[Senate Hearing 109-769]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-769
THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 15, 2006
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 1
Rice, Hon. Condoleezza, Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
prepared statement............................................. 55
Responses of Secretary Rice to questions submitted by the
following Senators:
George Allen................................................. 73
Joseph Biden................................................. 56
Barbara Boxer................................................ 74
Lincoln Chafee............................................... 90
Russell Feingold............................................. 75
Chuck Hagel.................................................. 95
Richard Lugar................................................ 101
Mel Martinez................................................. 82
Paul Sarbanes................................................ 86
John Sununu.................................................. 124
George Voinovich............................................. 129
ABC News Poll: Life in Afghanistan, December 7, 2005............. 133
(iii)
THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman,
Alexander, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry,
Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Secretary Rice will be with us in a few moments. She is en
route presently. Because we have a very restricted time period
today, from 9:45 to 11:45, we're going to try to utilize each
minute so that we will have maximum fairness to each one of our
members who may have questions and dialog with the Secretary.
Let me mention that, at a point in which a quorum of the
committee is present--that is, 10 members--at a convenient
point, and with the cooperation of the distinguished ranking
member, Senator Biden, we will pause for a short business
meeting of the committee. We have a substantial list of Foreign
Service officers. We have a number of ambassadors who have been
heard in subcommittee or full committee meetings, as well as
State Department persons. We will try to gain confirmation of
those, at least in the committee, and send those to the floor.
In the interest of attempting to expedite the hearing, I
have a substantial opening statement, which greets the
Secretary, points out the difficulties that both the Secretary
and Congress have had in getting the support that we need for
our State Department for foreign assistance, and for our other
foreign policy objectives. It is important that we formulate
strategies to work effectively together in those endeavors. I
will submit that statement for the record and may refer to it
in my time of questioning.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator From Indiana
Today the Foreign Relations Committee welcomes Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice. We greet her as the President's spokesperson on world
affairs and the chief architect of U.S. foreign policy. We have many
questions for her pertaining to a wide variety of foreign policy
issues, including the Bush administration's plans for making further
progress in Iraq and Afghanistan; the status of negotiations pertaining
to Iran, North Korea, and the Arab-Israeli peace process; and her
assessment of the State Department's budget.
This is the first international affairs budget that has been
developed under Secretary Rice's guiding hand. This budget should be
seen as the civilian counterpart to our military budget. The missions
and objectives funded by the international affairs budget must be
strengthened if we are to secure America's future. Secretary Rice's
call for ``transformational diplomacy'' is evidence that she agrees.
This budget includes a welcome increase, but recent history suggests
that the full request may not survive the congressional budget process
without vigorous and ongoing dialog between the executive and
congressional branches.
Last year, Congress slashed the President's international affairs
request by $2.1 billion--or about 6 percent. The year before that,
Congress cut the request by a comparable amount. Thus, for two
consecutive years, Congress has refused to give the President what he
says he needs to address global challenges through nonmilitary means.
Much criticism of administration policy in the war on terrorism is
leveled on the Senate floor and in various congressional committees,
but the Congress itself is limiting the number of people and programs
that could be activated to address terrorism, weapons proliferation,
energy dependence, avian flu, religious extremism, and innumerable
other threats. None of these national security challenges can be
overcome purely through unilateral policy choices or through military
action. We are dependent on other nations to help us respond to these
threats so that individual Americans can enjoy the security they need
to get an education, build a career, raise families, save a nest egg,
and live fulfilling lives. We cannot fully succeed in this fundamental
mission, unless the programs and people funded by this budget succeed.
The Bush administration deserves praise for its international
affairs budget submissions. President Bush and Secretary Powell
reversed the downward spiral in U.S. foreign policy capabilities that
was imposed during the 1990s. In that decade, both Congress and the
executive branch rushed to cash in on the peace dividend. The defense
budget was cut substantially, but in percentage terms, the much smaller
foreign affairs budget suffered even more. During the 6-year period
from 1992 to 1998, the 150 Account was cut every single year. As a
percentage of GDP, this 6-year slide represented a 38-percent decrease
in foreign affairs programs.
In the post-cold-war days, cutting the 150 Account seemed logical
to many. But by the time we confronted the tragedy of September 11,
2001, many of our foreign policy capabilities were in disrepair. In
2001 the share of the U.S. budget devoted to the international affairs
account was barely above its post-World War II low and only about half
of its share in the mid-1980s. Embassy security upgrades were behind
schedule, we lacked adequate numbers of diplomats with key language
skills, many important overseas posts were filled by junior Foreign
Service officers, we possessed little civilian post-conflict
stabilization and reconstruction capacity, and our public diplomacy was
dismal. Our diplomatic capabilities have made progress under President
Bush, but much work is left to be done.
Given Congress's actions during the last 2 years, one might begin
this hearing by asking an obvious question: Namely, what $2 billion in
this budget submission does the administration prefer to be cut? But I
believe that Secretary Rice genuinely wants to devote every dollar of
the request to aggressively safeguarding America's future. So instead,
I would like Secretary Rice to explain in her remarks what the
President and his administration will do to guarantee that Congress
preserves this request and approves the supplemental funding for the
150 Account that we hear will be requested soon.
What will the Commander in Chief do--in an era that members of his
administration are describing as the ``long war''--to ensure that he
has the civilian tools to fight that war? What will he do to ensure
that we have sufficient funding to build secure embassies for American
workers and travelers, to deny terrorists any hope of official
documentation to enter this country, to work with foreign partners to
track down terrorists overseas, and to secure dangerous weapons
wherever they are found?
I would cite one episode to illustrate the difficult atmosphere in
Congress with respect to the international affairs budget. During last
year's budget resolution, an amendment was offered in the early stages
of consideration to shift $410 million from the 150 Account to another
priority. The amendment passed virtually without dissent, 96 to 4. The
four Senators who voted against the cut to the 150 Account were members
of this committee.
This lopsided defeat occurred despite the fact that 44 Senators had
signed a letter to President Bush shortly before strongly urging ``a
robust increase'' in the international affairs budget. Even the
Senators who had organized the letter voted against the 150 Account in
this first challenge to it. I do not question the judgment of the 96
Senators who voted for the amendment. The account to which the money
was transferred was a compelling priority. But we must recognize that
the budget is full of compelling priorities, and historically, foreign
affairs spending has been a prime target for offsetting increases
elsewhere.
Even today, when we are in the midst of a global struggle of
information and ideas, when anti-Western riots can be set off by the
publication of a cartoon; when we are in the midst of a crisis in Iran
that will decide whether the nonproliferation regime of the last half
century will be abandoned; when we are soon to enter our fourth year of
attempting to stabilize Iraq; and when years of effort to move the
Arab-Israeli peace process are at risk--even then, the reservoir of
support for international spending in Congress is shallow. Members of
Congress may recognize the value of the work done by the State
Department and some selected programs may be popular, but the 150
Account seldom will be defended against competing priorities.
Again, this year, 45 Senators have signed a letter to the President
asking for increases in the 150 Account. But Congress, left to its own
devices, is unlikely to give the President what he has requested. The
only way to achieve full funding of the request is for the President,
the Secretary of State, and other top officials to emphasize
unequivocally and repeatedly over the course of months that this is the
amount that we need to keep the country safe and to meet our
obligations. They must draw indisputable connections between this
funding and American national security.
To make a comparison, I recently interacted with the Department of
Defense on a program that they wanted to initiate. I received notes,
telephone calls, and visits from members of the Joint Chiefs, a
combatant commander and top civilian leadership at the Pentagon. With
this kind of legislative mobilization and willingness to explain their
requests, the Defense Department tends to succeed in debates on
spending and programmatic changes. We need a State Department with
similar determination, backed up by Presidential support.
This committee will soon hold a hearing to examine policy options
with respect to Iran. That nation's intransigence in the face of
growing international opposition points to a diplomatic showdown. We
should not underestimate the impact of an Iranian Government possessing
nuclear weapons. Beyond our concerns about what a hostile government
might do with such weapons, the development of an Iranian nuclear
capability could destabilize the Middle East and undercut the efficacy
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The administration has sought
a diplomatic solution to the problem working through allies and the
United Nations Security Council.
At the U.N. Security Council last week, I told that body: ``If Iran
does not comply with U.N. resolutions and arms agreements, the Security
Council must apply strict and enforceable sanctions. Failure to do so
will severely damage the credibility of a painstaking diplomatic
approach and call into question the world's commitment to controlling
the spread of nuclear weapons.'' I am particularly interested in
hearing from the Secretary if the administration has a set of sanctions
in mind that it believes would alter Iranian behavior. I believe that
we must think two or three steps beyond the question of whether we can
obtain an original positive vote in the Security Council.
Similarly, we are interested in your views on Iraq. Last week, this
committee held a hearing on the efforts to stabilize and reconstruct
Iraq, which revealed some progress, but also some troubling
deficiencies. The State Department is now the lead executive branch
agency in charge of stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq. As the
administration asks for additional funding for Iraq reconstruction, we
must continue to make certain that funds are being spent efficiently
and according to a clear set of priorities.
We are also eager to listen to your views on the Arab-Israeli peace
process in the wake of the election of Hamas. We applaud the personal
efforts you have made to preserve and advance the peace process.
I want to commend your work to develop a more efficient and
coordinated U.S. Government foreign assistance strategy. Your decision
to name Randy Tobias as the USAID Administrator and your advisor on
developing a new, comprehensive approach to foreign assistance is
welcome, and we are looking forward to his confirmation hearing.
Another area where your leadership is particularly appreciated is
your support for the State Department's Office of Reconstruction and
Stabilization and your decision to dedicate 15 of the 100 newly
requested State Department positions to that Office. As you know,
Senator Biden and I initiated conversations back in 2003 about this gap
in the Department's capability. It was clear to us that the State
Department and USAID needed to develop an ability to mobilize quickly
in post-conflict situations. I hope that you will create the Active-
Duty component of the response corps that we envisioned in our
legislation. We should work together to make certain that both the $75
million conflict response fund and a robust operations budget is funded
for this purpose.
Madame Secretary, it is a pleasure to have you with us today. We
look forward to your insights on these matters and to the chance to
engage you in a dialog on the administration's global strategic vision.
The Chairman. I will then, turn now to the distinguished
ranking member, Senator Biden, for his opening statement,
following which we're hopeful that the Secretary will be able
to give her statement, and then we will proceed with a question
period, starting with a round of 5 minutes for each member,
moving around the table from one side of the aisle to the
other. Hopefully we will have an excellent opportunity to
explore all of our major issues.
It's a privilege, as always, to have the Secretary of
State. We look forward to this hearing. We thank her for
accommodating the schedule to Congress, which made it necessary
to postpone the hearing yesterday due to rollcall votes on the
floor.
I turn now to my distinguished friend, Senator Biden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR
FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have a longer statement that I'll submit for the record,
and I will repeat some of this in my questioning to the
Secretary.
But one of the things that I'd like to speak to the
Secretary about today is the overall rationale for this
administration's foreign policy. Four years ago, they announced
that the ``axis of evil'' had to be dealt with, they talked
about Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Korea now has the capacity to have
at least four times as many nuclear weapons as they had before.
We say that they cannot be a nuclear state, when, in fact, they
are. They are a nuclear state, and we seem to be living with
it. What are we going to do about it?
With regard to Iran, there was, I think, a paralysis for
about 4 years on Iranian policy, but now I want to talk to the
Secretary. I think the administration has gotten the policy on
track here, in terms of working with the rest of the world to
attempt to isolate and thwart the aspirations of the present
Iranian Government toward acquiring nuclear capability, or
nuclear weapons capability.
And in Iraq the question is, Are we going to leave behind a
nation more stable than we found it when we went in? We had a
very damaging, I thought, report by the inspector general about
the status of our reconstruction efforts in Iraq in every
measurable indicia of progress--oil, potable water, sewage, et
cetera. We are way behind. And we're actually at prewar levels
for the Iraqi people. And it's clear to me that we're going to
substantially draw down the American forces. It's clear to me
we're going to be below a hundred thousand, by the end of this
year; and at the end of 2007, significantly lower. And as you
and I have talked, and many of us have talked about it, there's
a need to galvanize international pressure on Iraqi leaders to
actually come up with a consensus government. I'm not hopeful,
based upon the deal made, apparently, with Jaafari and Sadr.
I'm not hopeful. And so, I'd like to talk about that a little
bit, because the policy seems not to be succeeding.
And I'd also want to talk about the policy of elections. I
think this administration is enamored with elections, and
confuses them with democracy. Elections a democracy doesn't
make. Democracies cannot come to fruition without elections,
but you need the infrastructure for democracy. And we've not
done all that well in the elections that have been held.
And in Lebanon, Hezbollah gains a democratic, ``foothold.''
We all know what happened in Israel with Hamas, a difficult
problem to deal with. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood. In Iraq
the elections clearly went toward a clerical pro-Iranian tilt.
Where does that go? So, I want to talk about that.
I also want to mention the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11
Commission has given pretty bad grades here.
And I see the Secretary is here now. Madam Secretary, we
weren't being disrespectful; we're trying to save your time by
us doing our opening statements----
Secretary Rice. I apologize.
Senator Biden [continuing]. In your absence. And we'll
repeat some of this in questioning.
And I also want to talk, Mr. Chairman, a little bit about
Darfur. It is good news the United Nations has taken the step
it has, but, quite frankly, in the interim an awful lot of
people are going to die. And I firmly believe the United States
should lead the way in NATO to provide a small NATO protection
force and a NATO-enforced no-fly zone to bridge the U.S.
mission.
And, last, I want to commend the Secretary for thinking
creatively with her proposal on the Foreign Service and
coordination of foreign assistance programs. And I'd like to
speak about that a little bit.
But my entire statement I'd like to be placed in the
record, if I may, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
Senator Biden. And I thank you for holding this hearing. I
thank the Secretary for accommodating our schedule from
yesterday.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
Madam Secretary, welcome back to the committee.
Four years ago, the President warned that we confronted a dangerous
axis of evil in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and that by seeking
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes presented a ``grave and
growing danger.''
Today, two members of the axis of evil--Iran and North Korea--pose
an even greater threat to our security than they did 4 years ago, and
in the third, Iraq, we risk trading a dictator for chaos.
We continue to have a great debate about Iraq. But we can all agree
that an unstable Iraq is not in our interests.
The drawdown of American troops is already underway--I believe we
will be down to 100,000 Americans by the end of this year, and half
that number by the end of 2007.
The critical question now is whether we will leave Iraq with our
security interests intact. The answer will depend on our success in
three areas:
First, we must galvanize international pressure on Iraq's political
leaders to form an inclusive government and agree to a consensus
constitution.
Second, we must provide Iraqi security forces with the leadership,
training, equipment, and logistical capabilities to operate on their
own. We have made progress, but there is still a long way to go.
Third, we must develop Iraq's governing capacity and ability to
deliver basic services.
Last week, we heard a dismal report on the current state of Iraq's
infrastructure. By just about every critical measure--electricity,
drinkable water, sewage treatment, and oil production--Iraq is worse
off today than before the war. Unless these shortfalls are addressed,
they will continue to fuel the insurgency.
Perhaps the gravest danger to our security lies in Iran. If the
world does not dissuade Iran from producing fissile material, or
developing the capacity to produce that material, then an extremist
government that actively supports international terrorism will gain a
nuclear weapons capability.
Four years of policy paralysis in Washington during the first term
did nothing to stop Iran's program. I commend you for the last year of
determined diplomacy, which has led to a broad coalition of support for
reporting Iran to the U.N. Security Council.
But that was the easy part. Now the world must take more tangible
action to show Iran how isolated it will be unless it reduces its
nuclear ambitions.
The world must also convince the Iranian people that a nuclear
weapons capability is not in Iran's national security interest. I urge
the executive branch to conduct careful studies of possible sanctions--
and their impact--that could be implemented against Iran. It is equally
vital for the administration to prepare the American people for some
level of sacrifice in order to maintain economic pressure on Iran.
The administration has stated that ``The United States is not
prepared to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea.'' I don't know what
that means, as most experts believe North Korea already has nuclear
weapons, and that it probably increased its arsenal from one to two
weapons to as many as 10 over the past 5 years.
I do know this: Big nations should not bluff. And by any measure we
are currently tolerating a nuclear North Korea.
The United States is not to blame for North Korea's intransigence.
But the lack of urgency and attention given to this problem is
troubling.
In December, the 9/11 Commissioners issued their latest report card
on the Government's efforts to implement its recommendations. On the
areas where the State Department has responsibility, Madam Secretary,
it did not make the Dean's List.
The Commissioners gave out several ``Ds''--including on the issue
of making a maximum effort to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons
of mass destruction, our policy on Saudi Arabia, and certain public
diplomacy efforts.
I am not surprised by this dismal rating--for years, this
administration has underfunded critical nonproliferation programs and
failed to cut through redtape with Russia.
The recent victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections is further
evidence that elections do not a democracy make. Indeed, the recent
string of strong showings by Islamists in the Middle East--Hamas, the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, religious parties in Iraq, and Hezbollah
in Lebanon--remind us that elections can produce distorted outcomes
when there is not equal emphasis on developing the institutions of
democracy, such as political parties, a civil society, a free press,
and the rule of law.
Hamas's victory casts a pall on the future of the peace process.
Israel cannot be expected to negotiate with a party that calls for its
destruction, engages in terrorism, and maintains an armed militia.
Unless Hamas changes it stripes, we must build international
support to isolate it.
I remain concerned by the inadequate response to the tragedy in
Darfur. The initiative to establish a U.N. force for Darfur is welcome.
But it will take up to a year to deploy such a force. In the meantime,
thousands more will suffer from genocidal acts. The United States
should lead the way in NATO to provide for a small NATO protection
force--and a NATO-enforced no-fly zone--as a bridge to the U.N.
mission.
Finally, let me commend you for thinking creatively with your
proposals on the Foreign Service and coordination of foreign assistance
programs. We still don't know all the details of these proposals, but
we look forward to working with you to develop them in the months
ahead.
The Chairman. Indeed. And we greet you, Secretary Rice. We
thank you very much for making it possible for us to conduct
this hearing today, because your presence is the essential
element.
I've submitted my opening statement for the record. Senator
Biden has summarized his, and it's a part of the record. As I
have mentioned earlier, I'm hopeful that staff members will
inform Senators as they are coming in, that we have a very
important promotion list, as well as nominees to the State
Department, and ambassadorships. At a time that we get a
quorum, we will have a short business meeting, and hopefully do
business which will be helpful to you and to American diplomacy
in the process.
But we're delighted that you're here, and honored. I have
informed all of us that our hearing must end at 11:45;
therefore, we'll adopt a 5-minute question period so that
members, hopefully, on both sides of the aisle, can be
accommodated.
It's a privilege to recognize you, Secretary Rice.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Biden, Senator Hagel, other Senators. Thank you very much for
giving me the opportunity to address you.
I have a longer written statement, which I would like to
enter into the record, but I will not go through that
statement, so that we can maximize time for questions.
Mr. Chairman, it's been a little over a year since I was
confirmed by this committee as Secretary of State, and
obviously a lot has happened in that year.
The President's budget this year is in support of a foreign
policy that is devoted to the creation of a more hospitable
environment for the forward march of freedom and democracy.
Democratic processes must be supported around the world. These
are transitional periods in some part of the world--some parts
of the world, like the Middle East. And the democratic
transitions are, indeed, difficult. But people have to have
their voice, and the United States must stand for a principle
that democratic processes, no matter how difficult, are always
preferable to the false stability of a dictatorship.
You will notice that this year the President is requesting
funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, where young democracies are
trying to make their way toward stability. I will talk later,
perhaps in questions, about developments in the Middle East; in
particular, the Palestinian elections. And let me just say that
the United States does want to congratulate the Palestinian
people on having held an election that was largely free of
violence and largely believed to be free and fair. The
Palestinian people voted for change. We believe that they voted
for change against long-term corrupt practices that have made
their lives difficult and their progress difficult. What has
not changed is the Palestinian people's desire to have a freer
and a better life. And, in that regard, Hamas, which won that
election, now has both an obligation and a choice to fulfill
the Palestinian people's desire for a better life. That better
life can only be achieved in a peaceful environment, which can
only be achieved with a two-state solution. And so, Hamas is
being confronted with a choice by the international community.
I think the Quartet statement speaks to that choice, that Hamas
must recognize the right of Israel to exist; disarm as a
militia; and renounce violence. Because only under those
circumstances can there be true international support for the
next Palestinian Government.
We recognize, also, that other major challenges have arisen
this year. In particular, I would like to speak briefly to the
Iranian problem, the Iranian regime, with its destabilizing
policies throughout the region, policies that support terrorism
and violent extremism. The Iranian regime uses those tools to
further ideological ambitions and policies that are, frankly, a
challenge to the kind of Middle East that I think we would all
like to see, one of tolerance, one of democracy. The United
States will actively confront the aggressive policies of this
Iranian regime. And, at the same time, we are going to work to
support the aspirations of the Iranian people for freedom in
their own country.
The Iranian regime is now deepening its own international
isolation through toxic statements and confrontational
behavior, most especially in its pursuit of nuclear weapons and
pursuit of policies that are now being roundly condemned by the
international community.
Mr. Chairman, I think it's fair to note that no one wants
to deny the Iranian people or the Iranian nation civil nuclear
power. Many different options have been put before Iran. They
have chosen to isolate themselves instead. In a year of
peaceful and patient efforts, the United States has broadened
the diplomatic consensus on the threat posed by Iran's nuclear
program. We have successfully convinced Russia and China and
India and Brazil and Egypt and many others to send the issue to
the U.N. Security Council. The community of nations is, as I
said, not debating whether Iran should have civil nuclear
power, but how to safely do so without a proliferation risk.
We must now expand the international consensus on the
Iranian regime's nuclear ambitions to address the full scope of
its threatening policies. In conjunction with our multilateral
diplomacy, the United States will develop sensible measures,
security measures, including looking further at our
Proliferation Security Initiative and those who cooperate with
us to try and deny, to regimes like Iran, North Korea, and
others, the materials for covert programs that threaten the
international system.
At the same time, we are going to begin a new effort to
support the aspirations of the Iranian people. I want to thank
the Congress for giving us $10 million to support the cause of
freedom and human rights in Iran this year. We will use this
money to develop support networks for Iranian reformers,
political dissidents, and human rights activists.
We also plan to request $75 million in supplemental funding
for the fiscal year 2006 to support democracy in Iran. That
money would enable us to increase our support for democracy and
improve our radio broadcasting, begin satellite television
broadcasts, increase the contacts between our peoples through
expanded fellowships and scholarships for Iranian students, and
to bolster our public diplomacy efforts.
In addition, I will be notifying that we plan to reprogram
funds in 2007 to support the democratic aspirations of the
Iranian people.
Now, I'm sure that the members of the committee know that
going forward with this effort requires that we remove
obstacles that hinder our ability to support those courageous
Iranians working for their country's freedom, so we are working
with the Treasury Department to overcome U.S. regulatory
restrictions to allow the U.S. Government to make grants to
nongovernmental organizations for democracy promotion
activities in Iran.
We want to expand our educational exchanges with the young
people of Iran who have never experienced democracy. In the
1970s, 200,000 Iranians studied in the United States. That
figure is 2,000 today. We must change this. And we will. And
we're beginning a new effort to dramatically increase the
number of Iranians who can come to study in America, the number
of Iranian professionals who wish to visit. I've said, on a
number of occasions, that I've read that it is forbidden in
some quarters to play Beethoven and Mozart in Tehran. We hope
that Iranians can play it in New York or in Los Angeles.
Finally, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that Senator Biden
kindly mentioned the efforts that we're making in the
Department to transform our workforce, to transform the men and
women--the skills and tools of the men and women--of the State
Department who must lead our transformational diplomacy. We
have repositioned 100 Foreign Service and other positions--
there will be more--because we feel that the presence needs to
match the global challenges.
We have also undertaken, within the limits of my authority,
a reform of foreign assistance so that we can get better
alignment between USAID and State, so that we can be better
stewards of the American people's money.
I want to be very clear that America will always care for,
and will always try to serve, the most vulnerable populations
with humanitarian assistance and with help for child welfare
and with assistance to disaster relief, when necessary. It is
also our goal to make our foreign assistance something that is
not permanent for countries as they transition to well-managed
countries that fight corruption, that govern wisely, that make
investments in their people. And so, one of our goals is to
make certain that we are serving, also, the objective of the
creation of well-governed democratic states that, on their own,
can attract foreign investment, attract trade, and begin to
move away from foreign assistance.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I'm now happy to
take questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Department
of State, Washington, DC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I appreciate
this opportunity to address the committee and to talk about America's
role in meeting the unprecedented challenges of our world today. I look
forward to working closely with Congress to ensure that America's
diplomacy has the necessary resources to secure our interests, advance
our ideals, and improve people's lives around the world. In all of
these mutual efforts, of course, we must remain committed to our
responsibility to be good stewards of the American taxpayers' hard-
earned dollars.
The President's FY 2007 International Affairs Budget for the
Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies totals
$35.1 billion. President Bush also plans to request supplemental
funding to support emergency, one-time programs that are essential to
the success of some of our highest foreign policy priorities.
This money will do more than support our diplomacy; it will
strengthen our national security. America today is a nation at war. We
are engaged in a long conflict against terrorists and violent
extremists. Across the world, the members of our Foreign Service, Civil
Service, and our Foreign Service Nationals are advancing America's
diplomatic mission, often working in dangerous places far away from
their friends and loved ones. Our Nation's men and women in uniform are
also shouldering great risks and responsibilities. They are performing
with courage and heroism, and many have made the ultimate sacrifice to
secure our way of life. Today, I want to recognize these courageous
public servants and their families, who endure long periods of service
abroad and painful separation with fortitude.
America's enemies remain eager to strike us again, but our actions
in the past 4 years have weakened their capability. Our diplomacy plays
a vital role in defeating this threat. We are building partnerships
with traditional allies and with new partners that share our perception
of the threat. Most importantly, we are working directly with foreign
citizens who wish to build thriving free societies that replace hatred
with hope.
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to offer an overview of the current
mission of the men and women of the State Department--a mission that we
have called transformational diplomacy.
A NEW DIPLOMACY FOR A TRANSFORMED WORLD
In his second inaugural address, President Bush laid out the vision
that leads America into the world: ``It is the policy of the United
States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and
institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of
ending tyranny in our world.''
The President's vision stems from the recognition that we are
living in an extraordinary time, one in which centuries of
international precedent are being overturned. The prospect of violent
conflict among great powers is more remote than ever. States are
increasingly competing and cooperating in peace, not preparing for war.
Peoples in China, India, South Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil are
lifting their countries and regions to new prominence. Democratic
reform has begun in the Middle East. And the United States is working
with our democratic partners in every region of the world, especially
our hemispheric neighbors and our historic treaty allies in Europe and
Asia, to build a true form of global stability: A balance of power that
favors freedom.
At the same time, other challenges have assumed new urgency. The
greatest threats today emerge more within states than between them, and
the fundamental character of regimes matters more than the
international distribution of power. It is impossible to draw neat,
clear lines between our security interests, our development goals, and
our democratic ideals in today's world. Our diplomacy must integrate
and advance all of these goals together.
So I would define the objective of transformational diplomacy this
way: To work with our many partners around the world to build and
sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs
of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international
system. This is a strategy rooted in partnership, not paternalism--in
doing things with other people, not for them. We will use America's
diplomatic power and our foreign assistance to help foreign citizens
better their own lives, build their own nations, transform their own
futures, and work with us to combat threats to our common security,
including the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
PRACTICING TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY
Faced with such extraordinary challenges, we must transform old
diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes, and we must
empower our people to practice transformational diplomacy. With the
generous support of the Congress, my good friend and predecessor, Colin
Powell, brought American diplomacy into the 21st century. Now, my
leadership team and I are building on this strong foundation and
beginning the generational work of transforming the State Department.
This will not only strengthen national security, it will improve our
fiscal stewardship. We are committed to using American taxpayers'
dollars in the most effective and responsible way possible to
strengthen America's mission abroad.
In the past year, we have begun making changes to our organization
and our operations that will enable us to advance transformational
diplomacy. We are forward-deploying our people to the cities,
countries, and regions where they are needed most. We are starting to
move hundreds of diplomats from Europe and Washington to strategic
countries like China, India, South Africa, and Indonesia. We are giving
more of our people new training and language skills to engage more
effectively with foreign peoples. We are enabling our diplomats to work
more jointly with America's service men and women. And I have announced
that I am creating a new position of Director of Foreign Assistance.
This reform will transform our capability to use foreign assistance
more efficiently and more effectively to further our foreign policy
goals, to bolster our national security, to reduce poverty, and to
improve people's lives around the world.
We are making the initial changes using our existing authority, and
the additional funding we are requesting in the FY 2007 budget will
help us continue implementing our vision to transform the State
Department to meet the challenges of the 21st century. For this
purpose, we are requesting $9.3 billion for State Department
operations.
Transformational diplomacy begins with our people--ensuring that
they are in the right places, with the necessary tools and training to
carry out their mission. We are requesting $23 million for 100 new
positions on the new frontlines of our diplomacy: Key transitional
countries and emerging regional leaders in Africa, Latin America, the
Middle East, and Asia. These new positions will complement the 100 that
we are already repositioning as part of our ongoing effort to change
our global diplomatic posture. This repositioning effort will require a
renewed commitment to secure and modernize our many posts overseas, and
we are seeking $1.5 billion for security-related construction and
rehabilitation of our diplomatic facilities.
In addition to requesting new positions, we will continue to invest
in our people, our greatest resource. More and more, we are calling
upon our diplomats to leave their families and serve at unaccompanied
``hardship posts'' that now make up 20 percent of our yearly overseas
assignments. With your help, as part of our effort to modernize the
Foreign Service, we will institute a new pay-for-performance system
that fairly compensates our men and women working abroad. We will also
further our efforts to train America's diplomats to speak critical
languages like Chinese, Urdu, and Arabic, which they will increasingly
need, in addition to more traditional languages, as they progress in
their careers. New training will also make full use of dynamic new
technologies, and we are asking for $276 million to integrate our
workforce with the latest information technology and to support
professional training needed for success.
These new tools and training will better enable our Nation's
diplomats to tell America's story to the people of the world, and in
turn, to listen to the stories they have to tell. We have heard the
legitimate criticisms that have been made of our public diplomacy, and
we are rethinking how we do business. I have stressed that public
diplomacy is the responsibility of every single member of our
diplomatic corps, not just our public diplomacy specialists. One idea
we are beginning to implement is the creation of forward-deployed,
regional public diplomacy centers. These centers, or media hubs, will
be small, lean operations that work out of our embassies or other
existing facilities, enabling us to respond quickly to negative
propaganda, to correct misinformation, and to explain America's
policies and our principles. The $351 million that we seek will be
essential for us to continue revitalizing our public diplomacy.
To complement our public diplomacy, we must ensure that America
remains a welcoming place for all tourists, students, and
businesspeople, while at the same time protecting our homeland from
terrorists and criminals who would exploit our open society to do us
harm. The State Department, in partnership with the Department of
Homeland Security, has taken new steps in the past year to realize the
President's vision of secure borders and open doors through information
technology. Our request of $1.1 billion will fund the Border Security
Program and enable us to hire 135 new consular officers and passport
staff to meet the growing demand of foreign citizens seeking to travel
to America, while maintaining our fundamental commitment to serve each
and every American citizen when they go abroad. At the same time, we
are seeking $474 million to support our educational and cultural
exchanges, which increase mutual understanding between our citizens and
the peoples of the world.
Finally, we must continue to enable our Nation's diplomats to work
effectively with their partners in the United Nations and other
international organizations. We seek $1.6 billion to fund U.S. assessed
and voluntary contributions to international organizations. The United
States takes our international obligations seriously, and we remain
committed to strengthening the financial stability, efficiency, and
effectiveness of international organizations.
DEFEATING TERROR AND ADVANCING LIBERTY
The President's FY 2007 budget will help prepare the men and women
of the State Department to meet the goals of transformational
diplomacy. Our principal objectives are to stem the tide of terrorism
and to help advance freedom and democratic rights.
We are requesting $6.2 billion to strengthen the coalition partners
who are standing shoulder to shoulder with us on the front lines in the
fight against terrorism. Our assistance empowers our partners to
practice more effective law enforcement, police their borders, gather
and share essential intelligence, and wage more successful
counterterrorism operations. In many states, our assistance will also
help to bolster thriving democratic and economic institutions reducing
the societal schisms that terrorists exploit for their own ideological
purposes. Our FY 2007 request includes, among others, $739 million for
Pakistan, $560 million for Colombia, $154 million for Indonesia, $457
million for Jordan, and $335 million for Kenya.
Essential to winning the war on terrorism is denying our enemies
the weapons of mass destruction that they seek. Our diplomacy cannot
focus on nonproliferation alone; we must also develop new tools and new
policies of counterproliferation: Actively confronting and rolling up
the global networks involving rogue states, outlaw scientists, and
black-market middlemen who make proliferation possible. We are building
on the achievements of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8
Global Partnership, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. We are
working to stop Iran and North Korea from succeeding in their quest for
weapons of mass destruction, and we continue to do everything in our
power to deny terrorists access to the world's most dangerous weapons,
including threatening conventional weapons like MANPADS. The FY 2007
budget proposes to increase funding for our State Department's efforts
to help countries fight the proliferation of dangerous weapons and
materials.
These requirements are essential and immediate, but our vision must
look beyond present horizons. To defeat the threat of terrorism, we
must work to build a future of freedom and hope. As President Bush has
said, in the long run, liberty and democracy are the only ideas
powerful enough to defeat the ideology of hatred and violence. Freedom
is on the march today all around the world, and the United States must
continue to open a path for its expansion, especially in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
In December, over 12 million Iraqi people voted in free elections
for a democratic government based on a constitution that Iraqis
themselves wrote and adopted. Through their actions, the overwhelming
majority of Iraqis are demonstrating that they support freedom and
oppose terrorism. The democratic government that is taking shape in
Baghdad today should support human rights, foster new opportunities for
prosperity, and give all Iraqis a stake in a free and peaceful future.
It should separate stalwart Iraqis from the purveyors of terror and
chaos. Iraq is on a track of transformation from brutal tyranny to a
self-reliant emerging democracy that is working to better the lives of
its people and defeat violent extremists.
Although Iraqis are undertaking this work themselves, international
assistance remains essential to Iraq's success. United States
assistance is helping Iraqis to build their security capabilities,
empowering civil society and democratic institutions, increasing and
improving the production and availability of electricity, distributing
millions of new textbooks, providing access to clean water for millions
of Iraqis, and helping protect millions of Iraqi children from disease.
The President's request of $771 million, along with the forthcoming
supplemental request, is an essential part of our National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq. The funding for the Department's operations and
programs is a critical counterpart to the efforts of our troops in the
field as we pursue our integrated security, economic, and political
tracks to success in Iraq. The supplemental request will fund programs
that are integral to our counterinsurgency campaign and to the
operating and security costs of our diplomatic mission, while the FY
2007 request supports capacity development essential for Iraq's
transition to self-reliance. The money requested by State will allow us
to work effectively with our Iraqi partners to advance our strategy of
``Clear, Hold, Build''--clearing areas of insurgent control, holding
newly gained territory under the legitimate authority of the Iraqi
Government, and building economic infrastructure and capable national
democratic institutions that are essential to Iraq's success.
Our work also continues in Afghanistan. After the United States,
along with our allies and friends, removed the Taliban regime, the
Afghan people set out to liberate themselves. They did so with the
international community by their side. And today, the Afghan people
have achieved the ambitious vision that we all set together 4 years ago
in Bonn, Germany: A fully functioning, sovereign Afghan Government.
This government was established through successful Presidential and
parliamentary elections, in which millions of men and women voted
freely for the first time. Today, Afghanistan has a democratic
constitution; an emerging free economy; and a growing, multiethnic army
that is the pride of the Afghan people.
Despite this dramatic progress, there is still much hard work to be
done. President Bush's request of $1.1 billion for Afghan
reconstruction, along with supplemental funding to be requested, will
allow us to continue helping the people of Afghanistan meet the
remaining political, economic, and security challenges they face. With
your continued support, along with help from NATO, the United Nations,
and all other contributors from the international community, we can
help the Afghan people complete their long journey toward a future of
hope and freedom.
The people of Iraq and Afghanistan are helping to lead the
transformation of the Broader Middle East from despotism to democracy.
This is a generational challenge, in which elections are an important
and necessary beginning. The freedom to choose invests citizens in the
future of their countries. But as President Bush has said, one election
does not establish a country as a democracy. Successful democracies are
characterized by transparent, accountable institutions of governance; a
thriving civil society that respects and protects minority rights; a
free media; opportunities for health and education for all citizens;
and the official renunciation of terrorism and ideologies of hatred. On
this last point especially, we will continue to insist that the leaders
of Hamas must recognize Israel, disarm, reject terrorism, and work for
lasting peace. Helping the nations of the Broader Middle East to make
progress in building the foundations of democratic societies is the
mission of the Middle East Partnership Initiative, for which we are
seeking $120 million. We are also requesting $80 million for the
National Endowment for Democracy to continue its good work in promoting
lasting democratic change all around the world.
The progress of the Broader Middle East is hopeful, but it still
faces determined enemies, especially the radical regime in Tehran. Iran
is a strategic challenge to the United States, and we have a
comprehensive view of the threat that Iran poses. The regime is seeking
to develop nuclear weapons. It is a leading state sponsor of terrorism.
It is working to destabilize its region and to advance its ideological
ambitions. And the Iranian Government oppresses its own people, denying
them basic liberties and human rights. Through its aggressive and
confrontational behavior, Iran is increasingly isolating itself from
the international community.
In recent months, U.S. diplomacy has broadened the international
coalition to address Iran's nuclear ambitions, and Iran's case will
soon be heard in the U.N. Security Council. Our goal now is to broaden
this coalition even further, to intensify the international spotlight
and encourage our many international partners to respond to the full
spectrum of threats that the Iranian regime poses.
For our part, the United States wishes to reach out to the Iranian
people and support their desire to realize their own freedom and to
secure their own democratic and human rights. The Iranian people should
know that the United States fully supports their aspirations for a
freer, better future. Over the past 2 years, the Department of State
has invested over $4 million in projects that empower Iranian citizens
in their call for political and economic liberty, freedom of speech,
and respect for human rights. We are funding programs that train labor
activists and help protect them from government persecution. We are
working with international NGOs to develop a support network for
Iranian reformers, political dissidents, and human rights activists. We
will devote at least $10 million to support these and other programs
during this year (FY 2006), and we are eager to work more closely with
Congress to help Iranian reformers build nationwide networks to support
democratic change in their country.
MEETING GLOBAL CHALLENGES
Like terrorism and nuclear proliferation, many of the greatest
challenges in today's world are global and transnational in nature.
These threats breach even the most well-defended borders and affect all
nations. Today's global threats require global partnerships, and
America's diplomats are helping us transform our relationships with
countries that have the capacity and the will to work on a global basis
to achieve common purposes--countries like India, Japan, South Korea,
Australia, El Salvador, and our allies in Europe.
One major global threat comes from disease, especially the scourge
of HIV/AIDS. This pandemic affects key productive members of societies:
The individuals who drive economies, raise children, and pass on the
customs and traditions of their countries. The United States is
committed to treating people worldwide who suffer from AIDS because
conscience demands it, and also because a healthier world is a safer
world. The hallmark of our approach is the President's Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief. This program is the largest international initiative
ever by one nation to combat a single disease. The Emergency Plan
combines our strong bilateral programs with complementary multilateral
efforts to fight AIDS and other debilitating infectious diseases
through contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria, of which America is by far the largest contributor since
the program's inception.
The Emergency Plan is rooted in partnership. Our approach is to
empower each nation to take ownership of its own fight against HIV/AIDS
through prevention, treatment, and care. The results to date have been
remarkable. In the past 2 years, the Emergency Plan has expanded life-
extending antiretroviral treatment to 471,000 people worldwide, 400,000
of whom are located in sub-Saharan Africa. And as of last year, the
Emergency Plan has extended compassion and care to more than 1.2
million orphans and vulnerable children. The President's 2007 budget
requests $4 billion, $740 million more than this year, to continue
America's leadership in the global fight against HIV/AIDS.
The 2007 budget also includes $225 million to fight malaria, which
is a major killer of children in sub-Saharan Africa. This request is
part of the President's pledge to increase U.S. funding of malaria
prevention and treatment by more than $1.2 billion over 5 years. The
United States is committed to working with the international community
to increase preventive and curative programs in 15 African countries
with particularly high rates of infection by 2010. We seek to reduce
malaria deaths by 50 percent in these countries after 3 years of full
implementation.
The United States is also playing a key global role in preparing
for the threat of a possible avian influenza pandemic--providing
political leadership, technical expertise, and significant resources to
this effort. In September 2005, President Bush announced the
International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza. The
partnership, which includes 89 countries and 9 international
organizations, generates political momentum and coordinating action
among all partners. At the January 2006 International Pledging
Conference on Avian and Pandemic Influenza held in Beijing, the United
States pledged $334 million in current budget authority to protect
health in the United States and around the world. The most effective
way to protect the American population from an influenza outbreak is to
contain it beyond our borders. The 2007 budget provides resources to
continue these activities in countries already experiencing outbreaks
of influenza and in other countries on the cusp of infection.
Another key global challenge is to curtail the illicit drug trade
and to dissolve the relationships between narco-traffickers,
terrorists, and international criminal organizations. The 2007 budget
requests $722 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which
advances the President's goal of strengthening democracy, regional
stability, and economic development throughout the hemisphere. The
initiative provides funding for law enforcement, security programs, and
alternative livelihood assistance for those at risk from the trade of
illicit narcotics.
Finally, as we transform our diplomacy to meet the increasingly
global challenges of the 21st century, the United States remains
committed to putting the power of our compassion into action wherever
and whenever it is needed. In 2005, the United States led the world
with our generous emergency responses to people suffering from
unprecedented natural disasters--from the Indian Ocean tsunami, to the
earthquake in Pakistan, to the mudslides in Central America. Our swift
action has helped to provide relief, to prevent the spread of disease,
and to begin restoring livelihoods and rebuilding these devastated
regions. The United States remains the world's most generous provider
of food and other emergency humanitarian assistance. Throughout the
world, we are also helping refugees to return to their countries of
origin. When that is not a viable option, the United States leads the
international community in resettling refugees here in our Nation. The
FY 2007 request of $1.2 billion for humanitarian relief, plus $1.3
billion in food aid, will ensure that we are prepared to extend the
reach of American compassion anywhere in the world.
THREE GOALS OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
The United States will continue to build strong partnerships to
meet the global challenges that increasingly define international
security in the 21st century. But we recognize that many states cannot
meet the basic responsibilities of sovereignty, including just and
effective control over their own territory. In response, the United
States must assist the world's most vulnerable populations through our
transformational diplomacy--using our foreign assistance and working
with our partners to build state capacity where little exists, help
weak and poorly governed states to develop and reform, and empower
those states that are embracing political and economic freedom. These
are three main goals of our country assistance programs, with the
ultimate purpose being ``graduation'' from foreign economic and
governance assistance altogether. Vibrant private sectors in free,
well-governed states are the surest form of sustainable development.
Building state capacity
We must do all we can to anticipate and prevent the emergence of
failed states that lead to humanitarian crises, serious regional
instability, and havens for terror and oppression that threaten our
security. On September 11, we were attacked by terrorists who had
plotted and trained in a failed state: Afghanistan. Since then, we have
spent billions of dollars and sacrificed precious lives to eliminate
the threat and liberate the brutally repressed people of Afghanistan.
We must use all the tools and resources available not only to prevent
future failed states, but to help nations emerging from conflict and
war to become responsible, democratic states.
The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
was established to address complex and challenging situations around
the globe. Partnering with the international community, we will help
countries in crisis achieve a path to lasting peace, good governance,
and economic development. Working in conjunction with our lead regional
bureaus, our Reconstruction and Stabilization Office is already
beginning to advance this mission in the field. It deployed a team to
Sudan to assess the effectiveness of our assistance programs in
implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in negotiating a
political settlement in Darfur, in delivering humanitarian assistance,
and in establishing security. As a result of these assessments and
planning efforts, U.S. resources have been allocated more effectively
to help people in need in Sudan. Our office has also helped the Haitian
people take a decisive step toward a better future, pinpointing
problems with voter registration and the electoral council in time for
them to be remedied before last week's historic elections.
The 2007 budget proposes to strengthen this Office's ability to
lead U.S. planning efforts for countries and regions of most concern,
and to coordinate the deployment of U.S. resources when needed. The
budget proposes $75 million, including a Conflict Response Fund to
build our civilian response capabilities, to prevent failing states,
and to respond quickly and effectively to states emerging from conflict
around the world. With an early and effective civilian response, we can
reduce the need for a more robust and costly military commitment by
more quickly shifting responsibility for key functions to civilian
actors.
Our efforts to build state capacity continue in Sudan. The need for
security is of the utmost importance to this effort, and the
Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) points the way forward. The CPA, which
ended 22 years of North-South civil war in Sudan, is the framework for
resolution of conflict throughout Sudan. The CPA created a Government
of National Unity that shares power and wealth, and establishes
elections at every level by 2009.
Implementing the CPA is essential to ending the genocide in Darfur.
The United States is appalled by the ongoing atrocities that have
persisted in Darfur, and we continue to lead the ongoing international
effort to aid the region's displaced people, assisting over 1.8 million
internally displaced persons and over 200,000 Sudanese refugees in
Chad. I ask for your full support of the President's upcoming
supplemental request, which will include support for the African Union
and for transition to a U.N. peacekeeping mission to bring peace to
this war-torn area. We are requesting $1.1 billion in the FY 2007
budget to transition to peace in Sudan, meet humanitarian needs, lay
the foundations for economic development, and strengthen sustainable
democratic institutions.
We are also continuing to partner with the people of Haiti to
advance the cause of freedom and build lasting foundations of a
democratic state. Just last week, the people of Haiti held fair and
free elections. We now look forward to working with the citizens of
Haiti, their newly elected government, and the international community
to help Haiti chart a positive path of freedom and prosperity by
strengthening good governance, improving security and the rule of law,
fostering economic recovery, and addressing critical humanitarian
needs.
As is evident by the hard work and sacrifice of the U.N.
peacekeepers in Haiti, international peacekeeping missions carried out
by the United Nations and partner organizations are essential to
creating the secure conditions conducive for democratic elections and
basic state capacity. The $1.3 billion request for these efforts
worldwide is also crucial to facilitating the delivery of humanitarian
relief and providing a stable political and economic environment that
fosters democratic institutions and development. To continue to provide
well-trained, effective peacekeepers that understand and respect human
rights, I am requesting over $100 million for the third year of the
Global Peace Operations Initiative to train and equip 75,000 troops by
2010. Current missions and capacity-building efforts increase our
security at home and provide relief to the heroic troops in our own
Armed Forces.
Helping developing states and the most vulnerable populations
Where the basic foundations of security, governance, and economic
institutions exist, the United States is advancing bold development
goals. Under President Bush, the United States has embarked on the most
ambitious development agenda since the Marshall Plan, including a new
debt relief initiative, the doubling of Official Development Assistance
since taking office, and funding for the international financial
institutions that is linked to performance. Development is an integral
pillar of our foreign policy. In 2002, for the first time, the
President's National Security Strategy elevated development to the
level of diplomacy and defense, citing it as the third key component of
our national security. States that govern justly, invest in their
people, and create the conditions for individual and collective
prosperity are less likely to produce or harbor terrorists. American
diplomacy must advance these development principles.
U.S. development assistance focuses on building the tools for
democratic participation, promoting economic growth, providing for
health and education, and addressing security concerns in developing
nations, while at the same time responding to humanitarian disasters.
Such investments are crucial to improving the lives of people around
the world and enhancing our own national security. At the same time, we
must invest in reform in countries so that these efforts will not go to
waste, but provide both the necessary tools and the right incentives
for host governments to secure the conditions necessary for their
citizens to achieve their full potential.
Relieving the burden of heavily indebted countries is essential to
ending a destabilizing lend-and-forgive approach to development
assistance for poorer countries and allowing these countries to
progress on the road to prosperity. At the Gleneagles summit last July,
the G-8 agreed on a landmark initiative to provide 100 percent
cancellation of qualifying Heavily Indebted Poor Countries' debt
obligations to the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund. U.S. leadership was instrumental in
securing this agreement. We estimate that a total of 42 countries will
receive up to $60 billion in debt relief as a result of this
initiative. The budget that I present to you today fully supports the
U.S. share of the multilateral debt forgiveness provided by the G-8
proposal.
The United States and our G-8 partners went much further than
relieving debt. I ask you to go much further as well and support our
Government's commitment for the most ambitious package for Africa ever
supported by the G-8. This package will fight malaria, HIV/AIDS, and
corruption and help create an environment where democracy and economic
opportunity can flourish. Specifically, the 2007 budget supports the
President's commitment to double our assistance to Africa between 2004
and 2010. In addition, the request supports the U.S. Government's
commitment to help African countries to build trade capacity; to
educate their citizens through the 4-year, $400 million Africa
Education Initiative; and to combat sexual violence and abuse against
women through a new Women's Justice and Empowerment Initiative.
Although Africa is a focus of our efforts to reduce poverty and
invest in people and reform, it is by no means the only continent on
which our resources are directed. We seek a total of $2.7 billion for
Development Assistance and Child Survival and Health funds. By
investing in the citizens of developing countries, we are investing in
the future of the American people.
Empowering transformational states
The final goal of our country assistance programs is to empower
those states that are governing justly and to help them address key
constraints to their economic growth and poverty reduction. The
flagship of our efforts is the Millennium Challenge Account, which is
helping states that are making measurable progress to achieve
sustainable development and integration into the global economy.
In 2002, in Monterrey, Mexico, the nations of the world adopted a
new consensus on how to reduce international poverty. Developed nations
agreed to dramatically increase their amount of assistance to
developing countries, and developing countries committed to making
progress toward good governance, economic freedom, and an investment in
the health and education of their people. In response to this Monterrey
Consensus, our administration and the Congress created the
revolutionary Millennium Challenge Account, which targets billions of
dollars in new development assistance to countries that meet benchmarks
of political, economic, and social development. This innovative
approach partners with and invests in low and lower middle income
countries that take ownership for their own sustainable development and
poverty reduction.
In the past year, we have accelerated our efforts to negotiate and
sign development compacts between transformational countries and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation. To date, the MCC has identified 23
countries eligible for development compacts, and we have approved
compacts worth a total of $1.5 billion with eight countries: Armenia,
Benin, Cape Verde, Georgia, Honduras, Madagascar, Nicaragua, and
Vanuatu. Nine eligible countries have prepared proposals totaling $3.1
billion, and another six will soon submit proposals of their own. We
are seeking $3 billion of new funding in the FY 2007 budget, with the
goal of approving up to 10 new compacts.
As important as our foreign assistance is, free trade is ultimately
the key to every country's sustained development and economic growth.
As the President stressed in the State of the Union, promotion of free
trade is essential to enhancing the prosperity of the American people
and to supporting developing countries in their effort to participate
fully in the global economy. The Bush administration has signed or
negotiated free trade agreements with Chile, Singapore, Jordan,
Bahrain, Oman, Morocco, Australia, five Central American countries plus
the Dominican Republic, and most recently, Peru. Fostering free trade
is a vital part of our development policy. In the past 5 years, the
United States has more than doubled our investment in helping
developing countries to trade freely and competitively in the global
economy. We pledged at the recent WTO ministerial in Hong Kong to
increase this assistance to $2.7 billion by 2010, and our FY 2007
request for trade-related development assistance will be an important
step toward that ambitious and hopeful goal.
Mr. Chairman, America's purpose in this young century is to marry
our democratic principles with our dramatic power to build a more
hopeful world. Our purposes are idealistic, that is true; but our
policies are realistic, and we are succeeding. President Bush and I
have called upon the men and women of the State Department to practice
transformational diplomacy, and they are rising to this challenge with
enthusiasm and courage. They are helping our many partners around the
world to build a future of freedom, democracy, and hope for themselves
and their families.
Realizing the goals of transformational diplomacy will require a
sustained effort over the course of a generation. Most importantly, it
will require a strong partnership with the Congress. We at the
Department of State will do our part to use our existing authority to
make our foreign assistance more effective and to enhance our ability
to serve as responsible stewards of the American taxpayers' money. Our
goal in establishing the new position of Director of Foreign Assistance
is a first step. We welcome a dialog with Congress about how we can
work together to improve America's foreign assistance further, enabling
us to respond more quickly and more effectively to the world's
development challenges. By making America's foreign assistance more
efficient and more effective, we will help people around the world to
improve their lives, we will strengthen the hope that comes with
freedom, and we will advance our national security.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Rice.
I'll begin the questioning period. And, as I mentioned,
we'll have a 5-minute period. And I'll offer at least one
pattern that people might want to employ. I'm going to ask
three questions, and stop, and let you respond in that period
of time.
The first deals with Iran and the possibilities that the
Iranians will not be cooperative. There has to be at least some
credibility that we and the international community could
effect sanctions or some action beyond the diplomacy in which
we are now involved. So, I want to ask you, Is there currently
vigorous discussion with potential partners in this situation--
namely, China and Russia and India, whose cooperation would be
essential--at various levels of sanctions, particular types of
sanctions that might be effective, that are least injurious to
the world as a whole, but perhaps effective with regard to
leadership of Iran?
Second, we had hearings last week on reconstruction in
Iraq. It was apparent to all Senators that income for Iraq, as
well as technical assistance, will be needed for several years.
And it is not clear how that is to be paid for. So, I would
like for you to give some idea as to an intermediate program of
financing for reconstruction and maybe a request for some
estimate as to what other countries in the world might be
willing to contribute--a quarter, a half--or how, in the
postwar situation, with reconstruction and the building of a
viable democracy, others may participate.
Finally, in my opening statement I went into a long history
of unfortunate cuts year by year throughout the 1990s in
foreign assistance and support for the State Department and for
diplomacy. The Bush administration has asked for more money.
Last year, the Congress responded by cutting $2 billion. That
was about the same as the response of the year before. So, I'm
asking, I suppose, for how we can effect a strategy to try to
bring about a better result, because the requests that you are
now making are important. The public needs to know that, very
frequently, at the end of the day, after several weeks and
months of conferences, they do not occur. And we must be more
successful.
Could you respond to these issues?
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much, Chairman Lugar.
First of all, on Iran, I do think we've made a lot of
progress in getting an international consensus. And it was a
major breakthrough to have Russia and China agree that this
belonged in the Security Council. And now that it is in the
Security Council, and we have the weight of the Security
Council, including the possibility of chapter 7 action, which
could then give greater confidence and greater strength to IAEA
efforts. I think we have a menu now of options that were not
there when we were just in the IAEA Board of Governors.
We are, indeed, in constant discussion with our colleagues
about the course ahead. It will not surprise you that there are
differences about when and where and how to employ sanctions,
should they be needed. The first course, I think, will be to
try to get to the Security Council and remind the Iranians that
they are completely isolated. Their activities that were
announced today--there are news stories today about enrichment
and reprocessing having begun--they have now crossed a point
where they are in open defiance of the international community.
Under Secretary Burns will be in Europe next week for a meeting
of the G-8. He will have discussions with his counterparts.
Under Secretary Joseph has had discussions with his. And I,
also, with mine.
I think we want to keep our options a bit open on what
specific measures we have to take, but let me be very clear,
the international community is going to have to act, and act
decisively, if Iran is to know that there is a consequence for
their open defiance of the international community. And so, we
are working on precisely that.
In the first instance, we want to look at the effect on the
international community, as a whole, of any actions that we
take--economies and the like. But we also want to try and not
hurt the Iranian people. And so, I think you will see us trying
to walk a fine line in what actions we take.
As to reconstruction, I think we've made progress on
reconstruction, although I will say that the job was much
bigger than any of us imagined, with the deteriorated state of
the Iraqi infrastructure. I think none of us knew, for
instance, that when we saw Baghdad lit up as a city, that, in
fact, the country probably only had 50 percent of the
generating power that it needed, but it was being mostly given
to Baghdad; the rest of the country was in darkness, so to
speak. We've evened that out. That has given greater demand--
there is greater demand from consumers for this.
But, in specific answer to your question, we have made a
lot of investments in the infrastructure. We think that many of
them have taken hold, but we've been downscaling the kinds of
infrastructure projects that we have. Reconstruction with a
small ``r,'' rather than with a large ``R,'' is the way that
I've been describing it. More in the provinces.
And one way that we intend to support the new Iraqi
Government is to have these provincial teams that can marry
political and military and reconstruction expertise on a more
local level. On a more national level, we have an extensive
Ministry Assistance Team Program. We have requested funding--
some in base funding and some will come in supplemental
funding--for what we would hope would be about a 2-year program
to really help stabilize these important functions.
But I am very actively, now, working to get support from
Iraq's neighbors and also from other countries. I might note
that Germany made its first contribution to the Iraqi
Reconstruction Fund. It was a small contribution, but it was a
breakthrough for Germany, and I hope we will get more support.
Finally, on foreign assistance. Senator, I think we're just
going to have to get out there and make the argument. America
wants to be compassionate, I think. And part of this is
compassion--what we do in HIV/AIDS, what we do in malaria
prevention. But we also have to make the case to the American
people that this is also about our own security and our own
safety. We know what happened when Iraq--or when Afghanistan
became a failed state, and we paid for that, and paid for that
dearly, with terrorist attack after terrorist attack,
culminating in the fall of the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on
September 11. And so, I now have begun to talk about this as
national security spending, because unless states are capable
of governing themselves, governing their borders, fighting
terrorism, dealing with the challenges of proliferation and
terror, we will not be safer. And so, I've begun to talk about
it in that way, and perhaps that will resonate with the
American people.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Rice.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would ask permission that I
be able to submit some questions to the Secretary----
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Biden [continuing]. Because the time is short.
The Chairman. That will be true for each Senator, and we'll
send those questions over for the record.
Senator Biden. I thank you.
Senator Biden. I am confused a little bit by the
administration's policy on elections. And they think they have
turned out well. I think it's been a near disaster. I have a
series of questions relating to that.
I'd like to start with Iran. Iran has watched North Korea
cross the same boundaries. You and the President and others
have said, ``We cannot accept another partial solution that
does not deal with the entirety of the problem in Korea.'' And
yet, we were told, last year, by the Director of Defense
Intelligence Agency that North Korea can now arm a missile with
a nuclear warhead. And so, when you talk about Iran, my
question is this. Has there been--and you would not be able to
discuss it, I suspect, openly--but has there been an analysis
done as to what impact an oil embargo would have on Iran? Not
just what impact it would have on us and other nations, but
Iran is a net importer of refined oil products, and, according
to what I have read, it would have a dramatic, dramatic
negative impact. And, already, Ahmadinejad is preparing his
people for the need for sacrifice. So, my question is, Has such
analysis been done?
Secretary Rice. Yes. We have been looking at analyses of
the full range of potential sanctions.
Senator Biden. The President said, ``We're sanctioned out
with regard to Iran.'' I think that was his quote. Are there
any sanctions of consequence on the table other than energy and
the oil sector?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, we are--we have heavily
sanctioned Iran, obviously, after 1979, but the--there are
still some measures that we might even be able to take on our
own, and we're looking at those. Obviously, anything that we
can do multilaterally will be much more effective. And I think,
now, with the Security Council resolution--or Security Council
venue for Iran, we will be able to begin those discussions.
As I said to Senator Lugar, it is not easy. There is not--
there is not common view on when or how sanctions ought to be
taken. But the Iranian regime is giving the world a very good
set of reasons to take serious measures. And the more that they
do, and the more that they isolate themselves, I think, the
more you will see a willingness on the international community.
If I could just say, on North Korea, I think there's one
very important difference. For a variety of reasons, North
Korea is an extremely isolated state that seems to revel in its
isolation. And the Iranians have not been. They've been
isolated from us, for a variety of reasons, but this is a state
that trades with the world, that has the diplomatic relations
with the world, that has a population that is sophisticated,
that travels. I don't believe that the Iranians want to endure
the kind of isolation that has been attendant to the North
Korea policy.
Senator Biden. In your absence, I complimented you and the
President on your bringing the world together with regard to
Iran.
Now, you indicated that you want to work through some of
the bureaucratic hurdles of the executive order that existed
before you came to power, and since you've been in power, with
regard to helping democratic movements inside Iran. You and I
talked at some length about that a few years ago, when there
was a democratic movement that was alive, and when Khatami was
talking about wanting to have exchanges, everything from
students on. Assuming there was such a metamorphosis again, is
that something we would find in our interest to do?
Secretary Rice. Well, I think we find it in our interest
now to try and remove these bureaucratic hurdles and to see if
we can't engage the Iranian population. And, in some ways, you
could argue that they need it even more now, because they are
being isolated by their own regime. The regime risks--the
regime's policies risk the total isolation of Iran, and the
Iranian people shouldn't have to suffer for that. And so, when
I speak of these differences, you know, we learned, a little
while ago, that we were unable, for instance, to publish the
works of Iranian human rights activists in the United States
because of some of our licensing requirements. And so, we want
to look at some of those issues.
Senator Biden. If there is any help you need from this
committee on doing away with some of the, in my view,
ridiculous impediments for trying to start, at least, the
exchange of ideas--I would hope you would ask us.
My last question relates to Darfur. I've been meeting with
NATO officials, including the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO
and his counterparts. There is a feeling within NATO, at least
expressed to me, that if a country took a lead--i.e., the
United States--in moving to insert a small NATO force within
existing forces--we're training them now--that we could have a
profound impact. Is there any intention on the part of the
administration to try to have a bridge to the United Nations
taking over this process that would involve NATO being more
engaged, with actually having some small number of boots on the
ground inserted within existing African Union forces now?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, the United States was the
country that first raised this in NATO. I remember raising it
in NATO and asking for NATO participation in Darfur. We now
have lent a planning element, as well as some lift, to the
African Union forces that are there.
We want to continue to do this within the context of the
African Union. It is extremely important, for a variety of
reasons, to have their support and to have the African Union
have the lead ownership--I'm sure you understand why--in this
mission.
We are prepared to talk with our NATO counterparts about
what more we can do to support the AMIS force. It's our view,
at this point, that shoring up the AMIS forces until we can get
the U.N. forces is a better option than trying to build three
different forces--the AMIS forces, a bridge force, and then the
U.N. force. You probably know we are president of the Security
Council this month in the United Nations, and we are trying to
use that presidency to get the resolution to really get going
on the peacekeeping forces.
Senator Biden. I'm not suggesting we build a third force.
In meeting with AU officials, I have been told that they would
welcome the placement of NATO forces within AU forces, not
unlike we're doing with Iraqi forces. And that's what I'm
talking about. I will lay out some questions in writing for
you.
Secretary Rice. Absolutely. And let me just say, we will
work with NATO to try to enhance the capability of the AMIS
force until a U.N. force can get on the ground.
Senator Biden. I think we have to lead that.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, Secretary
Rice.
First, Mr. Chairman, I will like--and would submit
additional questions, because of our time restrictions. I would
appreciate having the opportunity to do that.
Secretary Rice, I want to compliment you, your team. I
think during your first year at State Department you have done
what you had told a number of us when you were here before this
committee a year ago, and that is to reach out to the
international community, use the State Department career
foreign policy diplomatic experts in a way that enhances our
country and our foreign policy. I think you've done the kinds
of things--at least in this Senator's opinion, it is critically
important if we, in fact, are to deal with these great
challenges that face the world--not just the United States;
these are international challenges that will require
international responses--and to build back those relationships,
and to build back those institutions and strengthen the United
Nations and strengthen the IAEA and other organizations that we
are very much part of, I think, is absolutely critical.
With that, I want to go to two general areas, back to the--
to Iran and to Hamas, and the Palestinian issue. You and I have
had conversations in the past, as well as other members of this
committee, and--about the regionalization of this issue of Iran
or Iraq. We now find a new development in the Palestinian
territories with a new government being formed. Iran is in the
middle of all of this, as we know; and that further complicates
your efforts. And it, I think, gives us, also, some
opportunities, as well, because it gives us opportunities to
reach out and--your specific points here about the budget
request that will include focusing on young Iranians, next
generation, in the Middle East, which is absolutely, probably,
is critical to our future security, as any one thing.
There was a story in the front page of the Wall Street
Journal yesterday which you may have seen, a big, blaring
headline, ``Iran Plays Growing Role in Iraq, Complicating
Bush's Strategy.'' And if you didn't read it, let me just take
one piece of this and then get to a question.
Talks about, ``Iran's influence is most apparent in Iraqi
politics where a Shi'ite-dominated coalition has just nominated
a Prime Minister with very close ties to Iran, but it also
emerges in many areas of Iraq--Iraqi life that get less notice.
Iranian businessmen, for example, are some of the largest
investors in restoring Iraq's shattered infrastructure;
nonprofit groups from Iran providing basic health services that
crumbled in the chaos following the U.S.-led invasion; Iraq's
Shi'ite media are getting training from experts across the
border in Iran.'' And it goes into considerably more detail.
My question is this. As you reach out, and as you formulate
policy and present that policy in the form of a budget and
other explanations, I'd like to have you try to capsulate all
of this, because Iran is the most powerful country in the
Middle East. It is the most difficult. It, from their
perspective, is sitting there with the United States military
forces on both its east and west border. Israel has nuclear
capability. Pakistan and India have nuclear capability. And as
this is all thread together in the fabric of what we're trying
to do to sort this out, if you could talk a little bit about
how we're dealing with all of this--I hope we are now past the
Chalabi days of relying on that crowd, or that kind of policy
or direction. I note a significant difference, too, in the
IAEA, versus where we were going into Iraq, when we essentially
dismissed the IAEA and their inspectors, that they didn't know,
when they were an apologist group for the Iraqis. I hope those
days are over. It appears they are; that we're working closely
with IAEA.
And then I'm going to top it off with this question. This
is an open hearing. I recognize that. And we'll probably have
to take this up in a closed hearing, or at least in closed
conversation, about any efforts to try and deal with the
Iranians in an off-channel way. I am aware that an initiative
was made in 2003 to the Iranians by this Government. And tell
us what you can about that; not necessarily the 2003, but any
initiative for the United States to be engaging the Iranians in
some way--not negotiating, not diplomatic recognition. But I
don't see, Madam Secretary, how things are getting better. I
think things are getting worse. I think they're getting worse
in Iraq. I think they're getting worse in Iran. I hope the
Hamas development will start to develop in a different
direction. But we are now at a point where sanctions, for
example--Senator Biden asked the question--consequences. Have
we thought through consequences of sanctions? What are we doing
about sanctions? Have we thought through why that would even be
a feasible option?
Now, I've thrown a lot at you, but you like it that way,
because you can pick and choose and not answer some of the
things. [Laughter.]
But I would appreciate getting a broader sense of this,
because I do think it's all connected.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
I do think your analysis that this is all connected is
exactly right. Iran is, through its policies in the Middle
East, probably our biggest strategic challenge as a single
country, because Iran is pursuing policies in the Middle East
that are 180 degrees counter to the kind of Middle East that we
would build. You have to look only at their support for
Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, their, sort of, sidekick with
Syria with that relationship, even though Syria is under deep
suspicion in the international community. That relationship has
grown. Certainly, we have wanted the Iranians to have good
relations with the Iraqis, their neighbors, but in a
transparent way. And I think their relationships are not always
transparent, because of Iranian activities, particularly in the
south.
So, you are right, there are major challenges there, but I
think that we have to look at this in several bites. The first
is, when we talk about Iraq and Iranian influence in Iraq, we
need to recognize that, while there is Iranian influence in
Iraq, there are also influences that are counter to that
Iranian influence. And with the selection of Mr. Jaafari by the
United Iraqi Alliance, the Shi'a group, they still have to go
now through a process of government formation, and, indeed,
even confirmation of the Prime Minister, with a block--or with
people that are Sunni and Kurd and other movements, like the
Allawi movement that won, also, large parts of the vote. And
so, there is going to have to be, now, old-fashioned politics
to come to some conclusion. So, I would not overstate Iranian
influence by recognizing that it is diluted by a number of
other forces and factors that are deeply suspicious of Iranian
influence and of Iranian power.
I would also note that in the region, if you look around
the region, in the gulf countries and in other places, there is
also suspicion of Iranian activities and Iranian behavior. And
part of our goal has to be to have, with others who are
concerned about Iranian behavior, a kind of common dialog and
discussion about how to counter that Iranian behavior. And I'm
going to go out to the gulf next week. I expect to have some of
those conversations. Because no one wants to see a Middle East
that is dominated by an Iranian hegemon, particularly one that
has acquired nuclear weapons technology. And, in fact, the face
of Iran now, President Ahmadinejad, has crystalized the concern
of the international community about Iran, because he speaks in
blunter ways about Iranian ambitions than did prior Iranian
Governments.
So, I think we have a number of levers. Leaving aside
whatever we might do in the Security Council, in terms of
consequences for Iran's behavior, we need to think of this as a
strategic approach to many who are concerned about Iranian
influence and growing Iranian influence.
Finally, let me just note that, in the long term, I think
that the Iranian geostrategic position doesn't look all that
good. If you look at, now, a democratic Afghanistan that is,
indeed, a good friend of the United States, a democratizing
Iraq that is--I think will be a good friend of the United
States, Iran finds itself in a different geostrategic situation
than it found itself just several years ago. It will try to
influence those events, it will try to influence those
governments. But it's going to have, I think, a hard time, in
democratic processes, being a dominant force.
As to your question about contacts, the only contacts that
have been authorized with the Iranians for this government are
for our Ambassador in Afghanistan to have contacts with his
counterpart. We think it's useful on counternarcotics. We think
it's useful on issues of terrorism in Afghanistan. And so, Ron
Newman is empowered to do that. Similarly, Zal--by the way Zal
Khalilzad did that when he was in Afghanistan. We do it with
the United Nations. Zal has similar guidance in Iraq. He can,
as he sees fit--with guidance from here, he can encounter and
talk to his counterpart. So, that is the way that we're dealing
with those near-term places where we bump up against one
another. I think any broader talks, I don't really see the
point, because Iran's policies are so belligerent and so
counter to our own that it's difficult to see what that
conversation would be about. But in terms of Iraq and
Afghanistan, we do have channels that we can use.
Senator Hagel. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, the President said, during his State of
the Union Address, that we are winning in Iraq and he is
confident in his plan for victory. Unfortunately, the American
people don't share this confidence. A recent NBC/Wall Street
Journal poll conducted January 26 through 29, 2006, shows that
a majority of Americans--52 percent--believe the President has
failed to give good reasons why the United States must keep
troops in Iraq. Similarly, 53 percent of Americans are less
confident that Iraq will come to a successful conclusion. They
don't share his confidence, because they see what is happening
on the ground. They see brave men, like ABC's Bob Woodruff and
his cameraman, seriously injured while trying to report on,
``the good news coming out of Iraq.'' They see Jill Carroll, of
the Christian Science Monitor, a young woman who went to Iraq
to tell the story of the Iraqi people, kidnaped and begging for
her life, and we pray for her safe return. And, of course, the
death and the injuries keep climbing, up to 19,000 Americans
either dead or wounded.
This administration's rosy scenarios, like the VP's
statement that the insurgency was in the last throes, your
statement in 2005 that the insurgency has been dealt several
blows, just don't match realities on the ground.
The number of attacks against coalition troops, Iraqi
security forces, and civilians increased by 29 percent last
year. Let me give you specifics. Insurgents launched 34,000-
plus attacks in 2005, an increase of 8,000 from 2004. Last
year, the number of car bombs more than doubled, from 420 to
873. The number of suicide car bombs went from 133 to 411.
Sixty-seven attackers wore suicide vests last year, up from
seven in 2004. Roadside bombs increased from 5,000-plus to
10,000-plus.
Last week, a chart appeared in the New York Times depicting
the extent of casualties just in one month. And I just want you
to see this, because sometimes we don't recognize what's going
on there. More than 800 people were killed as a result of the
insurgency.
And what do the Iraqi people think of all this? Sixty-four
percent of Iraqis believe that crime and violent attacks will
decrease when the United States redeploys out of Iraq. Perhaps
more important, 73 percent of Iraqis believe there will be
greater cooperation among Iraq's political factions when the
United States redeploys.
So, I say to you, if we're in Iraq to help the Iraqi
people, then we ought to start listening to the Iraqi people
and start a redeployment.
Now, success in Iraq also depends greatly on the ability of
our forces to better secure Iraq's oil infrastructure. Paul
Wolfowitz told Congress, in 2003, ``We're dealing with a
country that can finance its own reconstruction with oil, and
relatively soon.'' That was another rosy scenario. The reality
is, Iraq's oil production has dropped from prewar levels. And I
want to show you a headline from the New York Times a little
more than a week ago, ``Oil Graft Fuels the Insurgency.'' The
Iraqi Finance Minister has estimated that insurgents receive 40
to 50 percent of all oil smuggling profits in the country. So,
not only is the oil not financing the reconstruction, it is
financing the insurgency that is killing American troops.
Our main reason for going to Iraq was to get rid of the
WMD, or, as you said, ``not to wait for the smoking gun to
become the mushroom cloud.'' That was a farce. And the truth is
coming out. The CIA intelligence officer in charge of the
Middle East intelligence from 2000 to 2005 wrote,
``Intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions
already made.''
Our standing in the world is low. According to the Pew
Research Center--and the American people know it--two-thirds of
Americans say there's less international respect for the United
States than in the past. And when asked why, a strong majority,
7 in 10 Americans, cite, ``the war in Iraq.'' The war in Iraq
is bringing our standing down in the world. The American people
are smart.
Now, you have cited elections in the Middle East as a sign
that, ``the neighborhood is changing.'' But is the neighborhood
changing for the better? It doesn't appear so. You've admitted
to being blindsided by the Hamas victory, saying, ``I've asked
why nobody saw it coming. It does say something about us not
having a good pulse.'' And I do appreciate your candor there.
But this has become a pattern. This administration was shocked
by Hamas, shocked by the election of the Iranian leader,
shocked that Iraqis voted for conservative religious parties
with ties to Iran instead of secular candidates like Ahmed
Chalabi, whose party got not one single vote in the Iraqi
Parliament. I remember when he sat behind the First Lady in
2004 at the State of the Union Address. This administration
seems to have a tin ear when it comes to the Middle East, and
that tin ear is making us less safe.
Secretary Rice, do you really believe that elections in the
Middle East, where these kind of terrorists and extremists
groups are being chosen--and I know Senator Biden went into who
they are--do you think that's working to the benefit of the
United States? And, in a broader sense, not just in the Middle
East, but also in places like Bolivia and Venezuela, do you
agree that nations throughout the world are electing more
negative candidates who run against America?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, if the option is not to hold
elections, I think that would be a terrible----
Senator Boxer. That wasn't my question.
Secretary Rice. Well, no, you asked, so let me answer. I
think if the option is not to hold elections and not to give
people their say, then that's an untenable position for the
United States.
Senator Boxer. That wasn't my question.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I would like to answer your
question.
Senator Boxer. Good.
Secretary Rice. Now, the Middle East. The question assumes
that there was somehow stability in the Middle East that we
have somehow disturbed, that the false stability of dictators
like Saddam Hussein, who put 300,000 people in mass graves, who
twice attacked his neighbors, who used weapons of mass
destruction, both against his neighbors and against his own
population, that that false stability was preferable to the
admittedly difficult course that the Iraqi people are now set
on to try to learn to deal with their differences by compromise
and politics rather than by repression. It assumes that it was
preferable for the Palestinian people to live under the regime
of Yasser Arafat, which was a regime of extraordinary
corruption, and, indeed, incapable of governing the Palestinian
territories in a way that spoke to the aspirations of the
Palestinian people. It assumes that it was better for Syrian
occupation of Lebanon to continue for more than 30 years,
Syrian occupation that was----
Senator Boxer. Madam Secretary, could I----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. May I complete my answer?
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Just interrupt----
Secretary Rice. May I just complete my answer?
Senator Boxer [continuing]. In a very positive way for you?
Secretary Rice. May I just complete my answer?
Senator Boxer. Well, no, because you are not answering the
question.
Secretary Rice. No, Senator. You asked me if I thought that
the world was better now, and I'm telling you that I think it
is.
Senator Boxer. Well, I asked you exactly this. Are these
elections that have been held, and the people that have been
elected, including the leader of Iran--what is happening in
Israel in the Palestinian side--I am asking you--Venezuela,
Bolivia--they seem----
Secretary Rice. And, Senator----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. To elect----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. I'm answering the question.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Anti-American candidates, is
that working to the benefit of America?
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Boxer. I'm not asking you the----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Senator----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Benefit of anybody else.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I have to answer in the following
way. Your question assumes that, had we not had elections, for
instance, in Lebanon, where, indeed, Hezbollah won some seats,
that the Lebanese people would be----
Senator Boxer. That wasn't----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Better off.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. My question.
Secretary Rice. Or multicandidate elections in Egypt. Yes,
I think that the elections have made the world, in a
transitional state, a better place. And the United States is
standing for its principles, which is that the people of the
Middle East, the people of Latin America, ought to be able to
choose their leaders.
Now, there are times when elections turn out in ways that
we would prefer that they did not. Clearly, the election of
Hamas is a difficult moment in the prospects for peace between
the Palestinians and the Israelis. But the Palestinian people
got a chance to go to the polls and express their desire for
change. They have done so. And now the international community
will hold Hamas responsible for the policies that it
undertakes. And I believe, as the Quartet does, that Hamas will
have one choice, which is to make a choice to recognize the
right of Israel to exist, to renounce violence, and to engage
in a process that will lead to a two-state solution.
In sum, Senator, when you have dealt with a Middle East
that for 60 years had a freedom deficit, for 60 years where the
United States turned a blind eye to the authoritarianism that
was there, it is not surprising that perhaps the best-organized
parties were extremist parties. But that isn't a reason to
despair that elections have happened in the Middle East. It's
not a reason to despair that the people of the Middle East have
had an opportunity to express themselves. It is a call to work
harder for the development of civil society, to work harder for
the development of political parties that can occupy the
middle. But I would not change a policy that affirms America's
belief that people ought to have a right to choose.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I just must say one--wrap this
up this way.
I asked you, Do you agree that nations throughout the world
are electing more negative candidates who run against America?
OK, your answer is, ``Elections are great, and anyone who
thinks that the world isn't better somehow doesn't want
elections.'' I just want to say, because you attributed, in an
oblique way to me, the fact that I thought the status quo was
wonderful, is incorrect. You never answered this. And as we sit
here today, American businesses are being burned down. Burned
down. The Pew has just done a poll indicating that our standing
in the world has never been lower. If you think this is good
for America, that is fine. But I would say we need to do
better. We need to get our message across. We need to have the
people in these countries feeling good toward America and
electing candidates that feel good about America, not
candidates that stand up and say, ``Death to America,'' and
``America is the Satan.'' And then we say, ``Oh, this is
better''?
So, I think there is a disconnect here, Mr. Chairman. And I
hope that we will, in fact, change some of our policies so that
we don't see that these elections keep electing people whose--
who run on these anti-American platforms. It doesn't make us
safer. And I'm concerned about our people.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, it assumes that the Middle
East was safer when ideologies of hatred produced people that
flew airplanes into our buildings on 9/11. The fact is that
what we are reaping now is policies--the implications and
outcomes of policies that for 60 years denied freedom in the
Middle East. And we're just now on a path beginning to
acknowledge and affirm the right of the people of the Middle
East to have freedom.
Yes, there are going to be some outcomes that are not
perfect, from the American point of view. But I don't think
that our policy can be, ``You can only have elections if you
plan to elect American--or candidates that are friendly to
America.''
Senator Boxer. No one's suggested that, either.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
With the cooperation of the committee, I would note that a
quorum is present, and the committee will take a short recess
to hold a business meeting.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. I thank the Secretary for this recess. We
will now resume the hearing, and I will call upon Senator
Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Chairman Lugar. And welcome,
Secretary Rice.
Following up on some of the conversations just taking
place, if--one of the ramifications of these elections and
democracies is that we don't talk to the winners; and that, I
see as a problem, if we are not happy with the result. So, now
we have--we're not talking to the Iranians, we're not going to
talk to Hamas, we're not talking with the Venezuelans, we won't
talk with the Bolivians. So, my question is, Do we support the
delay of elections in Egypt? And if the Muslim Brotherhood were
successful--if we do support those elections, and the Muslim
Brotherhood are successful, will we not talk with Egypt?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Just let me note that we, of course, have a mission in
Venezuela, and an Ambassador there who engages the Venezuelan
Government very often and at many different levels. In terms of
Bolivia, the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs
went to the inauguration of Mr. Evo Morales. And so I would
just note that we do talk to these people.
Where it comes to Iran, I would not put the Iranian
election in the same category with elections that have been
held in other places, because, of course, the Guardian Council
decided who could run in that election, and then they held
elections. I think calling that an election stretches the term
in the way that we think about it.
As to Egypt, no, we are disappointed that the elections
have been postponed in Egypt. The Egyptians have said that this
is because the municipalities were not ready to carry out
elections, that the lists were not prepared, and so forth. But
we are going to continue to press for the forward march of
democratic values and democracy in Egypt. The multicandidate
Presidential elections and parliamentary elections that were
carried out, while not perfect, did change the composition of
the Egyptian Government, the parliamentary elections, in a
substantial way. It has been our policy--because the Muslim
Brotherhood, as a party, is not legal in Egypt--to respect the
laws of Egypt. I do think that, as elections go forward in
these countries, that we are reaching out, within legal
constraints, to the broadest possible range of candidates.
Now, Hamas is in a different category. And I know you
didn't ask about Hamas, specifically, but let me just mention,
Hamas is a terrorist group. We have listed it as a terrorist
group. We don't have discussions with terrorists. It is our
hope that Hamas will take the signals from the international
community that it is not acceptable to say that you want a
peaceful life and then refuse to recognize the partner; and
that is Israel. But we will not have contacts with Hamas,
because we list it as a terrorist group. But there are any
number of countries where we find the government with policies
with which we do not particularly agree, with which we have
contact, and intend to continue to.
Senator Chafee. OK. We can argue about our level of our
contact with these countries, whether it's Venezuela or
Bolivians, but there's no doubt we're not talking to the
Iranians, no doubt we're not talking with Hamas. And now my
next question is, Considering our deep involvement in the Arab
world, where does peace between the Israelis and Palestinians
rank in our--in your national foreign policy priorities? And
just recently, regarding the elections of Hamas, Dennis Ross,
who was our lead negotiator for 12 years in the Middle East,
under both Republican and Democratic administrations, said,
``We had so many opportunities to stop this.'' And former
President Bush, George H.W. Bush, envoy John Wolf concurred in
this sentiment. So, why didn't we take advantage of these
opportunities?
Secretary Rice. Well, I don't know anybody who worked
harder to try and work with the Palestinian Authority to help
it reform----
Senator Chafee. First of all, where does it rank in our
priorities?
Secretary Rice. It ranks extremely high, and certainly in
the top very few things. I probably spend more time on this
issue than almost any other. You know that I have been to the
region several times. You know that I, personally, engaged to
negotiate the Rafah movement and access agreement. And so----
Senator Chafee. But you'll argue--you won't argue that
whatever has happened has been disastrous. We have a terrorist
organization winning elections.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. I agree that this is a
difficult moment for the peace process, but if Hamas will take
the signals being given it by the international community as to
what it will take to govern, it could, in fact, be a more
positive development.
I would also note, Senator, that, in this same period of
time, the Israelis are now completely out of Gaza, out of four
settlements in the West Bank, and have begun to dismantle
outposts. So, these are----
Senator Chafee. All very well and good, but Hamas has just
won these elections. And Dennis Ross and John Wolf had said we
missed opportunities. Do you disagree with that?
Secretary Rice. Actually, Senator, I don't think that the
United States of America is responsible for the election of
Hamas. No; I don't. I think the--what has happened in the
Palestinian territories----
Senator Chafee. Dennis Ross and John Wolf are wrong.
Secretary Rice. Well, I don't know precisely what they
said. I'm going to see Dennis tomorrow, so I can ask him
precisely what he said. But my----
Senator Chafee. He'll probably say the summer of 2003,
after the fall of Saddam--let me finish----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. When Abu Mazen was elevated to
Prime Minister, and there was a hudna, a cease-fire, for that
whole summer, nothing was done. John Wolf was the envoy, and he
said nothing was done to back up our commitments. And then,
again, another opportunity, death of Yasser Arafat. Again, Abu
Mazen elevated to Prime Minister--President.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I just----
Senator Chafee. And----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. I just----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. That's the whole summer--that
whole year----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Senator, I just----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. Of 2005----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. I just beg to disagree.
Senator Chafee. Nothing was done.
Secretary Rice. I just----
Senator Chafee. Nothing was done.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. I'm sorry----
Senator Chafee. Opportunities missed.
Secretary Rice. I'm sorry, Senator----
Senator Chafee. And now we have----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. I just disagree.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. A very, very disastrous
situation of a terrorist organization winning elections.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I just----
Senator Chafee. That's what----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Beg to differ.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. That's what Dennis Ross will
say tomorrow----
Secretary Rice. Well----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. When you meet with him.
Secretary Rice. I will ask him. But I have to say that
people have been trying to make peace in the Middle East for a
long time, including Dennis--and, of course, couldn't do it.
And one reason that it wasn't possible when----
Senator Chafee. It was never this bad.
Secretary Rice. Well, we did have the 4 years of the
intifada, which was pretty bad. A lot of Israelis died, a lot
of Palestinians died. And so, we do have, now, a period in
which Israelis have withdrawn from the Gaza, and the
Palestinians have the ability to govern the Gaza, if they can.
We have a situation in which they're withdrawing from parts of
the West Bank. We have an agreement on movement and access for
the Palestinian people, so that they can access the
international border that is Rafah. There has been some
progress.
But as to the ability to deliver a two-state solution,
Senator, people have been trying for a long time. And the one
thing that has changed--and, I think, changed for the better--
is that the Yasser Arafat regime, which was corrupt and which
was self-serving and which did not have the aspirations of the
Palestinian people at its core--is now gone. What we witnessed
in the victory of Hamas is a backlash against its residual,
Fatah, which was also corrupt.
And let me just say, Abu Mazen tried to do some good
things. They reformed the Finance Ministry under Salam Fayyad.
They did try to do some good things. The relations with Israel
improved. They were able to deliver some goods for the people.
But, ultimately, the Palestinian people voted for change,
because the Fatah did not change quickly enough. That's the
reason for Hamas's victory. And now, it is our hope that Hamas,
having to govern, will understand what the international
community has said to them.
Senator Chafee. And we should get ready for the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, also.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, again, I think that the
option of not giving people a choice in who will govern them is
just one that the United States of America can't stand for.
We're dealing with 60 years of policies in the Middle East, not
5. We're dealing with policies in the Middle East that created
a freedom deficit. We're dealing with policies in the Middle
East that supported authoritarian governments that then closed
off legitimate political space for political parties to
develop. And it is, perhaps, too much to expect that you are
going to have, after a change in that policy, those political
parties develop overnight. I, nonetheless, would rather go
through a transition in places like Lebanon and even the
Palestinian territories, certainly Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
places, than to rest my hope for security in the false
stability of authoritarian governments and dictatorships that
cut off any opportunity for the people of the Middle East to
legitimately express their views and their choices.
Senator Chafee. Well, I agree with you, and I would wish
that these elections would go toward more peaceful----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. Advocating candidates. And
that's our difference.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I really didn't expect to say anything on this subject at
all, but I just wanted to pick up very quickly on what Senator
Chafee said.
Holding elections themselves, Madam Secretary, doesn't mean
you have a democracy. An election does not mean democracy. And
there was great intense desire on the part of Israel, as well
as President Abbas, not to have that election at that period of
time. And it was our insistence that the Palestinians proceed
forward.
I happen to agree with the position that you can't deal
with Hamas. I mean, I think that's absolutely correct. You
can't sit down with people, negotiate water rights and moving
across the borders and all the other things, and people are
blowing you up at the same time. So, I agree with that. But
there really is a serious question here about the overall
approach.
I met with President Abbas the day he was elected--January,
a year ago--and he looked at me, and he said, ``Senator, I know
what the expectations are, but I don't have the capacity, I
don't have police cars, I don't have radios, I don't have
trained people, I don't have the ability to do what they expect
of me, and I need help.'' And I've talked to Jim Wolfenson, as
have others, and a lot of other people. And the bottom line is,
I regret to say, the West--not just us--the West didn't come
through. And Hamas had a greater ability to deliver in the
streets a year and half ago than Fatah. Now, Fatah had its
corruptions. We all understand that. But I believe that there
is a measure of responsibility for the West's lack of adequate
response with respect to trying to help. We're not responsible
for the outcome, but we certainly are responsible for our
actions in between.
What I want to ask you--a number of questions, one about
Iraq and--a couple about Iraq. But, before I do, we learned,
last week, that Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby authorized--was
authorized by his superiors--reportedly, Vice President Cheney;
we don't know the answer--to leak classified information from
the prewar national intelligence estimate on Iraq to the press
in the summer of 2003. And my question is, Are you aware of any
authorized leaks of classified information, or anyone
instructing someone to leak classified information, to members
of the press?
Secretary Rice. Senator, this question has arisen in the
context of a legal issue and an investigation, and I'm just not
going to comment on anything related to the case of Scooter
Libby.
Senator Kerry. Well, can you tell us whether or not you
have personally ever authorized the leak of classified
information to any members of the press?
Secretary Rice. Senator, this question, again, arises in
the context of the Scooter Libby case----
Senator Kerry. No, that arises in the context of your
responsibilities within the White House at any time, or now.
Have you ever authorized the leak of classified information to
the press?
Secretary Rice. I'm not going to talk about something that
arises in the context of an investigation in a case. I have
always acted lawfully within my duties as National Security
Advisor and now as Secretary of State.
Senator Kerry. Let me ask you this question. Do you support
the practice of authorizing individuals to leak classified
information to the press?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I believe that the protection of
classified information is one of our highest duties. I have
always endeavored to protect classified information and to make
certain that, if classified information is going to be used in
any way, that procedures were followed, including procedures
for making certain that the intelligence agencies were
comfortable, or had agreed, that such information could be
declassified. So----
Senator Kerry. So, you do not support it?
Secretary Rice. I've always followed the rules.
Senator Kerry. You do not support the leaking.
Secretary Rice. I believe that the protection of classified
information is our highest--one of our highest duties.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
The other day, General Kimmett, Mark Kimmett, gave a speech
in London to the Institute of Strategic Studies wherein he
reportedly said, ``The United States will not maintain any
long-term bases in Iraq. Our position is, when we leave, we
won't leave any bases there.'' I wrote to General Pace to
follow up on this, and General Pace wrote me back and said,
``At present, the Department of Defense has no plans for the
permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq.''
This has long been an issue of contention. So, you know,
General Casey has said, ``The sense of American occupation is
part of what feeds the insurgency.'' The administration,
however, has never formally said, ``We're not going to have
permanent bases.''
So, I would ask you today, Is it, in fact, the policy of
this administration not to have permanent basing in Iraq?
Secretary Rice. I think General Pace has spoken to that,
Senator, and he speaks for the administration.
Senator Kerry. So----
Secretary Rice. Senator, our job now is to use our forces
to help the Iraqis gain control of their own security
environment, to train their forces, to protect our people who
need to go out in the field to be a presence outside of
Baghdad. That is the purpose of our forces. As the President
said, we don't want to be there one day longer than we need to
be.
Senator Kerry. I understand that. No, and we all want that
transition. I'm just trying to figure out what the long term
is, because I don't think the administration has actually said
that before with clarity. So, if you are affirming, today, what
the generals have said as the policy, that's a step forward.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I think General Pace has
spoken to this. I don't want to, in this forum, try and
prejudge everything that might happen all the way into the
future. The policy of this administration is to, as quickly as
possible, turn over responsibility for security to the Iraqis.
And, as the President said, we will be very pleased the day
when American forces can come home.
Senator Kerry. So, the conclusion from what you've just
said is that the civilian leadership, which is how we lead the
military in the United States, has a different position from
the uniformed leadership, which is, you're reserving the right
to make that decision in the future.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I said I am not going to try to
speak to something that is that far into the future.
Senator Kerry. I heard what you said. I understand.
Secretary Rice. We are----
Senator Kerry. No, I----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. For instance----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Understand.
Secretary Rice. Yes, sorry.
Senator Kerry. I got your answer.
Finally, last area, because I know the light's going on
here. When I was in Iraq a few weeks ago, I had a good
meeting--I thought it was a good meeting--with Abdul Aziz al
Hakim. And he made it pretty clear to me in that meeting that
the SCIRI party had no intention of changing the constitution,
that they might accept some so-called technical ministerial
people in a couple of the key Ministries--Interior, Defense,
Finance. But nobody, not even the Ambassador, who is very
skilled and who we all have great respect for, was able to
identify who those people might be. Now, given al-Jaafari's
ratification as the new Prime Minister again, in a very, very
divided vote, and one that sends shivers through the Sunni, can
you tell us what is happening with respect to the efforts to
leverage a real political reconciliation that, in fact,
delivers to the Sunnis sufficient guarantees that will
undermine support for the insurgency? Because every military
leader has made it clear that this insurgency does not get
resolved at the barrel of a gun; it will be resolved only
through the political settlement. And the prospects of that
settlement, given what has happened already in this choice, and
the problems with Mr. Allawi's party and their being left out,
et cetera, leaves major, major questions on the table. Could
you walk us through that a bit, please?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I wouldn't draw any
conclusions just yet as to the work that still remains for Mr.
Jaafari and others in bringing others onboard so that, in fact,
they can govern. I would remind that the Shi'a alliance does
not have a majority. It, therefore, has to form a broad
national unity government, bringing other parties in, even if
the Shi'a alliance holds together. So, I think they have a ways
to go yet.
Senator Kerry. But you'd agree with me that the key to that
national unity government, which we all understand is key----
Secretary Rice. Oh, of course.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. And we accept that----
Secretary Rice. It's absolutely key----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Is to get those ministries
filled with the proper people and to change the constitution.
Secretary Rice. It is, and it's also very important that
the Sunnis have wanted some changes to the constitution. That
is certainly something that will need to happen. But I would
let the Iraqi political process play out for a while here.
There is a lot of politics still to be done to bring together a
coalition. We keep talking as if Mr. Jaafari is the only issue
here. He's not.
Senator Kerry. No, I understand that.
Secretary Rice. He cannot govern without bringing others
onboard. And so, I'm quite sure that there will be many demands
from others as to what happens now, going forward. That,
indeed, is the nature of politics.
Senator Kerry. But the fundamental division of federalism,
which is a SCIRI party goal, major goal, with major political
ambitions attached to it, versus a national, ``unity,'' is a
real--that's a big tension.
Secretary Rice. Of course it's a tension, Senator. There
are tensions in any political system. You know, our own
political life began by being, unfortunately, unable, for a
number of years, to resolve the issue of slavery. We,
nonetheless, managed to create ourselves as a union. I don't
think the Iraqis have anything quite that bad yet on their
plate. And so, I would say let's let this maturing political
system now deal with the various tensions within it concerning
what will happen about federalism, what will happen to changes
in the constitution. These are precisely the discussions that
are going to have to go on for Mr. Jaafari or whoever becomes
Prime Minister to form a national unity government. Yes; we do
know some of the people that are being considered for key
posts. I think, obviously, we want to reserve those discussions
for the Iraqis rather than publicly talking about their own
process of government formation. But we're very involved in
helping them to work through this extremely difficult period.
But this is the core of their politics right now. So far,
they have demonstrated a capacity to get through every single
phase together rather than split apart. They did get through
the writing of a constitution together rather than splitting
apart. And I think they will continue to, because that's what
the political context is.
Senator, if I may just very briefly, though, on the
elections, because I agree with you, elections don't mean
democracy. I've never yet, however, seen a democracy begin
without an election. And so, we shouldn't underestimate the
importance of elections. What it means is that in our policies
we have to work harder to help develop civil society and
moderate political forces into political parties. That can't
happen in an authoritarian environment. The notion that you can
somehow have the practices of democracy underneath an
authoritarian regime so that then when you have an election you
have all of these well-developed parties that can compete, I
think, is just not logical. So, yes; I think you have to take,
if you will, the opportunity for an election to stimulate the
political system, then to begin the process of building a full-
fledged democracy.
As I said, elections don't mean democracy, but I've never
seen one begin without an election.
Senator Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the
comment. Actually, the American democracy began with a
revolution, not an election. And----
Secretary Rice. Yes, they held an election.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. The fact is----
Secretary Rice. Fairly soon afterward, I believe----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. I understand. But it began----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Senator, and that's when
democracy really began.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. With a revolution. Ultimately,
we had a civil war to resolve the issue of slavery, and there
are many people who argue that Iraq is already in a low-
intensity civil war. And if you don't resolve the differences
in this constitution, it will get worse.
So, my point, Mr. Chairman, is simply that there are a lot
of players over there, and a lot of others, who do not see the
pieces of the political pie--can we get there? I believe we
can. I think Senator Biden--there's a lot of us who have felt--
and we've sort of stuck with this concept that success is
critical. There's a way to get there.
Senator Biden. I think we're getting beyond it.
Senator Kerry. But there are a lot of people who feel that
opportunity after opportunity to realistically deal with that
is just being obliterated and ignored.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I would just urge a little
patience with the Iraqis. That was my point about the American
democracy, is it took us a while to work some of these issues
out. I don't think the Iraqis are headed toward a civil war.
Senator Kerry. You say a little patience. The American
people have already sustained a war that has gone on longer
than World War II, longer than it took us to beat the axis
powers, and have invested in ultimately what will be up to $300
billion, and some say $\1/2\ trillion before we finish. That's
pretty patient.
Secretary Rice. The Iraqis have been at the process of
government formation for 1 year. That is really not very long--
--
Senator Kerry. The only point----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. In history.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. I'm making, Madam Secretary----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. They had to overthrow,
Senator, a brutal dictator. And, yes; they've had to learn the
patterns of coming to terms with each other politically rather
than through violence. And that takes some time.
Senator Kerry. All I point to are the fundamentals. And if
the fundamentals remain as divided as they are--and growing
worse, not better--we have a problem.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, maybe, it's the beauty of America that we're so
strong, we're so rich, and we're so powerful that there's a
sense if we just did a little more, people would elect folks
that, you know, we'd like a little more. I would maintain
that--again, the election of Hamas is a horrible--it's
outrageous, and we have to deal with that, but that--the
failure of leadership is Abu Mazen. Failure is failure to deal
with corruption. And, you know, the democracy is a messy thing.
And I paraphrase Churchill. It's the worst form of government,
a messy form of government, but a far cry better than anything
else. I think there is a fundamental question that's being
asked here. Do we continue to support leadership that rejects,
ignores, the will of the people, or do we move forward with the
democratic process? I would hope we would continue to have the
courage to move forward with the democratic process, because I
agree with your sentiments, Madam Secretary, that you can't
develop a rule of law and civil society in oppressive regimes.
And so, these are some messy times now, but, goodness gracious,
I appreciate your--you disabusing us of the notion that somehow
they were the halcyon days of intifada and Arafat, of Saddam,
of Khomeini and the Taliban. That just wasn't the case. It's
tough today, but it was downright brutal and ugly awhile ago.
If I can just shift gears, focus a little bit on one of my
favorite subjects: U.N. reform. One of the issues, the areas
where there appears to be some movement, but an area of
concern, is the Human Rights Commission. Clearly, the reform
movement has not taken hold to the degree that we would like,
but there is some progress. I think Ambassador Bolton is doing
an outstanding job. My concern is, in particular, regarding the
Human Rights Commission. We're still at a stage right now where
we don't have criteria for membership. Some of the things on
the table would not allow for continuous membership. So, we
would be off again, and we wouldn't be part of this body. And
then, from everything that I've seen on the table, we're still
facing the situation where Israel is the only nation that's
still out of the process. Even in the Human Rights Council,
they're still--the absurdity of our democratic ally in the
Middle East not even being part of the process.
Do we have some bottom lines, in terms of the Human Rights
Commission? Are we just going to accept, you know, something
transformed that keeps us out at some point, that doesn't have
criteria, and that continues to block out Israel? Or are we
going to say we're--we want a Human Rights Council, but it's
got to be the right kind of Human Rights Council?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
We do not want just any Human Rights Council. We certainly
want something that is far better than the Human Rights
Commission, which we are, thankfully, abolishing, a commission
that once had Sudan as its chair, when Sudan was under the
sanction for genocide, so--a finding of genocide.
We are working very closely. I talked to Kofi Annan about
it when he was down. I think people understand that this needs
to be a different kind of body. We have, for instance, proposed
that it should not be possible to serve on the Human Rights
Council while you're under sanctions for terrorism or for human
rights abuses. This seems, to us, a rather self-evident matter.
But it isn't a terribly popular position, it turns out. So, we
will work with others to try and achieve some standards and
some criteria that make it possible to say that this Human
Rights Council actually has some standing to look at issues of
human rights. No, Senator, we don't want just any Human Rights
Council.
Senator Coleman. Well, I appreciate that. And, again, the
issue with Israel, and the United Nations has made some----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Reform there. They've
recognized the Holocaust. They're dealing----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. With the issue of anti-
Semitism in a different way. But to continually exclude, to
block out, is something that I--I think we have to draw some
lines and say that's not acceptable.
Secretary Rice. Absolutely.
Senator Coleman. Let me, if I can, refocus--we've gone from
the big picture--really, you know, focused locally. You know,
when I was a mayor, you say that the most important park was
not the national park, but the one in your backyard. Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative. Real security issues, in terms of
folks moving--getting in and out of this country. No question
about that. But for those of us who represent northern border
States, I've got kids in Minnesota who hop in a van, and they
go play hockey with kids right across the border, because there
aren't enough kids in--just in one part or the other. There is
a--economic ties that are strong. And there are family ties. We
have moved away, I believe, from purely the passport
perspective. But I just want to put on the table and have your
folks go back and reflect, we need something that is, one,
cost--you know, affordable. In Washington, 60 bucks, 70 bucks
may be the price of a lunch. That's a lot if you've got five
kids and you're in Warroad, you're in International Falls,
you're in Roseau, Minnesota. And so, you know, 15-20 bucks may
not be a lot, but $60-$70 is a lot for American families who
have got kids shooting across the border to play hockey on a
regular basis.
Portability, it's--you know, I mean, can't we, you know,
talk to MasterCard or Visa, and you get a little card you can
stick in your pocket, so if you're fishing in--you know, on--in
Rainy River, and you--something falls in the lake or something,
you can put it back in your pocket and replace it, cheap? And
the issue--other thing is, you've perhaps noticed that there
are businesses and others--right now, we're suffering. They
happen to be--people believe that you can't go to Canada now
without a passport. My son asked me that the other day. As it
is, we're not looking to 2008, but there are businesses that
are being impacted now.
So, you know, perhaps do a pilot project, perhaps do
something that we can test whether it works. But this is one of
those little things, Madam Secretary, that's a big thing. And I
would hope we'd continue to retool this, because I've got folks
who are concerned about their economic livelihood. As it is,
there isn't a lot of industry up there. Tourism is a big part
of it. And if they're impacted--if we put in place something
that prevents families from easy access moving across--
dissuades folks from wanting to go up there, it's going to have
a terrible--it's going to have a negative impact in a place
that really can't afford that kind of impact.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
We will continue to look at the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative. Probably the first person who didn't like the idea
of passports was the former Governor of Texas, who came to us
and said, ``You can't do this. You don't know how traffic moves
on the Texas-Mexico border''--and, of course, for Canada and
the northern States. And so, Mike Chertoff and I have been
working on this. We have come up with the idea of this single
card. We will obviously try to make it as affordable as
possible, as easy as possible, while recognizing that there's a
good security reason for having some form of identification
that is standard.
Senator Coleman. Appreciate it. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, good morning. Since this is a hearing on
the President's budget on foreign affairs, I want to ask you
some specific questions about the budget and the policy reasons
behind the President's priorities.
We have serious challenges all over Latin America, the
Caribbean, and Central America. It seems to me that the policy
driving the proposed cuts in the President's budget for
assistance to various nations is a wrongheaded policy. So I
would like to give you a forum to explain, for example, the
reason for the cuts in the assistance program to El Salvador
from $22 million to $7 million.
Secretary Rice. Yes. Well, Senator, I was with the Foreign
Ministers, last night, of El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, and
Panama. And we talked about the region and ways to strengthen
American and democratic influences in the region.
El Salvador is obviously a very important partner. We are
about to work with El Salvador--and it's going very well--for a
Millennium Challenge Account compact, which will be a
substantial increase, then, in foreign assistance to El
Salvador. And, as is the case with Nicaragua and Honduras, some
of the cuts in other kinds of assistance are where there was
some overlap in that kind of assistance that now we expect the
Millennium Challenge compacts to be addressing, but also
something of a shift in the way that we are going to,
therefore, deliver foreign assistance to some countries that we
think are at a stage where they are governed wisely, where they
have largely rooted out corruption, and where we're, therefore,
able to work with them in a different way through the
Millennium Challenge Program. It's not that we have cut,
overall. As we've put Millennium Challenge money in, we haven't
cut development assistance as a routine matter, because we
continue to do development assistance, and we continue to do
economic support fund assistance for these countries.
Senator Nelson. Let me----
Secretary Rice. We will have a very large--a large compact
with El Salvador.
Senator Nelson. Well, let's correct, for the record, just
on your statement there. You say you haven't cut it, overall,
but the President's request for development assistance overall
in Latin America is cut by 28\1/2\ percent.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I said worldwide, as a routine
matter, we have not, as we've gone in with Millennium
Challenge, then decided, all right, we've got a Millennium
Challenge, we're going to cut development assistance. It wasn't
in specific to Latin America.
Senator Nelson. Well, the nature of my questions are with
regard to Latin America. We've covered other areas. And I don't
think things are going too well for us in Latin America. I'm
concerned that the Latin American people are not holding us in
high esteem. So I wonder why we suddenly have a policy of
cutting development assistance to Latin America. Now, you've
explained three countries--Nicaragua, Honduras, and El
Salvador. You said that even though those cuts occur--and
they're Draconian cuts--you say that's going to be made up with
the Millennium Challenge, if that is awarded. And they haven't
been announced----
Secretary Rice. Well, they have----
Senator Nelson [continuing]. To those countries.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. They have been, for Nicaragua
and Honduras. Those compacts are in place and announced.
Senator Nelson. Not in El Salvador.
Secretary Rice. El Salvador. El Salvador is still being
negotiated. That's right.
Senator Nelson. So, you seem to make it up there, but what
about the rest of Latin America which gets a huge cut of 28\1/
2\ percent?
Secretary Rice. Senator, there are some cuts in development
assistance to some countries in Latin America. I can get you an
answer that goes country by country, because there are
different explanations in many of these cases.
[The submitted written answer to the information requested
follows:]
Foreign assistance for the region has nearly doubled since the
start of the administration, rising from $862,452,000 in FY 2001 to
$1,696,841,000 in FY 2007. Although the current request for Latin
America represents an overall decrease of 1 percent from the FY 2006
request, this does not reflect a reduced commitment to Latin America.
We have prioritized our foreign policy goals against available
resources and competing demands for assistance. For example, reductions
for middle-income countries where the need is not as great allows us to
increase assistance in areas such as Africa, where the need is greater.
Moreover, in addition to our FY 2007 request, we will be providing
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funding to Nicaragua, Honduras,
and Paraguay, increasing our overall assistance to the region.
Since the MCC was established in 2004, it has approved compacts for
Nicaragua ($175 million) and Honduras ($215 million). Bolivia submitted
a proposal in December 2005, and discussions are pending Bolivia naming
a senior negotiator. We expect El Salvador to submit its proposal later
this fiscal year for a significant amount of assistance. On February 8,
MCC's Board approved a $37 million program for Paraguay as a Threshold
Country, one that has shown political commitment to good governance but
has not yet achieved the policy reforms that could make it eligible for
a compact. Guyana has also been selected as a Threshold Country, but
does not yet have an approved program. MCC funding has increased the
total resources available to the region.
We believe our overall funding is at a level that will help us
achieve our foreign policy goals in Latin America--even as we
incorporate transformational diplomacy strategies across the board that
will result in more effective foreign assistance. We have, in fact,
requested additional resources to better focus on those activities that
will stimulate growth and be truly transformational. To stimulate
growth in the CAFTA-DR states, in addition to the $20 million in
Economic Supports Funds (ESF) and $20 million in Development Assistance
(DA) that has been requested for labor and environment, we have
requested $30 million for rural development in the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, and Guatemala ($10 million each).
Our funding request reflects our commitment to focus assistance on
trade and capacity building as we believe our greatest benefit can be
drawn from trade and economic growth. U.S.-accumulated direct
investment in the region is $325 billion, and two-way trade between the
United States and the region was $443 billion for the first 11 months
of 2005. We have free trade agreements (FTAs) in place with Canada,
Mexico, and Chile. The CAFTA-DR agreement has now entered into force
with El Salvador as of March 1, to be followed as soon as possible with
Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, and
eventually Costa Rica. FTA negotiations were concluded with Peru on
December 7, 2005, with Colombia on February 27, 2006, and are ongoing
with Panama and Ecuador.
During the budget hearing, you asked Secretary Rice, specifically,
about our funding for Haiti. Since 2004, we pledged over $400 million
in assistance to help the Haitian people and transform Haiti into a
more stable, prosperous, and democratic nation, This does not include
our contribution of $261.5 million to the U.N. mission (MINUSTAH) over
this same period. We coordinate closely with donor partners to ensure
all priorities are funded and to avoid redundancies. Other donors
pledged a total of $970 million over the FY 2005-FY 2006 period. The
multidonor Interim Cooperation Framework launched in July 2004 at the
Haiti Donors' Conference at the World Bank will be extended until the
end of 2007 to ensure continued support to the next government. We look
forward to the next high-level donors' pledging conference slated for
later this year to reinforce this close coordination among donors and
confirm the international community's long-term commitment toward
Haiti. As Secretary Rice stated during her testimony, we will take a
look at what level of support we will need to give, and what support we
will need to get others to give to Haiti.
USAID's current multiyear Haiti strategy concludes at the end of FY
2006 and a new country strategy begins in FY 2007. Our assistance
program to Haiti funds jobs, environment and natural resource
management, vocational training, food assistance and medical care, as
well as technical advice and budget support to the government. We
provide healthcare services to over a third of the Haitian population,
and over 2.2 million vaccination doses for children. We are fighting
AIDS by reinforcing prevention efforts, expanding testing, and
providing antiretroviral treatment throughout the country. In addition,
we support civil society organizations and the media, and provide
credit to small and microentrepreneurs. With the inauguration of the
new government, we and our international partners will look for
additional opportunities to introduce new programs to strengthen the
Parliament and improve capacity at the local level.
As you are aware, 2006 is the year of elections across Latin
America. We are looking at all of the new governments that may have new
requirements and we very much want to make sure that we fund them
adequately. Enclosed are the individual country and regional program
descriptions from the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) that
explain our request in greater detail.
[Editor's note.--The submitted information mentioned above from the
Congressional Budget Justification was too voluminous to include in the
printed hearing. It will be retained in the permanent record of the
committee.]
Secretary Rice. It is also the case that we have had to
refocus some of the assistance on places where we think there
is greater relative need.
Senator Nelson. Elsewhere in the world.
Secretary Rice. Elsewhere in the world.
Senator Nelson. Outside of----
Secretary Rice. Outside----
Senator Nelson. All right. Well, then let me bring you to a
place that we have an enormous amount of strife right now:
Haiti. Haiti needs a long-term commitment from the United
States, as well as the rest of the world, to have a chance to
improve its situation. And here we are, hanging by our
fingernails every day now on a disputed election and so forth,
and yet the administration, for example, in development
assistance, has included a cut to Haiti in its proposal to the
Congress--we're going to make the decisions, but I'm trying to
find out from you the policy reasons why, in the poorest nation
in the Western Hemisphere, we would cut development assistance
from $29.7 million to $23.1 million, and child health and
survival, which includes vaccinations, that we would cut from
$19.8 million to $15.8 million.
Secretary Rice. Senator, if you take our overall funding
for Haiti, it is level, if you look at economic support funding
and the like. But let me just note that we made a commitment to
Haiti, in the donors conference, for 400 million dollars' worth
of assistance. That was our commitment to Haiti. That has been
apportioned as follows: 2004, $101 million; 2005, $209 million;
and 2006, $194 million. So, we have met those requirements.
We will continue to look at what will need to be done in
Haiti now that there will be a new government. We have to
remember that we've also been supporting the efforts of others
in peacekeeping, in election assistance, and the like. So, I
think the development assistance piece doesn't show the entire
picture for what we're doing for Haiti.
But I would be the first to agree that we're going to have
to take a look, as we look forward to next year's budget, for
now, with hopefully a stable government in Haiti, not a
transitional government, on what support we will need to give
and what support we will need to get others to give to Haiti.
And I think that's a fair question. We will have to look at
that level of support.
Senator Nelson. Well, this Senator is going to try to
increase that budget. Am I going to get some resistance from
you?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I never like to turn down money,
particularly in a good cause. I would just say that I think we
believe we've adequately funded our needs in Haiti, but we are
well aware that, in a couple of cases around the world--Haiti
is one, Liberia is another--we're looking at new governments
that may have new requirements, and we very much want to make
sure that we adequately fund them.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Let the Chair just mention that we've tried desperately,
from the beginning, to make sure every Senator can be heard
today. We have four Senators still to be heard. We have about
24 minutes. The Secretary will need to leave at 11:45. And so,
the Chair will ask each Senator to cooperate in trying to
maintain something close to the 5 minutes.
Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dr.
Rice, and welcome.
For Senator Coleman, I was up at the Super Bowl and met
with some of our Homeland Security people there, shippers and
trucks that go over the bridges and tunnel, and the ferry that
goes across there from Windsor to Detroit. They've done a great
job using technology and making sure commerce is actually
moving more quickly than before 9/11. So, maybe that would be a
model, where Homeland Security can work in Minnesota.
Two areas I want to discuss with you; Hamas and the Iran
Sanctions Act.
On Hamas, Secretary Rice, what is the administration's
efforts going to be to make sure that no U.S. funding finds its
way to Hamas? How do you plan to deal with the kinds of
assistance that are sometimes characterized as humanitarian? In
your answer, if you could, sometimes we fund various
international agencies, it might be the United Nations or
others, that funding somehow could get into the hands of Hamas.
If you could share the administration plan with me, because I
don't want a penny of American taxpayers' money going to fund
Hamas.
Secretary Rice. No, I understand, Senator, and neither do
I. We are reviewing all of our programs, and reviewing them
piece by piece, so that we know exactly how moneys would move,
and the like.
I've already let the Palestinians know that I have to
secure moneys that were put forward for Gaza withdrawal
reconstruction, because, frankly, that is money that would be
available to the Government of the Palestinians. And if that
government is Hamas, then that government cannot have that
money. So, we're making some efforts, already, to secure
funding that may have been already granted.
On the matter of the rest of the funding, we do want to be
responsive to humanitarian concerns. You know, we want to be
able to continue to support immunization of Palestinian
children. We want to be able to continue to support the
refugees, something that we have been doing for a very, very
long time. We do it through nongovernmental organizations and
through U.N. agencies. But we will look very hard at what the
path, if you will, would be for the use of those moneys.
I do think we want to continue to be responsive on
humanitarian needs. I think it would not be in our character to
refuse to immunize Palestinian children because Hamas is in the
government. But that portion of the funding that would go to
support the government, whether it is reconstruction projects
or budget support or anything of the like, we've been very
clear that, unless the Palestinian Government, whatever its
composition, is prepared to recognize Israel and to carry out
the other requirements of the Quartet, that no money will go to
that government.
Senator Allen. Insofar as the refugees, what funding are
you referring to?
Secretary Rice. Well, there are refugee camps in the
Palestinian territories, in Gaza.
Senator Allen. Right.
Secretary Rice. And we have--through the U.N. refugee fund,
we have given some funding, over many years, to support those
refugee camps, much as we support refugee camps in Darfur or
other places. And I think we will want to look at how that
works. But I want to reserve that we really have to look hard
at the humanitarian needs versus government support. And
government support, we absolutely will not do.
Senator Allen. Good.
Now, insofar as the Iran--actually, it's my understanding
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act will be expiring sometime this
summer. I believe it's in August. I presume that it'll be
reauthorized. Are there any specific suggestions that the
administration will have to that act? Changes, additions,
deletions? If you could share those with us, please.
Secretary Rice. Thank you. Thank you, Senator. I think we
want to do a careful look at where we are in a couple of
months, in terms of where we are with our allies. We are in a
different phase now. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, I think, has
been very useful to us as a tool, but we're in a different
phase now. And so, I appreciate your suggestion, and I'll take
it as an invitation to review with concerned Members of
Congress how we might think about the reauthorization under new
circumstances. I'm not really prepared to give you answers now,
specifically, but we will do that work.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Dr. Rice.
I'll yield back the matter of seconds I have not consumed.
[Laughter.]
Thank you, Dr. Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
Let me just mention that Senator Obama and Senator Martinez
have been with us well over an hour, and I'm going to recognize
them in that order, and then we'll proceed back into the
regular order.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice, let me--I want to touch on three things.
And, since my time is limited, I want to make sure everybody
gets a chance. You know, if we can keep our answers, and my
questions, relatively brief, that would be terrific.
First, on Iraq. Let's stipulate that elections and
democracy are superior to authoritarianism and torture. So,
we'll--that, I think, is a given. I think the concern that
you've heard, from some of the panelists at least, is that,
although we recognize the need for patience in Iraq, that
democracy takes some time, that the back and forth between the
various factions is not untypical of a fledgling democracy,
there is a difference between what's going on in Iraq and what
happened in the United States during our early formative years,
and that was, there wasn't a third country--or there wasn't an
outside power that was financing this entire experiment, our
experiment. And, you know, we have spent, as has been
mentioned, $300 billion. You know, the estimates may be higher.
We've lost a substantial number of young men and women, who
have served us bravely. And so, I think the bottom line, I
guess, is, At what point do we say that we are going to start
ratcheting down our involvement as the Iraqis figure out what
it is that they want to do?
So, I think a lot of the questions are prompted not by some
unrealistic notion of how quickly Iraqis should get their act
together, but, rather, the fact that we're on the hook for
blood and treasure. And this administration has suggested
that--has been open-ended, in terms of its commitments. And so,
let me be very specific on the question. You know, there has
been discussion about a phased withdrawal. And the question is
whether we can anticipate, given the direction that
negotiations between the various factions in Iraq have been
proceeding, whether or not such a phased withdrawal is
advisable, would help send a signal to the Shi'as that we're
not going to be here forever, and that they need to negotiate
with the Sunnis, and would start signaling to the Iraqi
population that, in fact, we are not interested in permanent
bases and long-term occupation there?
Secretary Rice. Well, on the latter point, first of all,
the United States is not seeking permanent bases around the
world very much anymore. And, in fact, we're moving permanent
bases out of most of the world back to the United States. So, I
think----
Senator Obama. I understand. But the----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. But----
Senator Obama [continuing]. This is a specific perception
on the----
Secretary Rice. No.
Senator Obama [continuing]. Part, and----
Secretary Rice. No; I understand, Senator. I certainly do.
My perception of this, or my way of thinking about this, is
that rather than talking about phased withdrawal, we need to
talk about what needs to be accomplished for the conditions to
be proper for the United States to begin to diminish its
presence. We have gone from 17 to 15 brigades just----
Senator Obama. Well, then----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Just recently.
Senator Obama. I'm less interested in terminology. And I
don't mean to interrupt you, but I've got a couple of other
questions. So, the--I guess what I'm saying is, Are conditions
being met that would then allow for a phased withdrawal?
Secretary Rice. I don't want to use the term ``phased
withdrawal,'' but I think the conditions are being met that
will lead to more and more transfer to the Iraqi forces
themselves of responsibility for their security, for the
control of their territory----
Senator Obama. So, you are optimistic that the direction--
--
Secretary Rice. I am----
Senator Obama [continuing]. That the direction----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. I am----
Senator Obama [continuing]. That the democracy----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Optimistic----
Senator Obama [continuing]. Is leading----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. The direction; yes.
Senator Obama [continuing]. Will allow us to start bringing
troops home.
Secretary Rice. I am optimistic that the United States is
seeing Iraqis step up, take responsibility for security, take
responsibility for controlling their territory, that the
government-formation process is moving----
Senator Obama. Madam Secretary, you're----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Ahead.
Senator Obama. Very good----
Secretary Rice. Yes. And----
Senator Obama [continuing]. But what I'm asking----
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Obama [continuing]. You is----
Secretary Rice. Senator, I----
Senator Obama. You're not going to answer the question, is
what you're saying.
Secretary Rice. No. What I'm saying is, I do believe that
this is going in the right direction. And, as the President
said, when it's going in the right direction, we have no desire
to be there any longer in any larger numbers than we need to
be.
Senator Obama. OK. Well, the--we're a little stuck here.
And you--you parried that well. I have to say that the question
that the American people want to know is, At what point can we
end the large-scale commitments that are costing us billions of
dollars and have, so far, cost us thousands of lives? And so,
that's really the bottom line. And if--people are impatient not
about Iraq, they're impatient about our commitments, which are
putting us in the red.
Iran. There has been some significant progress in getting
China and Russia and others onboard to send a strong signal to
Iran that, in fact, the pursuit of nuclear weapons is not
acceptable. My specific questions are, Have we reached the
point where there is agreement among Russians, Chinese,
Indians, others, in the form that sanctions or penalties or
signals to the Iranians--what those would look like? You don't
have--and then you may not want to articulate all of them. I'm
sure that there's a menu of choices. I guess what I'm saying
is, Do we have--is your sense that those folks are moving along
with us, or are they just saying a lot of pretty words, but
aren't as committed as we are on this issue?
Secretary Rice. Well, earlier I had mentioned that I think
it's not going to be easy to come to agreement about what the
course ought to be, in terms of sanctions. But I do believe
that we're having those discussions. The more Iran does the
kinds of things that it did today, in starting enrichment and
reprocessing, and, therefore, defying the international
community, the more I think you will see people come together
around a set of consequences for Iran's behavior.
We are in very intense discussions with our colleagues
about what that menu might look like, about how that menu might
play out over time. I don't want to get ahead of the
diplomacy----
Senator Obama. I understand.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. But we are in those
discussions.
The Chairman. Senator Obama, I----
Senator Obama. Am I out of time? Can I just ask one last
question? And they're--on this Iran topic?--and that is, the
Russians have proposed a very specific plan to provide some
face-saving to the Iranians, should they back down.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Obama. Is it the administration's position that
that is a viable framework, provided that there was strong
verification and that, in fact, the Iranians were behaving?
Secretary Rice. We do support the Russian plan, because we
believe it achieves the essential thing, which is not to allow
enrichment and reprocessing to take place on Iranian soil. We
also would note that the President, all the way back in his
speech at the National Defense University, talked about fuel
assurances for countries that might want to build a civil
nuclear power, but should not have the full fuel cycle. And so,
the Russian proposal is consistent with those, although there
are certain elements that I think we would have to continue to
work through with them. We are supportive of the Russian
efforts.
Senator Obama. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for
your courtesy.
And thank you, Madam Secretary. It's good to see you.
I think that it's important that, you know, we point out
the fact that elections do require more than--I'm sorry,
democracies do require more than election day. And one of the
troubling signals we've seen in recent--the year or two--is the
elections of Mr. Chavez in Venezuela not followed by
democratic-like behavior, becoming more and more of a
totalitarian. So, I hope when we look at elections as being
only determinative of what happened on one given day, we do it
across the board, and not just selectively.
I also want to commend the President for reaching out to
Evo Morales, a person who has not had publicly kind things to
say about the President--in fact, quite unusual for heads of
state to comment in that fashion--but that he did, in fact,
place a phone call to him, and--that I thought was a terrific
moment of reaching out.
And I guess what I would point out is that bad behavior
around the world does not always depend upon the actions of the
United States, but that people sometimes behave badly on their
very own, with or without the assistance of what we may or may
not do.
And speaking of bad behavior, Iran and its troubling
tendencies appear to also be headed in our region. You know,
Florida's backyard is our Western Hemisphere, so I concern
myself greatly with what happens there. And in recent days,
we've seen increasing diplomatic interaction between Iran and
Cuba and Venezuela, two countries that voted not to send Iran
to the Security Council because of their very dangerous
behavior in nuclear weapons.
I want you to--I'm going to follow the chairman's example--
I want you to comment on that, if you would, in addition to
also further comment on the fact that the MCA was, in my
understanding, not intended to take the place of other
assistance. So, again, on the issue of cuts to the region of
Latin America, I'm greatly concerned, and share the concern of
Senator Nelson there.
And, third, if you could comment also on the migration
accords with Cuba. Recently, we've seen some very troubling
situations there. One is this incident with the bridge and the
wet-foot/dry-foot thing, which, frankly, no one can quite
understand how we got to that. And, second, yesterday, in the
Wall Street Journal, it was pointed out the story of the--a
very compelling story of these two--a couple, husband and wife,
who were trying to be reunited with their family here in the
United States, escape Cuba, because Cuba would not let them
leave legally, even though the United States had granted them a
visa, and now find themselves in very deplorable conditions
being detained in the Bahamas. Whether you're aware of the
situation and what we might be doing to encourage the Bahamas
to behave neighborly and release these folks so they might join
their families here.
Secretary Rice. Thank you. Senator, I was not aware, until
I saw the Journal piece, and I will--we will get back to you
with an answer.
[Editor's note.--The committee understands that the Office
of the Secretary of State provided the requested information
orally to Senator Martinez.]
Senator Martinez. Ambassador Rood has been great on this--
--
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Martinez [continuing]. To the point of visiting
them, and so forth.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Martinez. And we've been back and forth with
letters. But more action, I think, is required.
Secretary Rice. Yes. I understand.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
Secretary Rice. On Cuba, generally, as you know, we have
tried to have a humane migration policy, but one that does not
somehow encourage Fidel Castro to play games with our--with
migration policy, which he is wont to do, as you well know,
from Florida. And so, we have maintained a policy that I think
balances those two elements. But when we have a case of the
kind that you are talking about, we try to remember that, of
course, Cuba is a terrible dictatorship, and that people are
fleeing for reasons of political oppression, not just economic
matters. And so, that's why the policy on Cuba has been
different than the policy on some other places.
In terms of Iran, yes; it was interesting that those who
voted with Iran were Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela. And we have--
we believe that it is very important that those in this
hemisphere recognize that whatever they may think this is, in
terms of sticking a thumb in the eye of the United States, it's
really a thumb in the eye of the international community,
because that vote in the IAEA was a solid one that included
Egypt and China and all kinds of countries in the consensus.
And so, I think that's a message that needs to be sent.
And, finally, on the issue of elections, I agree that
election day is just election day. The follow-on that we've
been emphasizing in our region is that it's not an issue for us
of whether you're elected from right or left, it's an issue of
whether, after elected, you, in fact, govern democratically.
And that is the challenge, I think, in our hemisphere, is to
make sure that people who are elected, govern democratically.
But I just want to say, again, as you would agree, Senator,
let's also not undervalue the fact that free and fair elections
do matter, because you cannot have a democracy unless there are
free and fair elections. It is not a sufficient condition, but
it certainly is a necessary one. But then we have to make sure
that we send the message that people govern democratically.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I join my colleagues in welcoming you here
this morning. I regret that we weren't able to have the hearing
yesterday, because I think you had set aside a considerable
amount of time for yesterday's hearings. But apparently a
political event Monday night led to the cancellation of
yesterday's hearings, and I regret that that took place.
Actually, I want to ask some questions about the
President's budget for foreign affairs, which I understood to
be the topic of the hearing.
I've always been concerned about us lagging behind in the
payment of various assessed obligations we've undertaken. Other
countries are meeting them, but we fall behind. For instance,
in the Multilateral Development Banks, we're now behind in our
contributions to the Inter-American Investment Corporation and
the Multilateral Investment Fund. And the administration isn't
seeking, in this budget, to take care of those arrearages. At
the Global Environment Facility, I gather there are no other
countries, other than the United States, in arrears there. Why
aren't we addressing that problem?
Secretary Rice. Well, we do have budgetary constraints that
sometimes we have to live with some arrearages. We have tried
to make those minimal, and we've tried to live up to our
obligations to make certain that the organizations do not
experience, in a sense, a cash-flow problem because the United
States is not paying. And I think we are living up to that
obligation.
Senator Sarbanes. I have a suggestion for you, in the face
of your budget constraints. The Millennium Challenge
Corporation is building up huge balances. In fact, it's
estimated that, with the request you've just made, which is for
another $3 billion--even if you assume their most optimistic
projections about paying money out and signing these compacts--
there will be over $3\1/2\ billion in unobligated funds.
Secretary Rice. Senator, we just had the Millennium
Challenge Account board meeting. And, in fact, the numbers
suggest that, with the increased capacity that John Danilovich
has brought on, and with an active program, that they will seek
to approve 11 new compacts worth over $4 billion in fiscal year
2007. They've already signed five compacts, over $900 million,
to date. And they have another seven pending, which would be $2
billion. So, they would have, by the end of fiscal year 2007,
absorbed all appropriated requested funding. In fact, they, in
the board meeting, were concerned that we might now be getting
into a position in which we would have to be--start to draw
back on our negotiation of contracts, because we might not have
the funding there.
Senator Sarbanes. They've been telling us----
Secretary Rice. You will find that----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. They've been telling us that
for a long time. We were told last spring that all of the $2.5
billion that had been appropriated would be obligated by the
end of calendar year 2005. The last quarterly report showed
$435 million cumulative disbursements through 2005. Even if you
take into account the compacts they've signed, totaling another
$900 million, they are still falling well short of coming
anywhere near what they had projected.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think it took some time to get
this corporation up and running, and it took some time to get
the right processes in place. But they have fundamentally, and
very aggressively, accelerated this process now, and they
anticipate that, at the end of FY 2007, they will have fully
spent their appropriated funding.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, it's on the radar screen. We're
going to watch that very closely.
I want to ask one question about your peacekeeping. We're
lagging, falling behind, as well, in meeting our peacekeeping
obligations.
Why have you not requested funding for the U.N. force in
Cyprus? We've consistently funded that over the years, and the
peacekeeping contribution for Cyprus has been zeroed out in the
fiscal 2007 request.
Secretary Rice. Senator, the funding that we requested on
peacekeeping, we believe, will meet our obligations. I will get
back to you with a specific answer on Cyprus.
[The submitted written answer to the information requested
follows:]
The United States has been and remains a strong supporter of the
United Nations role in seeking a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus.
UNFICYP has been an important part of this effort, and we will continue
to work closely with the mission to ensure it remains an effective
force supporting the eventual renunification of Cyprus. The
Department's FY 2006 appropriation includes $4,678,000 for UNFICYP. As
you noted, the Department's FY 2007 budget proposal includes no funding
for the UNFICYP mission. UNFICYP's mandate is expected to be renewed
again for 6 months in June against current fiscal year funding. Should
the pace of the political process require further renewals into FY
2007, we believe we will be able to reallocate funds within the CIPA
account to continue our support for UNFICYP and its important mission.
Progress toward a Cyprus settlement will require creative thinking
and constructive dialogue. The United States is encouraging the United
Nations and the parties to the dispute to work together to move the
Cyprus settlement process forward. We welcome all proposals that seek
to break the current deadlock, and hope that all parties will engage
and remain flexible and creative. The United States stands ready to
assist the United Nations and the parties in this effort.
Secretary Rice. But we believe that this will meet our
obligations. I will say that because there are new peacekeeping
duties, we did seek, in the supplemental last year, some help
and relief for peacekeeping funding. We did receive it, and
this time, we believe, in our 2007 budget, we have accounted
for what we need to do the peacekeeping that is immediately
before us. I think you will see, in the supplemental, that
there will probably be some requests for peacekeeping in
Darfur, because that is not a part of the 2007 budget. But this
funds our peacekeeping obligations as well as we can do, given
other budget constraints.
Senator Sarbanes. No; I'm specifically asking about the
Cyprus money. The budget request assumes that the mission will
be terminated in fiscal year 2007. And, of course, then you
zero it out in your chart, as well----
Secretary Rice. Well, of course, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. But why--what's the basis
for----
Secretary Rice. Senator, we are, of course, working to try
to get a resolution of the Cyprus situation. Cyprus, of course,
now is a member of the European Union. There is a lot that is
happening on the political front in that regard. If it becomes
necessary to continue that mission, then we'll find the money
for it and try to reprogram it, or try to meet the obligation.
But we believe that a lot, politically, is changing with that,
including Cyprus's incorporation into the European Union.
Senator Sarbanes. And how does that affect the
peacekeeping?
Secretary Rice. Because, Senator, we're working very hard
now to get back to where we were a year ago, which was, at the
time of the Annan plan, with which I know there were some
disagreements, to actually resolve this conflict. Should there
be need for continued peacekeeping there, we'll meet the
obligation.
Senator Sarbanes. Why don't we do it the other way? Provide
the money, and then, if you don't need it, then you're in a
better position to take care of some of these other needs, as
well.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, we have a lot of----
Senator Sarbanes. I mean, we could----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. A lot of----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. We could drop----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Budget demands.
Senator Sarbanes. We could put a zero line for a lot of
things in here, on some kind of favorable assumption about
what's going to happen.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, we have a lot of budget
demands, and we're balancing a lot of requirements. But we'll
meet our obligations if we need to.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Murkowski, the final questioner of our Secretary.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
And my question, and probably the Secretary's response will
be less than a minute, recognizing the Secretary's time.
We're going to get to the point where every time you look
at me you're going to think of the Arctic and what we need to
do there. But--your responses have ranged all over the globe--
but no concerns raised thus far, as they relate to the Arctic
and Arctic policy. And, as you know, that's something that I
have been encouraging those in the State Department to work
with us on, and we're going to have a lot more conversation
about it.
Specifically, 2007 is the International Polar Year. All
eyes are going to be on Alaska and the United States and our
role in that international event. My question to you this
morning is, What funding, if any, is included in the budget for
this international event next year?
Secretary Rice. I will have to get back to you, Senator. I
don't know the specifics.
[The submitted written answer to the information requested
follows:]
The President requested funding to support this event as a part of
the National Science Foundation's budget submission. There is no
specific request for additional funding for the International Polar
Year (IPY) in the Department's FY 2007 submission.
The Department is participating in activities associated with the
IPY through the Office of Oceans Affairs within the Bureau of Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES/OA). OES/OA
has provided funding for the Arctic Human Health Initiative, and Arctic
Council IPY project and is currently reviewing funding requests for IPY
activities. The Department routinely receives a specific appropriation
originated by Congress for the Artic Council, which supports activities
associated with events like the IPY.
Secretary Rice. Obviously, we have wanted to work with you
on the Arctic Council, because not only is it important, but
it's also good for our relations, I think, with Russia, where
we need more cooperative efforts. And so, if we've not been as
responsive as we should on that issue, then we will try to be
more responsive.
Senator Murkowski. We look forward to working with you on
this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Dodd just appeared. Let me just say, the Secretary
needs to go, but I'll recognize you, Senator Dodd, for----
Senator Dodd. I understand that, and I apologize to you,
Madam Secretary. We had a--hearings on Katrina over in the
Banking Committee with Senator Shelby this morning, with our
colleagues testifying. And so, I apologize. Trying to be two
places at once. I just had a meeting with the delegates from
Mexico over here. We have the Interparliamentary meeting coming
up in a couple of weeks in Mexico, and I've attended those over
the last 25 years. And so, in preparation of that, as well, I
apologize.
I must say, Mr. Chairman, I noticed, at Coretta Scott
King's funeral, a very full-throated Secretary of State during
some of the wonderful music that was at that ceremony. I was
with my colleague from Delaware. We went down together for
that. And I commend you----
Senator Biden. And neither one of us can sing. [Laughter.]
Senator Dodd. Oh, I know. I was jealous.
Secretary Rice. I'm a minister's daughter.
Senator Dodd. I gathered that. I was----
Secretary Rice. I grew up in church choirs. [Laughter.]
Senator Dodd [continuing]. I was thinking that. Let me
raise a--and I gather you've been over a lot of the issues that
I would have raised, and substantive matters here, before the
committee--obviously, Haiti and occurrences in Latin America.
And I know you're busy. I want to raise a subject matter with
you, Madam Secretary, that is obviously somewhat sensitive to
people--but I know Senator Kerry addressed this, to some
degree--but the issue of these unauthorized wire taps has come
up recently, and the declassification of classified materials.
And when you were the National Security Advisor, I gather
decisions were made to go forward with these wire taps, outside
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the FISA Act. And
I'd be remiss if I didn't ask you here to shed some light on
all of this, since this was the time period when you were
sitting in that chair. What role, if any, did you play in the
administration's decision to undertake any of these wire taps
without warrants? Were you aware they were going on at the time
without recourse to the FISA process? And why was this
necessary? If you might shed some light with us, please.
Secretary Rice. Certainly. Senator, I will not try to speak
to the authorities question. I think the Attorney General has
spoken to that, and is better positioned to speak to that. But
this was done under the President's authorities, the
constitution, and also under statute. But from the point of the
view of the National Security Advisor--that is, from----
Senator Dodd. Right.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. The security point of view--I
was, indeed, aware. I felt very strongly that what the 9/11
experience had told us was that we had a gap between what was
going on--an intelligence gap between what was going on inside
the country, in terms of cells that were operating here,
hijackers who, indeed, were operating in the country and
communicating to people outside the country about those
terrorist acts, and that that was a scene that we had to close.
And the assessment of the professionals was that the FISA--and,
by the way, we used FISA, and used it aggressively--but that
FISA would not permit the kind of rapid and flexible and quick
use of the surveillance in order to pick up the conversations
that would be taking place between people who might have
intentions to hurt us here and people plotting and planning
outside the country.
I was convinced, myself, that this was a program that was
limited in its scope to terrorism, that it was a program that
was under the President's authorities, and that it was a
program that was absolutely necessary.
Senator Dodd. Was there any debate about the issue of
sidestepping the FISA requirements, that you can recall?
Secretary Rice. I think, Senator, had the President
believed, and had we believed, that it was possible to do this
under FISA, that that would have been done. But the nature of
what was being done here, which is not against the kind of
fixed----
Senator Dodd. I think we agree on that.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Longer term targets----
Senator Dodd. I think all of us sort of agree on that. I
listened, over the weekend, to our former Democratic leader,
Tom Daschle, and Jane Harman, as well as the two Republican
leaders of intelligence, and I found that they sort of
expressed my views. All of us sort of agree that we ought to
have a program that allows us to be able to protect America,
where there is conversations occurring here.
The issue really was about this--the issue of the
warrantless decision. And that's the hub of the question,
really; not whether or not there ought to be a program, but
whether we step aside the warrant approach on this thing.
Secretary Rice. I understand, Senator. And my only point to
you is that I was convinced--I think, along with others--that
we did not have the option of doing it under FISA, as it
currently existed, and that it did not give the kind of agility
and flexibility that was needed for the specific kinds of
programs that needed to be run.
Senator Dodd. Do you know--are you aware that FISA does
allow for retroactive approval? So, you can actually conduct
the wire tap, and then go back and get the approval, after the
fact.
Secretary Rice. I am aware, Senator, but there--those who
do this for a living had conversations with the President, and
with all of us, about what was required, and that FISA did not
give the kind of agility and flexibility that was necessary to
do it. And I, frankly, felt that we were blind and deaf at the
time of September 11, and that our highest obligation was not
to be blind and deaf again.
Senator Dodd. Let me quickly--and I--again, you're being
patient with your time, and I appreciate it, but I wanted to
ask about the declassification of classified materials, as
well. And I realize I'm going back a bit here to your earlier
job here. But there have been reports lately that Scooter Libby
was authorized to discuss portions of the national intelligence
estimate--I think that was the report, anyway--of that
document, related to Iraq, with reporters by his superiors--
that was the question there--by his--authorized to speak by his
superiors. And I wonder if you might share just a--let me just
ask a couple of these questions and have you respond in general
rather than going through question to question.
One, if you could share with us, Who were Mr. Libby's
superiors, at least in your mind at that time? What was the
process at the White House and the National Security Council
for declassification materials, if there was one? Is it
governed by executive order, which I gather some have suggested
might be the case? Or has the President delegated this
authority to others, which I gather he might be able to do, as
well? And do you have such authority--did you have such
authority, as National Security Advisor, that has been
discussed here? And do you have it now? And would it have been
appropriate for, say, the Vice President, in your view, to
authorize Mr. Libby to discuss these portions of the national
intelligence estimate on Iraq with reporters?
I mean, it's a very important line of questioning here, in
terms of what happened on this thing. And I, again--you're
Secretary of State today, but you were NSC, and it's important
that we try to clarify it.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't really think that I should
comment on things that have arisen in the context of a legal
case and investigation. I would only say that, as I said--and
Senator Kerry asked a similar question--that I believe that
it--that the protection of classified information is among our
highest responsibilities and duties, that it must--that our
responsibility to follow the law in that regard is a very high
duty. And I fundamentally believe that I always did follow the
law in the exercise of my duties.
Senator Dodd. Putting aside Mr. Libby, per se, just as a
process question alone, is there--is there a process which
allows for people to talk with reporters about classified
material, that we're not aware of, that we should be aware of?
Secretary Rice. Senator, there is a process of
declassification.
Senator Dodd. Right. We know that.
Secretary Rice. And I believe that I have always followed
the law in this regard. I really don't think I can comment
further, because this has arisen in a legal matter.
Senator Dodd. OK.
Well, Mr. Chairman, I might just suggest, at some point, we
may want to, as a committee--I leave this up to you and Senator
Biden to talk about, but it might be worthwhile for this
committee to--maybe in a private setting, to be--have a further
discussion about this, because it's an important matter,
obviously, the declassification of materials and how it occurs,
here. And I might suggest that be a way we might proceed.
And, again, I--it's not my intention here--maybe at the
last minute here--but, obviously, these are important
questions, and they did involve your--during your watch. And
so, I felt compelled to raise them with you and--here. And I'd
like to pursue them a bit further, if I could. But, obviously,
we are stretching time limits here. But those are two important
matters I'd be interested, Mr. Chairman, in seeing the
committee examine in some forum that might allow us for further
discussion on it.
The Chairman. Well, it's an important issue, and--for the
whole Senate, and obviously for our committee. And so, I'll
take that under advisement with the distinguished ranking
member.
Senator Dodd. I thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you so much, Secretary Rice----
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much----
The Chairman [continuing]. For your testimony----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [continuing]. And for your forthcoming----
Secretary Rice. Mr. Biden, thank you.
The Chairman [continuing]. Responses. It's great to have
you here.
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much. It's good to be with
you.
The Chairman. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement by Senator Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Senator From
Connecticut
Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing an opportunity for members of
the committee to hear from Secretary Rice and to share our thoughts and
concerns with her on the direction of United States foreign policy and
more generally on the standing of the United States globally.
Madame Secretary, you have expressed satisfaction with the modest
increase in the FY 2007 foreign affairs budget. At the appropriate time
I will be interested in hearing from you how you see the various
components of that budget furthering U.S. interests around the world.
In glancing through the Department of State's FY 2007 budget
submission to the Congress, I came across a quote from you, Madame
Secretary. You stated, that ``The President set a bold mission for our
Nation, and to achieve it America needs an equally bold diplomacy--a
diplomacy that not only reports about the world as it is, but seeks to
change the world itself.''
It would seem to me to be quite a leap from ``reporting about the
world'' to ``changing it.'' Shouldn't we first be trying to develop a
much greater understanding of what is happening around the globe--in
the Middle East, in Iraq and Afghanistan, in Latin America, on the
Korean Peninsula, in the People's Republic of China, in Russia and the
former Soviet Republics?
Any why?
Why, for example did the Palestinian people vote for the likes of
Hamas--a terrorist organization which openly seeks the destruction of
Israel.
Why does the newly elected President of Iran seem not to miss any
opportunity to provoke the United States?
Why are our efforts to reach agreement on fundamental reforms at
the United Nations resisted by governments who should have every reason
to want a strong and functional United Nations?
Why has the Muslim community been so susceptible to efforts by
agitators to use the publication of a dozen admittedly objectionable
cartoons in an obscure Danish newspaper to mount violent protests in
selected cities in Europe and the Middle East?
Why is one Latin American country after another electing left of
center, nationalist candidates to office?
It seems to me that it is very premature and dangerous to careen
ahead remaking the world in our own image without fully assessing
whether we have any chance of succeeding, how those efforts will be
received by others around the global, and most important of all, what
those changes are likely to mean for U.S. economic, political, and
national security interests.
I am encouraged of late by the more deliberative, cautious, and
cooperative approach that the administration has adopted in a number of
areas--with respect to the recent Palestinian elections, a willingness
to cooperate with European efforts to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions,
a wait-and-see attitude toward the Bolivian elections to mention but a
few.
I hope this is a signal that the administration has begun to chart
a new course--a course that embraces multilateral cooperation and
respect for the rule of law, and one that rejects preemption and
unilateralism unless vital U.S. interests can only be served by acting
alone. I strongly believe that U.S. interests will be more effectively
served by this approach.
Again, Madame Secretary, I join with my colleagues in welcoming you
to the committee this morning.
______
Responses of Secretary Condoleezza Rice to Questions Submitted by the
Following Senators
Questions of Senator Joseph Biden
Question. In the formation of a new Iraqi Government and
constitutional review process thereafter, we are in the midst of what
may be the last chance to convince Sunni Arabs that they have a stake
in the new Iraq.
(a) Please describe your strategy for involving Sunnis in the
political process and breaking them off from the insurgency.
(b) How are you coordinating international efforts to pressure the
three groups toward creating a government of national unity and making
constitutional promises? What actions have you personally taken and do
you plan to take to advance these objectives? Have you revisited the
idea we discussed during your last appearance--and endorsed by
Secretaries Powell, Kissinger, and Shultz--of establishing a contact
group that includes the major powers and key Iraqi neighbors?
Answer. (a) As articulated in the National Strategy for Victory in
Iraq, we have an integrated approach that incorporates political,
economic, and security tracks aimed at building a democratic,
pluralistic, and stable Iraq. In partnership with our Iraqi
counterparts, MNF-I and the coalition members, we have pursued a
strategy to isolate those elements in Iraqi society who can not be won
over to participation in the political process, while at the same time
engaging those entities who are yet uncommitted to this process. As
part of that strategy, we are urging regional leaders to actively
engage with influential Sunni Arab Iraqis. Much of our and the U.S.
military outreach is focused on Sunni Arabs. I met with their
representatives on my last two trips to Iraq.
The ever-expanding circle of players in the current Iraqi political
environment, especially among Sunnis, is a good example of how our
strategy appears to be taking hold; large numbers of Iraqis
participated in both the October referendum and December 2005 election.
Strong Sunni Arab participation in both is an indication that our Sunni
engagement policy is achieving results. It is worth noting that in
reaction to the tragic Samarra shrine bombing and ensuing violence that
followed, Iraqi leaders universally condemned the attempt to derail the
political process and urged calm and constructive dialogue to ease
sectarian tensions. This is still another sign of the growing support
for democratic principles emphasizing debate and dialogue over the use
of violence and intimidation to achieve political goals. Iraq's leaders
have also successfully hammered out major elements of the government
framework that can form the basis of a national unity government
representing the full spectrum of Iraqi society. Finally, as further
evidence that progress is being made, local political leaders are now
beginning to talk of mobilizing themselves in preparation for the
provincial elections. All of these developments are healthy signs that
Iraqis are moving forward to take responsibility for their own futures
in a way that respects the diversity of others and rejects the use of
violence. The success of our political track approach mutually
reinforces our security and economic tracks decreasing dependence on
U.S. support.
(b) The USG is committed to actively engaging Iraq's neighbors and
all international partners on the future of Iraq and the stability of
the region. Though it is the Iraqis themselves who will need to come to
an agreement on a government of national unity, a clear and consistent
international message regarding the importance of such a government is
vital. The international community's political and tangible support for
a national unity government, once created, is also essential. With this
in mind, we have executed a coordinated diplomatic strategy with Arab
and regional countries, coalition members, other partners, and
international organizations.
Travel by Department principals to regional and other countries,
and outreach to international organizations, NGOs, and international
financial institutions are also aspects of our international engagement
strategy. Ambassador Khalilzad has promoted engagement on Iraq in
visits with Iraq's neighbors including visits to Amman, Riyadh, and Abu
Dhabi. The recent Arab League engagement with Iraq, including plans to
open an office in Baghdad, and the November Arab League Cairo
conference, is another initiative he helped sponsor. We are also very
supportive of efforts by regional leaders; here King Abdullah of Jordan
deserves special credit to reach out to Iraqis. Foreign ministerial
meetings, international summits, bilateral meetings, official visits,
and many congressional delegations are also reinforcing our objective
of increased international support for an Iraqi Government of national
unity. In every appropriate venue, we will continue to urge
international partners to support Iraq politically by encouraging
political compromise and the creation of a government representative of
all Iraq's citizens.
Our current focus on formal international engagement begins with
the United Nations, in the Security Council, in a series of high-level
``Iraq Strategic Dialogue'' talks we conduct with the U.N. Secretariat,
and on the ground with our close contacts with the Iraq U.N. Mission.
We have agreed with the United Nations to consider a Baghdad-based
neighbors and others contact group of ambassadors. We are also working
with two regional/international fora on Iraq--the Arab League
initiative noted above, which plans a major Baghdad conference later
this year, and the World Bank/UNDP-led International Reconstruction
Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) efforts to coordinate dozens of key
international donors. Several major IRFFI meetings are also planned for
this year.
Question. Earlier this month, the committee heard testimony from
the State Department, USAID, GAO, and Inspector General Bowen. By most
critical measures--electricity, drinkable water, sewage treatment, and
oil production--Iraq is actually worse off today than before the war.
And billions of dollars have gone missing.
Going forward, it is clear that most of the administration's goals
for the reconstruction program will not be met. As security costs rise,
a ``reconstruction gap'' has developed and hundreds of projects may end
up unfinished unless additional reconstruction aid is produced in far
greater amounts than the $735 million that is contained for Iraq in the
FY 2007 budget proposal.
How will we make up this ``reconstruction gap'' between
projects planned and projects likely to be completed?
Are the initial goals of the Coalition Provisional Authority
still operative, for example, on electricity, oil production,
and potable water? When the $18.4 billion has been expended,
which of the CPA's goals do you expect to be met and which
won't?
Answer. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) have provided
valuable suggestions for managing our reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
In fact, as SIGIR points out, we will complete fewer construction
projects under the IRRF program than initially planned in 2003. There
are a variety of reasons for this.
Our reconstruction priorities have changed in response to the
evolving situation on the ground and priorities of the Iraqi
Government, which has requested smaller projects that are easier to
sustain and have an immediate impact on individual communities. For
these reasons, the initial CPA goals should not be considered the
current measures of success. The increase in insurgent attacks since
2004 has resulted in a greater percentage of IRRF funding being devoted
to improving the capacity of Iraqi Security Forces.
Despite many challenges, we have been successful in improving the
delivery of essential services to Iraqis in several areas, including
the water sector and sewage services, where we have provided access to
potable water for an additional 3.1 million people, and access to
sewage treatment for an additional 5.1 million people. We have
increased immunization of Iraqi children against childhood diseases:
Now more than 96 percent of children under the age of 5 have been
vaccinated against measles, mumps, rubella, and polio.
In designing the IRRF II program, initially of approximately $15
billion for civilian reconstruction (not counting the initial security
forces component of $3 billion placed in the IRRF legislation), the
United States was aware that it could not ``rebuild'' Iraq's
infrastructure, which had been run down by decades of mismanagement,
war, and tyranny. U.S. assistance programs are helping to build or
refurbish the basic infrastructure that will enable Iraqis to
significantly expand the delivery of essential services. In addition to
ongoing projects, the level of service delivery will be further
enhanced by improvements in Iraqi capacity, subsidy reforms, and a
decrease in infrastructure attacks as the Iraqi Security Forces
continue to improve their ability.
Question. After your October 19, 2005, testimony before the
committee, among the questions for the record I submitted to you, I
asked that you provide the committee with a breakdown by Iraqi
governorate of both obligated and committed U.S. funds across the
country. Your response indicated that ``the Department will seek to
respond to your request for a breakdown of U.S. assistance programs, by
governorate, more completely by the end of November.'' To the best of
my knowledge, the committee has still not received this information.
Please provide it.
Answer. Last fall, the Department promised to respond to your
request for a breakdown of U.S. assistance programs by governorate. We
are pleased to provide the attached set of seven maps, which provide an
indicative picture of the distribution of construction programs in the
following sectors of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF):
Electricity; water and sanitation; justice, public safety,
infrastructure and civil society; oil; roads, bridges and construction
(including school projects); transportation and telecommunications; and
health.
The totals in each of the sectors are current as of February 11,
2006, and do not include overhead or contingency reserve funds, or
projects which have not yet been obligated. They also do not include
construction contracts issued through the Multinational Strategic
Transition Corps-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which deal with the security sector of
the IRRF. The distribution may change as remaining IRRF funds are
obligated.
IRRF programs are designed, after consulting with Iraqi
authorities, first and foremost according to what is needed to
facilitate Iraq's transition to self-reliance and prosperity. Equitable
geographic distribution is a factor in this process, but is not the
sole determinant for any IRRF project.
[Editor's note.--The maps provided could not be converted for print
and will be maintained in the committee's permanent files.]
Question. The President's ``National Strategy for Victory in Iraq''
says that success will depend ``on the conditions on the ground in
Iraq.'' (emphasis in original) The Strategy document lists the victory
conditions as including: ``Progress in the Iraqi political process and
the increasing willingness of Iraqis to forge political compromises,
consolidation of gains in the training of Iraqi Security Forces,
commitment to, and implementation of, economic reforms by Iraqi
leaders, increased cooperation of Iraq's neighbors, and expanded
support from the international community.'' You made passing reference
to these conditions during your testimony.
(a) What constitutes success in each of these five areas?
(b) What specific metric is the U.S. Government using to determine
progress in each of these five areas? How are we performing against
these metrics?
(c) What economic reforms have been undertaken by the Iraqi
transitional government? In view of the administration, what further
reforms are required once a permanent government is seated?
(d) What would constitute cooperative policies by the Syrian and
Iranian Governments in Iraq? What, if anything, is the administration
doing to promote them? How do you assess current Syrian and Iranian
policies in Iraq? Have there been any areas in which Syrian and Iranian
Governments have been constructively engaged in Iraq?
Answer. (a&b) The President's ``National Strategy for Victory in
Iraq'' (NSVI) outlines goals and measures progress in Iraq along three
tracks: Political, security, economic. The administration provides
regular updates to Congress and the American people on our progress to
meet these goals and measures, including through the Iraq Weekly Status
Report, the Measuring Security and Stability Report, and the U.S.
Policy in Iraq Act Report.
Stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can
protect the interests of all Iraqis, and facilitate Iraq's full
integration into the international community constitutes success in the
political track. The metrics used by the USG to measure progress in
this area include the number of Iraqis willing to participate in the
political process, Iraqi integration into the international community,
and political benchmarks set forth by UNSCR 1546 and the Transitional
Administrative Law. Building on two prior electoral successes, over
12.2 million Iraqi voters (78 percent of eligible voters) went to the
polls on December 15, 2005, despite the threat of violence, to elect a
Council of Representatives (CoR), the first step to government
formation. The result has been a political process that includes all of
Iraq's major communities with broad-based, across-the-board buy-in. We
are particularly heartened by both the large Sunni Arab turnout in the
December elections especially when compared to the virtual boycott in
January 2005, and the productive involvement of the Sunni political
leaders, whose groupings won over 20 percent of the parliamentary seats
in government formation and program talks.
In an effort to engage more Arab support for Iraq, the Secretary of
State's Special Coordinator for Iraq initiated intensive consultations
with key Arab States. The November 2005 Arab League meeting resulted in
a call for Arab States to cancel or reduce Iraqi debt, increase
assistance, and enhance their diplomatic presence in Iraq.
International partners, excluding the United States, pledged over $13.5
billion in economic aid at the 2003 Madrid Conference. The United
Kingdom, Italy, and others have expressed an interest in the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. Based on the creation of the Iraqi Constitution,
successful elections, support from the international community, and
movement, albeit slow, on formation of a unity government in Iraq, the
USG has seen substantial progress in the political track.
Along the security track, an Iraqi Security Force (ISF) capable of
independently providing security and maintaining public order in Iraq
constitutes success in this track. The USG uses specific metrics to
track progress including, the number of trained and equipped ISF
personnel, readiness of operational units, percentage of operations
conducted by Iraqis alone, and ISF progress in assuming battle-space
control. As of March 20, there were more that 111,000 trained and
equipped soldiers, sailors, and airmen. More than 89,000 police have
been trained and equipped. Overall, more than 250,000 Ministry of
Defense and Ministry of Interior forces have been trained and equipped.
Currently, 49 Iraqi Army battalions now control their own battle space.
Today, much of Baghdad is under ISF control along with Najaf and
Karbala as well as parts of other provinces. The increased capabilities
of the ISF, particularly the army, were illustrated in their efforts to
prevent violence from escalating after the February 22 Samarra bombing.
Based on these and other metrics, the USG has seen steady progress
along the security track.
Success along the economic track is constituted by the capacity of
Iraqi institutions to maintain essential services, rejoin the
international economic community, and improve the general welfare of
all Iraqis. Success along this tract is measured by GDP, per capita
GDP, rate of inflation, provision of essential services such as water
and electricity, barrels of oil produced and exported, numbers of
businesses opened, and employment levels, along with progress of the
reform agenda described in (c) below. There have been some notable
successes in the provision of essential services thanks to U.S. funded
projects, including increasing access to fresh water for 5.1 million
Iraqis and to sewage facilities for 3 million Iraqis. U.S.-funded
projects have also supported nationwide vaccinations against measles
and rehabilitated approximately 30 percent of Iraq's schools. The
impact of U.S.-funded projects in the oil and electricity sectors have
been reduced by insurgent attacks. Despite terrorist efforts, Iraq's
economy grew from $18.9 billion in 2002 to $33.1 billion in 2005. The
IMF estimates that the real GDP grew by 2.6 percent in 2005 and expects
it to grow by 10.4 percent in 2006, with commensurate growth in per
capita GNP, and a recent significant drop in unemployment. While the
Iraqi economy continues to be overwhelmingly dependant on oil, other
sectors are developing, including services and trade. Ongoing U.S.
assistance projects will help Iraq enact economic reforms needed to
sustain long-term growth, including commitments under the IMF Stand-By
Arrangement and reforms needed to join the WTO.
(c) Since 2003, Iraq has implemented a new stable currency,
negotiated a historical debt relief agreement with the Paris Club,
started the process of acceding to the World Trade Organization,
successfully concluded an Emergency Post Conflict Agreement with the
IMF, and negotiated a follow-on standby arrangement. As part of its
agreements with the IMF the government undertook several economic
reform initiatives. It legally established the independence of the
Central Bank, and commissioned an outside audit of the Central Bank. It
started reform of the national budget accounting process, moving from
the current manual system to a modern electronic system that meets
international standards. It took a major first step to reform Iraq's
distorting fuel subsidy program by raising prices for all fuel products
last December, many by a factor of 500 percent. It is developing a
national payments system that will link the Central Bank to commercial
banks, improving efficiency in the banking system and strengthening
bank supervision capabilities.
There are several priority items for continued economic reforms.
The first is increasing budget transparency by adding meters on oil
production, improving fiscal discipline in the ministries, and
improving ministerial capacity to manage contracting. Second, the
independent government auditing institutions, Board of Supreme Audit,
Commission for Public Integrity, and the inspectors general need to be
strengthened. Third, Iraq needs to continue its subsidy reform efforts
to bring fuel prices to regional market levels and to eliminate the
government monopoly on importing refined fuels. At the same time, it
must continue development of a social safety net to shield vulnerable
populations from the impact of these price increases. Finally, to
encourage investment (both foreign and domestic) the government needs
to carry through on legal reform of its commercial code as outlined in
its Foreign Trade Memorandum to the World Trade Organization and it
needs to reform and modernize the moribund banking sector.
We are working with the government to support their efforts to
implement these priority reforms.
(d) The Syrian Government has not yet taken sufficient steps to
better secure the Syria-Iraq border and stop the transit of foreign
fighters to Iraq. Syria remains a transit point for anticoalition
elements traveling to Iraq, both Iraqi Former Regime Elements and
foreign fighters, although Syria has tightened visa entry controls at
airports on our urging. Syria must stop its territory from being used
by those seeking to destabilize Iraq and the region.
Syria must arrest former Iraqi regime officials who are supporting
the Iraqi insurgency from Syrian territory and hand them over to the
Iraqi authorities, just as they handed over Sabawi Ibrahim Al-Hasan Al-
Tikriti on February 24.
Syria has made some progress on its economic commitments with Iraq.
It returned the $262 million in Iraqi assets that were held by the
Commercial Bank of Syria to the Development Fund for Iraq. However,
approximately $580 million in disputed claims have yet to be finally
resolved. The Syrian and Iraqi Governments signed a Memorandum of
Understanding on this issue, and working-level discussions have begun
on the disputed claims. The Syrians insist on a formal high-level trip
from the Iraqis before establishing formal diplomatic relations, which
may speed up work on economic disputes.
Finally, terrorist financiers continue to operate from Syria in
support of the Iraqi insurgency, a problem that the Syrian Government
has not yet addressed. Syrian obstruction has prevented the resolution
of a number of outstanding commitments in Iraq, from economic
obligations to border security.
We continue to pressure Syria to stop the flow of insurgents,
weapons, and financing to Iraq by isolating Syria diplomatically and
encouraging the international community, particularly the Arab League,
to do so as well. We continue to train and equip ISF to police the
Iraq-Syria border and are both building new and refurbishing old Iraq-
Syria border crossings.
Iranian behavior is counterproductive to the establishment of peace
and security in Iraq. The USG strongly objects to Iran's support for
militant groups in Iraq, including the provision of explosives-related
equipment and technology. For several months, Ambassador Khalilzad has
had the authority to engage with his Iranian counterpart in Iraq to
discuss our concerns about Iranian actions that negatively impact
Iraq's internal security, but for various reasons no talks have as yet
taken place. We will also continue to work closely with the Iraqi
Government to address all issues related to Iraq's security and
stability.
Question. The administration reportedly has decided not to move
toward a free trade agreement with Egypt at this time, in part because
of the Mubarak government's failure to hold free and fair elections and
its arrest of opposition leaders.
What specific steps would you encourage Egypt to take to
make an FTA possible?
Answer. A free trade agreement with Egypt is a key component of the
President's vision for a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013,
and remains a priority obective for the administration.
I will be traveling to Cairo next week to speak with President
Mubarak, including about a possible free trade agreement. When I am
there, I will stress that the United States enjoys an important
strategic relationship with Egypt. There has been real progress on
domestic economic and political reform in Egypt during the last 8
months, but I will note that there have been disappointments and
setbacks as well. I will talk candidly about these with Egypt--as a
friend, not as a judge. But as a friend, I will emphasize that we want
to see an Egypt that is fully developing politically and along the
lines of reform as well, and we will discuss the future of this reform.
We are still discussing and will continue to talk about the FTA
with Egypt. The timing to announce the intention to begin negotiations
is not right just now, but we want to have an FTA with Egypt because we
believe that it will make a difference to economic reform and
ultimately the economy in Egypt.
A key message that I will carry is that Egypt is a country of
greatness, and the Middle East region needs this country to be at the
center of positive change.
Question. Last year, you told the committee that ``The United
States is not prepared to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea.'' North
Korea's stockpile of fissile material has grown dramatically over the
past 3 years, and the former Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, told a Senate committee last spring
that North Korea can arm a missile with a nuclear warhead. You have
also stated to this committee that, in dealing with this threat, ``We
cannot accept another partial solution that does not deal with the
entirety of the problem . . .''
(a) How long will the administration tolerate North Korea's
possession of nuclear weapons?
(b) Do you believe deterrence and containment are adequate policies
to deal with North Korea? What, if any, new policy approaches are you
considering?
(c) Do you believe there are any viable military options to
eliminate North Korea's nuclear programs?
(d) Are there any circumstances under which what you have called a
``partial solution'' would be preferable to no solution at all? Is a
``partial solution'' incompatible with pursuing a lasting, permanent
solution? Could not a ``partial solution'' be a step toward a complete
solution?
Answer. (a) For over a decade, the United States has assessed that
North Korea has produced enough plutonium to make one or more nuclear
weapons. Our objective remains the complete, irreversible, and
verifiable elimination of the DPRK's nuclear weapons and nuclear
programs. We are pursuing that objective through the multilateral
diplomacy of the six-party talks. All six parties (the United States,
China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea) have agreed on the
goal of denuclearization of the peninsula.
(b) The September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of Principles contains
all the elements of a comprehensive solution that advances the
interests of all parties--economic, political, security. For the DPRK,
in the context of its complete denuclearization, these include steps
toward normalization of diplomatic relations subject to bilateral
policies, provision of energy and other types of economic assistance,
and enhanced security. In addition, the directly related parties agreed
to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the peninsula in an
appropriate separate forum. We have made clear that the process that
would lead to the DPRK's realization of these benefits will not move
forward until it returns to the table so that the process of
denuclearization and implementation of the principles can begin.
(c) When it comes to protecting our national security, no option is
off the table.
(d) Our fundamental objective is the complete, irreversible, and
verifiable elimination of the DPRK's nuclear weapons and nuclear
programs. Our policy is to achieve this objective through the
implementation by all parties of all the provisions of the September
19, 2005, joint statement. We will also continue to take concrete
action to protect ourselves and our allies against any illicit and
proliferation activities by the DPRK.
Question. The Eugene Bell Foundation has just launched a new
people-to-people initiative (Saemsori) designed to facilitate
reunification visits for Korean Americans with their North Korean
relatives. There are 2 million Korean Americans, and experts estimate
that perhaps as many as 250,000 of them have relatives in North Korea.
Another American nongovernmental organization (NGO), Amigos
International, is completing construction of a private university in
Pyongyang, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, to be
staffed largely by American faculty. Amigos International also has
several small-scale agricultural training programs underway inside
North Korea.
(a) Does the State Department support these efforts?
(b) What specific steps will the State Department take to assist
the efforts of these and other NGOs engaged in humanitarian outreach to
the North Korean people?
Answer. (a) The State Department welcomes efforts by American and
other NGOs aimed at bettering the lives of the North Korean people.
(b) Other than strictly humanitarian aid, most types of U.S.
assistance to North Korea are prohibited. The United States has been
the largest contributor of humanitarian food assistance to the DPRK
through the World Food Program, contributing about 2 million tons over
the last 10 years.
We are prepared to consider funding for proposals for humanitarian
assistance from NGOs. However, current limitations imposed by Pyongyang
on access and monitoring by international aid organizations and NGOs
make it very difficult to assure that the humanitarian assistance we
might give would reach its intended recipients.
We have made clear to the DPRK that full implementation of the
September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of Principles the six parties
unanimously adopted in Beijing would transform the nature of the
relationship between our two countries in a way that would make it
possible for us to consider other forms of assistance to improve the
lives of the North Korean people. We remain prepared to discuss
implementation of the provisions of the joint statement, but the
process, cannot move forward until the DPRK returns to the table.
Question. Indonesia has arrested eight suspects in the 2002 Timika
murders.
Will the administration continue to press the Indonesian
authorities to ensure that all those responsible for the Timika
murders are brought to justice?
Are you confident that Indonesia will follow the evidence,
wherever it may lead?
Will the FBI continue to participate actively in the
investigation and monitor the prosecutions?
Answer. The Department of State continues to work closely with the
Government of Indonesia on this case, in the interest of achieving
justice for the death of all the victims, including both Americans and
Indonesians. The Ambassador and senior Department officials remain in
close contact with Mrs. Patsy Spier, who was wounded in the August 31,
2002, attack and widow of one of the American citizens killed in the
attack.
Both the U.S. Government and Mrs. Spier have impressed upon
Indonesian officials the importance of achieving justice through a fair
and credible trial. President Yudhoyono has vowed to follow through and
has repeatedly expressed and demonstrated his determination to see that
justice is served.
After the January 11 arrests, the Government of Indonesia assured
the U.S. Ambassador that cooperation with the FBI on this case would
continue; it has. The Indonesian National Police is collaborating
closely with the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice in the
investigation. The Indonesian Embassy in Washington also arranged for
Mrs. Spier to meet with the Indonesian Attorney General and Justice
Minister in March during their visit to the United States.
Question. President Bambang Yudhoyono has expressed his strong
support for reform of the armed forces, and has already taken
significant steps to advance democratic reforms, fight corruption, and
improve the professionalism of the Indonesian Arny.
(a) What steps will the administration take to promote reform of
the Indonesian Armed Forces?
(b) Will you press for an end to the impunity often enjoyed by
members of the army? Specifically, will you press the Government of
Indonesia to hand over General Wiranto, who has been indicted by an
international tribunal for his role in crimes committed by Indonesian
Army units in East Timor? If not, why not?
Answer. (a) The administration is actively assisting the Indonesian
Armed Forces to continue its internal reform process toward becoming a
modern, professionalized force that respects the rights of its citizens
and is accountable to civilian authority. Our mil-mil assistance and
engagement program with the Indonesian Government, including IMET, FMF,
JCETs, and other assistance is designed to emphasize and facilitate
such reform. Even more importantly, we are working on many fronts to
enhance civilian oversight of the military, including strengthening the
Indonesian Department of Defense (especially with respect to managing
defense resources), the Indonesian Legislature, and civil institutions,
including the media. This year the USG will provide over $140 million
in assistance to civil society and less than $2 million in military
assistance (IMET and FMF).
In February 2005, after a determination by Secretary Rice that
Indonesian authorities were cooperating with the FBI in the Timika
investigation, the administration reinstated International Military
Education and Training (IMET) assistance for the Indonesian military.
By exposing promising military officers to U.S. standards for military
professionalism and respect for human rights, the IMET program is a
critical component of the U.S. Government's efforts to promote reform
of the Indonesian Armed Forces.
The November 2005 national security interest waiver of
congressional restrictions on Foreign Military Financing and lethal
defense exports has allowed the administration to begin constructively
engaging a reforming Indonesian military in a climate of trust.
However, it does not mean that the floodgates to advanced U.S. military
hardware have been thrown wide open. All requests for military
assistance to Indonesia are considered case by case. Each applicant for
U.S. training is thoroughly vetted for human rights abuses in
accordance with Leahy guidelines.
The administration shares congressional concerns regarding respect
for human rights, accountability, and civilian control of the
Indonesian military. As we normalize our military relations with
Indonesia, we continue to stress, both privately and publicly, that
military reform and accountability are essential. Indeed, we have more
opportunities to do that now, because we are in more frequent contact
with the civilian government and the military. Additionally, the
Yudhoyono government is becoming more receptive to such engagement
since we are no longer perceived to be publicly criticizing Indonesia.
In her March visit to Jakarta, Secretary Rice discussed military reform
with President Yudhoyono and highlighted its importance in her speech
at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. We have made it clear that mil-mil
normalization is dependant upon the Indonesian military's continued
reform efforts.
(b) The overall human rights situation in Indonesia has continued
to improve over the past year. Significant problems remained--
particularly in areas of separatist conflict--but the end of the
country's long-running internal conflict in Aceh Province was a major
step forward. Indonesia has made limited progress in establishing
accountability for numerous human rights violations committed by the
security forces, and this is a key area for improvement. There is
evidence that the TNI has been willing to punish soldiers who have
committed abuses during the conflict in Aceh, including a total of 160
convictions for human-rights-related offenses in 2004 and 2005.
However, as enumerated in the annual State Department Human Rights
Report, many cases of abuses remain unresolved.
Achieving accountability and ending the culture of impunity for
members of the Indonesian security forces is critical for the long-term
success of Indonesia's democratic transformation. The USG continues to
emphasize the need to achieve credible accountability for atrocities
committed in East Timor in 1999, including any member of the Indonesian
military who may have been responsible. After the failure of previous
efforts to punish those responsible, Indonesia and East Timor have
established the Indonesia-East Timor Truth and Friendship Commission
(TFC). The administration has emphasized to both Indonesia and East
Timor that, in order to be credible, the TFC must name the names of the
perpetrators, be transparent, hold public hearings, involve the
international community, and protect witness confidentiality. The
administration will continue to work with our Indonesian and East
Timorese democratic partners to strengthen support for justice within
their societies. We are also awaiting the U.N. Secretary General's
briefing to the Security Council on the U.N. Commission of Experts
report submitted in May 2005.
Question. South Korea: South Korea is not currently a member of the
Visa Waiver Program (VWP), but the administration has announced the
creation of a ``roadmap'' to facilitate Korea's efforts to qualify for
the VWP. South Korea is the world's 11th largest economy and our 7th
largest trading partner, and almost a million South Koreans travel to
the United States every year. Yet we have only one place for South
Koreans to apply for visas in South Korea, and the Consulate in Seoul
is the busiest United States Consulate in the world.
(a) How close is Korea to qualifying for the VWP? Where is South
Korea still deficient? What steps is the Department taking to assist
ROK in qualifying for the Visa Waiver Program? How quickly do you
believe South Korea will be able to qualify?
(b) Do you support reopening a Consulate in Pusan, not only to
improve visa services, but also to better represent U.S. interests in
Korea and expand our presence in this vital treaty ally? If not, is it
a matter of resources or policy?
(c) What is your plan to strengthen consular services in South
Korea to meet the growing demand for nonimmigrant visas?
Answer. (a) Designation to participate in the Visa Waiver Program
requires that Korea meet legislative criteria including a low visa
refusal and traveler overstay rate and a determination that U.S.
security and law enforcement interests would not be negatively impacted
by Korean participation in the program. We recognize Korea's work
toward meeting some VWP legislative criteria including sharing lost and
stolen passport data and the development of a biometric passport.
Presidents Bush and Roh included the creation of a Visa Waiver
Program roadmap for the ROK in their Joint Declaration In Gyeongju in
November and we are working to finalize this roadmap. The U.S. Embassy
in Seoul and the ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs have established a
Visa Issues Working Group that meets quarterly to discuss consular
issues of mutual concern, including steps the ROK would need to take to
meet the requirements for inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program.
(b) The Department is considering the establishment of a small
limited-purpose presence in Pusan, but no decision has been made at
this time. However, these one- or two-person offices (designated as an
American Presence Post) generally do not issue visas or provide routine
consular services.
(c) Seoul's consular section has upgraded its facilities and added
staff to process Korean applicants more quickly and efficiently. Last
year, we processed 400,000 visa applications, an increase over the
previous year. Appointment wait times have dropped substantially, to 3
days currently, from 30 days a year ago.
Question. Since taking office, President Bush has generally pursued
a policy of quiet, personal diplomacy when managing the United States
relationship with Russia. However, a number of recent developments
raise serious concerns about whether this approach is yielding
dividends. As you know, in the last few years, the Russia Government
has restricted the work of nongovernmental organizations, consolidated
control over Russia's political system and natural resources, virtually
eliminated independent broadcast media outlets, interfered in the
elections and economies of neighboring countries, and offered to
negotiate with the leadership of Hamas. How much longer do current
trends in Russia need to continue before the administration reevaluates
its approach to dealing with Moscow?
Answer. The United States constantly reevaluates its dynamic
relationship with Russia and other countries, in keeping with the
Department of State's mission to ``create a more secure, democratic,
and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the
international community.'' Such review is an ongoing process.
We are troubled by trends within Russia, especially with respect to
democracy and human rights, and have expressed those concerns to
Russia, both publicly and privately. The United States and its allies,
for example, actively communicated their concerns during the course of
debate on the new NGO law that President Putin signed in January. We
are closely observing the process of its implementation, and have
emphasized to Russian officials the importance of fair, transparent,
and consistent application of the law so as to foster, rather than
hinder, the vital work NGOs perform. We seek the same transparency, and
hold the same frank dialogue, in discussing domestic and international
issues with Russia.
President Bush has repeatedly stressed--most recently at Freedom
House March 29--that it is critical ``for the United States to be in a
position to be able to express our concerns'' to Russia, and that this
involves a relationship of engagement enabling ``candid conversation.''
Those conversations do not always immediately lead to our desired
outcome, but they allow America's voice and concerns to be heard loud
and clear.
Question. When you were in Moscow last April, you said (in an
interview with CBS): ``What we need to do is to be very clear with the
Russians that the deepening of United States-Russia relations is in
large part dependent on common values and on continued democratic
development in Russia.'' Since then, you have been candid about the
setbacks to democracy in Russia, from its crackdown on NGOs to Putin's
centralization of power--stating recently that Russia seems to be
``going in the wrong direction'' with respect to democracy. And yet you
have also said that the United States has ``very good relations with
Russia, probably the best relations that have been there for quite some
time.'' If improved U.S. relations with Russia depend on continued
democratic development there, then how can our relationship be the best
it has been for quite some time?
Answer. The United States is deeply concerned and very candid about
setbacks to democracy in Russia. We regret that President Putin has
pursued policies in many ways inimical to the robust evolution of
Russian democracy. We have clearly and repeatedly expressed our
concerns about specific areas where Russia's policy--such as the new
NGO law or the decision to appoint rather than elect regional
governors--stymies democratic development. We have publicly urged
Russia to embrace democratic development more vigorously.
But, as I stated in an interview in February, it is also important
to maintain some historical perspective on the remarkable changes we
have seen in Russia during the past 15 years. ``Obviously we are very
concerned, particularly about some of the elements of democratization
in Russia that seem to be going in the wrong direction. [But this] is
not the Soviet Union; let's not overstate the case. I was a Soviet
specialist. I can tell you that Russia bears almost no resemblance to
the Soviet Union.''
President Bush has also emphasized the importance of historical
perspective: History is on the side of freedom. Speaking at Freedom
House, March 29, he reminded us that the ``advance of freedom is the
story of our time,'' and that ``it's an interest of a country like
Russia to understand and welcome democracy.'' That is why President
Bush is committed to engaging with Russia in frank discussion, aware
that this path may not yield immediate solutions, but still promises
the best long-term way of achieving the kind of cooperative bilateral
relationship we are seeking with Russia on many of our key strategic
interests.
Question. In the last year, the Government of Uzbekistan massacred
several hundred unarmed antigovernment demonstrators in the city of
Andijan, cracked down on all forms of dissent in the country, and
expelled U.S. forces from their base in southern Uzbekistan, though the
mission they were supporting in Afghanistan was far from over. Since
then, the administration has condemned the Uzbek Government's actions
and aided Uzbek citizens seeking refuge in third countries.
(a) What concrete steps has the administration taken since the
Andijan massacre to pressure the Uzbek regime to change its policies?
(b) Why has the administration not followed the European Union in
imposing targeted sanctions against the Uzbek leaders responsible for
the massacre?
Answer. (a) In response to the Andijan events, the U.S. immediately
and repeatedly called for an independent, international investigation.
We also undertook an immediate review of U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan.
As a result, aid to the Government of Uzbekistan was severely limited;
numerous military, border security, and economic reform assistance
programs were canceled. Approximately $3 million of these funds were
reprogrammed to support additional democracy and human rights programs
in Uzbekistan. When allowed, the United States monitored the cases and
trials of dissidents and political opponents of the Government of
Uzbekistan, including those accused of involvement in Andijon. The
United States also supported and voted for a U.N. Third Committee
resolution on Uzbekistan.
(b) We note the European Union's decision to impose sanctions on
the Government of Uzbekistan for its failure to heed calls from the
international community, including the United States, to allow an
independent, international investigation into the tragic May 2005
events at Andijan.
We do not rule out the potential of imposing our own sanctions on
Uzbekistan, should respect for democracy and human rights continue to
deteriorate. We have repeatedly stressed to the Government of
Uzbekistan that our bilateral relationship must include genuine
progress on human rights and democracy.
Question. According to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG
Report No. ISP-I-06-13A, Inspection of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan,
January 2006, pp. 39, 41), in September 2002 the Department awarded a
$115 million cost-plus contract for embassy construction to the firm
Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR). At the time of inspection, the
construction had been drastically reduced in scope, was nearly a year
past its original completion date (December 2004), had already cost
$147 million (28 percent more than the originally agreed amount), and
had produced ``work that is below acceptable standards.''
Do you consider KBR's record for work done on Embassy Kabul
to be satisfactory?
Does KBR remain on the list of preapproved contractors
eligible to bid on embassy construction projects?
Answer. The OIG report stated that, ``Despite concerted efforts by
Overseas Building Operations (OBO) personnel on site to hold KBR to
high standards, OIG became aware of some finish work that is below
acceptable standards.'' (p. 41.) The OIG visit coincided with issuance
of a certificate of substantial completion. As is standard in the
construction process, those items not meeting standards were placed on
a ``punch list'' for the contractor to correct.
With regard to cost and schedule, the contract was originally
awarded on a cost reimbursement basis because it was determined that no
contractor would be able to assess the logistic and security risks
associated with the construction without including enormous
contingencies in a fixed-price bid. When it became apparent that the
original cost estimate would be substantially exceeded and the
contractor had obtained detailed familiarity with the work and
conditions, OBO negotiated a contract modification with KBR to convert
the contract to firm, fixed-price in order to preclude any further
price escalation.
As with other contractors that are eligible to bid embassy
construction projects, KBR participated in a source selection
evaluation process that deemed the firm eligible to compete for
additional work. Firms do not simply ``remain'' on a list of approved
contactors but rather are evaluated against many factors including past
performance each fiscal year.
Question. By letter dated February 4, 2005, other Senators and I
wrote to express concern that the administration would seek authority
in the FY 2005 supplemental for the Department of Defense to train
police forces of other countries, including the Afghan national police.
You replied on March 25, 2005, stating that the funds requested in the
FY 2005 supplemental for acceleration of the Afghanistan police
training program would be ``directed to the Department of State, which
is the agency currently responsible for implementing this program.''
Is it still the case that the Department of State is
responsible for the Afghanistan police training program, or is
the Department of Defense the lead agency? If it is the latter,
what is the current role of the Department of State with regard
to this function?
Answer. Public security and the rule of law are critical for all
future rebuilding efforts and for providing long-term stability to the
people of Afghanistan. The goal of the USG Afghanistan Police Program
(APP) mission is to help Afghanistan develop a competent, professional,
democratic police force with the necessary training, equipment,
infrastructure, institutional capacity and organizational structure to
enforce the rule of law in Afghanistan.
In April 2005, Embassy Kabul reported on the arrangement State and
DOD reached to ensure that security sector reform efforts in
Afghanistan are closely coordinated. State and DOD agreed that the
Office of Security Cooperation--Afghanistan (OSC-A) would be
established with program implementation and oversight responsibility
for all security sector programs--including the Afghanistan Police
Program (APP). OSC-A has since changed its name to Combined Security
Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A), but State and DOD's APP
responsibilities remain the same.
INL continues to be responsible for implementation of
training, mentoring, and reform programs;
The Chief of Mission continues to develop policy guidance;
and
DOD provides integrated oversight for implementation on the
ground.
The Ambassador and the CFC-A Commander work very closely together
to monitor all aspects of APP development, and there is strong
interagency cooperation and coordination between DOD and State on this
program.
Question. Please explain in detail what assistance we are asking
NATO to provide the African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan in advance of
the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission for Darfur? How
does what we are requesting NATO to provide in advance of a U.N.
mission in Darfur differ from what NATO is already doing to help the
AU?
Answer. The United States strongly supports expanded NATO
assistance to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). A precisely
targeted assistance mission focusing on capacity-building and mentoring
of AMIS headquarters elements during the transition to a U.N. force in
Darfur could help increase AMIS capability. NATO should concentrate its
assistance for AMIS headquarters on hands-on training and staff
capacity-building with particular focus on helping the AU establish a
Joint Operations Center (JOC) and a Logistics Coordination Hub in
Darfur. NATO personnel could deploy to AMIS headquarters to conduct
courses on the structure and operation of a JOC and logistics hub and
then remain in place to mentor AU staff officers. Additionally, the
Alliance could consider the provision of intelligence and expanding
capacity-building to AMIS sector headquarters in Darfur.
Finally, NATO would continue to airlift AU troop contributions into
Sudan. If approved by the North Atlantic Council and the African Union,
these assistance options would represent a significant increase in NATO
support to AMIS. Previously, NATO had airlifted 7 AU battalions,
provided 14 NATO personnel to train 125 AU staff officers in El Fasher
and Addis Abba, and supported a U.N.-run training exercise. The
measures currently under consideration at NATO would provide more NATO
personnel training a greater number of AU officers for longer periods
of time with the option of continued mentoring after training
concludes. In particular, expanded capacity-building to AMIS sector
headquarters outside of El Fasher could significantly improve AMIS's
ability to coordinate and manage the mission in Darfur.
Question. Are there currently legislative impediments that prevent
the United States from providing certain types of assistance that the
administration feels are necessary to support the Government of
Southern Sudan (GOSS)? If so, please explain what the impediments are,
and what assistance, specifically, the United States has been prevented
from giving to the GOSS. Will the administration consult with Congress
to ease restrictions that it feels prevents provision of assistance to
the GOSS?
Answer. The United States foreign assistance to Sudan is subject to
numerous legal restrictions that result in significant delays in
providing assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan. Restrictions
have the most impact on exports of defense articles or services or
other exports that may require a Presidential waiver and congressional
notification due to Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of
terrorism. Providing timely assistance to transform the Sudan People's
Liberation Army from a guerilla force into a viable army is key to
developing long-term security in Southern Sudan. Additional authority
would allow us to provide military and defense assistance to the South
and the GOSS more readily. The administration has consulted with
Congress on this matter and will continue to work with Congress to
ensure that we are able to provide effective assistance to the GOSS.
Question. The ``Summary and Highlights'' of the Function 150 budget
issued by the Department indicates that Development Assistance will
fund programs in stable developing countries that are ``committed to
promoting economic freedom, ruling justly, and investing in people.''
(a) These criteria have been used in the Millennium Challenge
Account. Are they now to be used also with regard to all development
assistance? Please explain in detail how a country's commitment to
these criteria will be measured.
(b) Does this mean that our foreign assistance program dollars will
not be used to support programs designed for such things as developing
clean water treatment activities, enhancing girls' education or
enhancing democracy in countries that are too poor to sufficiently
``invest in people,'' or that have governments that are not democratic?
Answer. (a) Development Assistance funds will be used to fulfill
the objectives of ``ruling justly,'' ``investing in people,'' and
``encouraging economic freedom.'' A country's commitment to these
criteria will be measured by the same indicators introduced with the
Millennium Challenge Account, which will now be applied to all U.S.
Government assistance. For governing justly and democratically, these
indicators include: Civil liberties, political rights, voice and
accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of
corruption. For economic growth, these indicators include: Cost of
starting a business, 1-year consumer price inflation; fiscal policy,
trade policy, regulatory quality, days to start a business. For
investing in people, these indicators include: Public expenditures on
health as a percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), immunization rates
for diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus (DPT3) and measles, public primary
education spending as a percent of GDP, and girls' primary education
completion rate.
(b) Development Assistance (DA) funds will be used to help
countries, including those with a gross national income per capita of
less than $3,255, to achieve improvement in country performance,
measured by the indicators listed above. Focusing DA funds toward
achieving the objectives of ruling justly, investing in people, and
enhancing economic freedom does not preclude support for programs such
as developing clean water treatment activities, enhancing girls'
education, or enhancing democracy under the new framework.
Question. What consultations has the Department undertaken with
private voluntary organizations about your plans for transforming the
foreign aid structure? If you have not undertaken any, do you plan to
do so?
Answer. The Department recognizes the valuable role that private
voluntary organizations play in implementing U.S. foreign assistance
funds. Staff from the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance will
keep key private voluntary organization representatives abreast of the
changes that are happening with regard to the foreign aid structure.
Additionally, the Director of Foreign Assistance, Ambassador
Randall L. Tobias, will address the organization, InterAction, a
coalition of more than 160 humanitarian organizations, as the opening
keynote address at their annual conference on April 10, 2006. During
this speech he will discuss his vision for the future of foreign
assistance and take questions and answers from the attendees.
Ambassador Tobias will also address the Advisory Committee on
Voluntary Foreign Aid, which includes representatives from
universities, international nongovernmental organizations, U.S.
businesses, and government, multilateral, and private organizations.
During this session, he will lay out the new foreign assistance
framework and address questions from the participants.
Question. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for fiscal year 2006 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to conduct or
support a program to build the capacity of a foreign country's national
military forces. You were given a role, by statute, in the process.
(a) Is it expected that this authority will be exercised in FY
2006? If so, when?
(b) Which office or offices of the Department will be involved in
carrying out your authority under this provision?
(c) In which countries will this authority be exercised?
Answer. (a) The Department of State is playing a major role in
deciding how the section 1206 train-and-equip authority is used. We've
been working closely with our colleagues in the Department of Defense
in formulating plans to be exercised in FY 2006. We expect to soon
forward these proposals to the President for his consideration.
(b) The Bureau for Political-Military Affairs is the State lead in
jointly formulating plans to use section 1206 authority. Within State,
they have worked closely with all of the regional bureaus in developing
the proposals.
(c) Our recommendation to the President will include proposals in a
number of geographic regions. As soon as the President has made his
decisions, we look forward to briefing Congress on the specifics of the
approved proposals.
Question. On September 26, 2005, the President issued Presidential
Determination No. 2005-38. The determination waived the application of
section 575 of the FY 2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, ``as
well as any provision of law that is the same or substantially the same
as such provision, including subsequently enacted provisions.''
What is the legal basis for the authority to make a
determination made with regard to a future, as yet unenacted,
law?
Answer. Section 575 of the FY 2005 Foreign Operations, Export
Financing and Relation Programs Appropriations restricts assistance for
Saudi Arabia. The President exercised the waiver authority provided,
certifying that Saudi Arabia is cooperating with efforts to combat
international terrorism and that the proposed assistance will help
facilitate that effort. Pursuant to this waiver, limited IMET funds
appropriated in FY 2005, but which were ``no-year'' funds, were
obligated for Saudi Arabia earlier during this calendar year.
Although the determination contained the clause referred to, the FY
2006 FOAA provides an identical restriction and waiver authority, in
section 582, which is comparable to section 575 of the FY 2005 FOAA.
The administration has not as yet proposed any FY 2006 funds for Saudi
Arabia and thus has not had to apply section 582. Were there a desire
to provide assistance to Saudi Arabia using funds appropriated under
the FY 2006 FOAA that are restricted by section 582, we would recommend
that a waiver of section 582 be pursued at such time.
Question. By the administration's estimates, the President's
request for Child Survival and Health programs for FY 2007, if enacted,
would mean a $211 million cut in programs that provide health,
nutrition, water and sanitation programs, immunizations and assistance
for children displaced or orphaned by causes other than HIV/AIDS. What
specific programs and in what countries is the administration
suggesting cuts for and why have those programs and countries been
targeted for cuts?
Answer. The FY 2006 appropriation for the Child Survival and Health
Programs Fund (post-rescission) is $1,569.150 million and the FY 2007
request is $1,433.000 million. The FY 2007 request is $136.150 million
below the FY 2006 enacted level. The primary reduction in funding is
the Agency's contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and
Malaria. The FY 2006 enacted level for the Global Fund is $247.500
million and the FY 2007 request is $100 million. The FY 2007
consolidated USG request for the Global Fund is $300 million; $100
million each from the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of
Health and Human Services.
Question. The administration has requested nearly $1 billion more
for programs under the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative. All of the increases
over the fiscal year 2006 projected budget appear, however, to be
channeled toward the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR), which covers only 15 countries. The administration appears to
be requesting $25 million less in fiscal year 2007 for non-PEPFAR
countries than was appropriated for this fiscal year. Does the
administration project that the HIV-infection rates and/or the number
of HIV-infected people in all of the nonfocus countries will decline?
Why isn't the administration asking for an increase in funding to
combat HIV/AIDS in nonfocus countries?
Answer. The overall request for PEPFAR funding in fiscal year 2007
is up dramatically, from approximately $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2006
to $4 billion. Within this overall increase, priority was placed on the
focus countries. Without the fiscal year 2007 level of funding for the
focus countries, it will not be possible to meet the 2-7-10 goals
established by the President and Congress.
At the same time, however, the request does include a modest
increase from the fiscal year 2006 enacted level of funding for
bilateral programs in other countries (from $425.6 to $432.7 billion,
not including funding for research). Beyond the focus countries, the
Emergency Plan targets $5 billion over 5 years to support HIV/AIDS
programs in an additional 108 countries, international research,
international partnerships (including the Global Fund), and other
activities. In fiscal year 2005, PEPFAR directed $293 million to HIV/
AIDS program activities in these 108 nations.
The President's fiscal year 2007 request for the focus countries
is, in part, an attempt to recover from the effects on focus country
programs of the redirection of almost $527 million from focus country
programs to the Global Fund and to other bilateral programs over the
Emergency Plan's first 3 years. Of these three broad areas of the
Emergency Plan, funding for the focus countries, originally planned to
be $10 billion over 5 years, is the only one which has not been funded
at the planned level overall to date. Other USG programs, including
those beyond the focus countries, are on track to meet the $5 billion
target level over 5 years as originally envisioned for the Emergency
Plan.
Question. I am deeply concerned by our budget to support U.N.
peacekeeping missions. Both this year and in 2007. Assistant Secretary
Silverberg has spoken about a $500 million shortfall for this year,
such that we will run out of money to pay our peacekeeping assessments
this summer.
How is the Department going to handle this shortfall for the
CIPA account in fiscal year 2006?
The President's funding request for U.N. peacekeeping in
fiscal year 2007 is only slightly higher than that for last
year, at $1.14 billion. Yet the U.N.'s total budget will
increase next year, given the anticipated mission in Darfur.
Why is there not a higher request for fiscal year 2007?
Answer. The shortfall for FY 2005 of $145.010 million and the
projected shortfall for FY 2006 of $376.752 million totals $521.762
million. The FY 2006 supplemental budget contains a request of $69.8
million for the CIPA account for Sudan/Darfur as well as language
providing transfer authority from the Peacekeeping Operations request
which, in total, would offset a total of $129.8 million in the above
total for a net shortfall of $391.962 million at the end of FY 2006.
We expect that there will be no new shortfalls in FY 2007, i.e.,
that the request will be sufficient to pay FY 2007 assessments. We have
asked for an increase in FY 2007 funding for Sudan operations in
anticipation of the United Nations taking over operations in Darfur.
Question. As you know, a law limiting our payments for U.N.
peacekeeping to 25 percent has gone back into effect. We are now
accruing arrears, because we are assessed at a rate of about 27
percent. I have introduced legislation to remedy this problem (S.
2095), and the President has proposed similar legislation in his
budget.
Do you agree that it is important for the United States to
pay its peacekeeping bill in full? Do you support S. 2095?
Answer. The administration agrees that it is important to pay its
U.N. peacekeeping assessments in full. We support legislation to enable
the United States to pay U.N. peacekeeping assessments at the rate used
by the United Nations.
Question. As you know, the U.N. Headquarters building is unsafe,
failing to meet municipal fire and safety codes and drastically in need
of security upgrades; however, plans to break ground for the new
building have been delayed and costs are increasing by the day. The
United Nations has recruited a top-notch person, Fritz Reuter, to work
on the Capital Master Plan for renovation; however, I understand that
funding for his office will run out in a few months.
What is the administration doing to support that a plan for
construction be finalized as soon as possible? How are
Ambassador Bolton and Department officials in Washington
working to garner support among member states for getting this
project underway?
Answer. The United States appreciates and supports the work of the
Secretariat on the Capital Master Plan (CMP), in particular the efforts
of Assistant Secretary General Fritz Reuter and the Capital Master Plan
Office. The United States supports this project, as renovations are
strongly needed to make the U.N. facilities safe and secure and a
General Assembly decision on project strategy is, therefore, critical.
As both the United Nation's largest contributor and host country, the
United States also has a direct interest in ensuring that the CMP is
implemented in the most cost-effective and transparent manner possible.
The General Assembly adopted a resolution on May 8 that provided an
appropriation of $23.5 million, for the continuation of preconstruction
activities, and $77 million in commitment authority, to be used to
begin procurement of a temporary conference building and lease office
swing space. The United States disassociated from the consensus on this
resolution. Without a decision on project strategy the administration
did not believe it would be prudent to agree to the full $100.5
million, but did endorse the appropriation of $23.5 million to complete
design work. The administration will work constructively in the next
resumed session of the General Assembly to resolve remaining issues on
the CMP, in particular, the critical decision on project strategy.
Question. You have noted that the President's request includes $75
million to strengthen the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization, which will include support for a Conflict Response
Fund. In addition to the fund, what amount is requested to expand the
operations of the Office itself? How many additional positions will
this funding support? How, specifically, will these positions
contribute to the mission of the Office?
Answer. In FY 2007, the President's request includes $20.1 million
in State Operations funding for Reconstruction and Stabilization
management. This request includes $6.5 million in operating funds and
$13.6 million in personnel costs ($5.2M for permanent State FTE and
$8.4M for nonpermanent State FTE) to expand the operations of the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS). Currently, S/CRS has 15 permanent positions, approximately 12
interagency detailees, and 48 nonpermanent positions funded by State
(15 of which are Active Response Corps). This funding will support an
additional 15 permanent State Department positions and maintain the 48
nonpermanent, State-funded positions already in S/CRS.
The FY07 funding request, and the positions it would create, will
allow S/CRS to coordinate effective deployments to prevent or transform
conflict--thereby institutionalizing the Department of State's
leadership role in planning for and implementing stabilization and
reconstruction activities. We will build on pilot interagency
deployments, such as those in Chad, Haiti, and Sudan, and respond to
developing crises and conflicts by increasing the number of conflict
assessment teams and sectoral advisors deployed to provide expertise
and to serve as catalysts for follow-on interagency response. S/CRS
staff also will focus on refining and testing operational response
mechanisms, which will allow us to stand ready to deploy interagency
staff to work with the military at the Geographic Combatant Command and
field levels in the next crisis.
The additional funding and staff will allow S/CRS to coordinate
multiple country responses simultaneously--lending support to State
regional bureaus and leading interagency planning processes that link
all USG programs and resources to a comprehensive strategy to address
conflict prevention and transformation.
This funding will also allow S/CRS to increase cooperation and
interoperability with international partners--increasing the total
international impact of efforts to advance stabilization and
reconstruction activities.
Question. A recent inspector general report on the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security (ISP-I-06-03) indicated that personal escape masks
issued to overseas posts need to be replaced in the next several fiscal
years, but that under current budget estimates, ``only a fraction of
the masks can be replaced each year,'' and that further reduction will
``decrease the number of posts that receive training'' and other needed
equipment for employee safety in this area.
(a) What funds are provided in the baseline plan for FY 2006 and
the budget for FY 2007 for personal escape masks? How many replacement
masks will such funds purchase?
(b) How many personal escape masks are due for replacement in
fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008?
(c) How many posts will not receive training in the case of escape
hoods?
Answer. (a) As of the close of FY 2005, all overseas posts had
fully equipped and trained First Responder Units, and all overseas
posts had received a comprehensive chem/bio training package that
included the provision of escape masks and the associated training.
Over 110,000 masks were deployed. The FY 2006 plan includes $1.7
million for replacement of 15,887 masks; the FY 2007 budget includes
$2.7 million for replacement of 25,233 masks.
(b) There are 23,400 personal escape masks due for replacement in
FY 2006 and 36,350 in FY 2007, on the basis of a 4-year replacement
cycle. To address this shortfall, the Department sent a random sample
of expiring masks to the U.S. Army's Edgewood Chemical Biological
Command in Aberdeen, MD, to determine whether the shelf life could be
extended for a fifth year. If the shelf life can be extended, the
Department will have sufficient funding to replace all masks on
schedule by FY 2010. If the shelf life of the masks cannot be extended
for a fifth year, replacement masks would be supplied to only critical
and high-threat posts, due to a lack of funding.
(c) All overseas posts have been initially equipped and trained
with personal escape masks. New employees will be provided with escape
mask training upon arrival at post. Refresher training is available for
employees on an as-needed basis, at the rate of approximately once
every 2 years for each post.
Question. The ``National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America,'' issued by the Department of Defense in March 2005, states as
a vulnerability of the United States that ``[o]ur strength as a nation
state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of
the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.''
Do you regard engagement in international fora and use of
judicial processes as a ``strategy of the weak?''
Do you regard it as equivalent to terrorism?
Answer. You are asking for an interpretation of a Department of
Defense document. I think it would be more appropriate to address this
question to that Department.
As for the underlying challenge to the United States being
described by the phrase that you quote, I understand this to refer not
to the use of international fora and judicial processes, which is
undertaken regularly and legitimately by many, but to the ``abuse'' or
``misuse'' of these fora and processes by some who would seek to
undermine by any means our national interests and those of our friends
and allies.
Question. What role does the Department have in extraordinary
renditions undertaken by U.S. Government agencies? Please be specific.
Answer. The term ``extraordinary rendition'' is frequently used to
refer to a rendition by one state to another state with the knowledge
or intent that the receiving state will torture the individual being
rendered. The United States does not engage in such extraordinary
renditions--as we have repeatedly made clear, including at the U.S.
Presentation to the Committee Against Torture in May, the United States
does not transport, and has not transported, detainees from one country
to another for the purpose of interrogation using torture. The United
States has not transported anyone, and will not transport anyone, to a
country if the United States believes he or she will be tortured. Where
appropriate, the United States seeks assurances it considers to be
credible that transferred persons will not be tortured.
To the extent that questions have been raised about the rendition
of individuals outside of normal extradition procedures, the United
States has acknowledged that it, like other countries, has long used
procedures, in addition to extraditions or other judicial procedures,
to transport individuals from the country where they were captured to
their home country or to another country where they can be questioned,
held, or brought to justice. In this regard, after detainees held in
Guantanamo have been approved for release or transfer to other
countries, the State Department has played a role in such transfers by
seeking, where appropriate, diplomatic assurances of humane treatment,
as well as assurances that the individuals in question will not pose a
threat to the United States or its allies.
Question. What has been the involvement of the Department with
regard to the construction of, maintenance of, or seeking the
permission for use of, facilities to detain terrorist suspects in
foreign nations? Please be specific.
Answer. The Department has the lead role in negotiating the
transfer of Guantanamo detainees to their country of nationality or a
third country, when appropriate. For example, the U.S. Government and
the Government of Afghanistan exchanged diplomatic notes regarding the
transfer of detainees from the United States to the Government of
Afghanistan, which committed to accept responsibility for the returning
Afghan citizens and will work to ensure that they do not pose a
continuing threat to Afghanistan, the coalition, or the international
community. The United States is providing assistance to refurbish Block
IV of the Pol-e Charki prison (PeC), and to train and equip an Afghan
guard force. Further information in reference to this question has been
provided in a classified answer.
Question. It is expected that the administration will send a large
number of detainees currently in Guantanamo back to their home
countries, including Afghanistan, where many will continue to be
detained.
(a) If detainees are transferred to the custody of the Government
of Afghanistan, what will be their legal status?
(b) Do you expect them to be charged with crimes and prosecuted by
the Government of Afghanistan? If not, under what domestic law will
Afghanistan detain them and for how long?
(c) If they are detained without charge, what impact will such
detention have on efforts to build the rule of law in Afghanistan? Will
the International Committee for the Red Cross and the Afghan Human
Rights Commission have access to these detainees.
Answer. One of the Department of Defense's current missions is to
use all necessary and appropriate force to defeat the al-Qaeda network
and its supporters. In the course of that campaign, which remains
ongoing, the United States and its allies have captured thousands of
individuals overseas, virtually all of whom are foreign nationals.
Fewer than 500 of these foreign nationals are being held by the
Department of Defense (DOD) at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba (GTMO).
It is appropriate for DOD to detain these enemy combatants as long
as hostilities are ongoing. Nonetheless, as former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, Matthew Waxman, has
previously declared, DOD has no interest in detaining enemy combatants
longer than necessary. Where detention is deemed no longer necessary, a
detainee may be released to the control of another government. The
United States also transfers GTMO detainees, under appropriate
circumstances, to the control of other governments for continued
detention, investigation, and/or prosecution.
In all such cases of transfer for continued detention,
investigation, and/or prosecution, as appropriate, as well as
situations in which the detainee is transferred for release, the
detainee is transferred entirely to the custody and control of the
other government, and once transferred, is no longer in the custody and
control of the United States. The individual is detained under such
circumstances, if at all, by the foreign government pursuant to its own
laws and not on behalf of the United States. With respect to your
specific questions regarding Afghanistan:
(a) If GTMO detainees are transferred by the United States to the
Government of Afghanistan, they will no longer be in the custody and
control of the United States and thus the Government of Afghanistan
will determine their status.
(b) There is not a uniform policy or expectation with respect to
all Afghan detainees that may be transferred from GTMO to the
Government of Afghanistan. Furthermore, if an individual transferred is
detained or prosecuted by the Government of Afghanistan, such action
would be taken pursuant to the laws of Afghanistan and would not be
done on behalf of the United States. The Government of Afghanistan is
currently conducting an assessment of its domestic laws to determine
its detention and prosecution capabilities and we would not speculate
as to the domestic legal framework under which the Government of
Afghanistan might charge or detain an individual detainee.
(c) We fully expect Afghanistan to detain the transferees in
accordance with its domestic laws and international obligations, which
will help build the rule of law in Afghanistan. We additionally
anticipate that the Government of Afghanistan will allow the
International Committee for the Red Cross to have access to any
individuals determined to be enemy combatants, if they are detained.
However, this is a matter that the ICRC will negotiate directly with
the Government of Afghanistan.
Question. It is expected that the administration is planning to
send a large number of detainees currently in Guantanamo back to their
home countries, including Saudi Arabia, where many will continue to be
detained.
(a) If detainees are transferred back to the custody of the
Government of Saudi Arabia, what will be their legal status?
(b) Do you expect them to be charged with crimes and prosecuted by
the Government of Saudi Arabia? If not, under what domestic law will
Saudi Arabia detain them and for how long?
(c) Will the International Committee for the Red Cross have access
to these detainees?
(d) Given Saudi Arabia's well-documented record of torture, how
will the State Department ensure and credibly verify that detainees
transferred there will not be tortured.
Answer. (a) Consistent with our discussion in the answer to the
previous question, if GTMO detainees are transferred by the United
States to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, they will no longer be in the
custody and control of the United States and thus the Saudi Arabian
Government will determine the status of any detainees transferred.
(b) There is not a uniform policy or expectation with respect to
all Saudi detainees that may be transferred from GTMO to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, if an individual transfer is detained or
prosecuted by Saudi Arabia, such action would be taken pursuant to the
laws of Saudi Arabia and would not be done on behalf of the United
States. As a result, we cannot speculate as to how long Saudi Arabia
might or might not detain such individuals.
(c) As noted with respect to Afghanistan in the answer to the
previous question, any question of ICRC access to another countries'
prisons, is a matter for negotiation between the ICRC and that country.
(d) The United States does not transfer individuals to other
countries where it believes it is more likely than not that they will
be tortured. A country's individual human rights record is a factor in,
rather than a substitute for, a case-by-case analysis, taking into
account the particular circumstances of the transfer, the country to
which the transfer is being made, the individual concerned, and any
concerns regarding torture or persecution that may arise.
The Department works closely with the Department of Defense and
relevant agencies with respect to the likelihood of torture or other
treatment concerns in a given country and the adequacy and credibility
of assurances obtained from a particular foreign government prior to
any transfer. In each of these contexts, as appropriate, the United
States obtains assurances in order to be satisfied that it is not more
likely than not that the individual in question will be tortured upon
return. If, taking into account all relevant information, including any
assurances received, the United States believes that a person more
likely than not will be tortured if returned to a foreign country, the
United States would not approve the return of the person to that
country.
Finally, with respect to verifying any assurances made, as has been
stated on numerous occasions, we would take steps to investigate any
credible allegations of torture and will take appropriate action if
there is reason to believe that diplomatic assurances obtained are not
being honored.
Question. The United States has long condemned governments that
engage in enforced disappearances--a practice generally defined as
depriving an individual of his or her freedom and then refusing to
acknowledge where that person is being detained or even the fact of his
or her detention.
(a) Does the State Department agree with this definition of
``forced disappearances?'' If not, how does the Department define the
practice?
(b) Would the long-term detention without charge of a terrorist
suspect in an undisclosed location to which the International Committee
for the Red Cross has no access constitute a forced disappearance? If
not, why not?
Answer. (a) The definition of an enforced disappearance may vary
under international law. During the negotiations of the recent United
Nations Commission on Human Rights Working Group to Elaborate a
Normative Instrument to Protect All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, the United States supported the following definition:
For purposes of this instrument, enforced disappearance is
considered to be the arrest, detention or abduction of a person
by or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
state, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, with the intention of removing that person
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
(b) No. As we have repeatedly indicated, we believe that we are in
a continuing state of armed conflict with al-Qaeda, and that the law of
war governs the treatment of al-Qaeda combatants captured in the course
of our military obligations. The interrogation and transfer of captured
al-Qaeda members is more than an appropriate tool in this fight--it is
critical to exercising our responsibility to protect our own citizens
from further attack. U.S. personnel are required to treat all detainees
consistent with U.S. law and treaty obligations, including prohibitions
on torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and prohibition
against transferring persons to be tortured.
Question. With the passage of the McCain amendment, no detainee in
U.S. custody anywhere in the world may be subjected to cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment that is banned by the 1st, 8th,
and 14th amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which,
among other things, prohibit the treatment that violates due process or
``shocks the conscience.'' Some have argued that these constitutional
prohibitions operate as a sliding scale, with the definition of what
``shocks the conscience'' shifting based on the governmental interest
at stake.
In the State Department's view, are there circumstances
where the government's interest in gathering information is so
great that, even after passage of the McCain amendment, nothing
short of torture would shock the conscience? Or are there
certain forms of treatment that would ``shock the conscience''
and constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under
any circumstance? If it is the former--that under certain
circumstances there are no limits on what ``shocks the
conscience''--would you be willing to accept a foreign
government's reliance on that same argument to justify its
treatment of captured U.S. military personnel?
Answer. The Department of State refers questions regarding the
application of the McCain amendment to specific interrogation
techniques to the Department of Defense, which is responsible for
operational decisions regarding interrogation at the Defense Department
detention facilities. Questions regarding the scope of the prohibition
on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment found in the 5th, 8th, and
14th amendment of the United States Constitution are referred to the
Department of Justice.
______
Question of Senator George Allen
Question. In light of Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev's threats
to resume war and Azerbaijan's significant increase in military
spending, can the President continue to certify that U.S. military
assistance will not undermine efforts to negotiate a peaceful
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
Answer. Yes. U.S. security assistance to Azerbaijan is carefully
targeted so as not to undermine or hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate
a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or to be used for
offensive purposes against Armenia, as per Public Law 107-115. The
United States assists Azerbaijan by upgrading its capability to combat
terrorism, to operate with U.S. and NATO forces, and to protect its
borders against the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, illicit
narcotics, and other items that threaten international stability and
U.S. national security.
The projected increased military spending of 76 percent in
Azerbaijan in 2006 is proportionate to the budget increase, due to
dramatically increased oil revenues. The increase in military spending
may also be driven by fear of, and increasing political pressure from,
its powerful neighbors, Iran and Russia.
The President and Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan have participated
actively in a series of meetings led by the OSCE Minsk Group (the
``Prague Process'') since 2004, aimed at finding a peaceful settlement
to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite the stall in negotiations
that resulted after talks at Rambouillet, France, in February 2006, we
continue to believe that 2006 offers a realistic window of opportunity
to achieve a peaceful settlement to the conflict. We support the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and hold that the future status of
Nagorno-Karabakh is a matter of negotiation between the parties.
We are providing Azerbaijan with a level of military assistance
consistent with its crucial participation and cooperation in the war on
terror. The Government of Azerbaijan has made invaluable contributions
to the war on terror, including, but not limited to, blanket overflight
rights, the use of Azerbaijan military bases, information-sharing, and
law enforcement cooperation. Azerbaijan's cooperation with the United
States Government has allowed us to achieve several significant
successes in disrupting terrorist cells and in bringing terrorists to
justice.
______
Questions of Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. What is our strategy to make sure that this area (``the
lawless Pashtun tribal areas'') of Pakistan does not remain an area of
sanctuary for the Taliban and al-Qaeda?
Answer. To support Pakistan's efforts to exercise stronger control
in the tribal areas, we are providing assistance for border security
and socioeconomic development. Along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border,
we are supporting the building of roads and outposts that allow for
more effective control of the border. We are also supporting
construction of new schools, teacher training, microfinance programs,
health activities to improve child health services and installation of
small-scale infrastructure projects such as dug wells and
minihydroelectric schemes to secure community support for Pakistan's
Government.
Our mutual aim is to enhance central government authority in the
tribal areas to ensure that the region will never again be a sanctuary
for terrorists and militants.
We also participate with both Pakistan and Afghanistan in the
Tripartite Commission, a military forum that meets regularly on cross-
border military and security cooperation. Through the commission we
work with both Pakistan and Afghanistan to bring improved field
coordination and communication for security operations in this region.
Question. Will the U.S. support efforts to pass a binding Security
Council resolution calling for constructive action on Burma?
Answer. The United States remains gravely concerned about the
deteriorating situation in Burma. We believe the Security Council has
an important role to play in promoting positive change there, and we
are actively exploring ways to build UNSC consensus on the need for
further discussions and possible action on Burma in follow-up to the
landmark Council discussion on December 16.
We are also advocating discussion of Burma in other U.N. bodies,
such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Third
Committee. Last year, the United States cosponsored the European
Union's annual Burma human rights resolution at the United Nations
General Assembly's Third Committee, which called for ``a genuinely
inclusive'' political process through the ``unhindered participation of
all political parties and representatives of ethnic nationalities,'' as
well as the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners.
Separately, we are supporting the International Labor Organization's
request to place Burma on the 2006 ECOSOC agenda.
We will continue to encourage U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to
remain engaged in Burma, and to work with the U.N. Secretariat to
identify the best possible successor for the Secretary General's former
Special Envoy to Burma, Razali Ismail.
Question. Secretary Rice, 60 Minutes recently ran a piece on the
widespread waste, fraud, and abuse that has plagued the Iraq
reconstruction effort. Highlighted in the piece was a contractor,
Custer Battles, that was given tens of millions of dollars in contracts
despite having no experience and no qualifications. Despite failing
miserably in every job it was asked to do, the Coalition Provisional
Authority not only refused to fire Custer Battles, it wrote a glowing
review and continued to give them contracts.
Secretary Rice, you were placed in charge of coordinating Iraq's
reconstruction in October 2003. What involvement, if any, did you have
with this particular case?
Answer. In October 2003, the National Security Council created an
Iraq Stabilization Group with four interagency cells, including one on
economics, in order to strengthen interagency policy support for the
Department of Defense and the Coalition Provisional Authority and to
help prepare for the next phase of the reconstruction effort in Iraq.
This interagency group had no direct involvement in reviewing
contracts. The Custer Battles case is now before the Federal district
court in Virginia, and it would be inappropriate to comment on pending
litigation.
On May 11, 2004, the President issued a National Security
Presidential Directive in which he determined that the Secretary of
State would be responsible for the continuous supervision and general
direction of all assistance for Iraq. To that end, the Department of
State cooperates closely with the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG), the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), each of which actively audits
U.S. programs in Iraq.
______
Questions of Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. Does the proposed increase in this budget request for the
current U.N. mission in Sudan take into account the likelihood that the
African Union mission in Sudan may be replaced by a new U.N.
peacekeeping Mission later this year?
Answer. Yes, the $442 million Contributions to International
Peacekeeping Account (CIPA) request includes $160 million for a U.N.
peacekeeping operation in Darfur based on the likelihood that the
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) will transition to a U.N.
operation this year. Though the U.N. Security Council has not yet
adopted a resolution authorizing that transition, we expect one within
the March timeframe to kick off the ``re-hat'' of AMIS, and a U.N.
operation in Darfur would become fully operational between end-
September and end-December 2006. We are pressing for this transition to
take place as soon as possible to improve security and humanitarian
access in Darfur. The $442 million FY 2007 CIPA request also includes
$282 million to sustain the current U.N. peacekeeping operation in
Southern Sudan (UNMIS).
Question. Has the State Department begun planning for the possible
role of NATO or a new U.N. peacekeeping mission in Darfur?
Answer. The Department is working with the United Nations,
bilateral partners, and the African Union to expedite a formal African
Union (AU) request for a U.N. re-hat of the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) and to obtain a U.N. Security Council Resolution
authorizing that transition shortly thereafter. In the interim before
adoption of that resolution, we are working with the U.N. Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to advance the planning process
authorized by our February 3 UNSC Presidential Statement, which
directed DPKO to cooperate with the UNSC members, the AU, and the
parties to the Darfur conflict to begin planning for a future U.N.
peacekeeping operation in Darfur. We have provided DPKO with four U.S.
military planners from the joint staff and will continue working with
DPKO and the Secretary General's office to expedite the planning
process.
We are also exploring new ways to increase AMIS capacity in the
interim. AMIS needs additional expertise and, as the President has
said, we believe NATO can do more. NATO has already trained over 120
AMIS Force Headquarters staff and has taken the lead in providing
strategic airlift for thousands of newly deployed or rotating AMIS
troops. We are working closely with European allies to determine how
NATO, in coordination with the EU, can provide more support and are
optimistic that, with a request for assistance from the United Nations
or African Union, NATO will be able to do more.
Question. What is the administration's strategic plan for Sudan and
how is it linked to its budget request? Is your budget request
sufficient to cover our strategy in Sudan for the coming year?
Answer. The overarching U.S. policy goal is to achieve a peaceful
and democratic transformation that assures broad participation in the
political process and fosters civil liberties and to promote a just,
viable political settlement to the conflicts in a united Sudan. Our
strategy to achieve this is multifaceted. One facet is a stable
Southern Sudan; demilitarized, at peace with its northern neighbors,
and on the path toward long-term reconstruction with immediate
humanitarian needs met. Another is to help bring an end to the conflict
in Darfur and facilitate the return of internally displaced persons and
refugees to their homes. The reconstruction of Southern Sudan is a
major subgoal of the United States strategy for rebuilding and
stabilizing Sudan. However, because events in Southern Sudan are
closely connected and affected by events in other parts of the country,
including Darfur, Eastern Sudan, and the North, the USG must take an
integrated approach. The USG assistance to Sudan is divided into three
categories:
Humanitarian Assistance: Meeting basic humanitarian needs--
food, shelter, and health services--of vulnerable and returning
populations affected by conflict will reduce the threats to
stability and thus strengthen the successful implementation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Transitional Security: Elements that contribute to
transitional security include such activities as peacekeeping
in Darfur; transformation of the SPLA into a professional army;
assistance to strengthen the rule of law and to mitigate
conflict in the south; and support to the U.N. Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS). We also believe a more robust peacekeeping effort is
needed in Darfur and for that reason support a U.N. re-hat of
the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), but one that would
incorporate elements of AMIS. In a transition to a U.N.
peacekeeping force we would concurrently support and strengthen
AMIS during the transition period.
Reconstruction of Governance, the Economy and Social
Services: Strategic investments for the south to provide
essential services in communities that will be receiving
returnees; to mitigate local conflict over scarce resources; to
rehabilitate infrastructure for the promotion of markets and
freedom of movement; to promote immediate agricultural and
enterprise opportunities; and to support the creation of a
participatory and responsive government structure and system.
The Department of State's FY07 budget request is specifically keyed
to funding these categories and objectives. We believe our FY07
request, when coupled with the FY06 supplemental request, is sufficient
to implement our Sudan strategy as outlined.
Question. Given that Somalia is a failed state, a breeding ground
for terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, and a convenient base
for pirates and criminal networks that are roaming around the region
unhindered, why is the funding request for Somalia so low?
Answer. The formation of a transitional governing entity known as
the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) provides an
opportunity for increased U.S. engagement in FY 2007; however,
Somalia's continued instability, lack of security, and low absorptive
capacity hampers extensive U.S. direct bilateral assistance programming
in many sectors in Somalia.
For example, in FY 2005, the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, was
forced to suspend the award of additional Democracy and Human Rights
Funds (DHRF) due to the inability to gain access to Somali territory to
maintain appropriate project monitoring and financial controls. In
addition, existing legislation prevents direct assistance to a Somali
Government due to Somalia's significant arrears to the United States
and further complicates our ability to program U.S. assistance in
Somalia.
Despite these restrictions, we continue to program limited levels
of U.S. foreign assistance in Somalia in the areas of governance,
conflict resolution, and support for civil society. As a result, U.S.
assistance programs in Somalia are currently supporting peacebuilding
efforts by Somali civil society organizations in an effort make the
region less vulnerable to terrorist organizations seeking a safe haven.
In addition, U.S. humanitarian assistance will address the humanitarian
needs of the Somali people. In FY 2006, increased Public Law 480, title
II assistance will address the humanitarian needs of approximately 1.7
million people currently at risk of starvation in southern Somalia.
Vulnerable populations in Somalia, particularly in the regions of
Puntland and Somaliland, will also receive humanitarian assistance
through U.S. contributions to the Africa programs of the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. We will continue to review opportunities for additional U.S.
assistance activities and programs in Somalia as the ongoing political
process develops.
Question. Does the administration have a comprehensive strategy to
promote peace and democratic governance in Somalia? Is the Office of
Reconstruction and Stabilization involved in assisting with the
development of such a plan?
Answer. The administration's strategy to promote peace and
democracy in Somalia will build upon earlier successes in the
reconciliation process and work with our regional and international
partners to support the reestablishment of stability and effective
governance in Somalia. U.S. policy toward Somalia is designed to
support the reestablishment of a functioning central government in
Somalia capable of bringing the Somali people out of this long period
of civil conflict and addressing the humanitarian needs of the Somali
people and the international community's concerns regarding terrorism.
In order to achieve these policy objectives, we will coordinate our
engagement with our international, regional, and donor partners to
support positive developments in Somalia. The administration's strategy
reflects guidelines provided by the Office of Reconstruction and
Stabilization.
We are currently in the process of seeking and identifying the
additional personnel and budget resources needed to implement this
engagement strategy and achieve U.S. policy objectives in Somalia. Our
ability to engage effectively with a nascent Somali Government and
governing institutions, however, will be driven by events inside
Somalia and the progress made by various members of the Somalia
Transitional Federal Institutions. In this regard, we have closely
followed the recent convening of the first session of the Somalia
Transitional Federal Parliament in Baidoa. Through the U.S. Embassy in
Nairobi, Kenya, we continue to urge all members of the Transitional
Federal Institutions to resolve their differences peacefully within the
framework of the Transitional Federal Charter.
Question. Is the United States coordinating with other donor
countries and international organizations to maximize international
assistance? What mechanisms or bodies exist to do this?
Answer. U.S. assistance to Somalia is coordinated through the
Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB) that was established in December
1993 and consists of a variety of policy and sectoral committees in an
effort to improve the impact of the international community's
assistance to Somalia. The SACB is a voluntary coordination mechanism
that provides a framework for developing coordinated approaches for
donor engagement in Somalia. A range of donors, including the United
States, has provided consistent support for SACB activities.
In addition, during a donor coordination conference in October
2004, the international community agreed that the United Nations should
lead coordination and cooperation of the international community with
respect to Somalia and with the Transitional Federal Institutions
(TFIs). A Declaration of Principles was approved, establishing a
Coordination and Monitoring Committee (CMC). This framework created the
highest level mechanism for coordination between the TFIs and the
international community. The CMC is cochaired by the Prime Minister of
the Transitional Federal Government and the Special Representative of
the United Nations Secretary General (UNSRSG). The UNSRSG also chairs a
weekly meeting that brings together the international community on an
informal basis to discuss political developments. Voluntary U.S.
contributions to a variety of United Nations agencies, including the
U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), and U.N.
Children's Fund (UNICEF), also support multilateral donor engagement in
Somalia.
Although sharp divisions within the TFIs have prevented the CMC
from functioning since April 2005, we continue to work with our donor
partners and regional actors to develop and consolidate a common
position to advance the reconciliation process in Somalia. There is a
separate monthly donor coordination meeting in Nairobi chaired by a
Troika of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Representatives from USAID and
State participate to the extent possible in the numerous coordination
meetings in Nairobi.
Question. Was the administration monitoring the detainees linked to
al-Qaeda who recently escaped from prison in Yemen prior to their
escape?
Answer. All 23 prisoners were held at a maximum security facility
run by the Political Security Organization (PSO). The Yemeni Government
specifically designated this prison for terrorism-related offenders.
U.S. Embassy officials were occasionally granted access to certain
prisoners based on written requests.
Question. What actions did the administration take to try to
prevent a repeat of the detainee escape that took place in 2003?
Answer. The two detainees who escaped from prison in the southern
city of Aden in 2003 were placed, after recapture, in the Sanaa
Political Security Organization prison where prison security was
considered tighter.
Question. What assurances, commitments, and cooperation has the
United States received from the Yemeni Government with respect to
prosecuting those responsible for the attack on the USS Cole?
Answer. In July 2004, the surviving terrorists involved in the
attack on the USS Cole were brought to trial as a result of
collaborative investigations by the Yemeni authorities and the FBI. The
trials were held with a USG representative present. The Attorney
General maintained regular contact with the Embassy throughout the
process. In September 2004, a Yemeni court convicted the six terrorists
charged with planning and perpetrating the attack on the USS Cole.
Question. Does the current budget request reflect any changes to
our assistance to Yemen needed to address the prison break and any
forthcoming changes to the United States-Yemen relationship?
Answer. Currently there are no direct funding requests for
additional resources in the aftermath of the escape.
Question. Were you satisfied with our relationship with Yemen
before the escape?
Answer. Since the post 9/11 forging of United States-Yemen
counterterrorism partnership, the Yemeni Government has significantly
improved the security situation in Yemen and denied Yemen as a haven
for al-Qaeda. United States-Yemen counterterrorism cooperation prior to
the January 2006 prison escape was positive, although Yemen's limited
capabilities often posed challenges.
High-level engagement--e.g., visits to Yemen by Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Frances F.
Townsend, and President Saleh's November 2005 visit to Washington--
yielded successes and also highlighted difficulties. For example, we
remained unsatisfied with Yemen's response to our requests to close
down the private sector arms trade, install a modern inventory system
to better account for military hardware, and improve information-
sharing on the interrogation of terror suspects. The U.S. Embassy in
Sanaa remains focused on these and other challenges as we continue to
the effort to sustain effective counterterrorism cooperation with
Yemen.
Question. What role has this new office played in developing a
strategy for addressing stabilization and reconstruction efforts in
Sudan? How many people within this new office are dedicated to Sudan-
related work?
Answer. Deputy Secretary Zoellick asked S/CRS to assist the Bureau
of African Affairs (AF) in preparing an interagency conflict
transformation plan, with a focus on planning for implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and ongoing efforts to resolve the
crisis in Darfur.
S/CRS facilitated meetings of the interagency to further develop
and refine the strategic goals and essential tasks of this plan.
Metrics were identified to measure progress to meet these goals. This
process also provided a forum to synchronize crosscutting efforts.
At the request of OMB, S/CRS also assisted the interagency in
facilitating a review of the interagency Sudan budget requests to
identify potential resource gaps. This analysis helped decisionmakers
formulate the FY06 supplemental and the FY07 budget request.
At the peak of the planning effort in the fall of 2005, S/CRS
dedicated four staff full time to work on Sudan, with three others
working half time or more. S/CRS funded a core Secretariat of 3
personnel, located in the Africa bureau at State, to improve
information flow among the interagency, develop robust performance
measures for the plan, and provide geospatial analysis to the
reporting. Five S/CRS staff continue to work part time on Sudan-related
issues. S/CRS is providing a security expert to assist in the Abuja
talks, and has funded three positions at the Embassy in Khartoum to
assist in documenting USG-wide conflict transformation planning and
implementation by all USG agencies.
Question. Does the Africa bureau work closely with this new office?
Answer. S/CRS and the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) work
collegially and cooperatively on a range of issues. On Sudan, we worked
closely on the conflict transformation planning process, an interagency
process to develop an overall USG strategy, including resource
requirements, for achieving democratic transformation and an end to
conflict.
AF and S/CRS regularly dialogue on strategies to address potential
conflict in countries on the continent. Last year we jointly sponsored
a roundtable and simulation on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
which generated some new ideas for the upcoming elections. More
recently, S/CRS has cooperated closely with AF on Chad by fielding a
team to assess underlying causes of conflict and to assist Embassy
N'Djamena and AF with conflict prevention planning.
Question. Is this new office part of discussions concerning the
deployment of additional peacekeepers to Darfur?
Answer. The Bureau of African Affairs (AF), in conjunction with the
Bureau of International Organizations (IO), has the lead in supporting
the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and working to transition it
to a U.N. peacekeeping operation. S/CRS has focused its efforts on
developing an overall strategic framework for post-conflict
reconstruction and democratic transformation in Sudan.
Question. Does the budget request provide adequate resources for
its continued or increased effectiveness? What is its operational
budget request for FY 2007?
Answer.
The FY 2007 funding request for State Operations will
provide for 15 additional personnel on a permanent basis for S/
CRS. Because current staffing is largely dependent on temporary
detail arrangements, the additional resources in FY07 would
allow us to regularize some of our current staffing and
institutionalize our efforts.
Current levels of staffing and operations funding allow S/
CRS to provide per year:
Leadership and management of three major country response
efforts with regional bureau, including management of
planning process;
Support to conflict prevention efforts in three countries;
Leadership of civilian participation in two major military
exercises that test military and civilian planning and
deployment for R&S operations.
Each such country engagement effort includes participation
of numerous staff from other bureaus, departments, and
agencies.
Attachments
STATE PERSONNEL FOR S/CRS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plan 2005 2006 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
S/CRS and Active Response Corps*
Cumulative FTE.................. 9 15 30
Cumulative Temporary Positions** 22 48 48
-----------------------------------
Total Perm & Temp............. 31 63 78
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* S/CRS staff supplemented by contractors and other short-term hires, as
well as interagency detailees.
** Additional temporary State positions, not counting contractors or
interns.
[Dollars in thousands]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY06 FY07
Account FY05 actual estimate request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY05 Supplemental Operating $7,700 ........... ...........
Funds*..........................
Bureau-Managed Operating Funds... **$737 $6,237 $6,507
Cost of Permanent Positions $1,485 $2,475 $5,250
Funded..........................
(total FTE).................. (9) (15) (30)
Cost of other State nonpermanent $2,950 $7,920 $8,400
staff...........................
(total positions; includes (22) (48) (48)
Active Response Corps)......
--------------------------------------
S/CRS Total (State $12,872 $16,632 $20,157
Operations--D&CP).........
Conflict Response Fund (Foreign 0 0 75,000
Ops)............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Supplemental provided 2-year funding; $2.6M obligated in FY05 and
$5.1M in FY06.
Question. How will the new Director of Foreign Assistance relate to
NSPD-44 and the role of S/CRS?
Answer. S/CRS was created to better organize our government to
address the full spectrum of conflict--from prevention to response. Our
operating assumption has been that S/CRS would manage to 2-3 post-
conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts at one time.
We anticipate that S/CRS will be activated when the United States
engages in an effort that requires strategic planning, coordination,
and interoperability among multiple USG agencies in the use of foreign
assistance as well as in military, diplomatic, and other areas. S/CRS
is also charged with international coordination for S&R operations,
with creating a joint operations capability for managing a response,
and with developing deployable civilian capacity. The Presidential
Directive on reconstruction and stabilization, issued in December,
reinforces this mandate.
The Director of Foreign Assistance will manage the range of foreign
assistance, which includes about $19 billion in aid provided to 80
countries. This role is complementary to the efforts in S/CRS and in
other parts of our Government to focus on effective U.S. engagement.
States are most at risk of failure in a transition from conflict
because their institutions are weak, and they are often reliant on
international assistance, which can at times be slower in arriving than
needed. In a crisis, speed is key. We have to be able to quickly assess
our resources, define goals and objectives, identify needs, and
allocate available resources as quickly and effectively as possible in
anticipating, planning, and responding.
By establishing a central node to oversee foreign assistance more
broadly, and look across the entire pool of resources, we see an
opportunity to further improve our capabilities to manage strategies
for country assistance programs. The new structure will provide S/CRS
with a valuable partner in our efforts to manage post-conflict
response.
Question. What relationship will the Director of Foreign Assistance
have with the Assistant Secretaries and Coordinators at the State
Department and Assistant Administrators at USAID who currently have
responsibility for designing and implementing foreign assistance
programs?
Answer. I am establishing the position of Director of Foreign
Assistance (DFA) to align better our foreign assistance programs with
our foreign policy goals, to align more fully the foreign assistance
activities of USAID and State, and to demonstrate that we are
responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars. I am investing the DFA with
authority over foreign assistance funding and programs to achieve these
goals, not to supervise Assistant Secretaries and Coordinators or
Assistant Administrators. Nor are the reporting relationships of
Assistant Secretaries or Assistant Administrators expected to change.
Instead, the Director of Foreign Assistance will work closely with
Assistant Secretaries and Assistant Administrators in exercising his
authority over foreign assistance funding and programs and developing
coordinated strategies, plans, and budgets.
Question. Who will control the funds that are currently apportioned
to those individuals and how will the decisionmaking process work?
Answer. To the extent permitted by law, I will delegate to the
Director of Foreign Assistance the foreign assistance funding
authorities consistent with and necessary to achieve a single
coordinated foreign assistance approval authority. Under my direction,
the DFA will have approval and coordinating authority over all foreign
assistance.
Question. How has the Department of State planned for managing a
wide-scale outbreak of avian influenza in Africa, and has your office
developed contingency plans to address the diplomatic, economic, and
security concerns that an outbreak of avian influenza may have in each
major region of the continent?
Answer. The H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus has
spread to Africa, with the virus detected in Nigeria, Egypt, and Niger.
We are particularly concerned about the potential for spread of the
H5N1 virus in Africa, given the relatively weak health and preparedness
infrastructure in many African countries and the continent's high
incidence of immunocompromised people. Further, the H5N1 virus is not
just a health matter but an economic, security, and social issue.
Outbreaks in birds cause economic hardships and may threaten food
security in some regions. The social, economic, and political impacts
of a virulent human flu pandemic, whether sparked by the strain that is
currently circulating in birds or by any other new strain, could be
devastating.
Our framework for action in Africa is predicated on measures in
support of surveillance, preparedness, response, and containment.
The State Department has established an interagency African Avian
Influenza Network that was activated to respond to avian influenza
outbreaks in Africa, starting with Nigeria. U.S. Ambassadors are
instructed to encourage host governments to promote strong interagency
communication and coordination (particularly among Ministries of
Agriculture, Health and Information) to combat the threat of avian
influenza. As in the case of Nigeria, U.S. Embassies are encouraged to
work closely with other donors and U.N. resident representatives to
prioritize host country needs and coordinate appropriate international
responses. Our Embassies are instructed to convey to host governments
the importance of coordinating their efforts with neighboring
countries, and U.S. Embassies in neighboring countries also coordinate
closely among themselves. Regional organizations such as the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been engaged to develop
regional response strategies and resources, as outbreaks become more
widespread.
Within the African Avian Influenza Network, the State Department's
Avian Influenza Action Group and the Bureau of African Affairs are
coordinating closely with the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Defense (DOD) and
other appropriate agencies, both in Washington and in affected and
high-risk countries, to develop assistance programs and technical
support for countries potentially affected by outbreaks. Both the
interagency African Avian Influenza Network in Washington and the
country teams at U.S. Embassies and consulates overseas are developing
appropriate contingency plans for addressing the anticipated
diplomatic, economic, and security concerns of countries affected by
avian influenza in Africa. Our plans are coordinated with appropriate
international technical organizations including the World Health
Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
Question. Do you believe the budget request includes enough support
for regional organizations and countries that need to strengthen their
capabilities to respond to such an outbreak in the coming year?
Answer. At the present time, we believe that $214 million in FY
2007 funds, in addition to $280 million in FY 2006 supplemental
appropriations will be adequate to help support regional organizations
and countries that need to strengthen their capabilities to respond to
such an outbreak in the coming year and to help contain an influenza
outbreak beyond the borders of the United States. The adequacy of U.S.
support must take into account the totality of contributions of the
international community, including financial and other support provided
by multilateral, bilateral, and private sector donors. The reality of
the threat of pandemic influenza is that it is too large for any one
country to address alone, and requires a comprehensive and coordinated
response from the international community. It is also important to
realize that building the capacity of many of these nations to
adequately respond will require time as well as funding (conducting
training, building laboratories, developing and establishing policies,
etc.) and some tasks may require more than a year to complete.
Question. Please provide a description of the new DOD-State
transition planning group for Iraq and Afghanistan led by GEN (Ret.)
Kicklighter.
Given how complex our stabilization and reconstruction
operations in Iraq have been, will this new planning effort for
two countries dilute the quality of its work?
What are the primary products or processes GEN Kicklighter
will deliver?
Why wasn't this new effort set up until last October or
November?
Answer. The Iraq-Afghanistan Joint Transition Planning Group is a
joint Department of State and Department of Defense team that has been
asked by both Secretaries to review U.S. Government efforts to address
medium- and long-range transition challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Recognizing the complexity of the issues and the number of interested
agencies, the group has been asked to focus the scope of their
assessment primarily on security-related transition challenges.
Currently, the group is collecting data and engaging in initial
analysis exercises; the final product is still being contemplated.
Through the end of 2005, a major focus of the Iraq and Afghanistan
campaign plans was the training and equipping of the security forces.
This remains a priority but as the respective security forces start to
command increasing responsibility, the time has come to consider and
prepare for security-related transitions in the medium- and long-range
timeframe.
Question. Would the U.S. Government render a suspect to a country
that is known to practice torture, as long as that government assured
the United States that it would not torture that particular suspect?
What form would that assurance take?
Answer. The United States does not transfer individuals to other
countries where it believes it is more likely than not that they will
be tortured. Decisions with respect to transfers are analyzed on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular circumstances of
the transfer, the country to which the transfer is being made, the
individual concerned, and any concerns regarding torture or persecution
that may arise.
In the immigration removal and extradition contexts, the United
States reserves the use of assurances for a very small number of cases
where it can reasonably rely on such assurances that the individuals
being transferred would not be tortured.
In the context of decisions relating to the transfer or
repatriation of individuals detained by the U.S. Armed Forces at the
U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Department works closely
with the Department of Defense and relevant agencies to advise on the
likelihood of torture or other treatment concerns in a given country
and the adequacy and credibility of assurances obtained from a
particular foreign government prior to any transfer. In each of these
contexts, as appropriate, the United States obtains assurances in order
to be satisfied that it is not more likely than not that the individual
in question will be tortured upon return. If, taking into account all
relevant information, including any assurances received, the United
States believes that a person more likely than not will be tortured if
returned to a foreign country, the United States would not approve the
return of the person to that country. Finally, in answer to your
question regarding form, these assurances, when obtained, are
frequently transmitted through diplomatic notes.
Question. Do you seek similar assurances that individuals will not
be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment?
Answer. As a general matter it should be noted that article 3 of
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment provides that ``[n]o State Party shall expel,
return (`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.'' By its terms, this provision applies to
torture and not to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment. That said, it should be noted that in some contexts the
Department of State seeks more specific assurances, as appropriate. For
example, if the receiving State in question is not a party to certain
relevant treaties, such as the Convention Against Torture, the
Department may pursue more specific assurances, which, for example,
assure that an individual will not be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment.
Question. As you know, the European Parliament is currently
investigating whether the CIA or other U.S. Agencies or other countries
carried out abductions, extraordinary rendition, detention at secret
sites, and torture of prisoners in EU countries or have used EU
countries to transfer prisoners. Would you support a similar inquiry by
the U.S. Congress into these matters?
Answer. No, I would not. As this administration has repeatedly
stated, and as I made clear on my trip to Europe in early December, the
United States does not condone torture. Nor does it transport detainees
from one country to another for the purpose of being tortured.
Moreover, our policy has been clear that the United States does not
authorize interrogations that involve cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, as defined by U.S. obligations under the Torture Convention,
regardless of where those interrogations occur. The Detainee Treatment
Act codified this policy into law.
______
Questions of Senator Mel Martinez
WESTERN HEMISPHERE ACCOUNTS: USAID PROGRAMS
Question. The biggest regional funding setbacks appear to be in the
two key USAID Bilateral Economic Assistance programs: Child Survival/
Health and Development Assistance, which suffered a combined decrease
from last year's actual funding of more than $85 million. Even counting
the significant $31 million boost that State Economic Support Fund
(ESF) and the $22 million increase in funding for HIV/AIDS in Haiti and
Guyana, the net regional decrease (more than $32 million) is troubling.
Why were these decreases to USAID programs necessary? Some of that
decrease may be the result of some countries naturally ``graduating''
or ramping off of certain child care programs (e.g., El Salvador,
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Peru), but it seems that even that
money should be reinvested in the region. Did you consider shifting it
to other countries in the region?
Answer. While the FY 2007 request for Development Assistance
funding has been reduced from $254 million to $182 million (28%
reduction) and Child Survival and Health (CSH) funding has declined
from $141 million to $128 million (10% reduction), the overall foreign
assistance request for the region has remained in line with previous
years because of increased Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) funding.
Most of the reduction in CSH is in the family planning budget
category. The Agency has recently developed criteria for phasing out
USAID family planning assistance, based on two internationally accepted
benchmarks in family planning: Total fertility and contraceptive
prevalence rates. Using these criteria, the LAC Bureau has identified
six countries in which to phase-out family planning assistance over a
2- to 5-year period. The Bureau will gradually reduce the amount of
CSH-funded family planning assistance in the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru.
Much work remains to be done to improve equitable and sustainable
access to voluntary family planning services in Haiti, Bolivia,
Guatemala, and Honduras--countries that do not meet the Agency-defined
criteria for phaseout of family planning assistance. Therefore, these
family planning programs are not being phased out.
The administration has determined that the majority of CSH
resources will be targeted to regions of the world that have greater
need for health resources with large population densities, limited
access to clean water, and lack arable land. No consideration was given
to shifting resources to other countries in the region.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE ACCOUNTS: COUNTERDRUG & LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS
Question. The two key counterdrug programs for the region,
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) ($60,885M to
$54,800M) and Andean Counter Drug Initiative (ACI) (from $727,155M to
$721,500M) have been decreased a total of $11,740M. This is the wrong
time to trim counterdrug programs in the region. Why were these funds
decreased overall? Why were programs in Peru and Bolivia decreased so
much? (Peru: $106,920 to $98,500; Bolivia: From $79.2M to $66M)
Answer. The decreased FY 2007 budget request for the Western
Hemisphere INCLE account primarily reflects a $5 million reduction in
funding for Haiti in an effort, to take into account the country's
capacity to absorb assistance and effectively use the assistance we
provide to rebuild law enforcement and judicial institutions.
The FY 2007 budget request for all of ACI provides virtually the
same level of funding as in FY 2006. However, the need to keep Colombia
at viable levels, to meet funding requirements for the Air Bridge
Denial program, and to accelerate the Critical Flight Safety program
necessitated funding adjustments within the ACI account. For example,
we will continue the Air Bridge Denial program in FY 2007 by funding it
through the Colombia Interdiction line item instead of a separate line
item, as was the case in previous fiscal years. The FY 2007 ACI request
also devotes additional resources to the much-needed Critical Flight
Safety Program. The increased request for this program will accelerate
the Department of State's Air Wing's efforts to upgrade its severely
aged aircraft fleet to commercial standards in order to sustain
counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions in the Andean region.
At $66 million, Bolivia will have sufficient funds to maintain
current program levels. New programs that were envisioned for FY 2007,
such as forced eradication operations in the Yungas, will not be
possible at this level of funding. However, while the decision to
reduce the Bolivia program to a level below the FY 2006 was made prior
to the election of Evo Morales as President, it does not appear that
the Morales administration is planning on pursuing aggressive coca
reduction policies in the Yungas. USG-owned aviation assets in Bolivia
will also benefit from the Critical Flight Safety program, which will
upgrade seven helicopters at an approximate cost of $21 million.
The FY 2007 funding request for Peru mirrors the administration's
FY 2006 request of $98 million. An increased appropriation in FY 2006
plus our FY 2007 request, along with some internal shifting of program
resources, will enable the Government of Peru to enhance levels of
interdiction and eradication to address the 38-percent increase in coca
cultivation and meet program targets.
Question. The two key counterdrug programs for the region,
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) ($60,885M to
$54,800M) and Andean Counter Drug Initiative (ACI) (from $727,155M to
$721,500M) have been decreased a total of $11,740M. This is the wrong
time to trim counterdrug programs in the region. Why was the Haiti law
enforcement funding decreased--at a time when we need to sustain
support to Haiti?
Answer. We agree that Haiti needs sustained support. However, we
must balance our efforts to build an effective administration of
justice and law enforcement structure with the absorptive capacity of
the Haitian Government. We have made a long-term commitment to rebuild
Haiti's law enforcement and judicial institutions that takes into
account Haiti's ability to use the provided assistance effectively.
We believe that the level of funding for law enforcement is
appropriate given the current situation in Haiti. We will continue to
closely monitor the situation and recommend changes as necessary. We
hope that our assistance will grow as a democratically elected
government takes office and the fruits of our initial reform take hold,
increasing Haiti's absorptive capacity.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE ACCOUNTS: FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF) AND
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND EDUCATION TRAINING (IMET) PROGRAM
Question. What is your assessment of how the FMF program is working
in the region?
Answer. The FMF program in the Western Hemisphere is working well,
despite the tight budget environment and American Servicemembers'
Protection Act prohibitions on some military assistance programs. FMF
assists regional governments to control their national territory,
better defend maritime approaches to the United States, and undertake
defense modernization for participation in peacekeeping and coalition
operations. Among our larger programs, FMF supports Colombia's
counterterrorism and naval interdiction efforts, which have resulted in
a decrease in terrorist attacks in that country from 1,257 in 2003 to
611 in 2005; modernization and interoperability programs for El
Salvador, which as a key coalition partner is currently on its fifth
rotation in Iraq and has committed to a sixth; and a new initiative--
Enduring Friendship--to enhance security of our ``Third Border'' by
promoting Caribbean security and stability. In addition to individual
country programs through which countries receive assistance, the
Enduring Friendship regional program would provide FMF funds to select
Caribbean countries to support maritime security efforts in the
Caribbean Basin. Also, as part of the broader security assistance
program for the region, four Central American countries have received
peacekeeping operations funding in the past to enhance their
peacekeeping capabilities as part of a worldwide peacekeeping
operations initiative and may again receive funding in FY07.
Question. Should we consider delinking IMET--for specifically
targeted countries--from constraints imposed by American Service Member
Protection Act (ASPA)?
Answer. First, it is important to remember why we pursue article 98
agreements. We have major reservations with the International Criminal
Court and its claim of jurisdiction over U.S. persons. These agreements
protect all U.S. persons and servicemembers from surrender to the
International Criminal Court without our consent and thus remain a
priority for the President and the Department of State.
The prohibitions the Congress included in the American
Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) have been useful in securing many
of the 101 article 98 agreements we have signed to date. These are
important agreements to protect U.S. persons from illegitimate
assertions of jurisdiction over all U.S. persons--particularly our
servicemembers acting overseas. We have authority in the ASPA to waive
the prohibitions for important national interests and are now reviewing
the remaining IMET prohibitions on countries that have not yet signed
an article 98 agreement to determine whether this prohibition is still
helpful to our efforts to secure article 98 agreements and whether it
is important to our national interest to restart IMET programs with
these countries even in the absence of article 98 agreements.
Question. Do you agree that the sanctions that cut the flow of IMET
money can create a vacuum that other nations might fill and limit our
contact? Is the executive branch considering using the ASPA authority
to allow IMET money for countries that are ICC signatories--but do not
have article 98 agreements? Do you think a legislative fix would be
required?
Answer. Attempts by countries such as China, the United Kingdom,
Russia, France, and India to expand their influence by offering
military training predates the American Servicemembers' Protection Act
(ASPA), but the ASPA prohibitions may have opened a wider window of
opportunity for them in some countries. The prohibitions Congress
included in the ASPA have been useful in securing many of the 101
article 98 agreements we have signed to date. These are important
agreements to protect U.S. persons from illegitimate assertions of
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens. We believe we have adequate authority
in the ASPA to waive the prohibitions for important national interests
and are now reviewing the remaining IMET prohibitions on countries that
have not yet signed an article 98 agreement to determine whether this
prohibition still provides leverage in our efforts to secure article 98
agreements to protect U.S. persons from surrender to the International
Criminal Court without U.S. consent and whether it is important to our
national interest to restart IMET programs with these countries.
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION
Question. Is the $3B in this year's request enough? It appears that
if you move forward on planned compacts that are already in the
pipeline--your funds could be obligated by the end of this fiscal year.
Is that accurate? What will happen if additional countries come on line
seeking funding?
Answer. On April 3, 2006, MCC will sign its eighth compact,
reflecting commitments of over $1.5 billion, in addition to having
signed threshold agreements with five countries for nearly $100
million. In the current fiscal year, MCC is on track to finalize at
least three more compacts totaling an additional $1.1 billion, which
will represent funding commitments of up to $1.7 billion for FY06,
almost twice the level committed in FY05.
MCC projects that in the FY07, we expect to sign between 9 and 12
new compacts, comprising commitments of more than $3 billion. As a
result, MCC will have total commitments approaching $6 billion, with up
to 21 countries, by the end of FY07.
Because of the robust demand of eligible countries, we are
projecting that all currently available program funds from FY04, FY05,
and FY06 will be exhausted by the second quarter of FY07, making the
FY07 request for MCC all that more critical to our success.
At funding levels lower than $3 billion, MCC will likely delay
negotiating compacts with some eligible countries, not to mention the
newly eligible FY07 countries that the Board of Directors will select
this November. It would be unfortunate if these countries who have
undertaken significant political, economic, and social policy reforms,
and those striving to be selected, find that meeting the criteria for
eligibility does not result in actual funding of their development
projects to achieve long-term sustainable economic growth.
As Chair of the MCC Board of Directors, this is something I, and
the board, feel strongly about, as noted in the recent letter to Senate
and House appropriators that each member of the board signed. I look
forward to working with Congress to ensure that MCC has sufficient
funding as we move forward with our critical mission in the developing
world.
Question. I know that before the recent elections, the previous
government in Bolivia submitted an ambitious project for the
consideration of the MCC Board. What is the status of that project? Has
the MCC Board reviewed it? Is it a proposal that has merit?
Answer. The Bolivian Government under President Rodriguez delivered
an ambitious proposal to MCC on December 1, 2005, 3 weeks before the
elections that brought the Morales administration into power. At that
time, MCC agreed with the Bolivian Government and the Bolivian Embassy
in Washington that MCC would wait to review the proposal until the new
government was established and indicated whether it wished to proceed
with the December proposal or develop a new proposal.
As of March 1, 2006, the Morales administration has not formally
communicated its intentions to MCC with respect to the December
proposal. The MCC Board of Directors has not reviewed the proposal. MCC
staff has not undertaken a thorough review of the proposal as MCC is
awaiting the position to be adopted by the Morales administration with
respect to the proposal.
Question. Was this project coordinated with the Morales campaign?
If so, what have been the early signals on whether they will proceed
forward vigorously with this project?
Answer. The proposal submitted to MCC was not coordinated with the
Morales campaign directly but rather was developed through a
consultative process to which the Morales campaign and its major
constituencies were parties. On several occasions during the process
the Bolivian MCC program coordinator contacted the leaders of all the
leading political parties with regard to the proposal being developed.
As of March 1, 2006, the Morales administration has not formally
communicated its intentions to MCC with respect to the December
proposal.
Question. What linkage--if any--is there between awards of
Millennium Challenge funding and other State and USAID assistance? Do
we decrease State-ESF or USAID DA or Child Surv/Health if/when a
country receives MC assistance?
Answer. Funding for MCA has not resulted in reductions to
traditional assistance programs during this administration. Consistent
with the commitments made in Monterrey, Mexico, the administration has
maintained or grown the core development accounts while ramping up the
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the President's Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). For example, in 2001, enacted funding for
Development Assistance and Child Survival & Heath accounts totaled
$2.12 billion. In the President's FY07 budget, $2.71 billion is
requested for these two same core accounts. As MCA builds to full
capacity and its intended funding level of $5 billion annually, it will
become the principal U.S. assistance mechanism in its partner
countries, allowing USAID to continue to refocus its aid resources
where they can have the greatest impact on poverty reduction and key
development needs, like education and health.
______
Questions of Senator Paul Sarbanes
Question. On what basis do you estimate such sharply reduced (IDFA)
needs for FY 2007?
Answer. The requested level of funding should be sufficient to
maintain the U.S. Government's ability to monitor and initiate
responses to emergency needs worldwide.
IDFA funding for FY 2007 will also allow the U.S. Government to
continue to improve emergency response and disaster mitigation
capabilities of disaster-prone countries.
The budget would not be sufficient to ensure an adequate U.S.
Government response in the event of a large-scale natural disaster or
major famine event (e.g., Asia's tsunami, Pakistan earthquake, Ethiopia
2000-01).
Question. Can you explain why you have once again cut ASHA in the
FY 2007 request?
Answer. FY 2007 is a tight budget year. We have allocated available
resources as best we can to meet a broad range of priorities. We
continue to value ASHA programs.
Question. Despite a record of efficiency and results, acknowledged
even by Ambassador Bolton, UNICEF faces a cut in the proposed U.S.
contribution for FY07. Likewise, the budget request cuts over $14
million from UNDP, and earmarks nearly half of the remaining $94.5
million for trust funds. What is the rationale for cutting programs
that have proven their cost-effectiveness?
Answer. The administration's FY 2007 International Organizations
and Programs (IO&P) request, which funds voluntary U.S. contributions,
aims not to exceed $289 million, or 2.5 percent over the FY06 request.
The requests for UNICEF ($123 million) and UNDP ($94.5 million)
together account for 75 percent of the IO&P budget request.
The FY 2007 request for UNICEF represents a $9 million increase
over the administration's request of $14 million in FY06. The $9
million increase in the request for UNICEF accounts for more than 100
percent of the total net requested increase in the IO&P account ($289
million in FY07 versus $282 million in FY06).
The U.S. Government is the largest single donor to UNICEF. The
United States has played a leadership role in UNICEF since its
inception and continues to do so under the leadership of former
Secretary of Agriculture, Ann Veneman, as the UNICEF Executive
Director. The United States support for, and leadership in, UNICEF
activities offers compelling evidence of the U.S. commitment to the
United Nations, to multilateralism, and to addressing humanitarian
crises and development challenges.
With respect to UNDP, the administration's FY07 request of
$94.5 million is virtually the same as the FY06 request of $95
million. The FY07 request includes $50 million for UNDP's
regular budget to support administrative and general
programming costs. It also includes $24.5 million and $20
million respectively to UNDP trust funds for democratic
governance and crisis prevention and recovery. These are core
UNDP functions.
Moreover, these allocations support the Secretary's initiative to
restructure foreign assistance by aligning our resources with our
interests and priorities.
Question. What is the total of our current international
peacekeeping arrears? Why has the administration not requested funding
to pay these arrears? Do you support lifting the cap on peacekeeping
contributions, which is the cause of our going into arrears?
Answer. Prior to FY 2000, the U.S.-accumulated arrears of
approximately $400 million primarily caused by a 25-percent cap on
peacekeeping payments. Although Congress appropriated sufficient funds
each year from FY 2000 until FY 2005 to pay annual assessments, the
pre-2000 arrears remain outstanding, and in FY 2005 our arrears grew by
$145 million because appropriated funds were not equal to our
assessments.
The shortfall for FY 2005 of $145.010 million and the projected
shortfall for FY 2006 of $376.752 million totals $521.762 million. Due
to the emergency situation in Sudan/Darfur, the FY 2006 supplemental
budget contains a request of $69.8 million in the CIPA account for
Sudan/Darfur as well as transfer authority language from the
peacekeeping operations request which, in total, would offset $129.8
million of the above total arrears for a net projected new arrears of
$391.962 million at the end of FY 2006.
The administration strongly supports full payment of U.N.
peacekeeping assessments to ensure continued American leadership in
shaping the international community's response to developments that
threaten international peace and stability. The administration
requested authority to lift the 25-percent assessment rate cap on
payments of U.N. peacekeeping assessments during FY 2006, in order to
permit payments at the rate assessed by the United Nations, up to 27.1
percent. However, this authority was not included in the enacted FY
2006 appropriations legislation.
Question. What do you estimate to be the increased costs for
salaries, hardship and danger pay, language training, educational
allowances, security upgrades, and other personnel-related expenses in
connection with the ``global repositioning'' plan?
Answer. This summer we are beginning a shift of 100 personnel from
Washington and the European Affairs bureau (EUR) to overseas positions
in the other regional bureaus as well as within a number of regions.
The initiative also includes new Iran-related positions in Washington
and abroad. As we are just starting the implementation process, the
impact in FY 2006 will mostly be related to one-time startup costs for
establishing the new positions from EUR and Washington in other areas
of the world and shifting positions within some regions. We are going
through a process now to identify the net change in salary and position
support costs, taking into account the timing of when incumbents will
vacate positions being abolished and when officers will arrive in the
newly created positions. These costs (approximately $5 million across
all bureaus) are being incorporated into our FY 2006 spending plans and
will pay future dividends by shifting our personnel and resources to
critical needs posts overseas.
Question. What kinds of security studies have been done, or will be
done, prior to opening the American Presence Posts, where our diplomats
would move outside the Embassy to live and work and represent America
in potentially difficult and dangerous settings?
Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security participates in an
interdepartmental working group that is studying the concept of
American Presence Posts (APPs) and developing guidelines and procedures
for opening APPs. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism
Act (SECCA) of 1999 (Public Law 106-113) requires that any new
diplomatic facility meet collocation and 100-foot-setback statutory
requirements. The collocation, setback, and waiver requirements
uniformly apply to embassies, consulates, and APPs. Once a post has
identified a potential APP site, the Regional Security Officer (RSO),
in coordination with DS Headquarters and the Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations (OBO), will conduct a physical security survey of
the location to determine security requirements. APP sites must adhere
to, or be in, the final stages of compliance with the Overseas Security
Policy Board (OSPB) standards prior to occupancy. Additionally, waivers
to SECCA and exceptions to OSPB standards must be obtained for any site
deficiencies that cannot be remedied.
Question. In the aftermath of September 11, Congress granted the
President limited and conditional authority to waive section 907 of the
Freedom Support Act. As part of that waiver, there was also an
agreement made between the administration and Congress to ensure
military parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, in this year's
budget, the President has requested $4.5 million in FMF for Azerbaijan
and only $3.5 million for Armenia, as well as $885,000 in IMET for
Azerbaijan and only $790,000 for Armenia. On what basis has the
administration decided to depart from its previous commitment to
provide equal amounts of military assistance for Armenia and
Azerbaijan? What actions has the United States taken in response to
belligerent rhetoric from Azerbaijan, such as President Aliyev's
statements that ``this year defense spending has grown by 76 percent,
we will create a powerful army and will be able to liberate our lands
at any time,'' and that ``hostilities could break out again'' if the
international community does not force Armenia to return Nagorno-
Karabakh?
Answer. The waiver of section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act
annually since 2002 has allowed us to provide military assistance that
enhances Azerbaijan's interoperability with NATO and U.S. forces. The
proposed FY 2007 FMF level for Azerbaijan is linked to U.S. priorities
in fighting terrorism and strengthening maritime security to address
WMD proliferation, terrorist transit, and drug trafficking on the
Caspian Sea. FMF will also enhance Azerbaijan's capabilities to
participate in international peacekeeping efforts.
We share your concerns about the still-unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. The minor increase in FMF for Azerbaijan as proposed in the
President's budget request in January does not signal any change in the
U.S. position on Nagorno-Karabakh. We have communicated that very
clearly to the governments of both nations. Furthermore, we provide all
assistance on terms that clarify both its intended purposes and the
limitations on its use.
Question. How much of Iraq's preinvasion debt has been forgiven by
countries other than the United States? How much debt remains, and to
which countries?
Answer. Iraq's sovereign debt outstanding in April 2003 was
approximately $124 billion, of which about $100 billion was owed to
other countries and $24 billion owed to commercial creditors. Of the
debt to other countries, $39.6 billion was held by Paris Club creditors
(which includes the G-8 and other developed countries). The exact
amount of Iraq's sovereign debt will only be known once Iraq has
reconciled claims with all its creditors and negotiated debt reduction
agreements.
The Paris Club agreed in November 2004 to forgive 80 percent of
Iraq's Paris Club debt in three tranches (30% when the agreement was
signed; 30% once Iraq reached a standby arrangement with the IMF; and a
final 20% after 3 years of successful performance under the standby
arrangement). All but two of the 18 Paris Club members have signed
bilateral agreements with Iraq implementing the Paris Club agreement.
Iraq expects to reach agreements with the last two, Russia and
Australia, soon.
Iraq's remaining debt to other countries, estimated at about $61.6
billion, is owed primarily to Arabian Peninsula countries ($44
billion). Iraq expects to resume discussions soon with these debtors
over settlement of their claims, which remain to be reconciled.
We have urged all non-Paris Club countries to give Iraq debt
reduction at Paris Club terms, if not better. Romania, Slovakia, and
Malta have concluded debt agreements; we expect others to do so. At
Iraq's request, the Paris Club will send letters to 11 of Iraq's non-
Paris Club creditors urging them to conclude agreements at Paris Club
terms.
Iraq has also made considerable progress with its commercial
creditors, with claimants holding nearly 70 percent of the commercial
claims having accepted offers to settle on terms comparable to Paris
Club terms.
Question. Why does the FY 2007 budget request fail to account for
the full costs of ongoing war operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? How
can these expenses be justified as ``unanticipated emergencies''?
Answer. The FY 2007 request for foreign assistance includes $771.19
million in ESF and other programs for Iraq, and $610 million in ESF and
other programs for Afghanistan. None of this money has been requested
to fund ongoing military operations. This funding would support
programs that are critical to continuing our engagement with
Afghanistan and Iraq, and supporting their transition to self-reliance.
For Iraq, these programs are broken down into two main areas.
First, $276.5 million is for a range of programs to develop the
capacity of Iraq's national-level government, support economic reform,
and develop the agricultural and private sectors. Second, $494.69
million is requested to support a range of political, rule of law, and
democracy programs. While we believe that this funding will be critical
in achieving our goals of supporting Iraq's transition, we are not
seeking these funds on the basis of ``unanticipated emergencies.''
In Afghanistan, the $610 million FY 2007 ESF request represents
funding for the large-scale USG reconstruction program taking place
around the country. Like Iraq, this funding request is not for military
operations and we are not seeking it on the basis of ``unanticipated
emergencies.'' Almost half of the FY 2007 request--$276.5--will be used
to fund infrastructure projects (roads and electrical power projects).
The remainder of the FY 2007 ESF request, if approved, would be spread
across various sectors including: Education, Health, Agriculture and
Alternative Livelihoods, Economic Governance, Democracy and Governance,
and PRT Quick Impact projects.
Question. On January 5, the President announced the launch of a new
``National Security Language Initiative'' and promised to request $114
million in FY07. How much of this funding is included in the State
Department's budget. Which new or improved programs will these funds
support?
Answer. The State Department portion of the $114 million is $26.7
million. This amount will allow the Department to support study of
critical languages by Americans and build on the achievements of the
flagship Fulbright Scholarship program, Gilman Scholarships for U.S.
undergraduates and youth exchange programs through the following
activities:
U.S. Fulbright Students: Provide 6 months of overseas
language study as an add-on to U.S. Fulbright student grants
for at least 150 selected participants to study critical-need
languages before beginning their academic projects.
Intensive Advanced Language Study: Expand intensive overseas
summer language study institutes in critical-need languages for
American university students at intermediate and advanced
levels.
Intensive Introductory Language Institutes: Increase the
study of critical-need languages by American undergraduates
through overseas summer language programs for beginners.
Gilman Scholarships: Triple the number of opportunities for
Gilman scholars (U.S. undergraduates with financial need) to
study abroad in critical-need language countries.
Fulbright Teaching Assistants: Expand the Fulbright Foreign
Language Teaching Assistant (FLTA) program to bring 300 foreign
teachers to the United States to help teach their native
languages at U.S colleges and high schools, while studying
English and U.S. studies.
Teacher Exchange: Bring 25 foreign high school teachers of
English to the United States to teach Chinese, Arabic, and
Russian in U.S. high schools and send 50 American teachers
abroad for intensive summer study of critical-need languages.
High School Exchange: Expand academic year, semester, and
short-term exchanges abroad for American high school students
in critical-need languages.
Overseas Teaching: Increase support for USG-funded
institutions providing critical-need language instruction
abroad, such as the American Overseas Research Centers.
In addition to the $26.7 million, the President's request includes
$1.2 million to provide for 8 additional positions critical to the
successful execution of these initiatives.
Question. Concerns have been raised within the academic community
that the Commerce Department's proposed rule on ``deemed exports'' will
have a significant negative impact on our ability to attract and retain
highly qualified foreign students and researchers to U.S. universities.
Do you believe there are fundamental differences between universities
and private companies that should be reflected in the final rule? When
do you expect the Commerce Department to publish its response to the
rulemaking?
Answer. We are working with the Department of Commerce to ensure
that should there be any change to the deemed export regulation, such a
change would balance the need to protect national security with our
ability to attract the best foreign researchers to our universities.
The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) already treats
university research differently and we don't expect this to change. The
vast majority of basic and applied science research conducted in U.S.
universities results in open and published information that is shared
with the broader scientific community. This information is considered
``fundamental research'' and does not require an export license under
the EAR. Such research can be distinguished from corporate and U.S.
Government sponsored research, the results of which are restricted for
proprietary and national security reasons.
We are encouraging the Department of Commerce to consult further
with the academic community and others before publishing a proposed
regulation.
Question. During the course of developing your recommendations for
changes to the U.S. foreign assistance structure, there has been
virtually no consultation with congressional Democrats or with private
voluntary organizations that play a major role in implementing foreign
assistance programs. Why has there not been more consultation thus far,
and what will you do to improve the consultative process as the reform
effort proceeds?
Answer. The changes that have been made to date are internal and
aimed at seeking better performance under the authorities already
granted us by the Congress. We welcome further discussions about ways
to improve foreign assistance as we move forward.
Question. Following your testimony before the committee on February
16, 2005, you were asked a question for the record by Senator Biden, as
follows:
Question. When do you anticipate providing the
administration's treaty priority list for the 109th Congress?
Answer. The Treaty Priority List has been prepared and is
being cleared throughout the executive branch; we plan to
submit it to the committee shortly. The Department recognizes
the importance of this list in assisting the committee to
organize its work and is very appreciative of the cooperation
it has received from the committee in the treaty law area
during the 108th Congress.
Why has the Treaty Priority List for the 109th Congress never been
submitted?
Answer. In a letter of April 5, 2006, the State Department provided
Senator Biden with a list of 16 treaties that had been identified in
briefings by the administration as treaty priorities or treaties for
which the administration supported progress by the Senate. These
treaties are as follows:
Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom
Treaty with Japan on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters
Treaty with Germany on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
Convention for Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission Established by the 1949 Convention Between the
United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica
Agreement with Canada on Pacific Hake/Whiting
Protocol of 1997 To Amend the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973, as Modified by
the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime and Two Supplementary Protocols
Protocol of Amendment to the International Convention on the
Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure
for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade, with Annexes
Stockholm Convention on Certain Persistent Organic
Pollutants
Treaty with Sweden on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters
Since last year's briefings, we are pleased that the Senate took
action on the treaties listed below:
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
Convention for Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission Established by the 1949 Convention Between the
United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica
Agreement with Canada on Pacific Hake/Whiting
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime and Two Supplementary Protocols
Protocol of Amendment to the International Convention on the
Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism
We would appreciate the committee's rapid action on the treaties
remaining on the original list. We also would be happy to discuss any
additional treaties on which you may have questions or an interest.
______
Questions of Senator Lincoln Chafee
Question. Can you explain how this budget submission meets the
needs of the new Liberian Government as you currently view them, and
amplify in what ways you could envision your position changing if the
Liberian Government says they need more assistance?
Answer. Thanks to strong congressional support in fiscal years
2004, 2005, and 2006, the United States has been able to play the
leading role in helping Liberia begin recovery from 14 years of civil
war, generations of corruption, and a near-total absence of government
services and of respect for human rights and the rule of law. This
funding is key to helping the new Government of Liberia establish the
conditions for consolidating the peace and building prosperity.
The FY 2007 request of $89.945 million for Liberia should continue
our support for many programs:
Economic Support Funds (ESF) would continue to provide
funding primarily for quick-impact reconstruction of schools,
hospitals, and government buildings in county centers using
war-affected youth, as well as rural road construction needed
to facilitate economic revival. It would also support
transparent economic management (GEMAP), civil service
retrenchment, national reconciliation (TRC), judicial reform
and police training.
Child Survival and Health (CSH) would expand primary health
care in targeted communities; strengthen nongovernmental
organizations and county health teams organizationally; and
expand health care training.
Development Assistance (DA) would expand USAID's community-
focused, post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.
DA would increase access to justice, agricultural production
and market access, train newly elected government officials,
strengthen civil society, and support education.
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
funds would provide civilian police to the U.N. mission to
monitor, mentor, and reform the Liberian National Police.
Peacekeeping Operation funds (PKO) would support security
sector reform (SSR). This funding would help create a
professional, capable, and fiscally sustainable Liberian
military.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) would support ongoing SSR
with sustainment training and some military equipment.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) would
fund leadership and specialized skills training for the new
Liberian military.
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) funding for Africa
would support the return and reintegration to Liberia of
refugees and internally displaced persons and Liberian refugees
from Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.
We have ongoing discussions with the Liberian Government about the
country's needs and will continue to consider those needs in
conjunction with our policies and budget priorities.
Question. Also, we have a large, vibrant, and important Liberian
population in Rhode Island, and they are justifiably concerned about
what their immigration status will be with a newly elected government
in Liberia. As you know, these brave people came to a new country after
fleeing a disastrous situation in their home country and have set down
roots, started families, become part of the community. In addition to
being an asset here, they are an important source of support, for
instance through remittances, for family members that reside in
Liberia. I know this is outside your specific purview, but I think you
are an important voice on this issue: Can you share with me your view
on the immigration status of Liberians residing in the United States as
well as whether you support the goal of Senator Reed and my bill, S.
656?
Answer. As you have indicated, many of the 15,000-20,000 Liberians
living in the United States fled their country's long civil war. Now
that peace is taking hold in Liberia and a new, democratically elected
government is in place, many of these Liberians will choose to return
home. Many others will choose to remain in the United States and move
ahead on the path toward U.S. citizenship.
Some 3,792 Liberians are currently living in the United States
under Temporary Protected Status (TPS). As you are aware, the power to
grant TPS is based upon criteria outlined in section 244 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1254a, and is vested in
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Secretary of Homeland
Security exercises this authority in consultation with the State
Department and other appropriate agencies. On August 16, 2005, DHS
announced an extension for a period of 12 months of the TPS designation
for Liberia. The State Department is consulting with DHS on country
conditions in Liberia in the current review of Liberia's TPS status.
As for S. 656, the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of
2005, the Office of Management and Budget normally coordinates the
administration's position on pending legislation. The State Department
would be but one interested agency contributing to that overall
position. I would not want to get ahead of that process here.
Question. In his State of the Union Address, President Bush spoke
of the importance to U.S. national security of investing in the foreign
affairs budget by stating, ``Shortchanging these efforts would increase
the suffering and chaos of our world, undercut our long-term security,
and dull the conscience of our country.'' Secretary Rice, could you
comment on how the programs in your budget are an integral component of
our country's national security? Also, given the importance you and the
President have placed on development, democracy, and diplomacy, does
this budget provide enough funding to meet our national security needs?
Answer. Assuring U.S. national security, both physical and
economic, immediate and long term, is our top foreign policy priority.
It is the prerequisite to our freedom and prosperity, and to our being
able to advance these goals elsewhere. But our security interests
cannot be achieved apart from our development goals and our democratic
ideals in today's world. Our assistance must integrate and advance all
of these goals together.
Accordingly, the primary objective of our assistance is to build
and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the
needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the
international system. In the near term we must give priority to nations
that are strategically important in the war against terrorism. The
largest single piece of our 2007 foreign assistance budget request is
to strengthen the coalition partners on the front lines in the fight
against terrorism. Our assistance empowers our partners to practice
more effective law enforcement, police their borders, gather and share
essential intelligence, wage more successful counterterrorism
operations, and provide for their own defense. In many states, our
assistance will also help to bolster thriving democratic and economic
institutions reducing the societal schisms that terrorists exploit for
their own ideological purposes. These programs support not only the
security of our friends and allies, but ultimately the security of the
United States.
Question. In 1975 Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed that ethnic
influence has become ``the single most important determinant of
American foreign policy.'' In the last quarter century, global travel
networks and communications technology have enabled a growing number of
the world's population to simultaneously participate in more than one
society. What is the State Department's perception of these diaspora
communities? Do you think there are benefits, or negative consequences,
to engagement with diasporas, specifically with regard to our foreign
policy goals? Are there any foreign aid projects currently being
conducted, or planned on, through this budget, that include diaspora
research and engagement? In your opinion, are these projects, if any,
sufficient? What types of further initiatives--either specific projects
or more general policy-focused research--do you think could be useful?
Answer. The United States rightly celebrates its diverse
population. Diaspora communities can be a powerful force for positive
change. Indeed, many of our programs in settings as diverse as India,
Armenia, and Haiti are already building effective partnerships with
diaspora communities to accelerate development.
At the same time, we recognize that this subject warrants more
research and discussion which could generate new opportunities for
collaboration. I welcome the opportunity to work with diaspora
communities to encourage their contributions to our foreign assistance
efforts.
Question. Nearly 11 million children under the age of 5 die each
year. Many of these children live in the developing world, and the most
common causes of death are preventable or treatable diseases such as
measles, tetanus, diarrhea, pneumonia, and malaria. These illnesses are
easy to diagnose and extremely cost effective to treat. To help address
this problem, I am proud to have joined with Chairman Lugar, Senator
Boxer, and many others in enacting the Assistance for Orphans and Other
Vulnerable Children in Developing Countries Act of 2005. More broadly,
in 2000, the United States joined 188 other countries in supporting
eight Millennium Development Goals designed to achieve ``a more
peaceful, prosperous, and just world.'' Two of the Millennium
Development Goals call for a reduction in the mortality rate of
children under the age of 5 by two-thirds and a reduction in maternal
deaths by three-quarters by 2015. On September 14, 2005, President
George W. Bush stated before the leaders of the world: ``To spread a
vision of hope, the United States is determined to help nations that
are struggling with poverty. We are committed to the Millennium
Development Goals.'' Will the funding requested for child survival and
maternal health meet the goals we have committed to?
Answer. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include, inter
alia, the global targets to reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate of
children under 5 and to reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality
ratio by 2015. The MDGs are targets for all U.N. Member States, and we
are working together with other donors to make the most effective use
of aid resources. Money alone is not sufficient to meet the MDGs on
time. According to UNICEF, for example, at the current rate of progress
it will take until 2045 (as opposed to 2015) to reduce under-5
mortality by two-thirds in developing countries.
More important than money is building capacity to achieve the MDGs.
U.S. foreign assistance programs work closely with countries on a
bilateral level, as well as on a multilateral level through our
partners, the United Nations, and other organizations. Our programs in
global health have had a great and lasting impact not only because we
are committing more public and private resources, but also because we
are altering the landscape of our foreign assistance programs with a
commitment to results. Through a series of international conferences,
treaties, and initiatives, world leaders, governments, and donor
agencies have developed strategies aimed at reducing child and maternal
mortality, halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS and other
infectious diseases, insuring financing for these as well as other
development needs, and formulating a global plan of action for
sustainable development. Great strides have been made: Immunization
programs have saved millions of children's lives; low-cost rehydration
therapy has contributed to a 33-percent increase in life expectancy in
the developing world; smallpox has been eradicated worldwide; and in
the past 20 years the number of the world's chronically undernourished
has been reduced by 50 percent.
Question. The President highlighted the importance of basic
education, especially the unmet educational needs of girls throughout
the world, in the State of the Union. I agree with him, and you,
Secretary Rice, on the goals of improving basic education, and it being
a critical element of transformational diplomacy. Given its importance,
I am curious to why funding is not more robust. Can you speak to why
the administration has requested a cut in funding for basic education?
Can you address whether the number of countries receiving basic
education assistance will be reduced, what countries will be affected,
and if fewer children will be educated if the budget request is
enacted?
Answer. The administration has allocated 20 percent of its
Development Assistance request for FY 2007 to basic education. This is
the same proportion of Development Assistance (DA) funds as was
allocated to basic education in FY 2005 and reflects the importance the
administration places on improving basic education in its overall
development agenda.
In its FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification, the Agency for
International Development proposed that 36 countries receive DA-funded
basic education assistance. That is three fewer countries than are
receiving DA-funded basic education assistance in FY 2006. Benin,
Madagascar, and Malawi are the countries that would not receive basic
education development assistance in FY 2007.
Question. I think our response to the tsunami and the Pakistani
earthquake demonstrated our compassion as a nation. In addition to
being the right thing to do, it appears that we are benefiting from our
actions in terms of improving our standing in the Muslim world. Many
have said that the sight of the USS Abraham Lincoln, used as a base of
operations following the tsunami off the coast of Indonesia, and the
sight of U.S. helicopters in Pakistan in relief operations after the
earthquake were tangible evidence of U.S. power being used for good.
With the military humanitarian relief response ending, how are we
continuing to visibly demonstrate that we have a long-term commitment
to helping these people recover? Also, are we using the space that
these events seem to have created to push for peaceful resolution to
regional conflicts? I know we have seen notable successes in Indonesia,
and I am wondering if similar efforts are being made in Sri Lanka and
Kashmir?
Answer. The humanitarian assistance provided by the United States
after the tsunami and the earthquake vividly demonstrates America's
compassion, generosity, and commitment to help those in need and has
helped to improve the image of the United States among both Muslims and
non-Muslims in the developing world.
The United States will continue to provide humanitarian assistance
to the survivors of the October 8 earthquake after U.S. military in-
kind support ends on March 31. Our humanitarian assistance has been
widely publicized in Pakistan through Embassy Islamabad's daily press
releases and frequent local media placements. Relief supplies provided
by the U.S. Agency for International Development are required to be
marked with the ``USAID brand,'' which indicates that the goods are a
gift from the American people. Projects funded by the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance through its implementing partners are also
``branded.'' These projects will continue to operate and remind
Pakistanis of the U.S. contributions to the humanitarian effort after
the earthquake relief response ends.
Looking ahead, the United States signed a $200 million agreement
with Pakistan in January covering an ambitious 4-year U.S.
reconstruction program (fiscal year 2006-fiscal year 2009) whose focus
is to rebuild schools and primary health care facilities, ensure a
trained workforce, and improve livelihoods. These permanent, seismic-
resistant facilities will bear a plaque indicating that they have been
funded by the United States. The Embassy will continue to publicize the
substantial U.S. contributions to relief and reconstruction to reaffirm
our long-term commitment to help Pakistan recover from the earthquake.
The President's budget request for fiscal year 2007 includes $50
million in new funding to continue earthquake reconstruction begun in
fiscal year 2006.
Pakistan and India have used the earthquake to make modest progress
in dealing with the Kashmir dispute. We believe that both governments
should take advantage of this opening to advance the reconciliation
process and resolve Kashmir peacefully, taking into account the wishes
of the people of Kashmir. On March 4 in Islamabad, President Bush said,
``The best way for Kashmir to be resolved is for leaders of both
countries to step up and take the lead. And that's exactly what
President Musharraf has done, and that's what Prime Minister Singh has
assured me he wants to do, and that is to resolve this situation.
Obviously, there needs to be some confidence in order for the countries
to go forward, and therefore, the confidence-building measures that the
governments have taken is beginning to bear fruits, in my judgment . .
. However, in order for a deal to get done, it requires commitment at
the leadership level. And in my perspective, I've seen the commitment,
and the role of the United States is to continue to encourage the
parties to come together.''
The President alluded to some developments that occurred after the
earthquake. India and Pakistan opened five border-crossing points on
the Line of Control. The two countries are discussing proposals to
permit the regular shipment of goods by truck through these crossing
points. Openings in the Line of Control have the potential to be
significant, reversing more than 50 years of policy forbidding direct
travel between the two halves of Kashmir. The people-to-people contacts
allowed by these crossing points should greatly improve mutual
understanding and encourage both governments to continue to seek
resolution of the Kashmir dispute.
Fifteen months after the tsunami struck Sri Lanka, the United
States continues to address many facets of the longer term
rehabilitation and reconstruction effort. Highlights include
construction of a new Arugam Bay bridge, designed to last a century and
the only direct link between two tsunami-devastated communities in the
east; repairs and upgrades of three damaged harbors, vital to the
livelihoods of coastal communities; rehabilitation or reconstruction of
vocational as well as educational schools; and construction of
playgrounds.
In the aftermath of the tsunami, the U.S. Agency for International
Development provided targeted support to 20 municipalities in tsunami-
affected districts, focusing on training and technical assistance for
political parties at the district level to facilitate a consensus on
community rehabilitation and service needs. The programs provided
capacity development for community forums to create a network of
citizen-led advocacy groups. These initiatives increase the
responsiveness of political actors and government officials to
community-based needs and opinions on peace and development issues.
The United States had hoped that the implementation of the Post-
Tsunami Operational Management Structure, a joint mechanism for
managing tsunami relief and reconstruction in Tamil areas, would have
helped build confidence between the government and Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam and led to progress in the broader peace process.
Unfortunately, the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure was
never implemented after its constitutionality was challenged before the
Supreme Court. President Rajapaksa has established a new government
agency to oversee tsunami reconstruction, including a program to
replace the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure.
We welcome the recent progress made in the peace process at the
recent talks in Geneva between the government and Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam and hope this will lead to further cooperation in providing
relief and reconstruction assistance to tsunami-affected areas.
Question. With regard to Pakistan, while the improvement of our
image following our response to the earthquake was significant, how
would you analyze our standing now? Can you comment on the cartoons of
the prophet Muhammed published in Denmark last fall, and the current
riots in Pakistan, and what that means for our efforts there? Also, can
you give us an update on what the President may bring up on his visit
to the region next month, and in particular focus on what efforts will
be made for further democratization?
Answer. President Bush's visit to Pakistan highlighted several
aspects of our relationship with Pakistan that directly address the
interests of its people. Most importantly, the President underscored
our commitment to a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan. This
partnership will benefit the people of Pakistan through greater
engagement in fields including energy security, education reform,
economic opportunity, and science and technology. The President also
reiterated our commitment to supporting reconstruction in earthquake-
affected areas. Our relief and reconstruction efforts have always been
designed to meet urgent humanitarian needs, but they have also improved
the popular image of the United States. We are confident that our
ongoing support for Pakistan's reconstruction efforts will continue to
demonstrate America's compassion, shifting perceptions over the long
term.
President Bush and President Musharraf spoke about the need not to
hurt religious sensibilities when the topic of the Danish cartoons
arose. Many protests in Pakistan were peaceful. We all support the
peaceful right to protest. We do not believe that violence and rioting
are acceptable political statements.
On democracy, President Bush said, ``The elections scheduled for
2007 are a great opportunity for Pakistan. The President [Musharraf]
understands these elections need to be open and honest. America will
continue to working--working with Pakistan to lay the foundations of
democracy.'' President Bush also underscored the importance the United
States places on democracy during his meetings with Pakistani
officials. The Department of State is working with the government,
political parties, and civil society organizations in Pakistan to
ensure that all political parties will have an opportunity to
participate in free and fair elections in 2007.
______
Questions of Senator Chuck Hagel
REGIONAL MIDDLE EAST ISSUES
Question. How does the United States consult with our Middle East
partners, and in particular the Gulf States, on the range of critical
Middle East issues: Iran, Iraq, Hamas, Hezbollah?
Answer. We have established productive consultative mechanisms with
the governments of the region, covering a broad range of topics. In
addition, senior officials, beginning with Secretary Rice, frequently
travel to the region, engaging on every issue of concern. Secretary
Rice was most recently in the Middle East April 26-27, when she visited
Iraq. Our Ambassadors and Embassy staffs also enjoy excellent access to
officials at all levels through the governments of the region.
Question. Isn't there a need for a better consultative mechanism
with our gulf partners that creates a framework for our relationships,
and ensures we don't consult with gulf countries only when we have a
request?
Answer. Secretary Rice has met collectively with her Gulf
Cooperation Council counterparts three times since the fall: In
September, at the United Nations General Assembly; in November in
Bahrain; and in February in the United Arab Emirates. In addition, our
Ambassadors and Embassy staffs enjoy excellent access to officials at
all levels through the governments of the region, and senior officials
frequently travel to the region to consult with their counterparts. We
have almost 10 formal consultative mechanisms with the governments of
the gulf that ensure that we share our views regularly, and not just
when we seek their assistance. They cover topics from economics and
trade to counterterrorism to a broad range of strategic discussions.
The United States-Saudi Arabia Strategic Dialogue, for example, was
inaugurated last November and comprises Working Groups on
Counterterrorism, Human Development and Exchanges, Military Affairs,
Energy, Consular Affairs, and Economic and Financial Affairs.
IRAN: U.S. DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
Question. Please provide a detailed description of U.S. assistance
programming based on FY05, FY06, and requested FY07 (including
supplemental) funds. Are any U.S. assistance funds being spent to
increase access to the Internet for people inside Iran?
Answer. Our foreign assistance programs for the Near East and North
Africa are contained in the Department's Congressional Budget
Justification, available on-line at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/60654.pdf. This document contains both the requested
funding levels and a detailed description of their aims. It includes
both bilateral and regional programs, such as the Middle East
Partnership Initiative and the Multinational Force and Observers.
With regard to Iraq, our foreign assistance program is explained in
two separate parts: First, the bulk of the funding enacted in 2003 can
be found in the document entitled ``Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Achievements
Through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,'' available on-line at
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/60857.htm. Second, our latest FY06
and FY07 budget proposals are highlighted in the document entitled
``Advancing the President's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.''
This document is available on-line at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/
rpt/62397.htm.
The United States is at a critical juncture in its concerns with
the Iranian regime. Iran's support for international terrorism,
rejection of the Middle East peace process, lack of respect for the
human rights of its citizens, and its lack of democracy. Of course, as
the President said, we are also deeply concerned about ``the Iranian
Government defying the world with its nuclear ambitions.'' These are
serious impediments to Iran's normal relations with the international
community. These concerns are symptoms of this corrupt regime's lack of
transparency, political openness, and respect for its people.
This year, a Department-wide effort will invest over $10 million in
programs that promote democracy and respect for human rights in Iran.
This is the third year of this effort. This effort aims to assist those
in Iran who are working to bring about increased freedom, better
opportunities for all Iranians, and greater respect for human rights.
They include civil society activists, advocates for political and
economic freedom, those promoting greater freedom of speech and the
media, labor rights activists and advocates for rule of law, and
increased respect for human rights. The process for awarding these
grants is currently ongoing and no funding decisions have yet been
made.
In addition to these programs, part of the supplemental budget
request the Secretary made to Congress was to expand our communication
with the Iranian people. Part of our effort to expand freedom of speech
will include programs to provide information to Iranians via the
Internet.
The Department has, for the past 3 years, been operating its own
Persian-language Web site. The latest metrics show that visits to the
site have increased 282 percent in the first 3 months of 2006 as
compared to the same period in 2005, and over 60 percent of the
visitors come from inside Iran. The site offers content on democracy,
U.S. policy, and global issues. The supplemental request would allow
the Department to add staff and increase translation to dramatically
increase content, provide interactive programs, including Web chat and
Web casting, and significantly increase marketing. The supplemental
request would also enable the Department to program speakers on
democracy and governance topics in neighboring countries, then sending
the content back into Iran via neighboring country media and our
Persian Web site.
Question. Will the U.S. Government provide any assistance for the
purpose of developing Iranian opposition groups outside of Iran?
Answer. We have made clear that the United States strongly supports
the aspirations of the Iranian people for freedom and democracy in
their country. As President Bush said in the State of the Union
Address, ``Our Nation hopes one day to be the closest of friends with a
free and democratic Iran.''
We plan to use $15 million of our supplemental request--in addition
to the $10 million that Congress has already appropriated--to empower
Iranian activists and further human rights, support and strengthen
civil society, help Iranians acquire the skills of citizenry and
advocacy, support alternative political centers of gravity, improve
justice and accountability, and increase tolerance and freedom of
speech, assembly, and other basic rights for the Iranian people.
Our projects focus on influential democratic actors and groups,
including labor, women, and students. To this end, the Middle East
Partnership Initiative and the Bureau of Human Rights and Labor will
accept concept papers for over $10 million in grants to accelerate the
work of Iranian reformers and human rights and democracy activists.
Question. Aren't democracy programs that use U.S. NGOs (such as
IRI, NDI and NED, or their intermediaries) going to be hampered simply
because they are American or affiliated with the United States? Which
Western NGOs currently operate in Iran?
Answer. Iranian reformers find themselves in dangerous situations
every day. We recognize that Tehran is suspicious of foreign
cooperation with domestic Iranian NGOs and likely monitors those
relationships.
This presents an obstacle to our promotion of democracy in Iran
though not an insurmountable one. The administration stands with
courageous reformers who are on the frontlines of freedom working to
have a voice in their own future. To ensure that our programs can be
implemented safely, we do not publicly identify individual recipients
of U.S. funding.
A number of Western NGOs--including several U.S.-based NGOs
operating under OFAC licenses; the London-based Committee to Defend
Women's Rights in the Middle East, which has an Iranian cofounder; the
Dutch-based Institute for Advocacy for Development Cooperation; and the
German-based Friedrich Ebert Foundation--operate in Iran. These
organizations focus on a variety of missions, including advocating for
women's rights, facilitating the exchange of ideas between European and
Iranian groups, working with youth groups and intellectuals, and
capacity building for Iranian civil society activists.
Question. How does the administration engage the Iranian diaspora
who live in the United States?
Answer. We communicate with a broad spectrum of the Iranian
diaspora worldwide, including in the United States. The American
diaspora community can play an important role in the promotion of
political reform in Iran. U.S. policy recognizes that political reform
within Iran must be indigenous. The administration is prepared to
support civil society and the cause of freedom in Iran.
IRAQ: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS
Question. In September, you told this committee that, as part of
the clear, hold, and build strategy, the administration would be
standing up Provincial Reconstruction Teams in each of the non-Kurdish
governorates, and one for the three Kurdish governorates. Aside of the
three consulates which have been renamed PRTs, how many new PRTs are
fully operational in Iraq? Please provide a specific timeline for
standing up the remaining PRTs.
Answer. Our three Proof of Concept PRTs in Mosul, Kirkuk, and
Hillah have been up and running since November. The first evaluation of
the synergy produced by combining some military civil affairs
operations with State and USAID political and capacity-building
operations is positive. The Baghdad PRT is our next highest priority,
and we are now coordinating with the Iraqis, DOD, coalition partners,
and other U.S. agencies to roll out this PRT as soon as possible. Our
British and Italian partners are pressing ahead to roll out PRTs in
Basra and Dhi Qar provinces, in which the United States would
participate. These PRTs could be ready by May. We continue to refine
our planning for other PRTs, and we expect the stand-up process to
continue over the next 6 months, as resources permit.
IRAQ: CORRUPTION AND OIL
Question. Oil exports are Iraq's primary source of revenue, and
Iraq's primary cause for corruption. Today, oil revenues are controlled
by the central government with little transparency and accountability.
What are the United States, the IMF, the World Bank, and
others doing to help Iraq fix this problem?
Why aren't we leveraging our assistance to pressure the
Iraqis to clean up the distribution of its oil revenue?
A recent Brookings report recommends a fixed distribution
plan of oil revenues, with portions of oil proceeds going
directly to the central government, to local and provincial
governments, and to an infrastructure repair fund, etc. What is
the administration's assessment of such a proposal?
Answer. The IMF, World Bank, United Nations, and United States
agree that more transparency in Iraq's oil industry is crucial, and all
are working with the Government of Iraq to address this issue. The IMF,
World Bank, United Nations, and the Iraqi Government are members of the
International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB), established by the
United Nations to provide transparency in Iraq's oil revenues. The
United States is an observer to the IAMB. The IAMB provides oversight
of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), into which all Iraqi crude oil
export revenues (the vast majority of Iraqi Government revenues) are
deposited. The IAMB mandate was authorized in UNSCR 1546. The mandate,
which was extended in UNSCR 1637, expires on December 31, 2006, unless
a new U.N. Security Council resolution extends it further. The IAMB
authorizes audits of the DFI, including reviews of cash receipts and
payments from the DFI as well as an assessment of internal controls. In
effect, the audits assess how well the Iraqi Government is managing the
execution of its budget (both expenditures and revenues). The
assessments have led to a number of recommendations that the IAMB and
other donors (including the United States) have discussed with Iraqi
officials.
The IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) also contains recommendations
that reinforce those made by the IAMB. In the area of fiscal
management, recommendations included the establishment of a special
Ministry of Finance unit to prepare monthly government cash-flow
projections and an audit oversight committee to succeed the IAMB by the
end of 2006. The SBA also required a review of existing procurement
rules to bring them in line with international standards and the
adoption of improved budget execution regulations. Specifically for the
oil sector, the IMF recommended that Iraq install an oil metering
system, restructure the sector to consist of commercial enterprises
overseen by the Ministry of Oil; and draft new laws to regulate the
hydrocarbons industry that would be in line with the new Iraq
Constitution and international best practices. We agree strongly with
the IAMB and IMF recommendations, which mirror many of our own
recommendations to the government.
We are using IRRF funds to help the Government of Iraq install
meters on the Al-Basra Oil Terminal, the primary loading point for
crude oil exports. This will provide better accountability and
transparency for exports. This and other projects are improving Iraq's
ability to implement the recommendations above and provide the
technical capacity needed to change the sector's operational history.
The Governments of the United Kingdom and Norway are also working with
the Iraqis on technical training of officials in the area of oil sector
transparency. In addition to its role on the IAMB, the World Bank is
providing policy advice to the government based on its experience in
other countries.
These reforms and others already underway will go far to improve
the government's ability to formulate, execute, and account for its
fiscal processes. They will also help add transparency to the process,
which an emergent civil society can use to hold the government
accountable, thus deepening Iraq's democratic foundation.
Regarding the Brookings report, the State Department agrees that
ensuring sufficient budgetary resources to fund central and constituent
government operations, social services, and maintenance of key
infrastructure (four of the five ``baskets'' mentioned in the report)
will be crucial challenges for the next government, along with the
fiscal transparency and anticorruption issues mentioned above. Revenue
sharing arrangements in particular are a key issue in talks on
finalizing the constitution.
The fifth basket in the Brookings report recommends an oil fund to
provide annual direct payments to Iraqi citizens based on some
percentage of Iraqi oil earnings. This recommendation is more
problematic. The idea is attractive on its face and we are optimistic
that Iraqi oil production will eventually generate budgetary surpluses
that could be invested in various ways for the future. But at present
Iraq runs a large fiscal deficit and cannot afford to divert funds from
pressing reconstruction needs and ongoing government operations to
invest in a fund. There is no budget surplus that could be redirected
to an oil fund without shortchanging other priorities, such as standing
up security forces, maintaining key infrastructure, and making the
necessary investments in the oil section to fuel future Iraqi growth.
Moreover, case studies show that such funds rarely improve fiscal
operations or transparency in countries with challenged institutions
and a history of breaking fiscal rules. In such cases, oil funds are
generally more likely to reflect the problems of the fiscal system they
are created from. Iraq's fiscal deficits and management shortcomings
strengthen the need to remain engaged with the Iraqi Government on
transparency, revenue sharing, and other anticorruption and good
governance efforts, as planned under the U.S. assistance program.
IRAQ: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
Question. According to Ambassador Jim Jeffrey's February 8
testimony to the SFRC, the international community has only obligated
an additional $200 million since September 2005.
How do you explain the failure of the international
community to better meet its pledges to assist Iraq? Please
describe any further obligations that you expect will occur by
other countries in the coming 6 months.
Answer. The international community has already disbursed about
$3.3 billion of the $13.6 billion pledged to Iraq in Madrid pledges in
late 2003. Most of those pledges, made in late 2003, were to be
disbursed over the 4-year period of 2004 to 2007. They are thus still
in the process of disbursal.
Many of the pledges are in the form of loans, and have taken longer
to disburse because loan agreements must be negotiated with the Iraqi
Government. Japan, the second largest donor after the United States,
has already disbursed all of its Madrid pledge of $1.54 billion in
grant aid, and we understand that it is close to finalizing the first
of its loan agreements from its $3.5 billion in pledged concessional
loans.
The United Kingdom is also well along in disbursal of its $452.3
million Madrid pledge, having disbursed $300 million by the end of
February.
The new obligation since September 2005 that you refer to in your
question is related to the European Commission's announcement of an
additional 200 million euros for 2006. Due to its budgetary process,
the EC pledged year by year for Iraq--200 million euros each year for
2004, 2005, and 2006. Its 2004 and 2005 pledges have already been fully
disbursed.
In November 2005, the World Bank approved a $100 million loan for
Iraq, its first loan for that country in 30 years, representing the
first part of its Madrid pledge. The International Monetary Fund signed
a $485 million Emergency Post Conflict Assistance (EPCA) loan in 2004,
and a $600 million standby arrangement with Iraq in December 2005.
We are working with the Iraqis to encourage other donors to
accelerate their pledge disbursals. We are not aware of any specific
plans by other donors for new pledges for Iraq, but we will support the
new Iraqi Government as it seeks new assistance.
International partners have also extended considerable debt relief
to Iraq. In the historic November 2004 Paris Club agreement, and
largely due to strong U.S. support, sovereign creditors agreed to
forgive 80 percent of Iraq's debt in three phases. Nearly all Paris
Club creditors have now formalized their accords with Iraq, and we
expect the remaining ones to do so in the coming 6 months. Three non-
Paris Club sovereign creditors have also matched or exceeded Paris Club
terms, and we are supporting the Iraqi Government as it seeks to obtain
debt relief from other non-Paris Club creditors. Key gulf creditors
have assured us and the IMF that they would offer debt relief to Iraq
on at least Paris Club terms, and Iraqi authorities indicate they will
approach these creditors in the coming months to discuss such debt
relief.
U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Question. Why shouldn't the Director of Foreign Assistance be a
Senate-confirmed position?
Answer. I have undertaken the current reforms as part of an effort
to use existing authorities for maximum effectiveness. Under my
guidance, the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) will systematically
evaluate our progress and he will use this evaluation to identify any
further changes that might be appropriate. We very much look forward to
working with Congress going forward to evaluate the appropriateness of
the tools currently available to improve the effectiveness of foreign
assistance.
Question. Under existing law, does the Director of Foreign
Assistance have the authority to make all decisions regarding foreign
assistance from State and USAID?
Answer. To the extent permitted by law, I will delegate to the DFA
the foreign assistance funding authorities consistent with, and
necessary to achieve, a single coordinated foreign assistance approval
authority. Under my direction, the Director of Foreign Assistance will
have approval and coordinating authority over all foreign assistance.
Question. Please describe any further changes, including
legislative changes, that the administration plans to implement on U.S.
foreign assistance.
Answer. As I stated in announcing the new leadership position, the
current structure of America's foreign assistance risks incoherent
policies and ineffective programs and perhaps even wasted resources. We
must align our activities more fully across the State Department and
USAID and within the State Department itself so that we are better able
to achieve our goals and can be better stewards of public resources. A
driving purpose behind my decision to establish the Office of the
Director of Foreign Assistance, therefore, is to apply a more
strategic, results-oriented, and long-term view to the use of foreign
assistance funding. As we evaluate the efficacy of this reform, we look
forward to consulting with the Congress and discussing the need for
further reform, if any.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY FOR DOD
Question. On July 19, 2005, you and Secretary Rumsfeld sent a
letter to the Hill asking Congress to give the Defense Department
permanent statutory authority to disburse military security assistance.
Please explain to the committee how giving DOD this authority is
consistent with your effort to create a more unified and rational
leadership structure overseeing U.S. foreign assistance.
Answer. The Department of State supports this new authority because
it would augment the resources and authorities available to the
President to act quickly when unforeseen events make the initiation or
expansion of a training, equipping, or advisory program necessary. In
addition, I am able to lend my continued support because the statute
stipulates that State and DOD shall jointly formulate the execution of
train and equip programs.
I look forward to working with Congress to develop the flexible
tools we need to win the global war on terror without compromising
State's primacy in foreign assistance.
NORTH KOREA: FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
Question. How much hard currency does the North Korean regime
receive from its counterfeiting operations? (If necessary, please
provide a classified answer to respond fully.)
How much do you estimate that the financial sanctions against the
Banco Delta Asia Bank (suspected of laundering the counterfeit U.S.
currency produced by North Korea) have cost the North Korean regime?
(If necessary, please provide a classified answer to respond fully.)
Answer. The responses to these questions are classified and are
retained in the committee's secure safes.
ENERGY SECURITY
Question. What is your and the State Department's role in
addressing U.S. energy security interests?
Answer. The objective of our energy policy is to ensure that our
economy has access to energy on terms and conditions that support
economic growth and prosperity. We must also ensure that the United
States can pursue its foreign policy and national security interests
without being constrained by energy concerns. In addition, our policies
must also be consistent with America's broader economic and foreign
policy goals and complement domestic policy initiatives.
To this end, the State Department:
1. Promotes the diversification of energy supplies,
worldwide;
2. Works with other oil consuming countries to respond to
supply disruptions, particularly through the coordinated use of
strategic petroleum stocks;
3. Encourages major oil producing countries to maintain
responsible production policies to support a growing world
economy and to reduce oil market price volatility; and
4. Works with other countries to reduce global dependence on
oil, including through conservation, efficiency, and through
the development of alternative sources of supply.
Question. Do recent events on energy security such as Russia's role
as a supplier to Europe, developing Central Asian reserves; the rising
energy demands in Asia have foreign policy implications?
Answer. Yes. Russia is a country of tremendous natural resources.
Expanding oil and gas production, particularly in remote regions like
eastern Siberia, to meet domestic needs and fulfill export contracts
will be a major challenge for Russia in years to come. Russia could
become a major supplier of liquefied natural gas to world markets over
the next few decades. Energy production in the Caspian region is on the
rise; like Russia, Caspian producers, especially in Central Asia, will
have to improve transport options to get their products to market.
Those options may run west, south, or east--to traditional markets in
Europe or to meet new demand in India and China. Energy efficiency and
conservation also remain major challenges for the former Soviet sphere,
particularly in Russia and Ukraine.
We are encouraging Russia to improve its investment climate, work
constructively with foreign companies to enhance production and
transport mechanisms, and lean on its companies to engage in
transparent, market-based activities. Given surging demand, especially
in Asia, incremental, non-OPEC production, such as that in Russia, will
be very important in the global market. In Central Asia and the
Caucasus, we will also promote foreign investment, and encourage
regional governments to work together to expand and diversify pipeline
routes. Russia has identified energy security as a major focus for the
G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg, which President Putin will host in July.
Europe remains a net importer of energy; two-thirds of the EU's
total energy requirements will be imported by 2020. The EU currently
imports 30 percent of its gas from Russia. Bickering between Russia and
Ukraine over natural gas supply and transit, which led to temporary
disruptions in supply over New Year's, spurred European leaders to
refocus their attention on energy security, and in particular to
reevaluate options to diversify sources of energy imports and adopt new
energy-saving technologies.
We will work closely with our European allies, as well as engage
Russia and its neighbors, to advance our energy agenda: To ensure that
our economy has access to energy on terms and conditions that support
economic growth and environmental stewardship. Energy is a critical
issue for our friends in Europe, and the European Union is helpfully
focusing on a need for common approaches to shared energy challenges.
At the same time, we will strive to bolster energy security across the
European Continent and EurAsia region. President Bush's Advanced Energy
Initiative outlined U.S. efforts to develop alternative sources of
energy and reduce foreign dependence. The United States and Europe were
already collaborating on hydrogen, clean coal, renewable energy,
nuclear fusion, and clean transport. With the State of the Union
providing further guidance, we will redouble our efforts, and extend
them into the CIS.
______
Questions of Senator Richard Lugar
TROPICAL FORESTS AND CORAL REEFS
Question. Senator Biden and I recently reauthorized funding for the
Tropical Forest Conservation Act, which we authored. The Department's
budget request cuts funding for TFCA. How many dollars and how many
projects are ``in the pipeline'' for TFCA? How difficult is it for the
Department to encourage other governments to comply with all the
governance conditions of TFCA?
Answer. The administration has a significant amount of TFCA funding
remaining from earlier appropriations. According to the Treasury
Department, approximately $60 million in TFCA funding remains in the
Treasury Debt Restructuring Account. About $30 million of this amount
has already been allocated to countries that have been declared
eligible for TFCA.
For the remaining funds, we are examining the possibility of TFCA
programs with other countries. However, we cannot say with certainty at
this time whether countries that have applied for TFCA treatment will
be declared eligible under the criteria set forth in the act, or
whether countries with whom we are in preliminary informal discussions
will decide to apply for TFCA treatment. We anticipate that the amount
already on hand, together with any amounts the administration may
decide to allocate to TFCA from the FY07 budget, will be sufficient in
the near term.
We believe the political and economic eligibility criteria set
forth in the TFCA are useful in identifying countries with a commitment
to good political and economic policies--policies that are necessary
for the successful administration of long-term programs like TFCA.
However, we note that a number of countries expressing interest in TFCA
have not met one or more of the eligibility criteria.
Question. There has been criticism that debt relief programs like
TFCA ``encourage bad behavior'' in developing countries. Has the
Department under review other approaches to protecting tropical rain
forests, and other critical ecosystems like coral reefs?
Answer. We understand that there are sometimes concerns that debt
relief programs run the risk of encouraging irresponsible borrowing in
that borrowers may expect future loans to be forgiven as well. We do
not believe this is a problem with TFCA, which is a small, selective
program that deals only with concessional debt incurred before January
1, 1998. In addition, TFCA can be described more properly as debt
redirection rather than debt relief. Under TFCA, the borrowing country
is still required to make payments in local currency for tropical
forest protection that are roughly equivalent in most cases to what
they would have repaid to the USG under the original debt obligation.
The administration considers TFCA an innovative approach to
conserving tropical forests that complements our bilateral and
multilateral activities. For example, USAID routinely provides grant
assistance to eligible developing countries to support forest
protection and sustainable management, including protection of
biodiversity. USAID support in this area has been augmented recently
through two innovative initiatives: (1) The Congo Basin Forest
Partnership, a multidonor public-private partnership launched by the
Department in 2002, to which we are contributing $54 million over 4
years through USAID's Central African Regional Program on the
Environment (CARPE), and (2) the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative,
which was initiated in 2005 and focuses on conserving biological
diversity in the world's largest intact tropical forest.
Through our contributions to international organizations and
financial institutions such as the International Tropical Timber
Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations and the Global Environment Facility, the United States supports
a wide range of projects in tropical countries designed to protect,
conserve, and sustainably manage their forests.
The USG, primarily through USAID, also provides about $20 million
annually to programs that benefit coral reef ecosystems in Meso-
America, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. The Department recently
established an Environmental Regional Hub in Fiji in order to enhance
our coral reef conservation activities in the Pacific Islands. In July
2007, the USG will assume the cochair with Mexico of the International
Coral Reef Initiative which the Department launched in 1993, giving us
another platform to promote coral reef conservation worldwide.
Question. Is it your view that, if more money were available for
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and weapons dismantlement
programs, you would be able to eliminate more threats faster and that
this would be in U.S. national security interests?
Answer. I support the President's budget, which supports our
national security goals in all respects, not just in
counterproliferation and weapons dismantlement programs. These are a
vitally important element of our foreign assistance mix, but so are
also our efforts to strengthen our diplomacy and build democracy in
places where it is weak or absent. Within the parameters of the
President's FY 2007 request, I will work to allocate funds to enable
the United States to develop and refine sensible security measures,
such as furthering our Proliferation Security Initiative and enhancing
the ability of those who cooperate with us to deny to regimes like
Iran, North Korea, as well as nonstate actors, including terrorist
groups, the materials for covert weapons programs that threaten the
international system.
Question. As you know, we have been working with the Department to
update legislation that Senator Biden and I wrote to give statutory
standing and needed personnel authorities to the Department for the
Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. We asked for the
Department's views and support for the legislation a month ago. How
soon can we have your view on this legislation?
Answer. The Department appreciates the continuing focus on these
issues that you and your committee have shown. The legislation provides
many useful personnel and funding authorities that would enhance the
ability of the Department and its partners in other agencies to respond
more rapidly and effectively.
In addition to our earlier discussions on the State authorization
bill, our staff will continue to work with you to provide additional
information.
Question. U.S. bilateral and multilateral energy discussions are,
for the most part, run through the Energy Department. Yet the issue of
energy security must be a paramount foreign policy consideration of the
United States. How do you propose that the State Department incorporate
energy security into its core mission?
Answer. The United States imports almost two-thirds of its oil, and
our energy security is inextricably linked with developments that occur
overseas. We rely on the private sector to find, produce, and
distribute oil and refined products. However governments also have key
roles:
(1) We need to minimize political constraints that may
inhibit the smooth functioning of global energy markets, and
(2) We have to ensure that we are free to pursue our broader
foreign policy objectives without undue concern over the
possible impact on our country's energy supplies.
The State Department deals with these issues in a number of ways.
We work with the Department of Energy and the International
Energy Agency to maintain strategic petroleum stocks in
consuming countries, and to coordinate their release in
response to a supply disruption. This most recently occurred in
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita last fall.
We engage with producing and consuming countries to try to
ensure the smooth functioning of energy markets worldwide.
We provide diplomatic support to private sector efforts to
open up new sources of energy supply, such as in the Caspian
region.
More broadly, the goal of energy security is closely tied to
our efforts to work for regional security and economic
development in many parts of the world.
Question. On November 17, 2003, President Bush transmitted the
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime to the Senate for its advice
and consent. The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the
convention in 2004. In July of last year, by voice vote the committee
ordered the convention reported to the full Senate, with a
recommendation that the Senate give its advice and consent to
ratification. The Senate has yet to act on the convention.
Does the administration continue to support U.S. ratification of
the Cybercrime Convention? How important is this convention in your
view?
Answer. Yes, the administration continues to strongly support U.S.
ratification of the Convention on Cybercrime.
The Convention on Cybercrime is the only multilateral treaty to
address the subject of crime committed against and using computer
systems. It provides important tools for U.S. investigators and
prosecutors in their work to prevent and combat terrorism and organized
crime, and for protecting the Nation from terrorist attacks and attacks
on critical information infrastructure. It is also essential to
securing the international cooperation we need to enforce our criminal
laws, including those against piracy of intellectual property and
purveying child pornography.
The convention provides all of these benefits to the United States
without requiring any change to U.S. law, including to the protections
guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. No country could use the
convention to force the United States to do an investigation or give
evidence when to do so would transgress our well-established
protections of free expression and freedom of religion.
A number of coalitions of U.S. businesses, including businesses in
the information technology, Internet, and content provider fields, have
expressed their strong support for U.S. ratification of the convention.
They believe it would not only improve the security of the United
States, but also help address the global problem of Internet crime,
such as the spreading of viruses and worms, phishing attacks, and
identity theft.
The Attorney General recently wrote to the Senate majority and
minority leaders to reaffirm the administration's strong support for
the convention. I join him in urging the Senate to act quickly to give
its advice and consent to ratification of this important instrument.
Question. It is not a national flaw that our hopes for a peaceful
world exceed our ability to provide for it. Your leadership in taking a
hard new look at foreign assistance is welcome. Can you describe your
philosophy in making the kinds of tradeoffs that ultimately have to be
made? For example, how do you weigh the value of MCC assistance to
well-governed poor countries versus assistance to nations that are
strategically important in the war against terrorism? How do you
provide assistance to failed and failing states when the reason they
are failing is that they have corrupt and ineffective governments? What
about regional tradeoffs--the importance of boosting former Soviet
States in their lean toward the West versus the need to influence
nations with significant Muslim populations? How do you prioritize our
foreign assistance goals?
Answer. Assuring U.S. national security, both physical and
economic, immediate and long term, is our top foreign policy priority.
It is the prerequisite to our freedom and prosperity. But our security
interests cannot be achieved apart from our development goals and our
democratic ideals in today's world. Our assistance must integrate and
advance all of these goals together.
Accordingly, the primary objective of our assistance is to build
and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the
needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the
international system. In the near term we must give priority to nations
that are strategically important in the war against terrorism. The
largest single piece of our 2007 foreign assistance budget request is
to strengthen our coalition partners on the front lines in the fight
against terrorism.
Over the longer term, to secure freedom and prosperity both at home
and abroad, we must provide real incentives to poor countries that
demonstrate commitment to ruling justly, investing in their people, and
promoting market freedoms. The Millennium Challenge Account has already
shown that it is a powerful incentive, one that provides hope by
promoting sustainable economic growth to reduce poverty in the poorest
counties. ``Getting incentives right'' is one of the key lessons of
development economics over the last 50 years, and it explains why the
MCA is so important.
In the case of states that have failed or are failing because of
corrupt and ineffective governments, we must insist on transformation
as a condition of any assistance to their governments. We are
requesting funds to meet humanitarian needs, lay the foundations for
economic development, and strengthen sustainable democratic
institutions in countries such as Sudan and Haiti.
Regionally, many areas of the world remain vulnerable to
authoritarian, despotic, and corrupt rulers--whether in former Soviet
States, the Middle East, or elsewhere. We cannot afford to ignore any
region. Nonetheless, we recognize the special importance of helping
countries overcome the legacy of Communism and the appeal of political
Islamist ideology. For this reason, we continue to provide funding
under the Freedom Support Act to promote the rule of law and the growth
of democratic and market institutions in countries that just 15 years
ago lived under totalitarian Soviet rule. We also place high priority
on helping the nations of the Broader Middle East to make progress in
building the foundations of democratic societies, for example, through
the Middle East partnership initiative.
As you note, prioritization of our foreign assistance goals is a
complex process, which must balance all of these and many other
critical issues such as post-disaster humanitarian relief and global
health threats. In making such decisions, we must consult widely, not
only within the Department but also with other agencies, to ensure that
the decisions are as well informed as possible. Other than assuring the
national security of the American people as our top priority, there are
no absolutes, but rather a careful balancing of a wide variety of
policy goals and assistance tools.
FOREIGN AID BUDGET
Question. What relationship will the new Director of Foreign
Assistance have with the Assistant Secretaries and Coordinators at the
State Department and Assistant Administrators at USAID who currently
have responsibility for designing and implementing foreign assistance
programs? Who will control the funds that are currently apportioned to
those individuals? How will the decisionmaking process work?
Answer. I am establishing the position of Director of Foreign
Assistance (DFA) to better align our foreign assistance programs with
our foreign policy goals, to align more fully the foreign assistance
activities of USAID and State, and to demonstrate that we are
responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars. I intend to delegate to the
DFA authority over foreign assistance funding and programs to achieve
these goals, not to supervise Assistant Secretaries and Coordinators or
Assistant Administrators. Nor are the reporting relationships of
Assistant Secretaries or Assistant Administrators expected to change.
Instead, the Director of Foreign Assistance will work closely with
Assistant Secretaries and Assistant Administrators in exercising his
authority over foreign assistance funding and programs and developing
coordinated strategies, plans, and budgets. Under my direction, the DFA
will have approval and coordinating authority over all foreign
assistance.
Question. What role will the Director of Foreign Assistance assume
with respect to the myriad other agencies that currently provide
foreign assistance, including the MCC? Will the administration
establish a formalized coordination structure with you at the helm? How
will you ensure that State/USAID programs are not being run at cross-
purposes with DOD, Justice, Labor, MCC, etc.?
Answer. The Director of Foreign Assistance is intended to provide
overall leadership to foreign assistance that is delivered through
other agencies and entities of the U.S. Government, such as the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). By instituting integrated
country strategies and operating plans, the Director of Foreign
Assistance will help ensure that USG agencies delivering foreign
assistance are not working at cross-purposes, that, in fact, we are
taking advantage of agencies' comparative strengths to create a U.S.
Government program that is effective and makes the most efficient use
of taxpayer dollars. With respect to other U.S. Government agencies,
including the MCC, the Director of Foreign Assistance will work in
concert with these agencies to address the pressing issues that face
developing countries and to ensure that programming is complementary
and stove-piping is curtailed.
Question. How many people do you envision will work in the Office
of the Director of Foreign Assistance? What capabilities/
responsibilities will they have? How many such individuals will be new
hires as opposed to being pulled from current positions within State
and USAID? To what extent will you have input into the hiring,
training, and assignment process at State and USAID to ensure
appropriate expertise is developed at these two agencies?
Answer. To implement foreign assistance effectively, the United
States must have the right people, with the right skills, in the right
place at the right time. With regard to staff needs for the Director of
Foreign Assistance, I intend for this Office not to be duplicative, but
instead to add value to the current environment. I anticipate an office
that, when fully staffed, will bring together something in the range of
50 to 100 positions, based on bringing together existing staff who are
performing common foreign assistance functions in the two
organizations. The DFA will consult with, and provide a full
notification to, Congress once we have made the necessary decisions
about how to best utilize these existing functions. As the Director of
Foreign Assistance and I define strategic priorities and develop
comprehensive country plans, we will consider whether our human
resources align with program priorities and resource availability.
Question. Some supporters of the restructuring believe it does not
go far enough and that the administration has missed an opportunity to
launch a much more ambitious and necessary reform effort. Does this
restructuring mark the first step toward a future and bolder reform
effort?
Answer. I have undertaken the current reforms as part of an effort
to use existing authorities for maximum effectiveness. Under my
guidance, the Director of Foreign Assistance will systematically
evaluate our progress and use this evaluation to identify any further
changes that might be appropriate. We very much look forward to working
with Congress going forward to evaluate the appropriateness of the
tools currently available to improve the effectiveness of foreign
assistance and to determine whether further reforms may be necessary.
Question. Please comment on the concerns that some have expressed
that the new initiative may lead to a greater degree of aid
politicization in which long-term development and poverty reduction
goals will be overwhelmed by the demands of shorter term strategic
considerations. To what degree will USAID remain influential in shaping
U.S. development policy?
Answer. A driving purpose behind my decision to establish the
Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance is to establish mechanisms
to promote a more strategic allocation of our foreign assistance funds,
targeted to specific results. Strengthening the U.S. Government's
commitment to long-term, results-oriented development will require the
unique talents and voices of both State and USAID. Coherent,
comprehensive, multiyear strategies will replace fragmented
programming, and the United States will promote greater ownership and
responsibility on the part of host nations and their citizens. As with
the strategy that Ambassador Tobias employed as U.S. Global AIDS
Coordinator, U.S. Government assistance must address immediate needs
and crises, while at the same time laying the foundation for long-term
sustainability under the leadership and responsibility of host nations.
Question. In your initiative to implement transformational
diplomacy, you identified several ways in which Foreign Service
Officers will be affected, in terms of training, skills, and
assignments. Will these same changes also apply to USAID staff,
especially those posted overseas?
Answer. To implement foreign assistance effectively, the United
States must have the right people, with the right skills, in the right
place at the right time. A key advantage of these reforms is the
ability to bring all strengths and resources of the United States to
bear in achieving foreign policy goals.
My vision is to ensure that our diplomatic corps and other human
resources are prepared to take on the challenges we face today. In some
cases, that may require new or additional skills and capabilities,
including in areas such as strategic and program planning, procurement,
and monitoring and evaluation. Just as we seek to apply a strategic
approach to the implementation to foreign assistance, strategic
approaches underway for the allocation of operational and human
resources must continue.
USAID operates in some of the most difficult circumstances in the
world where having adequate resources are critical for implementing
successful programs.
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
Question. Your commitment to devote 15 new slots to the Office of
Reconstruction and Stabilization will bring the number of people in the
Office up to about 100. Do you believe that there is now enough
critical mass to establish the active-duty response corps that is
called for in our legislation? How have your experiences in staffing
positions in Afghanistan and Iraq affected your view of the need for
such a corps?
Answer. Additional FTE appropriated to S/CRS will be used to
regularize existing staff positions that are currently not permanent,
but provided through temporary arrangements. The current staffing
within the Office is 48 State personnel and 12 interagency detailee
positions. There are already 6 members of the Active Response Corps in
initial training and all 15 will be on board by summer. They will
participate in training, military exercises, and planning and will be
available for deployment.
A truly ``active'' ARC requires dedicated funding so that the
Department can create separate permanent positions to ensure
availability of staff to plan, prepare, and deploy. Without sufficient
overall staffing levels for the Department, it will not be possible for
the ARC to expand.
Experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have demonstrated
the need for training and preparing staff in advance through training,
military exercises, and planning. Having staff available who have
committed in advance, and are prepared to deploy, ensures more rapid
mobilization of the right skillsets.
Question. In your recent Georgetown speech, you said: ``We have an
expansive vision for this new office, and let there be no doubt, we are
committed to realizing it.'' How does your budget request shore up that
statement? How much funding did the Department devote to operations of
the Office in the 2006 budget? What do you envision for 2007?
Answer. The following table outlines S/CRS funding for FY05 and
FY06, as well as our FY07 request.
[Dollars in thousands]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY06 FY07
Account FY05 actual estimate request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY05 Supplemental Operating $7,700 ........... ...........
Funds*..........................
Bureau-Managed Operating Funds... **$737 $6,237 $6,507
Cost of Permanent Positions $1,485 $2,475 $5,250
Funded..........................
(total FTE).................. (9) (15) (30)
Cost of other State non-permanent $2,950 $7,920 $8,400
staff...........................
(total positions; includes (22) (48) (48)
Active Response Corps)......
--------------------------------------
S/CRS total (State $12,872 $16,632 $20,157
Operations--D&CP).........
Conflict Response Fund (Foreign 0 0 $75,000
Ops)............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Supplemental provided 2-year funding; $2.6M obligated in FY05 and
$5.1M in FY06.
Question. As you may know, we have updated the legislation giving
this Office statutory standing and will be working to have that pass
the full Senate as free-standing legislation. It authorizes both a 500-
person reserve component and a 250-person active-duty component of a
Readiness Response Corps at the Department. Can you describe your
current thinking on how you would use this new authority?
Answer. We currently have sufficient authority to create a standing
response corps within the Department. We will be requesting the
necessary resources in FY 2008 and later to staff the Readiness
Response Corps as requirements become further defined. Currently, we
have a standby response corps that has helped identify from within the
Department and retirees, those who may be interested and ready to
deploy or to provide surge capacity within State in a crisis but who
would continue to work in other positions until needed.
We are requesting some funding in FY 2007 to begin the development
of a Civilian Reserve that would draw on nongovernmental skillsets to
provide the USG a standing corps of trained and preidentified employees
who can deploy rapidly and fill key sectoral gaps in rule of law and
security.
There are several components of staffing requirements:
S/CRS core management staff;
Department of State surge capacity--Active and Standby
Response Corps;
Other agency surge capacity;
On-call Civilian Reserve;
Implementing partner capacity (Global Skills Network of
contracts, NGOs, grantees).
S/CRS has estimated a need for a core staff of 80 to provide
leadership and management of integrated USG planning and
response and to manage development of comprehensive and
interoperable civilian capabilities.
Current staffing is a combination of permanent,
nonpermanent, interagency detailees, and temporary staff.
We need to institutionalize a standing capability that will
ensure lessons learned are lessons applied. Our long-term plan
is to convert nonpermanent staffing to permanent and be able to
reimburse agencies for detailees; both will ensure that we are
able to attract and retain the best employees.
S/CRS estimates a need for 100 members of an Active Response
Corps to provide the Department with a separate cadre of
rapidly deployable, trained, and exercised personnel who can
augment Embassy operations, manage initial field engagements,
participate in the added workload of preparing plans for
response, and embed with military forces if deployed. While not
deployed, they will train, exercise, and work within bureaus to
build capacity for response and address conflict issues.
Current funding provides for an initial 15 members of an
Active Response Corps in FY06 (all will be onboard by summer).
In addition, there is a need to access additional personnel
within State through a Standby Response Corps made up of
individuals who have expressed interest in deployments or to
surge into domestic efforts. This SRC has been identified.
Other agencies also have, or are augmenting, their internal
surge capacity to be able to respond to demands for their
expertise and program management capabilities.
A Civilian Reserve system that would provide readily
available outside experts to serve in USG missions does not
exist. We propose to build such a system initially focused on
the need for rule of law personnel who have advance training
can be called up within weeks and deployed.
Existing implementation capabilities in State and USAID and
other agencies is frequently carried out through contractors,
NGOs, and grantees. There is a need to strengthen and widen
those capabilities across the USG to ensure adequate capacity.
Question. Although the administration's FY 2006 request for the
creation and funding of a Conflict Response Fund was not included in FY
2006 Foreign Operations appropriations, funding authority for the
transfer of up to $100 million for the purposes of the fund was
provided in the DOD authorization act (sec. 1207, Public Law 109-162).
Have you requested, or do you intend to request, such a transfer from
the Secretary of Defense? If so, for what purposes?
Answer. We are currently working to develop proposals for use of
the funding and have worked with DOD on the process for requesting a
transfer. We believe that having a ready pool of resources to address
conflict transformation priorities will provide a valuable tool in
addressing emerging needs in conflict situations. Our goal will be to
support ongoing planning efforts undertaken by S/CRS, to respond to
unforeseen needs, and to build capacity to respond to conflict.
Question. S/CRS and Joint Forces Command have requested a study
from the Institute for Defense Analysis on the potential costs of the
civilian response corps that you envision S/CRS as creating. What has
the administration learned from that study about the potential costs of
such a corps? How do you respond to concerns that the expansion of a
civilian corps to carry out these activities will promote ill-
considered interventions?
Answer. The IDA study was a good start in providing valuable
information on civilian surge capabilities of other organizations,
including their estimated costs. We used such information and lessons
from previous engagements to develop our own concept for establishing a
civilian reserve. The conclusion from outside and internal experts, is
that a standing capacity that can be readily accessed and which has
high degree of preparation and reliability will be needed. Assumptions
we used to define the legislative, management, and budgetary
requirements for creating the concept are now being validated through a
comprehensive management study that S/CRS has contracted to an outside
firm. This study will address how to manage the reserve system
including recruiting, hiring, and preparation.
Having the capacity to respond quickly and effectively will make
U.S. engagements more successful. The USG will respond to national
security challenges based on our interests, the important difference
will be that we will have additional civilian tools to complement our
military assets.
Question. The budget request contains $11 million for preventive
activities. This appears to be the first request for such a category of
assistance in the State Department budget. In what countries and
circumstances do you believe this will be used?
How will such activities be coordinated with possible USAID
activities for the same purpose?
Has the State Department developed measures that would help assess
whether preventive programs can actually forestall conflict and result
in budget savings through the adoption of a policy of preventive
diplomacy rather than dealing with conflicts after they erupt?
Answer. The FY 2007 request includes $11 million in Economic
Support Funds (ESF) for Reconciliation Programs, a slight increase over
the administration's request in FY 2006. This is not a new program. In
fact, Congress earmarked ESF for reconciliation programs in FY 2004.
USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, with State's
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, oversees the programs.
They are currently funding 21 ongoing programs in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Mali, Burundi, Angola,
Bolivia, Colombia, Yemen, Israel and the West Bank/Gaza. Since FY 2004,
several additional countries were made eligible including Guinea,
Kosovo, Morocco, Russia (Northern Caucasus only), Rwanda, and Uganda.
Each year, before releasing a call for proposals, the country list is
reviewed and revised in light of country need, foreign policy
priorities, and the potential for real program impact.
This competitively awarded fund is used to support reconciliation
programs and activities that bring together individuals of different
ethnic, religious, or political backgrounds from areas of civil
conflict and war in order to address the root causes of conflict.
Programs that include mediation of specific disputes, mechanisms for
restorative justice, dialogue, and training for conflicting parties or
support of peace processes are examples of the types of activities that
will be considered. Programs that bring together conflicting parties in
an effort to implement practical solutions to specific conflict issues
(e.g., land use, unemployment, and natural resources management) are
most likely to receive support under this fund.
The funds made available under this earmark frequently complement
ongoing conflict mitigation activities in the field funded by USAID
including the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. Funded
proposals must demonstrate complementarity rather than duplication.
Every program implemented under the reconciliation fund is designed
with monitoring and evaluation plans that enable USAID to assess the
results of the program as measured against its stated goals and
objectives. These evaluation plans are assessed by the proposal review
committee to ensure that they adequately measure project impact. Sample
indicators that help measure progress in the prevention of violent
conflict are: The number of trained leaders demonstrating ability to
guide communities through divisive issues; number of land-related
conflicts successfully mediated; increased participation of community
members in multiethnic activities, meetings, and events by the end of
the program; and community members negotiate the establishment of
truces and safe zones in areas of conflict.
AFGHANISTAN
Question. Though the Taliban has been removed from power and most
al-Qaeda elements have been driven out of Afghanistan, last year marked
the most violent year since 2001. Indications are that the security
situation is unlikely to improve and may even deteriorate in 2006. Will
the intended transition to a NATO/ISAF-led security sector for the
entirety of Afghanistan adequately meet U.S. and Afghan interests in
stability and counterterrorism?
Answer. We are concerned about the increased violence and use of
suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and are working
closely with Afghan security and intelligence forces to counter these
threats. Indeed, Afghan forces have thwarted a number of suicide
attacks.
President Karzai has condemned these attacks as have provincial
government and religious leaders. In addition, Afghans--who have been
the primary target of the attacks--have staged protests against suicide
bombings. Relying on suicide attacks will further alienate the Taliban
from the vast majority of the Afghan people.
NATO forces are up to the challenge. The NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is expected to expand to southern
Afghanistan by fall 2006. As it expands from its current area of
responsibility in the north, west, and in Kabul, ISAF will enter a more
challenging security environment. To meet those challenges, NATO has
updated its operations plan and rules of engagement. We are confident
that those rules give NATO commanders the robust and flexible framework
they need to carry out ISAF's mission in the south.
Question. Responsibility for train and equip programs in
Afghanistan has shifted from the State Department to the Defense
Department. Is DOD carrying out this program under the supervision of
the U.S. Ambassador? Has the State Department been able to retain
influence over the program? How responsive are DOD personnel to
political concerns expressed by State Department personnel?
Answer. The Chief of Mission has policy responsibilities for all
USG programs in Afghanistan and coordinates closely with the Office for
Security Cooperation--
Afghanistan (OSC-A) which is responsible for reform of the security
forces including the ANP. The Ambassador and the CFC-A Commander work
very closely together to monitor all aspects of the ANA and ANP's
development, and there is strong interagency cooperation and
coordination between DOD and State on this program. DOD provides
biweekly briefings on the status of the ANA and ANP to the Department
of State and briefs the Afghanistan Interagency Operating Group (AIOG)
on the status of the ANA and ANP and funding.
In FY 2005, the State Department provided significant funding,
including $396.8M in FMF funds to train and equip the ANA, $945K in
IMET funds, and $15.5M in PKO funds for salaries. Congress also
provided $795M in FY 2005 supplemental funds to the Department of
Defense through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to support ANA
train and equip requirements, which also support ANP activities
(including $200M in FY 2005 supplemental). The FY 2006 budget includes
$792K in IMET funds to continue ANA training at U.S. military
facilities. DOD's FY 2006 supplemental request for the ANA is $823M to
support training, life support, maintenance, salaries, equipment, and
infrastructure.
In FY 2005, the State Department provided significant funding,
including $424.5M in INCLE funds to provide training, mentoring, and
reform assistance to the ANP. The FY06 budget includes $58.5M in INCLE
funds to continue ANP assistance. DOD's FY 2006 ASFF supplemental
request for the ANP is $1.3B, which covers all facets of the program--
including $585M for training, mentoring, and reform activities.
DOD and State have worked closely together to develop this request,
as required by the ASFF, and will continue to work closely together in
implementing the program. DOD will directly support the equipment,
infrastructure, and salary needs of the Afghan police while the intent
is for DOD to transfer funds to the State to continue implementation of
the critical training, mentoring and reform elements of the program.
State provides a senior civilian deputy for police to OSC-A to ensure
coordination between OSC-A and Embassy Kabul.
Question. President Karzai has proudly stated that his country
``now has a constitution, a President, a Parliament, and a nation fully
participating in its destiny.'' Despite these significant
accomplishments, Afghanistan remains a fragile state. How can we ensure
the newly agreed-upon Afghanistan Compact is as successful as its
predecessor Bonn Agreement of 2001? To what extent is the United States
joined by other countries, including Afghanistan's neighbors, in
continuing the fight against al-Qaeda, Taliban, narcotics traffickers,
and warlords?
Answer. The Afghan people and their current President have much of
which to be proud. The progress that has already been achieved seemed
almost unimaginable only a few short years ago. The international
community recognized Afghanistan's new status during the recent London
conference. The Afghanistan Compact adopted at the conference sets out
a framework for a more mature partnership between the Afghan Government
and the international community, with mutual commitments by each.
Afghanistan is a full partner in the new compact with benchmarks to
achieve and timelines to adhere to. Among the commitments made by
Afghanistan are its pledges to consolidate peace by disbanding all
illegal armed groups, and to create a secure environment by
strengthening Afghan institutions to meet the security needs of the
country. Afghanistan also vowed to achieve a sustained and significant
reduction in the production and trafficking of narcotics over the next
few years, with a goal of their complete elimination. The NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the U.S.-led Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF), and partner nations agreed to provide strong
support in establishing security and stability in Afghanistan, in close
coordination with the Afghan Government.
The Joint Monitoring and Coordination Board, also established in
the compact, provides a new forum for monitoring Afghanistan's
compliance and for coordinating our efforts with those of the Afghan
Government and other donors. For its part, the international community
has backed up its political commitments with financial pledges totaling
US$10.5 billion for the implementation of the interim Afghan National
Development Strategy. With the country's institutions maturing and the
commitment of the international community remaining high, the new
compact should provide an even firmer basis for combating Afghanistan's
acknowledged challenges.
Question. The administration's pledge at the London conference
essentially flatlines aid for Afghan reconstruction at $1.1 billion--
the same amount budgeted for the current fiscal year. The slow pace of
reconstruction has generated popular discontent, directed at both the
government of Hamid Karzai and at the United States. Given the
resurgent strength of the Taliban, and a baseline of dissatisfaction
that erupted into violent anti-Western protests in early February,
would it be advisable to raise our commitment to Afghan reconstruction?
Answer. An independent national survey in Afghanistan by ABC News
in December 2005 measured opinions on a wide variety of issues related
to the U.S. presence, Taliban legacy, pace of reconstruction, and
satisfaction with the Afghan Government. The results were overwhelming
and unambiguous. According to the poll, the Afghan people widely
believe that despite still difficult living conditions, the U.S.-led
overthrow of the Taliban was a positive development (87 percent),
strongly support the administration of President Hamid Karzai (83
percent), and firmly agree that the Afghanistan of today is headed in
the right direction (77 percent). There is widespread sentiment that
living conditions (85 percent), security from crime and other violence
(75 percent), and freedom to express political opinions (80 percent) is
better than it was under the Taliban.
Regarding the level of U.S. assistance for Afghanistan, Secretary
Rice announced at the London conference that the United States had
provided a total of over $5.9 billion ($1.1 billion in FY 2006 + $4.8
billion in FY 2005) since the last donor gathering in Berlin. In
addition, she announced that our FY 2007 budget request for Afghanistan
was over $1.1 billion.
The FY 2007 figure only represents the Department's Foreign
Operations budget request. Funding from other agencies that typically
contribute to Afghan reconstruction and security assistance (such as
DOD) is not factored into the FY 2007 number as it was for previous
years. The reason for this is that it is still very early in the FY
2007 budget cycle and the amount of USG funding that will be available
from other sources is not yet clear.
Thus, in terms of the Foreign Operations budget, the $1.1 billion
requested for Afghanistan in FY 2007 actually represents an increase of
27 percent, or over $200 million from the FY 2006 Foreign Operations
request.
We are confident that this request for FY 2007 is the right amount
of funding necessary to support our vast reconstruction and security
assistance programs in Afghanistan.
Question. An [original question said ABC] NBC News Poll conducted
in October 2005 found that a large majority of Afghans support the aims
and effort of the United States in Afghanistan. However, this may
reflect expectations for the future rather than satisfaction with the
current unstable situation. Do you have a sense that the people's
expectations can be met? How long does the government have to meet
these expectations before support for it drops?
Answer. Most Afghans think their life is already better. An ABC
News poll in December 2005 \1\ found that 87 percent of Afghans
surveyed believed the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban was good for
their country. Eighty-five percent said that their living conditions
had improved, and 80 percent said their freedom of expression is
better. Seventy-five percent say their security from crime and violence
has improved as well.
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\1\ See the ABC News poll at the end of the question and answer
section.
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Of course, to maintain widespread support it will be necessary to
manage expectations while continuing to deliver real improvements in
people's lives. The political institutions that have developed at the
national level need to demonstrate their relevance by delivering
security and governance at the local level. Economic growth, in
particular, will be key to meeting expectations. While it is not
possible to predict the future course of public opinion in Afghanistan,
maintaining a productive level of public support is most likely if the
Afghan Government, with international support, keeps its focus on
achieving progress in an equitable manner.
Question. The impact of the opium and heroin trade is undermining
progress in reconstruction and stabilization. How is the State
Department ensuring that the strategies and tactics of U.S. agencies
and our international partners are coherent and more cost-effective
than they have been in the past? How much of the FY07 counternarcotics
budget is devoted to demand reduction?
Answer. Indeed, the cultivation, production, and trafficking of
opiates exert a destabilizing influence on any country, but trafficking
is particularly dangerous to an emerging democracy such as Afghanistan.
The United States, with State's INL Bureau in the lead, is working with
international partners to make a long-term, comprehensive investment in
countering narcotics in Afghanistan in an effort to reverse forces that
are hindering the development of the legal economy, fueling widespread
corruption, undermining good governance, and supporting traffickers and
other criminal elements. The following summarizes our efforts:
First, INL participates in all international fora advocating for
full-partner participation in Afghanistan's reconstruction and
development. In 2006, both the London Conference on Afghanistan and the
Doha Conference on Border Management in Afghanistan focused
international community's attention on the need for a unified,
integrated counternarcotics (CN) effort and solicited international
support for CN and police programs. We will continue to encourage the
active involvement of INL's international partners in combating illicit
narcotics production and trafficking in Afghanistan.
Concurrently, the United Kingdom is a key partner nation in
coordinating international CN assistance, and INL works closely with
them on every front. Recognizing the availability of CN moneys from
donors lacking a bilateral relationship with Afghanistan, the United
Kingdom, Afghanistan, and the United Nations established the Counter
Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF.) The UNDP oversees administration of this
fund, while the Government of Afghanistan retains operational control
over allocation--$78.6 million has been contributed since the fund was
established in October 2005.
Also, Department of Justice prosecutors, working alongside United
Kingdom and Norwegian legal experts, mentor the Vertical Prosecution
Task Force (VPTF), building long-term Afghan capacity to arrest,
prosecute, and punish traffickers and corrupt officials. Currently, the
docket contains over 100 ongoing prosecutions. In a significant October
2005 victory, Afghanistan extradited its first high-value trafficker to
the United States. The 2005 Anti-Narcotics Law, formally decreed by
President Karzai, now provides a legal structure that allows for modern
investigative techniques and for expedited international extradition.
Moreover, it is important to note that the USG's five-pillar CN
strategy is dynamic, changing in response to changing conditions on the
ground. Our five-pillar CN implementation action plan contains programs
that can quickly be modified to address emergent needs. The January
2006 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) rapid
assessment survey, anticipating sharp increases this year in opium
poppy cultivation in the southern Helmand province, in addition to
anecdotal evidence from the field, prompted INL to further action.
Specifically, Embassy Kabul's CN Task Force and the Narcotics Affairs
Section, working together with the Government of Afghanistan, United
Kingdom, UNODC, and the U.S. military, quickly developed and
implemented a responsive plan augmenting Governor-led eradication. This
includes the deployment of additional security forces, the Afghan
Eradication Force (AEF), targeted public information campaigns,
alternative livelihoods programs and interdiction operations. The task
force interacts daily with Helmand's provincial government, which
continues to show good cooperation. By constantly reevaluating and
improving the five-pillar strategy, the U.S. interagency is ensuring
that our actions to help Afghanistan are both coherent and cost-
effective.
Finally, even as our international partners contribute in various
ways to CN efforts in Afghanistan, it is important to underscore U.S.
principles and actions. We believe a credible show of force in tandem
with substantive development activities are the cornerstones to
limiting poppy cultivation and opium trafficking. The establishment of
a clear and consistent legal system is also crucial in providing long-
term traction necessary to implementation of counternarcotics policies
and programs. INL's Interdiction pillar focuses on targeting and
dismantling drug trafficking organizations while building Afghan CN law
enforcement capacity. The Afghan Counternarcotics Police, collaborating
with the DEA, are arresting and beginning to prosecute the command and
control elements of these organizations. The Narcotics Interdiction
Unit, supported by the DEA's Foreign Advisory Support Teams and the
Afghan Special Narcotics Force, interdicted 43.9 metric tons of opium
and 6.1 metric tons of heroin in 2005. The presence of INL Huey II
helicopters will aid in increasing seizure statistics. Akin to rule of
law initiatives, the Justice Reform pillar works closely with
interdiction efforts. A recent Afghan Presidential decree provides that
major CN cases will be transferred to Kabul for prosecution by the
VPTF, comprised of specially trained Afghan prosecutors and
investigators.
As for FY07, INL will devote $2 million to demand reduction
initiatives including substance abuse prevention training; treatment
techniques; technical assistance on the creation of drug-free community
coalitions; and research into the identification of prevention and
treatment ``best practices'' that can benefit demand reduction programs
worldwide.
SELECTED COUNTRY ISSUES
Question. In November of last year, the military rulers of Burma
began relocating the ministries comprising the capital of Burma from
Rangoon to Pyinmana. How do the relocation plans of the generals impact
plans for construction of a new U.S. Embassy in Rangoon?
Answer. These actions are not impacting the construction of the New
Embassy Compound (NEC). The project is proceeding on schedule to be
ready to move into by September 2007. The design-build contract for the
Rangoon NEC was awarded at the end of FY 2004, and notice to proceed
was given to the contractor in January 2005. Construction on the NEC is
about 40 percent complete at the end of February 2006. The Thai and
Australians are also proceeding with ongoing diplomatic construction
projects in Rangoon.
The move of the capital will make communications more difficult and
further slow responses to our requests--a situation that will hinder
the activities of all the embassies in Rangoon. The new capital is
still under construction, and we have been informed that embassies
cannot move to Pyinmana before 2008, which gives time to determine if
this move will actually hold. Currently government officials welcome
the opportunity to return to Rangoon to meet with us, but over time, we
may have to increase our in-country travel to Pyinmana, among other
options.
Question. What is the status of construction of the new U.S.
Embassy in Beijing, China? At this point, is construction proceeding
``on budget''?
Answer. Construction of our New Embassy Compound (NEC) in Beijing
was initiated in May 2004. The $434 million project is on schedule for
completion before the summer Olympics in 2008 and is proceeding on
budget. Construction on the NEC is 28 percent complete as of March
2006.
By way of background, the Beijing NEC is being built on a 10-acre
site in the ``Liang Ma He'' (3rd Diplomatic Enclave). In February 2004,
the Department affirmed to Congress that the projected staffing was
``rightsized.'' The Beijing NEC will accommodate 664 projected desk
positions (both U.S. and local Chinese hires) and collocate
approximately 20 U.S. Government agencies.
In 2001, the Department developed a comprehensive plan to improve
operationally and functionally inadequate U.S. facilities in China. The
Beijing New Embassy Compound (NEC) is Phase I of that plan. New
consulates in Guangzhou and Shanghai are phases II and III,
respectively. Full funding for the Guangzhou Consulate is in the FY06
budget.
The United States and Peoples Republic of China signed the
bilateral Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) in November 2003,
which applies to the simultaneous construction of our Embassy in
Beijing and the PRC Embassy in Washington.
On the basis of reciprocity, the People's Republic of China (PRC)
has begun construction of a new embassy in Washington. The status of
the PRC Embassy project is as follows:
In January 2004, the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts approved
the final design.
The Groundbreaking Ceremony for the new PRC Embassy in
Washington was held on April 22, 2005.
The project is scheduled to be completed in 2008.
Question. The administration is recommending $20 million in ESF to
``continue ongoing programs devoted to economic growth and reforms,
good governance and poverty alleviation, as well as attacking pervasive
corruption'' in the Philippines.
What results can be demonstrated from previous ESF funds
expended to ``attack pervasive corruption''?
Answer. ESF funds supported Philippine Government anticorruption
efforts at the national and local levels, created greater public demand
for reform, and enabled civil society participation in activities
intended to curb corruption. For example, ESF funds were used to train
investigators and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman (the
Philippine Government office charged with combating corruption), which
they had not previously received, resulting in a significant
improvement in the conviction rate from 13 percent in 2003 to over 30
percent in 2005. At the local government level, ESF funds were used to
help Mindanao cities improve their business practices and reduce
corruption. A recent evaluation showed that these cities were
successful in drastically reducing the processing time of business
permit renewals from more than a week to just a few hours, which made
their procurement transactions more transparent and removed
opportunities for corruption. ESF was also used to implement
transparent government procurement and insure accountability, as well
as capacity-building in civil society organizations. Specifically, we
provided training for 700 volunteers as observers in bids and awards
committees to facilitate more rigorous monitoring of government
procurement and to provide a means for reporting procurement
irregularities to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Question. India is increasingly looking to Iran to satisfy its
rapidly growing energy requirements, particularly in the gas sector.
How can we bridge the gap between our two countries' divergent policies
toward Iran? To what extent do U.S. officials raise the issue of Iran
with their Indian interlocutors? To what extent could India rely on
energy suppliers other than Iran to fulfill its energy requirements?
Answer. Rather than diverging, the gap between our two countries'
policies toward Iran narrowed last September and February when India
voted in the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors'
meetings to refer Iran to the United Nations over Iran's violations of
its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. The Indian Government
does not want another nuclear-armed country in its neighborhood, nor do
we.
The United States avails itself of every opportunity to raise with
the Indian Government our concerns and the concerns of the global
community about Iran's egregious behavior. Iran is a frequent focus of
our Embassy's daily engagement with the Indian Government. During his
recent visit to India, President Bush emphasized that nuclear weapons
in the hands of the Iranians would be dangerous for all of us. We have
told the Indian Government that we do not support the proposal for an
Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline and that such a project may invite
scrutiny under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.
We recognize India's growing energy needs and want to work with
India to enhance its energy security. We have established joint working
groups with Indian counterparts on oil and gas, power and energy
efficiency, new technology and renewable energy, and coal to identify
and develop indigenous energy resources that might be alternatives to
Iranian imports, and to increase the efficiency of India's energy
utilization, which may reduce the country's need for Iranian oil and
gas. The United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, if
implemented, could also help reduce India's requirement for imported
fossil fuels as India will have an opportunity to utilize the most
modern and efficient technologies to develop its nuclear power
industry. In addition, we continually encourage the Indian Government
to seek stable and secure energy sources elsewhere in the Middle East
and in Central Asia.
Question. What is the rationale for continuing to provide large
direct cash transfers to the Government of Pakistan, rather than
programming increasing amounts of our assistance through USAID
projects? What might the costs be in terms of U.S. policy toward
Pakistan if the United States were to program more of our assistance
toward USAID-sponsored democracy, health, and education projects? Would
there be any potential gains for U.S. policy in the region in terms of
countering anti-U.S., extremist attitudes?
Answer. In 2003, the United States committed to provide Pakistan
$300 million in Economic Support Funds per year in fiscal years 2005-
2009. According to agreements concluded in 2004 with the Pakistani
Government, $100 million of this assistance will be used for project
aid, and $200 million will be provided as budget support to be used for
mutually agreed purposes. The Pakistani Government's budget planning
assumes the United States will honor this commitment. It is important
to establish our reliability.
The Pakistani Government for its part has upheld its undertakings
in this process. According to the agreement, which is reviewed and
updated annually, Pakistan is to use the $200 million in budget support
to achieve the goals it set for itself in the Poverty Reduction
Strategy it developed with the World Bank. Notably, these goals include
a commitment to increase spending on health and education
significantly. Pakistan is, for example, committed to increase
education spending from 2.5 to 4 percent of Gross Domestic Product
within 5 years. The Pakistani Government has, in fact, boosted
education spending significantly, from 1.7 percent of GDP in 2002 to
2.5 percent in the fiscal year ending in June 2005. In short, our
assistance has leveraged large increases in Pakistani Government
spending on critical social needs. Budget support allows the USG the
greatest input to build Pakistan's capacity in meeting these critical
social needs without requiring a larger staff to be in country to
administer the program. Security concerns still require us to limit
staffing in Islamabad, and hence our ability to more closely monitor
our activities.
Changing the mix of assistance from budget support to project aid
is unlikely to improve significantly our ability to counter anti-U.S.,
extremist attitudes. We believe that improved public outreach on
USAID's activities would better address these concerns rather than just
shifting funds to USAID programs in Pakistan; we are actively
undertaking efforts to that end. Cutting funds from GOP budget support,
however, could damage our ability to effectively work with the GOP. It
could also result in decreased Pakistani Government spending on
critical needs like education. The USAID mission in Pakistan has
allotted $250,000 to launch a public information campaign that will
build on the positive public response to our earthquake relief efforts
and expand it to other parts of the portfolio.
U.N. PEACEKEEPING
Question. Given the clear cost savings and burden-sharing with U.N.
missions such as the one in Haiti, why has the administration not
requested full funding for its past obligations?
Answer. The inclusion of a funding request for arrears other than
those related to Sudan-Darfur was not made because the administration
limited its request for supplemental peacekeeping funding to the
emergency situation in Darfur-Sudan.
Question. Estimates are that the United States will run out of
money to pay its peacekeeping dues by June of this year, with a
shortfall of some half a billion dollars for 2006. Will this funding be
included in the supplemental? If not, how can we insist that the United
Nations reform itself when we are not paying our bills on time?
Answer. Prior to FY 2000, the United States accumulated arrears of
approximately $400 million primarily caused by a 25-percent cap on
peacekeeping payments. Although Congress appropriated sufficient funds
each year from FY 2000 until FY 2005 to pay annual assessments, the
pre-2000 arrears remain outstanding, and in FY 2005 our arrears grew by
$145 million because appropriated funds were not equal to our
assessments.
The shortfall for FY 2005 of $145.010 million and the projected
shortfall for FY 2006 of $376.752 million totals $521.762 million. The
FY 2006 supplemental budget contains a request of $69.8 million in the
CIPA account for Sudan-Darfur as well as transfer authority language
from the Peacekeeping Operations request which, in total, would offset
$129.8 million of the above total arrears for a net projected new
arrears of $391.962 million at the end of FY 2006.
The inclusion of a funding request for these remaining arrears was
not made because the administration limited its request for
supplemental peacekeeping funding to the emergency situation in Darfur-
Sudan.
AIDS, MALARIA, AND AVIAN FLU
Question. How much of the funding already appropriated for avian
flu will be used for overseas programs? What specific programs will
this funding entail? How will the $55 million in the budget request be
spent?
Answer. Of the nearly $3.8 billion appropriated in the FY 2006
supplemental request for avian and pandemic influenza, a total of $280
million will be used for overseas programs. This amount includes
approximately $132 million managed by USAID; $114 million managed by
HHS (Note: $31 million of the HHS total is for international research
funding that is not counted as foreign assistance); $18 million managed
by USDA; $10 million managed by DOD; and $6 million managed by the
Department of State. The FY 2006 funds will be used for a wide variety
of programs, including: Improving surveillance and response systems;
support for the World Health Organization (WHO); the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO); and the World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE), international planning and preparedness; prepositioning
of supplies; training of rapid-response teams and medical personnel;
improved monitoring of animal vaccine distribution and use; support of
human disease research; biosecurity enhancement; food safety and
industrial methods training; vaccine formulation; military-to-military
partnership capacity-building; international public information
programs; and international coordination and support for the
President's International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza.
The State Department's $6 million will be spent on international
response coordination involving foreign governments and nongovernmental
organizations and diplomatic outreach. In addition to $280 million,
agencies are exploring ways to increase their international assistance.
The FY 2007 budget request of $55 million for USAID's international
assistance programs will continue to be spent on surveillance and early
warning preparedness, planning, prepositioned supplies and equipment
and communications.
Question. Does the administration intend to implement programs
designed to prevent the spread of avian flu in developing countries?
What is the anticipated impact on the budget if avian flu spreads as
some health experts fear it might? For instance, are we prepared to
ramp up avian flu programs if the virus spreads Africa-wide?
Answer. Through the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic
Influenza announced by President Bush in September 2005, the
administration is working hard to improve global readiness, including
in developing countries, by elevating the issue on national agendas. In
addition, the partnership brings together key nations and international
organizations to coordinate efforts among donor and affected nations;
mobilize and leverage resources to mitigate the spread of the disease;
increase transparency in disease reporting and surveillance; and
building capacity to identify, contain, and respond to a pandemic
influenza.
At the present time, we believe that $214 million in FY 2007 funds,
in addition to $280 million in FY 2006 supplemental appropriations will
be adequate, coupled with contributions of the international community,
including financial and other support provided by multilateral,
bilateral, and private sector donors. The reality of the threat of
pandemic influenza is that it is too large for any one country to
address alone, and requires a comprehensive and coordinated response
from the international community.
With regard to our efforts in Africa, the State Department has
established an interagency African Avian Influenza Network that was
activated to respond to avian influenza outbreaks in Africa, starting
with Nigeria. U.S. Ambassadors are instructed to encourage host
governments to promote strong interagency communication and
coordination (particularly among Ministries of Agriculture, Health, and
Information) to combat the threat of avian influenza. As in the case of
Nigeria, U.S. Embassies are encouraged to work closely with other
donors and U.N. resident representatives to prioritize host country
needs and coordinate appropriate international responses. Our Embassies
are instructed to convey to host governments the importance of
coordinating their efforts with neighboring countries, and U.S.
Embassies in neighboring countries also coordinate closely among
themselves. Regional organizations such as the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) have been engaged to develop regional
response strategies and resources, as outbreaks become more widespread.
Within the African Avian Influenza Network, the State Department's
Avian Influenza Action Group and the Bureau of African Affairs are
coordinating closely with the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Defense (DOD) and
other appropriate agencies, both in Washington and in affected and
high-risk countries, to develop assistance programs and technical
support for countries potentially affected by outbreaks. Both the
interagency African Avian Influenza Network in Washington and the
country teams at U.S. Embassies and consulates overseas are developing
appropriate contingency plans for addressing the anticipated
diplomatic, economic, and security concerns of countries affected by
avian influenza in Africa. Our plans are coordinated with appropriate
international technical organizations including the World Health
Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
Question. The administration is proposing $300 million for the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria in FY 2007--less
than Congress has provided in any of the last 4 fiscal years. To what
extent does the administration's emphasis on funding bilateral AIDS
programs, rather than the Global Fund, reflect disappointment with the
work of the Global Fund? What is your assessment of the effectiveness
of Global Fund efforts to assure accountability in the use of its
resources?
Answer. The Global Fund remains an important part of the Emergency
Plan strategy, and the U.S. Government remains by far its largest
single contributor of funds. The Emergency Plan originally anticipated
allocating $1 billion to the Global Fund over 5 years. However, we are
now on track to provide over $2 billion to the fund in 3 years. The
President's fiscal year 2007 request for focus country bilateral AIDS
programs funding--$2.717 billion within Foreign Operations and $2.776
total--is, in part, an attempt to recover from the effects of the
redirection of almost $527 million from focus country programs to the
Global Fund and other components of the Emergency Plan over PEPFAR's
first 3 years. If focus country budgets are not fully funded again in
FY 2007, the capacity needed for a dramatic expansion of services in FY
2008 will not be possible--and no increase in FY 2008 spending could
undo this setback. Without the FY 2007 level of funding for the focus
countries, it will not be possible to meet the 2-7-10 goals of the
Emergency Plan--especially the goal of supporting treatment for 2
million.
At this point, the Emergency Plan can realize the most immediate
impact through its bilateral programs, which focus on building capacity
for massive, rapid scale-up of prevention, treatment, and care
programs. The Global Fund plays an important long-term role in the USG
strategy, providing financing to enable developing countries to respond
to the challenges of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. However, the
Global Fund model, with a lean Secretariat and no field staff, does not
allow funding to be deployed as quickly as USG bilateral programs. For
example, from the time the Global Fund announces a Call for Proposals
when it launches a round of financing, often a full year, at a minimum,
passes until the time a grant recipient actually begins programmatic
work. The Emergency Plan, with a global presence of dedicated full-time
field staff, is typically able to program money within a much shorter
time span. While the USG seeks to build the Global Fund into a
successful international funding mechanism over time, in the immediate
term, our judgment is that any redirection of resources from bilateral
programs to the Global Fund will endanger our ability to reach the 2-7-
10 goals by 2008 envisioned by the President and Congress.
Each country needs to find the right mix of bilateral and
multilateral contributions to get the most immediate results from its
investment. For the USG, the 20-year history of its bilateral programs
means that these programs can move much faster--especially in the focus
countries--than the Global Fund. In fact, other governments have made
similar determinations to invest heavily in bilateral efforts rather
than multilateral options:
In 2004 the share of USG contributions that went to the
Global Fund was more than twice that of the United Kingdom.
Countries with a much more modest presence on the ground
than the United States--such as Germany and Japan--are
comparable to the United States in terms of allocation of
funding between bilateral and Global Fund contributions.
The Global Fund has shown promise, but it remains a young
organization, and it must stick to its original vision as a
performance-based, public-private financing instrument. The USG is
working with the Global Fund to focus on areas where improvement is
needed, particularly those areas highlighted by Congress. In spite of
significant accomplishments, we continue to share concerns identified
in the House FY05 and FY06 appropriations reports, for example, about:
Possible shift from project support to budget support;
Threats to the Comprehensive Funding Policy;
Deficiencies in performance-based funding system;
Concerns about adherence to rigorous progress benchmarks and
results-based disbursement;
Lack of coordination of technical assistance for grants;
Questions about the role of Local Fund Agents;
Domination of Country Coordination Mechanisms by host
governments and international organizations;
Devolution of authority from the Board to the Secretariat;
and
Inadequate speed, efficiency, transparency, and
accountability of grants.
If the Global Fund maintains its core mission and a model that
Congress supports, and as the fund's performance improves in the years
to come, there will be opportunities to reassess the level of USG
funding for it. For FY 2007, however, it is crucial that the USG
continue to concentrate its resources on focus country programs.
Question. The State Department's Global AIDS Initiative directs its
work primarily in 15 focus countries, 12 of them in Africa as well as
Haiti, Guyana, and Vietnam. The FY 2007 budget proposes almost a 60-
percent increase in assistance to these countries, while bilateral
programs for other nations appear to decline slightly. Does the FY 2007
proposal enable the United States to adequately help other countries
facing grave threats from AIDS, such as impoverished Malawi in Africa,
Honduras in Central America, or India, China, and Russia?
Answer. The overall request for Emergency Plan funding in fiscal
year 2007 is up dramatically, from approximately $3.2 billion in FY
2006 to $4 billion. Within this overall increase, priority was placed
on the focus countries. Without the FY 2007 level of funding for the
focus countries, it will not be possible to meet the 2-7-10 goals
established by the President and Congress.
At the same time, however, the request does include a modest
increase from the FY 2006 enacted level of funding for bilateral
programs in other countries (from $425.6 to $432.7 billion, not
including funding for research).
The President's FY 2007 request for the focus countries is, in
part, an attempt to recover from the effects on focus country programs
of the redirection of almost $527 million from focus country programs
to the Global Fund and to other bilateral programs over the Emergency
Plan's first 3 years. Of these three broad areas of the Emergency Plan,
funding for the focus countries, originally planned to be $10 billion
over 5 years, is the only one which has not been funded at the planned
level overall to date. The President's fiscal year 2007 request for
focus country bilateral AIDS programs funding--$2.717 billion within
Foreign Operations and $2.776 total--is, in part, an attempt to recover
from the effects of the redirection of almost $527 million from focus
country programs to the Global Fund and other components of the
Emergency Plan over PEPFAR's first 3 years. Other USG programs,
including those beyond the focus countries, are on track to meet the $4
billion target level over 5 years as originally envisioned for the
Emergency Plan.
Question. The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25) states the sense of
Congress that by the end of fiscal 2006, U.S. assistance programs
should be providing antiretroviral therapy to 2 million patients. Are
we on track to meet this target?
Answer. The USG will not meet the sense of Congress provision to
support antiretroviral treatment for 2 million people by the end of the
third year of Emergency Plan implementation, fiscal year 2006. The
provision did not adequately reflect the need to invest intensively in
building local capacity for scale-up of prevention, treatment, and care
programs. Taking this concern into account, the President set a 5-year
timeframe for meeting the Emergency Plan goals of supporting treatment
for 2 million people, preventing 7 million new HIV infections, and
supporting care for 10 million people infected and affected by HIV/
AIDS, including orphans and vulnerable children, in an accountable and
sustainable way.
The USG has made dramatic progress in its efforts to support host
nations in building capacity, laying the foundation for long-term
sustainability and continued success. As of September 30, 2005, the
Emergency Plan supported life-extending treatment for approximately
471,000 people with HIV/AIDS, 401,000 of them in the 15 focus
countries. Based on the data collected through fiscal year 2005 and
shared in the recent annual report to Congress, we are confident that
we will meet the President's goals.
The Emergency Plan remains committed to supporting national
treatment strategies through partnerships with host governments,
nongovernmental organizations (including faith- and community-based
organizations), and the private sector, together providing the full
spectrum of services required for quality treatment. These programs are
providing services that achieve results while building the local,
sustainable capacity needed for the long term. The services and
capacity expansion supported to date include:
Training for clinical and laboratory personnel;
Training of counselors for treatment regimen adherence,
prevention, and healthy living;
Physical infrastructure including improved clinical space
and laboratory equipment; and
Distribution, logistics, and management systems for drugs
and other commodities.
In order to meet the Emergency Plan's obligation of accountability,
the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator collects data on
treatment and other results on a semiannual basis.
Question. The legislation also requires that for fiscal years 2006
through 2008, 10 percent of authorized funds be devoted to helping
orphans and vulnerable children. How will you meet this target under
the fiscal 2007 request?
Answer. The Emergency Plan has already supported care for nearly 3
million orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) through prevention,
treatment, and care activities in the 15 focus countries. Based on
currently approved funding activities as of January 2006, we are
already on target to meet the 10-percent budget requirement for OVCs in
fiscal year 2006. The Emergency Plan will work to ensure that it
continues to meet the budget requirement in fiscal year 2007 as well.
As part of its efforts to ensure compliance with the 10-percent
earmark in FY 2006 and beyond, the Emergency Plan has asked the USG
teams in the focus countries to maintain focus on the following
technical priorities in programming for OVCs:
Strengthening systems and structures at the family,
community, and national levels to achieve scale and
sustainability for meeting the short- and long-term needs of
vulnerable children;
Providing comprehensive quality services based on a menu of
essential services; and
Facilitating a supportive context to reduce stigma and
discrimination and increase child protection (e.g., advocacy,
social mobilization, policy reform).
In the related area of pediatric treatment, the USG plans to
accelerate progress in fiscal year 2006 and beyond. Key initiatives
include:
Establishing targets for children on treatment at the
country level;
Working with domestic and international partners to ensure
affordable pediatric ARV formulations and diagnostic
techniques, including:
Improving laboratory infrastructure to support pediatric
diagnosis;
Working with private and public sector partners to ensure
affordability of medicines;
Strengthening the supply chain to allow for delivery of life-
saving medicines to the children that need them.
Training health care providers in pediatric treatment; and
Working at the community level to fight stigma and provide
support to children and their caregivers.
Question. USAID has made recent changes in how it implements its
malaria program in response to earlier criticism that a large portion
of funds was being spent on administrative overhead rather than
insecticides, medical treatment, and mosquito netting. With the
President's pledge to spend an additional $1.2 billion through FY 2010,
do you anticipate any other changes to the program?
What are the obstacles to reaching the President's objective of
reducing malarial deaths in target countries by 50 percent?
Answer. USAID does not envision further policy changes beyond those
implemented in late 2005. The focus will be to fully implement these
reforms throughout the USAID malaria program.
The single greatest obstacle to achieving the President's goal of a
50-percent reduction in malaria deaths is the weak health
infrastructure in many sub-Saharan African countries. This includes a
lack of adequately trained staff at all levels of the health care
system and weak logistics and management systems. Other obstacles
include: (a) The worldwide shortages of insecticide-treated mosquito
nets and artemisinin-based combination drugs that are expected to
continue for another 1-2 years; (b) delays in implementing Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria grants in some countries; and
(c) challenges involved in improving and controlling prescription and
use of antimalarial drugs in both the public and private sectors. The
USAID malaria program, African Governments, and other development
partners are aggressively addressing these constraints. Each of the
countries included in the President's Malaria Initiative has a
comprehensive malaria control plan that was developed in conjunction
with the National Malaria Control Program and other partners.
USAID ACCOUNTS
Question. Is the United States paying adequate attention to
countries that are not selected to participate as focus or Compact
countries in the MCA, PEPFAR, and malaria initiatives? Is U.S. economic
assistance evolving into highly selective programs that concentrate
only on the ``best performers'' or those with most severe health
challenges? Have we made a decision not to address the needs of large
populations living in poverty in those countries that fall outside the
``preferred'' categories?
Answer. USAID focuses the bulk of its resources where the needs are
greatest and where expected results are highest, including countries
where there is political commitment. That said, where the need is great
and political will is weak, USAID still provides support for
humanitarian purposes to reach the poor, often through nongovernment
channels. The United States provides assistance from a number of
accounts to a wide array of countries--well over 100. Aside from Burma
and China, the United States has a significant aid program in every
low-income country with large numbers of poor people.
Further, the programs mentioned in the question are less
concentrated than commonly recognized.
The number of MCA eligible countries rose from 16 in 2004 to
23 in 2005. An additional 13 countries are eligible for
threshold programs aimed at achieving MCA eligibility.
PEPFAR resources are focused on 15 countries that account
for about half of the world's 40 million HIV infections. There
are five other bilateral country programs that receive over $10
million in USG assistance annually. Together with the 15, they
cover 70 percent of the world's HIV infections. Overall, PEPFAR
funds are supporting programs in 123 countries, much of which
is focused on large, low-income populations, many of which are
in Africa. The USG is the largest bilateral donor to the Global
Fund for HIV/AIDS and through its contributions reaches
additional countries.
USAID currently supports malaria activities in 18 countries
plus 2 regional programs. Most are in low-income countries in
Africa where the malaria prevalence is highest and the
potential for impact is greatest. The President's Malaria
Initiative (PMI) focuses increased resources on countries most
affected by the disease, growing from 3 countries this year to
15 countries by 2008.
Question. What is the justification for the cut in the USAID
Development Assistance account?
Answer. The FY 2007 DA and CSH combined request is a slight
increase over the FY 2006 President's budget, so the administration has
maintained our overall priority for funding. However there was a shift
from DA to CSH to meet a commitment for increasing malaria funding
which resulted in less DA funding for programming in all regions.
Question. Latin America is particularly affected by the cuts in the
USAID Development Assistance account. Estimates are that aid to Latin
America from this account will decrease by 28 percent. Could you please
give us the overall amount for Latin America envisioned in this budget
once all aid programs are included, including Economic Support Funds
(ESF) and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and compare it to
last year's figure? Are cuts to the region justified? What are the
comparable figures for Africa, which is seeing a 4-percent cut in the
Development Assistance account?
Answer. While the FY 2007 request for Development Assistance
funding has been reduced from the FY 2006 enacted level of $254 million
to $182 million (28 percent reduction), the overall foreign assistance
request for the region has remained similar to previous years because
of increased Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) funding. In addition,
the FY 2007 request for Economic Support Funds is $31 million more than
the FY 2006 level and will focus on rural development and market
access. The FY 2007 level for USAID's programs in Latin America and the
Caribbean is $92 million less than the FY 2006 allocation of $914
million (11 percent reduction); given this, LAC has begun a process of
limiting sectors and retargeting resources to areas identified as
weaknesses by the MCC.
In FY 2006, the MCA will be providing significant resources through
Compact agreements to Nicaragua ($175 million) and Honduras ($215
million) and through Threshold Country funding to Paraguay ($37
million). The Threshold Country program will be managed by USAID and is
included in the Agency's planned spending for FY 2006. With the
addition of MCA resources focusing on areas of rural development
traditionally implemented by USAID, the FY 2007 budget request is
adequate to reach the Agency's goals in the region.
Question. When the President announced the MCA initiative in March
2002, he said funds would be in addition to, and not a substitute for,
other U.S. economic assistance. Nevertheless, in the FY 2007 budget
request, for the six MCC Compact countries where USAID maintains an aid
program, overall economic assistance would decline from FY 2006 levels:
Honduras, from $32 million to $25.5 million; Nicaragua, from $32
million to $22.7 million; Armenia, from $74.3 million to $50 million;
Madagascar, from $21.5 million to $17.5 million; and Benin, from $12.3
million to $8.8 million. Has there been a change in the
administration's thinking that regular U.S. economic assistance can be
reduced in MCC Compact countries? Will the compacts adequately
substitute for the sector priorities funded in the past by USAID? Is
the same thing likely to occur as other countries sign MCC Compacts?
Answer. There are two countries in the Western Hemisphere with MCC
Compacts: Nicaragua and Honduras. While, FY 2006 DA resources for these
two countries have been reduced, it is not the result of the Millennium
Challenge Account fund. USAID reduced the FY 2006 levels for these
countries to meet the administration's commitment to provide resources
for improvements to the labor and environment sectors under CAFTA-DR.
The FY 2007 funding is reduced by 26 percent for Honduras and 41
percent for Nicaragua, while Honduras has received an MCC compact of
$215 million and Nicaragua has received an MCC compact of $175 million.
One focus of these compacts is on agricultural development, including
crop diversification and market access, developmental programs
traditionally funded by USAID. Another focus of the MCC programs is on
the improvements in the highways and roads in both countries and one
port in Nicaragua. These projects will compliment USAID's development
programs in Nicaragua and Honduras at the local and national level.
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION
Question. The administration is requesting $3 billion for MCC again
this year. There has been skepticism in the past that the organization
can spend this amount of funding effectively and efficiently. Can you
explain why $3 billion is justified this year?
Question. On April 3, 2006, MCC will sign its eighth compact,
reflecting commitments of over $1.5 billion, in addition to having
signed threshold agreements with five countries for nearly $100
million. In the current fiscal year, MCC is on track to finalize at
least three more compacts totaling an additional $1.1 billion, which
will represent funding commitments of up to $1.7 billion for fiscal
year 2006 (FY06), almost twice the level committed in FY05.
MCC projects that in FY07, we expect to sign between 9 and 12 new
compacts, comprising commitments of more than $3 billion. As a result,
MCC will have total commitments approaching $6 billion, with up to 21
countries, by the end of FY07.
Because of the robust demand of eligible countries, we are
projecting that all currently available program funds from FY04, FY05,
and FY06 will be exhausted by the second quarter of FY07, making the
FY07 request for MCC all that more critical to our success.
At funding levels lower than $3 billion, MCC will likely delay
negotiating compacts with some eligible countries, not to mention the
newly eligible FY07 countries that the board of directors will select
this November. It would be unfortunate if these countries who have
undertaken significant political, economic, and social policy reforms,
and those striving to be selected, find that meeting the criteria for
eligibility does not result in actual funding of their development
projects to achieve long term sustainable economic growth.
As Chair of the MCC Board of Directors, this is something I, and
the board, feel strongly about, as noted in the recent letter to Senate
and House appropriators that each member of the board signed. I look
forward to working with Congress to ensure that MCC has sufficient
funding to as we move forward with our critical mission in the
developing world.
Question. As chairman of the board of the MCC, how do you assess
the corporation's first 2 years of activities? How would you
characterize the changes put in place by the new CEO, Ambassador
Danilovich? Do you agree with his plan to fund larger, but possibly
fewer compacts in order to achieve greater MCC impact?
Answer. MCC's first 2 years are ones of great progress and great
learning. In February 2004, MCC started with just eight people, a
budget and borrowed office space. In executing its mandate, MCC
experienced the usual difficulties inherent in all startups, where
virtually all activities were being done for the first time. The
challenge of building an organization while working through its
engagement with newly selected countries on a new development concept
was substantial.
MCC has successfully established itself as an organization and will
soon have eight compacts to show for its efforts so far. MCC took on
many of the lessons from its successes and shortcomings during this
time of tremendous growth and continues to expand its capabilities and
sophistication in its activities as it continues to move forward,
particularly under the new leadership of the new CEO, Ambassador
Danilovich. For example, MCC has developed detailed guidance for
partner countries so expectations are clear on both sides and the
compact development process can move much more quickly and smoothly.
No longer a startup, MCC has also implemented a range of internal
management provisions to improve its function as an organization. For
example, MCC has spent considerable effort since Ambassador
Danilovich's arrival to establish various internal fiscal and policy
controls, an aggressive staffing plan to hire sufficient personnel to
handle the increasing workload, and a much improved budgeting process.
Last, I am fully supportive of Ambassador Danilovich's push for
larger compacts in a limited number of countries. MCC's mission is to
transform poor countries through funding and incentives so that our
partner countries are the ones championing the necessary reforms and
policy measures to increase economic growth and reduce poverty through
their own efforts and leadership. Development and the political will
for development cannot be imposed from the outside, and MCC is targeted
to those countries that seek most seriously their own success.
Question. When the President announced the initiative in March
2002, he said MCC would be in addition to, rather than a substitute
for, other U.S. economic assistance. Nevertheless, the countries that
are now MCC countries are seeing a drop in regular assistance in the FY
2007 budget request. Is this a pattern that we expect to repeat in
every MCC country? How do you see the relationship between regular
assistance and MCC assistance?
Answer. The MCA is very much considered an addition rather than a
substitute for traditional U.S economic assistance. While I do not
believe MCC is a substitute for other funds, I do have an obligation to
make choices among competing demands. One criterion is to avoid overlap
and duplication of funding efforts. Based on overall need and
commitment, I focused the resources where there is relatively high
country commitment and need. This resulted in proportionately more
resources going to Africa and South Asia, and fewer to Latin America.
The request for the Development Assistance Account in the President's
Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) Budget is $227 million, lower than the 2006
enacted level. However, the administration has focused funding in this
account on transformational development and accountability for results,
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the budget increases
the focus on countries that have the greatest need for assistance,
along with the greatest likelihood of achieving results with this aid.
Further, this account reduces funding for middle-income countries where
the needs are not as great, and in MCA eligible countries where
governments are proposing MCA programs that significantly overlap with
traditional accounts.
Question. How do you see the relationship between the MCC Chief
Executive Officer and the USAID Administrator now that the USAID
Administrator will be serving as your Director of Foreign Assistance?
Answer. I have every confidence that Ambassador Tobias, as Director
of Foreign Assistance and Administrator of USAID, and Ambassador
Danilovich, MCC CEO, will work hand-in-glove to address the pressing
issues that face developing countries. MCC has already established a
healthy and cooperative relationship with USAID, particularly since
USAID plays a key role in MCC's Threshold Program, and I expect that
this will continue and strengthen under USAID's new leadership. MCC
will continue as an independent corporation, as it was originally
designed, but will work closely and in concert with the direction of
the priorities and strategies of the Director of Foreign Assistance.
TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY
Question. Do you foresee additional security needs as we launch
more people beyond our Embassies to work in American Presence Posts
outside capital cities?
Answer. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act
(SECCA) of 1999 (Public Law 106-113) requires that any new diplomatic
facility meet collocation and 100-foot-setback statutory requirements.
The collocation, setback, and waiver requirements uniformly apply to
embassies, consulates, and American Presence Posts (APPs). Once a post
has identified a potential APP site, the Regional Security Officer
(RSO), in coordination with DS Headquarters and the Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations (OBO), will conduct a physical security survey of
the location to determine security requirements. APP sites must adhere
to, or be in, the final stages of compliance with the Overseas Security
Policy Board (OSPB) standards prior to occupancy. Additionally, waivers
to SECCA and exceptions to OSPB standards must be obtained for any site
deficiencies that cannot be remedied. Once all requirements are firmly
identified, available Department resources will be prioritized as
necessary.
Question. Will the Virtual Presence Posts be combined with the
Successful American Corners program where computers and American-
generated literature are located in public and university libraries for
use by the public and students?
Answer. Both the Virtual Presence Posts (VPP) and American Corners
program are options available to Chiefs of Mission overseas to improve
outreach and engage the local public. The programs are not mutually
exclusive and, in fact, should reinforce one another. Depending on the
post's need and the local situation, one or both of the programs may be
appropriate for posts to use as a platform to reach out to different
communities in the host country. The offices responsible for the
respective programs are coordinating efforts and working together to
provide guidance to posts.
Question. A recently submitted report to Congress on the level of
language-designated positions at our Embassies shows that for FY05,
none of these positions have been filled in Baghdad by qualified Arabic
speakers. Perhaps even more alarming, the report said that only four of
all the positions in Baghdad were designated as requiring Arabic. How
can this be when we so desperately need to communicate better with the
Iraqis? In Kabul, another critical post, 11 out of 18 positions are
currently staffed by officers ``meeting'' or at least ``partially
meeting'' the language requirement there according to the report. Given
the number of new positions that Congress has authorized and funded for
the Department, why aren't more language qualified officers filling
these critical needs?
Answer. The U.S. mission in Iraq was established in June 2004
following an extensive interagency planning process resulting in the
transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to a full
fledged U.S. Embassy. Employees were then, and still are, significantly
restricted from moving out of the International Zone, given the
security environment, although employees do regularly travel outside
the International Zone to fulfill mission requirements. Although Arabic
language proficiency is an important element to many U.S. mission Iraq
jobs, not every position requires full working proficiency in the
language. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) sought officers with
well-rounded skills who could function effectively in a very difficult
environment. Many Iraqi Government, business and opinion leaders speak
excellent English. Existing language gaps have been filled with the use
of talented interpreter/translators.
The Foreign Service Institute (FSI), the Human Resources Bureau
(HR), and the Bureau of NEA are developing a cadre of advanced speakers
who will support transformational diplomacy and defend and advance U.S
interests abroad. The Bureau of Human Resources, in its Foreign Service
recruitment process, has established incentives for Arabic and other
hard language qualified officers to help meet the Department's growing
need for language proficiency. In the past 3 years, HR has recruited 30
professional proficient Arabic speakers. In FY 2003 through 2005, the
Foreign Service Institute reports 312 enrollments of State employees in
courses designed to achieve Limited Working Proficiency (2 level) in
Arabic (including Standard Arabic and Egyptian Arabic) and another 105
enrollments of State employees in courses designed to achieve General
Professional Proficiency (3 level) or higher in Arabic. The Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs continues to provide long-term Arabic training
opportunities for Foreign Service employees, including training
beginning in September 2006.
Question. A number of your proposals for transformational
diplomacy--Foreign Service officers trained to run programs,
operational nation-building activities far away from capitals,
strengthening rule of law, improving health and reforming education--
are all missions that are currently being carried out by USAID
officials. Can you describe where you see such missions overlapping and
give us a sense of how you see responsibilities dividing between USAID
and State in the field?
Answer. As we transform to being more engaged in a ``hands-on''
fashion to try to help people transform their lives, there will be
enough work for both the Foreign Service and the USAID corps. These
roles are by no means redundant or competitive. USAID is our primary
delivery mechanism for hands-on assistance and will continue to play
that role in even a stronger way, but a more coordinated way. A
strengthened USAID only augments these capabilities. Foreign Service
officers are and will continue to become engaged in a different kind of
work than in the past, while still maintaining traditional diplomatic
roles, and must be well trained properly to do so.
Question. Since 2003 there has been a decline in the number of
people taking the Foreign Service exam. In addition, there was a gap in
the number of training positions versus training goals at the
Department. How will State make up that gap? How do you plan to
encourage more people to take the Foreign Service exam? What effect
might your transformational diplomacy have on Foreign Service
applications in the coming years?
Answer. In 2003, 20,342 applicants took the written examination; in
2004, 19,101; and in 2005, 18,699. While it is true that slightly fewer
people took the exam in recent years, we still have a very large
candidate pool for a relatively small number of positions.
Nevertheless, we have a number of efforts aimed at encouraging more top
quality people to take the Foreign Service exam, including internships,
fellowships, partnerships with nongovernmental organizations,
participation in a variety of conferences, advertising, and the use of
foreign language materials to reach out to family members of potential
recruits so they will better understand the challenges and rewards of a
Foreign Service career. Our Diplomats in Residence identify, counsel,
and mentor potential Foreign Service candidates.
It is our hope that transformational diplomacy will attract
individuals to the Foreign Service in even larger numbers for a career
where they will be on the cutting edge of diplomacy, and where they are
more than ever on the front lines as U.S. representatives in new
postings around the world.
The Diplomatic Readiness Initiative of Fiscal Years 2002 to 2004
included plans for 512 training positions. In fiscal year 2004,
Department appropriations fell 89 positions short of the DRI goal. In
addition, due to the emerging requirements of staffing Iraq and
Afghanistan, an additional 153 positions were diverted from training,
leaving the Department a total of 242 positions short of our DRI
training goal.
Question. Please explain the proposed pay-for-performance system.
Do you expect that it will boost retention and recruitment? How
competitive would this system be with the private sector? What effect
would this new performance-based pay system have on the pay of current
Foreign Service officers?
Answer. The Department understands that the final legislative
proposal on Foreign Service modernization will be transmitted by the
administration very soon. Generally, the system would eliminate
longevity-based pay increases and institute a system similar to that
already in place for the Senior Foreign Service, wherein an employee's
annual pay adjustment is dependent on the previous year's performance
assessment. The proposal would also establish a global rate of pay for
the Foreign Service to attract and retain a labor market for worldwide-
available personnel, based on the needs of the Service, consistent with
other pay systems with similar worldwide availability requirements.
We expect that the proposed system will enable the Department to
continue to recruit and retain top talent willing to spend a great
portion of their career overseas. Currently the private sector and
other components of the USG employ pay structures for their worldwide
deployable workforce that reward rather than penalize overseas service.
This proposal will reward employees commensurately with performance and
will restore the incentives for overseas service throughout an
employee's career.
The effect on current Foreign Service officers at the FS-01 level
and below, like the Senior Foreign Service, would also no longer be
guaranteed an annual pay increase just for an additional year in
service. As of April 2008, all increases in pay would be performance-
based. Further, the rank-and-file Foreign Service would no longer take
a pay cut for serving overseas, significantly restoring the incentive
for overseas service. Under the forthcoming proposal, as of April 2008,
one global pay schedule would be used for Foreign Service personnel
(FS-01 and below) regardless of overseas or domestic location.
Although the system does not address the differences between the
public and private sector on pay levels in general, it employs both
private and public sector standards for pay benefits for professional
staff who spend the majority of their careers deployed worldwide on a
rotational basis. The majority of the private sector, the United
Nations, most NGOs, and the USG intelligence agencies do not require
their employees to take a pay cut when deploying on assignment to an
overseas location.
CLIMATE CHANGE
Question. The UNFCCC--Although the United States is not a party to
the Kyoto Protocols, the United States did ratify the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). At a recent meeting of
the parties to the UNFCCC in Montreal, State Department officials
signed a document pledging to a ``dialogue on long-term cooperative
action to address climate change.'' What is the Department's strategy
to achieve this UNFCCC dialogue? Does the Department foresee this
dialogue under the UNFCCC leading to regional, multilateral, and
bilateral agreements and treaties dealing with climate change? What
part does the Asian Pacific Partnership play in this dialogue under
UNFCCC? What other climate change mitigation initiatives undertaken by
the administration are part of this UNFCCC dialogue?
Answer. The United States views the UNFCCC ``Dialogue on Long Term
Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change'' as an opportunity to
advance our practical, results-oriented climate policy, especially
through showcasing our multilateral climate science and technology
partnerships. The dialogue is not a negotiating forum, as the UNFCCC
decision establishing the dialogue makes clear, but a series of up to
four workshops in which we will share our experiences in addressing the
climate challenge--especially in the areas of sustainable development
goals, adaptation, the role of technology and the importance of
realizing the full potential of markets. We are actively engaged in
preparing to participate in the first meeting of the dialogue, which
will take place in May.
The United States is currently involved in a wide range of
multilateral agreements and other initiatives dealing with climate
change that are consistent with UNFCCC goals. They include:
Leading nuclear technology research and development through
the Generation IV International Forum;
Pioneering hydrogen as a clean energy carrier, through the
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy;
Developing cost-effective technologies to capture and store
carbon emissions from abundant fossil fuels under the Carbon
Sequestration Leadership Forum;
Integrating and expanding global measurements to improve
decisionmaking, under the Group on Earth Observations;
Bringing cost-effective, energy-producing methane capture
and use technologies to developing countries through the U.S.-
initiated Methane-to-Markets Partnership; and
Increasing access to modern energy services in more than 20
countries through the Global Village Energy Partnership. The
United States has also renewed its participation in ITER, the
international project to harness fusion energy.
The new Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI) will increase spending on
clean-energy sources that will reduce oil usage and change the way we
power our homes and automobiles. The initiative includes significantly
increased funding in fiscal year 2007 for biofuels research, the Solar
America Initiative, the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, and FutureGen, the
world's first zero-emissions fossil fuel plant. The Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership, a component of the AEI, is a comprehensive strategy
to enable an expansion of nuclear power in the United States and around
the world, to promote nuclear nonproliferation goals, and to help
resolve nuclear waste disposal issues. DOE's fiscal year 2007 budget
request includes $250 million for this effort.
Since 2001 the United States has negotiated bilateral climate
change agreements with 13 individual countries, a group of 7 Central
American countries, and the European Union. Scientific research, clean
energy technologies, and capacity-building are emphasized, with policy
discussions also underway.
In January, six countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea,
and the United States) launched the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean
Development and Climate to help accelerate the global deployment of
clean and efficient energy technologies and practices. The
partnership's activities will be consistent with, and contribute to,
our efforts under the UNFCCC.
We view these multilateral agreements and other initiatives as
successful examples of practical approaches to achieving the objectives
of the UNFCCC. Stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere will require the development and deployment of new,
transformational clean energy technologies, and we are taking the lead
through our domestic programs and by mobilizing the international
efforts outlined above.
Question. Official Senate Observer Group--When President Reagan
initiated arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1985, he
asked the Senate to establish an official observer group. This official
Senate observer group greatly contributed to bipartisan Senate support
from the lengthy and complicated treaties resulting from the
negotiations. Treaties negotiated without this kind of strong
bipartisan support, like Kyoto, also contribute to international
misunderstandings and American public diplomacy problems when the
Senate expresses opposition, as it did with Kyoto through the Byrd-
Hagel resolution. This committee has gone on record unanimously calling
for an official Senate observer group to participate in future
negotiations over climate change. Do you support such a role for the
Senate? Are you willing to work with the Senate on such a process?
Answer. The administration welcomes the participation of Senators
and their staff as observers on our delegations to the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change. We seek to advance our climate change
approaches through the Framework Convention, of which we are a member,
and we seek to protect U.S. interests as parties to the Kyoto Protocol
move ahead on their agenda.
We note that congressional observers from both the Senate and the
House regularly participate on U.S. international delegations. For
example, this past December, a Senator and nearly 30 congressional
staff members traveled to Montreal, Canada, to observe climate change
proceedings as part of the U.S. delegation. Congressional participants
attended meetings of the U.S. delegation; received regular and frequent
briefings; and attended both formal and informal negotiating sessions.
______
Questions of Senator John Sununu
DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Question. In addition to AID's long-time primacy and expertise with
regard to development assistance, DSCA has unique abilities with regard
to security assistance, and Congress recognized many years ago that
other government agencies could make similar unique contributions in
their own areas of expertise. For which programs, accounts, and
agencies do you intend the DFA to be responsible?
Answer. I am establishing the position of Director of Foreign
Assistance (DFA) to better align our foreign assistance programs with
our foreign policy goals, to align more fully the foreign assistance
activities of USAID and State, and to demonstrate that we are
responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars. The DFA is intended to
provide overall leadership to foreign assistance that is delivered
through other agencies and entities of the U.S. Government. To the
extent permitted by law, I will delegate to the DFA the foreign
assistance funding authorities consistent with and necessary to achieve
a single coordinated foreign assistance approval authority. The
Director of Foreign Assistance will work closely with other government
agencies in exercising his authority over foreign assistance funding
and programs and developing coordinated strategies, plans, and budgets.
Under my direction, the DFA will have approval and coordinating
authority over all foreign assistance.
Question. On what basis will the DFA have authority over those
programs, accounts, and agencies? Will the DFA assume the statutorily
based authorities of, e.g., the SEED and FSA coordinators? If not, how
do you envisage the relationship between the DFA and programs with
independent statutory authorities? How will the DFA be able to direct
and affect the design, implementation, and evaluation of specific
programs?
Answer. To the extent permitted by law, I will delegate to the DFA
the foreign assistance funding authorities consistent with and
necessary to achieve a single coordinated foreign assistance approval
authority. The Director of Foreign Assistance will work closely with
coordinators in exercising his authority over foreign assistance
funding and programs and developing coordinated strategies, plans, and
budgets.
The DFA is intended to provide overall leadership to foreign
assistance that is delivered through other agencies and entities of the
U.S. Government. By instituting integrated country strategies and
operating plans, the Director of Foreign Assistance will help ensure
that USG agencies delivering foreign assistance are not working at
cross purposes, that, in fact, we are taking advantage of agencies'
comparative strengths to create a U.S. Government program that is
effective and makes the most efficient use of taxpayer dollars. With
specific respect to agencies that have an independent statutory
existence, the Director of Foreign Assistance will work closely with
them to address the pressing issues that face developing countries and
to ensure that programming is complementary and stove-piping is
curtailed. We will respect statutory authorities, but also seek
opportunities for synergy and efficiency.
The added value of the Director of Foreign Assistance role is not
in interfering with the core functions, specific responsibilities, or
operations of the various agencies implementing foreign assistance; it
is in ensuring that all activities are part of a coordinated whole,
and, therefore, that impact is greater than the sum of parts.
Question. What sort of support staff would the DFA have? There is
nothing in the FY 2006 or FY 2007 budget requests suggesting new
positions are needed to implement this initiative. Is it your intention
that this become an adjunct function of AID's Program Planning
Coordination staff (PPC), since the DFA would also be the
Administrator?
Answer. With regard to staff needs for the Director of Foreign
Assistance, I intend for this office not to be duplicative, but instead
to add value to the current environment. I anticipate an office that,
when fully staffed, will bring together something in the range of 50 to
100 positions, based on bringing together existing staff who are
performing common foreign assistance functions in the two
organizations. The DFA will consult with and provide a full
notification to Congress once we have made the necessary decisions
about how to best utilize these existing functions.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ORGANIZATION
Question. Please provide the committee with a spreadsheet showing
for each of the years 1996-2005 the following:
The number of PD (or USIA, for the preintegration years)
officers, by grade (O-5 to MC) and their average time-in-class
(TIC);
The number of PD positions, by grade;
The number of new PD hires, by grade;
The number of retirements or other departures, by grade;
The number of PD officers promoted into that grade and their
average TIC and time-in-service (TIS);
The number of PD officers serving in non-PD-cone positions;
The number of non-PD officers serving in PD positions.
Answer. Reliable information on these issues is not available for
1996 to June 2000. See spreadsheet below for information from 2000 to
2005.
THE NUMBER OF PD OFFICERS, BY GRADE (O5 TO MC) AND THEIR AVERAGE TIME-IN-CLASS (TIC)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 05 CY 04 CY 03 CY 02 CY 01 CY 00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grade Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg.
No. of TIC No. of TIC No. of TIC No. of TIC No. of TIC No. of TIC
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CM.......................................... 2 4.9 4 3.4 4 2.2 5 2.4 6 1.4 6 0.8
MC.......................................... 56 3.4 59 2.9 54 2.7 49 2.1 41 1.8 35 0.9
OC.......................................... 79 3.2 81 2.9 89 2.7 87 2.2 83 1.9 80 0.9
O1.......................................... 171 3.9 178 3.4 175 2.9 170 2.5 181 1.8 182 0.8
O2.......................................... 148 4.2 163 3.5 174 3.0 175 2.6 184 1.8 179 0.9
O3.......................................... 141 1.4 79 1.5 65 1.7 74 2.2 81 1.6 88 0.8
O4.......................................... 283 1.8 244 1.6 167 1.5 115 1.3 56 1.1 42 0.9
O5.......................................... 83 0.9 94 1.0 100 1.0 74 0.9 50 1.0 14 0.7
O6.......................................... 19 0.7 22 0.8 29 0.6 34 0.6 14 0.7 0 0.0
O7.......................................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................... 982 ....... 924 ....... 857 ....... 783 ....... 696 ....... 627 .......
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Average TIC only includes DOS time only, not USIA time.
Question. Is there a need for a midlevel hiring program to bring in
experienced public relations/communications professionals to contribute
to our public diplomacy efforts?
Answer. Thanks to robust hiring of entry-level officers under the
3-year Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, we have been able to fill many
of the gaps that existed in our midranks just a few short years ago.
Our midlevel public diplomacy officers receive in-depth training and
are well prepared to meet the challenges of explaining U.S. policy
abroad. We believe that under the experienced senior leadership in the
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy's office, these committed career
professionals are doing an excellent job getting our message out.
Question. Please provide for the committee a bureau-by-bureau
description of the physical integration of public diplomacy officers
into the regional and relevant functional bureaus (i.e., are they
across town, across the street, in the same building, the same general
area of the building, or colocated with the policy offices).
Answer. Domestically assigned former USIA staff, apart from those
in the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) and the
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), are organizationally
and physically integrated into the Department of State bureaus listed
below. While many of these employees are housed within the Department
headquarters, the Harry S Truman Building, there are also employees
assigned to bureaus with offices located in various annexes within the
District of Columbia (DC) metropolitan area. Approximately 800 IIP and
ECA employees remain in the former USIA Headquarters Building (301 4th
Street, SW, Washington, DC). However, the Department is working with
the General Services Administration to identify potential office space
so these employees could be relocated closer to the Harry S Truman
Building.
Question. Please describe their [public diplomacy officers in
regional and functional bureaus] integration into State's lines of
authority (i.e., do they receive taskings largely through a PD
structure or are policy office directors and embassy front offices
managing their day-to-day activities)?
Answer. Public diplomacy officers in regional and functional
bureaus and in embassies overseas are fully integrated into the
bureaus' structure and the embassy country teams. In the Department,
they report to a Deputy Assistant Secretary in each of the bureau front
offices, and overseas, the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) reports
directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). In addition, Under
Secretary Karen Hughes has recently introduced a network of Public
Diplomacy Deputy Assistant Secretaries in each regional bureau who
report both to the bureau assistant secretary and to her. This ensures
a direct reporting arrangement to the Under Secretary for the public
diplomacy function.
Question. You have requested additional Public Diplomacy Program
funding in FY07. How will those funds be used in the field to enhance
our efforts?
Answer. An increase of $10 million is requested for the Office of
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to support public diplomacy
objectives through engagement, empowerment, and evaluation.
Speaker Program Expansion
With the $1,265,000 requested, the Department will create a new
youth speaker program, modeled after the U.S. Speakers Program, in
which Americans from a variety of walks of life are recruited to travel
and participate in programs developed especially to engage younger
groups. This proposal will provide a more strategic focus for the U.S.
Speaker Program to sustain and reinforce interaction with targeted
overseas audiences using a mix of communication tools, including
videoconferencing and Web-based techniques.
Arabic and Chinese Language Services
The requested funding of $1,700,000 will expand the Department's
Arabic and Chinese language services by making more information
available in those languages. The Department will provide a more
complete offering of policy statements, texts, and transcripts and
contextual materials, in formats that intended audiences (Arabic and
Chinese speakers) are most comfortable with, for example, Web sites,
listservs, Web-casting, text messaging, etc. Expanding Arabic language
services will support U.S. foreign policy in the broader Middle East,
while expanding Chinese language services will allow the Department to
reach audiences in one of the fastest growing regions in the world.
American Corners
The $3,200,000 requested addresses the President's charge to the
public diplomacy community to engage with international audiences--to
tell America's story and also listen to the stories of others. American
Corners provide the logistical foundation for interactive dialog and in
most countries, the only source for that dialog. American Corners make
use of interactive technology and provide visitors access to material
about the United States in a multimedia format. Expansion of American
Corners will provide an opportunity to explore life and culture in the
United States, and in many localities will provide one of the best
places to obtain accurate and current information about economic,
cultural, political, educational, and social trends in the United
States.
Countering Disinformation and Discrediting Terrorists
With the $2,000,000 requested, the Department will use a proactive
approach to an effort to discredit terrorists and diminish their appeal
to win the war on terror. The Bureau of International Information
Programs (IIP) has created a program to debunk false stories about the
United States. The program will expose un-Islamic behavior by
terrorists; support partners in their campaigns to delegitimize
extremists in their midst; and partner with foreign community leaders
in public education campaigns against terrorism and the terrorist
messages of hatred and violence.
Television (TV) Cooperatives and Media Broadcast Projects
Television and video broadcasting products continue to be powerful
strategic tools for bringing America's foreign policy message to
worldwide audiences. The TV Co-Op program has proven to be one of the
most critical components of the Department's overseas media outreach.
The Department is seeking $585,000 to implement additional TV Co-Ops
that will target Arab and Muslim audiences in order to build closer
relationships, counter extremists, enhance the credibility of the
United States and reestablish the image of the United States as a
partner for positive change.
Evaluating and Polling
With the $1,250,000 requested, the Department will establish a
fully effective, performance-based executive direction and evaluation
capability. The Evaluation Unit will develop a ``culture of
measurement'' by training Public Diplomacy Program managers on program
planning, including needs assessments, audience research, and early
planning for monitoring and evaluation; designing and implementing
outcome assessments; and creating a centralized program planning,
management and performance database that will include planning
guidelines, needs assessment information, audience analysis data, and
evaluation findings. The Department will also expand its polling and
survey program in Arab and Muslim-majority countries to address
negative views of the Unites States, U.S. policy, and the war on
terrorism in those Muslim-majority and Arab countries.
PALESTINIAN POLICY AND AID
Question. Your strategy for dealing with a Hamas-led Palestinian
Authority appears to rely upon President Abbas as a counterweight. But
we systematically built up the Prime Minister's position--rather than
his--over the past few years and his record to date is one of
indecision and weak leadership. How do you envision moving ahead?
Answer. Our policy decision regarding the Office of the President
and the person of President Mahmoud Abbas is clear: We intend to
maintain contact with the interim government under his leadership until
a new government takes charge. President Abbas has outlined his program
for peace and mandated the new PA government to be formed to commit
itself to these policies of partnership.
The international community has made clear that a new Palestinian
Authority government must disavow terror and violence, recognize
Israel's right to exist, and accept previous obligations and agreements
between the parties. This was the position taken by the Quartet--the
United States, European Union, Russia, and United Nations--in their
statement of January 30.
These requirements are based upon longstanding principle and are
applicable to any Palestinian Government. But as Secretary Rice has
said, Hamas, as the majority party in the new Palestinian Legislative
Council, will now have to bear responsibility for the decisions it
makes and face up to the consequences of those decisions, which will
shape the international community's approach to issues involving the
Palestinians and regional peacemaking efforts.
We believe that it is critical that there be a Palestinian partner
for peace, and we intend to maintain a dialog with President Abbas. Our
assistance program for the Palestinians is currently subject to an
interagency review. We will advise the Congress of the outcome of that
review, and consult further on next steps upon the completion of that
process.
Question. Your FY07 request includes $150 million for aid to
Palestinians, appropriately caveated to indicate a review is under way
in light of the outcome of the January 25 elections. Quite aside from
political turmoil, it is clear that an economic crisis is brewing: The
stock market in Nablus has already lost 25 percent of its
capitalization; the fresh produce from Gaza which was intended to be a
mainstay of its economy is rotting, unable to reach Ben Gurion Airport
for transport to export markets in Europe; the ability of the
Palestinian Authority to pay teachers and health workers after this
month is in grave doubt. How can we address this under current
circumstances?
Answer. With the expected formation of a Hamas-led Palestinian
Authority (PA) government, a comprehensive interagency review of all
USG assistance to the Palestinians is underway. This review will ensure
that our assistance continues to reflect U.S. policy goals and fully
complies with U.S. law; it is informed by our abiding commitment to
meeting the basic humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people. We will
advise the Congress of the outcome of that review, and consult further
on next steps upon the completion of that process.
Until a new government is formed, we are cooperating with the
international community to facilitate the work of the caretaker
government and ease the suffering of average Palestinians. We have
worked closely with Arab governments and the international community to
stabilize the finances of the interim PA government. The European Union
has promised to provide approximately $140 million in support to the
caretaker government to cover salaries, utility bills, and humanitarian
needs. In February, the Qataris transferred $14 million, enabling the
PA to pay its January wage bill, while the UAE has promised additional
support, which we expect would help the PA pay February wages. For its
part, while Saudi Arabia continues its $15.4 million bimonthly
transfers, it has yet to deliver on its additional pledged support.
Ultimately, as the majority party in the new Palestinian
Legislative Council, the burden falls on Hamas to fulfill the peaceful
aspirations of the Palestinian people and create a climate that
encourages stability and economic growth. Hamas can only achieve these
outcomes by committing to the three principles laid out by the Quartet
(the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) in its
January 30 statement: Renouncing violence, recognizing Israel, and
accepting prior agreements and obligations, including the roadmap. As
Secretary Rice has said, Hamas will now have to bear responsibility for
the decisions it makes and face the consequences of those decisions.
Lebanon
Question. Are you satisfied with the level of cooperation by the
Syrian regime with the United Nations investigation? Does that
investigation have the resources it requires? Should the investigation
be expanded to examine other politically motivated killings in Lebanon?
Answer. We have not been satisfied with the level of the Syrian
regime's cooperation with the UNIIIC investigation; the two prior
reports of the Commission reflect a distinct lack of Syrian
cooperation. As I said in my statement on January 11, 2006, we continue
to call upon the Syrian regime to respond positively to the requests of
U.N. Independent International Investigation Commission (UNIIIC). The
Syrian regime must cease obstructing the investigation into the
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri and cooperate
fully, as required by U.N. Security Council resolutions. We intend to
refer this matter back to the Security Council if Syrian obstruction
continues.
We continue to work with our colleagues on the United Nations
Security Council to ensure that the UNIIIC has adequate resources at
its disposal. The United States stands firmly with the people of
Lebanon in the pursuit of justice and bringing the investigation to its
ultimate conclusion.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1644, unanimously adopted by the
UNSC, authorizes the United Nations to extend assistance to the
Lebanese Government's investigations into the other assassinations. We
fully support this process. Continuing assassinations in Lebanon of
opponents of Syrian domination, including most recently the murder of
journalist and Member of Parliament, Gebran Tueni, on December 12,
2005, create an atmosphere of fear that Syria uses to intimidate
Lebanon. Syria must cease this intimidation and immediately come into
compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions.
Question. Assuming senior Syrian officials are shown to be
complicit, would you support their referral to the International
Criminal Court, expanding the mandate of either of the existing
International Tribunals (Yugoslavia, Rwanda), or creating a new
tribunal?
Answer. In unanimously adopting UNSC Resolution 1644, the U.N.
Security Council began the process of determining what international
trial elements are needed to assist Lebanon in seeking justice for the
assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri. In operative paragraph 6
of the resolution, the Security Council ``Acknowledges the Lebanese
Government's request that those eventually charged with involvement in
this terrorist attack be tried by a tribunal of an international
character, requests the Secretary General to help the Lebanese
Government identify the nature and scope of the international
assistance needed in this regard, and requests also the Secretary
General to report to the Council in a timely manner.''
The Lebanese Government's legal team is consulting with the United
Nations on possible mechanisms for a Lebanese tribunal with
international elements. We anticipate the Secretary General will report
on this matter, and the United States will study the report.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is not a realistic option,
including because the jurisdiction of the ICC is restricted to
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, none of which apply
to the Hariri assassination.
Question. The President's FY 2007 budget includes a 500-percent
increase in FMF for Lebanon. For what is this intended?
Answer. As the Lebanese Government implements political, economic,
and institutional reforms, we have a key opportunity to fill the void
left by the withdrawal of Syrian troops by assisting the Lebanese Armed
Forces develop into a unifying national institution with the capacity
to assert its sovereignty and deploy throughout the country, as called
for in UNSC Resolution 1559.
FMF is a critical tool to supporting the process of rebuilding and
restoring the operational readiness of the Lebanese Armed Forces to
accomplish U.S. goals as outlined in UNSCR 1559 and 1614. Lebanon
received no FMF in FY 2005, and only $990,000 in FY 2006. The FY 2007
request is $4.8M. FMF in FY 2007 will enable follow-on support and
ammunition to sustain existing inventories of U.S.-origin weapons,
vehicles, and equipment. FY 2007 FMF will support the acquisition of
repair parts and maintenance, ammunition, and body armor for the
Lebanese Armed Forces. The increased amount of funding is critical in
order to enhance the operational readiness of the Lebanese Armed
Forces.
______
Questions of Senator George Voinovich
Question. The FY 2007 budget request reflects a proposed decrease
in Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, from $357
million to $273 million, a decrease of 23 percent. Bulgaria, Croatia,
and Romania have been phased out in FY 2007 and will receive no funding
in FY 2007. Additionally, there are decreases across the board for
other countries, including a 16-percent decrease for Serbia and
Montenegro.
Please discuss the State Department's rationale for decreasing SEED
funding and plans for phasing out the remaining SEED recipient nations.
Specifically, does the State Department believe that programs in the
areas of rule of law, democracy, anticorruption, and other areas are
nearing completion in Southeast Europe? Several reports indicate that
corruption remains rampant through the region and there is much work to
do to institute rule of law, democracy, and judicial capabilities
throughout the region. Please comment on the vision of U.S. assistance
to Southeast Europe.
Answer. In FY 2007, SEED assistance will continue to promote a
Europe that is whole and free, grounded in democratic principles and
the rule of law, prospering in a market economy, and integrated into
Euro-Atlantic institutions. Our work includes stabilizing war-torn
Southeast Europe; supporting transition resulting from Kosovo status
talks and a possible Montenegrin independence referendum; supporting
progress toward democracy and market economies in which transparency
and competition replace corruption and cronyism; strengthening U.S.
partners in the war on terror; and promoting Euro-Atlantic integration.
Two countries that will phase out of SEED funding in FY 2007,
Bulgaria and Romania, have signed accession agreements with the
European Union in anticipation of joining as early as January 1, 2007
(with a ``safeguard'' clause that could put off accession until 2008).
Like these countries, Croatia will not receive FY 2007 SEED funds as it
has made significant progress on economic and democratic reforms and
looks to possible EU accession as early as 2009. All three countries
received significant preaccession aid from the European Union in 2005.
Kosovo and Serbia, which are requested at $79 million and $62
million respectively, would receive the bulk of SEED funding in FY
2007--an important transition period resulting from the Kosovo final
status talks. For Bosnia, $31 million is requested for supporting
reform as it institutes a new, more independent constitutional
structure with state-level ministries.
Our request for Macedonia is $27 million. The European Union named
Macedonia a candidate country in December 2005. SEED assistance to
Albania is requested at $20 million; Albania just initialed a
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union. The
request for Montenegro is $8.5 million. In each of these countries (or
republics), we will continue anticorruption assistance and support to
the justice sector. Since important work remains in the region to
address justice sector reform, SEED funding in this sector will not
phase out as early as in other sectors, as displayed in the chart
below.
Plans for bilateral SEED assistance budgets also had to be
considered against the need to fund the U.S. contribution to the OSCE
(FY 2007 is the third year the SEED budget will fund U.S. contributions
to the OSCE), as well as expenses for the Office of the High
Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The FY 2007 OSCE
request is $28.5 million, up from $24.4 million in FY 2006, due to
growing OSCE contributions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law
Economic Democratic Social enforcement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sector or program phaseouts--SEED assistance:
Albania............................................. 2013 2013 2014+ 2014+
Macedonia........................................... 2010 2010 2010 2011
Serbia/Montenegro................................... 2010 2011 2011 2014+
Sector or program phaseouts 10 or more years:
Bosnia.............................................. 2014+ 2014+ 2014+ 2014+
(No phase out has been developed for Kosovo assistance)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Please clarify how funds be allocated within Europe and
Eurasia for Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs (NADR), including with the Export Control and Border Security
(EXBS) funds.
Answer. The NADR account crosscuts several key areas of our foreign
policy concerns by supporting nonproliferation activities to prevent,
security, and containing WMD; strengthening international agreements on
nonproliferation constraints; and ensures peaceful cooperation
regarding nuclear safety; preventing and countering terror attacks on
U.S. interests at home and abroad; and promoting peace and regional
stability, while meeting humanitarian needs in post-conflict
environments including nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and
humanitarian assistance.
Four offices within the Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation expend NADR program funds. The Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund is requesting $38 million for FY 2007. The NDF will
not know how its FY 2007 funds will be allocated until the third or
fourth quarter of the fiscal year owing to the nature of NDF
operations, but during the last 5 years a majority of its program funds
have been expended in Europe and Eurasia, though only about 20 percent
of NDF's projects to date are in the former Soviet Union. The NWMDE
programs are requesting $56.2 million for FY 2007. NWMDE will continue
to expend the majority of its program funds in the former Soviet Union.
With the resources from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)
and NDF it has only been in recent years that it has started scientist
redirection programs in Iraq and Libya and they make up less than 5
percent of the total program spending. The Office of Multilateral
Nuclear and Security Affairs is requesting $50 million for the
voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency. These
funds are used primarily for the IAEA's safeguards, technical
cooperation, nuclear security, and nuclear safety programs, of which a
significant portion goes to programs in Europe and Eurasia. For
example, approximately 25 percent of IAEA technical cooperation funds
were expended in 2004, the last year for which figures are available.
ISN is also requesting $19.8 million for its contribution to the
International Monitoring System, which operates globally.
EXBS is requesting $45.05 million for FY 2007. Of that, $17.495
million would be expended for EXBS program initiatives in Europe and
Eurasia. It is anticipated that Slovenia will graduate to join Poland,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and
Bulgaria in the limited sustainment phase of the EXBS program. In
Southeast Europe, EXBS will concentrate on developing legal/regulatory
and licensing infrastructures as well as increasing interdiction and
investigation capabilities. In Turkey, EXBS will concentrate on
providing more sophisticated WMD interdiction equipment and on
fostering greater government outreach to industry. EXBS will focus on
improving customs and border guards enforcement in Russia, Ukraine,
Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan.
FY 2007 will mark the first year for an EXBS program in Georgia,
which will focus on enhancing border security, effective legal/
regulatory and licensing infrastructure for strategic trade
enforcement, and outreach to dual-use industries to assist them in
establishing internal compliance. EXBS will be equipping key smuggling
routes in Central Asia and the Caucasus with inspection and radiation
detection equipment and supporting efforts in the Caspian Sea area to
detect and interdict WMD-related technology proliferation. EXBS will
also deploy a new Maritime advisor in Albania.
The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs utilizes funds from three
NADR subaccounts: Humanitarian Demining, the International Trust Fund
for Humanitarian Demining (ITF), and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/
LW) destruction. The humanitarian demining request includes $1.5
million to continue demining in the region of Abkhazia in Georgia with
the objective of declaring Abkhazia mine and unexploded ordnance impact
free by the end of 2007. We also plan to support increased demining
capacity in Azerbaijan to meet the national strategic objective of
clearance of all accessible areas by 2008. The $10 million requested
for the ITF in FY 2007 will continue our mine action support in South
East Europe. Our funds leverage an equal amount of matched funds from
other national and international donors to foster humanitarian mine
action in the region. ITF funds support comprehensive humanitarian mine
action programs in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and
Montenegro, Macedonia, and the province of Kosovo. The
SA/LW destruction program has requested $8.6 million in FY 2007 funds.
Approximately half of these funds would be expended in Europe and
Eurasia, primarily to support continued reduction of large and aging
stockpiles of SA/LW and associated munitions, including man-portable
air-defense systems (MANPADS).
The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is
requesting NADR funds for FY 2007 for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program (ATA), the Counterterrorism Financing Assistance Program (CTF),
the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), and CT Engagement with
Allies. The ATA Program uses NADR funds to provide training and
enabling equipment at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels
to law enforcement officials of foreign nations allied with the United
States in the global war on terrorism, but lacking in the expertise
and/or resources to effectively engage the threat. Of the $135.6
million requested for ATA for FY 2007, $6.6 million would be used to
support assistance planned for Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Turkey, and some regional activities.
The CTF Assistance Program uses NADR funds to provide training and
technical assistance with the objective of building sustainable,
dynamic antimoney laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes
that adhere to international standards and implement effective programs
in the legal, financial regulatory, financial intelligence, law
enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and international cooperation
fields. Of the $9.08 million requested for CTF for FY 2007, $200,000
would be used for programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey. TIP
strives to constrain terrorists' freedom of movement between countries
by providing participating nations with a computer-based watch listing
system enabling immigration and border control officials to quickly
identify suspect persons attempting to enter or leave the country. TIP
also provides participating nations with increased capability to
collect traveler data and contribute to the global effort to understand
terrorist methods and track their movements. Of the $11.8 million
requested for TIP for FY 2007, $500,000 would be used for funding
deployment of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and
Evaluation System (PISCES) to Georgia and Macedonia and to sustain/
upgrade existing programs in Kosovo and Malta. Finally, NADR funds for
CT Engagement with Allies programs could be used to sponsor conferences
to foster regional cooperation on maritime security/terrorist
interdiction, mainstream Muslims' engagement against extremism, border
security, and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction and their
components. Of the $1 million requested for CT Engagement for FY 2007,
$100,000 would be used to help fund an Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) hosted workshop for regional
counterterrorism organizations to coordinate efforts, exchange best
practices, and identify areas for future joint action.
Question. Please clarify the State Department's policy regarding
International Military Education Training (IMET) funds and article 98
agreements. Provide a list of the countries that have been prohibited
from receiving IMET assistance because they have not yet signed an
article 98 agreement. Of these countries, which countries are actively
seeking membership in both NATO and the European Union? Considering
IMET funding promotes U.S. goals of interoperability, Western military
ideology, and bilateral military exchanges, does restricting IMET
hinder progress for NATO membership, MAP, or PfP goals? The President
waived article 98 requirements for the NATO aspirants. Please comment
on whether the State Department has given consideration to requesting a
waiver provision for the countries actively seeking NATO membership
(with U.S. support and encouragement) so that they can receive IMET
without an article 98 agreement?
Answer. The prohibitions that Congress included in the American
Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) have been useful in securing many
of the 101 article 98 agreements we have signed to date. These are
important agreements to protect U.S. persons from illegitimate
assertions of jurisdiction over all U.S. persons--particularly our
servicemembers acting overseas. We have authority in the ASPA to waive
the prohibitions for important national interests and are now reviewing
the remaining IMET prohibitions on countries that have not yet signed
an article 98 agreement to determine whether this prohibition is still
helpful to our efforts to secure article 98 agreements and whether it
is important to our national interest to restart IMET programs with
these countries even in the absence of article 98 agreements.
Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Namibia, Niger, South Africa, Tanzania,
Samoa, Croatia, Malta, Serbia-Montenegro, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, St. Vincent and
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela are all
currently prohibited from receiving IMET assistance because they are
International Criminal Court members and have not yet signed an article
98 agreement.
Question. Public diplomacy is a key priority of mine. I am very
interested in how the FY 2007 State Department budget addresses a
variety of key issues in the area of public diplomacy. Please elaborate
on how new funds will be allocated to advance public diplomacy. Please
explain whether the State Department will use funds to provide
additional personnel in the area of public diplomacy or additional
training for public diplomacy officers. Please elaborate on how the
State Department will increase funding for language specialists and
foreign language training in Arabic, Chinese, and other critical areas.
Will the State Department also use public diplomacy funding to increase
educational exchange programs with countries in the Middle East? Which
countries and how much?
Answer. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
has developed a strategic framework to ensure that America's ideas and
ideals prevail. This framework has three key objectives:
To offer a positive vision of hope that is rooted in
America's freedom agenda;
To isolate and marginalize extremists and undermine their
attempts to appropriate religion; and
To foster a sense of common interests and values between
Americans and people of different countries, cultures, and
faiths.
An increase of $10 million is requested for public diplomacy to
support these objectives through engagement, empowerment, and
evaluation.
Speaker Program Expansion
With the $1,265,000 requested, the Department will create a new
youth speaker program, modeled after the U.S. Speakers Program, in
which Americans from a variety of walks of life are recruited to travel
and participate in programs developed especially to engage younger
groups. This proposal will provide a more strategic focus for the U.S.
Speaker Program to sustain and reinforce interaction with targeted
overseas audiences using a mix of communication tools, including
videoconferencing and Web-based techniques.
Arabic and Chinese Language Services
The requested funding of $1,700,000 will expand the Department's
Arabic and Chinese language services by making more information
available in those languages. The Department will provide a more
complete offering of policy statements, texts, and transcripts and
contextual materials, in formats that intended audiences (Arabic and
Chinese speakers) are most comfortable with, for example, Web sites,
listservs, Web-casting, text messaging, etc. Expanding Arabic language
services will support U.S. foreign policy in the broader Middle East,
while expanding Chinese language services will allow the Department to
reach audiences in one of the fastest growing regions in the world.
American Corners
The $3,200,000 requested addresses the President's charge to the
public diplomacy community to engage with international audiences--to
tell America's story and also listen to the stories of others. American
Corners provide the logistical foundation for interactive dialog and in
most countries, the only source for that dialog. American Corners make
use of interactive technology and provide visitors access to material
about the United States in a multimedia format. Expansion of American
Corners will provide an opportunity to explore life and culture in the
United States, and in many localities will provide one of the best
places to obtain accurate and current information about economic,
cultural, political, educational, and social trends in the United
States.
Countering Disinformation and Discrediting Terrorists
With the $2,000,000 requested, the Department will use a proactive
approach to an effort to discredit terrorists and diminish their appeal
to win the war on terror. The Bureau of International Information
Programs (IIP) has created a program to debunk false stories about the
United States. The program will expose un-Islamic behavior by
terrorists; support partners in their campaigns to delegitimize
extremists in their midst; and partner with foreign community leaders
in public education campaigns against terrorism and the terrorist
messages of hatred and violence.
Television (TV) Co-Operatives and Media Broadcast Projects
Television and video broadcasting products continue to be powerful
strategic tools for bringing America's foreign policy message to
worldwide audiences. The TV Co-Op program has proven to be one of the
most critical components of the Department's overseas media outreach.
The Department is seeking $585,000 to implement additional TV Co-Ops
that will target Arab and Muslim audiences in order to build closer
relationships, counter extremists, enhance the credibility of the
United States and reestablish the image of the United States as a
partner for positive change.
Evaluating and Polling
With the $1,250,000 requested, the Department will establish a
fully effective, performance-based executive direction and evaluation
capability. The Evaluation Unit will develop a ``culture of
measurement'' by training Public Diplomacy Program managers on program
planning, including needs assessments, audience research, and early
planning for monitoring and evaluation; designing and implementing
outcome assessments; and creating a centralized program planning,
management, and performance database that will include planning
guidelines, needs assessment information, audience analysis data, and
evaluation findings. The Department will also expand its polling and
survey program in Arab and Muslim-majority countries to address
negative views of the Unites States, U.S. policy, and the war on
terrorism in those Muslim-majority and Arab countries.
Costs associated with the establishment of new American officer
positions are not a component of the Department's PD request. The
Department is requesting an additional 70 positions, which may include
public diplomacy positions, to support transformational diplomacy as
part of the overall FY 2007 Diplomatic and Consular Programs funding
request.
The Department's training program for public diplomacy officers,
including language training, is the principal responsibility of the
Foreign Service Institute, which has an innovative training strategy
designed to directly support new and emerging policy and management
priorities. PD training courses that are presently being offered to
American officers are being reviewed in an effort to insure that
evolving public diplomacy concepts and practices are being clearly
disseminated. The Department will utilize additional funding requested
in the Educational and Cultural Exchanges appropriation to address
exchange programs with countries in the Middle East.
______
ABC News Poll Submitted for the Record by Senator Lugar
[From ABC News Poll: Life in Afghanistan, Dec. 7, 2005]
Despite Deep Challenges in Daily Life, Afghans Express a Positive
Outlook
Four years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghans express both vast
support for the changes that have shaken their country and remarkable
optimism for the future, despite the deep challenges they face in
economic opportunity, security and basic services alike.
An ABC News poll in Afghanistan--the first national survey there
sponsored by a news organization--underscores those challenges in a
unique portrait of the lives of ordinary Afghans. Poverty is deep,
medical care and other basic services lacking and infrastructure
minimal. Nearly six in 10 have no electricity in their homes, and just
three percent have it around the clock. Seven in 10 Afghan adults have
no more than an elementary education; half have no schooling
whatsoever. Half have household incomes under $500 a year.
Yet despite these and other deprivations, 77 percent of Afghans say
their country is headed in the right direction--compared with 30
percent in the vastly better-off United States. Ninety-one percent
prefer the current Afghan government to the Taliban regime, and 87
percent call the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban good for their
country. Osama bin Laden, for his part, is as unpopular as the Taliban;
nine in 10 view him unfavorably.
Progress fuels these views: Despite the country's continued
problems, 85 percent of Afghans say living conditions there are better
now than they were under the Taliban. Eighty percent cite improved
freedom to express political views. And 75 percent say their security
from crime and violence has improved as well. After decades of
oppression and war, many Afghans see a better life.
More can be done; most say each of these is better, but not
``much'' better, than under the Taliban. And in a fourth crucial area--
jobs and economic opportunity--progress is badly lacking: In this basic
building block, just 39 percent see improvement.
In a separate measure, Afghans by nearly 2-1, 64-34 percent, say
their own household's financial situation is bad (most Americans, by
contrast, say theirs is good). Yet that economic discomfort has not
produced political dissatisfaction: Ratings of President Hamid Karzai,
the current government and the newly elected parliament are all high.
Better hopes for the future are a likely reason. This poll finds
broad expectations--expressed by two-thirds of Afghans--that life
overall will improve in the year ahead. That optimism, while
encouraging, also carries the danger of discontent if those
expectations go unmet.
This survey was conducted for ABC News by Charney Research of New
York with field work by the Afghan Center for Social and Opinion
Research in Kabul. Trained Afghan researchers interviewed a randomly
selected sample of 1,039 adults across the country.
CONCERNS--Some results may raise particular concerns. One is that,
despite broadly favorable views of the United States, three in 10
Afghans say attacks against U.S. forces can be justified. There are
about 18,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, with more than 250 killed to
date--including nearly twice as many in 2005 as in any previous year.
Acceptability of attacks on U.S. forces spikes among disaffected
and socially conservative Afghans, who account for about 15 percent of
the population. In this group just 29 percent say such attacks cannot
be justified, compared with 60 percent of all Afghans.
At the same time, even among all Afghans, 30 percent say such
attacks can be justified. That may reflect social mores in a country
where violence is not an uncommon means of settling disputes, and
perhaps specific grievances in areas where administrative or legal
remedies are lacking.
In another result that may give pause, one in four Afghans say
there are circumstances in which it's acceptable to grow poppies for
opium production, a trade that's soared since the Taliban were ousted.
Acceptance of poppy farming--if no alternative source of income is
available--reaches 41 percent in the highest opium-producing provinces
as identified by the United Nations last year. And acceptability soars
in the two provinces that historically have been the country's centers
of poppy cultivation, Nangarhar in the East and Helmand in the West.
(While cultivation in Nangarhar reportedly is down sharply this year,
it appears that attitudes that tolerate it have not followed.)
Many fewer Afghans--just five percent--say poppy cultivation is
acceptable in all cases; more say, rather, that it's acceptable only if
no alternatives are available. That suggests that the opium trade may
be vulnerable, to the extent other income-earning opportunities--such
as the cultivation of alternative crops--can be provided in its place.
But it won't be easy: The United Nations estimates that one in 10
Afghans is involved in cultivating opium poppies.
GROWING OPIUM POPPIES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acceptable
------------------------------ Not
In all If no acceptable
Net cases alternative
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Afghanistan............... 26% 5 21 73
Non-opium provinces........... 19 3 17 79
Opium provinces*.............. 41 9 32 57
Nangarhar & Helmand........... 75 20 55 25
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Opium poppy >10% of cereal cultivation, per U.N. 2004.
The survey also finds substantial suspicion of cheating in the
recent parliamentary elections. Nearly half of Afghans, 46 percent,
believe there was vote buying, intimidation of voters or cheating in
the vote count in their area. Still, 77 percent are confident
nonetheless that the parliament will work for the benefit of the
people, although far fewer, 34 percent, are ``very'' confident that
will be the case.
In terms of threats the country faces, most-cited is the Taliban,
an insurgent group since it was ousted with the fall of Kandahar on
Dec. 7, 2001. Forty-one percent call the Taliban the biggest danger to
Afghanistan, 28 percent cite drug traffickers and 22 percent say it's
local warlords. (The program to disarm those warlords enjoys vast
popular support, detailed below.)
WOMEN--The survey also finds broad majority support for women's
rights in Afghan society, albeit, as in other readings, with more
modest strength of commitment behind it. Nine in 10 Afghans support
girls' education and women voting, three-quarters support women holding
jobs and two-thirds support women holding government office--remarkable
in a country where the Taliban so thoroughly repressed such rights.
Perhaps surprisingly, support for most of these is nearly as high among
men as it is among women.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Women Men
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Support for:
Girls' education.......................................... 93% 92%
Women voting.............................................. 92 87
Women holding jobs........................................ 78 69
Women holding gov't office................................ 71 59
------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, while 89 percent of Afghans support women voting,
fewer, 66 percent, strongly support this right. And only about four in
10 ``strongly'' support women taking jobs outside the home or holding
government office. Even among Afghan women, fewer than half strongly
support women working outside the home or holding government office.
Personal experience may be a factor: Just 14 percent of Afghan women
are employed, compared with about 60 percent of women in the United
States.
There also are ethnic and regional differences, with support for
women's rights much lower among Afghanistan's Pashtun population, Sunni
Muslims who are dominant in the South and East of the country.
Also, support for women holding political office, in particular, is
much weaker in rural as opposed to urban areas, and weakest among rural
men.
Support for women holding political office:
All--65%
Urban--87%
Rural--59%
Rural men--51%
Rural women--67%
CURRENT CONDITIONS--Afghans give positive reports to several
aspects of their daily lives: Eighty-three percent rate their overall
living conditions positively, and ratings are nearly as high both for
local schools and the availability of food. Just over seven in 10
likewise say their security from crime and violence is good. In each of
these, though, far fewer--ranging from just 15 percent to 28 percent--
say things are ``very'' good.
Fewer overall, 59 percent, say clean water is readily available,
and other basic conditions--medical care, jobs and economic
opportunity, roads and bridges and power supply--are rated far worse.
LOCAL CONDITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Good Very
(net) good
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall living conditions.................................. 83% 15%
Local schools.............................................. 80 25
Availability of food....................................... 78 22
Security from crime/violence............................... 72 28
Availability of clean water................................ 59 18
Medical care............................................... 44 12
Jobs/economic opportunity.................................. 35 5
Roads, bridges, etc........................................ 24 2
Electricity supply......................................... 17 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are significant differences in conditions across the country.
Security is better in urban areas (of which the largest by far is
Kabul, where about one in seven Afghan adults live); 40 percent in
urban areas describe their security as ``very good,'' compared with 24
percent in rural areas.
Both security and economic conditions are notably worse in the
Southwest and East (where the Taliban have been active) than elsewhere.
And services seem weakest in the Northwest, where fewer than two in 10
report having clean water, good medical care or good roads, bridges and
other infrastructure. In Kabul, just 18 percent lack any electrical
power; that soars to more than two-thirds in the North and East.
SECURITY--Security is especially critical in a country so long
wracked by war. When the 77 percent of Afghans who say the country is
headed in the right direction are asked in an open-ended question why
they feel that way, three related answers dominate: Security, peace or
the end of war, and disarmament.
Mentions of freedom, democracy and reconstruction follow; women in
particular mention freedom for women, who were repressed under the
Taliban regime: Twenty percent of women (compared with four percent of
men) cite freedom for women as a reason they say the country's going in
the right direction.
Why is the country going in the right direction?
[Multiple answers accepted]
In percent
Security.......................................................... 34
Peace/end of war.................................................. 31
Disarmament....................................................... 27
Freedom/free speech............................................... 17
Democracy/elections............................................... 15
Reconstruction/rebuilding......................................... 15
Similarly, when asked the single most important priority for the
country, 40 percent of Afghans say security from crime and violence
remains paramount. That's followed fairly closely by creating jobs and
economic opportunities, then much more distantly by the need for
infrastructure improvements. When first- and second-highest priorities
are combined, however, these rank about evenly. There's much to do.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
first and
First second
priority priorities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security from crime/violence...................... 40% 45%
Economic opportunities............................ 31 49
Improving infrastructure.......................... 14 45
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another expression of the importance of security comes in support
for the country's ``DDR''--disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration--program. Largely Japanese-funded, the program is said to
have disarmed 70,000 fighters under local warlords, offering them
vocational training in exchange for their weapons. Not only do 95
percent of Afghans support the program, but 72 percent ``strongly''
support it, by far the highest level of strong support for any program,
individual or entity measured in this survey.
VIEWS OF THE U.S.--Eighty-three percent of Afghans express a
favorable opinion of the United States overall, similar to the 87
percent who call the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban a good thing.
That compares to favorable ratings of a mere eight percent for the
Taliban, and five percent for bin Laden. People who are unhappy with
their local living conditions are twice as likely to have an
unfavorable opinion of the United States.
Support for the United States is less than full-throated. Far
fewer, 24 percent, regard it ``very'' favorably. And while 68 percent
rate the work of the United States in Afghanistan positively, that's
well below the ratings given to Karzai, the United Nations or the
present Afghan government (83, 82 and 80 percent positive,
respectively).
Still, an 83 percent favorable rating for the United States, and a
68 percent positive work performance rating, are remarkable--in sharp
contrast to negative views of the United States in many other Muslim
nations. (Another contrast is Karzai's job rating--83 percent
positive--compared with George W. Bush's in the United States, where
just 39 percent of Americans approved in the last ABC News/Washington
Post poll.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ex./
Good Excellent Good
Net
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rate the work of:
Hamid Karzai as president...................... 83% 45% 38%
The United Nations in Afghanistan.............. 82 33 49
The Afghan government.......................... 80 27 53
The United States in Afghanistan............... 68 20 48
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the Afghan public's security concerns--and distaste for the
Taliban--there is little demand for prompt U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan. Just eight percent say the United States should leave now,
and only another six percent say it should withdraw within the next
year. The most common answer by far: Sixty-five percent say U.S. forces
should leave Afghanistan ``only after security is restored.''
SHIITE/SUNNI--Notable in this survey is the similarity of views
between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, the two doctrinal groups so sharply
at odds in Iraq. As in most of the Arab world, Sunnis dominate in
Afghanistan--85 percent of the population is Sunni (including nearly
all members of the Pashtun and Tajik ethnic groups) while 15 percent is
Shiite (including nearly all ethnic Hazaras).
There are differences: Thirty-two percent of Sunnis say attacks on
U.S. forces can be justified, compared with 19 percent of the Shiite
minority. And 51 percent of Shiites describe the Taliban (a Sunni
group) as the biggest danger facing the country, compared with a (still
high) 39 percent of Sunnis.
But few Sunnis or Shiites alike view the Taliban favorably (nine
percent and six percent, respectively). Their ratings on improved
conditions are similar, as are their expectations for the future and
their views on Karzai, the current Afghan government, the United
Nations, the United States, the ``DDR'' disarmament program and women's
rights.
WORK and POSSESSIONS--A simple accounting of household possessions
tells volumes about life in Afghanistan. Barely one in 10 households
has a refrigerator or a car. Three in 10 have a mobile phone; almost no
one has a landline telephone. Nearly everyone has a radio, but barely
four in 10 have a TV. About half own a work animal.
In percent
Household possessions:
Radio......................................................... 95
Bicycle....................................................... 63
Work animal................................................... 47
TV............................................................ 43
Mobile phone.................................................. 31
Motorbike..................................................... 26
Car........................................................... 12
Refrigerator.................................................. 11
Satellite dish................................................ 9
Landline phone................................................ 1
Farming is the main occupation; nearly a third of working Afghans
are farmers or farm laborers. As befits the low levels of education,
illiteracy is high, 42 percent.
The population is largely rural, with 79 percent of Afghans
residing in small villages. And it's a young country, with a median age
(calculated among adults only) of 32 years, compared with 44 in the
United States.
METHODOLOGY--This survey was conducted for ABC News by Charney
Research of New York, with field work by the Afghan Center for Social
and Opinion Research in Kabul. Interviews were conducted in person, in
Dari or Pashto, among a random national sample of 1,039 Afghan adults
from Oct. 8-18, 2005. Sampling points were selected at random in 31 of
Afghanistan's 34 provinces, with households selected by random route/
random interval. The results have a 3.5-point error margin. Details of
the survey methodology are available upon request.
[The full results of the ABC News poll can be found at http://
abcnews.go.com/US/PollVault/.]