[Senate Hearing 109-868]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-868
DARFUR REVISITED:
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 28, 2005
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware........... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Jones, General James L. Jr., USMC, Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe,
Mons, Belgium.................................................. 34
Lugar, Hon. Richard, U.S. Senator from Indiana................... 1
Zoellick, Hon. Robert B., Deputy Secretary, Department of State.. 3
Appendixes
Appendix I.--Prepared Statement of The Honorable Robert B.
Zoellick....................................................... 47
Appendix II.--Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Members of the Committee to Deputy Secretary of
State Robert Zoellick.......................................... 61
Appendix III.--Prepared Statement of General James L. Jones,
USMC, Commander, United States European Command................ 72
Appendix IV.--Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Members of the Committee to General James L.
Jones, Jr...................................................... 84
(iii)
DARFUR REVISITED: THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in
Room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, the Hon. Richard
G. Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Sununu, Biden,
Dodd, Feingold and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
The Chairman. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will be called to order.
The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to continue our
examination of the crisis in Sudan. Our committee has been
deeply interested in this issue. On July 22, 2004, Congress
passed Senate Con. Res. 133, which declared the policies of the
government of Sudan in the Darfur region to be genocide. A year
ago this month, we invited former Secretary of State Colin
Powell to testify before our committee on Sudan. At that
hearing, he voiced the U.S. Government's conclusion that
genocide was indeed occurring. Then in December, Congress
passed the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, which I
introduced with Senator Biden.
Our hope has been that the United States would maintain a
strong leadership role in organizing and implementing the
international response to the crisis in Sudan. In fact, the
United States has provided diplomatic, economic, military, and
humanitarian assistance that has mitigated the genocide, but
not eliminated it. Compared with a year ago, casualty rates in
Darfur have fallen significantly and humanitarian assistance is
reaching displaced persons with greater consistency. In
addition, largely through the work of former Presidential Envoy
to Sudan and United States Ambassador, John Danforth, the
United States helped broker the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
between the north and the south, signed January 9, 2005.
But despite this progress, millions of Sudanese still
suffer in precarious circumstances, threatened by violence,
hunger, and disease. Moreover, some U.S. diplomatic and
economic initiatives to influence the actions of the Government
of Sudan on Darfur continue to be stymied by countries pursuing
economic or political advantage.
The Darfur crisis is complex, but it has not been sudden.
It has gradually unfolded, providing ample opportunity for
humanitarian action by the international community. Although
many nations have responded, the resolve and unity of the
international community have not been commensurate to the
horrors of the crisis. Khartoum's status as an oil exporter, a
major arms importer, and an Islamic government has diminished
the appetite for decisive action in some foreign capitals. But
neither economic interests, nor religious identification should
trump responsible international actions in a case where
genocidal policies are being conducted.
Today's hearing on Sudan is an opportunity to explore ways
the United States can continue to lead the humanitarian and
diplomatic response to the genocide in Darfur. An important
part of an effective response is the consolidation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was concluded with
significant U.S. leadership. That agreement was intended to
have a moderating influence on the Sudanese government and its
policies in Darfur. Thus far, there is little evidence of that.
The African Union has taken gradual but useful steps as a
regional organization in responding to the crisis in Sudan, as
well as elsewhere on the continent. With transportation help
from NATO, the African Union force in Sudan is expected to
reach 7,700 troops by the end of October. The African Union,
however, has capacity and capability limitations. If it is to
succeed fully, it must continue to integrate international
planning, logistics, and technical assistance into its
operations.
Today we look forward to learning the estimates of our
witnesses about the effectiveness of the current mandate for
the African Union and the prospects for an expansion of that
mandate. We also expect to hear what further role the United
Nations and NATO can play in assisting in Darfur security. It
is clear that the civilian population and humanitarian groups
must be better protected from attacks by militias and rebels.
I am encouraged by the stability following the recent
tragic death of the First Vice President, Dr. John Garang, in a
helicopter crash. An international investigation will report on
the causes of that crash, but preliminary reports indicate that
it probably was an accident. Dr. Garang was instrumental in
concluding the peace agreement, and his successors must sustain
his decades-long commitment to Sudan by building a durable
peace that brings economic development.
We are pleased today to be joined by two good friends of
the committee, who speak with knowledge and authority about
United States efforts in Sudan. First we will hear from Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. He will discuss the
overarching United States approach to peace and stability
across Sudan.
The administration has stated unequivocally that a
resolution in Darfur is essential if there is to be an
improvement in relations with the Sudanese government. I am
encouraged by Secretary Zoellick's personal engagement in Sudan
and his naming of a special representative, Roger Winter, to
help resolve the crisis in Darfur. Even as we focus on Darfur,
we must be cognizant that simmering disputes in the East and
the South remain a threat to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
On our second panel, we will hear from General James Jones,
Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Under General Jones'
leadership, EUCOM has established constructive ties with
numerous African militaries and begun a process of improving
regional cooperation. The North Atlantic Council tasked General
Jones with supporting the efforts of the African Union in
Sudan. He has skillfully applied NATO's airlift capacity and
other technical assistance to the endeavor, and has worked with
other international partners to ensure the delivery of security
resources to the region. We are interested in the lessons
learned through this mission, but also the opportunities that
such assistance gives for mutually reinforcing the common goal
of peace and stability. We are also eager to hear about EUCOM's
role in building cooperative security in the region, such as in
Chad.
I thank our distinguished witnesses for coming this
morning. We look forward to an insightful discussion on Sudan
and Darfur.
As Senator Biden arrives and has an opportunity to look at
his notes, I will recognize him for an opening statement. But
at this time, I would like to call upon our first witness, the
Honorable Robert Zoellick.
We appreciate very much your coming this morning. I
understand that you have extensive testimony. And the committee
will not have a time limit. We want to hear from you, and we
appreciate your testimony. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT B. ZOELLICK, DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Zoellick. Thank you very much, Chairman, for
inviting me. I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you
and Senator Hagel, Senator Feingold, Senator Sununu. And it is
always an honor to be working with General Jones, who has been
an excellent partner on this.
I prepared a PowerPoint, which I thought might actually be
a better way to go through some of this. So I hope you have it
in front of you.
Let me just start on the first page, or page two. I have
given you a map of Sudan. And the key aspect to take away, as
many Americans are unaware, this is the largest country on the
continent. It has nine neighbors in Africa, which suggests why
you have such a strong regional interest of what goes on.
Now the next page sets out the goals of U.S. policy. I
always think it is useful to be clear about what one is trying
to accomplish. And it certainly enables you to help assess our
performance.
First, the goal of a unified peaceful Sudan that would
contribute to regional development and also cooperate with us
on counterterrorism. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that means
the key and full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Accord that Senator Danforth did so much to accomplish to deal
with the North-South strife.
But another important element will be economic development
throughout all of Sudan, because part of the precursors of this
problem has been the recurring cycle of famine and suffering
that leads to cross border violence and refugee flows. We also
want to have Sudan be a constructive participant in African in
international affairs and to strengthen our counterterrorism
cooperation.
Second, to achieve this overall goal, we need to follow
through on the Government of National Unity that was created by
the CPA, make sure it is responsive to the needs of all of
Sudan's people and accountable to them through free and fair
elections.
The device for this is, again, the follow-through under the
CPA to have local, regional, and national elections in the four
years. But equally important is building the capacity of the
southern Sudanese government, because they will need this to be
able to participate effectively in a federalized Sudan.
Third, an end to the violence in Darfur, which needs to
lead to a reconciliation among the various tribal groups,
eventually the voluntary return of people to their homes, and
accountability for the perpetrators. At this point, our focus
has been on humanitarian care, expanding the security network
for civilians in Darfur and Chad through the security
operations with also the tremendous help of the NGOs and the
international observers. I have had three opportunities to
visit Darfur over the past few months. The people on the ground
there are doing tremendous things under extremely difficult
conditions.
Fourth, and this relates to your opening statement, Mr.
Chairman, at the same time, I think we can do these things in
ways that strengthen the African Union's capacity to provide
basic security, ensure humanitarian access, mediate political
conflicts, and build from what we hope will be a success for
them in Darfur and Sudan.
And fifth, to demonstrate strong U.S. support for peaceful
development in democracy in all of Africa.
Now I am going to outline how we want to try to accomplish
these goals. But looking at page four I want to just touch on a
little bit of brief history, because I have found that in
trying to understand the problems today, it is very critical to
have a sense of some of the background.
Sudan as a country has been marked by ethno-religious
exclusivism since Khartoum traders and mercenaries first tried
to carve out a state through conquest in the Nile Valley in the
19th century. Historically, it has been dominated by a very
small clique of traders, soldiers, and administrators. They
tend to be drawn from three tribes that are north of Khartoum.
This is an important point. Their orientation historically is
toward the Arab world. So it is to Cairo, Damascus, Saudi
Arabia.
So, in effect, Khartoum has been an Arab metropolis that
has been surrounded by impoverished sub-Saharan expanses. In
the South, you have a traditional African tribal structure,
animist and Christian communities. In the West, in Darfur, you
have a mixing of Arab and African tribes, which have come over
the centuries in waves. Some of these people are actually
connected to the Berbers in Morocco, because there have been
long migrations for either religious or trade purposes. There
are links to ancient Saharan peoples, Arab tribes from the
North.
A point that I note is that this has led to a very complex
mixture of nomads and farmers that has created an economic
condition that is very dependent on a rain-fed boom and bust
agriculture and grasses. This can create, and has created, an
instability in the past. And frankly, Mr. Chairman, in addition
to the Peace Accord that we are trying to achieve in Abuja
right now, it would need to be combined, in my view, with a
serious development effort so as to try to avoid the frictions
of the past breaking out again.
In the North, you have a mixture of Arab tribes that
predominate in urban areas. In the East, there has been
generally an egalitarian, pastoral group, the Beja that has
ancestral ties to Egypt.
Now in the past, until 1989, the way that Sudan was run was
you had a very weak center in Khartoum that coopted these
constituencies in the regions to create a power base. Indeed,
there was an independent sultanate or the Fur dating back to
the 17th century that was overthrown by the British in 1916.
Indeed, the name Darfur comes from homeland of the Fur, because
that was the key tribe there.
As many of you know, the history of British colonialism was
an indirect rule system. So what the British did was they
replaced this structure with an imperial native administration.
They awarded homelands to paramount chiefs. And in doing so,
they displaced this older, more fluid social order. And a key
point, again, for the current conflict is that some of the
nomadic groups did not get lands, because they were not settled
agriculturists. This has set a long fuse for the future.
The nature of this rule depended on the effectiveness of
local leadership in government. There was a very fascinating
device by which they used tribal conferences among these
mixtures to try to settled disputes. And I think this will be
something that is important in the peace process in the future.
Sudan itself achieves independence in 1956. If you turn to
page six, you will see this leads to the roots of the present-
day conflict. Given this history, you have a very strong
resentment on the periphery of the Muslim Arab domination in
the center. And the southern groups really start to struggle at
the same time of independence in 1956. There is a peace
agreement in 1972 that fails because it was not fully
implemented, a caution for all of us today. The government of
Sudan tries to impose Shari'a Law in 1983. This resumes the
civil war under the leadership of the late Dr. John Garang, a
southerner who had been integrated into the army and, as some
of you know, studied in the United States, got his doctorate
at, I think, Iowa State or University of Iowa in agriculture
and economics.
This also is the first use of a counterinsurgency tactic
that you are going to see repeated, which is the government
starts to mobilize militias, drawing with a sense of cruel
irony here from the Darfur region of cattle-herding Arabs to
lead their counterinsurgency strategy in the South. It is a
very basic strategy, and it is a cruel one. It relies on
brutality, starvation, and robbery to wipe out the locals.
There is an estimated two-and-a-half-million people that died
in that conflict, which stretches across 21 years. And there
are millions more displaced internally and externally.
Around the same time--and this is an important point to
recognize--Darfur starts to have its first conflict, again, in
the mid-eighties. It is based on the economic conditions. There
is a drought and famine. There is a breakdown in migration. And
at the same time, as I know many of you, particularly the
Chairman will recall, this is the era in which Quaddafi was
trying to move into Chad. So he tries to use this region as a
backdoor into Chad.
For the first time in this mixture--remember, Darfur is all
Muslim. It is not like the Christian South--he starts to divide
the societies by creating an Islamic legion and comes up with a
racial ideology of Arabism that plays into the present
conflict.
In 1989, General Bashir overthrows the government,
establishes the Revolutionary Command Council for National
Salvation to rule over Sudan. The National Islamic Front is led
by Dr. Turabi, who takes over as the leading party.
In the late Seventies to early Nineties, you have a
hyperinflation that wipes out the middle class. Turabi is the
leader of the vicious war in the South. At the same time, he is
actually reaching out to Darfur, trying to bring in some of the
less-accepted Muslim communities, but he does not have a real
effect in terms of development.
In 1992, there is a declaration of Jihad in Kordofan
against the SPLA. This is the southern group leading in the
Nuba Mountains rebellion. It is a failure to create an Islamic
state through force. In 1998, again, the strategy of army,
militias, and starvation in the oilfield zones of Upper Nile
province in southern Sudan is utilized.
During the nineties, Turabi hosts Osama bin Laden. With the
United States attack in 1998, we see the start of a rethinking
on the part of Bashir with Turabi. In 1999, there is a split in
Khartoum. As a result, Bashir arrests Turabi.
On the top of page eight is the introduction to the effort
that the United States launched under Senator Danforth in 2001
for a peace initiative. At this time, the focus is primarily on
the North-South conflict. After September 11, the government of
Sudan recognizes the dangers that it sees. Bashir is fearful of
his associations with Osama bin Laden and the terrorists. He
also realizes he cannot defeat Garang and the SPLM militarily.
So the context for the CPA agreement, and I think this is
very important as we look to the future, is really politics
driven by exhaustion. The Khartoum government realizes it
cannot beat Garang in the South. It is worn down by decades of
war. It has had these ideological projects that have produced
nothing. And this is combined with Senator Danforth and major
U.S. and international pressure. This is what produces the
North-South Accord that was signed in January of 2005.
But I stress this because in my view the result was based
on cold calculation. This is not some epiphany. The leopard
does not fundamentally change his spots. And as we go forward,
it is important that, as we consider the use of pressure and
power, as well as incentives, that we keep that in mind.
The CPA accomplishes something very important. It creates a
new pattern of power sharing with the historical problem of
geographically defined constituencies. It offers prospects of
development. They are developing oil resources. So they start
to realize there is an interest in getting linked in the
international economy.
But outside Khartoum, and this is again the issue that we
struggle with today, there are two impulses. There is an
impulse for equality, which you can implement through the CPA
Accord, and emancipation. But that pulls people in the opposite
direction. So should the peripheries try to win the strongest
possible representation from the center or should they try to
break away? This remains the fundamental question of Sudan.
On page nine I point out that even as you have this
negotiation going on with the North-South Accord, Khartoum's
old habits and fears of separation are also intentioned. In
2002, some Darfurians start to complain about Arab militia
harassment. The problem festers. Some of the rebels attack a
police station in 2003. So even as Khartoum is negotiating with
the South, it unleashes an army and this brutal
counterinsurgency strategy in Darfur in 2003.
We also suspect that some of the people in Khartoum felt
that the negotiators in the North-South Accord were giving away
too much. So you have this terrible sequence of loss of life,
wide-spread rape, and destruction of villages. Over two million
people are forced from their homelands. The violence is carried
out by a combination of government forces, Arab militia, and
the rebel groups. And the ties are not separate from the
relationship in the South. Some of the rebel groups, the SLA,
has some ties with the SPLM in the South. In this context, as
you noted, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. found that genocide occurred
on September 9, 2004.
The U.N. then conducted an investigation. They came to a
slightly different conclusion. They came to crimes against
humanity, but they said that this was basically a definitional
issue. They had a statement that it was similar in its effect
to genocide.
But the other point about this is that, in addition to the
North-South and Darfur, one has to be alert to is that there
are dangers elsewhere in Sudan, the eastern provinces, as well
as in Kordofan. As I noted when I pointed at the map, there is
a very strong African interest in this, not only because of
their empathy for the people of Sudan, but they are worried
about destabilization of nine neighbors and the breakup of
states. Because as they look at their own colonial borders, the
pattern of breakup of African states is not one that anyone
wants to see.
It is also an opportunity to demonstrate the African
Union's ability to deal with African problems. And this goes to
one of your points, Mr. Chairman. As many of you know, there
was an organization called the OAU, the Organization of African
Unity, until 2002. The Africans took what could turn out to be
a very significant step in creating the African Union, which
has a special political structure. It also has a structure to
try to deal with some of these security issues.
It establishes among African countries ``a right to
intervene in international or regional conflicts.'' So this is
an important precedent for Africans dealing with African
problems.
On page ten, I just highlight the North-South Agreement,
the CPA. It was begun in 2002, signed on January 9, 2005. I
have talked on occasion with Senator Danforth about his
tremendous efforts to achieve this. And at heart, it tries to
create a fair political relationship, where you have power and
wealth sharing leading to national elections in four years. It
has extraordinarily detailed implementation requirements--some
1,100 items one has to track in this process.
But among the key items, is a pre-interim period that was
scheduled to be completed by July 9. That set up the Interim
National Constitution. This in turn sets up a Government of
National Unity for a six-year period, which was just recently
formed. It establishes a new Institution of the Presidency,
where Bashir is the president. The first vice president was
from the SPLM, Dr. Garang, now Salva Kiir. Then the second vice
president is Taha, the man who had negotiated with Garang the
North-South Accord.
It has a bicameral national legislature that was just
established. As I mentioned, on September 20 they announced the
ministerial cabinet. It establishes the legal basis for the
Government of southern Sudan. That is what is going on right
now in southern Sudan--creating the legislature perhaps today
and a constitution.
Then, it sets up a process for competitive elections, oil
revenue sharing, joint integrated military units, and respect
for human rights. The ongoing leverage for the South is they
have an opt-out clause after six years.
Now as all this is happening, there is a terrible blow to
the process in that Dr. Garang crashes on July 30. I was in
Asia at the time, but I was very appreciative of the help of my
colleagues. We sent out a team from the National Transportation
Safety Board right away, which was important because, given the
history of this conflict, you can imagine the stories that were
starting to spread. There was communal violence that started to
break out in Khartoum and Juba and other places. You mentioned
Special Representative Roger Winter. He went out with our then
Assistant Secretary for Africa, Connie Newman, promptly to try
to calm things down.
They and the statements of Mrs. Garang, who is an extremely
courageous person, Salva Kiir, who assumes Garang's post,
frankly calms the situation down. But, and this is a point I
want to stress, we are in a very sensitive moment because of
this. Dr. Garang was a very strong leader in the system. So his
organization, the SPLM, is now trying to work through how to
set up a government of southern Sudan, how to be represented in
Khartoum, how to help us in Darfur. And it is a point of some
stretch.
I have had a chance to talk to Mr. Kiir a couple times by
phone. I hope he will come actually to Washington in a month or
two. And if he does, I hope he has a chance to meet with some
of you. He is a military commander. He has not really had this
kind of exposure. I think it is important that he have a chance
to talk to the Congress, as well as the Executive Branch.
On the other hand, you also have a challenge for the people
in Khartoum. They worked out this arrangement with Dr. Garang.
And now they have a new set of players, and some of them may be
tempted to overreach. This goes back to the point I made about
the cold calculations.
There is another important issue, which is that Garang was
the one figure in the South that really stood for a unified
Sudan. And one of the questions will be whether his colleagues
will remain committed to this position.
On page 12, I just highlight what I think is a potential
critical issue, which is the connection of an upward or
downward spiral. On the one hand, the Comprehensive Peace
Accord does much more than settle the dispute between North and
South. It actually creates a political and a constitutional
framework for people to try to resolve the conflicts in Darfur
and other regions.
We hope, as I mentioned, that the SPLM involvement in the
Government of National Unity could help us resolve Darfur. I
spoke yesterday to the new foreign minister of the Government
of National Unity, who is from the SPLM, Lam Akol, about trying
to work with us on these issues.
If we are successful, the backing that the United States
and the rest of the world has shown for the North-South Accord,
including financially, could create a positive incentive for
these other regions to come to peaceful accords. So the upward
spiral is the implementation of the CPA, a new Sudanese
government, expanded AU mission on the ground, and
reconciliation in Darfur all within this political framework.
But the point that I have made to people throughout the
Sudanese political structure North and South is there is a
potential downward spiral. If we cannot maintain peace and
security in Darfur, improve the situation, and move to a peace
process, the ability for us to support this new hopeful
government is going to be severely undermined. That is the
downward spiral.
On page 13, I just mention some of Darfur's needs. The
basic part, of course, is always supplying food and basic
necessities. You have some two million people that have been
forced off their lands. And at the same time, you have the need
to improve security outside the camps and inside the camps. But
that is basically, for all the work that that requires, that is
a holding action. It needs to be combined with a political
reconciliation process, bringing together the government, the
rebel groups, and various tribes. That is what is going on
right now in Abuja, Nigeria, a peace negotiation.
As I have suggested, I think that is actually going to have
to be combined, if they reach a peace accord on paper, with
some efforts to deal with the economic and social issues that
drove the conflict. The good news is that it has been a good
rainy season. Some improvement in security and distribution of
seeds suggests that we are going to have a better planting
season in West Darfur and some of the other states. But the
insecurity and limited access is still going to interfere with
this harvest. So we are going to be needing to provide
substantial food assistance throughout 2006.
One point of particular compliment here. When I go to
Darfur, I talk not only with the NGO workers, but our AID
teams. And they have done a fantastic job. These people, as I
mentioned, are in extraordinarily difficult conditions. They
are adapting to an environment that is still violent, still
faces bandits, and, frankly, they have done some heroic work.
The United States, and this is something we can be proud of
as a country, has provided 68 percent of the food delivered to
Darfur in 2005. It is an issue I raised with our European and
other colleagues. They are on the hook to do more, but it is
something perhaps--I know many of you meet with Europeans--we
could put on their screen a little bit more.
What you have seen at this point is some decline of
harassment of some of the NGOs by the government, but the rebel
harassment and banditry has increased.
The AU, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, is in the process
of expanding its security forces. They are currently up to the
6,000 of the 7,700. We are extraordinarily pleased to have had
help from NATO and the EU in terms of the transport,
logistical, and planning support. Just to give you a little
sense, since your opening statement suggested an interest in
the multilateral diplomacy aspect, I first had a chance to talk
about this with General Jones on an earlier trip I took and
stopped in Brussels and spoke to the NAC ambassadors.
Secretary Rice also pressed to try to get NATO backing for
this. As you know, the EU then said, well, we want to be part
of it. And we said fine, let's all do it together. Then we had
to get the African Union to ask for NATO's help. But, it is a
good example of how NATO can adapt and change.
The deployment target for completion is October 2005. An
important part is not to see this only as soldiers. One of the
most critical operations is civilian police presence that is
included in that. They are expanding, the African Union is
expanding their operation in about 70 camps. And in
particular--we will touch on this a little bit later--we put a
particular emphasis on the safety of women. There are things
that can be done inside the camps. We are going to do some
things in terms of crisis centers to try to help.
It is of some significance, if you think about this history
of a colonial area of Sudan, that we got them to accept the AU
and the NATO presence. This is something that we want to
continue to encourage. I was particularly pleased that the U.S.
was able to form a partnership with the Rwandans, who frankly--
I was just talking about this with General Jones--have been
some of the better troops. They have been through a genocide.
We have brought two of their three new battalions. I think over
the next week or two we are going to bring their third
battalion.
We have also provided, since the African Union mission
began in 2004, about $170 million of support. But this is an
issue, just to alert you and appropriators, we may have to come
back to as we go forward.
When Secretary Rice visited in July, she made a particular
emphasis on trying to emphasize using the Trafficking in
Persons Report to strengthen the efforts of women against such
violence. We worked out an arrangement actually where we are
going to put in additional resources, and the government of
Sudan has also committed to a series of steps, some of which
include reviewing their criminal procedures and investigations,
these terrible reports that these women have made. We have
asked them to send out senior women leaders from Sudan to talk
about this issue. We are trying to emphasize this is an overall
part of the Darfur response.
In general in Darfur, what you have seen is the large-scale
organized violence has substantially subsided. But the
situation remains very fragile and dangerous. So you no longer
have the government forces in major actions. And until about a
week ago, you didn't have major rebel forces in actions. But
you still have the Janjaweed and other militias undisbanded.
They continue to contribute to the violence.
And you also have a situation--there are no angels in this
part of the world--where the rebels are also grabbing cattle
and trying to stop humanitarian supplies. Keep in mind that one
of the rebel groups, the JEM, goes back in its links to Turabi,
who was the prime minister, or was the leader who was deposed,
who had the ties with Osama bin Laden.
What I am sure you have also noticed is that over the past
week there has been an upsurge in violence. Roger Winter is in
the region right now talking with the SLA leaders and the
people in Khartoum about this. This is particularly dangerous.
This is a tinderbox. And this is a place where you could
imagine the cycle restarting.
Our best estimate is what has gone on is that some of the
rebel leaders were positioning themselves for the negotiations
in Abuja, because there are splits among the rebel groups.
Frankly, one of the important messages that I want to send
today and I hope you send is that no one should be engaging in
violence. If people try to think this going to improve their
negotiating position, it is going to undermine their position
with us.
The progress in Abuja has started. It is very modest. There
was a Declaration of Principles that was signed on July 5. The
AU has done an important job in this. The man in charge of it
is the former prime minister of Tanzania, Salim Salim. But as I
mentioned, some infighting among the SLM rebels has impeded the
talks. That is something we are actually working on these very
days.
This is a classic issue where to work this, we have to get
everybody pushing the rebel groups and the government to try to
reach an accord in the framework of the CPA. So we are working
with the U.N. special representative, the AU, and Europeans,
Chadians, the Libyans have contributed, and the Egyptians. We
have to put a common pressure on the parties.
We also have the follow-through on the U.N. resolutions on
economic sanctions and accountability, because it is vital that
there be a signal, particularly since it is dangerous that
there is no impunity for crimes. The ICC began its
investigations in June. The goal here is to provide a secure
environment, and create an opportunity, as I suggested before,
to tribal reconciliation, so people can return home in the
start of 2006.
But this will be an ambitious tasking. To do this, one is
then going to have to take on disarming the militias, the huge
challenge of restarting life, which involves grazing rights and
water issues, tribal tensions, and a series of the historical
topics I mentioned before.
Now, on the CPA follow-through, there is the need to follow
through on the financial support. I think in the letter you
sent me, Mr. Chairman, you asked about some of this
information. This was put together at an Oslo Donors Conference
that I attended. There were some $4.5 billion of pledges. I
have given you an overview of the U.S. support. I talked with
the Norwegian development minister, Hilda Johnson, who has done
a very good job, and was in Washington recently. Unfortunately,
the government--well, I do not want to complain about the new
government--but the government in Oslo is changing, and she
will no longer be in this position. Regardless, we need to work
with the Norwegians and others on the follow-up on their
pledges.
One of the U.N. resolutions was to put a U.N. peacekeeping
mission in the South; and, again, to distinguish the AU mission
in Darfur. I have noted the progress on that. There are about
2,500 people that have been deployed. We hope for the final
deployment by the end of the year.
Then we have a major food issue, not only in Darfur but
also in the South. And here, just as the United States has
provided about 66 or 68 percent in Darfur, we have provided
about 61 percent in the South.
The reason this is so important is you are now at a point
where you have to show that peace works. If people go home and
they cannot get food, you are going to have a hard time
demonstrating that you have a new future for Sudan. We expect
the harvest to be somewhat better. But you are talking about a
couple million people that could be coming back. So we are
working closely with AID on some basic packages to get them
started.
Another issue that is very important is there has been a
group in the far south called the Lord's Resistance Army that
is led by a crackpot who basically requires kids to go do his
killing for him. We have been working very closely with the
Ugandans since this group has operated traditionally out of
northern Uganda. President Museveni has been fighting the LRA.
In the past, the government in Khartoum was supporting the LRA.
They have withdrawn that support. Now it appears we have a
situation where Khartoum, the SPLM, and the Ugandans are all
pushing together on the Lord's Resistance Army. There is some
evidence I have seen that they may have tried to flee to Congo.
So we also have to press Congo on this.
I also mentioned at the start, though, it is very important
we keep our eye on the formation of the government of Southern
Sudan. I have been to Rumbek. I went on my first visit, which
is in the south. It is pretty basic there. We are spending
about $20 million for programs to help set up this government
and about $17 million additionally on the security side.
We need to continue to push the Sudanese government on CPA
implementation as well, because there are other groups. I
mentioned at the start the Beja in the east, and there are some
groups in the north. This is a centrifugal force problem. We
have to try to urge them to continue to come to terms. And
there has been some good news on that front.
We also have to focus on the formation of the Government of
National Unity. As I mentioned, we had a team that arrived
promptly after Dr. Garang's death. Salva Kiir and the SPLM have
announced their support for the CPA. The process is moving
forward. The New National Assembly, and President Bashir has
made the positive statements. The new ministers are being
named. And Jendayi Frazier, who is sitting behind me, our new
Assistant Secretary for Africa, is going to go out in a couple
weeks and try to meet the new government.
As I mentioned, previously, we also have to work with the
government about returnees in the South. There are about two
million people around Khartoum in IDP camps. Frankly, some of
them have been forced out violently. Thus we have been trying
to work with the Wali in Khartoum, as well as the national
government to stop that.
There are some key issues that I see regarding the CPA
implementation. We have had some delays resulting from Dr.
Garang's death, but we need to keep pressure on the withdrawal
of the Sudanese army from the South, because Juba will be the
headquarters of the South. It is hard to build your
headquarters if the other army is still there. That has
started.
We have to put in place the key mechanisms of the CPA. And
here the one I really want to stress is there is something
called the Assessment Evaluation Commission, which is to have
oversight over the whole process. That is one that I regularly
pressed with my calls yesterday and others with Vice President
Taha recently. That has to get in place and then some of these
others, like the National Petroleum Commission, which will
involve the resource sharing.
We need to have active SPLM engagement with the Government
of National Unity. And my point here is, Dr. Garang did this.
This is what he was about. But you have a new team here, and it
is very important that they have their place at the table and
that they use it. We need the parties and the powers in
Khartoum to work seriously with the SPLM. There can be a
temptation with some of these new players that they may try to
work around them. There is a new advisory council been
appointed for the president that looks suspiciously like a
shadow cabinet.
And, as I mentioned, there are efforts against the Lord's
Resistance Army. One other sensitive issue, just to alert you
to it, given the problems in terms of some of the discussions
of land territories, there was, as part of the CPA, a Boundary
Commission for Abyei set up to determine the boundaries of this
region. It was chaired actually by a former U.S. ambassador. It
has come up with a finding. And it is going to be a very
complicated implementation, but it needs to be implemented.
So finally, Mr. Chairman, in summary, as you can see, this
is a problem that has lots of threads. And while many people
focus on Darfur, what I am trying to do today is to emphasize,
if you look at Darfur without looking at the North-South, you
are not going to see the picture. We have to work on multiple
transitions, from war to peace, from centralization to a
genuine federalism, emergency problems to development, and
military rule to democracy.
There is a chance for an upwards spiral, where these pieces
could fit together, or there is a chance for a downward spiral.
This is a classic multilateral diplomacy problem. We are
working with the AU, the EU, Arab League, and a whole series of
partners on other allies to make it work. I mentioned the trips
that the Secretary and I have made. Given the importance of
this issue, and since Roger Winter has been an active player in
Sudan for some 25 years, and worked as part of AID in the
President's first term, I asked him to be my special
representative to give me additional support on the ground.
I know there is a strong interest in the Congress on this
topic. I appreciate that because we are going to need more
support as this process goes along, both in the messages that
are sent and with the resources. I will just perhaps say the
obvious. It is not going to be a smooth or clear-cut path. But
I do think there is a pathway ahead.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to take your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zoellick can be found in the
Appendix.]
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Secretary
Zoellick, for a very comprehensive briefing. We appreciate the
preparation and likewise your own participation in all of this.
And we are delighted that Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer is
with you today. You mentioned her active participation.
I would like to call now on the distinguished Ranking
Member of the committee, Senator Biden, for his opening
comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. I echo the Chairman's sentiment. Thank you,
Mr. Secretary, for being here. I think it is, to state the
obvious, important that high-ranking officials are here and
reporting directly. And we appreciate it.
I have an opening statement, which I apologize for not
being here to give. I would ask unanimous consent that it be
able to be placed in the record. And I will withhold it.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this timely and important
hearing. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here and for your tireless
efforts in Sudan. It's also a pleasure to have General Jones with us
today. In my experience, he is a man who doesn't see problems--he looks
for solutions.
Last September, Secretary Powell released the findings of a State
Department investigation which found that genocide was occurring in
Darfur.
Now, here we are over a year later--and it is not clear to me that
any of the fundamentals have changed for the vast majority of the 3.4
million people affected by the war in Darfur.
According to a leading Washington based NGO, as many as 400,000
people may have been killed as a result of the hostilities. Countless
women have been raped, and continue to be the victim of sexual
violence. Two million people are still displaced from their houses. The
fragile cease-fire in Darfur seems to have disintegrated in the past
month. Banditry has increased exponentially. The headlines coming out
of Sudan over the past couple of weeks read ``Darfur Risks Descending
Into Anarchy,'' and ``Fresh Fighting in Darfur Threatens Peace Talks.''
Just this morning, the BBC reports that U.N. Humanitarian Relief
Coordinator Jan Egland is saying that violence in Darfur is so bad that
the humanitarian relief effort could ``all end tomorrow.''
I know there has been some movement. The July 5 agreement between
Khartoum and rebels on a Declaration of Principles may provide a
framework through which to handle further peace negotiations. With
NATO's help, the African Union has been able to deploy nearly 2,000
additional troops to Darfur, for a total of about 5,800. The death of
John Garang did not result, as some feared, in the unraveling of the
North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
But none of this progress has resulted in peace in Darfur. Instead,
it seems to me that the situation in Darfur has changed from one in
which clearly identifiable actors are engaged in straightforward
hostilities into one in which there is persistent violence by people
who are difficult to identify.
And I am not convinced we are doing all we can to stop the violence
and create the conditions that allow people to go home. When I was on
the Chad-Sudan border early this summer, an AU commander told me the AU
lacks the mandate, the men and the material to really make a
difference. Since then, NATO has stepped in to help deploy more AU
forces. But I still think the AU would benefit from a small number of
NATO troops on the ground to back them up. I believe that if NATO stood
up to back the AU mission, the Janjaweed, the rebels, and the bandits
would stand down.
Mr. Chairman, I think it is important that during this hearing we
come to a mutual understanding of not only how to measure progress in
Darfur, but more important, how exactly we should define success. What
are the minimum conditions that must exist in Darfur before we can
declare the AU mission a success? I want to be sure that we clarify
this issue here today because I for one am very concerned that we are
all beginning to suffer from ``Darfur fatigue.''
What do I mean by that?
I mean that, with so many problems here at home after Katrina and
Rita--not to mention Iraq--the American people understandably may want
us to refocus our efforts and our resources. And we may have to make
some strong arguments to convince them we cannot make our
responsibilities at home and abroad a zero sum game.
I mean that we are becoming inured to the suffering of nearly two
million people living in camps because the World Health Organization
says that their overall health has improved.
I believe that we may mistakenly believe that current security
conditions in Darfur are acceptable because while the Sudanese
government is still sending military aircraft into Darfur for
``observation,'' at least they haven't dropped bombs on civilians in a
few months.
I mean that, in a state of exhaustion, we might come to believe
that since less that 10-percent of nearly two million displaced people
have risked their lives to go home to plant crops this year, they're
fine with the new status quo--and we should be, too.
So I hope that during your testimony Mr. Secretary you will clearly
and specifically lay out what has to happen on the ground in Darfur for
the administration to consider the situation resolved, and what exactly
our policy is to get there.
Because no matter how tired we get, the people of Darfur are even
more tired. They are tired, they are scared, and they are traumatized.
And unlike all of us in this room, they do not get to turn the channel,
or turn to page two, or wake up from the nightmare of their lives.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Senator Biden. And when I get to my turn to question, I
will fold in some of the observations I was about to make. And
it is great to see General Jones here.
General, welcome.
The Chairman. We have good participation and obviously
another important speaker later on. So the Chair will suggest
an eight-minute limit for questions in a round. And hopefully
this will give members a chance----
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, could I make a suggestion
maybe?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Dodd. I find a lot of my questions will be for
both General Jones and the Secretary. I wonder if we might hear
from General Jones and then have the opportunity to--is that
possible or what?
The Chairman. The jurisdictional problem here is that the
Secretary is an official of the United States Government. And
General Jones is wearing his NATO cap.
Senator Dodd. You had better put it on, General. I did not
recognize you this morning.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. So, I do not want to draw too much from all
of that. But the Chair wrestled with these problems and we have
two panels.
Secretary Zoellick, you have asked for congressional
support and resources. Can you give any more specific an idea
of what would be desirable? You have given a very comprehensive
briefing. It is dazzlingly complex. As you pointed out, moving
circles intersect, and the dynamics are really uncertain. To
say the least, this is very difficult for many of us on this
committee, quite apart from our colleagues who do not have the
opportunity to study this in the same way, to understand what
the role of the United States ought to be beyond what you are
doing diplomatically, in terms of money, appropriations or
programs or of congressional participation.
Can you address this more specifically?
Secretary Zoellick. Mr. Chairman, I will give you an
overview. And I am sure we could follow up with you and your
staff in greater detail, if you wish. Part of the challenge in
dealing with this issue in budget terms is, we put together our
budgets for 2006 in the summer of 2004. Well, as you have seen,
it is a little hard to preview some of these issues.
Now fortunately--and we have had excellent cooperation from
AID on this--in areas like food supplies, there are various
emergency accounts. There are accounts that are not just
designed for Sudan but can be adjusted for various purposes. I
would highlight for you a few areas.
One, we have discussed the African Union force. At the time
that budgets were put together in the 2004 period for 2006, we
were making an assumption that it might be a U.N. force in the
west, as opposed to the African Union force. And as you know,
it is a different peacekeeping account for U.N. than it is for
general peacekeeping.
When this African Union force started to come in place, we
worked out language that allowed us to take some money from the
U.N. peacekeeping account, $50 million, over the past months.
But one issue will be what will be the ongoing needs of this
African Union force.
A topic I have talked about with Senator Biden in other
context is, there is some discussion about if at some point the
African Union force will transition to a U.N. force. Then it
becomes a question of that account. So one issue is the support
for the peacekeeping arrangements.
A second is the humanitarian supplies. And again, as I
noted in the tables at the back, we have some flexibility with
AID and others about how we program some of these funds,
depending on the food needs. But this is one we are going to
have to watch together.
A third is, and I have already given you some sense the
support we have given to the government of Southern Sudan.
These are not necessarily large sums in terms of standing up.
Remember, this is starting from scratch. I mean, we are helping
them create a national bank. We are helping them create
ministries, to list the use of just some of the funds that we
have devoted to this endeavor.
Now one of the issues legally we are going to have to work
on is that, as you know, we have imposed sanctions all over the
place in dealing with Sudan. We found ourselves with our hands
tied in helping with the new government of the South, given
these sanctions. So this has been an issue we have already
talked about with some people on the House side, that is to
give us a bit more freedom to handle some issues in the South.
The last piece of it is what I have suggested to you--and I
cannot go any further than really just put this on your
screen--is if we are able to get a peace accord in Abuja--and
Jan Pronk, the U.N. special representative, is pushing people
to reach this by the end of the year. That is going to be
ambitious, given these problems that I have described, but we
may, I hope, make some further progress.
If we can create conditions for people to start to return
home, the reason I perhaps gave you a little bit of the history
here was because it is not just going to be words on paper, we
are going to have to create conditions for people to actually
make it and get a start again. That is going to require a more
serious development effort. So that is more of the anticipatory
area.
And the last part, Mr. Chairman, because I know many of you
spend time with people around the world, as I do--this should
not be only a U.S. show. You see, the United States is putting
in about 68 percent of the food in Darfur and 61 percent for
the country as a whole. As you know, there is a big debate
about food aid that I read about on the trade side and, as you
also know, the European Union wants to cut down our food aid.
Well, I hope then they help supply some of the food aid here.
So, we need more help from some of the other players
internationally. And I think that this is one of the benefits
of kind of having multiple roles. I hit a lot of these people,
but you can help him, too.
The Chairman. Does that give complete room for all the
activities that are going on? There is no conflict currently
that I know of within the Security Council. Is that right?
Secretary Zoellick. No. And in fact, the U.N. Security
Council just extended the mandate of the southern forces to, I
believe, March of next year. One of the issues that we need to
discuss with the African Union is, you know, at some point what
are their thoughts about melding their force with the U.N.
peacekeeping force. Again, this is a point of some sensitivity.
The African Union is justifiably proud of what they have
accomplished.
As I pointed out, they have expanded their forces. They are
not quite at the 7,700. And there is some discussion about
trying to go to 12,000. I am not sure whether they really could
identify the forces for this. This is a point that I know
General Jones might talk about.
We have helped with transportation. We have helped with
logistics. NATO ran a map planning exercise recently. From what
I have seen on the ground, we can also--I mean, we as a group--
Canadians, Europeans, others--can help is in terms of some of
the operational performance. You have platoons and companies
out there trying to play a role that is part military
diplomacy, part peacekeeping.
It is an evolving role for them. And, frankly, they have
gotten people wounded in the line of action. We have a lot of
respect for what they have done. We also have to think again
with them at what point does this transition into a broader
U.N. force, too.
The Chairman. Is there peace with the neighbors of Sudan?
Are there any difficulties with any of the neighbors fomenting
trouble or taking advantage of the situation?
Secretary Zoellick. Yes. But it comes from different
directions. Let us start in the Darfur where I know a number of
you have interests. I think Senator Biden visited Chad. You
have tribes that go across these areas. The president of Chad
is a Zagawa. They are one of the key tribes along with the Fur
and a couple others that are a key part of the strife.
I met with the foreign minister of Chad recently. Part of
what we have done with the AU diplomacy and our bilateral
diplomacy is to try to keep everybody on the same sheet of
music. They are worried about destabilizing their own
situation. The people of Chad have, at some high cost, taken
some 200,000 of the refugees. I do not mean to highlight them
as a problem. I am just saying that it is an issue of the
instability.
I mentioned Uganda in the South with the Lord's Resistance
Army. That is another key point. In the East, there are very
sensitive relations with Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea has had
differences with the government in Khartoum. That has been from
where some of the rebel groups have operated. A couple months
ago, we had some concerns about whether the Beja, this group in
the East I mentioned, was being stirred up by Eritrea. We have
talked with the Eritreans. The fact that there are difficulties
with Eritrea, Ethiopia, and with the border elsewhere makes
this additionally complex.
But I guess what I would emphasize, Mr. Chairman, is, and
your question draws this out, one reason I was trying to give
people a sense of this is that to accomplish the diplomacy in
this, you are working in a regional context. You have to do it.
The good news so far in Darfur is from Libya to the United
States people were pushing people to reach an accord. And we
have to just keep that pressure up.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for jumping in with both feet into
this. I mean this sincerely. This is a travesty. I know you
know it. You have seen it. A number of us have been there. And
it is monumental.
Let me make one reference to my opening statement. I think
that we have, to use an overused phrase up here on the Hill, a
very narrow window here. The American people are about to
suffer from fatigue here. The fact that there are two million
displaced persons, the fact that there has been some ramping
down of the genocidal activity, the fact that there is some
progress being made, couple that with the incredible burden
that the American people are feeling, as is everyone, including
the President, of the loss of life in Iraq, the hundreds of
billions of dollars total being expended, now another gosh-
knows-how-much money for the Gulf States, and I am a little
worried that we have not sorted out what resources will be
needed.
You mention the need for congressional support and
resources. I think that is going to have to be pretty targeted
pretty quick, pretty soon, because, you know, we will hear not
irrationally from our constituents that charity begins at home.
This is a situation where progress has been made, but a lot
more has to be done.
And so I would urge, to the extent that you can get a fix
on what you think is going to be needed. In addition, perhaps
not to answer now in the eight minutes I have, but in a written
response, a pretty detailed assessment; if you can tell us, who
else is in the game, what other countries are contributing,
what European countries are doing beyond the NATO mission, it
would be very helpful.
After I got back from visiting a refugee camp in Chad--the
northernmost--about 15 kilometers from the border, I kept
contact with a number of the NGOs that we ran into; to be
precise about this, my staff has kept in contact. And they are
acknowledging that on the ground that there has been some
progress. But they are concerned that the lack of the physical
capacity of the AU, the African Union, in terms of literally
the weapons they carry, the logistical capability they have, is
beginning to wear off a little bit in terms of people thinking
that they had better be careful, because the AU may respond.
I have a number of questions for General Jones more
specifically about what we do relative to the AU, what NATO
does. But here is my concern. The mandate that the AU has and
Khartoum's, how can I say it, acquiescence in that mandate
seems to me to still be relatively narrow. And this transition,
looking at a transition from African Union to U.N. control
forces, I think is pretty dicey. But let me, with that
background, ask this question: You seem to--and I am not
disagreeing with you. I just want to make sure I understand it.
You seem to be putting a lot of your hope and expectations on
the North-South agreement succeeding in the sense that in
Khartoum there is southern representation that has some
political clout, that as a consequence of that, there will be a
more rational policy coming out of Khartoum towards Darfur.
Is that correct? Am I connecting the dots?
Secretary Zoellick. That is one element, Senator, but there
are other elements. I think the government of Sudan unleashed
this merciless campaign. They thought that they could wipe
these guys out before everybody noticed. They were wrong. And
that is why I said at one point, these are all cold, hardheaded
calculations.
They have now realized that that is not in their own
interest. So they pulled back their own forces. But the
Janjaweed with their links to the government is still around. I
think the key is that it won't only be the point that you
properly identified I hope will help us, the presence of the
southerners in the government, but also the work of the African
Union negotiators in Abuja and all these other players I
mentioned to Senator Lugar to put pressure on the rebel groups
and the government to reach an accord.
At this point, Senator, one of the greatest difficulties we
are dealing with is splits among the rebel groups. The
government is at the table. And I do not mean to say that they
are, you know, angels in the process. But they are ready to go.
And, I do not only mean the difference between the SLM and the
JEM, but within the SLM you have some different generations of
leadership. And that is an issue we are working very hard right
now.
Senator Biden. I met with some of those leaders. They came
in. They came across the border from Sudan. They were actually
field commanders. At least they identified themselves as that.
And as best as we could assess from our checking with your
folks, they were. But my sense, for what it is worth, is that
they will be manageable in direct proportion to their being
convinced that Khartoum is in fact not just waiting until the
crisis occurs somewhere else in the world and the focus gets
taken off of this area, because that is my greatest concern.
And it will happen. This is a volatile world we are in right
now.
My time is almost up, so let me conclude by asking you
about Chad. One of the things that I observed, I mean, what a
God-forsaken part of the world in terms of natural resources or
lack thereof, with people who really did, because of tribal
connections, open up, at least the present leader of Chad, open
up access to a couple hundred thousand people coming across the
border.
I apologize for not knowing this, but have we made any
commitment, or the international community made any commitment,
to make Chad whole economically for what has been an absorption
of resources, not the least of which is just clear cutting the
few pieces of wood that exists sticking out of that desert
area?
What are we doing relative to the impact for them? If we
had 3,000 folks coming from Haiti into Florida, or 300,000 or
200,000 or 100,000, we would have a significant impact. And I
found it fascinating--and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman--
when I met with Chadians, they want to know how they can get
into the camps. And I asked them, ``What do you mean, get into
the camps?'' They said, ``Why can't we go into the camps and
get water? Why can't we go into the camps and get food? Why
can't we live in the camps?'' which I thought was a pretty
interesting observation of the status of their circumstances
absent this influx.
So my question is: Tell me about Chad resources, impact of
the several hundred thousand folks, and are we or the
international community doing anything to ``make them whole,''
if you will, for lack of a better phrase?
And I thank you for your testimony.
Secretary Zoellick. The key point, Senator, is that they
are included in the whole humanitarian effort. So when I talk
about the support for Darfur, I am also including what is the
aid we are providing for the 200,000 or so refugees in some 12
camps in Chad. The whole project of humanitarian support
applies to all those people.
Now second, this is why it is important that we not stop
where we are with humanitarian support and basic security. The
point I am trying to emphasize is we really have to keep
pressing this peace negotiation process forward so those people
can go home, otherwise they become an ongoing burden.
Third, I think I mentioned also I just met with the Chad
foreign minister last week around the U.N. meetings, in part to
get a better sense of how they see things and ways we can work
together. They are one of the co-mediators in the Abuja peace
process that is going forward.
I think we have a pretty good shared interest and
connection with them. But it is a good counsel to make sure
that we are worried about their stability, too.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, welcome. What in your opinion is the
relationship between China and Sudan?
Secretary Zoellick. Well, at this point, it is primarily
energy and energy development. Although if you look at one of
the charts I had in the back here, China is going to contribute
to some of the peacekeeping force in the South, which is a good
effort and shows responsibility. When I was in Beijing in late
July, early August, for some strategic discussions, and this is
a point I made in a speech recently as well, I emphasized to
the Chinese that they needed to consider that, as they were
trying to develop energy resources in various parts of the
world--and this is not just Sudan, but it is Burma, Iran, and
others--they need to consider the impression that that will
create for us and for others when we see issues like genocide.
I said they can make their own determination, but there are
probably ways we can work together. They can also maintain
their energy development. And I got a general response about
willingness to do that, to work with the government to try to
press the government to follow through on these accords. They
benefit from a stable system, too.
Indeed, one of the follow-up actions of the discussions
that I had, Senator, is that Assistant Secretary Frazer is
going to have a discussion with the Chinese about Africa in
general. I think this is something we need to do and broaden
more. We may not be in agreement on every issue, whether it be
Sudan or Zimbabwe or others, but it is important that they
understand where there will be costs in their relations with us
and others. And I think there is some chance that we can get
some help. They will not be necessarily as public as we are,
but they might press the government on some of the things we
would like.
Senator Hagel. Have they, in your opinion, hindered our
efforts with the United Nations or any other multilateral
institution that we have been working with regarding Sudan?
Secretary Zoellick. In the context of early this year, we
had to deal with what became the three Security Council
resolutions--one to set up the North-South peacekeeping force,
one dealing with the economic sanctions, and one dealing with
the ICC and the issues of impunity.
I do not know for sure on the peacekeeping force, but they
are participating. I do not recall any difficulty in that
context. On economic sanctions, they have been more resistant,
as they have been in other areas, but they accepted the type of
sanctions that were developed.
And on the ICC, I do not know, in particular. I was just
trying to make sure we could abstain, frankly.
Senator Hagel. Is this an area that you noted in your
testimony in reference to working with the various multilateral
institutions, regionalization, your noting of your, I am not
certain of the title, representative in the area, along with
the assistant secretary who is sitting behind you, to try to
more fully work with China and other nations? And in context
with that question, how will the assistant secretary work with
your personal representative? And what will be the
relationship, and how will they make adjustments, especially
focusing on what you had talked about in your testimony,
getting more regional effort, not just through the African
Union, but the nine neighbors, China not a neighbor, but very
important?
Secretary Zoellick. Well, I am the overall point. The
President and the Secretary look to me to try to pull this
together, whether it involves AID, the various bureaus in the
State Department that have an interest, the NSC, DOD, and
others. That is my role and responsibility.
And on some of the things you mentioned regarding China, I
think I may be able to be of help. That is why I am raising
this in Beijing and talking about it in my speeches, because on
this and some other issues, since I am playing on multiple
topics at once, I can emphasize the priority of this for the
United States.
I will give you another example. When I was in Egypt and
meeting with President Mubarak, I was emphasizing the
importance of us working closely together on this. When you get
further away from the African context, it is part of my role.
Although, as I mentioned, Assistant Secretary Frazer will be
leading our discussion with her Chinese counterpart to talk
about Sudan and others.
Roger Winter, the special representative for me, works with
the Africa office. He does not have a separate office. He is
attached to my office representing the particular role and
interests that I have been asked to play on this issue. But he
is very much integrated with the African bureau. That is where
the staff and the support and the others involved come from. We
had the good fortunate that he did this before, when he was at
AID working on the North-South Accord.
His relations with Sudan are very extensive over many
years. This really gives us a tremendous asset in terms of some
of the people in the South and, I hope, dealing with some of
the rebel groups. But obviously, I look to Assistant Secretary
Frazer to help pull the overall effort together.
And as I mentioned, this is a topic where Senator Biden and
the Chairman mentioned there is just a heck of a lot of work to
do with a heck of a lot of players. So, I can do some of it.
Roger can do some of it. Andrew Natsios can do some of it.
Secretary Frazer can do some of it. I have weekly meetings
where we are tasking these things out and trying to anticipate
and work the diplomatic problems that arise day by day.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. You noted a number of times in
your testimony the efforts of the African Union and the
progress, I think would be a fair way to state it, of the
African Union. And I would like to pursue that in my last
question.
And by the way, I share your positive sense of direction.
And I have always believed--and I was in Nigeria and Abuja the
morning the Nigerian president convened the African Union
conference to deal with this in August of last year.
The continent of Africa is going to have to equip itself to
deal with its problems. We can support and we can help, but I
think that is much to your point in your testimony and what you
have been about as well over the last few years. And with that
in mind, where are the institutional weaknesses and strengths
in your opinion as this problem in Darfur is going to be with
us for a while, as the African Union takes on more and more of
a role, outside of just the peacekeeping, outside of the
military, the security, but the geopolitical strategic, as well
as diplomatic leadership, to address this problem?
Secretary Zoellick. Well, again--and I know you know the
region and the issues very well--the African Union has come a
long way in a very short time. But not surprisingly, their
basic problem is one of lack of resources to make some of these
things happen. But the head of the African Union Commission is
Chairman Konare, who is the former president of Mali, a very
poor country, but democratic, has done a fantastic job.
As you mentioned in the case of Nigeria, there is an
ongoing president, in addition to the president of the
commission, this has been President Obasanjo. They have set up
a series of, I think, eight or nine commissions, one of the
most important one being a peace and security commission that
is headed by an Algerian named Djinnet.
So in some ways, Senator, if you can imagine the trials of
the European Union in a much poorer context, trying to come
together and work cooperatively, that is the work ahead of
them. But what I have been sincerely impressed by is, in a
relative short time, after having the strategy of hands off
everybody and neighbors, they are really trying to come to
grips with these issues.
Now let me take it more directly. In the diplomatic side,
the Abuja peace talks were chaired by, I mentioned, former
Prime Minister Salim. We can help. For example, we probably
have some of the best ties with the SLA, which I was mentioning
in one of the previous questions. We need to let them know that
we want them to have a fair chance to negotiate an arrangement.
But they also cannot return to violence.
So this week, to be frank, to give you an insight on this,
with Roger being there, we pressed very hard. And I think it is
because of us, we have them back at the table. That is just a
start. So there are things that we can help diplomatically.
On the military side, and this is an area where I imagine
General Jones can comment more, they need everything from
armored personnel carriers, which the Canadians are helping to
supply so they can perform the mission better that Senator
Biden talked about, to paying the troops. We have provided in-
kind support. This is, as those of you who have been out there
know, this is a rough part of the world. And so troops have to
be housed somewhere. We have paid for that and set up with a
group called PAE, a contracting service, so they have places to
live and operate. The troops have to be paid.
So there are a lot of areas in terms of the resource side,
if they are going to have an effective mission.
Now this, I think, just looking ahead, Senator, this is one
of the bigger questions in some of the work we have been
fortunate to do with EUCOM. What investments do we want to make
in this kind of a peacekeeping mission over time to help
develop their capabilities. Because, frankly, it can be
inappropriate for U.S. forces to be there. So if we are going
to deal with these problems, how can we enhance their
capabilities?
There is some other work that has actually just been
started by a former colleague of mine, David Gombert, at the
National Defense University, who is actually trying to see how,
with some investment, he might be able to use some of the net
center capabilities to have a rather small, but well-organized
and well-prepared force with sensors and information technology
and others that could really deal with these problems in the
future.
I have encouraged David to talk to you, people on the Hill,
and also, frankly, we are looking at it in our office, and at
the Department of Defense. This is maybe a subject we could
have some further discussion about, if it is of interest here.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me begin by
thanking Secretary Zoellick and General Jones. It is a pleasure
to see both of you here. And I understand--I apologize, Mr.
Chairman.
With my familiarity, General Jones, I had forgotten for a
moment your new role here, I suspect, General.
And so I understand why you cannot have them at the table
simultaneously. But I have great respect for both these
individuals and thank them for their efforts.
I am sure the Chairman, I missed his opening comments, but
I presume you went over and mentioned some of the data and
statistics regarding the tragedy of Darfur. And I guess the
numbers, Mr. Zoellick, I presume you agree with them, roughly
two million people have been displaced as a result of this
situation. And the numbers of those who have lost their lives,
you see the low number of around 70,000, the high number around
400,000. What is your statistic? What is your number you use of
the number of people who have lost their lives?
Secretary Zoellick. Well, I will tell you, frankly, I do
not think anybody knows. And I have said that publicly. And any
of those numbers, and this is an important point to have out,
are way too high, I mean, way too high to have that many people
die.
Senator Dodd. But you would not necessarily argue with the
400,000 number either then, for that matter.
Secretary Zoellick. Well, this opens a big debate, Senator.
I will just point out that our Office of Intelligence and
Research have done various estimates. It depends on what time
period you start. And they have looked at these with some 50
epidemiological studies. It is all on our website explaining
the logic.
Frankly, the U.N. World Health Organization Collaborating
Center for Research did a review in May with a 42-page document
titled ``Darfur, Counting the Deaths, Mortality Estimates from
Multiple Survey Data.'' And they are basically in the same
range that we are.
To get to the numbers--and, you know, this is whether it is
160,000, 180,000, the U.N. representative of England has used
the 180,000 number, but he has also referenced some of these
U.N. studies--to get to the number that you are talking--you
mentioned the high-end number--there are only two surveys that
we are aware of. They basically take the most intense period of
mortality in a rather limited area and expand them over a 26-
month period. That is probably an overestimate. But I hasten to
say, you know, that no one can know for sure.
So you and your staff can look at what we have on the
website and criticize it or analyze it. And again, you have
very similar work from the U.N. World Health Organization
looking at some 50 studies.
Senator Dodd. But the numbers are pretty staggering.
Secretary Zoellick. Whatever they are, they are too high.
Senator Dodd. And the amount of refugees, that 200,000,
that is a more accurate number. We have a better a count on
that.
Secretary Zoellick. That, again, I am being careful. That
is refugees in Chad. So that is cross-border. As you said, you
have some two million-plus internally displaced.
Senator Dodd. Right. Displaced.
It was about a year ago, in fact on September 9 of last
year, Secretary Powell was sitting at that table, not in this
room. We had a hearing in another location. And on that day he
called the activities in Darfur genocide. What is the position
of the administration today? Do you still agree with Secretary
Powell that you would call it genocide?
Secretary Zoellick. Well, even more, I agree with President
Bush, who has made the same statement. So yes. And what
happened after that, Senator, is that we worked to pass a U.N.
resolution that set up a committee of investigation. The
committee of investigation reported in January of 2005. They
did not find genocide, but they found crimes against humanity.
Their statement, probably just worth making sure that we have
here on the record, because I do not want them to have their
position----
Senator Dodd. Well, they took a different position. I
know. I mean, I realize the United States took the position
this is genocide.
Secretary Zoellick. Right.
Senator Dodd. The U.N. has a different position. Is it our
view that the Sudanese government is complicit very directly in
this genocide?
Secretary Zoellick. Well, it is what is now being pursued
by the International Criminal Court----
Senator Dodd. I know that. I want to know what the United
States position is. Do we believe the Sudanese government is
directly complicit in this genocidal behavior?
Secretary Zoellick. I would have to say yes. I mean, they
were part of the whole process that was going on.
Senator Dodd. Well, that bring me to the question, because
obviously while there has been a lot of good things that have
happened, and I want to emphasize that, the amount of resources
that we have voted on here and have been expended to try and
provide some relief for these people here, I am deeply worried
that, one, we still have under the African American Union
situation, if we look at the larger picture here and despite
the U.N. investigation here, as I understand it anyway, and you
correct me if I am wrong, the U.N. declines to endorse the
United States assertion that the Sudanese government is very
directly, as a whole, complicit in genocide.
In its limited or unlimited report, the U.N. says the
responsibility for their actions in Darfur are limited to
individuals. And this does not even take into account, of
course, that many members of the African Union do not even view
what is happening in Darfur as genocide, which raises the
point, when you look at what they can do, they are limited, as
I understand it, to protecting the monitors rather the civilian
population.
Is that not true?
Secretary Zoellick. You are moving through a couple
different topics here. So let me take each one. To be fair to
the U.N., their finding on January 25 was that this was no less
serious and heinous than genocide. What this deals with is a
different view in terms of the Genocide Convention of 1947 and
1948. So again, crimes against humanity, which they found, is
what we used in the Nuremberg trials.
What I have tried to be careful about on this, Senator, is
I do not want to cast dispersions on people like President
Mbeki, who do not have the same finding we do. We all agree
what happened was outrageous. It was heinous. We believe it is
genocide. They believe it is crimes against humanity. We have
to stop it. We have to get it turned around and fixed.
What you are then asking about was the African Union
mission.
Senator Dodd. Right.
Secretary Zoellick. And on this, the African Union mission
was expanded in May of this year after a review of its role.
And again, since these are African Union forces, we have made
clear that we could welcome an additional expansion of the
mandate, if they so chose. But it is important to have a sense
of what these people are really doing on the ground. Because it
effects the nature of their peacekeeping force, if you had the
government actually engaged in large-scale violence, they could
not stand up to it. So it needs to be combined with diplomacy
to pull the government forces back, which they have.
When I talked with the Rwandan deputy commander, who is a
first-rate individual, he described it almost as a military
diplomacy. Let me give you a practical example so you have a
sense of what they do.
On one of the visits that I was at, I had a presentation
about the location of the forces, the rebel forces, the
government forces. It was like a splotch on different maps.
There was an NGO, Doctors Without Borders, that had a hospital
that said we may have to close down because we are not getting
people coming to our hospital.
The Rwandan commander who was with me pulled aside the
rebel officers--and this also tells you something interesting.
They have liaison from the rebels and the government with the
AU forces there--pulled them aside and basically said: Look, it
is your people who are dying. We have to negotiate some safe
corridors to get these people through, which is what they did.
So the nature of the peacekeeping mission here is one where
there is a certain deterrence factor. And as I said, recently,
with the expanded mandate, they put some armored personnel
carriers in some of the camps. But in the diplomatic context of
where you separate the forces, they are expanding their
numbers, trying to lessen the tension.
The reason I mention this, Senator, is that now and then
there is a sense that this will be solved if we give them a
greater combat mandate. I do not think that is the case.
Senator Dodd. Well, let me ask you this. Let me jump to
one area very quickly. The light went on here. And that is, I
am distressed in a sense. You mentioned the Nuremberg trials.
We will be--I think November 20 would be the sixtieth
anniversary of the opening of those trials. United States led
the way. In fact in this very room, Judge Roberts, who is going
to be confirmed in a day or so for Chief Justice of the United
States, used Robert Jackson as a model, the chief prosecutor
for the United States during those trials.
It is troublesome to me, and I understand the
administration's view in not wanting to endorse the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court, but
I am perplexed over how we can call something genocide, how we
can agree that the Sudanese government is very complicit in
this genocidal behavior, and then abstain when it comes to a
resolution, 1593, before the United Nations, which would
establish the bringing of the Sudanese officials before a
criminal court.
Again, the generation that said no, we are going to try
these criminals from the 13-year era, the Nazi regime 60 years
ago, today an administration that is reluctant and abstains
when genocidal behavior occurs from allowing these thugs to be
brought to trial. I do not understand that. Could you explain
why the administration is abstaining on this particular issue?
Secretary Zoellick. Well, Senator, you know well the
concerns that the United States has as the greatest power in
the world with our forces around that our people could be
subject to the International Criminal Court. And I might add--
--
Senator Dodd. This is a specific request, though.
Secretary Zoellick. Senator, if I could finish the answer.
It is not just the administration. There is an act passed
by Congress, the American Service Members Protection Act, that
reflects this policy passed by the U.S. Congress.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Secretary Zoellick. So I think the important thing is, you
are right, we did abstain. And, under this act, we have the
ability, if asked to cooperate, to cooperate. As I said in the
House, if people ask for our help, we will try to make sure
that this gets pursued fully. We do not want to see impunity
for any of these actors.
Senator Dodd. We have supported in the past specific--and
certainly in Bosnia, the situation there--the criminal trials
involving those individuals. Why would we support one there and
not one here?
Secretary Zoellick. We are not failing to support the
action of the prosecutor in this effort.
Senator Dodd. Are we going to, if they ask for our
support?
Secretary Zoellick. And again, Senator, if you ask about
U.S. leadership on this issue, I think you will find that most
people in the world, the African Union I have encountered, the
U.N. officials I have talked to, feel that the United States,
starting with Senator Danforth, have really displayed some very
important leadership.
So I do not think there is any question of our moral
position.
Senator Dodd. Well, I do not disagree with that. I said
that earlier. My concern is whether or not we are going to
stand up a generation later. We watched Rwanda. We saw what
happened with Bosnia. We have it here now. We have called it
genocide. We said the Sudanese government is complicit. And yet
we are abstaining when it comes to bringing these people to bar
justice. I am saddened by that.
Thank you.
Secretary Zoellick. Senator, I think the important part is,
frankly, not those actions, but it is what we are doing on the
ground. And I think what we are doing in terms of food,
security, diplomacy, making the CPA work, is what will
demonstrate the United States role in the history books.
Senator Dodd. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Secretary, thank you for your diligence on this and
other issues and efforts to follow up with my office on a
number of issues.
Let me first ask you about this. Many recent reports
characterized conditions on the ground in Darfur as having
somewhat stabilized. And these reports cite relatively steady
humanitarian indicators to back up this assertion. But it seems
to me that the people of Darfur living in the midst of a
chronic crisis--I happen to have had the chance earlier this
year to be in Chad and visit one of those camps, as well, that
Senator Biden visited. Not the same camp, but a similar camp, I
think.
They are utterly dependent on international humanitarian
assistance for survival. And in the meantime, humanitarian
organizations are coming under increasingly frequent attack.
The people of Darfur are uprooted from their homes and fearful
of security conditions outside of and sometimes within the
camps. And MSF and other organizations continue to report
widespread incidences of rape.
So there seems to me to be nothing really all that stable
at all about the situation of desperation and vulnerability.
What, in your view, is the realistic time frame or time line
for improving the conditions in which these people are living
and creating an environment of security in which people can
voluntarily return to their villages and rebuild their lives?
Secretary Zoellick. Senator, let me start by saying the
reports that you have seen from the U.N. and the African Union,
and I think your comments reflect this, need to be put in a
relative context. It is still a very violent place. It is still
a very dangerous place. What has changed is the nature of the
large-scale conflict and warfare.
So I think that with what is still happening we should be
pushing to get civilian police monitors and a lot of other
things to improve the humanitarian security situation. I would
add to that the vagaries of weather. You have rainy seasons.
You just had flooding. You had some terrible conditions that I
just read about a couple days ago that have taken out a number
of these camps. So it is a precarious situation. It is
extremely fragile.
What I have tried to emphasize, Senator, is a three-part
formula. One is we have to continue to be creative and move
forward to get the humanitarian supplies to these people, the
food, fight the disease, and try to improve the conditions for
women, some of the things I mentioned in the testimony.
Second, we need to expand the security arrangements. Part
of this is getting more of the African Union forces there, some
of the things I mentioned about civilian police somewhat
equipping them, some ways to be able to help execute the
mission further, and then, as we have discussed, to say what
else one might need to be able to do.
But if I could emphasize one point, it is that we cannot
stop there, because this remains very fragile and dangerous. So
the point that I have tried to emphasize is we have to get this
Abuja peace process forward so that we can try to use the type
of framework we used in the CPA to try to reach some peace
accord.
You asked about a time frame. Jan Pronk, the U.N. Secretary
General's Special Representative, has said we should try to get
this done by the end of this year, because that would allow
people to start to return home, if all goes well, before the
rainy season next year. I have used that comment to say yes, we
should really try to do that. It is going to be a stretch goal
for the reasons I mentioned.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Just some more
follow-up on the AU force. Consistently, reports from the
ground in Darfur praise the efforts made by the African Union
thus far. But they also underscore the reality that this force
is obviously not sufficient to provide security or protect
civilians. And it does not have confidence of the people in
Darfur who have to make judgments about their own security.
Do you believe that more AU troops on the ground will make
a critical difference in changing these perceptions, or is a
stronger mandate necessary or both? I am curious for your
reactions to those.
Secretary Zoellick. Yes. The evidence has shown, and U.N.
reports show this, the more forces there are, the more it helps
improve the situation. But this is an extraordinarily large
area. So that also goes to the ability of the forces to have
the mobility to execute their mission, some of the things I
mentioned on the operational planning side. And again, there
are things that the African Union is now doing to try with
additional forces to create a confidence environment. So you
have probably read the stories about women being afraid to go
out and get wood. They are willing to go out and get some wood.
Frankly, we are, also with the help of AID, trying to come
up with some stoves and other things that do not have to use as
much wood, so people do not have to go out as much.
I think there is going to now be an assessment when they
get up to the 7,700, which I hope will be at the end of
October, about where one goes next. And as I mentioned, there
was some discussion about willing to go to a higher number,
12,000. But I also see the African Union's straining to get up
to the 7,700 number. They have had some difficulty. There is a
question about South African forces that had been pledged and
who else may go.
So we will have to work with the AU as they reach that
point to determine if there is a need for additional forces,
can they provide them. And as I have also suggested, whether
you have a U.N. peacekeeping mission in the South, can this be
blended in some fashion?
On the mandate issue, we are open to a more expanded
mandate, if they choose. They are their forces. They are their
people. It is in some ways a little presumptuous for us to tell
them who they should be fighting. Okay? But as I have
suggested, I do not think it is just a question of words on
paper. It is a question about how they feel and the execution
of that mandate. And that, as I tried to describe with Senator
Dodd, one really has to see the situation on the ground. It is
not a situation where these forces are going to be in a major
military action with the other parties. They are basically
playing a deterrence role, a confidence building role, some
protection around the camps, and, frankly, mediation of these
forces.
Senator Feingold. But in terms of simply giving them the
additional mandate, you seem skeptical that that alone would--
that the AU by itself, even with the mandate, would be able to
handle all of this. You seem to be suggesting a need for more.
Secretary Zoellick. Well, first off, as a policy matter, we
would not resist a stronger mandate, and for the reasons that I
suggested.
Senator Feingold. But does that do the job?
Secretary Zoellick. Pardon?
Senator Feingold. My sense from your remarks is that that,
by itself, does not do the job and does necessarily mean that
the AU by itself would have the capacity to handle this
situation on its own.
Secretary Zoellick. That is the question, Senator, as you
said ``do the job.'' It is important to have a sense of what
the job is.
Senator Feingold. Let me turn to the North-South process
again. Are you confident that the well-sharing arrangements,
which will be implemented fairly and transparently, given the
fact that the SPLM failed to secure control of either the
finance ministry or the ministry for mining and energy? And
what will it take to sustain a Southerner's confidence in well-
sharing arrangements in light of these decisions with regard to
those key cabinet positions?
Secretary Zoellick. We are going to press on all these
points, Senator. And let me start with even in the South, as
they stand up their new government, we need to make sure that
it is a transparent government so that as we provide aid and
others provide aid, we can be certain that we do not have
problems of corruption.
As for how things will work with the Government of National
Unity, I stressed earlier the importance of the Assessment
Evaluation Commission, which will be an oversight body that
will include people from outside Sudan to help monitor these
actions.
In terms of the overall support, for example, on the
petroleum side, after the Government of Southern Sudan is
formed, there is supposed to be a National Petroleum Commission
formed that is also supposed to examine these numbers and
process it transparently.
So, Senator, the basic answer is I am not sure of anything.
And that is why I identified these topics. We have to keep
pressing both parties to make sure that it has full
implementation. I certainly would not take any of this for
granted.
Senator Feingold. Just before my time is up--I guess it is
up right now. Let me just say, in terms of the issue we were
talking about before in Darfur, what the job is, I think it is
civilian protection and providing security so that people feel
safe and they can go home. I heard people in Chad tell me they
did not feel safe going home. And they are not able to go home
and rebuild their villages.
The question I asked you is, can the AU do that job?
Secretary Zoellick. Yes. And what I was, again, trying to
do was draw some threads here together. I think for people to
eventually go home, Senator, it is going to require a peace
accord, which is not just AU military forces. It is going to
require the disbanding of the Janjaweed, which is not just a
question of the AU going into military action.
What I am trying to suggest here is that it is important
for the AU to be able to have the additional capability, the
weaponry, the words and mandate, but to see that action
outside, loosely speaking, the larger diplomatic and political
context, I think runs a risk of misleading about what can
reasonably be accomplished here.
Just let me take a moment to give you one more sentence.
The critical point now is that the government of Sudan is not
engaged militarily as they were before. Their military
capabilities could overwhelm the AU forces. So as it is in
traditional peacekeeping missions, with people in the midst of
a war zone, indeed, it is very hard to have a peacekeeping
force.
So it is the responsibility of us and other governments to
make sure that the government of Sudan does not undertake those
military actions, that they do not have the helicopters flying.
That is one of the things I spend time trying to make sure
stays in place.
In terms of the African Union capabilities, I think more
troops will help. I think that getting them the armored
personnel carriers that they can have in some of the locations
will help. And the more that there are, I think the more areas
that they are able to cover. I spend a lot of time talking with
a lot of outside groups on this. I do not want to leave the
false impression that to ``solve'' the problem or do the job is
simply a question of additional either AU or, for that matter,
other capabilities of a military nature. It has to be a
military diplomatic----
Senator Feingold. Well, the only thing that that leaves me
concerned about is does this leave the government of Sudan
basically in the driver's seat? Do they get to decide whether
to disarm and disband the militias? I mean----
Secretary Zoellick. No, because that is why we and
everybody else are involved and, you know, we have a
combination of sanctions. We are using the African Union, the
European Union, and others to press them on action, and this
goes to the point that I also tried to make about the
connection of the North-South Accord with Darfur.
Look, Senator, some people consider this highly
controversial. I made the point that do not expect that the
North-South Accord can live in isolation from Darfur. So if, as
a strategic matter, the people in Khartoum want to try to have
this Government of National Unity work with all that could be
with it. And you want us and the international community to
help, then we had better get Darfur fixed.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
I just have one short question, Mr. Secretary. The new
State Department Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction
headed by former Ambassador Carlos Pascual is in Sudan
presently. This is their first operation. Can you describe how
and where they are engaged and how they are doing?
Secretary Zoellick. Yes. That is an important part. I
should have mentioned this, Senator, to your first question
about the several types of resources. Because this is the exact
concept we are trying to get some of our transition support to
help. Ambassador Pasquel's team has first helped on the
southern side, as we are trying to think about how to stand up
the government of Southern Sudan and how to deal with some of
the security forces and their reorganization.
There are also some other issues in the South as there has
been South-South strife, as well. You properly remind me that
as part of the team that I have at the State Department, they
are part of the team that I draw on on this, and particularly,
as we would also turn to some of the things that I hope we will
be able to do in Darfur at another stage, I would expect them
also to be involved with that.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much. We appreciate that
you and Secretary Rice have been working to perfect this. This
new team is going to need a great deal of assistance, both
through identification of their mission and likewise the budget
for the mission. I am sure you understand.
Senator Dodd?
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I just had one additional
question for the secretary.
I understand your answer, obviously, to the question I
raised about the ICC. Under the American Services Protection
Act, there is a clause in that law that allows for the United
States to cooperate with these international criminal courts.
The simple question I have for you, if we are asked to
cooperate with the court in pursuing the officials of the
Sudanese government, will we be cooperative in that regard?
Secretary Zoellick. Yes. That is the point I was trying to
make.
Senator Dodd. And that is the provision in the law that
you are aware of, as well.
Secretary Zoellick. Yes.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Zoellick, for
your testimony, the preparation, and the comprehensive nature
with which you have responded to our questions. We appreciate
having you, as always.
Secretary Zoellick. Thanks, Chairman.
The Chairman. The Chair would like to call now General
James Jones.
As I welcome General Jones, the Chair would like to point
out that very recently General Jones was with me in Algeria and
Morocco. And he was extremely helpful in the rescue mission of
404 Moroccan prisoners held by the Polisario in the southwest
Sahara desert for sometimes over 20 years at a time.
General Jones provided two aircraft, 38 Marines, and a
humanitarian mission that was extraordinarily helpful. This is
a part of his mission in NATO and with EUCOM to make certain
that the United States is coordinating with friends in Africa,
and specifically Algeria and Morocco on this occasion.
It is a privilege to have you again before us, General
Jones. And would you please proceed with your testimony?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS
EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM
General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is a great
pleasure to be here. And I am appearing before you in response
to the invitation letter in two hats--one is NATO commander and
one is European commander--to talk a little bit about Africa
and NATO's efforts in Africa with specific emphasis on Darfur.
And I will do that very briefly, because I think I can
summarize it very quickly. And also the United States European
Command's theater security engagement in Africa.
And I have before you some charts, and I will just refer to
them just so you can follow along. The first one that you have
before you is the Unified Command Plan. And it shows you the
expanse of the U.S. European Command's area of operation, which
includes 91 countries in Europe, Africa, and the Near East.
In the European Command and in NATO, we feel that the
African reality is here for us and for those who are concerned
about the strategic future and its implications with regard to
our collective security in the 21st century. NATO's initial
attention to Africa and the crisis in Sudan and its revitalized
Mediterranean dialogue are indications of a growing awareness
of this new reality within the alliance itself. How EUCOM's
theater security strategy helps to bring stability to vast
areas plagued by chronic instability is a developing success
story, which could be the prologue for our engagement in the
21st century.
Let me turn very quickly to NATO and ask you to look at the
second chart that should be in your stack in front of you. at
26 nations, NATO is today our most important and enduring
strategic alliance. It is changing dramatically and has changed
over the last three years. It has gone from being essentially a
reactive, defensive, static, linear alliance arrayed against an
equally static threat to a more proactive capability that is
developing agility, speed, and a geostrategic sense of its
missions for the 21st century.
Today, NATO is involved in operations in Afghanistan, in
Iraq, from which I just returned this morning, in the Balkans,
an operation-active endeavor in the Mediterranean. We have
bilateral relations with Russia, the Ukraine, Partnership for
Peace nations, the Mediterranean dialogue nations, and the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. And NATO's primary example for
transformation is the development of the NATO Response Force.
The third chart will talk briefly about NATO's mission to
Darfur. The African mission in the Sudan known as AMIS is an
example of the alliance's extended focus and willing reach.
Secretary Zoellick's expose more than adequately captured the
history and the current issues of today's problem. So I will
just simply comment on the three facets of the NATO mission.
This is a 15-nation contribution to coordinate airlift
donation with AU troop, African Union troop, deployment plans.
Secondly, to support the U.N. peacekeeping and planning and
conducting of a map exercise to help train the staff of the
AMIS force headquarters at El Fasher. And three, capacity
building for the staff officers of the AMIS.
The keys to our operation are that NATO is in support of
the African Union, that NATO works closely with African Union
officials. And so far one of my conclusions of this effort has
been that this underscores the ability of NATO to work with
multiple organizations, such as the U.N., the EU, the AU, and
other organizations simultaneously.
NATO is today considering additional requests from the
African Union, which it has received. The North Atlantic
Council has probably already discussed it, and I am just not
aware of what they have decided. But my guess is that they will
prolong their mission. It is obvious that the strategic
importance of Africa is growing, and we are not alone. We, the
United States, are not alone in recognizing this fact.
For example, China plays an increasingly active economic
role in Africa today with an increase of 48 percent in its
economic aspirations since 2002. To paraphrase a statement made
to me by an African leader about the growing China relationship
in Africa. He says: We love the United States. You, above all
else, tell us exactly what we need. And then China turns around
and gives it to us.
The United States still remains number one in economic
relations in the totality of Africa with a $44 billion in 2005.
However, in Africa we have to be concerned about the inroads of
Jihadism, which is slow but steady. In my view, it is the
number one common concern loosely referred to as terrorism in
large, generally ungoverned areas, which spawn recruiting for
such activities from among the hopeless.
Shifting demographics and pandemic diseases are well-known.
The median age of Africa will soon be 15 years old, whereas in
Europe it will soon approach 50 years old. This
disproportionate distribution of wealth between the haves and
the have-nots, corruption, crime, piracy in potentially wealthy
states, but immense opportunities to bring stability and
economic recovery through a proactive engagement over a
sustained period of time.
It is estimated that 25 percent of the United States oil
imports will come form the Gulf of Guinea within the next ten
years. And liquid natural gas from the region will reach $30
billion within a 10-year period.
Theater security corporation activities led by the European
Command is derived from our regional priority and policy
guidance from the Secretary of Defense's security cooperation
guidance. The centerpiece of our efforts for security and
stability lies in building relationships with allies and
regional partners. Theater security cooperation is regionally
focused across five regions of Africa. And your next chart
should show how the African Union itself looks at Africa in
terms of five distinct regions.
A few examples of theater security initiatives may be
helpful. The Global Peace Operations Initiative, known as GPOI,
meets our growing need for peacekeeping operations, enables us
to work with lead nations and international organizations. In
Africa, US-GPOI will expand existing Africa contingency
operations, training and assistance programs to develop the
African capacity for peacekeeping operations and support.
Eighty million dollars in appropriations for GPOI was
provided in the 1005 omnibus appropriations bill. I would like
to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your efforts on GPOI in getting
funds to meet our growing need for well-trained peacekeeping
operation troops, and thank the many members of the committee
for their interest in developing and recognizing the strategic
importance of Africa.
Next I have two slides that may be of some interest to the
committee on the State Partnership Program, which is probably
one of the least understood, but most highly successful
programs that the United States has, not only in Africa but in
Europe. And I have taken the liberty of showing you the
distribution of our National Guard Partnership Programs in both
Europe and Africa.
Of note, in 2003 there were no programs of that kind of
Africa. And you can see the progress we have made in a short
period of time. This, to me, is an irreplaceable effort on
behalf of our state National Guard air and ground forces to
develop partnerships in developing areas of the world that are
based on mutual trust and confidence and confidence sharing and
capacity building. I can think of no program that has more
long-term significance and potential than the State Partnership
Program.
The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, known as
TSCTI, is a long-term interagency effort to combat terrorism in
the Trans-Saharan Africa. Its goals is to assist governments to
better understand and control events in their borders, to deny
safe haven for terrorist practices, recruiting, and training,
and to help fragile democracies who need our proactive help to
be successful in combating serious challenges within their
borders, challenges such as security, social problems, economic
problems, offsetting the Jihadism recruiting, corruption, and
crime, and a myriad of other difficulties that plague many
nations in Africa.
Another approach is a clearinghouse approach.
Clearinghouses created for Africa, the South Caucuses in
southeastern Europe, allowing the U.S. to coordinate our
actions with those of other nations involved in similar efforts
in the same regions. This has the effect of eliminating
redundancy. It saves money. It allows for more cohesive
international efforts. And it deconflicts many international
programs.
Africa Clearinghouse has brought 13 African countries
together with NATO, the EU, and the United Nations. An
inaugural conference was held in May 2004, focused on West
Africa and the Economic Community of West African States, known
as ECOWAS. And in December of that year, a similar conference
was held, which focused on the Eastern African states. So the
clearinghouse concept is very, very efficient and very
important for the future of our combined international
activities in Africa.
Finally, a word about our security assistance programs.
Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, is the means for those who
can afford it to obtain U.S. equipment. The FMF request for
2006 is at $38.5 million.
Secondly, the International Military Education and
Training, known as IMET, provides education and training for
foreign military and civilian personnel. Today's IMET
recipients are tomorrow's foreign military and civilian
leaders. The EUCOM portion for Africa of the IMET request for
2006 is $12.9 million.
One of the regular comments that one hears in Africa with
regard to the United States is that we are increasingly seen by
many as being difficult to work with, slow, and cumbersome in
our responses. And when we do respond, there are too many
strings attached and too many conditions to the assistance that
we provide.
It is increasingly clear to me that our client states,
especially in Africa, have other options that they can turn to,
and they are capitalizing on them. Nonetheless, most would
prefer a U.S. relationship. Usually on security issues, the
first telephone call they make is to the United States for
assistance.
In conclusion, it is a privilege to represent our proud
nation as a supreme allied commander of Europe and commander of
the U.S. European Command. The tasks we face in Africa are
enormous but are not insurmountable. The indispensable
influence attained by our forward presence coupled with our
theater security cooperation programs provides the best chance
of prevailing in the global war on terrorism and in meeting our
national security goals.
As we work together to improve our capabilities and to
advance U.S. policy objectives, we must also recognize that
today's complex security environment requires a greater degree
of coordination within our own government and among our allies
in order to be effective. As we support the African Union's
effort in Darfur, NATO is determined to work in full
transparency with the European Union, the United Nations, NGOs,
and individual nations.
Although very limited in scope and duration, the NATO
response to the crisis in Darfur is consistent with the
transformation of the alliance in response to the new security
environment. NATO and the United States, through the European
Command, are engaged in the most fundamental transformation and
contemporary history. it is an exciting time to be in Europe
and to be Africa.
And Mr. Chairman, I look forward to responding to any
questions you might have. Thank you for your attention.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, General Jones.
[The prepared statement of General Jones can be found in
the Appendix.]
The Chairman. We will once again have an eight-minute
question period for each one of us.
Let me start, General Jones, by saying that your own
leadership in the African mission has been really
extraordinary. And I ask from that context, on behalf of many
of us, for you to discuss how NATO became involved in Africa at
all. Concerning the context of our discussion with Darfur, we
are pleased that you are involved. The same question, I
suppose, could have been raised, and has been at various NATO
conferences, as to why NATO has taken an interest in the Middle
East, or taken a look at the Mediterranean associations in
which NATO has been involved.
You have mentioned these wide relationships with the United
Nations as a whole, but also obviously with the EU, with the
African Union. Describe the evolution of how the NATO mission,
the trans-Atlantic alliance and the mutual defense that was
implied by that almost half a century ago, has moved to Africa,
quite apart from other situations.
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, the evolution was not a rapid
one, as you know. NATO, as a result of the Prague Summit in
2002, began its most fundamental transformation in terms of its
capabilities. And as I mentioned, it finds itself now in
different parts of the world, a far cry from the static defense
philosophy of the 20th century.
I believe that NATO's interest in Africa is still quite
embryonic. But nonetheless, it is moving in the right
direction. There is an Article 5 mission in the Mediterranean
entitled Operation Active Endeavor. It is NATO's only
counterterrorism operation. But it spans the entire length of
the Mediterranean.
NATO recently revised its Mediterranean dialogue with seven
Mediterranean countries as partners, five of which are on the
southern rim of the Mediterranean, and is attracting that kind
of interest in the security of this very important body of this
very important sea.
Despite the many political difficulties that some countries
have in the region, particularly the North Africa, the one
thing they have in common is a deep and abiding respect for the
prospects of terrorism occurring in their own backyards and not
knowing anything about it. Similarly, the divide between North
Africa and the Mediterranean is no longer a wide expanse. In
literal terms, it is a little bit like stepping over a stream.
And European countries and the alliance are properly
concerned about mass immigration, unlawful immigration, the
spread of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, narco-
trafficking, and Jihadism coming from the south to the north.
And so I think NATO is coming to the realization that a little
proactive engagement could probably go a long way, instead of
being reactive and waiting for something extraordinarily bad to
happen and then having to spend millions, if not billions, of
Euros to counter whatever happens down the road.
NATO is also planning on having its final exercise
certifying the NATO response force next year in Cape Verde
islands, which is a considerable strategic distance, but it is
in a southern direction. NATO has always been an east-west
orientation. And it is exciting for me, at least on a strategic
sense, to see that kind of attention.
And the same holds true in the Middle East. The Secretary
General and NATO have sent emissaries to all countries in the
Persian Gulf to discuss how NATO might be of assistance in some
way. Some of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, notably
Israel and Jordan, of course, are very close to the theater. So
these are dialogues that are going on. And it is a
characteristic of an expanding scope of NATO's strategic focus.
And I think it is encouraging.
The Chairman. Well, that is a very important explanation,
in terms of both the geographical compactness now realized and
Europe's own situation with regard to many persons who have
come from the northern African states and who are resident now
in Europe, with sometimes the potential for terrorism and the
actuality of it in some unfortunate instances. It does show the
evolution of static conflict in Europe with respect to the war
on terrorism or the problems of international drugs or other
things that plague people.
And you have shown the tie-ins with the states of our
country, which is interesting, because there were many such
pairings in Europe. But now, as NATO's focus and Europe's come
together, this type of confluence of interest is apparent.
One thing you touched upon that is important, I think, is
to understand the tremendous search by China for
petrochemicals, and oil in particular, in Africa, and how this
affects the geopolitics. We may be unfair in our criticism of
the Chinese, but at least we have observed that they are not
fastidious with regard to the democratic elements. Wherever
there is oil, there are apparently deals to be made, to bid for
the last acre.
And the Chinese are not alone in that. They are sometimes
accompanied by people from India, for example, which is
confusing to us. As we saw just in the last few days, gas
pipelines suggested from India to Iran, at the very time that
we are involved in delicate negotiations with European friends
with regard to nuclear weapons in Iran.
Can you comment on this particular problem? It touches upon
Sudan, and it touches upon Algeria, as well as other countries
that have resources of this kind. Is this pervasive search for
oil, maybe even this desperate search, likely due to the
geopolitics that are involved? And how does that affect your
mission?
General Jones. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, a military
officer in uniform ventures into the political world at great
risk. But there is some clear signs of what is going on. I
think it is more fact, not conjecture. But a country like
China, for example, is not encumbered with some of the laws and
regulations, quite appropriately, that we have. And they are
actively working in Africa. And I might add that they are also
doing the same thing in our own hemisphere, in South America.
But that is for somebody else to talk about. But that is fairly
well recognized.
But they are actively--they are busy in Africa on a very
wide plane, to include scholarships for young Africans to come
to China to study, all expenses paid, to bring African officers
to China to study Chinese tactics and Chinese weaponry, and
then return to their countries. And they are making these
offers on a broad scale at a very reduced rate, very affordable
rate, many times absolutely free.
And the economic bargaining that goes in is at rates that
are very, very attractive and without any strings attached. So
this is, I think this is something that the United States, and
certainly other nations, have to look at. And I was pleased to
hear that there was going to be a conference with China on that
issue. And I think it is important that--that is not to say
that China cannot compete in Africa, but we all, as much as
possible, ought to be playing by the same rules. And right now
there is wide, it seems to me, to be wide disparity in how we
are playing.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, General Jones. It is a pleasure
to have you here. I cannot think at this moment in transition--
and you have referenced how NATO, when you were here in the
Senate and we were beginning--this is a different NATO. It is a
different world. And at this critical moment in this transition
period, when some in this country have questioned the utility
of NATO and the total expenditures that we have in NATO, I
cannot think of anybody we could have had better positioned to
be the Supreme Allied Commander than you. You bring a breath of
knowledge and also a breath of candor and straightforwardness
that those of us that sit on this side of the table have truly
valued. And I am not being solicitous.
So I want to thank you. Thank you for your leadership. And
that is not a usual thankful, General. I mean that sincerely.
It is a big deal. And it is a big deal where you are right now
for us, in my view.
I want to pursue a little bit of what the Chairman was
talking about. There is, at least in my travels in Europe, a
growing recognition of the importance strategically of Africa
to Europe. As you said, the Mediterranean is not very wide
anymore. And the concern about a destabilized continent and
what it can and might do to a stable Europe is something I
think is daunting on people.
But do you think there is the sense--and I realize you are
a military man. But I have, if I may say--when I first got here
as a young 29-year-old kid elected to the Senate, I thought
everyone--this is a slight exaggeration; it is a real
exaggeration--but I thought everyone that all the flag officers
in the United States military were Slim Pickens jumping out of
the back of a B-52, sitting on a hydrogen bomb. Remember that
movie?
And in the last 25 years, the single-most competent people
that I have encountered in all of government have been flag
officers. If I had to list the top 25 people that have
impressed me in my last 32 years, I would say 15 of them would
be wearing a uniform; because you not only understand the
Constitution, you understand foreign policy and you understand
military person.
So I am not being solicitous when I ask you this question.
What is your sense from the perm reps that you have to deal
with every day, that is the civilian ambassadors, if you will,
at NATO, as to their sense of the emerging competition that
China presents in Africa? Is it palpable yet or is it only kind
of at this strategic military level that people are thinking
about it?
General Jones. I think the answer to that is it is still
very embryonic and very nationally focused in terms of
individual domestic economic issues and where they are engaged.
And on Africa, as you know, it is very sensitive in view of the
history of many European countries in the continent. But it--I
think the good news is that there are elements of change here.
And I think that particularly with the world of the U.S.
European Command--and if I might, I meant to introduce Major
General Scott Gration, who is the J-5 at the U.S. European
Command. And the reason he is here, other than the fact that he
is a great U.S. Air Force officer, is that he is the son of an
African missionary. And he spent 17 years or 18 years of his
life in Eastern Africa and speaks fluent Swahili.
And I cannot tell you what a difference it makes when I go
to Africa or when General Wall goes and we get off the airplane
and here is an Air Force general officer who speaks fluent
Swahili and was raised in Africa. So it gives us a real leg up
on understanding the issues, as only somebody who has lived
there can explain them.
But I do believe that the focus of the Mediterranean
dialogue, the mission in Darfur, the NATO response force
operation in Cape Verde next year, and the operation Active
Endeavor, all of these are southern leanings that never existed
in NATO just three years ago.
Senator Biden. One of the things that some of us--I do not
speak for the Chairman, but my recollection is he may have
shared the same view, that when some of us over a year ago or
longer said NATO should get in the game here in Darfur, we were
basically told by some that, as my Grampa would say, ``that
horse can't carry that sleigh,'' that NATO is too overextended,
NATO is preoccupied, et cetera.
And it is interesting to me that the gold standard, quite
frankly, unfortunately for you all, is NATO. And when NATO
stands up, most folks, the bad guys, usually stand down. I am
being a bit facetious, but not really. My view was in our
discussions about NATO's involvement was that I was convinced
that if NATO stood up in any form, that the Janjaweed would
stand down, and Khartoum would back down.
Now here is the question I have. And my time is running and
I see my colleague from Illinois is here. So I will try to
consolidate this question. It seems to me that your present
activity, and you listed it as it relates to Darfur, to go from
the general to the specific, we are getting airlift map
exercises, capacity building, that we have a shot here of doing
something that can extend beyond the benefits that may flow to
Darfur immediately. And that is to begin the process of maybe,
maybe, moving the AU, the African Union, military capacity to a
different stage, a different place, that this may be this
exercise that allows that to begin to happen.
And so my question is, as it relates to Darfur, given the
constraints of the mandate under which the AU is currently
operating, such as Khartoum's ability to keep the African Union
from deploying to prevent attacks, if you were asked by the
NAC--and you may not want to answer this. But if I know you
well enough, as I think I do, hopefully you will--if you were
asked by the NAC, what further assistance would you recommend
that NATO provide the AU in order to enhance their ability to
protect civilians in Darfur beyond what you are doing, if--so
it goes more to your capacity, if you were given the mandate or
instructions. Is there the capacity in NATO to do more? I am
not suggesting you are not doing all you have been asked to do.
General Jones. The contribution of NATO nations, just from
a point of interest, included airlift donations from Denmark,
Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, U.K., and the United States,
and personnel from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Spain, U.K., and the U.S. deployed on this
mission, go into Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and other parts in
Africa.
The mission has been very carefully and very intentionally
scripted to provide support to the African Union. And
therefore, it is the African Union that NATO has asked to tell
us what it is, where we can be helpful. And what they have
asked for are the three elements that I described.
My feeling is that the African Union right now and the
military forces that we are dealing with are in fact about as
far along as they can be. We are talking about eight
battalions, roughly, six of which have been lifted into Darfur
already. Two are not quite far enough along to actually go
there.
So the capacity of what the African Union can contribute in
terms of troops is limited somewhat by the experience factor.
Although they can get a lot of men, they just cannot get a lot
of trained men. And secondly, the ability to sustain those
forces over a period of time. And that is a big problem.
So if, in fact, the alliance wanted to do more, it would be
in the area, I think, of training, of providing capacity, of
developing combat service support, and the logistics for
support of these battalions that are operating at huge
distances. I asked General Gration how big Sudan was in
relation to something in the United States. He said from Canada
to the Gulf of Mexico and from the East Coast to the
Mississippi. That is Sudan. Extraordinary distances.
And I am always relearning that lesson when I am thinking
of Africa, that you could take all of China, all of Russia,
most of Europe, put it in Africa and still have a lot of room.
So an enormous place. And that strategic distance makes it
difficult.
So I would say, if NATO wished and if the EU wished, or
other nations, keep supporting the African Union. Stay with it.
Teach them the values of how militaries operate in a democracy.
Make sure that human rights is part of the whole thing. And do
the nuts and bolts work that has to be done to develop these
competent forces. I do not think there is an overnight
solution.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous
consent, at the request of Senator Kerry--he is unable to be
here, but he would like to keep the record open until Friday so
he can submit questions. And with your permission, I would
like--I do not want to hold anything up here--to submit a few
more questions for the record, including the possibility of no-
fly zones being able to be enforced and a few other things.
But I thank you, all three of you gentlemen in uniform--
there are four, excuse me, in uniform here today--for being
here. You are an incredible asset to us. I thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden. The record will be
kept open through Friday to accommodate both Senator Kerry and
any questions that you may formulate for the witness.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you so much for not only appearing before us
today but also for the excellent work that you are doing. Since
I am the last person here, I will try to be brief and not delay
your departure. I just wanted to pick up on some themes that
Ranking Member Biden discussed. And I apologize that I missed
your initial testimony due to a conflicting meeting. If I am
going over old ground, please say so.
It sounds like there is an assessment that the AU forces
over time can be an extraordinarily valuable asset for the
entire continent. It also appears that their immediate presence
is having some salutary effect in at least witnessing what is
taking place and, as a consequence, preventing some of the more
outrageous activities from occurring.
It also sounds, though, that because of just limited troop
levels and capacity that the AU is not in a position to either
provide ongoing protection in this vast region to many Sudanese
who are still in their villages or outside of settlements. A
corollary of this is that if we ever wanted to move the
internally displaced persons back to their homes, they would
continue to be vulnerable.
There has been talk about increasing the levels of AU
troops to 12,000. Is that feasible in any reasonable period of
time? If not, what is your response, and what is your military
judgment, with respect to the possibility of blue helmeting
troops to get additional troops there?
General Jones. Thank you, Senator. This is a complex issue,
because when you talk about training competent formations,
military formations, depending on where they come from from
donor countries, the distance factor, as I mentioned earlier,
is a huge problem because it involves how you sustain these
forces once they are there.
And a second challenge is how you rotate them, because they
cannot obviously stay forever. So you need a rotation base for
the force that goes in there. But given resources, of which the
AU does not have a lot of, but given resources and given
training commitments by competent nations who wish to do that
kind of thing, capacity building, training headquarters, and
the like, you could increase the capacity relatively quickly.
But it would take a dedicated commitment over a reasonably
sustained period of time and the resources to do that. The
training aspect of it is really not terribly difficult, but the
totality of what needs to be done is expensive and it will take
time. But it can be done.
Senator Obama. So is it your judgment, then, that it is
something that would be useful, if we had the resources to do
it?
General Jones. I think you could do it. And I think the
African Union is the way to do it. I think in all of our
activities, whether it is NATO or the U.S. European Command in
Africa, we always try to make sure that there is African buy-in
to what we are doing and there is an African identification
with what we are doing. So that Africans must be involved in
developing their own future. And it must be, in my view, the--
it is nonnegotiable that they are off to the side while we are
doing anything. They have to be fully involved and have
ownership. And that works extraordinarily well, as you know.
Senator Obama. Right. Along those same lines, and let me
broaden the lens here for a second, you know, we have a
specific problem in Darfur, in Sudan. But as you are sadly
aware, there are a lot of other potential hot spots throughout
the Continent of Africa. One of the things that I am interested
in is what lessons we have learned from a military perspective
in terms of how we might be able to trigger early warning
systems in Africa, and inject ourselves in a constructive way
prior to things getting completely out of control? How might
NATO or the U.S. European Command play a role in conflict
resolution in advance of the kinds of severe civil war
situations that we are seeing?
General Jones. Senator, I thank you for that question,
because that is something that we have been thinking quite
about in the European Command, because it is at the essence of,
I think, success and failure in the 21st Century. And the way I
would answer the question is to say that I personally believe
that reactive costs are always vastly more expensive than
proactive costs. So I am an advocate for proactive engagement.
The key is to be able to decide where and at what time and
how you engage. So whether it is the United States bilaterally
or within a coalition or as part of NATO, I think the principle
is the same. For example, in Africa, using the proactive versus
reactive analogy, in 2004, we expended $2.9 billion or 96
percent of our total Africa security costs in a reactive way,
whereas a proactive engagement was only $120 million.
And what I am trying to suggest here is that if we are
able, and as we are doing, by the way, in North African and
sub-Saharan African where there is a common coming together
among nations about the concerns of security of their vastly
undermanned spaces and their borders, which have shown the
beginnings of Jihadism activities and recruiting, terrorism, if
you will, we are engaging for a very small amount of money with
U.S. forces and forces of other countries to help various
nations train their forces in support of a democracy.
But the difference is we are not waiting for something bad
to happen. We are doing it with them, pushing them to the
front, encouraging them to work with their neighbors on this
common problem. And it has been astounding to see the progress
in a short period of time. It is not page one of the Washington
Post, but it will help prevent a page one for the Washington
Post in 10 years' time or 15 years' time. And I believe that
this proactive engagement is really the key.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, General.
I would love at some point, Mr. Chairman, to explore this
question further and get some specifics in terms of what is
effective, what is not----
General Jones. I would be glad to.
Senator Obama. ----and what that might mean in terms of our
ongoing engagement with the continent. I appreciate your
appearance here.
General Jones. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. If you have additional questions, you may
proceed, if you want to.
Senator Obama. I think the general has already been
generous with his time. And you have been patient with me, as
usual.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, sir.
General, we thank you again for your comprehensive analysis
and for your personal leadership. And we appreciate the
military personnel who have accompanied you to the hearing.
Thanks again for all that you do for our country and for NATO
and for EUCOM.
General Jones. Thank you very much, Senator. It is a
pleasure to be here.
The Chairman. With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X E S
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Appendix I.--Prepared Statement\1\ of the
Honorable Robert B. Zoellick
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\1\ Deputy Zoellick's statement was presented to the committee in
the form of a Powerpoint presentation. So that the statement could be
included in this hearing print, we have converted the statement to
simple text.
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Goals of U.S. Policy
Unified, peaceful Sudan that contributes to regional development
and cooperates on counter-terrorism.
Fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA)
between North and South.
Economic development of all areas of Sudan.
Ending the recurring cycle of famine and suffering, cross-
border violence, and refugee flows.
Re-establish Sudan as a constructive participant in African
and international affairs.
Strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation.
A Government of National Unity that advances Sudan's development,
is responsive to the needs of all Sudan's peoples, and is accountable
to the Sudanese people through free elections.
Participatory and inclusive democratic government in a
federal system that respects human rights and shares resources
for the benefit of all Sudanese.
Successful, free, fair, and democratic elections at the
local, regional, and national levels within four years.
Build the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan,
improve conditions in southern Sudan and other marginalized
areas.
An end to violence in Darfur, reconciliation among tribal and other
groups, the voluntary return of people to their homes, and
accountability for the perpetrators.
In the meantime, humanitarian care and security for IDPs and
other civilians in Darfur and Chad, and security of operations
for NGOs and international donors.
Strengthened African Union capacity to provide basic security,
ensure humanitarian access, and mediate political conflicts, drawing on
success in Darfur and all of Sudan.
Demonstration of strong U.S. support for Africa's peaceful
development and democracy.
Background and Context
Sudan has been marked by ethno-religious exclusivism since Khartoum
traders and mercenaries carved out a state through conquest in the Nile
Valley in the 19th Century.
Historically dominated by a small clique of traders, soldiers, and
administrators.
Drawn from tribes along the Nile north of Khartoum.
Arab cultural and religious orientation; links to Cairo,
Damascus, Saudi Arabia.
Khartoum has been an Arab metropolis surrounded by impoverished
sub-Saharan expanses.
In the South, a traditional African tribal structure
(animist and Christian communities).
In the West, in Darfur, a mixing of African-Arab Muslim
tribes which have come over centuries in waves: West Africans
on long migrations (and trade routes); ancient Saharan peoples;
and Arab tribes from the North.
Mixture of nomads and farmers, complex networks
connected to desert-edged villages, very dependent on
rain-fed (boom and bust) agriculture and grasses.
In the North, a mixture of Arab tribes (comprised of
Nubians--a significant minority group) predominate in the urban
areas.
In the East, generally egalitarian, pastoral Beja with
ancestral ties to Egypt and Nubians.
In the past (until 1989), a weak center in Khartoum co-opted
regional constituencies to create a power base.
Independent Fur Sultanate (of 17th century) of Darfur
overthrown by the British in 1916.
Imperial ``native administration'' awarded homelands with
paramount chiefs, displacing older, more fluid social order.
(Some nomadic groups didn't get lands, lighting a long fuse for
the future.)
Rule depended on effectiveness of local leadership and
government.
Tribal conferences as a means to settle disputes.
Sudan achieved independence from Great Britain in 1956.
Largest country on the continent.
Borders nine other countries.
Estimated 40 million people in 2005.
Roots of conflict:
Strong resentment from the periphery of Muslim Arab
domination at the center--southern groups commence struggle
coincident with independence in 1956.
Peace agreement in 1972 failed because it was not fully
implemented; GOS imposed Shari'a Law in 1983; southern civil
war resumes under the leadership of Dr. John Garang, a
southerner who had been integrated into the GOS military during
the 1972 peace implementation.
First use of government-mobilized militias in the South as a
counterinsurgency strategy in mid-1980s, drawing on cattle-
herding Arabs of Darfur (reliance on brutality, starvation, and
robbery).
An estimated two and one-half million die in conflict that
stretches across 21 years. Millions more displaced internally
and externally.
Darfur in conflict in the mid-1980s:
Drought and famine of 1984-85--breakdown and migration.
In 1987, Libya used the region as a ``backdoor'' into Chad.
``Islamic Legion'' and a new racial ideology (``Arabism'').
In 1989, General Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir overthrew the
government to abort a peace initiative and established the
Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation to rule Sudan. The
National Islamic Front, led by Dr. Hassan al Turabi, took over as the
leading party.
Hyperinflation of 1978-95 wipes out Sudan's traditional middle-
class.
Turabi prosecutes a vicious war in the south; reaches out with
Islamic embrace in Darfur, but without real effect on development.
In 1992, declaration of Jihad in Kordofan against SPLA-led Nuba
Mountains rebellion; failed effort to create Islamic state through
force.
In 1998, army, militias, and starvation used in oilfield zones of
Upper Nile province in southern Sudan; battle over money and power, as
well as Islam.
During 1990s, Turabi hosts Osama bin Laden.
U.S. attack on a suspect WMD production facility possibly linked to
al-Qaida in Khartoum, August 1998.
In 1999, split within Islamic movement in Khartoum: President
Bashir arrests Turabi.
The U.S. launches a peace initiative for Sudan in early 2001.
Senator Danforth appointed September 5, 2001.
After September 11, 2001, the GOS accelerates reorientation toward
the U.S.
Bashir fearful of Sudan's association with terrorists.
GOS cannot defeat Garang and the SPLM militarily.
Politics driven by exhaustion--worn down by decades of war, failure
of ambitious ideological projects--and substantial U.S. and
international pressure led to North-South Accord (Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA)) signed in January 2005.
New pattern ofpower-sharing among geographically-defined
constituencies.
Prospects for development (in part through energy) with
greater international acceptance.
Outside Khartoum, the impulse for equality and emancipation pulls
in opposite directions: Should the peripheries win strongest possible
representation at the center to obtain fair share of power and
resources, or should they break away?
Khartoum's old habits--and fears of separation--are also in tension
with the negotiated power-sharing.
In 2002, some Darfurians complained of Arab militia
harassment; the problem festered and the rebels attacked a
police station in 2003.
Even as Khartoum negotiated with the SPLM in the south
(starting 2002), it unleashed the army and a brutal militia
counterinsurgency in Darfur in 2003.
Some in Khartoum believe CPA negotiation gives away too
much.
Large loss of life, widespread rape and destruction of
villages, over two million forced from their homelands.
Violence carried out by government forces, Arab militias
(Jinjaweed), SLA, and JEM. Large-scale interference with
humanitarian programs by GOS.
Some Darfur rebels (SLA) have ties with SPLM.
U.S. finds genocide has occurred in Darfur (September 9,
2004); UN rules ``crimes against humanity'' (January 2005).
Dangers elsewhere in Sudan: Eastern provinces as well as Kordofan.
Need to try to prevent flare ups of violence.
Strong African interest to: avoid destabilization of nine
neighbors; prevent possible breakups of states; demonstrate the African
Union's ability to deal with African problems.
The Naivasha (North-South) Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
U.S. initiative led to active IGAD peace process.
Begun in 2002, signed January 9, 2005.
U.S. mediation vital, led by Senator Danforth.
A fair political arrangement founded on power and wealth sharing,
leading to national elections within 4 years.
Very detailed implementation requirements.
Pre-Interim period ended as scheduled on July 9.
Ratified Interim National Constitution, initiating a
new Government of National Unity for 6-Year Interim
Period.
Established new Institution of Presidency (Garang sworn
in as First VP).
Instituted a bicameral national legislature
(established September 1, 2005).
Shared ministerial positions (announced September 20,
2005).
Established legal basis for Government of Southern
Sudan.
Commits parties to develop process for competitive
elections, oil-revenue sharing, joint-integrated military
units, and respect for human rights.
South can ``opt-out'' through referendum at end of 6-Year
Interim Period.
Death of Dr. John Garang
On July 30, Dr. Garang was killed in a helicopter crash. The U.S.
dispatched an NTSB team to participate in the international
investigation of the crash's causes, deemed an accident by Mrs. Garang
and the SPLM (final report expected January 2006).
Communal violence erupts in Khartoum, Juba, and other cities.
To address sources of fragility, we accelerated work in Juba
(water and sanitation, electricity, food assistance), in the
three transition areas (Abyei, Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue
Nile), and with the new Government of South Sudan.
Salva Kiir, Garang's deputy, is announced as the new head of the
SPLM and First Vice President of Sudan in an orderly succession
process, signaling reliance on CPA.
Dr. Garang is buried in Juba, the ``capital'' of the South on
August 6 with President Bashir and Salva Kiir participating in the
service. Security was provided by joint SPLA and GOS military forces.
Sensitive moment for both new SPLM leadership and North-South
working relations.
Dr. Garang was the strongest Southern voice for a unified Sudan
under the CPA.
The CPA and Darfur: Reinforcing Upward, Arresting Downward Spirals
The CPA creates a political and constitutional framework for
sharing authority and wealth within which to end the conflicts in
Darfur and other regions.
SPLM involvement in the new Government of National Unity should
also help resolve Darfur.
Backing by the U.S. and countries around the world creates a
positive incentive to come to terms.
So the ``upward spiral'' is CPA implementation, a new Sudanese
government and approach, an expanded AU mission on the ground, and
reconciliation in Darfur (and other areas) within this political
framework.
But ongoing tragedy in Darfur will preclude U.S. and other support
for the new government and CPA implementation: the ``downward spiral.''
Darfur's Needs:
Supply food and basic necessities to camps for people forced off
lands (some 2 million) and communities affected by the conflict;
improve security inside and outside camps; foster political
reconciliation among the government, rebel groups, and various tribes;
and redress long-term economic and social issues driving conflict.
Good rains, improved security, and the distribution of seeds has
led to a projected 60% increase over 2004 in the amount of crops
planted in West Darfur, the most stable of the three states of Darfur.
Increases have been seen in all three states.
However, insecurity and limited access will still interfere with
the 2005 harvest. Continued food assistance will be needed in 2006.
Drought exacerbating human needs, increasing displaced populations.
Food flowing: AID has done a great job along with NGOs.
68% of food delivered to Darfur in 2005 is supplied by the
U.S.
GOS harassment of NGOs has decreased while rebel harassment
and banditry has increased.
The AU is expanding security forces to 7,700 (currently 6,003
deployed).
NATO/EU are providing transport, logistical, planning
support.
Deployment targeted for completion in October 2005.
Expand AU police operations to about 70 camps. Need to
stress safety of women.
Sudanese government supports AU/NATO role.
U.S.: Airlifted Rwandans; visited Rwanda to discuss and
thank; $50 million deployed promptly to build quarters;
assisted with AU planning and logistics.
Secretary Rice made ending violence against women a major priority.
Sudanese government has made commitments; U.S. has linked progress to
Trafficking in Persons status. U.S. will support by opening women's
crisis centers in Darfur and monitoring progress closely.
Large-scale organized violence has substantially subsided, but
situation remains fragile and dangerous.
GOS military pulled back, but Jinjaweed and other militias have not
been disbanded and continue to contribute to the violence.
Rebels (SLA/JEM) active, attacking humanitarian convoys and
fighting over livestock.
JEM connects with Turabi, the former Prime Minister.
Recent increase in violence; possibly positioning for
negotiations.
AU peace talks between GOS and rebels have made modest progress,
resumed September 15 with training workshops; substantive talks began
September 26
Declaration of Principles signed July 5, 2005.
Important for the AU to continue to lead.
SLM infighting has impeded talks.
U.S. supporting through work with UN representative, partner
countries for AU, SPLM, senior U.S. officials on the scene.
UN resolutions on economic sanctions and accountability signal no
impunity for crimes against humanity or genocide, by any party.
ICC has begun its investigations.
Goal is to create secure environment and political, tribal
reconciliation so people can voluntarily return home safely beginning
during the first half of 2006.
Disarm militias.
Still face huge challenge of restarting life, redressing
issues of land, grazing rights, and water.
Tribal tensions due to land, drought, new settlements will
remain--conflict among tribes over local resources.
CPA Follow-Through:
Oslo Donors Conference:
$4.5 billion pledges (for CPA implementation and
humanitarian needs throughout Sudan); need delivery.
U.S. (for all of Sudan): $630 million in FY 2004: $1.135
billion in FY 2005, plus additional $132 million CIPA; seeking
$540 million in FY 2006, plus additional $250 million CIPA.
Norway leading on follow-up for donors. From FY 2003-2005,
U.S. has committed more than $1.9 billion to Sudan.
UNSC Resolution 1590 on March 24 authorized 10,715 observer force
for southern Sudan. (2622 deployed as of 21 September 2005)
UNSC Resolution 1627 (September 23) extended the UNMIS
mandate through March 24, 2006.
Deployment started in May 2005; aim for completion by
December 2005.
U.S. maintaining Civilian Protection Monitoring Team through
October; excellent monitoring work.
Food shortages for returnees and displaced persons.
U.S. has provided over 61% of food delivered to non-Darfur
Sudan in 2005.
Acute food shortages are occurring in remote areas of Sudan,
including parts of Bahr Al Ghazal, Nuba Mountains, and Upper
Nile.
Prospects are better for the 2005 harvest, but estimates
suggest it will still be far less than normal. The pace of
population returns to Southern Sudan is expected to accelerate
following the rainy season and the consolidation of the
Government of Southern Sudan, which will increase humanitarian
needs.
Peace in Darfur will increase humanitarian requirements to
support returns.
Press Sudanese Government to work with SPLM and Uganda on Lord's
Resistance Army (in far south).
Working with Government of Southern Sudan to set up basic
institutional capabilities:
Sent Interagency Assessment Team.
Total of $19.68 million in FY 05 for programs to assist the
formation of the GOSS.
Need to show progress and transparency in the south.
Continuing to push the Sudanese government on CPA implementation in
an inclusive fashion (to include other groups).
Formation of the Government of National Unity and other CPA steps
delayed due to death of Dr. Garang.
Need to work with GONU through the challenging transition.
U.S. team arrived promptly to signal U.S. support for CPA
and consult with the parties on the way forward in the wake of
Dr. Garang's death.
SPLM and Salva Kiir have affirmed support for the CPA.
CPA implementation moving forward. New National Assembly
with SPLM representation has met. President Bashir made
positive statement.
GONU was formally constituted with appointment of new
ministers on September 20.
Need to support formation of Government of Southern Sudan.
Support safe and voluntary return of displaced Sudanese.
Encourage GONU to improve international acceptability.
Especially Darfur, handling of IDPs and refugees.
Encourage new policies at national, local, and provincial
governance; promoting security and community-level conflict resolution;
economic development; and health and education.
GONU needs to cease forced relocations of IDPs from sites
near Khartoum.
Issues Regarding CPA Implementation
Delays related to Dr. Garang's death.
Steady reduction of Sudanese military forces in Juba is a
prerequisite for Juba serving as the new capital for the Government of
Southern Sudan.
Key mechanisms of CPA need to be put in place, e.g. Assessment and
Evaluation Commission, National Petroleum Commission.
Need active SPLM engagement in GONU.
Need powers in Khartoum to work seriously with SPLM as GONU
partners.
Stop violent displacement of IDPs in Khartoum by State authorities.
GONU partners need to act jointly to eliminate LRA presence in
Sudan.
The report of the Abyei Boundaries Commission needs to be
implemented in a manner that fully complies with the provisions of the
CPA.
In Summary
Need to work with Sudan an multiple transitions:
War to peace.
Centralization to genuine federalism--devolution of power.
Emergency to development.
Military rule to democracy.
Upward or Downward Spirals.
Working closely with AU.
Multilateral diplomacy with particular African partners; the
UN; Arab states; UK, Canada, Norway, Netherlands; NATO; EU;
others.
Three visits to Khartoum, different parts of Darfur, Rumbek in
southern Sudan.
Secretary Rice visited Khartoum and Darfur in mid-July.
Appointed Special Representative Roger Winter to augment my
personal involvement, working closely with Assistant Secretary Jendayi
Frazer.
Will need Congressional support and resources.
Not a smooth, nor clear-cut path.
Must concentrate on both achieving accords and implementing them--
lots of detailed work.
SUDAN
AMIS Locations in Darfur as of Sept. 9, 2005
Map of UNMIS Sector Allocations
Appendix II.--Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Members of the Committee to Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator Biden
to Deputy Secretary Zoellick
Question. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who are operational
have said that the presence of the African Union (AU) has made a
difference, but there are some problems. First, the AU is ill-equipped.
For example, one of the AU brigades in North Darfur is woefully under
equipped with only two vehicles for 144 soldiers, and one AK-47 rifle
and two magazines of ammunition per soldier, which seems to me to be
barely enough for self-defense. Second, civilians on the ground say
that the armed groups get to know the AU schedule. If the AU patrols on
Friday, for example, the attacks happen on a Wednesday. So the
janjaweed are able to outsmart the AU much of the time. As a result,
many civilians are losing confidence in the AU's ability to improve
security.
Is it true that the AU is not properly equipped to do its job? Is
the current AU appeal for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) fully funded?
How much money was requested specifically to support AMIS in the
President's FY 06 budget request? Out of which account was it
requested? How much money do you anticipate needing in the coming year
to support the AU? What are we doing bilaterally through NATO, to
improve the capabilities of the contingents on the ground to provide
security effectively?
Answer. The presence of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)
has made a notable difference and has contributed to the fact that
large-scale violence in Darfur has subsided, particularly in those
areas where AMIS is deployed. We are continuing to work closely with
Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, the EU, NATO and others to make sure
that AMIS has what it needs to successfully accomplish its mission. We
have committed over $160 million to AMIS thus far, primarily for camp
construction, operations and maintenance. We are encouraging the EU to
release the =70 million it has identified for AMIS in 2006 from its
African Peace Facility. Since NATO became involved, we have been able
to coordinate the airlift to Darfur of nearly 5,000 additional AMIS
personnel as well as provide additional training for newly deployed and
rotating troops. AMIS is now at approximately 6,100 personnel on the
ground. We are also working to deploy 105 Canadian-contributed Armored
Personnel Carriers and support vehicles to Darfur as part of Canada's
larger $100 million-plus AMIS commitment. In addition to NATO airlift
assistance, we continue coordinate with AMIS to pursue the possibility
of an expanded NATO support role to bolster command and control in
discussions with the AU.
Due to the evolving and expanding AMIS operation throughout FY 05,
and our budget cycles, the Administration did not request funds to
support AMIS in the President's FY 06 budget. To fund AMIS we were
compelled to allocate $160 million in PKO funds from FY 05 accounts and
the FY05 supplemental. We urge Congress' support for new Sudan funding
needs and we will continue to work with Congress to ensure that AMIS is
properly equipped, particularly for such needs as ground and aviation
fuel, salaries and medical assistance, and camp operations and
maintenance.
But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just
improving the capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working hard
to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary, respond
to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe the
ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in Abuja.
For that reason, we support the AU mediation with technical experts.
Our continued strong pressure on both the government and the Darfur
rebels underscores to the parties our determination to resolve the
Darfur crisis.
Question. Rape has been rampant in Darfur. According to NGO's
working in the field, even in instances in which the general security
situation improves, sexual violence continues unabated. The requirement
for women to go through the police to seek medical care--which the
government knows they will rarely do--still exists de facto if not de
jure. Clearly the government is prepared to go to extraordinary lengths
to prevent the world from knowing the extensive use of sexual violence
as a weapon of war in Darfur. Do you agree with those who say that
sexual violence in Darfur has not diminished and that the perpetrators
operate with complete impunity?
Answer. Secretary Rice and I believe that ending violence against
women is a critical component of our policy on Sudan. During our visits
to Darfur, both the Secretary and I spoke with victims and heard their
horrific stories. In response, the United States has taken a number of
steps to address this problem, and we are beginning to see some
changes, but much more remains to be done.
For example, we launched an initiative to combat violence against
women, including working with the Government of National Unity (GONU)
to implement new institutional policies and procedures to protect women
from violence and end the impunity long associated with the crime of
rape. One component of our plan is the opening and expansion of women's
crisis centers in IDP camps.
We are also aggressively monitoring an action plan developed by the
Government of National Unity aimed at violence against women in Darfur.
This action plan includes removal of the notorious ``Form 8'' filing
requirement, which forced rape victims to file a form with the police
before seeking medical attention. The Sudanese penal code has been
amended to clarify that Form 8 is no longer required for rape victims
seeking medical services. Further, we are pressing the Sudanese
government to disseminate information on the removal of the Form 8
requirement at every level of government. Additionally, the Sudanese
action plan includes a series of workshops in Khartoum and the state
capitals in Darfur intended to raise awareness that violence against
women is a crime punishable by law. Under the plan, police forces will
be given extra training on protecting human rights, especially those of
women and girls. Vice President Taha has agreed to chair a technical
committee devoted to overseeing implementation of this action plan.
Local government officials in Darfur have started to acknowledge
that rape is a problem--this is a big step from a few months ago, but
is clearly only a first step. In order to change the climate of
impunity, government officials must take steps to enforce appropriate
laws. We have used resolutions at the UN to pressure the government to
end the climate of impunity, such as UNSCR 1591, establishing a UN
Sanctions committee empowered to freeze the assets and impose travel
bans on individuals responsible for violence and atrocities in Darfur.
Question. According to the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking
in Persons, Sudan was removed from Tier 3 to Tier 2 Watchlist because
of the government's commitment to implement a plan of action to end
sexual violence against women in Darfur. What does sexual violence in
Darfur have to do with trafficking in persons? Are people being
trafficked from Darfur? Why did the announcement of a plan--rather than
its implementation--prompt the removal of Sudan from Tier 3?
Answer. Sexual violence is directly related to trafficking in
persons. In Darfur, one of the consequences of rape is cultural
ostracism. Victims are often forced to leave their home communities,
shunned by family members, and left with no resources to care for
themselves and their children, and often find themselves vulnerable
targets of abduction, trafficking, and further sexual exploitation. For
other girls and women, a sexual assault may be only the first act of
violation, to be followed by abduction and sale into servitude.
The Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report released on June 1, 2005,
stated that Sudan is a source country for women and children trafficked
for the purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation. On July 21,
Secretary Rice visited an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in
Darfur, talked with victims of rape, and emphasized the need for the
government to actively take steps to combat violence against women in
Darfur. On August 13, the Sudanese responded with an action plan,
indicating the steps it would take and the ministries responsible for
implementation. During the next month, the government began to
implement the plan and we are seeing the first steps of recognition by
local governments in Darfur that sexual violence is a problem that must
be addressed.
The TIP legislation is designed to encourage and to acknowledge
government planning to combat trafficking. In accordance with the
legislation, the Administration placed Sudan on the Tier 2 Watch List
(T2WL) for TIP on a probationary basis, based on its action plan. Since
the T2WL designation involves no change in US policy other than a
prohibition, we view this action as an incentive to achieve better
results on this important issue, which is the objective of our TIP
efforts.
Of particular note, the Government sent an order to the Director
General of the Ministry of Interior to distribute Form 8 clarification
(Form 8 required a Sudanese woman to name her assailant, in the case of
rape, before she was able to receive medical treatment--a procedure
which put many women at immediate risk of retaliation by the accused)
to all police stations in Darfur. We have told the Sudanese we expect
progress on the plan and a tangible demonstration of improvements in
the status of women in Darfur. We plan an interim assessment in two
months and will continue to reevaluate Sudan's TIP ranking.
Question. What is the U.S. Government doing to ensure that over
11,500 aid workers on the ground in Darfur are able to provide
desperately needed humanitarian services in an increasingly hostile
environment?
Answer. During my trips to Darfur, I have been impressed by the
dedication and professionalism of the NGO workers I have met--they work
under extremely difficult conditions and yet bring care and commitment
to their work. When I visit Sudan, I always make it a point to visit
NGO workers and talk with them about ways we can help.
I have personally intervened with the SLM to respect and support
the efforts of humanitarian workers. The SLM issued a statement stating
it would protect these workers. During the course of my last visit, I
also raised my concern over the commercial traffic ban at the Kalma IDP
camp.
We are working closely with the African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS), the UN, international partners, and non-government
organizations to create a secure environment for delivery of
humanitarian relief and ensure that these workers have the support they
need in order to be able to reach the people in need.
In partnership with the UN, AMIS is focused on ensuring the safe
delivery of humanitarian assistance. Much of AMIS's activity is through
what they call ``military diplomacy.'' They mediate conflict by
facilitating dialogue between warring tribal groups. When I was in
Golo, Rwandan Deputy Force Commander Kazura pulled together
representatives from the Sudanese Government, the SLA, and several
local NGOs to jointly agreed on the creation of a humanitarian corridor
so that injured civilians could reach a local hospital.
We continue to encourage the AU to coordinate closely with NGOs to
ensure that AMIS efforts to improve overall security in Darfur are also
carefully directed at producing a secure environment for delivery of
humanitarian relief. When requested and possible, AMIS provides escort
for humanitarian convoys. To further facilitate the effective delivery
of humanitarian assistance to the most critically vulnerable
populations throughout Darfur, the USG has also provided more than
$17.8 million to the UN World Food Program for the transportation of
humanitarian personnel and goods in difficult to access areas, as well
as for logistics, road rehabilitation, and communications support.
But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing
the composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working
hard to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary,
respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe
the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in
Abuja.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the UN will play in
peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace-building in Darfur over the
long-term?
Answer. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has had
considerable success in stopping large-scale organized violence in
Darfur under extremely difficult conditions. The strong support
provided by the United States and other nations to AMIS has forged a
partnership that highlights the importance of enabling African
responses to African crises. Though acts of violence and banditry still
occur in Darfur, the UN and other international observers agree that
AMIS has been critical to improving the conditions for the people of
Darfur in the areas where it operates.
AMIS has made an unprecedented effort to end the violence and
atrocities in Darfur, but we need to assess continually whether it has
the capacity for future operations such as facilitating the return of
refugees and IDPs. AMIS has a broad mandate, and the number of AMIS
troops has increased, but as this complex and multidimensional
peacekeeping mission expands, we need to evaluate how AMIS is
responding. An AU-led assessment mission will visit Darfur in December
for this purpose. The mission will include U.S., EU, UN, and NATO
representatives.
We remain focused on increasing international support to AMIS,
while also working closely with the AU and others to determine next
steps. We will proceed carefully with this assessment since we don't
want to undermine this important African response to a major African
problem. Further, we want to ensure the possible extension of a UN
peacekeeping force, and that its troop components correspond to Darfur
sensibilities and needs. As you are aware, while the UN peacekeeping
force in the South (UNMIS) is established, it is not yet fully
deployed. Among the options we will examine jointly with the AU is
whether there should be an increased role for the UN, and possibly one
which could incorporate elements of the AU peacekeeping force.
But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing
the composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working
hard to to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary,
respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the
international community believe the ultimate solution to violence in
Darfur is a peace agreement in Abuja.
__________
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator Kerry
to Deputy Secretary Zoellick
Question. Large scale attacks by the government forces and related
militias have declined in recent months. But daily attacks against
civilians and aid workers continue, in a climate of banditry and
lawlessness. Just this month, a humanitarian convoy was ambushed by
armed men, villages in south Darfur were attacked by Arab tribesman,
and commercial convoys were attacked in west Darfur. The aid workers
were robbed, beaten, and threatened with death if they returned to the
region. And displaced civilians throughout many of the Darfur regions
say they still did not feel safe enough to go home, despite deployment
of the African Union forces.
Is the administration convinced that the African Union, even with
logistical and transport assistance from NATO, is an adequate
international response to the ongoing genocide in Darfur?
Answer. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has made an
impact and is justifiably proud of what it has accomplished. Though
acts of violence and banditry still occur in Darfur, AMIS has been
critical to improving the conditions for the people of Darfur in the
areas where it operates. AMIS has showed the importance of enabling
African responses to African crises, with strong support from the
United States and other international donors.
AMIS has made an unprecedented effort to end the violence and
atrocities in Darfur, but we need to assess continually whether it has
the capacity for future operations such as facilitating the return of
refugees and IDPs. AMIS has a broad mandate, and the number of AMIS
troops has increased, but as this complex and multidimensional
peacekeeping mission expands, we need to evaluate how AMIS is
responding. An AU-led assessment mission will visit Darfur in December
for this purpose. The mission will include U.S., EU, UN, and NATO
representatives.
We are focused on increasing international support to AMIS, while
also working closely with the AU and others to determine next steps.
Among the options we will examine jointly with the AU is whether there
should be an increased role for the UN. We will proceed carefully with
this assessment since we don't want to undermine this important African
response to a major African problem. Further, we want to ensure the
possible extension of a UN peacekeeping force, and that its troop
components correspond to Darfur sensibilities and needs. As you are
aware, while the UN peacekeeping force in the South (UNMIS) is
established, it is not yet fully deployed. Among the options we will
examine jointly with the AU is whether there should be an increased
role for the UN, and possibly one which could incorporate elements of
the AU peacekeeping force. But ending the violence in Darfur will take
more than just changing the composition and capabilities of
peacekeeping forces. We are working hard to augment the AU's already
impressive capabilities to deter and, when necessary, respond to
ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe the
ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in Abuja.
Question. Reportedly, many of those perpetrating violence on the
ground are fully aware of the African Union's limited mandate and
believe that AU forces will not intervene during violent clashes. In
addition, many civilians seem to be losing confidence because of
apparent confusion among various African troop contributors over the
mandate.
a. How does the administration interpret the mandate of the
AU forces?
b. Do you believe that the mandate allows these forces to
intervene and protect civilians? If so, in what way and under
what conditions?
c. Do you believe the mandate should be expanded and would
the administration support such an expansion?
d. Wouldn't it make sense to give all of the AU forces a
clear mandate and robust rules of engagement to provide the
security environment we say we want?
Answer. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has a broad
mandate that allows troops to monitor and observe compliance with the
N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement; to assist in the process of
confidence building; to contribute to a secure environment for delivery
of humanitarian relief; to support the return of internally displaced
persons and refugees to their homes; and, to contribute to the
improvement of the overall security situation in Darfur. The AU's
mandate and rules of engagement were expanded in May to include
allowing AU troops ``to protect civilians under imminent threat.''
Though acts of violence and banditry still occur in Darfur, the
international community agrees that AMIS has been critical to improving
the conditions for the people of Darfur in the areas where it operates.
We would support any expansion of the mandate that the AU feels
necessary to better ensure that violence and banditry are reduced and
that would bolster the confidence of the Darfur people. However, the
central issue is more one of resources and its role. We have consulted
with AMIS about its needs, assured it that we would support a further
augmentation of troops, and redoubled our efforts to deploy 105
Canadian contributed Armored Personnel Carriers to Darfur. However,
since these are AU troops, adopting a more robust peacekeeping role
could also increase the threat level to these troops. Of necessity we
look to the AMIS leadership to make the decision about the appropriate
combat response, since it is one which affects the lives of their
personnel.
But a broadened AU mandate or more troops on the ground will not
solve the fundamental problems in Darfur. Ending the violence in Darfur
will take more than a military solution; it will require a political
agreement in Abuja. Consequently, our efforts are focused in two
directions: strengthening AMIS in Darfur and accelerating the Abuja
peace process upon which a sustainable peace depends.
__________
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator Obama
to Deputy Secretary Zoellick
Question. Mr. Secretary, in July, 2004, the AU prepared a plan for
making the mission in Sudan more effective. This plan emphasized the
importance of disarming Janjaweed militias protecting civilians, and
facilitating humanitarian assistance.
The AU, however, soon concluded that Khartoum's tacit cooperation
was needed for successful deployment--limiting the scope of AU
activities to those acceptable to the Sudanese government and
significantly scaling back the AU's mandate.
a. The AU is doing extremely dangerous work under some of the
most difficult conditions imaginable, and I applaud their
efforts. However, my question is this: as long as the AU
mission--no matter how good its intentions--is built within a
framework that rests on the tacit approval of Khartoum, isn't
it inherently limited on what it can hope to accomplish in
Darfur?
b. How can we change the AU mission to get out of this box?
How do we divorce the structure of the AU away from the
influence of Khartoum?
c. Let me play devil's advocate and ask if you believe the AU
approach to be flawed? Do we need to be thinking about options
outside the AU--such as a UN ``blue helmeted'' peacekeeping
mission, with a strong mandate from the Security Council and a
steady funding stream? Do we need to consider some other
approach?
Answer. I agree that the African Union (AU) is doing hard work and
has had success. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has made an
unprecedented effort to end large-scale violence and atrocities in
Darfur. The strong support provided by the United States and other
nations has forged a partnership that highlights the importance of
enabling African responses to African crises. Though acts of violence
and banditry still occur in Darfur, the UN and other international
observers agree that AMIS has been critical to improving the conditions
for the people of Darfur in the areas where it operates. Importantly,
the AU's presence in Darfur has provided international observation of
the conflict and the activities of each party.
The Sudanese government has given permission to the AU to operate a
military mission inside its territory partly because the AU has played
such an effective mediating role. Khartoum granted approval for 105
armored personnel carriers that have been made available to AMIS by our
Canadian allies. The Sudanese government has also agreed to NATO and
European Union airlift assistance to AMIS.
AMIS has made an unprecedented effort to end the violence and
atrocities in Darfur, but we need to assess continually whether it has
the capacity for future operations such as facilitating the return of
refugees and IDPs. AMIS has a broad mandate, and the number of AMIS
troops has increased but as this complex and multidimensional
peacekeeping mission expands, we need to evaluate how AMIS is
responding. An AU-led assessment mission will visit Darfur in November
for this purpose. The mission will include U.S., EU, UN, and NATO
representatives.
We are focused on increasing international support to AMIS, while
also working closely with the AU and others to determine next steps.
Among the options we will examine jointly with the AU is whether there
should be an increased role for the UN, and one that possibly could
incorporate elements of the AU peacekeeping force. An AU-led assessment
mission will visit Darfur in December for this purpose. The mission
will include U.S., EU, UN, and NATO representatives.
But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing
the composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working
hard to augment the AU's capabilities to deter, and when necessary,
respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe
the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in
Abuja.
To fund AMIS we were compelled to allocate $160 million in PKO
funds from FY 05 accounts and the FY 05 supplemental. We could help
AMIS more if we had the financial resources. We look for an increase in
financial support from the Congress in the next spending bill.
Question. Mr. Secretary, there is no question that the AU is doing
dangerous work under some of the most difficult conditions imaginable.
That said, a number of analysts have identified three basic problems
with the AU Mission in Sudan:
One, a problematic mandate, which is not sufficiently clear
concerning the protection of civilians and humanitarian workers. Two, a
lack of troops--at most 7,700 soldiers by the end of October (current
levels are between 5,500 and 5,800)--to patrol a vast area. Three, a
lack of capacity: intelligence, interoperability, logistics, and air
support.
a. Are we sure that we can do enough to fix these three base,
but substantial, flaws of the AU Mission in Sudan--in a
relatively short amount of time--in order for this force to be
effective at ending the violence in Darfur? Or should we be
thinking of solutions outside of the AU?
b. Mr. Secretary, please detail what the U.S. and the
international community is doing to address the flaws--that I
just outlined--with the AU mission. Is this enough? What else
can and should be done?
Answer. We believe that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)
can be justifiably proud of what it has accomplished. Though acts of
violence and banditry still occur in Darfur, the UN and international
observers agree that AMIS has been critical to transforming the
security situation and improving the conditions for the people of
Darfur in the areas where it is operational. The strong support
provided by the United States and other nations to the African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has highlighted the importance of enabling
African responses to African crises.
We are working with other donors and now NATO to increase AMIS
capacity. We are working closely with Canada to provide and maintain
105 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) to AMIS troops. The U.S. has
provided 16 experienced contract military observers; promoted and
supported NATO airlift and training; and initiated regular joint
assessment missions. In addition, our work on camp construction,
operation, and maintenance provides the backbone of AMIS's logistical
infrastructure.
AMIS has a broad mandate that allows troops to monitor and observe
compliance with the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement; to
assist in the process of confidence building; to contribute to a secure
environment for delivery of humanitarian relief; to support the return
of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes; and, to
contribute to the improvement of the overall security situation in
Darfur. The AU's mandate and rules of engagement were expanded in May
to include allowing AU troops ``to protect civilians under imminent
threat.''
We would support any expansion of the mandate that the AU feels
necessary to better ensure that violence and banditry are reduced and
that would bolster the confidence of the Darfur people. However, the
central issue is more one of resources and its role. We have consulted
with AMIS about its needs, and assured it that we would support a
further augmentation of troops, and we have redoubled our efforts to
deploy 105 Canadian contributed Armored Personnel Carriers to Darfur.
The AU remains essentially a monitoring force. It is not in Darfur to
fight a war or enforce the peace. Since these are AU troops, adopting a
more robust peacekeeping role could increase the threat level to these
troops. Of necessity we look to the AMIS leadership to make the
decision about the appropriate combat response, since it is one which
affects the lives of their personnel.
AMIS has made an unprecedented effort to end the violence and
atrocities in Darfur, but we need to assess continually whether it has
the capacity for future operations such as facilitating the return of
refugees and IDPs. AMIS has a broad mandate, and the number of AMIS
troops has increased to almost 6,100 currently, but as this complex and
multidimensional peacekeeping mission expands, we need to evaluate how
AMIS is responding.
We are focused on increasing international support to AMIS, while
also working closely with the AU and others to determine next steps.
Among the options we will examine jointly with the AU is whether there
should be an increased role for the UN, and possibly one which could
incorporate elements of the AU peacekeeping force.
We will proceed carefully with this assessment since we don't want
to undermine this important African response to a major African
problem. Further, we want to ensure the possible extension of a UN
peacekeeping force, and that its troop components correspond to Darfur
sensibilities and needs. As you are aware, while the UN peacekeeping
force in the South (UNMIS) is established, it is not yet fully
deployed.
Ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing the
composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working
hard to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary,
respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe
the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in
Abuja. For this reason, we continue to support the AU mediation with
technical experts, work closely with all the parties at the peace
talks, and keep the pressure on the government and rebel groups to move
them to reach a swift settlement.
Question. Senior Rwandan officials have asserted that, despite the
limited AU mandate, Rwandan troops would defend civilians if attacked.
There have been instances, documented by NGOs, where Rwandan troops
have taken up positions to prevent the Janjaweed from attacking
civilian villages.
a. Does the U.S. Government believe that the Rwandans are
acting appropriately and are we encouraging other members of
the AU Mission in Sudan to follow suit?
b. Mr. Secretary, how does the U.S. Government read the AU
mandate? Does it allow for the protection of civilians?
c. What are the implications for the mission if you have
different components of the AU forces interpreting the mandate
differently?
Answer. The AU's mandate and rules of engagement were expanded in
May to specifically include language allowing AU troops ``to protect
civilians under imminent threat.'' I have seen similar reports of
Rwandans being proactive and have also heard of AMIS forces positioning
armed personnel carriers in IDP camps to deter attacks. I believe they
are acting appropriately and we similarly encourage others, recognizing
it's their lives that are on the line. In addition, the African Union
(AU) mandate allows troops to monitor and observe compliance with the
N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement; to assist in the process of
confidence building; to contribute to a secure environment for delivery
of humanitarian relief; to support the return of internally displaced
persons and refugees to their homes; and, to contribute to the
improvement of the overall security situation in Darfur. I believe that
the AU understands and is implementing its mandate, although
performance varies. We would welcome and support any expansion of the
mandate that the AU feels necessary to better ensure that violence and
banditry are reduced and that would bolster the confidence of the
Darfur people.
Ultimately, ending the violence in Darfur will take more than a
military solution. We are working hard to augment the AU's capabilities
to deter and, when necessary, respond to ceasefire violations by any
side. But we and the AU believe ending violence in Darfur cannot be
accomplished solely by changing the size, mandate, composition, or
leadership of any peacekeeping force. Consequently, our efforts are
focused in two directions: strengthening AMIS in Darfur and
accelerating the Abuja peace talks upon which a sustainable settlement
depends.
Question. Mr. Secretary, one of the key issues, seldom discussed
but nonetheless critical, to dealing with the bloodshed in Darfur, as
well as the North-South process, is the role of other nations in the
region.
For example, Eritrea and Sudan have been fighting a proxy war since
the 1990's. Egypt is watching the North-South agreement very closely
because of their interest in water resources from the Nile. And, the
Ugandans are very much involved in the developments in Southern Sudan.
There are other examples, as well.
I believe that these regional issues are critical, especially over
the long-term, to bringing lasting peace to Sudan. If neighboring
countries believe it is in their interest to continue proxy wars or
meddle in a fragile peace process, they will continue to create serious
obstacles.
What are we doing to change this dynamic?
Is U.S. policy sufficiently geared towards addressing some of these
regional problems?
Answer. I agree with your observation that events in Sudan are
closely linked to the actions and attitudes of Sudan's neighbors, and
that is why U.S. policy has put a strong emphasis on regional
cooperation. Sudan is the largest country in Africa, and the history of
Sudan's conflicts shows that the role of other nations is critical.
For example, we are working to engage Sudan's neighbors in the
peace process in Darfur and in other parts of Sudan. As you have noted,
Eritrea has had differences with the government in Khartoum, and some
rebel groups have operated with Eritrean support. Several months ago,
Eritrea made overtures seeking improved bilateral relations with
Khartoum, and the United States has urged Eritrea to support
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and to
advance the peace process in Darfur. Eritrea's relationship with Sudan
has long been complicated by Sudan's close ties with Ethiopia.
Nevertheless, we will continue to push Eritrea to be constructive.
You also mention Uganda's involvement in southern Sudan. As you
know, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has long operated in the far
southern part of Sudan, seeking refuge from the Ugandan military. I
have personally raised this problem with President Museveni of Uganda.
We have urged closer cooperation between Khartoum, the SPLA, and Uganda
to pursue the LRA in southern Sudan, and to prevent the LRA from
further incursions into neighboring countries.
Several of Sudan's neighbors have a constructive role to play in
the Darfur peace process and CPA implementation. For example, when I
met with Egypt's President Mubarak, I emphasized the importance of us
working closely together on Sudan. Egypt could have a major influence
on the Sudanese government and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA),
the coalition of northern opposition parties led by DUP head Mirghani.
On Darfur, we are working with the African Union (AU), the United
Nations, the European Union, Chad, Libya, and Egypt to put pressure on
rebel groups and the government to reach a peace accord. Chad shares
the AU mediator role with Nigeria and Special Envoy Salim Salim for the
Darfur peace process. I recently met with the Foreign Minister of Chad
to get a better sense of how we can work together on peace in Darfur
and on humanitarian support to the approximately 200,000 Darfurian
refugees in some 12 camps in Chad.
We will continue to work with Sudan's neighbors, as well as other
bilateral and multilateral partners, including the AU, UN, EU, and
NATO, to provide support to CPA implementation and work towards a
peaceful resolution of the crisis in Darfur.
Question. Mr. Secretary, my understanding is that there are three
areas, in particular, that are pivotal to a successful North-South
peace agreement: the South Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, and Abyei.
Experts have suggested that the people of these regions will need to
see tangible results to be invested in the peace process.
What are we doing in these three critical areas? Is it enough?
Answer. The three areas of Southern Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, and
Abyei are areas north of the traditional border of Southern Sudan that
have been deeply affected by the 21-year North-South civil war. The
United States has led international efforts to bring peace, stability
and humanitarian relief to these areas.
For example, the United States helped broker a successful ceasefire
in the Nuba Mountains that built confidence among the parties. In
Abyei, the United States sent retired Ambassador Don Pettersen to serve
as an expert on the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC). Pettersen was
selected to chair the Commission and it issued its report in early July
2005, determining that the area should receive special administrative
status during an interim period. The United States is also funding
programs in all three areas targeted to prevent the recurrence of
conflict and build governance capacity. We are assisting in the state
constitutional drafting processes, local government capacity building,
teacher training, school construction, internally displaced persons/
refugee return, resettlement and reintegration, and land reform.
The return of traditional land is potentially one of the greatest
peace dividends. The United States funded a pilot land project in the
Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile focused on identification of community
land areas, and ensuring legal recognition and protection of customary
land rights.
There are multiple problems with the current education system.
Extremely low literacy rates, too few schools, and poorly trained
teachers are just some of the challenges facing the three zones. The
United States supports programs to improve basic and secondary
education in all three transition areas.
There are more than one million displaced people in and around the
three transitional areas. The United States is providing food aid and
relief commodities to returnee families, as well as community training
in hygiene and sanitation management.
Question. Mr. Secretary, let me ask about peacekeeping and
intervention forces more generally. We are increasingly seeing a
dichotomy between those nations that send troops as part of U.N. and
other similar types of multi-national missions and those who pay the
bills.
I realize that after the experiences of the 1990's, fewer
countries--many for legitimate reasons--are willing to put troops under
U.N. auspices. And, I am not suggesting that we start ``blue-
helmeting'' U.S. troops.
However, the problem we face is that nations in the ``pay the bills
category'' often bring tools--such as air assault capabilities,
intelligence, and logistics--that are essential to the success of
peacekeeping and other military operations.
Is there a way to start bridging this dangerous, and seemingly
growing gap, between one set of nations that pay the bills and another
set of nations that deploy troops?
Answer. When peacekeeping missions rely heavily on troops from
developing countries, an important key to success is to pair the
logistics and airlift capabilities of other donor countries and
organizations with the troops on the ground. We have done exactly that
with the African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS). For example, in areas
where AU capacity is lacking--such as in strategic airlift--
organizations NATO and the EU have moved to rapidly fill the void. We
made an effort to get NATO to take on this unprecedented role and also
persuaded the Government of Sudan to support this effort. The United
States, through our Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), and NATO
have also taken the lead in providing AMIS troops with logistical
support and pre-deployment peacekeeping training. Under GPOI, the
United States is providing training, communications equipment, and
advisors for the headquarters of the AU and the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). This assistance will help improve the AU
and ECOWAS' ability to plan and conduct operations and is an investment
in their future ability to bear more of the peacekeeping burden.
This approach allows us to support and enable an African solution
to an African problem, with peacekeepers who are from the region
directly affected by the crisis. By intelligently combining the
resources of the United States, NATO, and our European and Canadian
allies, we can provide the logistical and other support to make the
African Union's mission a success.
Question. Mr. Deputy Secretary, let me take a step back for a
moment and ask a bigger question.
Over the last decade--from Kosovo to Afghanistan to Darfur--the
question frequently arises: what are the principles that guide the
United States, as well as the international community, when determining
when to use force to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign nation--be
it to stop genocide, international terrorism, ethnic cleansing, or
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. Deputy Secretary, what are the Bush administration's principles
in that regard? When should the United States and the international
community use force to intervene in these types of situations? When
should other instruments of U.S. and international power, such as
sanctions, be used?
Answer. There are no simple tests that can be mechanically applied
in determining when to use force. The United States stands for the
expansion of liberty. No people on earth want to be oppressed, aspire
to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.
The United States must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of
human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the
state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for
women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private
property.
Given our commitment to these priciples, the United States must
weigh the costs and benefits of intervention in light of all the
circumstances that we face at a given time. At the same time, we should
also weigh different strategies to advance our principles, not always
involving the use of force. Each attempt at stopping genocide,
international terrorism, ethnic cleansing, or proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction presents very different strategies to advance our
principles, not always involving the use of force. Each attempt at
stopping genocide, international terorism, ethnic cleansing, or
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents very different
considerations.
Obviously, first and foremost, the United States must be prepared
to use force when necessary for self-defense. The international
community enshrined this principle in Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. Situations outside of self-defense, including genocide or
ethinc cleansing, may constitute appropriate circumstances for the
international community to intervene to protect local populations from
government that are perpetrating such atrocities. Each case must be
evaluated on its own merits, with a response correlated to that
evaluation.
When the United States determines that intervention is necessary,
we have a series of tools available to create positive action.
diplomatic pressure and sanctions are two of these tools. Sanctions
represent a middle ground in international politics, being more severe
than verbal condemnation, but less severe than the use of force. The
use of sanctions is limited tomaintain or restore international peace
and security, but the effectiveness of this tool depends on close
cooperation with others. We seek to impose sanctions on governments or
other entities that are capable of being a threat to international
peace or security or that are in fact threatening international peace
and security.
Finally, we also have the obligation to the American people to be
careful and judicious in the deployment of U.S. troops and putting U.S.
lives at risk. We need to consider carefully how force relates to the
objective. And, we need to ensure the support of the support of the
American people and to adhere to our Constitutional obligations.
Question. Mr. Secretary, I realize that comparisons between
historical examples are less than perfect, but I can't help be reminded
of the haunting comparisons between today's situation in Darfur and
what happened just before the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995.
In both situations, there were large, relatively concentrated
numbers of highly vulnerable IDPs. In both cases, there was a lull in
violence. In both cases, there was a peacekeeping force that was
undermanned with a flawed mandate. We know all too well the tragedy
that was Srebrenica.
Given the problems with the AU force structure and mandate, is this
something we need to be vigilant of in Darfur? What can we do to
prevent this from happening in Darfur?
Answer. We must certainly remain vigilant. Though acts of violence
and banditry still occur in Darfur, the UN and international observers
agree that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been critical
to improving the conditions for the people of Darfur in the areas where
it operates. We and other international donors are working hard to
ensure that AMIS continues to have what it needs to prevent and respond
to violence. While AMIS has had success in stopping large-scale
violence in Darfur, the upsurge in violence between October and
December highlights the limits of AMIS's capability. We judge we have
arrived at the logical point where we should consider a transition to a
UN force. Even if the UN and key partners agree to a transition to a UN
force, a transition would take time. Any change to a UN operation
should be coupled with steps to strengthen AMIS. In the interim, we are
working hard to fund and strengthen the current AMIS operation.
But ending the violence in Darfur will take more than just changing
the composition and capabilities of peacekeeping forces. We are working
hard to augment the AU's capabilities to deter and, when necessary,
respond to ceasefire violations by any side. But we and the AU believe
the ultimate solution to violence in Darfur is a peace agreement in
Abuja. For this reason, we continue to support the AU mediation with
technical experts, work closely with all the parties at the peace
talks, and keep the pressure on the government and rebel groups to move
them to reach a swift settlement.
Question. Mr. Deputy Secretary, we know that the Chinese, in some
ways, have been impediments to the work of the international
community's efforts to pressure the Government of Sudan to end the
violence in Darfur. We also know that this is largely due to the
strategic calculations that Beijing has made concerning access to
energy resources.
Some China watchers have suggested that the Chinese have recently
become more sensitive to the diplomatic pressure and outcry that has
occurred with respect to their military build-up in the Taiwan Strait
area.
Is there any evidence to suggest that the Chinese are feeling any
similar pressure with respect to their relationship with Khartoum?
Answer. The United States believes Beijing should play a more
responsible role in Sudan. As I said recently in a speech to the
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, China must do more than
take oil from Sudan. It should take some responsibility for resolving
Sudan's violence and humanitarian crisis, and work with the United
States and others to do so. This past summer, I discussed Sudan at
length during my Senior Dialogue meetings in Beijing with Executive
Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo. I stressed that China's
unquestioning support of the Khartoum regime does not serve Beijing's
own long-term interests and damages China's reputation. China has
legitimate energy concerns, but these would be better met by policies
to support open, efficient energy markets, rather than attempts to
``lock up'' energy resources. Moreover, China's role in Sudan--as well
as Iran, Burma, and Zimbabwe--causes other countries to question
China's motives. We have been encouraging the Chinese to act as a
responsible stakeholder in the international system; Sudan is one area
where China could clearly demonstrate its willingness to play such a
role.
__________
Appendix III.--Prepared Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC,
Commander, United States European Command
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan. In addition to
discussing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's mission to support
the African Union's Mission in Sudan, I also want to share U.S.
European Command's broader strategy for Africa that is designed to
protect U.S. interests in the region while developing the capacities of
nations to more effectively address security and stability challenges.
On behalf of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast
Guardsmen and Department of Defense Civil Servants of EUCOM, and their
family members, I want to express our gratitude for your continued
support.
Our history of bringing stability to areas plagued by ethnic and
cultural conflict has prepared us to broaden our focus to the east and
south. Instability in Africa is generally caused by variations on a
consistent theme: weak political institutions and security structures
lack the ability to address extremist influences and illegal
activities. Our goal is to assist nations to build effective,
responsive governments and to develop security structures supportive of
emerging democratic governments. Our success depends on maintaining
relevant, focused, and complementary security cooperation, tailored to
the political, social, economic, and military realities in Africa.
As we work together to improve our capabilities and to advance U.S.
policy objectives, we must also recognize that today's complex security
environment requires a greater degree of coordination within our own
government and among our allies. EUCOM's plan to promote cooperative
security relationships, enhance the capacity of foreign partners, and
expand cohesion amongst government agencies is consistent with these
goals. We must leverage the full spectrum of diplomatic, economic,
information, and military options to advance our national interests and
improve our ability to bring peace to areas of current conflict,
prevent future conflict and achieve post-conflict stability where
necessary.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains our most
important strategic partnership. The extended period of peace and
prosperity in Europe is the result of our engagement within the
Alliance. The United States is a direct beneficiary of this stability.
The economic, social, and security ties between the United States and
the countries of Europe are long-standing and firmly rooted in shared
ideals. Just as our presence in Europe since the end of the Second
World War helped create the conditions for security, prosperity and
multinational cooperation to flourish, it is my firm belief that a
transformed U.S. military posture in an expanded NATO alliance can
broaden this sphere of stability beyond the borders of Western Europe.
It is a strategic imperative that the United States remains engaged in
Europe and maintains its influential role within the NATO framework. We
will share in the benefits of a transformed alliance that has the
political will and sustainable expeditionary military capability to act
beyond the boundaries of its member states.
NATO's mission to Darfur is especially significant. It shows how
the Alliance is shouldering the burden of 21st century security
challenges, even when they are radically different from Cold War
challenges and located far beyond its traditional area of action.
NATO's involvement in Darfur will help create relationships between key
regional security organizations as NATO works with the African Union
(AU) mission. Most importantly, this engagement will ameliorate one of
the world's worst humanitarian crises.
II. NATO MISSION TO DARFUR
Background
The Darfur region became the scene of a bloody rebellion in 2003
when two local rebel groups--the Justice and Equality Movement and the
Sudanese Liberation Army--attacked a number of government installations
and forces, accusing the Sudanese government of oppressing non-Arabs in
favor of Arabs. In response, the government mounted a campaign of
aerial bombardment supporting ground attacks by an Arab militia, the
Janjaweed.\1\ The government in Khartoum set the downward spiral in
motion by providing significant support to the Janjaweed. Following
those attacks, the Janjaweed were accused of committing human rights
violations, including mass killing, looting and rape of the non-Arab
population of Darfur. By the summer of 2004, it was estimated that
50,000 to 80,000 people had been killed and at least a million driven
from their homes, leading to a major humanitarian crisis. In response,
on 28 May 04, the African Union established a military mission in Sudan
(the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)) and deployed a small
monitoring force over the summer. The aim of AMIS is to improve ecurity
and political stability in order to permit the government of Sudan to
provide for the needs of its people.
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\1\ The Sudanese government had very few regular soldiers in
proportion of the Sudanese soldiers were of Darfur origin, distrusted
many of its own units; the government therefore used the Janjaweed as a
proxy militia force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Situation/Security Assessment
Since the deployment of the small monitoring force, the African
Union has twice expanded the size and scope of AMIS and consequently
had some success in improving security in Darfur. Nevertheless,
different agencies now estimate that between 180,000 and 300,000 have
died and more than 1.8 million people have been displaced from their
homes. Some 200,000 refugees are estimated to have fled westward to
neighboring Chad, while the vast majority of refugees remain trapped in
Darfur camps and settlements. Many of these refugees live on the edge
of survival, hostage to Janjaweed abuses.
The African Union and donors have expressed a desire to further
improve the impact of security operations by enhancing capabilities and
substantially increasing the size of the military and police
components. On 26 April 2005, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of
the African Union Commission, wrote to the NATO Secretary General,
among others, requesting logistical support to assist with this
expansion of the AU Military Mission.
Support to African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)
Over the period 26-27 May 2005 the NATO Secretary General, myself,
and supporting staff attended an international donors' conference held
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. From that conference African nations pledged
to provide military units to enable AMIS to expand its mission. Rwanda
offered three+ battalions,\2\ Nigeria offered three battalions, South
Africa offered one+ battalion\3\ and Senegal offered one battalion.
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\2\ The plus represents a Kenyan Military Police Company and a
Force HQ Company from Gambia.
\3\ The plus represents an Engineering Company and Explosive
Company and Explosive Ordance Disposal team.
Following discussions on 1 June 2005 with relevant authorities in
the African Union, United Nations and the European Union, specific
proposals for NATO support to AMIS were forwarded to HQ NATO--the
proposals took into account assistance provided by other organizations.
On 22 June 2005 the North Atlantic Council approved NATO's support for
the African Union's Mission in Sudan. NATO's support is being offered
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gratis to the African Union; NATO will not be reimbursed.
Though logistics support (predominantly airlift) is needed by the
African Union, the principal challenges to delivering AMIS improvements
stem from AMIS' current inability to both command and control an
enhanced mission and co-ordinate the deployment of the additional
forces. The African Union Headquarters running AMIS are generally
effective and competent but they are small in number and stretched.\4\
Conscious of this, NATO's proposals balance the sensitivities of the
African Union and the desire for ``African solutions to African
problems.'' They also emphasized NATO's supporting role to the African
Union and co-operation with other international players, notably the
European Union.
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\4\ The African Union Headquarters (in Addis Ababa) are running
several concurrent AU missions spread across Africa.
As the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, I have appointed a Senior
Military Liaison Officer to act on my behalf with the African Union and
other organizations. This Liaison Officer is the single NATO military
point of contact for the African Union and representatives from African
troop contributing nations, donor nations pledging support to the
African Union, the United Nations and embassies.
Concept of Support
The unifying purpose of NATO's support to AMIS has been to enable
the African Union to expand its mission in Darfur as smoothly and
successfully as possible, in line with their plan and the defined
limits of our support. Against this background, two key factors have
underpinned all of NATO's efforts: NATO acts in support of the African
Union and in coordination with the European Union, troop contributing
nations and all other donors; and NATO personnel work closely with the
appropriate African Union officials in order to facilitate logistical
support to the African Union Mission in Sudan.
NATO's support has fallen into three areas, each limited in scope
and time:
Coordinating the provision of airlift donations with African
Union troop deployment plans. The deployment of African
battalions and reserves/support elements was originally
approved by the North Atlantic Council to take place between 1
July and 30 September 2005. Following severe weather in Darfur
in early August, the African Union's local transport
contractors have been unable to secure the spares and fuel
required to move African Battalions out from the airheads to
their assigned sectors in Darfur as quickly as NATO can bring
troops in. On 30 August, the African Union formally approached
NATO requesting an extension of the mission. With the support
of airlift donors this has now been approved and the airlift
will conclude on 22 Oct 05.
Supporting the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping in
the planning and conduct of a map exercise, whose primary
training audience has been the staff at the AMIS Force HQ at El
Fasher.
Temporarily establishing a small facility to offer capacity
building for staff officers drawn from, or destined for, the
AMIS HQs in Sudan or Addis Ababa.
A further offer was made by NATO to act as a clearing-house to
assist the African Union in de-conflicting offers of equipment, but
this was declined as unnecessary.
Individual nations have offered airlift support through NATO and
the European Union, and the alignment of these offers to African Union
requirements has been crucial to the success of African Union troop
deployments. Alignment has and continues to be achieved through close
coordination between the Joint Administration Control and Management
Centre in Addis Ababa, the NATO Allied Movement Coordination Center at
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the multilateral
European Airlift Centre in Eindhoven (which is working on behalf of the
European Union). Airlift support offered by NATO nations includes:
strategic airlift (that required to get troops from donating African
nations near to the AMIS theater of operations), tactical airlift (that
required to transport donated troops inside the AMIS theater of
operations) and funding to finance commercial airlift. Some strategic
aircraft will be constrained on the airfields they can use and will
land at air transfer points outside Sudan. Tactical aircraft will then
lift people and assets forward into Sudan.
NATO supported the United Nations-led map exercise that concluded
on 27 Aug 05 by providing military personnel and expertise to the team
that wrote the exercise. This writing team consisted of military and
non-military organizations (African Union, United Nations, European
Union, and humanitarian relief agencies). The exercise focused on
creating opportunities for the African Union staff to practice and
perfect their procedures in the areas of: command and control,
integration of effort between military and civilian components, and
coordination with humanitarian relief agencies. The African Union
benefited from this exercise, showing great interest and commitment.
All participants are now taking part in the lessons learned process.
Staff capacity building has been delivered through a series of
seminars and workshops. The content of these seminars and workshops
focused on providing training to address real-Darfur issues, drawing
where possible from lessons learned during the map exercise. NATO's
staff capacity building activities will be complementary to both a
Canadian offer to help the African Union develop an information
management capability and a United Nations/European Union initiative to
enhance staff building capacity in the field of logistics. The NATO
support team is based in the African Union's training Center of
Excellence in Nairobi.
NATO has approached this mission in a spirit of openness and
transparency, seeking to complement and cooperate with the African
Union, the European Union and the United Nations. In our dealings with
these bodies, this approach has been reciprocated.
Coordination with the European Union
The European Union views its support to the African Union mission
in Sudan as a packaged assistance mission, coordinated with other
International Organizations, and tailored to support the operational
needs identified by the African Union with the African Union retaining
leadership responsibility. The European Union Military Committee
considers the key challenge ahead to be the matching of African Union
requirements including movement and equipment, with offers from
international organizations and donors.
The legal status of NATO and European Union military personnel
supporting AMIS took time to finalize but did not impede the mission.
An existing AU/Sudan Status of Mission Agreement was discussed (along
NATO Status of Forces Agreement lines) at an AU Conference in Tripoli
on 5 Jul 05 but not formally amended for several weeks. Further delays
in securing Exchanges of Letters with the AU and individual African
donor nations meant early deployments were conducted on a bi-lateral
basis with nations. Status of Forces was finally secured late August.
Force protection for NATO and European Union personnel is provided by
the African Union.
Medical support for the deployed NATO personnel is being delivered
through a civilian contractor currently providing to the African Union.
This arrangement was agreed upon following a European Union medical
reconnaissance of the contractor's facilities and capabilities in the
region. The region's medical capabilities include both Role 1 and Role
2 facilities and rotary wing aeromedical evacuation assets. Role 3
medical support is provided through a private clinic in Khartoum.
Strategic aeromedical evacuation may be conducted directly from the
Role 2 facility at El Fasher airfield or from Khartoum. Should it be
necessary, arrangements are in place for casualties to be transferred
for treatment within the French military medical facilities in Djibouti
or N'Djamena, Chad.
While this effort does not involve the EU drawing on NATO assets
under the Berlin Plus\5\ arrangements, co-ordination with the European
Union has been particularly close. Regular meetings have been held in
Europe and a close link has been forged between the Allied Movements
Co-ordination Centre at SHAPE and the European Airlift Centre in
Eindoven. NATO and European Union Staff work together in the Joint
Administration Control and Management Centre in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
and have overall responsibility for strategic movement planning,
control and coordination. In addition, European Union military
personnel join NATO, UN, AU and Aid Agency personnel on the United
Nations-led map exercise.
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\5\ Berlin Plus derives from NATO's 1999 Washington Summit, and is
based on the intention to facilitate the conduct of European Union
operations using NATO asset and capabilities ``for operations in which
the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance.''
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Contributions of Member Nations
Confirmed airlift contributions under the NATO banner:
Canada. Canada has offered an aircraft in July or September
2005. As this offer consisted of strategic airlift that could
not operate directly into the Darfur region, thus necessitating
the provision of tactical airlift by another donor nation, the
Canadian offer was declined.
Denmark. Denmark offered an aircraft from 20-29 September
2005 to provide tactical movement capability; this offer is
expected to remain in place during the three-week pause
requested by the AU.
Italy. Italy has offered an aircraft in September for a
limited number of sorties.
The Netherlands. The Netherlands originally offered an
aircraft from 20-29 September 2005. Ministry of Defence
officials have confirmed that aircraft and aircrew remain
available for the revised deployment dates resulting from the
three-week deployment pause.
Turkey. Turkey has offered an aircraft from 20-29 September.
This offer is expected to remain valid for the three week pause
requested by the AU.
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has offered financial
support to Nigeria for either costs associated with a Nigerian
aircraft move or civilian charter (up to 1 million
or =1.4 million).
United States. The United States has offered the capability
to move 1800 Rwandan troops, including their ammunition and
cargo. To date, approximately 1200 personnel have been moved to
the Darfur region, the remaining 600 are scheduled to be
airlifted in late-September 2005.
The Ukraine (a non-NATO member but a member of the
Partnership for Peace program). The Ukraine has offered a
variety of commercial charter aircraft under reimbursement
arrangements for operational costs.
Confirmed airlift contributions under a European Union banner:
France. France has offered the capability to move a complete
Senegalese battalion, including rotation of forces, with
military strategic and tactical assets.
Germany. Germany has offered six aircraft, to include
rotation of African Union forces. Due to a variety of other
airlift offers for the movement of the eight battalions, the
German offer has been applied to the movement of approximately
380 Civilian Police personnel in the fall of 2005 (dates to be
confirmed).
Greece. Greece has offered two aircraft in August 2005. They
have been used for transportation of the Senegal battalion from
Dakar to Sudan, but under EU umbrella.
Luxembourg. Luxembourg has offered =75,000 for contracted
airlift or purchase of tickets on scheduled commercial flights.
Timeline
A member of the SHAPE planning staff first deployed to the African
Union's Mission in Sudan HQ, Addis Ababa on 23 May 2005. On 19 June
2005 SACEUR's senior military liaison officer deployed to the AMIS HQ
in Addis Abab, Ethiopia. Personnel to support the map exercise began to
deploy on 9 July 2005 and the task was completed by 27 August 2005.
Personnel conducting the staff capacity building deployed on 27 July
2005 and will complete their tasks by the end of September 2005. The
airlift started on 01 July 2005. All NATO staff will withdraw from
Africa on 30 Sep 05 less two movements staff who will remain to support
the activities of the SHAPE Allied Movements Coordination Centre's
effort. This is expected to continue until 22 October 2005.
U.S. Financial Assistance to Sudan and the Darfur Crisis
The U.S. continues to be viewed as an influential leader in NATO
and in the world and has already provided much to alleviate the complex
problems involved in the Darfur Crisis, both unilaterally and
multilaterally. To date, the U.S. has given $637 million dollars in
humanitarian aid to the region and provided approximately $150 million
in support of the African Union's (AU) military mission in Sudan.
III. THE GROWING STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA
African security issues will continue to directly affect our
homeland security. The growing use of the Trans-Sahara region in Africa
by terrorists threatens the security of the United States and our
European allies. The spawning grounds for future terrorists share
several common characteristics: vast ungoverned spaces offering
sanctuary; governments unable or unwilling to provide for even the most
basic of human needs; and social unrest where populist clarion calls to
extremism find fertile soil. The transnational nature of these dangers
undermines our ability to foster a broader and lasting stability in the
region.
Violence from numerous crises has created areas of lawlessness that
transcend state borders and cause instability. High population growth
rates, poor land management, desertification and agricultural
disruptions caused by economic shifts, internal conflicts, and refugee
influxes are making it increasingly difficult for several countries to
feed themselves. This is especially true in Chad, where drought and
refugees from the conflict in Darfur have created a humanitarian
catastrophe.
Fragile democracies are having to combat serious challenges to
include security concerns, social pressures, teachings of radical
fundamentalism, disease, and criminality that imperil the future hopes
for the people of Africa. The broad expanses of ungoverned or poorly as
the proximity and ease of movement to population increasingly
attractive to transnational terrorists governed regions, as well
centers in Europe, are interested in exploiting the region for
recruiting, logistics, and safe havens. The breeding grounds of
terrorism and illicit activity on the continent of Africa require our
attention at both the national and regional security level. It is
against this backdrop of current and impending crises that we focus our
attention, efforts, and investment.
IV. SHAPING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Failed or failing states, instability, and ethnic conflict lead to
humanitarian catastrophes such as the situation in Darfur. In a
progressively interdependent world, it is imperative that the U.S.
address the circumstances which lead to these crises with the full
range of political, economic, information, and military tools,
synchronized with our international partners. The complexity of today's
security environment requires new methodologies to promote conflict
prevention and conduct post-conflict operations. A military approach
alone will not deliver the desired outcome in countries and regions
where there is little or no experience in responsible governance.
Integrated interagency and international action is necessary to achieve
long-term strategic goals.
Institutions that are adequately equipped or organized to confront
a fluid and diverse geo-strategic landscape will be successful in
protecting U.S. interests. The application of national power must
include the widest array of resources and capabilities. The
determination of requirements, the development of policies, and the
implementation of strategies require the synchronization of all U.S.
Government organizations that have a stake in the outcome.
The very nature of today's international climate dictates that
policies, national policy objectives, and the execution of operations
are fundamentally interagency in scope and purpose. With this
understanding, and given the level of authority and responsibility of
the Geographic Combatant Commanders to carry out our national security
activities, it is imperative that these strategically focused staffs be
organized in a manner that reflects the interagency process. The
instruments of national power are most effective when applied in
concert with one another. They must not only be synchronized in their
application, they must also be complementary and structured in a manner
that ensures unity of effort between the various agencies.
EUCOM has been working with the Department of Defense (DoD) to
improve our approach to developing, sourcing, and implementing a fully
integrated security cooperation strategy. DoD's Security Cooperation is
an important instrument for executing U.S. Defense Strategy by building
defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests;
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and
coalition operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and
contingency access and en route infrastructure. Theater Security
Cooperation (TSC), an element of DoD Security Cooperation, involves
those activities undertaken by Combatant Commands to implement this
guidance. There are number of security cooperation activities EUCOM is
capable of directly targeting toward TSC priorities and objectives.
There are also a number of activities that occur in our area of
responsibility that the Geographic Combatant Commander has some degree
of visibility, but has no direct influence over and other activities in
which we have neither visibility nor influence.
Our aim is to eliminate competition for limited resources that
produce overlapping programs that create unnecessary redundancies. We
must also ensure our efforts generate a cohesive, interactive link with
other U.S. Government agencies that will enable seamless execution. To
achieve this, there must be transparency between the agencies to
encourage cooperation and the sharing of ideas and information.
Congressional support will be essential as the Department of Defense,
together with other Executive departments and agencies seek to create
greater harmonies and transform our policy making and resource
allocation processes to become more agile and responsive.
The construct we currently employ to achieve our nation's security
objectives is essentially a cold-war era model designed principally to
face a defined and predictable threat. To achieve our goals we must be
willing to embrace institutional change and a shift from our previously
understood paradigms. We need to create a methodology that recognizes
the interdependency of our national powers in order to become more
strategically effective.
Integration of EUCOM and other U.S. agency activities throughout
our area of responsibility will be necessary to achieve our stated
strategic goals. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) have
been created at Geographic Combatant Commands to establish connections
between civilian and military departments that will improve planning
and coordination within the government. This advisory element
facilitates information sharing and collaboration by providing day-to-
day working relationships between military and civilian planners. At
EUCOM, we have already begun to modify our Joint Interagency
Coordination Group (JIACG) to better integrate all the elements of
national power. We envision expanding the EUCOM JIACG to include
representation from all the departments and agencies necessary to
coordinate the myriad activities that take place in the theater. We
must attain unity of effort in order to minimize redundancy and
maximize the use of resources.
Current crisis-driven activity focusing on limited, short-term
solutions is no longer adequate for dealing with the major challenges
in Africa. The United States, in association with partner nations,
international institutions, and non-governmental organizations, must
assist African leaders to strengthen their states, revitalize their
civilian institutions, and rebuild traumatized societies and economies
to restore stability and security. While Africans themselves must
ultimately achieve these objectives the United States needs a
comprehensive, multinational, interagency approach to help make them
successful.
NATO Engagement in Africa
Mediterranean Dialogue: Mediterranean Security is becoming
increasingly important as an integral part of the overall European
Security environment. NATO, the European Union, and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have clearly recognized
the reality that efforts to enhance the security of the Mediterranean
region, including the countries of North Africa and the Near East, are
critical missions.
Launched by NATO in 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) has
successfully contributed to achieving better cooperation and
understanding between NATO and the seven MD partners: Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Mauritania,\6\ Morocco and Tunisia. In 2004, NATO
leaders and the MD countries agreed to elevate the MD to a genuine
partnership. The enhanced MD will contribute to regional security and
stability by enhancing the existing political dialogue; achieving
interoperability; assisting in defense reform; and contributing to the
fight against terrorism. It will also prepare partners' forces to
contribute to non-Article 5 NATO-led operations.
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\6\ Due to the August 2005 Coup, all bilateral assistance programs
(except for non-humanitarian assistance have been suspended with
Mauritania.
MD countries have already started the first steps towards an
enhanced relationship: Morocco participates in NATO operations in
Kosovo and both Israel and Algeria have demonstrated their interest in
contributing to Operation Active Endeavor (which might also include
information and intelligence sharing). Jordan's medical facility in
Afghanistan, although integrated in a non-NATO operation (Op Enduring
Freedom), is providing a very useful contribution to NATO operations in
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that country.
Operation Active Endeavour: Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE) is
NATO's only Article 5 operation. It began on 26 October 2001 as
surveillance and monitoring operation in response to a US request for
counter-terrorism support in the eastern Mediterranean. OAE has since
been expanded to embrace new strategic objectives to include compliant
boardings, Straits of Gibraltar (STROG) escort operations (currently
suspended), and an expanded Area of Operations to include the entire
Mediterranean Sea. To date, more than 66,000 ships have been hailed,
90+ suspect vessels have been compliantly boarded, and 488 ships have
been safely escorted through the STROG. NATO and the AU share a clear
and common interest in limiting illicit activity within the
Mediterranean Sea.
Following the Istanbul summit in June 2004, NATO leaders recognized
the need to enhance the partnership with Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)
Nations, to include Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia
from the African continent. High-level staff talks are planned for July
05 in which senior members from all MD Nations are invited to SHAPE to
discuss a variety of cooperation initiatives. Recognizing the
effectiveness and further potential of OAE, several Partner Nations
have already expressed an interest in participating with NATO in the
form of information exchange or contribution of military assets. Of the
MD Nations, both Algeria and Israel have each initiated formal
discussions with NATO towards an ultimate goal of participating in OAE.
Overall regional security and cooperation are greatly enhanced with the
involvement of NATO's MD Partners.
NATO Response Force Exercise (LIVEX 06): A live exercise (LIVEX) to
test the NATO Response Force's full operational capability will take
place in Cape Verde in 2006. The exercise will demonstrate the NATO
Response Force's expeditionary capability and stretch national and NATO
deployment procedures and our ability to sustain a large deployed
force. Approximately 6,500 troops will deploy for 14 days to conduct
selected missions and remain self-sustained due to the lack of local
capability, limited local resources, and Cape Verde's minimal
supporting infrastructure. Command and control of the deployed force
will be executed from the Joint Force Command HQ at Brunssum, Holland.
Air, Land and Maritime forces will be provided by the Air Component
Command HQ at Ramstein, Germany, the Spanish Maritime Force HQ and the
Eurocorps HQ, France.
An initial reconnaissance (21-27 May 05) to nine of Cape Verde's
islands is complete. The team was warmly welcomed. Senior government
officials were eager to assist the exercise, offering open access to
ports, hospitals, airports, military establishments, etc. Cape Verde
Government (GoCV) suggested expansion of the exercise scope to include
counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-human trafficking, anti-
smuggling, and illegal immigration themes, indicating the local
population would be happy to act as role players! GoCV will provide one
company of troops as participants and requested NATO extend invitations
to their African neighbors (especially Senegal and Angola) to observe
the exercise. Indications are the GoCV are willing to expand the
scenario to meet as many NRF training objectives as possible.
U.S. European Command Strategy
In light of the dynamic international security environment and
newly emerging threats, both the European Command and NATO have
embarked upon a process of comprehensive transformation to better
prepare both organizations to face today's transnational threats. As
you know, in 2001 the Secretary of Defense initiated a strategy-based
review of the U.S. global defense posture, and subsequently directed
all combatant commands to evaluate their structure, organization and
processes in order to gain transformational efficiencies and develop
new capabilities to meet emerging requirements. The efforts we are
undertaking to meet the objectives laid out by the Secretary represent
the most extensive adjustments to the European theater in its history.
The changes contain broad and far-reaching implications for our nation,
our allies, and our military.
As we embark upon this important mission we must be mindful of the
leadership role we bear, and ensure that the measures we undertake will
increase our strategic effectiveness. In a world full of uncertainty
and unpredictable threats, the United States continues to be viewed as
the leader in providing stability and security. As we map a course for
the future we must remain cognizant of the key elements that enabled us
to be successful in the last century and be wise enough to recognize
the new security challenges we face.
Theater Security Cooperation: EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation
(TSC) programs are the centerpiece of our efforts to promote security
and stability by building and strengthening relationships with our
allies and regional partners and are an indispensable component of our
overarching theater strategy. These programs are regionally focused to
assist our allies in developing the capabilities required to conduct
effective peacekeeping and contingency operations. Well-trained,
disciplined forces help mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict,
prepare the way for warfighting success, and ultimately reduce the
burden on U.S. forces. Most importantly, Theater Security Cooperation
efforts support the long-term strategic objectives of the Global War on
Terrorism by building understanding and consensus on the terrorist
threat; laying foundations for future ``coalitions of the willing'';
and extending our country's security perimeter. Within EUCOM, we have a
variety of resources, programs, and policies available to aid us in
developing and implementing our TSC strategy. The value of these
strategic resources cannot be overstated.
Strategic Theater Transformation: EUCOM's Strategic Theater
Transformation (STT) Plan, which is a component of the Department of
Defense's Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, will permit
EUCOM to transform itself into a command better able to meet the
diverse challenges of this new century. The objective of our plan is to
increase EUCOM's strategic effectiveness through a fundamental
realignment of basing concepts, access and force capabilities.
Essential to achieving this strategic effect are the development of
basing and force manning models that support the principles of an
expeditionary philosophy. To achieve the first, we envision a series of
smaller forward operating sites (FOS) and cooperative security
locations (CSL) strategically located throughout the AOR. Such bases
will be anchored by several existing Main Operating Bases (MOB), which
are of enduring strategic value and remain essential to theater force
projection, throughput, and sustainment.
The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) relies increasingly on
EUCOM's en route infrastructure system to project U.S. forces to crises
areas in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the
Caucasus. Modest investments in these bases will ensure we maintain
critical southern air mobility routes for TRANSCOM and an ``air-
bridge'' to expand operational reach. As we look even further south, we
envision expanding the EUCOM en route system so we can engage future
threats in sub-Saharan Africa. This new system will consist of a series
of cooperative security locations, located across Africa, enabling the
rapid deployment of forces.
As EUCOM shapes the theater with forward operating sites and
cooperative security locations, we must maintain leadership within NATO
and across the AOR that is credible and capable. EUCOM must remain
engaged regionally in order to build upon international relationships
and strengthen the many institutions that can help manage crises when
they occur or, ideally, before they occur. As such, the value of
forward basing, forward presence, and focused commitment remains an
essential cornerstone of our strategy for the future.
Regional Initiatives and Programs: EUCOM's TSC strategy is derived
from regional priority and policy themes stated in the Secretary of
Defense's Security Cooperation Guidance. EUCOM has taken a regional
approach that links individual country objectives to broader theater
goals.
The goal for Africa is stability, security, and prosperity. Working
with the State Department, we are assisting the African Union and
African regional organizations to develop their security structures.
Stability programs targeting improvements in health, education, good
governance, civil infrastructure are focused on countries with the
greatest need. Security programs--military training and education,
peace operations capabilities, resources and infrastructure--are
focused on countries that possess the capability and show the desire to
lead Africa into the future.
Development of effective security structures in Africa will lay the
foundation for future success; however, they are dependent upon on
commitment of manpower, financial, and institutional resources
necessary to establish and sustain real progress. African security
issues will continue to directly affect our homeland security. Modest
near-term investments will enable us to avert crises that may require
costly U.S. intervention in the future.
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative: Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is the long-term interagency plan
to combat terrorism in Trans-Saharan Africa. The goal of TSCTI is to
counter terrorist influences in the region and assist governments to
better control their territory and to prevent huge tracts of largely
deserted African territory from becoming a safe haven for terrorist
groups. TSCTI builds upon the successful Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI)
which, beginning in 2002, helped train and equip at least one rapid-
reaction company, about 150 soldiers, in each of the four Sahel states:
Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. TSCTI is more ambitious in both
geographic and programmatic terms.
The overall approach is straightforward: build indigenous capacity
and facilitate cooperation among governments in the region that are
willing partners (Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger,
Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia, with Libya possibly to follow later) in
the struggle with Islamic extremism in the Sahel region. TSCTI helps to
strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhance and
institutionalize cooperation among the region's security forces,
promote democratic governance, foster development and education and
ultimately benefit our bilateral relationships with each of these
states. Key security-related aspects of the TSCTI include training in
basic marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation,
patrolling and medical care. The military component of TSCTI, like the
Pan Sahel Initiative, seeks to directly engage with participating
nations and assist in protecting their borders and exploiting
opportunities to detect and deter terrorists by providing basic
training and equipment and train additional forces. TSCTI also engages
more countries than PSI with a greater emphasis on helping to foster
better information sharing and operational planning between regional
states. We have briefed the Ambassadors and select Country Team members
from all nine TSCTI countries and have received their support. We will
continue to fully coordinate with the interagency and with U.S. Country
Teams to ensure that the overall TSCTI is balanced, complements the
total U.S. effort in the GWOT and is tailored to the unique conditions
within each country in this region.
Programs such as TSCTI support U.S. national security interests in
the Global War on Terrorism by enhancing African regional security and
promote an Africa that is self-sufficient and stable. These programs
also better prepare participating nations to stop the flow of illicit
arms, goods, and people through the region helping focus nations to
better protect their own vast borders and regions.
America's war on terrorism cannot be fought alone. Historically,
proactive security costs with programs such as the Pan Sahel Initiative
are significantly less expensive than reactive missions to the world's
hotspots. Political instability in Africa that is left to fester could
lead to repeated interventions at enormous costs. TSCTI is a proactive
program that is a relatively small investment, but that will be a
powerful inoculation against future terrorist activity, leading to an
increasingly stable Africa. The Administration is working to integrate
TSCTI into future budget and planning cycles. Long-term, continuous
engagement will build bonds where few existed and strengthen those
already established. The U.S. needs to continue security cooperation
measures with nations that support regional initiatives leading to
peace and stability.
Global Peace Operations Initiative: The Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI), fully funded in its first year as part of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (PL 108-447), is designed to meet
the world's growing need for well-trained peace operations forces by
enabling the United States to work with lead nations and selected
international organizations to support, equip and train other
countries' forces. In Africa, the U.S. will implement GPOI by expanding
the existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
program and expand exercise activity aimed at enhancing African
capacity to conduct peace support operations.
We are grateful for the committee's support of this vital program,
especially the $114 million authorization recommended for fiscal year
2006 in section 2515 of the reported version of the Foreign Affairs
Authorization Act. This authorization is the same as the President's
budget request for fiscal year 2006 which will fund the second year of
this important program.
Cooperation with African Regional Organizations: EUCOM has
aggressively worked with regional organizations, such as the African
Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to
develop a regional ability to respond to crises.
The African Union, formed in 2002, comprises more than 50 nations.
EUCOM is helping the African Union develop a robust military planning
and operational capability to deal with crises more effectively. We are
also helping to establish the required command and control capabilities
so that the AU can communicate with the five regional headquarters and
these headquarters can communicate with the national militaries in
their respective regions. Our investment in AU capabilities is reaping
tremendous benefits by giving Africans the capability to deal with
challenges like Darfur.
ECOWAS is a regional organization of 15 West African nations formed
in 1975. Its military intervention in Liberia in 2003 proved to be a
successful undertaking, but not without substantial multinational
support. Working collectively with the United Kingdom, France, Canada,
and several other countries, EUCOM has sought to help build ECOWAS'
capacity for conducting peacekeeping operations to a level that
requires limited U.S. and European logistic support, and no U.S. troop
support. With coordinated support and encouragement from the United
States, allied donor nations including non-governmental organizations
and international corporations, ECOWAS has measurably improved its
capacity to respond to regionally supported operations.
We have worked closely with Uganda in the prosecution of a local
terrorist organization, resulting in a country more prepared to counter
insurgencies that threaten internal and regional stability. Other
nations in the region have not only expressed interest in similar
activities, but also provide capabilities that are found only within
their region.
Many other countries in Africa have shown both the willingness and
the capability to support peacekeeping operations. Nigeria provided
strategic airlift for crucial peacekeeping operations in Liberia and
Sudan. Gabon assumed a lead role in the Economic and Monetary Community
of Central Africa (CEMAC) mission in the Central African Republic.
South Africa has supported several international military missions.
Although the African Union continues to improve its peace support
operations capacity, the UN remains very active on the continent. For
example, there are currently more than 43,000 UN military peacekeepers
involved in operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.
The U.S. needs to continue engagement with nations that are
supportive of regional initiatives leading to peace and stability.
Regional leaders like Senegal, Ghana and Uganda have not only been
willing to support the Global War on Terrorism, but also have been
proactive in facilitating dialogue between nations within their area of
influence that were once in conflict. Their approach to curbing HIV/
AIDS and providing economic stimulus are models that are proven to work
in the African context for African nations.
State Partnership Program: One of the most successful and
influential programs employed by EUCOM is the National Guard State
Partnership Program (SPP). Under this program, professional military
contacts build valuable, often life-long relationships at all levels
that serve to enhance cooperation and advance U.S. strategic interests.
The SPP links U.S. states and territories with partner countries for
the purpose of supporting EUCOM's security cooperation objectives and
assists partner nations in making the transition from authoritarian to
democratic governments. The unique civil-military nature of the Guard
allows it to actively participate in a wide range of security
cooperation activities that provide great flexibility in meeting our
Theater Security Cooperation objectives.
This past year was extremely successful as National Guard Soldiers
and Airmen conducted over 115 events with partner nations. Indeed, SPP
has been so successful that EUCOM is planning to seek funding to expand
the program in Africa. In the last two years, four partnerships have
been added: South Africa-New York; Morocco-Utah; Ghana-North Dakota;
Tunisia-Wyoming. Currently there are 25 states partnered with 23
foreign nations in the EUCOM AOR. SPP is a key Theater Security
Cooperation tool that supports U.S. Government objectives by promoting
access, bolstering capabilities, and enhancing interoperability.
Clearinghouse Approach: The regional TSC approach is being refined,
in part, through clearinghouse initiatives. Clearinghouses, created for
Africa, the South Caucasus, and Southeast Europe, allow the United
States to coordinate its actions with other nations involved in
security cooperation in the same region. Each serves as a multi-
national forum for interested countries to share information about
their security assistance programs for specific regions. The objective
is to optimize the use of limited resources by merging the various
security cooperation programs into a comprehensive, synchronized
regional effort. Clearinghouses provide a medium for deconflicting
programs, avoiding duplication and finding ways to collaborate and
cooperate.
The Africa Clearinghouse has brought thirteen African countries
together with NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union. The
inaugural conference, held in May 2004, focused on West Africa and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The regional
approach continued in December 2004 with a conference concentrated on
east Africa.
Security Assistance Programs: Security Cooperation Activities are
managed programs planned and executed for the purpose of shaping the
future security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. Key
among EUCOM's TSC tools are Foreign Military Financing, Foreign
Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, and International Military
Education and Training. These programs provide access and influence,
help build professional, capable militaries in allied and friendly
nations, and promote interoperability with U.S. forces.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides critical resources to
assist nations without the financial means to acquire U.S. military
equipment and training. It is an essential instrument of influence;
builds allied and coalition military capabilities; and improves
interoperability between forces. The FY 06 FMF request for African
countries in the EUCOM AOR, included in the International Affairs
(Function 150) account, totals $38.5 million.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
demonstrate our nation's continued commitment to the security of our
allies and friends by allowing them to acquire superior U.S. military
equipment and training. FMS and DCS sales are vital to improving
interoperability with U.S. forces, closing NATO capability gaps, and
modernizing the military forces of our new allies and partners.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) including
Expanded IMET (E-IMET) provides education and training opportunities
for foreign military (IMET) and civilian personnel (E-IMET). These
programs enhance coalition operations by improving military-to-military
cooperation and interoperability; reinforcing civilian control of the
military; advancing the principles of responsible governance; and
supporting the stability of newly formed democracies. As a result of
the relationships that develop from IMET, our return on investment in
long-term access and influence is significantly enhanced. Today's IMET
participants are tomorrow's senior foreign military and civilian
leaders. In Africa, IMET and E-IMET have been the most successful
programs in promoting professional militaries that respect democracy
and human rights.
The political goodwill accrued from these programs far outweighs
the small investment. Consequently, our interests are
disproportionately injured if this program is reduced or sanctioned.
The EUCOM portion of the fiscal year 2006 IMET request for African
countries is $12.935 million and, like FMF, is also included in the
International Affairs (Function 150) account. We must continue to carry
out and indeed intensify our IMET programs in order to help promote
U.S. long-term objectives of democratic development and good
governance.
V. CONCLUSION
It is a privilege to represent this proud nation as the Supreme
Allied Commander of Europe and Commander, U.S. European Command. The
tasks we now face in Africa are enormous, but are not insurmountable.
The indispensable influence attained by our forward presence, coupled
with our Theater Security Cooperation programs provides the best chance
for winning the Global War on Terrorism and meeting our national
security goals. As we work together to improve our capabilities and to
advance U.S. policy objectives, we must also recognize that today's
complex security environment requires a greater degree of coordination
within our own government and among our allies.
As we support the African Union's efforts in the Darfur, NATO is
determined to work in full transparency with the European Union, the
United Nations, NGOs and individual nations. Although limited in scope
and duration, the NATO response to the crisis in Darfur is consistent
with the transformation of the Alliance in response to the new security
environment. The willingness of the Alliance to engage in out-of-area
operations, to now include Africa, underscores NATO's level of
commitment to change and the recognition that new approaches are
required.
At EUCOM we also continue to seek new and innovative ways to meet
the challenges we face in Africa and throughout our entire area of
operations. We will continue to reach out to multiple stakeholders in
governmental, as well as non-governmental activities to maximize our
ability to achieve our national objectives. Preparing for the urgent
challenges before us will require institutional innovations and the
creation of new capabilities, which will yield a more comprehensive
security apparatus and enable greater coordination and cooperation
throughout the United States government and the international
community.
We look forward to working with the members of this committee as we
continue to assist in the development of effective security structures
in Africa that will lay the foundation for future success.
VI. LEXICON
A Main Operating Base (MOB) is an enduring strategic asset
established in friendly territory with permanently stationed combat
forces, command and control structures, and family support facilities.
MOBs serve as the anchor points for throughput, training, engagement,
and U.S. commitment to NATO. MOBS have: robust infrastructure;
strategic access; established Command and Control; Forward Operating
Sites and Cooperative Security Location support capability; and
enduring family support facilities. As previously stated, these are
already in existence.
A Forward Operating Site (FOS) is an expandable host-nation ``warm
site'' with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly
prepositioned equipment. It can host rotational forces and be a focus
for bilateral and regional training. These sites will be tailored to
meet anticipated requirements and can be used for an extended time
period. Backup support by a MOB may be required.
A Cooperative Security Location (CSL) is a host-nation facility
with little or no permanent U.S. presence. CSLs will require periodic
service, contractor and/or host nation support. CSLs provide
contingency access and are a focal point for security cooperation
activities. They may contain propositioned equipment. CSLs are: rapidly
scalable and located for tactical use, expandable to become a FOS,
forward and expeditionary. They will have no family support system.
A Preposition Site (PS), by definition, is a secure site containing
pre-positioned war reserve materiel (Combat, Combat Support, Combat
Service Support), tailored and strategically positioned to enable
rotational and expeditionary forces. PS's are maintained at high
readiness for immediate use, strategically located with guaranteed
access. They are an important component to our transformation efforts.
``En Route'' Infrastructure (ERI) is a strategically located,
enduring asset with infrastructure that provides the ability to rapidly
expand, project and sustain military power during times of crises and
contingencies. ERI bases serve as anchor points for throughput,
training, engagement and U.S. commitment. They may also be a MOB or
FOS.
__________
Appendix IV.--Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Members of the Committee to General James L. Jones, Jr.
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator Biden to General Jones
AFRICAN UNION CAPABILITY
Question. When I was in Chad in May, I met with an African Union
Sector Commander, a general, who was kind enough to come across the
border from Sudan to meet with me. He told me point blank that he
didn't have the mandate, men or equipment to stop the violence in
Darfur. He also made two additional points: that the government
continued to kill civilians and destroy of villages with impunity, and
that the AU could not be effective in stopping violence without western
soldiers on the ground with him. Speaking from a military perspective,
do you agree with the Commander's assertion--does the AU, in your
opinion, lack the personnel, equipment and mandate to improve security
for the population of Darfur? What would it take, militarily, to
improve security in Darfur?
Answer. The African Union (AU) Sector Commander is operating under
a restricted set of rules of engagement. The United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) passed two resolutions (1556 and 1564) specifically
endorsing the deployment of an AU force to monitor the April 2004
ceasefire agreement and then expanded the AU monitoring mission. The
subsequent UNSC resolution (1574) failed to grant the AU authority to
stop hostile actions unless engaged by either party. In other words,
they can defend themselves, but not take offensive actions to prevent
the killings and destruction.
In the past year, the AU has increased the number of deployed
troops from 2,270 to over 6,100 and has requested more than $700
million to purchase helicopters, armored personnel carriers and other
equipment. The number of troops and personnel required are a function
of three things: (1) the size of the area of operations (larger than
Iraq); (2) the perception that military action will be effective to
improve the security situation, and; (3) the willingness of the
combatants to lay down their arms. A properly sized and equipped force
with a clear mandate to use force against those initiating hostile
actions will help set the conditions that can lead to a cessation of
hostilities. However, a military solution will not in itself be
sufficient to address the underlining causes that precipitate the
violence.
NATO NO-FLY ZONE
Question. Could NATO, if a decision was taken at the political
level, enforce a no-fly zone in Darfur--does it have the capacity to do
so? What sorts of resources would it take?
Answer. Two key factors must underpin all of NATO's efforts: NATO
acts in support of the African Union (AU) and NATO personnel work
closely with the appropriate AU officials in order to facilitate
support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). NATO's supporting
role to the African Union must be emphasized. A NATO enforced no-fly
zone is not being planned at this time. There is no guarantee that NATO
flights into Sudan to enforce a no-fly zone would stop the violence and
could undermine the peace process by diminishing the authority of the
AU.
RECOMMENDED NATO ACTION
Question. What types of actions--if given the mandate--would you
recommend that NATO take to help the African Union create a secure
environment for civilians in Darfur?
Answer. NATO has asked the African Union (AU) to inform us where we
can be helpful and, thus, the NATO mission has been carefully and
intentionally executed to provide support to the African Union. If, at
the request of the African Union, the alliance wanted to do more, it
would be in the area of training and developing combat service support
and the logistics that could assist the AU battalions that are
operating at huge distances.
Beyond the airlift support provided, NATO's significant
contribution to the African Union has been capacity-building for the
staff officers of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Staff
Capacity Building Seminars were held in September 2005. This initial
effort was received positively by the AU headquarters and the AU has
formally requested additional training seminars. The North Atlantic
Council has recently endorsed this request. Our training should
endeavor to imbue them with the values of how militaries operate in a
democracy and ensure that respect for human rights are included. This
type of training will lay the foundation for the development of
competent forces.
ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN UNION TROOPS
Question. Given the constraints of the mandate under which the AU
is currently operating, if you were asked by the NAC, what further
assistance would you recommend that NATO provide to AU troops in order
to enhance their ability to protect civilians in Darfur?
Answer. NATO's role is to contribute to strengthening the African
Union's capability to significantly expand its. presence in Darfur in
an attempt to halt the continuing violence. Any further assistance
would most likely be conducted in a manner that enhances the existing
mission. NATO's military assistance could encompass training competent
nations who wish to do capacity building. Training headquarters staff
will enhance security to the civilians by focusing operational plans
and logistical requirements in a more efficient way. Additionally,
NATO's activities in Darfur must involve the participation of the
African Union and conducted in a manner in which Africans can identify
with as they develop the necessary skills and credibility to conduct
these type of missions that are necessary to build their own future.
NATO ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN UNION
Question. Humanitarian relief organizations operating in Darfur
have said that the presence of the AU has made a difference, but there
are some problems. Number one, the AU is ill-equipped. For example, one
of the AU brigades in north Darfur has only two vehicles for nearly 150
soldiers, and one AK-47 rifle and two magazines of ammunition per
soldier. Two, the AU lacks intelligence gathering capability--the
soldiers have no idea where armed elements are going to strike next.
These NGOs say that the rebels, janjaweed and bandits, know the AU is
outgunned and cannot find out where the armed groups are operating. So
basically, civilians are loosing confidence in the AU's ability to
improve security. What has NATO done to improve the capacity of the
AU's intelligence gathering capability? Have you seen any results? Are
the armaments described above--two vehicles for 144 soldiers, and one
AK-47 rifle and two magazines of ammunition per soldier--adequate for
the environment in Darfur? How should those soldiers be equipped? What
about general operational tactics, such as not having a predictable
schedule--are we helping with that? What have we done either through
NATO or bilaterally to help equip the AU?
Answer. Regarding intelligence gathering capability, the African
Union (AU) forces are fairly adept at this; however their ability to
process that information into actionable intelligence is less
effective. The U.S. has provided an intelligence expert from the U.S.
Central Command to the Forward Headquarters in El Fasher, Sudan to
assist with developing greater understanding and capacity for assessing
available intelligence.
NATO is not engaged to provide tactical level instruction, nor
assess the AU capabilities to conduct tactical-level operations. The
NATO Strategic Military Mission Order, approved by the North Atlantic
Council, authorized support along only three lines of operation:
Airlift support of eight AU Battalions, support to United Nations (UN)
led map exercise (MAPEX) for AU headquarters, and development/delivery
of Staff Capacity Building workshops for AU headquarters.
To date, seven of the eight battalions, have been transported into
theater by NATO and AU coordinated airlift. The AU is working to force
generate one additional battalion following the Republic of South
Africa's withdrawal of the final battalion. Final airlift activities
are expected to be completed by the 31 October 2005. The UN-led map
exercise was accomplished in August 2005 and the UN final report is in
coordination at UN Headquarters for final release. The Staff Capacity
Building Seminars were held in September 2005 and were received
positively by the AU headquarters. NATO exposure to any other
activities outside these operations is minimal.
NATO TROOP REPORTS
Question. What have NATO troops who are involved in the training
reported back about the relative ability of (a) the ability of AU
headquarters staff to carry out a multinational operation; and (b) the
relative capabilities of the troop contingents--their ability to shoot,
move and communicate with one another--that have been deployed to
Darfur?
Answer. As approved by the North Atlantic Council, NATO military
officers provided Staff Capacity Building Seminars both at the Darfur
Integrated Task Force (DITF) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Headquarter at El Fashir, Sudan.
The African Union (AUK displayed a keen interest in this training and
on average sent twice the expected personnel to each of the four
seminars. This training focused on individual staff member procedures
at the DITF and Force-level headquarters. The AU, recognizing their own
training requirements and the opportunity that NATO provides, requested
additional seminars. The NATO trainers confirmed the requirement for
additional training. The North Atlantic Council has approved the
extension of the mission until March 2006 and plans are underway to
deliver more training through NATO Allied Command Transformation.
NATO is not engaged to provide tactical level instruction, nor are
we engaged in the assessment of AU AMIS capabilities to conduct
tactical-level operations.
AFRICAN UNION CAPABILITY
Question. In your opinion, has the African Union reached a stage in
its development where it can successfully undertake a mission such as
the one it's currently signed on to in Sudan?
Answer. The African Union (AU) is accomplishing the mission it was
given--peacekeeping. However, with regard to the security situation, it
appears that a stronger mandate with authority and expanded freedom to
operate is required in order to satisfy expectations that the African
Union presence will stop all of the violence.
The experience gained by conducting this mission and the confidence
that will come if they reach a successful conclusion will greatly
enhance their ability to undertake similar missions in the future. This
is the first significant mission for the AU as an organization, which
will undoubtedly expose a number deficiencies and challenges that must
be overcome in order to increase its overall effectiveness to
accomplish this mission and those that will occur in the future. There
are a few areas which the African Union is still developing, such as
the ability to transport troops from member nations.
The viability of the AU is an important element in USEUCOM's
overarching strategic goals in Africa. In concert with our State
Department and OSD, EUCOM will continue to support the African Union
(AU) and regional organizations to help ensure their success. In so
doing we will help African regional organizations and their member
countries develop the military capabilities they need to respond to
regional problems and to protect their strategic resources, reduce
destabilizing tensions, and further develop cooperative, mutually-
beneficial relationships.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted by Senator Obama
to General Jones
PROBLEMS WITH AFRICAN UNION AIRLIFT
Question. Can you outline the problems that the African Union faces
with mobility, specifically with airlift and why this is an important
issue?
Answer. Airlift is exceptionally important in Africa because of the
enormous size of the continent, the often rough nature of the terrain,
and the generally very poor condition of the infrastructure. To be
credible, the African Union must be able to get its forces where they
are needed on short notice, and airlift is the only way this can be
done. A functioning airlift capability can be achieved only by a
comprehensive process that addresses the availability of airframes; an
effective maintenance system; training for pilots, maintainers, and
other experts, such as air traffic controllers; and a reliable supply
of consumables, most notably fuel. Currently, most African countries
lack adequate strategic lift assets to provide airlift for deploying to
desired regions. The few nations that do have any airlift capacity are
reluctant to use their assets due to deficient finances and inadequate
maintenance. An example is Nigeria, which had only one of eight C-130s
in a flyable condition during the airlift of their battalions.
The paucity of operational strategic lift within the African Union
underscores the importance of U.S. European Command's Theater Security
Cooperation (TSC) programs. A fundamental principle of our security
cooperation efforts is to build military capacities, such as airlift
and aircraft maintenance, that will enable organizations like the
African Union to respond more efficiently and effectively to regional
crises. In so doing we reduce the burden on U.S. forces and equipment
and help build important security partners that advance our common
interests.
BUILDING AFRICAN UNION AIRLIFT CAPACITY
Question. What has either NATO or the United States done to address
this shortfall and what more can be done to build the airlift capacity
of the African Union?
Answer. The United States European Command (EUCOM) is currently
developing the ``African Airlift Initiative,'' a promising proposal
designed to focus EUCOM's energies in the effort to help Africans build
airlift capacity.
While working to improve maintenance and logistical capabilities,
this initiative will focus on fostering ``regional thinking'' among our
African partners. This regional approach is important because it
fosters cooperation by willing African partners while promoting an
efficient and effective. airlift force in the face of an austere fiscal
environment.
In order to improve maintenance capability, the African Airlift
Initiative proposes the establishment of several regional logistic and
maintenance hubs on the African continent. These hubs should result in
an overall improvement in aircraft reliability and effectiveness.
EUCOM proposes to act in partnership with the African Union (AU)
and select ``focus countries'' to promote sponsorship and hosting of
regional maintenance and training symposiums that would be open to
surrounding countries.
As African airlift reliability improves and the requirement for
U.S. airlift diminishes, this initiative proposes increased training
with our African partners. These multinational training opportunities
will help develop the skills of African air forces while providing the
additional benefit of honing U.S. aircrew skills.
Finally, this initiative will pursue efforts to support the AU as
it enhances and improves regional command and control structures. To
this end, EUCOM proposes the creation of an African Airlift Center in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in partnership with the AU headquarters there.
This facility would be responsible for scheduling African airlift to
meet African requirements and for coordinating donor country
contributions. It would include facilities necessary to provide both
regional and continent-wide coordination, scheduling, and planning
functions for African airlift missions.
The vision for the end state of the African Airlift Initiative is
an African continent postured and ready to handle the airlift
requirements for any humanitarian crisis or natural disaster. By
assisting Africans to improve aircraft availability and reliability,
the success of future African airlift operations should not hinge on
U.S. or NATO involvement.
For its part, NATO has addressed this shortfall by coordinating the
donation of strategic airlift from nations--NATO and non-NATO--as well
as working with the European Union to avoid overwhelming the processing
stations in theater. The United States, under the NATO banner, has
provided strategic airlift and transported three of the eight
battalions plus additional troops, including civilian police, to and
from theatre. Finally, based on the AU's latest request for support,
NATO's North Atlantic Council has approved the extension of the mission
until March 31, 2006.
LIMITATIONS IN ADDRESSING THE AIRLIFT SHORTFALL
Question. What limitations do NATO or the U.S. European Command
face in addressing the airlift shortfall?
Answer. The most significant limitation to the short-term fix--
filling African shortfalls with NATO and U.S. European Command (EUCOM)
airframes, crews, and equipment--is the availability of aircraft,
personnel, and budget to address African shortfalls. There are
competing priorities for these assets. Airlift support for
contingencies that exceed the capacity of available assets requires the
reprioritization of theater support missions and often results in the
cancellation of airlift missions supporting EUCOM service components'
operations.
The predominantly poor infrastructure throughout Africa creates
additional challenges. To ensure mission success, EUCOM must deploy
more airlift assets, accompanying sustainment equipment and support
personnel, than would be required at locations with robust
infrastructure. This increases the demand for airlift assets that would
otherwise be supporting EUCOM service component missions.
The most significant limitation to the proposed long-term fix--
improving functioning African airlift capability--is that once an
organic capability for airlift is established in a country, there is no
guarantee that it will be used for the greater good of all Africa.
EUCOM lacks appropriate, tools to influence African nations to
participate in humanitarian or peace operations. Unless the crisis at
hand is demonstrably linked to the national interests of a particular
country, their participation cannot be assured or even expected.
EFFECT OF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES
Question. General Jones, all of us are well aware of the enormous
U.S. military force structure changes underway in the European Command
Area of Responsibility. Moreover, all of this is taking place in an
environment where we are fighting a war in Iraq, conducting operations
in Afghanistan, undergoing a BRAC round and responding to natural
disasters here at home. How do these changes, in the middle of this
challenging environment, effect your ability as either the Commander of
U.S. forces, or as the Supreme Allied Commander, to influence the
security situation in Africa?
Answer. Clearly, Africa's strategic importance is growing. The
United States European Command's (EUCOM) efforts are focused on
transforming our current force structure in Europe from a ``cold-war''
era heavy force to an agile, mobile, and tailorable force capable of
rapid deployment into any one of a number of Forward Operating Sites or
Cooperative Security Locations. Our objective is to increase strategic
effectiveness through the realignment of bases and the improvement of
access and force capabilities throughout EUCOM's area of
responsibility. These transformational efforts will improve EUCOM's
capability to maintain relevant, focused, and complementary security
cooperation activities customized to the social, economic, and military
realities in both Europe and Africa. A fundamental principle of our
strategy is a proactive approach that will enhance regional security,
mitigate potential conflict, and build military capacities of our
allies and partners that can reduce the burden on U.S. forces.
EUCOM's more adaptive infrastructure and theater security
cooperation activities will improve operational reach and tactical
flexibility; increase responsiveness and cooperation with friendly
nations to meet the objectives of the National Defense Strategy; and
better promote U.S. interests in today's international security
environment.
NATO PRAGUE SUMMIT
Question. Can you briefly outline how the decisions made at the
NATO Prague Summit in 2002 helped prepare NATO to be more effective in
responding to crises like the one in the Darfur?
Answer. NATO is putting into place a series of measures to increase
the deployability and usability of its forces. NATO adopted a three-
pronged approach at the 2002 Prague Summit: (1) launching the Prague
Capabilities Commitment, (2) creation of the NATO Response Force, and
(3) streamlining the military command structure.
Under the Prague Capabilities Commitment, member countries agreed
to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas. In certain
areas, such as strategic airlift, NATO countries are pooling resources
to provide the Alliance with the required capabilities to respond to
crises like Darfur.
The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technological
advanced force that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed.
With over 20,000 troops, the NRF will be able to deploy after five days
notice and sustain itself for 30 days of operations or more if re-
supplied. The NRF gives NATO the means to respond swiftly to various
types of crises anywhere in the world.
Finally, NATO has streamlined its military command arrangements to
provide a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command
structure. This reflects a fundamental shift in Alliance thinking. It
has resulted in a significant reduction in headquarters and operations
centers. This new command structure will be better able to conduct the
full range of Alliance missions. This restructuring has proven
beneficial to our support of the AU Mission in Sudan. With a more
efficient decision-making cycle NATO's response to the AU request was
extremely rapid, from first receipt of the original request to North
Atlantic Council approval of the Strategic Mission Order, to deployment
of personnel.
These measures are aimed at ensuring the Alliance can fulfill its
present and future operational commitments and fight new threats such
as terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is
particularly important as NATO takes on new missions in places such as
Darfur and Afghanistan.
NATO OUT-OF-AREA MISSIONS
Question. What work remains to be done within NATO in order to
better enable proper training, equipping, and organization of the
alliance to conduct out-of-area missions and to respond to future
contingencies in Africa that parallel the crisis in Darfur?
Answer. The full operating capability of the NATO Response Force
(NRF) is the centerpiece of the near-term transformation of NATO to
rapidly respond to crisis within NATO and outside of the alliance's
boundaries. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and
technological advanced force that the Alliance can deploy quickly
wherever needed. With over 20,000 troops, the NRF will be able to
deploy after five days notice and sustain itself for 30 days of
operations or more if re-supplied. The NRF gives NATO the means to
respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world.
Elements of the NRF got their first significant test by providing
significant humanitarian assistance to the United States after
Hurricane Katrina. This kind of humanitarian assistance is continuing
beyond the NRF context with NATO's assistance to Pakistan following
their recent devastating earthquake. However, the transformation of
NATO--on both the political and military levels--continues as we
recognize and deal with each new challenge together.