[Senate Hearing 109-760]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-760
KEEPING TERRORISTS OFF THE PLANE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 7, 2006
__________
Serial No. J-109-107
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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32-148 WASHINGTON : 2007
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JON KYL, Arizona JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN CORNYN, Texas CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
Michael O'Neill, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Bruce A. Cohen, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security
JON KYL, Arizona, Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JOHN CORNYN, Texas JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
Stephen Higgins, Majority Chief Counsel
Steven Cash, Democratic Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona.......... 1
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of
California..................................................... 4
WITNESSES
Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade,
Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C.............. 18
Laylagian, Leon, Executive Vice President, Passenger-Cargo
Security Group, Washington, D.C................................ 20
Rosenzweig, Paul S., Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for
Policy, and Jayson P. Ahern, Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, D.C............................. 5
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade,
Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., statement.. 26
Laylagian, Leon, Executive Vice President, Passenger-Cargo
Security Group, Washington, D.C., statement.................... 51
Rosenzweig, Paul S., Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for
Policy, and Jayson P. Ahern, Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., statement................. 56
KEEPING TERRORISTS OFF THE PLANE
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2006
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland
Security,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:41 p.m., in
room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jon Kyl,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Kyl and Feinstein.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF ARIZONA
Chairman Kyl. This hearing of the Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security
will come to order.
The subject of our hearing today is called ``Keeping
Terrorists Off the Plane,'' a simple title but one that is of
the utmost importance, as was illustrated by events in Great
Britain just about 3 weeks ago, and as we approach the fifth
anniversary of September 11th next Monday.
We have a distinguished panel. Paul Rosenzweig is Counselor
to the Assistant Secretary for the Policy Directorate of the
Department of Homeland Security. He is also a law professor and
published author with a background in litigation and public
policy.
Jay Ahern is the Assistant Commissioner in the Office of
Field Operations at U.S. Customs and Border Protection. He was
appointed to the position in March 2003 and oversees an
operations budget of $2.4 billion and over 24,000 employees. He
has been in public service for over 30 years.
On the second panel, we have Jess Ford, the Director of
International Affairs and Trade at the Government
Accountability Office, GAO. During his over 30 years of service
with GAO, he has directed the completion of numerous studies on
national security and border issues for Congress, and we have
one such study that we will be talking about today. And I will
leave the introduction of Mr. Leon Laylagian to Senator
Feinstein, but I want to thank him for traveling from New
Hampshire to be with us today.
If anyone needs a reminder of what is at stake in the war
against terrorists, visit the international arrival gate of any
large airport in the United States. The arrivals board will
show incoming flights from places like Mexico City, Tokyo,
Paris, Sydney, Rio, Manila, Tel Aviv, Montreal, London. There
will be a crowd of people waiting outside the security area to
pick up passengers from those flights. And the crowd will be
made up of many different kinds of people, all carefully
watching the stream of passengers for a familiar face, whether
it is a grandparent, mother or father, child, friend, business
associate. It is a place of reunions and embraces and laughter.
Of course, if the terrorists had their way, none of these
people would make it to the gate alive. Given the chance, the
would detonate explosive aboard an aircraft or attempt to seize
control of an aircraft and drive them into targets on the
ground.
We have to be clever in this war on terror--more clever
than the terrorists. We have to know how to improve the
security of international flights without unnecessarily
disrupting travel for the many millions of people who fly into
the United States each year, and without unnecessarily
interfering with the work that commercial air carriers perform
so well.
Obviously, one of the best places to start is by simply
keeping terrorists off of airplanes. How do we do that? How
well do we do it? And what do we need to do to improve?
Well, DHS has three primary tools at its disposal to screen
passengers before they get on international flights. Each of
these tools is in transition or experiencing problems. The
first of these is the passenger name record, PNR, data. In the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Congress
mandated that air carriers share PNR data with U.S. border
officials so they can get a look at the information collected
when a passenger is booking a flight, run that data against
terrorist and criminal watchlists, and assess risk.
Unfortunately, the European parliament has successfully
challenged DHS' agreement with the European Union Commission to
obtain PNR data on flights originating in Europe, and DHS and
the EU are up against a September 30th deadline to attempt to
reach a new agreement.
The second tool is the Advanced Passenger Information,
System, or APIS. The information transmitted to the Department
of Homeland Security by air carriers using APIS includes
biographical data from passports presented by travelers, which
CBP bounces off its terrorist and law enforcement databases.
The problem is under the current regulation air carriers are
permitted to transport that data up to 15 minutes after
takeoff. That is 15 minutes too late if you have terrorists
like those apprehended in the London bomb plot in August who
want to simply blow up the aircraft in flight.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 required DHS to issue regulations allowing for pre-
departure vetting of passengers. DHS has published that
regulation for comment, but it will not take effect until some
time in October or later.
The third tool is DHS' Immigration Advisory Program, the
IAP, which places CBP officers in foreign airports to examine
the travel documents that passengers are carrying and advising
airlines who is not likely to be admitted to the United States.
They apparently do a very good job of weeding out travelers
within invalid or expired visas and fake passports and could
play an important role in deterring terrorists. However, there
are presently only three IAP teams stationed abroad in London,
Amsterdam, and Warsaw, with Tokyo set to come online in
October. That is too few airports, and DHS needs to
aggressively expand the program.
We will also discuss today the Visa Waiver Program. The
Visa Waiver Program allows approximately 16 million foreign
nationals from 27 countries to enter the United States each
year without first obtaining a visa. The program is extremely
beneficial to the United States and our friends in the
international community, but it poses a severe security
vulnerability because visa waiver travelers are not interviewed
and fingerprinted by consular offices before getting on planes,
as those who do get a visa are.
Just this week, the Government Accountability Office issued
a report raising serious issues about DHS' oversight of this
program. Senator Feinstein and I just briefly talked about this
on the floor a moment ago. This has been one of her chief areas
of concern, and we are going to want to examine what steps DHS
is taking to mitigate risks in this program. It is fortunate
that countries participating in the program will be required
after October 26th to issue their nationals improved e-
passports, which are machine readable, tamper resistant, and
carry a digital photograph and an integrated chip, but on the
downside, plenty of old grandfathered passports, many of them
stolen or altered, and these will continue to be accepted for
international travel.
The bottom line at this point, nearly 5 years after the
horrible incidents of September 2001, is that while we have
taken a lot of steps to improve the security of our country,
and in particular, travel from abroad on aircraft, there is
obviously still a long way to go. And we know that terrorists
have not been quiet during this period of time because we have
too much information about plots in the works or disrupted
plots that suggest that they intend to take advantage of our
vulnerabilities. What this means is that everybody who is
working this problem in the Government of the United States,
including those of us in Congress, have got to do everything we
can to identify where these creases in the system are, where
the terrorists might attempt to exploit our open and
wonderfully free environment for their horrible deeds and find
ways to close those creases or close those loopholes. And the
purpose of this hearing today is to focus on just some aspects
of the problem so that as we approach this fifth anniversary,
we can continue to not only engage in the oversight that this
Committee has done, but also to propose any legislation or
administrative fixes or anything else that we need to do to
better secure our country.
Now I will turn the microphone over to Senator Feinstein.
There has been nobody who has been more focused on national
security, not only since September 11, 2001, but before then. I
had occasion to review the list of hearings that we held before
September 11th, and I do not want to say that we told you so,
but Senator Feinstein and I and others had noticed a lot of
things that were not right about the security and about the
threats that existed to the United States. And it is no
surprise, therefore, that some of the ideas that we had were
very quickly passed into law after September 11th. But we did
not get a whole lot of attention paid to them before.
So I could not be more privileged to have a partner in this
effort more capable and more committed than Senator Feinstein.
STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate those comments, and as you know, it has been a
delight for me to work with you.
I share your concerns on the Visa Waiver Program and have
read the GAO report and am very concerned. You are correct, we
have 27 countries, 15 million people coming in a year. The US-
VISIT Program knows who comes in, but they do not know who goes
out. That part of the program is not functioning. To make it
worse, no one can tell us when it will be functioning. So what
this leaves us with is the soft underbelly whereby people can
go to a visa waiver country, which there are 27 of now, and
come in just with a passport.
What complicates this is there is so much fraudulent
passport use, and I want to read one sentence from the GAO
report right at the beginning: ``Stolen passports from visa
waiver countries are prized travel documents among terrorists,
criminals, and immigration law violators, creating an
additional risk. While the DHS has intercepted many fraudulent
documents at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledge
that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have
entered the United States using a stolen or lost passport from
a visa waiver country.''
Now, I am privy to intelligence data. I cannot give you the
numbers, but I can tell you there are tens of thousands of
these documents stolen--passports, Geneva Convention travel
documents, and international driver's licenses. These become
prime acquisitions for terrorists because they can simply come
in from a visa waiver country with these documents.
The report goes on: ``DHS has sought to require the
reporting of lost and stolen passport data to the United States
and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol),
but it has not issued clear reporting guidelines to
participating countries.'' My question of DHS is: Why not?
Secondly, while most visa waiver countries participate with
Interpol's databases, four do not. DHS is not using Interpol's
data to its full potential as a border screening tool because
DHS does not automatically access the data at primary
locations. Again, why not?
Senator Sessions and I got into the immigration bill a
passport fraud bill, Senator Kyl, which toughened the penalties
for passport fraud. When we began to look into it, somebody
that had a fraudulent passport was simply given the passport
back and let go. My view is there has to be a price for the use
of a fraudulent passport, and it ought to be a ``go to jail
free'' ticket. We toughened the penalties. That is part of the
immigration bill that apparently isn't going anywhere right
now. My thought was that you and I and the Committee might put
this part out as a stand-alone, as we did our border tunnel
bill, and just get it passed before we go out in October. So
that is one thought that just germinated through my head.
But in the 14 years I have been on this Committee and on
the Immigration Subcommittee, we have had testimony about the
Visa Waiver Program, and it has been one delay after the other
in terms of setting up and getting effective the US-VISIT
Program. I am very worried about it. We now have people who
think, well, you will introduce a bill and let this country or
that country come into the Visa Waiver Program. And I feel very
strongly that if a country does not meet the statutory
requirements for visa waiver, they should not be allowed to
come into the program. This again, I repeat, is the soft
underbelly.
Now, let me comment on one other point that is coming to my
attention, and that is the issue of cargo security aboard
passenger planes coming into the United States. Every day
passengers remove their shoes, take out their laptops, leave
liquids behind, bags pass through electronic screeners, and
everybody accepts this as a necessary inconvenience. And we
have all stood in the lines and watched this happening, and I
think it is one of the great things about America, that people
just heave to and say, look, if it helps make things secure, I
am prepared to stand there for an hour, an hour and a half. And
so all the passengers really get my very serious commendation.
But on some level, this provides a false sense of security.
Recent news suggests that only 10 to 15 percent of air cargo is
screened for explosive, even though this commercial air cargo
gets stowed in the same compartments of passenger airplanes as
checked luggage. This, in my view, is unacceptable and also
unnecessary, especially given the other means of transportation
often available for cargo transportation, including all cargo
airplanes.
My view is very firm. If we cannot get more cargo screened,
we ought to prohibit it on passenger airliners and let it go
somewhere else. But we have got to screen cargo because this,
again, is another part of the soft underbelly of the Nation.
And so I hope to ask some of these questions of our witnesses.
I want to welcome them here and not prolong them any longer.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein.
We will start with our two witnesses. We will start, Mr.
Rosenzweig, with you and then Mr. Ahern. The clock says 5
minutes. If you can keep it roughly to that, that would be
great. Of course, your written statements will be included in
the record.
STATEMENT OF PAUL S. ROSENZWEIG, COUNSELOR TO THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR POLICY, AND JAYSON P. AHERN, ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Rosenzweig. Thank you very much, Chairman Kyl, Senator
Feinstein. I will keep to 5 minutes, though I will look forward
to the questions and answers, since some of the answers to many
of the questions you and Senator Feinstein have posed in your
opening will take somewhat longer than 5 minutes for me to
address.
I am very pleased to be here today to discuss the ongoing
efforts of the Department to prevent terrorists from entering
the United States and posing a threat to international air
travel. As you noted, the recently dismantled plot to blow up
aircraft en route to the United States from Britain reinforces
the importance of the homeland security mission. It reminds us
not only that terrorists remain intent upon targeting air
travel, but also of the importance of a layered approach to
security. I will be happy to address all of the programs that
we have spoken of in the questions and answers. In my brief
remarks now, I would like just address the Visa Waiver and the
PNR--Passenger Name Record--program.
As you know, the Visa Waiver Program allows citizens from
27 designated countries to come to this country for up to 90
days without a visa. VWP is at the forefront of our efforts to
facilitate international travel. Millions of people use it
every year. It is also at the forefront of our effort to defend
against those who would abuse America's welcoming nature.
The program sets strict security standards for member
countries. For instance, visa waiver country passports have to
contain a chip with the user's biometric and biographic data, a
requirement that has been propagated over the past several
years. Also, VWP travelers are required to enroll in the US-
VISIT Program upon arrival, which collects their fingerprints
and photographs and stores them. We have been moving forward on
developing protocols for the reporting of lost and stolen
passports, and to maybe make a bit of news, I can say that they
have been cleared through the Government, and we anticipate
rolling them out with an expectation of asking our EU
colleagues to meet the new standards by April of next year. We
have been coordinating with the Department of State on a series
of bilateral approaches to the various countries to inform them
of the new standards, and I will be happy to elaborate on what
they are likely to be during our discussions.
Just this week, as you alluded to, GAO did issue several
reports on the Visa Waiver Program. We appreciate the GAO
reports and their recommendations for improvement. In fact, we
have already addressed many of the issues GAO has identified.
We have made good progress. There is, however, still room for
improvement, and most saliently, the current VWP program
identifies security threats exclusively on a country-by-country
basis. We think that, as we go forward, the program needs to
look for security threats on a passenger-by-passenger basis. We
look forward to working with the Senate and with our
international partners to strengthen VWP's security features.
The second issue I would like to mention is Passenger Name
Records. That is airline information that tells us about a
passenger's identity and travel plans, for example, information
about itinerary or contact phone numbers. Federal law requires
that airlines turn over PNR to the Department, and we currently
collect it from 127 airlines. that number represents
essentially every major carrier that flies to the United
States. The depth and breadth of PNR makes it a vital tool for
the thorough vetting of all passengers.
As you also know, however, European officials have
expressed misgivings about the status of the program under
European private laws. The U.S.-EU arrangement on PNR data sets
strict limits on our ability to share PNR information, both
within the Department of Homeland Security and with other
counterterrorism and law enforcement agencies. And in May of
this year, the European Court of Justice annulled the agreement
based upon its reading of European law. DHS is strongly of the
belief that continued sharing of PNR data is essential for safe
and secure international travel. At the same time, we are
committed to making sure that air travel is not disrupted by
these events.
As we negotiate with our European allies for a replacement
agreement, we will not forget the key lessons of 9/11: the
necessity of sharing information so dots can be connected
before attacks materialize. The two programs I have highlighted
stand at the front and center of DHS' effort to prevent
terrorists from entering the United States and posing a threat
to international air travel. The information provided through
the VWP and PNR, as well as through API and the IAP program you
have mentioned, are essential to our homeland security efforts.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Feinstein, I want to thank you for
the opportunity to present this them, and I look forward to
responding to your questions.
Chairman Kyl. I appreciate it. You have a lot to cover, and
5 minutes does not do it justice. We will get back to you.
Thank you.
Mr. Ahern?
Mr. Ahern. Thank you very much, Chairman Kyl and Ranking
Member Feinstein. It is my pleasure to appear before you today
and discuss the efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
and what measures we have taken to increase the security and to
protect the country against the threat of terrorism.
First I would like to speak about our progress that we have
made in enhancing security at our ports of entry, with a
particular focus on aviation security. And, secondly, I would
like to explain CBP's critical role in response to the recent
threat to aviation for flights departing the United Kingdom
destined for the United States where this plot to blow up
commercial aircraft reinforced the threat that this country
continues to face today.
To put our mission in perspective, and certainly both
Senators being from Arizona and California, you realize that
the Border Patrol, another operating component within CBP,
annually apprehends over 1 million illegal aliens attempting to
enter the country illegally between our ports of entry. And
certainly that is a considerable challenge. But I would submit
that the activity in our Nation's ports of entry is just as
daunting and poses other challenges. In this environment, we
have to use risk management in order to determine which
travelers are legitimate and law-abiding versus those that are
attempting to circumvent laws.
The universe is, for example, in 2005, fiscal year 2005, we
had 431 million people, travelers applying for admission coming
into this country at our ports of entry. And although this is a
largely compliant population of travelers, we actually had
565,417 people, individuals who were found to be inadmissible
to the United States for a variety of adverse reasons. But most
alarming is the fact that CBP detected 493 of these individuals
to be inadmissible under suspicion of terrorist or security
grounds. These include, in addition to the thousands of other
arrests that we make at our ports of entry for narcotics and
other violations of law, 7,662 criminals that were queried
through the National Crime Information Database. And the number
is significant as it continues to go up, but it points to one
of the other enhancements that have been made since 9/11, and
that is just not querying people solely on the biographic
information but also using the biometric capabilities we now
have at our ports of entry to identify individuals who may be
traveling across our borders with aliases so we can actually do
the biometric confirmation of who they are and confirm the
warrant at that point in time.
But speaking of the specific U.K.-U.S. threat, on August 9,
2006, this year, we were faced with a very serious threat to
the security of our country and its citizens, and the thwarted
London-based attacks certainly reminded us all that we must
remain vigilant and continue our efforts in the detection and
apprehension of potential terrorists before they step foot on a
plane, in advance of their departure, and in advance of their
arrival into the United States. And as our front-line border
agency, CBP was rapidly responding to these threats by
immediately implementing a pre-departure vetting process on all
flights--that is approximately 130 flights a day--from all
airports in the U.K. that are destined to the United States.
In order to accomplish this critical homeland security
measure, CBP has been successful in large part due to the
outstanding cooperation we have with our partners in the
airline industry. In responding to these threats, we required
the commercial carriers to provide Advance Passenger
Information system, that data, in advance of departure, and CBP
at our National Targeting Center then completed a thorough
vetting of each individual against a multiplicity of systems,
including terrorist watchlists and our Treasury Enforcement
Communications System. This individual vetting required
biographic information that was cued through an electronic
swipe of the passport by the airlines overseas--again, pre-
departure. Once the vetting was complete, we then would provide
the information back to the airlines to be able to give an all-
clear, or if those individuals were not allowed to board, that
was then coordinated appropriately with the U.K. government
authorities. In a recent example, 3 days ago, on September 4th,
through this process we actually identified an individual who
was on the no-fly list prior to departure. He was given a no-
fly and actually was turned over to the authorities in London
before boarding for the United States.
Just to summarize the amount of flights that have been
vetted since the August 9th threat stream, 3,597 flights have
been vetted coming into this country, and they were carrying
769,000 passengers destined to the United States. Of that
population, 20 individuals were denied boarding for terrorist
or security grounds pre-departure. That shows how critical it
is to get the information prior to boarding on aircrafts bound
for the United States.
Given this process overseas, this is why DHS and CBP
provided the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking--and it is currently
posted in the Federal Register--that proposed to seek the
Advance Passenger Information 60 minutes prior to departure or
through an Advance Quick Query process real time up to 15
minutes prior to departure if the 60-minute requirement cannot
be met because of transiting passengers at major international
gateways. And this certainly is essential, as demonstrated by
the U.K. plot, to make sure that we have this information in
advance of departure so we can do a thorough vetting.
I will certainly begin to summarize at this point because I
do not want to go beyond my time, but I will be happy to talk
about the Immigration Advisory Program that you spoke of that
we have in three locations. We will have a fourth location up
within a very short period of time, and we have an additional
expansion plan for fiscal year 2007. And at this point in time,
I will conclude and look forward to any questions you might
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenzweig and Mr. Ahern
appears as a submission for the record.]
Chairman Kyl. Well, thank you again. There is far too much
for you to cover everything.
Let me begin by just focusing, Mr. Ahern, on the last thing
you talked about. There has been some publicity about the
problems associated with aircraft that take off where there has
not been an adequate opportunity to vet all of the people on
the manifest prior--or on the passenger list prior to takeoff.
You described a rulemaking or mentioned a rulemaking that would
expand this. Would you tell us what the status of that is, what
you expect to come from it, and what will occur as a result?
Mr. Ahern. Yes, sir. I would be happy to, Senator.
Currently, the requirement that is provided to the carriers is
to give the information, the Advance Passenger Information,
which is all the information basically contained in a passport,
electronically transmitted, the passenger manifest, if you
will, so we can then run it against all our watchlisting
systems. But, currently, that is mandatorily required 15
minutes after--upon wheels up, 15 minutes after wheels up. That
we have seen through many of the flight diversions that have
occurred on aircraft bound for the United States, that is too
late in the process. And given the current threat stream that
we are still working right now, that clearly would have been
too late.
So the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking went in about 2 weeks
before the August 9th threat, and we actually have it proposed
for getting the information 60 minutes prior to departure, but
also through deliberations and very exhaustive discussions with
the airline industry, who have been very supportive of this, we
have learned also a lot of transiting passengers in major
international gateways, we had to take a look at how could we
make sure we do not negatively impact the airline industry as
we impose this new rule.
So we were able to come up with something that still
provided a level of security pre-departure, which is called the
Advance Quick Query, so that we can actually get real-time
submission and provide real-time response, but closing it out
15 minutes pre-departure so that we still can make security
vetting determinations prior to the aircraft pushing back.
The public comment period closes on October the 12th. We
will analyze those comments, and then we will move forward with
the final implementation of the rule.
Chairman Kyl. And that seems logical that for 95 percent of
the passengers, there is plenty of time to get the pre-
screening done, and for the few that come in at the very last
minute, you could do some real-time checking, and it wouldn't
be too burdensome. I mean, that is at least the way I look at
it. Is that the pitch you are making on the rulemaking?
Mr. Ahern. That is exactly what we are stating at this
point, and that again is something we have learned through a
very deliberative process with the airlines. We do not want to
have a negative impact on the airline industry and have the
economic harm be created through this rulemaking process.
Chairman Kyl. Just one more question of you. You mentioned
the fact that there had been 20 people detained as a result of
the interlocking checks that you described, and I will get to
that later. But what can you say about these 20 people?
Mr. Ahern. A lot of these individuals were people that were
on either no-fly or watchlisted individuals. Whether they
actually posed a threat to civil aviation security, I would not
go into detail in this particular hearing. I could say they
were not part of the U.K. plot. Those individuals had
previously been disrupted by the U.K. authorities. But these
were individuals that presented security concerns, and we
thought it was prudent to give a denied boarding and have them
offloaded and turned over to the U.K. authorities.
Chairman Kyl. Okay. I did not think you could tell us much
about them, but at least it illustrates the fact that something
has to happen, and for the general public, who knows what
might--some may be fine, others may not.
Mr. Rosenzweig, you talked about the Visa Waiver Program,
and I am going to, since that has been such an interest of
Senator Feinstein's, leave most of that for her to get into, if
she would like. But you talked about some new standards in
April. Those I gather will make the passports themselves more
secure, but would not do anything to solve the problem of,
number one, the passports that have been stolen already, or
manufactured; and, two, the lack of an oral interview, which is
at least supposed to occur with the issuance of a visa and
which sometimes can reveal information that is important for
screening purposes. Is that correct?
Mr. Rosenzweig. That is, I guess, one of the problems with
speaking too quickly. I must misstated it slightly. The
standards that DHS will be pushing out to our friends and
colleagues in the European Union for which we will seek action
by next April will be standards by which we ask them to do
direct reporting of lost and stolen passports, both blanks and
stolen issued travel documents, in a direct report to the
United States. It will encompass both a time requirement and a
request that they provide a 24/7 point of contact within their
government since we need somebody that we can reach on a real-
time basis to resolve ambiguities when a document that we think
meets--is lost or stolen is encountered by one of our CBP
agents at the port of entry.
So that is the standard that I was speaking about. It is
the one that is directly responsive to the Enhanced Border
Security Act.
Chairman Kyl. I think you described it correctly. I mis-
described it a moment ago. And this is a problem because in the
past we had not gotten notice from many countries of stolen
passports. Is that correct?
Mr. Rosenzweig. That is correct. We have been working with
them to develop means for direct reporting, and then the
secondary goal is the one alluded to by Senator Feinstein,
which is to make it available at ports of entry to the CBP
officer on the ground so that he can detail and use that on a
minute-by-minute basis.
Chairman Kyl. But it is still a fact that many passports
are stolen. That is still remains a problem. And, secondly--and
I am going to get into the interlocking other mechanisms here
in a minute, but there is no independent interview of the
person coming here.
Mr. Rosenzweig. That is correct.
Chairman Kyl. And just to illustrate the nature of this
problem, Zacarias Moussaoui, who was the suspected 20th
hijacker, was a French citizens, as I believe. Is that correct?
Mr. Rosenzweig. Yes.
Chairman Kyl. And I don't recall whether he came here under
the Visa Waiver Program, but he could have if he did not. And I
am getting nods of heads that yes, he did.
There is something about this clock that is giving me far
more time than I deserve, and I do not know quite what it is.
So what I will do, Senator Feinstein, is turn to you if you are
ready, and then we will come back for another round.
Senator Feinstein. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think to Mr. Rosenzweig, let me ask this question: The
GAO report concludes that the Visa Waiver Program would be
strengthened if DHS takes certain steps, including requiring
that all visa waiver countries provide the United States and
Interpol with nonbiographical data from lost or stolen issued
passports as well as blank passports, and also development of
clear standard operating procedures for the reporting of stolen
and lost blank and issued passports. It also recommend that DHS
develop and implement a plan to make Interpol's stolen travel
document database automatically available to immigration
officers at primary inspection.
What steps is DHS taking to implement that recommendation?
Mr. Rosenzweig. Thank you very much for the question. The
news is good, albeit perhaps a little delayed. On the first of
those, the development of uniform standards for reporting, that
is precisely the set of standards that I was speaking about
with Senator Kyl. We expect to have those cleared out of the
executive branch within a matter of weeks.
Senator Feinstein. Is this the April release that you were
talking about?
Mr. Rosenzweig. April will be the deadline that we would be
asking our European colleagues to meet. I expect for them to
have these standards in hand and to be sharing them with them
as we go through the fall, recognizing that it is not an
instantaneous process that they can turn on on a dime. We are
going to ask them to--
Senator Feinstein. Why don't you give us--it might be
useful--the operational date. When will this be operational?
Mr. Rosenzweig. We are going to ask our European colleagues
who are members of the Visa Waiver Program to have this done by
April 30, 2007.
Senator Feinstein. So it will be operational May 1?
Mr. Rosenzweig. That is our request. Whether or not all of
the visa waiver countries meet that deadline and how we will
deal with--
Senator Feinstein. I guess this is the problem. No deadline
is ever kept, and I cannot think of one that has been kept with
this program. So, I mean, I really think this is important, and
I think if a visa waiver country does not want to cooperate,
they should drop out of the system.
I think we are in an era now where I understand airlines
want passengers. I understand the chamber wants business, but
American citizens do not want terrorists. And, therefore, this
becomes much more important than anything else.
Mr. Rosenzweig. I agree with your sentiments. We are not in
a position to make a unilateral demand, and the only hammer we
have is the rather stringent one of compelling a country to
drop out, which has very significant foreign policy and--I am
not apologist for the visa waiver countries. I think that they
need to get with the program. But I cannot make them--
Senator Feinstein. There ought to be statutory regulations,
and if somebody does not want to follow them, then they drop
out of the program. Nobody forces a country to be in the Visa
Waiver Program.
So, I mean, I guess people can sort of develop a great
affront and say, ``Oh, I am appalled by this.'' But, look, this
country has been attacked in a major way, and we care about it.
I guess it is the largest--it is a larger loss of life than
Pearl Harbor. So, you know, people are concerned. They do not
want it to happen again.
So the stolen passport becomes a very interesting terrorist
expediter, and we have got to control it. So, I mean, my view
is that if you run into recalcitrant countries, please--I do
not know how Senator Kyl feels about it, but I sure feel
strongly. I would be willing to introduce the legislation.
Whether it would go anywhere I cannot tell you, but--
Mr. Rosenzweig. Well, I am quite certain that this colloquy
will find its way into the capitals of the visa waiver
countries, and I will certainly make sure that they are aware
that I share your concerns.
Chairman Kyl. Senator Feinstein, would you just yield for a
second, and then I will give you more time.
Senator Feinstein. Yes, of course.
Chairman Kyl. Mr. Rosenzweig, what four countries do not
share lost or stolen passport information with Interpol?
Mr. Rosenzweig. I have that in my briefing book, but I am
just going to--
Chairman Kyl. Okay. We might as well just get their names
out right here.
Mr. Rosenzweig. Holland, Japan, Norway, and Sweden.
Chairman Kyl. All right. Holland, Japan, Norway, and
Sweden.
Mr. Rosenzweig. Yes.
Chairman Kyl. And regarding your request in 2005 to certify
their intention to report lost or stolen passport data to DHS,
what countries failed to certify their intent to share that
data?
Mr. Rosenzweig. I do not believe any country failed to
certify their intent to share that data.
Chairman Kyl. All right. Double-check that for us.
Mr. Rosenzweig. Yes, we would be happy to get back to you.
Chairman Kyl. Okay. Thank you.
Go ahead, Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Those are very good questions. Let me
follow up. When will American inspectors at airports have full
access to Interpol data on passports?
Mr. Rosenzweig. That is the second part of your earlier
question. We completed a pilot test on historical data with the
Interpol database through something known as the Mind Mobile
Interpol--
Mr. Ahern. Network Database.
Mr. Rosenzweig. Network Database. Thank you, Jay-- just
this past July, and we are analyzing the results. That test
actually demonstrated some operational difficulties in making a
live connection to Interpol that need to be resolved. My goal
would be to have those resolved, at least in theory, by the end
of this year and then operational in the second or third
quarter of next year. That is an aspirational goal. I should
add--
Senator Feinstein. Of 2006? I am writing it down, and I am
going to get you to sign it afterwards.
Mr. Rosenzweig. Absolutely.
Senator Feinstein. Operational when?
Mr. Rosenzweig. My goal is second or third quarter of next
year, 2007.
Mr. Ahern. Senator, if I might add a little more, give my
colleague here a break for a second, if I might, some of the
things that are happening I think that are important to make
sure for the record it is reflected that we get a considerable
amount of lost and stolen passport information directly into
our systems today through the State Department. We also get a
direct feed from the U.K. Government to the State Department on
lost and stolen passports. So we have a considerable amount of
lost and stolen passports in our system today, so that is fed
in through the Department of State's class system into our
integrated border inspection system. So we do have access to a
considerable amount.
Certainly, we look forward to getting the full link with
Interpol, but even with Interpol, I think there is an important
thing that we need to make sure as we go forward, and
certainly, we realize, as does the head of Interpol, that we
need to make sure there is a good quality data in that system,
to make sure that it is updated and current, because a lot of
reported lost passports get retrieved. And even in the U.K.
flight vetting, as we were looking against some of the lost and
stolen passport database access we do have, we found a lot of
individuals who had reported a passport as being stolen that
had later been retrieved, and we were then doing an interview
with these individuals on the basis that it was a lost
document, and they just had not reported its retrieval.
So we need to make sure that the quality of the data that
is put into the Interpol database and we then have access to is
well defined and accurate and current.
Senator Feinstein. I would be willing to make a bet that
your numbers will not come anywhere close to the number stolen
in a given year from EU countries that are members of the Visa
Waiver Program.
Mr. Ahern. I do not want to debate that fact with you. I
just wanted to talk about where it is--
Senator Feinstein. You do not want to do that, because it
is a huge number. And that is really the concern because--why
would somebody steal these passports? Only one reason: to sell
them on the black market to somebody who could not get a
passport legitimately.
Mr. Ahern. That is clearly the purpose, to gain illegal
access into some country.
Senator Feinstein. Now, I asked the question about American
inspectors at airports, but let me put it another way. Would
this include all primary immigration inspectors, Mr.
Rosenzweig? The earlier question I asked about having that
available.
Mr. Rosenzweig. You mean the access to the Interpol lost
and stolen database?
Senator Feinstein. Yes.
Mr. Rosenzweig. In the long run, yes, as with--
Senator Feinstein. But that is not in your date of the
second or third quarter of next year. That is just airports.
Mr. Rosenzweig. That would be for airports, yes.
Senator Feinstein. Okay. Then we have ports of entry,
shipping ports of entry.
Mr. Rosenzweig. Yes. The plan, of course, would be to
propagate it from air ports of entry and sea ports of entry,
which are relatively minor and modest. But land ports of entry
are an amazingly numerous and difficult task, and, of course,
it requires technology, it requires an investment of a
substantial amount of money, and it will require deployment and
training. It will not be instantaneous.
Senator Feinstein. Let me just conclude by thanking you for
your work. I know it is hard because I know there are cross-
conflicts, and you are caught right in the middle of them. But
it is just so important--this country has been such a sieve--
that we close some of those doors.
I was telling the Senator, the Chairman, I should say, that
even before 9/11, I had been very concerned about the misuse of
the student visa program, and I could not get anybody's
attention. We had some evidence that there was a lot of fraud
going on, even a bogus school set up next door to one of our
offices in California. You had California officials at schools
convicted of falsifying information about foreign students
present that were not present. And then just recently, I saw
where 11 students from Israel did not show up at the
university, the University of Montana, I believe it was.
Chairman Kyl. Egypt.
Senator Feinstein. Excuse me, Egyptian students did not
show up at the University of Montana, which raises a whole
question about how this program is being monitored, if, in
fact, it is. Do you have any information on that?
Mr. Rosenzweig. We track students through our SEVIS
program, the Student Entry Visa Issuance System. My familiarity
with the 11 Egyptians that you were talking about comes only
from the same place it does with you, which is the newspaper--
or perhaps you have better information than I. I do know that
we track them down.
We continue through Immigration and Customs Enforcement to
register schools within the SEVIS program as recipients of
students. The issuance of visas to students, though, is a
responsibility of the Department of State out in the various
posts, and so I would probably have to defer on who is getting
issued and what the standards are to somebody from that
Department.
Senator Feinstein. Would you be willing to take a look at
it and give us a report in writing as to how it is now being
monitored and whether, in fact, it is?
Mr. Rosenzweig. Absolutely.
Senator Feinstein. I think the universities finally came to
the table and agreed to monitor students to see first, if they
were accepted, if they came, and then to send that information
to INS; secondly, that they remained in school and actually
took the courses, and check--I do not know whether it was by
quarter or by year, but it was one of the two. And I think that
is very useful.
We know that the student visa programs were used by
terrorists who actually committed attacks on this country, so I
think it is something that is well ordered.
Mr. Rosenzweig. I would be happy to get back to you.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.
For either one of you, why can't DHS do more to get
Passenger Name Record data on transatlantic flights? Going back
to something I talked about in my opening statement.
Mr. Rosenzweig. I think that one is in my square. We do get
Passenger Name Record information on transatlantic flights.
However, because of European concerns about privacy issues, the
Department is prohibited, except on particularized case-by-case
bases, from sharing that information with anybody outside of
the Customs and Border Protection. So, for example, CBP cannot
share that information with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, much less the FBI or other counterterrorism or
counterintelligence agencies. That has, as Secretary Chertoff
has said, placed some very significant limits on our ability to
use that data to assess terrorist threats from unknown
terrorists--cleanskins. Where we use API, Advance Passenger
Information, for known terrorists, watchlist matching, the
Passenger Name Record is principally of use for us in
identifying the unknown terrorists.
The European Court of Justice has just struck down the
agreement that limited our ability to use Passenger Name Record
data, and, indeed, my boss is in Europe today trying to
negotiate a replacement.
I have to say that European privacy concerns are tending to
pull us to use even less of the data, if I read the members of
their parliament correctly. That I think would be inconsistent
with American interests in making better use of that data as a
vital means of identifying who is coming.
Chairman Kyl. Isn't the problem here that not everybody is
known to be a terrorist who is a terrorist? Sometimes you have
to put a few things together to connect the dots, as the saying
goes, to figure out that this person is probably not somebody
you want to allow to get on the airplane and come to the U.S.,
or at least you want to check some additional things before you
do that. So given the fact that there is an awful lot of gray
in here, you do need to share that data, say, with the FBI or
someone else to say, ``Do you know anything about this person?
Is there a problem here?'' Is that the problem? And if so, what
can the United States do, what could the Congress do to
persuade our European friends who are, for the most part, on
the Visa Waiver Program that this is something they need to
help with?
Mr. Rosenzweig. Well, I am going to let Mr. Ahern tell you
a little bit about the actual uses because I think that is an
important point.
On the second of those, that is the argument that I made as
recently as this morning to members of the EU, that enhanced
data sharing is the foundation of the Visa Waiver Program, and
that our ability to get information about individuals so that
we can target our resources better allows us to be more
forthcoming and facilitative in the travel sphere, and that the
converse of that is equally true.
Jay?
Mr. Ahern. Senator, certainly you have hit on a real
critical issue, and that is the ability to identify individuals
who are not watchlisted and who could be associated with
individuals who may be. And one of the things that the
Passenger Name Record system provides us is a research
capability. Currently, 127 airlines that fly to the United
States provide that information to us. That actually accounts
for 95 percent of the air travel. Before there is any alarm
over the 5 percent that remains, that is very small or charter
airlines that do not have a reservation system, and so they are
not able to comply with the existing law. But the ability to
take it and put links and have our tactical targeters at the
National Targeting Center or through the local targeting units
we have throughout the country, to be able to do linking of
individuals on reservations is critical for us for national
security because, as we find more people look for individuals
that are not watchlisted to try to introduce them into the
country, it is a critical national security tool that we have
to have.
Chairman Kyl. Let me just ask one final question here
relating to the additional resources that might be provided to
the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit. There has been
publicity about the small number of people at headquarters who
are available to provide oversight, and I would be anxious to
get your ideas about what we can do. Is it necessary for us to
authorize something here or to appropriate more money or to
direct that more people be put into the oversight position?
Because, again, this is a program which is designed to operate
to make it easy for people when you do not have the usual
checks of, for example, the oral interview that is required for
the visa issuance.
Mr. Rosenzweig. I believe that at this point I am supposed
to say the President's request for funding for fiscal year
2007, which I believe the current appropriations bill meets,
will, we think, cover our resource needs. We operate with full-
time staff in my office as well as several contractors who
provide assistance. We also call upon the resources of ICE and
CBP agents overseas to participate in the country reviews. So
at this juncture, we are confident that the President's
request, if fully funded, would meet our needs for the--
Chairman Kyl. Well, how many people are in the headquarters
right now to oversee this program?
Mr. Rosenzweig. The Visa Oversight Unit has two full-time
staff and--three contractors?
Mr. Ahern. Three contractors.
Chairman Kyl. See, that is the problem. That is the
question I got this morning on an interview. How can they
possibly do this with two? I said, ``Gee, I do not know. I will
ask this afternoon.'' I mean, it seems implausible that with
the number of millions of passengers and the difficulties--and
we have only scratched the surface here in the brief time we
have today discussing that--that that is an adequate number.
And so I guess I would be curious when you say that the new
budget submission will provide adequate resources, how many
people will that provide? And I realize people are not
everything. A lot of it is the technology as well. But how many
would you have overseeing it?
Mr. Rosenzweig. Perhaps I should clarify that the five
people here in Washington are not the ones responsible for each
country review. Before we review Norway's compliance or
Brunei's compliance, we assemble a team comprised of other DHS
employees and also contractors, give them training on the
country conditions, and then send them out for an intensive 2-
week study of a particular country's security arrangements,
passport issuance processes, et cetera. So the five people that
you and I are discussing are essentially the administrative,
bureaucratic head back here in Washington. They are not the
arms and the legs who are responsible for all the millions of
people. In addition, we call upon many other resources at CBP
and in the Policy Directorate to do things like meet with
Interpol to discuss the integration of lost or stolen--of their
stolen travel documents database into Customs and Border
Protection.
Chairman Kyl. Why don't you simply, if you would, submit
for the record a little statement that provides the
justification or the rationale for the number of positions
sought in the new budget submission.
Mr. Rosenzweig. I would be happy to.
Chairman Kyl. And any other information that you think
would be useful to us.
I have some additional questions I will ask you, if I
could, for the record, and we will leave the record open for
you to not only answer those questions, but if other members of
the Committee have questions they might want to submit, you
will receive those as well.
Senator Feinstein, anything else of these witnesses?
Senator Feinstein. No, I have nothing else. Thank you.
Chairman Kyl. There is so much more we could go into, and I
am sure there is a lot more you would like to tell us. We have
another panel, and we are constrained by time. But please, if
there are other things that you think you need to bring to our
attention to provide a complete picture, do that as part of
your submission in the questions that we will get to you. And I
want to thank you both, as Senator Feinstein did, for your
service. Please pass that on to the folks that you work with as
well.
Mr. Rosenzweig. Thank you.
Mr. Ahern. Thank you.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you very much.
Chairman Kyl. While this panel is retiring, I will again
mention that Jess Ford is the Director of International Affairs
and Trade at the GAO, and we have reports and some questions of
him, and I will allow Senator Feinstein to introduce for the
record our other witness.
Senator Feinstein. The Chairman has graciously asked if I
would introduce Leon Laylagian, and I am very pleased to do so.
He is the Executive Vice President of the Passenger-Cargo
Security Group, which is a nonprofit trade association. He is a
pilot of 757s and 767s, as I understand it; first officer; a
graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; he previously
served the Air Line Pilots Association as a security liaison;
and a former representative of the Coalition of Airline Pilots
Associations and the Independent Pilot Pilots Association. He
has also served as a member of TSA's Aviation Safety Advisory
Committee for cargo security in 2003.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you.
Mr. Ford, would you like to begin? And then we will just
turn directly to Mr. Laylagian, and then have our questions.
STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND
TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Feinstein. I
will try to be brief. You have already covered some of the main
points in our reports, which were issued on Tuesday. I am
pleased to discuss these reports.
In fiscal year 2005, nearly 16 million travelers entered
the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, covering 27
participating countries who are allowed to come here for 90
days or less without obtaining a visa. Participating countries
were selected because their citizens had demonstrated a pattern
of compliance with U.S. immigration laws and the governments of
these countries granted reciprocal visa-free travel to U.S.
citizens. The Visa Waiver Program was created in 1986 as a
pilot program and was made permanent by law in 2000.
The Visa Waiver Program facilitates international travel
for millions of foreign citizens seeking to visit the United
States each year, creating substantial economic benefits to our
country. However, travelers visiting the United States under
the Visa Waiver Program can pose significant security risks,
for example, because they are not interviewed by a consular
officer prior to their travel. In addition, border inspectors
at U.S. ports of entry may not know the visa waiver traveler's
language or their local fraudulent document trends in the
traveler's home country, nor have the time to conduct an
extensive interview.
Lost and stolen passports from visa waiver countries are
highly prized among travelers seeking to conceal their true
intent and identities and nationalities. DHS officials have
acknowledged that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens
may have entered the United States using stolen or lost
passports from a visa waiver country. In fact, passports from
the Visa Waiver Program countries have been used illegally by
hundreds of travelers attempting to enter the United States.
For example, we reported that from January to June of 2005,
approximately 300 individuals had their passports confiscated
at the border because they were considered to be fraudulent. In
2002, Congress mandated that the DHS review the security risks
poses by each of the visa waiver countries' participation in
the program at least every 2 years. In 2004, DHS conducted its
first mandated biennial reviews of 25 of the 27 member
countries and subsequently determined that all of them should
remain in the program.
However, we have identified several problems with the
country review process. Specifically, key interagency
stakeholders, such as the embassies overseas and DHS forensic
document analysts, were left out of portions of the review
process. Also, the country assessments prepared by DHS were not
completed in a timely fashion and contained some dated
information that did not necessarily reflect current risks. For
example, they conducted the review from May through September
of 2004, but did not transmit the report to Congress until
November of 2005, over a year after these trips were taken.
DHS has not provided sufficient resources to the Visa
Waiver Program Oversight Unit to effectively monitor the risks
posed by the visa waiver countries on an ongoing basis. While
the unit developed a strategic plan to monitor the program, it
is unable to fully implement the plan because it does not have
enough staff and resources. In addition, DHS has not
established Visa Waiver Program points of contact with U.S.
embassies so that it can communicate directly with foreign
government contacts and field officials who are best positioned
to monitor compliance with the program's requirements and
report on current events and issues of potential concern.
Without this outreach, DHS is not able to leverage the existing
resources at U.S. embassies in all visa waiver countries to
obtain current information on potential risks, as well as the
country's progress in addressing these risks.
Our report identifies a number of actions that DHS has
taken to try to mitigate some of these risks. For example, they
terminated the use of German temporary passports under the
program when they learned that these documents were not well
controlled.
In the interest of time, I am just going to quickly
summarize our recommendations. We made several recommendations
to the Department of Homeland Security to strengthen this
program, including the creation of a real-time monitoring
mechanism to improve communication between the Department and
overseas posts; to improve additional resources for the Visa
Waiver Program Unit so that they can conduct their mission. We
also made a series of recommendations to mitigate the program's
risks, including communicating clear operating standards for
reporting lost and stolen passports. Finally, we recommended
that the Congress consider establishing a deadline by which the
Department must complete its biennial country assessments to
provide more timely reporting to the Congress.
We believe these recommendations will help strengthen the
program, and it is essential that the Department take strong
actions--
Senator Feinstein. Mr. Chairman, if I may, Mr. Ford, would
you just repeat that last recommendation once again, please?
Mr. Ford. We recommended that the Congress consider
establishing a deadline by which the Department would complete
its biennial country assessments and report that information to
Congress. And, again, that was to address the timeliness
problem that we found with the last report they sent to you
all. They sent it to you in November of 2005, but it was based
on information collected in 2004, and a lot of that information
was dated as well. So some of the information in the report you
received was 2 to 3 years old. We think that Congress needs to
have more up-to-date information so they have a better
understanding of what the security risks are in these
countries.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Ford. With that, I think I will close, and I would be
happy to answer of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford appears as a submission
for the record.]
Chairman Kyl. Thanks very much. Like our previous
witnesses, there is a lot to talk about. We do appreciate your
succinctness and directness.
Mr. Laylagian?
STATEMENT OF LEON LAYLAGIAN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
PASSENGER-CARGO SECURITY GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Laylagian. Thank you, Chairman Kyl, Senator Feinstein.
I thank you for the opportunity to be here today and provide
testimony on--
Senator Feinstein. Could you turn on your microphone,
please? Just press that button.
Mr. Laylagian. Thank you for the opportunity to be here
today to provide testimony on this most important issue of
aviation security. My name is Leon Laylagian. I am the
Executive Vice President of the Passenger-Cargo Security Group.
PCSG, a trade association, working with legislators,
regulators, and aviation security professionals, is dedicated
to providing solutions in efforts to improve aviation security.
PCSG has a professional partnership with over 22,000 airline
pilots, an affiliation with nearly 400,000 airline passengers,
and numerous industry leaders. I am also an airline pilot of 17
years with over 12,000 hours of flight time in a variety of
aircraft, both domestically and international. I have flown for
three passenger carriers and presently fly a Boeing 757 and 767
for a major all-cargo airline. My airline security work began
in 1993, and I have served in many different capacities with
unions and grass-roots efforts to improve airline security. I
have served on various government working groups, including the
TSA's Aviation Security Advisory Council for cargo security in
2003. I am also a graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University, also having served in the United States Navy.
The British police foiled the recent London airline bombing
plot and, much like the 1995 Operation Bojinka, averted mass
murder on an unimaginable scale. The human element,
intelligence gathering, and its proper distribution carried the
day in both cases. However, on a day-to-day operational scale,
available technologies are necessary tools to add important
layers of security.
As a working group member of the 2003 TSA Cargo ASAC, we
waited a long time for rulemaking that falls short of reality.
Placing the Known Shipper Program at the tip of our cargo
security spear is not the answer. Other members of the ASAC
hold the same discomfort with this approach, which seems to
favor a perceived economic bias against technology application.
In the U.S., a very small percentage of our belly-checked or
loaded-in-belly-pits cargo undergo electronic or physical
inspection. Some technology is transported around the country
for use on a purely random basis, while a majority of the cargo
relies on the Known Shipper Program, which we all know did
nothing to prevent Charles McKinley from shipping himself from
New York to Texas. Of course, this does not address the all-
cargo airline, which is a tragic loophole.
On an international arena, many countries are using
technologies to inspect significant portions of the belly
freight loaded on passenger jets. The tools vary from high-
energy X-ray and CT scan to spectral analysis, K-9s and sub-
pressure simulation or altitude chambers.
Two countries in particular have a proven track record over
the last 5 years using what is now old technology for
mitigating smuggling, contraband, and terrorist-related
shipments. No single layer is perfect, but the combined
strength of the multiple layers will best deflect the terrorist
vector.
Back to the Known Shipper Program, this has the potential
to be a very valuable tool used to focus on which shipments
require more scrutiny. Presently, the TSA has not required the
development of a central database due to shipper concerns of
proprietary information with respect to competitors. Instead of
the green or red vetting of the program, we would recommend a
more articulate program to include green, yellow, orange, and
red to account for not only the origin and destination of the
shipment, but also to address the supply chain. And those that
handle packages in the chain should have a thorough and
meaningful background check.
A 40-percent electronic inspection requirement should be in
addition to this program, coupled with a random inspection
feature which would make an enhanced Known Shipper Program a
very useful tool.
As a final note on international operations, it would be of
benefit to the American public if the TSA collaborated with our
European counterparts and took advantage of their repeated
offers to demonstrate to us how they employ technology
effectively without damaging throughput or incurring a cost
burden. Legislators such as Senator Feinstein have introduced
language in the past to improve this segment of aviation
security. While many of the technologies are not perfect, they
are effective at mitigating threat. If we require spending on
R&D for 2 years with implementation beginning 1 year following,
we will embark on a process that will add a meaningful layer of
security. The question is: Do we buy the computer today, or do
we wait a few months for the improvements? The answer is: We
need the tools now to get the job done and can ill afford doing
nothing when we can be doing something to mitigate the threat.
I call on Congress to enact a law that will address the
urgent need to inspect cargo instead of relying on the
paperwork that only addresses the chain of custody of a given
shipment, and to provide the necessary funding to support this
critical element of our National infrastructure.
Thank you again, Chairman Kyl, Senator Feinstein, and I
welcome any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Laylagian appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Kyl. Thank you very much. I just heard an official
this morning taking the opposite side of the issue that you
just articulated, but it is one of these great conundrums. You
have technology that is available today that is not the best,
but it is what we have. And you try to get it out into the
field, and somebody says, ``Well, but we have something just
around the corner that is going to be a whole lot better. Why
don't you wait?'' Of course, it is more expensive. And it is
always a very difficult proposition as to what you put your
money in. And then you have the long-term research into
something really, really great for things like nuclear
weaponry. For example, we held a hearing on that in this
Subcommittee that you will want to look into. So, I mean, there
is no easy answer to that question, I appreciate.
Mr. Ford, you talked about the deadline on the visa waiver
country assessments, and I just wonder: What is it that takes
so long to get those done? Is it the lack of staff?
Mr. Ford. Well, we think that is part of the problem. We do
not think that the Oversight Unit was adequately resourced in
conducting the review. There were a number of interagency team
members who were involved in the process. The site visits were
taken in--I think it was from June to September of 2004. It
took over a year for the reports to be drafted and cleared, and
we know that the content of the report, which is classified
contained a lot of outdated information. And there was other
information that subsequently was available that was not in the
report.
So we think for these reports to be useful to Congress,
they should have as much current information in them as they
possibly can. So that is one of the reasons we suggested that
Congress may want to require that DHS, you know, speed the
process up.
I might add that I mentioned that they reviewed 25 of the
27 countries. The other two countries that they did not get to,
they began the review of that in the spring of 2005, and they
still have not reported the results of those two countries to
the Congress yet. So I am not so sure that they have been able
to resolve the timeliness factor about getting this information
quickly to the Hill.
Chairman Kyl. I appreciate that. Could you just quickly
tell me what you see as the security benefits of the new e-
passport for visa waiver travelers?
Mr. Ford. I think the e-passport, because of the additional
protections that it has in it, has the potential to ward off
some of the risks from the old passports that can be more
readily counterfeited or can be used--someone could take a
blank passport that had been stolen and insert a photograph.
The new e-passports have the new technology which makes it
much more difficult for them to be counterfeited. The concern
that we have, though, is that many passports are good for 10
years, so even with the new e-passports, they may be good for
the people who get them now, but for those people who continue
to have the old passports, or access to them, that is where the
risk is. And until, you know, the old passport system is
exhausted, we are going to have a potential security risk, in
our view.
Chairman Kyl. Thanks very much.
You all had to wait a long time, and then you sat through
the first panel, and I said we would try to conclude this by 4
o'clock, so I am going to quickly move on to Senator Feinstein
here.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ford, I think your report is excellent, and I really
thank you for it. I think you point out a number of things that
are obvious and some that are not obvious, and clearly we
should take some action.
You indicated that you felt that the Congress should take
some action, and I would like to talk to Senator Kyl, and
hopefully we will initiate something along the lines that you
suggest.
I would ask you, Mr. Laylagian, about the cargo inspection.
You say that a meaningful inspection formula would require 40
percent using electronic or physical means, 40 percent chosen
by an enhanced Known Shipper Program. What is that?
Mr. Laylagian. Well, it would better refine or articulate
the Known Shipper Program to cover not only--you have the
400,000 known shippers, but you have hundreds of thousands of
handlers that would be involved in the movement of those
shipments from the departure point to its arrival. And what the
enhancement would be would be, in essence, a package profiling
system should be collected in a central database, would be the
best way for the TSA, I think, to manage that because they
would have control over that information. And depending on the
knowledge of where the departure point is, who the shippers
are, who the ownership of those shippers are, and where it is
going and how it is getting there, what hands are being put on
that shipment on its way would better refine what type of
technology application should be put on that.
Senator Feinstein. So, in other words, you measure the
shipment by those who touch it.
Mr. Laylagian. That would be a big part of it, and the
content.
Senator Feinstein. So if you get those who touch it well
known, then you can find danger points, either with people who
are not well known or people who may not be reliable shippers.
Is that the point?
Mr. Laylagian. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. And then you would have the series of
red, green, yellow, whatever the colors are, that would
identify what the problem was.
Mr. Laylagian. What the vetting level of the handlers might
be. I mean, right now the background check information is not
to a level that it should be.
Senator Feinstein. Do you think that is more effective than
X-ray or K-9?
Mr. Laylagian. It is a tool; it is a layer. I mean, if you
were trying to cover a hole in the ground and you had one pie
plate to cover it, if it was a manhole, you would have a hard
time preventing things from going through there. That is the
Known Shipper Program. You have got one pie plate over that
hole. You add different types of technologies, they are not--
none of them are perfect in their forms the way they are right
now, but they do a reasonable job of getting that job done. You
add two, three, four pie plates, you start mitigating, you
start adding the layers to cover that hole and protect it. You
are never going to make anything perfect, but right now
essentially we are--
Senator Feinstein. Well, let me ask you a question. This
would be applied to all airports or major airports?
Mr. Laylagian. It could be applied across the system, and
it could be done effectively across the system, and it could be
done on a risk assessment basis as to which airports you would
choose to cover or not. There are some small airports that do
not have the infrastructure or logistics to manage certain
types of electronic inspection equipment. Portable systems
might be effective for them during seasonal portions of the
course of the year. But it may not be that way, in which case
you would be able to make those decisions with the more refined
Known Shipper Program, making that a better tool to make that
call.
Senator Feinstein. Has this been discussed with TSA?
Mr. Laylagian. It has. It has certainly been discussed
during the ASAC. There is an ongoing discussion right now.
There is the freight assessment system, which has turned into
the Cargo Working Group. It is a continuing conversation as to
how they work those details out.
There is a lot of resistance to setting up a central
database, which I think is problematic for the Known Shipper
Program. There are certain things that are hindering the
effectiveness of the Known Shipper Program right now, and
rather than just making it a good or bad proposition, my
recommendation to make it more articulate by adding four steps
rather than two, would be better able to decide which shipments
should receive more scrutiny--shipments of sweatshirts, high-
energy X-ray, I mean, there are certain things that you should
not be seeing in that shipment, and that would be a way of
deciding how that tool could be better used.
Senator Feinstein. Okay. Well, thank you. If you have any
other--I appreciate your writing here, but if you have any
other specific recommendations of what we might do, I think we
would both appreciate receiving them.
Mr. Laylagian. There are a number of aviation security
professionals and even managers that work in the cargo arena
for passenger carriers. If I can collect them and sit down
together with you, I think we clearly could make
recommendations.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. If you would do that, that
would be appreciated.
Mr. Laylagian. Yes, Senator.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you very much, and I want to thank this
panel as well. Mr. Ford, we know where to get you, and we will
probably be in touch with you from time to time, but we
appreciate the report that you issued here, and your testimony
as well. And, likewise, Mr. Laylagian, if you can get some
recommendations to us from other folks, that would be
appreciated, too.
We will leave the record open--I don't know how many days,
but a few days--for other members to submit questions to you
and for you to submit anything else that you think would be
useful to us. We appreciate your testimony very much, and if
there is nothing else, then I will adjourn this meeting of the
Subcommittee. It is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Submissions for the record follow.]
[Additional material is being retained in the Committee
files.]
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