[Senate Hearing 109-679]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-679
A NUCLEAR IRAN: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 2, 2006
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Clawson, Dr. Patrick, deputy director for Research, the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC...... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Lehman, Hon. Ronald F. II, director, Center for Global Security
Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, Ca 10
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 6
Santorum, Hon. Rick, U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania.............. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Takeyh, Dr. Ray, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies,
Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC................... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer.... 50
(iii)
A NUCLEAR IRAN: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES
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THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Biden, Boxer, Bill Nelson, and
Obama.
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. We apologize to the audience and
to our first witness this morning for tardiness. The committee
has been privileged, however, to have an intelligence briefing
on the subject before us this morning with Ambassador
Negroponte and we are grateful for his availability and that of
his staff. Members will be moving from S-407 to this room
quickly.
But before I commence my opening statement and recognize
the distinguished ranking member, I would like to recognize the
presence of a very important colleague, Senator Santorum, who
has offered legislation in this field. I would like to ask him
to make his presentation at this time because he has other
duties and responsibilities in addition to his coming before
our committee.
We are privileged to have you and I would like to recognize
you at this time.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICK SANTORUM, U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Santorum. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your indulgence in allowing me to testify and
giving me priority status above the chairman and ranking member
in being able to present such testimony. So thank you, and I
appreciate you holding this hearing today. This is, as you are
well aware, one of the most important issues facing this
country and what we do in dealing with the problem--national
security problem--that Iran is to this country.
I do not have to remind you, Mr. Chairman, you are very
well aware of the Government of Iran's track record of being a
supporter of terror and treating its own people in a
terroristic manner. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran
created Hezbollah, actively support Hamas, the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestinian-General Command. Iran has been implicated in
activities associated with al-Qaeda in the 1996 attack on U.S.
military personnel at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.
Troubling of recent note is Iran's continuing involvement
in Iraq, with some very disturbing news as to their involvement
with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and
the organization's Badr Brigades, which, of course, leads us to
be concerned about the manipulation of the Iraqi police and
military forces.
In addition to their actions on the terrorist front, the
Government of Iran is no less known for its violations of human
rights. The State Department's recent report on Iran notes the
occurrence of summary executions, disappearances, extreme
vigilantism, widespread torture, and other degrading treatment.
I have had numerous people come and talk to me about the
religious persecution that occurs in Iran.
One thing you can say about Iran, they are indiscriminate
in discriminating. They discriminate against Christians, Jews,
the Biha'i, other Muslim sects. This is a very religiously
intolerant regime.
Again, another troubling aspect to Iran is their now very
evident pursuit of a nuclear capability. This has been well
documented and I will not redocument it.
Mr. Chairman, I have asked that my full statement be made a
part of the record, where I provide all that documentation.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
Senator Santorum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The recent 27 to
3 vote by the IAEA board to report Iran to the U.N. Security
Council, in my mind, creates an opportunity here for the United
Nations to look at sanctions as a way to chill to the fervent
attempt by Iran to pursue their nuclear weapons capability.
Obviously, it is not clear whether we can get the support of
China and Russia and other members of the Security Council to
support sanctions. Nevertheless, I think we should be pursuing
that within the United Nations, and things such as a travel ban
on Iranian leaders, a ban on international flights by Iran Air,
a ban on receiving cargo carried by Iranian governmental-owned
ships, and aggressive action to make sure the governmental
leaders in Iran responsible for human rights abuses and
executions are brought to trial. I think it is important that
we stress with the United Nations that actions need to be
taken.
I would also suggest that the Congress needs to take action
to show support for our President's policies with respect to
Iran. We need to show that we are willing to take action at
this time, that we are not just calling for the United Nations
to do something, but that the Congress itself recognizes the
threat that Iran poses to the security of the world and
certainly our own national security, and that we should act in
support of constraining Iran's ambitions.
I, along with 60 other Members of the U.S. Senate, have
supported S. 333, which is the Iran Freedom and Support Act. It
calls for vigorous support for peaceful change in Iran. The
Iran Freedom and Support Act, a bill I authored, has been
referred to your committee and is currently under
consideration, and I would urge you, Mr. Chairman, to report
that legislation to the full Senate.
The legislation seeks to make it harder for the Government
of Iran to have access to foreign investment and revenues to
support terrorist activities and to pursue nuclear activities.
The bill also codifies sanctions, controls, and regulations
currently in place against Iran by executive order. The bill
declares that it should be the policy of the United States to
support efforts for Iranian self-determination, in other words,
free and fair elections.
Finally, the bill authorizes $10 million for the assistance
of prodemocracy efforts, although it is my intention to modify
that in light of the fact that the State Department has come
forward with a supplemental, hopefully inspired by this bill
and others in the House, to fund prodemocracy efforts in Iran
to the tune of $75 million. So our intention is to actually up
the ante to $100 million. Some have asked whether this funding
would make a difference in Iran and I would say the answer to
that is really just to look at the composition and the
demographics of Iran. A majority of Iranians were born after
the Islamic Revolution in 1979. These young men and women have
grown up under brutal oppression in conditions which they hate.
These people are the folks that we must appeal to and try to
enjoin in doing something about changing the governmental
status within the country of Iran. These are folks who listen
to Western media and broadcasts for news and they question the
authority, as lots of young people do, and they are looking for
greater individual freedoms. They are also technologically
savvy and so there are ways in which to communicate and to
gather support.
The funds authorized in my bill would support elements
within Iran who are dedicated to democratic values and respect
for human rights and particularly the rights of women.
So calling for free and fair elections, providing United
States assistance, combined with the codification of sanctions,
means that Iran's shaky economy could be exploited to advance
the cause of freedom. Abbas Milani of the Hoover Institute
notes that the private sector investments have virtually
stopped, private banking is in severe crisis, and the
government has been lowering interest rates.
Others note some of the regime's surprising
vulnerabilities. Despite its massive oil reserves, Iran has
little capacity to produce gasoline or jet fuel, two important
refined petroleum products. Iran also lacks the ability to
develop and exploit its vast natural gas reserves.
The international community needs to leverage these and
other weaknesses to dissuade Iran's leaders from pursuing
nuclear weapons. Together with smart sanctions, such as
freezing the assets and confiscating the property of the
regime's leaders, an overt policy declaration by the Congress
that supports prodemocracy movements in Iran will encourage the
forces of change within Iran.
Finally, I want to emphasize that the Iranian Freedom and
Support Act is a nonviolent way to bring about change within
Iran. You hear lots of talk about the military option being
left on the table and we cannot take it off the table. I would
agree with that, but I think that does not mean that we are
paralyzed to act, that we need to do some things and the
Congress can act to support the prodemocracy forces within
Iran. The administration has recognized that this can be
pursued. I hope the Congress would step forward with this
authorization and express its support for the Iranian democracy
movement.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking member
for the ability to come here and testify before your committee
and certainly urge your support for S. 333. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Santorum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Santorum, U.S. Senator From
Pennsylvania
Chairman Lugar, Ranking Member Biden, and members of the committee,
I appreciate your willingness to hold this hearing on recent
developments in Iran, and I commend you for your efforts to highlight
the many problems we are facing with the agenda of the Government of
Iran. I also want to commend you on selecting a panel of outside
experts who will add to the understanding of events transpiring in Iran
and the ways that the international community can respond to these
trends.
Let me begin by reminding the members of this committee of the
Iranian Government's dreadful track record. From its inception, the
Islamic Republic of Iran has supported acts of terror inflicted upon
innocent persons, and has systematically thwarted efforts to achieve
peaceful relations among Middle Eastern countries. Iran has long headed
the ``State Sponsor of Terrorism'' reports issued by the U.S.
Department of State. Iran's support for terrorism is known all too well
by Americans.
Iran created Hezbollah, the terrorist gang behind the 1983 suicide
terrorist attacks against U.S. military and civilian personnel in
Lebanon, and actively supports Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command,
all murderous organizations with long histories of committing heinous
acts against the civilized world. Iran, in cahoots with al-Qaeda, has
been implicated in the 1996 attack on U.S. military personnel at Khobar
Towers in Saudi Arabia. These groups kill civilians and work against
the national security interests of the United States and our allies.
Iran's reach into Iraq is also profoundly disturbing. Iran's connection
to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and
the organization's Badr Brigades means that Iran is able to manipulate
Iraq's police and military forces.
Iran's human rights violations are no less chilling. As described
in the recent publication, ``Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The
U.S. Record 2004-2005,'' the Department of State reported that, in
Iran, ``Summary executions, disappearances, extremist vigilantism,
widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment remained a
problem.'' It then noted, ``The Government continued to discriminate
against and harass the Baha'i community and other religious and ethnic
minority groups, including Jews, Christians and Sunni and Sufi
Muslims.'' Finally, this report stated, ``The government continued to
severely restrict worker rights, including freedom of association and
the right to bargain collectively.'' In short, the Government of Iran
oppresses its people and deprives them of the liberties enjoyed by
citizens of Western democracies.
Iran's nuclear aspirations are perhaps the most unsettling of all.
While Iran is permitted to pursue peaceful nuclear research under the
terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its record,
including systematic deception over nearly two decades, leaves little
doubt about the mullahs' real intentions. In November 2003, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had been
developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years and
had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment. Furthermore, the
IAEA reported that Iran had conducted over 110 unreported experiments
to produce uranium metal and separated plutonium, and had possession of
designs that clearly related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons
components. In August 2005, following the election of the religious
fanatic Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's President, Iran announced that
the ongoing negotiations under the terms of the 2004 Paris Agreement
brokered by the EU3 were ``unsatisfactory.'' Iran then announced it was
resuming the conversion of raw uranium into gas for enrichment, and, in
January 2006, the Iranians removed the IAEA seals on its enrichment
plant in Natanz, a facility aided by the pariah scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan
of Pakistan.
The recent 27-3 vote of the IAEA Board to report Iran to the United
Nations Security Council and the board's admonishment that Iran's many
failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with the NPT and the
absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for
peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment, should
serve as a wake-up call for the world that Iran's nuclear ambitions
cannot be ignored any longer. Iran's aggressive behavior and its
concealment of ongoing nuclear activities can only mean that the
Government of Iran seeks to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons.
Unlike the junior Senator from New York, I believe that the EU3
negotiations were beneficial in that they demonstrated to the world--
with the exception of Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela--that Iran's nuclear
aspirations are not limited to peaceful nuclear research. These
negotiations also set the stage for a successful reporting of Iran to
the United Nations Security Council.
Although it is not clear that China, Russia, and other members of
the Security Council will support sanctions against Iran, nonetheless,
smart sanctions should be discussed and debated by the Security
Council. We do not want to punish the people of Iran, who seek
democracy, but rather the oppressive and murderous regime in Tehran.
The Security Council, therefore, should consider:
(1) A travel ban on Iran's leaders;
(2) A ban on international flights by Iran Air;
(3) A ban on receiving cargo carried on Iranian Government-
owned ships; and
(4) Aggressive action to see that government leaders in Iran
responsible for human rights abuses and executions are brought
to trial.
I have recently heard two very bothersome claims about Iran. The
first was a television news anchor who stated, I am paraphrasing, ``The
prodemocracy movement in Iran is like the anti-Vietnam war movement was
in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s--a mile wide and an inch
deep.'' The other observation was made by a senior U.S. Senator who
concluded, again paraphrasing, ``There are no good options with regard
to Iran.''
I believe both are wrong. The prodemocracy movement is anything but
feeble. The regime's own public opinion polls prove that the
overwhelming majority of Iranians detest the regime, and want it
changed. And many of our colleagues have worked hard to propose good
options for dealing with the Iranian threat. Along with 44 cosponsors,
I have introduced S. 333, the Iran Freedom and Support Act. It calls
for vigorous support for peaceful change in Iran. The Iran Freedom and
Support Act has been referred to this committee for further review and
consideration. I urge you to report the legislation to the full Senate
for debate and consideration.
This legislation seeks to make it harder for the Government of Iran
to have access to revenue and foreign investment--resources it can use
to support terrorist organizations or pursue nuclear activities. The
bill also codifies sanctions, controls, and regulations currently in
place against Iran. The bill declares--as we surely should declare--
that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts by
the Iranian people to exercise self-determination over their own form
of government. Finally, the bill authorizes $10 million in assistance
for prodemocracy efforts.
This bill is a modest step forward in supporting those prodemocracy
forces in Iran that seek greater freedom and a better life for the
Iranian people. Given the administration's recent commitment to provide
$75 million to prodemocracy efforts within Iran, I intend to increase
the level of funding authorized by my bill to $100 million.
Some have asked whether the legislation would make a difference in
Iran. I answer: Look at the demographics. A majority Iranians were born
after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. These young men and women have
grown up under brutal and oppressive conditions, which they hate. These
are the people to whom the United States must appeal and support. These
are the people who listen to Western media broadcasts for news,
question authority, seek greater individual freedoms, and are savvy
toward new technologies of communication. Time and time again, I hear
that the youth of Iran looks to the United States and actively seeks to
enjoy the freedoms of the West. The funds authorized by my bill would
go toward supporting these and other elements within Iran that are
dedicated to democratic values, respect for human rights and the rights
of women.
This public policy declaration and U.S. assistance, combined with
the codification of sanctions, means that Iran's shaky economy could be
exploited to advance the cause of freedom. Abbas Milani of the Hoover
Institution notes that private sector investments have stopped, private
banking is in a severe crisis, and the government has been lowering
interest rates. Further, an estimated $200 billion in financial capital
has left the country recently. Millions of Iran's people are
impoverished or unemployed, and they need to know that we will help
them.
Others note some of the regime's surprising vulnerabilities.
Despite its massive oil reserves, Iran has little capacity to produce
gasoline and jet fuel, two refined petroleum products. Iran also lacks
the ability to develop and exploit its vast natural gas reserves. The
international community needs to leverage these and other weaknesses to
dissuade Iran's leaders from pursuing nuclear weapons.
Together with smart sanctions such as freezing the assets and
confiscating the properties of the regime's leaders, an overt policy
declaration by the Congress that supports the prodemocracy movement in
Iran will encourage the forces of change within Iran. Another targeted
sanction, suggested by Milani, would entail freezing the foreign assets
of Iran's revolutionary foundations, through which the government's
elites export their ill-gotten gains, and control business empires.
Finally, I want to emphasize that the Iran Freedom and Support Act
is a nonviolent way to affect change within Iran. Some have called for
leaving all options--including military attack--on the table, but
surely it is wise to support the people of Iran and provide financial
assistance to prodemocracy groups inside and outside the country before
we begin discussions on a military solution that is fraught with danger
and unpredictable consequences for the entire region. I am encouraged
to see that the administration has also made this a priority with the
recent announcement to seek $75 million in supplemental funding for
fiscal year 2006.
Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, thank you for
permitting me to testify at this hearing. I hope that the committee
will give strong consideration to S. 333 and that it will report this
legislation to the full Senate for debate.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Santorum,
for that testimony, and likewise for your leadership and that
of other Members of the Senate who have been speaking out on
this issue. I think that the general consensus among members of
our committee in this hearing is the initiation of a very
important study of one of the most crucial problems of American
foreign policy. We must weigh carefully the elements of S. 333
and other suggestions that members may have, including our
administration. We are attempting diligently to stay on the
same wavelength with the administration because these are
delicate matters in which we all have informed and sometimes
strong opinions.
But yours is an important one, and I appreciate your
introduction of the bill. It has been referred to our committee
and it will be given very thoughtful and careful consideration.
Senator Santorum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you for coming.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Let me now commence with my opening
statement. I will recognize Senator Biden. Would the witnesses
like to come to the table at this juncture, because you will be
recognized immediately after these statements.
[Pause.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. The Committee on Foreign Relations meets
today to examine the challenges posed by Iran's campaign to
acquire nuclear weapons. After more than 2 years of
negotiation, Iran's recent decisions to limit International
Atomic Energy inspections and to restart uranium enrichment
present a fundamental challenge to global stability and efforts
to prevent nuclear proliferation.
If the international community cannot muster the
cohesiveness and determination to stop the Iranian nuclear
drive, we will have undermined the international
nonproliferation regime, risked igniting a regional arms race
in the Middle East, and allowed a government with close links
to terrorist organizations to acquire nuclear weapons.
Iranian leaders deceived the international community about
their nuclear activities for more than 18 years. They have
rejected compromises, and threatened to cut off oil and natural
gas exports should the international community impose
sanctions. According to State Department reports, the Iranian
Government continues to be one of the primary supporters of
terrorism in the world. Iran has provided funding, weapons, and
training to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and
other designated foreign terrorist organizations.
Shi'a-dominated Iran continues to infiltrate and harden
divisions among the ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, making
the consolidation of a unified Iraqi Government more difficult.
Iran also supports a Syrian regime that has been implicated by
United Nations investigators in the death of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Iran's President has explicitly
threatened the existence of Israel, and has denied the
Holocaust, among other inflammatory statements. Earlier this
year, Iranian leaders incited Muslims to destroy embassies and
consulates in response to cartoons published in the Danish
press.
These actions have underscored for the world the risks that
would be associated with the Iranian Government's acquisition
of nuclear weapons capability. When Senator Coleman, Senator
Voinovich, and I visited the United Nations in February, I told
the Security Council of the United Nations that if Iran does
not comply with the U.N. resolutions and arms agreements, the
Security Council must apply strict and enforceable sanctions. I
emphasized that decisions delayed over the course of months and
years may be as harmful as no decisions at all.
As options are considered, however, we must assess the
effectiveness of types of sanctions in achieving our
objectives. We will ask our witnesses today if they can
prescribe a set of sanctions that would both receive broad
international support, but, more importantly, also alter
Tehran's behavior.
I am hopeful that our government is thinking several
diplomatic steps beyond the immediate preparations for securing
a positive vote in the Security Council.
I look forward to the insights of our witnesses on other
diplomatic steps that the United States and its allies should
be undertaking. The world does possess economic and diplomatic
leverage on Iran, but exerting that leverage will require
sacrifice from individual nations, particularly those who buy
oil and natural gas from Iran. For this reason, United States
diplomacy must reach beyond the European nations that have been
the primary negotiators with Iran.
Our interest in considering sanctions is not in harming the
Iranian people. Sadly, they are victims of a repressive regime
that is increasingly corrupt and unresponsive. Iranians do not
want their country to be an outcast among the world's nations.
They deserve a government that is legitimate and devoted to the
people's interests. There are reformers inside and outside of
Iran who want to bring change. But we should be realistic about
the possibilities for political transformation or internal
regime change.
We do not have indications that the unelected regime faces
short-term political competition from a popular movement. But,
nevertheless, we should seek opportunities to speak directly to
the Iranian people and to improve our means of communicating
with them. We should understand that, having lived through a
brutal and devastating war with Iraq in the 1980s, most
Iranians fear a return to war. This fear is being exploited by
the government in its campaign to justify nuclear weapons and
to distract Iranians from the economic hardships that they have
faced for decades.
Although Iranians are patriotic and proud of their
identity, few have invested their loyalties in the unelected
clerics who control power. Our message to the Iranian people,
many of whom have a positive view of the United States and the
West, should be that we do not want war. Rather, we want to see
an economically reinvigorated Iran based on increased personal
freedoms and interactions with the outside world. Pursuit of
nuclear weapons by the Iranian regime is distancing the Iranian
people from this goal.
We are pleased to welcome this morning an outstanding panel
with deep experience on Iranian issues. Dr. Ronald Lehman is
director of the Center for Global Security Research of the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Dr. Patrick Clawson is
the deputy director for Research at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy. Dr. Ray Takeyh is the senior fellow for
Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. We
look forward to their analysis and their recommendations.
Before we proceed, however, I would like to recognize the
distinguished ranking member of the committee, Senator Biden,
for his opening statement, and then I will recognize the
witnesses in the order that I have mentioned you. I will
mention at the outset that your full statements will be made a
part of the record. You need not ask permission that that be
the case. It will be the case, and we will ask you to proceed
in any way you wish to bring enlightenment to us.
Senator Biden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR
FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will
ask unanimous consent that my entire statement be placed in the
record because it mirrors--there is not a single thing you said
I disagree with and I would be somewhat repetitious----
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
Senator Biden [continuing]. And add one point. Gentlemen,
thank you so much for being here. We are anxious to hear what
you have to say. There is an old expression: Big nations cannot
bluff. I am not worried, but I am concerned as we deal with
what is, obviously, a serious security problem, that we have a
realistic assessment as best we can of what the consequences of
certain actions or inactions will be.
I am looking forward to you giving us some insight as to
not only what options may be available, the prospects of
keeping the international community together on this, but what
the reaction, if you have a sense, among the Iranian people
will be to certain of the things we may initiate as a nation.
My instinct tells me that we underestimate the support for
a nuclear Iran among Iranians of all stripes. They live in a
pretty tough neighborhood. I suspect, even the democrats with a
small ``d'', not necessarily pro-Western, there is not
inconsiderable support for the nation. I would like your
assessment, as we go along, as to what you think, beyond the
frustration with the clerical domination of all levers of
security power. How do they feel, the Iranians, even those who
strongly oppose the present administration, the present
government there, about the acquisition of a nuclear
capability, weapons capability?
What do you think the reaction would be to either sanctions
that were consequential, if we could reach that conclusion
internationally, and/or military action of any kind, from air
strikes to physically embargoing their export of oil? So I hope
you will talk about some of those things with us today and I
look forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator from
Delaware
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for scheduling this timely hearing and
also for arranging the intelligence briefing that we received earlier
this morning.
The world's effort to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons
is entering a very delicate stage.
Iran may accept the Russian proposal to turn Iran's uranium
hexafluoride into nuclear reactor fuel, and agree not to engage
in uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing.
If it does not do that, however, then the U.N. Security
Council is likely to take up the issue and begin an effort to
pressure Iran into meeting the demands of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
I support that effort and I believe we all have a vital interest in
its success. Today's hearing may help us understand what that will
take.
The outrageous and confrontational statements by Iran's President,
calling for the destruction of Israel and denying the Holocaust, have
helped to focus minds on the prospect of a nuclear Iran. The EU-Three
have grown frustrated by Iran's antics and are moving to ratchet up
pressure on Iran. And Russia and China voted to report Iran to the U.N.
Security Council.
But pressuring Iran will not be easy. Tom Schelling warned us years
ago that if you want to compel a country to do something, you must do
more than threatening or applying pressure. You must also convince the
country that if it complies, you will stop the pressure (rather than
``moving the goal posts'' and demanding still more).
Maintaining pressure won't be easy, either, because we need other
countries to stand with us; we can't do this alone.
And we need to understand Iran:
Why does Iran want nuclear weapons, or at least the
capability to build them? What would it do with them?
Are there significant differences of opinion among elite
groups? Between the leaders and the led?
What sanctions might work, if we define success as either
convincing Iran to change its policy or making it much harder
for Iran to complete its nuclear programs?
Would sanctions divide Iran, or unite it in support of the
current regime?
Are there ways to reach out to Iran, without sacrificing
longstanding American interests in human rights, Middle East
peace, and counterterrorism?
Are there ways to promote a dialog within Iran on whether
nuclear weapons will contribute to Iran's national security or
harm it?
Are there ways to support the Iranian people, without
undermining the democratic forces that we want to help?
There are no easy answers to these questions, but we have three
fine witnesses today to help us grapple with these questions. I look
forward to their testimony, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
The Chair now calls upon the Honorable Ronald Lehman for
his testimony. We are pleased, as always, to have you before
the committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN II, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
GLOBAL SECURITY RESEARCH, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL
LABORATORY, LIVERMORE, CA
Mr. Lehman. Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, I am honored
that you have asked me to join you again today. You have my
written statement and if I build upon what you have said and
what Senator Santorum has said I think I can be relatively
brief and leave more time for discussion.
You have asked me to address several issues with respect to
an international response to the ongoing Iranian nuclear
weapons program. My basic message is, time is running out, but
we have to manage the time that is available and that will
require that we keep our focus.
More specifically, in the last month the board of governors
of the IAEA has voted, nearly unanimously, to refer the Iranian
noncompliance matter to the U.N. Security Council. This is a
very important development. As you know, the Security Council
has not yet acted on the issue of North Korean noncompliance.
There are, however, a number of parallel diplomatic efforts
under way. The European 3--the United Kingdom, Germany, and
France--have been trying to engage with Iran. They reached an
impasse, but my understanding is that after Iran was unable to
agree to the Russian proposal that was being discussed this
week, the EU3 will meet with Iran tomorrow and, as you know,
the next board of governors meeting will be on Monday, March
6--begin on Monday, March 6--and that additional information
will be then forwarded to the Security Council for action.
The United States has been supportive of these actions. But
I think your question is, What do we really need to get done.
There--I think there are three general points I would make. One
is to emphasize what is really at stake, that this is, in fact,
a serious matter. The second is to make clear what does need to
be accomplished. Third is to provide viable options that can
actually lead to practical solutions.
Iran is not the only challenge to the Nonproliferation
Treaty and Iran's nuclear weapons program creates dangers to
more than the treaty. Still, the issue of NPT compliance is
critical. If the international community fails to act now, much
more than the NPT could begin to unravel.
Senator Santorum has mentioned some of the problems in
dealing with Iran and the other witnesses are going to discuss
some of these issues. So let me simply say that we need to
stress to the international community both the importance of
the nuclear issue, but also how it fits into these broader
considerations, both political and economic. The goal must be
for Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program and to do so in
a way that gives the international community real confidence
that that has been done.
Iran has had under way a covert and illegal activity, much
of which it has not acknowledged except under pressure from the
IAEA and others. The IAEA continues to express concern over the
lack of Iranian cooperation in resolving these matters.
Now, Iran in particular seeks to develop the ability to
produce fissile material that could be used for nuclear
weapons. Many people think that the issue is one of quantity,
how much can they produce. The problem is if they are permitted
to do the research and development on enrichment it will not
only give them the capacity to, then, quickly move toward
industrial production for weapons, but it also will mask
activities that could be under way that are covert.
So the international community--if I were going to say,
what is the most positive technically related thing that has
happened in recent months, it has been the almost uniform
agreement among the international community that research and
development must not be permitted if we are going to put an end
to the risks that are associated with the program.
You have asked me to comment a bit on what could the
Security Council do and I am going to give you some specifics.
I do not want to manage negotiations. This is a complex dynamic
process. But I want to give you some things that I think could
be done that would be of some value.
One is that I think the Security Council needs to reaffirm
its view, expressed at the head-of-state level by the Security
Council in January 1992, that further proliferation is a threat
to international security. The Security Council has been silent
on this matter for too long.
The second is I think the Security Council should make
clear the existing and essential principle of international law
that a state in violation of its obligations cannot escape the
consequences of its violation simply through withdrawal.
International law cannot survive if withdrawal becomes the
``Get-Out-of-Jail-Free'' card for violations. This is something
that I think that the Security Council needs to make clear.
In the case of North Korea and again in the case of Iran,
the threat of withdrawal is used to intimidate. We should not
be intimidated by it. We should understand that we do not care
if they withdraw; they have got to live up to their
obligations. That is an issue.
I think the Security Council should make it clear that if a
party withdraws from the NPT, recognizing that sovereign states
have a right to withdraw from treaties, that nevertheless
withdrawal from the NPT is a matter of concern for the Security
Council and ought to be considered immediately.
I think the Security Council could make clear that these
principles apply not only to the future, but to the existing
cases that we are dealing with. I think that it would be, in my
view, inappropriate not to name Iran specifically, and, in
fact, I think they should strongly endorse at a minimum the
measures that the IAEA Board of Governors have already called
upon Iran to implement. In this case we are talking about a
suspension of all enrichment-
related activity, including research and development. They need
to deal with the fact that they have the research reactor that
is moderated by heavy water, that could be used for a plutonium
approach to weapons. And they need to implement the additional
protocol.
The IAEA has called for additional transparency measures
that go beyond the norm, and I will come back to this question.
But I think that these are things that the Security Council
could and should endorse to make clear that the Security
Council cares and has authority to act in this area.
I think that Iran, in my view, is in violation of its
central obligations. I think the Security Council needs to step
up to that. I think the Security Council should call upon the
members of the United Nations to be supportive of the IAEA and
the Security Council conclusions on Iran.
There are a number of points that I just want to make
briefly. First, I want to commend the committee for bringing
regional specialists here. As you know, one of my particular
concerns is that in the post-cold-war era we have an even
greater divide between the so-called functional experts, people
who do nonproliferation as I do, and the regionalists.
Everybody was something of a Sovietologist in the cold war, but
now we are dealing with many more different cultures and I
think the questions that Senator Biden raised at the beginning
are very much at the heart of how do we understand these
cultures so that we can deal with them more effectively.
I want to emphasize, again, that we can talk at length
about all the technical aspects of discrepancies and
nondisclosures and things, but I think the important point to
remember is that we should not be blinded by the fact that Iran
has under way a nuclear weapons program and we need to look at
it from all of its perspectives.
The second thing is that you may remember that when we were
working the North Korean problem we actually had an agreement
that most people have forgotten, the North-South
Denuclearization Agreement. We were actually rather proud of
achieving that. But as you may remember, one of its provisions
went well beyond the NPT. It called for no reprocessing and no
enrichment on the Korean Peninsula.
Now, at the time I referred to that as an NPT-plus regime
and the point I tried to make was that Korea is a particularly
dangerous place and business as usual in Korea is not adequate,
and, therefore, I thought the North-South Denuclearization
Agreement was a very important achievement.
Now, interestingly enough, because we caught that North
Koreans reprocessing there was a preoccupation with
reprocessing and for a while people forgot that enrichment was
also a concern. Then later, as we know, there was concern about
enrichment. In Iran we have the opposite. People are focusing
very, very much on the enrichment issue, and all I would like
to say is do not forget reprocessing. The Iranians are putting
a lot of effort into this and they are pursuing a number of
different paths.
Senator Santorum and Senator Biden have mentioned some of
the issues and you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman, some of the
issues related to stronger measures such as sanctions. I have
got some of that in my written remarks. I think I agree, we all
want smart sanctions. We have got to figure out what smart
sanctions are. In the end, I think we do have to recognize that
there is a chance we will fail. If we do fail, we do have to
consider how we strengthen our defenses and how we shape and
tailor deterrence to deal with the situation.
My bottom line is this. I think people have not yet
internalized how serious it will be if you have a nuclear-armed
Iran. A whole series of paths will start to be pursued by a
wide range of people. Some of that will be in the area of
proliferation, but I think there will be political
consequences, consequences for the international security
architecture, how nations relate to each other, and there will
be economic consequences.
I would not be at all surprised to see these feed on each
other, and the result could be very serious economic downturns,
recession, perhaps depression, in some parts of the world or on
a global basis, increased war and violence in these troubled
regions. So again, Ben Franklin talked about the horseshoe
nail. The IAEA findings may seem like a horseshoe nail, but
there is a real war out there and I think we need to recognize
this is very serious.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lehman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, Center for
Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore, CA
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee on Foreign
Relations, I am honored that you have asked me to be here today. I
appear as a private citizen and do not speak for any organization with
which I am associated.
You have asked me to address four questions about Iran's nuclear
program:
1. How can the United States work to ensure that, unlike
North Korea, the United Nations Security Council acts in a
meaningful and timely manner to deal with Iranian
noncompliance?
2. Is the Iranian situation different from that of North
Korea, both with regard to issues bearing on noncompliance and
the potential for multilateral solutions?
3. What actions might the Security Council take with regard
to Iran, both with respect to sanctions and incentives to bring
Iran back into compliance and ease international tensions
regarding its nuclear program?
4. What other steps might the international community take
outside the Security Council?
With respect to the ongoing Iranian nuclear weapons program, the
United States and the international community need to stay focused.
This effort will not end quickly. At home and abroad, we must resist
diversions as well as divisive pressures. At the same time, dialog such
as this hearing is vital to exchange information and to build sound and
shared assessments.
An effective international response to Iran's noncompliance with
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) must be developed,
particularly in the light of our experiences with North Korea. The key
multilateral vehicle for dealing with the North Korean nuclear program
is the six-power talks. The UNSC has not yet taken up North Korean
noncompliance with the NPT. On Iran, however, the Board of Governors of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--by a nearly unanimous
vote--has referred the Iranian matter to the UNSC. After receiving
additional information to be determined at the upcoming IAEA board
meeting, Security Council consideration will begin. This follows
efforts by three European Union members--Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom--to persuade Iran to come into compliance. Russia also
has made a proposal.
The United States has been supportive of these and other
international efforts. Many diplomatic efforts are underway. In my
opinion, to ensure that the Security Council acts ``in a meaningful and
timely manner,'' the United States and others need to:
(1) Emphasize what is at stake;
(2) Make clear what needs to be accomplished; and then
(3) Provide viable options that lead to solutions.
Iran is not the only challenge to the NPT, and Iran's nuclear
weapons program creates dangers to more than the treaty. Still, the
issue of NPT compliance is critical. If the international community
fails to act now, much more than the NPT could begin to unravel. If
allowed to become nuclear-armed, Iran is unlikely to be the last new
nuclear weapons state in the Middle East or elsewhere. Many nations
will alter their security arrangements and military postures to meet
the new and more dangerous instability. Political advancement will be
disrupted; a severe economic downturn is likely. Other witnesses today
will underscore what is at stake. Security, prosperity, and freedom are
at risk not only in the dangerous region of the Middle East, but also
on a global basis. The United States needs to help everyone understand
these likely consequences.
The goal must be for Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program,
and to do so in a way that gives the international community real
confidence that that has been done. Confidence in success will involve
a lengthy process of engagement that addresses more than technical
compliance with IAEA safeguards. In the meantime, we need to keep our
eye on the development that caused the current urgency. Iran has been
seeking to acquire the ability to produce nuclear weapons usable
materials. Much of this effort has been covert and illegal, masked by
an extensive program of denial and deception. Iran has acknowledged
some of this history, piecemeal, only after being confronted with
evidence, but the IAEA has again expressed concern that after 3 years
of intensive Agency efforts, key uncertainties have not been addressed
due to lack of transparency.
Iran wishes to continue the research and development necessary for
an industrial scale production capacity of fissile material, and then
it wants to begin such production. The problem, given the entire
context of Iranian activities, is that to permit the research that
gives Iran capabilities such as uranium enrichment with gas
centrifuges, would be to provide both the basis for a parallel nuclear
weapons program and the means to mask covert weapons activities or
procurements and to break out of the treaty. The immediate step is to
prevent the development or acquisition of such enrichment technology or
other means to acquire weapons useable material.
Undoubtedly, the Security Council will not act initially with the
full range of powers that it has. Early on, however, the Security
Council should make clear its concern and authority. Here are some ways
in which it might do so.
The U.N. Security Council needs to reaffirm its view, expressed by
the U.N. Security Council Heads of State in January 1992, that further
proliferation is a threat to international security. On the seriousness
of proliferation, the U.N. Security Council has been silent for too
long.
The U.N. Security Council should make clear the existing and
essential principle of international law that a state in violation of
its obligations cannot escape the consequences of its violation simply
through withdrawal. International law cannot survive if withdrawal
becomes the ``Get out of Jail Free'' card for violations.
Recognizing the right of sovereign states to withdraw from
treaties, generally, the Security Council could make clear that any
withdrawal from the NPT, in particular, is a matter that warrants
immediate U.N. Security Council consideration.
The U.N. Security Council could make clear that these principles
apply not only in the future, but also to concerns presently engaging
the international community.
The U.N. Security Council could state that Iran, by name, falls
under these principles.
The Security Council could endorse measures in IAEA Board of
Governors resolution (GOV/2006/14 of February 4, 2006, which ``deems it
necessary for Iran to:
``Reestablish full and sustained suspension of all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including
research and development to be verified by the Agency;
``Reconsider the construction of a research reactor
moderated by heavy water;
``Ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional
Protocol;
``Pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with
the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on
18 December 2003;
``Implement transparency measures, as requested by the
Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond
the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and
Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals,
documentation relating to procurement, dual-use equipment,
certain military-owned workshops and research and development
as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing
investigations.''
The Security Council could direct the IAEA to use all the tools
available to it and to propose additional measures to help resolve
matters of fact, and that the UNSC will support those actions including
special inspections.
The Security Council could find that Iran has violated central
obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Security Council could call upon Iran to address the concerns
of the international community by abandoning its nuclear weapons
program and by doing so completely and transparently.
The UNSC could call upon all members of the United Nations to take
measures in support of the Security Council decisions to bring Iran
into compliance with the NPT and undo the dangers created by Iran's
covert nuclear weapons program. Member states are already bound to take
similar and related measures under U.N. Security Council Resolution
1540.
The U.N. Security Council could reiterate that the full range of
options available to the U.N. Security Council may be warranted when a
threat to international security arises.
Iranian actions are reducing the time available for the
international community to prevent the appearance of a nuclear-armed
Iran. More measures undoubtedly will be required of the international
community and the UNSC. To gain international support, however, the
first step must be for the UNSC to make clear to all where it stands.
This would help provide a foundation upon which the international
community can build an effective, united response.
Iran and North Korea have many differences in culture and context,
the most obvious being the extreme nature of Pyongyang's isolation from
world politics and economics, but both are serious threats to
international security. Understanding the differences is important. One
of the great challenges facing nonproliferation today is bridging the
knowledge gaps between regionalists and functionalists, and I commend
the committee for bringing both types of experts here today. For my
part, let me concentrate on some of the lessons, I believe, should have
been learned from the North Korean experience that are of relevance to
Iran.
We must recognize that IAEA findings of discrepancies, or failures
to report on materials and activities, are not merely technical and
historical. Nor are they to be dismissed or grandfathered. Complete
disclosure and transparency is necessary to have any confidence that we
are dealing successfully with the real nuclear weapons program.
Although Iran's ability to produce necessary fissile material is
the major missing piece for the Iranian nuclear weapons program, we
must not ignore other activities that Iran has underway as part of
their nuclear weapons program and also their programs to develop
ballistic missiles and other means of delivery.
In Korea, it was a covert reprocessing activity that created the
crisis, but uranium enrichment was always a concern. Likewise, in Iran,
we have become focused on near term enrichment capability, but we
should not lose sight of the dangers associated with reprocessing in
Iran.
We must recognize that because of the dangerous behavior and
rhetoric of Iran, as in the case of North Korea, business as usual will
be insufficient. In the case of North Korea, in 1991, we developed the
North-South Denuclearization Agreement that prohibited both
reprocessing and enrichment, providing something of an NPT-plus regime
because of the difficult security context.
Undoubtedly, the process of negotiation and engagement will take
time, but we must manage that time properly. For its part, Iran needs
time to complete tasks related to its nuclear weapons program, and it
will want to buy more time and create other windows through which it
can work on its program. For example, Iran might readily forgo
temporarily industrial scale activity for the period of time it needs
to do more research to make that production capability effective. We
need to understand the undesired consequences of partial measures that
address some but not all of Iran's nuclear weapons efforts.
Likewise, difficult negotiations will create pressures to
exaggerate small accomplishments or dismiss steps backward. We must be
careful not to get so caught up in the process that we lose sight of
the goal. In this regard, the experience with Libya is clearly a more
attractive model than that with North Korea.
In dealing with North Korea, the lengthy negotiating process often
left us in what might be called an NPT-minus situation with threats to
withdraw from the NPT and on-again/off-again IAEA and other access and
inspections. At the same time, the gradual erosion of the situation
discouraged action because the threshold of additional danger at each
moment was too small to motivate the international community to act
even as the total danger grew. This was an experience with North Korea
that we should try to avoid with Iran.
We must also understand that we, and others, have more tools than
the IAEA. Efforts like the Proliferation Security Initiative provide
important means to help with nonproliferation.
Everyone speaks of both carrots and sticks, but psychology and
culture differ. Incentives and sanctions have been studied extensively.
Sometimes they work. Sometimes they don't. This committee does not need
for me to repeat the history or the literature. I would, however, like
to highlight a few of the fundamentals that I think are most important
in the case of Iran.
The United States already has extensive sanctions against Iran, but
this is the exception rather than the rule among countries. We should
consider the consequences if other nations were to do what we do. When
broad sanctions or incentives become necessary, those provided by a
distant actor may be less effective than narrow sanctions nearly
universally enforced or targeted sanctions by a party of importance. In
the case of Iran, Europe is an important consideration, but Russia and
China may determine the effectiveness of both carrots and sticks. Both
have extensive economic and political interests in Iran that could
influence Iran positively. Unfortunately those same interests create
pressures to lower the priority given to nonproliferation.
If measures are taken, the first and most important of them should
be aimed at the resources, prosperity, and legitimacy of the regime's
leadership and those who keep the oppressive leadership in power.
In summary, we need to recognize that Iranian noncompliance with
the NPT, however technical, is not about technicalities or the fine
print; it is about nuclear weapons in the hands of a regime that could
dramatically destabilize the world creating conditions that lead to
economic depression, WMD terrorism, and war. If we fail to prevent a
nuclear-armed Iran, we are not without measures to try to deter or
defend our allies, our interests, and ourselves. Yet, we would all be
better off if we avoid getting into those dire straits.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Lehman, for your
testimony.
I would like now to call upon Dr. Patrick Clawson, deputy
director for Research of the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy.
Dr. Clawson.
STATEMENT OF DR. PATRICK CLAWSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH,
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Clawson. Thank you very much for letting me appear
today and letting me put my statement into the record.
Given the fiasco about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction,
we face an uphill battle in persuading people that the threat
from Iran is real, and in waging that battle we would be well
advised to understate our case and not to rely upon what our
intelligence agencies tell us is almost certainly happening,
but to the maximum extent that we can to emphasize what it is
that Iran itself acknowledges that it is doing.
Here the new President of Iran, President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, helps us a lot by his big mouth. His famous
comment about Israel must be wiped off the map was made in an
October conference, the title of which is often misreported.
The actual title was ``The World Without Zionism and America.''
Those last two words are not idle phrases from President
Ahmadinejad because he really sincerely believes that his
cothinkers were able to bring down one superpower, namely the
U.S.S.R., and that they will be able to do that again, to
America. This is a man who regularly says that Islam is not
limited to a city or country; ``if we intend to run the world
we should prepare the way for it.'' He means that.
But there are also a lot of Iranian actions that we can
point to. Let me just cite two areas, namely terrorism and
their nuclear program. On terrorism, there are many things they
do, whether it is in Iraq or with al-Qaeda, that our
intelligence community tells us are reasons for great concern.
But I would urge us to concentrate on that which the Iranian
leaders themselves openly acknowledge that they are doing, so
that we do not have to deal with complaints or suspicions about
how good is our intelligence.
In particular, Iran openly acknowledges that it provides
hundreds of millions of dollars in support for Hezbollah in
Lebanon. Now, for a long time Hezbollah enjoyed a lot of good
press, but as Lebanon has moved toward democracy and as
Hezbollah has blocked those moves and has worked more openly
with Syria to prevent Lebanon from achieving its full
sovereignty, Hezbollah is finding itself in a more isolated
position and, therefore, more vulnerable to pressure. I was
struck by the fact that recently the United Nations complained
about arms smuggling to Hezbollah, something that the U.S.
Government for many years has complained about, but to find the
United Nations complaining about it, that is a step forward.
Similarly, Iran has, for a long time, openly acknowledged
that it is the principal supporter of Palestinian Islamic
Jihad. Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a group that really does
not have a whole lot of support inside the West Bank and Gaza
Strip and relies upon the Iranians. So we can say that its
terrorist activities are very much the Iranian responsibility.
That is a different situation than with Hamas, which Iran would
dearly like to work with more closely, but has always
maintained a certain independence from Iran.
This same approach that I am suggesting about the terrorism
issue I would also carry over toward the nuclear issue. As Mr.
Lehman was explaining, there is excellent reason to think that
Iran has a nuclear weapons program, but we do not need to get
into that. We can just take Iran's statements at face value
that all it is doing is building a full nuclear fuel cycle.
There is no question about that. Iran shows to reporters what
it is doing. Iran openly acknowledges this. This is openly
known.
Then we can point out that people like the Nobel-Peace-
Prize-winning Director of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, Mohamed ElBaredei, says that there should be a global
moratorium on these enrichment facilities because they are so
dangerous that if they are completed they would put a country,
``a few months away,'' from having a nuclear weapon. So we can
simply say that, look, Iran, even if we will accept all your
arguments that all you are doing is building a nuclear
enrichment program, that is too dangerous. And, in particular,
given your track record of lying to the IAEA for 18 years, we
cannot accept that you have lived up to your half of the NPT
bargain; that bargain being that states are allowed to have
dangerous technologies in return for living up to their
safeguards agreements and being open and honest about what they
are doing. And since you have not been open and honest, Iran,
well, sorry, but you cannot have this dangerous technology.
This approach, rather than emphasizing the intelligence
information which suggests that Iran actually has a nuclear
weapons program, would, I suggest, be more convincing to people
in the region, people in Iran, and people around the world.
Similarly, when it comes to the question of the threats
that Iran's nuclear program represents, as Senator Biden said,
Iran obviously lives in a dangerous neighborhood and everyone
knows that. We would do well to acknowledge that, while at the
same time pointing out that, in fact, nuclear weapons have
generally been a doomsday weapon, to be used in an ultimate
scenario of great catastrophe, and it is very hard to see how
Iran faces that kind of a security problem. Iran's security
problems are failed states around it, the rampant drug
smuggling that comes in from Afghanistan, the spillover of
terrorism that they are suffering from Iraq. These are Iran's
problems and nuclear weapons are not useful for dealing with
Iran's security problems.
Whereas, no matter what Iran's intentions are, if it
acquires a nuclear capability it will inevitably be a greater
player in Middle Eastern politics in a way that would upset
many of its neighbors and, therefore, could well spark an arms
race that would destabilize the entire region. It is disturbing
to me that I have had Pakistani generals describe, in
considerable detail and accuracy, the arrangements that Germany
and the United States had during the cold war about the
stationing on German soil of American nuclear warheads that
were on top of missiles controlled by the Germans. We took the
attitude that that was consistent with Germany's NPT
obligations because we continued to control the warheads. If
Pakistan were to store its warheads on Saudi soil on top of the
Saudi long-range missiles under a similar arrangement that the
United States and Germany had, I certainly would not feel more
comfortable and I suspect that our Israeli friends would feel
even less comfortable.
So there are many ways in which we can describe the Iranian
threat that understate the case and I think would be more
convincing as a result. When it comes to American responses--
excuse me--the international community's responses as to what
to do about Iran's programs, there as well I think it would be
useful for us to understate the case. So I would put on the
table some instruments of persuasion and not just instruments
of dissuasion. In particular, during the cold war we found that
confidence and stability-building measures were useful for both
sides, and there are some confidence and stability-building
measures which would be in the interest of the United States,
but I think we could say to a candid world that these are also
in Iran's interests. We might not persuade the Iranians to
accept such things as an incidents-at-sea agreement to prevent
episodes in the Persian Gulf or an exchange of military
observers, but I do think this would help in the battle for
hearts and minds if we, at least, made an offer of instruments
of persuasion as well as dissuasion.
When it comes to the instruments of dissuasion, there has
been much talk about the Security Council process and that is
very important, but there are things that we can do parallel to
the Security Council process that do not depend upon our
waiting for the Security Council to act, and those would be
wise measures for us to initiate now. So, for instance, there
are a number of deterrence and containment steps that we could
take that could help reassure neighboring countries and also
affect Iran's calculus.
For instance, if we were to announce that we are prepared
to sell to the Arab States, in the Persian Gulf, more advanced
antimissile systems and air defense systems, that could raise
doubts in the minds of the Iranian decisionmakers about their
country's ability to reliably deliver its nuclear weapons and
that could affect their calculations. It could also affect the
calculations of regional states about whether or not they need
to proliferate on their own.
Furthermore, Iranian hotheads regularly threaten to close
the Strait of Hormuz if the West escalates pressure on Iran on
the nuclear program. I would just remind you that our Defense
Intelligence Agency regularly informs Congress that Iran has
the capability to temporarily close the Strait of Hormuz. Well,
that would suggest to me that we would do well to exercise how
would we protect that vital strait and to move additional
assets into the region to protect the strait and indeed ask
some of our NATO partners to also help in that task. A
multilateral exercise showing that the outside world is
prepared to deter Iranian escalation of a crisis would again be
useful in showing the international resolve about these
matters.
But all these measures to press Iran and to deter it are
stalling tactics, because so long as Iran has an Islamic
republic it is going to pursue a nuclear weapons program. I
happen to think that if Iranian reformers come to power they,
too, would want nuclear weapons, but they would want good
relations with the outside world even more. So I am confident
that the Iranian reformers, if they came to power, would say:
Well, if freezing the nuclear program is the price we have to
pay for better relations with the outside world, then that is
something we are prepared to do.
So it is in our interest to promote that kind of reform
movement inside Iran. There is not much we can do. There are
modest steps we can take, and we have absolutely no idea how
successful that is going to be or on what time scale. Analysts
have not accurately predicted any revolution anywhere in the
world in the last 200 years. I do not think that they are going
to be successful this time, either. When President Reagan
visited Berlin and said ``Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall,''
very few people thought that that wall would be gone within a
few years. We have absolutely no idea about what time scale
change will come to Iran and it would be unwise for us to
assume that change will be successful.
But it would also be both the morally right thing and the
politically prudent thing for us to do to take the modest steps
that we can to encourage that change.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Clawson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Patrick Clawson, Deputy Director for
Research, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC
Given the fiasco about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, it is
only natural that many Americans are suspicious when the Bush
administration warns that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. And against
the background of many exaggerated claims about a direct Iraqi role in
terrorism against the United States, it is to be expected that many
Americans are skeptical about U.S. claims that Iran is the world's
leading sponsor of terror. The U.S. Government has a tough task to
convince Americans that Iran is a real threat. Undertaking that task is
well worthwhile.
HIGHLIGHTING WHAT IRAN ACKNOWLEDGES DOING
One way to highlight the Iranian threat is to simply quote Iranian
leaders. It is not hard to cite Iranian leaders' threatening rhetoric.
The October 26, 2005, conference where President Ahmadinejad said,
``Israel must be wiped off the map'' was actually entitled ``The World
Without Zionism and America''--and those last two words are not empty
rhetoric to a man convinced that his cothinkers have already brought
down one superpower (the U.S.S.R.). Indeed, Ahmadinejad really means it
when he says, ``Islam is not limited to a city or country and every
Muslim should have a global insight. If we intend to run the world, we
should pave the way for it.'' (Iranian Labor News Agency, in Persian,
January 6, 2006). Those inclined to dismiss this language would do well
to heed German Chancellor Angela Merkel's warning, ``When National
Socialism [Nazism] was on the rise, there were many outside Germany who
said, `It's only rhetoric, don't get excited.' There were times when
people could have reacted differently, and in my view, Germany is
obliged to do something at the early stages . . . We must prevent Iran
from developing its nuclear program'' (quoted in the Washington Post,
February 4, 2006).
But let us go beyond words to look at actions. I will confine
myself to two areas: Terrorism and the nuclear program.
Terrorism. There are many troubling indications of Iranian
involvement in terrorism, such as the continued acknowledged presence
of senior al-Qaeda leaders in Iran who are supposedly under arrest but
who were able to order the May 12, 2003, Riyadh bombings on their
phones. However, if the U.S. Government emphasizes these links with al-
Qaeda, it risks running into international skepticism, because the
information comes from intelligence sources. A much more fruitful
approach is to highlight what Iran readily acknowledges.
Top of the list here is Hezbollah in Lebanon. Richard Armitage,
then Under Secretary of State, warned, ``Hezbollah may be the A-team of
terrorists and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the B-team'' (speech at USIP,
September 5, 2002). Iran was responsible for creating Hezbollah and has
supported it for 20 years with hundreds of millions of dollars,
shipments of advanced weapons, and training in sophisticated terror
techniques. During the period when Israel occupied southern Lebanon,
Hezbollah portrayed itself as a movement in resistance to foreign
occupation. That was part of its activities, but it was also actively
engaged in terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians and Jews, such as
blowing up the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. Hezbollah's
self-portrayal as a resistance movement has worn thin since the 2,000
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. In the first years after the Israeli
withdrawal, many around the world were prepared to turn a blind eye to
Hezbollah's armed activities. But that has changed as Lebanon has made
great advances toward democratic independence, while Hezbollah
continues to support Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs and uses
its militia to threaten the stability of democratic institutions. Now,
there is much scope for pressing the case against Hezbollah and its
Iranian sponsors. Indeed, in recent weeks, even the United Nations
complained about a January 31 arms shipment to Hezbollah by way of
Syria, in blatant violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559
which calls for disarming militias though the United Nations was too
polite to note that the arms came from Iran.
Another Iranian-sponsored terror group that should be in the U.S.
crosshairs is Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Iran has worked hard to
insinuate itself into Gaza and the West Bank. Fortunately, its puppet
group PIJ has never taken off the way Hezbollah did--that is, PIJ has
never sunk roots into the local communities. Precisely because PIJ is
rather isolated, it is a good target for attack. The U.S. Government
would do well to concentrate on criticizing Iran for its support of
PIJ. That is much easier to do than to complain about Iran's
longstanding courting of Hamas, which it has provided with money,
weapons, and training. State Department counterterrorism coordinator,
Henry Crumpton, warns, ``it is clearly an [Iranian] objective'' to make
Hamas into ``another proxy'' like Hezbollah which is ``just an
extension of the Iranian Government'' (interview with Jerusalem Post,
February 22, 2006). However, to date, Hamas has remained rather
independent of Iran.
Also difficult to confront are Iran's activities in Iraq. While
U.S. officials have intelligence about Iranian arms shipments reaching
insurgents, Iran can plausibly blame smugglers across the rugged
border. And most Iranian activities in Iraq fall in a grey zone--
troubling, yet part of the usual rules of the game by which governments
compete for influence. Major aspects of this support entail broad
financial backing for Iran's friends in Iraq and an extensive
propaganda apparatus, including the slick Al Alam television network.
Nuclear weapons. There is no doubt Iran is building a ``nuclear
fuel cycle'' which will let it dig uranium ore out of the ground and
then ``convert'' it into a gas and ``enrich'' the uranium, increasing
the proportion of the most weapons-usable type. Iran proudly shows
nuclear fuel cycle facilities to reporters and to international
experts. Rather than emphasizing the justifiable suspicions about
Iran's intentions, it may be more productive to take, at face value,
Iran's claim that it is only building a fuel cycle. Right now, only a
few countries have a nuclear fuel cycle program, and most of them have
nuclear weapons. Nuclear fuel cycle programs are so dangerous that
President Bush has proposed, ``The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing technologies to
any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning
enrichment and reprocessing plants'' (speech at National Defense
University, February 11, 2004). In a similar vein, International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General and Nobel Peace Prize winner,
Mohammed ElBaradei of Egypt, has proposed to ``put a 5-year hold on
additional facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium
separation.'' Further, he states that ``there is no compelling reason
to build more of these facilities'' anywhere in the world (op-ed in
Financial Times, February 2, 2005).
Iran's declared intentions--to build a nuclear fuel cycle--would
give Iran the capability to make the ``fissile material,'' as
specialists call it, which is at the heart of an atom bomb. Making the
fissile material is the hard part of making a nuclear weapon.
Assembling the actual bomb is not particularly hard for an industrial
country like Iran; ElBaradei estimates that task would take Iran only
``a few months'' (Newsweek, January 23, 2006). Iran has no particular
reason to actually do the bomb work yet; first, it has to complete the
nuclear fuel cycle and make the fissile material. So it is possible
that Iran has not started to work on how to put together a bomb because
there is no need to do so yet.
To be sure, there are disturbing indications Iran is actively
designing and researching how to build atom bombs and fit them on its
missiles. The January 31, 2006, IAEA report warns about ``alleged
undeclared studies, known as the Green Salt Project, concerning the
conversion of uranium dioxide into UF-4 (``green salt''), as well as
tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile reentry
vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear dimension and which
appear to have administrative interconnections.'' U.S. intelligence
possesses more information in the same vein. Indeed, French Foreign
Minister, Philippe Douste-Blazy, has said, ``No civil nuclear program
can explain Iran's nuclear program. So it is a clandestine military
nuclear program'' (Financial Times, February 17, 2006). But that is in
the realm of inferring Iran's intentions from limited evidence, much of
it from intelligence sources. Having seen how poor intelligence can
be--overestimating the Iraqi weapons programs, underestimating the
Libyan and North Korean programs--we should not be surprised if the
world is skeptical about claims that are based on necessarily
incomplete intelligence; indeed, Iran's latest response to the IAEA has
been to dismiss these intelligence allegations as forgeries (New York
Times, February 28, 2006). Therefore, Washington would do well to
concentrate on what is known, which is that Iran is actively and
proudly building a nuclear fuel cycle capability which will enable it
to quickly build nuclear weapons if it so decides.
In addition, the U.S. Government should emphasize the IAEA Board of
Governors' complaints about ``Iran's many failures and breaches of its
obligations to comply with its NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty)
Safeguards Agreement'' (to quote the most recent resolution adopted on
February 4, 2006). The IAEA reports lay out in detail how Iran has lied
about its nuclear program for 18 years and how Iran continues to refuse
to answer many of the IAEA's questions about its activities. The point
to be driven home is that the NPT is a bargain: Countries have the
right to peaceful nuclear technology if they live up to the obligation
to be open and transparent about their nuclear activities. Iran claims
the rights, but it has not fulfilled its obligations. Framing the case
that way is the most effective way of refuting Iran's claim that its
rights are being violated.
THE THREAT POSED BY IRANIAN ACTIONS
Iran's activities pose many threats to U.S. interests. For
instance, there is a serious risk that Iran could undermine the
stabilization of Iraq. Michael Rubin has warned, ``Step-by-step,
Iranian authorities are replicating in Iraq the strategy which allowed
Hezbollah to take over southern Lebanon in the 1980s . . . As in
southern Lebanon, what cannot be won through bribery is imposed through
intimidation'' (Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2006).
But let me concentrate on the threat from the Iranian nuclear
program. Here again, the U.S. Government would do well to understate
the case, given skepticism based on the Iraq experience. It is useful
to begin by acknowledging that Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood
and that nuclear weapons are sometimes a logical response to security
threats. That would put Washington in a better position to argue that
nuclear weapons make no sense for Iran's legitimate security concerns.
Nuclear weapons are appropriate as a doomsday weapon, and so they are a
logical weapon for a small country facing larger neighbors who threaten
to obliterate it--think Israel or Pakistan. But now that Saddam Hussein
is gone from the scene, Iran is surrounded by weak and fragile states
which have no interest in invading it. Iran's real security concerns
are from state failure, such as drug smuggling from Afghanistan and
ethnic separatist violence from Iraq and Pakistan. Iran's only problems
with powerful states are because of the fights which Iran has chosen to
pick with the United States and Israel--countries which would be happy
to live in peace with Iran if it stopped its sponsorship of terrorism
and opposition to the Middle East peace process. In short, the U.S.
Government should emphasize that Iran has security problems, but that
nuclear weapons are not the answer to those problems.
Furthermore, regardless of Iran's motivations for establishing its
nuclear program, nuclear advances would inevitably make Iran a bigger
player on the regional scene. That is a matter of concern because Iran
is not a status quo power. The theme of my recent history of Iran,
``Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos'' (coauthored with Michael Rubin;
Palgrave Press, 2005), is that Iranians are proud nationalists,
intensely aware of their ancient glories; they remember that a mere 200
years ago, Iran was twice its present size.
To understand how Iran would use its nuclear program to throw its
weight around, consider what Iran would be able to do regarding Israel.
A nuclear-ready Iran might argue that it has the right to be consulted
on what constitutes an acceptable settlement between Israel and its
Arab neighbors, claiming that the entire Muslim world is affected by
the future of the holy places in Jerusalem. That would be bad enough--
Iranian meddling would reinforce Palestinian radicals and complicate
any effort to normalize relations between Israel and Middle Eastern
countries. But a nuclear-ready Iran might take greater risks in its
support of anti-Israel Palestinians, for instance, transferring to
Hamas the same long-range rockets Iran has stationed in Lebanon (so
far, those rockets remain under Iranian control, rather than being
released for independent use by Hezbollah). And there is always the
possibility--however faint it may be--that in a crisis, Iran might
threaten the use of nuclear weapons, which it would undoubtedly present
as a defensive measure designed to prevent Israeli aggression against
helpless Arabs.
Even if Iran did not directly threaten Israel, it is likely that a
nuclear-ready Iran would set off a regional arms race, making the
Middle East a more dangerous place with serious consequences for world
peace. Iran's neighbors are not going to sit still if Iran starts
throwing its weight around. The grave risk is that they will respond by
activating their own nuclear programs. It would be very bad news if
Egypt decided that it needed to have the same nuclear fuel cycle
capability Iran is pursuing. And there are rumors that Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia have a secret deal that if Iran becomes nuclear-ready,
Pakistan will ship to Saudi Arabia some nuclear warheads to put on the
long-range Chinese missiles Saudi Arabia bought some years ago
(missiles the Chinese use to carry nuclear warheads). Ostensibly, the
Pakistanis would retain control of the warheads, allowing Saudi Arabia
to claim that it was not violating the NPT.
U.S. RESPONSES
Let me confine my remarks to how to respond to the nuclear threat.
Too much of the discussion about responses to Iran's nuclear program is
concentrated on the extreme solutions: Either attack or appease. There
is a wide range of intermediate policy options which hold much more
promise.
To influence Iran, the United States needs instruments of
persuasion and dissuasion. Most of the persuasion instruments proposed
by Europe have been economic agreements which smell like disguised
bribes. Since Iran is flush with oil income that has swelled its
foreign exchange reserves to over $30 billion, Tehran has dismissed
these offers. A better approach is to concentrate on security measures,
to counter the argument that Iran needs nuclear weapons because it has
real security needs. There are many confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs) and arms control measures which would provide gains
for both Iran and the West. Examples of CSBMs would be an exchange of
observers for military exercises in and near Iran, or an incidents-at-
sea (INCSEA) agreement to prevent unintended naval confrontations. The
point of making such offers would be first and foremost to impress
world opinion with how reasonable the United States is being. After
all, if NATO and the Warsaw Pact could agree on CSBMs at the height of
the cold war, then Iran would look stubborn and uncompromising if it
refuses such measures when offered by Washington. Whether Iran accepts
these offers is not the main point; we are primarily in a battle for
hearts and minds--mostly the hearts and minds of Europeans, Russians,
and Chinese (though, of course, the hearts and minds of Americans and
Iranians as well). The more the great powers take a unified stance
blaming Iran for causing a crisis, the more pressure Iran will feel to
concede.
As for instruments of dissuasion, there has been too much attention
paid to comprehensive economic sanctions, which could damage Western
economies if imposed while oil markets are so tight. Much more useful
would be measures to emphasize Iran's isolation over the nuclear issue.
In particular, Iran has suspended IAEA inspections which were
authorized under the ``Additional Protocol,'' adopted by the IAEA in
1997 drawing on the lessons of how Iraq and North Korea misled IAEA
inspectors. (Iran, which has never ratified the Additional Protocol,
agreed to follow its provisions as part of the November 2004 ``Paris
Protocol'' with the British, French, and Germans). Furthermore, Iran
has refused IAEA requests to interview key scientists in its nuclear
program. It would be entirely appropriate for the Security Council to
first call on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and then, if Iran
refused, to order Iran to cooperate, using the Security Council's
authority under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which compels
countries to follow Security Council orders. A chapter VII resolution
would be a huge step, because if Iran fails to comply, then the
Security Council would presumably consider enforcement action, such as
sanctions or ultimately military force (any consideration of sanctions
now would be highly premature: Iran has yet to refuse to comply with a
Security Council order).
If the Security Council issued an order to Iran, Tehran might well
decide to comply. After all, when faced with a united United States-
European stance in October 2003, Iran did agree to suspend its
enrichment activities--an action which very few Iran-watchers
anticipated. Not only that, but after Iran backed out of the
suspension, it again climbed down, agreeing in November 2004 to an even
more comprehensive suspension. This track record, in which diplomatic
pressure persuaded Iran to suspend the key part of its nuclear program,
gives reason for optimism about the current diplomatic process.
If, in fact, Iran refused to obey the Security Council orders, then
the Council should sanction Iran. The aim of those sanctions should be
to politically and diplomatically isolate Iran--which might not impress
Ahmadinejad, but would worry many in Iran's ruling circles (bearing in
mind that the Iranian President is not the key decisionmaker on foreign
and security policy; that power rests with the revolutionary clerics,
especially Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei). In several cases recently, the
Security Council has imposed targeted sanctions, such as banning travel
by key individuals, to drive home the high political price of
unacceptable actions. In both Serbia and South Africa, the sanction
felt most keenly by the public was the ban on international sporting
competition. If young Iranians learn that their country's participation
in the June 2006 Soccer World Cup is dependent on resolving the nuclear
issue, there will be a dramatic increase in the interest they take in
how the negotiations are going.
At the same time that the Security Council process is unfolding, a
parallel track would be to adopt defensive security measures. These
measures could increase the likelihood that Iran will back down,
because they would show Iran that its security will be worse off due to
its hard-line stance on nuclear matters. Furthermore, deterrence and
containment measures, similar to those of the cold war, would have the
further advantage of putting the West in a better position to use
military force if the need were to arise. One step in this direction
would be to sell Arab States in the Persian Gulf more advanced
antimissile systems and air defense systems. Raising doubts in the
minds of Iranian decisionmakers about the country's ability to reliably
deliver its nuclear weapons could make their use prohibitively risky
for Tehran in all but the direst of circumstances. Another step would
be to assist Israel to deploy more Arrow countermissile batteries and
to develop more sophisticated follow-on versions of the Arrow.
In addition, the West should act now to forestall Iranian threats
to global energy supplies. Iranian hotheads regularly threaten to
disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz if the West escalates pressure
on Iran about the nuclear question; to quote Iran's leading newspaper,
``the arrogance (the United States) must receive the signal that a
boycott of Iranian oil or in case of a bigger folly in connection with
the military threat, it must give up the entire oil of the Persian
Gulf'' (Touhid Ahmadi, ``Death Boomerang,'' Keyhan, February 22, 2006).
A multilateral exercise to protect the Strait of Hormuz with
minesweepers and other naval vessels, if conducted in the near future,
would be a useful way to signal Iran that the West is serious and
united in its willingness to use force to protect its vital interest in
the gulf. At the same time, such an exercise would be entirely
defensive and in no way suggesting that the West is preparing an attack
on Iran.
But all these measures to press Iran and to deter it are stalling
tactics. So long as Iran has an Islamic Republic, it will have a
nuclear weapons program, at least clandestinely. The key issue,
therefore, is: How long will the present Iranian regime last? Analysts
have had a poor record at predicting when fundamental changes will take
place. Who among us expected that when President Reagan said in Berlin,
``tear down this wall,'' it would indeed fall within 3 years? So, too,
it is not possible to tell when change will come to Iran, though it is
quite clear that the Iranian people detest the present system. At the
same time that it concentrates on the nuclear issue, the United States
has an important interest--both strategic and moral--in supporting
Iran's prodemocratic forces. It would be a grave setback to
Washington's reform agenda in the region if the United States were
perceived to have abandoned Iran's beleaguered prodemocratic forces by
making a deal with hard-line autocrats to secure U.S. geostrategic
interests. On top of which, the reigning mullahs would almost certainly
cheat on any such a deal, as they did during the Iran-contra affair
when they released some hostages only to take others. The only sure
route is the best moral route: Supporting Iranian democrats with what
modest aid Washington can provide, such as increased television, radio,
and Internet broadcasts.
A word about the international diplomatic efforts. There is much
good news here, especially the strong European-United States unity
about Iran policy in contrast to the profound differences in the 1990s.
Still there is a real risk that Iran is stalling for time. Despite
limited successes of diplomats, Iran's program keeps moving forward,
even if slowly. The pessimistic reading of Iranian actions over the
last 3 years is that Iran has agreed to freezes in its nuclear
activities whenever it has encountered technical problems which require
more research to resolve; when Tehran is ready to make the next step
forward, it unfreezes and moves ahead until it bumps up against the
next technical constraint. This reading would suggest that diplomacy
may be doing little more than providing legitimacy for Iran without
effectively limiting its nuclear program. In other words, there is a
serious risk in continuously compromising in order to preserve
international unity: Unless we stand firm on certain basic points,
diplomacy could become Iran's enabler.
Some day, it may become necessary to take more direct action
against the Iranian nuclear program. To quote IAEA director ElBaradei,
``Diplomacy has to be backed up by pressure and, in extreme case, by
force. We have rules. We have to do everything possible to uphold the
rules through conviction. If not, then you impose them. Of course, this
has to be the last resort, but sometimes you have to do it'' (Newsweek,
January 23, 2006). If force were to be necessary, the options are much
broader than an air raid like that which Israel mounted in 1981 against
Iraq's Osiraq reactor. For instance, Israel put a stop to Egypt's
missile program in the early 1960s by arranging the sudden premature
death of German scientists working on those missiles in Egypt. Iran's
nuclear program is a series of sophisticated, large industrial plants
which could encounter industrial accidents.
The bottom line is that Iran's nuclear program is an unacceptable
risk to world peace; one way or another, it must be stopped.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Clawson.
We would like to hear now from Dr. Ray Takeyh.
STATEMENT OF DR. RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Takeyh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me. I
will confine my comments to the domestic political debates that
surround Iran's nuclear issue as I understand them. I would
actually suggest that really more than any other issue in the
recent years, the nuclear question has exposed the divisions
within the Islamic republic on the nature of its international
orientation. I think as some of the other guests said here
today, I think all factions are united on Iran having a robust
nuclear program, which in due course will give it the option to
assemble the bomb. However, the decision to actually cross the
threshold and assemble a weapon in defiance of the
international community and in violation of Iran's own treaty
obligations has generated a subtle, yet, in my view, a robust
debate.
I would suggest that the primary supporters of a sort of a
nuclear breakout option would be hard-line elements associated
with the Supreme Leader's office, Ali Khamenei, a name who has
not been mentioned yet today, curiously enough. Through command
of key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards and the
Council of Guardians, they have inordinate impact on Iran's
security issues and security planning.
A very basic aspect of hard-liners' ideology is that Iran
is in constant danger from a wide variety of predatory external
forces and, therefore, requires military self-reliance. This is
a perception that was molded by a revolution that sought to
refashion the regional norms. That mission has failed, but the
perception nevertheless remains.
Obviously, as has been mentioned, Iran's nuclear
calculations have been hardened by the rise of the new
President, Mr. Ahmadinejad, and many other Iran-Iraq war
veterans who are beginning to assume positions of power.
Although the Iran-Iraq war ended some almost 20 years ago, I
guess, for many within this generation it was their defining
experience that conditioned their strategic assumptions. Even a
cursory examination of Ahmadinejad's speeches reveals that for
him the war is far from a faded memory; it is a real historical
enterprise.
This has led many, including the President, to perceive
that, given the Western insensitivity to Saddam's war crimes
and his use of chemical weapons against Iran, combatants and
civilians alike, Iran's security cannot rest on disarmament
treaties or global opinion. Given their paranoia and
suspicions, the hard-liners insist that America does not
necessarily object to Iran's proliferation, but it objects to
the character of the regime, and that proliferation is the
latest issue that the Americans are using to coerce and
pressure Iran. This argument has some degree of validity at a
time that the President is in India blessing its nuclear
weapons program irrespective of its compliance with the NPT. So
that plays into that particular rhetoric; that particular
perception.
Moreover, they suggest even if we give in on the nuclear
issue, the Americans would then find another issue to coerce us
with; therefore, why bother making any concessions at all on
what is, after all, a critical national program. Beyond such
demands, the international community's demands that Iran
permanently and irrevocably relinquish what it perceives to be
its rights under article 4 of the NPT, namely to have some sort
of enrichment capability, has led the leadership to be
nationalistically aroused. A country that has been historically
subject to foreign intervention and capitulation treaties is
inordinately sensitive to its national prerogatives and
sovereign rights. For Iran's new rulers, they are not being
challenged because of their provocations and their treaty
violations, but because of superpower bullying and hypocrisy.
In a peculiar manner, I think you begin to see their
nuclear program and Iran's nationalism being fused in their
imagination. Therefore, the notion of compromise and
acquiescence has a limited utility to Iran's aggrieved hard-
line nationalists.
The Islamic republic is nothing if not factionalized and
there are other factions that play in the nuclear issue. The
Western perception that somehow the nuclear issue is determined
by a narrow band of conservatives is, in my view, flawed.
Supreme Leader Khamenei has broadened the parameters of the
debate and included elites from all the relevant political
constituencies. The reformers out of power, the pragmatic
conservatives struggling against their reactionary brethren,
professionals from the national security establishment are all
allowed to have a seat at the table and voice their views.
Given the provocative nature of the nuclear program,
Khamenei seems to be hoping that the burden of any ensuing
international confrontations would be shared by all political
factions alike, as opposed to being the sole responsibility of
the conservatives only.
Therefore, even the systematic consolidation of power by
the conservatives since the February 2004 parliamentary
election has not silenced voices calling for restraint within
the decisionmaking process. Who are they? I think Patrick
alluded to some of them. But in contrast to hard-liners, the
pragmatic elements within the Islamic republic suggest that
Iran's ongoing integration in the international community and
the global economy mandates certain restrictions on its nuclear
ambitions. It is tempting to see this issue as a divide between
reformers and conservatives, but it enjoys support from such
conservatives as Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Expediency
Council, and many other reformers who are very critical of the
conservatives and are associated mainly with the Islamic
Participation Front and other such reformist organizations and
parties.
Again, this particular faction does not call for
dismantling of the nuclear edifice and the nuclear apparatus,
but it merely calls for development of Iran's nuclear program
within the confines of the NPT, which are rather broad. Given
Iran's long-term commitment to NPT, the prevailing
international scrutiny, a provocative policy could invite
multilateral sanctions and lead Iran's commercial partners, the
Europeans, the Japanese, and others, to embrace United States
policy of pressuring and isolating Iran. Therefore, the nuclear
issue has to be considered in the wider context of Iran's
international relations.
In recent months, as Iran's remarkably reckless diplomacy
has led to a series of IAEA resolutions criticizing it and
referring it to the Security Council, the members of this group
have called for restraint, even suspension of various of Iran's
nuclear activities. Rafsanjani has taken the lead in
admonishing the new President to be cautious and many of the
reformers have already come out and called for actual
suspension of the program and resumption of dialog with the
Europeans as a confidence-building measure.
Hovering over this debate, as hovering over all debates in
Iran, stands the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. As mentioned, I
think his instinct is to support the reaction elements within
the state in their call for defiance and pursuit of the nuclear
option. However, in his role as the guardian of the state he
must consider the nuclear program in the context of Iran's
commercial and international relations. Thus far, despite his
ideological compunction, he has somewhat pressed the state
toward restraint. The fact that Iran continues to negotiate
with Russia and others, is open to negotiations, and has not
resumed full-scale activities despite its capability of doing
so reflects his willingness at this time to subordinate
ideology to pragmatism. That may change as there are internal
pressures pressing the leadership toward further defiance.
The question then becomes what is to be done. I have
proposed this idea in a number of forums. It has a poor
reception in almost every one, so I will try it one more time,
with the same degree of confidence that it will be unacceptable
here.
Today we are where we are. Iran's portfolio is at the
Security Council. That is not reversible. But when the
portfolio went to the Security Council in February, the
administration suggested that we have a 1-month pause before
the Security Council begins its deliberations, which will be
some time, I suppose, in the middle of March. I would actually
extend that pause for another 6 months, all the way to
September, and in the meantime I would establish a contact
group to essentially address Iran, in the same manner that the
six-party talks are beginning to negotiate with the North
Koreans.
In the end, there is no Russian solution, there is no
European solution to Iran's nuclear program. Despite our
reservations and prohibitions, the United States has to be
involved in these negotiations for the proliferation problem to
be resolved conclusively. Therefore, this particular seven-
party format, which would involve the United States, the EU3,
Russia, China, and Iran--that makes seven--would approach Iran
with its own negotiating template, namely, in exchange for
various security dialogs and even commercial and economic
relationships, Iran would have to conclusively and irrevocably
relinquish its enrichment rights, because I think, as other
guests have said to you today, an enrichment capability means
an essentially accelerated weapons capability should a state
desire it.
If Iran rejects this concerted last diplomatic effort, then
the United States can return after a 6-month period to the
Security Council with a greater consensus and greater
assurances that the United Nations would impose tough
multilateral sanctions against Iran. Examining the past history
of countries that have renounced nuclear weapons or nuclear
weapons programs, as this one is, the predominant theme is that
these renunciations took place only after these countries
experienced a substantial lessening of their external security
environment and were greater partners in the global economy.
And I will stop there. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Takeyh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow, Middle East
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC
After the International Atomic Energy Agency on February 4 voted to
report Iran to the U.N. Security Council because of its concerns over
its nuclear program, the rituals of diplomacy persist. The
international community sees the Security Council move as ratcheting up
the pressure in order to deter Iran from moving closer to a potential
weapons capability. But the Islamic Republic is seemingly determined to
acquire a sophisticated nuclear infrastructure that will avail it a
weapons option at some point in the near future.
Today, Iran stands at crossroads. For nearly 3 years, Iran was
involved in delicate negotiations with Britain, France, and Germany,
regarding the direction of its nuclear program. The failure of those
talks have not lessened the scope of international diplomacy, as the
Russians are now struggling to craft an agreement that prevents Iran
from completing its fuel cycle capabilities. Ultimately, the course of
Iran's nuclear policy may be decided less by what Europeans say, than
by what Americans do. The nature of Iran's relations with the United
States and the type of security architecture that emerges in the
Persian Gulf are likely to determine Iran's decisions. It is neither
inevitable nor absolute that Iran will become the next member of the
nuclear club, as its internal debates are real and its course of
actions is still unsettled. The international community and the United
States will have an immeasurable impact on Iran's nuclear future. A
more imaginative U.S. diplomacy can still prevent Iran from crossing
the nuclear threshold and assembling a bomb.
UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN REGIME
More than any other issue, the nuclear question has exposed the
divisions within the clerical establishment over Iran's international
orientation. To be sure, Iran's many factions are united on the need to
sustain a vibrant nuclear research program that, in due course, will
offer Tehran the option of manufacturing a bomb. However, the prospect
of actually assembling a weapon in defiance of the international
community and in violation of Iran's longstanding treaty commitments
has generated a subtle yet robust debate.
From the outset it must be emphasized that for all the factions
involved in this debate the core issue is how to safeguard Iran's
national interests. The Islamic Republic is not an irrational rogue
seeking such weaponry as an instrument of an aggressive, revolutionary
foreign policy designed to project its power abroad. This is not an
``Islamic bomb'' to be handed over to terrorist organizations or
exploded in the streets of New York or Washington. For Iran this is a
weapon of deterrence and the relevant question is whether its
possession will serve its practical interests?
The paradox of the post-September 11 Middle East is that, although
Iran's security has improved through the removal of Saddam and of the
Taliban in Afghanistan, its feelings of insecurity have intensified.
The massive projection of American power in the region and the enduring
antagonism between Washington and Tehran constitute Iran's foremost
strategic dilemma and its primary motivation for the acquisition of the
``strategic weapon.'' At a time when the American politicians routinely
and loudly contemplate regime change in Iran, it is hard for the
leadership in Tehran to categorically dispense with a nuclear program
that can serve as its ultimate guarantor. However, as with nearly every
other important issue currently being debated in the Islamic Republic,
the notion of crossing the nuclear threshold is hardly a settled topic.
The primary supporters of the nuclear breakout option are hard-line
elements associated with the Supreme Religious Leader, Ali Khamenei.
Through command of key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards
and the Guardian Council, Iran's reactionary clerics have enormous
influence on national security planning. A fundamental tenet of the
hard-liners' ideology is the notion that the Islamic Republic is in
constant danger from predatory external forces, necessitating military
self-reliance. This perception was initially molded by a revolution
that sought not just to defy but refashion international norms. The
passage of time and the failure of that mission have not, necessarily,
diminished the hard-liners' suspicions of the international order and
its primary guardian, the United States. Jumhuri-ye Islami, the
conservative newspaper and the mouthpiece of Khamenei, sounded this
theme by stressing, ``The core problem is the fact that our officials'
outlook on the nuclear dossier of Iran is faulty and they are on the
wrong track. It seems they have failed to appreciate that America is
after our destruction and the nuclear issue is merely an excuse for
them.''
In a similar vein, Resalat, another influential conservative paper,
sounded out the themes of deterrence and national interest by claiming,
``In the present situation of international order whose main
characteristics are injustice and the weakening of the rights of
others, the Islamic Republic has no alternative but intelligent
resistance while paying the least cost.'' Given such perceptions, the
Iranian right does not necessarily object to international isolation
and confrontation with the West. Indeed, for many within this camp,
such a conflict would be an effective means of rekindling popular
support for the revolution's fading elan.
Iran's nuclear calculations have been further hardened by the rise
of war veterans such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to positions of power.
Although the Iran-Iraq war ended nearly 20 years ago, for many within
the Islamic Republic it was a defining experience that altered their
strategic assumptions. Even a cursory examination of Ahmadinejad's
speeches reveals that for him the war is far from a faded memory. In
his defiant speech at the U.N. General Assembly in September 2005,
Iran's President pointedly admonished the assembled dignitaries for
their failings: ``For 8 years, Saddam's regime imposed a massive war of
aggression against my people. It employed the most heinous weapons of
mass destruction including chemical weapons against Iranians and
Iraqi's alike. Who, in fact, armed Saddam with those weapons? What was
the reaction of those who claim to fight against WMDs regarding the use
of chemical weapons then?
The international indifference to Saddam's war crimes and Tehran's
lack of an effective response, has led Iran's war veteran turned
President to perceive that the security of his country cannot be
predicated on global opinion and disarmament treaties.
Given their paranoia and suspicions, the hard-liners insist that
American objections to Iran's nuclear program do not stem from its
concerns about proliferation, but its opposition to the character of
their regime. They argue that should Iran acquiesce on the nuclear
portfolio, the perfidious Americans would only search for another issue
with which to coerce Iran. ``The West opposes the nature of the Islamic
rule. If this issue [the nuclear standoff] is resolved, then they will
bring up human rights. If we solve that, they will bring up animal
rights,'' emphasized Ahmadinejad. As such, there appears no sufficient
reason to compromise on a critical national program since such
concessions will not measurably relieve American pressure.
At the core, all disarmament agreements call upon a state to forgo
a certain degree of sovereignty for enhanced security. Once a state
renounces its weapons of mass destruction programs it can be assured of
support from the international community should it be threatened by
another state possessing such arms. This implied tradeoff has no value
for Iran's hard-liners. Once more, the prolonged war with Iraq
conditions their worldview and behavior. Iraq's use of chemical weapons
against Iran with impunity, if not the tacit acceptance of Western
powers, has reinforced Iran's suspicions of the international order.
Jumhuri-ye Islami stipulated, ``As a rule, it is futile to enter any
deal with the West over issues related to the country's independence
and national security.'' For many of the Islamic Republic's reactionary
clerics, the only way to safeguard Iran's interests is to develop an
independent nuclear deterrent.
Beyond such perceptions, the American demands that Iran relinquish
its fuel cycle rights granted to it by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty has aroused the leadership's nationalistic impulses. As a
country that has historically been the subject of foreign intervention
and imposition of various capitulation treaties, Iran is inordinately
sensitive of its national prerogatives and sovereign rights. For the
new rulers of Iran, they are being challenged not because of their
provocations and previous treaty violations, but because of superpower
bullying. In a peculiar manner, the nuclear program and Iran's national
identity have become fused in the imagination of the hard-liners. To
stand against an impudent America is to validate one's revolutionary
ardor and sense of nationalism. Thus, the notion of compromise and
acquiescence has limited utility to Iran's aggrieved nationalists.
Despite their bitterness and cynicism, the theocratic hard-liners
are eternal optimists when it comes to the international community's
reception of Iran's nuclear breakout. Many influential conservative
voices insist that Iran would follow the model of India and Pakistan,
namely the initial international outcry would soon be followed by
acceptance of Iran's new status. Thus, Tehran would regain its
commercial contracts and keep its nuclear weapons. The former Iranian
Foreign Minister Akbar Velayati noted this theme when stressing,
``Whenever we stand firm and defend our righteous stands resolutely,
they are forced to retreat and have no alternatives.'' The notion of
Iran's mischievous past and its tense relations with the United States
militating against the acceptance of its nuclear status by the
international community is rejected by the right.
However, should their anticipations fail, and Iran become subject
of sanctions, it is a price that the hard-liners are willing to pay for
an important national prerogative. Ahmadinejad has pointedly noted that
even sanctions were to be imposed, ``The Iranian nation would still
have its rights.'' In a similar vein, Ayatollah Jannati, the head of
the Guardian Council, has noted, ``We do not welcome sanctions, but if
we are threatened by sanctions, we will not give in.'' The notion of
the need to sacrifice and struggle on behalf of the revolution and
resist imperious international demands is an essential tent of the
hard-liners' ideological perspective.
In the Islamic Republic's informal governing structure, the
national security decisions are subject to input by many figures, even
those not necessarily with a portfolio. The former Prime Minister, Mir
Hussein Mussavi, for instance, who has been out of power for nearly two
decades is, nevertheless consulted, intimately, about Iran's nuclear
course. It appears that despite Western perceptions that the nuclear
issue is decided by a narrow band of conservatives, Khamenei has
broaden the parameters of the debate and has included relevant elites
from across the political spectrum in the nuclear deliberations. Thus,
reformers out of power, moderate conservatives struggling against their
reactionary brethren as well as professionals from key bureaucracies
are allowed to stress their point of view. Given the provocative nature
of the nuclear program, Khamenei seems to be hoping that the burden of
any ensuing international confrontation would be assumed by all
political factions, as opposed to being the responsibility only of the
conservatives. Thus, the systematic consolidation of power by the
conservatives over the state does not necessarily mean that voices of
restraint are excised from the decisionmaking process.
In contrast to the hard-liners, the pragmatic elements within the
Islamic Republic's officialdom insist that Iran's on-going integration
into the international order and the global economy mandates accepting
certain restrictions on its nuclear program. Although it is tempting to
see this issue as divided between reactionaries and reformers, the
coalition pressing for reticence features both conservatives, such as
Rafsanjani, who is currently the head of the Expediency Council, and
the reformist politicians attached to the Islamic Participation Front.
The proponents of this strategy do not call for the dismantling of
Iran's nuclear edifice, but for the development of a breakout capacity
within the flexible guidelines of the NPT. Given Iran's long-term
commitment to the NPT and the prevailing international scrutiny, a
provocative policy could invite multilateral sanctions and lead Iran's
valuable commercial partners, such as the European Union, to embrace
the U.S. policy of isolating and pressuring Iran. Thus, for this
constituency, a hedging strategy can sustain Iran's nuclear program
while maintaining its international ties.
In the recent months, as Iran's reckless diplomacy has generated a
series of IAEA resolutions condemning its conduct and calling for its
referral to the U.N. Security Council, the members of this group have
called for restraint, even suspension of various nuclear activities.
Rafsanjani has taken the lead in admonishing Iran's new President by
stressing that ``we have reached a sensitive point. There is need for
prudence on both sides. The reformers have gone further, as Mohsen
Armin, a leading figure of the Organization of the Mujahedin of the
Islamic Revolution, called on the government to ``suspend nuclear
activities voluntarily and resume talks in order to build confidence
and protect Iran's right to conduct peaceful nuclear activities in the
future.'' For the more moderate elements of the nuclear program has to
be seen in a wider context of Iran's international relations.
Unlike their reactionary brethren, the more pragmatic elements
appreciate that given Iran's ``exceptional'' nature and the eagerness
of the United States to publicize all of its infractions as a means of
multilateralizing its coercive policy, a defiant posture may not serve
it well. The influential moderate politician Mohsen Mirdamadi
stipulated, ``The reality is that our recent achievement in the area of
nuclear technology has been part of our strength and created new
opportunities for us in the international arena, but we should not turn
this into a new threat. We should be careful not to bring the United
States and Europe together.'' To be sure, other states have
surreptitiously developed nuclear weapons, however, they did so with
superpower acceptance--even complicity--and an international
environment that was not suspicious of their intent. Iran does not
enjoy such advantages, as its revolutionary past and its continued
engagement with terrorist organizations makes many states wary of its
motives. Tehran simply does not have the luxury allotted to Pakistan or
India. All this does not imply a propensity to renounce a weapons
capability but recognition of the need for restraint and the importance
of the international community and its opinion.
Iran's pragmatists are increasingly being drawn to the North Korean
model, as Pyongyang has adroitly managed to employ its nuclear defiance
to extract concessions from the international community. Through a
similar posture of restraint and defiance, threats and blandishments,
perhaps Tehran can also utilize its nuclear card to renegotiate a more
rational relationship with its leading nemesis, the United States. The
conservative publication Farda postulated such a move, stressing that
``the credibility that these weapons have had and continue to have at
the global level, their importance is in the support they give to
bargaining in international negotiations and advancement of the
country's national interests.'' The influential conservative politician
Muhammad Javad Larijani, echoed this theme by stressing, ``If out
national interests dictate, we can go to the bowels of hell to
negotiate with the devil.''
Hovering over this debate, once more, stands the Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei. As mentioned, Khamenei's instincts would be to support the
reactionary elements in their call for defiance and pursuit of the
nuclear option. However, in his role as the guardian of the state, he
must consider the nuclear program in the context of Iran's larger
international relations. Thus far, despite his ideological
compunctions, Khamenei has pressed the state toward restraint. The fact
that Iran continues to negotiate with the Russians and did suspend
critical components of its program for over 2 years, reflects his
willingness to subordinate ideology to pragmatism. Indeed, President
Ahmadinejad's acceptance of the negotiations, despite his campaign
rhetoric, denotes his willingness to accede to the direction set out by
Khamenei.
All this may change, as Iran does need to make critical decisions
regarding its nuclear program. In assessing a state's nuclear path, it
is important to note that its motivations cannot be exclusively
examined within the context of its national interests and security
considerations. Whatever strategic benefits such weapons offer a state,
they are certainly a source of national prestige and parochial benefits
to various bureaucracies and politicians. As such constituencies
emerge, a state can potentially cross the nuclear threshold even if the
initial strategic factors that provoked the program are no longer
salient. The emergence of bureaucracies and nationalistic pressures in
Iran is generating its own proliferation momentum, empowering those
seeking a nuclear breakout. Time may not be on the side of the
international community, as inevitably the pragmatic voices calling for
hedging are likely to be marginalized and lose their influence within
the regime.
The question then becomes, What is to be done? The focus of U.S.
diplomacy should not be on Ahmadinejad, as his pathologies are
immutable. However, should Washington and its European allies craft a
generous package of security assurances and measurable sanctions relief
in exchange for Tehran's suspension of the critical components of its
nuclear infrastructure, it may succeed in peeling away important
clerical powerbrokers from the cause of nuclear arms.
In the end, there is neither a Russian nor a purely European
solution to Iran's nuclear conundrum. Despite its aversions and
prohibitions, the United States has to be involved in negotiations with
Iran for this issue to be conclusively resolved. At this point,
Washington should contemplate establishing a contact group that would
involve seven parties: United States, Russia, China, Britain, France,
Germany, and Iran. The seven-party format would provide the Bush
administration with enough political cover that it could state publicly
that it has not bestowed legitimacy or recognition on the Islamic
Republic. This would be similar to the stance Washington has taken vis-
a-vis Pyongyang in the six-party talks.
These talks would offer Iran nuclear fuel guarantees that could
place the fuel with a trusted third party. But fuel assurances alone
would not be enough incentive to convince Tehran to suspend its
uranium-enrichment program. In addition, the security dialog approach
should provide Iran with tangible economic incentives designed to help
its ailing economy. Furthermore, Iran's right to peaceful nuclear
technologies would be recognized. However, in return, Tehran would
agree to cease its enrichment activities as well as other work that
could lead to production of weapons-usable fissile material. In
addition, Iran would ratify and implement the additional protocol to
help provide verifiable evidence that these activities have been
suspended.
If Iran rejects this concerted diplomatic effort, then the United
States will have an easier time reaching a consensus through the United
Nations to enact tough multilateral sanctions. Examining the past
history of countries that have renounced nuclear weapons or potential
weapons programs, the predominant theme is that these renunciations
took place only after those countries experienced a substantial
lessening of external threats.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Takeyh.
We will have a round of questioning now by members of the
committee with a 10-minute limit and then we will have a second
round if that is required. I will commence the questions.
Following through on your proposal, Dr. Takeyh, that we
have a 6-month hiatus and talks which now incorporate in your
formula Iran and China and Russia--and perhaps that is the
right size group--I suppose you could explore whether there are
other parties. But the Europeans certainly represent maybe not
only themselves but also others who might be affected by
economic relations with Iran. Certainly China and Russia are
involved. Conceivably India might be a party if one were
brainstorming, largely because of the potential for a
multibillion dollar, multiyear deal that they have been
fashioning with Iran.
But the purpose of my exploring this with you is to say
that I am wondering whether your group or anyone represented at
the table or elsewhere has done any systematic research on the
economic effects of an attempt to have a total embargo on Iran
of its exports. Now, granted there might be questions about the
enforceability of that, who really stops all the flow here,
there, and yon, and I grant that. But, nevertheless, let us
say, hypothetically, that the nuclear situation was serious
enough that the world said after whatever stage, 3 months, 6
months, a year, a year and a half, that we have to do something
that is meaningful. But at the same time each of the countries,
each of the parties involved that you have discussed around the
table, will be making a calculation of what the effect might be
upon their economies as well as on the economies of others who
are customers or partners of their situations in trade.
We would certainly be making such calculations, or at least
the futures markets on oil and natural gas would be making
calculations, as they do whenever rumors begin to float. I make
this point because it appears to me that each of the countries
involved and their publics need to have a certain amount of
discussion during this period of time, as to the consequences
of their economies and everybody else in the world.
In addition, we need to have a more careful analysis of the
economy of Iran. That may be harder to come by, but at the same
time there are surely people who have thought about those
issues and have, at least, plus or minus assumptions.
I mention all of this because my fear is not that people
are being glib about sanctions, but at the same time people
also may be glib about the fact that this is just not going to
happen, that as a matter of fact you go to the Security Council
and nations begin to take a look at the deals they have already
made or the potential for energy security or lack of it. So it
becomes convenient, ultimately, to say this is a bridge too
far.
So, if we are going to have the 6-month pause that you
suggest, and that may be a good idea, I would like for this not
only to be maybe a parallel to the six-party talks with North
Korea, which go on and off; at the moment off. We do not know
when they will come on again. I would like some concerted study
and debate in this country, as the report clearly would be.
Let us say one estimate would be that the price of oil
would go to $150 a barrel, at least temporarily, given
disruptions and the close call now of how much reserve there is
in the world, and we begin to calculate that as itinerant
politicians are going back and forth to our States and visiting
with people. They see gasoline at the tank at $5 a gallon or
whatever it might be at that point and they say: Why do you not
do something about this? Why are you sitting there debating?
Well, we are doing; we are discussing, and, as a matter of
fact, maybe we have already enacted sanctions against Iran. The
oil is not there any more, and as a result these are the
consequences.
It may be that as the American people understand the
dilemma that nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran means to us,
whether it be our troops in Iraq, any prospects we ever have in
the Middle East, helping anybody for that matter, whether we
even have a presence in the Middle East after all of that--
these are issues that surround this that I do not think are
getting much of an airing. That is one reason for having this
hearing. We will have some more to begin to discuss what we are
really talking about, what the consequences to us and others
are, quite apart from the Iranians.
My question to you, first of all, is where, if this
committee were interested in having this kind of discussion,
just among those of us around this table, would we find data,
information, estimates that could lead to an informed debate,
as opposed to exaggerations, fear-mongering, all the rest of
it? Do you have any suggestions where we might look?
Dr. Takeyh. Yes. A lot of this stuff is actually--Iran's
budget and so on--is actually printed and on various Web sites.
It is an opaque society, but there is some degree of
transparency.
Iran's economy is vulnerable to rigorous multilateral
sanctions, particularly involving its petroleum-gas sector, not
just in terms of other countries not purchasing Iranian oil,
but also in terms of investments in Iran's dilapidated oil
industry. I think Iranians estimate they require about $70
billion investment in their oil and gas industry over the next
10 years in order for them to continue their current level.
The Chairman. So, the withholding of that is significant
all by itself.
Dr. Takeyh. Yes, in order to continue their level of
production and perhaps even increase it.
In terms of actually sanctions working on issues other than
oil and gas, which I think would be very difficult sanctions
for the international community to accept because of the
dramatic impact on the global economy, it is important to
recognize that a lot of foreign investors stopped actually
going into Iran in June 2005 when President Ahmadinejad was
elected. Once he was elected, if you are a German
pharmaceutical company or a Chinese company you are not looking
at a President, who is disdainful and suspicious of foreign
investment and says he does not want it, as necessarily a
hospitable place to do business.
If you are an oil company, you have to deal with the
situation because Iran is an important producer and has a very
rich repository. But much of the foreign investment has already
shrank, and a lot of the internal investment is already leaving
the country.
Now, Iran is actually, I would say, in the long term, is in
economically bad shape, in the short term is in economically
good shape. That is the paradox of it. It has a substantial oil
stabilization fund, which the President of the country is
trying to raid and it is being resisted by the Parliament. It
has actually--its projected economic growth for next year I
think they figure will be 7 percent. But long term, of course,
Iran has demographic problems. It has problems with its oil
industry. It has problems managing its situation. So in the
immediate level I do not think Iran is increasingly vulnerable.
Second of all, the last thing I would say is, I do not
actually believe that the international community would accept
an oil embargo on Iran, and when administration officials sit
in places like this and you ask them, what sort of sanctions
are you contemplating, they say: Oh, we have a menu of options.
So far the United States has been able to get Iran's portfolio
transferred from one international organization to another. It
is because we have not asked the international community--the
Japanese, the French, the Germans, and the Indians--to actually
put their economic, commercial interests at stake. We have
asked them for procedural acquiescence: Could you vote for us
on this issue with the assurance that we are not going to ask
for a whole lot?
Now we are getting into a crossroads. Now we are going to
the Security Council and we eventually are going to ask our
partners, the coalition, that they will have to accept our
sanction policy and put their commercial contracts and treaties
at stake. It is entirely possible that international unity may
evaporate at that stage. I am not certain, but I would not bet
on it.
Now, Patrick is an economist and he is dying to answer this
question, with years of training as an economist----
The Chairman. Well, let me just, before he does, say that I
think that you are on track. We are now, we are at a point in
which we are going to the Security Council March 6. You are
suggesting a little bit of a time-out period for a larger
negotiation, because when we press the Chinese or the Russians
or anybody else they might say with regard to their economic
situation: No, this is a bridge too far; procedure is one
thing, actual economic pain is another.
This is why I want to try to quantify, what are the
actualities of this kind of thing? What kind of situation would
we have in the world if we were to do this? Because you are
quite correct, our administration and everybody else, the
administration I suppose of Germany or Britain, would say that
all options are on the table and that includes all kinds of
sanctions, military activity and what have you. But as a matter
of fact, what are the consequences of any of these things,
short of military activity, just the often mentioned embargoes
and sanctions?
I think we want to get some facts out here so that we are
not glib in talking about options on the table, off the table.
Your point is that thus far we have got some procedural
acquiescence.
Dr. Takeyh. Which is not inconsiderable.
The Chairman. Yes, and maybe that is helpful.
Patrick, would you come in at this point.
Dr. Clawson. Mr. Chairman, the last time that the Iranians
thought that the world was acting to stop their flow of oil was
back during the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, and the Iranian response
was to sprinkle mines throughout the Strait of Hormuz and to
threaten shipping. They have regularly practiced the capability
to do that again and their hotheads regularly announce that if
we were to impose an embargo that that is what we should
anticipate happening.
If Iran were, in fact, to try to impede shipping through
the Strait of Hormuz, as I mentioned, the DIA Director says
that they could do it for a period of time. That would have a
very considerable impact on world oil markets. Even though the
Director of the International Energy Agency, Claude Mandel,
says that our world strategic stockpiles are good enough that
we could go through a period like that and be able to stabilize
markets, I think he is being very optimistic.
So the key question is whether or not Iran would take
aggressive actions against the shipping of other countries in
the event of such an embargo.
The Chairman. Well beyond its own predicament.
Dr. Clawson. Exactly. And that is where the question of
whether or not we have in place assets that can protect the
strait, not just whether we can move them there in the next
couple months, but are they there already, will become a
crucial question. The answer, frankly, is that there are not
the assets in place to get the Strait of Hormuz open and
protect shipping. Yes, we could move those assets there. But
boy, during the couple of months that that would take it would
be a very interesting time to be in the oil business.
The Chairman. Well, it would. The reason I ask these
questions is not to be provocative. We are coming up to some
difficult decisions. The American public needs to understand
the consequences of all of this. We need to understand them. We
have to make choices and votes. The information you have given
is very important about the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has
possibilities to disrupt other trade.
We will leave to everybody's judgment as to what kind of
surplus oil there is in the world, but every briefing we have
had has suggested that is zero. You are right up against it.
This is the reason that even an attack on the Saudis last week
sent a spike for a day or 2 with regard to oil futures markets,
with just the supposition that such a thing could happen at one
very, very large refinery in Saudi Arabia.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I wish you would keep going, Mr. Chairman,
because, look, this is--one of the frustrating things about
this discussion is that we have an awful lot of very bright
people with very few answers to anything. Not just you at the
table, but across the board.
Everybody starts off with the proposition that we cannot
tolerate a nuclear Iran. Wonderful. That is a great
proposition. I agree with that. We cannot tolerate it. Then
everybody says: OK, well, what are we going to do about it? And
it ranges from, well, we are going to do what I think the
administration is correctly doing; we are going to make sure,
at a minimum, we are not the bad guy if anything has to happen
because we have cooperated fully with the Europeans, with the
Russians, with the Chinese, with the United Nations, with every
agency available, to demonstrate that we are not a bunch of
cowboys out there just as gunslingers. I think that is
important. It is not an unimportant thing.
Then you say, OK, but you know this administration that
exists in Iran today, I do not think a single one of you
believe there is any possibility it is going to cease and
desist from seeking a nuclear capability in the near term
absent some significant hurdle that it faces, and being
sanctioned by telling them they are going to have their assets
seized, which they have already moved, we are not going to let
them travel, does anybody think that is going to alter their
behavior in terms of this march forward that we are talking
about?
So, then we get down to, OK, there are two options that may
affect behavior. One is a sanction regime, the other is a
military option. Then we pursue the military option and we find
out that the military option would require a significant--I
understand General Clark is making a speech today and is
putting on, which he has every right to do, his former hat as
the Supreme Allied Commander and giving his assessment of what
would be required--
x number of sorties, x number of divisions, blocking the
strait, et cetera.
Then we talk about sanctions. The only ones that would
reasonably have any impact, most people think, are if you dealt
with oil and gas, because the analysis that many people have
done, I suspect you have done as well, is that if we could
unite the world in doing that and we could take the hit, the
hit on Iran would be consequential, maybe more significant on
the world but very significant on them. But there has never
been any measure of that.
But everybody says, well, we are not going to be able to
get the world to do that, but we are going to stand by the
policy we will not tolerate a nuclear Iran.
So let me say that one of the things we said all prior to--
and I remember, Ron, we talked about this, and your great help
with the committee in trying to set up post-reconstruction
capabilities within countries, et cetera. We talked at length
about--you have all been in many discussions about what we
talked about before we moved on Iraq. This is just pure Biden.
No foreign policy can be sustained in this country without the
informed consent of the American public. Flat-out, cannot be
sustained.
There is no information available to the American public on
what the heck we mean by we cannot tolerate and what the
consequences of either a military option would be for Americans
or the consequences of what an embargo of consequence would
mean for the Americans.
So, I hope if we do nothing more in this committee, rather
than judging whether or not the world community would go along
with an embargo, or judging whether or not the world community
would accept military action on the part of the United States,
what would it entail for the United States of America? It may
very well be if we really mean what we say, that we will not
tolerate a nuclear Iran, that the American public might very
well choose the economic hardship over the military
confrontation. They should get a choice in this. They should
get a say in this. They should have some input in this through
their elected representatives.
Obviously, I never speak for the chairman, but I suspect
that is one of the reasons why he keeps pursuing this, if the
options were employed, notwithstanding no one thinks the
options can be employed. And the irony is, you may find we have
more hydrogen-run automobiles in a heartbeat than in Tom
Friedman's gas tax. I am not being facetious.
My mother, God love her, she is 89 years old--88 years old,
almost 89--lives with me, and she has said from the time I was
a kid: Joey, out of everything bad something good will come if
you look hard enough. All kidding aside, gas goes to $5 a
gallon, awful, awful, incredible dislocation. In relative
terms, relative to the rest of the world we are relatively no
worse off than anybody else in the world. And guess what, we
might have a real energy policy, not a joke, not a joke.
Now, I am not proposing that. So what I would like you to
do--and I am not going to say any more. I would like each of
you to speak to--get real with us, will you? Do not be
academics with us. Tell us what would the consequence be? Dr.
Clawson, you are an economist. What are the consequences? What
do you think would happen if we could convince the world to
have an oil and gas embargo?
Granted, I would not bet my daughter's graduate school
tuition on it, but what would happen? What does it mean? And if
any of you would also respond to the military option. We are
told in various fora--and I am not revealing anything from any
classified briefing we have had--this is not taking out Iraq's
nuclear effort like the Israelis did. But you know, I could
picture if this were, quote, an ``all-out war'' where we could
bring Iran to its knees militarily at least. We could, in fact,
have an embargo so no ship ever breached their ports. We could
do a lot of damage to their various nuclear facilities without
taking them all out. We could make it very difficult over the
next 3, 4, 5 years for them to get to that point.
So I guess what I am saying is, I worry about the rhetoric
that ``we cannot, under any circumstance, tolerate a nuclear
Iran,'' without knowing what the price we may have to pay if
that is, in fact, the goal to accomplish that end.
So can you, doctor, speak with me a little bit about the
economic consequences to Iran as well as us, and can the rest
of you talk in the few minutes that I have left about the
prospects and the consequences of the use of military power to
deal with this?
Thank you.
Dr. Clawson. I have done a fair amount of work for DOE on
supply disruptions and if we are able to protect the Strait of
Hormuz, if we judiciously use our strategic petroleum reserve,
if we do not encounter problems from Venezuela, Nigeria, or
Russia, then we would be able to keep the price $80 a barrel,
something like that, and it would be touch and go for a few
years, but we could--if all of those conditions are met, we
could be staying at $80 a barrel.
But we would be extraordinarily vulnerable to additional
oil supply shocks under those circumstances, be it al-Qaeda
attacks, things in Saudi Arabia, the like. And it would take
several years before Iran would really feel the pinch because,
as Ray mentioned, they have got this very large reserve fund at
the moment, over $30 billion in foreign exchange reserves. So
it would take several years before Iran would feel the pinch,
but they would then indeed feel a very profound shock and that
would be a big problem for them.
On the military side, not my specialty, but let me just
suggest that the potential for covert action, and that if we
look around the Middle East, the way in which the Israelis
stopped the Egyptian missile program in the early 1960s and the
initial Israeli efforts against the Iraqi programs were to
arrange premature deaths of scientists involved and to take
other covert actions.
The Iranian industrial facilities are highly complex
industrial facilities that have been subject already to lots of
industrial accidents. If the rate of accidents rose
dramatically and that slowed down the Iranian program, that
could have quite an impact.
So, I would hope that if we ever got to that point of
military action the first thing we would try would be things
less confrontational like covert actions, because I worry that
if we start attacking them they are going to attack us back.
When the United States Navy thought that it caught the Iranians
red-handed sprinkling mines in the Persian Gulf in 1988 and so
we decided to take action against them, we forgot that they
could take action against us and suddenly we were in the
largest surface naval confrontation since the Korean war. The
Navy had not even calculated that the Iranians might react. So
the big risk that I would say about any air raids against Iran
is the Iranians are going to fight back.
Dr. Takeyh. I will just deal with the military option as
such. I would actually suggest again that we do not have a
military option in terms of disabling or I would even say
slowing down the program. You always hear defenders of the
military option or those who articulate it say, well, it will
not destroy the program, but it will slow it down. I am
actually prepared to contest that.
If Iranians are engaged in redundancy, which every
determined proliferator does, what does that mean? That means
10 plants doing the same thing. You destroy nine of them, you
do not necessarily shorten the nuclear timeline. In order for a
military strike to work, the United States would require not
good intelligence, but perfect intelligence. Now, I was not at
Mr. Negroponte's briefing, but I do not think I have to be to
know we do not have that sort of intelligence.
Second of all, Iranian nuclear facilities are dispersed,
they are hardened, they are urbanized. We have to prepare to
take civilian casualties.
Third of all, some people suggest, well, maybe redundancy
is very cost wasteful; maybe the Iranians have not done it. If
you are sitting in Teheran and every day the President of the
United States says the military option is not off the table, I
think you are engaging in redundancy.
So we do not really have a military option. Now, whacking
the scientists, Patrick can speak about that. I think the
Iranians have enough scientific knowledge and scientific
software to be able to continue the program.
In terms of Iran's nuclear calculations, I do not believe
they are immutable. I am unprepared to suggest that it is
inevitable that Iran will become the next member of the nuclear
club. I think we are in a very difficult situation and
whichever path you go down to you have to go big. If you are
going to go down the path of coercion you have to be prepared
to have multilateral sanctions enacted by the United Nations,
adhered to by the international community over a prolonged of
time. If you are going to go down the road of concessions, you
have to be prepared to offer American economic, political,
security concessions to an unsavory regime.
The hour is too late for IAEA resolutions and the hour is
too late for pistachios and carpets. It has to be big,
whichever direction you go to. But I think both those
directions can have an impact on Iran's nuclear determinations.
Senator Biden [presiding]: Thank you very much.
Mr. Lehman. I agree that it is not too late, but it is
going to be quite a challenge. You focused on the question of
the price and I think the price will be determined by how we
play the game. I agree it is going to take a substantial price
even up front.
There are sort of two ways to think about this. One is that
it is a sort of pay me now or pay me later. I do think we need
to understand the consequences of postponing action. The price
later may be very, very high and we will wonder why we did not
do something earlier.
But there is another key factor the other witnesses Ray and
Pat have mentioned. That is to a large degree the price is
going to be determined by how much others are with us. Now, the
good news right now is that much of the international community
is with us, and, in fact, even on these somewhat arcane issues
such as the R and D on enrichment they get it. They understand
now that there is a real issue here.
So you have asked about, the chairman asked about, the
economic calculations. I have seen a lot of data. I have not
seen a good comprehensive study. I would caution that, of
course, it is going to be scenario-based because the various
options play in a dynamic political world. So who is with us,
how firm are they, how serious are they, will determine what
kind of sanctions you can get, what impact it will have.
Now, all the sanctions history is sort of a subset of the
old question of who has got more leverage, the debtor or the
creditor. I would translate that into the carrot and stick
issue. So, for example, with Russia and its nuclear activities
or China and its oil, on the one hand that puts them somewhat
beholden to Iran. On the other hand, it gives them leverage on
Iran, and if they are really sincerely going to be with us--and
I have to note that, despite all of the efforts to work with
the Iranians this week, the Russians have still, at least
judging from the press reports, have hung firm on the matter of
principle.
So, I think that I would not--I think you are absolutely
right, Senator Biden. If we walk in to the world and say, here
is what we have decided, we have decided cut off all the oil
now, there is going to be sticker shock up front. On the other
hand, if you build the case and try the options and play the
game well, I do not rule out that people will do the
calculation and if that becomes necessary people may well step
up to it.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Clawson, not now, but for the record, is it possible to
get a copy of the analysis you made about oil? Or is that
classified?
Dr. Clawson. Let me find out, sir.
Senator Biden. Or maybe you can just come and talk to me.
Dr. Clawson. I would be happy to come and talk to you.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]: Thank you very much, Senator
Biden.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let Senator Obama go ahead.
The Chairman. All right, you yield to Senator Obama.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. That is very kind of you, Senator Nelson.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, members of the panel.
It is obviously a very important issue.
Let me return, let me take the other side of what I thought
was a terrific point made by Senator Biden. We have generally,
across the board, said that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable. I
happen to share that view. But let me play devil's advocate
here, as I think it is worth at least exploring the other side
or examining why it is not acceptable.
There was an article by Barry Posen, last week, arguing
that you essentially can maintain a containment posture to a
nuclear Iran that might not be optimal, but might be preferable
to the scenarios in which we have a significant oil embargo or
we are engaging in military action. What is clear in this
situation is there are no good choices. There are just better
or worse choices.
I was wondering if you could specifically, any of you, all
of you, one of you, specifically address that argument that, in
fact, when you weigh the costs and benefits, discouraging Iran,
that that is a manageable process?
Dr. Takeyh. I actually think a nuclear Iran is really an
international calamity. Barry Posen actually calls himself a
realist and makes that argument. That would contest the realist
credentials.
Should Iran become the second state that developed a
nuclear weapons capability while being a member nation of the
NPT, that would effectively eliminate the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty as a means of regulating global
proliferation norms. The NPT is a problem in the sense that it
is a treaty that requires modernization, it is a treaty that
requires to be brought up to date. But it has served a very
valuable purpose in maintaining some sort of a nuclear
nonproliferation regime and it has limited the number of states
that have actually crossed the threshold. That would end the
NPT. It would no longer be a treaty of any degree of
credibility and that will have a dramatic impact, I suspect,
for international security.
Second of all, an Iran with a nuclear weapons capability or
even nuclear weapons, it is not unreasonable to believe that it
will be a more aggressive state regionally because it will
perceive certain immunities from having such a deterrence, and,
therefore, it might be more of a revisionist state, it might be
more of an aggressive state, within a volatile region, within a
volatile subaspect of the region, the Persian Gulf, which I
think is also disastrous.
There are so many unpredictable consequences about the
potential regional arms race. A region that should dedicate its
resources to its economic betterment, given its demographic
problems, will divert further resources to military hardware
and that does not do the region as a whole any degree of
benefit.
So, I think this is an eventuality, this is a proposition
that we should try to avoid at all costs.
Dr. Clawson. I would just suggest, sir, that in my short
lifetime the Middle East has been racked by so many horrific
wars, and it would be such an act of optimism to think that if,
in fact, the Middle East had a number of nuclear-armed states
that nuclear arms would not be used. And the cost of that would
be extraordinary for the world and extraordinary for the United
States.
I would just get very, very nervous about a Middle East in
which there were a fair number of countries that were nuclear
ready. Unpredictable changes in government, dictators doing
bizarre things; this region excels in fanatics of all sorts.
Mr. Posen's proposal is to gamble where the losses would be
counted in the hundreds of thousands or millions of lives.
Mr. Lehman. To say that it is unacceptable for Iran to have
nuclear weapons correctly invites the question: So what do you
do about it? I think we just need to recognize, as Pat and Ray
have said very eloquently, this will be very, very bad. So the
result for us is not to go slice our wrists. The result is we
are going to have to do something about it.
I just came back from the gulf and I just want to echo what
Ray and Pat have said. The dynamics are so complex there. You
are going to have some of the states in those regions that are
coming to us and basically asking us to make commitments that
this body may not wish to make. At the same time, if you are
not prepared to make those commitments they are going to go in
a different direction, in some cases acquiring their own daddy
rabbits, their own protectors, or their own weapons, or make
their own accommodations.
This is an incredibly volatile region. So yes, we should
not just make declarations of moral outrage. We have got to
recognize we have got to roll up our sleeves.
Senator Obama. I think the point you made, the last point,
was borne out when I was visiting the region as well. The
situation in Iraq obviously heightens the concerns of some of
the other states about Iran's growing influence. It is hard for
me to imagine that they would not respond in ways that would be
very destabilizing for the region over the long term. I just
wanted to get that on the record. It is part of what I think
Senator Biden indicated. It is necessary for us, I think, not
to just state these things, but to lay out precisely what the
concerns are here.
Dr. Takeyh--did I pronounce that properly? Given your
comments about the NPT, I am just curious. The President is
visiting India. What signal do you think we are sending to the
Iranians about whether or not they can get away with something?
I think that there is a general perception, you know, North
Korea played this game, have not been--have not suffered dire
consequences. Now we are looking at a potential deal with
India, and which they developed nuclear weapons. Pakistan
developed nuclear weapons and now the Bush administration
considers them the strongest of allies.
There is this sense that there is a short-term memory here
and I am just wondering whether, specifically, since there is
some indication that the administration may be trying to close
this deal so that when he appears with Prime Minister Singh
that there is some statement about it. Do you want to give me
some sort of----
Dr. Takeyh. Sure. It is a very bad signal. Patrick
mentioned in his testimony that we should pay attention to what
Iranian leaders are saying, and what they are saying is that
the India-Pakistan model can be applicable to them. Namely,
after initial international outcry, if we just stand firm we
can regain our commercial contracts, so in essence we can keep
our nuclear weapons as well as our commercial treaties.
In my written testimony I have submitted a number of
citations actually by Iranian officials who say this, that
steadfastness and strength will eventually lead to evaporation
of international unity and then normalization of our commercial
relationship.
I will say that absolving Pakistan of its nuclear sins
because it is, a ``valuable ally in the war against
terrorism''--I actually managed to say that without laughing,
which is a remarkable degree of self-discipline--and now most
recently the acceptance of India's nuclear program irrespective
of that country's snubbing of the NPT for a long time--it is
very difficult to make the case to the international community
and to Iranians themselves that we are serious about
proliferation.
That is why Iranians say: You people do not care about
proliferation; it is only about the character of the regime,
and, therefore, why should we make any concessions anyway, and
in due course we are going to regain our international
commercial relationships. So this is not a good day for the
proliferation cause as such.
Mr. Lehman. This is one where I have a disagreement, having
dealt with the Indians and the North Koreans and the Iranians
all these years. There is almost no relationship we have with
anybody in the world that does not result in a talking point
for them. I agree we have to listen to how they play the game,
how they speak to their domestic audiences; how they speak to
their international audiences. And, frankly, we are not very
good, often, at rebutting what are basically rhetorical devices
for covering up what they are doing.
All of these parties have done that. When we tried to
engage North Korea--when the Clinton administration tried to
engage North Korea under the Agreed Framework--the Iranians
used that as a major, major attack on why the United States was
still urging restraint in nuclear dealings with Iran while they
were engaging with North Korea, which was in violation of the
NPT. That is a far stronger argument, even though it still is a
subterfuge for the fact that Iran is violating the NPT, than
the argument that we are trying to engage the Indians, who are
not a party to the NPT, to try to get them to move in the right
direction in terms of supporting NPT, supporting restraint, or
at least ending their war on the NPT and supporting a broader
approach to nonproliferation.
Now, I am no apologist for the Indians. I am certainly no
apologist for the Pakistanis. But I am not about to give the
Iranians cheap arguments.
Senator Obama. I think the question is not so much cheap
arguments. Two points. One is, we are actually moving forward.
There is an administration decision that is being made right
now with respect to India, so this is not retrospective. The
question is, How does that fit in with our posture toward Iran?
The second point, I guess, and it is a broader point, and
then I will stop because I am out of time and I do not want to
abuse the graciousness of my colleague, Senator Nelson, is it
strikes me that we have some disarray in terms of how we think
about the NPT; its structure. There is not sufficient coherence
as far as I can tell in terms of how we are approaching a lot
of these problems. It needs to be updated. We missed that
opportunity just recently, and I think this underscores how
important it is for us to think about Iran specifically, but
also think more broadly about how do we make sure that the NPT
is meeting current challenges and closing loopholes, something
that we have been failing to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Clawson. Senator, if I may just make a quick comment on
that. It may be a problem for our nonproliferation policy, but
the Iranian leaders' view that friendly countries to the United
States can get away with lots of things, whereas hostile
countries get penalized, is, in fact, something which is
helping us with regard to the Iranians, in that they have
concluded that they are subject to particularly harsh penalties
because they are unfriendly to us.
So that may be a problem for our overall NPT policy, but
for solving this particular Iran policy the Iranian conclusion
that if you are friendly to the United States you can get away
with bloody blue murder, but if you are opposed to the United
States you cannot spit on the sidewalk, actually helps us in
the relations with Iran.
Senator Obama. Well, what it certainly does is it makes
Iran unable to anticipate or predict entirely what our
intentions are.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Of course, a big difference between
India and Iran is that Iran has a declared policy to want to
eliminate another country and with such a state policy, to give
them the means by which to achieve it is a big difference. Any
comment?
Dr. Takeyh. In terms of elimination of Israel? Well, if I
am Pakistani I am sort of concerned about India's nuclear
proliferation from an equally existential perspective.
I do not believe Iran should have nuclear weapons. I do not
believe it should have nuclear weapons capability. I do not
think it is inevitable for it to have either. I think there are
many things that the international community can do to prevent
that. I think that if Iran crosses the threshold it is a
failure of American imagination, it is a failure of
international resolution, it is a failure of international
diplomacy, and all those things are avoidable.
I never understood the argument that, well, Iran is going
to have these weapons, so let us just think about containment.
To me that is a profoundly un-American argument. This is the
country that built the Panama Canal and beat Hitler, and we are
just going to acquiesce to Iran having weapons capability? I
think there are diplomatic routes out of this still. The hour
is late, but it is not too late.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to ask you about that. And, Mr.
Lehman, if you would chime in, too. You see a diplomatic route
out of this and yet Iran has rebuffed the European proposal for
negotiations. It has now turned down, according to the morning
newspaper, the Russian proposal for a second time. So what is
the route using negotiations?
Dr. Takeyh. Well, I would have to offer my seven-party
talks again. In my written testimony I have a proposal. As I
said, it has poor reception everywhere. It is here today. It
draws on a very imperfect model, the six-party talks with North
Korea. That is almost always difficult to offer that, as
Patrick said, as a smashing success.
But I do think that for these negotiations to work, if they
are going to work--and they may not; I am prepared to accept
that they may not work; I offer no panaceas--the United States
would have to be involved in these negotiations. If you accept
my assumption--you may not--that Iran would like these weapons
not for global domination, but as a weapon of deterrence
against a range of external threats, most centrally the United
States, if you accept the argument that this is a weapon of
deterrence as opposed to power projection, then lessening of
the country's security concerns, security anxieties, could
diminish its nuclear appetite.
The only country that is capable of doing that at this
moment is the United States of America. The European
negotiations that you talked about, what security guarantees
can Germany make? The European negotiations took place on the
three baskets: The security discussions, economic discussions,
and technology transfer. The Europeans were incapable of
offering what Iran wanted on any of those three. Security
guarantees--Iran is not surrounded by German troops; they are
surrounded by American troops. Economic concessions--Iran's
inability to be integrated in the global economy stems from
American prohibitions and its own doing, as opposed to European
sanctions. Technology transfer--it is inconceivable for Iran to
have high-level technology without American approbation.
So the United States is central to this project, to this
process, and if it is uninvolved then these negotiations are
inevitably going to fail. They may produce interim suspensions,
but they will not resolve the issue in a conclusive manner.
Now, should the United States become involved in a seven-
party format, eight-party format, whatever contact groups you
want? Would they necessarily succeed? It may fail. That is why
I think any negotiations within Iran has to be a very limited
timeframe, 6 months, 4 months, and not beyond that. They should
not drag out, as the North Korean talks.
I am not saying it will work, but you will never know if
you do not try it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Lehman.
Mr. Lehman. Senator, you asked me to address this question
of the path and I will do my best. The biggest problem we have
in dealing with the nonproliferation regime and its core, the
Nonproliferation Treaty, is that you are trying to apply
universal rules and principles to what are different
circumstances. So I think Senator Obama is correct; there is a
lot of confusion about how you do that. But I would argue there
are coherent policies and paths and that we can understand what
those are.
I think that Iran is a good example of the need to shape
the process to deal with the culture, the security conditions,
the economic interactions, and we have got to do that.
Now let me say, I am somewhat lukewarm about the contact
group proposal myself, but let me explain my thinking and maybe
Ray and I will come to a common view. Let me use the example of
North Korea. It is a dangerous region. We had a package. It was
the NPT-plus with the North-South Denuclearization Agreement,
the IAEA safeguards, the South Koreans are going to have
inspections in the North and vice versa. It really looked like
it was going somewhere.
Then what happened? Well, we discovered that, despite all
of that, the North Koreans were still running the program and,
in fact, had developed a very large reprocessing facility which
they had just begun to use. Everybody seemed united. We just
had this great head-of-state summit, a Security Council
resolution that further proliferation was not unacceptable but
a threat to international peace, which is the code word for we
really mean it.
Now, a year later what happens? The Security Council will
not endorse Hans Blix's request to do a special inspection in
North Korea. What happens to all of this plea for
multilateralism? The answer was: Turn to the United States and
say: Uncle Sam, hey, why don't you guys go deal with this?
So we got off track because the international community
said basically, is this not something they have got to deal
with the United States? And we lost the support. We ended up--
we tried again and again by various means, some better, some
worse, but all well intended, to try to address, as I think Ray
correctly says we have to, the broader security and economic
issues in North Korea.
In the end, why did we end up in six-party talks? The
answer was that basically the United States, by itself, cannot
solve the problem. It requires the help of other people and we
have to be a part of that.
But what we have never done on North Korea is get the
international community to stand firm and say this is what it
is all about. So, before we go off and get Uncle Sugar to take
the heat, I think what we need to do is get the international
community to say: All right, are you here or not? And if this
is the end of the Nonproliferation Treaty, if it is over, we
know what to do about that. But let us find out now.
Senator Bill Nelson. But we have not been able to get the
international community to step up to the plate.
Dr. Clawson. I disagree with that, Senator. I actually
think that in the current negotiations the French position is
tougher than ours. Indeed, I would say that the position being
taken by the E3, the EU3 big countries--Britain, France, and
Germany--in these negotiations is pretty darn good, pretty darn
tough.
Senator Bill Nelson. But not Russia. Russia just gives Iran
an excuse to delay.
Dr. Clawson. I thought the Russians were just going to play
an obstructionist role and I was, frankly, quite shocked when
the Russians instead said: All right, we are going to make a
real effort.
Certainly, my discussions in Moscow, this fall, found there
is a broad understanding in the policy elites in Moscow that a
Russian nuclear program is a real problem for them and they are
making a real effort to try and solve it. That is kind of
surprising. The Russians are not being so helpful on lots of
things these days, but at least they are making a real effort
on this one.
So I think it is rather surprising the last few years how
much the E3 has stepped forward to try and solve this and taken
a tough stance and not given in. The E3 is refusing to
negotiate with the Iranians right now. That is an unnatural
stance for them, to refuse to negotiate. They say Iran has to
reinstate the freeze.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, Dr. Clawson, you would endorse Dr.
Takeyh's seven-nation----
Dr. Takeyh. I do not think he would.
Dr. Clawson. Well, actually it already--what I find amusing
about this is it already exists, and that Secretary Rice after
all attended that dinner with the Foreign Ministers of the six
countries that he is talking about that was arranged in London
by Jack Straw. It already exists. The Foreign Ministers of
those six countries are already conferring with each other
about what to do about Iran and reaching agreement. They are
conferring as a collective group. If the Iranians want to meet
with them, they can.
Senator Bill Nelson. I like your optimism. It is the only
positive thing that I have heard. You are talking about the
Russians and there is some degree of optimism there, but when
it comes to the Security Council, what are the Russians going
to do at the next Security Council meeting? So the picture gets
murkier and murkier.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Let me just add to my colleagues' questions. The Indian
agreement has come into the discussion a bit because this is a
current event which is very important. Each of you have sort of
a different slant on what ought to occur there. One argument
with regard to helping India with fissile material and nuclear
technology is that this may have a substitution effect with
regard to their need for Iranian hydrocarbons, in essence, and
that case could be made for a number of nations around the
world.
If you are serious about lessening the bargaining power of
Iran, why, we already talked without great specifics about our
own country, how rapidly we get into alternative fuels, hybrid
cars, clean coal technology, all the rest of it. Some of us
take that very seriously for the very reason that we are
talking about Iran today. Essentially, without there being that
degree of serious purpose on the part of the American public
and American politicians, the Iranians make some assumptions
from that.
So my reason for dwelling on facts for the American public
is that, ultimately, there must be a constituency for the
actions that our foreign policy has here. We are talking in
academic terms about possibilities, but the President, Members
of the Senate and House, and some of you will have to discuss
with actual constituents what are the consequences of Iran
having nuclear weapons.
Dr. Lehman has discussed these pretty graphically not only
after his recent trips, but in the past. The potential for a
number of nuclear states in a very small area, given the
instability of those regimes or the volatility of leadership
and so forth, is potentially catastrophic for them. But,
likewise, then we discuss, What are the consequences for us?
Are there some Americans who would say, well, if that is the
nature of those countries and they attack each other, that is
very sad in a humanitarian sense, but it is over there; it is
not here? That used to be a big tenet of our assumption. Maybe
that still is true.
We have had some colloquies with business leaders at a
roundtable once again about energy this week here in this body.
Many people still do not really assume that the price of
gasoline at the pump is not $2, but more like $20 after you
factor in the military we have in the area, and all the
commitment of our national defense budget to that. What if
Americans decided we really are tired of military involvement
in the area? The Iranians would have nothing to worry about. We
are pulling everybody out. So that that is a different set of
assumptions. For the moment they cannot assume that. We are
there and quite a presence, right next door as well as in other
situations.
But some in the American body politic would say that we
ought not to be there or that we ought to have a timetable of
weeks, months, and so forth to be out of there altogether.
So what I am trying to assess from each one of you is how
we get to the kinds of arguments that are going to have to be
made about potential action here that is credible to ourselves,
as well as to our allies, who see some constancy in this, and
finally to the Iranians or others who might have designs on
nuclear material and nuclear weapons over there.
You have been helpful in that respect, but I am still
trying to come to grips with the issue. I am raising the same
questions with members of our administration, as opposed to
generally discussing options that are on or off the table, to
get very specific about the potential costs. So that when I go
to my constituents in Indiana I may say, this is a very, very
serious problem. The consequences of our dealing with it in
this way or that way are likely to have these ramifications for
your lives, for your business, for whether we have growth in
Indiana or in the United States or not. On the other hand, our
failure to deal with them may lead to a seemingly interminable
set of destructive activities that will also have an effect
upon your business, your lives, whatever may be involved.
In other words, we have got to broaden the conversation in
this country because we are coming up to some very difficult
decisions and if they are made without constituent support and
without broad information the staying power or the credibility
of this is not going to be what it needs to be. Given the
stretching of our Armed Forces as we now have them, the fact
that we are running a $400 billion deficit, domestically, in
the country, $700 billion in terms of foreign trade, this is
sort of a backdrop of the world economy and of ours,
specifically, as we approach each of these particular steps.
So I do not want to dwell on this excessively, but we
appreciate your testimony, to try to initiate our own study for
the benefit of ourselves, but likewise for the public that may
be interested in the questions we are raising.
Now, I suppose I want to ask, specifically--we have talked
about the seven-power negotiations, the fact that at the
Foreign Ministry level some of this may be proceeding now, as
it is in North Korea. One of the things we have learned in our
committee hearings is that we may not have made great progress
with the North Koreans, but it is possible that American
diplomats have made a lot of progress with the Chinese
diplomats. Because we had some proximity to other negotiators
around the world, we were taking, seriously, problems together.
The assumption, that right away we would come to the same
national interest, was probably naive, but I note the fact that
we are beginning to identify more common national interests
with the Koreans, both North and South with the Chinese,
certainly with the Japanese, and even with the Russians on
occasion as they come into this thing. That might be the case
with Iran likewise. It may be that it has been healthy.
I saw a group of people, the comparable group from Great
Britain yesterday, their version of the Foreign Relations
Committee. We met over in S-116 for a while and we talked a lot
about Iran as well as other things. The fact is that we are
coming to a better idea of the parameters of this problem, of
the consequences for all of us, by having these contacts.
I applaud Secretary Rice for her push to get us involved
more with the European 3 and with all of the examination of
this in a way that, perhaps, we were not as much as we should
have been before.
So the negotiation route still, I think, has some promise,
but only if it is informed by the facts, the consequences that
are more broadly understood, by us as well as the Iranians and
by our friends who are involved, and maybe by other interests
that come in. There are ways that we can be helpful to the
Indians or the Chinese or the Japanese or anybody who also has
a stake here. It may be our negotiation on other issues in
which they have interests that may have to enter into this, as
opposed to the purity of just Iran and Iran, specifically. I
invite your thoughts on that final point. Are there other
interests in the world that are going on presently, that in
some way might affect our effectiveness in getting this
international coordination, in getting the votes at the United
Nations, as a matter of fact, in being effective
diplomatically, as opposed to finally saying at the end of the
day, we may fail, because I am not sure what that means, what
failure at this point means. Does it mean that we accept the
fact that Iran has a program and that they are going to
eventually proceed to do whatever they are going to do, and if
we say OK, we will define deterrence as our object and if you
do something very bad we will hit you? Is that really the end
of the day? And if so, give us at least some final thoughts, if
you can, each of you a summary, of how you see this hearing?
Dr. Clawson.
Dr. Clawson. Senator, if I may say so, my impression is
from conversations with leaders from most of the countries
involved in the negotiations, is that their concerns are, at
least, as much the Nonproliferation Treaty and the
nonproliferation system as they are the particular character of
the Iranian regime, and that one of the reasons that there has
been such an active role played by some countries that,
otherwise, you might expect to be much more in the back seat
about these matters is because of the depth of their commitment
to the global nonproliferation regime.
We, in fact, do not serve our own interests well when we
think that it is commercial concerns by countries like Russia
and China, much less France and Germany and Britain, that are
driving their position on this matter. Really it is a genuine
concern about solving this global proliferation problem which
is at the heart and core of the decisionmaking in all of the
countries involved.
The Chairman. You really believe the publics in those
countries, quite apart from their leadership, have the same
interest in the NPT?
Dr. Clawson. No, I do not think most of the public is
engaged and thinking about it. There has not been the kind of
process that you described in many of the countries. There has
in some. Intriguingly, in a country like Germany there is much
more public concern about the NPT than there are in some other
countries. So that is one of the reasons why there is
considerable German public support for taking a strong stance
on this matter.
The Chairman. Mr. Takeyh.
Dr. Takeyh. I think you are absolutely right in one sense,
Senator. We have to be honest with our allies and public about
the costs of confrontation and the sacrifices that that would
involve. In terms of our allies, we have to let them know that
they will have to put their commercial interests at stake and
that is the price to be paid if we are going to go down the
path of coercion, confrontation, and isolation of Iran.
We have to be honest with our public that perhaps that
confrontation will lead to economic consequences in terms of
oil shortages, that we will have an increased level of
expenditures for gas, and that has all kinds of industrial
implications in America, not just in terms of transport
services.
We have to also be honest that a confrontation with Iran
may play itself out in Iraq, where the Iranians have an
infrastructure that is capable of extending our casualty rates,
retarding the development and reconstruction and rehabilitation
of Iraq and, therefore, prolonging the American occupation of
that country.
So this is a very dangerous road we are going on and
everyone has to understand the stakes and everyone has to
understand the sacrifices that are involved. I do not believe a
confrontation is inevitable, but if you are going to go down
that route then you have to prepare your allies and the public
for its consequences and repercussions.
In terms of Iran, international community, and the United
States, I do not believe we should offer concessions to every
other country in order to gain compliance, their agreement with
us on Iran. I do not believe we should exonerate India of its
nuclear proliferation sins in order to gain a vote in the IAEA.
I do not believe we should stop criticizing the lack of
democracy in Russia and the retardation of any democratic
process in order to gain some sort of Russian leverage. I do
not believe we should subordinate all our security and
political concerns to Iran. But we should deal with Iran in a
more realistic way.
The Chairman. Just following up on that, though, What do
you finally mean? In other words, as each of these countries
becomes disenamored with us or whatever our policy is and
indicates that for various reasons, even procedurally, it is
not as convenient to vote right now or to move ahead, does this
not leave us more and more isolated in the process as we
continue?
Dr. Takeyh. I do not believe at the end of the day we are
going to get international compliance with measurable economic
sanctions against Iran, the type of intrusive economic
sanctions that will make an impression on that country's
nuclear deliberations. So these concessions we are making
ultimately are unlikely to be successful in terms of the
ultimate objective of disarmament of Iran anyway.
The Chairman. Mr. Lehman.
Mr. Lehman. All of the nations whose actions will be
essential to be successful with Iran have multiple interests.
They have economic risks, security risks. They are going to
balance all of these things.
Having said that, I am struck by not so much the difference
in the three witnesses, but the similarities of our views and
by the fact that that is what I find if I go to Europe, that is
what I find elsewhere, is that more and more at sort of the
policy wonk level there is more and more cohesion about what it
is that we need to think about. So I think if the West holds
firm we have got a real shot at this.
Now, I have said ``the West.'' What I mean is the
Europeans, Northeast Asia, us, North America. But I think that
we need to remember that still two key players are Russia and
China, and we cannot pander, but at the same time there are
several things that matter to Russia and China that play in the
Iranian case. Some of those are related actually to security,
but the most obvious and public have been the economic. But I
think we also ought to remember that there are political
factors. They already have nuclear weapons. Their status
problem is they want to be players, and they can decide, do
they want to be players who gain their status by being in
opposition or do they want to be players because they can make
meaningful contributions to something that everybody supports.
I think that is the theme and the approach that we ought to
take.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, we thank all three of you for your
papers as well as for your forthcoming responses. This is an
area that the committee will continue to explore, as you would
hope, I am sure, and we look forward to consulting with you.
Thank you for your appearance. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of Dr. Ray Takeyh to Questions Submitted by Senator Barbara
Boxer
Question. In December 2002, the world discovered that Iran had
secret, undeclared nuclear sites, including a uranium enrichment
facility and a heavy water production facility. Since that time,
inspections carried out by the International Atomic Energy Association
have confirmed Iranian efforts to enrich uranium, separate plutonium,
and import materials from the likes of the Pakistani nuclear smuggler,
A.Q. Khan.
Yet despite these developments, the Bush administration did not
develop a viable policy on Iran, but instead launched a war of choice
against Iraq. Tragically, 3 years later, it appears as though the big
winners of the Iraq war are the mullahs in Iran.
By launching a war against Iraq--a country with no nuclear weapons
program--we have strengthened Iran's position in the Middle East and
hurt our ability to respond.
Not only is the U.S. military bogged down in an increasingly
violent war in Iraq--which has severely weakened the U.S. ability to
exert pressure on Iran--but Iraq's Government is now headed by a pro-
Iranian slate of Shiite political parties.
Iran's Foreign Policy Chief proudly touted this fact in a recent
interview with Time Magazine, saying that ``when the Americans
supported Saddam, all the present leaders [of Iraq] were our guests,
including Talabani, Barzani, Jaafari, Hakim, and all those. The reason
for our friendship is that it goes back many years.'' And, the
friendship is getting stronger.
In a historic move, Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari paid a
visit to Iran last year, in which he laid a wreath on the tomb of the
Ayatollah Khomeini--the man behind the hostage crisis and several
terror attacks against Americans.
The Iranian Government also offered a $1 billion credit line to
Iraq and the two countries signed military agreements.
While the Iraqi Government asserts that these agreements are solely
for peaceful purposes, there is no doubt that Iran supports Shiite
militias, including the lethal ``Badr brigades'' which have been
implicated in horrific reprisal attacks against Sunnis.
It has also led to sophisticated weaponry--such as massive roadside
bombs--finding its way into Iraq at a horrible cost for U.S. troops.
The U.S. Director of National Intelligence recently said that
Iran's goal is to cause the United States to experience ``continued
setbacks'' in its drive to stabilize Iraq. And we know that last week's
violence in Iraq pushed the United States to the brink of all the
``setbacks'' it can handle.
Do you agree with experts such as University of Michigan Professor
Juan Cole who says that the biggest winner in the Iraq war is Iran?
Answer. I do agree with Professor Cole that the biggest winner in
Iraq today is Iran. However, there is not need for a zero-sum game,
namely everything that is in Iran's advantage is necessarily to the
disadvantage of the United States. The fact of the matter is that the
goals of the United States and Iran do somewhat coincide in Iraq. Iran
seeks to maintain Iraq's territorial cohesion, prevent the Sunni
domination of its politics and empower the Shiite community. The
Iranian theocracy does not seek to export its revolution next door, but
merely ensure better set of interlocutors next door. Given that much of
the turbulence in the Persian Gulf era for the past three decades has
been due to poor relations between Iran and Iraq, better relations
between those two countries is not necessarily bad for America.
Question. Two weeks ago, I suggested to Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice that the United States has a ``tin ear'' to the Middle
East.
Prior to the Iraq war, the Bush administration suggested that the
Iraqi people viewed the United States as their ``hoped-for liberator.''
But almost 3 years later, the violence in Iraq is continuing to
escalate: 2,298 U.S. troops have lost their lives, and 73 percent of
Iraqis believe that there will be greater cooperation among Iraq's
political factions when the United States leaves the country.
Meanwhile, U.S. policies have helped galvanize hard-liners and
nationalist sentiment in Iran, contributing to the election of Mahmoud
Amadinejad over former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. I'm afraid this
suggests that we may not be fully in touch with the sentiments of the
Iranian people.
My question to you is: Where are the Iranian people on the question
of nuclear weapons? Is there widespread support within Iran to strike a
deal with the international community and permanently forgo the
development of nuclear weapons?
Jim Muir--the BBC's Tehran correspondent has suggested that ``many
[Iranians] would be proud if they did join the nuclear club,'' and that
the issue of obtaining a nuclear bomb has ``become an issue of national
pride.''
How broad is popular support for a nuclear capability within Iran?
Is that support for a bomb, or solely for a peaceful nuclear capacity?
Answer. It is a popular refrain in Washington today that
Ahmadinejad has been the best thing that has happened to America. In
fact, the Bush administration's diplomacy of threats and coercion is
also the best thing that has happened to Ahmadinejad. He has cleverly
used the nuclear issue and America's belligerence to consolidate his
powerbase, deflect attention from the domestic deficiencies of the
regime and undermine his more moderate foes. The nuclear issue and its
nationalistic appeals can only help the hard-liners.
Question. While I enthusiastically support U.S. aid to prodemocracy
efforts within Iran, I think that it is terribly important that this
money be used wisely given our record on initiatives such as these, and
I am specifically referring to the debacle with Ahmad Chalabi and his
Iraqi National Congress.
As you will recall, the Bush administration paid Chalabi over $32
million over a 4-year period, and the information that he provided,
much of which was used to justify the invasion of Iraq, turned out to
be useless, misleading, and even fabricated. Furthermore, Mr. Chalabi,
the exile ``of choice'' to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
also may have provided sensitive information to Iran.
In light of President Bush's recent request for $15 million to
support, among other things, ``Iranian political organizations,'' how
can we ensure that we do not run into another Chalabi-type debacle?
How can we ensure that this money is spent wisely?
Answer. Below, please see a piece that a colleague and I did in the
Los Angeles Times on the faulty assumptions of Secretary Rice's
democracy promotion efforts in Iran.
[From the Los Angeles Times, Feb. 26, 2006]
The Wrong Way to Fix Iran
(By Charles A. Kupchan and Ray Takeyh)
The Bush administration quietly orchestrated a major shift in U.S.
policy toward Iran this month, requesting $85 million from Congress to
help bring about regime change in Tehran. Washington is now seeking not
just to contain Tehran's nuclear ambitions but also to topple the
Iranian government.
The war in Iraq has made all too clear the high cost of using
military force to attain regime change. Accordingly, the administration
is taking a page from Eastern Europe, where the United States used
radio broadcasts and direct assistance to opposition groups to help
undermine authoritarian governments and promote democracy.
Administration officials explicitly cited Poland's Solidarity movement
as a model.
Although democratizing Iran is a worthy objective, the
administration is making a mistake in embracing a strategy for regime
change based on the European experience. Conditions in Iran bear little
resemblance to those that accompanied the downfall of dictatorial
regimes in Europe, making it likely that the administration's new
strategy will backfire and only strengthen Tehran's hard-liners.
Instead of isolating Iran and seeking to undermine the regime from the
outside, Washington should engage Iran, bringing about a natural
process of political reform from within.
Across Eastern Europe, the opposition movements that toppled
communism--and have more recently brought democracy to places such as
Georgia and Ukraine--were avowedly pro-American. Dissidents were only
too happy to receive assistance from Washington and to identify
themselves with U.S. policy. Alignment with the U.S. remains a valuable
political asset for Europe's new democracies.
Not so in Iran. A pronounced suspicion of the U.S. spans the
political spectrum. The Bush administration's rhetorical--and now
financial--support for the Iranian people only makes life more
difficult for the democratic advocates it is intended to buttress.
Iranian conservatives continue to respond to U.S. ``interference'' by
cracking down on dissidents whom they portray as a ``fifth column.''
Even those reformers with pro-American inclinations have been forced to
cover their backs by denouncing American belligerence.
In Eastern Europe, the regimes felled by democratic revolt were
brittle and illegitimate; they had long been discredited in the eyes of
their citizens. In contrast, Iran's current regime enjoys considerable
popularity. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been quite adept at
wrapping himself in the mantle of nationalism. The Bush administration
fails to appreciate that its coercive diplomacy on the nuclear issue is
undercutting its effort to drain support from Iran's leaders.
The centralized regimes of Eastern Europe also maintained tight
control over the media, so U.S. broadcasts and the covert distribution
of information played a vital role in fostering democratic debate. Such
measures will prove far less effective in Iran, where access to
cellphones, the Internet and satellite TV is widespread. Although Iran
does not have a free press, domestic debate is reasonably pluralistic.
The U.S. has a stake in Iran's internal power struggles, and the
administration is right to want to undermine Iran's reactionary
clerics. However, the best way to do so is to offer the Iranian people
not radio broadcasts in Farsi but the realistic prospect of integration
into the international community. Doing this gradually, starting with
the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, the U.S. can encourage
Tehran to embrace decentralization, accountability and transparency--
political practices that ultimately will bring down Ahmadinejad and his
firebrand conservatives.
Moreover, Washington would be investing in a repository of goodwill
within Iran, essential to nurturing a new generation of reformers that
sees the U.S. as a prospective partner rather than the Great Satan.
Coercive threats are needed to persuade Tehran to abandon its efforts
to acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons. But those threats
must be accompanied by credible promises of political normalization
should Tehran veer from its belligerent policies. Otherwise, only the
hard-liners--who rely on external demons and isolation from the
international community to justify their monopoly on power--benefit.
Eastern Europe's would-be democrats knew that the West was waiting
for their countries with open arms, encouraging them to take the
earliest opportunity to discard their repressive regimes. In a region
still beset by deep distrust of American motives, Iran's progressives
now need the same assurance.
Question. During a ``World without Zionism'' conference in Tehran
last October, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for Israel
to be ``wiped off the map.''
The Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, testified
on February 2, 2006, that Iran ``already has the largest inventory of
ballistic missiles in the Middle East.'' We have known for some time
that Iran is capable of striking Israel with these missiles.
And, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a large number of
Iran's ballistic missiles currently possess the capability to deliver
chemical, biological, or radiological dispersion warheads.
I am not just concerned about Iran's advancing nuclear program and
the possibility that it may possess nuclear weapons 5-10 years from
now. I am concerned about the threat posed by Iran, today, to both
Israel and U.S. forces serving in the region.
How serious is this threat?
Answer. It has always been my perception that Iran seeks a nuclear
weapons capability as a means of ensuring a viable deterrent posture
against an evolving range of threats, particularly the United States. I
don't believe that Iran seeks a nuclear
weapon in order to destroy Israel. During the past three decades Iran
has been relentlessly hostile to Israel, but it is a hostility
expressed through sponsorship of militant Palestinian groups and
Hezbollah, as opposed to a more direct military confrontation.