[Senate Hearing 109-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LEBANON: SECURING A PERMANENT CEASE-FIRE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Norton, Augustus Richard, Professor of International Relations
and Anthropology, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts..... 59
Prepared statement........................................... 60
Pascual, Hon. Carlos, Vice President and Director of Foreign
Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.......... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Salem, Paul, Director-Designate, Carnegie Middle East Center,
Beirut, Lebanon................................................ 46
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Welch, Hon. C. David, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC........... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Appendixes
Appendix I: U.S. Government Assistance to Lebanon................ 65
Appendix II: Lebanon--Stockholm Donors Meeting, 31 August 2006
(New Pledges, Total Pledges, Flash Appeal Pledges, Recovery
Appeal Pledges)................................................ 66
Appendix III: Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Feingold to Assistant Secretary Welch.................. 71
(iii)
LEBANON: SECURING A PERMANENT
CEASE-FIRE
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in Room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Sununu, Biden,
Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Today, the committee meets to examine the Israeli/Hezbollah
conflict that erupted in July. Fighting came to an end in
August after extensive U.N. and U.S. diplomatic engagement, but
tensions remain high. We will consider what the United States
and others can do to secure lasting calm on Israel's northern
border, strengthen the Lebanese Government so that it can fully
control its territory, and assist in meeting Lebanon's urgent
humanitarian and reconstruction needs. We will also discuss the
impact of this conflict on broader United States interests in
the region, including achieving a peace settlement between
Israel and the Palestinians.
The U.N.-brokered cease-fire, based on Security Council
Resolution 1701, so far appears to be holding.
The next phase in the process involves Israel withdrawing
its forces from Lebanon while the Lebanese army and a
strengthened international peacekeeping force move into
southern Lebanon. Simultaneously, the Lebanese Government must
work to prevent the smuggling of arms to Hezbollah, with the
ultimate goal of disarming Hezbollah and other militias
operating in Lebanon.
Some progress has been made toward reestablishing
stability. Israel has ended its naval and aerial blockade of
Lebanon, allowing trade and travel to resume. The Lebanese
Government has announced that it will send 15,000 troops to the
south, and its Defense Minister has publicly stated that the
army will take action against anyone who violates the cease-
fire.
A number of governments in Europe and elsewhere have
indicated that they would contribute troops to the expanded
peacekeeping operation. Yet Hezbollah has refused to lay down
its arms, and Syria has objected to any international force
guarding Lebanon's border with Syria.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese Government, with the help of the
international community, must address the urgent humanitarian
needs of its citizens and rebuild housing, roads, bridges, and
other infrastructure damaged in the fighting. It must do so in
the face of political competition from Hezbollah, which has
also undertaken a reconstruction campaign funded largely by
Iran and wealthy Arab supporters.
The Lebanese Government, which has limited resources, is
seeking help from the international community. An international
fundraising conference in Stockholm last month resulted in
pledges of close to 1 billion for the reconstruction efforts.
Persian Gulf states reportedly have promised additional
assistance.
We look forward to hearing whether our witnesses believe
that the sums pledged to Lebanon's reconstruction, including
the approximately $230 million in assistance announced by the
White House last month, are adequate for the task. We also want
to know whether sufficient controls are in place to ensure that
these contributions will have the maximum impact possible and
will avoid being diverted for corrupt or inefficient purposes.
If there is a competition underway between the Lebanese
Government and Hezbollah for the hearts and minds of the
Lebanese people, then it will be important for the government
to be seen as in charge of the reconstruction agenda and
implementing an effective reconstruction strategy.
We are also concerned by the conflict's political impact on
the region. We want to assess whether Hezbollah and its
Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, gained popularity in the
region, notwithstanding the suffering they brought upon the
Lebanese people.
Some observers have contended that the extremists preaching
confrontation and violence against Israel have been
strengthened in relation to moderate Arabs, such as Palestinian
President Mahmoud Abbas, who has espoused negotiation and
coexistence.
Now, regardless of whether this view is entirely accurate,
the United States must play an active role in strengthening the
Lebanese Government and reinvigorating the quest for a
resolution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
We're delighted to be joined by two distinguished panels to
help us assess these issues and evaluate policy options.
On the first panel, we welcome Mr. David Welch, Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, who will provide
the administration's views.
On our second panel, we welcome three experts from the
private sector: Dr. Paul Salem, director-designate of the
Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, who is an expert on
Lebanon's complex politics; Ambassador Carlos Pascual, vice
president and director of foreign policy studies at the
Brookings Institution, who recently served as director of the
State Department's Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization,
and just returned from a visit to Lebanon; and Dr. Augustus
Norton, professor of international relations and anthropology
at Boston University, who is an expert on Lebanon's Shi'a
community and Hezbollah.
We thank each of our witnesses for coming this morning. We
look forward to their insights.
I would like now to call upon our distinguished ranking
member, Senator Joseph Biden, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And observers of this committee will not be surprised to
hear me say, once again, I associate myself with your remarks,
and, but for the fact I should put in a statement, I should
just leave it at that, because I think you've covered most of
what I think need be covered.
Mr. Secretary, welcome. It's delightful to have you here.
To state the obvious, the shooting has stopped in Lebanon, but
the ultimate outcome is going to be determined, as we all
agree, by what happens in the next several months. And if we
use our diplomatic capability to the extent that I think we're
capable of we have a chance to shift the balance of power in
Lebanon away from Hezbollah and toward progressive forces
within Lebanon. But this isn't going to happen by itself, as we
all know; and we can't afford to be passive bystanders, as I
would argue--I don't want to get in an argument with the
administration--as I believe we were, once Syria pulled out. If
we repeat that lack of exercise of diplomacy, I think we're in
real trouble.
But I think we have a real chance. And the administration
seems to be seized of that. I would like to compliment the
Secretary of State for working with her French counterpart to
actually get us to this point.
But I think the first-and-foremost responsibility--and it's
not a ``done deal,'' as they say--is, we have to ensure the
success of the U.N. peacekeeping force now moving to Lebanon.
These new troops can't be timid observers, a replica of the
ineffectual UNIFIL operation that watched helplessly--and I'd
say haplessly--as Hezbollah built its infrastructure and
arsenal over the past 6 years.
On a related point, I look forward to hearing from
Secretary Welch on what concrete steps the U.S., Lebanon and
our allies are taking to prevent the resupply of Hezbollah,
particularly across the border with Syria.
Second, it seems to me we have to move urgently to
strengthen Lebanon's army and its internal security forces,
especially as the Lebanese army deploys in the south. Granted,
it's 70,000 folks, but, based on British assessments--I'm not
talking about classified information, I'm just reporting what
was in the newspaper--based on British military assessments, as
well as U.S. military assessments, they are not particularly
effectual now, they need at least $300 million in equipment
resupply, and that doesn't even count training, as I understand
it. And so, it's a major undertaking, but I think everybody's
ready to cooperate in seeing that happening. But it's going to
require substantial resources and a dedicated training effort,
in my view. And I've not heard much about what the plan for the
actual training of the Lebanese army is, and the re-equipping
of it, or equipping of it, in the first instance.
Most experts that I've spoken to and that I've read,
several of whom are here today to testify, believe that
Hezbollah is actually stronger than the Lebanese army. The
United States has an indispensable role to play here, it seems
to me. We've had a decades-long security relationship with
Lebanon that now we have a chance to build upon, if we're
smart. The Lebanese army and the internal security forces are
keen to step up this cooperation. Now, I've had little direct
interaction with the Lebanese Government since I was in Lebanon
for the election, after the Syrians had departed, so I'm basing
this on information that I've been given.
But I believe that we should prepare to go well beyond the
$42 million that the administration is proposing to support the
Lebanese army. As I said earlier, my understanding is, both the
Brits and us, our military, think that the need is 300 million.
I'm not suggesting that we have to provide it all, but I'm
suggesting it has to be provided.
And finally, it seems to me we have to commit to building
Lebanese institutions, ensuring the success of a massive
reconstruction program. And, again, I know I'm repeating what's
been already said, but it must--must, must, must, must, must--
go through the Lebanese Government in Beirut. It's the same
argument that the three Senators in the middle here you're
looking at made with regard to Afghanistan several years ago,
that it must, should absolutely go through Kabul. A lot of it
went directly to warlords, a lot of it went directly to
regions, and it made, in my view, the President of Afghanistan
the mayor of Kabul, not the president of a country. We can't
repeat that kind of mistake here, in my view. I think it's less
likely to happen here. But this is an opportunity to embolden
and build indirectly by our going through the elected
government, a government that can actually control.
We've got to do something. I hope we learned our lesson
from the way in which we did not, in my view, adequately
support, at the outset of his first election, the Palestinian
Prime Minister. So, I hope we don't make those mistakes again.
While we're preparing position papers and needs assessments
for Stockholm, the donors conference that occurred at the end
of August, the commitment of a billion dollars or more, we all
know that a billion dollars isn't enough. We know that the
number is well in excess of $3 billion. Although we had to go
about it the way we did, the mullahs did not bother for a needs
assessment. Iran understood their opportunities, as that famous
expression attributed to a Tammany Hall politician, he said,
``We seen our chances, we seen our opportunities, and we took
'em.'' Well, they seen their opportunities, and you now have
Hezbollah walking around handing out $12,000 payments, if that
information is correct, to those whose homes were destroyed.
Among many lessons we should learn from the Iraq fiasco is that
post-conflict institutions require quick, high-visibility
reconstruction projects that immediately benefit the local
population. I'm baffled, as I said, that with over a month to
plan and knowing the war would end roughly when it did, we
couldn't figure out a way to get money in to the Prime Minister
quickly so he could be the one to begin to make the
announcements as how he was going to rebuild.
I remember a Chairman of this committee saying that, ``What
we need in Iraq is about 30 mayors with walking-around money.''
Well, we need some mayors with walking-around money. And we
need it now.
So, that old bad joke, this has the ring of deja vu all
over again, but it's a real achievement when the Syrian forces
were withdrawn from Lebanon in the spring of 2005--in the face
of massive street demonstrations in Beirut, and united calls
from the international community. But Syria's withdrawal
fulfilled only one important element of 1559, and the rest, as
we all know, as they say, is history. I'll not take the time to
repeat it.
But, in the meantime, last time out, Iran outspent us by
more than five to one in Lebanon, after the so-called Cedar
Revolution, and our failure to follow through, along with our
allies, to take advantage of Syria's withdrawal, to challenge
Hezbollah, was, with the benefit of hindsight, seriously
misguided. This is not Monday morning quarterbacking. A number
of observers were warning of the risk posed by Hezbollah in the
south, in the wake of Syria's pullout. But I hope, and seems as
though, we're not going to repeat that again.
But the one word I would use to describe my sense of what
has to be done is urgency. Urgency. Urgency.
That's why I hope we move quickly.
And I'm anxious to hear from the Secretary, as well as the
other witnesses.
And one last point, Mr. Chairman. I am supposed to
introduce an amendment on the floor at 10:30 or quarter of 11,
so if I leave at that time, it'll only be because I have a time
slot to introduce an amendment on this legislation.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Secretary Welch, we welcome you, again, to the committee.
We appreciate your coming this morning to speak on this
important set of issues.
Now, your entire statement will be made a part of the
record, and please proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF HON. C. DAVID WELCH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Senator.
I apologize for keeping you waiting, sir. Traffic was a
little more difficult than we expected this morning.
If I might just highlight a couple of points that are in my
prepared remarks, and introduce the full text for the record.
First of all, I appreciate the opportunity to come before
you on this important subject, because I think I agree with
what you said, Senator Lugar, and what Senator Biden said, that
what happens in Lebanon is important, in and of itself, and, of
course, has an impact more broadly throughout the region.
The July 12 attack by Hezbollah was a surprise to us and to
Israel. What was not a surprise was the tactics and strategy of
Hezbollah, which has had a longstanding policy of attacking
Israel and attacking us. We've know for some time that this
political party and militia is a major destabilizing factor
inside Lebanon, and its connections to Syria, and beyond Syria
to Iran, are an additional destabilizing factor in Lebanon and
more broadly. So, those are additional reasons why this
particular conflict in Lebanon has to be considered in its
regional context.
Hezbollah has operated in Lebanon as a state within a state
for some time, outside the control of the central government.
The conflict started by Hezbollah on July 12 led to enormous
suffering and destruction, both in Lebanon and in Israel, and
it highlighted the risks of this situation being allowed to
continue. As Senator Biden said, one can't be complacent and
allow this to recur.
So, we took the approach, at the outset of the conflict,
Senators, that what was needed here was not a precipitant rush
to a cease-fire, but an effort to build a cease-fire on a more
permanent and sustainable basis, to put in place conditions
that ideally would reduce the risk, if not eliminate it
entirely, of a return to the status quo. That was the purpose
of our diplomatic effort.
We were not building from nothing. The structure of
international attention to the situation in Lebanon does date
back some time. And, of course, before the untimely death of
Rafik Hariri, the U.N. Security Council had passed Resolution
1559, which called upon foreign forces to withdraw. The tragedy
of Rafik Hariri's murder is that it took that to precipitate
the Syrian pullout.
But, even further back than 1559, there is a framework for
establishing Lebanese sovereignty in the Taif Accord and in
Resolution 425, from 1989 and 1978, respectively. Resolution
425 established the UNIFIL force that was in existence on July
12.
In Resolution 1701, which capped the diplomatic effort led
by the United States and some of our other partners in the
Security Council--which, by the way, was approved unanimously
by the Security Council, a rare thing, when it comes to votes
on a Middle East issue. This resolution established important
new instruments for security, which, I would argue, sir, helped
put in place the conditions for a more permanent and
sustainable cease-fire.
First, it called for an immediate cessation of hostilities
and set the parameters for a permanent cease-fire. We're in
that period now, between the immediate cessation of hostilities
and the more permanent cease-fire.
Second, this resolution established an international
embargo on any arms to unauthorized groups in Lebanon.
Third, it created an enhanced international force to
support the Lebanese army in deploying to the south as Israel
withdraws and, at the request of Lebanon, to help in securing
Lebanon's borders from the illegal transport of weapons into
Lebanon.
Fourth, this put in place other mechanisms to assist the
Government of Lebanon to expand its sovereignty throughout the
country.
And, more broadly, and finally, it put in place certain
principles for a more lasting peace.
If carried out--and our diplomatic effort is intended to
see that this resolution is carried out--these new rules would
change the situation in Lebanon and in the region, and, I would
argue, significantly for the better, and would more than meet
our standard of no return to the status quo.
How is implementation of this going? I think, so far, so
good. We're, as I said, in between the cessation of
hostilities, which came 2 days after the passage of the
resolution, and the more permanent cease-fire, which should
begin once Israel has fully withdrawn from Lebanon. But, in
this interim period, already, there is an historic deployment
of the Lebanese army southwards. Of course, members of this
committee are familiar with it, but perhaps our audience is
not, but the Lebanese army has not, for many, many years,
deployed fully throughout Lebanon. And, for almost 40 years, it
has not been present in any significant way in the southernmost
parts of Lebanon.
Second, there are very capable new U.N. UNIFIL forces, or
forces joining the new UNIFIL. These are more heavily armed,
and they're more numerous. They have a significantly different
and robust mandate. And there are additional force commitments
that are coming into place even as we speak.
For the first time, also, UNIFIL has a maritime role.
Previously, there was no international participation in
protecting the Lebanese coastline, which was vulnerable, also,
to smuggling.
As these instruments have come into place, some of the
measures that were put in effect before by Israel as part of
its defense have been lifted. For example, the air and sea
blockades have come off on September 7 and 8, respectively.
More broadly, the international response, so far, to the
needs of Lebanon has been impressive. I agree with Senator
Biden, it's necessary to distinguish between what has been
delivered and what has been promised, and to emphasize the
urgency of delivering on the promise.
But the international community is mobilizing, with
impressive support, and I think the Lebanese are feeling that,
because many, many have started returning to their homes. As
you know, there were significant numbers of Israeli and
Lebanese citizens displaced throughout this conflict, and that
was a grievous problem inside Lebanon.
We announced, in August, about $230 million of American
taxpayer support for Lebanon, of which we have spent nearly $60
million so far. We do try--Secretary Rice does try--whenever we
make an announcement, not to do it merely on the basis of
promise, but to show some delivery. From the inception of this
crisis, we were there with medical and other humanitarian
supplies. And today, we have delivered the first shipments of
U.S.-supported wheat into Lebanon. So, we're trying to continue
this effort to back up our promise with what will be visible
effort.
Beyond the American contribution, there were very
significant pledges made by others at the Stockholm conference
at the end of August. The expectations of the Government of
Lebanon were exceeded, with nearly a billion dollars, total, of
pledges.
As I mentioned, many people displaced in Lebanon have begun
to return home; however, reconstruction needs are very
significant for those who are trying to rebuild their lives and
their livelihoods. There's also a pressing need to deal with
the problem of unexploded ordnance particularly in the south,
and we're trying to contribute to that effort, as well.
We've announced some projects to rebuild vital
infrastructure. I do think it's important that the people of
Lebanon see some tangible evidence of this kind of American
support, because the tangible evidence of the destruction is
very considerable, and we have been indirectly held to account
for that.
We are urging the Lebanese Government to take, also, a
longer-term look at its reconstruction needs, and we foresee
that in the middle of this month, when the IMF/World Bank
meetings occur in Singapore, that we'll begin to address the
longer-term economic reform and reconstruction requirements in
Lebanon.
I listened very carefully to your remarks with respect to
security assistance to the legitimate Lebanese security
services. The Lebanese army is modest by Middle East standards.
It is primarily U.S.-equipped. And we do, in the
administration, share a sense that the United States should
continue to contribute to strengthening the Lebanese army.
The Lebanese Government had decided to undertake these
deployments, even though they lacked certain kinds of equipment
that would have made the deployments easier. So, they didn't
condition it. We're trying to accelerate our assistance to the
Lebanese army in the area of spare parts; in particular, for
some of the vehicles and other equipment necessary for these
deployments. And while we need to go to Congress with some
notifications with respect to that, we would appreciate your
support in both houses so that we are able to undertake this.
I think that demonstration of American support, in the
security assistance area, is incredibly important in leveraging
that of other governments, particularly friends of ours in the
region whose financial wherewithal may be more immediate and
available.
We, behind the scenes, worked very closely, as Senator
Biden mentioned, with the Government of France, but also other
governments, and with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping, so
that the concept of operations and the rules of engagement for
the new UNIFIL force would be capable ones. And we also worked
very hard to identify the appropriate troop contributors. We
are quite conscious that there have not been too many
peacekeeping operations approved in the Middle East; and so,
when we do a new and restructured operation like this one, it's
very important to put the proper architecture in place for its
success.
This is the first new peacekeeping operation in my area of
responsibility since August 1981, when the United States
approved the Sinai MFO. So, it's very important that we enable
its success.
The new UNIFIL is beginning to deploy in considerable
numbers. I think all of us have seen some of that in the news
and on television. As of September 6th, there were troop
commitments of nearly 9,000; and, just in the last week or so,
there are additional government decisions on participation,
even in the last day or so. Over 3,000 fresh troops are on the
ground, and more arriving every day. We expect additional
combat elements from France to arrive this week. French, Greek,
and Italian naval vessels are assisting the Lebanese navy now
in patrolling the coastline. And I expect the German Government
to address itself very shortly to a German Government decision
for Germany to play a more permanent role in maritime
surveillance for UNIFIL.
Of course, a lot needs to be done, still, despite these
accomplishments, so far. And, in particular, that needs to be
done so that we can counter the influence of others and those
who are not so happy with this success, so far. And we need to
do so, as Senator Biden said, urgently.
One aspect of that is to make the land border more secure.
That responsibility is not Lebanon's alone. As I mentioned, a
significant achievement in this new resolution is the
imposition of an arms embargo. Respect for the arms embargo is
obligatory on all member states of the U.N., including Syria
and Iran. When Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Damascus
the other day, he pointed this out publicly. I think that
statement is important, because it's a public holding- to-
account of governments for their responsibilities.
We have called upon all member states to act aggressively
to enforce the embargo. And we have urged Lebanon to deploy
additional resources to the land border to enable the
protection of Lebanon's sovereignty against those who
surreptitiously would try to violate it.
Disarmament of militias is a continuing challenge inside of
Lebanon, particularly with respect to Hezbollah. This was
called for previously in Resolution 1559, and the new
resolution asks for ideas from the Secretary General on how to
pursue that. This is a significant challenge internally and
politically inside of Lebanon, but we believe it's necessary to
a lasting peace, and it is necessary, also, for Lebanon's
assertion of its sovereignty under Lebanese law over all of
Lebanon. Partly, our security assistance and our reconstruction
effort is designed to help that along politically.
We'll continue our effort to support moderate governments
like that of Lebanon, which has been democratically elected, in
order to help meet the needs of the Lebanese people and allow
their freedom to take real root inside this country.
Again, thank you for asking us to appear and to discuss
these matters with you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Welch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. C. David Welch
review of the situation in lebanon and the way ahead
Thank you, Mister Chairman, and other distinguished Members of the
committee for inviting me here today. I welcome the opportunity to
discuss the important developments in Lebanon over the past several
weeks and the ways in which the U.S. and the international community
can help create the conditions that will ensure a lasting peace.
The recent conflict in Lebanon was instigated by Hezbollah's
unprovoked July 12 attack across the Blue Line into Israel--an attack
in which several Israeli soldiers were killed and two captured. This
attack was not an isolated incident, but rather reflected a long-
standing policy of Hezbollah to engage in periodic attacks against
Israel--even after Israel's withdrawal (which was confirmed by the
United Nations) from Lebanon in 2000. That such terror attacks have
continued with considerable frequency in the six years since Israel's
withdrawal is hardly surprising; since its inception in the early
1980s, Hezbollah has belied its claims to be a movement resisting
occupation by engaging in terrorism, including its involvement in the
1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut which killed 63 people, the
bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut that same year which killed
241 U.S. servicemen, the 1984 bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex which
killed 2 U.S. servicemen, and the 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires which killed 29, as well as the 1994 attack on the Jewish
community center in Buenos Aires which killed 85. As this record shows,
Hezbollah is a major destabilizing factor in the Middle East, closely
allied with Syria and Iran. The Lebanon war instigated by Hezbollah
this summer must therefore be seen in the context of the broader Middle
East situation which we face.
Hezbollah has operated as a ``state-within-a-state'' in the
Lebanese body politic, outside of the control of the central
government. The events of July 12, which touched off a conflict that
led to enormous suffering and destruction in both Lebanon and Israel,
highlighted the risks of allowing this situation to continue. Secretary
Rice made it clear that while a cease-fire was of the utmost urgency,
it needed to be lasting and sustainable. U.S. diplomacy aimed at a
permanent solution that would reduce the risk of a return to the
``status quo ante.'' We thus led the effort to create a new dynamic in
Lebanon for greater stability and peace in that country, an effort that
resulted in the passage of UNSCR 1701.
The international community had earlier voiced its commitment to
support the Lebanese people in their goal of a fully sovereign
democratic state when it passed UNSCR 1559 (September 2, 2004) and
UNSCR 1680 (May 17, 2006). Security Council Resolution 1559, in
particular, is premised on supporting a fully sovereign government, and
called for foreign forces operating in Lebanon without the permission
of the government of Lebanon to depart. A framework for establishing
Lebanese sovereignty goes back even further to the Taif Accord of 1989
and UNSCR 425 (March 19, 1978).
The brutal assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri and 22 others on February 14, 2005, brought the Lebanese people
to the streets demanding an end to violence and foreign intervention in
Lebanon's internal affairs. Two months later, Syria withdrew its
military forces from Lebanon ending a nearly thirty-year occupation.
The international community expressed its solidarity with the people of
Lebanon with the passage of UNSCR 1595 authorizing an international
investigation into Mr. Hariri's murder. We support the efforts of the
UN and the Lebanese government to create a tribunal with international
elements to bring to justice those responsible for this heinous crime.
With UNSCR 1701, unanimously approved by the UN Security Council on
August 11, the international community established important new
instruments for security. The resolution called for an immediate
cessation of hostilities to the most recent conflict between Hezbollah
and Israel, imposed an international embargo on arms to unauthorized
groups in Lebanon, created an enhanced international force to support
the LAF in deploying to the south as Israel withdraws and at the
request of Lebanon to secure Lebanon's borders from the illegal
transport of arms, put in place mechanisms to assist the government of
Lebanon to expand its sovereign authority throughout the country, and
laid out the political principles for a lasting peace. If carried out,
these new rules will change the situation in Lebanon and in the region
significantly for the better and will more than meet our standard of
``no return to the status quo ante.''
We are making good progress. For the first time in almost 40 years,
the Lebanese Armed Forces have deployed to the south. Capable new
UNIFIL forces, much more heavily armed and numerous and with an
expanded and robust mandate, are accompanying them, and force
commitments are nearing their desired levels. Also for the first time,
UNIFIL has a maritime role. Reflecting these developments, and as a
result of significant diplomatic efforts by Secretary Rice with the
Israelis, Lebanese and the UN, Israel lifted its air blockade on
September 7 and its maritime blockade on September 8.
The initial response to the needs in Lebanon has been impressive.
The international community has mobilized to provide impressive
quantities of humanitarian aid, and Lebanese citizens are returning to
their homes. On August 21, President Bush announced more than $230
million in humanitarian, reconstruction, and security assistance to
Lebanon--more than $55 million of which has already been provided for
Lebanon. We will also be leveraging the private sector and other
economic incentives to support Lebanon.
Pledges of $940 million made at the August 31 International
Conference on Early Recovery hosted by Sweden doubled the amount the
Government of Lebanon was seeking in its appeal document.
An impressive international relief effort during and just after the
crisis has produced results. Over 750,000 of the estimated 980,000
people displaced by the conflict have now returned to their homes.
However, much more remains to be done to enable these people to rebuild
their lives and their homes.
An immediate need will be the removal of the thousands of
unexploded ordinance in the south left behind after the conflict. The
U.S. has announced that it will provide an initial $420,000 and will
request congressional approval in the next fiscal year for an addition
$2 million to aid in this effort.
The U.S. has also announced projects to rebuild vital
infrastructure including roads and bridges, support residential
reconstruction and provide temporary shelters for families as they
repair their homes, restore and repair schools that were damaged or
used as shelters, clean up environmental damage linked to the massive
oil spill off Lebanon's coast, and restore the livelihoods of thousands
of fishermen along the coast from Tripoli to Naqoura where recovery
hinges on getting the fishing industry back up and running.
Looking ahead to longer-term reconstruction, we have urged the
government of Lebanon to take a leading role. Lebanon will present its
initial findings at a meeting of the Economic Core Group to be held on
the margins of the World Bank/IMF Meetings in Singapore next week. We
look forward to a larger reconstruction conference to be held in Beirut
at a later date.
Our assistance to Lebanon will also include assistance to the
Lebanese security services and armed forces to fulfill their mandate to
secure the borders and territory of Lebanon. The LAF has undertaken its
responsibilities in deploying even before the delivery of essential
supplies and equipment. We will need to accelerate our assistance to
the LAF to ensure current deployments are sustainable. An effective and
well-trained Lebanese Armed Forces is a crucial component to the
implementation of UNSCR 1701, the sovereignty of government of Lebanon,
and lasting peace in the region.
The government of Lebanon has identified key equipment and training
needs, which we are working with the international community to
address. President Bush has announced approximately $42 million in FY
06 security assistance as part of the $230 million assistance package
to Lebanon.
We have also worked closely with our international partners in
establishing the concept of operations and identifying contributing
countries for the expanded French-led UNIFIL Force. This force is the
first new peacekeeping operation in the Middle East since August 1981
when the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace established the Multinational
Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.
UNIFIL has begun to deploy, accompanying the LAF as it takes up
positions along the Blue line. As of September 6, 8,500 troops had been
committed to UNIFIL and 3,138 troops were already on the ground. Nine
hundred additional French troops will arrive this week. French, Greek,
and Italian ships troops are assisting the Lebanese Navy in patrolling
their coastline; a more permanent fleet of German ships will replace
them in approximately two weeks. Additional UNIFIL troops are scheduled
to arrive at the end of the month. We expect complete withdrawal of IDF
troops from southern Lebanon within the next week.
However, while progress has been made, much remains to be done. Our
challenge now is to maintain the momentum towards a lasting peace in
Lebanon while countering the efforts of Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran to
repaint the conflict as a victory for Hezbollah. We will need to move
quickly.
Moving forward, we must maintain our emphasis on economic and
security assistance to Lebanon, channeling it in a way that supports
the government of Lebanon as it works to fulfill its responsibilities
under UNSCR 1701.
It is imperative that we continue to assist Lebanon in making its
land border more secure, but that responsibility is not Lebanon's
alone. UNSCR 1701 imposes a legally binding obligation on all states to
ensure that weapons are not supplied to Lebanon without the
authorization of the Lebanese government or UNIFIL. We have called on
all UN member states to act aggressively in enforcing this embargo,
ensuring that their territory and airspace are not used to undercut it.
The embargo imposes a particular requirement on Syria and Iran,
both of whom have a long history of interfering in Lebanon and of
supplying Hezbollah and other regional terrorist groups with weapons
and funding. They have continually failed to heed international calls
to stop resupplying these groups with deadly arms.
The disarmament of all militias, including Hezbollah, as called for
in UNSCR 1559, will continue to pose a significant challenge. The key
to Hezbollah's disarmament, and to a lasting peace, will be to ensure
the conditions necessary to permit the Lebanese government to assert
its sovereignty across all of Lebanon. Our security and reconstruction
assistance is designed to do just this.
While this conflict brought much destruction and heartache, its
resolution has provided us with opportunities that extend beyond
Lebanon. The Middle East stands at a critical crossroads, with profound
implications for America's national security. While there is a trend
towards democracy, there is also resistance to it. We must continue to
engage now to ensure that the loudest voices are not those that would
like to wipe the slate clean and start over with an exclusionary,
intolerant world view. We must continue to go on the offensive against
radicals and extremists who exploit conflicts to undermine a non-
violent and liberal order.
While making progress in Iraq and in the Arab-Israeli conflict
remain core concerns, the determination of the international community
and friends in the region to improve the economic and political
situation in the broader Middle East remains the only way to create
conditions for real change and lasting stability. To the degree that we
and they are successful, the ambitions of radicals and extremists will
fail. Increasing the scope of political freedom, reducing high rates of
unemployment, creating opportunities for personal economic improvement,
and raising the standard of living will help address the ``root
causes'' of terrorism and reduce the appeal of extremist political
movements.
We must continue our efforts to support moderate governments like
the democratically elected government of Lebanon in their efforts to
meet the needs of their people and to encourage genuine freedom to take
root. In no place are the risks and opportunities more apparent than in
the current situation in Lebanon. Our approach must be comprehensive
and it must seize opportunities when only dangers seem present.
We are under no illusions. Conflict resolution and reform in the
region will require a great commitment from the United States. How we
respond will define our relationship with the region for generations to
come.
Thank you for your time. I would be pleased to address your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Welch, for
your testimony.
I'm going to yield to Senator Biden for his questions,
because I know he needs to leave for the floor, and then I will
come after that. And we'll have a 10-minute round.
Senator Biden. Very gracious of you, Mr. Chairman, thank
you very much.
Mr. Secretary, what is your assessment of the immediate
impact, if any, of Hezbollah announcing to folks, particularly
in the south, that they will rebuild their homes and allegedly
supplying them with up to $12,000 in cash or--first of all, is
that accurate? Are they doing that? And, secondly, how do you
read the impact of that? I realize it's just beginning.
Mr. Welch. Well, I've watched the statements coming from
those particular quarters very carefully, Senator. At the time
the Secretary General of the Hezbollah made that pledge, he was
riding a wave of support throughout the Arab world that
acclaimed his party as victors in this incident. But I thought
his statement was interesting for what wasn't, I think,
sufficiently analyzed at the time, which was, as a politician,
it seemed me he felt the need to make that statement, and why.
Some would argue that it was in order to show that they can
move out smartly and deliver this. I think it was also a
defensive measure, sir.
Senator Biden. Well, I think it clearly was. He went even
further, as reported in today's press, that had he known what
the response would be, he would not have taken the action he
took. I am confident that was not to give solace to the
Israelis, but to make clear to the Lebanese he didn't mean this
damage to befall them. But that's not my question. My question
is, (a) Are they actually delivering cash to Lebanese to
rebuild? And, (b), If they are, what is the effect of that? Not
his reason for doing it. The effect.
Mr. Welch. I'm, frankly, not sure, so far. I know they
have delivered some, because there are accounts in the press
and people attesting to having received these stipends. That
said, there are other accounts from people who say it hasn't
shown up yet.
We've taken an estimate of what would be required. And to
meet this promise, Senator, very large sums of money would be
required. I'm not entirely sure they're in a position to
deliver on that promise.
And this would bring me to my third point--by promising to
do something, he is also suggesting that others would not be
able to do it, and then creating a different frame of reference
for the Government of Lebanon's own efforts. That, I think,
gets back to the question of getting others to come forward
with real reconstruction help.
Senator Biden. I think it presents a gigantic opportunity.
I'm not--see, it seems to me that this is wherein the urgency
comes. I mean, it's a gigantic opportunity here. I think this
is one of those deals that's like the fish on the dock in the
sun--the longer it lies there, the worse it's going to smell.
If we are smart, Hezbollah is going to look very bad when this
is all over. And it depends upon our--not just us; European, as
well, and the Gulf States--affirmative action to turn this from
a negative into a positive. And I think the potential is
there--I'm optimistic--if we act fairly swiftly.
Well, now let me shift. My discussions, and others--I'm
sure I wasn't the only one that has them--with the Gulf state
leaders, when Hezbollah initiated this effort, was a very, very
significant concern on the part of most Gulf state oil-
producing states, who are predominantly Sunni, about this being
an Iranian gambit, and the Shi'a Crescent--and you heard a lot
of talk about all of that. Now, our friends in Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf states are swimming in a sea of cash. I mean, they
are flush, like they have never been. Do you get a sense that
they're prepared to come in with big numbers. Everyone
acknowledges--and we'll hear from witnesses today, if my staff
is correct in what they're going to say--the reconstruction
costs are going to exceed $3 billion. We're talking about
pledges of a billion. Do we have any reason to believe that
there will be a significant commitment, meaning billion-dollar
commitments, coming from the oil states--Saudis, in particular?
Can you fill us in on what you know of their thinking right
now?
Mr. Welch. Yes. I think the news is encouraging there. As
early as the Rome conference, during, really, the peak of the
crisis, the Saudi and Kuwaiti Governments came forward with
significant pledges. Those were divided into two parts. One was
immediate deposits into the Lebanese Central Bank of foreign
exchange reserves to help the Lebanese currency.
Senator Biden. How much did they deposit?
Mr. Welch. I think it was in the neighborhood of a billion
dollars all together, Senator. Then there were reconstruction
and humanitarian pledges made. Many of the Gulf Arab states
delivered significant humanitarian assistance during the
crisis, and have pledged very large amounts. The Saudis, for
example, $500 million; Kuwaitis, $300 million.
Senator Biden. We are cooperating very closely with the
French and NATO and the European countries, as well as
encouraging Turkey and other Muslim countries to participate in
the UNIFIL force. How closely engaged are the Saudis with us in
detailed discussions about the objectives in Lebanon? Are the
Saudis, on their own, concluding they have to help; or is it
because of the fact that, as you pointed out at the beginning
of your testimony, the Arab street was much more sympathetic to
Hezbollah at the end of the process than they were at the
beginning for--quote--giving the Israelis their comeuppance
here? Do we have to deal at more arms' length with the Saudis,
in terms of public reception now, because of that? Or are they
foursquare in the position of joining the international
community, led by the Europeans and the United States, to
rebuild Lebanon?
Mr. Welch. Let me divide my answer into two parts. There
are different roles here. The Saudis, for example, have really
no record of contributions to peacekeeping operations. And,
furthermore, more broadly, the Gulf States, in general, don't
have a substantial record in contributing there. So, we didn't
see them as necessarily logical troop contributors.
Senator Biden. No, I'm not suggesting that. Have there
been actual discussions where we sit down and say, ``Look,
let--are we on the same page here? This is about Iran. This is
about Hezbollah. This is not in your interest, Saudi Arabia.
You know it's not in your interest. Therefore, since it's not
in your interest, are we''--and then coming up with a coherent
strategy where we know what they're going to do? For example,
my staff was, late August, in Lebanon--and, I am embarrassed to
say maybe the majority staff was, too, I don't know, but my
staff was there--and had an opportunity to meet with the Prime
Minister and many others, most of the actors. And the Prime
Minister, at that time, in late August, which is now 3 weeks
ago, almost, when the word was that Hezbollah was beginning to
dispense cash, indicated he was not at all certain, at that
time, what pledges, financial pledges, were coming from, had
been made, or likely to come from the Saudis and the Kuwaitis.
Now, things may have changed since then. I hope they have.
But that's the context in my asking this question.
Mr. Welch. Let me continue and endeavor to answer the
question you had about larger coordination.
I think the answer to that is ``pretty good,'' in this
case. For example, Prime Minister Siniora was just in Saudi
Arabia this last weekend, and the Saudi Government provided
important public testimonial of support for him. And I think if
you were to go back and ask him today how does he feel about
the political support he and his government have gotten from
some of our friends in the Arab world, he'd feel pretty good
about it, sir.
Although they're not playing a role in contributing to the
U.N. peacekeeping operation, we do feel that they will make
important contributions, primarily financial, to security
assistance support for the Lebanese authorities. We're working
on that right now.
In terms of delivering on some of their reconstruction
pledges, I'd like to get back to you with it, to just be
certain about the facts of where they are with respect to their
pledges.
[The information referred to above follows:]
Mr. Welch. Although not all donors have specified the amount of
their contributions, a list of contributions compiled by the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (attached--Lebanon
pledge conference final) indicates that 57 countries and several
regional organizations have announced commitments to Lebanon. These
publicly stated contributions range from $25,000, donated by Monaco, to
the Saudi pledge of $500 million in reconstruction assistance, $63
million of which is already committed. The Department does not have a
comprehensive list of funds delivered to-date. This process is being
actively managed by the GOL.
A breakdown of the top ten donors from the Stockholm Conference,
provided informally by the Government of Sweden, follows:
1. Saudi Arabia.--$60 million (our understanding is that this
reflects Saudi humanitarian/early recovery assistance; we
understand that Saudi Arabia will be looking to spend a large
amount of what is left of the $500 million on reconstruction
assistance, which we assume will be announced at the Beirut
donors' conference).
2. Qatar.--$300 million.
3. U.S.--$180 million (this is the $230 million minus the $55
million in humanitarian assistance that had been disbursed
prior to the conference).
4. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.--$112
million.
5. Spain.--$94 million.
6. European Commission.--$91 million.
7. UAE.--$50 million (It is likely this reflects Emirati
humanitarian assistance; they are spending $15 million on
demining/UXO removal and have made an undefined pledge to
support schools and hospitals in the south.
8. Italy.--$38 million.
9. Germany.--$28 million.
10. Sweden.--$20 million.
Combining the above with other pledges of $20 million or less, the
Swedish Government has reported that the revised total of support
pledged at the Stockholm Conference is $973 million.
[Additional information on the Stockholm Conference can be
found in Appendix II, page 66, of this hearing print.]
Senator Biden. I'd appreciate that.
Mr. Welch. But they have indicated to us that they
understand the political challenge presented by Hezbollah's
decision on July 12th, they took a very forthright public
position against that, themselves, not long afterwards, in the
Arab League and elsewhere. And, more importantly, they have
signaled that they should emphasize the southern part of
Lebanon in using their reconstruction assistance, which I think
would get at your other question, sir.
Senator Biden. Well, thank you very much; my time is up. I
thank the Chairman for his graciousness. I wish you all the
good luck in the world. This is a real opportunity, and I hope
we take full advantage of it, and do it expeditiously.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Let me ask Secretary Welch some questions that are
stimulated by an article, or a column, by Henry Kissinger in
the Washington Post today as he analyzes the Lebanon situation.
Secretary Kissinger indicates that essentially the goal of
Hezbollah was not one of attempting to bring about a form of
order in which there are nation-states negotiating with each
other. In fact, as a political player in Lebanon--as one that
is armed, and that is prepared to go wherever it wishes to go,
notwithstanding whatever the government might do--Hezbollah
will seek to retain its arms, and its ability to play that
role. The Lebanese government says that the Lebanese people are
angry at Hezbollah for causing the destruction of their homes,
bridges, airport facilities, and what have you. But Secretary
Kissinger indicates that Hezbollah has come out of the conflict
more popular than the government. And furthermore, at least
Henry Kissinger would feel, Hezbollah has no intention of
disarming; it intends to continue to attempt to unify Shi'ites
and Sunnis in a hatred of Israel and the United States that
will transcend boundaries; to expand Syria's influence; and to
enable Iran to play a much larger role in the area. In
conventional diplomacy, we, in the West, continue to think of
the established international boundaries around Iraq or Syria
or Lebanon. These are not necessarily the boundaries involved
in the transnational conflict that Henry Kissinger is talking
about. So, our Secretary of State, and you, following
conventional diplomatic practice, have to go to the Government
of Lebanon. But, in fact, the real power is Hezbollah, not the
Government of Lebanon. Our ability to negotiate with
Hezbollah's backers, Syria and Iran, is severely limited.
As Kissinger would say, the peacekeeping operation is, if
not in shambles, at least pretty well trampled over. As a
result, the hopeful signs, at least, of the cease-fire are
important. Certainly the reconstruction is important, but
ambassadors in the area with whom I visited have indicated
something which is no secret, and that is that anti-American
feelings, quite apart from anti-Israeli feelings, have risen
sharply in this process on the basis of a feeling that the
Israelis, in their retaliation, were so-called ``allowed,'' in
quotes, by the Americans to proceed to destroy houses, bridges,
and so forth, in Lebanon. And, therefore, even as we come along
with assistance to rebuild Lebanon, once again our stock in
trade, in terms of public support, is diminishing rather than
growing.
Now, this is a large list of particulars, but comment, if
you will, on whether our ability to deal with the Lebanese
Government makes the major difference here. Our hopes are that
it somehow will become strong, that its army might, in fact,
control its own territory, that Lebanon could deal with Israel.
If I read Henry Kissinger correctly, he would say this is
interesting as a possibility, but improbable in reality,
because the real reality is Hezbollah, armed by Iran, perhaps
aided by Syria, as well as others. And so, try as hard as we
may to prop up a Lebanese Government and an army that can
control its territory and its borders, Lebanon's leaders are
going to be totally incapable of that kind of a mission.
Now, what sort of a response do you have to that?
Mr. Welch. Well, I think it is demonstrably true that
before July 12th, when Hezbollah launched this attack, that it
was able to operate autonomously. In fact, that was the
complaint from our Arab friends as the conflict started, that a
group would undertake to exercise the most sovereign of state
acts, an act of war, without any regard to the interests of the
people or the interests of the state. That statement, on the
part of Saudi Arabia and then the Arab League, is really an
extraordinary one. So, I think there's every recognition of the
reality that Mr. Kissinger describes.
The Chairman. But it didn't seem to last for long. You
know, we were so heartened that they said anything. Then, stage
left, they're out of there.
Mr. Welch. Well, you know, it's true, sir, that reaction
of public opinion, anytime there is violence between Israel and
any of its neighbors, or the Palestinians, it tends to head in
only one direction.
The question that I think former Secretary Kissinger is
alluding to here is, Are there the measures that are being put
in place up to the task? It's a valid question. I would argue
that we have done some things that are important in that
regard. And I'll come to that in one second. But it is also
true that those are being tested, and will be tested in the
future. And they require vigilance and discipline to hold to.
What are they? First of all, as a result of this
resolution, there are substantial new protections in place for
the authority and sovereignty of the central Government of
Lebanon and for peace and stability in the area.
Number one, there are to be no armed groups in the area of
deployment of the new UNIFIL. That is in the south. And that
was where Hezbollah had its most significant armed presence.
And it is not to be there in the future. And that's the job of
UNIFIL and the Lebanese army, to assure that it is not.
Number two, there's an arms embargo now. There wasn't an
arms embargo before passage of this resolution. So, it's an
obligation on other countries not to make the problem worse by
rearming these people.
Number three, there is a call--admittedly, over a longer
term and as part of a Lebanese process--for the disarmament of
this militia, which is the only significant armed militia left
in Lebanon. I mean, there are some armed Palestinian
organizations, but they pale in comparison to the capabilities
of Hezbollah. That's probably the most difficult of all of the
tasks to achieve, because it requires political consensus and
organization within Lebanon.
But there is, I would argue, a greater evidence of
international support toward that goal; and, in particular, by
inviting the role of the Secretary General in, you know, how to
help the Government of Lebanon exercise it.
Now, I recognize that--and Mr. Kissinger is right--these
are things that I would expect the adversaries of peace will
test, and it's our common obligation to try and best them in
that endeavor.
The Chairman. As a practical matter, though, how will the
Government of Lebanon disarm Hezbollah? Just physically, how
can this happen? Hezbollah plays a role politically in the
government, and apparently a fairly popular one, as a matter of
fact. It's a democracy, and people like Hezbollah, apparently.
Mr. Welch. Well, they have been freely elected to the
parliament, you're right, sir. And the parliamentary elections,
as by our judgment, were up to an international standard.
Previous disarmaments in Lebanon have occurred, and they
have been consensual. After the Taif Accords, other militias
were disarmed, and they did so willingly. They did it in
different ways. To the best of my knowledge, almost all of them
simply sent their fighters home. Their weapons were, in at
least one case, redistributed to the Lebanese army, and, in
anther case, sold abroad; and, unfortunately, in that case,
sold to another conflict area.
How this will occur in the case of Lebanon is something
that we don't know yet. That it should occur, I think there's
greater agreement that it should.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I would defer to
my more senior member, Senator Hagel.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Hagel?
Senator Hagel. Senator Nelson, thank you. Mr. Chairman,
thank you. Welcome, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, could you describe for us what renewed
efforts are underway by the United States Government to restart
negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians on the overall
issue that we are talking about here this morning, the larger
context of that conflict?
Mr. Welch. Well, this is something we've been seeking to
do for some time, Senator. It's been a summer of stress and
hardship. Ever since June 25, when, in an operation from Gaza
into Israel, an Israeli soldier was taken captive, pretty much
all efforts to restart any conversation and negotiation between
Israelis and the Palestinian Authority has been extremely
difficult and limited. We're pursuing this now on a number of
fronts.
First is to support all efforts to obtain the release of
this IDF trooper, and, for that matter, the others. The
Government of Egypt has been playing a constructive role in
that regard, trying to break through the impasse that, I have
to say, regrettably, still persists on that.
Second, we have tried to keep the access and movement
restrictions that have been in place by the Israeli authorities
around and into Gaza, tried to relax those as much as possible,
given the security concerns the Israelis have.
The situation inside Gaza has become quite difficult,
actually more difficult after June 25th, but we've been able to
relieve that somewhat by getting the Government of Israel to
allow humanitarian shipments and provide other humanitarian
needs into Gaza, including some shipments of American
assistance.
More broadly, we still have this continuing problem of a
division within the Palestinian Government. There's one part of
the government that accepts to pursue negotiations on the basis
that all others in the international community would accept,
and that part of the government is led by the President,
Mahmoud Abbas. Another part, led by the Prime Minister, Ismail
Haniyeh, who represents the Hamas majority in the PLC, does not
subscribe to the same principles for engagement in the peace
process. They've been unable, so far, to surmount their
resistance to doing that. There are some discussions underway
now among the Palestinians, about how to get over that hurdle,
but I don't see, yet, that they've reached resolution of that
difficulty.
We would like to see conversations, even negotiations,
restart between Israel and the legitimate part of the PA just
as soon as possible. I think realistically that's going to
depend on some of these other developments.
Senator Hagel. Well, does that mean the United States
Government is not actively engaged in taking initiatives to
restart those talks or working with regional powers, not unlike
the Beirut declaration of 2002, or some initiative to move this
forward? Is that a fair assessment, based on what you've just
said, that we are essentially leaving it to the currents to
take us wherever we're going to go?
Have you been instructed by the Secretary or the President
to take any specific initiative in this regard?
Mr. Welch. Yes, Senator, but ``initiative''----
Senator Hagel. Can you explain that?
Mr. Welch [continuing]. ----``initiative'' is a big and
conceivably more exuberant term than I would use.
Senator Hagel. Well, you define it for me.
Mr. Welch. We have been very active particularly in trying
to surmount this division among the Palestinians. We would like
to see a government among the Palestinians that can accept the
three principles laid out by the Quartet in the early part of
this year. Those are: a government that would accept that
Israel is a fact, and exists; that would accept to pursue
negotiations in an environment free of violence and terror; and
that would subscribe to the previous agreements signed by the
Israelis and the Palestinians and such things as the Arab
League initiative. We've been promoting that privately as one
way to break through this impasse. We believe President Abbas
is doing the same thing.
We've been very actively in touch with them, even during
the conflict in Lebanon; though, Senator, I would say we were
careful in how we did that, and did not want to take it beyond
private diplomacy, because we didn't want to link the two
conflict areas. That would be rewarding extremists in both,
were we to do that. We remain very active, until this moment,
in trying to achieve this, as well. Secretary Rice has done so
personally in very recent conversations with the Palestinians
and Israelis. We have the Israeli Foreign Minister visiting us
today, in fact. I was in touch with President Abbas, myself,
over the last several days to deal with this question of the
government crisis that they have. And we have had similar
conversations with our Arab partners, particularly the
Egyptians, Jordanians, and Saudis.
Senator Hagel. Well, as you know, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1701 lays out a set of principles to form a basis of
a permanent cease-fire and a long-term solution. I think the
Secretary General is scheduled to give a report on that, mid-
September. And one of the areas, if I understand that
resolution correctly, is to address the Lebanon/Israeli issue,
and instructs the Secretary General to help reach some
agreement there.
What is the status, as far as you understand it, of the
progress of the Secretary General in this regard?
Mr. Welch. Senator, the Secretary General's report was
just delivered to us last night. It is very Lebanon-specific,
derived principally from the requirements presented by
Resolution 1701, and it's diagramed against each of the broader
political principles that are in the first part of that
resolution. It's spare in its comment about the overall
regional situation, though it is mentioned.
I would say, on balance, the report is positive, overall,
because, as I mentioned earlier, in this period following the
cessation of hostilities, and given the deployment of the new
UNIFIL elements and the Lebanese army, the news is relatively
good from Lebanon, so far.
Now, he does point out in the report a number of areas that
need further effort, and some of the earlier questions alluded
to those. That includes the issue of disarmament, and it
includes the issue of the enforcement of the arms embargo, too.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Could you give this committee a general inventory of what
assistance the United States is providing, and is planning to
provide, Lebanon in terms of military assistance and economic
assistance? Generally, frame up the programs and the general
amount of money that we have pledged.
Mr. Welch. I will try to do that, sir. And I will also
make a detailed submission for the record.
[The information referred to above can be found in Appendix
I, page 65 of this hearing print.]
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Welch. We have pledged around $230 million. That
includes assistance from the current fiscal year and the next
fiscal year. About $40 million of that is security-related
assistance. Of that $230 million, between $55 million and $60
million is humanitarian aid. That is already being expended.
When we prepared for the Stockholm conference, sir, we tried to
organize to deliver our aid in such a manner that it was would
support things that were visible. So, those activities, to give
you some examples that I have on a list here, are to use
American taxpayer dollars to repair some of the bridges and
roads that were damaged in the fighting; to assist with
rebuilding of homes and other infrastructure; the school year
is about to begin in Lebanon, so we also wanted to help out on
rehabilitation of schoolhouses; there was a very significant
oil spill during the conflict, and we are making a contribution
there, but also to help the fishermen who have been affected by
this incident. As you know, Lebanon depends, for its natural
livelihood, on the ocean; and, finally, as I mentioned earlier,
helping with unexploded ordnance. These programs total, all
together, in the neighborhood of nearly $60 million,
themselves.
For the details of where this comes from, because it's a
complicated picture, both moving current and next fiscal-year
monies, but also reprogramming some other sums, I'd like to
submit an answer for the record.
[The information referred to above can be found in Appendix
I, page 65 of this hearing print.]
Mr. Welch. As I said, some part of our ability to deliver
this, sir, also depends on congressional support, and we would
hope to have that from, of course, the Senate, but also the
House.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
If I could just get one clarification, Mr. Chairman. Of the
$40 million you noted for security, is that $40 million for the
Lebanese army?
Mr. Welch. Not exclusively, sir. Some part of it would be
to assist the new peacekeeping operation. A significant part of
it, $10 million, is in DOD appropriations, under something
called Section 1206, which is exclusively for the Lebanese
army. I believe, sir, though I'd have to check, that that
requires congressional assent. This is spare parts for APCs,
helicopters, trucks, and other--it's mostly logistical
equipment, not guns. We are providing other personal-kit items
for LAF soldiers. We are going to increase our IMET program.
And then, beyond the army, we're looking at some assistance for
the internal security forces, which is, sort of, their national
guard. They have a national police service. That's what that
is. And that's more modest, but it's important. We haven't had
much of a relationship to that organization, and we feel it's
important, in the present context. That would support their
capabilities, including for airport security, scanning
equipment, but also training needs. We're looking at some
modest amounts of money also to support police and judges.
And I think one of the most important things we're going to
do is not involved with our money, but using the promise and
delivery of our money to get that from others, to those
organizations. In particular, there are some governments in the
region who can provide weapons, which are, believe it or not--
it's sometimes hard to conceive that weapons are needed in
Lebanon, but, for the legitimate security authorities, they
are, and many of the shoulder-fired weapons that the Lebanese
army and internal security forces have are not operable, so
they need those, and we hope to get friendly governments in the
area to provide them, using Gulf assistance money.
Senator Hagel. Well, I appreciate it. And I look forward
to seeing the detailed list, when you are able to bring it up.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson of Florida. Mr. Secretary, at the end of the
day what we want to do is to stabilize Lebanon. A major part of
stabilizing Lebanon is to disarm Hezbollah, which one U.N.
resolution already calls for, and the last one did not. Now
that the Israeli blockade has been withdrawn, is it not
realistic to assume that arms are flowing back in to Hezbollah?
Mr. Welch. This is the single most important and difficult
of the chores. There is absolutely no question that the long-
term real sovereignty and authority of Lebanon depends on the
central government being the sole source of the right to use
violence. That's what governments do. You can't have armed
militias that operate according to their own law and their own
politics. One part of disarming Hezbollah is to provide
protections so that it is harder for them to rearm. I think
that there are substantial new protections now available in the
way the Lebanese army and the new UNIFIL troops are deploying,
and in the coastal protection. The key question will be, Will
others from outside Lebanon violate this embargo, perhaps
through the land border? A lot depends on the ability and will
of the Government of Lebanon to enforce that, but also a lot
depends on the will and attention of the international
community to its enforcement, too. Those rules, Senator, you're
quite right, didn't exist before. But now we have them, and
it's up to us to exercise the vigilance and the discipline to
make sure that they are applied.
You ask, Is this rearmament occurring? We are watching that
very, very carefully. And, in this forum, I can say I think
that our judgment, so far, is, no, that it is not occurring.
That does not mean that it won't, sir.
Senator Nelson of Florida. I hope you're right, but I doubt
it.
Now, let me ask you about Syria. For example, Syria lost a
lot of influence after the tragic assassination of Rafik
Hariri. Is this not a way for Syria to start exercising some
more influence over Lebanon as being the conduit through which
those arms will flow to Hezbollah?
Mr. Welch. Well, they can try that, but that would be in
violation of international law. The resolution is very clear in
this respect, sir. And I think Secretary General Annan did
everyone a service when he stood up in Damascus and said that
that's the new rule and Syria is obliged to enforce it.
Senator Nelson of Florida. So, what are we going to do, and
what would the United Nations do if we catch Syria red-handed?
Mr. Welch. First of all, the trick is to catch anybody
red-handed. And I don't want to say we want to see it happen so
that we can catch 'em red-handed. We don't want to see it
happen.
But we are working with the Lebanese, with others in the
international community who want to help Lebanon along that
border, to make sure that there are measures put in place that
would avoid this risk. Should it happen, then I think we'll
bring the matter up in front of the Council and present
whatever evidence is available so that Syria, or whoever is
doing it, would be held to account.
Senator Nelson of Florida. And what would the Council
require of Syria, at that point?
Mr. Welch. Well, those rules are not spelled out yet, sir.
Senator Nelson of Florida. See, that's the problem. We're
in this Never-Never Land of head fake and sleight of hand and,
of course, we know what happened, now. Very sophisticated arms
got in that nobody knew about. Well, let me ask you--88
Senators sent a letter to the European Union asking the
European Union to add Hezbollah to its designated terrorist
groups list. Give me your opinion why the EU hasn't done this,
and also, what benefits would come if the EU did designate them
as a terrorist group?
Mr. Welch. Well, hard for me to answer. I don't represent
the European Union. We've already designated Hezbollah, as you
know, under U.S. law, and we've urged----
Senator Nelson of Florida. Well, let me ask you this, then.
Is it a priority, in our discussions with the EU, to get them
to designate Hezbollah a terrorist group?
Mr. Welch. Yes. Has been, is, and will be.
Senator Nelson of Florida. All right. If they did, what
benefit would occur?
Mr. Welch. As I understand it, the European laws vary from
country to country as to how they apply European Union rules. I
think we would be content to see them registered and then apply
some rules, because presently they are not. They have
undertaken some actions against Hezbollah organs. For example,
their TV station. And they have interdicted, basically under
law enforcement cooperation, some financing. But I think, more
broadly speaking, there are few rules that they apply, as the
EU qua EU.
Senator Nelson of Florida. Do you have any idea why the EU
has not designated them?
Mr. Welch. Their practice--again, I'm not seeking to
defend something that they haven't done that we've requested
them to do--but their practice typically has been that if the
Security Council designates or passes rules affecting terrorist
organizations, then they would follow suit and apply those. We
believe there is sufficient basis for them to exercise that
prerogative already, regardless. But, for their own reasons,
they've chosen not to do so, so far, beyond the specific
examples I mentioned.
Senator Nelson of Florida. Do you think the unsettled
nature of Lebanon is going to increase the Syrian influence?
Mr. Welch. No, sir, I don't, actually. I think Syria's
influence has suffered as a result of this conflict. I think we
may be in that period of time where there's still a bit of the
euphoria on the street that surrounds this aura of resistance
that the Hezbollahis had. But I think if you look at how the
international community has responded, it's responded in ways
that will make Syria's influence harder to exercise in the
future. And any Syrian violation of those new rules, I think,
would present new risks to Syria.
Senator Nelson of Florida. With regard to the television
station, you're quite right to point out that France and Spain
and the Netherlands have imposed bans on the television
station, but the television station we saw was a major element
of Hezbollah's communications. And it's looked upon as the
tenth most watched satellite station in the Arab world. So,
since the administration designated this a terrorist entity,
this past spring, what additional measures is the
administration taking against Al Manar?
Mr. Welch. I think the most important target of our
efforts is to deprive them of the ability to have satellite
transmissions. They have commercial contracts with the
satellite carriers, and we have had a significant diplomatic
effort to try and influence those decisions. So far, it's not
succeeded, Senator.
Senator Nelson of Florida. One little success, their sister
radio station was knocked off the air by a Spanish satellite
company after the designations. Senator Coleman and I had
requested this about a year and a half ago, and, once you all
did make that designation, that was one little success.
Mr. Welch. And we've been trying, with the two most
significant service providers in the area, to get them to back
away from their business contracts with this organization. But,
I want to be honest--we haven't succeeded, so far.
Senator Nelson of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I have 3 seconds
left, and I will just throw out this question.
Boy, it concerns me that the Palestinian President is
forming some kind of cooperation with Hamas. I recognize his
political reality in front of him. What does the State
Department think about this?
Mr. Welch. Well, we've spoken to that issue as recently as
yesterday, and I made a statement, myself, about this. We--the
standards that we have--well, let me step back a second here.
The United States has certain standards with respect to
Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization, so our law is pretty
strict in that respect. We led the international community in
defining the principles under which we would interact with any
Palestinian Government. Those are the three I mentioned
earlier. To the extent we understand it so far, the discussions
among the Palestinians about a new national unity government do
not appear to rise to that standard, Senator. And that's been
communicated to them, both privately and publicly.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Coleman?
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, a little bit of history. Resolution 1559, how did it
deal with the issue of armaments to Hezbollah?
Mr. Welch. There were several significant features of that
resolution, but it's nowhere near as prescriptive, sir, as
1701. What is suggested first, the most important thing, was
that foreign troops should not be present in Lebanon. And that
was the international legal basis for the call for Syria to
pull out, which didn't really gain force until, unfortunately,
the murder of Rafik Hariri.
With respect to disarmament, there was a provision, as I
recall it, in that resolution that called for the disarmament
of militias. Hezbollah claimed that that didn't apply to them,
although all logic wouldn't see it that way, because they were
not a militia; they claimed to be a national resistance. I
don't think anybody really bought that argument. I think that
was contrived in order to justify their retention of arms.
There are other armed groups present in Lebanon,
principally Palestinian, and the most significant of those are
Syrian-supported, so it applied to them, also.
Senator Coleman. There's been a lot of criticism on the
Hill about the failure to enforce 1559. And, if you look at
history as any kind of indicator of the future, I think there
is a lot of doubt, a lack of confidence in success of 1701 that
we want it to succeed. But clearly, the administration's goal
was not to go back to the status quo--to a situation where, for
Hezbollah, the situation is not much different today than it
was before July 12th. It's still there, it's still armed. Can
you give me some sense of whether Hezbollah was being rearmed
today, the issue is ``not now,'' but clearly you're not in a
position to say ``not in the future.'' Help me have some sense
of optimism that we've got anything more than the status quo
here, Hezbollah being more popular than it was before, and
perhaps limited ability, and certainly limited history, in
terms of enforcement of U.N. resolutions.
Mr. Welch. I think Senator Biden had an interesting point,
Senator Coleman, when he said that when this fish sits on the
pier for a while and begins to stink, we'll see how deep that
public support really is.
But your question is a good one. I would argue that
Resolution 1559 was important, but kind of spare, in what it
gave us as tools of enforcement. Resolution 1701 is really
quite different. It does empower a very substantial new force
to help the Lebanese army do something it's historically never
done, which is deploy in the south. And right now all the
evidence suggests that the Hezbollahi armed presence isn't
there in the south anymore. That would be a significant change
in the status quo. And I think the best evidence for that
Senator, is the fact that Israel is withdrawing, because I
doubt that they would tolerate the risk, were the Hezbollahis
still present.
Second, there's this coastal surveillance capability now,
which is just starting up. The Lebanese coastline has been
vulnerable to smuggling before. The land border remains a
vulnerability, as I described. And we're going to have to do
further work in that area.
But the arms embargo itself, there wasn't anything like
that in 1559, and now it's a matter of international obligation
that countries can't do this.
Now, as Senator Nelson pointed out, you need to elaborate,
What are the penalties if you violate it? But the first is to
create the presumption, the requirement that it should not be
violated. So, in addition to the protections inside Lebanon, I
think you have these significant new instruments outside it, as
well. Those weren't present with 1559.
Senator Coleman. Let me talk a little bit about the land
border concern that I have, the Syria/Lebanese border. I
understand that UNIFIL is not going to be enforcing that. The
Lebanese have said that they'll control that. And yet, you
know, this is where arms flow from Iran into Lebanon. Are there
any viable options for addressing that threat to future
stability and security?
Mr. Welch. Well, this is a very good question. The first
thing that has happened is that the Lebanese army is now moving
into that area in much more significant numbers than before,
and they are conducting operations to assure the protection of
the border.
Second, we would like to see international support up
there. And the Lebanese Government has requested that of
certain European governments. And they are beginning to provide
that. It's not under a UNIFIL umbrella, that's correct, but
these are important and significant countries that will come in
to do this, and I think if that assistance can get established
on the ground, and these border crossings be more controlled--
in particular, there are four major ones that are involved--
then there's the promise that this will be--that the Lebanese
Government's border and customs monitoring systems will be much
better than they have been in the past.
Senator Coleman. One of the challenges--and I'd like to
just ask a little bit about the Syrian influence. I mean, the
Syrian connection--it's one thing to have a resolution saying
Syria is out of Lebanon, but, on the other hand, you have
relationships, particularly with Syria and the Lebanese
military, that I presume go back, and there's no way to kind of
cleanse that. Do you have a sense of Syrian influence with the
Lebanese military, does that continue? Does it have an impact?
Is there anything that we're doing to deal with that?
Mr. Welch. Syria is Lebanon's only other land neighbor,
and historically socially, economically, these two countries
are very linked. So, to say that Syria is not going to have
influence in Lebanon, or, for that matter, sir, that Lebanon
wouldn't have influence in Syria, is not possible. It's going
to be there. Now, the question is, Is it going to be a normal
relationship? It hasn't been a normal relationship in the past.
You know, you're dealing with a very weird situation, where I
believe these two countries are the only two members of the
Arab League that don't have embassies in each other's capitals.
Even the PLO, with its difficult history in Lebanon, has an
embassy in Beirut. And Syria doesn't. So, the call, in the
Secretary General's report, for the restoration of a normal
diplomatic relationship between the two countries is, I think,
important. There has to be that kind of mutual and balanced
respect for each other.
Now, would that eliminate their influence? No, but it would
put it on, I think, a tolerable basis, if there were good
intentions on both sides.
Senator Coleman. In reality, Syria didn't need an embassy
in Lebanon; it had Lebanon.
Mr. Welch. It had troops there for many years.
Senator Coleman. Let me just touch on the soldiers that
were kidnaped, the two by Hezbollah and one by Hamas. You've
touched upon that very, very briefly. But my understanding was,
when the hostilities ended and 1701 was put in place, one of
the, you know, principal understandings was the return of the
two IDF soldiers. Where are we at? And what's the prospect for
that, kind of, very basic humane understanding and agreement
that these parties have agreed to? When is that going to be
enforced?
Mr. Welch. Well, it's the position of the United States,
Senator, that two Israeli soldiers that we believe are still
being held captive by someone, in someplace within Lebanon, and
should be returned unharmed. The same applies to the one
soldier being held captive someplace in Gaza. We're not--we,
the United States--we're not involved in trying to obtain their
release. My understanding is that Israel and Lebanon have
looked to the Secretary General now with respect to the people
held in Lebanon, and in his report that was just given to us
last night, he says he is working on that, but he says that,
given the sensitivity of the task, he is not going to say very
much about it. That's where that effort stands.
With respect to the soldier held captive someplace in Gaza
by someone, we see the most promising effort, continue to be
the one led by the Egyptian Government. That said, I can't say
to you that any release or exchange is imminent there. I would
both have to be spare in my comment about that, but also, I
don't know that that negotiation is about to produce anything.
Senator Coleman. My time's up. I realize that these are
not our soldiers, but we do have a stake in the normalization
of relations in the area, and stability in the area. And these
two would be very simple and basic preconditions of cessation
of hostilities. It would seem to me we would have an interest,
a strong interest, in pursuing that as vigorously as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coleman.
Senator Obama has graciously ceded for the moment to
Senator Sununu, so I will call upon the Senator from New
Hampshire and then the Senator from Illinois.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Senator Obama. I have to depart immediately after the
questioning, so I'll try to keep my questions very short. And
your answers, so far, have been very direct, Secretary Welch.
You spoke of the pledge of $230 million. And when the
United States--the administration, the President, or the
Secretary--makes an announcement that there's $230 million
going to be made available to deal with the aftermath of this
crisis, I think the natural assumption is that that 230 million
is going to be in addition to other funds, other assistance,
other relationships that have previously existed. But if we
look at the way this money breaks down, that's simply not the
case.
We have $230 million. A hundred million dollars in
humanitarian relief. You mentioned $60 million in
reconstruction, but that money is really coming from money that
was already allocated in our appropriation bills for ESF
support to Lebanon. You mentioned the security funding, but a
third of that, over $25 million, is going to go to support
UNIFIL and U.N. forces, not to the Lebanese army. And so, at
the end of the day, it appears that there's really very little
new funding that will be provided to the country or government
or people of Lebanon to deal with the aftermath of this crisis.
Wouldn't that seem to be the case?
Mr. Welch. Well, one thing I will do when we submit an
answer for the record on the breakdown of these funds is try
and separate out that number for you, Senator, so that Congress
can see it with great clarity.
[The information referred to above can be found in Appendix
I, page 65 of this hearing print.]
Mr. Welch. Let me assure you that, from where I sit, there
is no more determined advocate of additional funding to Lebanon
than myself, and, for that matter, the Secretary of State. But
then, we're advocating a lot of other budgetary needs,
including in my region, and that's an intense competition. But
I believe powerfully in the value of this assistance, and in
its ability to leverage others to provide assistance.
Senator Sununu. And, to be clear, I'm not worried about
the determination or the intentions or the objectives. What I'm
worried about is the unintended consequence of making a certain
international commitment, public commitment, when the actual
realities of the funds that are made available are much less
than what was suggested. I'm worried about the effect of
overpromising and underdelivering. And when, as you rightly
point out, we emphasize the value of visibility, it's
counterproductive if, at the end of the day, the visibility
might be less than--actually be less than it otherwise would
have been. Let me give an example. Of $37.5 million in EMF
funding for fiscal year 2007, and $20 million or $30 million
for fiscal year 2006, a significant portion of those funds are
for scholarships, for educational support, something we've
talked about in this committee, I've worked on somewhat over
the last several years. And then to allocate that entire $37
million for 2007 to the reconstruction effort suggests that the
funds then will not be available for those scholarship and
educational support programs. Now, I don't know what the answer
is, but you just can't have it both ways.
And so, if, at the end of the day, we make an announcement
that there's going to be $37 or $40 million available for
reconstruction, but the scholarships end up going away, we've
done a disservice to our own efforts in the region; of course,
we've done a disservice to the Lebanese people. So, as I look
at the breakdown that has been provided--and it's probably not
as detailed as the one you will provide--I see many red flags,
because we can't claim to provide X amount of support knowing
that of the $100 million in support that $50 million that we
already promised has to be reprogrammed.
To that point, you mention the need to reprogram funds. And
so, that's a red flag, right there. That means we're taking
funds away from some area, potentially, in Lebanon, and putting
it elsewhere. There will be, I hope, a little bit of new money
here. You mentioned a concern of resistance, resistance in
Congress. Have you, in making these initial requests for
reprogramming in four funds, met with any resistance from
Congress?
Mr. Welch. I think what I said, Senator, is, I would like
congressional support, which is a diplomat's way of saying ``I
need it.''
Senator Sununu. And I hope you get congressional support,
but, to date, have you met with any resistance in Congress?
Mr. Welch. We're still going through the process of
explaining what we need to both houses.
Senator Sununu. Have you made requests to reprogram funds?
Mr. Welch. No, we've not submitted those yet.
Senator Sununu. You haven't submitted any reprogramming
requests.
Mr. Welch. I think that's the answer. Now, you're talking
to--you're not talking to the aid side of our house right now.
However, I----
Senator Sununu. I will--I mean, I understand. As much as I
respect your abilities, you don't know everything.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sununu. But--and so, I--but I would like a
specific answer to the question. Have you made reprogramming
requests? And have they been granted or have holds been put on
those requests? Because, look, you know, people have got to
stand up and let the public, and certainly let the
administration, know where they are and whether or not they're
holding up these reprogramming requests.
Mr. Welch. Senator, we have made reprogramming requests. I
think we are in a position to spell some of those out to you
separately, if I might. And we do presently have holds on those
requests.
Senator Sununu. I thank you for your candor. And I find
that extremely problematic. And, to a certain--an example of
the problem that I am talking about, that--well, certainly I'd
like to see the funds made available, but it becomes
counterproductive, actually hurts our effort, hurts our cause,
certainly hurts the work that you are doing, undermines the
work that you're doing, when we are making public commitments,
and we have a hearing that talks about public--our own members
support it, congressional support for the Siniora government
and the difficulties that they've been through--public
commitments have been made, and then, behind the scenes, we are
either, (a) reprogramming funds that were already there, so
that the net effect of the funding will be less than it should
be, and, therefore, fall short of what we're committing to in
public, and, on top of that, we have a crisis situation, we
have either committees or members of Congress that are even
putting holds on the limited reprogramming requests that have
been made. I think that it's counterproductive, from a
diplomatic perspective, from a humanitarian perspective, and I
think, in the long run, it undermines our security goals,
America's security interests. And you've spoken, I think, very
directly about how our security interests are intertwined here.
If you'd like to comment.
Mr. Welch. Well, Senator, I hope to be able to do a better
job at persuading people of the requirement for these monies.
Senator Sununu. Finally, on the military assistance, could
you speak, at least a little bit, about the specific ways in
which you hope the military assistance will be provided when
it's provided directly to the Lebanese army. Where do you think
their shortcomings are, from your discussions with our security
personnel that are helping with this relationship?
Mr. Welch. We've been working with the Lebanese army for
some time, as you know, and we have done, I won't say, a full-
blown assessment, but a pretty important assessment of what
their requirements are. And they're significant, but not
overwhelming. And, I mean, I think with good intention and
international support, we would be able to meet a large part of
their needs.
I think, as I said earlier, this is not a very large army,
by Middle Eastern standards. It's mostly U.S.-equipped, and its
mobility needs, communications requirements, and associated
firepower are important. And I think we ought to have
initiatives in all those areas.
Since our assistance monies are rather limited, and,
historically, we've had to build from a fairly low base in
helping the Lebanese army, we're going to concentrate on the
logistical end first. For example, their trucks, Jeeps, APCs,
the stuff that they're driving into southern Lebanon right now,
I think, ought to be an important emphasis. That's what they've
asked us for, also. They presented a long and detailed list of
other requirements, including lethal requirements--ammunition
and weapons--which we've seen as perhaps more appropriate--or
appropriately could be provided, and more immediately, by
others. And we're doing a bit of fundraising to help them get
those requirements.
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much.
I want to close with just a couple of brief comments. One,
I know you agree with, or I think you agree with, or at least
understand the motives here, but I want to state it for the
record, that if any of the money commitment, or any of the
methods we use to get funding to Lebanon in the aftermath of
this crisis, take resources away from the educational support
that we have historically been providing and effectively have
committed in previous appropriation bills, I think it would be
an absolute tragedy. I think that funding far and away has
historically supported our diplomatic efforts, our
communication efforts, our cultural ties, our historic ties,
our economic ties, whether it's to Lebanese-American
University, American University in Beirut, or other schools and
academic institutions. I just want to underscore that. It would
be a travesty if we had to reprogram funds and, as a result,
shortchange those programs. It's the definition of penny wise
and pound foolish.
And, second, I just want to commend the work of the embassy
staff and the Ambassador there. Having worked on these issues,
we were in very close contact with them during the crisis,
during the evacuation, and they've really done a great job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Sununu.
Senator Obama?
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Welch, it's good to see you again. Last time we
saw each other, things were a little more calm in your neck of
the woods.
Mr. Welch. If such a thing is possible.
Senator Obama. If such a thing is possible.
You've already gone over a lot of the ground that I was
interested in, but since I'm the last questioner before the
next panel, maybe we can just revisit a couple of points.
What, at this point, are the prospects of the international
community, especially in light of the deployment of an
international force, being able to strengthen the Lebanese
Government to the extent that it can control its own borders,
vis-a-vis Hezbollah? What's your expectation here? Is this new
international force going to have to deploy for the foreseeable
future in order to maintain a buffer zone there, or do you
think that there are enough elements in place within the
Lebanese Government to actually start creating a more effective
sovereign state in a relatively short period of time?
Mr. Welch. Thank you for this question, Senator.
In my business, you can look backwards and say, ``Well, I'm
discouraged, because in 1978 we set up something called the
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, and the Interim has
been there since 1978 and we're in 2006.''
Senator Obama. Right.
Mr. Welch. If that isn't something that's semipermanent, I
don't know what is.
Senator Obama. Right.
Mr. Welch. Or you can look forward, and you can say that.
It's probably a feature of the Arab/Israeli conflict that even
in those places where there isn't a peace to keep there is some
form of international support for the management of peace. This
border has been one of those, and one of the most difficult.
I believe, looking forward, that we have substantial new
tools in our hands. Can I guarantee that these eliminate all
the risks? No, sir, I can't. But I think this is a
fundamentally new contribution here.
The new UNIFIL is nothing like the old UNIFIL. It has
completely new concept of operations and rules of engagement.
If you were to take a look at these U.N. documents, sir, they
provide for a very robust capability. I think the existence of
combat battalions from NATO member states is a significant new
addition. And this is not 40 troops, this is in the hundreds. A
maritime surveillance mission--again, with capable NATO-
affiliated navies--is hugely important.
But the main game here is political. And it's exactly as
you describe it: to change this balance of authority and power
inside of Lebanon.
I believe that the government, led by Fouad Siniora--beset
with as many difficulties as it was before and during this
crisis--has done a truly remarkable job in addressing it. They
deserve our support. I think the March 14 movement that is at
the heart of that government stands in opposition to those
forces of extremism and violence that would start this kind of
thing again. And we're all called upon to help out in that
endeavor.
I think, here also, the United States--and forgive me if I
sound like I'm tooting our own horn in this respect--I think
American diplomacy made a good contribution. We were attacked
publicly at the beginning of the conflict, for appearing not do
much about it, but the very things that we said at the
beginning of the conflict that should be done to really truly
put in place something that was more sustainable, we have
managed to attain. We need to hold people to those. We need to
make sure that they operate. But I think we realize the
importance of this. Beyond Lebanon, too.
Senator Obama. Just to follow up, in terms of what we mean
by ``an effective UNIFIL force,'' how many troops are we
talking about over a sustained period of time in order to
create stability in Southern Lebanon?
Mr. Welch. Well, the authorization provides for up to
15,000.
Senator Obama. Right. And right now we have around 4,000.
Mr. Welch. I can be sure that there are around 4,000
already deployed. And the significant deployments are picking
up pace right now. There are additional commitments that--I
don't believe they get us to 15,000, Senator, but----
Senator Obama. Okay. Let's assume we get to 10,000 troops.
Mr. Welch [continuing]. ----It's in that neighborhood.
Senator Obama. What's your estimation? Are we looking at
10,000 troops, UNIFIL troops there semipermanently? From 1978
to now is about 28 years. Is this ``new'' UNIFIL likely to be
deployed for this duration?
Mr. Welch. I think the countries that are stepping up to
these deployments, while they're not signing on for something
permanent, understand that this is not a transitory deployment.
Senator Obama. This isn't long term. I'm just trying to
play out the end game here. Are the goals to limit the
skirmishes along the border, so that you're not seeing the
kinds of incursions back and forth that we had seen before,
that you're not seeing missiles launched into Israel or cross-
border rapes. Is that an accurate assessment of, sort of, the
modest goals that we've set forward here?
Mr. Welch. Sir, I think our objectives--and, frankly, the
reach of the resolution--go beyond that.
Senator Obama. Describe for me more broadly what our long-
term goals and objectives are.
Mr. Welch. Right now, we're in this period between the
cessation of hostilities and the permanent cease-fire. The
cessation of hostilities means an end to offensive military
operations.
Senator Obama. Right.
Mr. Welch. That has been respected by all sides. As a
result of that, and the fact that the Lebanese army's
deploying, UNIFIL--new UNIFIL is going in, and the IDF is now
pulling out.
But when you get to the permanent cease-fire, that requires
respect for what's called the ``blue line.''
Senator Obama. Right.
Mr. Welch. It's not, as you know, an established border
with a peace agreement between the two parties. But that would
mean there are no violations of that line coming from Lebanon
into Israel or, for that matter, the reverse.
Senator Obama. Right.
Mr. Welch. That is the premise.
Senator Obama. Right.
Mr. Welch. And the new UNIFIL is composed with that in
mind.
Senator Obama. Okay. But that's the--UNIFIL's main
function is just to maintain that blue line and its integrity.
Mr. Welch. And to help the Lebanese army in ensuring that
there is no armed group, other than UNIFIL and the Lebanese
security authorities, present in that area of operations.
That's an expanded area of operations under the new UNIFIL, and
it would mean that there is no Hezbollahi armed presence in
that area.
Senator Obama. Okay. And so, that brings us, I guess, to
the next question. I mean, my understanding is, no one is
particularly optimistic about disarming Hezbollah, at this
stage. Am I correct about that?
Mr. Welch. My former boss, Colin Powell, used to say
optimism is a force multiplier, and, in my business, I need
force multipliers, so I'm not going to give up the optimism.
Disarmament of Hezbollah is a national goal. But there are no
groups, armed groups, to be in the area of operations, the
Lebanese army, and UNIFIL in the south. So, that is an
immediate goal.
Senator Obama. Okay. So, the immediate goal would be to at
least--assuming we don't disarm Hezbollah--to restrict their
operations in such a way as Hezbollah not intruding in this
southern area around the blue line.
Mr. Welch. That's correct. And they appear, so far, to be
respecting that obligation.
Senator Obama. Okay. Get inside Hezbollah's head for a
moment. They've come out of this, in some ways, as heroes
within portions of the Arab world. And this may be shortlived.
But there's a sense, at least that in the short term, Hezbollah
was strengthened politically on the Arab street by what
happened. What do they now attempt to do? Do they try to
further consolidate political power within the Lebanese
Government? Do they try to plan future attacks, or try to
undermine UNIFIL's efforts? Do we have a sense of what they
want, what their end game is?
Mr. Welch. Well, this gets into the realm of speculation.
Senator Obama. Or intelligence.
Mr. Welch. Well, I can't go into the latter, sir.
Senator Obama. Okay. Fair enough.
Mr. Welch. But I'll try a little informed speculation.
Senator Obama. Okay.
Mr. Welch. If I were in their shoes, I'd try and change
the subject, attack the Government of Lebanon verbally, attack
us, Tony Blair, others, because when Hassan Nasrallah made the
decision, for whatever reason, on July 12th to launch this
attack into Israel, he displaced over three-quarters of a
million Lebanese as a result of the conflict that ensued, most
of which are his constituents.
Senator Obama. Do they blame him, or, at this point, do
they blame Israel?
Mr. Welch. Well, my guess is, they and others likely
blamed Israel and others in the international community,
including us. But that's a fish that's on the pier and
beginning to stink as Senator Biden said. The destruction that
happened in Lebanon is not something that Israel one day picked
up and decided it would like to do. It happened because of an
unprovoked attack for which one party is solely and simply
responsible, and they will have to live up to that.
Senator Obama. Well, I guess the point that I'm trying to
get at is how we can play a constructive role in--but in a
realistic fashion--in creating stability in Lebanon when you've
got Hezbollah still armed, you've got a Shi'a population that
still feels somewhat disaffected, you've got forces of
moderation in Lebanon that appear to have been weakened. My
suspicion is that only time's going to tell how this plays out
politically. It seems to me that what we've done by deploying
this international force create a situation which is helpful,
which is working to stabilize the situation and end the
immediate hot conflict, but I still don't get a sense of how we
approach the long-term diplomatic task of getting at the root
causes of this conflict and creating a stable Lebanon that is
not a base for future operations by Hezbollah of this sort. And
I don't know the degree to which that can't be solved until our
relations with Iran and Syria change, or until we make more
progress in resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. But I'm
just trying to get a bigger picture of--if we are trying to map
out where do we want to be a decade from now, given all the
elements that are in place, What's our best-case scenario? What
is it that we're going to be trying to pursue? And it's a
reasonable answer to say that, you know, we've just tried to
stop the bleeding right now, and we haven't yet formulated a
strategy, long term. And, if it is, you know, that's perfectly
acceptable. I don't fault you for not having that immediate
answer.
Mr. Welch. Well, Senator, I think we've done better than
that, actually. I don't see the present measures that we're
trying to put in place as merely stabilizing the situation.
Senator Obama. Okay.
Mr. Welch. I hope you would agree that, upon examination,
they reduce the risk that this will occur again.
Senator Obama. Well, I'm sorry, go ahead.
Mr. Welch. And, second, I mean, let's look at the record
over the last several years and not just pause it at this
moment in time and ask ourselves about the challenge at
present. There are no Syrian troops in Lebanon now. Admittedly,
it took a tragedy to, kind of, galvanize that change, but this
is a huge and important development for Lebanese freedom.
There is a substantial and growing public sentiment in
Lebanon in favor of a moderate, liberal approach to government.
You know, I mean, it's, of course, got its character, that's
Lebanese, in particular. That's the politics of the place.
Those people need support. But they weren't there before, just
one summer ago, when you had the first parliamentary election
in Lebanon in years when there wasn't a Syrian presence.
Now, ideally, those freedoms will expand, and some of the
work that we're doing now is designed to help protect that. So,
I would say that the trend line here, despite these things, is
actually pretty good, and not in the interests of the enemies
of peace.
That said, I believe that these are very determined people
who have a lot at risk in their position; in particular, in
Damascus. And I would not expect that they're going to take
this lying down. I think they see some loss, not just of
political face, but of practical interests, and they're not
going to make this easy. But we know that. And I think with, as
I mentioned earlier, determination and good intentions, we can
do that.
The audience for helping Lebanon is much larger now, too.
We've got a good solid basis of transatlantic understanding on
how to do this--cooperating with the French, after all, and
that's not a bad thing. The support we have from our moderate
friends in the Arab world is excellent. They're all aware of
the risk of these subcontracted entities like Hezbollah. And I
think we can use that support constructively to help Lebanon.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.
And thank you very much, Secretary Welch. We very much
appreciate your opening statement, your comments, and your
forthcoming responses to our questions.
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much, Senator.
The Chairman. And we look forward to seeing you again soon.
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Chair would now like to call our second
panel. It includes the Honorable Carlos Pascual, vice president
and director of foreign policy studies, Brookings Institution;
Paul Salem, director-designate, Carnegie Middle East Center, in
Beirut, Lebanon; and Augustus Richard Norton, professor of
international relations and anthropology at Boston University,
in Boston, Massachusetts.
Gentlemen, we appreciate your coming today. Let me just say
that your statements will be made a part of the record. I would
suggest that you proceed as you wish with statements of
approximately 10 minutes or thereabouts, so that all can be
heard and I or other members will have an opportunity to raise
questions before we come up against a roll-call vote, which is
promised for about 12:15. I'm going to ask you to testify in
the order that I introduced you, and that would be, first of
all, Ambassador Pascual. Welcome, again, to the committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. CARLOS PASCUAL, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR
OF FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ambassador Pascual. Mr. Senator, thank you very much. I
appreciate this opportunity to testify before you and the
committee, and thank you for the opportunity to also submit for
the record my written statement.
My comments today are based, Mr. Chairman, on a trip that I
just completed in Lebanon on Monday. While it was a time-
limited trip, it was intensive. We had an opportunity to
interview several dozen government ministers, technical staff,
diplomats, relief workers, foreign and domestic NGOs, bankers,
business people, essentially many of the key people who are
involved in developing a vision for the reconstruction
program--designing it, supporting it, and actually implementing
it.
I came away, Mr. Chairman, most surprised by two things.
One was the unity of the Lebanese people, and, secondly, the
opportunity that we have right now. And this has been a subject
of discussion throughout this hearing.
There is, indeed, a palpable bitterness about the war and
the blockade and how it essentially snatched away from Lebanon
what many people saw as an opportunity to turn around the
fortunes of that country.
The economy was finally growing, at a rate of 6 percent,
tourism was restored, there seemed to be a sense of hope where
the wounds from the civil war were healing.
What is interesting is that the response the war engendered
was one by the Lebanese people as the Lebanese people, not as
Shi'a, not as Sunni, not as Druze, not as Maronites, not as
Orthodox, but as the Lebanese people.
One also saw a tremendous amount of talent in the private
sector, in the banking sector. From my experience in the former
Soviet Union, if we had only had such a banking sector in that
region of the world, we could have done amazing things. And
what we also saw was a tremendous capacity for crisis
management.
If we recognize that, as a result of the war and the
blockade, there was $2.5 billion in capital flight, 1 million
displaced people, 30,000 homes that were destroyed or partially
destroyed, 500,000 dual-citizen Lebanese that left the country,
and a billion dollars worth of lost revenue as a result of the
war, and yet, still during this period, the currency has been
stable, inflation is in check, the society is now starting to
rebuild, 1701 was negotiated, and the blockade was lifted. The
Saudi and Kuwaiti Governments deserve a lot of credit for the
$1.5 billion that they deposited into the Central Bank. This is
not money to be spent, it's essentially to protect the
currency. This support helped, but it could not have happened
without the internal talent of the Lebanese people, and that's
a tremendous asset on which to build.
That does not mean that we should be complacent. There are
three massive challenges, I believe, that have to be addressed
at the same time, and the cost of these three massive
challenges I would estimate at about $5.1 billion over 2 to 3
years. The needs assessments are being done still, but I think
it's important that we start thinking on this order of
magnitude, because I think $5.1 billion is actually a very
conservative estimate.
The first challenge is on near-term humanitarian aid and
recovery. Two-thirds of those who have displaced have already
returned. They did not return because of assistance, they
returned almost immediately, because of an interest of going
back to their homes. There's a real time pressure to move and
provide them assistance because of the winter that is
encroaching and the requirements to get so much done before
November.
Some of the key requirements are: shelter, water, stopgap
electricity-sectors measures, and restoring the schools. I
would estimate the cost of this portion of the recovery program
at about $600 million, based on some relatively conservative
estimates of the numbers of homes that were destroyed and the
number of people who were displaced.
The second challenge is one of building social, economic,
and physical infrastructure. There's a phenomenal need for
jobs, Mr. Senator. If we look at the situation on the ground,
crops were destroyed, tourism has ended. Essentially, the
people who are going back have no work. They need some form of
temporary subsidy to be able to survive, but fundamentally they
need jobs, and their communities need to have a mechanism to
get involved in rebuilding and put their communities to work.
There also is a need for long-term physical infrastructure.
Three-quarters of the country's roads and bridges have been
destroyed or somehow affected. The electricity sector is
sporadic. The water system was poor, and is even poorer now,
and it doesn't reach effectively into the rural areas. A
reasonable estimate for this portion of the recovery program
and reconstruction program is $3.5 billion.
And, finally, there are structural and financial issues
that have to be addressed. Lebanon has the highest per-capita
debt in the world; 25 percent of the budget on an annual basis
goes to debt service.
Secondly, the electricity sector is one of the most
inefficient in the world. Subsidies to the electricity sector
are costing about a billion dollars a year, about 25 percent of
the budget in subsidies.
Between these two things, subsidies to the electricity and
debt service, the government has been spending half of its
budget. If this cannot be fixed and resolved, there will be no
sustainable recovery in Lebanon.
Also because of the high level of debt, it is impossible
for the Lebanese Government to finance these measures by taking
on additional debt. And, hence, as a result of the financial
losses that took place this year--as a result of moving from 6-
percent growth to, at best, no growth, and moving from a
primary budget surplus to a primary deficit--they need $1
billion in grant budget support.
Let me say a few things about the financial requirements
and flows, because, certainly as demonstrated in the previous
conversation, I think there's been a lot of confusion about
that.
I indicated that this estimate of $5.1 billion, I think, is
conservative. It does not cover compensation for capital flight
or targeted subsidies for reform programs. It does not even
touch on the requirements for the military. It does not touch
on requirements for boosting investments by the private sector.
On the supply side, there have been significant pledges.
For reconstruction, the Saudis have pledged $500 million; the
Kuwaitis, $300 million; Qatar, another $300 million--$1.1
billion between them. That should be counted against the $5.1
billion total. These funds have not been delivered, because the
mechanisms for their administration have not been established.
There is no fund for which this money is to be deposited. Qatar
is looking for a mechanism to adopt villages, but how to do
that in a systematic way that does not result in corruption
still has not been established.
The Saudis and the Kuwaitis, as I indicated, provided $1.5
billion to the Central Bank. That should not be counted against
this total. It cannot be used for reconstruction purposes. It
is there to protect the currency.
At the Stockholm conference, $940 million were pledged, and
others have indicated that a total of $1.2 billion have been
provided so far. Part of that has already been consumed in
humanitarian aid, and should not be counted as assistance for
the future. As well, we get a mix of apples and oranges. At
times, when we look at the totals of pledges, some contain
military assistance, others contain peacekeeping. I would say
that a reasonable estimate against the $5.1 billion requirement
for reconstruction, that about $2.5 billion has been pledged,
and there is still another gap of about $2.6 billion.
Against this, we have the U.S. $230 million pledge, of
which the administration has indicated $180 million relates to
the topic of economic recovery and reconstruction. The sectors
in which the administration is working are reasonable, except I
would caution that we should be looking carefully at whether we
deliver much further food assistance to Lebanon. It is an
economy that is fundamentally entrepreneurial, and we should
not destroy their markets by an oversupply of food aid.
The approach has been responsible, essentially using
nongovernmental organizations as a way to disburse money and a
way to control funds in an unstable environment. It is a
program that one would say is characteristic of a midsized
country which is well-meaning and has a limited strategic
interest in the region. I do not think that that is how we
would want to characterize the United States.
If we wanted to associate the strategic interest that is
appropriate with Lebanon, I would suggest that we set a target
of $750 million for the U.S. contribution for recovery and
reconstruction. That would be about 15 percent of the $5.1
billion total that I indicated, or another $570 million for
reconstruction and recovery beyond what the U.S. has pledged
thus far. This 15-percent total would be consistent with what
the United States provided in tsunami relief. It is actually
less than the usual 25 percent that we provide in major
international reconstruction programs. It does not--I would
stress--it does not include military assistance. And here, even
$300 million is a conservative figure. If we look at the
average requirement around the world for equipping and training
forces, it's usually been about $20,000 per soldier.
Multiplying that by 15,000 Lebanese troops occupying the south,
that, in and of itself, gets us to a $300 million total. It
does not include aerial surveillance or capabilities of
patrolling the border more effectively. I think we're going to
see a requirement well over a billion dollars, and we need to
be thinking about how we're going to respond to that.
A couple of comments on how to approach the reconstruction
program and how to use these funds.
First of all, I would stress a very important principle--it
has been underscored throughout this hearing, and I would say
it again--the importance of using this assistance as a way to
strengthen the Lebanese state and to build confidence in the
Lebanese state. It is crucial for internal actors within
Lebanon to believe that the best thing for their future is to
be part of a unified state and not part of a state within a
state--i.e., Hezbollah. They must have the confidence that
Lebanon can provide--the Government of Lebanon can provide for
their needs. It's critical to attract international capital.
It's critical to attract people back to the country.
In terms of how to use the funds, I've provided some
specific suggestions in my written testimony. I would just
highlight the importance of using assistance through private
banks, the private sector, through NGOs, the university
community, through local private experts, in ways that will
complement the capabilities of the government. This is going to
be a tricky process. The government still does not have a very
effective process of being able to channel and monitor funds to
a local level, yet there are techniques that have been used,
particularly in Afghanistan. I had the benefit of traveling to
Lebanon with Ashraf Ghani, the former Minister of Finance in
Afghanistan, and we've already begun to outline some of the
approaches that he took in Afghanistan of being able to use
money--move money to a local level, get communities involved,
and get them involved in the employment of local communities.
Finally, let me just stress a few points on why this
matters so much.
Lebanon is, indeed, the most multiethnic society in the
region. It has the strongest private sector. It has the
potential to succeed. It can play a leadership role in the
region. And if it fails, the prospects for peace in the region
become even yet more dim.
In the op-ed by Henry Kissinger, which you cited earlier,
he said that, the balance sheet of this war, in part, is going
to depend on psychological and political factors. And one of
those factors is going to be Hezbollah and its de facto reality
as a state within a state. There is debate on whether Hezbollah
has become stronger or whether working in the south will
actually strengthen Hezbollah. I think the answer to
Hezbollah's future very much rests with the reconstruction
process.
There are certain realities that I think are important to
acknowledge. First is that there is a legacy that was left by
the Lebanese civil war. There simply was no effective
assistance that was provided to the south. There's a legacy of
corruption, of half-finished projects, of discrediting the
government's role. Hezbollah stepped into a vacuum. And that
vacuum has to be combated. If there is no effective government
role, there will be one source of providing for the people's
needs, and that is Hezbollah.
Secondly, what I began to hear from people on the ground
working actively in the south is that, yes, Hezbollah's role is
real, it's extensive, but that Hezbollah is also being
overwhelmed. It is a huge challenge. Hezbollah began with an
immediate dynamic process of handing out checks for those who
needed to rebuild their houses. Their ability to continue the
assessment process and hand out those resources has been
limited. And increasingly what we are being told by the
government and by NGOs active in the region is that Hezbollah
is actually opening more and more space for others to come in
and be active.
Thirdly, what we heard from the NGOs working in the area is
that there are many NGOs active in the south who are not linked
to Hezbollah and who do not depend on Hezbollah to be able to
undertake their activities. There is an opportunity to be able
to work very effectively.
There are, in my mind, two options dealing with the issue
of the south and Hezbollah. One either works in the south, uses
NGOs in the interim as a way to help channel resources,
eventually develops more creative and innovative mechanisms to
empower the way that the state can move resources to the local
level; or one blocks such assistance to the south and sends the
message that the Lebanese Government and the international
community really have no interest in Lebanon's Shi'ite
community. If the latter were to be done, I think it would
simply institutionalize instability.
I think, Mr. Chairman, there is a real chance to make real
a prospect for a better Lebanon in the future. And one of the
things that we have to ask ourselves is, How important is it to
us to invest resources in this endeavor? I think, just for
illustrative purposes, it's worth reflecting for one second on
the fact that we provide $2.3 billion in FMF every year to
Israel. There are good reasons for why these funds are
allocated. In this case, I'm suggesting a one-time allocation
to Lebanon of $750 million, about a third of Israel's annual
FMF. Both are for exactly the same purpose: a stable Middle
East that can, in fact, actually provide for a viable Lebanese
state that is not a source of terrorist activity, that is a
source of prosperity and stability. And that may one of the
best investments we can make in Israel's security, as well as
our interests for stability in the long term in the Middle
East.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pascual follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Carlos Pascual
restoring confidence in lebanon's future
Mr. Chairman and other distinguished Members of the committee,
thank you for this opportunity to testify today on promoting viable
peace and stability in Lebanon. I commend the committee's focus on this
issue. Lebanon's future is inescapably tied with the broader fate of
the Middle East. It is in America's interests, and also in neighboring
Israel's interest, to see Lebanon succeed as a democratic, multi-ethnic
and prosperous state. If Lebanon remains unstable, it will contribute
to the destabilization of the region and sink the hope of the Cedar
Revolution for a free and independent Lebanon.
My testimony is based on a trip to Lebanon completed on September
11. I had the benefit of working with Ashraf Ghani, former Minister of
Finance in Afghanistan and one of the world's foremost experts on
political and economic transition. We went to Lebanon under the
auspices of the Brookings Institution and in the spirit of Brookings'
commitment to contribute to critical public policy issues. We conducted
dozens of interviews with the Lebanese government, donors, NGOs, the
private sector, diplomatic community, and various UN offices, including
UNIFIL.
I left Lebanon impressed by the talent of its people. I left
cautious and wary of the political complexity and unpredictability. The
Lebanese resent the way in which the war and blockade shattered their
lives--physically, emotionally and economically. War grasped from
Lebanon yet another chance at normalcy just when the economy was
growing at 6 percent, tourism was booming and the wounds of the civil
war had begun to heal. But there is also a surprising opportunity in
the unity the war has engendered. The Lebanese people stood together
primarily as Lebanese, and if this sense of unity can be tapped before
new hardships dominate people's lives, Lebanon has the chance to create
a new reality in the Middle East. Hence, there is an urgency to support
Lebanon's efforts now--when there is a real chance for Lebanon to
succeed.
Lebanon's reconstruction also cannot be untangled from the fate of
Hezbollah. Arguments abound on whether Hezbollah was strengthened or
weakened by the war. Both are undoubtedly true. Hezbollah lost
combatants and its weapons arsenal is depleted. Its image as a
resistance force was burnished. But the real test affecting Hezbollah's
future--and by extension the future of the Lebanese state--is whether
Hezbollah or the Lebanese government are seen as restoring security and
economic life to devastated Shiite areas.
There has been public debate in the United States over whether U.S.
assistance should go to the south and whether it might reinforce
Hezbollah. There is no such debate among Lebanese actors. Lebanese
NGOs, the government, private sector and parliamentarians were adamant
in our discussions that the south must be part of any recovery
strategy.
Some stressed that failure to reach the south after the last civil
war gave no alternative to Hezbollah's development as a state within a
state. NGOs indicated that they have options to work with groups other
than Hezbollah. Alternatively, ignoring the south would entrench a
Shiite view that they have no place in Lebanon's politics and increase
the mid-term prospects for political turmoil. The practical options are
straightforward: mitigate the risk of benefiting Hezbollah by using
international NGOs as a short-term means to control and disburse
resources, or block such assistance and make clear that neither the
Lebanese government nor the international community has an interest in
Lebanon's Shiites. The latter will simply institutionalize instability.
Three Major Challenges
To achieve and sustain its recovery, Lebanon must address three
enormous challenges. The first is to mitigate the immediate impacts of
war so that those returning to destroyed homes and livelihoods can
begin to rebuild their lives. It is crucial to get as much done as
possible by November, before winter begins. The principal needs are in
the south and in Beirut's southern suburbs. A rough estimate of the
immediate cost is $600 million. The second challenge is to build
critical social, economic and physical infrastructure. The focus should
be on putting to work Lebanon's strongest asset: the private sector.
Needs assessments are still being completed, but we should expect a
cost of around $3.5 billion. Thirdly, Lebanon must rectify structural
economic and financial issues that have saddled the country with the
world's highest per capita debt. These core reforms are made harder by
lost revenues and increased expenditures due to the war. A conservative
base figure to make up for lost revenues this year is $1 billion.
This total estimated cost--$5.1 billion to begin to address
credibly all three sets of challenges--is illustrative and
conservative. It does not compensate for $2.5 billion in capital flight
or resources needed to stimulate large scale private investment. It
does not provide for targeted subsides that will be needed to
facilitate critical reforms, especially in the electricity sector, or
for crucial refinancing of the public debt. It does not include the
cost of strengthening the Lebanese military and equipping it to monitor
its borders and prevent or disrupt arms flows. As detailed later, the
U.S. should set a target of 15% of this total--$750 million--for
recovery and reconstruction. This percentage would be comparable to
American contributions to tsunami relief and reconstruction in 2005. To
date, of the $230 million the U.S. has pledged, about $180 million
would support this target (i.e., excluding security assistance). For
context, this one-time injection of $750 million would be about one
third of what the United States provides each year to Israel in Foreign
Military Financing--and the goal, in effect, is the same. If Lebanon
cannot function as a state, Israel will face yet a greater threat of
instability and terrorism.
We cannot overestimate the difficulty of addressing these
challenges simultaneously, yet Lebanon has little choice if it is to
move beyond crisis management to stable growth. Reconstruction
investments can stimulate near-term gains, but they cannot be sustained
without a viable economic base. The fact that there has not been an
economic meltdown in spite of the war's destruction, costs, lost
economic opportunity, and both human and capital flight is a tribute to
the management of the Lebanese authorities. They have demonstrated that
they have the talent to succeed. The Lebanese people and private sector
have determination and resilience. But Lebanon needs a major injection
of international resources to seize this opportunity to create a new
reality of multi-ethnic success in the Middle East.
Restoring Political Confidence
I have been asked to focus on issues related to reconstruction, but
I would be remiss not to underscore the linkages between economic
progress and the need to help Lebanon build confidence in the state.
The Lebanese state must be perceived as able to provide security and
restart the economy in order to get all sectarian groups to buy into a
unified Lebanon and transform Hezbollah's existence as a state within a
state. Perceptions of security and state competence are crucial to
attracting international capital and the return of 500,000 Lebanese
dual citizens who left during the war. The way in which reconstruction
efforts are carried out--whether they help the state become an
effective actor that also enables the private sector--will strongly
shape perceptions of state competence.
It will be just as important to take actions that give both
international and internal actors confidence that political stability
can hold and that war is not likely to commence yet again. To be sure,
the ideal solution is a comprehensive peace agreement for the Middle
East, but that will take time and a restoration of trust in the region.
In the interim, several actions can make a symbolic and substantive
impact and contribute the successful implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 1701:
Trilateral coordination on military issues among Lebanon,
Israel and UNIFIL are facilitating an orderly transition from
Israeli to international and Lebanese forces in the south. This
experience should be institutionalized, perhaps in a Joint
Military Commission, to allow for more effective monitoring and
communications. If crises arise, communications can occur
through established and tested channels.
Israel and Lebanon should explore the range of engagement
they can undertake in the spirit of the 1949 Israel-Lebanon
Armistice Agreement. That arrangement remains valid even if
details are outdated. But its fundamental purpose, if pursued
in spirit, is to underscore that neither side has the intent to
attack each other. Such assurances are critical to positioning
the Lebanese state to create conditions that can make obsolete
Hezbollah's rationale for its militia and facilitate consensus
on its disarmament.
The international community must act on its promise to equip
the Lebanese military to control its border effectively,
including with helicopters and unmanned aerial surveillance.
While Syria appears to have accepted international technical
assistance to Lebanese forces patrolling the Syria-Lebanon
border, the Lebanese forces need the capacity to act to avoid
Hezbollah's rearmament with new and more sophisticated
missiles.
International support should be provided to help the
Lebanese military coordinate with internal security forces and
the police. If we failed miserably at such coordination to
prevent 9/11, we certainly should not assume that Lebanon has
the resources, equipment and capacity to do so.
Risk insurance and guarantees for private investment
(through IFC, OPIC, EIB) will help shape perceptions that the
international community has reached consensus to secure
Lebanon's future and is willing to back it financially.
Finally, the international community in its diplomacy should
assure the Lebanese government that it supports the need to
integrate Shiites more fully into the governance of Lebanon.
The means for this need to be internally defined, and it will
take time to reach consensus. But all actors, internal and
external, should back a dialogue that makes the Shiia community
believe that its needs are best met by buying into the Lebanese
state, not by supporting an organization that acts outside it.
Near-term Humanitarian Aid and Economic Recovery
The war displaced 1 million people, a quarter of Lebanon's
population, and it destroyed or partially destroyed 30,000 housing
units. It destroyed crops and tourism in the south, taking away two
main sources of income for the year. Losses were concentrated in the
Shiite south and southern suburbs of Beirut. The immediate objective
must be to facilitate viable returns for the displaced by November,
before winter sets in. The key needs are shelter, water, electricity
and the reopening of schools. Families will need transitional subsidies
to compensate for lost income. Numerous needs assessments have been
done, but neither the government, nor the UN, nor the NGO community
seems to have a comprehensive picture on the near-term requirements.
For planning purposes, we can estimate a family need of $20,000 for
each of the 30,000 destroyed or partially destroyed homes, including
investments that should benefit the community more broadly. That
suggests a funding need on the order of $600 million. The Stockholm
pledging conference raised $940 million, but it is a mixture of direct
bilateral funding for NGOs and funds promised through a yet-to-be
created early recovery trust fund. Without a clear picture on the
mechanisms to access funds, the Lebanese government does not yet have
the means to get them in a timely way to those who need them most.
At a municipal level, government capacity is limited. Hezbollah is
said to be under strain due to the magnitude of the reconstruction task
and is increasingly leaving space for government and other NGOs. In
some areas NGOs are reportedly bumping into each other; other areas are
reportedly ignored. Given the time constraints, perfection is not
possible, but a number of steps can be taken:
Donors should work with the government and UNDP to get data
immediately into a new database controlled by the Prime
Minister's office on early recovery and reconstruction support,
broken down to the village level and generic types of
assistance. This can provide a basis to identify gaps in needy
areas and determine where funds are already programmed to
reduce duplication.
International NGOs working in partnership with local NGOs
should be the immediate vehicle to disburse funds for recovery
in the south. This is not ideal as it bypasses the government
as a financial channel, but there are no alternatives in the
short-term.
To bring government into the picture, the government and
NGOs should create coordination mechanisms through Municipal
Federations that bring together several municipalities. The
focus should be to identify needs, adjust programming and give
the government a management role in responding to local
communities. This is the first step in bringing Shiia
communities into more direct relationships with government
structures.
The Lebanese government needs to create a central point of
contact in the national government to liaise with
municipalities, and link municipal needs to international
funding. Municipalities currently fall under the Ministry of
Interior, whose primary task is internal security. A direct
substantive link is needed to the Ministry of Finance.
U.S. assistance is working through NGOs to get resources to
communities. Many NGOs have worked bravely through the conflict and its
aftermath. However, there is still no clear understanding among NGOs,
the Lebanese government, and even many U.S. officials on how the $230
million U.S. pledge will translate into projects and where they will be
focused. There is no clear strategy for any donor or the Lebanese
government to make resources channeled through NGOs work to reinforce
the Lebanese state. Given the crisis environment, that is not
surprising. Now there is an urgent need to give greater coherence to
these efforts.
Building Social, Economic and Physical Infrastructure
As Lebanon moves beyond immediate recovery, it must build a
sociopolitical and economic foundation that strengthens the private
sector, creates jobs and integrates Lebanon's poorest communities with
the rest of the country. Four sets of initiatives can help.
The first is to give communities a practical role in setting
priorities, acting on them and providing oversight. Indirectly, such an
initiative can provide an immediate boost to employment. If these
communities have a stake in decision making and can see a link between
their involvement and community-based investments, they will have a
greater stake in a unified Lebanon. Experience in Afghanistan has shown
that such initiatives can work at community level even when resources
are limited. In Lebanon, there are two added tools: a well developed
banking sector and a vibrant civil society.
Eventually the model would be for the Ministry of Finance to open
project-specific bank accounts. Initiatives could start in the South.
To tap into the accounts, each municipality would need to select an
oversight committee that represents different segments of society.
Communities would agree on specific projects. Pre-screened NGOs,
university affiliates and private firms could be contracted to work
with communities to develop and implement projects. Funds would become
available once local oversight committees decide on a project, register
it with a municipality, and select an implementation partner to provide
support. Funds would be disbursed in tranches based on performance,
with final payment coming with the completion of a project. In the
initial stages, outside partners (NGOs, universities, private
consultants) may need to take a direct role in implementation, phasing
down over time. The government would be seen as supporting but not
directing community activity. Banks would provide a means to control,
track and audit payments. There is no ``correct'' funding level for
such a program, but $100 million could cover the south and northeast in
its first 18-24 months.
Second is a job creation program. There is no community in Lebanon
that is not within 30 minutes of a bank. Commercial banks have
experience in administering micro and small business finance. There is
liquidity in the banking system, but risk is high, and thus interest
rates and lending terms are prohibitive for small businesses. One part
of the initiative would provide partial guarantees and subsidies to
lower interest rates, provide a repayment grace period, and extend the
term of lending. While such subsidies would need to be phased out, they
would open the credit market to a wide range of small entrepreneurs
whose businesses have been destroyed or disrupted by war. The second
part of the initiative would rely on NGOs to survey communities and put
in place contracts with universities and private firms to provide
services and training to entrepreneurs. Depending on the actual risk
assessments, $100 million in guarantees could generate several times
that amount in actual lending. Another $50 million should be used to
put in place training and technical support contracts. For illustrative
purposes, if this initiative funded 10,000 loans at $20,000, with each
loan supporting projects that generate on average 10 jobs, that would
create 100,000 jobs. Assuming each job benefits a family of 5, one can
affect about half of the south's population.
Third is the need for large-scale private sector financing that
could invest in new business opportunities and support restructuring
and modernization of medium and large scale enterprises. Lebanon had
been regaining its place as a hub for business and financial services
for the Gulf; its engineering and construction companies were
rebuilding much of the Gulf. A major fund could help attract back $2.5
billion in capital flight and 500,000 skilled Lebanese who fled during
the war. The Association of Islamic Banks has announced its intent to
raise a $2 billion fund, with initial commitments of $200 million.
Western investment agencies such as OPIC, IFC and EIB could contribute
to the capitalization of such a fund through investments or insurance,
potentially opening opportunities for American business through Lebanon
into the Gulf.
Fourth, infrastructure crucial to unifying the country, meeting
social needs, and stimulating private activity needs to be rebuilt--or
in some case built for the first time. Top priorities are electricity,
water systems, roads and bridges. Needs assessments must still be
completed, but preliminary estimates are on the order of $3.5 billion.
The World Bank has completed a preliminary project design for
electricity production, transmission and distribution. The Saudis and
Kuwaitis have pledged between them $800 million for reconstruction.
More will be needed, but the first step is to work out the modalities
for project development and disbursement.
Local firms can handle the design, supervision and construction.
Ideally there would be one trust fund with common rules to manage
reconstruction funds, yet many donors do not want to contribute to a
single trust fund which they do not control. This issue must be
addressed before the process of administering aid takes up more time
than putting it to work. The Lebanese Government has suggested the idea
of countries ``adopting'' projects--which could work for roads and
bridges. But clear standards and rules would need to be created to
maintain quality and control corruption so that resources actually
produce cost-effective results.
The U.S. has agreed to adopt the Fidar Bridge, and we should
contribute to this national reconstruction initiative, but we are
unlikely to be a major financier of infrastructure. More important, the
U.S. should consider a contribution of $100 million that could be
managed by the World Bank for the Government of Lebanon to support
feasibility studies that will accelerate the construction timetable.
Internationally, it is not unusual for projects to be held up by more
than a year for want of grant financing for feasibility work. In
Lebanon, $100 million for feasibility studies could help leverage
several billion dollars in project funding and give the U.S. a voice in
the policy frameworks for such projects. It could also give the U.S. a
role in the design and management of an international infrastructure
fund where we might otherwise be excluded if we were not contributing
directly to construction costs.
Financial and Structural Foundations for Growth
Lebanon's Finance Minister and the Governor of the Central Bank
deserve praise for keeping the currency stable and inflation in check
despite massive capital flight and a sharp drop in revenues to the
government. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided timely financial banking
by transferring a total of $1.5 billion to bolster reserves. (Footnote:
these funds cannot be used for reconstruction. They should not be
counted toward international commitments for reconstruction.) But three
pending problems must be addressed.
The first is a need for $1 billion in budget support this year to
compensate for revenue losses. The war caused a direct loss of about
$650 million in revenues that could not be collected. It also caused
the economy to contract from a projected 6% growth to at best no growth
this year, causing another $350 million in revenue losses. The
government budget will go from a projected primary surplus (before debt
service) to a primary deficit. The government's only alternative to
finance this loss is by printing money, which would shatter its control
over inflation. As discussed below, Lebanon has the highest per capita
public debt in the world; taking on more debt to finance the deficit
would only exacerbate a key structural problem.
The second is a need to refinance the public debt of $36 billion.
Private Lebanese banks hold $20 billion of this debt, and they have
indicated that they will refinance. A key issue will be their
willingness to allow a grace period at a minimal interest rate. The
remaining $16 billion will require help from international official and
private creditors. Working out a debt relief scheme will be
complicated, but the U.S. could help catalyze the process, in
conjunction with the EU, by asking the IMF to mount an urgent mission
to develop possible financing alternatives. The United States and the
EU should state their willingness in principle for OPIC and the EIB to
contribute to a solution.
The third problem is rooted in the electricity sector. Subsidies to
the sector cost the government about $1 billion annually. Between
electricity subsidies and debt service, Lebanon spends half its annual
revenues, crowding out other investments in infrastructure or the
social sectors. Ending these subsidies will produce an economic shock
and hardship among the poor, likely requiring a targeted subsidy
program. This is exactly the type of initiative where donor grant
funding for feasibility studies and technical assistance could have a
massive multiplier effect.
Status of International Assistance
There is a great deal of confusion about how much has been pledged
for Lebanon and how much is needed. Part of the problem is that pledges
have not been comparable, and some humanitarian aid included in these
totals may have saved lives--but it has been consumed and is not
relevant to the future. A quick survey illustrates the confusion:
Saudi Arabia ($800m), Kuwait ($300m) and Qatar ($300m) have
pledged $1.4 billion in reconstruction assistance. Some may go
through reconstruction funds, other parts may go to ``adopt a
village'' programs. None of it has been spent.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided $1.5 billion to support
reserves. This money cannot be spent and should not be counted
as reconstruction assistance.
The Stockholm early recovery conference raised $940 million.
Some have said that a total of $1.2 billion has been raised
when added with other pledges. But some pledges were for
expended humanitarian aid. The pledges also mix humanitarian
and early recovery projects. Of this amount, no government or
donor entity in Lebanon could tell us the operative total for
recovery and reconstruction.
Private donors are raising funds, including investment funds
such as the fund being developed by the Association of Islamic
Banks. Such commercial funds will most likely invest in income-
generating business and should not be counted upon to finance
core reconstruction costs.
The U.S. and others have pledged funds for security
assistance; President Bush said it is $50 million of our $230
million pledge. At times security assistance gets mixed up with
reconstruction pledges, adding more confusion about the totals.
Some donors are counting assessed costs for UNIFIL peace-
keeping mission to their contributions, and others are not.
If we take as a base for recovery and reconstruction the $5.1
billion suggested above, the relevant pledges are likely on the order
of $2.5 billion. Commercial funds are desperately needed to finance
profit-making investment, but given Lebanon's massive commercial
financing potential the bulk of such commercial funds should not be
counted against specific reconstruction targets. An exception should be
made for small business finance. The costs for equipping the Lebanese
military could run from $300 million to over $1 billion, depending on
whether aerial surveillance and response capabilities are funded. Such
funding needs should be tracked separately. The cost of peacekeeping
should not be calculated in international totals since it is an
assessed U.N. cost, but individual donors need to track their capacity
to meet their assessed shares.
In short, there is still no danger of over funding. Recovery and
reconstruction funding is probably half the needed total--in other
words, a $2.5 billion gap. There is no clear picture on security
assistance, but it is likely that on the order of another $500 million
would be required if a robust border monitoring and response capacity
is to be created.
Adequacy of the U.S. Response
For the most part, the U.S. portfolio addresses practical
transitional requirements and uses responsible funding vehicles such as
established NGOs to channel the funds. U.S. NGOs have played an
important role in early recovery in Lebanon. The U.S. government works
closely with the Siniora government in managing post-war crises. In
nature and scope, the U.S. portfolio is what one would expect of a mid-
sized country with good intentions and a limited strategic interest in
Lebanon. If we subtract U.S. funding for security, our contribution is
about $180 million, or about 3.5 percent of the total requirement.
To be fair, $180 million should not be taken as the full U.S.
contribution. There has been only a preliminary donors conference for
early recovery and a major ``reconstruction'' conference is months off.
But we need to be planning now for a major pledge that brings the U.S.
total commitment, excluding security assistance, to $750 million--in
other words, another $570 million above current commitments for
recovery and reconstruction. In addition to this, the United State
should provide yet more to support the Lebanese Army. The $50 million
the U.S. has pledged is about six to ten times short of the lower-end
requirement, and that does not even consider the need for support for
Lebanon's internal Security Forces.
It would be premature to try to specify exactly how another $570
million should be used without in-depth analysis, but the analysis in
this testimony is structured to provide a framework for programming.
Broad program structures have been suggested, of which the U.S. can
decide whether to fund a share. Illustratively, the outlines of such a
program might be:
$100 million for community-based and municipal development.
$150 million for job creation and small business finance.
$100 million in OPIC and EXIM costs to generate on the scale
of $300-500 million in private investment or finance.
$70 million to contribute to small-scale targeted
infrastructure projects.
$100 million to support feasibility studies and related
technical assistance for construction, infrastructure and
structural reform (e.g., electricity sector) projects.
$25 million to finance auditing, evaluation and
accountability activities, including public-private
partnerships on transparency.
$25 million to build government and parliamentary capacity
to monitor programs and communicate effectively with the
public.
Actual allocations should be coordinated with the Government of
Lebanon and other major donors. At least $300 million of the $750
million should start to be mobilized now, particularly for an expanded
community development and job creation initiative, with the rest
appropriated in FY 2007. With funding always tight in the Foreign
Operations account, Israel might suggest to the U.S. Congress and
Administration that about 10 percent of its $2.3 billion annual Foreign
Military Financing allocation could be temporarily reallocated for
reconstruction in Lebanon, as in the end it would contribute to a
similar aim of Israel's security and stability in the Middle East.
Opportunity for Leadership and Change
The reconstruction process in Lebanon will be complicated and at
times controversial. Political pitfalls abound. This is a region with a
history of corruption. Economic success is just as dependent on
political developments and security as on sound policy and resources.
In this environment, the U.S. has the opportunity to play a tangible
leadership role that depends on a strong presence on the ground and
regular diplomatic engagement. We have an opportunity make our presence
felt more strongly:
A stabilization and reconstruction specialist has just been
deployed to Beirut. A team of 3-5 others should be added to the
country team to coordinate the U.S. effort and create a strong
on-the-ground capacity to provide leadership and coordinate
with the government, UNIFIL and other donors.
The U.S. can help the Lebanese leadership structure its own
reconstruction team. UNDP is playing a particularly important
role in coordinating resources, but much can be done informally
to discuss management structures to interface with the
international community and to handle aid flows.
The U.S. can lend insights on creative public-private
partnerships to monitor projects and combat corruption.
We can lend informal support in conceptualizing public
information campaigns so that the Lebanese understand the
government's strategy, see how funds are being used, and
develop realistic expectations about assistance pledges.
It is also important that we transform our own perception about
what Lebanon's reconstruction signifies. This is not merely a technical
endeavor. Lebanon has the most ethnically diverse population in the
Middle East. It has the strongest private services sector in the
region. It has fundamentally democratic roots. Success in Lebanon has
the potential to reverse a trend in the region toward extremism and
intolerance. The Lebanese people have the talent to succeed. The
international community can provide essential resources. The critical
determinant will be the Lebanese state--whether it can engender the
internal and international confidence to get all parties to support
Lebanon politically and give it an enduring sense of stability. For all
those who believe in peace in the Middle East, we have a stake in this
endeavor.
Thank you for your time. I would be pleased to address your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Pascual.
I'd like to call now upon Director Salem.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL SALEM, DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE, CARNEGIE
MIDDLE EAST CENTER, BEIRUT, LEBANON
Dr. Salem. Thank you, Mr. Senator.
I submitted my testimony for the record. I also submitted
the draft of an article that's appearing in Foreign Affairs
which goes in much greater detail into the outcomes of the
situation in Lebanon, but I'd just like to highlight a few
points from my testimony and from the article.
First of all, I share some of the positive outlook that was
expressed by Secretary Welch and others in looking at the glass
half-full. One overall thing that we can take away from this
is, this is an important case where multilateral diplomacy came
up with a resolution which really has teeth and translated
certain interests and objectives into actions on the ground
large parts of which have already been implemented. And I think
Resolution 1701 is very different from Resolutions 1559 or 425,
or others relating to Lebanon--or for that matter, to the
region--is a very excellent example of the U.S. using
multilateral diplomacy to get real results and to build real
stability and security.
Also taking that sort of message in general, if we don't go
on from 1701 to work on building more stability in Lebanon's
immediate environment, 1701 will eventually collapse. It cannot
stand in a vacuum.
But 1701, in itself, does lay the foundations for a secure
and stable Lebanon. Lebanon itself is a democracy; it has a
vibrant political life and dynamic economic life. But Lebanon's
stability and security is part and parcel of the security of
the region.
The main change in Lebanon's security environment is that
for the first time in at least 40 years, the Lebanese state is
regaining control of its borders. That development, which is
already taking place, cannot be underestimated. Its effects
will be felt in the months and years to come. We don't know
exactly what effects it will have on the armaments of
Hezbollah, its disarmament in the future, and the political
environment within the country, but putting in place this
cornerstone of sovereignty after the Syrian withdrawal is of
historic importance.
The second cornerstone, which is currently not there, which
is the Lebanese state's ability to have a monopoly on force, is
the next challenge. It's something that's not immediately
mandated or immediately explained as to how that's to take
place in 1701, although it's mentioned as an objective. And
this really relates to the disarmament or decommissioning of
Hezbollah. Of course, it also relates to the disarming of
Palestinian groups in Lebanon. The armed Palestinians were one
of the key causes of the collapse of the state in the late '60s
and early '70s. Hezbollah's continued armament is a cause for
concern at the current juncture.
Both of these issues were part of the Taif Agreement, were
part of Resolution 1559, and were being addressed in the
national dialogue meetings which were taking place throughout
the year among Lebanese leaders, including Hezbollah, until
June of this summer. So, there is internal acknowledgment that
this is a very serious issue that needs to be addressed.
I think the events and the outcome of the war and 1701
helps the country move a bit closer down that line. However,
disarming or decommissioning Hezbollah is very complex, and
largely a political process, much like the disarming of other
militias in Lebanon, much like the IRA previously in Ireland.
The questions of whether the army is stronger than
Hezbollah, or Hezbollah is stronger than the army, is not the
relevant question. The army has a large Shi'ite membership--at
least 35 percent. Any military confrontation with Hezbollah
means civil war in Lebanon and would destroy the country, and
is something that is not to be contemplated.
Yes, Hezbollah has gained stature, it has gained popularity
in the Arab and Islamic world, for obvious reasons. However, in
Lebanon itself, it faces a much more difficult situation than
before the war, and there are a number of reasons for this. The
primary reason is that the events of the war, triggered by the
events of July 12, ended up devastating their own constituents,
the Shi'ite community. And Hezbollah, whatever else happens,
has to spend the next 2 to 3 to 4 years rebuilding the lives of
its own constituents, and, for that reason, is not in a
position to engage in another war or to launch any other
activities. That is part of the reason why maybe they conceded
the south, they conceded the border points, for the time being,
because, in effect, they're not in a position to wage war, as
they did on July 12th, perhaps encouraged, at the time, by
Syria and Iran.
In addition, Hezbollah faces cash problems, in the sense
that their influx of cash, which used to come freely to them,
did not come through the banking system; it came through other
routes. With the control of the port, the airport, and the land
crossings, the control of cash, or the amount of cash that they
might have access to, might be compromised. In addition, there
is a large question mark relating to the extent of the support
that Iran is willing to give Hezbollah in this postwar
situation. Hezbollah did not expect this war. The amount of
money needed to rebuild lives is much more than they have, and
is probably much more than Iran is willing to give them, and
that, as the Ambassador just mentioned--initially they rushed
out with checks and so on, but, since them, they have scaled
back their promises, probably indicating the reality that the
money needed is much more than they actually have access to.
Also, in terms of their deterrent role previously, vis-a-
vis Iran, the effect of this war on their relationship with
Iran is also a point of some interest and some questioning. At
one level, their robust performance in the war gives pause and
protects Iran to some degree. It gives pause to those, maybe,
in this country or other places who might think of military
operations against Iran. The recent war gives pause because one
would think: ``If Hezbollah could do this much, what could Iran
do?'' On the other hand, Hezbollah's missile system was
supposed to be a deterrent in case Iran was much more directly
attacked or under threat. That deterrent was, in a sense,
wasted in a side war, or in a proxy war. So, the future of that
relationship, although solid, might be open to some questioning
regarding the extent of money that might be available.
Politically, within the country, Hezbollah faces a much
more difficult position than it did before. Up to the year
2000, of course, Hezbollah was very much supported within the
country as resisting an Israeli occupation that largely ended
in the year 2000. Between 2000 and 2006, the issue of Shebaa
Farms was somewhat of a figleaf that kept Hezbollah somewhat
afloat. Syria ran the country, so they could keep them afloat
throughout that period. But, most importantly, up until July of
2006, Hezbollah and its leadership did not, in effect, do
anything that jeopardized, in a major way, the security of
their own community, or, in fact, the overall security and
well-being of Lebanon. They were effective, in the '90s,
getting Israel out of Lebanon, and people saw that as a very
positive move. So, this is the first time that an action they
have taken has really come to contradict Lebanese interests,
and particularly their own community's interests. It also very
much undermines the logic that they used to put forward before
July, that their arms would help to protect Lebanon, or that
their separate existence from the state would protect Lebanon
from any Israeli retaliation.
So, despite their popularity in the region, and their
robust and somewhat heroic performance in the resistance, they
do face a very difficult political future, in terms of
justifying their existence as they were before 2006.
What's likely to happen, in my view, is somewhat of a wait-
and-see situation. And this relates largely to Iran and Syria
and regional balances of power. For the time being, they're
laying low, as are Syria and Iran, with respect to 1701. They
have accepted 1701. They have told Kofi Annan that they will
support 1701. But, as we all know, the major confrontation in
the region relates to Iran. It neither relates to Hezbollah,
nor to any other player. And it's the future of that general
set of relations, regional and international, which will tell
us, 6 months or a year from now, what is the balance of power
in the region. Will Iran and Syria be resurgent? Will they then
begin to challenge 1701 at a later date? For the time being,
they are not. In effect, they are being very positive about it.
I think what's crucial, some of the smaller elements
relating towards moving towards decommissioning Hezbollah, is
making progress on two issues that are mentioned in 1701. One
of those issues is the situation of the Shebaa Farms. The
Shebaa Farms, maybe, is strategically not very significant,
but, as a political figleaf, has been very significant. Shebaa
Farms is a contested area between Lebanon and Syria, but, in
any case, it is certainly not Israeli territory. And 1701 has a
mechanism for dealing with that. The return of Shebaa Farms at
least to U.N. auspices and UNIFIL auspices, would remove one of
the figleafs or remove one of the issues that could help moving
towards decommissioning.
The second issue is also mentioned in 1701, Lebanese
captives with Israel, which is mentioned, and should be
addressed.
These are two things that could serve to help the Lebanese
deal with some of the issues that are being raised by
Hezbollah.
In addition, Hezbollah, as the main party representing the
Shi'ites of Lebanon, credibly has said in the past, ``Look, the
Lebanese state did not protect you in the south. We can. The
Lebanese state did not deliver services. We can. The Lebanese
state is not allowing you enough of a role in decisionmaking
and so on. We can.''
So, there are a lot of challenges, on the Lebanese army and
on the Lebanese political system and on the Lebanese state, to
try to answer some of those complaints of the Shi'ite
community, or some among the Shi'ite community, which justify,
perhaps falsely, the existence of an independent group such as
Hezbollah.
We're in a situation in which, on the one hand, 1701 is
putting the squeeze on arms and cash and so on, on Hezbollah,
but, at the same time, we have to wean away supporters of
Hezbollah as a political party within the Lebanese system. And
they do have serious concerns, and this will mean a much more
serious approach to security and defending the borders from the
Lebanese army, and a much more serious approach to political
reform and building a state that has much less corruption, much
less confessionalism than was the case previously.
Finally, in terms of the international community, and
particularly the United States, certainly what the Ambassador
has mentioned, in terms of supporting reconstruction, I think
that, in a sense, goes without saying, and I support everything
that the Ambassador mentioned. But the United States is most
important as a political mobilizer and a political superpower.
1701 is most threatened to unravel from regional powers. A
despondent Israel upset about its loss of military prestige,
which is an immense issue within Israel today, could, in the
foreseeable future, look ways to reassert its prestige.
Hezbollah humiliated Israel's land forces to some degree. It's
very important that at no time in the next year or two any
operations from the Israeli side erupt; and that's something
the United States certainly should be engaged in.
Syria is in a very, very tense state. They have been forced
to withdraw from Lebanon. They did take a blow in the last war.
They are under investigation for the assassination of Hariri in
the U.N. investigation. And they feel that they are, in
general, targeted by an administration that considers them a
player in the ``Axis of Evil.'' A cornered Syria could do
immense damage, as it has in the past.
However, Syria, even throughout this crisis, has continued
to indicate its interest in the Golan Heights, and there's been
a bit of movement on that front. And I think it's imperative
that the United States take a leading role in trying to get
some motion back into at least that side of the peace process.
Dancing doesn't always have to always lead to marriage, but
dancing can create relationships, and can massage a situation
in a very tense standoff.
Finally, most of the chips reside with the confrontation in
Iran. A military confrontation with Iran will include Lebanon.
And Lebanon absolutely would not survive a military
confrontation with Iran. Hence, Lebanon's security, and 1701
and its chances, rely on a similarly robust approach to
multilateral tough diplomacy vis a vis Iran. Some elements of
that are in play right now in the negotiations with Iran, but
what we might take from 1701 is the possibility of achieving
important objectives through multilateral diplomacy and
avoiding the carnage of war, which Lebanon would suffer from,
definitely, if it happens with Iran.
Finally, Lebanon is a confrontation state in the Arab/
Israeli conflict. It's no surprise that Lebanon is in the midst
of a war. It might recur again at a time when there are ongoing
wars with the Palestinians, confrontation with Syria,
confrontation with Iran, confrontation with Lebanon. There is
not enough that can be said about the need to build on 1701 by
also getting very, very vigorous movement back into the Arab-
Israeli. The Arabs have made their position clear, including
Syria, that they do want normalization and peace with Israel,
on reasonable grounds that have already been expressed by the
United Nations. It is important for the United States to be
seen--after it was seen as supporting this war--as taking the
lead in trying to create peace. Even if peace is not achieved,
trying counts for something and, I think, trying would help
bring a sense of stability in the region, and would allow the
United States not to be the target of hostility, and to be able
to play a stabilizing role in a very, very unsettled situation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Salem follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Paul Salem
lebanon: building on un resolution 1701
The events of the past two months have demonstrated the power of
diplomacy to create the conditions of stability and peace from the
wreckage of war. Lebanon is reeling from one of the most destructive
wars in its history; with over 1,200 dead, 160,000 housing units
damaged or destroyed, along with thousands of businesses, hundreds of
roads, and over 80 essential bridges, losses to the economy are
estimated conservatively at above 30% of GDP--and this in a country
that is already carrying a debt amounting to 180% of its GDP. Yet,
through the efforts of the Lebanese government and the international
community, the war was brought to a negotiated end through UN
Resolution 1701 that lays the foundation for lasting security and
stability in and around Lebanon. 1701 provides a great opportunity to
consolidate a secure, democratic and prosperous Lebanon; it also
beckons the United States and the international community to build on
this success by renewing their efforts to bring the long-standing Arab-
Israeli conflict to a negotiated end.
Lebanon today stands on the threshold of a new era. After the
devastation of war, comes the opportunity to secure its borders, reform
its democratic institutions, and relaunch its once dynamic economy. The
challenges before the Lebanese government are numerous.
At the security level, the deployment of the Lebanese armed
forces--with essential support from the UNIFIL--to reclaim control of
the country's land, sea and air borders, puts back in place the
essential cornerstone of Lebanese statehood and reverses the reality of
four decades in which the state did not control the borders. The
Lebanese government must consolidate this move by continuing to
strengthen the armed forces and maintaining the national political
support and will that is essential to their success. Securing Lebanon's
borders from outside interference helps secure Lebanon's internal
unity; and that unity, in turn, stabilizes the country and contributes
to the stability of the region.
The government still faces a challenge in securing the other
cornerstone of statehood, which is a monopoly on armed force. The
disarmament of all non-governmental armed groups in Lebanon is a basic
tenet of the Taif Agreement of 1989 on which Lebanon's post civil war
consensus has been built; it was also reiterated in resolutions 1559
and 1701. The disarmament of the remaining militias in Lebanon--
Hezbollah and the armed Palestinian groups--was high on the agenda of
the National Dialogue meetings that were taking place in Lebanon until
this past June. Agreement was reached on disarming Palestinian groups
that are situated outside the Palestinian camps, but talks broke down
before agreement could be reached on the full disarmament of
Palestinian groups or Hezbollah.
The decommissioning of Hezbollah, like the decommissioning of the
IRA, is possible but is also a complicated and mainly political
challenge. Hezbollah is the principal party of the Shiite community in
Lebanon and is represented in Parliament and government, and as a
political party raises valid points about defense of the south, the
effectiveness of the state, foreign policy, social justice and welfare,
and the share of the Shiite community in government. While weaning
Hezbollah away from its military role and its over-dependence on Iran,
the government must answer some of the concerns of the community
Hezbollah represents through beefing up the Lebanese army so it can
truly promise defense and security to the long-suffering inhabitants of
south Lebanon, and through wider partnership of the Shiite community in
government, and a more efficient and less corrupt state which can
deliver development beyond Beirut, and prosperity beyond the upper
middle class.
The challenge is to consolidate security by moving ahead with
urgently needed political reforms. These would include the passage of a
new electoral law (a draft of which was already presented in June by
the government's own-appointed National Electoral Commission), the
passage of a new administrative decentralization law, the consolidation
of the constitutional court and the judiciary, as well as serious
initiatives to increase efficiency in the civil service and combat
political and bureaucratic corruption. It would also include reaching
out to the Shiite community, in this hour of their greatest distress,
as full partners in government, within the parameters of this reborn
sovereign, independent and united Lebanon.
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri
have declared their commitment to this process; these words must be
turned into deeds in government and in Parliament.
In terms of relief, reconstruction and economic revival, the
challenges are clear and urgent. Although it was slow in providing
immediate relief, the government has moved quickly in assessing the
massive damages, clearing away rubble, rebuilding roads and bridges,
and setting up a mechanism to provide assistance for citizens to
rebuild homes and businesses, and organizing aid. The Arab and
international community, including the united states, has been
extremely generous in extending reconstruction aid to Lebanon. The
challenge before the government is managing reconstruction quickly and
efficiently, and avoiding the waste and corruption that plagued the
post civil war reconstruction process in the 1990s. In terms of
reviving the economy, Lebanon does not need aid, it simply needs the
renewal of faith in Lebanon from among investors, businesses and
tourists. This faith was coming back quickly before this latest war; it
can be recaptured again.
Beyond Lebanon, the U.S. and the international community have an
interest to stand behind the full and robust implementation of
Resolution 1701: in supporting the Lebanese state, the Lebanese armed
forces, UNIFIL, and the reconstruction process. More importantly, the
international community must guard against the unraveling of 1701 by
trying to ensure that none of Lebanon's neighbors--all of whom have
accepted 1701--act to break it. A despondent Israel, concerned about
its army's loss of prestige, should be dissuaded from launching any
further attacks simply to reassert its superiority. A cornered Syrian
government, fearful of its loss of influence and an ongoing U.N.
investigation, should be coaxed on the road to peace not war. And
regarding Iran, regional stability would be better served through
strong multilateral diplomacy to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions,
rather than war.
A stable and peaceful Lebanon can contribute to a stable and
peaceful region; but an explosive region will sooner or later come back
to destroy Lebanon. Resolution 1701 is an important building block for
peace in the region; but it must be buttressed by further negotiations
and further agreements in the region. The Arab countries unanimously
declared their commitment to full peace with Israel in the Beirut
summit of 2002. Syria, even today, has indicated its interest in peace
in exchange for its occupied land in the Golan.
Making peace will not be, and never is easy; but waging perpetual
war is not a viable alternative. It is my view that the United States
and the international community should build on the momentum of 1701
and should bring their immense capacities and resources to bear--not on
waging another war--but on building a formidable alliance to bring
about a negotiated, just and lasting end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
That objective is within our reach. Lebanon needs it; the region
needs it; the world needs it. The bible says, Blessed are the
Peacemakers. Indeed, let all men and women of good faith, in this
august Senate and in this nation, turn their energies to building
peace. Let us restart this century anew; not as a century of conflict
and war, as the perpetrators of September 11 wanted it, but as a
century of peace and prosperity, as all good people of the world--Arab
and American--Muslim, Christian and Jew--want it.
__________
Squaring The Circle: Domestic Politics
and Regional Security In Post-1701 Lebanon
by paul salem \1\
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\1\ This article is scheduled to be published in Foreign Affairs in
fall 2006.
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Wars rarely proceed as expected; proxy wars are no exception.
Hezbollah's raid on July 12, backed by Iran, was apparently intended to
entangle Israel in a limited skirmish on its northern border and a
drawn out prisoner exchange at a time when Iran was facing mounting
pressure over its nuclear issue. Israel, backed by the U.S., responded
with a large scale war aiming to deliver a knock out blow to Hezbollah
in order to eliminate any missile threat on northern Israel, weaken
Iran in any upcoming showdown, and eliminate what the U.S. considered a
major opponent in the War on Terror. The U.S. also hoped to give a
boost to the Lebanese government which they considered a friend and a
potential democratic success story. Following the law of unintended
consequences, events in this war did not develop as any of the parties
expected: Hezbollah got a full scale war, in which it achieved some
almost unexpected battlefield victories as well as massive popularity
in the Arab and Islamic world, but which also left its constituency
devastated and its tactical and political options compromised; Israel
unleashed massive air power on Hezbollah strongholds and Shiite towns
and neighborhoods but could not knock out Hezbollah, nor stop its
missile attacks on northern Israel--even Israel's ground invasion
suffered serious reverses that punched holes in the IDF's aura of
invincibility. From the Iranian perspective, it could claim part of
Hezbollah's popular victory in the Arab and Islamic world, and
Hezbollah's robust performance served to give pause to those who might
think that military action against Iran would go as planned; on the
other hand, the war wasted much of the deterrent power that Iran had
vested in Hezbollah for Iran's own hour of need. From the U.S.
perspective, although the war did degrade Hezbollah's capacities, it
failed to knock out Hezbollah, drove Arab and Islamic public opinion
further against the U.S., and weakened an already fragile Lebanon.
Nevertheless, the belated ending to this devastating war, based on
UNSCR 1701, provides a foundation for moving beyond the crisis and a
framework for new political and security realities in Lebanon and the
region that could serve to help rebuild what has been destroyed and
create a stable and secure Lebanon that, in turn, would serve to
promote the interests of regional peace.
Gaining Perspective
For those unfamiliar with Lebanon's makeup, it is a parliamentary
democracy in which power is shared among the various confessional
communities. The constitution dates back to 1926 and was modeled after
participatory government practices that dated back to 1862. The last
major amendments to the Constitution were undertaken in 1990 to
incorporate changes agreed upon in the Document of National
Understanding, known as the Taif Agreement, that was reached in 1989
and provided the basis for the ending of the civil war that had erupted
in 1975. Members of Parliament are elected to seats that are reserved
on a fixed confessional basis with equal representation for Christians
and Muslims. Parliament elects its Speaker, who must be a Shiite
Muslim, a President, who must be a Maronite Christian, and (through the
President) names a Prime Minister, who must be a Sunni Muslim. Seats in
the Council of Ministers are again balanced on a confessional basis as
are most high posts in the civil and armed services. Syrian troops
which had entered Lebanon in 1976 and were supposed to start
withdrawing in 1992, according to the Taif Agreement, actually expanded
their deployment in Lebanon in 1990 and ended up controlling the
country between 1990 and 2005. During that period, they dominated the
government, interfering in elections, naming presidents and prime
ministers, and determining major government policies and decisions.
The change in rule in Syria, with the death of Hafiz al Assad in
the Summer of 2000 and the accession of his son Bashshar, followed by
September 11 and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, changed
Lebanon's political environment. Bashshar al Assad could not find his
father's middle path within the U.S.'s new ``With Us Or Against Us''
foreign policy, and international toleration of Syria's control of
Lebanon came to an end. International polarization generated
polarization within Lebanon, with Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Druze
leader Walid Junblat, and a number of leading Maronite leaders forming
a pro-Western anti-Syrian coalition, and President Emile Lahoud,
Hezbollah and a number of smaller parties forming a pro-Syrian
coalition. General Michel Aoun, a prominent Maronite leader, who
started in the former coalition, eventually drifted closer to the
latter. Hariri's assassination in February of 2005 triggered the
massive demonstrations of March 14 that were followed by a Syrian
withdrawal. The anti-Syrian coalition, known henceforth as the March 14
Coalition, hoped that the Syrian withdrawal would enable the removal of
Lahoud and the weakening of Hezbollah. This did not happen, and the
March 14 coalition settled into an uneasy stalemate with the pro-Syrian
coalition, itself dubbed the March 8 coalition after the date of a
large rally organized by them on that day.
Hezbollah was established in Lebanon in the wake of the 1979
Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
It capitalized on the earlier Movement of the Deprived (organized later
as the Amal Movement) that had been established by Imam Musa Sadr, a
charismatic cleric who had mobilized the Shiite community to agitate
against decades of socio-economic and political marginalization and
resist Israeli aggression in South Lebanon. He disappeared while on a
visit to Libya in 1978. In the 1980s Hezbollah mirrored quite directly
the radical ideology of the Islamic Revolution, calling for an Islamic
Republic in Lebanon and prosecuting an active war against U.S. and
Western interests in Lebanon. In the 1990s, reflecting a more pragmatic
turn in Tehran and adjusting to the realities of Lebanon, Hezbollah
joined the Lebanese political system through parliamentary and local
elections, wound down its direct activities against U.S. and Western
interests, and developed a focus as a guerrilla resistance movement
against Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. With the withdrawal of
Israeli troops in May of 2000, Hezbollah claimed a historic victory,
but had to find new justification for its continued carrying of arms:
this was pinned on the issue of Shebaa Farms (a strip of land on Mount
Hermon seized by Israel from Syria in 1967, but claimed by Lebanon and
Syria to be Lebanese territory) and Lebanese captives in Israeli jails.
With the assassination of Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian troops in
April 2005, Hezbollah now found itself in the forefront of Lebanese
politics, leading an anti-Western coalition against the anti-Syrian
coalition led by the Hariri camp.
From the time of his appointment as Prime Minister in 1992, the
agenda of Rafiq Hariri largely conflicted with that of Hezbollah.
Hariri came to power on an agenda of reconstruction and economic
development that relied on stability and calm to attract Lebanese, Arab
and foreign investment. He believed that Israel's occupation of South
Lebanon could be resolved diplomatically, while Hezbollah pursued the
armed resistance option. Each time Hezbollah's resistance provoked a
large Israeli retaliation, such as in 1993 and 1996, Hariri's
development plans were set back several years. The failure of the
international community to resolve the Israeli occupation
diplomatically fatally wounded Hariri's efforts. His recovery project
foundered, and his faith in diplomatic solutions to the South was
belied by events, and he was essentially driven out of office in 1998
with Hezbollah in the ascendant and a new hard-line president, Emile
Lahoud, in office.
When Israel finally did withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000, it was
chalked up as a victory for the Resistance not state diplomacy. After
his comeback in the 2000 elections, Hariri returned to the Prime
Minister's office, but now in an uneasy relationship with the new rule
of Bashshar al Assad in Syria, and in a balancing act with President
Lahoud, Hezbollah and a number of other parties. Strong voices were
raised at the time arguing that, with the Israeli withdrawal, it was
time for Hezbollah to be decommissioned. However, Syria, as the
dominant power over Lebanon, blocked these demands and continued to
protect and promote an armed Hezbollah under the logic of liberating
Shebaa Farms and providing a deterrent against potential Israeli
attack. In many ways, the war of 2006 was a result of what was not
addressed in 2000.
Finally, a few words on the Syrian-Iranian relationship in Lebanon.
Syria and Iran had initially come to proxy blows in the 1980s with the
ascendance of Iranian Hezbollah at the expense of the Syrian-backed
Amal movement, with a number of pitched battles being fought between
the two groups. A distribution of roles was eventually worked out with
Amal shrinking as an armed group and Amal leader Nabih Berri assuming
the post of Speaker of Parliament as of 1992, and Hezbollah largely
taking over the military arena. Syrian-Iranian cooperation in
supporting Hezbollah proceeded relatively smoothly throughout the 1992-
2005 period, with Iran providing most of the finances, training and
arms, and Syria providing the conduits and cover and managing the
Lebanese politics of the situation. With the Syrian withdrawal in 2005
and Syria's increasing regional and international isolation over the
investigation of the Hariri assassination, Iran moved to take a more
direct role in Lebanon, essentially supplanting Syria as Hezbollah's
supervisor in the Lebanese arena.
On the eve of the war, Lebanon was in a situation of political
stalemate. The government led by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, made up
largely of members of the March 14 coalition, also included members of
Amal and Hezbollah who could effectively veto key decisions they
disagreed with. In the country, the March 14 coalition led by Rafiq
Hariri's son, Saad, and Walid Junblat, was counterbalanced by a
coalition including Hezbollah, Michel Aoun, President Lahoud and a
number of other parties. President Lahoud was serving out his term to
the autumn of 2007, the government could not push through key economic
reforms, and the state coexisted alongside the independent power of
Hezbollah.
The Politics Of War
In the early days of the war, the government issued a statement
critical of Hezbollah for undertaking the provocative raid of July 12
and triggering the war and for arrogating to itself the power of making
war and peace. The Amal and Hezbollah members of government expressed
their ``reservations'' vis a vis the statement, but it was issued
nonetheless. There were similar statements issued, conspicuously, by
prominent Sunni states in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and Jordan. The initial days of the war saw internal tensions escalate
dangerously. Many in the Hezbollah and March 8 camp suspected the March
14 camp to have colluded in encouraging the Israeli-American war
against Hezbollah, and many in the March 14 group suspected that
Hezbollah, backed by Syria and Iran, had triggered this war to bring
about the destruction of Hariri's reconstructed Lebanon, bring down the
government, and take over the rubble that would be left. These tensions
were fueled further by the reality that most of the Israeli attacks
were devastating Shiite areas, and by the conditions of high Sunni-Shii
tension in the region, particularly in Iraq. Serious fears surfaced of
Sunni-Shii unrest, particularly in Beirut where desperate and
disgruntled Shiite refugees from the south were being housed in equally
disgruntled Sunni neighborhoods.
Public opinion shifted however, when it became clear that Israel
was not simply retaliating for the July 12 operation, but had launched
an all out war on Hezbollah, and concomitantly, the Shiite community
and other parts of the country; Hezbollah was thereafter seen as
perhaps irresponsible for staging the July 12 attack, but the onus of
blame shifted to Israel and the U.S. for prosecuting and prolonging
such a widescale war. As the massive civilian toll of the war mounted,
early anger at Hezbollah turned to fury at Israel and the U.S.
Reeling from the destructive effects of the war, and partly
reflecting this shift in opinion, and partly to avert further Sunni-
Shii escalation of tension, the government shifted gears itself and
focused its efforts on securing a cease-fire. Stunned by the U.S.'s
refusal early on to push for a quick cease-fire, the government
presented its own cease-fire plan to the international community. The
plan called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate
Israeli withdrawal from any territory seized, return of refugees to
their towns and villages, exchange of prisoners, deployment of the
Lebanese army to the South, strengthening of the UNIFIL force in the
South, revival of the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and
Israel, placing of Shebaa farms under U.N. custody, international aid
to help rebuild the country, and the principle of decommissioning all
non-state armed groups.
The eventual resolution, UNSCR 1701, that brought an end to the war
in mid-August was built on the framework of the government's earlier
proposal but went beyond it, with much more detail about a beefed up
UNIFIL force and its role in the south and border points, and much more
clarity about the obligation of the Lebanese state to extend its
authority throughout the country and secure its borders and prevent the
re-supply of weapons to Hezbollah or any other non-state actor. It did
not include a mechanism for the immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, but
reaffirmed the necessity of doing so.
Aftermath
The Lebanese emerged from the cease-fire initially preoccupied with
the debate about who had won or lost the war. Hezbollah had rushed to
declare what they called a ``divine victory'', citing their very
survival, as well as their ability to continue firing missiles at
Israel through the war and the ability of their fighters to inflict
heavy losses on Israeli armor and ground troops in a number of
engagements in the south as proof of their victory. Indeed, this was
the first Arab-Israeli war that did not end in victory for Israel. And
it was hailed as such around the Arab and Islamic world. The
transparent confusion and demoralization of Israeli troops returning
from south Lebanon, and the very public avowals of failure coming
through the Israeli press, seemed to confirm Hezbollah's claims.
Indeed, many of Hezbollah's battlefield victories had been real: they
had found a way to protect their missile launching capacity from
Israeli neutralization, and they had devised guerrilla defenses and
tactics that could effectively slow down Israeli land advances and
inflict heavy losses on them.
However, it was also clear that Lebanon, and particularly the Shia
of Lebanon, had suffered enormous human and economic losses. With 1,200
people dead (almost a third of those children), four thousand wounded,
one million displaced, 130,000 housing units damaged or destroyed,
along with thousands of small businesses, 300 factories, 80 major and
secondary bridges, hundreds of roads, and significant damage to a large
number of schools and hospitals, as well as the country's electricity
network, the airport and the environment, this war was the costliest
Arab-Israeli war in Lebanon's history; much costlier than the 1996 and
1993 wars and more devastating even than the 1982 Israeli invasion of
Lebanon. The initial cost was estimated at around 30% of the country's
GDP. From a pre-war GDP of $21 billion, costs amounted to about $7
billion, which included $3.6 billion in direct costs of damage to
homes, business and infrastructure, and a further $3-4 billion in lost
revenue from a ruined tourist season, suspended trade, disrupted
industry, and a devastated agriculture sector. In a country already
suffering from a 180% debt/GDP burden and having just completed over a
decade of laborious and costly reconstruction, this war dealt the
country a staggering blow which it will take many years to recover
from. The bulk of this destruction was concentrated in the mainly
Shiite areas of south Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut.
Hezbollah, as an organization, also had losses to tally, mainly
tactical and political. It had given up control of the area south of
the litany to the Lebanese army and a beefed up UNIFIL, and agreed to
Army control of the Lebanese-syrian border points against re-supply--
both very significant concessions. With the devastation of Shiite
areas, it also faced the reality that it could not put its constituency
through another war in the immediate future and would have to
concentrate on relief and reconstruction for the next two to three
years at least. In more concrete terms, it had lost a number of its top
fighters (estimates range from 300-600), exposed its strategies and
tactics, and lost many of its medium and long range missiles. In
addition, it found itself struggling to rework its arguments regarding
its raison d'etre. The argument it used before the war, that its arms
helped deter Israel had proven incorrect, and Israel had been provoked
instead. The argument that a non-state actor could defend Lebanon
better because Israel would not retaliate on the country was also
proven incorrect. The sense in the country that Nasrallah was careful
enough not to expose Lebanon to a ruinous war--which had been more or
less accurate up till July 12--was also lost. Even among the Shiite
community, although support for Hezbollah and Nasrallah remained
overwhelming, there was some grumbling that neither Iran nor Syria had
come to their aid, and that the cost of this seemingly unnecessary war
was ruinous.
However, Hezbollah also had strong arguments that it put forward.
It had shown how an organized fighting force could effectively fight
Israel and defend against another occupation of the South at a time
when the Lebanese army showed neither the proclivity nor the ability to
do so. It also showed how it could move quickly on relief and
reconstruction work at a time when the state remained slow and
lumbering. It could also say that Israel's war, which had ruined
Lebanon, was openly backed by the U.S. administration, which the March
14 group claimed as their main friend and ally. It could also claim
victory on the battlefield, and as such was in no mood to surrender its
arms.
What Is To Be Done? -- Lebanon:
This latest war presents a number of challenges to Lebanon as a
state and a nation. Much will depend on what lessons are learned from
the war, and what steps are taken to consolidate security, economic
recovery, and political development.
At the security level the government must be firm and decisive in
implementing the security provisions of 1701. It must continue to
strengthen the army, the internal security forces, and the intelligence
services to carry out these tasks. The deployment of the Army to the
area South of the Litani has already gone smoothly and is not likely to
falter because Hezbollah has conceded that area for the foreseeable
future and might be itself be looking for a buffer to avoid getting
into another unnecessary fight with Israel. The control of the border
points along the Syrian border is a much more challenging task;
Hezbollah conceded the point in principle, but is opposed to the
deployment of UNIFIL troops along that border. Syria has also
threatened that if UNIFIL troops are deployed on its border, it will
close its borders with Lebanon, which would choke the Lebanese economy.
The firm control of the airport and seaports are of equal importance.
these are obviously crucial issues, because while Hezbollah is
exhausted for the time being, if the borders and entry points are not
controlled, Iran and Syria could channel huge amounts of cash and arms
to the organization and build it back to its pre-war capacities within
months. The Lebanese government has been sensitive to the risk of
confrontation with Syria; it has deployed troops to control the border
points and declared that it does not need UNIFIL troop assistance but
only technical assistance in terms of specialized border monitoring and
control equipment and training. The security services have equally
moved to secure the airport and sea ports. The approach outlined by the
Lebanese government is a viable one, as the armed services have the
capacity to control these entry points; the problem in the past has
been the consistent will to do so. Finally, in the security area, the
government must consolidate its authority over all Lebanese territory;
this would include reclaiming security authority over the southern
suburbs of Beirut and certain areas of the Biqaa Valley, which are
still the preserve of Hezbollah,. Surely, this should be done without
confrontation, but it needs to be done nonetheless.
This leaves the question of the eventual disarmament or
decommissioning of Hezbollah. Although this is not a point that is to
be implemented in this current phase, it is an issue that was being
discussed before the war erupted, and has now become much more relevant
and pressing. If the Army secures the South and the border points, if
there are no future Israeli attacks, and if Hezbollah is prevented from
re-arming, its military raison d'etre and future would be largely
compromised, and it would be likelier to contemplate a profound change
in its role and status in the country. A number of ideas have been
floated ranging from straight disarmament, like other militias disarmed
at the end of the Lebanese civil war, to integrating Hezbollah's forces
under the state's authority within a national defense structure under
the model of a Civil Defense League, or National Guard, or Boarder
Defense Brigade or some such similar structure. This hurdle is a
crucial one, but awaits the outcome of the proper implementation of
1701 first.
At the economic level, the challenges are clear and daunting. The
government needs to act quickly in reconstructing what was destroyed,
rebuilding tourist and investor confidence, and continuing to manage
the country's precarious public debt situation. Headed by a Prime
Minister who oversaw most of Lebanon's previous reconstruction and
economic development, this government is well equipped to do so. The
government has already outlined its reconstruction and compensation
scheme, held an international short term aid conference (in Stockholm,
August 31) and is organizing a longer-term international economic aid
donor's meeting. Of course, the proof is in the implementation, and the
government must remain vigilant that the reconstruction and recovery
programs for blighted areas not succumb to slow-downs and corruption.
The opportunity to prove the state's immediate relevance to inhabitants
of these areas should not be wasted. While Hezbollah initially
undertook to compensate and rebuild all damaged properties, it has
since gone back on that promise apparently having underestimated the
extent of the destruction and overestimated the funds available to it.
Interestingly, an Iranian delegation that visited the country after the
war, pledged to channel its main aid through the Lebanese government,
not Hezbollah.
At the political level, firm steps should also be undertaken to
consolidate political unity and develop the country's political
institutions. The government must move beyond its immediate concern
with holding on to power and show that it can lead true political
reform. This means a fuller implementation of the Taif Agreement. At a
minimum, this means the passing of a new election draft bill, a version
of which had already been prepared by the National Electoral Commission
that the government itself appointed, and the passing of an
administrative decentralization bill that is long overdue. The
government enjoys a majority in Parliament which can then turn these
bills into law. The government must also show that it is able to revive
faith in the state by more effectively combating corruption and
breathing life into the civil and armed services.
At a more immediate level, there are serious political divisions
within the country that cannot be ignored; the government had been
stalemated before the war, and is likely to continue to be so if these
divisions are not addressed. A National Dialogue process had been put
in place throughout the first half of 2006 that had brought together
leaders of all communities; it made significant progress on a number of
issues relating to Shebaa Farms, the Hariri investigation, and
Palestinians in Lebanon, but bogged down on the issues of Hezbollah's
arms and election of a new President. At a minimum this National
Dialogue should be resumed. Hezbollah and Aoun are calling for the
establishment of a government of National Unity in which they would
have broader representation, but the government has declined, citing
the confidence of Parliament that it still enjoys, and fearing that
bringing the opposition into government so early on might paralyze its
ability to fully implement 1701. Nevertheless, the government must find
ways to meet the opposition part of the way, and to more fully
consolidate national unity.
At a more fundamental level, important players have basic choices
to make. The leadership of Hezbollah must re-assess its policies and
status and decide, at some point soon, whether it wishes to fully
integrate into the Lebanese state and assume its role as a principal
leader of the Shiite community of Lebanon within the Lebanese
democratic state framework, or remain an independent extra-legal force
with principal links to a foreign state, Iran. If the latter, the
Shiite community in Lebanon also has important choices to make; do they
really wish to support a ``two-state solution'' in Lebanon, or are they
committed to a united and independent Lebanon? Different communities in
Lebanon have gone through similar moments of truth: the Maronites
allied with Israel to try to regain their power in Lebanon; the Sunnis
and Druze relied on the PLO at one point to gain the upper hand in
Lebanon; and everybody used--and was used by--the Syrians. In this
regard, the Shiite community, as well as other communities, must
realize that foreign alliances, taken too far, threaten national unity
and the integrity of the state.
From another perspective, the mistake that was committed by the
Maronites in past decades in overplaying their political hand and over-
dominating the government, risks being repeated by leaders in the Sunni
community. The Sunni community was, arguably, the largest beneficiary
from the Taif Agreement as executive power was largely shifted from the
Maronite presidency to the Sunni office of the Prime Minister. The
Shiite community, which was very numerous and powerful at the end of
the war, gained only marginal advantages in the Taif Agreement, which
was, after all, negotiated in Saudi Arabia and mediated by three other
Arab Sunni states. The benefits came almost exclusively in the
legislative branch with enhanced powers for the Shiite Speaker of
Parliament, including a role for Parliament in naming a Prime Minister.
The executive branch, however, remained largely the preserve of a
strengthened Sunni Prime Minister and a weakened Maronite President.
Shiite proposals, such as having a Shiite Vice Presidency or
establishing a bicameral legislative within a limited time frame were
not approved. Even an unwritten understanding that the key post of
Minister of Finance would be Shiite--such that government decrees which
require financial outlay would have the signature of a Sunni Prime
Minister, a Shiite Minister of Finance and a Maronite President--was
dropped in 1992 when Hariri took office. At a time when the Shiite
community is being asked to gradually wean itself off Hezbollah and
Iran and integrate more fully into the Lebanese state, the community's
complaints about how the post-Taif state has developed must be
considered seriously. While the Syrians ran Lebanon, the main Shiite
parties, allied to Syria, enjoyed widespread effective power both
inside and outside the state; but with the Syrian withdrawal, their
concerns have come back to the fore. At some point soon, progress must
be made toward establishing a bicameral legislative where the lower
house is free of confessional restriction of seats and in which the
Shiite community can feel more fairly represented; in addition, the
Council of Ministers, as the heart of the executive branch, must be
revamped with its own internal bylaws (which it now lacks) and a
broader sense of partnership among major communities. It will not do,
in the long term, to argue--like the Maronites complained in the past
that they could not share more power with the Sunnis because they were
too close to Gamal Abdel Nasser or the PLO--that more power cannot be
shared with the Shiites because they are too close to Iran or Syria: as
they feel a wider stake in the state, they, like others before them,
will and should reduce their reliance on outside players. The horse
must be put in front; the cart will follow.
What Is To Be Done? -- The U.S. and The Arab and International
Community:
If the Lebanese government is to achieve its goals, it will require
strong and consistent support from the international community.
At the security level, the international community must compliment
its support for a beefed up UNIFIL with serious technical, training and
materiel support for the Lebanese armed forces and security services.
The international community must also understand Lebanon's own security
concerns and help Lebanon implement 1701 without triggering new
external or internal conflicts. This will require serious consideration
of how to fully secure the border points without triggering a conflict
with Syria, and how to move gradually toward decommissioning of
Hezbollah without triggering civil war.
At the economic level, the need for Arab and international
assistance is clear and has already taken off. This should obviously be
complimented by strong encouragement for businesses and firms to
reinvest in the country.
At the political level, the international community should be
careful not to break Lebanon as it tries to fix it. It should realize
that Lebanon's stability and independence is best secured through its
political unity, and that pushing the country too far, one way or
another, exacerbates internal divisions and can lead to the opposite
effect. Attempts to push Lebanon into the Baghdad Pact in 1958 led to
civil war; similarly, the U.S.'s ``With Us or Against Us'' Foreign
Policy puts exceptional strain on the Lebanese polity. The
international community should stand by the government, pushing it and
supporting it at the same time; but also listening closely to its
concerns and its readings of the internal and regional situations. The
international community should also encourage the government to
undertake overdue political reforms and to work toward reinforcing
national unity.
Perhaps most importantly, the international community must help
protect 1701 from forces that could derail it: a despondent Israel,
eager to redress its loss of military prestige, could renew attacks
against Hezbollah and Lebanon under the rubric of ``defensive
operations'' and/or the U.S.-championed ``war on terror.'' This would
destroy the accomplishments of 1701, destabilize the Lebanese state,
and vindicate the arguments of Hezbollah. The U.S. must use its
influence with Israel to prevent such activity.
The Syrian regime has been pushed out of Lebanon, threatened by
members of the U.S. administration, and is under investigation for
Hariri's assassination; in his angry speech after the end of the latest
war, Bashshar al Assad lashed out at the March 14 group and other Arab
leaders, but also pointedly concluded that his objective was the return
of the Golan heights. An intensely cornered Syria can find many ways to
destabilize Lebanon. Now is as good a time as any to revive Syrian-
Israeli peace talks that almost bore fruit in the mid-1990s.
Finally, how the U.S. and the international community deals with
Iran's nuclear ambitions will impact directly on Lebanon: if war is
launched on Iran, there is little doubt that Israel and Hezbollah will
be involved in it, and Lebanon would end up in complete and final ruin.
Only if a political settlement is reached, can Lebanon hope to escape
being engulfed in another war. Lebanon has no stake in Iran being, or
not being, a nuclear power; however, how the outcome is achieved is of
immediate relevance to Lebanon.
Conclusion
The deployment of the Lebanese army and a beefed up UNIFIL to south
Lebanon is a move of historical significance that reverses 37 years of
Lebanese army absence from the sensitive Lebanese-Israeli border and
neutralizes Hezbollah's main zone of operations; the control of ports
and border points will also prevent rearmament of Hezbollah and will
strengthen the state's hand in developing a monopoly on military power.
However, the building of a strong and stable Lebanon and the eventual
decommissioning of Hezbollah is a complex and delicate political
process that requires regional and international help. The Arab and
international community must help Lebanon to rebuild and should
appreciate the complexity of the Lebanese political process and be
careful not to break Lebanon as they try to fix it. Squaring the
domestic politics of Lebanon with the circle of regional and
international tensions will not be easy; but Lebanon has emerged from
complex and costly wars before.
Peace is built one step at a time. UNSCR 1701 does not fully
satisfy any of the parties to it; yet it is an important building bloc
toward stabilizing Lebanon, which in turn should open the way for
taking further steps toward stability and peace in Lebanon and the
region. The latest war was a symptom of wider and deeper conflicts in
the region; let us hope that the treatment of this symptom will
encourage the regional and international community to treat the wider
and deeper causes.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Director Salem.
I appreciate the extraordinary testimony both you and
Ambassador Pascual have given.
Let me just say that we're going to run into the roll-call
vote, but I want to give as much time as possible to our final
witness. I'm going to put a time of 12 minutes on the clock, so
that you, sort of, see how it's moving. That will take us into
the roll-call vote, but it will also give me a few minutes to
get to the floor to do my duty.
Would you please proceed, Professor?
STATEMENT OF AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON, PROFESSOR OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ANTHROPOLOGY, BOSTON UNIVERSITY,
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
Dr. Norton. Thank you, Senator Lugar. It's an honor to be
sitting here in front of you.
The 2006 Israel/Lebanon war will be remembered for the
momentous miscalculation of Hezbollah, which tried to stretch
the rules of the game, with disastrous results, and for the
failure of Israel to defeat its protagonist.
Israel calculated that it could turn southern Lebanon into
a killing box devoid of civilians, where it could then defeat
Hezbollah in detail. Instead, the area was turned into a
humanitarian disaster zone, where Hezbollah was well-prepared
to confront the technically superior Israeli army.
When the war began, neither Israel nor its American
protector even considered a serious role for United Nations
peacekeepers. After 34 days of war, a war which was allowed to
go on far too long, in my view, with civilian deaths rapidly
growing, especially in Lebanon, where over 1200 innocent people
died, compared to 41 in Israel, and the international clamor
for a cease-fire growing, the prospect of a robust U.N. force
for south Lebanon became very attractive. Unfortunately, I
believe that we could have reached that point far earlier, had
U.S. diplomacy been conducted differently.
There was, between Hezbollah and Israel, a kind of security
system operating. There's been a lot of uninformed commentary
about the nature of the conflict in south Lebanon from 2000 to
2006. In fact, that border was largely quiet. One Israeli
civilian was killed by Hezbollah fire during that 6-year
period. A total of 17 Israeli soldiers were killed during that
period; however, most of them were killed in the occupied Golan
Heights. So, basically, this was a situation which was not
perfect, and certainly there was Hezbollah harassment of
Israel, but, nonetheless, compared to the previous years of
occupation, it was a reasonably quiet period. There were about
10 incidents of Katyushas being fired across the border.
According to Israel officials, generals and others, almost all
of those incidents were the responsibility of Palestinian
groups, not of Hezbollah. So, even if Hezbollah survives in
some way as a militia apparatus in Lebanon, at least, if the
past is any instruction, there's a possibility of re-erecting
some kind of effective security system.
The outcome, in many ways, of this war, it seems to me, was
foreseeable from the very beginning, and, certainly, careful
analysts foresaw it from the very beginning: namely, that
Hezbollah would retain a strong base. It's true, as other
witnesses have indicated, that debates have been unleashed in
Lebanon concerning Hezbollah's viability as a political player
and so on; but, nonetheless, the core constituency has been
sustained. Why? One of the reasons is, Senator, there are two
security problems. Israel has a legitimate security problem,
but the people of Lebanon have a legitimate security problem,
as well. Upwards of 20,000 people have been killed in Lebanon
by Israel over the last quarter century. Many thousands of
those have been civilians. Unless the new robust UNIFIL can
provide security, then Hezbollah is going to have a rationale.
It's clear to me, from reading the rules of engagement, which
are extensive and very carefully drafted, some 22 pages--I
don't want to go into detail, on the record, for a variety of
reasons--but, in any case, on the basis of reading those, it's
clear that this is going to be a very professional force, but a
force that has no intention whatsoever of attempting to effect
the disarmament of Hezbollah.
In effect, what's going to be at play in this UNIFIL zone
is a don't-ask/don't-tell policy, vis-a-vis Hezbollah. In other
words, people are not going to go searching for their weapons,
and Hezbollah's not going to display them ostentatiously.
That does not point to a route towards disarmament, it
points to a kind of freezing of the situation. This is what
U.N. peacekeeping forces do best, they freeze the situation.
And, in that regard, I certainly would associate myself with my
colleagues, and with the optimistic hopes of Secretary Welch,
that we could see an active diplomatic project to basically
take advantage of that freezing of the situation.
From the standpoint of the Lebanese army, they have been
sent to the south to, quote, ``work in cooperation''--in fact,
the Arabic word that's used is, precisely, ``ta'awun,''
cooperation--``to work in cooperation with the resistance.''
This does not indicate a project of disarmament.
My long-term view--and I'll be brief here, Senator, because
I know that your time is dwindling--but a long-term arrangement
that makes sense, and the only one I can really think of that
makes sense at this stage, is to work towards the integration
of the militia apparatus of Hezbollah into the army. That
raises all kinds of difficulties, in terms of command
relationships and so on. Nonetheless, at least as a first step,
to achieve that goal of integration, in principle, seems to me
to be a very important direction to move in, because that would
place the responsibility for that militia apparatus precisely
in the hands of the Lebanese national government. Much more
work would need to be done.
But I would like to end by underlining the point I made
earlier. There are two security problems, an Israeli security
problem and a Lebanese security problem. And we need to be very
vigilant to be sure that both of these security problems are
addressed if not solved. And that means that the United States
Government must be very vigilant, in terms of supporting
UNIFIL, even if UNIFIL has to act against Israel to ensure the
security of Lebanon.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Norton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Augustus Richard Norton
The 2006 Israel-Lebanon war will be remembered for the momentous
miscalculation of Hezbollah, which tried to stretch the ``rules of the
game'' with disastrous results, and for the failure of Israel to defeat
its protagonist. Israel calculated that it could turn southern Lebanon
into a ``killing box,'' devoid of civilians, where it could then defeat
Hezbollah in detail. Instead, the area was turned into a humanitarian
disaster zone where Hezbollah was well-prepared to confront the
technically superior, but muscle-bound Israeli army.
When the war began, neither Israel nor its American protector even
considered a serious role for United Nations peacekeepers. After 34
days of war, with civilian deaths rapidly growing (especially in
Lebanon where over 1,200 innocent people died compared to 41 in Israel)
and the international clamour for a cease-fire growing, the prospect of
a ``robust'' UN force became very attractive.
1.
In May 2000, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon after facing
unrelenting pressure from a resistance led by Hezbollah. Hezbollah
began after Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon as a child of the Iranian
``Islamic revolution.'' If Iran was the mother of Hezbollah, Israel was
its stepfather because Israel's two-decades long occupation fostered
and honed Hezbollah.
Beginning in the 1990s, ``rules of the game'' developed between
Hezbollah and Israel. These rules provided that both sides would avoid
attacking civilians and restrict their activities to clearly defined
areas, especially the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. While the Golan
Heights is Syrian territory, a small pocket of the land is claimed as
occupied Lebanese territory.
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah tried to stretch the rules by capturing
two soldiers on Israeli soil. Hezbollah hoped to use the captives to
bargain for three Lebanese prisoners held by Israel, but the government
instead chose to exploit the provocation as a casus belli and to launch
a war to eliminate Hezbollah as an effective militia adversary of
Israel. In point of fact, the Israeli army had been chomping at the bit
for a chance to settle scores with Hezbollah, and both Israel and the
U.S. relished the opportunity to devastate a powerful proxy of Iran.
In the six year period that followed the end of the occupation, the
Israeli-Lebanese border was quieter than it had been for the past
thirty years. One Israeli civilian was killed by Hezbollah during this
period, a victim of a falling anti-aircraft round fired at Israeli jets
violating Lebanese air space. A total of 17 Israeli soldiers died, most
either in Lebanon or on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. There were
about ten incidents of Katyusha rockets fired across the border into
Israel or into Israeli territorial waters. Almost all of the incidents
were attributed by Israelis officials to Palestinian groups, not to
Hezbollah.
Thus, while the border was hardly tranquil, it was far calmer than
even Israeli generals thought it would be when they left Lebanon in May
2000. Of course, it was Hezbollah's error to presume that Israel was
either satisfied with the status quo or sanguine about the impressive
arsenal of rockets pointed towards Israel from Lebanon.
2.
The United Nations Security Council resolution that won a cease-
fire in the Israel-Hezbollah war envisages the buttressing of the
existing peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. The United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had been allowed (indeed, actively
encouraged by the U.S.) to dwindle to a skeleton force of 2,000
peacekeepers, but resolution 1701 provides for a dramatic expansion of
the force to as many as 15,000 troops. Contingents have been offered by
Malaysia, Bangladesh and Indonesia , all nations that refuse diplomatic
relations with Israel, but the core intent of resolution is to bolster
UNIFIL with significant European force contributions.
One of the telling successes of Hezbollah is that it has acquired
such a fierce reputation for its tough toe-to-toe battles with Israel
in this summer's war that no sentient prime minister wished to send
soldiers to do what Israel demonstrated it could not do. Even Turkish
generals, whose army is no pushover, indicated that they were not
enthusiastic about sending fighting units to Lebanon.
France initially balked at sending a sizable contingent to Lebanon,
and resolution 1701 seemed to be in jeopardy. However, after two weeks
of careful discussions, mostly focused on the rules of engagement that
define UNIFIL's behaviour, France, Italy and Spain stepped forward as
major contributors. France will lead the force until the present French
commanding general's assignment ends in early 2007, and command of the
force will then pass to Italy.
3.
UNIFIL was first deployed in 1978. Its original mandate, largely
crafted by the U.S., was to oversee the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Lebanon. Unlike today, when Hezbollah is seen as the culprit in
Washington, President Jimmy Carter viewed Israel's 1978 invasion of
Lebanon as an excessive and aggressive response to terrorism.
The area of operations for UNIFIL remains much the same today,
namely Lebanon south of the Litani river. When it first deployed,
UNIFIL instantly found itself faced with uncooperative belligerents.
Palestinian militants, who then controlled much of southern Lebanon,
insisted on maintaining positions in two large sectors, including one
right in the middle of the UNIFIL zone.
Israel, too, undermined UNIFIL by refusing to allow it to fully
deploy. In 1978, Israel handed control of a border enclave to a gang of
Lebanese Army deserters. Israel dismissed UN protests pretending that
it had no control over the ``South Lebanon Army'' of Major Sa'ad
Haddad, which it paid, trained and directed.
In contrast to the Palestinian militants, who were an alien force
disliked by many people in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah draws much of
its membership from the local population. The Shiite party boasts
strong local support in the region, as the Israelis discovered to their
cost during their long occupation from 1982-2000.
4.
After more than a month of bombardment, Hezbollah emerged with its
support intact if not increased. Its impressive and rapid response to
the needs of those whose homes and lives have been ravaged--mostly, but
not all Shiite Muslims--has further consolidated its impressive base of
support.
Outsiders often forget that the Lebanese have suffered tremendously
under Israeli attacks for three decades, so one of the key tasks of
UNIFIL is to insure that Lebanese civilians are permitted to peacefully
return to and rebuild their devastated villages. If UNIFIL-plus cannot
facilitate the restoration of the civilian population, then the next
few months may only be an interlude in the 2006 war.
Given Hezbollah's broad base of support, and the fact that its
Lebanese supporters see no other force that can thwart Israel should it
decide to reignite the war, it is completely unrealistic that the new
international contingents will succeed either in disarming Hezbollah or
in diminishing its appeal. If UNIFIL is going to succeed, it will need
the cooperation, not the animosity of Hezbollah. For its part,
Hezbollah has declared its agreement any of its members found carrying
arms may be detained and disarmed.
The major question is whether UNIFIL-plus will operate not only
competently but fairly. The key to restoring stability to southern
Lebanon is not only to see Hezbollah stand down, but also for the new
force to avoid being seen as an instrument of Israeli influence or
occupation.
The new force will probably total no more than 12,000 soldiers and
sailors, not the 15,000 originally envisaged. It will be twice the size
of UNIFIL at its earlier peak strength of 6,000. Even so, UNIFIL-plus
will retain a major deficit that characterizes almost any international
force, namely an endemic lack of local knowledge and language skills.
The introduction of as many as 15,000 Lebanese troops should help
to mitigate this problem, especially since the UN force is to work
side-by-side with the Lebanese army. Lebanese civilians have already
welcomed their army, and Hezbollah has always treated the army with
respect. While outgunned significantly by Israel, the Lebanese army is
led by a professional officer corps and it is technically competent.
Unfortunately, many of the Lebanese soldiers deployed to the South are
poorly equipped, as reflected in requests to UNIFIL for basic supplies.
The Security Council resolution anticipates that the Lebanese
soldiers will disarm Hezbollah. There is absolutely no possibility that
this will happen. Many Lebanese soldiers applaud it for defending
Lebanon, and the army has been ordered to work ``in cooperation with
the resistance.''
It is popular sport in some circles to castigate the United Nations
for its failures, but no peacekeeping force will be any more effective
than the contributing countries allow it to be. Will governments permit
their soldiers to protect Lebanese civilians from Israeli ``defensive''
attacks, or will soldiers be ordered to mount risky offensive
operations against Hezbollah if they prove necessary? These are
questions that are more likely to be answered by national governments
than by UNIFIL commanders. If Israel or Hezbollah attempt to thwart the
peacekeepers, the success of the force may turn on the willingness of
European governments to accept casualties.
Careful thought has been given to creating parameters that minimize
the risks of an escalation of violence. The rules of engagement (ROE)
for UNIFIL have been crafted to insure that the force has the authority
to meet armed challenges, if necessary, with deadly force. Equally
important, the ROE specifically spell out the authority to use force to
protect civilians, or humanitarian workers. The rules emphasize that
when force is used it must be proportional to the threat, minimize the
prospect for civilian casualties and represent the minimum level of
force necessary to meet the challenge.
There is no question that in terms of troop strength, equipment,
and mandate UNIFIL-plus represents a serious enhancement of the
peacekeeping operation in southern Lebanon. When UNIFIL was first
deployed, in 1978, there was a notable effort by French peacekeepers to
forcefully execute their mandate, but after a few bloody clashes with
Palestinian guerrillas, who then dominated parts of southern Lebanon,
the will to use force subsided. Some UNIFIL contingents were even
directed by their home governments not ever to fire their weapons, and
in general the operational culture of UNIFIL included a reticence to
use lethal force. Thus, the new ROE represent, in principle at least,
the prospect for a more assertive operational posture.
Hezbollah commands broad support in southern Lebanon, and so long
as the peacekeepers and the Shiite group maintain a ``don't ask, don't
tell'' arrangement there are unlikely to be any concerted challenges of
UNIFIL by Hezbollah. It remains to be seen whether efforts by the
Lebanese government to stem the arms flow to Hezbollah by more actively
policing the Lebanese-Syrian border, as well as supplemental steps by
the naval forces pledged to UNIFIL, curtail the arms flow to Hezbollah.
There is a greater likelihood that Israel may seek to intervene in
the UNIFIL zone, perhaps to assassinate a Hezbollah official or to
interdict a suspected movement of arms. Israel is also likely to strike
in other parts of Lebanon against suspected arms shipments, or even
alleged Hezbollah military targets. In the first few weeks of the
cease-fire following the summer war, UN data indicates that most cease-
fire violations were committed by Israel (the ratio was nearly 19:1).
In the past, Israel brushed UNIFIL aside pretty much at will and it may
be tempted to assert its right of self-defence to launch attacks in the
U.N. zone.
Unless UNIFIL demonstrates firm resolve against both Hezbollah and
Israel, it will quickly cede its credibility. The ROE define the
military means for demonstrating resolve, but it is politics that will
permit or restrict resolve. It is distressingly easy to imagine a
situation in which the United States tolerates if not endorses Israeli
actions that undermine, even jeopardize UNIFIL's operational
credibility.
Putting UNIFIL on steroids will probably do no more than freeze the
situation in southern Lebanon. That in itself is an accomplishment,
given the intensity of the war of 2006, but the real work that needs to
be done is diplomatic. The diplomatic work entails patiently rebuilding
a stable security framework in southern Lebanon that recognizes that
both Lebanon and Israel have legitimate security interests.
Peacekeepers do not solve crises, but they do stabilize crisis
zones. The integration of Hezbollah's military apparatus into the
Lebanese army should be a goal of diplomacy. This solution has been
already suggested by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The success
of UNIFIL-plus will probably be measured by it ability to inspire
confidence in both Israel and Lebanon that Hezbollah's independent
militia role is a dangerous anachronism, but that confidence will not
be born over night. The success or failure of the force will also be
hostage to external developments, including conditions in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the success of international efforts to curtail the
Iranian nuclear program and the fate of Iraq. In short, as much as the
cease-fire in the summer war was overdue, the outcome of this
experiment in more robust peacekeeping is uncertain.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Professor.
Each of you has presented extremely complex dilemmas. As a
matter of fact, the list that I've made as I've been jotting
down the hazards of this is formidable. First of all,
Ambassador Pascual dealt with a potential budget of $5.1
billion, with a suggestion that the United States would
contribute $750 million, although it's not clear, you know, who
contributes the rest. But then there is the prospect, which may
be too pessimistic, that all the rebuilding proceeds, but then
conflict again occurs, with re-destruction of that, while we're
still in the process of reconstruction. In other words, in
looking for some governance, some stability, you wish this
could be a framework in which Lebanon is isolated for a while,
and people have a chance to come back, get jobs, rebuild their
homes and their airport; their tourism comes back, nobody
touches them. But you're describing, at best, finally,
Professor, a situation in which maybe there is a stalemate, or
stability that comes from the fact that nobody decides to make
an aggressive move, that Hezbollah is not really just armed,
but, conceivably, in due course, that it integrates with a
Lebanese army. That might have been the case, for instance, in
Iraq, perhaps. But it wasn't. This is a concept that has not
been weighed, it seems, by our Government, as yet, or by
others. That's the value of these hearings, to bring forward
important ideas as to how we're to deal with this.
With respect to Hezbollah, as you've suggested, Director
Salem, perhaps its constituency has been affected, because it's
a part of the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who have been
displaced or, as Ambassador Pascual has pointed out, are
unemployed, sometimes without houses or adequate shelter and so
forth. There must be a rebuilding process for this. But then,
skeptics would be sanguine enough to say that there's a core
group of Hezbollah that's not all that worried about
reconstruction; they're not involved in the building business.
And, as a matter of fact, maybe we will be successful in
stopping an arms flow. Maybe Hezbollah won't have many arms
left. But, on the other hand, the skeptics would say that you'd
be surprised how much Hezbollah left and how resilient these
folks are. As Professor Norton points out, Hezbollah is there
and they're not disarmed. Overlaying all of this, as each of
you noted, is Iran's role. What is the relationship of Iran,
not just to the area, but to the United States? What's going to
happen in the United Nations with regard to Iran's nuclear
program? A nuclear-armed Iran would cast a shadow across the
region.
You've been most thoughtful and generous in your papers and
in your testimony. We're going to be thinking about this. The
value of your testimony is evident, I think, to everyone who
has been a part of this hearing, and we appreciate very much
your coming and your preparation.
Dr. Norton. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. So saying, we thank you, and we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X E S
----------
Appendix I: U.S. Government Assistance to Lebanon
I. Lebanon Funding Planned and Reflected in CBJ.
A. FY 2006: $39.6M ESF; $.99M FMF; $.693 IMET; $1M NADR-HD; $.18M
INCLE--Total $42.463M
B. FY 2007: $35.5M ESF; $4.8M FMF; $.935M IMET; $2M NADR-HD--Total
$$43.235M (does not include the $26.3M anticipated to support UNIFIL
from the State Operations Contributions for International Peacekeeping
Activities--CIPA.)
II. FY 2006 Lebanon Post Conflict USG Commitments (as per President's
announcement of August 21.)
A. FY 2006 Funds Not Previously Allocated to Lebanon:
--$68M IDFA--Identified as emergency relief to
Lebanon.
--$9.2M P.L. 480 Title I--Food for Progress
--$.63M P.L. 480 Title II--Food Aid
--$10M MRA--Identified as emergency humanitarian
relief; includes $7.3M in FY 2006 Emergency
supplemental previously not allocated; $1.6M from
unexpected program recoveries and $1M in previously
allocated funds for the protection requirements of
international and non-government partners.
--$13.5M ERMA--Presidential Drawdown authorized
August 21, 2006.
--$2M IO&P--Reprogrammed to UN Mine Action Group from
funds made available as a result of pariah state
restrictions.
--$2M DA--Reprogrammed from the Asia and Near East
Bureau's FY 2006 Program Development and Learning
objective.
--$27.95M GWOT PKO--Previously identified for
numerous CT activities as part of the FY 2005
Supplemental that were still pending final approval/
notification.
--$1.5M NADR-ATA--Programmed from the NADR-ATA NEA
Regional allocation not previously identified for
specific country programs.
--$.059M IMET--Reprogrammed from the pool of end-of
year funds identified to be excess to other country
programs within the IMET program.
--$2.723M FMF--Reprogrammed from Nepal, Argentina and
ASPA restricted-countries.
--$10.632M--DOD Section 1206 authority as part of a
larger train and equip allocation.
--$2.41M--These funds have yet to be identified to
meet our overall reconstruction commitment.
B. FY 2006 Funds Previously Allocated to Lebanon Country Programs
Re-Prioritized to GOL Post-Conflict Needs.
--Of the $39.6M in ESF, $14.07M is being reprogrammed
to address reconstruction activities, impacting the
Economic Growth, Democracy and Environment Strategic
Objectives.
--Of the $1M in NADR-HD, $.42M is being reprogrammed
to support specific demining activities related to post
conflict reconstruction.
__________
Appendix II: Lebanon--Stockholm Donors Meeting,
31 August 2006
New Pledges, Total Pledges, Flash Appeal Pledges,
Recovery Appeal Pledges \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Financial Tracking Service (FTS)/Tracking Global Humanitarian
Aid Flows, [email protected]; Data compiled by OCHA on the basis of
verbal statements at meeting plus previous written reports from donors
and implementing agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part I: Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development through Korea
(Republic of); Part I continues on the following page.
Part I: Continued.
Part II: Kuwait through United States; Part II continues on the
following page.
Part II: Continued.
__________
Appendix III: Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary David Welch by Senator Feingold
Question. What is the nature and scope of Hezbollah's activities in
southern Lebanon? Can you describe Hezbollah's role in reconstruction
efforts in southern Lebanon specifically? Is Hezbollah's role in
reconstruction efforts hampering or displacing the efforts of the
international community, or more importantly, the Lebanese government?
Answer. Prior to the conflict, Hezbollah operated a substantial
network of social services throughout southern Lebanon.
Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah made a public announcement that Hezbollah would provide
substantial assistance to help the Lebanese people rebuild, pledging
money to help people pay rent and buy furniture. While we have not yet
seen evidence that Hezbollah is failing to deliver on its promises so
far, we are skeptical that its leaders will ultimately have the
financial resources to fulfill these pledges.
Thus far, Hezbollah's activities have not hindered the ability of
either the international community or the government of Lebanon to
provide assistance to the Lebanese people. We are pleased to see the
Lebanese government taking a leading role on the initial and long-term
reconstruction effort through their participation at the August
Stockholm Conference on Initial Recovery and the September Meeting of
the Economic Core Group for Lebanon that was held on the margins of the
IMF/World Bank Meetings in Singapore. We anticipate a larger
reconstruction conference will be held in Beirut before the end of the
year.
Question. We all know how complex massive reconstruction efforts
like this can be. One significant challenge concerns the capacity of
the Lebanese government to coordinate the various aspects of
reconstruction efforts throughout the country. Can you identify how
reconstruction efforts are being coordinated within Lebanon, and what,
if any, mechanisms exist to ensure that large-scale reconstruction
efforts are supporting broader political and economic goals of the
state?
Answer. The office of the Lebanese Prime Minister has overall
responsibility for reconstruction, focusing especially on the macro
economy and investment. The Ministry of Finance and the Council assist
it in its efforts for development and reconstruction. The Council
coordinates the details of individual projects at the working level,
while the Ministry of Finance is in charge of looking at the big
picture and making sure that economic, administrative and fiscal
reforms are coordinated with reconstruction.
Question. When discussing the actual implementation of
reconstruction efforts on the ground in southern Lebanon, is there any
one central focal point or organization that is mapping the entire
range of projects that are necessary, that are being completed, and
that might need more attention?
Answer. The office of the Prime Minister is the central point
coordinating with the Ministry of Finance and the Council for
Development and Reconstruction (project details), as well as with the
various affected ministries (Education, Public Works, Defense,
Interior, etc.).
Question. How are the U.S. government and the Government of Lebanon
working with the private sector in reconstruction efforts?
Answer. President Bush will announce a Presidential Delegation to
Lebanon composed of distinguished business executives who have agreed
to launch a nationwide effort in the U.S. to demonstrate private-sector
support for Lebanon's reconstruction and development. Following their
trip, they will ask American individuals and corporations to donate
directly to the U.S.-Lebanon Partnership Fund, a new fund, administered
by Global Impact, to provide help. The delegation--which included John
Chambers, President and CEO of Cisco Systems, Ray Irani, President and
CEO of Occidental Petroleum, and Yousif Ghafari, Chairman and CEO,
Ghafari Companies--is scheduled to visit Lebanon on September 24.
Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora has said he will welcome the delegation
and the private sector initiative in general. Craig Barrett, Chairman,
Intel Corporation, is part of the private sector team but will not
participate in the trip.
Question. The Secretary of State has noted in past speeches that it
takes a ``plan'' to disarm a militia. What is our plan for disarming
this militia, and is this plan coordinated with our partners in the
region? How long will disarmament take? What obstacles, if any, exist
to effectively implementing a disarmament program?
Answer. UNSCR 1701 establishes an area in southern Lebanon that
will be free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than
those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL forces. This is a good
first step.
Through internal dialogue, the Government of Lebanon will need to
address the disarmament of Hezbollah. We expect Prime Minister Siniora
to continue to move forward on implementation of 1701, but their
effectiveness will depend on the willingness of President Lahoud and
key Parliamentary blocs, including those of Aoun, Hezbollah, and Amal,
as well as the March 14 coalition, to put aside previous political
disagreements and put the longer-term needs of the Lebanese people
first. We can expect various factions within Lebanon to continue to try
to undermine the democratically elected government.
Enhanced political, economic, and security support will be key to
providing the Siniora government the strength that it will need to
address the Hezbollah threat and ultimately disarm it. Our assistance
is designed to do just this, and we are coordinating with regional
partners to ensure their assistance is channeled in this way.
Through enforcement of the embargo on illicit weapons shipments,
the international community is also making it harder for Hezbollah to
rearm. We shall continue to publicly remind Syria and Iran of their
responsibility under international law to prevent the shipment of
weapons to Hezbollah.
Answer. What is your current diplomatic strategy to engage regional
actors in reconstruction efforts?
Answer. We are in frequent contact with the Economic Core Group for
Lebanon, which, in addition to the U.S., other Western donor nations
and the EU, includes major regional donors or sources of skilled human
resources such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE and Egypt.
Question. What is the role of the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization? Given the office's mandate, is it
playing a lead role in helping develop a strategic plan or in managing
U.S. reconstruction efforts in Lebanon?
Answer. On September 5, S/CRS deployed Senior Foreign Service
Officer Pat Nelson-Douvelis to Beirut for a 90-day TDY to assist the
Embassy in coordinating USG reconstruction and stabilization
assistance. Ms. Nelson-Douvelis is a current S/CRS office director, a
former DCM, and an assistance expert. This S/CRS staff deployment is
intended to be flexible and conform to the needs of the Embassy and the
situation on the ground. We have also detailed an S/CRS staff member to
the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) to assist the Lebanon desk,
and to participate in interagency planning efforts in several venues.
Ms. Nelson-Douvelis primarily supports the Embassy and NEA in
coordinating assistance in cases where there are new programs or there
is no specific agency representation in the Embassy. USAID and the
Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) have well-established
representation and coordination mechanisms already in place. Ms.
Nelson-Douvelis also works with the appropriate bureaus and agencies to
integrate efforts related to the over $230 million assistance package
announced by the President.
In addition, Ms. Nelson-Douvelis is working with other diplomatic
missions and the Lebanese government to better coordinate international
police assistance. ODC and the DATT have already been involved in on-
going U.S. police and military assistance efforts. Ms. Nelson-Douvelis
works to integrate the contributions of other donors, and to help
coordinate programs funded by transfers to the Department of State
under the Department of Defense's section 1207 authority.
Question. Is there a strategic plan for managing U.S.
reconstruction efforts within Lebanon?
Answer. On August 21, the President pledged a package of over $230
million to assist the people of Lebanon in rebuilding their country.
This assistance package includes three main components: assistance for
reconstruction, emergency and humanitarian relief; and assistance to
the Lebanese Armed Forces and other security services.
The funds will support vital needs identified by the Lebanese
government such as rebuilding infrastructure; road repairs; residential
reconstruction; repairing schools; restoring livelihoods; clearing
unexploded ordnance; and assisting with oil spill cleanup.
Specifically, we are contracting with a company with
representatives already on the ground in Lebanon to clean a high
priority oil spill site near Beirut, train clean-up crews, and provide
the necessary equipment. Working with Lebanese and participating
international aid organizations, the team will also develop a wildlife
protection plan, spill response and remediation training to empower the
Lebanese to be in a position to cope with any future spills on a more
immediate basis.
In communities that rely on the fishing industry we are providing
livelihood kits--including nets, hooks, and other materials--to
thousands of fishermen along the coastline, from Tripoli to Nakoura,
whose equipment was damaged or destroyed.
We are expanding a nearly decade-long landmine and unexploded
ordnance (UXO) humanitarian clearance program that is supported by the
U.S. in order to help remove the latest explosive remnants of war.
We have urged the government of Lebanon to take a leading role in
the longer-term reconstruction and are pleased to see them doing so. We
look forward to a larger reconstruction conference to be held in Beirut
at a later date.
Question. Experts on the second panel described massive shortfalls
in the amounts of money needed for assisting Lebanon recover from this
conflict. This includes support for reconstruction, the security
services, etc. Can you explain how the U.S. government came up with its
original amount of just over $200 million? Is this amount tied to any
strategic plan or assessment?
Answer. The $230 million that the U.S. pledged to assist Lebanon
was determined by identifying all funds that could be made available
quickly to aid with reconstruction, security, and humanitarian
assistance. Funding was drawn primarily from existing humanitarian
assistance funds, including the International Disaster and Famine
Assistance (IFDA) funds, Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) funds,
and Emergency Migration and Refugee Assistance (ERMA) funds. Additional
funds were derived from Economic Support Funds (ESF), Voluntary
Peacekeeping (PKO) funds, and Section 1206 Authority funds, among
others.
Our goal was to provide funds to address a comprehensive and broad-
based program of aid to Lebanon in FY 06 and FY 07. It encompasses
reconstruction of housing and infrastructure; humanitarian assistance
including food and water, relief commodities, and shelter, and support
to the Lebanese security forces; and international peacekeepers. This
initial pledge by the U.S. government was designed to provide as much
immediate aid as possible.
It is also important to note that the Conference on Lebanon's Early
Relief, held in Stockholm at the end of August, yielded some $942
million in pledges--nearly twice as much as expected.
Question. With the deployment of the Lebanese army and
international forces into south Lebanon, to what extent does Hezbollah
still represent leverage for Iran in its nuclear dispute with the
international community? Has Iran's position in Lebanon been
strengthened or weakened by the recent conflict?
Answer. Iran provides technological, operational, and financial
support and guidance to Hezbollah. While we do not believe that Iran
directly ordered the July 12 attack that sparked the recent conflict in
Lebanon, we believe Iran continued its support to Hezbollah throughout
the recent conflict.
UNSCR 1701 makes it more difficult for outside actors, including
Iran, to undermine the sovereignty of the Lebanese government. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1701 clearly requires all states to take
the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and all
other military equipment to Lebanon, unless authorized by Lebanon's
government or by UNIFIL for its use. This is a matter of international
law, and we continue to publicly call upon Iran and Syria to meet their
obligations fully to help implement that resolution and past Security
Council resolutions on Hezbollah, ultimately to include the full and
verifiable disarmament of Hezbollah. We appreciate UNSYG Annan's
delivering this message personally to the Syrian and Iranian
leadership.
Question. To what extent is Hezbollah replenishing its arsenal and,
if it is, at what point might Israel take military action to impede the
process?
Answer. UNSCR 1701 created a number of tools to prevent the
rearmament of Hezbollah.
UNSCR 1701 calls for countries to prevent all arms shipments to
Lebanon except those approved by the democratically elected Government
of Lebanon. We continue to call on the international community, Iran
and Syria in particular, to meet the international legal obligations
contained in UNSCR 1701 and prevent illicit arms shipments to Hezbollah
or any other unauthorized group in Lebanon.
The Lebanese government has also taken steps to address customs
issues at its airport, seaport, and borders. PM Siniora has requested
UNIFIL assistance in monitoring the air and seaports. German customs
agents have arrived at the Beirut airport, and interim fleets of
Italian, French, and Greek ships are assisting the LAF in monitoring
shortly. On the border with Syria, the LAF announced that they have
deployed 8,600 soldiers to monitor illegal crossings in a variety of
terrain. LAF troops have also been deployed to bolster customs brigade
personnel at official crossing points. The Germans are expected to
provide equipment and training at four official land crossings; experts
began arriving on Thursday, September 7. DPKO also recently sent a team
to assess border security.
At this time we do not have evidence that these tools are not
working. All UN member states, not simply Israel and Lebanon, are
required to support the implementation of UNSCR 1701.
Question. How effective do you think the Lebanese Armed Forces will
be in fulfilling their peacekeeping mandate? To what extent does Syria
retain residual influence among Lebanese military officials who worked
with Syrian counterparts during the period of occupation?
Answer. It is encouraging that the LAF has almost completed its
deployment of 15,000 troops to the South of Lebanon. This is the first
time in almost 40 years that they have deployed to this region. While
the LAF remains under-equipped, they did not make assistance a pre-
condition of deployment.
Reports are that the chain of command within the LAF remains strong
and loyal to the GOL. While a large percentage of the LAF is Shia, and
some individual soldiers may have Hezbollah sympathies, the LAF did not
experience desertion problems during the conflict.
We now have a unique window of opportunity to strengthen the GOL
via the Lebanese security services in the hopes of empowering them to
make more difficult political decisions, to include the disarmament of
Hezbollah, and increasing their ability to secure the Lebanese borders
with Israel and Syria. U.S. Security assistance is also designed to
address the shortages of LAF equipment and training to ensure that
their deployment remains sustainable.
__________