[Senate Hearing 109-976]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-976
HOMELAND SECURITY: THE NEXT 5 YEARS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 12, 2006
__________
Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
Allison J. Boyd, Counsel
Melvin D. Albritton, Counsel
Jennifer A. Hemingway, Professional Staff Member
Michael L. Alexander, Minority Staff Director
Holly A. Idelson, Minority Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Collins.............................................. 1
Senator Lieberman............................................ 3
Senator Domenici............................................. 5
Senator Levin................................................ 6
Senator Coleman.............................................. 7
Senator Dayton............................................... 8
Senator Warner............................................... 9
Senator Voinovich............................................ 10
Senator Bennett.............................................. 12
Senator Carper............................................... 13
Senator Lautenberg........................................... 33
WITNESSES
Tuesday, September 12, 2006
Hon. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 14
Leroy D. Baca, Sheriff, Los Angeles County, California........... 40
Richard A. Falkenrath, Ph.D., Deputy Commissioner for
Counterterrorism, New York City Police Department.............. 44
Steven N. Simon, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle
Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.................. 48
Daniel B. Prieto, Senior Fellow and Director, Homeland Security
Center, Reform Institute....................................... 52
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Baca, Leroy D.:
Testimony.................................................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 69
Chertoff, Hon. Michael:
Testimony.................................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Falkenrath, Richard A., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 74
Prieto, Daniel B.:
Testimony.................................................... 52
Prepared statement........................................... 113
Simon, Steven N.:
Testimony.................................................... 48
Prepared statement........................................... 106
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Chertoff................................................. 130
Mr. Baca..................................................... 202
Dr. Falkenrath............................................... 208
Mr. Simon.................................................... 212
Mr. Prieto................................................... 216
HOMELAND SECURITY: THE NEXT 5 YEARS
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M.
Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Collins, Voinovich, Coleman, Bennett,
Domenici, Warner, Lieberman, Levin, Carper, Dayton, Lautenberg,
and Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS
Chairman Collins. Good morning. We have a very full agenda
today with many distinguished witnesses, so I am going to ask
all of us to abbreviate our opening statements because we have
a noon vote.
As the Nation remembers the shock and loss of the attacks
on our country 5 years ago, the Committee this morning will
look ahead to assess the homeland security challenges the next
5 years will bring. Our expert witnesses, from the very top of
the Department of Homeland Security to the front lines, will
provide valuable insight into these challenges.
The morning of September 11, 2001, was one of uncommon
brilliance here in the United States. In the blink of an eye,
it was transformed into one of unthinkable horror. Two thousand
nine hundred ninety-six innocent men, women, and children
perished. Two of our major cities were under assault, two
centers of our economic and military power were in flames, as
was a field in Pennsylvania. To many, it seemed that a new kind
of war had begun.
If we had had the discussion that we are having today 5
years before September 11, 2001, it would have been clear that
those attacks were not the opening salvo of a new war, but the
foreseeable escalation of a war that had long been underway.
Nineteen ninety-six was the year that Ramzi Yousef, while
awaiting trial for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was
convicted of a conspiracy to plant bombs on a number of U.S.
airliners. Nineteen ninety-six was the year of the truck bomb
attack on Khobar Towers, an attack that specifically targeted
U.S. military personnel. And, 1996 was the year that Osama bin
Laden relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan and declared war on
the United States. The terrorist strategy was evolving to
direct massive attacks on high-profile American targets, but we
failed to see it. We failed to perceive that these seemingly
isolated events were, in fact, tied together.
That was the failure which the 9/11 Commission referred to
as a ``failure of imagination.'' How different things might be
today, 5 years after September 11, 2001, if our imagination had
been fully engaged 5 years before.
The fundamental obligation of government is to protect its
citizens. Today, we will explore a number of questions about
how government can better protect its citizens. To answer those
questions, we must first seek to identify the threats we face.
Terrorism constantly evolves. As the devastating attacks
around the world prove, terrorists will strike wherever
opportunity allows and wherever innocent people are the most
vulnerable. The terrorists' resourcefulness, cunning, and
patience are exceeded only by their cruelty.
The recent arrests in Canada and Miami, the attacks on the
London subway last year, and the thwarted airliner plot in
Britain have made clear that terrorism masterminds no longer
have to rely upon operatives imported from abroad to infiltrate
target nations and carry out attacks. The emerging threat
appears to be from ``homegrown'' terrorists, much harder to
detect and not deterred by increased security at our borders.
I am particularly concerned by the extent to which this
infection is spread within our State and Federal prisons. The
Committee will hold a hearing on prison radicalization later
this month. But we know from cases both abroad and here in the
United States, with Kevin James, an American now awaiting trial
who founded an organization based upon his radical
interpretation of Islam while in prison in California, that the
new face of terrorism may be born and raised right here in
America.
As the terrorist tactics evolve, the overall objective
remains the same--to cause maximum loss of innocent lives, to
damage our economy, and to defeat our resolve. As they adapt to
our strengthened defenses, terrorists continue to pursue ever
more spectacular and devastating attacks.
In addition to identifying the most likely threats that we
face, we must constantly assess and improve our efforts to
counter them.
Our efforts during the past 5 years have been substantial.
We have closed the gap between law enforcement and intelligence
that the terrorists exploited on September 11. We have created
the Department of Homeland Security. We have made investments
in training and equipping our first responders. We have
strengthened our borders with additional personnel and improved
technology. We have brought about the most comprehensive
restructuring of our intelligence community in more than a half
century.
These efforts, though, do not describe a task accomplished
but one underway. Each remains a work in progress, and the
emerging threats compel us to ask the hard questions about how
well we have done in the past and whether we are prepared for
the future.
Among the questions that I intend to explore today are:
How can we confront the challenge of homegrown terrorists?
What resources do State and local law enforcement need to meet
it? How can we work with the American Muslim community to
prevent the radicalization of our own citizens?
What are our greatest vulnerabilities to a chemical,
biological, or nuclear attack, and how can they be mitigated?
How can we continue to improve the effectiveness of
intelligence-gathering capabilities against terrorists while
protecting the civil liberties of the American people?
How can we accelerate the development of a common culture
at DHS and help DHS work more effectively with its State and
local counterparts in detecting, preventing, and responding to
acts of terrorism?
What is the role of the private sector--the business
community, health, education, and other institutions, as well
as the public--in strengthening our defenses against terrorism?
Have we neglected the security of other forms of mass
transportation in our focus on aviation security?
How can we use our technological edge more effectively?
Should interoperable communications be a national priority?
What other technologies can we better deploy to protect against
diverse targets?
From the perspective of the past and present, we must
imagine the future. September 11, 2001, was a day of profound
loss, but it was also a day of inspiring courage. The first
responders and ordinary citizens who rushed into the Twin
Towers and the Pentagon to save others, the brave souls on
Flight 93 who gave their lives so that others might live,
remind us of the greatest asset we bring to bear against this
challenge--the spirit of the American people.
Chairman Collins. Senator Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Welcome to you, Secretary Chertoff.
Madam Chairman, I am grateful to you for calling this
hearing to discuss the state of our homeland security 5 years
after Islamic terrorists murdered 3,000 innocent Americans and
shocked the rest of us out of our false post-Cold-War sense of
security. Yesterday was a day of remembrance and requiem. Today
we quite properly ask: Where do we want to be in homeland
security 5 years from today? What can we say, if I may
personalize it, to the parents of America about what we will do
in the next 5 years together to be able to guarantee that their
children's upbringing and lives will be as secure as theirs
were prior to September 11?
September 11, 2001, like Pearl Harbor, was a tragedy of
such enormity that it began a new era in which we understand
that we are at war with a different kind of enemy and that our
country, led by the Federal Government, must pull together and
do better at fulfilling our constitutional responsibility to
provide for the common defense against this unconventional and
unprecedented threat. The threat of a terrorist attack at home
on Americans is as real today as it was 5 years ago. The foiled
plot to explode airliners heading to the United States from the
United Kingdom is the most recent and publicly acknowledged
example.
But let me say at the outset that just as the threat of a
terrorist attack is as real today at home as it was 5 years
ago, we together can say to the American people that they are
safer than they were on September 11, 2001, although, as we all
acknowledge, they are not yet as safe as we want them to be.
We have every reason, as we look back at these 5 years, to
thank God and to thank all who work each day to protect our
homeland security that America and Americans have not been
attacked at home since September 11, 2001. We are thankful that
a number of terrorist plots have been disrupted through
increased vigilance at home and cooperative work with our
allies abroad. And as Chairman Collins has indicated, since
September 11, we have made historic organizational changes in
our government to shore up our homeland defenses. These include
the reorganization of our vast and far-flung security and
emergency response agencies into the Department of Homeland
Security, the creation of the 9/11 Commission, the enactment of
its bold proposals for reform and greater security, and the
establishment of the Northern Command to focus the Department
of Defense on homeland as well as international security.
The point of these changes has been to focus the Federal
Government's attention on terrorism 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week with resolve, coordination, and strong leadership to bring
purpose and effectiveness to the protection of our homeland. As
I have said, we are clearly safer today because of all that we
have done together, although there are clearly weak links
remaining that we must deal with together.
I know that along the way there have been misgivings and
some soul searching about the Department of Homeland Security,
but I do not hear any credible voice saying that we erred in
creating the Department of Homeland Security. So if the
Department has not yet fully lived up to all that we in
Congress hoped it would be, let us resolve today, as we look
forward to the next 5 years, to work together to make it so.
Let me say very briefly that the first great challenge that
the Department has faced is to bring itself together. We gave
the Department an enormous task to bring together 180,000
Federal employees from a large number of agencies with
different cultures and different directions. I quote Warren
Bennis here, adviser to four Presidents, who said that we need
``the capacity to translate vision into reality.'' And that is
the work of leadership, and it has been a challenge, but I
believe progress has been made in the time that the Department
has existed.
The failure of leadership we saw, without belaboring,
acutely and tragically in the run-up and aftermath to Hurricane
Katrina. Mr. Secretary, as you know, the pain and devastation
that Hurricane Katrina caused and is still causing would be
even worse if a weapon of mass destruction, a nuclear weapon,
were to explode in a crowded city, if terrorists were to spray
a mall with a deadly biological agent, or if a naturally
occurring virus spread to the level of a pandemic. We are
looking to you for leadership on these threats. I know that you
have acted to apply some of the painful lessons learned in
Hurricane Katrina. You know that we on this Committee have
tried to do the same through legislative work. The fact is that
there is more work to be done.
Second, I continue to believe that we are underfunding some
of the critical homeland security needs, particularly our first
responders.
Mr. Secretary, today I look forward to hearing from you, to
use Bennis' words, your vision of where this Department is
going, but also what you intend to do to translate that vision
into reality and into action. I also welcome and look forward
to the views of the expert witnesses who will follow.
The security of the American people is the highest priority
of our government. The plain fact is, without security, there
cannot and will not be the life, liberty, and pursuit of
happiness that our government was formed to secure. So we have
got to get this right, and we have got to get it right
together.
And I close with a thank you to Chairman Collins and the
other Members of the Committee because, as we look back over
the last 5 years since September 11, 2001, in a capital city,
which has become all too partisan, reflexively, on the question
of homeland security--and there have been moments where this
has not been totally true, but on balance, as we look back,
this Committee has acted with a real sense of unity that goes
well beyond partisanship for the national interest and for
homeland security. And the legislation that we have reported
out, that has been adopted by Congress, that has been signed by
the President, and that I believe today makes the American
people safer than they would otherwise be is a testament, Madam
Chairman, to your leadership and to the commitment of all
Members of the Committee to forget party labels and work
together as Americans to secure our future against a brutal and
inhumane enemy.
I thank the Chairman.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Domenici has asked to give his statement next
because he has to leave for another committee that he is
chairing.
Senator Domenici.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI
Senator Domenici. Let me thank you so much and say to the
other Members, I will take little time. I have to chair the
Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing wherein we have
the company involved with the Alaskan spill. That is the issue
before that committee, and I am chairing it, so I would ask
that my statement be made a part of the record, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Without objection, all statements will
be.
Senator Domenici. I would just say to the Secretary, I
commend you for the work you are doing, and my observation as
one who works here on the Committee and observes from the
outside is that things are beginning to gel in the way you
would like to see them. It is a very difficult job that you
have taken on, and I know it is not always successful day by
day. But I want you to know that I always thought you had the
potential to be a great leader in this job. And I want to
continue to give you the opportunity to prove what you can do.
I also look forward to seeing you more and more on the
science and research part of your endeavor because that is
absolutely paramount. Some things are happening with our
National Laboratories that seem to me to bode well for our
future and send some terribly tough signals to our opposition
that we are up to finding out what they are doing and we are
doing something about it. For this I thank you and congratulate
you.
I think I will see you in my State at a dedication of an
R&D facility, which does make me think very highly about your
capabilities in the future. Thank you.
Thank you to all of the Senators.
[The prepared statement of Senator Domenici follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI
Madam Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing to discuss the
Department of Homeland Security's future. Thank you also, Secretary
Chertoff, for spending time with us today to discuss the future of
homeland security.
I want to start by thanking you for taking on the difficult task of
overseeing the Department of Homeland Security. Your Department is
young and is tasked with the difficult job of securing our Nation. I
appreciate your service to America, I have enjoyed working with you
over the past couple of years, and I look forward to working with you
in the future.
It is appropriate that we meet today to discuss homeland security
since yesterday was the fifth anniversary of September 11, 2001. That
was a horrific day, and the images and shock are still with us. But I
believe that since then, we have made significant progress in the
Global War on Terror and in our efforts to secure America.
I look forward to hearing about where we have come since
establishing the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 and where we
are going in the coming years. I believe our future will include new
research and development efforts; collaboration with universities,
industry and national labs; secure borders and ports of entry; and
state-of-the-art security technologies. This isn't an exhaustive list
of our homeland security needs, and I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses on the future of homeland security.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Collins. Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
calling this hearing and for the way that you and Senator
Lieberman have managed to run this Committee on such a
wonderfully bipartisan and effective basis.
Immediately following the September 11 attacks, America
came together as one Nation with one purpose: Protecting our
country from those who would do us harm. Since that time, we
have made important progress, such as hardening airplane
cockpits and federalizing aviation security. Yet 5 years later,
there are still gaps in our homeland security system that need
to be closed. The focus of this hearing is to look forward and
to ask what still needs to be done.
First, if we are serious about homeland security, we need
to adequately fund it. Year after year, we have seen
significant cuts to our vital first responder grant programs.
One of the areas where we have a significant shortfall is in
the area of interoperable communications equipment. In the
Senate, we have voted to establish demonstration projects for
interoperable communications along Northern and Southern
borders, but those projects have been dropped in conference. We
still do not have a dedicated source of funding for
interoperable communications equipment within the Department of
Homeland Security, and presumably that means that the
Administration does not believe that interoperable
communications are important enough to deserve dedicated
funding.
Another major shortfall is in the area of reducing the
threat of proliferation of fissile materials. The 9/11
Commission found that the ``greatest danger of another
catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if
the world's most dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most
dangerous weapons.'' The report went on to state that al-Qaeda
has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at
least 10 years and that there is no doubt that the United
States would be a prime target. Preventing the proliferation of
these weapons warrants a maximum effort by strengthening
counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation
Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program.
In the December 2005 follow-up report card, the 9/11
Commission gave the Administration a grade of D on this
recommendation, saying that, ``Countering the greatest threat
to America's security is still not the top national security
priority of the President and the Congress.''
We also have great needs, I believe, particular needs in
the area of developing a consolidated watchlist of persons that
are suspected of terrorism, where terrorists are identified and
stopped from entering into the country and moving around our
country. Five years after the September 11 attack, we still
have a long way to go, according to the Government
Accountability Office, in compiling a watchlist that is
complete, accurate, and available to law enforcement.
I want to thank Secretary Chertoff for joining us today
and, again, thank you, Madam Chairman, and our Ranking Member,
Senator Lieberman. And I hope we can continue to all work
together to accomplish these important objectives.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Coleman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I agree with
your comment and that of the Ranking Member that we are safer
today, but we do live in a much more dangerous world. I just
want to thank you for this hearing, looking forward 5 years.
All too often in the Senate, we have focused on yesterday,
today, and if we are lucky, maybe tomorrow. This is important
enough to look down to the future.
A principal responsibility of government, Madam Chairman,
as you noted, is protecting the citizens and providing for the
national security. And in this post-September 11 world, Mr.
Secretary, that is homeland security, your responsibility,
which is right at the very center. In the past, we suffered
from a failure of imagination. Today we have to worry about the
failure to deal with the unimaginable. We have to imagine the
unimaginable and then figure out a way to deal with it, and
that is an extraordinary challenge, and the challenges are
broad--border security, port security, chemical security, just
to name a few.
We also must rebuild the confidence of the Department of
Homeland Security and its ability to respond to disasters both
natural and manmade. We cannot ignore that and must ensure that
bureaucracy and red tape don't hinder the ability to integrate
new technologies. There is great hope with new technologies.
Senator Domenici talked about that. It is also a key to
success.
Finally, we need to remember the lessons of September 11,
2001, and the decade that preceded it. As the Chairman has
noted, we cannot rest, we cannot let our guard down, and we
cannot relent in fighting this battle that history will reveal
as the battle of our lifetime. And I am confident that with
strong leadership and a bipartisan effort we will succeed.
Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I would ask that my full
statement be entered into the record.
Chairman Collins. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Coleman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN
I want to thank our distinguished Chairman and Ranking Member for
holding this important hearing.
We have the opportunity today to make an assessment of where we
are, and equally important, where we are going in terms of homeland
security over the next 5 years. The facts are that today America is
safer than it was on September 11, 2001. It is a major accomplishment
that there have not been any successful terrorist attacks on American
soil in 5 years and this is a testament to the great lengths we have
gone to protect our citizens both at home and abroad. It is also a
testament to the strength, vigilance and awareness of the American
people.
Additionally, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
and the revamping of our intelligence community operations have
institutionalized and improved the practice of defending our Nation. As
a result, 15 major terrorist plots against America have been thwarted--
and those are just the ones that have been disclosed. Countless more
undisclosed plots are likely to have been thwarted as well. However, we
face an enemy that is constantly adapting and changing and that only
has to be right once where we have to get it right 100 percent of the
time.
With this in mind, a strategic vision for the future must have some
built-in flexibility so that we have the ability to change as our
enemies do. There are certainly many challenges that lie ahead
including border security, port security and chemical security, just to
name a few. We must also rebuild the confidence of the American people
in the Department of Homeland Security's ability to respond to
disasters both natural and man-made. Ensuring that bureaucracy and red
tape do not hinder the Department's ability to integrate new
technologies and ideas to address these issues will be a key to future
success. Finally, we need to remember the lessons of September 11 and
the decade that preceded it. We cannot rest. We cannot let our guard
down. And we cannot relent in fighting this battle that history will
reveal as the battle of our lifetime.
I look forward to hearing the testimony from our witnesses today
and again want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for their
leadership on this issue.
Senator Collins. Senator Dayton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAYTON
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, when Minnesotans ask me, as they often do,
whether we are safer since September 11, I reply that we are
because of the constant vigilance of yourself and thousands of
other dedicated men and women in your agency and our Armed
Services, our intelligence agencies, and so many others. And I
salute you and all of them for your dedicated efforts.
That being said, we must continually ask ourselves what can
we do better, and in August, just last month, I toured parts of
our Southern border with Mexico in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona,
and our Northern border with Canada along northern Minnesota.
On our Southern border, I met with many experienced and
sophisticated Federal agencies who, frankly, should be heard by
this Committee and by Congress regarding what is effective and
what is not for our border security. However, my eyewitness
experience supports Senator Lieberman's statement that we are
underfunding our border security efforts.
For example, in El Paso, Texas, the day before my early
morning visit that one facility apprehended and detained 269
people attempting to illegally enter our country. There is a
fence, which is one of the important barriers to that illegal
entry, yet still within the city limits that fence inexplicably
just stops. The reason, I was told, is because the funding had
run out.
Along our Northern border, the Federal homeland security
presence is far more limited, and in long stretches of that
5,525-mile border, border security is really non-existent.
Despite increased funding by Congress and a mandate to increase
the number of Northern border agents during the past 2 years,
that number of border control agents has reportedly declined
from 996 to 950. At any one time, only 250 agents are actively
guarding our Northern border, and local law enforcement
officials, whose first responder funding in Minnesota has been
cut to only 40 percent of what it was a year ago, tell me that
the Federal presence, while the people individually are very
dedicated, is simply not sufficient to meet the demands. The
illegal trafficking of people, of narcotics, of, God forbid,
terrorists, while not as strong a likelihood as along our
Southern border, and certainly the volume of what they call
``economic illegal immigration,'' those coming across the
country for job purposes, is far less, still the threat is very
real. And I would commend to you, as others have said, the need
to increase that Northern border security.
I would ask respectfully that you and the President--and I
have written the President, asking for your support of an
amendment which I had introduced, which was adopted by the
Senate, which would increase the funding by $44 million for
Northern border security agents, increase the number by 236,
which would be a 24-percent increase. That is in the fiscal
year 2007 Senate appropriations bill that is going to
conference. I would again respectfully ask for your support and
that of the Administration. That would be an important first
step to improving our Northern border security.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Warner.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I will
put my statement into the record, but I do want to join in a
most sincere way in commending you and Senator Lieberman for
the strong leadership that you have given this Committee on a
most critical issue. I do not know of anything more critical
than our own homeland security. Both of you are members of the
Armed Services Committee, so you bring that perspective to bear
on this.
I also want to commend the President for the manner in
which he led the Nation yesterday in, I think, very respectful
ceremonies honoring those who lost their lives and reminding
America about the enemy we face today is unlike any enemy that
we have ever faced in the history of this Nation in terms of
the breadth and the depth and the blind conviction that they
have to bring destruction to those people in the free nations
of the world, and most particularly, I suppose, us.
But I would say also, Secretary Chertoff, you have shown
strong leadership. You have weathered the storms, and your
strength of leadership seems to grow daily. And I commend you
for the manner in which you found time during the summer period
to travel extensively across this Nation, indeed to my State.
And I watched you firsthand dealing with those first
responders, be they policemen or firemen or other people in the
communities, and struggle with the tough questions put down at
the grass-roots level. You had the answers. You gave the
assurances. But you were realistic and honest in your approach
about how funds are not unlimited, but you are doing the best
you can to distribute them. So carry on.
But I would come back to a caution by my good friend,
Senator Levin. Both of us are concerned about the progress made
in establishing more robust interoperability of communications,
and I would hope in your remarks today you would address that.
I thank the Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER
Madam Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today and I wish
to thank our witnesses for their efforts over the past 5 years to help
make our Nation a more secure place. Much has been done to date at the
local, State, and Federal levels. The formation of the Department of
Homeland Security combined dozens of Federal agencies; created new
agencies and directorates; and established a comprehensive Federal
mission for the new paradigm of security risks our Nation now faces.
The 185,000 public servants of DHS are dedicated to their mission to
protect this country, its people, and its ideals from those who mean to
do harm.
We have taken significant steps in critical infrastructure
protection; enhanced transportation security on land, sea, and air;
strengthened security at the Nation's borders and ports; reformed our
intelligence capabilities; and established a stronger coordination of
effort among the various levels of government.
But perhaps the single most important change in this country over
the past 5 years is one that each individual American has experienced
in his or her heart and mind. It is simply the realization that we are
not safe from those who mean to do us harm and that we can never again
rest from the charge to protect our home. Today's enemy is different
than those of the past. No longer are we dealing with actual
governments as the primary threat--we must now defend our own cities
from within.
I joined this Committee in the 109th Congress because I fervently
believe that this is a critical time in American history not unlike
when the branches of the military were combined into one Department of
Defense in the 1940's. We continue to build the Department of Homeland
Security to lead efforts to protect the Nation and under the leadership
of former Secretary Ridge and now Secretary Chertoff we are in good
hands.
Five years ago I said that ``our people have suffered in a single
day our greatest tragedy--yet history will show this to be America's
finest hour.'' I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and
continuing the work before this Committee to enhance the safety and
security of our entire Nation.
Senator Collins. Senator Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First of all, I would like to say this: The question I am
constantly asked when I am at home in Ohio is, ``With such
partisanship in Washington, how can Congress accomplish
anything?'' And I point to this Committee and several other
committees where bipartisanship is well and alive. And I
commend you and Senator Lieberman for the terrific leadership
that you have provided to this Committee. The American people
should be assured that we are working together on the very
important homeland security challenges that face our Nation.
Second, yesterday, I think standing on the steps of the
Capitol in memory of September 11, 2001, vividly reminded me of
the serious threats we are facing in the global war on terror,
and I think most people thank God that we have not had any
terrorist event here in this country for the last 5 years.
I am pleased also that the President has finally leveled
with the American people and indicated that we are at war.
Osama bin Laden has declared war on us. Our freedom and way of
life is under attack by Islamic extremists who have distorted
the Islamic faith and launched jihad against the United States
and anyone who shares our values. And the American people
should understand that this is the situation. I sometimes refer
to it as the ``Fourth World War.'' In other words, this
struggle is not something that is going to be over by snapping
our fingers. It is going to be with us now for a long time. I
would hope that maybe my grandchildren will have this off their
back, but it is going to take a lot of hard work.
Our success in the war on terror has much to do with the
Homeland Security Department, which has been in existence now
for over 3 years. I think people should understand that it is
the most formidable management challenge ever undertaken in the
United States of America: Merging 180,000 people and 22
disparate departments and programs, and it is not going to be a
lay-up shot to integrate this new Department. And it is not
going to be fully accomplished, Secretary Chertoff, during your
term. The management challenges will continue for quite some
time, and it will take significant effort and focus to ensure
that the Department becomes all that we want it to be.
We must also understand that we cannot guard against every
security threat imaginable. We need to recognize that we have
astronomical national debt, and it is the highest percentage of
our GDP in a long time. We are neglecting the nondefense
discretionary part of our Federal budget. We have to look at
the big picture and prioritize based on our limited fiscal
resources. I don't know how we can continue overspending in
this country.
From a fiscal point of view, we simply cannot afford to
accomplish every objective Congress is seeking to achieve. We
need more budgetary resources, perhaps even a temporary
increase in our taxes so that we can afford to address our
enormous national debt, improve our homeland security
capabilities, and also continue fighting the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Secretary Chertoff, constantly Congress
is telling you, do this, do that. You only have so much money,
and we need to consider the big picture, the whole budgetary
perspective, and better prioritize our homeland security
spending according to risk.
Secretary Chertoff, today I am also hoping that we can hear
from you about your strategic plan for the Department. Where
are you now? Where are you going? How long is it going to take?
And how can we help you to better do the job that we have asked
you to do?
[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Yesterday, our Nation observed the fifth anniversary of the tragic
and violent terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The brutal images
of September 11 will forever be burned into the minds of the American
people. My own memories of visiting the Pentagon and being at Ground
Zero shortly after the attacks will never fade.
Each anniversary of September 11 renews our national resolve to
fight the War on Terrorism at home and abroad. The American public
should be reassured that our Nation is undoubtedly safer, but we must
remain vigilant, because Osama bin Laden has declared war on us. Our
freedom and way of life is under attack by Islamic extremists who have
hijacked the Islamic faith and launched a jihad against the United
States, Israel, and anyone who shares our values.
Madam Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing today
to evaluate the Federal Government's progress in securing the American
homeland against future attacks. Five years after September 11, and
more than 3 years after the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, it is appropriate for this Committee to take stock of our
national homeland security policy and evaluate where we are and where
we need to be.
Integral to this discussion is a review of how the Department of
Homeland Security is coming together as a cohesive entity. As my
colleagues know, the creation of DHS in 2003 merged 180,000 employees
from 22 disparate Federal agencies and represented the single largest
restructuring of the Federal Government since the creation of the
Department of Defense in 1947.
Building stronger management capabilities is vital to the success
of the Department. In order to effectively accomplish its complex
mission of securing the Nation from terrorism and natural hazards, DHS
must have an effective management structure with experienced leaders
who are capable of integrating the many separate departmental
components and ensuring effective operations and planning.
I hope today's hearing will also include a thoughtful examination
of ways we can improve our risk management capabilities. We all agree
that it is imperative to secure our homeland against terrorism and
strengthen our response capabilities, but we must also acknowledge that
this country has finite budgetary resources.
It is simply not possible for us to guard against every theat--and
frankly, if we tried to, we would bankrupt our Nation in the process.
As our national homeland security policy matures, we have to use our
common sense and begin to prioritize by allocating our limited
resources based upon risk assessments.
Secretary Chertoff, thank you for being here and for your service
to our Nation. I look forward to your testimony regarding the progress
DHS has made and what I hope will be a candid discussion of the
challenges the Department continues to face. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Bennett.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BENNETT
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
The war with terrorists did not begin on September 11,
2001. It was going well before that, just as the Second World
War did not begin on December 7, 1941. Those were the two dates
on which Americans became aware of the fact that war was going
on in the world around them and the two dates on which it came
home to Americans in a very terrible and terrifying kind of
way.
During and after the Second World War, we reorganized our
resources and our government to deal with the threat that we
discovered, and we are doing the same thing now, reorganizing
our government to deal with the threat that we have discovered.
It was not easy after December 7, 1941, and it has not been
easy after September 11, 2001, but it is a task that we must be
about. And, Madam Chairman, you and Senator Lieberman have led
the way in this Committee.
Secretary Chertoff, you have the burden of presiding over
one of the most difficult parts of this reorganization around
the new realities in the world. You are handling it in a very
capable fashion, and we appreciate your service. We appreciate
your dedication to this task and look forward to hearing what
you have to say.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Mr. Secretary, good
morning.
I want to start off by thanking Madam Chairman and our
Ranking Member for holding this hearing this morning. It is
certainly a timely one.
Five years ago yesterday, as we all know, the prevention of
future terrorist attacks like the one that occurred for all
intents and purposes became the Federal Government's, our
government's top priority. And it became a top priority for
State and local governments like my own State of Delaware. And
as we reflected yesterday on the tragedy that struck us 5 years
ago, I think it is good that we are also taking the time here
today to examine the progress that we have made and, in some
cases, the lack of progress that we have made since that tragic
day occurred.
There has been progress in a number of areas. As I travel
in airplanes, I am reminded, especially coming back from
Manchester, England, a couple of weeks ago, of our ability to
respond quickly and to try to tamp down threats that would harm
many people at once.
As I visit nuclear power plants--and I have visited several
around the country--I am reminded I think we are doing a better
job there in making them more secure.
As we look at our ports, I think we have done some good. I
think we can do more in the legislation that we take up today,
that our Chairman and Ranking Member and Senator Murray have
worked a whole lot on, but there is a good deal more that we
can do there. There is a good deal more that we can do with
respect to rail and transit security, and we have an
opportunity to consider that in the context of the port
security bill.
This Committee has worked long and hard on trying to make
chemical plants more secure, and I do not know that we will
have a chance to take that bill up this week, but we need to
get the bill reported out of Committee almost unanimously and
get it before the full Senate.
I look forward to hearing from you, Mr. Chertoff--I always
do, Mr. Secretary--and from our other witnesses today about the
successes of the last 5 years but, more importantly, about the
work that you and your Department need to do and what we need
to do to support those efforts, and hopefully to improve them.
For a variety of reasons, whether it be the war in Iraq or
the continuing standoff between Israel and the Palestinians or
any number of other grievances, the number of those who wish to
do us harm is likely growing, and it is important that we get
this right.
Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
We are now very pleased to welcome our first witness today,
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Michael
Chertoff.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF,\1\ SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Chertoff. Chairman Collins, Ranking Member
Lieberman, Members of the Committee, it is a real pleasure for
me to appear before you today, the day after the fifth
anniversary of September 11, 2001, to talk about where we have
come over the last 5 years and, perhaps even more important,
what our vision is and our strategy is for the next 5 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Secretary Chertoff appears in the
Appendix on page 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Every time we have a ceremony recalling the events of
September 11, 2001, I am reminded of some new way in which it
touched each of us, not only in our professional capacities,
but in our personal capacities.
Yesterday, as part of my commemoration of September 11, I
was in Bayonne, New Jersey, and present at the unveiling of the
sculpture given by the Russian people to commemorate the event.
I was with Senator Lautenberg from the Committee and former
President Clinton and a number of other people. And as we laid
the flowers down at the base of the monument at the conclusion
of the ceremony, I found the name of a college classmate whose
name I had never seen on the rolls of the lost of September 11.
And it was a reminder of the fact that the pain of September 11
continues to touch us even 5 years after the event.
But it is also an opportunity to renew our dedication and
our unity of purpose. I agree with what everybody here has
said. The area of homeland security is one that stands above
the normal division of differences that sometimes characterizes
what goes on in our political system. It has always been a
pleasure for me to work with this Committee because, not only
as a group but individually, you have each afforded me wise,
dispassionate counsel and always recall that whatever our
disagreements, there is a far more central unity of vision that
we all have about what we need to do. And so I am delighted to
be able to appear at this very momentous time to recall where
we have been and see where we are going.
I would say there is one dynamic that is the most important
in setting our strategy and our agenda going forward, and that
is a recognition that we have to be realistic about what we
expect and about what we do. We do have limits, and we do have
choices to make, and it falls to me in my job most often to
have to make a judgment about how to allocate priorities among
those choices.
Our limit is not only financial, although that is clearly a
limit, and to understand that, one need look no further than
bin Laden himself, who said soon after September 11 he wanted
to bankrupt us. He understood that one tool he had in waging
war against the United States was to drive us crazy into
bankruptcy trying to defend ourselves against every conceivable
threat.
But, in addition, we have to bound ourselves with other
limits. We do not want to break the very systems we are trying
to protect. We do not want to destroy our way of life trying to
save it. We do not want to undercut our economy trying to
protect our economy. And we do not want to destroy our civil
liberties and our freedoms in order to make ourselves safer. So
it falls to us in all of these respects to seek balance and
realism about what we can expect, what we promised the American
people.
Let me say that I have divided the task into five general
buckets, and I will tell you very briefly--and I would ask that
my full statement be made part of the record.
Chairman Collins. Without objection.
Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. Where we have gone and
where we intend to go on each of these five buckets.
The first of these is keeping bad people out of the
country. This was a central recommendation of the 9/11
Commission. The good news is we do have integrated terrorist
watchlists which do enable us to identify the names of bad
people who are trying to get into the country. We have also
fully deployed our biometric US-VISIT Program, which captures
two fingerprints from every non-American who enters the United
States and allows us to check them against our databases. That
has kept out a lot of bad people.
Between our ports of entry, we have committed to doubling
the number of Border Patrol by the end of 2008. We have
committed to building additional fencing and additional
tactical infrastructure. And we are within 2 weeks about to
unroll a strategic technological initiative with respect to the
border that will put sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles and
other high-tech tools in place to leverage our capabilities and
the hard work of our Border Patrol.
We have more we can do. The great challenge, I think, for
the next 5 years is not keeping out the known terrorist. It is
keeping out the unknown terrorist, the unidentified terrorist.
And we have two programs underway that will let us do that.
The first is we need to be able to take passenger name
record information, which is information that the airlines
capture or travel agents capture, and we need to be able to run
that against our databases, against telephone numbers and
credit cards that we have already identified as connected to
terrorist activity. As we sit here, we have the capability to
do that. There is one restriction. The Europeans, up until
recently, had restrained our ability to use the information we
got from airlines flying from Europe to the United States by
limiting the way we could apply that against our databases. We
are now in a position where I think we will have an opportunity
to talk to the Europeans about modifying those restrictions.
Clearly, we need to respect the interest and privacy, but I can
tell you from my personal experience after September 11, we
used some of that very data to track down the connections of
the 19 hijackers in the days immediately following September
11. I was involved in doing that personally. And one of the
lessons I learned was this: I would much rather track down the
terrorists before the bombs hit than after the bombs hit. And
we need to move forward with this.
Second, we are going to start deploying this fall the
capability to read 10 prints and not just two prints from
foreigners entering the United States. The ability to go to a
10-print system will give us a capability we have not had up to
now, which is we can screen all of those prints against latent
fingerprints picked up in the battlefields all over the world,
in safe houses and off of bomb fragments. It will mean that
once this is fully deployed, hopefully with the next couple of
years, anybody who has ever been in a safe house or built a
bomb is going to have to wonder whether we are going to catch
them when they cross our border.
The second area is screening cargo. Here again I am pleased
to say that by the end of this year, we will have 80 percent of
the containers that come into the United States going through
radiation portal monitors, and by next year we are going to be
at close to 100 percent.
Our next vision is to take this overseas, and I know
Senator Coleman had suggested I go to Hong Kong. I have looked
at the process they have in place there, which is an integrated
system for not only screening for radiation but putting
containers through X-rays. And we are currently working very
actively with a number of foreign ports to begin deploying a
system like that over the next couple of years as well.
The third area is infrastructure protection. I am pleased
to say we have done a tremendous amount to improve aviation
security, as underscored most recently by the events of last
August. That includes, contrary to some misinformation that has
been put out in the media, that we do have a unified watchlist,
the no-fly list that captures all the people whose identities
we know about that we want to keep off airplanes. But we also
have more work to do with respect to other sectors of transit.
I am pleased to say that next month, in October, I
anticipate that the Department of Transportation and my
Department will roll out additional and new regulatory measures
that will strengthen our ability to control and protect
hazardous inhalation materials that travel by rail. I can also
say that we have done quite a bit to strengthen our screening
of air cargo. One hundred percent of the packages that are
presented to the airlines by individuals to be put in the cargo
holds of passenger planes are now going to be screened through
baggage explosive detecting equipment. And we are working with
freight consolidators to increase the amount of screening we do
of their freight as well as to insist that they have a trusted
traveler program.
The fourth bucket is information sharing. Under the
leadership of the DNI, we have done a tremendous amount to
improve the collection and sharing of intelligence. I agree
with the observations made here, and I think to be made by the
next panel, that we need now to work more closely with State
and locals in opening up a broad channel of exchange of
information. Ambassador McNamara, who is working for Ambassador
Negroponte, has been working closely with my chief intelligence
officer and the FBI to put such a model in place, and we are
already beginning, by embedding our analysts into the field,
working with local authorities in fusion centers from Los
Angeles to New York, and that program I think has a great deal
of hope and a great deal of promise in terms of our ability to
build a degree of integration vertically that will match what
we now have horizontally.
Finally, let me talk a little bit about response, in
particular, the question of interoperability. That, of course,
was a central lesson of September 11. The good news is we
actually now have technology that will permit first responders
and people from different jurisdictions to talk with one
another even though they operate radios on different
frequencies. These devices are called ``gateways,'' and I have
seen them operate, and they do, in fact, work. That is not to
say that we do not want to progress to the next level of
technology, which will be a broader ability to use
interoperability with different kinds of data that will require
us to make some tough decisions about how we use the next stage
of digital communications equipment. But it also means that the
real challenge now is a challenge of leadership. These agencies
have to agree on common rules of the road about how they are
going to talk to one another, what codes they are going to use
to describe events, who is going to talk to whom, what is the
language that is going to be used, and what are the rules of
the road.
This is not, frankly, a technology issue. This is an issue
of having community leaders come to an agreement. Some
communities have done it. We have a lot of interoperability in
the National Capital Region. Los Angeles County has
interoperability, and they have reached these agreements. Some
communities have not done that yet, and we have to guide them
in doing that, and we plan to be doing that this year.
Let me conclude by identifying three areas where I think
Congress can act this fall to dramatically enhance our ability
to continue to build on the progress we have made.
The first is in the area of chemical security. This
Committee has done a lot of work on chemical security. It is an
urgent issue. One of the great remaining threat vectors for
this country is the possibility of somebody attacking our
chemical infrastructure and creating an inhalation hazard. We
partly regulate this now through our ability to regulate the
ports and through the regulation that we are going to be
putting out with respect to rail transit in the next month. But
there remains a gap, and legislation that is currently in
Congress that would address that gap is urgently needed. And I
would really request that Congress act on it this month.
Second is port security. I recognize there is legislation
on the floor now. It would institutionalize and strengthen many
of the measures we are currently taking. We have worked with
this Committee on port security. We commend it for its work
again. This would be a tremendous contribution to put into
effect this month.
And, finally, with respect to the area of immigration, we
continue to believe it is important to have a comprehensive
plan to address the issue of immigration if we are really going
to solve the problem at the border.
There are also some short-term things that can be done. We
have recognized the Senate has enacted $1.8 billion in
additional funding as part of the Department of Defense
supplemental, which would be addressed to strengthening some of
what we do in border enforcement. I have also urged again and
again that Congress act to dissolve the Orantes injunction,
which is hampering our ability to remove people from El
Salvador based upon a court order that arises from a civil war
that has long ended. Steps like these taking this forward would
be of major assistance to us in accomplishing the ambitious
but, nevertheless, achievable goals that we have set for
ourselves.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for an
excellent statement.
You emphasized in your statement the actions that you have
taken or will be taking to strengthen border security, which is
certainly a goal that I share. But since September 11, the
majority of terrorist attacks overseas have been executed by
homegrown terrorists. In fact, as Richard Falkenrath will point
out on our next panel, ``Since September 11, 2001, most
terrorists plots and attacks perpetrated worldwide have been
conceived, planned, and executed by individuals who are part of
the local population and who have had only limited, if any,
transnational linkages to terrorist organizations abroad.''
The NYPD as well as the L.A. Sheriff's Department have gone
to great lengths to establish and deploy counterterrorism units
in order to protect their regions against the threat of
homegrown terrorism. How much emphasis is the Department
placing on this emerging threat?
Secretary Chertoff. Chairman Collins, we are putting a lot
of emphasis on that threat. We recognize, of course, that the
high-consequence threat--the weapon of mass destruction--is
still largely a threat that is international in character. But,
nevertheless, as demonstrated by what happened in London in
2005, the homegrown threat is serious. We are doing several
things.
First of all, we are working with communities like New York
and Los Angeles to help them build fusion centers. We opened
one in Los Angeles a few months ago, and that is a way of
integrating local intelligence gathering with our Federal
effort so that we can have a two-way flow of information.
The second thing we are doing is we are particularly
focused on prisons. I have met with corrections authorities in
New York State and California, where we have, obviously,
significant prison populations, to make sure that our
intelligence folks are working with their corrections folks at
a State level as well as a Federal level to identify threats
within the prison system, which history tells us is a fertile
breeding ground for extreme groups. And, obviously, prisons are
also populated by people who tend to have a willingness to
commit acts of violence.
The third thing is we are working hard to understand how it
is that homegrown groups get radicalized and become
operational. This country has a natural advantage in the way
its society operates that has apparently made us much less
susceptible than some countries in Western Europe. But it
requires that we continue to pay attention to what causes
radicalization, that we continue to embrace our Muslim co-
citizens, we continue to emphasize the importance of not
allowing ethnic prejudice to creep into what we do, so that we
tamp down on any tendencies in our own society that might, in
fact, replicate what we have sadly seen overseas.
Chairman Collins. If you talk to State and local law
enforcement officials, over and over again they point to the
need for interoperable communications equipment. You have
mentioned today that they, too, need to step up to the plate
and establish common standards, but there is another obstacle,
and that is funding. It is very expensive to establish
interoperable communications, and yet many of us think that
doing so should be a national priority.
Some of us have suggested designating 25 percent of the
homeland security grant money for interoperable communications
equipment. Would the Department support dedicated funding to
achieve a nationwide goal of interoperable communications so
that our first responders will no longer be hampered in their
ability to communicate during a disaster? This was one of the
lessons from the attacks on our country 5 years ago, but it is
a lesson that we saw once again in the response to Hurricane
Katrina when within the various parishes in New Orleans the
equipment was not compatible.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, we have put hundreds of millions
of dollars into grant programs for this kind of equipment, and
in principle, I think, making sure that our homeland security
funds are significantly dedicated to this kind of equipment is
worthwhile.
But I do have to say this: Often when I push on this issue,
what I see is the problem is we cannot get agreement about what
equipment to buy. And perhaps the answer is we will at some
point have to simply mandate that this is the equipment you
must buy and you are not going to get money for anything else.
But I would hesitate to dedicate a huge amount of money up
front without the input of the localities themselves to make a
determination of what they feel they need and how far they have
come and what the remaining gaps are.
I will say that we are planning by the end of this year to
have done a careful study with each of the communities of
exactly what their shortfalls are with interoperability. And
once we have that done, we may be able to give you a much more
specific answer about what funding needs are required.
Chairman Collins. But hasn't the Department been working on
common standards? It is my understanding that the Federal
Government has been working to develop consensus-based
equipment standards for 15 years, and now that responsibility
is hosted in DHS. So isn't an answer to that problem for the
Department to conclude its work and issue the consensus-based
standards?
Secretary Chertoff. It is, and one thing we are going to do
is, as we look at the new digital equipment, we are--and I have
actually mandated that we do come up with a standard about the
specifications on the digital equipment. One thing I want to
make sure of when we do it is that we do not unintentionally
lock in a particular proprietary form of communication that
gives somebody a monopoly. So we may require that a condition
of being designated is that you become open source and you make
the proprietary technology available to others so we can have a
competitive system.
So I do agree that is something we need to get done. That
is to get to the next level. What I do want to emphasize,
though, is as we speak at this moment, there is bridging
technology that achieves interoperability, and that is
available. And if something were to happen tomorrow, that is
out there. What needs to be done is those communities that have
not finished making their arrangements have to reach an
agreement.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Thanks again,
Secretary.
You spoke at the outset of your statement, I think
understandably, about the fact that we have to be realistic and
we cannot do it all. And then you listed the five buckets, some
of which imply an intensity of threat, seriousness of threat,
and a lot of which understandably are priorities of methods for
combating threats.
So I wanted to ask you, as we look forward to the next 5
years, if you could address the question of risk in a somewhat
different manner, which is what you believe the biggest
security risks are that America will face here at home, and
let's focus for a moment at first on terrorism. Obviously, we
face the continuing threat of a natural disaster like Hurricane
Katrina, but I am thinking about the terrorists. As you order
the ways in which terrorists may attempt to attack us, what is
the priority list?
Secretary Chertoff. Risk is composed of three things:
Threat, vulnerability, and consequence. And, frankly, I put the
most weight on consequence because threat and vulnerability
change, consequence rarely does.
The high-consequence event that is the biggest risk is a
weapon of mass destruction. A nuclear bomb, of course, is at
the end of the scale. A biological attack, even a serious
radiological attack, would have very powerful effects on our
entire country.
The good news is at least in terms of a nuclear bomb, the
likelihood of that happening, the threat in terms of
capability, is low at this point. On the other hand, I have no
reason to believe that threat is going to diminish over time,
and I do have reason to believe it is going to increase over
time.
Senator Lieberman. So would you put that at the top of the
list?
Secretary Chertoff. I would put that at the top
particularly because we need to be making the investments now
against the day 5 years from now when that threat does become
more likely.
Senator Lieberman. And the investments are in prevention or
response?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, they have got to be in
everything, but I have to say with a nuclear bomb, prevention
has to come first because there is no way a response to a
nuclear attack is going to be anything but inadequate in terms
of the lives lost and the damage done.
Senator Lieberman. Right. So let me ask you to take a
moment and now relate your five buckets to what you have stated
is the number one terrorist concern you would have, which is a
WMD attack, particularly a nuclear attack. How do we prevent
it?
Secretary Chertoff. Screening bad things out. A critical
element of what we have to do is keep out dangerous things from
the country, and that is why I put radioactive material at the
top of the list.
Now, that has to begin, as Senator Levin said, overseas.
The President signed an agreement with President Putin during
the G-8 to be much more aggressive in terms of our overseas
efforts to intercept this material.
From the homeland standpoint, eventually we want to make
sure that even before a container is loaded into a ship, we are
screening it for the possibility of radioactive material. We
also, by the way, will have by the end of next year radiation
portal monitors at each of our land ports of entry.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Chertoff. So that ring around the country is step
one.
Step two is what we call the ``Securing the Cities
Initiative.'' We anticipate over the next 2 years putting money
into and deploying radiation detection systems around at least
one major city, the city of New York, and two other cities yet
to be selected, the idea being that we will then build on that
to have a network of radiation detection equipment inside the
country itself. So that is one bucket.
Another bucket is intelligence. The DNI, Ambassador
Negroponte, is very focused on counterproliferation. Much of
our collection activity is aimed at determining whether there
are people out there building the capabilities to develop
nuclear weapons.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Chertoff. So enhancing that is a second issue.
A third issue is response, and whether it be a radiological
bomb or it be a biological attack, we have to have the
capability to come up with an antidote or a vaccine. And the
good news is with respect to many of these threats, we have the
antidote. We also need to be able to distribute it, and much of
the planning that we see, for example, in the avian flu area is
also a way of planning for how we would do a mass distribution
with respect to other kinds of biological vectors.
I can also tell you that we have deployed in a significant
number of cities biological detection equipment which goes off
when there is an ambient indication of a biological measure
because that enables us to respond more quickly.
So those are three areas in which we respond to that high-
consequence event.
Senator Lieberman. How about the prevention of the movement
of chemical and biological materials into the country in place
for an attack? In other words, we are focused, understandably,
on trying to detect the coming of a nuclear weapon. I
understand this is different because you could put together
chemical and biological means for an attack within the United
States. What systems do we have to prevent that? Intelligence
obviously is one. If we can know what is coming and break it
before it gets here, that obviously is the best way to do it.
Secretary Chertoff. I think the challenge with biological
and chemical is that there is plenty of stuff inside the
country. You do not need to bring it in.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Secretary Chertoff. And we saw in the Oklahoma City bombing
that ammonium nitrate could be a powerful weapon.
Now, we do regulate, particularly with respect to
biological hazards, we do some regulation with respect to the
way in which it is made available to the public. But there are
some kinds of chemicals and some kinds of biological agents
that occur in nature, and if someone had the wherewithal, they
could simply take something that occurs on a farm, like anthrax
on a farm or foot-and-mouth disease on a farm, and they could,
if they had the know-how, culture it to make it weaponized.
So there the focus has got to be--we cannot keep it out of
the country. We have got to focus on intelligence. We have got
to focus on rapid detection capability so that if there is an
outbreak, we can move quickly in order to tamp it down. And
that is an area, frankly, where our ability to distribute
vaccines or antidotes quickly is really our principal method of
defense.
Senator Lieberman. OK. My time is up. So, clearly, the No.
1 threat is a weapon of mass destruction.
Secretary Chertoff. In terms of consequence.
Senator Lieberman. Chemical, biological, or nuclear, in
terms of consequences. I would like to come back, unless
someone else asks you about it, how you rate--and I won't ask
you for an answer now--the threat of an improvised explosive
device here. Obviously, these are being used elsewhere around
the world by terrorists.
Thanks from your answer, and it guides us in prioritizing
our own work with you to try to prevent and protect and respond
to that number one concern that you have. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I want to follow up on Senator Lieberman's questioning
about the No. 1 threat being a nuclear weapon, nuclear
material, and the ability to bring it in through cargo, through
our ports. I think we deal with about 11 million containers
entering the country every year, and we have had discussions--
and I appreciate your taking the personal effort, Mr.
Secretary, to go to Hong Kong to take a look at that system.
One of the nice things about this Committee with the
leadership of the Chairman and the Ranking Member is I think we
have done a pretty good job putting partisan politics aside and
trying to figure out what is the best thing to do. And I am a
bit concerned with the politicization of kind of the fear of
something getting in there. The Washington Post has an
editorial today where they talk about mandating 100 percent
screening, and they use the phrase, ``The `inspect all
containers' mantra is a red herring that exploits Americans'
fears about what might slip through in order to score political
points . . . ''
Let me talk to you a little bit about that. The screening
of nuclear radiation that you talk about, 100 percent, that is
in our country, those are in our ports.
Secretary Chertoff. Correct. And I want to be careful to
use the word ``scanning'' because what we do is we put them
through scanners, and that is in our ports.
Senator Coleman. All right. But the ideal situation, of
course, is to get them outside because clearly if a device
comes in and it were to be in Long Beach, New York, or
Savannah, wherever it is, New Jersey, it would have a
devastating impact on not just people but commerce, and it
would be very disruptive. So ideally we want to do the
screening out, and then set up--we have our CSI, Container
Security Initiative. We have the pilot project looking at the
Hong Kong system. But Hong Kong, as you and I know, Mr.
Secretary--I think it is two lanes out of 40 that does 100
percent. And now there are proposals that say we need to do all
cargo within 3 years or 4 years.
Can you respond? Again, I want to push you on this really
hard, but tell us what is it that we can do, and even on an
accelerated pace, what can we accomplish in this area?
Secretary Chertoff. I think, first of all, the biggest
constraint--there are two constraints on our ability to operate
overseas. One is, of course, there has to be enough physical
room to put these devices in place without significantly
slowing up the flow of the containers. And I think you are
quite right, Senator, in pointing out that each port is going
to be different, and their capacity to manage the throughput is
going to depend on the nature of the port.
The second issue, frankly, is the willingness of foreign
governments to cooperate, which we do not control, because when
containers go through the system that we are proposing to start
to deploy, when they hit a red light, some of the containers
have got to be pulled out and have got to be opened. You have
got to inspect it. And the authority to do that lies with
foreign governments. We work with them, but it is their
authority that we use to open the containers.
They rightly worry about the burden on their own customs
officials in terms of whether they have the manpower and the
capacity to do that. So I cannot tell you that within 3 or 4
years we can fully deploy a system of having everything, every
container overseas go through a dual scanning system before it
gets on a ship because I cannot predict that foreign
governments will agree, I cannot predict that every port is
going to be configured in a way to allow that to happen. And I
would hate to have Congress pass something that would suggest
to the American people that there is a solution that is
completely pie in the sky.
Senator Coleman. But we can tell the American people that
every single container--every single container--is undergoing a
review process.
Secretary Chertoff. That is correct. Every single container
is screened in two ways.
First of all, based on information that we obtain about the
shipper, the track record, the destination, method of payment,
and a host of other considerations, and then the high-risk
containers are physically inspected or run through X-ray
machines.
Second, by the end of next year, all containers, once
they--at least at the point they arrive at our ports, will be
taken through radiation portal monitors before they leave the
port. So while not a perfect defense, it is a very good
defense.
Senator Coleman. And I keep going back to the former mayor
in me--and I think we have a number on this panel. There was
not a partisan way to collect garbage, I just wanted to get it
done. And I am not going to be satisfied--if foreign countries
are not cooperating, then we need to do something about that.
That is not an acceptable excuse for me. Then we need to say
that they are going to have some consequences. But I just want
to make sure that we do not get caught up and this become a
political football. It is too important an issue. And we will
push you, Mr. Secretary. We do want to see the results of the
Hong Kong project. Clearly, one of the challenges of Hong Kong
is that information right now is not integrated into the full
system. So we have got a lot of data there, but it is not being
used currently. And so the challenge first becomes to use it,
to have it integrated into our system, and then to assure the
American people that, yes, each and every container is being
reviewed and that we are maximizing and pushing to the limit of
making sure what we can physically look at without in the end
doing what Osama bin Laden wanted to do, which is to destroy
our economy.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I want to talk to you about the watchlist, Mr. Secretary.
The Terrorist Screening Center was supposed to have developed a
system through which screening agencies could directly access
the database, but this has yet to be completed. That is what
the GAO says. Is that correct?
Secretary Chertoff. I can tell you what my understanding
is. There is a no-fly list that is compiled from individual
databases maintained by individual agencies, and that list is
accessible as a single list or as a single database, and that
is what keeps people off of airplanes.
At the border, there are a number of different databases
because different agencies keep information for different
purposes, but it is possible to access them all immediately
from the port of entry so that we are capable at our ports of
entry of screening a list within a matter of moments for
somebody coming----
Senator Levin. How many lists are there?
Secretary Chertoff. I don't know if I can give you an
answer to that. Probably somewhere between half a dozen and 10,
depending on how you want to characterize them.
Senator Levin. Let's say a half a dozen. Why aren't they
integrated into one watchlist?
Secretary Chertoff. I think two reasons. First of all,
there is actually no reason to make them a single list, and
there are reasons not to make them a single list. The reason we
do not need to make it a single list is in this day and age it
is possible to check a name against four or five lists
simultaneously, with very little loss of time. I mean, it is
all done in a matter of seconds.
The downside with merging them, as opposed to integrating
them, is that they are held for different purposes. For
example, the FBI has lists of people who are involved with
criminal behavior or dangerous behavior, which includes
American citizens. But that is not really of use to the Border
Patrol in its entirety because we cannot keep American citizens
out of the country. They have a right to come in. And, in fact,
privacy advocates generally argue that unnecessarily merging
lists into one actually raises the risk to privacy.
Senator Levin. Can a local law enforcement person who
arrests someone who wants to see if he is on any terrorist list
access immediately all of the lists?
Secretary Chertoff. We have now completed phase one of
merging IDENT and IAFIS, which are the two fingerprint-based
systems, our system and the FBI's system, and I believe in
Boston and some other cities, we are now deploying that kind of
inter----
Senator Levin. But that local law enforcement person out
there in most jurisdictions cannot right now access, after they
arrest somebody, all of the terrorist watchlists?
Secretary Chertoff. I think that is right. I think they can
get the information that is pertinent to them through one of
two portals--either the FBI portal or through this merged
portal that we are beginning to deploy.
Senator Levin. So that a law enforcement person who arrests
somebody or is suspicious of someone can, through two portals,
punch a button, get all the information that all the agencies
have that would make this person a suspicious character----
Secretary Chertoff. I don't know if I can make it ``punch a
button.'' But in whatever way they access, for example, IAFIS,
which is the Bureau list, they can access that, and through
this new program, we are making it available now in some areas
because we have now begun phase one of merging these two.
Senator Levin. So that is not yet available in most place?
Secretary Chertoff. It is not yet fully available, correct.
Senator Levin. All right. Do we have all the resources to
make it available?
Secretary Chertoff. I think the issue is not a money issue.
I think it is a systems issue, making sure that we can deploy
it in a way that is not going to create false positives. I
think we are going to watch phase one, and I think we are on
track to completing the job in short order.
Senator Levin. Because I think when you just testified that
we have a unified watchlist and we have an integrated
watchlist, it makes it sound a lot more advanced than it really
is.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I want to be clear. I was
particularly being--I want to focus on, first of all, the TSA
no-fly list because there seemed--I was reading things in the
paper today that were suggesting that we do not have a unified
no-fly list, and I can tell you that is incorrect.
Senator Levin. That is not what I was referring to, though.
Let me ask quickly because I only have a minute and a half
left. How many of the people who were arrested in Britain had
visas to the United States?
Secretary Chertoff. Britain does not--under our Visa Waiver
Program, if you are coming as a tourist, you do not need to
have a visa to come from the United Kingdom or a couple dozen
other countries in Europe.
Senator Levin. So that many of those people had tickets to
come to the United States?
Secretary Chertoff. If they were coming--yes, they had
tickets--well, I would not say many had tickets, and I want to
be careful about not saying things that are going to create a
problem for the British case. I don't think they had tickets
yet, but I think they could have acquired tickets and would not
have needed visas if they were coming in, allegedly coming in
as tourists.
Senator Levin. Now, had the British that had been following
some of those people for a long time notified us of that fact
so that they would not get tickets to come to the United
States?
Secretary Chertoff. We were made aware in timely fashion of
the identities of the people. We would have prevented them from
getting on planes.
Senator Levin. From getting tickets?
Secretary Chertoff. I don't know if we would have stopped
them getting tickets. They would not have gotten on airplanes.
Senator Levin. All right. So that we have checked through
all these people and we know that we would have stopped them
from getting on airplanes?
Secretary Chertoff. Yes, because we would have had their
names.
Senator Levin. We did have their names?
Secretary Chertoff. Correct. Well, we had the names of many
of them. I mean, there may have been some that turned up in the
course of the investigation once the arrests started to get
made.
Senator Levin. No, but I mean before that part of the
investigation----
Secretary Chertoff. The people that they----
Senator Levin [continuing]. Began, we had all the names
that the British had.
Secretary Chertoff. Correct.
Senator Levin. OK.
Secretary Chertoff. Yes.
Senator Levin. Finally, what percentage of State or local
first responders would you estimate now have truly
interoperable communications equipment so that they can
communicate with State, local, or Federal agencies? Just give
us a rough perspective.
Secretary Chertoff. I know the 10 largest cities through
our Rapid Command Program have what we would call command-level
interoperability, which means that the agencies and
jurisdictions in the region can talk to one another at the
command level.
I cannot estimate for you in other parts of the country
because I think a lot of it depends on whether they have
purchased this gateway equipment, and a lot of it, frankly,
depends on whether they have built the rules that will allow
them to talk to one another.
However, by the end of this year, we will complete a study
and a survey of the 50 States and the 75 largest urban areas
precisely to ask them to test what their interoperability is
and then to come back and tell us what the gaps are.
Senator Levin. Again, I share what others have said here
with you that this is the greatest single complaint, I believe,
that we get from local first responders and law enforcement
people--the shortage of interoperable equipment. And it is not
just because they have not worked out the ground rules with
other jurisdictions. There are many cases that I know of where
applications have been filed for funding where those ground
rules have been agreed upon, and yet the funding has not been
forthcoming. So I do not think that is an adequate response to
a lack, an obvious lack of interoperable equipment where there
is a good reason to have interoperable equipment and the ground
rules have been worked out. And I hope you will pay some
additional attention to that issue.
Secretary Chertoff. I will. And when this survey is
completed, if it turns out, for example, that you have a
jurisdiction where they have the ground rules and they do not
have the equipment, we have grant funding available, which we
will be pleased to make available to get that equipment.
Senator Levin. Well, it is inadequate, I can assure you.
Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Yesterday I had a meeting with the
Jewish community in Cleveland, and it brought home to me
something that I have been concerned about for a long time, and
that is the radicalization of our own Muslim population here in
the United States.
I just completed a book by Gilles Kepel called ``The War
for Muslim Minds.'' We have got to recognize that this is a
different war than we have had before. It has a lot to do with
the minds of individuals and how do you deal with modernity and
how do you make sure that you do not have homegrown situations.
What I would like to know is: What is being done on the
Federal level to develop the infrastructure of understanding
and human relations in communities around the United States of
America to get people together to talk to each other so that we
do not end up with Muslim xenophobia and folks that heretofore
have felt integrated in a society feeling that they are not
part of our society? Kepel in his book says that he believes
that one of the ways that we need to be successful in Western
nations is considering how we deal with integrating Muslims
into our societies. In some countries it has been very
effective, in others it has not been so good. But what is going
on at the Federal level? Mr. Secretary, whose job is that?
Yours? Karen Hughes'? State Department's?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I think it began with the
President saying shortly after September 11 that this was not
an attack by Muslims and that we should not allow this to draw
us into characterizing Muslims or people from certain parts of
the world as being anti-American, that it was an attack by a
number of ideologues who happened to use the language of Islam.
It is a shared responsibility in this sense: I mean, we are
doing a lot of work, some with the academic community, trying
to understand the psychology of radicalization and trying to
understand why it is, for example, that there are problems in
Western Europe that we have not yet had, some of which flow
from the nature of the societies over there. Part of it is
simply getting out there and interacting. I mean, I have tried
on a number of occasions to go out to the Muslim community or
have them come meet with me to interact with them and speak
with them. Part of it is recruiting and encouraging Muslim
Americans to become part of doing public service and working in
law enforcement and working in intelligence. And we have some
of them.
We all recognize that people of all ethnic groups can be
involved in criminality or terrorism, and it does not condemn
the ethnic group. What we have got to do is continue to build
upon those positive aspects of our society that make people----
Senator Voinovich. Well, there is certainly a Federal
aspect to this, but I also think the infrastructure of
understanding and human relations is largely built at the local
level.
Secretary Chertoff. It is community-based.
Senator Voinovich. It is. When I was mayor of Cleveland, we
had significant tension between our minority community and our
police department. So we started a dialogue to bring people
together to talk about it; to enhance communication and build
ties. And I am really concerned that at the national level,
there is not any real thought being given to how to work with
maybe the National League of Cities or the U.S. Conference of
Mayors to try to get the cities to start to think about how to
bring people together on this issue. How do we reach out to the
top Muslim leaders in the United States, identify who they are,
begin to have a real dialogue with them, and also include the
Jewish community?
My other concern on an international level is the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. For 4
years, I have been trying to get them to make anti-Semitism and
Muslim xenophobia priorities because that is the underpinning
of many of the tensions in communities. And I think so often
what we are doing is preventative, to make sure something does
not happen. But I think outreach is equally important, and how
successful we are going to be will depend upon how well we
start to work at integrating our American Muslim community.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I agree with you. Certainly
internationally, Under Secretary Hughes is very focused on
this. I know the President is actually focused on this. And,
domestically, as I say, as we do this research, I think it is a
very good idea for us to get some of the perspective we
accumulate out to the cities and the States through the various
organizations like the NGA and the National League of Cities
because, I agree, the front line on understanding does lie in
the local community.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I would like to work with you on
that.
The other thing, and this is a big issue, as you know, we
have been monitoring DHS management in my Oversight of
Government Management Subcommittee, and I want you to know that
I am deeply concerned about the high level of staff turnover
and vacancies at the Department. This is a particularly serious
problem at the senior leadership levels. The Committee has been
aware of vacancies at FEMA. We know about that, Madam Chairman.
But there are also continued vacancies in the Transportation
Security Agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs
and Border Patrol, and the National Cybersecurity Division.
What are you doing about filling those vacancies? Also, is
there a long-term strategic management plan in place about what
needs to be done in the agency? And how long is it going to
take to get it done?
Secretary Chertoff. Let me answer both parts of that. The
issue with respect to turnover is twofold. It is not, by the
way, restricted to DHS. I mean, the Bureau, the FBI, has had a
significant amount of turnover in the counterterror area. And I
will be blunt. It is a hard job. After 3 years, people get
burned out. They get tired. And, frankly, there is not a lot of
patting on the back, and that tends to drive people out of the
agency, too.
I wish I could hold these people--there are people--I mean,
sometimes you want to see people go, but sometimes there are
people you do not want to see go. But you do not have the
ability, when people get really tired out, to look them in the
eye and say, ``You have got to keep going.'' It is a real
sacrifice for some of these jobs.
We are working very hard to fill these jobs, and we have
been successful in doing it. It is a cumbersome process. I have
been particularly frustrated with the ability to fill the
cybersecurity job. It is hard to compete with the private
sector. I cannot pay nearly the amount of money you can make in
Silicon Valley. On top of that, we have laborious and sometimes
unpleasant background checks, requirements of financial
divestiture that people sometimes finally say, ``I cannot be
considered because I am going to be sacrificing the ability to
put my kids through college.''
So we have been very lucky in that the number of public-
spirited people of top talent who we have gotten to join the
agency during my tenure is extraordinary. We have had people
like Charlie Allen and Kip Hawley and George Foresman. There
are other people I would like to consider, but it is hard to
recruit. We are continuing to work on that.
On the larger management issue, we do have a strategy to
implement this kind of a strategic plan for completing the
integration, which involves not only merging the number of IT
systems into a single system, finishing the job of having our
financial systems reduced in number, empowering the chiefs of
the various business lines to have more authority over their
counterparts in the individual components, but also bringing a
career path into fruition that, much as DOD does, actually
rewards you for activities that are either joint or undertaken
with other agencies and that has an educational process for the
senior leadership that will emphasize that, like the Capstone
or Pinnacle program at the Defense Department.
I have asked my Deputy actually to work on this, and I am
envisioning he may come sit with you and give you a little bit
more granularity about that.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would also
like to join with others who have complimented you and the
Ranking Member, Senator Lieberman, for your leadership on this
and holding this very important hearing.
Mr. Secretary, I need to, I guess, respectfully disagree
with what I took to be your presumption that the American
people are not willing to pay for or we have to posit a choice
between bankruptcy and the maximum necessary homeland security.
I think if you posit to the American people do you want realism
as defined by, at least in Minnesota, a 60-percent reduction in
funding for its homeland security plan from a year ago, people
would say, I think almost overwhelmingly, if not unanimously,
they do not want that kind of less-than-adequate funding. And
it is hard to assess from the Legislative Branch what is
sufficiency in funding. That is where we really have to defer
to you. But I worry that the Office of Management and Budget is
defining our funding commitment to homeland security rather
than your or rather than what the imperative is.
Again, having witnessed firsthand the last month, both the
Southern border effort and certainly the Northern border, I
think it is inadequate. I think while certainly progress has
been made, that progress is insufficient to the risks involved.
And, again, I think the American people expect from us--not
perfection, that is impossible, but they expect from us that we
are going to be doing everything that is feasible as rapidly as
feasible in order to provide the maximum optimal homeland
security; and if we are not doing that, I think we need to be
candid with one another, you and Congress, and then with the
American people, why it is we are not fiscally capable of
undertaking that kind of priority.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I agree with you it has to be
optimal, but I think there are several different realities we
have to recognize. One is you could in theory spend a limitless
amount of money on security. People can do that in their own
home. I mean, I could redo my house and buy five locks and buy
steel doors and buy expensive security systems with sensors.
There is always more you could do. We all make judgments about
what the optimal amount is.
But it is not just a question of spending money. We cannot
put into effect systems that destroy our ability to operate in
our way of life. I mean, I could give you--a perfect example is
the issue of getting on the airplane. Some people argue we
should ban all hand luggage, walk on with nothing in your
hands, not even a magazine. That would clearly increase
security. There would be a high cost to people in doing that--
not a monetary cost but a personal cost. Business travelers
would find it very difficult. Mothers would find it difficult.
So what we wind up doing is we wind up balancing. We wind
up looking at what is the marginal additional benefit and what
can we accomplish without requiring that sacrifice.
We are going to have disagreements about that. Even those
who are experts have disagreements. But I think the principle
that there are limits and balance I think is when we disserve
the American people if we don't emphasize that we are always
facing choices.
Senator Dayton. I respect that. I am glad you went to Hong
Kong. I mean this sincerely. I would prefer you come to
northern Minnesota and talk with especially the local law
enforcement officials there and get their perception of what--I
think the imbalance, at least as it exists up there, is
decidedly on the side of lack of sufficiency rather than the
excess, which I agree with you, more is never enough.
Regarding the interoperability issue, and I am way beyond
my limited expertise when you talk about something like
gateways, but that is a problem, again, with the local
officials in Minnesota. You talk about leadership. If there is
an expertise that your agency possesses about how to define
this--because I think it is critical, as you say, that people
get on the same page before they are spending money to upgrade
their equipment or buy new equipment and compound the problem
rather than resolve it, whether there is some kind of national
conference or State conferences that you could be part of--your
agency be part of either convening or participating in, I
certainly, again, would like to convene one of those in
Minnesota because I think the local officials are starving for
that kind of understanding, if they do not have it, if it
exists out there, that expertise, they do not have it. And I
think to communicate that now, as I say, before we are spending
more money that is not going to resolve the problem or make it
worse, it would really be imperative.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, that is why we are doing this
study with the States in the 75 large urban areas, precisely to
pinpoint in a systematic way what the gaps are. And once we get
that done by the end of the year, I think we can have a much
more focused discussion with the States and localities about
what it is they really need and what it is they have to do in
order to get up to snuff.
Senator Dayton. Well, I think the time, the urgency of that
undertaking, if it needs to wait until the end of the year
until the study is complete, but I hope the beginning of next
year then your agency could provide that leadership and that
expertise and get everybody as much as possible, at least show
them what the page is. If they are not going to get on it, that
is their responsibility, but at least give them that guidance.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Bennett.
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I have to say I am impressed at your
presentation here this morning, the degree to which you have
gotten your arms around the problems and catalogued them in a
way that is very coherent and intelligent. And I come away from
the hearing with a higher sense of confidence in the level of
progress that has been made by the Department. We both
understand it is not where it wants to be, where it needs to
be, but frankly, in the period of your stewardship, it has
moved farther than I might have anticipated that it would.
Most of the concerns that I have had have been talked about
by those who have questioned you before me, but I want to come
back to Senator Voinovich's question and focus on one aspect,
which you raised in your response to Senator Voinovich, and
that is the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and
Telecommunications. You may remember that I got quite exercised
about that and urged you to move ahead and was delighted when
it was created. Now it has been a year since that position was
created, and it still has not been filled.
And I hear what you said to Senator Voinovich about the
difficulty of filling it, but I want to share with you my own
experience when I have been to Silicon Valley, where the first
question I was asked was, ``Why hasn't this position been
filled?'' And my answer was not as completely sophisticated as
yours, but it was basically the same answer: ``Well, Federal
salaries compared to Silicon Valley salaries are so low that
they are having a hard time attracting somebody.'' And I was
told, ``Senator, we will give you a list of half a dozen people
who are willing today to give up their Silicon Valley salaries
to come into government service on a 1-year, 2-year kind of
mission, if you will, to try to get that thing under control.''
I don't know if you have been to Silicon Valley. They did
not give me the list, so I have no names to share with you. But
have you made that kind of an effort to say, ``All right, we
understand that this is a fairly significant financial
sacrifice on your part, but your country needs you and give us
2 years, step aside from your more highly paid job, step aside
from your career long enough to sacrifice for your country,''
and gotten any kind of a response?
Secretary Chertoff. I have been to Silicon Valley, Senator,
and first of all, I want to say that I believe we will actually
be in a position where the President will have somebody to
nominate in the very near future. But I actually tried to do
some of that and also reached out through people in the
Department who have backgrounds working with people in the
field. I want to be careful not to get specific about people in
a way that would invade their privacy.
I would say that it was a combination of challenges. It has
really been probably the biggest personnel frustration I have
had since taking this job because I have had extraordinary
people coming to fill other jobs. This one, it has been a
combination of not just the money, but many of the people with
experience face conflict-of-interest issues because the
technology they would have to pass upon would have been
technology that they had something to do with, or they have
divestiture issues, which I frankly--it is hard to argue to
people--or it is one thing to give up your salary. It is
another thing to get into a hefty divestiture, particularly if
you are a comparatively young person. And some of them
eventually just culturally were--took themselves out of the
running. We had some false starts, I would say.
I think we are at the point now where I am hopeful we will
have this position filled in very short order, but I confess to
you that filling this job has been really tough.
Senator Bennett. I understand that, and it may be, Madam
Chairman, Senator Lieberman, that Senator Voinovich with his
interest on human capital, we consider amendments to the law
that say for a specified period of time--that is, if you serve
for a specific period rather than make a career, there can be a
waiver for some of the other aspects that you have. In my
position as Chairman of the Agriculture Subcommittee of
Appropriations, we run into some of this same sort of thing
with respect to the FDA because the rules are very firm that
you cannot be an expert for the FDA if you have any connection
with this, that, or the other pharmaceutical company. And we
end up unable to draw on anybody who has any real expertise
because everybody who has an expertise has someone who is
willing to pay for it. And we take the automatic assumption
that if someone on the outside is willing to pay for your
expertise, you are prima facie corrupt and, therefore, cannot
work for the government.
Now, I do not believe that is true. This is as critical a
position in Homeland Security, as I think Secretary Chertoff
has made clear, as we can find, and perhaps we ought to
consider in this area, and maybe some others, passing
legislation that would say if they come in for a specific
period of time, they are not going to be in a permanent
situation, they ought to be allowed a waiver from some of these
conflict-of-interest circumstances, as long as they are fully
disclosed and everybody understands all of them, because
failure to do that leaves us naked in an area that, if I were a
terrorist, would be my first area of attack on the United
States right now.
I think we could have greater devastation shutting down
some computers, hacking into the capacity--talk about
interoperability of equipment. If you hack into the network
that these people are using and shut the network down, the
equipment could be the best in the world and it does not work.
And having someone focusing on this with the kind of attention
that it needs is very critical, and we have gone, frankly,
longer than we should have to create the position, and now we
have gone a year without anybody in the position. And I think
it is something that Congress ought to look at because I
believe the Secretary has laid out his challenge very
dramatically to us here this morning.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I commend you for the effort and the
intelligence that you bring to this assignment. It is still
such an incredibly complicated, gigantic thing that I think
that despite your efforts and a lot of interest in what is
taking place, there is still some exposure that we ought to try
to deal with as quickly as we can.
Do you believe that 100 percent inspection of cargo would
be a worthwhile endeavor?
Secretary Chertoff. I want to define three separate things:
``Screening,'' which means identifying through intelligence and
information what is in the cargo, we do 100 percent.
``Scanning,'' running through radiation portal detection
equipment, we will be close to 100 percent by the end of next
year. ``Physical inspection''----
Senator Lautenberg. It currently is 5 percent.
Secretary Chertoff. No. Running through radiation----
Senator Lautenberg. Scanning?
Secretary Chertoff. Scanning through radiation portal
monitors in our ports will be 80 percent by the end of the year
and close to 100 percent by the end of next----
Senator Lautenberg. In our ports. Are you talking about
cargo containers coming here----
Secretary Chertoff. Correct.
Senator Lautenberg [continuing]. Will have already been
scanned----
Secretary Chertoff. No. When they arrive, before they leave
the port, they will have been scanned through radiation portal
monitors, 80 percent will have been scanned--we will be at 80
percent by the end of this year and close to 100 percent by the
end of next year.
Senator Lautenberg. This is after the container has been
put down on American soil.
Secretary Chertoff. Correct. That is correct.
Senator Lautenberg. And if there is something in there that
is designed to wreak havoc in our community, would it be a
little late? It takes some time to get the cargo off the boat
and----
Secretary Chertoff. Well, the screening, in terms of
intelligence-based screening, in terms of what is in the
container, is something we do--actually a good deal of it we do
overseas.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, I would like to pass that, if you
do not mind, because screening to me is not really an effective
way to do it, and I particularly want to focus on the scan
side.
Secretary Chertoff. The scanning, some of it we do
overseas, but the vast majority of it is done once it has
arrived here. That is why, as I said earlier, I went to Hong
Kong, we looked at the system they have there, and we are----
Senator Lautenberg. When did you go, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Chertoff. This spring. I think it was March or
April.
Senator Lautenberg. This year.
Secretary Chertoff. And we are working with a number of
foreign governments now to begin to deploy a system overseas
that would scan containers before they actually get loaded on
the ship. The constraint there, as I said earlier, will be
twofold: It will be making sure that physically they are able
to do it, given the configuration of the port; and, second, of
course, the foreign government has to agree because it is their
port.
Senator Lautenberg. Do you believe that it can be done? The
equipment that you saw in Hong Kong, does it work as it is
suggested, a 2-minute slide-through and a relatively modest
cost per container?
Secretary Chertoff. I think it moves quickly, but there are
some technological barriers. One of them is, depending on the
nature of the port, sometimes there is background radiation
that creates a problem. And the second thing is you have to
have the ability, when you actually do get a red flag, to do a
timely inspection. The constraint there is whether the foreign
port has enough inspectors----
Senator Lautenberg. I am going to interrupt you, as much as
I hate to do it, because we were friends way before we got
here. So would it make us safer in any measure, do you think,
scanning the cargo?
Secretary Chertoff. Overseas?
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Secretary Chertoff. Sure, I mean, if we can get it done in
practical terms and if the foreign governments are supportive,
that is where we would like to go.
Senator Lautenberg. Would you think that it is an appealing
idea--scanning each of 11 million cargo containers entering
American ports each year is a recipe for crippling our
manufacturing and commerce, wasting time and money that could
be better used for other measures, adding little to our
homeland security? Do you agree with that statement?
Secretary Chertoff. I want to be real careful because
people use words in different ways. I think the idea that you
are going to physically inspect every container is not
realistic and would, in fact, destroy the entirety of our
maritime system. I think the ability----
Senator Lautenberg. Would a nuclear explosion in a cargo
container destroy our maritime system?
Secretary Chertoff. It would, Senator, but you could also
bring a nuclear container through a container on the back of a
truck coming from Canada. So the logic----
Senator Lautenberg. So what do we do? Do we just throw up
our hands----
Secretary Chertoff. No.
Senator Lautenberg [continuing]. And say because that could
happen, why bother?
Secretary Chertoff. No. Again, what we try to do is we try
to come up with a risk-based solution, one that raises a
significant barrier to the risk, but not at the cost of
destroying that which we are trying to protect.
I think that a combination of what we are doing with
radiation scanning here, what we are working with foreign
governments to do overseas--and I would love to see us do this
Hong Kong pilot, roll this out overseas, and we are going to be
doing that over the next few years--I think that is all good,
and that will really raise the barrier. I do think that 100
percent physical opening is not realistic.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, not opening, but, again,
scanning, if you are looking for radiation, if you are looking
for explosive materials, and that can be detected promptly.
I read further from a press report that was handed out by
this Committee during a press conference before in which it
declares that 100 percent scanning of cargo containers is a red
herring, and we say--it says, ``Even if manpower and equipment
necessary for 100 percent scanning were available, the process
would impose delays and create massive backlogs at ports.
Scanning a shipping container takes several minutes. Analyzing
the scan images can take up to 15 minutes.'' Is that correct?
Secretary Chertoff. I think, Senator, it is going to depend
a lot on a number of different things. It is going to depend on
whether it is a transshipment port, which means you have
containers coming from Port A to Port B, and then they have to
be offloaded--that makes it much more difficult and time-
consuming--as opposed to a port where the containers originate
in the port and, therefore, they just move through in a single
line. It depends on the physical structure of the port.
Senator Lautenberg. But it does not necessarily--you are
not suggesting that it does simply impose delays, create
massive backlogs at ports? I mean, do you see our industry and
our economic activity being destroyed by scanning, attempting
to scan 100 percent of the cargo that comes in?
Secretary Chertoff. I understand, Senator, you are trying
to drive me to give you a yes or no answer.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, I would like that.
Secretary Chertoff. If I am going to be accurate, I cannot
do it. I have got to tell you it depends a lot on the
individual port. In some ports, we are probably going to be
able to do something like 100 percent scanning overseas, and we
are working to see whether we can get some ports in the next
couple of years to----
Senator Lautenberg. I am going to be cut off here very
soon, but there is a bill on the floor of the Senate in which I
called for 100 percent scanning of containers and am attempting
to get that done. The Committee has in turn decided that three
pilot projects would be enough.
Mr. Secretary, you and I were at a very important event
yesterday with citizens typically from our State of New Jersey,
your State and my State, 700 people died; there still is injury
that affects the health and well-being of people. A firefighter
died last week who tried to help in the rescue operation
because of a lung disease that he contracted.
So when we talk to those people, we make promises that we
are going to do everything we can to try to keep them safe. And
to me, when we start talking about pilots when, in fact, we
have effective equipment--you say the equipment is effective in
Hong Kong that you saw?
Secretary Chertoff. I mean, the pilot was effective, but I
have to qualify it. There were some constraints in the ability
to use it in real life, and that is what I do not want to do is
tell the American public we have got a magic bullet and the
bullet turns out not to be effective. So, I mean--there is
promise in----
Senator Lautenberg. So the alternative to that is tell the
public we are going to ask you to take some more risk while we
pursue this debate.
Secretary Chertoff. Senator, I can say this because we are
old friends. I confront this argument a lot, and there is
nothing I would like more than to be able to say, Wow, we have
a way to make every port in the world scan all the radiation
overseas. But I cannot do that with a straight face because not
every port is physically constructed to be able to do that, and
not every country is willing to do that, and I cannot make
other countries do things.
It is like I get in my car or I put my daughter in my car,
I understand it is not 100 percent safe. If I wanted my
daughter to be 100 percent safe, I would put a 5-mile-an-hour
speed limit cap on the car, and it would not go more than 5
miles an hour. But I do not do that because that is more safety
than we can afford.
All of us--we have 40,000 people die every year on the
highway. That is a guaranteed 40,000 who die. We do not require
that cars be manufactured to go no more than 5 miles an hour.
So we do judge this----
Senator Lautenberg. But we require them to be sober and we
have red lights and we have other things.
Secretary Chertoff. That is right.
Senator Lautenberg. We have other protections, and if we--
--
Chairman Collins. The Senator's time has more than expired.
Senator Lautenberg. And if we inspected one out of 20
people going into the White House for tours or coming into this
place, would we feel secure? I don't think so.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Thanks, Madam Chairman, and thank you very
much for your testimony, Mr. Secretary, and for your responses
to our questions.
I want to come back to a point that you made with respect
to chemical security, an issue that this Committee spent a
whole lot of time on, and with the leadership of our Chairman
and Ranking Member, we hammered out a consensus, at least on
the surface, and reported a bill out--I don't know, was it
unanimously or----
Chairman Collins. Unanimously.
Senator Carper. Unanimously, which was a minor miracle, as
I recall, a month or two ago.
Senator Lieberman. A major miracle.
Senator Carper. There you go.
There are those who--and I know Senator Lautenberg spent a
lot of time on this. He cares a lot about this. Senator
Voinovich, among others. Among the issues that I think keeps us
apart is the issue of preemption, how we should deal with
States that have turned to--in the absence of any kind of
Federal standards or approach, what States would like to do,
and a handful of States have already passed, I think,
legislation or are considering it. Many others are debating it.
What advice would you have? And apparently this is
something you think is important, the Department, the
Administration thinks is important. We have got, I think, one
other Committee, the Environment Committee, on which I serve,
and I understand there is some jurisdictional wrangling that is
going on between our Committee and that committee that might
keep us from taking up the legislation.
And the other major issue--and correct me if I am wrong,
Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, but I think the other major
issue might be preemption. There are perhaps others. But a
little bit of advice would be welcome as to your willingness--
maybe just, first of all, your willingness as the Secretary to
work with some of our colleagues on other committees to help
remove a procedural road block to actually bring chemical
security to the floor. We have talked about whether or not it
would be offered as an amendment. The Republican Leader in the
Senate does not want to waste a lot of time on legislation that
would get bogged down in a food fight on chemical security. And
we do not want to spend a whole lot of time on trying to figure
out what is the right thing to do on preemption, when we are,
Democrats and Republicans--it is not a partisan issue. It is
just that people have different views.
One, your thoughts on how hard you are willing to push to
try to get something done on chemical security, and
opportunities, as we do port security legislation this week,
could be offered as an amendment. I think some folks are
offering rail security, transit security, which I very much
support. But rather than give a good testimony, what can you do
to help us actually get something done this week?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I know that we have been working
very closely with this Committee and other committees on both
sides of the Capitol on this issue. My desire is to get a
chemical security bill that gives us the authority to do what
we are poised to do for that gap area that we do not have the
authority. And I also do not want to let the perfect be the
enemy of the good, so what I have told the lawyers who are
deeply involved in working on this with people on the Hill is
to focus on what are the essential issues.
What I am totally unqualified to do is to opine on the ins
and outs of the legislative process and to give advice as to
how to best manage through the various committees and the
various vehicles.
Senator Carper. Could I interrupt for just a second? I
spent 8 years as a governor, and I was not supposed to be an
expert about that stuff either, but I was. And, frankly, you
have been at this job--you are good. I have a lot of respect
for you. But you need to have your antenna and your focus on
that as well.
When you sit there and you tell us chemical security is a
major priority of this Department, if you are not prepared to
weigh in here, roll up your sleeves, and try to get something
done, it is not as helpful as it might otherwise be.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I think we have been doing that,
and I think we have been up--and I have talked to not just the
Chairman----
Senator Carper. If I can interrupt again, Senator Voinovich
has just come back in. We are talking about chemical security.
We are talking about jurisdictional disputes here that might
preclude our getting something done. We are talking about the
issues of preemption, which I know you have a lot of interest
in, too. And I am trying to enlist the Secretary's active
participation in getting some progress here.
Secretary Chertoff. As I say, I spoke to the Chairman, I
spoke to the Ranking Member over the last several months, I
spoke to members of the House leadership, leaders in the House,
all trying to forge what I thought was a workable compromise
which would get us the authority to do what we need to do by
regulation.
I guess my advice would be to keep it as simple as
possible, that the more that is laid on something, my
observation has been, the greater the likelihood it will not
navigate through the very narrow channel which is available to
move something like this on. And particularly because what we
may get in the short term may not be the ideal solution, but it
will get us a good deal of the way to an ideal solution.
My weigh-in on this would be let's take the simplest
vehicle possible, the one with the highest likelihood of
success in both Houses, and let's try to get that done. And if
it turns out that we want to add to it later or with the
experience of time it is inadequate, that is fine. But we
actually can do a lot now, even with the most bare bones type
of thing which is out there, and so that is for someone who is
in the Peanut Gallery, so to speak, that is my coaching.
Senator Carper. Well, you are not in the Peanut Gallery. We
are in the car, and these two folks are like--one is driving,
and the other is riding shotgun, and the rest of the Committee
is in the back seat. You are not far away.
Secretary Chertoff. I am in the trunk? [Laughter.]
Senator Carper. We are going to keep you out of that trunk.
Chairman Collins. He wants you to be the engine.
Senator Carper. That is good.
Chairman Collins. Don't sound surprised.
Senator Carper. The other thing I wanted to mention, if I
can, Madam Chairman, to go back to rail security, there are a
bunch of tunnels that go into New York City. Every day they
carry, I am told, hundreds of thousands of people in and out of
New York City. They are submerged. I don't know what body of
water they go under--the Hudson River or the East River?
Secretary Chertoff. Hudson River.
Senator Carper. But they carry a lot of people. I am told
that if there was an explosion on any one of those commuter
trains or, for that matter, Amtrak trains, it could not only
hurt a lot of people on the train, but could actually puncture
a tunnel, cause flooding into the tunnel, flood that tunnel.
The water could back into the Penn Station and flood the other
tunnels as well and create great havoc and loss of life.
When I look at threats on the rail transit side, that to me
is like a preeminent threat. You have other threats that
include tunnels under Washington, DC, and Baltimore. You have a
lot of bridges between here and New York City and Boston that
are important as well.
When you consider transit and rail security in terms of
actually prioritizing what needs to be done, how do you set
those priorities? What are the priorities? And how are we doing
a better job today in rail and transit security than we were a
couple of years ago? And how do you see us doing even better in
the next year or two?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, actually, Senator, that is
exactly what we do. We looked at exactly the issue you talked
about. In fact, this past year--in the past, we had looked at
the issue of rail transit and mass transit in terms of amount
of trackage, and what we did is we changed that, so now we look
at trackage underground as opposed to--we tier it. We have
aboveground, underground, and then underground in tunnels that
are underwater, of which the third is the highest priority for
precisely the reason you talk about. And without saying it in
an open hearing, much of our transit grant decisionmaking this
last year for the first time was driven precisely by a
recognition that the consequences of something occurring in a
tunnel underwater are significantly greater than the same event
occurring on a stretch of track aboveground. And that is
exactly the disciplined approach we want to take. We have tried
to inject, among other things, real science into this process
now.
So I would envision that we will continue to push a
significant amount of the money on a risk basis to precisely
those elements of the rail infrastructure that have the
greatest vulnerability.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks. The last thing I would
say, if I may, Madam Chairman, going back to the issue of
chemical security, I would urge you to be proactive today, this
week, next week. Thanks very much.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for your testimony here
today. We obviously could keep you for several more hours, but
you are in luck that we have several more witnesses. So thank
you very much for your excellent presentation.
Senator Lautenberg. Madam Chairman, will the record remain
open?
Chairman Collins. The record will stay open for 15 days, as
it always does, for the submission----
Senator Lieberman. Madam Chairman, if I may end on a light
note. Mr. Secretary, I think you made a generationally
sensitive comment about the Peanut Gallery before. If I
remember from my youth, that was a term coined during the Howdy
Doody television show, and I prefer to think of you not as a
member of the Peanut Gallery but as Buffalo Bob. [Laughter.]
Secretary Chertoff. I actually thought it was a baseball
expression from when you were back in the bleachers, but----
Chairman Collins. I must say this is all completely lost on
me.
Senator Lieberman. For obvious reasons. [Laughter.]
Chairman Collins. Senator Pryor has just arrived, and
Secretary Chertoff, I want to give him the opportunity, if he
does want to ask a question.
Senator Pryor. That is OK.
Chairman Collins. OK. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I am going to call forward both our second and third panels
in the interest of time. We are very pleased to have such
distinguished witnesses with us today: Sheriff Leroy Baca and
Deputy Commissioner Richard Falkenrath, as well as Steven Simon
and also Daniel Prieto.
Sheriff Baca is the Sheriff of Los Angeles County and
commands the largest Sheriff's Department in the United States.
He is also Director of Homeland Security-Mutual Aid for
California Region I, which serves 13 million people. I want to
say that I had the pleasure of meeting the sheriff through
Representative Jane Harman on two trips to the L.A. area, and I
was so impressed with the work that he is doing to strengthen
the region's defenses against terrorism.
Dr. Richard Falkenrath was named the Deputy Commissioner
for Counterterrorism in the New York Police Department in July.
Prior to joining the NYPD, he was a Fellow at The Brookings
Institution, and from 2001 to 2004, he served on the White
House staff, including serving as the First Deputy Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security.
Steven Simon is Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at
the Council on Foreign Relations and co-author of the book, The
Next Attack.
Daniel Prieto is the Director and Senior Fellow of Homeland
Security Center at the Reform Institute. Previously, he was the
Research Director of the Homeland Security Partnership and
Initiative, as well as a Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard.
We welcome all four of our distinguished experts here
today. I want to apologize to you for your having to wait so
long. We had a greater attendance than we expected today in
view of the importance of the issues before us.
Sheriff Baca, we are going to begin with you.
TESTIMONY OF LEROY D. BACA,\1\ SHERIFF, LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
CALIFORNIA
Mr. Baca. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you, Ranking
Member Senator Lieberman, and Members of the Committee, which I
know have other things to do, and I realize that time is short.
I have seven points and six categorical recommendations to
make, and I would like to say that Los Angeles County is one of
America's engines for imagination and innovation when it comes
to public safety in view of this recent responsibility of
homeland security and terrorism.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Baca appears in the Appendix on
page 69.
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The first point on the categorical side here is that
California is a formal mutual aid State. It has been that way
since 1950. We have a very defined system in law where local
government is enabled by State support, through counties as
well, and that the mutual aid system that we use has been well
in place and time-tested. Whether it comes to earthquakes,
fires, any incident of disturbances or attacks, emergency
activities included, we know what to do.
Second, California sheriffs are mutual aid coordinators,
which means it is an integral part of the governmental process
and governance for mutual aid and first responders. In the case
of California, and Los Angeles County in particular, each
regional area--and I happen to be in command of Area I, which
includes two counties, Orange County and Los Angeles County--we
serve 10 million people and, therefore, organize over 50 police
departments and over 40 fire departments in whatever we do in a
mutual aid context. And therein the law enforcement mutual aid
coordinator, there is a need for us to operate in an area that
includes multi-level governance. And that is the operating
interoperable side of how you manage something in that you have
many governments working together to work at solving a problem.
The third point I will make is that we had developed a
Terrorist Early Warning Group System prior to September 11.
Although more than 5 years have elapsed since the tragedy of
September 11, we continue to institutionalize the lessons
learned of that day. We have Federal, State, and local
partners, and we aggressively pursue ways to integrate our
disparate agencies into a seamless network of information-
sharing cooperatives. To understand where the Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department is headed, there must be an
understanding of where we began.
We formed in 1996 the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group
System, which analyzes trends and potentials for terror attacks
within Los Angeles County. The TEW now employs subject matter
experts from law enforcement, the fire service, public health,
academia, and the military, all working together to ensure the
safety of Los Angeles County residents. Representatives from
the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security also work
within the TEW to produce high-quality, analytical products
that are provided to decisionmakers covering a variety of
subjects related to terrorism.
The fourth point is our Joint Regional Intelligence Center
of Southern California that was mentioned earlier. Recognizing
the value of cooperation between Federal, State, and local
agencies, leaders from the FBI, the U.S. Attorney General's
Office, the State Office of Homeland Security, Los Angeles
Police Department, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department decided more than 2 years ago to join together and
create a model for intelligence fusion centers. The vision
became reality in July 2006 with the grand opening of the Los
Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center and Mr. Chertoff was
there.
Using analytical processes developed by the TEW, analysts
from a variety of agencies and disciplines create an expansive
view of trends and potentials that could indicate a potential
terrorist attack. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was
also present at this center, and the components of that
Department, such as Customs and Border Protection, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security Agency, and
the Coast Guard, are contributing personnel to this
organization. These agencies possess critical information that
must be synthesized with local products to make the forecast of
potential threats clear. I strongly encourage the participation
of any public agency involved in issues of homeland security
with its local TEW fusion center to do exactly what we are
doing in Los Angeles.
Fifth, we have terrorism liaison officers. This is
necessary to keep the coordination of communication going on an
ongoing basis.
Sixth, there is a formal private sector outreach and
partnership. It is called the Homeland Security Advisory
Council. It is chaired by Marc Nathanson, founder of Falcon
Cable Corporation. We have every possible source of the
business community involved in this, and we work this Committee
very hard in a partnership with the National Security--it is
called the Business Executives for National Security (BENS),
based here in Washington, and therein integrating the private
sector into our intelligence process. This is a very big part
of what we do through infrastructure liaison officers. The
infrastructure liaison program further expands the network of
trusted agents to include people dedicated to the critical
infrastructure protection. This addition to our intelligence
process creates a comprehensive network that provides a better
opportunity for the prevention, disruption, or mitigation of a
terrorist attack.
I wanted to commend Senator Voinovich for his thoughts
concerning the Muslim American society. We have a formal Muslim
American outreach and partnership program. Another key
component to our strategy is our connection to the Muslim
community through the creation of the Muslim American Homeland
Security Congress. Consisting of respected leaders from Muslim
organizations within Southern California, their mission is to
foster communication, education, and mutual respect between law
enforcement and the Muslim community. Programs such as our
Homeland Security Advisory Council and our Muslim American
Homeland Security Congress are reflective of our belief that
homeland security is not an issue that can be resolved through
traditional police practices only.
This program will be moving itself to Chicago, and I will
be traveling with its leaders to Detroit, where our largest
Muslim American ghetto exists, so that we can further empower
Muslims to speak up in the securing of our homeland mission
here in the United States, as well as in nations abroad.
For the next 5 years--and you have heard this, and I will
just be very brief so the others can speak. What do we do in
the next 5 years? Well, there are seven things I would like to
say.
First is communications, and you have talked about
interoperability so I do not need to continue to focus on that.
But it is a gap that needs to be closed. Second, intelligence
must be shared vertically and horizontally across jurisdictions
for analysis, investigative, and operational purposes. Those
are three key components to intelligence: Analysis,
investigative, and operational purposes.
The second point is technology as a general subject.
Surveillance technology needs additional development and
standards. There are a lot of things going on out there in the
world of surveillance, but we do need to have better standards
on a national scale.
The next point under technology is detection technology, on
which we heard a significant amount of comment here by the
Senators and Secretary Chertoff. Detection technology for
chemical, biological, and radiological applications needs
additional development as well. I think that is clear.
The next point is national technology resources need
further logistical development for regional and national
application. In other words, I am talking about shared
classified technology. For example, the Department of Defense
and the National Intelligence Community have equipment that
local police do not have, and we would like to see further
access to that opportunity to use the equipment.
Finally under the point of technology, research and
development of new technology should be jointly managed to
avoid wasteful duplication. This should be managed by a
national board of volunteer Federal, State, and local
intelligence and first responder experts.
My third point on what can we do in the next 5 years is to
develop a joint forces training center, a system throughout the
United States. In other words, develop three or more training
centers on terrorism for Federal, State, and local first
responders and intelligence first responders of terrorist acts.
Currently, the California National Guard and the California
Mutual Aid Region I, which is Los Angeles and Orange Counties,
are developing this proposal, and we think it can be a model
for the rest of the Nation.
My fourth point is international cooperation, training,
best practices, and personnel exchanges should be expanded. I
have traveled to Jordan after the Amman bombings. I have
traveled to London after the bombings there with the train
stations. I have traveled to Israel. I have been to Turkey
after the bombings that have occurred there. And this is a very
critical part of how we all learn about what is going on in
different parts of the world. Current plans are underway to
have training in Paris, France, at the Interpol Headquarters
led by cities and countries that have experienced a terrorist
attack. I think we should take every major target city in
America and have those police chiefs and firefighter leaders,
along with their mutual aid coordinators, go to this conference
so that they can hear directly from these countries as to how
they managed the particular terrorist attacks they have
endured.
The fifth point is to continue to fund the National
Terrorism Early Warning Resource Center that partners with
local and State law enforcement. There are currently 26 local
terrorist early warning systems in our Nation today. The long-
range vision and effort is to link more than 50 terrorist early
warning systems across the country with other local and State
fusion centers, such as the Joint Regional Intelligence Center
in Los Angeles.
Sixth, the Department of Homeland Security's major
policies--I wish Mr. Chertoff was here, but I have told him
this before--should be developed in partnership with selected
experienced local, State, and Federal law enforcement leaders
in deciding financial, operational, and training policies. The
UASI grant program is one example where we can improve
significantly in what we are doing.
Thank you for listening to my comments. They have been very
brief in their content. I am talking about unified government,
unified first responder planning, and I am talking about
unified leadership, which is what American society wants today
on this subject of terrorism.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, Sheriff.
Mr. Baca. And I have copies of my testimony here.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Your full statement will be
put in the record.
Dr. Falkenrath.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD A. FALKENRATH, PH.D.,\1\ DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT
Mr. Falkenrath. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is always an
honor to be at this Committee, which did so much important
legislation in the last 5 years for the country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Falkenrath appears in the
Appendix on page 74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to start by saying a few words about my new job in
New York City in the New York City Police Department. I think
as everyone knows, we are the biggest and most densely
populated city in the country. We have a population of 8
million people; 40 percent are foreign born. The most diverse,
ethnically diverse county in America is Queens County. The
gross metropolitan product of New York City and its surrounding
areas is $900 billion. That is larger than all but about a
dozen countries. The New York City Police Department has 52,000
personnel, a budget of just under $4 billion. That puts it on
the order, in terms of size, with most armies in the world.
We have created a Counterterrorism Bureau and dramatically
expanded the Intelligence Division since September 11. The
Counterterrorism Bureau I have the privilege of now heading.
The Intelligence Division is headed for the last 4\1/2\ years
by a former Deputy Director of Operations of the CIA, backed up
by a former Deputy Director of Intelligence for the CIA who
runs our intelligence shop. All together, we have about 1,000
officers dedicated to counterterrorism and intelligence
missions and a total budget of on the order of $200 million per
year.
We have about 110 to 120 NYPD detectives assigned to the
Joint Terrorism Task Force at the FBI. They all report to me.
In addition, we do a very wide range of training and other
programmatic activities, both for our own people, our partners
inside the city, other State and local agencies, Federal
Government agencies, and international agencies from time to
time.
We have a cadre of civilian analysts whom we have hired
since September 11 who are as good as any I saw when I served
in the White House. They are headed by a Rhodes scholar and
former Supreme Court clerk. We have an outreach program to the
private sector.
The list goes on, and I catalogue this in my prepared
statement, which I ask be submitted to the record.
Chairman Collins. Without objection.
Mr. Falkenrath. The extent of the special events we need to
handle in New York City is shown this week. Yesterday we had
the commemoration of September 11. The President of the United
States was there. Next week, he is coming back, along with 159
other heads of State. It is the largest, regularly scheduled
meeting of heads of state in the world, the UN General
Assembly. We do it every year, have been doing it for 50 years,
and know how to do it pretty well.
This is who we are. New York City had to respond after
September 11 in this way and did. The same could also be said
in different ways of the other New York City agencies--the Fire
Department, OEM. They have also stepped up. It just so happens
that I am the one testifying today.
A word on the threat. In my testimony, I list 18 recent
encounters that New York City has had with international
terrorism in the past 15 years. They have repeatedly targeted
New York City. That is why we take it so seriously. The most
recent threat and plot came to light just a couple months ago
when a leak revealed an extremely sensitive intelligence
investigation into an ongoing threat against one of our tunnels
and, in fact, against a critical piece of infrastructure.
We view the threat to the city as a global phenomenon, and
hence, we take a global view, which can manifest in our city at
any moment in almost any way. We do not confine our work and
our analysis to the five boroughs for which we have direct
responsibility.
Globally, clearly on the good side, we have seen a
reduction in legacy al-Qaeda which attacked us on September 11
to a fraction of what it was before. This is good. We have also
seen an improvement in our border security, which has made it
somewhat more difficult for international terrorists to get
into the United States to conduct attacks. We do not take any
comfort from that because the baseline vulnerability was so
high, but there has been some progress.
Aside from those two items, though, I would say most of the
other indicators are bad. We have seen the proliferation of
extremist Muslim ideology, Muslim militancy, and Salafism,
which we think is a precursor to terrorism. That proliferation,
that spread of that ideology has been very well documented
abroad. A lot of people write about that. They talk about it on
television. We have observed it, and we have hard evidence of
it in New York City as well. It has us very worried, and I
would add, in many surrounding areas, not just in the five
boroughs.
The homegrown threat you referenced, Madam Chairman, in
your question to Secretary Chertoff we are very worried about.
These are the most common forms of attacks since, and there are
important implications for how we conduct counterterrorism
operations if we take the homegrown threat seriously, which I
will reference. We have seen increasing use of the Internet, of
course. The threat is very serious. I wake up every morning
thinking today might well be the day that we get another attack
in our city.
Now, recommendations. At your request, we will give a few.
They will not be confined just to issues of immediate interest
and concern to NYPD, but I will base them on that.
First, with respect to Federal counterterrorism, we note
that the vast preponderance of Federal effort--money spent,
hours spent by Federal personnel--is international in
character. It focuses on collecting and countering
international threats. The domestic counterterrorism effort
that we have is most powerfully predicated on this
international effort. Most of the high-profile investigations
that we have in the United States are begun because of a lead
that was generated abroad, and those are very important. And
the FBI has made a huge amount of progress conducting those
sorts of investigations. We work with them very closely, and we
now, I am happy to say, have an excellent partnership with the
FBI for those sorts of investigations.
We have a problem, however, when you deal with a homegrown
threat, which has no international connectivity or limited
international connectivity for which your massive national
technical collection abroad is unlikely to give you a predicate
to begin an investigation. Then the question is: How do we find
out about it in the first place? And there the answer is far
more likely to be found in the structure of law enforcement-
driven, local, highly tactical intelligence programs of the
sort we conduct.
Second, on information sharing. The Federal Government has
a plan or a vision for how information sharing is supposed to
work between Washington and State and local agencies, such as
my own. We are not sure what it is. There is a lot of different
information sharing going on. Occasionally it is useful. Mostly
it is not. The one that is consistently useful is the sharing
of classified information done in the context of the JTTF. That
works reasonably well for what it is. We have several hundred
personnel with top secret security clearances, so we are able
to handle that. Not all agencies are.
The important thing I would say here is the Federal
Government cannot try to control this. If they try to tightly
control it, if they have one single pipeline to the State and
local issues, it is sure to fail. And so I hope they do not go
down that road.
On the watchlist, a couple questions on this one. I believe
we have an integrated terrorist watchlist in this country. The
question is how well do we screen against it and when do we
screen against it. When we book somebody at NYPD, they are
always checked against the terrorist watchlist because we do a
national criminal records check, and that is linked up with the
TSC watchlist and that is good. There are many other areas,
though, where we could be screening where we are not. When you
get on an airplane to fly from New York to Washington, DC, you
are not screened electronically against a watchlist. Secretary
Chertoff and others here in Washington need to be working on
that.
Critical infrastructure protection. I have a lot to say on
it. I spend a lot of my time on this now that I am in New York.
For us, it is very tactical. It is about super-high-value
targets, and we catalogue them. We have studied them. I have a
list of what we deem to be the 30 or so most dangerous targets
in New York City. We guard it carefully, and we work on them to
try to reduce it.
What we do will depend on the case. In some cases, we might
close a street. We might put up a vehicle screening center. We
might put bollards in. We might work with the real estate
developer or the owner to enforce better standards in their
design for blast resistance.
On this I would say we are pretty much on our own. We do
not get a lot of help from Washington. If Washington wanted to
do something, it could set a standard for building codes that
would include blast resistance and performance standards. There
is no such thing. And it would get a policy on terrorism risk
insurance. Right now commercial policies do not insure against
terrorism risk and, hence, the private sector has no financial
incentive to take really prudent measures against it. They are
assuming that the Congress will insure them, that if there is
an attack, they will just buy them out. So there is no
terrorism risk insurance anymore. And if you wanted to do
something, that would make a difference.
The five last items, and then I will stop. Chemical
security, you know my views on this. I hope something gets done
in this Congress and to the President's desk. That would be
great. As a legislative handicapper, I would have to say the
odds are long. It is late in the season to be doing this. But
if it happens, great; otherwise, it is to the 110th Congress.
We will be disappointed, but we have been disappointed before
on that.
I would, however, want to state something on ANFO, ammonium
nitrate and fuel oil. This is the most common explosive. It was
the one that was used in Oklahoma City to take down the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal building. It was procured legally and easily
by those two bombers, and since then we have done nothing--
nothing--federally to improve the security of ammonium nitrate
fertilizer.
When you combine it with fuel oil and it is sold
precombined, it is governed by Title 18 criminal codes.
Separately--they can be easily combined. Separately, they are
not governed by anything. We conducted a test, a special
project to go to upstate New York and other areas to buy fuel
oil and ammonium nitrate fertilizer to build a bomb. We did it
with no difficulty whatsoever. We got companies, in fact, to
deliver supplies and materials to Brooklyn, tripping no wires.
And we built it in a warehouse in the Bronx. All right. Case in
point. So do not exclude ammonium nitrate from your chemical
security legislation.
On mass transit, in a very real way mass transit security
is New York's security. A couple statistics. In 10 weeks, more
people ride the New York City subway than ride all airplanes in
the entire country all year. One-third of all mass transit
rides in the country are on the New York City mass transit
system. If you look just at subways, 65 percent of all subway
rides in this country are in New York City. The terrorists are
attacking the subway system worldwide. We think that means they
are likely to come at ours, which is hugely vulnerable. The
Federal Government has spent $9 for every air passenger in the
country and 0.6 cents on every mass transit passenger in the
country. There is something wrong with this, so if government
were to be able to do a little bit there, it would help.
We have 2,700 mass transit cops who never come aboveground
during their duty. They stay underground, and that is their
whole job, and they do it on their own with no Federal
assistance to secure that.
Ports. I think on the port security, I think this town is
focused on the wrong part of port security. It has been on the
container security problem. The real problem, in my judgment,
is what al-Qaeda has done before when they attacked the Cole,
which is a small, explosive-laden boat brought up against a
passenger ferry or a critical infrastructure facility, and it
is security on the water. And there, again, we are doing it
more or less on our own. The Coast Guard helps out a little
bit. They are great partners, but they are really not in New
York harbor. It is mostly done by New Jersey State Police and
NYPD Harbor Patrol.
The last thing I will say on grants. We have big problems
with how the Federal Government has done grants. That is well
known. I would say six things.
First, the overall level of grants from the Federal
Government to the State and local agencies right now nationwide
is indefensibly low. The President proposed in February 2002
$3.5 billion. The level now, depending on what comes out of the
conference report, is going to be about $1.6, $1.7 billion for
the whole country for the whole year in 2007. That is nearly a
$2 billion reduction. That is too low, particularly when we are
spending $10 billion per month in Iraq. It just makes no sense.
Second, we believe 100 percent of the Federal money should
be risk-based, just like the 9/11 Commission, which in its
review of the implementation of its recommendations gave the
Congress an F on that matter. That is their opinion.
Third, of the State grants, we think those need to be
distributed by the governors on the basis of risk, not spread
around to all the outlying areas as they wish. DHS, when it
distributes money based on risk, needs to get a comprehensive
and coherent way of doing it. We don't think they have one now.
Finally, I would say DHS needs to permit the charging of
operational expenses that are dedicated to counterterrorism and
intelligence activities, separate and distinct units, to the
grants. They do not currently allow that. If you want to buy
equipment, that is great. If you want to conduct an exercise,
that is great. If you want to do a study with Booz Allen or
SAIC, that is great. But if you want to pay for an intelligence
operative who is working in a high-threat area, in a very
dangerous area with a lot of Muslim extremism, no, you cannot
charge that.
The last thing, I sincerely hope that the Congress does not
condition the disbursement of Federal grants on city
confidentiality policies with respect to immigration. This is a
very divisive issue in this country, immigration, and there is
an idea in the House markup that you should not give any money
to any city that prohibits its employees from talking to ICE
about a person's immigration status. New York City happens to
prohibit that in some cases. If the House bill became law, by
definition we would get no money, and this would be a bad idea.
It does not make any sense to hold the city hostage to the
country's ongoing dispute about immigration. Thank you for your
time.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Simon.
TESTIMONY OF STEVEN N. SIMON,\1\ HASIB J. SABBAGH SENIOR FELLOW
FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Simon. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am grateful for the
opportunity to address the Committee on this vital topic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Simon appears in the Appendix on
page 106.
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My understanding of the Committee's objectives in holding
this hearing is that witnesses should focus on the future and
address themselves to issues that might help both Congress and
the Executive Branch set homeland security priorities. The
Committee, it seems to me, is doing the right thing.
I have some very personal reflections on this issue that
are fairly broad-brush that I would like to share with you. I
am going to concentrate on three issues in particular.
First, the importance of cities as terrorist havens and
terrorist targets. There has been a lot of talk about that in
these statements, and the talk is well placed. Second, I am
going to address myself to the continuing significance to many
jihadists of weapons of mass destruction. And, third, to the
need to preserve the good will and sense of belonging of
America's Muslim communities as a matter of national security
beyond the intrinsic virtues of a cohesive, considerate society
in which citizens of all creeds can feel at home.
On urban warfare, the crucial point is that the jihad that
has evolved since September 11, 2001, has become a war of
cities. The transition from caves to condos, as one observer
described the evolution, has been impressive. The relatively
remote, rural bases that incubated the jihad had strong
advantages, especially given the importance of social networks
to the jihad, but municipalities have their own attractions, as
other witnesses have indicated. They offer anonymity, but also
community, both of which can confer a kind of cover.
Urban neighborhoods, with their numberless apartments,
coffee houses, mosques, and Islamic centers, provide the
setting for recruitment, clandestine meetings, preparation of
weapons, and other activities that form the terrorist
enterprise. They are not subject to Hellfire missile strikes or
submarine-launched cruise missiles or things like that. Those
tools will not work against this kind of presence. Think of
Mohamed Atta's Hamburg or the Leeds of Muhammad Siddique Khan,
who was the orchestrator of the July 7, 2005 bombings.
Qualities that favor the jihadists' defensive requirements
do not tell the whole story. However, the other side is that
cities are where their targets--both symbolic and of flesh-and-
blood--are to be found in abundance and proximity.
New York, as my colleague here has indicated, has shown
itself to be a crucial target for jihadists. This great city
was construed by al-Qaeda to be the beating heart of America's
economy, which bin Laden believed he could cripple; the symbol
of American arrogance as embodied by the ``looming towers'' of
the World Trade Center; and the seat, of course, of Jewish
power, which jihadists believe accounts for the global
subordination of Muslim interests to America and Israel. It is
also a teeming city, whose large and densely packed population
promised the most efficient path to a successful mass attack
that, from a jihadist standpoint, might even begin to settle
the score with the United States. There is no reason to think
that this conviction has weakened. Furthermore, New York City
proffers the same advantages to the attacker as do all large
cities.
The array of targeting opportunities, I might add, in New
York, as well as in other large cities in the United States,
particularly Los Angeles, as Sheriff Baca has indicated, is
quite wide. We can be perversely certain that an attack, when
it comes, will be the one we least expected, but one can make
some preliminary judgments. Mass transportation, as has been
indicated, symbols of authority, financial districts, and, we
should bear in mind, schools as well, given the importance in
jihadi propaganda to the depredations that the United States
has carried out against Muslim children, either directly or
through Israeli allies.
Improvised explosive devices like car bombs--the icon of
urban violence in Iraq and elsewhere--we can expect, as well as
Palestinian-style backpack bombs.
Now, the implication of this analysis, I hasten to add, is
that community policing and extensive video surveillance will
need to be stepped up. In this kind of urban warfare,
intelligence is acquired best by those who are most familiar
with the terrain: Police officers walking their beat. On the
front line, they get to know their neighborhoods, the residents
and the shopkeepers, form and cultivate relationships with
local citizens, and develop a sense of the natural order of
things and, therefore, of signs that something is out of the
ordinary or warrants investigation. The pivotal role of local
law enforcement is reinforced by the incapacity at this time of
Federal authorities to gather information skillfully,
discreetly, effectively, and without alienating potential
sources of intelligence. The FBI, in particular, presently
lacks the numbers, skills, knowledge base, and orientation to
contribute.
This does not mean, as my colleagues here have said, that
local law enforcement can or should operate in a vacuum,
especially in light of connections that have been disclosed
between the self-starter groups in the United Kingdom and al-
Qaeda figures in Pakistan. On the contrary, local police need
an umbilical connection to national intelligence agencies in
order to connect the dots they are collecting on the ground. It
is worth noting, by the way, that the success of the U.K.
counterterrorism effort in Northern Ireland was largely due to
the tight linkages between the local police, national police,
and Britain's domestic intelligence agency that were forged
early in the conflict.
Information sharing, which all parties now claim to be
essential, has not advanced significantly, and to illustrate
this point, I will just note that, at most, less than 1 percent
of the detectives or police officers in the United States have
security clearances that enable them to receive relevant and
operational kinds of information from Federal agencies. This is
a circle that clearly needs to widen.
The other issue we need to focus on is where the police
officers who will be collecting these dots I referred to are
going to come from. In the upcoming Federal budget cycle, the
COPS program is again under pressure to be cut. This program
has put more than 100,000 policemen on the street. It is an
invaluable program for American counterterrorist interests at
home.
Very briefly, I wanted to highlight the continuing
importance to jihadists of weapons of mass destruction. On the
basis of 10 years of dealing with their documents and
intelligence about them and so forth, I can guarantee to you
that they are very interested still in acquiring, deploying,
and using weapons of mass destruction. This puts a premium on
consequence management. That is the only aspect of this problem
I will highlight. It will be essential in the wake of an
attack, and it will be very difficult to prevent a successful
attack--that is to say, it will be very difficult to prevent a
well-planned attack. We must be able to respond at the Federal,
State, and local levels in lockstep and with the appearance and
reality of deep, deep competence. This will be essential to
preserving the fabric of our society in the wake of an attack
and deterring further attacks.
In operational terms, what I recommend is that there be a
single Federal enforceable standard for State and local
capacities for consequence management. Right now in the United
States, we are all over the place. The Federal Government needs
to establish a standard, establish milestones and benchmarks.
This is not just a matter of appropriating funds, but ensuring
that cities meet a given standard.
Finally, the September 11 disaster showed that skilled and
self-possessed and highly determined attackers could do
tremendous damage to the homeland without an infrastructure.
But that is not the only way things work. It is not the
adversary's sole option. Other approaches do require
infrastructure, in the shape of cells that may or may not be
linked to outside networks.
We have a potential problem in the United States with our
Muslim citizens. According to recent research, they are
increasingly choosing not to assimilate into American society.
They have been under huge pressure since September 11. This is
having its effect. They are finding solace instead in their
religious identity. Muslim student associations on college
campuses are growing rapidly as havens for Muslims who prefer
not to socialize with non-Muslims, and Muslims are building
Islamic schools as alternatives to the public school system,
which is perceived as inhospitable. They are trying to thwart
media bias by developing their own radio stations and so forth.
These are telltale signs of a growing problem, and the
evolving attitudes of non-Muslim Americans toward their Muslim
compatriots are also likely to spur alienation. According to a
2006 Gallup poll, a third of Americans admire ``nothing'' about
the Muslim world, and nearly half of all Americans believe the
U.S. Government should restrict the civil liberties of Muslim
Americans. This is increasing the pressure on our Muslim
citizens.
Now, of course, they have shown no sign of violent protest.
We really should be sure to keep it that way.
Now, I have put this issue before the Committee for lack of
a better place. The challenge outlined here requires leadership
and a program, yet given the way our government is structured,
there is no obvious lead agency or Special Assistant to the
President on the National Security Council or Homeland Security
Council to formulate a program to provide such leadership.
We are not the first to face this conundrum. Several years
ago, in the wake of a Whitehall study showing upwards of 10,000
al-Qaeda supporters in Great Britain, Her Majesty's government
tasked the Security Service--MI5--both to dismantle jihadist
networks and devise a plan to win the hearts and minds of
Britain's Muslim minority. Ultimately, the Security Service
balked at the difficult job for which they had no experience or
clear jurisdiction. We need to do better. Fortunately, unlike
our sister democracies across the Atlantic, we have time, and I
urge you not to squander it.
Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Prieto.
TESTIMONY OF DANIEL B. PRIETO,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER, REFORM INSTITUTE
Mr. Prieto. Thank you very much, Chairman Collins and
distinguished Members of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Prieto appears in the Appendix on
page 113.
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My name is Daniel Prieto. I am Director of the Homeland
Security Center at the Reform Institute. I want to thank you
for inviting me to testify before you today on the topic of
``Homeland Security: The Next 5 Years.''
At the 5-year anniversary of September 11, the question is
unavoidable: Is it safe? Dustin Hoffman's answer to that
question in the 1976 movie ``The Marathon Man'' was
alternately, ``Yes,'' ``No,'' and ``It depends.'' The same is
true when it comes to homeland security. For every area of
progress, significant gaps and vulnerabilities remain.
In many ways we are safer. Members of the Committee and the
previous speakers have outlined many areas where we have made
progress. But in many ways we are not safer. Five years from
now, there are five areas where we need to make significant
progress.
One, we have not fully engaged our citizens and captains of
industry to protect America.
Two, we lack a national consensus on priorities, and our
supposed strategies are not strategic enough. As a result, it
seems that we are perennially reacting to the latest threat.
Three, DHS struggles to meet the expectations that
accompanied its creation. Management is key.
Four, as the Nation that invented Silicon Valley, the
Internet, and companies like Microsoft and Google, we are the
technology envy of the world, but the government cannot seem to
get it right when it comes to important homeland security
technology projects.
And, five, information sharing is very much a work in
progress, and, in particular, on controversial data-mining
programs, we are forcing the trade-off of liberty for security
in an unnecessarily zero-sum game.
To start out on the first point, we need to engage society
better, both citizens and the private sector. The inaugural
National Strategy for Homeland Security argued that ``the
Administration's approach to homeland security is based on the
principles of shared responsibility and partnership with the
Congress, State and local governments, the private sector, and
the American people.'' While that sentiment was and is correct,
we have failed to execute on it. We have done too little to
engage and educate the public. Too many policymakers tend to
view the general public not as a source of strength, but as
either victims or prone to panic. Too many officials fear that
too much information provided to the public will either
frighten them or aid our enemies.
This discussion should end. The more informed and self-
reliant we are when the next attack or disaster strikes, the
better off we will be. The United States will win the war on
terrorism not by force of arms alone, but by the resolve and
resiliency of its citizens.
Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation puts it best in his
new book, Unconquerable Nation: ``We need to aggressively
educate the public through all media, in the classrooms, at
town halls, in civic meetings, through professional
organizations, and in volunteer groups. . . . The basic course
should include how to deal with the spectrum of threats we
face, from `dirty bombs' to natural epidemics, with the
emphasis on sound, easy-to-understand science aimed at
dispelling mythology and inoculating the community against
alarming rumors and panic.''
In addition to educating the public, we need to get to a
point where public-private partnership for homeland security is
more reality than rhetoric. Five years after September 11, the
capabilities, assets, and good will of the private sector to
bolster our homeland security remain largely untapped.
Second, homeland security needs to move from tactics toward
doctrine, especially when it comes to preparedness and on
critical infrastructure. While many security strategy documents
have been produced since 2001, most of them are largely
documents about tactics, methods, and processes. As such, they
fail to articulate the strategy and doctrine which can guide
implementation and provide goals with which programs can be
measured. This is particularly true, as I mentioned before, in
the areas of preparedness and critical infrastructure.
On preparedness, we need to create a homeland security
doctrine that takes a lesson from U.S. military doctrine. If
our armed forces through much of the last 50 years had to be
ready to fight two simultaneous wars in different theaters,
then DHS, the National Guard, NORTHCOM, and State, local, and
other Federal authorities should be prepared to confront two to
three simultaneous large-scale homeland security events of the
kind envisioned by the 15 DHS National Planning Scenarios.
In support of such doctrine, I see the creation of National
Guard Special Forces providing specialized and regionally based
training against the 15 DHS National Planning Scenarios for the
National Guard. Additionally, it would make sense for NORTHCOM
to have their own dedicated resources. They are currently only
allocated 1,000 permanent personnel and $70 million on a total
DOD budget of $400 billion and 1.4 million active-duty
personnel.
On critical infrastructure, we need a strategy that finally
makes tough choices about priorities. We have fallen into a
certain political correctness about critical infrastructure as
if all sectors--computers versus cows versus chemicals--pose
equal risks. They do not. Some sectors are more important than
others. In my view, this Committee is doing a very good job
looking at those priorities because, in my view, the priorities
are chemical facilities, transportation with an increased focus
on mass transit and hazmat transport in addition to airplanes,
and energy, including oil, gas, and the electric grid.
As a number of the other speakers have mentioned as well,
it is obviously extremely important to focus on regional
concentrations of critical infrastructure as well.
Bills in Congress are rightly seeking to give DHS authority
over chemical security. At the same time, authorities should
not stop there. Congress needs to give DHS clear authority over
security activities at any infrastructure sites that threaten
large-scale casualties or are critical to the functioning of
the U.S. economy regardless of sector. For example, DHS should
have authority to regulate critical energy infrastructure sites
in order to mitigate known vulnerabilities in the electric
grid.
DHS also needs to display better leadership on critical
infrastructure. First, DHS assumed that the market would
provide sufficient incentives for companies to adequately
protect critical infrastructure. That has not happened. Now DHS
has sharply curtailed protective efforts and is now acting
largely as a coordinator for the efforts of other agencies.
This is a mistake.
Third, security investments can help the overall health of
America's decaying infrastructure. The American Society of
Civil Engineers recently graded American infrastructure with
the grade of D. We need to do better. Security investments can
make infrastructure healthier, and we need to use all of the
policy tools at our disposal. I have argued repeatedly for the
use of greater tax incentives to increase investment in
critical infrastructure where the private sector is not doing
enough.
Third, we need DHS to be a respected and successful
organization, and to do that, we need to dramatically
strengthen DHS management.
The birth of DHS has not been easy. For its successes, it
has suffered significant failures and missteps, which in my
view have seriously damaged its credibility. Hurricane Katrina
was its lowest moment, but it has been beset by a number of
public missteps on a host of other topics. Due to
ineffectiveness or immaturity, DHS has increasingly diminished,
spun off, or shed responsibilities in such areas as
intelligence and information fusion, critical infrastructure
protection, and post-disaster housing and health. In the most
recent Federal personnel survey, DHS employees ranked their
organization at or near the bottom of nearly every measure of
effectiveness. Other Departments--Justice, State, the
Department of Defense--too often do not view DHS as a peer
organization.
DHS is falling behind, and the window of opportunity to get
things right may be closing. DHS risks becoming what I call
``the DMV of the Federal Government''--widely viewed as
inefficient and ineffective. If DHS fails to create synergies
among the many entities it inherited and to mature into a more
effective organization, we will be worse off as a country.
I present these facts about DHS not as an indictment. Many
of the problems were to be expected in a merger integration
exercise as large and complex as this. My point in raising them
is to urge this Committee to do all it can to shepherd the
maturation of DHS. It may be necessary to read between the
lines when senior DHS officials state that they have all the
resources and capabilities they need--rosy scenarios which may
be born of political expediency or pride. To the extent that
DHS's shortcomings stem from under-resourced or structurally
weak management, it is essential to not just punish or withhold
money, but to address the root of the problem by helping
strengthen management capability and accountability for the
long term.
To improve DHS management, key CxO level positions must be
given greater power and more resources. The Chief Financial
Officer, the Chief Information Officer, and the Chief
Procurement Officer continue to lack effective department-wide
purview and authority. Some changes implemented by Secretary
Chertoff have helped, in particular, the creation of a Policy
Office and an Office of Strategic Plans, as well as increasing
the power of the Deputy Secretary. But an organizational chart
that has 22 separate divisions reporting directly to the Deputy
Secretary while failing to fully leverage the CxO positions
does not make sense. Management control and integration of DHS,
in my view, remain far too weak.
Fourth, get technology right. America, as I said, is the
envy of the world when it comes to technology, but too many
homeland security projects since September 11 have stumbled,
from the FBI's virtual case file management to DHS's Homeland
Security Information Network to border security systems.
To keep the country safe, we need to make serious and
sustained efforts to improve how the government deals with
technology.
Fifth, and then I will close, we need to develop rules for
the use of consumer and company data for counterterrorism. In
May 2006, it was revealed that the NSA was augmenting domestic
surveillance with large-scale data analysis of consumer
telephone toll records. That revelation was only the latest
instance of government efforts to use data-mining and other
data analysis techniques in the war on terror. There is an
ongoing controversy over the government's use of private sector
and consumer data for counterterrorism purposes. Many of these
programs have raised little controversy. Other ones--DOD's TIA
and TSA's Secure Flight--have raised concerns and public outcry
and were shut down by Congress.
The growth in data analysis efforts marks the recognition
of a simple truth: Our spies are not well suited to address the
jihadist terrorist threat. At the same time, government
programs that analyze commercial data are imperfect and risk
wrongful entrapment of innocent citizens along with legitimate
terrorists. That risk is magnified by the fact that the laws
governing these programs are unclear.
We need to move beyond an environment where it seems
different Executive Branch agencies are simply experimenting
with large-scale data analysis techniques to see what works and
what they can get away with. In the next 5 years, we need to
move past experimentation and develop comprehensive
legislation, guidelines, and rules to govern the growing use of
consumer and company data in the fight against terrorism.
Within the next 5 years, Balkanized rules for the
government's use of company and consumer data need to be
addressed. Any attempt to harmonize those rules should focus on
the full life cycle of data: Procurement, receipt, storage,
use, ability to combine with other data, sharing within the
government and outside of the government, encryption,
anonymization, dispute, and redress.
Clear and consistent rules to govern this activity are
needed so that Americans do not feel that the only relationship
between civil liberties and security is a zero-sum game.
In conclusion, Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft, has
said that we always overestimate the change that will occur in
5 years and underestimate the change that will occur in 10
years. While we have made progress on homeland security in the
first 5 years, many of us are frustrated by the pace of change.
In the next 5 years, we have the opportunity and the duty to
make America safer and more secure. Five years from now, I hope
that we have exceeded our own lofty expectations.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
I want to thank all of you for excellent testimony.
Unfortunately, we have a vote underway that started at 12:10,
so I am just going to ask one question and then submit our
additional questions to the record. But our having to
abbreviate the hearing in no way diminishes our gratitude to
each of you for coming here today and sharing your expertise.
Sheriff Baca, my question is for you. I mentioned in my
opening statement my concern about homegrown terrorists. If we
increase border security but do not deal with the increasing
efforts to radicalize Muslim citizens of our country, we are
going to face a very serious threat.
You have mentioned an initiative that you have undertaken
which seems to me to put you far ahead of the Federal
Government in coming up with a strategy to engage leaders of
the Muslim community, and I commend you for that. And I am very
pleased to learn that you are sharing your efforts with other
cities, such as Detroit. I think that is terrific.
One area of particular concern to me is the conversion and
then in some cases radicalization of prison inmates, and we are
holding a hearing on that issue next week. Could you share with
us any thoughts you have on strategies to be used to try to
prevent the radicalization of prison inmates? And do you have
anything underway in that regard specifically focusing on
prisons?
Mr. Baca. Currently the California Department of
Corrections is aware of an incident that occurred in the city
of Torrance, which is in Los Angeles County, where inmates from
the State prison system became radicalized. One, upon release,
expanded that radicalization to some local community people who
were not from Muslim nations, but one in particular, however,
was a Pakistani national who came here and became an American.
At that point, they engaged in bank robberies and were
looking to fund themselves to attempt some attacks on targets
that they had identified within the county. Fortunately, we
intercepted them in the commission of the crimes, and then
through search warrants, we were able to find out the in-depth
nature of their plan.
Thus, what we have done in California is to alert ourselves
because the county jail system that I also manage feeds 40
percent of the State prisoners into the State system. So we
have intelligence officers in our local jails as well as in the
State jails, working closely with ``those inmates who have
leanings toward radical thinking.''
Chairman Collins. I think there is so much we can learn
from the L.A. experience, the New York experience, and from our
two other expert witnesses. In many ways, our larger cities are
ahead of us at the Federal level in identifying these threats
and coming up with successful strategies. And that is why it
disturbs me, Sheriff, to hear, because you and I have talked
about this before, that DHS is still not tapping into the
expertise as much as it should when it develops its own
policies and procedures, and that is something we are going to
need to push the Department on. I think that is so important.
And I know you stand ready to help.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you. I am going to follow you. It
would be very interesting to me to get your observations about
what the Federal Government is or is not doing in terms of this
radicalization of the Muslim population in the United States of
America.
Dr. Falkenrath, you have mentioned that you see it in New
York City. Mr. Simon, you have said that you see it. And the
issue is: What role should the Federal Government play? Who
should be playing it? And then what models are available around
the country to try to bring the communities together so that we
have something that we can try to replicate in other places?
Mr. Baca. If I may, Senator Voinovich, I was very pleased
when you made your very strong and appropriate comments about
your thoughts concerning what Muslim Americans and the
radicalization issues are in the world and, of course, here.
Homegrown terrorists are something that we concern ourselves
with.
After the bombings in London last year, I came back from
visiting with the Commissioner of Police and understood clearly
that we would have to do something more than what we are doing
now. So I got a hold of the Muslim American leaders in Los
Angeles County, Shura Council President, which is the president
of all the mosques, all mosques are nonprofits, got a hold of
religious leaders. And at the time there was a fatwa that had
occurred earlier, a few months earlier, from Canada and the
United States of religious leaders that were Muslims, as well
as scholars, who said that the Islamic belief and the Koran
does not authorize and sanction suicide bombers, criminal
terrorists, and the like.
We have formed, therefore, the nucleus for what is a formal
nonprofit called the Muslim American Homeland Security
Congress, and on the executive board are students from our
local universities, women, leaders of mosques, scholars, and
people who are active business people in the Muslim community.
And I would say that, in deference to my friend to the left of
me, I don't think that American Muslims are uninterested in
participating with all of us in protecting our Nation. I think
they have not organized themselves yet, and this Muslim
American Homeland Security Congress is the first step through
that organization. We will go to Detroit, as I mentioned. We
will go to New York. We will go to Chicago. And we will go
anywhere in the United States to further the regionalization of
this national effort. The principal goals are to educate Muslim
families as to what are the trends of radicalization within the
home itself. In the London experience, many of those that were
captured, their families were actually in some form of denial,
in some form of disbelief that their children were not really a
part of these terrorist attacks, when, in fact, they were. So
the self within the family, the educational process within the
family is a very high priority of this Congress, and also its
mission is to work closely with law enforcement, to work
closely with local government leaders, and to not have their
schools--and we have three Muslim American schools in Los
Angeles County--be viewed as separatist efforts, which they are
not. We have Armenian schools. We have French schools. We have
various ethnic schools. And they are not viewed in the same
fashion.
I can say, finally, that all of us, myself in particular,
since Los Angeles County--and I do want to say Los Angeles
County has 10 million people. It is the largest county in the
United States, and we claim to be, like New York, the most
diverse part of the United States. But we are just going to
stay at a tie. And I have traveled to Jordan and met with King
Abdullah. I have traveled to Pakistan and met with President
Musharraf. I have traveled and met with the leaders of the
justice system in Turkey, and I have seen what they have done
in response to the bombing attacks that they have experienced.
All three of these are Muslim nations.
What you are suggesting, I am following, and I commend you
for your vision on this issue because I have heard how
passionately you feel. American Muslims are patriotic to
America, and that is why they are here. The radicals that are
roaming about who are going to seize the moment and think they
can ride themselves up on the secrecy of some kind of a cover
is what we have to go after. Those are the needles in the
haystack, as far as I am concerned, and that should be one of
the top priorities of the Department of Homeland Security.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you so much for your testimony
today. It was very valuable to us, and I very much appreciate
your time.
The hearing record will remain open for 15 days for the
submission of additional questions. All those great questions
that we unfortunately do not get an opportunity to ask you
today we will submit for the record.
Thank you again for sharing your expertise and for your
commitment to this issue. This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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