[Senate Hearing 109-827]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-827, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2766
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
----------
MARCH 7, 29, APRIL 4, 6, 2006
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007--Part 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
S. Hrg. 109-827, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2766
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
__________
MARCH 7, 29, APRIL 4, 6, 2006
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Charles S. Abell, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma BILL NELSON, Florida
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN CORNYN, Texas E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Nuclear Weapons and Defense Environmental Cleanup Activities of the
Department of Energy in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for
Fiscal Year 2007 and the Future Years Nuclear Security Program
march 7, 2006
Page
Brooks, Ambassador Linton F., Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy...................... 4
Rispoli, James A., Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, U.S. Department of Energy.......................... 25
Global Strike Plans and Programs
march 29, 2006
Flory, Hon. Peter C.W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy.................................. 83
Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command........................................................ 93
Young, RADM Charles B., USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs 102
Gorenc, Maj. Gen. Stanley, USAF, Director, Operational Capability
Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space
Operations, Headquarters....................................... 105
Missile Defense Programs
april 4, 2006
Flory, Hon. Peter C.W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy.................................. 139
Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III, USAF, Director, Missile Defense
Agency......................................................... 145
Dodgen, LTG Larry J., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and Missile
Defense Command, U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command............ 158
Duma, David W., Acting Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
Department of Defense.......................................... 166
Military Space Programs
april 6, 2006
Sega, Hon. Ronald M., Under Secretary of the Air Force........... 211
Chilton, Lt. Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Joint Functional Component
Commander for Space and Global Strike, U.S. Strategic Command.. 224
Hamel, Lt. Gen. Michael A., USAF, Commander, Space and Missile
Systems Center, Air Force Space Command........................ 230
Chaplain, Cristina T., Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management Team, Government Accountability Office.............. 235
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2007 AND THE FUTURE YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:47 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Senator Jeff Sessions (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Graham, and
Bill Nelson.
Majority staff members present: Robert M. Soofer,
professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel;
and Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Micah H. Harris and Jill L.
Simodejka.
Committee members' assistants present: Meredith Beck and
Matthew R. Rimkunas, assistants to Senator Graham; Stuart C.
Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and William K. Sutey,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Sessions. The subcommittee will come to order.
Senator Nelson has some conflicts in schedule and I know he is
trying to get here, but I think it would be best for us to go
ahead and get started and he can join us when he can. He is
interested in being here. He is the ranking Democratic member
of the committee.
The Subcommittee on Strategic Forces meets this afternoon
to receive testimony on the President's request for fiscal year
2007 for the Department of Energy (DOE) activities under the
jurisdiction of this subcommittee. I'm pleased to welcome our
witnesses today, Linton F. Brooks, Administrator of National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Under Secretary of
Energy. Mr. Brooks, good to have you here, and James A.
Rispoli, Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
Management (EM). We are glad to have you. I thank you for your
service to our country and for taking the time and effort to
join us today.
We will begin this hearing in open session. Should it
become necessary to discuss any classified nuclear weapons or
other security matters, this hearing will move to Russell Room
222 for a closed session at an appropriate time. The
subcommittee will address as many matters as possible here in
this open setting.
The Subcommittee on Strategic Forces has jurisdiction over
approximately 60 percent of the entire DOE budget, which is
remarkable, amounting to $14.1 billion in the fiscal year 2007
budget request. Today we will receive testimony on the largest
programs which comprise the DOE activities as they have been
associated with the Department of Defense (DOD).
Specifically, we will examine the nuclear weapons
activities of the NNSA and the Defense EM program. Within the
context of the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for
these programs, we will examine the current state of health of
these programs as well as some notable challenges and apparent
impediments to success.
A critical task for this subcommittee is to exercise its
oversight functions with respect to U.S. nuclear forces.
Nuclear weapons are the most formidable weapons in our arsenal
and under the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) just released,
nuclear weapons continue to play the central role in our
posture. We must be confident, therefore, that we are investing
the taxpayers' dollars in a nuclear weapons program that will
deliver the results expected.
Administrator Brooks, the subcommittee is interested in
hearing your assessment of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
(SSP) which is charged with maintaining the safety, security,
and reliability and effectiveness of our current nuclear
stockpile, as well as the progress towards development of the
responsive infrastructure called for in the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) of 2001.
The subcommittee is also interested in your views on the
potential future transformation of the nuclear weapons
stockpile, including the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), as
well as your reaction to the Secretary of Energy advisory board
report titled ``Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapons Complex
of the Future.''
Mr. Rispoli, the subcommittee is interested in your
perspective as the Assistant Secretary of Energy for EM on the
progress to date and the outlook when tackling their main
challenges in addressing the environmental legacy of the
Department's atomic energy program. You have only been there
since last August, but probably been there just enough to know
what the problems are. We would like to talk about those.
The environmental cleanup program is currently experiencing
some spectacular failures, some of which I have discussed with
the Secretary of Energy during his appearance before the full
Armed Services Committee. We will explore these issues in
greater detail today.
In your invitation to appear, you were also asked to
address as a component of your testimony a number of policies
and issues in the EM program which you were not able to address
during your confirmation last year, but which you had committed
to address upon assuming duties as assistant secretary.
Senator Nelson, it's great to have you. Thank you for your
commitment to our Nation's defense and your expertise that you
bring to this subcommittee and to the full Armed Services
Committee. You're a valued member. So this subcommittee looks
forward to receiving that testimony as part of your written
statement.
During his appearance before the full committee 3 weeks
ago, I asked Secretary Bodman and expressed to him in plain
terms my concerns about the efficiency with which DOE is
carrying out its responsibilities as authorized by this
committee. This country finds itself in a budget environment in
which not a dollar can be wasted. Congress must have confidence
that the funds are prudently expended and that programs are
well managed.
I stated to the Secretary of Energy and I will say the same
today that I am unconvinced that we are getting all we can for
every dollar. While not accepting every aspect of my
characterization of DOE programs, the Secretary in general
agreed that DOE should do better, must do better. He stated
that he considers it his job to find efficiencies and to fix
them. However, it's not a job he can do alone.
I have pledged to the Secretary that through the execution
of this subcommittee's oversight responsibilities, we are going
to help him focus on those efforts and certainly you will be
key persons in helping the Secretary achieve those goals. So
these are some of the issues that we will explore in our
hearing today and let me now recognize my distinguished ranking
member, Senator Nelson of Florida, for any remarks he has.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to
highlight a couple of issues. The first is the RRW. That
program and its relationship to the overall SSP. This
relatively new effort, if successful, should enable maintenance
of a reliable nuclear deterrent without nuclear weapons testing
and with a significantly smaller stockpile of nuclear weapons
than we have currently.
But the RRW program is a challenging program and at the
same time that the Department is getting the RRW program, you
are also continuing to work on the life extension programs for
the legacy nuclear warheads, particularly the W-76 and the W-
80.
In addition, you are working on modernizing and hopefully
consolidating some aspects of the nuclear weapons
infrastructure. That's a significant task in itself. So I'm
concerned, is there too much going on to get accomplished? Last
week, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force talked about putting 6 pounds of work in a 5-
pound bag.
Mr. Ambassador, I think you might be considering trying to
put too much into the same pound bag. If the RRW is to achieve
its goals, the DOD has to be a willing partner and look
seriously at all of the requirements it has developed for you.
Without the direct budgetary responsibility, perhaps DOD is
asking too much and money is being spent on projects that we
will eventually not need. DOD is stretched too far and without
relief from some of what is probably not needed, the RRW may be
then running out of money for what it needs, or you don't have
time if you're working on these other things to get the RRW. So
we want to explore this.
Mr. Secretary, you're the manager of the largest
construction project in the United States. At the moment, there
are significant cost, schedule, and technological issues with
this facility that is needed to treat millions of gallons of
high-level radioactive waste stored in increasingly fragile
underground storage tanks at the Hanford site. How we meet the
commitments to Washington State and other States to complete
the cleanup begun in the early 1990s is of serious concern to
this committee.
I want you to discuss the plans for the EM program and tell
us how to ensure that the cleanup is completed and that the
health and safety of the work force and the community are
protected. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Nelson. You make some
excellent points and I think there is a concern that's been
recognized for sometime, as Senator Nelson said, that perhaps
DOD incorrectly thinking it's really not their money, has asked
for more out of DOE than is necessary.
I think that is perhaps true or has some truth to it.
Likewise, I think that there is a possibility that another
factor is at work, and it goes back to my days as United States
attorney when I worked with probably 8 or 10 different Federal
agencies and you learn how to work together or compete with one
another. When they sign what they call memorandums of
understanding (MOUs) which are very much like treaties between
two sovereign powers, it really causes some difficulties.
I think there is also a danger that since DOE gets the
money they get and any money that they save does not really go
back to DOE programs, that they don't have the same incentive
to cut costs and to manage efficiently as an agency, that they
at least have an opportunity to save some money and use it for
other things they give higher priority to.
So those are some of the things we'll be asking about here,
about how this system is working. This is an awful lot of money
that's involved and I think the taxpayers just want to give
oversight to it. Mr. Ambassador, would you give us your
thoughts.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINTON F. BROOKS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Ambassador Brooks. Thank you, sir. I welcome the
opportunity to discuss our budget request and I appreciate the
committee's past strong support. I have submitted a statement
for the record and I'd like to just summarize a few quick
points.
Before I do that, I'd also like to note for the committee
the presence of the new Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, Tom D'Agostino. Mr. D'Agostino was confirmed by the
Senate 2 weeks ago and sworn in last week, and I'm very
grateful for the committee's very prompt action on him and I
think you will enjoy working with him. He is an outstanding
public servant.
The President's budget supports three main NNSA objectives,
nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons nonproliferation,
and nuclear reactors. My written statement talks about
nonproliferation and reactors. I'd like to speak about where we
are in the weapons program.
First of all, it's very important for the committee to
understand that the stockpile remains safe and reliable. We
base this assessment on experiments, computation, analysis,
laboratory tests of component warheads and systems, and the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy make an annual
certification to this effect.
But as we draw down the stockpile, we have to consider the
long-term implications of successive warhead refurbishments.
Each refurbishment takes us a little further away from the
configuration that we had when we tested, and that raises
concerns not this month, not this year, probably not this
decade, but it raises concerns sooner or later about our
ability to ensure stockpile reliability and safety without
testing.
So to manage that risk, we need to transform the stockpile
and we need to transform the supporting infrastructure. Our
concept for doing so depends, as Senator Nelson and, Mr.
Chairman, you both mentioned, on the RRW. The idea here, as the
committee understands, is to relax the Cold War design
constraints, constraints that were perfectly sensible in the
military situation of 20 years ago, but are not sensible for
the military situation today. Those constraints maximize yield
to weight ratios.
By relaxing them, we can design replacement components that
are easier to manufacture, safer and more secure, eliminate
environmentally dangerous materials which also saves money and
increases design margins. This both ensures long-term
reliability and reduces the chance that any future
administration and any future Congress will be faced with the
question of having to consider testing again.
We have two independent design teams from nuclear weapons
laboratories exploring specific options. In addition to the
benefit that we will get from the RRW, the design itself is
important because it gives us the opportunity to train the next
generation of weapons designers and engineers. Most of those
who actually were involved in the design of nuclear weapons are
nearing the end of their careers.
Both teams are confident in their design. Both teams are
confident that they will meet requirements and their designs
will be certifiable without nuclear testing. We'll get
preliminary designs this month, and then there will be a fairly
intense peer review process. In the fall, we'll select one of
those two designs for further effort.
It is going to be important, however, if we are to get the
benefits of the RRW that we pay great attention to the weapons
complex. Now, it's important to understand the weapons complex
of today is significantly different from the weapons complex
that helped win the Cold War. We've seen dramatic reductions
both in size and funding. In 1990 our weapons complex employed
nearly 60,000 people. Today we have about half that number. The
footprint of our facilities is reduced from 70 million square
feet to 40 million square feet and we closed four facilities as
shown in the chart which I believe you have copies of,
including major Cold War facilities like the Rocky Flats plant
in Colorado and Pinellas plant in Florida.
But the complex still isn't right and I think we have to
implement what the President outlined in his NPR, a modern
responsive infrastructure that can sustain the Nation's nuclear
deterrent while being able to respond to DOD needs quickly and
effectively. I think right now we can respond effectively but
nobody would say that we can respond quickly.
We are carrying out an intensive effort to establish
exactly what that complex should look like. Last summer, we
received the report of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
Task Force, sometimes called the Overskei Report. Our challenge
is to gain the advantages that that report set forth in a way
that's affordable.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the importance of being wise
stewards of the taxpayers' money. The vision set forth in that
report is a compelling vision. It's a very thoughtful job, but
in the near term it's also an expensive process. What we are
looking to do is gain the advantages of that vision without
that expense and we will report to the committee in more detail
on our thinking later this spring.
Let me mention a couple of other challenges that you and we
are faced with in this budget. In the long term, the United
States needs the ability to manufacture plutonium pits, the
triggers for nuclear weapons. Last year, although supported by
the authorizers, Congress declined to appropriate planning
funds for a modern pit facility.
As a result, we are not seeking any funds in this year's
budget. Instead, we are focusing on an interim capability at
Los Alamos. We will work with Congress over the coming years as
part of this overall infrastructure plan to identify an
approach to the long-term pit requirements.
As Senator Nelson mentioned, we have DOD requirements for
life extension programs. Last year, reductions in the life
extension programs of the W-76 increased the risk of meeting
the DOD schedules in 2007. A reduction in the W-80 cruise
missile warhead will in fact delay deployment, and will
increase costs and delay introduction. So this committee has
always been a strong supporter of life extension programs which
provide the most direct support of the DOD and I hope you will
continue to be.
Last year, Congress significantly reduced funds for the
facilities and infrastructure recapitalization program. That's
a program to revitalize the fiscal infrastructure of the
weapons complex and to basically get us out of the hole we got
ourselves into in the '90s by underfunding maintenance.
We have agreed that we would terminate that program in
2011, but the program was reduced last year. I no longer
believe that is possible to meet the 2011 deadline, and we will
seek a 2-year extension. We are, however, committed to the idea
that this is a temporary program to get us well after which it
will be our responsibility to keep ourselves well.
Senator Sessions. This is an existing program?
Ambassador Brooks. A program to work off the backlog in
deferred maintenance. We inherited a fairly substantial
backlog. Our goal is to stabilize that backlog and then reduce
it to within industry standards and then thereafter to maintain
it.
We are, as the Chairman said, conscious of the need to be
wise stewards of the public money. As a result of that,
compared to the projections we gave this committee 2 years ago,
we have reduced our weapons program by about $860 million,
about half of that for deficit reduction, the other half
redirected primarily to nonproliferation.
Our request this year I believe to be balanced and
responsible and if approved by Congress, it will let us
continue transforming the stockpile structure, increase
nonproliferation measures, and enhance Navy force projection. I
hope the committee will support it. Thank you, sir, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brooks follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal
year 2007 budget request for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). This is my fourth appearance before this
committee as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, and I want to
thank all of the Members for their strong support for our important
national security responsibilities.
OVERVIEW
In the sixth year of this administration, with the strong support
of Congress, NNSA has achieved a level of stability that is required
for accomplishing our long-term missions. Our fundamental
responsibilities for the United States include three national security
missions:
assure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile while at the same time transforming that stockpile
and the infrastructure that supports it;
reduce the threat posed by nuclear proliferation; and
provide reliable and safe nuclear reactor propulsion systems
for the U.S. Navy.
The budget request for $9.3 billion, an increase of $211 million,
supports these NNSA missions.
Weapons Activities
The NNSA is committed to ensuring the long-term reliability, safety
and security of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. Stockpile Stewardship
is working; the stockpile remains safe and reliable. This assessment is
based not on nuclear tests, but on cutting-edge scientific and
engineering experiments and analysis, including extensive laboratory
and flight tests of warhead components and subsystems. Each year, we
are gaining a more complete understanding of the complex physical
processes underlying the performance of our aging nuclear stockpile.
However, as we continue to draw down the stockpile to the levels
established in the Treaty of Moscow--between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed
strategic nuclear weapons. We must consider the long-term implications
of successive warhead refurbishments for the weapons remaining in the
stockpile. Successive refurbishments will take us further from the
tested configurations and it is becoming more difficult and costly to
certify warhead remanufacture despite the extraordinary success of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).
If we were starting to build the stockpile from scratch today we
would take a much different approach than we took during the Cold War.
Most of today's warheads were designed to maximize explosive yield with
minimum size and weight so that many warheads could be carried on a
single delivery vehicle. As a result, weapons designers designed closer
to the so-called ``cliffs'' in performance. If we were designing the
stockpile today, we would manage risk differently, trading size and
weight for increased performance margins and ease of manufacture and
maintenance.
Second, the legacy stockpile was not designed for longevity. During
the Cold War we introduced new weapons routinely, turning over most of
the stockpile every 15-20 years. Today, our weapons are aging and now
are being rebuilt in life extension programs that are both difficult
and costly. Rebuilding nuclear weapons will never be cheap, but Cold
War decisions to use certain hazardous materials mean that, in today's
health and safety culture, warheads are much more costly to
remanufacture.
Furthermore, we continue to evolve our deterrent posture from its
Cold War origins to one that requires far fewer weapons. Decisions the
President announced in 2004 will result, by 2012, in the smallest total
stockpile since the Eisenhower administration. Even with these
unprecedented reductions, however, the stockpile--especially the
components we keep in reserve--is probably too large.
Finally, with regard to physical security, we must consider new
technology to ensure these weapons can never be used by those who wish
to harm us. During the Cold War the main security threat to our nuclear
forces was from espionage. Today, that threat remains, but to it has
been added a post-September 11 threat of well-armed and competent
terrorist suicide teams seeking to gain access to a warhead or to
special nuclear materials in order to cause a nuclear detonation in
place. This change has dramatically increased security costs. If we
were designing the stockpile today, we would apply new technologies and
approaches to warhead design as a means to reduce physical security
costs.
Fortunately, we know how to address all of these problems.
The administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), completed in
December 2001, called for a transition from a threat-based nuclear
deterrent with large numbers of deployed and Reserve weapons to a
deterrent based on capabilities, with a smaller nuclear weapons
stockpile and greater reliance on the capability and responsiveness of
the Department of Defense (DOD) and NNSA infrastructure to respond to
threats. Success in realizing this vision for transformation will
enable us to achieve over the long term a smaller stockpile, one that
is safer and more secure, one that offers a reduced likelihood that we
will ever again need to conduct an underground nuclear test, and one
that enables a much more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure.
Most importantly, this effort can go far to ensure a credible deterrent
for the 21st century that will reduce the likelihood we will ever have
to employ our nuclear capabilities in defense of the Nation--through
demonstration of responsiveness in design and production, demonstration
of confidence in our abilities, cleanup of portions of the Cold War
legacy and demonstration of America's will to maintain nuclear
preeminence. We have worked closely with the DOD to identify initial
steps on the path to a responsive nuclear infrastructure.
What do we mean by ``responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure?''
By ``responsive'' we refer to the resilience of the nuclear enterprise
to unanticipated events or emerging threats, and the ability to
anticipate innovations by an adversary and to counter them before our
deterrent is degraded. Unanticipated events could include complete
failure of a deployed warhead type or the need to respond to new and
emerging geopolitical threats. The elements of a responsive
infrastructure include the people, the science and technology base, and
the facilities and equipment to support a right-sized nuclear weapons
enterprise. But more than that, it involves a transformation in
engineering and production practices that will enable us to respond
rapidly and flexibly to emerging needs. Specifically, a responsive
infrastructure must provide capabilities, on appropriate timescales and
in support of DOD requirements, to:
Dismantle warheads;
Ensure warheads are available to augment the operationally
deployed force;
Identify, understand, and fix stockpile problems;
Design, develop, certify, and begin production of refurbished
or replacement warheads;
Maintain capability to design, develop, and begin production
of new or adapted warheads, if required;
Produce required quantities of warheads; and
Sustain underground nuclear test readiness.
As we and the DOD take the first steps down this path, we clearly
recognize that the ``enabler'' for transformation is our concept for
the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The RRW would relax Cold War
design constraints that maximized yield to weight ratios and thereby
allow us to design replacement components that are easier to
manufacture, are safer and more secure, eliminate environmentally
dangerous materials, and increase design margins, thus ensuring long-
term confidence in reliability and a correspondingly reduced chance we
will ever need to resort to nuclear testing.
The combination of the RRW and a responsive infrastructure--each
enabled by the other--may be genuinely transformational. The reduced
stockpile the President approved in 2004 still retains a significant
non-deployed nuclear stockpile as a hedge against technical problems or
geopolitical changes. Once we demonstrate that we can produce warheads
on a timescale in which geopolitical threats could emerge, we would no
longer need to retain extra warheads to hedge against unexpected
geopolitical changes.
In addition to the mission of continuously maintaining the safety,
security, reliability, and operational readiness of the Nation's
nuclear deterrent, establishing the capabilities to achieve and sustain
this transformation is a central focus of our activities.
Transformation will, of course, take time. We are starting now with
improving business and operating practices, both in the Federal
workforce and across the nuclear weapons complex, and through restoring
and modernizing key production capabilities. Full infrastructure
changes, however, will take a couple of decades. I believe by 2030 we
can achieve a responsive infrastructure that will provide capabilities,
if required, to produce weapons with different or modified military
capabilities. As important, through the RRW program we will revitalize
our weapons design community to meet the challenge of being able to
adapt an existing weapon within 18 months and design, develop, and
begin production of a new design within 3-4 years of a decision to
enter engineering development--goals that were established in 2004.
As part of the transformation process we are also actively
reviewing the recommendations of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force to prepare a
comprehensive plan for transforming the nuclear weapons complex. Many
of the recommendations are consistent with initiatives that NNSA was
already considering or is implementing (design of a RRW, consolidation
of Special Nuclear Materials, accelerating dismantlement of retired
weapons, managing the evolving complex to enhance responsiveness and
sustainability, and establishing an Office of Transformation). The
analysis of this report and its recommendations is underway and should
be completed and presented to Congress by this spring.
Transformation presents some significant near term challenges, one
of which is pit production. The NNSA considers an appropriate pit
production capacity to be essential to its long-term evolution to a
more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. We are disappointed,
therefore, that Congress declined to fund planning for a modern pit
production facility in fiscal year 2006. As a result, we did not seek
funding for this facility in fiscal year 2007; although we remain
convinced that increased pit production capacity is essential to our
long-term evolution to a more responsive nuclear weapons
infrastructure. In coming months, we will work with Congress to
identify an agreed approach to fund long-term pit production capacity.
In the meantime, we plan to increase the Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) pit manufacturing capacity to 30-40 pits per year by the end of
fiscal year 2012 in order to support the RRW. This production rate,
however, will be insufficient to meet our assessed long-term pit
production needs.
Another significant near term challenge is ensuring the security of
our people, our nuclear weapons, our weapons-usable materials, our
information, and our infrastructure from harm, theft or compromise. The
job has become more difficult and costly as a result of two factors:
the increased post-September 11 threat to nuclear warheads and
associated fissile materials coupled with the primacy of ``denying
access'' to these key assets--a much more rigorous security standard
than ``containment'' of the asset. We will meet the requirements of the
2003 Design Basis Threat (DBT) by the end of this fiscal year. We
expect to be compliant with the 2005 DBT revisions at the two most
sensitive locations, the Secure Transportation Asset and the Pantex
Weapons Plant by the end of fiscal year 2008 as required by
Departmental policy.
The world in 2030 will not be more predictable than it is today,
but this vision of our future nuclear weapons posture is enabled by
what we have learned from 10 years of experience with science-based
Stockpile Stewardship, from planning for and carrying out life
extension programs for our legacy stockpile, and from coming to grips
with national security needs of the 21st century as laid out in the
NPR. A world of a successful responsive infrastructure isn't the only
plausible future of course. But it is one we should strive for. It
offers the best hope of achieving the President's vision of the
smallest stockpile consistent with our Nation's security. That's why we
are embracing this vision of stockpile and infrastructure
transformation. We should not underestimate the challenge of
transforming the enterprise, but it is clearly the right path for us to
take.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Let me now turn to our nuclear nonproliferation and threat
reduction programs. Acquisition of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) capabilities, technologies, and expertise by rogue
states or terrorists poses a grave threat to the United States and
international security. The pursuit of nuclear weapons by terrorists
and states of concern makes it clear that our threat detection programs
are urgently required, must be successful, and must proceed on an
accelerated basis. The NNSA budget request addresses this urgency and
demonstrates the President's commitment to prevent, contain, and roll
back the proliferation of nuclear weapons-usable materials, technology,
and expertise.
Our programs are structured around a comprehensive and multi-
layered approach to threat reduction and nuclear nonproliferation. We
work with more than 70 countries to secure dangerous nuclear and
radioactive materials, halt the production of fissile material, detect
the illegal trafficking or diversion of nuclear material, and
ultimately dispose of surplus weapons-usable materials. We also work
with multilateral institutions including the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to strengthen
nuclear safeguards and improve the nuclear export control regulatory
infrastructure in other countries. This multi-layered approach is
intended to identify and address potential vulnerabilities within the
international nonproliferation regime, reduce the incentive for
terrorists and rogue states to obtain WMD, and limit terrorists' access
to deadly weapons and materials.
A significant amount of our work falls at the intersection of
nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear materials. The United
States is setting an example by making a firm commitment to reducing
its nuclear arsenal and recycling substantial quantities of weapons-
usable highly enriched uranium for peaceful, civilian, energy-
generating purposes. In 1994, the United States declared 174 tons of
highly enriched uranium (HEU) to be in excess of our national security
needs. The great bulk of that material is now in the process of being
downblended for use in civilian nuclear power reactors. Last year, we
announced that 17.4 metric tons (MT) of this material will be
downblended and set aside to establish a fuel bank in support of our
efforts to develop an international reliable fuel supply mechanism, an
issue I will return to later in my statement.
In addition, in May 2004, President Bush announced plans to reduce
our Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile by nearly half, to its smallest
size since the Eisenhower administration. This decision enables us to
begin to dispose of a significant amount of weapons-grade nuclear
material. Last year, the administration committed to remove an
additional 200 MT of HEU--enough material for approximately 8,000
nuclear warheads--from any further use as fissile material in U.S.
nuclear weapons. This represents the largest amount of special nuclear
material ever removed from the stockpile in the history of the U.S.
nuclear weapons program. The bulk of this material will be retained for
use in propulsion systems for our Nation's nuclear Navy--a step that
will allow us to postpone the need to construct a new uranium high-
enrichment facility for at least 50 years. Twenty MT of this HEU will
be down-blended to LEU for use in civilian nuclear power reactors or
research reactors.
We are also working with the Russian Federation to eliminate 34 MT
of weapons-usable plutonium in each country that will be converted into
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and burned in nuclear power reactors. We believe
we have now resolved the impasse over liability that has long delayed
the plutonium disposition program and the construction of the MOX plant
at our Savannah River Site.
Much of our work focuses on emerging issues such as detecting
clandestine nuclear supply networks, monitoring efforts by more
countries to acquire nuclear weapons, and preventing the spread of
nuclear fuel cycle technology. We have taken a number of steps to shut
down illicit supply networks and keep nuclear materials out of the
hands of terrorists as reflected in U.S. leadership in support of the
Proliferation Security Initiative, Security Council Resolution 1540,
criminalizing proliferation, and in strengthening international export
control regimes.
We have worked to expand our programs designed to stop nuclear
smuggling and nuclear terrorism by cooperatively developing and
employing radiological and nuclear detection equipment at key border
crossings, airports, and major seaports, or ``megaports,'' worldwide.
NNSA also assists and trains customs officials at home and abroad to
detect the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials,
as well as dual-use commodities that might be useful in weapons of mass
destruction programs. We are also expanding our efforts to secure and
transform global inventories of weapons-usable materials. Our programs
include the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to reduce and
secure fissile and radioactive material worldwide; our International
Material Protection and Cooperation (MPC&A) program which has
accelerated efforts to improve the security of weapons usable material
in Russia and elsewhere; and our efforts to complete the conversion of
research reactors throughout the world to the use of low enriched
uranium within the next decade. There are also two complementary
programs that address the repatriation of fresh and spent HEU material
from Russian-supplied research reactors and U.S.-origin material from
research reactors around the world
Cooperation with Russia on nonproliferation is nothing new for the
United States, but this cooperation has been heightened following the
rise of global terrorism and the events of September 11, 2001. The
Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation issued by Presidents
Bush and Putin at their Bratislava meeting last year is but one example
of the significant progress we have made over the last 5 years. This
joint statement has helped expedite our cooperative work with Russia.
For example, as a result of the Bush-Putin Bratislava joint statement,
we were able to make the return of fresh and spent HEU fuel from U.S.
and Russian-design research reactors in third countries a top priority,
as well as a plan for joint work to develop low-enriched uranium fuel
for use in these reactors. As a result, we were able to complete the
conversion of a Russian-supplied research reactor located in the Czech
Republic to low-enriched fuel and to airlift a significant amount of
HEU from the Czech Technical University reactor located near Prague for
safe and secure storage in Russia. We have also made significant
progress on the other Bratislava joint statement items, and we expect
this cooperation and success will continue.
Beyond the threat of nuclear terrorism, illicit networks engaging
in nuclear trade, and additional states seeking nuclear weapons
capability, the nonproliferation community also faces another
significant challenge--revitalizing nuclear energy throughout the globe
in a manner that also advances our nonproliferation interests. We have
the opportunity to reshape our collective approach to ensure that
nonproliferation is the cornerstone of the next evolution of civilian
nuclear power and fuel cycle technology. The challenge before us is to
make sure we design--from the very beginning--technologies and
political arrangements that limit the spread of sensitive fuel cycle
capabilities and ensure that rogue states do not use civilian nuclear
power as cover for a covert nuclear weapons program.
Last month, the administration announced the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership (GNEP) as part of President Bush's Advanced Energy
Initiative. GNEP is a comprehensive strategy to enable an expansion of
nuclear power in the U.S. and around the world, to promote nuclear
nonproliferation goals; and to help resolve nuclear waste disposal
issues. Fundamental to GNEP is a new approach to fuel cycle technology.
Under this proposed new approach, countries with secure, advanced
nuclear fuel cycle capabilities would offer commercially competitive
and reliable access to nuclear fuel services--fresh fuel and recovery
of used fuel--to other countries in exchange for their commitment to
forgo the development of enrichment and recycling technology.
Over the next year, we will work with other elements of the
Department to establish GNEP, paying special attention to developing
advanced safeguards and developing the parameters for international
cooperation. Since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
the world has sought to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
while expanding the benefits of nuclear technology. I believe that GNEP
takes us closer to that goal. By allowing us to move beyond abstract
discussions to tangible actions that will benefit directly those who
join us in this partnership. GNEP will offer us the opportunity to take
the international lead in making nonproliferation an integral part of
our global nuclear safety and security culture.
Naval Reactors
Also contributing to the Department's national security mission is
the Department's Naval Reactors Program, whose mission is to provide
the U.S. Navy with safe, militarily-effective nuclear propulsion plants
and ensure their continued safe, reliable and long-lived operation.
Nuclear propulsion enhances our warship capabilities by providing the
ability to sprint where needed and arrive on station; ready to conduct
sustained combat operations when America's interests are threatened.
Nuclear propulsion plays a vital role in ensuring the Navy's forward
presence and its ability to project power anywhere in the world.
The Naval Reactors Program has a broad mandate, maintaining
responsibility for nuclear propulsion from cradle to grave. Over 40
percent of the Navy's major combatants are nuclear-powered, including
aircraft carriers, attack submarines, and strategic submarines, which
provide the Nation's most survivable deterrent.
FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET REQUEST BY PROGRAM
The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request totals $9.3
billion, an increase of $211 million or 2.3 percent. We are managing
our program activities within a disciplined 5-year budget and planning
envelope. We are doing it successfully enough to be able to address the
administration's high priority initiatives to reduce global nuclear
danger in Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and provide for needed
funding increases in some of our programs within an overall modest
growth rate.
Weapons Activities
The fiscal year 2007 budget request for the programs funded within
the Weapons Activities appropriation is $6.41 billion, less than a 1-
percent increase over fiscal year 2006. This request supports the
requirements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program consistent with the
administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the revised stockpile
plan submitted to Congress in June 2004. Our request places a high
priority on accomplishing the near-term workload and supporting
technologies for the stockpile along with the long-term science and
technology investments to ensure the design and production capability
and capacity to support ongoing missions. This request also supports
the facilities and infrastructure that must be responsive to new or
emerging threats.
Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) is an area of special emphasis this
year with a fiscal year 2007 request of $1.41 billion, a 3-percent
increase over fiscal year 2006. In fiscal year 2007, we will be
accelerating efforts for dismantlement of retired warheads and
consolidation of special nuclear materials across the nuclear weapons
complex. Both of these efforts will contribute to increasing the
overall security at NNSA sites. DSW also supports routine maintenance
and repair of the stockpile; refurbishes warheads through the Life
Extension Programs; and, maintains the capability to design,
manufacture, and certify new warheads, for the foreseeable future. DSW
also supports managing the strategy, driving the change, and performing
the crosscutting initiatives required to achieve responsiveness
objectives envisioned in the NPR. Our focus remains on the stockpile,
to ensure that the nuclear warheads and bombs in the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile are safe, secure, and reliable.
Progress in other parts of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)
continues. The fiscal year 2007 request for the six Campaigns is $1.94
billion, a 9 percent decrease from fiscal year 2006. The Campaigns
focus on scientific and technical efforts and capabilities essential
for assessment, certification, maintenance, and life extension of the
stockpile and have allowed NNSA to move to ``science-based''
stewardship. These campaigns are evidence of NNSA excellence and
innovation in science, engineering and computing that, though focused
on the nuclear weapons mission, have much broader application.
Specifically, $425 million for the Science and Engineering
Campaigns provides the basic scientific understanding and the
technologies required to support the workload and the completion of new
scientific and experimental facilities. We will continue to maintain
the ability to conduct underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test
Site if required, but let me be clear, nothing at this time indicates
the need for resumption of underground testing for the foreseeable
future.
The Readiness Campaign, with a request of $206 million, develops
and delivers design-to-manufacture capabilities to meet the evolving
and urgent needs of the stockpile and supports the transformation of
the nuclear weapons complex into an agile and more responsive
enterprise.
The request of $618 million for the Advanced Simulation and
Computing Campaign supports the schedule to enhance the computational
tools and technologies necessary to support the continued assessment
and certification of the refurbished weapons, aging weapons components,
and a RRW program without underground nuclear tests. As we enhance
these tools to link the historical test base of more than 1,000 nuclear
tests to computer simulations, we can continue to assess whether the
stockpile is safe, secure, reliable, and performs as required.
The $451 million request for the Inertial Confinement Fusion
Ignition and High Yield Campaign is focused on the execution of the
first ignition experiment at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) in
2010 and provides facilities and capabilities for high-energy-density
physics experiments in support of the SSP. To achieve the ignition
milestone, $255 million will support construction of NIF and the NIF
Demonstration Program and $168 million will support the National
Ignition Campaign. The ability of NIF to assess the thermonuclear burn
regime in nuclear weapons via ignition experiments is of particular
importance. NIF will be the only facility capable of probing in the
laboratory the extreme conditions of density and temperature found in
exploding nuclear weapons.
The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign request of $238
million continues work to manufacture and certify the W88 pit in 2007
and to address issues associated with manufacturing future pit types
including the RRW and increasing pit production capacity at Los Alamos
National Laboratory.
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) and Facilities
and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP)
In fiscal year 2007 we are requesting $1.98 billion for the
maintenance and operation of existing facilities, remediation and
disposition of excess facilities, and construction of new facilities.
This is of critical importance to enable NNSA to move toward a more
supportable and responsive infrastructure.
Of this amount, $1.69 billion is requested for Readiness in
Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF), an increase of 3 percent from
fiscal year 2006, with $1.4 billion in Operations and Maintenance and
$281 million for RTBF Construction. RTBF operates and maintains current
facilities, and ensures the long-term vitality of the NNSA complex
through a multi-year program of infrastructure construction.
This request also includes $291 million for the Facilities and
Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP), a separate and distinct
program that is complementary to the ongoing RTBF efforts. The FIRP
mission is to restore, rebuild and revitalize the physical
infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. FIRP works in
partnership with RTBF to assure that facilities and infrastructure are
restored to an appropriate condition to support the mission, and to
institutionalize responsible and accountable facility management
practices. FIRP activities include reducing deferred maintenance,
recapitalizing the infrastructure, and reducing the maintenance base by
eliminating excess real property. The FIRP recapitalization projects
are key to restoring the facilities that house the people, equipment,
and material necessary to the SSP, the primary NNSA mission. FIRP
Facility Disposition activities reduce Environment, Safety and Health
(ES&H) and safeguards and security liabilities, address footprint
reduction of the complex, and reduce long-term costs and risks. The
primary objective of FIRP Infrastructure Planning is to ensure that
projects are adequately planned in advance of project start.
Last year, Congress significantly reduced funds for the FIRP
program. This reduction, coming on reductions in planned levels
dictated by fiscal constraints, means that the original (and
Congressionally mandated) goal of eliminating the maintenance backlog
and terminating the FIRP program by 2011 is no longer attainable. This
matter may require legislation extending the FIRP program to 2013. We
remain committed to the concept of FIRP as a temporary, ``get well''
program and to the long-term, sustained funding of maintenance within
the RTBF program.
Secure Transportation Asset
In fiscal year 2007, the budget requests $209 million for Secure
Transportation Asset (STA), a minor decrease from fiscal year 2006
levels, for meeting the Department's transportation requirements for
nuclear weapons, components, and special nuclear materials shipments.
The workload requirements for this program will escalate significantly
in the future to support the dismantlement and maintenance schedule for
the nuclear weapons stockpile and the Secretarial initiative to
consolidate the storage of nuclear material. The challenge to increase
secure transport capacity is coupled with and impacted by increasingly
complex national security concerns. To support the escalating workload
while maintaining the safety and security of shipments, STA is
increasing the cumulative number of Safeguard Transporters in operation
by 3 per year, with a target total of 51 in fiscal year 2011.
Environmental Projects and Operations
We are requesting $17.2 million for Environmental Projects and
Operations. The $17.2 million request is for a new function, Long Term
Response Actions/Long-Term Stewardship, which covers continuing
environmental stewardship at NNSA sites after the completion of
Environmental Management (EM) activities. This new program at each site
begins when EM cleanup activities are completed, and will continue for
several years. Activities comprise routine inspections of landfill
covers/caps, and maintenance of pump and treatment systems, and
starting in fiscal year 2007, will be performed at three NNSA sites:
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Kansas City Plant, and Sandia
National Laboratories.
The fiscal year 2007-2011 budget request does not include the
transfer of legacy environmental management activities at NNSA sites
that was proposed in the fiscal year 2006 budget request. However, the
responsibility for newly generated waste at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security Complex was
transferred to the NNSA in fiscal year 2006, and is managed in the
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities GPRA unit.
Nuclear Weapons Incident Response
The fiscal year 2007 request for Nuclear Weapons Incident Response
is $135 million, an increase of 15 percent over fiscal year 2006. The
NNSA Emergency Operations remains the U.S. government's primary
capability for radiological and nuclear emergency response in support
of homeland security. The program is continuing efforts to enhance
emergency response capabilities, and the budget request supports all
assets as planned, with emphasis on recruitment and training of
personnel called into action during emergency situations. The fiscal
year 2007 increase is primarily associated with the research and
development efforts of the Render Safe Research and Development
program. This budget realigns this research and development funding to
emergency response where the program is managed.
Safeguards and Security
The fiscal year 2007 request for Safeguards and Security is $754
million. This budget supports two security-related activities. The
budget request proposes that the physical security portion of NNSA's
Safeguards and Security GPRA Unit be renamed ``Defense Nuclear
Security'', consistent with the responsible NNSA organization. This
program is responding to a revision in threat guidance affecting
physical security at all NNSA sites. Meeting the Design Basis Threat
will require further upgrades to equipment, personnel and facilities,
and NNSA is committed to completing these activities. The Cyber
Security program activities, managed by the NNSA Chief Information
Officer, comprise the rest of this account, and the fiscal year 2007
request is essentially level with the fiscal year 2006 funding level.
The Request includes funding for the DOE Diskless Conversion
initiative. Meeting the post-September 11 security requirements has
required a significant long-term investment, reflecting DOE's
continuing commitment to meet these requirements.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program goal is to detect,
prevent, and reverse the proliferation of WMDs while mitigating nuclear
risk worldwide. Our programs address the danger that hostile nations or
terrorist groups may acquire weapons of mass destruction or weapons-
usable material, dual-use production or technology, or WMD
capabilities. Our primary focus in this regard is securing or disposing
of vulnerable stockpiles of weapon-usable materials, technology, and
expertise in Russia and other countries of concern. The
administration's request of $1.73 billion to support NNSA activities to
reduce the global weapons of mass destruction proliferation threat
represents almost a 7-percent increase over the budget for comparable
fiscal year 2006 activities.
The administration's fiscal year 2007 Fissile Material Disposition
budget request is $638 million, an increase of $169 million over fiscal
year 2006. This increase reflects the progress in implementing the
plutonium disposition program in the past year. Of this amount, $551
million will be allocated toward disposing of surplus U.S. and Russian
plutonium and $87 million will be allocated toward the disposition of
surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium. The plutonium disposition
program, the Department's largest nonproliferation program, plans to
dispose of 68 MT of surplus Russian and U.S. weapons-grade plutonium by
fabricating it into MOX fuel for use in civilian nuclear power-
generating reactors. The United States and Russia successfully
completed negotiations of a liability protocol for the program, and
senior Russian government officials have assured the United States that
this protocol will be signed in the near future. DOE has also been
working to validate the U.S. MOX project cost and schedule baseline as
part of our project management process, and we will have a validated
baseline in place before construction begins. DOE received
authorization to begin construction of the MOX facility from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, began site preparation work for the MOX
facility at the Savannah River Site, and implemented a number of
improvements to strengthen the management of the MOX project. Current
plans call for construction of the U.S. MOX facility to start in 2006,
with operations to start in 2015. The administration's budget request
is essential for continuing this work in fiscal year 2007, which will
be a peak construction year. Now that the liability issue is nearing
resolution, high-level U.S.-Russian discussions are taking place to
confirm the technical and financial details for the Russian
construction program.
The administration's fiscal year 2007 budget request of $107
million for the GTRI is a 10-percent increase over fiscal year 2006 and
supports the urgency carried in ambitious completion dates and
objectives set by the program. GTRI represents the Department's latest
effort to identify, secure, recover, and/or facilitate the disposition
of the vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials worldwide that pose
a threat to the United States and the international community. Since
the creation of GTRI, we have enjoyed a number of successes. Under our
radiological threat reduction program, we have completed security
upgrades at more than 340 facilities around the world. As a result of
the Bush-Putin Bratislava joint statement on enhanced nuclear security
cooperation, we have established a prioritized schedule for the
repatriation of U.S.-origin and Russian-origin research reactor nuclear
fuel located in third countries. As part of our nuclear materials
threat reduction efforts under GTRI, three successful shipments in
fiscal year 2005 to repatriate Russian-origin fresh HEU from the Czech
Republic (two shipments) and Latvia.
In accordance with the President's Bratislava commitment, we have
also begun working with the Russian Federation to repatriate Russian-
origin spent fuel. We have also conducted several successful shipments
to repatriate U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel from Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Greece, and Austria. We have converted three
research reactors in the Netherlands, Libya, and the Czech Republic
from the use of HEU to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel so
far in 2006, and we have completed physical security upgrades at three
priority sites housing dangerous materials in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan.
The International Material Protection and Cooperation fiscal year
2007 budget request of $413 million is a 2 percent decrease from fiscal
year 2006. For more than a decade, the United States has worked
cooperatively with the Russian Federation and other former Soviet
republics to secure nuclear weapons and weapons material that may be at
risk of theft or diversion. As part of the Bush-Putin Bratislava joint
statement, we agreed to accelerate security upgrades at Russian sites
holding weapons-usable materials and warheads. The Bratislava joint
statement also provided for a comprehensive joint action plan for
cooperation on security upgrades of Russian nuclear facilities at
Rosatom and Ministry of Defense sites. In addition, this statement
called for enhanced cooperation in the areas of nuclear regulatory
development, sustainability, secure transportation, MPC&A expertise
training, and protective force equipment. A number of major milestones
for this cooperative program are on the horizon, and the fiscal year
2007 budget ensures that sufficient funding will be available to meet
these milestones. Security upgrades for Russian Rosatom facilities will
be completed by the end of 2008--2 years ahead of schedule. By the end
of 2008 we will also complete cooperative upgrades at the nuclear
warhead storage sites of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and the
Russian Ministry of Defense sites. By the end of fiscal year 2007, we
will have provided security upgrades at more than 80 percent of all the
nuclear sites in Russia at which we now plan cooperative work.
The administration's budget request will enable us to expand and
accelerate the deployment of radiation detection systems at key transit
points within Russia and accelerate installation of such equipment in
five other priority countries to prevent attempts to smuggle nuclear or
radiological materials across land borders. Through our Megaports
initiative, we plan to deploy radiation detection capabilities at three
additional major seaports in fiscal year 2007 to pre-screen cargo
containers destined for the United States for nuclear and radiological
materials, thereby increasing the number of completed ports to 13.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $207 million for the
Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) is an
increase of 18 percent from fiscal year 2006. The EWGPP program is
working toward completing the permanent shut down of the three
remaining weapons grade plutonium production reactors in Russia at
Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Every week, these reactors currently produce
enough fissile material for several nuclear weapons. The overall EWGPP
plan is to shutdown these reactors permanently and replace the heat and
electricity these reactors supply to local communities with energy
generated by fossil fuel plants by December 2008 in Seversk and
December 2010 in Zheleznogorsk. The reactors will shut down immediately
when the fossil plants are completed. The first validated estimate of
total program cost--$1.2 billion--was determined in January 2004. After
extensive negotiations with Russia, we achieved $200 million in cost
savings. Also, under the authority to accept international funding as
provided in the Ronald W. Reagan Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005, we have received pledges of $30 million from six Global
Partnership participants. Construction of the fossil fuel plant at
Seversk started in late 2004, and the start of construction of the
fossil fuel plant at Zheleznogorsk was recently approved. The increased
funding as part of the fiscal year 2007 budget request allows for both
construction projects to remain on schedule and thereby hold the line
on cost.
The fiscal year 2007 budget requests $269 million for
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development. This effort
includes a number of programs that make unique contributions to
national security by researching the technological advancements
necessary to detect and prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear
materials. The Proliferation Detection program advances basic and
applied technologies for the nonproliferation community with dual-use
benefit to national counterproliferation and counterterrorism missions.
Specifically, this program develops the tools, technologies,
techniques, and expertise for the identification, location, and
analysis of the facilities, materials, and processes of undeclared and
proliferant WMD programs. The Proliferation Detection program conducts
fundamental research in fields such as radiation detection, providing
support to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
Intelligence Community. The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring program builds
the Nation's operational sensors that monitor from space the entire
planet to detect and report surface, atmospheric, or space nuclear
detonations. This program also produces and updates the regional
geophysical datasets enabling operation of the Nation's ground-based
seismic monitoring networks to detect and report underground
detonations.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request for Nonproliferation and
International Security is $127 million. This figure cannot be directly
compared to fiscal year 2006 because of a budget structure change that
has realigned the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and
HEU Transparency programs to this GPRA unit. Through this program the
Department provides technical and policy expertise in support of U.S.
efforts to strengthen international nonproliferation institutions and
arrangements, fosters implementation of nonproliferation requirements
through engagement with foreign partners, and helps develop the
mechanisms necessary for transparent and verifiable nuclear reductions
worldwide. This budget request addresses our need to tackle key policy
challenges including efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system,
attempts to block and reverse proliferation in Iran and North Korea,
attention to augmenting U.S. cooperation with China, India, and Russia,
and our plan to build-up the nonproliferation component of the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership.
Naval Reactors
The Naval Reactors fiscal year 2007 budget request of $795 million
is an increase of $13.5 million from fiscal year 2006. The program's
development work ensures that nuclear propulsion technology provides
options for maintaining and upgrading current capabilities, as well as
for meeting future threats to U.S. security.
The majority of funding supports the program's number-one priority
of ensuring the safety and reliability of the 104 operating naval
nuclear propulsion plants. This work involves continual testing,
analysis, and monitoring of plant and core performance, which becomes
more critical as the reactor plants age. The nature of this business
demands a careful, measured approach to developing and verifying
nuclear technology; designing needed components, systems, and
processes; and implementing them in existing and future plant designs.
Most of this work is accomplished at Naval Reactors' DOE laboratories.
These laboratories have made significant advancements in extending core
lifetime, developing robust materials and components, and creating an
array of predictive capabilities.
Long-term program goals have been to increase core energy, to
achieve life-of-the-ship cores, and to eliminate the need to refuel
nuclear powered ships. Efforts associated with this objective have
resulted in planned core lives that are sufficient for the 30-plus year
submarine (based on past usage rates) and an extended core life planned
for CVN 21 (the next generation aircraft carrier). The need for nuclear
propulsion will only increase over time as the uncertainty of
conventional fuel cost and availability grows.
Naval Reactors' Operations and Maintenance budget request is
categorized into six areas: Reactor Technology and Analysis; Plant
Technology; Materials Development and Verification; Evaluation and
Servicing; Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Operations and Test Support; and
Facility Operations.
The $212 million requested for Reactor Technology and Analysis will
support continued work on the design for the new reactor plant for the
next generation of aircraft carriers, CVN-21. These efforts also
support the design of the Transformational Technology Core (TTC), a new
high-energy core that is a direct outgrowth of the Program's advanced
reactor technology and materials development and verification work.
Reactor Technology and Analysis also develops and improves the
analysis tools, which can be used to safely extend service life beyond
our previous experience base. The increasing average age of our Navy's
existing reactor plants, along with future extended service lives, a
higher pace of operation and reduced maintenance periods, place a
greater emphasis on our work in thermal-hydraulics, structural
mechanics, fluid mechanics, and vibration analysis. These factors,
along with longer-life cores, mean that for years to come, these
reactors will be operating beyond our previously proven experience
base.
The $131 million requested for Plant Technology provides funding to
develop, test, and analyze components and systems that transfer,
convert, control, and measure reactor power in a ship's power plant.
Reactor plant performance, reliability, and safety are maintained
through a full understanding of component performance and system
condition over the life of each ship. Naval Reactors is developing
components to address known limitations and to improve reliability of
instrumentation and power distribution equipment to replace aging,
technologically obsolete equipment. Additional technology development
in the areas of chemistry, energy conversion, instrumentation and
control, plant arrangement, and component design will continue to
support the Navy's operational requirements.
The $118 million requested for Materials Development and
Verification funds material analyses and testing to provide the high-
performance materials necessary to ensure that naval nuclear propulsion
plants meet Navy goals for extended warship operation and greater power
capability. More explicitly, materials in the reactor core and reactor
plant must perform safely and reliably for the extended life of the
ship.
The $179 million requested for Evaluation and Servicing sustains
the operation, maintenance, and servicing of Naval Reactors' operating
prototype reactor plants. Reactor core and reactor plant materials,
components, and systems in these plants provide important research and
development data and experience under actual operating conditions.
These data aid in predicting and subsequently preventing problems that
could develop in Fleet reactors. With proper maintenance, upgrades, and
servicing, the two prototype plants will continue to meet testing needs
for at least the next decade.
Evaluation and Servicing funds also support the implementation of a
dry spent fuel storage production line that will put naval spent fuel
currently stored in water pits at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and
Engineering Center and at the Expended Core Facility (ECF) on the Naval
Reactors facility in Idaho into dry storage. Additionally, these funds
support ongoing decontamination and decommissioning of inactive nuclear
facilities at all Naval Reactors sites to address their ``cradle to
grave'' stewardship responsibility for these legacies, and minimize the
potential for any environmental releases.
The $64.6 million requested for Advanced Test Reactor Operations
and Test Support sustains the ongoing activities of the INL ATR
facility, owned and operated by the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science,
and Technology.
In addition to the budget request for the important technical work
discussed above, program direction and facilities funding is required
for continued support of the Program's operations and infrastructure.
The $57 million requested for facilities operations will maintain and
modernize the Program's facilities, including the Bettis and Knolls
laboratories as well as ECF and Kesselring Site Operations (KSO),
through capital equipment purchases and general plant projects. The
$2.8 million requested for construction funds will be used to complete
construction of a materials development facility and to support the
design of a materials research technology complex. Finally, the $31.2
million requested for program direction will support Naval Reactors'
DOE personnel at headquarters and the Program's field offices,
including salaries, benefits, travel, and other expenses.
Office of the Administrator
The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $387 million is an increase
of 14.2 percent over the fiscal year 2006 appropriation. NNSA completed
the reengineering of its Federal workforce last year and has begun to
recruit to fill critical skill gaps in safety, security, facilities,
and business positions, in addition to the Future Leaders Intern
program initiated in fiscal year 2005. The fiscal year 2007 request
increases to provide additional personnel and support for mission
growth in the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation area, as well as in
safety and security functions. The remainder of the increase reflects
functional transfers to NNSA of 18 people from other Departmental
elements, and fact of life changes including pay adjustments, increased
space and occupancy charges, and cost of living increases in pay and
benefits. We plan to support a slightly higher workforce level than in
previous years, reflecting support for mission growth areas and skill
gap closures.
Historically Black Colleges and Universities Support
A research and education partnership program with the Historically
Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) and the Massie Chairs of
Excellence was initiated by Congress in the Office of the Administrator
appropriation in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006. NNSA has
established an effective program to target national security research
opportunities for these institutions to increase their participation in
national security-related research and to train and recruit HBCU
graduates for employment within NNSA. The NNSA's goal is a stable $10
million effort annually. The majority of the efforts directly support
program activities, and it is expected that programs funded by the
Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors
appropriations will fund research with the HBCUs in areas including
engineering, radiochemistry, material and computational sciences and
sensor development. A targeted effort in education and curriculum
development, and support for the Massie Chairs, will also be continued.
MANAGEMENT ISSUES
NNSA has fully embraced the President's Management Agenda through
the completion of the NNSA re-engineering initiative by creating a more
robust and effective NNSA organization. Additionally, NNSA's success
has been recognized with consistently ``Green'' ratings from the DOE,
including Budget and Performance Integration. NNSA's Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation (PPBE) process was implemented
simultaneously with the standup of the new NNSA organization, and is
now the established management construct that integrates management,
financial data and performance information in a multi-year context.
The PPBE process is in its fifth year of implementation, and
provides a fully integrated, multi-year perspective. The linkages
within NNSA mirror the Headquarters and field organization structures,
and are supported by management processes, contracting, funds control
and accounting documentation. The cascade and linkages are quite
evident in our updated NNSA Strategic Plan, issued last November.
We take very seriously the responsibility to manage the resources
of the American people effectively and I am glad that our management
efforts are achieving such results.
Finally, to provide more effective supervision of high-hazard
nuclear operations, I have established a Chief, Defense Nuclear Safety
position and appointed an experienced safety professional to the
position. I believe this will help us balance the need for consistent
standards with my stress on the authority and responsibility of the
local site managers.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I am confident that we are headed in the right
direction. Our budget request will support continuing our progress in
protecting and certifying our nuclear deterrent, transforming our
stockpile and infrastructure, reducing the global danger from
proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, and enhancing the force
projection capabilities of the U.S. nuclear Navy. It will enable us to
continue to maintain the safety and security of our people,
information, materials, and infrastructure. Above all, it will meet the
national security needs of the United States in the 21st century.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. A statistical appendix
follows that contains the budget figures supporting our request. My
colleagues and I would be pleased to answer any questions on the
justification for the requested budget.
______
National Nuclear Security Administration
appropriation and program summary tables
outyear appropriation summary tables
fiscal year 2007 budget tables
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Secretary Rispoli.
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. RISPOLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Rispoli. Good afternoon, Chairman Sessions, Senator
Nelson, Senator Graham, other members of the subcommittee. I'm
pleased to be here today to answer your questions on the fiscal
year 2007 budget request in EM. I want to thank you and this
subcommittee for your support. Over the last 4 years, we have
made major strides in achieving results. We have made
significant progress in shifting focus from risk management to
real risk reduction and cleanup, an achievement not possible
without the strong leadership and support of this subcommittee.
During 2006 we expect to complete regulatory actions
associated with closure of the Rocky Flats site and to complete
cleanup at up to eight other sites, including Fernald, Mound,
Columbus and Ashtabula in Ohio--I would note that as of now, we
have a congressional add from last year that added some scope
to the work at Mound which will be done during 2007--the
Lawrence Livermore National Lab main site, Lawrence Berkeley
National Lab in California, the Kansas City plant in Missouri,
and the Sandia National Laboratory site in New Mexico.
With this 2007 budget request, achieving our short-term
completion goals for risk reduction and cleanup are achievable
with the intention to complete cleanup of eight more sites by
2009. Just a few examples of these are the contamination issues
of the Pantex Plant in Texas, the East Tennessee Technology
Park in Tennessee, the Lawrence Livermore National Lab Site 300
in California, and the Energy Technology Engineering Center in
California.
As with many complex and diversified programs, challenges
are not always apparent. The challenges that we face in the
cleanup are not always attractive. EM foresaw some of these
challenges, but others were not foreseen or were unexpected. We
have taken steps to regain momentum on these projects, but we
are realistic and recognize that overly optimistic assumptions,
statutory and legal issues, and some unrealized technology
advancement have led us to setbacks.
One of the most visible projects on which our progress has
slowed is the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford which was
mentioned earlier. We believe the Waste Treatment Plant project
you referred to is the largest and most complex construction
project in the Nation. It has encountered significant design
and construction setbacks.
As we know, the Department has received, and this was
mentioned as well, the report from the After Action Review
team. With the help of that report, we have identified problems
specific to this project and also some problems that we
recognize could be systemic problems in the national program.
We remain committed to fix these problems and complete the
project and begin operations to treat the significant tank
waste issues there at the Hanford site.
The investment we have requested in our 2007 budget for
Defense EM activities totals $5.4 billion and consists of one
Defense appropriation, that of Defense environmental cleanup.
With that investment, we will focus and emphasize on the
following three areas. First, ensure that safety is number one.
I don't mean safety for just the workers. I mean safety for the
site and for the community around the site.
We place a premium on protecting the workers and the
environment, and we are introducing an integration of safety
and project management. What I'm getting to there is that
safety has to be included in all of the design aspects for
these projects, not just the operational aspect, that has begun
at the earliest stages of design aspects. It's absolutely
essential to superior performance.
Second, we need to ensure the appropriate levels of
safeguards and security. It's crucial that we maintain
vigilance in our security to protect our citizens. The EM
program is responsible for tons of surplus nuclear material.
There is an overall increase in the safeguards and security
budget for EM in 2007.
Third, we need to ensure risk reduction and cleanup
completion. Risk reduction requires a pragmatic approach to
cleanup and occurs in various stages which involve the
elimination, prevention, or mitigation of risk. Our major focus
of risk reduction is stabilization of high risk materials
through validation and adherence to cost and schedule targets,
effective identification and management of risk, and the design
of contracts that drive outstanding performance.
A small selection of planned activity and milestones at two
of our largest sites in 2007 are at Hanford, to ramp up
construction of the waste treatment plant that's been referred
to, to maintain radioactive waste forms in a safe, compliant
condition, and continue on with single shell tank waste
retrievals and complete containerization and consolidation of
the K-West Basin and sludge at the K-West Basin.
At the Savannah River Site (SRS), we will complete
consolidation of on-site plutonium, continue to stabilize
radioactive liquid-based underground storage tanks, and
complete the shipment of drum legacy transuranic waste to the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). In particular, I'm pleased
to thank this subcommittee for section 3116 from the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 that enables us
to dispose of low level waste at SRS and other sites in a
prudent, safe, and compliant way.
The first determination using this statutory authority was
made by the Secretary in January 2006 and we have two more
wastes in the pipeline right now for similar action.
Significant results and emerging challenges went hand in hand
last year. The fiscal year 2007 budget request supports a
critical portion of the Department's environmental stewardship
responsibilities. We will build on our successes in EM missions
in a manner that is protecting the environment.
I'm committed to working with all interested parties to
resolve these issues and work with this subcommittee and
Congress to address any of your concerns. The Senate Armed
Services Committee, and this subcommittee in particular, are
key supporters of our Nation's cleanup efforts. I look forward
to a continuing dialogue with you on this subcommittee.
This concludes my formal statement and my full statement is
submitted for the record. I'd be pleased to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rispoli follows:]
Prepared Statement by James A. Rispoli
Good Afternoon, Chairman Sessions and members of the subcommittee.
I am pleased to be here today to answer your questions on the fiscal
year 2007 budget request for the Environmental Management (EM) program.
I want to thank you and your subcommittee for your support of the EM
program.
Since my appointment in August 2005, I have been visiting
Department of Energy (DOE) sites and familiarizing myself with the
breadth of work that EM has the crucial mission to accomplish. I have
been impressed with the dedication and focus of the workforce to remedy
the environmental legacy of the Cold War, a task that is both
inherently challenging and innately beneficial to our country. As I
have become more informed on the sheer immensity of the challenges that
face the program, I have a greater understanding of the progress we
have made and the significant challenges that lie before us.
Over the last 4 years, EM has made major strides in achieving
results. To our credit, the program has made significant progress in
shifting focus from risk management to risk reduction and cleanup
completion, an achievement not possible without the strong leadership
and support of this committee. In fact, in 2005, we physically
completed the cleanup of the Rocky Flats site, Colorado, produced 257
canisters of vitrified high level waste at the Savannah River Site
(SRS), South Carolina, ready for repository disposal, and completed the
Melton Valley legacy waste cleanup at the Oak Ridge Reservation,
Tennessee, while beginning the decontamination and decommissioning of
the last remaining gaseous diffusion plant facilities at Oak Ridge.
During 2006, we expect to complete regulatory actions associated with
Rocky Flats closure and complete cleanup at up to eight other sites.
The eight other sites targeted for cleanup completion and/or closure
are:
Fernald, Ohio
Mound, Ohio \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ With the possible exception of OU-1, which is being addressed
now as a result of fiscal year 2006 Appropriations Act direction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kansas City Plant, Missouri
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Main Site,
California
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, California
Ashtabula Environmental Management Project, Ohio
Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico
Columbus Environmental Management Project, Ohio
The fiscal year 2007 budget request builds on the past success of
cleanup and closure and sets our course for accomplishing our cleanup
responsibilities. The fiscal year 2007 EM budget request is $5.39
billion for defense activities, a decrease of $760 million from the
fiscal year 2006 appropriation, an indicator of our anticipated success
with completion and closure of Rocky Flats in Colorado and several
other sites in 2006. The fiscal year 2007 budget request reflects a
balance of reducing risk and completing cleanup with other Departmental
and national priorities. Overall, our request puts a high priority on
tank waste treatment and radioactive waste disposition while preserving
our site completion and closure impetus.
This budget request will make possible a ramp up in construction of
key components of the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford, Washington,
which had been slowed in 2005 and 2006, and continues safe management
and retrieval of waste from single shell tanks at Hanford, in pace with
the Waste Treatment Plant delays. This request increases funding for
the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project in Idaho to support
shipments of transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and
the construction of the Sodium Bearing Waste Facility to treat liquid
tank waste. This request reflects an increase to support the critical
path to closure for the East Tennessee Technology Park in Oak Ridge.
At the SRS, this request will support ongoing stabilization of the
site's stored nuclear materials, including funding for a container
surveillance capability and consolidating the site's own plutonium into
a single location. The request also provides for management and
disposition of liquid tank waste, including funding for design and
construction of the Salt Waste Processing Facility.
In addition, the request supports ongoing cleanup at National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sites, such as the Nevada Test
Site, Pantex Plant, and Lawrence Livermore-Site 300. It also supports
the first full year of remote-handled transuranic waste disposal at the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico.
With this budget request, our short-term completion goals for risk
reduction and cleanup are achievable, with the intention to complete
cleanup of eight more sites by 2009. They are:
Argonne National Laboratory-East, Illinois
Pantex Plant, Texas
East Tennessee Technology Park, Tennessee
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Site 300,
California
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, California
Energy Technology Engineering Center, California
Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York
Inhalation Toxicology Laboratory, New Mexico
The structure of fiscal year 2007 congressional budget request
focuses on each site. This structure has three appropriations: Defense,
Non-Defense, and Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
Decommissioning. This structure will allow the consolidation of all
site activities for visibility, accountability and performance. With
this fiscal year 2007 budget request, we are proposing several shifts
between program offices with the completion of cleanup.
With the completion of cleanup at Rocky Flats in
fiscal year 2006, this request transfers site responsibility
from EM to the Office of Legacy Management. However, EM's
request does include funding for Rocky Flats for the final
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act Record of Decision.
With the physical completion of cleanup work at
Fernald, this request transfers responsibility from EM to the
Office of Legacy Management for Fernald.
This request transfers the work scope associated with
the Nevada Offsites (Project Chariot, Amchitka Island, and the
Salmon Site; Central Nevada Test Area, Gasbuggy Site, Gnome
Coach Site, Project Shoal Area, Rio Blanco Site, and the
Rulison Site) from EM to the Office of Legacy Management.
This request transfers long-term response actions at
the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory from EM to the Office
of Science.
With completion of active remediation work planned in
fiscal year 2006 at Sandia National Laboratory, Kansas City
Plant, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Main Site,
this request transfers long-term response actions from EM to
the NNSA.
EM envisions that as cleanup work is completed at sites with
continuing missions, EM will transfer long-term surveillance and
monitoring activities to the cognizant program office or, for those
sites without a continuing mission, to the Office of Legacy Management.
Your support of this request will keep the cleanup program on track
to meet the commitments and produce results worthy of the investment of
the American people. We have shown we can deliver meaningful results
important to accomplishing a technically complex mission. With your
support, we will continue to show results important for today as well
as far into the future.
RESULTS AND CHALLENGES
The risk reduction, cleanup completion strategy has borne key
results. We will build on this success and commit our efforts to refine
our processes, taking advantage of opportunities and breakthroughs to
meet or exceed past expectations of performance. For instance, as of
the end of last year EM had cumulatively accomplished the following:
Packaged and certified 5,541 containers of enriched
uranium (out of 9,110 containers required over the cleanup
lifecycle) for long-term storage.
Packaged 11,307 metric tons of depleted uranium (out
of 685,161 metric tons required over the cleanup lifecycle) in
a suitable form for disposition.
Disposed of 960,143 cubic meters of legacy low-level
waste and mixed low-level waste (contaminated with hazardous
chemicals), out of 1,532,871 cubic meters required over the
cleanup lifecycle.
Eliminated 9 out of the 13 highly secure and costly
special nuclear materials storage areas, or Material Access
Areas.
Completed decommissioning, deactivation, dismantlement
and/or demolition of 1,106 out of 3,113 industrial facilities.
Completed remediation of a total of 5,858 release
sites (that is, discrete areas of contamination), out of 10,516
release sites required over the cleanup lifecycle.
In addition, on a site-specific level, we have:
Consulted with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under
section 3116 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005 and made the first waste determination to
allow certain low-level waste from reprocessing to be disposed
of onsite at the SRS in South Carolina, thereby reducing the
risks associated with the approximately 36.4 million gallons of
radioactive waste stored in the underground tanks there.
Retrieved the first 13,000 of 75,000 drum equivalents
of suspect transuranic waste 5 months ahead of the Tri-Party
Agreement (TPA) regulatory milestone at Hanford in Washington.
Completed the first ``wet to dry'' spent nuclear fuel
transfer campaign at the Idaho National Laboratory, with
Training Research and Isotope Production, General Atomics
(TRIGA) spent nuclear fuel now being held in dry storage.
Completed disposal of all low-level waste generated
during the Cold War era (>12,000 cubic meters) 1 year early at
the Savannah River Site.
Disposed of over 8,000 tons of scrap metal from
Portsmouth, Ohio.
Completed disposal of the remaining inventory of
hazardous waste generated during the Cold War era and over
8,000 cubic meters of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)--
contaminated low-level waste from Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
These results provide only one perspective or ``snapshot'' of the
progress EM has made in risk reduction and cleanup. As with a photo,
these accomplishments present only a limited view of the total program.
With EM, as with many complex and diversified programs, the challenges
behind achieving these results are not always apparent. EM foresaw some
of these challenges, but other challenges were unexpected. Some
challenges assail us from the technology perspective as we face some of
the most difficult issues in environmental cleanup. Other challenges do
not necessarily manifest themselves until we experience poor
performance or missed milestones. More recently, due to poor
performance and inadequate oversight, we have been challenged with
losing ground in completing design and construction on some key
projects. We are taking steps to regain momentum we have lost on these
projects, but we are realistic and recognize that overly optimistic
assumptions, statutory and legal issues, and unrealized technology
advancements have led us to setbacks we are now experiencing within
several key projects across the program.
One of the most visible projects on which our progress has slowed
is the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford. The Waste Treatment Plant
project perhaps the largest, most complex environmental construction
project in the Nation has encountered design and construction setbacks.
We remain committed to fix the problems, complete the project, and
begin operations to treat the radioactive tank waste at the site. We
have both internal and independent external reviews underway to
evaluate the major project management, project control, business, and
technical systems and processes, to ensure we fully understand what is
required to complete the project and begin operations. An After Action
Review by an external independent firm to assess the causes of the
issues surrounding the project was recently completed. Actions are
currently being implemented as appropriate to ensure the project is
being planned and executed responsibly, to bring it back to acceptable
performance.
Other examples of challenges to cleanup progress include delays in
facility design and construction in South Carolina to address
protection of workers under certain accident scenarios associated with
postulated seismic events, delays in sludge cleanup from spent nuclear
fuel basins in Washington to address more difficult conditions than
foreseen and allocation of cleanup resources to allow us to implement
security upgrades to safely store our special nuclear materials. We are
establishing realistic project baselines to account for these
developments and to refocus our efforts.
We are addressing these challenges while strengthening our ability
to address future challenges. For example, we have had performance
issues with EM work at Los Alamos and have not had an integrated
baseline yet that we are able to validate. But we are making
significant progress toward a new baseline. Additionally, we have a new
contract in place that is focused on finding new ways of doing business
in all areas of site operations, including cleanup and waste
disposition. We believe the new contract and a successful baseline
validation will offer us new opportunities to continue significant risk
reduction and cleanup with our fiscal year 2007 funding.
We have demonstrated that we can deliver. We will not falter in our
responsibilities to meet our mission objectives. We have and are taking
immediate steps to strengthen our performance by refining processes to
emphasize safety, project management, acquisitions, contract execution
and human capital.
RENEWED EMPHASIS
First and paramount to our success is safety--it is our top
priority. Safety affects all involved--Federal employees, contractors,
the site, and the community. We will continue to maintain and demand
the highest safety performance in all that we do. We have taken steps
to fully integrate safety into our project designs earlier than ever,
assure our line project teams have the necessary experience, expertise,
and training, and utilize a constant real-time feedback of lessons
learned. Every worker deserves to go home as healthy as she or he was
when they came to the job in the morning. No schedule, no milestone, is
worth any injury to our workforce. Safety is a cornerstone in the
execution of good project management.
In order to successfully execute our portfolio of projects, we are
instilling a rigorous project management mindset that will be ingrained
in all projects. Our performance has not been acceptable on several key
projects. My goal over the next couple of years is that at least 90
percent of our projectized portfolio will perform on or better than our
cost and schedule targets. The management tools used to plan, execute,
and monitor projects must be integrated into our business processes.
Our success will depend on our ability to build in this rigor. We will
target the shortcomings in our project management by using both DOE and
industry standard project management and business management tools. I
am personally conducting Quarterly Performance Reviews of all EM
projects, and have directed my senior staff to carry out monthly
project reviews. This includes fully implementing our management
systems, following through on corrective actions, and better applying
risk management principles--that is, identifying project uncertainties,
developing mitigation measures and contingency, and holding responsible
managers accountable for their resolution. I believe that this
approach, strong and effective project management will be the key to
our success.
To ensure effective project management, we must also apply the
proper procurement vehicles to meet our acquisition strategy. Clearly,
opportunities exist to improve our acquisition practices.
EM is an ``Acquisition'' organization. We accomplish our mission
through procurement and execution of our projects. It is vital that EM
acquire the best services and attract the best the contractor
community, including small business, has to offer. I have recently
proposed and will shortly implement a new organizational structure,
including a new Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Acquisition and
Project Management. This new organization will integrate the two
functions of procurement planning and project management, a significant
step in building up the expertise to carry out our responsibilities. We
will sharpen our skills through training and refocus our enterprise to
reflect our acquisition responsibilities. With this organizational
integration of project management and contract acquisition/
administration, EM will be positioned to provide technical excellence
commensurate with the responsibilities with which we have been
entrusted.
Complementing these refinements, we must ensure that our projects
are managed by highly skilled, competent and dedicated leaders and
staff, both Federal and contractor, who have the responsibility and the
authority to meet the EM program's objectives. We have in place a
rigorous certification program for our project managers. Our goal is to
certify all EM Federal project managers for each project by May 2006.
We want to assure ourselves that we have the right skills mix to
get the job done. We will provide our employees career development,
rewards, and support. I firmly believe that an organization is never
better than its people. Our employees, both Federal and contractor,
hold the key to our success as an agency.
Our desire is that at Headquarters and each site, our key
acquisition and technical personnel have knowledge of technical issues,
project management, and business management at an equivalent level of
expertise as their contractor counterparts to promote meaningful,
cogent dialogue on substantive issues. Our job as a Federal agency is
management and oversight, to be responsible stewards of the public's
trust and resources. Therefore, we must have a highly qualified and
technically proficient management team and staff. My aim is to have a
high performing organization, sustained by a career oriented workforce,
driven to produce results that are important now and into the future.
THE FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET REQUEST
The investment we have requested in our fiscal year 2007 budget
will continue the Department's success in achieving its mission of risk
reduction and cleanup completion. The Department's fiscal year 2007
budget request for defense EM activities totals $5,390 million. The
request consists of one defense appropriation, Defense Environmental
Cleanup.
Ensure safety is number one: The budget request continues to place
the highest priority on protecting workers, the public, and the
environment. EM is introducing new fervor in the integration of safety
and project management, validation and adherence to cost and schedule
baselines, effective identification and management of risks, and the
design of contracts that drive outstanding performance. Safety is
central to superior performance.
Ensure the appropriate levels of safeguards and security: It is
crucial that we maintain vigilance in our security to protect our
citizens. The EM program is responsible for tons of surplus nuclear
material. There is an overall increase in the safeguards and security
budget in fiscal year 2007 due to additional security requirements at
Savannah River, as a result of revisions to the Department's Design
Basis Threat (DBT) policy--the performance based standard, which each
of our sites must meet to ensure an acceptable level of protection.
Hanford has fully met the 2003 DBT policy, and will be reviewing the
2005 DBT policy as the Department is considering options for
consolidation of special nuclear material throughout the complex.
Risk reduction and cleanup completion: Risk reduction requires a
pragmatic approach to cleanup and occurs in various stages, which
involve the elimination, prevention, or mitigation of risk. Because
safe disposal of many materials will take a number of years to
complete, our major focus of risk reduction is stabilization of high-
risk materials:
High-curie, long-lived isotope liquid waste;
Special nuclear materials;
Sodium bearing liquid and other radioactive waste in
tanks;
Deteriorating spent nuclear fuel in leaky or poor
integrity basins;
Remote-handled transuranic waste and high transuranic
content solid waste stored on the surface;
Decommissioning of highly-contaminated facilities.
Although these items are to be considered when setting priorities,
their relative ranking may vary from site to site. Risk reduction is a
major consideration in the development of the site baselines. Examples
of planned activities and milestones for fiscal year 2007 that
correspond to site-specific risk categories are:
Hanford
Ramp up construction of the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant (WTP) Pretreatment and High-Level Waste
facilities.
The WTP is the primary facility to immobilize
(vitrify) the radioactive tank waste at the Hanford
Site. The WTP complex includes five major components:
Pretreatment facility, Low-Activity Waste facility,
High-Level Waste facility, Analytical Laboratory, and
the Balance of Facilities. In fiscal year 2007,
construction will ramp up on the two facilities slowed
in 2006 to address revised seismic criteria: the
Pretreatment facility, which will separate the
radioactive tank waste into low-activity and high-level
fractions, and the High-Level Waste facility which will
vitrify the high-level fraction into glass, ready for
disposal at a Federal repository.
Maintain tank farms in safe, compliant condition and
continue single-shell tank waste retrievals to maintain
adequate double-shell tank space.
The double-shell tank system has limited
capacity to receive wastes from the single-shell tanks
and that is anticipated to continue to be the case
until the WTP can provide tank waste treatment. The
fiscal year 2007 budget request supports a reduced rate
of single-shell tank waste retrievals that can be
sustained with the available double-shell tank capacity
until tank waste treatment can commence.
Complete containerization and consolidation of K-East
and K-West Basin sludge in the K-West Basin.
The K-Basins are located about one quarter
mile from the Columbia River. This project involves
removing radioactive sludge, debris, and water from wet
storage in the K-Basins to safe, interim storage or
final disposition away from the Columbia River. The K-
Basin facilities are well past their design lives and
are a major threat to the environment due to the
potential for basin leakage to the surrounding soil and
the Columbia River. The request is an increase over
fiscal year 2006 and reflects additional work scope due
to more challenging, as-found conditions of sludge and
debris; implementation of improved techniques for
sludge containerization; and application of a
systematic approach to design, testing, and operation
of sludge transfer activities.
Continue retrieval of suspect transuranic waste and
shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
Hanford has several thousand containers of
previously generated suspect transuranic waste stored
in the ground in a retrievable configuration.
Approximately 2,400 cubic meters of suspect transuranic
waste will be retrieved, an increase of approximately
600 cubic meters over fiscal year 2006.
Characterization and shipment of confirmed transuranic
waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for final
disposal will reduce the risks to facility workers as
well as reduce the safeguard and security vulnerability
associated with this waste. This action represents
final disposal of this waste in an environmentally
protective repository.
Increase River Corridor remedial action activities for
Reactor Areas D, F, and H; and complete three high priority
waste site interim remedial actions in the 300 area.
The River Corridor Closure Project focuses on
areas and facilities adjacent to the Columbia River and
includes remediation of contaminated waste sites;
decontamination, decommissioning, and demolition of
facilities; and placing eight reactors into interim
safe storage condition. This also includes digging up
contaminated soil and disposing of waste in the onsite
Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility, an
engineered landfill away from the river.
Maintain Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) complex
facilities, including vaults.
The PFP Complex consists of several buildings
that were used for defense production of plutonium
nitrates, oxides, and metal from 1950 through 1989. The
end state for the PFP is the dismantlement of all
facilities to slab-on-grade. The continuing presence of
special nuclear materials has caused a delay in
decommissioning and decontamination of PFP facilities.
However, safe, secure maintenance of the existing
facility continues as we finalize plans for
consolidation of the material, as does dismantlement
and demolition of ancillary PFP facilities.
Idaho
Continue transuranic waste shipments to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant.
These actions will serve to reduce operating,
surveillance, and maintenance costs while at the same
time reducing risk and enhancing long-term safety and
security.
Complete design and initiate construction of the
Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment facility to treat tank
radioactive wastes.
This project supports the EM goal of reducing
the risk of stored liquid radioactive waste. This
action will reduce the potential risk to human health
by preventing the potential migration of contamination
into the Snake River Plain Aquifer which is a sole
source aquifer used to supply water to the people of
southeastern Idaho.
Close the first three emptied underground storage
tanks at Idaho.
Removing the liquid waste decreases the risks
they pose to human health and the environment,
including the underlying Snake River Plain Aquifer.
Initiate final demolition of the Loss of Fluid Test
Reactor.
This will be the first of four high-risk
reactor dispositions under the current cleanup
contract. These actions will reduce potential risk by
deactivating high risk excess nuclear buildings at the
Idaho National Laboratory that have reached the end of
their useful lives.
Oak Ridge
Ship 75 percent of stored contact-handled transuranic
waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
This waste is stored in above grade-storage
trenches and in earthen trenches. Processing and off-
site disposal of the waste prevents the risk of release
to the environment and the continued cost of waste
storage and monitoring.
Initiate remediation field work at David Witherspoon
1630 Site.
This action will reduce the risks posed to
workers and the surrounding community from uranium and
polychlorinated biphenyls contamination in the soil.
Perform surveillance and maintenance of Building 3019.
This action will provide storage of the
Uranium-233 inventory in Building 3019 while we
evaluate alternatives to disposition the Uranium-233
inventory.
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Characterize 1,800 cubic meters of contact-handled
transuranic waste and prepare oversized transuranic waste items
for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
Characterization and shipment of this waste to
the Waste Isolation Pilot Project for final disposal
will reduce the risks to facility workers as well as
reduce the safeguard and security vulnerability
associated with this waste. This action represents
final disposal of this waste in an environmentally
protective repository.
Savannah River Site
Complete consolidation of on-site plutonium to K Area.
This action will consolidate Savannah River's
own plutonium from various on-site storage locations
into one existing Category 1 Special Nuclear Materials
Storage Facility to meet Design Basis Threat criteria.
Continue to stabilize liquid waste from underground
storage tanks.
Complete design and initiate site preparation,
long lead procurement, and construction of Salt Waste
Processing Facility.
Produce 250 canisters of vitrified high-level
waste.
Use the Interim Salt Processing System to
develop cesium removal capability.
Complete treatment of legacy mixed low-level waste and
complete shipment of drummed legacy transuranic waste to the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
Characterization and shipment of this waste to
the Waste Isolation Pilot Project for final disposal
will reduce the risks to facility workers as well as
reduce the safeguard and security vulnerability
associated with this waste.
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Complete first full year of remote-handled transuranic
waste receipt and disposal.
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad,
New Mexico, is the Nation's mined geologic repository
for the permanent disposal of defense-generated
transuranic waste. All retrievably stored transuranic
waste comes to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for
receipt, handling, and disposal. This will remove these
wastes from around the complex where they constitute a
major health and safety risk, into a centralized, safe
disposal configuration in New Mexico.
CONCLUSION
Significant results and emerging challenges went hand in hand this
last year. We will build on our successes in completing the EM mission
in a manner that is protective of the environment and public while
demonstrating fiscal responsibility. This fiscal year 2007 budget
request supports a critical portion of the Department's environmental
stewardship responsibilities. It will enable the next steps in
accomplishing the cleanup mission from past operations in support of
the Cold War while balancing the effective implementation of other
departmental and national priorities for the American people.
I am committed to work with all interested parties to resolve
issues and will work with this committee and Congress to address any of
your concerns or interests. DOE, our regulators, the communities and
our contractors are partners in this effort. Our success relies on this
partnership. As a partnership, we all succeed or we all fail together.
The Senate Armed Services Committee and this subcommittee in
particular, are key supporters of the Nation's cleanup efforts. I look
forward to a continuing dialog with you and the subcommittee. This
concludes my formal statement for the record. I will be pleased to
answer any questions at this time.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Senator Nelson,
I know, has another appointment he must keep and I'd be glad to
let you at this time go forward, Senator Nelson, if you'd like
to proceed.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will confer
with the Secretary with regard to that subject matter for you,
and we can follow up on the record if we need any additional.
Let me concentrate on the Ambassador, though. The National
Ignition Facility (NIF), what is being changed in the baseline?
What impact will these changes have on the cost of this caper?
Ambassador Brooks. The baseline for the NIF is remaining on
schedule. We continue to be on track to conduct an ignition
experiment in 2010. What we have done in order to remain on
track is reduce other expenditures, for example, at the Sandia
Z Machine and the Omega Machine in Rochester, New York.
Although in the 1990s, the NIF had some project management
problems, over the last 5 years, it has been consistently on
schedule and on budget. I see it has a remarkable safety record
and I see no reason that any of that will change. I expect that
we will conduct the first ignition experiment on schedule in
2010.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you see no technological challenges
that will not allow you to do the ignition in 2010?
Ambassador Brooks. I want to be very careful. I know the
Secretary doesn't like us to promise things we can't deliver.
We can promise we are going to do an ignition experiment in
2010. It's never been done before. Whether or not it will work
the first time is something we are just not going to know, but
I am confident that we are on track with the budget we have
submitted and support we have had in the past for 2010. Yes,
sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about your funding profile? Have
you got enough in order to complete the construction in 2008?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. To ignite in 2010?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let's talk about the RRW. Will there
be several RRW types in the stockpile?
Ambassador Brooks. I think so. Here's what I think will
happen, and I need to make it clear, some of these are
decisions that have not been made yet and shouldn't be made
yet.
We are concentrating first on a warhead that will be
suitable for use on several launched ballistic missiles. The
reason for that is that the W-76, which is the most numerous
warhead on our launched ballistic missiles, is the largest
single warhead type in the inventory. Although we have no
reason to believe there is a problem with it, were there a
problem, we will lack a good deal of flexibility. So what we
want to do is give ourselves greater diversity so we want to
concentrate on that first.
Ultimately, and ultimately probably means 15 years, maybe
18 years, maybe 20 years, we will need to have more than one
type of RRW because we never want to put the United States in a
position where a single failure could invalidate the deterrent.
But exactly when we start on a second design, I don't think we
know, and I don't think we are really going to know until we
see the results of this design competition.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is the new nuclear weapon going to use
the traditional nuclear weapons acquisition process or is it
going to be a modified nuclear weapon process?
Ambassador Brooks. We are still wrestling with that. The
traditional nuclear weapons acquisition process is cumbersome.
I think that we believe, consistent with the need to have
efficiency, that we need to find a way to streamline that while
still providing adequate opportunity for congressional
oversight.
I don't want to try and circumvent congressional
involvement, but we spend a fair amount of the time within the
building that we are going to try and find ways to shorten it.
But we have not focused on the details of that yet, other than
acknowledging to each other that we need a process. We have a
very ambitious goal for responsive infrastructure and those
goals will need more efficient management as well as more
efficient infrastructure.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you develop an RRW if you and
the laboratory directors determined that it was necessary to
conduct a nuclear weapons test?
Ambassador Brooks. No. But I don't think that's going to
come up. In fact, the whole concept of increasing design margin
is to decrease the chance of that ever being anything other
than a hypothetical question. But in the same way, we are
specifying that this first design fit in a particular artillery
shell and have the same military characteristics as the
existing warheads, we are specifying that it be developed
without nuclear testing.
Senator Bill Nelson. The goal of the RRW is to meet the new
military requirements?
Ambassador Brooks. No, sir. Same military requirements.
Same military characteristics. Same delivery systems aimed at
the same target. The goal is that when my counterparts from the
DOD are sitting before this committee in 15 years, they have
the same confidence in the stockpile that we have today, even
though in those 15 years, nobody has done any testing and
everything has gotten older.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. My final line of questioning is
that you all are planning a life extension for the full
complement of W-76, and the full complement of W-80, while both
weapons design laboratories are also working on the designs for
the RRW. As you said, it could replace some or part of the W-76
life extension.
Now, General Cartwright has recommended that the Air Force
and the Navy cruise missiles that carry the W-80 be retired.
Between now and the first production of the W-80 warhead in
2010, the NNSA is going to spend a half million dollars getting
ready to conduct the life extension program.
So the obvious question is, why not postpone the W-80 work
until a final decision is made on whether it's needed or not.
If you did not, it would have the result of slowing down the
work on the W-76, which you want to have ready.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. First, I prefer not to comment
on what the senior officer in another department may or may not
have recommended, but accepting your characterization for a
moment, at the present time, the DOD continues to support and
the President has continued to approve the long-term retention
of the W-80. Our planning is based on those requirements.
Obviously, if those requirements change, it would be silly
to spend money to extend the life of a system with no delivery
platform, but I think that's a decision that is now premature.
Senator, a lot of things get considered in government. I think
that it is not in the interest of good management to prejudge
decisions that have to get made by cabinet officers and the
President. I can see my responsibility as meeting the
requirements set by the DOD. Right now those requirements
require us to do a W-80 life extension. I'm certainly aware
that discussions go on, and if things change, we'll change.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are
concerned that you can't get it all done.
Ambassador Brooks. Mr. Chairman, can I take just a moment?
Senator Sessions. Please.
Ambassador Brooks. First of all, there are financial
issues. These things cost money. The laboratory effort on the
RRW does not draw on the same people and skills as life
extension programs. I think there are issues of the life
extension program which we are working on. Those issues are
primarily on the production side, rather than the laboratory
side.
I think frankly, the reason to be worried about the number
of things we are trying to do is not our fiscal ability, but
our physical ability. Right now, the RRW is a relatively small
number--sort of frightening to use $27 million as a small
number, but is a relatively small fraction of our budget.
If it has the promise it's going to have, the resources for
it will grow. The most logical place to get those resources is
from truncating life extension programs. The question that we
are wrestling with is how certain do we have to be that the RRW
concept is really going to: (A) work, and (B) fit in with the
country's priorities before we start shifting resources away.
That's a constant discussion. My guess is that in the next year
or 2, you will see us walk away from some of the life
extension, but that's assuming decisions that have not been
made yet.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. Senator Nelson, I think that
comes back to the point of view that, in many ways, your work
at DOE is similar to a contractor producing what DOD says it
needs, is that correct?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes. That's correct.
Senator Sessions. In general, you're reluctant to start
opining contrary to what the DOD says?
Ambassador Brooks. It's not just the DOD. The stockpile
that we maintain is approved by the President of the United
States and I conceive of my job of doing what the President
tells me to do.
Senator Sessions. He probably has not personally examined
it all and probably based on recommendations of DOD. My only
point is that sometimes if the two of you got together, we
could both save some money it seems.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. Some of the new leadership in
the weapons area in DOD are General Cartwright, who was
mentioned, and Under Secretary Krieg and I are wrestling with
that. We are all very conscious that we can do anything but we
can't do everything.
Senator Sessions. That's what I said. Senator Graham, it's
great to have you with us. I would yield to you at this time.
Maybe if you would give us a little history lesson and how it
was that you and the people of South Carolina were able to
speed up your cleanup and save the taxpayers money at the same
time. It's a story too seldom replicated in our Nation.
Senator Graham. What a great lead in. One, you helped us.
It was a 48-48 vote and just to make a complete record here,
South Carolina was willing to work with the DOE to take 50
tanks that had been filled with waste winning the Cold War, and
you come up with a logical way to clean those tanks up, leaving
some of the stream behind in a way that was environmentally
sound that would speed up cleanup by 23 years and save $16
billion.
Senator Sessions. $16 billion.
Senator Graham. $16 billion.
Senator Sessions. That's eight DDG ships.
Senator Graham. That could be done throughout the whole
system if people would just use common sense. The heel of the
tank you could scrape it forever and what comes out of the heel
could be sent to Yucca Mountain, clogging it up or you could
treat what was left behind and make it low level waste and
close these tanks up 23 years ahead of schedule and save $16
billion. The reason I wanted to do it is the biggest threat to
South Carolina is for the tanks to leak.
As soon as you get the material out of the tanks and treat
what is left in the heel, you're good to go. I wouldn't ask my
State to jeopardize its environment, but I did ask my State to
negotiate an agreement that makes sense to allow accelerated
cleanup and save money that need not be spent.
Unfortunately, this leads me to my first line of inquiry.
The political heat was unbelievable and because of Senator
Sessions and others we were able to win the day. What has
happened, Mr. Chairman, is that as we get ready to implement
the plan that we passed, DOE changed its seismic standards and
we are 2 years behind schedule and we really weren't consulted.
I went out on a limb with my governor to allow new
standards to be created that would leave a small portion behind
that we can stand to have behind. Now we are 2 years behind and
it was sort of we were blindsided and the whole effort to get
the tanks cleaned up and the waste out has run into problems.
Mr. Secretary, where are we and how are we going to get back on
schedule?
Mr. Rispoli. Thank you for that question, Senator.
Obviously, we have a very good rapport we believe with the
State of South Carolina.
Senator Graham. In all honesty, Mr. Secretary, they were
blindsided by the change of seismic standards and it created a
lot of problems back home.
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir. We obviously did not do as good as
we should have done in coordinating the seismic issue that has
been pending for years now. We had to bring it to closure.
You're absolutely correct. We did not do a good job of
coordinating that seismic standard with the regulatory people
of South Carolina.
For clarification for the members of the committee, the
issue is not really the seismic standard. The issue is the
degree of protection that you provide to the workers in the
facility and the site and the community should there be a
seismic event. The seismic standard itself was not at issue.
It's really the degree of protection, and the decision that was
eventually and finally made shortly after I was sworn in was to
go with a higher degree of protection for the workers for the
site and for the community because we see that safety has to
override any other consideration.
Senator Graham. If I may interrupt, Mr. Secretary, we agree
with that. But I don't think I was taking a risk. I thought I
was doing something good for South Carolina by agreeing to a
plan to get the waste out of the tanks so they won't leak, and
I rejected the extreme environmentalist argument that the
footprint left cannot be treated because it can. Mr. Chairman,
what was left behind is no threat to South Carolina. Why spend
$16 billion cleaning up something that doesn't need to be
cleaned up?
But now, we are off track and you're saying that we are
worried about our safety. We should have known that before we
did this deal.
Mr. Rispoli. I don't disagree with you. I would point out
that we have other steps. Since it's a phased program, we have
two other treatment processes that will come on line to begin
retrieving tank waste. This is the lower activity tank waste
that can be treated through other processes that will begin
sooner, so that we don't wait from now until 2011 when the
major project is operational to begin to treat.
Senator Graham. So you feel comfortable we are going to get
back on schedule?
Mr. Rispoli. I feel comfortable we will begin treating tank
waste with these other processes. We have the waste
determination by the Secretary using the 3116 authority that
will enable us to close tanks. We want them, just as you do, to
get on with closing tanks by removing the waste, treating the
waste through these interim processes through the salt waste
processing facility when it's built and operational. I believe
we have the same exact objectives.
I note again that we felt we had to make the facility safe.
Why would we build a facility knowing that it was not meeting
technical requirements of the Department?
Senator Graham. Will new tanks be required because of this
delay?
Mr. Rispoli. We do not foresee the need for new tanks. We
recognize that we have a tank waste management issue. We
believe that by bringing the new facilities, the interim
facilities on line, we can deal with the tank waste that will
be processed in those and avoid an issue where we would have
tank waste and stop it.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I think this would be good
for the committee to hear if you would indulge me. I want to
thank the administration in this regard and applaud you. I have
been representing SRS in Congress and the Senate for over a
decade now. All we did was talk about cleaning up. We spent
billions of dollars talking and nothing ever gets cleaned up.
This administration has come along and set some reasonable
standards and we are actually beginning to clean things up and
South Carolina will be better off if we can neutralize this
waste. If we can do it in a common sense way, the taxpayer will
be better off, the environment will be better off. I don't want
to spend 23 years doing something that doesn't take 23 years
and spend $16 billion for really no gain.
Now, I want to turn to another topic. South Carolina, Mr.
Chairman, several years ago, agreed to accept 34 tons of
weapons grade plutonium that has been deemed to be excess of
our defense needs. We took plutonium from Rocky Flats to South
Carolina so they could close Rocky Flats up earlier and save
hundreds of millions of dollars in storage.
The deal was you send it to South Carolina and we will
convert this excess plutonium, weapons grade plutonium into
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, which is commercial grade fuel. It will
take this off the market, it can never be captured by
terrorists and used to do bad things because the Russians were
going to do the same thing with 34 tons of excess plutonium in
their inventory.
I don't worry much about our inventory in terms of being
guarded and safe, but I worry a lot about what goes on in
Russia. Mr. Chairman, South Carolina stepped up to the plate
again and we took plutonium that we did not generate with the
hope and the idea, the promise that it would be turned into
something. Guess what? It was supposed to start in 2009. Now
it's 2015.
So I have 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium. We are way
behind schedule. The cost of the MOX program has over doubled
and I mention this, Ambassador Brooks, because I think you're
bringing some solutions to the table. If you can reassure my
chairman and me that we are going to get on with this, South
Carolina is not going to be stuck with this plutonium and the
world would be safer, I would appreciate it.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. Senator, we are going to break
ground and begin construction on a MOX fuel vitrification
facility later this year, sometime in the early fall. We are
working with the Russian Federation to try and find ways to
accelerate their elimination of plutonium through using a
different approach than we have looked at which would start
early use through reactors called the BN-600.
We have, since I was last before this committee, put lead
test assemblies into reactors. We have the technical data to
confirm that MOX fuel, as the process will manufacture at this
particular site and is manufactured in France, will in fact
work.
We have Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses so we
are going to go ahead. We have been delayed for a variety of
reasons, primarily a somewhat arcane and now resolved issue
with the Russian Federation over the liability of their
program.
We are absolutely committed to eliminating this material
for a whole bunch of reasons. Principally because it's part of
an agreement with the Russian Federation to eliminate theirs.
It frees up space so that I can further consolidate and improve
security, and frankly, this is awful stuff we don't need
anymore and we need to get rid of it.
We are committed to do that and I think we are going to be
showing you tangible proof of that commitment with the
construction later this year.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you both.
I know these problems are hard to solve, but I think South
Carolina has done its fair share and then some of doing it the
right way and economical way and smart way. Mr. Chairman, thank
you for your support because without it we could not have
gotten this done. I just think it's important for this
committee to provide the oversight. Promises made are promises
kept.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Graham. Having been
through some of that same type issue with regard to poison
gases, sarin at Anniston, people are just not very reasonable
in accepting stuff from outside the State. They just don't want
to hear it, even though you might be defending them. I was
surprised that we won. But it's a problem. South Carolina did
the right thing, and it is a commitment that I think you should
follow through on.
I also believe that we need to consider further the
techniques of cleanups that you did in South Carolina at other
sites. Mr. Rispoli, subsequent to their decision, I understand
that there was a NRC report that was affirming that procedure.
Would you share with us what happened? That was after we had
this tight vote that we had in the Senate.
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, I believe you're referring to
the consultation that we did with the NRC? The way that that is
set up and the way that it's working, we submitted our first
consultation in February 2005, following the October passage of
the law.
The NRC concluded their consultation which was a back and
forth process on December 28, so it was about a 10-month
process because I mentioned we have two more in the pipeline
with the NRC. One is for tanks 18 and 19. It's a matter for the
site in South Carolina. The other is for a similar issue in the
State of Idaho.
The report when it was finally concluded was favorable,
basically supported the determination that we made. I have been
in direct dialogue with the senior executive that works
directly for the commission to begin a process to try to
improve and streamline it. It took us 10 months to do the first
one. It will likely take us 9 months to do the next two.
The NRC has agreed that we need to streamline that process
so that we can do this better, faster, and more efficiently. We
see this authority that you have supported for us as being
absolutely key to prudent solutions of these problems. I just
want to make it go smoother because we don't expect this to be
the end. We expect this to be the front edge of what we need to
do.
Senator Sessions. Are these the same kind of tanks and same
kind of waste that we are looking at at Hanford?
Mr. Rispoli. We have single and double shell tanks in both
places. The waste is varied at each place. The wastes are quite
different depending upon tank height.
Senator Graham. If you were able to get such an agreement
at Idaho and Washington, how much sooner could you clean up the
tanks at those places and how much money could you save?
Mr. Rispoli. I think the key to what this statutory
authority gave us is the tremendous amount of savings to the
American taxpayer by being able to dispose of larger volume,
much lower radioactivity content waste in that way, either in
the tanks or in the first case, the first one that went
through, the salt stone disposal facility where it will be
actually put into a repository right onsite. So that the real
savings I believe is the monetary savings. In both phases, we
run a vitrification plant at Savannah River.
Senator Graham. We saved $16 billion in South Carolina. Do
you have any reason to believe it will be lesser at other
sites?
Mr. Rispoli. No, sir. If you look at volumes of waste,
Hanford is a very, very significant challenge for the Nation
because of the tank waste we need to deal with there as well.
Senator Sessions. Is there a bigger site than Hanford?
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, I would hesitate to speculate
because I don't know how much of the waste would be applicable
for that type of disposition. Clearly it's a sizable amount.
Well over 100 tanks there. Certainly it would be a sizable
savings to be able to go through with a similar process.
Senator Graham. Fifty tanks in South Carolina.
Senator Sessions. This is a matter we would rather
confront. I don't know whether this is a matter of regulation,
statute, or consent decree or just an agreement between the
State of Washington and DOE. How precisely has the plan been
established to go forward in a way different from the South
Carolina plant? What is the legal authority for that?
Mr. Rispoli. If I may explain that the Department initially
had the intention of disposing of waste in a way like this. It
was being done under departmental directives that were
challenged in court, and the initial rulings went against the
Department in that case.
The Department appealed, the appeals court found
differently than the court that made the initial judgment, and
just yesterday, the 6th of March, the initial court set aside
its ruling because the argument is that since the Department
did not actually propose to do it at Hanford, therefore, the
case was not ripe for a judgment, so that was set aside.
The Department is left with its own directive which in many
ways parallels Section 3116 authority that you had given to us.
What we do not know is if we were to progress on that path
again, whether there would once again be third party
intervention in bringing the lawsuit against our intention to
do that.
Senator Graham. If I may, I think the way it happened, the
importance of the legislation that you have passed was it gave
legal authority for the DOE in South Carolina to negotiate a
deal. It was very much similar to what they had proposed to
begin with, and that's where the savings in accelerated cleanup
came from.
South Carolina is a huge beneficiary in the sense that we
are getting 50 tanks cleaned up 23 years ahead of time, and
what is left behind in my opinion presents no danger to the
site and does save $16 billion and we could do this throughout
the whole complex.
Mr. Rispoli. Clearly, the three places this is most
applicable would be Savannah River, Idaho, and the Hanford site
in Washington State. By the way, the court case was specific to
the State of Idaho, as I believe you know.
Senator Sessions. So the court case has been set aside, a
judgment has been set aside in Idaho. What about the legal
status in the State of Washington?
Mr. Rispoli. The best way I can answer that is that the
Department does have its own directive that would permit us to
do something very similar and very parallel in the absence of
3116 authority. Obviously, the way that we would like to
proceed is to use a prudent, safe and reliable method of doing
that since we are talking about disposing in those tanks on
site a very low portion of radioactivity, even though the
volume is higher. Clearly that's the way that we would like to
proceed with that type of a determination.
Senator Sessions. Does it take legislation to allow you to
do that or are you saying if do you it you expect someone will
file a lawsuit? You think you have the authority today?
Mr. Rispoli. We have our departmental authority today. We
do not have the legal coverage of section 3116 that you
provided in the two States that it was specific to.
Senator Graham. South Carolina was willing to be bound by
this.
Senator Sessions. So the State of Washington perhaps is
not.
Mr. Rispoli. That would be my understanding.
Senator Graham. Yes.
Mr. Rispoli. I was not in this position at that time, but
that would be my understanding.
Senator Sessions. I want to just ask this so I get it
straight. If you decided that the process utilized in South
Carolina is safe and the NRC agrees and you'd like to use it in
Idaho, I believe you have the authority to do that. What would
be the situation in Washington if you decide to do it there?
Mr. Rispoli. We would clearly have to work with the State
regulatory body, which we, by the way, I believe have very good
relations with. We have many significant issues in the State of
Washington, primarily caused by the delay in the large Waste
Treatment Plant project. We work very well with the State in
working our way through those. Clearly we would have to work
with the State to propose a path forward to close those tanks
at the appropriate time.
Senator Sessions. But at this time, is there any agreement
in place that says you have to complete or remove the tanks, a
commitment on behalf of the DOE?
Mr. Rispoli. Not that I'm aware of, Mr. Chairman, but I
would like to confirm that for the record. Not that I'm aware
of.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Energy (DOE) had agreed to several enforceable
milestones that relate to tank closures in the Federal Facility
Compliance Agreement with State of Washington and Environmental
Protection Agency regulators. These milestones set expectations for
retrieval of more than 99 percent of the waste preparatory to tank
closure. They also recognize that some waste may remain in the tanks.
Our current plans are to conduct a waste incidental to reprocessing
determination pursuant to DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste
Management, and obtain any necessary State approvals prior to closing
these tanks. We have informed the State that we will not meet some of
the tank closure milestone dates, and we anticipate renegotiation of
these milestones in connection with other milestones relating to delays
on the completion of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant.
In parallel, the DOE is engaging the public and the State in
preparing an environmental impact statement (EIS) which will analyze
the environmental implications of alternative means of cleanup of the
tanks and residues. A selection of the cleanup alternative will be made
available only after public comment on the analysis per the National
Environmental Policy Act. Additionally, the single-shell tank closure
plan has been submitted to State of Washington regulators in compliance
with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The State has informed
DOE that it will defer approval of that plan until the EIS is issued.
Senator Sessions. I don't want to rush into anything like
that and affect people's lives and people who have ideas about
it. But this is a great nation and we do not have an unlimited
amount of money, and we have to use reasonable judgment on some
of these matters.
Some of the lawsuits that are being filed are being filed
by people who do not want us to have any nuclear weapons at all
and always oppose nuclear weapons, nuclear power and anything
related to it, which is not the consensus of the Nation and
never has been the consensus of the Nation. So we have to be
careful that somehow we just feel like we have to spend more
than we have to. So I hope that you will review that.
With regard to Hanford, let me proceed and discuss some of
the details there that concern me. The Waste Treatment Plant
project under construction now has been examined lately as an
extreme example, and therefore, some might say is not
representative of the program. But we are at the point where
DOE and Congress are beginning to receive some very thoughtful
analysis of what went wrong or is wrong with the project. I
would like to quote from some of the recent review findings and
ask for your opinion.
I would first note that the panel of outside experts which
was chartered by DOE to conduct an after action review
described a waste treatment project in this fashion--I would
note, Mr. Rispoli, that was before you took office.
So they describe it this way, ``the largest and most
complex chemical plant design and construction project ever
undertaken in the United States and possibly the world.'' Given
that this is the largest DOE project currently under
construction, I was surprised to read the following, again
quoting from the after action review, ``DOE headquarters was
not given copies of the weekly reports nor did they attend the
project quarterly reviews. No EM staff at headquarters
monitored the status or issues of the Waste Treatment
project.''
Now, it's important to note that this is a project whose
cost baseline during this time was increasing from an estimate
of about $6 billion to over $10 billion, as well as an
accompanying schedule delay of approximately 4 years from
original plans.
There are over 300 Federal employees at DOE headquarters in
the EM program office, as well as additional employees in the
DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction Management. The
employees in the Office of Engineering and Construction
Management, who were receiving information about the project
for over 2 years, accepted project status reports that
continually indicated nearly flawless performance of the
project against its costs and schedule baseline.
Again, according to the action report, ``such reporting
should have alerted reviewers that something was amiss. The
likelihood of a multibillion dollar project remaining perfectly
on schedule and budget month after month is exceptionally low,
especially with the technology issues regularly raised in
correlated briefing charts available to headquarters.''
My question is what is your understanding of how this
reporting situation was allowed to occur and persist? What are
the DOE's guidelines on schedule reporting on projects of this
magnitude? In your view, do the systems which are in place on
cost and schedule reporting give the DOE an accurate picture of
the current project status?
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, I think that report has been
very helpful to us. I think that having read it yourself, you
would agree that it's pretty straight from the shoulder and
easy to understand what went wrong. I can summarize it this
way. There were technical issues at that plant. The cost and
schedule targets, the base lines, as we call them, were set
very early in the engineering cycle and the technical issue
because of its size and complexity were not fully appreciated.
I think the report certainly reflects that.
Senator Sessions. I don't want to interrupt your thought,
having asked you a whole bunch of questions and now I interrupt
you. But, I think the implication of the report and review is,
my goodness, this was a $6 billion project that you have, it
seemed like there was enough intensity of concern in oversight
of it. Would you agree that's one of the thrusts of that
report?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir. I agree that is certainly a thrust
of the report.
Senator Sessions. Huge.
Mr. Rispoli. The quotes that you gave, we concur with those
findings. I would mention that I've been in the engineering and
construction business for over 35 years. It's absolutely
essential that when you're running any project, whether it be
modest or large or complex or simple, you must simply have
monthly reviews to know what is going on. You have to have good
data and you have to have monthly reviews and face to face
reviews. As that report indicated, those basic tenets of good
management of a project were not apparently being reported. We
have corrected that.
I, myself, since having been sworn in in August, just
finished our second round of quarterly project reviews of all
of our projects, of the Waste Treatment Plant. I now get bi-
weekly reports on that project, but we have completed face to
face quarterly reviews where the site managers come in and we
don't keep our staff out of the room.
In fact, we welcome the staff into the room so that they
can challenge the information that's being presented and
question whether or not we are doing things the best way and
whether or not the data is valid. Obviously I mentioned the
technical, but the way the project needs to be managed, I can
assure you we're managing it that way now. I can think of no
other thing we could be doing that we are not doing to manage
this project the way it's being managed given its size and
complexity.
Third, the report indicated what I would call institutional
problems. You would have noted that the staff out there to
manage this was like 100 people. There was one contracting
officer. We have ordered that more contracting people be hired.
We ordered that a contracting attorney be hired. We recognize
that we had staff shortfalls so we had difficulties that
covered the gamut from technical to project management which
most of what you quoted was related to project management, and
also institutional issues and we are addressing all of those
issues.
Senator Sessions. It does sound like you've gotten this
under control. The way you explained it is impressive. From
what I understand, you understand these kind of project
management requirements from the previous experience and that
you are bringing some order to that for which we are grateful.
I have to tell you, the taxpayers get tired of it. I don't
know how many billion dollars has been misappropriated here or
could have been saved with top flight management from the
beginning, but this is pretty tiresome. This is a lot of money
and we may have to take--they were discussing maybe taking $3
billion out of the defense budget. That's going to be very
painful this year because we have to spend the money somewhere
else, somebody says. The point of the matter is as big as this
government is, there is not one dollar to waste and I am glad
you're moving on top of that and we want to help you.
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would just like to
point out, noting that Senator Graham is not with us at this
moment, but there is a major difference between the State of
South Carolina and the State of Washington, and that is in the
State of South Carolina, we have already been vitrifying waste
for a number of years. We have already been accomplishing
actual processing of tank waste and given the significance of
the volume and the nature of the waste at Hanford and the fact
that we have not yet built this plant to begin processing
waste, I understand why the people of the State of Washington,
why we need to work with them so closely because they perceive
the same type of thing that you do that we set out to do
something. We have not yet succeeded, and I will assure you we
are determined to succeed. We are absolutely committed to
succeeding in this effort.
Senator Sessions. One of the other things I have to ask you
because I think the American people are entitled to an answer,
the after action review says ``the approach''--they talk about
lack of staff oversight that ``precluded consideration of
potentially costly high-risk issues until they came to a head
in 2004.''
They said the management approach precluded consideration
of some of these high risk issues until they came to a head in
2004. ``The approach seems intended to allow the waste
treatment project to proceed unimpeded long enough so that by
the time the cost increases surfaced, senior leaders had little
choice but to find the funds to complete the project.''
How do you respond to that?
Mr. Rispoli. I understand what the statement is meant to
imply, Mr. Chairman. I think most of us would agree that's
speculation. I don't know that anyone can conclusively state
that that was the case. Certainly that was the speculation made
by the review team that did that after action review.
Senator Sessions. Have you taken any steps to take
disciplinary action against any contractor or any DOE employees
who presumably held positions of high trust who allowed this
matter to get to the state it got to? Again, I know this was
all before you took office.
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir. I will tell you that when this
problem came to the Secretary of Energy's attention, he became
personally engaged and we began having regulatory meetings with
Mr. Riley Bechtel, the actual owner and name giver to the
company that we are dealing with. I can assure you that neither
we nor they are happy with our subsequent performance on this
effort. Some of the people that were involved are already gone.
For example, the reviews that were not appearing at
headquarters, the people engaged with that, many of them have
already moved on to other things.
There have been several changes of personnel both among the
Federal side and on the contractor side at the site. It is my
belief that the problems were not isolated to the site or the
feds or the contractor at the site. I think as you can read
about it, it was a basic failure of our ability to manage a
project of this size.
I again assure you that the Secretary immediately put some
actions in place back last July when he was briefed on this
subject. He put some very significant actions in place. Then
after the first draft of that report where it came to be, we
likewise did similar types of things to improve management both
at the site and at the headquarters.
Senator Sessions. It looks like you began to get control on
that. We have some major decisions to make in the future. I
hope that you will not be hesitant to speak up on the policy
questions to the extent of the cleanup required, the issues
that South Carolina has dealt with, and whether or not those
same principles could be applied there, and do so in a way that
certainly does not shut off or deny people in Washington and
Idaho the right to be consulted and discuss it, but
fundamentally it's our problem, I say our, Federal
Government's, United States. Surely, if we work at it, with
good science and care, we will make some progress.
Mr. Ambassador, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
recently issued a report titled ``Recommendations for Nuclear
Weapons Complex of the Future.'' This report, conducted at the
direction of Congress and completed by a panel of experts from
outside the DOE, envisioned a vastly changed nuclear weapons
complex.
The report recommended shutting down current facilities and
creating one large ``consolidated'' new location. A report was
prepared at the direction of Congress and attempted to take a
fresh look at the nuclear weapons complex as it exists and
compared it to the nuclear weapons complex we need now. Among
the principal findings of the reports were the following: ``The
DOD does not provide DOE with unified integrated weapons
requirements and the DOD does not appear to trust DOE's ability
to respond with predictability.''
I guess that's a lot like what Senator Nelson talked about
at the beginning. Then it goes on another one: ``The DOE has
burdened the nuclear weapons complex with rules and regulations
that focus on process rather than mission safety.'' It goes on:
``Cost benefit analysis and risk informed decisions are absent,
resulting in a risk averse posture at all management levels.''
Then in summary, they say this: ``The task force found a
nuclear weapons complex neither robust nor agile nor responsive
with little evidence of a master plan.''
This report was issued in July 2005 and was presented to
the Secretary of Energy shortly thereafter. It describes a
nuclear weapons complex that functions minimally and that as
currently configured will not be able to support us in the
future, that got an apparently bad grade. Maybe you can call it
an F. Why has the DOE not yet put forward a response or a
rebuttal of some kind to react to this report? I would think
that being criticized in this fashion DOE would feel compelled
to respond at least in some way. That's pretty dramatic
criticism, I think. Do you share any of the concerns of this
report and can we expect a response?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. I think we share most of the
concerns of the report. I don't think we disagree in any major
way on the assessment of some of the problems. What we are
trying to do is figure out a fiscally responsive, responsible
way to deal with the solutions. Let me take a couple of the
points.
With the new assignment of General Cartwright, with Under
Secretary Krieg and Under Secretary Edelman and I, we are
working to get greater clarity in DOD requirements. You see
this in the very close way the two departments are working
together on the RRW. Although this sounds like it's old news,
it was actually after much of the analysis was done that the
two departments worked together on the very large stockpile
reductions announced by the President in the summer of 2004.
We are not yet perfect in this regard, but we are
substantially better. The issue of the internal operation of
DOE facilities is something that the Secretary and the Deputy
Secretary and I are personally working on. We are working on a
formal methodology for risk, making risk informed decisions
rather than trying to make decisions that are zero risk. I
think the criticism that the Department has become risk averse
is true.
I think that fixing that while not letting the pendulum
swing too far, if you go far enough back in history of this
Department and predecessor organizations, you'll find
spectacular examples of hurting people. We have not done that
in the last 5 years. We want to improve our performance, but we
don't want to hurt anybody. So getting that exact balance is
something that we are still working on.
There has been no rebuttal to this report because largely
we agree. We agree with the report's conclusion that the RRW
should be central. We agree with the report's conclusion that
there should be accelerated dismantlements and we have been
asked in this year's budget for additional funding to
dismantle. I expect dismantlement to go up by roughly 50
percent between 2006 and 2007. We agree with the report's
requirement or recommendation for the consolidation of nuclear
material.
Where the problem comes for us is in this single complex.
The report would take facilities at the Pantex plant in Texas,
the Y-12 plant in Tennessee, and the plutonium-related work at
the Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) and put it all together in a
single facility. The report does not specify where that
facility might be. The problem is that whatever the merits of
doing that, it would require substantially more money than I
think we are likely to see in the near term.
Senator Sessions. The DOD has been through those things,
they call them Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC)
and they claim that if you analyze it correctly, you can
ascertain whether your savings will be worth it. A lot of times
people say it's easier to consolidate, but consolidation may
cost more than it's worth. But there are ways, are there not,
to analyze whether or not you could improve efficiency and save
by some consolidation?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. I think the Overskei panel
itself has some views, which I think are estimates of potential
savings. All of their estimates are only valid to one
significant figure. As they look over 25 years in the future,
they believe their recommendations would save a certain amount
of money. The problem is you save it in the last 15 years but
you spend it in the next 10.
Senator Sessions. That is true. Perhaps not that big a
deal. DOD's base closures were supposed to pay for themselves
in 5 years, or they were not going to close the base. I'm not
sure they were accurate. Let me just follow then. But let's ask
you this. DOD did not provide you with unified integrated
weapons requirements. You've taken steps to make that happen?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. We have.
Senator Sessions. You should. If there are not sufficient
responses there, then I think this Congress can pass
legislation that we require the kind of consultation that's
necessary.
With regard to the DOE rules that focus on process rather
than mission safety, what steps have you taken with regard to
that?
Ambassador Brooks. We are in the process of an extensive
internal look to try and decide how we move beyond the present
situation of very cumbersome safety rules without moving away
from fundamental safety. We are looking at a variety of things.
I met with all my Federal site managers on this subject about
10 days ago.
We have had a couple of additional looks, the Secretary and
the Deputy Secretary and I met.
Senator Sessions. You and the Secretary personally conveyed
to your employees that you agree with the report that says that
the risk informed decisions are absent and resulting in a risk
averse posture?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. You want that to end?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. We have done things to fix
that.
Senator Sessions. It would take you a while with
bureaucracy.
Ambassador Brooks. I need to be candid with Congress. It
has taken us a while to get to where we are and it's going to
take us a while to get where we need to be, but we are
committed to getting there.
Senator Sessions. I'll ask both of you this. We are
concerned that DOE has started an effort to make use of
alternatively financed construction projects. NNSA already has
within it a project that was started without notifying this
committee. Apparently it has two additional projects under
review that are ready to begin. Ambassador Brooks, how many
projects has NNSA started? How many are under review, and how
many are planned to begin in fiscal year 2006?
Ambassador Brooks. There are two projects at Y-12 which are
the two where, to be blunt, we screwed up. We notified the
appropriators and failed to notify the authorizers. We will not
make that mistake again.
The projects, had we properly notified the committee, you
would be pleased with because we are saving the taxpayers'
money through private financing and we are going to get things
that will help consolidate 1,200 people and get us out of a lot
of old and expensive and poor facilities. But we should have
notified the committee and we did not.
There are those two. There is a project at Los Alamos. I am
not aware of anything that is under consideration that has been
discussed with me. That doesn't mean I won't have people
wandering around the complex thinking of these ideas and I will
provide to the committee anything that is under active
consideration. I am not aware of anything new.
I am aware that there is a general belief that where it is
appropriate, these kind of alternate financing approaches can
be beneficial to the taxpayer.
Senator Sessions. Congress has to understand what is going
on in our oversight capacity.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Really, we have some concerns here. I
think we want to be more engaged perhaps than we have been in
the past in how your plans are going.
Ambassador Brooks. Certainly, sir. I do not believe there
is anything active right now, but I will provide either
confirmation of that fact or correction for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The process for developing an alternative for financing
construction is as follows: The contractor develops (with oversight
from the NNSA site office) a proposal that is submitted to the DOE
Office of Engineering and Construction Management (OECM) for review. If
OECM and the NNSA program believe the proposal has merit, it is
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and
approval. If approved, the contractor will engage a private development
firm to secure the financing and land needed for construction. In some
cases land is obtained via a lease or deed from NNSA or DOE. If the
Department does not provide the land, the commitment of the government
is generally limited to reimbursing the contractor for the reasonable
cost of leasing the building. This commitment is usually limited at one
year's lease cost subject to review each year if the contractor decides
to continue to lease the building.
Status of Current Defense Programs Projects:
Los Alamos Science Complex
What was proposed:Bioscience Building proposed to provide LANL with
a multipurpose facility, ``for responsive research and development and
industrial infrastructure needed to develop, build, and maintain
nuclear offensive forces and defensive systems.''
Status: Disapproved the analysis found a bias towards the lease
alternative and the total rent far exceeded total project cost. Not
pursued.
Albuquerque Transportation and Technology Center
What was proposed: Project provides physical facilities to be used
in support of the Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program, including
capabilities for STA fleet storage.
Status: OMB approval was received and presented to Congress as an
alternative lease under GSA. Congress approved. Contractor is seeking
financing.
Y-12 Administrative and Technical Support Facilities
What was proposed: Project will provide technical and
administrative offices, cafeteria, occupational health clinic, human
resources, administrative purchasing, visitors center and badging
office, technical computing, and small laboratories for use by the
contractor.
Status: Was originally submitted as the Oak Ridge National Security
Complex. OECM rejected the proposal, which was reworked by the
contractor and resubmitted. The analyses confirmed a valid business
case for choosing to proceed with the alternative of private
development with operating lease. Reviewed and approved by OMB.
Construction is presently underway.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, how many projects has
EM started, how many are under review, and how many are planned
for fiscal year 2006?
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, do you mean in the sense of
private financing?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Mr. Rispoli. I'm not aware of any, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, there may be some more
questions that I will submit to you for the record and we'll
keep the record open for 2 days for questions. I'm calling on
you and I think our full committee would call on you to
reaffirm, reestablish your relationship with the Senate to the
extent that we know that you are focused on representing the
taxpayers' interest in the defense of the United States, that
you're prepared to challenge the employees and contractors,
most of which are contract employees, in an aggressive way to
ensure that the taxpayers are being well-served by the work.
It's a difficult thing. Government works in ways that will
never be perfectly efficient. They are just not going to
happen. But a good management kind of lead can break down some
of the barriers and can be effective. I think many of the
problems that we have seen that clearly cost billions of
dollars and if not dealt with have cost us billions more in the
future represent a lack of will at the management level. With
good, strong will and determination, you see what the problems
are, how they can be fixed, not take surface answers, dig
deeply and challenge some of the ideas that may be percolating
can be real helpful to us. I thank you for your work.
Mr. Rispoli, you have a big challenge, I think, with this
cleanup. You know it's something we have to do. We will
probably spend a billion dollars in Anniston cleaning up poison
gas. I can't help but believe we could have done it for less,
but we would have done it safely or carefully and we will
probably spend $17 billion cleaning up poison gas facilities
around the country. Then we have the nuclear sites.
When you consider the flesh and bone that we need to have a
strong national defense, this is money draining away from us.
So if we can keep those costs at a level all the time while
getting the same results that we need to maintain safety, you
will make all of us over here happy. Anything else you would
like to add before we dismiss? Any responses or anything you'd
like to say?
Ambassador Brooks. No.
Mr. Rispoli. Just in closing, again, Mr. Chairman, thank
you for your continued support and we look forward to working
with you.
Senator Sessions. You have a critical role in our Nation's
defense and we look forward to working with you. Thank you. We
are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
1. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, in
1988, Congress established an external oversight board--the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)--to review the safety aspects
of Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear activities. In recent
experience, however, failure to resolve technical issues raised by the
DNFSB has resulted in the need for very costly interruptions in
projects while construction was already underway or has required
expensive retrofitting or redesign. The most notable examples have been
differences over the appropriate seismic standards at the Hanford Waste
Treatment Project, as well as the Salt Waste Processing Facility at
Savannah River in South Carolina. There have also been differences of
opinion between DOE and the Board regarding the appropriate safety
classification for a plutonium facility at Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL). What is the process, if one exists, for resolving
technical issues between DOE and the DNFSB?
Ambassador Brooks. The DOE guidelines, processes, functions, and
responsibilities for interfacing with the DNFSB are delineated in the
Department's Manual 140.1-1B, Interfacing with the DNFSB. This is
derived from the DNFSB's enabling legislation which specifies the
processes for accepting, rejecting, and implementing a DNFSB
recommendation. The DNFSB communicates issues with the Department
through a variety of mechanisms including formal recommendations,
formal reporting requirements, letters requesting action and
information, and letters providing information. The Department's
process used to resolve a technical issue is based on the DNFSB's
mechanism used to communicate it to the Department. In general the
action officer develops the strategy and obtains approval from the
responsible line manager. The Department's process encourages close
communication with the DNFSB and its staff through briefings,
discussions, site visits, and other informal interactions.
With respect to safety classification of the ventilation system for
the plutonium facility at LANL, National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) is conducting specific studies to understand the
effectiveness of existing safety systems at LANL and to determine what
modifications are needed to improve safety. The NNSA and LANL's
approach for addressing the safety classification of the ventilation
system and the status of analytical studies have been discussed with
the DNFSB.
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE processes, functions, and responsibilities for
interfacing with the DNFSB are delineated in DOE's Manual 140.1-1B,
Interfacing with the DNFSB. Usually, matters are resolved at the staff
level. Occasionally, issues must be vetted at the executive level to be
resolved. Ultimately, the DOE is the arbiter of the safety bases for
its facilities.
2. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, is
there a process which allows DOE to either accept or reject the DNFSB
recommendations prior to the need for these costly interventions?
Ambassador Brooks. The Department's Manual 140.1-1B, Interfacing
with the DNFSB, establishes a process for accepting and rejecting
formal DNFSB recommendations. This process is specified in the DNSFB's
enabling legislation. The Department's process encourages issues to be
resolved early with the DNFSB and its staff through briefings,
discussions, site visits, and other informal interactions.
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, section 315 of the Atomic Energy Act sets forth
the process by which the Secretary can either accept or reject a DNFSB
recommendation.
3. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, if
there were a more formalized process within which the DNFSB could raise
concerns, such as at the completion of preliminary design and final
design, and then DOE could react to those reviews by the DNFSB--would
that be a better system for containing the costs on these projects?
Ambassador Brooks. The DNFSB's enabling legislation establishes a
formal process that requires the DNFSB to review the design of a new
defense nuclear facility before construction begins and to recommend to
the Secretary, within a reasonable time, such modifications of the
design as the DNFSB considers necessary to ensure adequate protection
of public health and safety. The legislation also requires that during
the construction of any defense nuclear facility, the DNFSB is to
periodically review and monitor the construction and submit to the
Secretary recommendations relating to the construction of that
facility, as the DNFSB considers necessary to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety. The DNFSB and its staff are
encouraged to participate in the Department's own review of the design
and especially in the development of the preliminary documented safety
analysis to avoid having significant changes identified later. The NNSA
encourages the DNFSB site representatives to participate in the daily
developmental activities, such as meetings to resolve design issues,
for the same purpose.
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE is revising its specific processes for
improving how safety is incorporated into design of new nuclear defense
facilities, especially in the early project planning phases. As part of
that improvement process, the DOE is revising Order 413.3, Project
Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, originally issued in
October 2000. Based on experience and feedback, we have identified a
number of potential improvements to clarify and strengthen the order to
facilitate early integration of safety in the design, and the continued
focus on safety during the construction, testing, and turnover of
projects. A public meeting was conducted on December 7, 2005, where the
DNFSB concerns and DOE efforts were discussed. The public meeting
focused on the timely incorporation of safety into the design and
construction of defense nuclear facilities, and thus DOE is improving
its directive in this regard.
HEALTH AND PENSION BENEFITS FOR DOE CONTRACT WORKERS
4. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, in
debate on the defense authorization bill last year, there were a number
of proposed amendments dealing with the health and pension benefits of
DOE contract workers. Most notably, the Senate defeated an amendment
which would have enhanced the benefits of contractor employees at the
DOE Rocky Flats Site by crediting them with additional service time
against the contract. There were other amendments filed to the bill
that seemed to be intended to ``lock in'' the health and pension
benefits of contractor employees at other DOE sites. One amendment was
structured to prohibit DOE from entering into any contract for work at
a DOE site if the contract would have resulted in benefits for contract
workers which were less lucrative than those provided to current
contract workers. Why does DOE play such an intimate role in the
establishment of the benefits packages offered by its contractors?
Ambassador Brooks. NNSA accomplishes its mission primarily through
its contractors and their highly skilled and specialized workforce.
Because of the rather unique skills these employees possess they
generally work for the NNSA contractor throughout their careers. Even
when the government competes its management and operating (M&O)
contracts the majority of the employees simply transfer to the new M&O
contractor. In this way the government retains the benefit of the
skilled workforce and the flexibility afforded by the workers being
employees of the contractor rather than the Federal Government. In many
instances, the critical skills necessary to accomplish the NNSA mission
can be found only in a limited number of places, e.g. the scientists
and engineers at our national laboratories.
Virtually all of the costs incurred by the M&O contractor,
including the costs associated with pensions and benefits, are
reimbursed to the contractor by the government. So, while the NNSA does
not treat contractor employees as its own, the long-term relationship
and the reimbursement of virtually all costs has led to NNSA working
closely with its contractors on the design of the pension and benefits.
Contracts typically require approval by the contracting officer of the
pension and benefit plan documents, and of any changes to those plans
that increase the costs reimbursed by the government.
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE requires all prime contractors to meet
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, U.S. Department of Labor, and
U.S. Internal Revenue Service requirements as pension and benefit plan
sponsors, while assuring judicious expenditure of public funds.
Additional requirements are outlined in the DOE Acquisition Regulation
(Code of Federal Regulations, Title 48, Chapter 9) and in the DOE Order
350.1 Chg 1, Contractor Human Resource Management Programs. Because
these benefits represent considerable costs to the Department and are
reflected in the terms and conditions of our contracts, the DOE
provides oversight to ensure appropriate pension and health plans are
developed and administered. The DOE does not manage or administer any
contractor pension or health plans, nor do we have representatives on
any governing boards.
The DOE is committed to fulfilling its obligations under its
contracts regarding the reimbursement of contractor employee pension
and health benefit costs, but is focusing on methods to mitigate the
cost volatility and liability growth and to improve the predictability
of the DOE annual cost reimbursement obligations for contractor pension
costs.
5. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, is this approach
unique, compared with the contracting approaches of other Federal
departments?
Ambassador Brooks. While I believe that the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) utilizes a similar approach to the
management and operation of its facilities, I cannot speak with
certainty about the approach other agencies use.
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE is one of nine agencies that use Federally
Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) to conduct its
research and scientific work. According to the Congressional Research
Service (CRS), these centers were developed during and after World War
II as hybrid organizations to meet a Federal need through the use of
private organizations. At that time, there was recognition of a
national emergency requirement to recruit and retain scientific and
engineering talent for the war effort. DOE's Oak Ridge and LANL were
established at that time as government-owned, contractor-operated
(GOCO) facilities, with hiring and employee pension and benefits
programs developed and put in place by the contractor operator/
employer, not the Federal Government. This system of GOCO facilities,
with a contractor workforce, has been used by the DOE since that time
to carry out many of the DOE's major mission efforts, including weapons
production, scientific research and environmental cleanup.
The DOE is unique among Federal agencies with respect to the extent
it utilizes the GOCO approach to accomplishing the agency's missions.
However, the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies, including
the NASA (the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, operated by Caltech), the
Federal Aviation Administration, the National Institutes of Health, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Department of Homeland Security also
have FFRDCs operated by contractors with contractor employees. In all
agencies, Federal contracting officers are responsible for making
determinations of allowable human resource management contractor costs,
consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation and applicable
contract terms and conditions.
6. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, can you provide
examples of other Federal agencies that have a similar level of
involvement in managing workforce issues associated with the employees
of its contractors?
Ambassador Brooks. I do not have detailed insight into other
Federal agencies to sufficiently address this question.
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE and eight other Federal agencies use FFRDCs to
conduct scientific research and development work. The DOE has 16 large
research laboratories which are FFRDCs. The FFRDCs are operated by
contractors (e.g., educational institutions, nonprofit entities, or
for-profit entities), with non-Federal workforces and non-Federal pay
and benefits systems. In all agencies, Federal contracting officers are
responsible for making determinations of allowable human resource
management contractor costs, consistent with the Federal Acquisition
Regulation and applicable contract terms and conditions.
In response to rapidly increasing costs for employee pension and
benefits, most of these FFRDC contractors have restructured their
benefits programs. According to the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) and the CRS, FFRDCs at other agencies are using defined
contribution pension plans (e.g., 401k type plans) and like most
employers, do not provide supplemental medical care coverage for those
retirees who qualify for Medicare. On April 27, 2006, DOE issued DOE
Notice 351.1, Contractor Employee Pension and Medical Benefits Policy
that sets forth the DOE's policy on reimbursement of costs for
contractor employee benefits. Under this policy, new employees will be
offered market-based pension and medical plans.
SECURITY COSTS AND MATERIALS CONSOLIDATION
7. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, a
number of committees of Congress, including this one, have urged DOE in
the strongest possible terms to move forward on the consolidation of
the storage of nuclear materials across the DOE complex. Congress has
urged this consolidation in the face of escalating costs to secure
these materials against the threats that we now realize exist since the
attacks of September 11. What is DOE doing to address the cost of
security?
Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has been moving aggressively to improve
the security of nuclear materials, while continuing our stewardship of
the nuclear weapons stockpile. The NNSA has recently completed the
relocation of Category I/II nuclear materials from the Criticality
Experiments Facility at LANL to more secure facilities within LANL and
at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Nevada Test Site. Current
consolidation efforts include eliminating the need for a Category I/II
materials at Sandia National Laboratories site in Albuquerque, and
construction of new facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex
(Y-12). The new facilities will allow the consolidation of highly
enriched uranium into facilities that are easier to protect and more
efficient to operate.
To date, over 90 metric tons of surplus highly enriched uranium
have been eliminated as part of the fissile materials disposition
program. Disposition of additional excess materials is necessary to
support the Y-12 onsite consolidation effort, and to support the future
de-inventory of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The NNSA is
working with other departmental elements to establish disposition paths
for materials that are excess to national security requirements. Each
of these actions enhances our security posture, reduces security costs,
or allows us to avoid unnecessary security upgrades at existing
facilities.
Mr. Rispoli. Consolidation of nuclear materials to fewer sites and
disposition of nuclear materials are two strategies that will do the
most to reduce the future cost of security. Also, EM continues to
evaluate the application of new technologies to reduce the recurring
costs associated with manpower intensive operations. Since 2001, EM has
consolidated special nuclear materials from 14 material access areas
(MAAs) to 3 MAAs, which are facilities that store Category I materials.
Additionally, the DOE has established the Nuclear Materials Disposition
and Consolidation Coordination Committee (NMDCCC) of which EM is an
active member. The purpose of the NMDCCC is to ensure integration of
individual program disposition and consolidation efforts thus
identifying opportunities for resource sharing.
8. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
specifically, what are you doing within your program to bring about the
consolidation of materials and activities which will drive down program
costs?
Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has taken action to eliminate Category
I/II nuclear materials from multiple facilities in the nuclear weapons
complex and we are making progress in consolidation and disposition of
nuclear materials. However, materials consolidation is a complex issue
requiring consideration of site mission requirements, the availability
of materials processing, storage, transportation, and disposition
capabilities, and negotiation with State governments. The NNSA holds a
large inventory of excess nuclear materials. For some of these
materials, we have the programs and processes in place to disposition
them. Our programs to blend down highly enriched uranium (HEU) have
resulted in eliminating over 90 metric tons of HEU.
To continue our progress, additional disposition capabilities are
needed. We are constructing facilities at the SRS to convert excess
plutonium to nuclear fuel for use in electric power generation.
However, there are many materials that cannot be converted to nuclear
fuel and until disposition pathways are established, consolidation
options are limited. Consolidation to a site without disposition
capabilities would be counterproductive, consuming limited packaging,
secure transportation, and security resources, but without leading to
the elimination of the material. The NNSA is working to establish new
disposition and consolidation capabilities, such as the highly enriched
uranium facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex, and plutonium
disposition facilities at the SRS. Meanwhile, we are working with other
departmental elements to optimize the use of existing disposition
capabilities. For example, the NNSA has identified approximately 7.5
tons of nuclear materials that can be processed at SRS, using currently
available capabilities.
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE has established the NMDCCC to address these
issues. The Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment, the
Administrator of the NNSA, and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for EM comprise the executive steering committee and report to the
Deputy Secretary. This committee's initial focus is on establishing a
path forward for surplus plutonium at the Hanford Site to avoid
significant funding expenditures at Hanford to meet the latest security
requirements.
9. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, the
DOE NMDCCC is, as I understand it, the third manifestation of a
committee established by DOE to address this issue, under different
names and different chairmen, and yet none of these committees have yet
issued or implemented any recommendations resulting in actual
consolidation of nuclear material between DOE sites. When will we see
any results from these efforts?
Ambassador Brooks. Nuclear material management within the DOE has
been very fragmented, with each program setting its own priorities,
leaving a legacy of orphaned materials. We recognize the consequences
of this stovepipe style of management. Communication among programs has
improved significantly, partly as a result of Department-wide
consolidation committees. The strategic plan, under development by the
NMDCCC, will address the issue of departmental management of nuclear
materials. The strategic plan will create a framework for resolving
some of the more complex material disposition and consolidation
problems faced by the Department. In conjunction with the development
of the strategic plan, the NMDCCC is working to develop, in priority
order, implementation plans to address specific consolidation/
disposition initiatives. The first priority is development of an
implementation plan for consolidation of plutonium from the Hanford
Site in Washington, and excess plutonium from the national
laboratories.
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE's NMDCCC does have a new chairman with an
extensive background in nuclear materials management. This committee is
making progress on a variety of issues, and is undertaking to
thoroughly evaluate consolidation and disposition issues and thereafter
to include recommendations to the Department as appropriate. Both the
NNSA and the Office of EM are active members of the NMDCCC. The
principal mission of this committee is to provide a forum to perform
cross-cutting nuclear materials disposition and consolidation planning
with the objective of developing implementation plans for consolidation
and/or disposition as appropriate, so that out-year programmatic and
security costs to the Department are minimized.
CONSTRUCTION IRREGULARITIES AT Y-12 IN TENNESSEE
10. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, at its Y-12 Site in
Tennessee, DOE is constructing the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials
Facility. The principal purpose of this facility is to provide a
consolidated location for the receipt and storage of this Nation's
stockpile of highly enriched uranium. The new facility will meet all
safety and environmental requirements--which current storage locations
do not--and will provide a substantially more hardened and secure
facility for enriched uranium storage. DOE recently had to halt
construction of this facility, however, when it was discovered that the
reinforcing steel called for in the approved facility design was not
being installed. What is the status of this project?
Ambassador Brooks. Construction activity is gradually resuming at
the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, with the intention to
resume full construction activities by early April depending on the
rate at which workers can be recalled or rehired. As of March 7, 2006,
about a third of the project's work force had returned to the site to
restart steel placements and some non-building structure construction,
such as utility accesses and concrete pads that are required for the
project but not part of the building itself. The contractor is also
putting up structural steel in the mechanical support areas of the
building. This setback was indicative of a quality-control problem that
required a number of fixes. The contractor has taken aggressive steps
to improve the systems, processes, and procedures for project
management, quality control/assurance, and line management oversight
for this project. In parallel, the NNSA has increased its oversight of
the project to ensure that the contractor's assurance systems,
processes, and procedures are achieving the necessary changes in the
project's performance.
11. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, what is your evaluation of
the extent of the problem and what corrective actions are being
implemented?
Ambassador Brooks. Although peer reviews of the technical solutions
are not complete, it appears likely that all the non-compliant
conditions can be corrected without tearing out the existing
construction and starting anew (the large margins in the initial design
plus the quality of the conforming work are large contributors to this
likely outcome). Normal construction activity will resume during the
week of April 3, 2006.
The quality assurance problems have been given personal attention
by the senior corporate executives of all contractors and all involved
have reviewed and strengthened their oversight systems, processes, and
procedures for this project. This includes many changes in personnel
including: (1) the replacement of the quality assurance inspector who
failed to identify the missing reinforcing steel bars prior to concrete
placement, (2) the addition of numerous oversight and quality control/
assurance personnel, and (3) the addition and replacement of project
and construction management personnel. With respect to the NNSA, the
Federal Project Director has assigned a dedicated team of five
personnel to oversee all aspects of this project to replace the matrix
support he had before these issues surfaced. Numerous changes have been
made to reflect the Federal and contractor oversight procedures used at
Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) at the SRS, which have proved to be
successful.
12. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, how are the contractor and
project managers being held accountable for this interruption in
construction activities and any associated costs arising from it?
Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has formally notified the Y-12 Site
Office of NNSA's intention to reflect this poor performance and the
effectiveness of corrective actions in the fiscal year 2006 award fee
determination for BWXT Y-12, the management and operating contractor.
Implicit in this notification is that we will evaluate BWXT Y-12 in
part on the effectiveness of its efforts to hold accountable and to
recover costs to the greatest extent possible from the construction
subcontractor (with whom the Federal Government has no privity of
contract). A multi-year Performance Based Incentive is in place with a
primary focus on project baseline cost and schedule performance. Once
the upcoming Baseline Change Proposal is submitted and approved the
Performance Baseline Incentive will be adjusted accordingly to
establish the correct incentive and work to complete the newly
established baseline on or before the baseline schedule and within or
under the cost baseline. Finally, the contractor has implemented
personnel actions including replacing senior project and construction
management personnel.
PRICE ANDERSON ACT VIOLATIONS AT LIVERMORE LAB
13. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, last week the DOE issued a
notice of violation to LLNL for nuclear safety violations.
Specifically, the notice of violation stated that the lab ``did not
appropriately respond to observed and changing radiological conditions;
and radioactive material was allowed to be removed from the site
without fully understanding the contamination levels and without the
appropriate controls.'' The events cited in the notice took place in
2004. Can you explain why the process of issuing this safety citation
took so long?
Ambassador Brooks. The recent LLNL safety citation had a longer
timeline than most enforcement actions due to some unique circumstances
surrounding the case. Specifically, this enforcement case was extended
over time to include an initial key event in August 2004, a second key
event in April 2005, and several ongoing and longstanding programmatic
compliance issues.
In June 2004, a routine DOE/NNSA Price-Anderson Enforcement Program
Review identified that LLNL was not effectively implementing key
aspects of its own Price-Anderson self-regulatory program that the
Department relies on for applying enforcement discretion. Specifically,
if a contractor is effective at identifying and aggressively fixing
nuclear safety noncompliances before any real consequences, the
Department will typically refrain from issuing a citation.
Following this review DOE/NNSA decided to allow LLNL a 6-month
period (June 2004 to January 2005) to improve its self-regulating
performance partly due to the limited immediate consequences of the
identified issues. A January-February 2005 follow-up review indicated
LLNL had made limited progress in addressing the identified issues. In
addition, an investigation into an August 2004 radiological event
involving a Mobile Waste Characterization Facility (MOVER) indicated
that LLNL's ineffective performance was now resulting in undesirable
consequences. In March 2005, DOE/NNSA representatives decided to expand
the scope of the MOVER investigation and include other longstanding
nuclear safety performance issues. This investigation was completed in
August 2005 and included an April 2005 LLNL event involving the
unauthorized removal of radioactive contamination from the site.
In late October 2005, an informal enforcement conference was held
with LLNL senior management consistent with DOE/NNSA protocols. This
informal hearing allows the contractor to comment on the factual
accuracy of the investigation, discuss underlying causes and corrective
actions, and request mitigation towards any pending citation. A
proposed citation was completed in December 2005. In February 2006, the
citation was issued under my signature.
14. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, your letter to the
Director of Livermore, conveying the notice stated the following:
``I am also disappointed by the longstanding and recurring
nature of many of the deficiencies associated with the
violations. This recurring aspect casts significant doubt on
the Laboratory's ability to effectively analyze and correct
performance problems.''
What measures are you putting in place to address this larger
issue?
Ambassador Brooks. In my letter to the LLNL Director, I conveyed my
disappointment in the Laboratory's track record of failing to correct
identified deficiencies in a timely manner. Senior Laboratory managers
acknowledged the need for significant improvements in the Laboratory's
safety culture. We are committed to addressing identified concerns and
have been working aggressively over the past year on corrective actions
to prevent reoccurrence and ensure that high-quality safety programs
are in place at LLNL.
Our actions to date have included:
A thorough causal analysis of both the MOVER and
Phosphorous spill events has determined the underlying root
causes resulting in the implementation of new radiation
protection procedures, employee training, incident response
communication, and quality assurance processes.
Strengthening senior Laboratory management
accountability and instituting safety contracts with senior
managers to hold individuals personally accountable. These
contracts, required by the Director of the Laboratory,
stipulate that senior managers personally certify safety
practices within their organizations. This includes conducting
senior management walk-downs and detailed physical reviews of
Laboratory-wide hazard activities. Laboratory managers are
working to develop and implement a culture that encourages all
employees to stop work at any time if safety could possibly be
compromised.
Instituted a new Laboratory Office of Institutional
Performance Analysis (OIPA) that now tracks all external
assessments and required closeout dates. OIPA also analyzes
performance data to identify potential issues and applies a
``lessons learned'' strategy systemically across the
laboratory. A new senior management council regularly reviews
the work of OIPA, providing additional quality assurance. The
Lab's internal Price-Anderson Amendments Act (PAAA) office
structure and program expectations have been aggressively
strengthened. PAAA personnel have implemented new causal
analysis, verification, and validation procedures.
Specific improvements in other areas such as
configuration management, the formality of operations within
our nuclear facilities, incident response and safety
procedures, and radiation protection program staffing to
enhance and strengthen nuclear safety at LLNL.
From the DOE and NNSA perspective, I have increased
the level of Federal oversight at the Livermore Site Office,
assisted by nuclear safety experts from the NNSA Chief of
Defense Nuclear Safety Office, to monitor and assess LLNL
implementation of nuclear safety requirements. I will evaluate
Laboratory performance in complying with nuclear safety
requirements and the effectiveness of corrective actions as
part of the annual contractor performance review.
TEST READINESS
15. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 requires DOE to achieve a level
of ``test readiness'' which would allow the resumption of underground
nuclear testing within 18 months of a Presidential decision to conduct
a test. Under the law, DOE is to achieve this level of readiness no
later than October 1, 2006. I understand, however, that Congress has
not appropriated sufficient funds to allow the NNSA to support this
deadline. Is it true that DOE forecasts it cannot meet the statutory
deadline?
Ambassador Brooks. While the NNSA has made considerable progress in
improving its test readiness posture over the last 4 years, reducing
the readiness time from 36 months to 24, Congress did not provide the
funding requested by the President to achieve an 18-month test
readiness posture by the end of fiscal year 2006, as required by
section 3113 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004. Therefore, test readiness posture at October 1, 2006, will be
about 24 months.
16. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, in your view, does a
readiness posture of 24 months represent an acceptable level of
technical risk?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, we believe that this significant
improvement to 24 months is adequate for meeting our national security
needs.
17. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, in other words, since a
problem would likely have to be severe for this country to debate a
return to nuclear testing, when faced with a serious problem such as
this, in your technical judgment is it prudent to have to wait 2
additional years until we are ready to conduct a test to diagnose the
problem?
Ambassador Brooks. As previously discussed, Congress did not fully
provide the funds requested by the President to achieve an 18-month
test readiness posture by the end of fiscal year 2006. However, we do
believe that 24 months is adequate for meeting our national security
needs.
RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD
18. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, at the direction of
Congress, DOE is currently conducting a joint feasibility study--with
the DOD--on a RRW. This study will analyze a technical approach to
warhead design and maintenance which could potentially eliminate many
of the most costly and hazardous materials which are used in the
current nuclear stockpile. The nuclear weapons experts at the national
laboratories appear to be confident that it will be possible to field a
RRW without needing to resume underground nuclear weapons testing. Do
you share their confidence and why?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, I do share the confidence of those who
believe that we will be able to field a RRW without needing to resume
underground nuclear testing. While I am not a nuclear weapon designer,
I trust the judgment of expert nuclear weapon designers who inform me
that it is possible to field a warhead without underground testing,
especially if that warhead has ties to a previously tested
configuration. The intent of the RRW program is to identify nuclear and
non-nuclear replacement components that could be fielded without
nuclear testing. Feasible RRW options will be based on our database of
historical nuclear tests as well as from the experience of the
remaining designers and engineers who have successfully fielded our
current stockpile. The advances of our Stockpile Stewardship Program
(SSP) enable us to better understand nuclear explosive performance
through modeling, simulation, and experiments. The RRW designs are
explicitly chosen for higher margin in primary performance so that
certification analysis based on quantification of margins and
uncertainties will provide greater confidence than that provided by
today's high yield-to-weight designs as they continue to age or are
modified as part of the refurbishment program. That combination of
historical test information, modern SSP tools (e.g., high energy
density physics and the Advanced Simulation & Computing program),
improved margins, experienced designers and engineers, along with
relaxed military requirements for yield-to-weight ratios, will enable
us to design and certify nuclear components with high confidence. As a
result, fielding RRW systems will likely reduce the possibility that
the U.S. will need to conduct a nuclear test for certification or to
diagnose or remedy a stockpile reliability problem.
PIT PRODUCTION AND PLUTONIUM AGING
19. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, the United States ceased
production of plutonium pits when Rocky Flats was closed in 1989 and is
now trying to reconstitute a modest production line for pits at LANL.
What challenges--technical, operational, or cultural--is DOE
encountering in trying to increase the rate of production of pits at
Los Alamos?
Ambassador Brooks. There are many challenges confronting the DOE
and the LANL in increasing the rate of production of pits at the
plutonium facility at TA-55/PF-4. The PF-4 facility was designed over
30 years ago to support plutonium research and development instead of
the current multiple missions that include pit production. Major
challenges to improve the pit production capacity of PF-4 include the
physical limitations of the facility, equipment configuration and
installation, personnel qualification and retention, and continued
support of multiple plutonium missions. The TA-55/PF-4 facility
supports a number of important national missions in addition to pit
production. For example, continuing Pu-238 missions supporting the
NASA, both conventional and enhanced surveillance activities for pits,
special recovery activities, non-proliferation activities, and small-
scale physics testing. All of these activities use TA-55/PF-4 space
that limits the ability to expand the pit manufacturing mission. The
NNSA and LANL are working to resolve these challenges, and are
committed to establishing a pit production capacity of 10 W88 pits per
year in fiscal year 2007.
20. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, will the production at Los
Alamos be sufficient to sustain the stockpile over the long-term?
Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA plans to increase the LANL pit
manufacturing capacity to 30-40 pits per year by the end of fiscal year
2012. This production rate, however, is insufficient to meet DOD
projected requirements. The NNSA submitted a report to Congress in
January 2005 that identified the need for at least a 125-pit per year
capacity starting in 2021. This is based on a 60-year pit lifetime and
a stockpile based on the planned 2012 stockpile size approved by the
President and provided to Congress in a June 2004 report. Although we
expect more refined pit lifetime estimates by the end of fiscal year
2006, future pit production capacity requirements are likely to be
driven more by stockpile transformation than legacy pit lifetimes. We
are currently working with the DOD to develop long-term stockpile
quantities and transformation rates that would provide the requirement
basis for a long-term pit production capacity. Once we validate those
requirements through the Nuclear Weapons Council, we will work with
Congress to establish a plan for an infrastructure that can support the
longer-term need for pits.
21. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, in 2005, Congress directed
DOE to initiate more detailed study of the aging of plutonium pits used
in nuclear weapons to determine how long we might expect the current
pits to last. What is the status of this investigation?
Ambassador Brooks. By the end of fiscal year 2006, we will have
system-specific pit lifetime estimates that have been subject to peer
review between the weapons physics laboratories (LLNL and LANL) and
external review by a panel of scientific experts known as JASON.
SETTING BUDGET PRIORITIES
22. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, I am concerned that DOE
spending plans are influenced by the most vocal outside groups, or by
compliance agreements made years ago, and not through a careful
analysis of what environmental situations pose the greatest risk, and
how much cleanup is needed at each site in relation to the future use
of the site. Under the current program, is the DOE focused on cleaning
up the worst problems?
Mr. Rispoli. The fiscal year 2007 budget request reflects a crucial
balance of reducing risk and completing cleanup--an integrated strategy
to meet the program's objectives. Overall, our request puts a high
priority on safely dealing with tank waste, special nuclear materials,
and spent nuclear fuel disposition--our highest risk materials--while
preserving our commitments to site completion and closure.
23. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, is the DOE cleanup budget
prioritized by risk or are budgets set by the deadlines in the cleanup
agreements?
Mr. Rispoli. In formulating the budget request, we prioritize
cleanup work based on a judicious integration of risk, statutory and
regulatory requirements (including cleanup agreements),
interdependencies with communities and other DOE locations, and
contract and workforce efficiencies. Our aim is to forecast the needs
of the program in meeting the mission objectives of risk reduction and
cleanup completion while being good stewards of the U.S. taxpayer's
funds.
24. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, the cleanup agreement
between DOE, the EPA, and Washington State--called the Tri-Party
Agreement--was originally signed in 1989. A panel of outside experts
reviewing the Hanford cleanup characterized this agreement as follows:
``the milestones (in the agreement) were established well before all
the underlying science and technology had been developed.'' In
addition, according to reports, Under Secretary of Energy David Garman
made the following statement in a speech on February 16, 2006:
``Let's just be honest here; we're going to be in the legacy
cleanup business for a while. I think it's important for us to
get honest about that. To get honest about what our
capabilities are. To be honest about what kinds of timeframes
we're looking at.''
In your view, does it make sense to review the regulatory
agreements in place governing these cleanups--either on a periodic
basis or in cases where substantial new data or science is now
available?
Mr. Rispoli. The Hanford TPA Action Plan contains a process and a
form by which changes can be made to the TPA as the Hanford cleanup
progresses. Processes for changes to milestones are contained in all of
our regulatory agreements. The DOE and its regulators continuously
review these agreements for needed changes to milestones that may
result from technological advances and other issues.
Under the terms of the Hanford TPA, there have been approximately
440 approved change requests, six amendments, and three modifications
known as ``Directors Determinations.'' Within these changes, the
parties have agreed to add approximately 860 new milestones, delete
approximately 160 milestones, and extend approximately 200 milestones.
Essentially, these agreements in particular (and others in general) are
revised as situations warrant.
25. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, if the drive to execute
these cleanups on their original schedules is causing a substantial
upward pressure on the cost of cleanup, does DOE have an obligation to
revisit the existing commitments?
Mr. Rispoli. We are obligated to look at any opportunity that would
provide a similar or increased level of cleanup and risk reduction at
an improved schedule or lower cost to the U.S. public. We invite input
from our cleanup partners and other stakeholders that would enhance the
cost-effective completion of our mission objectives while meeting their
expectations.
WASTE INCIDENTAL TO REPROCESSING
26. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, 2 years ago, Congress
conducted substantial debate on the issue of residues or ``heels'' left
in nuclear waste storage tanks. Congress ultimately granted DOE the
authority to leave some small amount of this residue in place, after
DOE had physically emptied as much nuclear waste from each tank as
possible. This waste was defined as ``waste incidental to
reprocessing.'' How has DOE used this new authority?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE is implementing Section 3116 of the Ronald W.
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005
at the SRS and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the two sites
covered by the legislation.
On January 17, 2006, the Secretary made the first waste
determination under section 3116 for salt waste disposal at SRS, after
an approximately 10-month long consultation with the NRC. DOE is now
pursuing the necessary permits from the State of South Carolina.
DOE is currently consulting with the NRC on two other waste
determinations involving stabilized residual waste. The first concerns
INL tank residual waste, tanks, and associated components. The second
concerns residual waste in tanks at SRS.
27. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, the new authority requires
DOE to consult with the NRC in these matters. Has the NRC found this
approach to tank cleanup to be protective of public health?
Mr. Rispoli. In late December 2005, the NRC issued a Technical
Evaluation Report (TER) for the DOE draft waste determination for salt
waste disposal at the SRS. This NRC assessment was limited to the salt
waste disposal determination prepared by DOE. The NRC concluded that
there is reasonable assurance that DOE can meet the criteria provided
in the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 in section 3116
(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)(A)(i), provided that certain assumptions
made in DOE's analyses are verified via monitoring. The NRC reached
this conclusion based on information provided by DOE to the NRC in
letters dated March 31, June 30, September 15, and September 30, 2005.
There are three applicable criteria for determining that certain
wastes from reprocessing are not high-level waste. NRC's position on
each criterion follows:
``Given that there is reasonable assurance that DOE's
proposed approach can meet the other criteria in the NDAA,
including the performance objectives of 10 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) 61, Subpart C [Licensing Requirements for
Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste], and that there appears to
be no other properties of the waste that would require deep
geologic disposal, the NRC finds that there is reasonable
assurance that Criterion One [that the waste does not require
permanent isolation in a deep geologic repository for spent
fuel or high-level radioactive waste] of the NDAA can be met.''
``[T]he NRC has concluded that there is reasonable
assurance that DOE can meet Criterion Two [that the waste has
had highly radioactive radionuclides removed to the maximum
extent practical] with its proposed approach.''
``[T]he NRC has concluded that there is reasonable
assurance that DOE can meet Criterion Three, which by reference
incorporates the performance objectives of 10 CFR 61, Subpart
C.''
The NRC's conclusions presented in the TER are based on the
information provided by DOE. The NRC asserted, ``If, in the future, DOE
determines it is necessary to revise its assumptions, analysis, design
or waste management approach and those changes are important to meeting
the criteria of the NDAA, DOE should consult once again with the NRC
regarding the enclosed TER.''
28. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, this authority does not
apply to the waste tanks at Hanford in Washington. Is there something
unique about the chemistry of the waste in those tanks or could the
extension of this authority to Hanford tank waste result in an improved
and more cost effective cleanup for the Hanford tanks?
Mr. Rispoli. While different reprocessing technologies and unique
radionuclide removal programs were employed at Hanford, the SRS, and
the INL, the chemical make-up of the waste does not preclude extension
of this authority to Hanford tank waste. In fact, with the exception of
the final waste form for some of the wastes, the strategy for
retrieval, treatment, and disposal of tank wastes at the Hanford Site
is consistent with that of the SRS.
BUDGET PROPOSAL TO HIRE A PROJECT MANAGEMENT AGENT AT HANFORD
29. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, the fiscal year 2007
budget request includes a proposal to hire a contractor--referred to as
a ``project management agent''--to oversee or manage the work that is
being done by another contractor (Bechtel) at the Hanford Waste
Treatment Plant (WTP). This reads like an unusual proposal to hire one
government contractor to manage another government contractor. Could
you please explain the proposal that is contained in the budget request
for the hiring of this new ``project management agent'' at Hanford?
Mr. Rispoli. The project management agent would be what is termed
in the commercial construction industry as the owner's representative,
with the DOE being the owner. During peak construction and
commissioning of the WTP, this agent will have up to five full-time
senior personnel, each with expertise in managing large projects of
similar complexity. The agent will serve in an advisory role to the DOE
and will not direct Bechtel National, Inc., the Hanford WTP contractor.
The agent would advise DOE on: design conformance with contract
requirements; cost containment, quality assurance, and safety
compliance; effectiveness of management processes such as change
control and invoice reviews; and contingency issue anticipation. The
goal is for the agent to provide a broad range of experience and advice
to the DOE's Federal Project Director overseeing the WTP project.
This type of service is common in the engineering and construction
industry, and DOE has successfully employed this type of service on
several past projects.
30. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, what is Congress being
asked to fund and, if funded, what organizational structure would
result?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the
major construction of the WTP, Subproject 01-D-416, includes proposed
funding to obtain project management oversight assistance and personnel
to serve in an advisory role to the DOE's Federal Project Director for
the WTP project. The Federal Project Director reports to the Manager,
Office of River Protection. The goal is for the advisor(s) to provide a
broad range of experience and advice to the Federal Project Director
and to the Headquarters office dedicated to oversight of this project,
to help assure successful completion of the WTP.
31. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, DOE is also requesting
funds to hire additional Federal staff to manage the WTP project. Will
the Federal staff then oversee both contractors?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE Federal Project Director and other senior
Federal staff will oversee both the WTP contractor, Bechtel National
Inc., and the project management agent.
32. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, DOE has now put in place a
number of review teams and senior management teams, as part of the
``recovery'' plan at the WTP. Could you please provide a diagram or
narrative explaining the current reporting and organizational structure
in place for this project?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE's accountability for the Hanford Waste
Treatment and Immobilization Plant project flows from the Deputy
Secretary, as the Secretarial Acquisition Executive, to the Assistant
Secretary for EM, to the Chief Operating Officer for EM, to the
Manager, Office of River Protection, to the Federal Project Director.
The Office of Project Recovery serves in an oversight and advocacy role
at the Headquarters' Office of EM. The Director for the Office of
Project Recovery reports directly to the Assistant Secretary for EM.
REEXAMINATION OF RESPONSES
33. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, in your invitation to
appear, you were asked to address, as a component of your testimony, a
number of policies and issues confronting the EM program which you were
not able to address during your confirmation last year, but which you
had committed to address upon assuming your duties as Assistant
Secretary. Since you did not provide those views as part of your
testimony for the hearing, I am renewing the subcommittee's request for
this information by resubmitting these questions, originally asked of
you during your confirmation proceedings. Please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: The
Assistant Secretary for EM is responsible for cleanup activities
occurring at DOE sites across the country. What are your views on the
roles and responsibilities of field managers relative to those of EM
headquarters managers?
Mr. Rispoli. The field managers are responsible for ensuring that
the cleanup work is done in a safe and effective manner, and in
compliance with applicable laws and regulations. They are responsible
for managing the projects imbedded in the contracts through which the
Office of EM accomplishes its work. Headquarters managers are
responsible for developing policy and providing guidance that affects
field operations. Headquarters managers also provide oversight of the
field activities to ensure the work is carried out consistent with DOE
and EM policies.
34. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What
is your view of EM's organizational structure?
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM is currently in the process of
modifying its headquarters organizational structure to place greater
emphasis on acquisition and project management, safety, and technical
expertise. Our primary goal is to manage our projectized portfolio with
90 percent of our projects performing on, or better than, cost and
schedule targets. We must do this safely, for the protection of the
workers, the site, and the communities where our sites are located. The
proposed organizational structure better supports these goals by
establishing clear lines of responsibility and accountability to
improve overall program performance.
35. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Is
there a well-delineated and consistent chain of command and reporting
structure from the field staff to headquarters staff, from the
contractors to DOE officials, and from the Office of EM to the
Secretary of Energy and other DOE officials?
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM is in the process of modifying its
headquarters structure to improve program performance. One method of
accomplishing this is to establish clear lines of responsibility and
accountability at the most appropriate level within programs and
projects. Our proposed organizational structure solidifies roles and
responsibilities of each office in EM. Clearly understood roles and
responsibilities will improve interaction between field and
headquarters staff, and between Federal and contractor personnel.
Unchanged will be the line chain of command, which is exercised by the
Chief Operating Officer at Headquarters, directly to each EM site
manager. I intend to ensure all staff know their decisionmaking
authority and understand the chain of command for elevating issues when
necessary.
36. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Do the
field offices have enough autonomy and flexibility to work with the
contractors at the sites to get the cleanup finished in a safe and
efficient manner? In your opinion, should the field offices have more
autonomy than they currently have?
Mr. Rispoli. I believe sufficient autonomy and flexibility exist
within field offices to enable Federal staff to work with site
contractors effectively in completing cleanup activities in an
efficient manner. We are focusing on improving the understanding that
field office staff and headquarters staff have of their roles and
responsibilities within this process to maximize the effective use of
their capabilities. The entire focus is based upon the fundamental
principle that headquarters staff exist to assist the Chief Operating
Officer and the line organization to get the job done safely and
effectively.
37. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: The EM
program has used a variety of contracting methods, including management
and operating cost plus award fee contracts, cost plus incentive fee
contracts, and performance-based, fix-priced contracts. What is your
view of the role of these, or other, contracting methods, and what
principles do you believe DOE should follow when entering into EM
contracts in the future?
Mr. Rispoli. As I stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee in
June 2005, there should be a common, disciplined approach to our
acquisitions and contract management for the Department's EM projects.
This approach should offer the necessary latitude for tailoring each
contract to suit the individual challenges and risks associated with
each situation.
Since most of EM's cleanup activities are accomplished through the
use of a contract workforce, our acquisition strategies, contract
usage, and contract management are of paramount importance. That is why
EM's headquarters reorganized structure includes a Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Acquisition and Project Management, whose function will
be to lead development of acquisition strategies and contract vehicles
that set clear responsibilities, specific tasks, and facilitate
improved contract management by commercial contractors as well as by
Federal onsite officials.
When entering into contracts in the future, I expect the type of
contract to be selected on a case-by-case basis considering the scope
and complexity of the work, the uncertainties and risks involved, the
period of performance, and the incentive arrangement. This includes
appropriate use of management and operations arrangements, cost-plus-
incentive-fee contracts, performance-based contracts, and fixed-price
contracts for projects with well-defined work scope.
I expect to continue aggressive contracting strategies to clean up
and close sites that have clearly defined scopes of work and end
states. The goal is to write solicitations that incentivize safety,
innovation, cost savings, and schedule acceleration, where appropriate,
and to complement our emphasis on a strengthened project management
program.
38. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: The
DOE has offered changing views, over the lifetime of the EM program, as
to whether the program should focus on cleaning up the sites now within
its purview or whether the program should have an ongoing mission of
cleaning up all surplus DOE facilities, as the facilities become
excess, over time. Do you believe there is a point at which the EM
program should stop taking surplus buildings, facilities, or waste
streams from other components of the DOE into the EM program for
decommissioning, decontamination, and disposal?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE recognizes that it has significant
environmental liabilities that are not currently the responsibility of
any program. The DOE is currently in the process of evaluating options
for handling these unassigned and unfunded environmental liabilities.
39. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What
requirements would you place on the other DOE programs before you would
take additional buildings, facilities, or waste into the EM program?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE is currently in the process of evaluating
options for handling unassigned and unfunded environmental liabilities
and expects to identify a path forward by the end of fiscal year 2006.
As part of the transfer of any facility from one program to another
program for decontamination and decommissioning, I would envision that
the transferring program would be required to stabilize that facility
so that any immediate risk would be mitigated. A complete set of
transfer requirements will be developed as part of the process of
resolving this issue.
40. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Do you
believe it is an appropriate policy for the EM program to ``go out of
business'' at some point and leave the remainder of newly generated
waste as the responsibility of existing DOE programs? If not, how
should newly generated wastes be managed and which program (EM or the
program generating the waste) should budget for these activities?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, I believe it is the appropriate policy that the
DOE program that generates the waste is responsible for its management
and disposal. This is standard industry practice, since it provides an
internal driver for the generator to develop a cost-effective waste
management program that incorporates waste minimization approaches. As
a result, over the last several years, responsibility for management of
newly generated waste has been transferred to the generator or landlord
program at the various sites. The Office of EM maintains responsibility
for the management of newly generated waste at sites where it is the
landlord program.
41. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: In
developing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,
this committee did not adopt the proposal in the President's budget
request of transferring certain EM activities from the EM program into
the NNSA. In the committee's view, such a transfer would not comply
with the legislation which established the NNSA. What is the DOE's
interpretation of these provisions of the NNSA Act which relate to the
possible transfer of cleanup activities into the NNSA? What is your
interpretation?
Mr. Rispoli. Title XXXII of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65 as amended, the ``Act'')
established the NNSA as a separately organized agency within the DOE.
The Act provides that the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security serves
as the Administrator of NNSA. The Secretary of Energy may transfer to
NNSA ``any . . . mission or function that the Secretary, in
consultation with the Administrator and Congress, determines to be
consistent with the mission of the [NNSA].'' (NNSA Act Sec. 3291(b)).
(Section 3291(c) of the Act allows, but does not require, the Secretary
to ``transfer responsibility for'' any environmental remediation or
waste management activity to another non NNSA element of the DOE.)
Furthermore, the Act provides that the Administrator shall ensure that
the NNSA complies with all applicable environmental statutes and
requirements, and requires that the operations and activities of NNSA
are carried out in a manner that protects public health, safety, and
the environment. (NNSA Act Sec. Sec. 3261, 3211). In light of the
Secretary's authority to transfer functions to NNSA that are consistent
with NNSA's mission and the Administrator's responsibility for ensuring
that NNSA complies with environmental requirements and protects the
environment, the DOE's interpretation is that the NNSA Act allows the
Secretary to transfer these functions to NNSA after consulting with the
Administrator and Congress, and that the Administrator would have the
authority and responsibility for carrying them out. My interpretation
is the same as the DOE's.
42. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: During
her confirmation hearing before this committee on June 7, 2001, Ms.
Jessie Hill Roberson, your predecessor in this position, testified that
it was her goal to ``make changes that have lasting and permanent
impact on this program.'' Do you believe that the EM program is best
served, at this point in time, by a continuation of the focus on
accelerated cleanup begun under Assistant Secretary Roberson?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes. As has been demonstrated in the past, EM's
cleanup philosophy has proven to deliver results. Cleanup at as many as
nine sites will be completed by the end of 2006, including Rocky Flats,
Fernald, Miamisburg, Columbus, Ashtabula, Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--Main Site, Sandia
National Laboratories, and Kansas City Plant. In addition to these
important site completions, EM has completed many of the activities
focused on addressing the highest risks in tank waste management and
nuclear material stabilization. EM will continue to maintain a focus on
completion of site cleanup, which eliminates so-called ``hotel costs''
in order to optimize cost savings, with an additional eight sites or
areas (Argonne National Laboratory--East, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, East Tennessee Technology Park at Oak Ridge, Energy
Technology Engineering Center, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-
Site 300, Inhalation Toxicology Laboratory, Pantex Plant, and the
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center) projected to be completed in the
2007 to 2009 timeframe.
43. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: One of
the initiatives undertaken by Assistant Secretary Roberson was the
development of end states documents for each major site in the EM
program, depicting the residual contamination levels remaining at each
site after the completion of cleanup. What is the status of the
development of end states for each major site?
Mr. Rispoli. End state vision documents have been developed for
almost all of the major sites. The Hanford end state document is
nearing completion, and all other major sites have completed their
final draft end state documentation. Some sites have been exempt from
the process because the sites are scheduled to close in 2006 or 2007.
Each end state document takes into account residual contamination
levels and the appropriate alternatives for remediation. The process of
evaluating and refining end states will continue as new information
becomes available, new remediation technologies are developed, and
alternatives for future land use emerge. These documents will be used
to inform the applicable regulatory processes in determining ultimate
cleanup goals and associated remediation activities.
44. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Were
these documents intended to receive the concurrence of State and
Federal environmental regulators at each site, and if so, which sites
received such concurrence?
Mr. Rispoli. The end state documents reflect consultation among DOE
and State and Federal environmental regulators. They were formulated in
cooperation with the regulators and in consultation with affected
governments, including Tribal nations, as well as stakeholders. The
existing regulatory process, i.e., the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, is the appropriate vehicle
to provide for such consultation. The purpose of the consultative and
iterative processes is to provide that the final end state vision for
each site will have consultation with all affected parties.
45. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What
is the status of these documents at sites which did not receive
concurrence?
Mr. Rispoli. No sites have received concurrence on their end states
vision documents. The end state documents are intended to reflect a
consultation among DOE, and State and Federal environmental regulators.
DOE continues to work with the regulators to develop end states that
are protective, sustainable, and appropriate for the future use of the
site and surrounding areas.
46. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Did
the EM program intend for the end states documents to be the starting
point of a discussion with regulators about changes to the existing
regulations and compliance agreements that guide cleanup? If so, would
you pursue such discussions with regulators?
Mr. Rispoli. The end state documents are intended to be the product
of a consultative process involving regulators and stakeholders that
uses risk-informed decisionmaking to ensure that sites are remediated
to a level that is protective, sustainable, and appropriate for the
future use of the site and surrounding areas. The development of these
documents is one way in which the DOE continues to work with its
regulators and stakeholders to achieve the best, mutually beneficial
cleanup. The DOE has cleanup agreements in place at most of its sites;
these agreements were developed in accordance with laws governing
cleanup, such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, and the Atomic Energy Act. DOE, in cooperation with the regulators
and stakeholders, may consider revising existing cleanup agreements if
the parties agree that such changes substantially improve the
effectiveness of the cleanup.
47. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: One of
the promises of accelerated cleanup was that by applying additional
funds in the near-term to achieve the early completion of cleanup at
certain sites, more funds would be available for the remaining sites
where cleanup is expected to take longer. In other words, if DOE got a
few sites done and out of the way, there would be more room in the
budget to tackle other sites. Do you believe this promise of
accelerated cleanup has yet been realized, and if not, why not?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE has achieved several successes in its
accelerated cleanup efforts, including the physical cleanup of the
Rocky Flats Site along with up to eight additional sites planned for
completion in 2006 and as many as another nine sites by 2009. There
remains a strong focus on cleanup and closure.
48. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Do you
believe that the EM program has conducted sufficient technology
development so that a treatment and disposition pathway exists for all
identified waste streams under the program?
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM conducts selected technology
development and deployment activities to support the treatment and
disposition pathways for most of the identified waste streams under the
program. EM will continue developing new or improved technologies that
address limitations in current characterization and treatment
capabilities. Further, because of the long time frame associated with
cleaning up and closing the sites, EM will be conducting technology
development activities well into the future, including those for wastes
currently without disposition pathways. The technology development
focus is on treating and disposing of high-level tank wastes, stored
transuranic waste, deactivation and decommissioning, and groundwater
and soils.
49. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: If any
orphan waste streams--those for which there is no identified
disposition pathway--exist within the EM program, what technology
development or other efforts would you undertake to address them?
Mr. Rispoli. To directly support the Office of EM's accelerated
cleanup, the EM Technology Development and Deployment (TD&D) Program is
aligned and driven by site cleanup priorities. The technology
development focus is on treating and disposing of high-level tank
wastes, stored transuranic waste, deactivation and decommissioning, and
groundwater and soils. The field sites and headquarters staff identify,
select, and fund higher-risk, higher-cost technology alternative
projects that are outside of a site's prime contract and/or baseline
scope/schedule. If an orphan waste stream(s) project meets the
selection criteria, then one or more alternative project(s) would be
funded to resolve it. But, since orphan streams are those of unique or
unusual compositions, and tend to be site-specific and of limited
quantities, they might not meet the criteria for funding through the
mechanism of TD&D alternative projects. Instead, technology development
projects to address the orphan waste streams, when identified and
requested by the sites, are then addressed on a case-by-case basis, and
if approved, are funded through the Technical Assistance Program. This
includes two closely related programs: quick-response technical
consulting (Technical Expertise) and short-duration technology projects
(Technical Solutions Projects). As designed, the direct assistance is
provided by EM Headquarters to develop lower-cost, lower-risk technical
improvements to accelerate closure of the sites. I believe it is
essential for our complex cleanups to have a TD&D program. This is an
essential component of our ability to address limitations, for example,
in current radioactive waste characterization and treatment
capabilities.
50. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What,
in your view, are the continuing requirements for developing and
fielding new technologies, and what are the highest priorities?
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM program's technology investment
strategy is linked specifically to site Performance Management Plans
and life-cycle baselines, site end states, and corporate performance
measures. The strategy is based upon eliminating technology gaps or
deficiencies in capabilities, reducing technological risk in current
site baselines, improving performance, and lowering costs of current
operations. Technology investments are selected using criteria focused
on integrating the resulting product with site operations to ensure the
greatest impact to the EM mission in terms of risk and cost reductions.
The technology development focus is on treating and disposing of high-
level tank wastes, stored transuranic waste, deactivation and
decommissioning, and groundwater and soils.
51. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: During
fiscal year 2006, the EM program is scheduled to complete cleanup at
the following closure sites: Rocky Flats, Mound, and Fernald. In each
case, DOE must decide how to administer or transfer the post-closure
pension and medical benefits for cleanup workers at these sites. DOE
has indicated that it intends to keep the responsibility for
administering these benefits with the cleanup contractors, post-
closure. Has DOE evaluated any cost efficiencies that would be gained
by pooling the sponsorship and functional management of post-closure
benefits into a single purpose contract; one that could be competed for
and awarded to one of a number of companies that specialize in the
administration of such benefits?
Mr. Rispoli. Physical work was completed at the Rocky Flats site
last October. Sponsorship and management and administration for the
pension and welfare benefit plans for retirees are in the process of
being transferred from the Rocky Flats contractor, Kaiser-Hill Company,
L.L.C (K-H) to a K-H corporate affiliate, CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc.
Work at the Mound site is due to be completed in September 2006 and at
Fernald in September 2006 or sooner. Prior to that time, the Department
will determine what direction to provide to the contractors regarding
the disposition of the pension and retiree benefit plans at those
sites.
In instances where a site is closed without a successor contractor,
in the near-term, DOE intends to budget sufficient funds to settle
pension plan obligations at the earliest practicable date. DOE is
analyzing alternative vehicles to provide long-term contractor retiree
medical benefits.
DOE has not evaluated the costs of pooling the sponsorship and
functional management of post-closure pension benefits into a single
contract. The Department has not pursued this because the pension
benefit plans still will require appropriate legal sponsors. The
Department neither can legally sponsor qualified pension plans for
private sector employees nor assign sponsorship authority it does not
have to an entity that has no corporate relationship to contractor
employees.
52. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question:
Assuming the EM program is funded at the level of the fiscal year 2006
budget request, will there be any sites under the EM program where
sufficient funding will not be available to make payments to employee
pension plans at the levels mandated under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)?
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM's fiscal year 2006 budget request and
subsequent fiscal year 2006 congressional appropriations provide
sufficient funding to make payments to employee pension plans at the
levels mandated under the ERISA.
53. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Are
you aware of any sites under the EM program where making ERISA-mandated
pension plan payments will result in such a drain on available funding
that the furlough or involuntary separation of employees at the site
will be necessary?
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM's fiscal year 2006 budget request and
subsequent fiscal year 2006 congressional appropriations provide
sufficient funding to make payments to employee pension plans at the
levels mandated under the ERISA without work force impacts.
54. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Your
duties will involve the review and approval of workforce restructuring
plans at sites under the EM program. Please describe your general
approach and philosophy in reviewing workforce restructuring plans.
Given the nature of their work, cleanup workers are fundamentally in a
position of ``working themselves out of a job.'' How do you believe
this particular challenge is best handled from both a corporate
perspective and as a manager of these workers?
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM reviews workforce restructuring plans
to ensure that activities are conducted in accordance with DOE policies
and directives. EM's objective is to ensure that the contractor's
strategy effectively accomplishes the site's mission by retaining
employees with the skills, knowledge, and abilities necessary to
effectively and safely meet current and future missions within budget.
As a result of cleanup progress and the subsequent reprioritization of
work scope, workforce restructurings will continue, as we strive to use
skills efficiently and in a way that minimizes involuntary separations.
Individuals involuntarily separated from positions performing cleanup
work for DOE contractors may qualify for preferences in hiring at DOE
facilities and additional recall or bumping rights under applicable
collective bargaining agreements.
55. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: The
Federal Government and the State of Idaho have been in dispute
regarding whether and to what extent DOE is obligated to remediate
substantial quantities of buried waste that underlie the INL. What is
the status of any pending litigation involving this dispute and what is
the DOE position regarding its cleanup obligations for this waste?
Mr. Rispoli. This issue of the proper interpretation of provisions
of the 1995 Settlement Agreement with regard to buried waste dispute
has been tried before the Idaho District Court and the parties are
awaiting that court's decision. The DOE's position is that the cleanup
of buried waste is governed by the three party cleanup agreement among
DOE, the EPA, and the State of Idaho (the 1991 Federal Facility
Agreement and Consent Order) and not by the 1995 Settlement Agreement.
56. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: How is
DOE addressing any environmental risks associated with this waste?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE is addressing environmental risks associated
with buried waste under the three-party cleanup agreement among DOE,
the EPA, and the State of Idaho (the 1991 Federal Facility Agreement
and Consent Order). DOE completed a draft Remedial Investigation and
Baseline Risk Assessment for the buried waste and submitted it to the
regulators in December 2005. DOE is also conducting certain waste
retrieval activities and plans to complete additional studies and
develop a remedial decision by 2008. All of these activities are being
conducted according to processes established under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and the
National Contingency Plan.
57. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question:
Completion of cleanup at a number of EM sites depends on the timely
shipment of quantities of transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico for disposal. In some cases, DOE is
under regulatory deadlines for completing shipments to WIPP. What
regulatory deadlines does the EM program currently face related to WIPP
shipments and what is the current progress against those deadlines?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE currently faces regulatory deadlines related
to shipments of transuranic (TRU) waste to the WIPP at the INL and the
LANL.
INL must comply with milestones contained in the Idaho Settlement
Agreement. The milestones in this agreement that DOE currently faces
are:
After January 1, 2003, a running average of no fewer
than 2,000 cubic meters per year shall be shipped out of the
State of Idaho over 3-year period intervals (thus 6,000 cubic
meters by December 31, 2005). INL shipped 6,000 cubic meters of
TRU waste to the WIPP by February 21, 2006, and as of April 1,
2006, INL had shipped over 6,500 cubic meters of TRU waste to
WIPP since January 2003. DOE will need to ship an additional
6,000 cubic meters by December 31, 2008.
Additionally, a milestone requires that DOE shall ship
all TRU waste now located at the INL, currently estimated at
65,000 cubic meters in volume, to the WIPP or other such
facility by a target date of December 31, 2015, and in no event
later than December 31, 2018. In total, as of April 2006, INL
has made over 1,300 shipments and disposed of more than 10,400
cubic meters of TRU waste at the WIPP.
The Los Alamos Compliance Order on Consent signed on March 1, 2005
with the State of New Mexico, states that LANL's environmental
restoration will occur by fiscal year 2015. This is tied to a DOE
planning commitment that all legacy TRU waste will be removed by 2012.
As of April 2006, LANL has shipped more than 140 shipments consisting
of more than 800 cubic meters of TRU waste to the WIPP and continues to
consistently make three to four shipments per week to the WIPP. It is
estimated that LANL has approximately 10,000 cubic meters of TRU waste
remaining to be shipped to WIPP.
58. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Are
you aware of any issues that jeopardize DOE's ability to meet these
deadlines? If so, what is DOE doing to address these issues?
Mr. Rispoli. I am not aware of any issues that would affect the
remaining two Idaho Settlement Agreement Milestones regarding shipment
to the WIPP of certain stored waste from the State of Idaho. These
milestones involve meeting deadlines for waste movement, including
shipping 2,000 cubic meters per year out of the State of Idaho and
shipping all stored TRU waste at the INL to WIPP by December 31, 2015,
or not later than December 31, 2018.
The commitment in the Los Alamos Consent Order to complete
environmental restoration by fiscal year 2015 is tied to a DOE planning
commitment to complete legacy waste disposition by 2012. We believe
that the new contract we have with Los Alamos National Security LLC (a
limited liability corporation made up of Bechtel National, Inc., the
University of California, BWX Technologies, Inc., and the Washington
Group International, Inc.) will address these performance issues, offer
us new opportunities to continue significant cleanup and risk
reduction, and deliver progress towards a new baseline. To that end,
senior officials within the DOE have asked for the involvement of
senior executives of the parent companies of the new contractor to
deliver efficiencies and a baseline that can withstand scrutiny and can
be validated by the DOE. We assure you that we remain committed to the
Los Alamos Compliance Order on Consent with the State of New Mexico
(March 2005) and its environmental milestones.
59. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What,
if any, additional permits or permit modifications are needed for WIPP
in order to meet these deadlines?
Mr. Rispoli. The INL and the LANL have contact-handled transuranic
(CH-TRU) waste and waste which may be determined to be remote-handled
transuranic (RH-TRU) waste that need to be disposed of at the WIPP.
Getting CH-TRU and RH-TRU from INL and LANL to WIPP contributes to
meeting the Idaho Settlement Agreement and the LANL Consent Order
deadlines.
Currently, WIPP is only authorized to receive CH-TRU. DOE is in the
process of seeking a permit modification from the New Mexico
Environment Department (NMED) to allow for disposal of RH-TRU at WIPP,
as well as changes in requirements for the disposal of CH-TRU as
required by section 311 of Public Law 108-137.
60. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question:
Cleanup under the EM program occurs not only at closure sites, but at
DOE national laboratories and other sites with ongoing missions. These
locations are sometimes distinguished from the closure sites by use of
the term enduring sites. Does the EM program approach cleanup
differently at closure sites than at enduring sites?
Mr. Rispoli. No. The Office of EM's approach is the same at both
closure sites and enduring sites. The operating principles for EM are
to reduce risk and environmental liabilities, in accordance with
applicable statutes and regulations. The EM program continues to
eliminate significant environmental, health, and safety risks at all of
its sites. At all of its sites, EM performs risk reduction and site
closure or cleanup completion (in the case of sites with enduring
missions) with its regulators and stakeholders to determine the most
appropriate remediation schedules and approaches. EM continues to stay
focused on its cleanup mission across the DOE complex and is working
aggressively to enhance and refine project management approaches and to
address the challenges inherent in this multifaceted environmental
cleanup program.
61. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: How
should the EM program best manage the interfaces between its cleanup
operations and other ongoing missions at the enduring sites?
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM works closely with the Field Office
Managers, who have responsibility for all of the missions that are
conducted at the site, and the other Program Secretarial Offices in the
DOE to ensure that the cleanup mission is conducted safely and remains
focused on reducing both risk and environmental liabilities. When it
has been necessary, Memoranda of Understanding have been put in place
for issues at several sites that clarify responsibilities for complex
situations.
62. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Does
the EM program prioritize work differently at enduring sites, and if
so, in what way?
Mr. Rispoli. No. The Office of EM's approach is the same at both
closure sites and enduring sites. The operating principles for EM are
to reduce risk and environmental liabilities, in accordance with
applicable statutes and regulations. The EM program continues to
eliminate significant environmental, health, and safety risks at all of
its sites. At all of its sites, EM performs risk reduction and site
closure or cleanup completion (in the case of sites with enduring
missions) with its regulators and stakeholders to determine the most
appropriate remediation schedules and approaches. EM continues to stay
focused on its cleanup mission across the DOE complex and is working
aggressively to enhance and refine project management approaches and to
address the challenges inherent in this multifaceted environmental
cleanup program.
63. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question:
Secretary Bodman testified before this committee that DOE sites will
not achieve compliance with the current design basis threat until 2008.
Given the seriousness of the need to secure nuclear materials, both
abroad and at home, do you believe that this is a sufficiently rapid
response to the threats currently outlined by the intelligence
community, and against which DOE has agreed it must defend at its
nuclear sites?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE continually assesses information from the
Intelligence Community as it relates to protection strategies employed
at our facilities. While DOE has continued to strengthen the
capabilities to defend against potential threat levels at our Category
I quantity nuclear facilities, these facilities and our critical
nuclear materials are at low risk based upon today's required
protection criteria. We are continuing implementation of security
enhancements through changes in tactics, manpower, and technology. Some
of the security-effective and cost-effective solutions to design basis
threat changes rely on capital improvements that require several years
to design, procure, install, and/or construct. These active and passive
technological capabilities, coupled with the sites' protective forces,
provide a robust security posture ensuring our critical facilities and
materials do not become an elevated risk overnight. Likewise, this
robustness enables us to take immediate compensatory measures should
there be an unexpected, sudden change to the actual threat.
Periodic assessments, enhancement plans, and plans to eliminate
targets provide an appropriate security posture at our facilities to
ensure low risk. We are proceeding at the appropriate pace to ensure
threats will be met in an effective, timely, and efficient manner.
64. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What
actions would you undertake to consolidate and more rapidly secure any
special nuclear material existing within the EM program?
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM is focused on the disposition of
special nuclear materials. Our consolidation decisions are closely
connected to the ultimate disposition of these materials.
Additionally, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for EM, is
Chairman of the DOE's NMDCCC. Identifying a path forward for the
plutonium-239 at our Hanford Site is EM's highest priority for the
NMDCCC chiefly because of the urgency associated with removal of this
material in order to avoid the expenditure of significant funding at
Hanford to meet the latest security requirements.
65. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Do you
agree that, even with a primary focus on accelerating cleanup, it is
still an essential responsibility of the EM program to secure these
materials against the threats existing now?
Mr. Rispoli. The protection of weapons-usable nuclear materials is
an essential responsibility of the Office of EM. As we clean up the
former nuclear weapons complex, we are meeting this responsibility at
our sites with appropriate safeguards and security systems, equipment,
and manpower.
Through the NMDCCC, the DOE is evaluating consolidation options to
further secure these critical nuclear materials and minimize costs to
maximize cleanup resources.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
66. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) calls for a transition from a threat-based nuclear
deterrent with large numbers of nuclear weapons to a deterrent based on
capabilities with a smaller nuclear weapons stockpile and ``greater
reliance on the capability and responsiveness of the DOD and the NNSA
infrastructure to respond to threats.'' Last June, the Energy Advisory
Board issued a report, also known as the Overskei Report, suggesting a
variety of ways to make the complex more responsive and more efficient.
The Overskei Report concludes that the current NNSA plan to modernize
the production complex in place was not effective and that the current
complex ``is neither robust, nor agile, nor responsive, with little
evidence of a master plan.'' Neither DOE nor NNSA has responded to this
report. What is the responsive infrastructure required by the NPR?
Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA responsive infrastructure required by
the NPR is the industrial capability for weapon design, certification,
manufacturing, surveillance, maintenance, and disposition required to
support our nuclear deterrent in an uncertain world. A responsive
infrastructure provides a national security capability to respond to a
major technical stockpile issue or a geopolitical change before an
adversary could gain an advantage. Specifically, it allows us to
replace large numbers of deployed and reserve weapons so that the
augmentation or hedge component of the stockpile would not need to be
maintained at current levels.
The NPR established responsive infrastructure as the third leg of
the ``New Triad,'' making it equally important to strike and defensive
forces as part of our nuclear security strategy. The NNSA
infrastructure vision is a responsive set of national laboratories
complemented by modern production centers of excellence. This
responsive infrastructure includes the people, the science and
technology base, the facilities, and equipment to support a right-sized
nuclear weapons enterprise as well as practical and streamlined
business practices that will enable us to be agile and respond rapidly
to emerging needs. This responsive infrastructure must provide proven
and demonstrable capabilities, on appropriate timescales, and in
support of DOD requirements, to:
Ensure needed warheads are available to augment the
operationally deployed force;
Identify, understand, and fix stockpile problems;
Design, develop, certify, and begin production of
refurbished or replacement warheads;
Maintain capability to design, develop, and begin
production of new or adapted warheads, if required;
Produce required quantities of warheads;
Dismantle warheads; and
Sustain adequate underground nuclear test readiness.
67. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, what steps has NNSA
taken to implement all or any of the recommendations in the Overskei
Report?
Ambassador Brooks. The DOE has been actively reviewing the
recommendations of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB)
Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force to prepare a
comprehensive plan for transforming the nuclear weapons complex. Many
of the recommendations are consistent with initiatives that the NNSA
was already considering or is implementing. These initiatives include
design of a RRW, consolidation of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM),
accelerating dismantlement of retired weapons, managing the evolving
complex to enhance responsiveness and sustainability, and establishing
an Office of Transformation. With respect to the Consolidated Nuclear
Production Complex (CNPC), the Complex 2030 preferred scenario
consolidates production activities to distributed centers of excellence
that minimize the number of facilities and size of the total and
security footprint at each site. The cost profile and risk of
implementation to ongoing activities are reduced compared to a CNPC
implementation. For example, the CNPC option offers significant
challenges in the selection of a location that would accept the large
quantities of SNM and production activities, and how to minimize costs
particularly during the construction of the CNPC. The concept of
consolidated production centers of excellence allows NNSA to maintain
expertise developed over decades of meeting stockpile deliverables,
and, at the same time, allow us to more effectively manage costs and
risks over the long-term. The NNSA seriously evaluated the CNPC
alternative but found it to be both more costly in the near-term and
risky to implement (e.g., adverse impact to ongoing activities like
life extension programs). However, as we proceed with the scoping
process for a potential programmatic environmental impact statement, we
expect that a CNPC will be considered as an alternative.
68. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, in your statement, you
mention that NNSA has established an Office of Transformation. What is
the job of this office?
Ambassador Brooks. The Office of Transformation has not yet been,
but will be, established in 2006. The function of this office is to
drive change and to transform the nuclear weapons complex by
establishing the path forward to our 2030 vision and managing execution
of the Responsive Infrastructure Strategy Implementation Plan (RISIP),
as well as all subordinate plans. The RISIP defines how the NNSA will
achieve its 2030 vision and includes implementing strategies, goals,
actions, and metrics. The Director of the Office of Transformation will
be a senior NNSA Federal leader reporting to the Deputy Administrator
for Defense Programs.
69. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, when the NNSA begins to
develop plans for the responsive infrastructure, what are the
requirements that the infrastructure must meet?
Ambassador Brooks. As required by the NPR, the infrastructure must
be responsive to unanticipated stockpile issues, technological
surprise, adverse geopolitical change, and it must enable increased
reliance on deterrence measured by capability. To assist in our
planning process, we have worked with the DOD to develop quantitative
metrics to measure our progress towards ``responsiveness.'' Following
the NPR and the 2003 Stockpile Stewardship Conference, an initial set
of these metrics was negotiated. These metrics provide quantified
targets, e.g., resolve a new stockpile issue within 18 months. We have
since updated these metrics and now anticipate monitoring our progress
towards responsiveness in nine specific areas related to requirements
for cost, dismantlement, augmentation, addressing stockpile problems,
developing and producing warheads, demonstrating nuclear competencies,
and sustaining underground test readiness. The Nuclear Weapons Council
is expected to consider these responsive infrastructure metrics in June
2006.
70. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, for instance, what is
the planning assumption for the size of the stockpile, how many weapons
should be assembled and dismantled each year, and how many pits and
secondaries should be manufactured each year?
Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]
DESIGN BASIS THREAT
71. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
in 2003 the DOE issued a new Design Basis Threat (DBT) for which DOE
installations must establish their security posture. This DBT was
revised in December 2005. The goal is to have all installations and
facilities meet the 2003 DBT by the end of 2006 and meet the 2005 DBT
by the end of 2008. Could each of you identify any issues with any
sites or facilities that would prevent reaching these goals?
Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA is on-track to meet its commitment to
implement the 2003 DBT upgrades by the end of this fiscal year, which
has been a tremendous endeavor on the part of our sites. Regarding the
2005 DBT, the Department has requested that each site provide a
detailed vulnerability analysis to validate the upgrades and resources
required. The results of the site vulnerability analysis are being
evaluated and we are looking closely at the options and impacts
associated with the various upgrades so that risk management decisions
can be made. We will achieve compliance with the November 2005 DBT at
our two most critical activities (Pantex and our transportation
safeguards asset) by the end of fiscal year 2008 and we are continuing
diligently to identify requirements and funding at our other nuclear
sites in order to achieve compliance as soon as possible.
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM sites are implementing appropriate
security measures to meet the 2003 DBT levels. The DOE has approved an
exception to implementation of the 2005 DBT at Hanford to accommodate
continued storage of surplus plutonium at the site pending an EM
decision on off-site consolidation of the surplus plutonium. EM
facilities with an enduring mission are expected to fully implement the
2005 DBT requirements by the end of 2008.
72. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
do each of you have sufficient money in your budgets to meet the DBT
goals?
Ambassador Brooks. The 2007 budget has sufficient resources to
accomplish the security upgrades to meet the new DBT at our two most
critical operations, Pantex and the Office of Secure Transportation.
For the remaining four sites, the budgets and schedules will be
determined by the results of the ongoing vulnerability analyses and
next year's budgeting process. NNSA is committed to doing as much as
possible in the near-term to meet the DBT compliance requirements, and
will maintain effective and robust security at all of its nuclear
sites.
Mr. Rispoli. The fiscal year 2007 budget request fully supports
EM's goals and departmental decisions for the DBT implementation.
73. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
in reviewing the 2007 budget request, there seems to be a number of
projects with increased costs as a result of the revised DBT. Have each
of you been able to identify ways to meet the DBT with technology, as
opposed to more guards and guns, that will save money?
Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has been working tirelessly at finding
innovative solutions to meet the challenges of the new security
regimen. We have found that by maintaining our focus on the basics the
Department can dramatically curtail the growth of protective forces.
The basics include: hardening our facilities, creating vehicle standoff
distances, increasing delay times, and improving the training,
lethality, and survivability of the protective forces. The combination
of these techniques, with innovative technologies such as remotely
fired weapons and enhanced detection and assessment systems has given
NNSA greater advantage in defending our nuclear sites. As NNSA plans
for upgrades to meet the 2005 DBT, we continue to focus our efforts in
the use of physical barriers and technology solutions rather than
simply increasing the size of the protective force.
Mr. Rispoli. Technology innovations, such as enhanced detection and
assessment equipment, passive barriers, and upgraded weaponry, are
being actively employed at the SRS and the Hanford Site to meet DBT
requirements. These technologies enhance system protection
effectiveness and minimize protective force-level increases.
74. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the DBT is designed to
ensure that nuclear weapons and materials are secure. Does the DOD use
the same DBT for developing security at its facilities where nuclear
weapons are stored?
Ambassador Brooks. The DOD and DOE use different approaches to
providing a security foundational document (DBT), but we use the same
intelligence and techniques in providing onsite protection. The two
departments are working very closely on building common threat analyses
modeling tools and security strategy development approaches. NNSA is
confident that in the coming months and years you will see us working
closer with our colleagues in the DOD on this very important topic.
75. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, does it have the same
time lines as DOE to come into compliance with the DBT?
Ambassador Brooks. I would defer to the DOD to answer questions
regarding any timelines it may have in meeting compliance requirements.
In the DOE, we will be compliant with the May 2003 DBT by the end of
this fiscal year.
CONSOLIDATION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS
76. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
one of the key recommendations of the Overskei Report was to
consolidate all Category I and II special nuclear materials and weapons
components at one site. Do you believe that it is possible to
consolidate all of these materials into one site? If not one site, then
how many?
Ambassador Brooks. We take the recommendations of the Secretary of
Energy Advisory Board Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force
very seriously and have been evaluating options to consolidate Category
I and II quantities of special nuclear materials (SNM). Currently,
seven of the eight locations that are part of the nuclear weapons
complex have Category I/II quantities of SNM on their site.
Consolidation to a single site would be extremely challenging. Our
preferred approach is to significantly reduce the number of sites and
the number of locations within any given site that have these materials
(e.g., separate centers of excellence for uranium operations, plutonium
operations, weapons assembly/disassembly, and testing).
Mr. Rispoli. Consolidation to a single site would be extremely
challenging. One of the primary objectives of the NMDCCC is to
determine how to consolidate materials most effectively and to minimize
the number of sites.
77. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
what Category I and II materials do each of your programs have and what
are each of you doing to consolidate materials?
Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA sites that have Category I and II
materials are the Y-12 National Security Complex, Pantex Plant, Nevada
Test Site, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National
Laboratories. Office of EM materials are located primarily at the SRS
and at Hanford, but there are also relatively small quantities at Los
Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. EM is also
assuming responsibility for disposition of U-233 materials consolidated
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
The NNSA has construction projects to improve nuclear materials
storage, security, and processing capabilities at Y-12 and Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and disposition capabilities at the SRS. Materials
at Hanford, Sandia National Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory and excess materials at Los Alamos National
Laboratory will be relocated to sites with appropriate disposition
capabilities, or where the material is needed in support of
prograrnmatic requirements.
Mr. Rispoli. Within EM, the majority of our Category I materials
are in a form of plutonium or uranium. The majority of the EM Category
II materials are in a form of spent fuel, smaller quantities of
plutonium or uranium, and solutions or residues in process systems.
Onsite consolidation to a single-protected area has been completed at
the Hanford Site and is scheduled to be complete at the SRS by the end
of 2006. EM is working to clarify and finalize our disposition pathways
and to determine a site to remove the SNM from Hanford, subject to
compliance with applicable law including the National Environmental
Policy Act. Additionally, the DOE has established the NMDCCC, of which
EM is an active member. The purpose of the NMDCCC is to ensure
integration of individual program disposition and consolidation efforts
thus identifying opportunities for resource sharing.
78. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, do you anticipate the
NNSA will declare additional material excess in the next 10 years?
Ambassador Brooks. In October 2005 the DOE announced a decision to
restrict up to 200 metric tons of HEU from any further use as fissile
material in nuclear weapons. Of that amount, approximately 20 metric
tons was declared excess to programmatic requirements, and will be
blended down to low enriched uranium for civilian power reactors or
other uses. Approximately 20 metric tons was reserved for space and
research reactors, and approximately 160 metric tons was reserved for
naval reactors. Most of this material is in the form of assembled
weapons components. As these weapon assemblies are disassembled, the
materials will be evaluated to determine the appropriate disposition.
Materials that do not meet the specification for use in the naval
reactors program will be declared excess, and will be blended down to
low enriched uranium. There are no current plans to declare additional
plutonium excess.
79. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, is the EM program ready to
take responsibility for all excess category I and II material and begin
to consolidate that material?
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE currently is evaluating how best to manage the
excess Category I and II nuclear material within the DOE complex.
Surplus nuclear material associated with nonproliferation commitments
is managed by the Office of Fissile Material Disposition in the NNSA.
80. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, one of the key sites that
could be used to consolidate materials is the SRS. Could additional
materials be stored at SRS? What are you doing to work with the State
of South Carolina to bring more materials to SRS?
Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM is focused on the disposition of SNM.
Our consolidation decisions are closely connected to the ultimate
disposition of these materials. Although the SRS has the capacity to
store additional SNM, no final decision has been reached on shipping
this material to a receiver site. The Secretary of Energy established
the NMDCCC. This DOE-wide committee is chaired by the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for EM who reports to the Deputy Secretary of
Energy for this purpose. The NMDCCC is in the process of evaluating
this issue and expects to prepare a series of recommendations on
consolidation. Meeting security requirements in a timely manner is a
primary consideration. Other factors being considered include initial
and life-cycle cost, transportation, National Environmental Policy Act
analysis, timing, and equity issues.
RENDER SAFE
81. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the new Quadrennial
Defense Review mentions on several occasions the need to be able to
``render-safe'' WMD. The NNSA has for years been responsible for the
technical aspects of rendering safe nuclear devices. Is DOD expanding
the render safe mission for nuclear devices and what is NNSA doing to
support this expanded mission?
Ambassador Brooks. NNSA continues to work very closely with the
DOD. Presently, DOD has communicated the desire to enhance the
capability of its generic (Tier 3) Explosive Ordnance Disposal
capability. We do not expect this to add NNSA requirements, however.
The DOD is still evaluating whether there is a need to develop any
additional render-safe capability beyond the Tier 3 enhancement. NNSA
nevertheless will continue to work closely with DOD to provide the
support DOD requires.
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
82. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Mr. Rispoli, at
times the DNFSB raises issues of operational safety in the design and
construction of new buildings. Failure to resolve promptly the seismic
concerns raised by the DNFSB at the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant has
lead in part to the cost growth at that facility. Currently, the NNSA
and the DNFSB are unable to resolve a nuclear safety issue associated
with ventilation concerns at the new nuclear materials complex at Los
Alamos National Lab, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility
Replacement (CMRR) project. The DNFSB doesn't develop safety
regulations, it identifies the appropriate regulations and is tasked
with overseeing the DOE's proper implementation of the safety
regulations. Is there a clear process to resolve the issues raised by
the DNFSB?
Ambassador Brooks. The DOE processes, functions, and
responsibilities for interfacing with the DNFSB are delineated in the
Department's Manual 140.1-1B, Interfacing with the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board. This is derived from the DNFSB's enabling
legislation which specifies the processes for accepting, rejecting, and
implementing a DNFSB recommendation. The DNFSB communicates issues with
the Department through a variety of mechanisms including formal
recommendations, formal reporting requirements, letters requesting
action and information, and letters providing information. The process
used to resolve a technical issue is based on the mechanism used to
communicate it to the Department. The Department's process encourages
close communication with the DNFSB and its staff through briefings,
discussions, site visits, and other informal interactions.
With respect to the specific classification of the ventilation
system for the CMRR nuclear facility, the NNSA has performed
preliminary analyses of the facility based on the conceptual design and
concludes that the ventilation system will likely be classified as a
safety system; however, verification of the safety classification
properly awaits completion of the Preliminary Design and the
Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis, activities which are just
recently started. The designation of safety classification follows
current protocols and procedures.
Mr. Rispoli. The DOE processes, functions, and responsibilities for
interfacing with the DNFSB are delineated in DOE Manual 140.1-1B,
Interfacing with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. The
processes for the Secretary of Energy include rejecting a DNFSB
recommendation and reporting that implementation is impracticable.
Further, the DNFSB enabling legislation requires the DOE to notify the
President and Congress if implementation is not possible due to
funding. While not addressed specifically in the manual, the processes
used for correspondence from the DNFSB are the same. To date, the DOE's
interfacings with the DNFSB have provided an agreed upon solution to
safety issues.
83. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, what is the process to
resolve the safety issues at the CMRR while that facility is still in
the design phase?
Ambassador Brooks. DOE Order 413.3, Project Management for the
Acquisition of Capital Assets, and DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety,
provide design phase processes for the Department. The Department's
Manual 140.1-1B, Interfacing with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Satety
Board, establishes processes for interfacing with the DNFSB. The
process is specified in the DNSFB's enabling legislation. The
Department's process encourages early resolution of issues with the
DNFSB and its staff through briefings, discussion, site visits, and
other informal interactions. Where technical differences of opinion
cannot be resolved informally and the DNFSB determines the issue
requires formal resolution or more formal discussion, the DNFSB
communicates to the Department through a variety of mechanisms
including formal recommendations, formal reporting requirements or
letters requesting action. DOE then determines how best to address the
issue and interacts with the DNFSB and its staff to determine an
agreeable path forward to resolution. In the case of the CMRR,
discussions regarding technical differences are ongoing.
HANFORD WASTE TREATMENT PLANT
84. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, your organization is in the
process of building the WTP in Hanford, Washington, to vitrify the
millions of gallons of high-level radioactive waste stored there in
underground tanks. There have been many issues with the construction of
that facility and the related management of the storage tanks. These
include multiple process and design changes, funding issues, an
inability to resolve issues with respect to the appropriate seismic and
other technical criteria, and substantial increases in the cost of
concrete and steel. Early indications are that the cost of the facility
may be on the order of $10 to $15 billion. Ironically the very first
cost estimates for the WTP was in this range. How will the seismic
issue be resolved and on what time schedule?
Mr. Rispoli. Since your question refers to earlier estimates for
the Hanford WTP, I would first like to point out that all prior planned
designs for the WTP would have provided only one-fourth of the high-
level waste immobilization capacity. The current plant is sized to
treat and immobilize 100 percent of the high-level waste, thus
eliminating the need for a second, very sizable plant that the DOE's
prior plan envisioned. In addition, major advancements in technology
have been recognized that will improve WTP performance. These
advancements include development of an ion exchange material to more
effectively and less expensively remove radioactive cesium from tank
waste liquids; improvement of the throughput capacity for the large
glass furnaces making glass out of radioactive waste; and enhanced
blending ability of pumps to maintain a consistent mix of the waste. We
anticipate that the benefits from these improvements will avoid the
necessity of building a second plant for high-level waste, improve
turnaround time, reduce personnel exposure, reduce performance risk,
reduce operating cost, and reduce the total number of canisters
produced, thereby decreasing the volume of material ultimately sent to
a repository for permanent disposal.
With respect to the seismic issue, the DNFSB has been concerned
with DOE's seismic assumptions used for WTP design. Last year, DOE
developed interim seismic criteria based on agreement with the DNFSB on
ground motion values. The WTP prime contractor, Bechtel National, Inc.,
used the interim seismic criteria to check the engineering calculations
for the designs already completed and the structures already built.
Bechtel National, Inc., submitted to the DOE a revision to the
structural design criteria which incorporates the DOE's current best
understanding of the seismic hazard at Hanford, and the WTP, as well as
the assumptions from the interim seismic criteria. The DOE is reviewing
this revision to the structural design criteria. The DOE has also
engaged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to independently review this
latest revision to the structural design criteria. The DOE will discuss
this latest revision to the structural design criteria with the DNFSB
and carefully consider its recommendation regarding the criteria, if
any. The DOE expects the reviews and discussions to be completed by
late summer 2006, to permit proceeding with construction of those
portions of the facilities affected by the concern with the seismic
criteria.
85. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, how will a real cost estimate
be completed and on what time scale?
Mr. Rispoli. The WTP prime contractor, Bechtel National, Inc.,
provided to the DOE an updated Estimate-at-Completion (EAC) for the
project in December 2005. DOE completed two independent expert reviews
in March 2006 and provided to Congress: 1) an evaluation of the
technical adequacy of the design to meet the contract performance
rates; and 2) an assessment of the confidence in the cost and schedule
as submitted by Bechtel in the December 2005 EAC. In addition, the
contractor will deliver an updated EAC to reflect available funding for
fiscal year 2006 and impacts of results of the independent technical
and cost reviews. The contractor is to provide this revision to DOE by
May 31, 2006.
DOE has also engaged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to perform an
independent expert review of the EAC, and, if acceptable, to validate
the EAC. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has retained a number of
recognized industry experts working with its own senior staff. The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers' report is scheduled to be completed by late
summer 2006.
Based on the results from the reviews, the DOE expects to establish
a sound cost and schedule to complete the Hanford WTP. The objective is
to ensure this project will be well-managed. We owe it to Congress,
regional stakeholders, and the U.S. taxpayers that the substantial
investment in the WTP is receiving the highest level of talent and
attention the DOE can provide.
86. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, will there be any independent
validation of the cost, the design, and the vitrification process?
Mr. Rispoli.
Cost
The WTP prime contractor, Bechtel National, Inc., provided the DOE
an updated detailed EAC for the project in December 2005. Several
actions are occurring to develop a realistic project estimate and
schedule. The DOE has implemented and received an independent expert
cost review by senior industry professionals to assess the confidence
in the cost and schedule as submitted in December 2005. This review was
completed in March 2006. In late May 2006, the contractor will deliver
an updated EAC based on the available funding for fiscal year 2006 and
the impacts of results of the best and brightest technical and cost
reviews. DOE also engaged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to perform
an independent expert review of the EAC and to validate the EAC. The
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has retained a number of recognized
industry experts working alongside its own senior staff. The U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers' report is scheduled to be completed by late summer
2006.
Design
DOE completed an independent expert review in March 2006 and
provided to Congress an evaluation of the technical adequacy of the
design. The report indicated the WTP will work as designed, but
identified 28 issues which needed to be resolved in order for the WTP
to meet the contract performance rates. The review indicated all these
issues can be resolved with existing technology. The contractor has
begun incorporating the fix for a number of these issues and working
with the DOE on alternatives for the remainder of these issues.
Vitrification
DOE has had an in-depth technology development program for
vitrification systems over the past 20 years, to include the joule
heated melter being designed for the Hanford WTP. The DOE has also had
several vitrification systems in-use over the past 10 years: one at the
West Valley Demonstration Project, New York, and two at the SRS, South
Carolina (Defense Waste Processing Facility, and M-Area Vitrification
Facility). In addition, there has been extensive testing of glass
making in pilot facilities at the Duratek Inc., laboratory in Columbia,
Maryland, and at the Catholic University's Vitreous State Laboratory in
Washington, DC.
Based on the results from the professional reviews and years of
experience and testing, the DOE has a high-level of assurance in the
design, vitrification process, and the development of a sound cost and
schedule to complete the Hanford WTP.
87. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, what is the current status of
construction at the WTP?
Mr. Rispoli. The Hanford WTP consists of five subproject
facilities: Pretreatment Facility, High-Level Waste Facility, Low-
Activity Waste Facility, Analytical Laboratory, and Balance of
Facilities. As of the end of fiscal year 2005, approximately $2.9
billion had been spent on design, procurement, and construction
activities. Based on the contractor's December 2005 EAC, the percent
completion for the three elements (design, procurement and
construction) of the project, as of the end of fiscal year 2005, are:
design--68 percent; procurement/materials--44 percent; and
construction--28 percent.
88. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, the delays at the WTP will
cause the DOE to miss many of the commitments to the State of
Washington. One of the commitments that will not be met is pumping the
waste from the single shell tanks. How many single shell tanks will be
pumped out with the fiscal year 2007 budget request?
Mr. Rispoli. Waste retrieval is anticipated to be completed on four
single-shell tanks in fiscal year 2006 (C-204, C-103, C-201, and S-
112). Waste retrieval will be initiated and completed on two single-
shell tanks, C-108 and C-109, in fiscal year 2007. Retrieval on single-
shell tank Tank S-102 is also anticipated to be completed in late
fiscal year 2007 or early fiscal year 2008.
89. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, no funding is provided for
the bulk vitrification project in fiscal year 2007. Does this mean the
DOE is cancelling the project?
Mr. Rispoli. No. The DOE anticipates analyzing the bulk
vitrification alternative in the upcoming Tank Closure and Waste
Management Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act. In addition, DOE would develop a
Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System (DBVS) Project baseline that
can be used to determine the path forward for the full DBVS Project
tests. Substantial work has been performed to improve the basis for
estimating project costs in accordance with DOE Order 413.3, Project
Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. Using funding
requested through fiscal year 2006, in fiscal year 2006-2007, DOE plans
to complete the DBVS design; validate project costs; complete full-
scale cold tests at the vendor's Richland, Washington, site; conduct an
independent review by a senior professional team from private industry,
and academia; conduct an External Independent Review; complete a
project baseline; and progress through the critical decision process
for the DBVS required by DOE Order 413.3.
90. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, if the project is terminated
for 2007 and reconstituted at a later date, what is the increased cost,
how much time will be lost, and what plans have been made to recover
the workforce or hire and retrain a new workforce for the project?
Mr. Rispoli. There is no plan to terminate the project. Rather,
extensive activities are planned or are underway to develop a cost and
schedule baseline and other information required to proceed through the
critical decision process required by DOE Order 413.3, Project
Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. In order to establish
a baseline, there must be a valid basis to measure costs and schedules
against. Until a valid baseline is in place, DOE cannot know what
impacts there might be to the contractor workforce, if any.
91. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, will cancellation of the bulk
vitrification result in a failure to meet commitments to the State of
Washington?
Mr. Rispoli. There is no plan to terminate the project. Rather,
extensive activities are planned or are underway to develop a cost and
schedule baseline and other information required to proceed through the
critical decision process required by DOE Order 413.3, Project
Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. In order to establish
a baseline, there must be a valid basis to measure costs and schedules
against. Until a valid baseline is in place, DOE cannot know what
impacts there might be to the contractor workforce, if any.
92. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, how many commitments to the
State of Washington will not be met in fiscal year 2007 or beyond given
the fiscal year 2007 budget request?
Mr. Rispoli. There are no TPA milestones that will be missed due to
the fiscal year 2007 budget. However, some milestones are at risk
because of other issues, such as overly optimistic assumptions that
were in place when the milestones were established (e.g., failure to
anticipate various technical issues that have since come to light),
risk prioritization, bringing certain projects into line with the DOE's
Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets directive,
further waste site characterization, increased volume projections, and
prioritizing field data collection activities over paper generation
activities. The DOE plans to manage these risks and to use its best
efforts to meet the milestones. At this time, completion of hot
commissioning of the WTP, Milestone M-62-10, remains the only milestone
beyond fiscal year 2007 at risk because of the aforementioned issues.
93. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, has DOE started any
discussions with the State of Washington to modify the various
commitments under the TPA?
Mr. Rispoli. Currently, the Richland Operations Office is
discussing changes in Central Plateau Cleanup and Waste Management.
These discussions involve adjusting milestones to allow for further
characterization of waste sites and adjusting waste treatment
milestones to reflect revised retrieval volume projections. The TPA
parties recognized changes would be necessary and included a formal
change control process in the TPA. The DOE uses its best efforts to
initiate discussions or notify the document signatories of potential
milestone impacts in a timely manner. For example, the Office of River
Protection notified the Washington State Department of Ecology and the
Region 10 Offices of the TPA milestones impacted by the delays in the
construction and operation of the WTP on January 31, 2006.
Additionally, the Office of River Protection initiated discussions in
February 2006 with the Washington State Department of Ecology regarding
other near-term TPA milestones that were impacted by the WTP delays or
other performance and technical issues.
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
94. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, what additional steps could
you take to utilize the DOE national laboratories to ensure that
shortfalls in EM technical expertise are addressed?
Mr. Rispoli. I consider the DOE's national laboratories an
important resource to assist the DOE environmental cleanup mission. As
such, continued use of the national laboratory technical experts in the
Office of EM technical projects and activities is vital. EM is in
partnership with four national laboratories to obtain assistance in
identifying emerging issues and providing more technical assistance
across the EM complex. The labs can provide rapid response to address
current technical problems impeding site cleanup by evaluating new and
innovative approaches that result in cost savings or improvements to
waste disposition pathways. In addition, national laboratory technical
experts participate in longer duration evaluations to develop
alternatives to the larger site baselines in order to decrease life-
cycle schedule and costs. National laboratories also conduct research
in collaboration with Russian scientists and engineers to develop high-
level waste treatment technologies, for example.
EM is placing an increased emphasis on strengthening the technical
competencies of its Federal workforce through a multi-pronged approach.
This evolving approach includes the certification and qualification of
employees, development and sponsorship of training courses in specific
EM technical competencies, increased recruitment of mid-level and
career intern employees with technical experience and education, and
encouragement of employee participation in technical and professional
societies.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
NUCLEAR STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS
95. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, many times in your prepared
statement you talk about reductions, significant reductions, in the
nuclear weapons stockpile and you state that the 2001 NPR called for a
``transition from a threat-based nuclear deterrent with large numbers
of deployed and reserve weapons to a deterrent based on capabilities,
with a smaller nuclear weapons stockpile.'' What dismantlement
decisions have been made and implemented since 2001 to achieve the
reductions?
Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]
96. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, in what way is the stockpile
smaller today than it was in 2000?
Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]
97. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, what part of the transition
discussed in the 2001 NPR has occurred and what is planned?
Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]
98. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, how many dismantlements are
planned for fiscal year 2006 and for fiscal year 2007 and which weapons
will be dismantled in each year?
Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]
99. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, currently there are roughly
four weapons in reserve or inactive or other status in the stockpile
for every weapon deployed. Under the 2001 NPR, is there a goal to
reduce this ratio?
Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]
100. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, will the RRW program allow a
reduction in this ratio? What is the goal and what is a reasonable
ratio?
Ambassador Brooks. Last April, before this committee, I provided a
statement indicating that the RRW, if ongoing studies validated the
feasibility of RRW designs, will be the ``enabler'' to achieve the
infrastructure and stockpile transformation that is needed for the
Nation's future nuclear deterrent. Once we establish a responsive
infrastructure, can demonstrate that we can produce RRWs on a timescale
in which geopolitical threats could emerge, and can respond in a timely
way to technical problems in the stockpile, then I believe we can go
much further in reducing non-deployed warheads.
If we can demonstrate feasibility of higher margin replacement
warheads and components that increase confidence in the stockpile, we
believe this will allow further reductions in the stockpile.
Additionally, we believe these more easily manufactured replacement
warheads will provide an opportunity to transform to a more responsive,
cost effective, and efficient infrastructure that will then provide
more opportunities for additional stockpile reductions. A more
responsive infrastructure will allow less reliance on the non-deployed
stockpile for risk reduction, and lead to more reliance on the
infrastructure (i.e., ability to produce additional or repair warheads
in sufficient quantity) in responding to technical failures or new and
emerging threats of the 21st century. Our ability to reduce the
stockpile in the years beyond 2012 will depend critically on continued
progress in achieving the RRW and responsive infrastructure goals.
101. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, you state in your testimony
that by 2012 the stockpile will be ``the smallest stockpile since the
Eisenhower administration.'' What is the annual dismantlement plan to
achieve this reduction?
Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]
102. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, how do you quantify this
reduction based on the total number of weapons in the stockpile today--
50 percent, 25 percent, 10 percent?
Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington DC.
GLOBAL STRIKE PLANS AND PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Sessions and Bill
Nelson.
Other Senators present: Senator Byron L. Dorgan
Majority staff members present: Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; and
Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
minority counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Jill L. Simodejka and Pendred K.
Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; and William K. Sutey, assistant
to Senator Bill Nelson.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Sessions. The meeting will come to order. I'm
pleased to welcome our witnesses today--General James
Cartwright, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM); Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy; Rear Admiral Charles Young,
Director of the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs; and Major
General Stanley Gorenc, Director for the Air Force Operational
Capabilities Requirements. That's a mouthful.
General Gorenc. It is a mouthful.
Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, I thank you for your service
to your Nation. Many good things have occurred, and I know you
are thinking creatively and long range and to try to configure
us in a way we need to be for the short-term future and the
long-term future, and we're glad to have you join us today. We
will receive testimony today on the Department of Defense's
(DOD) policy plans and programs for global or strategic strike.
During the Cold War, the term ``strategic strike'' was
associated with the use of long-range nuclear forces to deter
the former Soviet Union. Today, strategic forces must provide
the President and the warfighter a range of capabilities to
address a new global security environment where rogue states
armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and violent
extremists have to be added to the list of strategic
challenges. This new concept for strategic strike, now commonly
referred to as global strike, was codified in the 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) conducted by the DOD.
Oh, Senator Nelson, great to have you with us. One of the
principal tenets of the NPR was a greater emphasis on advanced
conventional weapons as a means to reduce dependency on nuclear
forces to provide an offensive deterrent. While the United
States is well on its way toward reducing the nuclear forces of
some 2,200 operationally deployed warheads, by 2012, it is less
clear that our improved conventional strike capabilities are
maturing as quickly as they should be. For example, the June
2005 Prompt Global Strike Plan submitted to Congress noted,
``For the near future, in the event of a rapidly-developing
crisis, the DOD will not have non-nuclear, long-range precision
strike options for consideration by the national leadership.''
The budget request before us includes $127 million in fiscal
year 2007 to address this gap in the near-term by modifying 24
of the existing nuclear-armed Trident D-5 Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) that carry conventional warheads,
not nuclear. The capability to strike virtually anywhere on the
face of the Earth within 60 minutes could provide the President
with the means to preempt dangerous threats to the United
States and its allies and could well become one of the more
important deterrent tools in our Nation's strategic arsenal.
One example that might serve to illustrate the potential
importance of this capability is that at the outset of the
March 2003 campaign in Iraq, the United States launched an
attack with F-117 fighters and sea-launched cruise missiles in
an attempt to decapitate the Iraqi leadership.
According to the press reports, this strike took 4 hours to
execute. Despite the fact that U.S. forces were already
deployed in the region. Wouldn't it be in our interest to have
the capability to launch our strike within 30 or 60 minutes? We
are mindful, however, that there may be risks associated with
plans to collocate conventional and nuclear Trident missiles on
the same submarine. How, for example, would other nuclear
powers interpret U.S. intentions during a launch? In
determining whether to go forward with this program, we will
need to weigh carefully the potential benefits of this new
capability against the perceived risks. To help us make this
determination, the committee also needs to be aware of other
prompt global strike capabilities to include land-based options
available to the Department in the near-term and over time.
While addressing non-nuclear strike options, we must bear
in mind that nuclear weapons are uniquely capable of holding
certain critical targets at risk and that the size and
structure of our nuclear deterrent forces will continue to play
an important role in our national security posture. It is in
this context that we will consider the Department's plans to
reduce the number of operationally-deployed Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from 500 to 450.
These are just some of the issues we intend to explore in our
hearing today. Let me now recognize my distinguished ranking
member, Senator Nelson of Florida. I appreciate his partnership
and his interest in matters relating to our Nation's defense.
Senator Nelson, we welcome any remarks you have.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have three
issues to discuss today--(1) the proposal to convert the 24
Trident D-5 Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles to carry 4 non-
nuclear warheads each and replace 2 of the 24 nuclear D-5
missiles on 12 Trident submarines with 2 non-nuclear D-5
missiles; (2) the proposal to retire 38 B-52H bombers by 2008.
The most immediate issue, however, is the decision to terminate
the two B-52 upgrade programs by the end of this month,
effectively foreclosing the consideration of this proposal by
Congress; and (3) the lack of a decision with respect to the
nuclear cruise missiles--should they be retired or retained?
While this discussion is going on within the DOD, the
Department of Energy (DOE) is spending $100 million per year to
begin a life extension program on the W-80 Nuclear Warhead in
2010, the nuclear warhead that is flown by all three cruise
missiles. The decision needs to be made quickly on the
missiles. If the W-80 is to be retired, then we shouldn't waste
the $100 million per year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. Senator Dorgan, we are
delighted to have you as a guest of our committee. Do you want
to say something before we begin with our guests?
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thanks for inviting me. I'm
anxious to hear the testimony today, and I appreciate your
willingness to allow me to sit in.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much. Then we'll start
with Secretary Flory. Each of you that desire to make an
opening statement, we'd be delighted to hear you. If you'd like
to give abbreviated remarks and submit full remarks for the
record, we'll accept that also.
Secretary Flory.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER C.W. FLORY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Mr. Flory. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission,
I'll do just that. I will give a shorter opening statement and
ask that my entire statement please be included in the record.
Senator Sessions. Very well.
Mr. Flory. Chairman Sessions, Senator Nelson, Senator
Dorgan, I welcome the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee today to describe our progress in transforming the
Nation's strategic capabilities. I want to thank you and the
other members of the subcommittee for your continued support in
this important endeavor. The successful transformation of our
capabilities will require a sustained partnership between the
DOD and Congress.
As the recently published National Security Strategy (NSS)
notes, the new strategic environment requires new approaches to
deterrence and defense. Our deterrence strategy, as the
chairman pointed out in his opening remarks, no longer rests
solely on our ability to inflict devastating consequences on
potential foes. Today, a more discriminate approach and a
broader range of options and capabilities--including both
offenses and defenses--contribute to the deterrence of state
and non-state actors by denying them their objectives and, if
necessary, by responding with overwhelming force.
Our strategy for transforming U.S. strategic forces is
contained in the NPR of December 2001. The NPR was written in
response to congressional direction, and reflected Presidential
guidance to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons to the
lowest levels consistent with U.S. national security and our
commitments to allies.
The NPR called for an overhaul of U.S. strategic forces and
concepts and provided a framework to guide their future
development in a new and uncertain environment that we found
ourselves in following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The
NPR did a number of things. Notably, it directed reductions in
the number of operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads
from around 6,000 to levels between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012.
The NPR also established a so-called New Triad composed of
offensive strike systems to include nuclear, non-nuclear, and
non-kinetic capabilities that can generate strategic effects
promptly and precisely and at great range. It also included
defenses, both active and passive, as well as a responsive
defense infrastructure which includes the U.S. nuclear weapons
complex to provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet
emerging threats.
When fully implemented, the New Triad can provide the range
of capabilities and options needed for a credible deterrent
against a wide range of potential adversaries whose values and
calculations of risk, gain, and loss may be very different from
and, in many ways, harder to discern than those of past
adversaries. These capabilities will also be important should
deterrence fail. The New Triad is designed to transform our
strategic capabilities to deal with an uncertain future, and it
reflects new thinking about the meaning and purpose of U.S.
strategic capabilities.
For example, during the Cold War, the term strategic strike
was virtually synonymous with the employment of nuclear
weapons. This is no longer so. The development of precision
targeting, flexible and collaborative planning, and improved
intelligence and surveillance capabilities now enables us to
envision using highly precise and responsive conventional
systems to achieve strategic effects. So today, in appropriate
areas, we are adding and need to continue to add conventional
global strike to the mix of our capabilities.
During the Cold War, we also designed our strategic nuclear
forces to deter a single foe, the Soviet Union, and generally
treated all others as lesser-included cases.
Today, a one-size-fits-all approach to deterrence is no
longer appropriate. Today, we must tailor deterrence to fulfill
a number of functions: to assure our allies and friends; to
achieve specific effects against a wide range of potential
adversaries and circumstances, such as advanced military
competitors or nuclear competitors, regional WMD states, and
non-state terrorist networks.
We cannot predict with confidence which nations or nation,
which non-state actors, or which combination of the above may
pose a threat to our vital interest or those of our friends and
allies and how such a threat might materialize and what form
and attack it might take. As the NPR noted, the September 11
attacks dramatically illustrated the unparalleled extremism,
hostility, and unpredictability of some foes.
The NPR was only a starting point for the transformation of
our strategic capabilities and concepts. Since December 2001,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff,
USSTRATCOM, and the Services have been working together to
develop detailed implementation plans and operational concepts.
I would like to highlight some examples of our progress to
date. New missions have been assigned to USSTRATCOM to General
Cartwright here and his crew out in Omaha beyond their
continuing responsibility for strategic nuclear forces. These
include global strike, integration of missile defense, space
operations, integration of command, control, communications,
and intelligence, offensive information operations, and
integrating and synchronizing DOD's role in combating WMDs. I
know General Cartwright will have more to say on his response
to these many challenging tasks.
We have made significant progress in a number of areas. For
example, we have fielded an initial ballistic missile defense
capability at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force
Base, and we have initiated additional cooperation and
participation in our missile defense program. We are reducing
U.S. nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally-
deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012 and are on track to
meet our interim goal of 3,800 warheads by 2007.
We are also making progress in developing non-kinetic
strike capabilities and improving planning, intelligence, and
command and control capabilities to integrate our New Triad
effectively.
There are some areas, however, as you pointed out, Mr.
Chairman, where we have made less progress. These include
fielding prompt conventional capabilities for global strike,
transforming a Cold War nuclear arsenal to meet new challenges,
and revitalizing our nuclear infrastructure.
We are working hard to make greater progress in these areas
to realize the full potential and the broad mix of capabilities
called for in the NPR. For example, we need the systems to be
in a position where in a regional crisis against an adversary
armed with WMD, the credibility of our deterrent may turn on
our ability to threaten highly-valued assets of importance to
that state's leadership while minimizing collateral damage.
These assets may include WMD, missiles, command and control
facilities, or leadership bunkers, any one of which may be
protected in hard or deeply-buried facilities. Conventional
global strike capabilities are needed to augment our existing
military options for holding such targets at risk, and we need
to expand the range of prompt, long-range strike options
available to the President, options which are currently limited
to nuclear weapons.
Fielding this New Triad will strengthen the overall
credibility of our deterrent posture and maintain the nuclear
threshold at an appropriately high level and reduce our
reliance on nuclear weapons.
At the same time, this more flexible and capable strategic
posture can help address all four pillars of our defense
strategy. I mentioned earlier the capability to assure our
allies and friends to help dissuade potential adversaries from
investing in capabilities to challenge the United States and to
help deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression.
While our national strategy calls for reduced reliance on
nuclear weapons, these weapons will continue to play a critical
role. Nuclear weapons provide credible military options to
deter a wide range of threats, including chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons as well as large-scale
aggression. Nuclear weapons possess unique properties that give
the United States options to hold at risk target classes that
cannot be countered through non-nuclear means.
What we need here is not a smaller version of a Cold War-
era nuclear stockpile, we need capabilities that are
appropriate for the 21st century.
To accomplish the transformation of our nuclear stockpile,
it will be necessary to restore the Nation's nuclear
infrastructure. Revitalizing and restoring the nuclear weapons
infrastructure is essential to assure the long-term safety and
reliability of U.S. nuclear warheads and to provide a hedge
against an unforeseen, catastrophic technical failure and any
element of our nuclear force or against adverse geopolitical
changes.
To assist in transforming the stockpile and to help place
the nuclear infrastructure on a sound footing, one important
near-term initiative is the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).
The RRW program will ensure the long-term sustainability of a
stockpile by, among other things, eliminating hazardous
materials and simplifying warhead manufacturing--all of this to
be done without nuclear testing. If successful, the RRW may
enable further reductions in the size of the stockpile by
demonstrating a real capability to manufacture highly RRWs. In
this respect, the RRW may be a first step towards the
responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure called for by the
NPR.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that was completed in
February was another extensive review of all of the
Department's capabilities that took a very close look at
deterrence and the capabilities that we need to maintain our
deterrence.
Among other things leading into the QDR, we had a another
study in 2004-2005, which reviewed the fundamental assumptions
of the NPR. This was the Strategic Capabilities Assessment. In
the course of that, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
reviewed our original planning assumptions, the original
planning assumptions that had guided the decisions we made,
both to reduce our nuclear warheads and to develop the New
Triad and noted that those assumptions were still valid.
However, DIA pointed out that to the extent that conditions
were changing, to the extend that the trend was different from
what was predicted, it was trending, if anything, toward a
more-stressing rather than a less-stressing strategic
landscape--for example, with respect to developments in North
Korea, Iran, and general nuclear proliferation. These same
assumptions were reviewed and revalidated in the 2006 QDR when,
as I mentioned earlier, the senior civilian and military
leadership of the Department reviewed areas associated with
implementation of the NPR and development of the New Triad and
our overall defensive posture. As I noted earlier, the U.S.
needs to tailor its strategy of deterrence to each potential
adversary across a wide range of scenarios.
Specifically, the QDR concluded that the U.S. needs to
tailor its strategy of deterrence to each potential adversary,
that we need to make greater progress in fielding prompt,
accurate, non-nuclear global strike capabilities and that we
can also make further modest reductions in the strategic
nuclear force structure with minimal risk. I will touch briefly
on each of these QDR conclusions. First, with respect to
tailored deterrence, the U.S. needs to tailor its deterrence to
each potential adversary across a wide range of scenarios. This
means having the capability to create specific and appropriate
effects to influence the decisionmaking of each potential
adversary. Tailored deterrence will require that we understand
each potential adversary to a greater degree than in the past.
As I noted earlier, this may actually be harder to do than it
was in the past. Tailored deterrence also means that our
declaratory statements will need to be tailored so that our
policy statements and our operational capabilities work
together to send the same message and to strengthen deterrence.
Second, with respect to global strike and the need to
deploy a conventional global strike capability, as an element
of a more-tailored, deterrent posture, we need to deploy,
within 2 years, an initial capability that will allow us to
promptly engage targets globally with precision-guided
conventional weapons. This is the conventional Trident missile
system, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, that you mentioned in
your opening remarks. The way we plan to achieve this is by
arming a small number of long-range Trident missiles with
accurate, non-nuclear warheads. This system would represent a
near-term, affordable, relatively off-the-shelf and low-risk
option for providing the President of the United States with an
important capability that he does not have today. By deploying
conventional Trident, we close a longstanding gap in our
conventional strike capability for engaging an adversary
promptly and precisely anywhere in the world.
I understand there is concern, and this was mentioned in
your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman and Senator Nelson, that
there is a risk that the operational launch of a non-nuclear
Trident missile might cause other nations--for example, Russia
or China, to mistake such a launch for a nuclear attack. The
U.S. has employed dual-role weapon systems in many years, and
in fact, has done a number of missile tests from Trident and
other submarines. But we recognize that a non-nuclear Trident
missile aboard an SSBN will, in fact, represent a significant
new development, and this is a concern that we take very
seriously. I should point out that for the near-term, only
Russia will have the ability to detect and respond promptly to
ballistic missile launches of any kind. I think it's important
to note that we already have in place, both with respect to
Russian leaders--and is also concerned about the Chinese
leadership--we have, with respect to the Russian and Chinese
leaders, hotlines and other means for emergency communications
that would be an important part of our strategy for mitigating
any potential risk of misperception here.
In addition to hotlines and the potential for advanced
notification of a launch, we have other means for creating
transparency and building confidence. One of those would
include military-to-military talks between our respective
forces so that others would understand our concept of
operations for this new capability. Other options would include
ways in which we could structure and operate the system to
provide a notably different launch phenomenology, for example,
different tasking and authorization procedures so that a launch
of one of these systems would not, in fact, look just like a
launch of a nuclear system.
Again, we take seriously the risks that have been expressed
about the possibility of a misperception. We think we have
measures in place that would be able to mitigate this risk, and
we think that it's on balance. The benefits that could be
gained from this system are substantial, and the risks, while
are there things that need to be taken seriously, they are
things that we can confidently manage.
In this context, it is important to remember that while any
military action involves risks, there may also be risks and
sometimes, very serious regrets in not acting. By developing
and deploying this system, what we intend to do is to provide
the President with one more option with which he can choose to
act or not act or however he wants to proceed with respect to
threats against the United States. It's a question of filling
in a range of options that is not fully filled in right now.
My last point, with respect to the further reductions in
the ICBM force, we have made considerable progress in reducing
our operationally-deployed strategic weapons, as I noted
earlier. In light of this progress, the QDR has reevaluated our
strategic nuclear force posture and determined that with
minimal and acceptable risk, we could make further modest
reductions and retire 50 Minuteman IIIs. This represents a 10-
percent reduction in the size of the Minuteman III force as
envisioned by the NPR in 2001.
Mr. Chairman, once again, in conclusion, we need a
sustained partnership between the DOD and Congress if we are to
transform our Nation's strategic capabilities to meet the
uncertainties and challenges ahead. The Department will require
your and the subcommittee's and the chairman's and the full
committee's and the entire Congress's support as we continue to
replace the legacy Cold War force posture with a New Triad that
will protect our Nation in the new security environment.
I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Flory follows:]
Prepared Statement by Peter C.W. Flory
I. OPENING REMARKS
Chairman Sessions, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee: I welcome the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee to describe our progress in transforming the Nation's
strategic capabilities. I know that you understand the importance of
this effort and that you recognize the need to replace a force posture
configured for the Cold War with a New Triad that is better suited to
the new security environment. I want to thank the members of the
committee for your continued support in this effort. Successful
transformation of our capabilities will require a sustained partnership
between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress.
II. THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW: A CATALYST FOR CHANGE
As the recently published National Security Strategy (NSS) notes,
the new strategic environment requires new approaches to deterrence and
defense. Our deterrence strategy no longer rests solely on an ability
to inflict devastating consequences on potential foes. Today, a more
discriminate approach and a broader range of capabilities--including
both offenses and defenses--contribute to deterrence of state and non-
state actors, by denying them their objectives and, if necessary, by
responding with overwhelming force.
Our strategy for transforming U.S. strategic forces is contained in
the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of December 2001. The NPR was written
in response to congressional direction, and reflected Presidential
guidance to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons to the lowest
levels consistent with U.S. national security and our commitments to
allies.
The NPR called for an overhaul of U.S. strategic forces and
concepts, and provided a framework to guide the future development of
these forces in the new and uncertain environment we found following
the attacks of September 11, 2001. The NPR directed reductions in the
number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from around
6,000 to levels between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. The NPR also
established a New Triad composed of:
Offensive strike systems--to include nuclear, non-
nuclear, and non-kinetic capabilities that can generate
strategic effects promptly and precisely, and at great range;
Defenses--both active and passive; and
A responsive defense infrastructure--including the
U.S. nuclear weapons complex--to provide new capabilities in a
timely fashion to meet emerging threats.
These New Triad capabilities will be integrated by improved
planning, intelligence, and command and control.
When fully implemented, the New Triad can provide the range of
capabilities and options needed for a credible deterrent against a
range of potential adversaries whose values and calculations of risk,
gain and loss may be very different from--and more difficult to discern
than--those of past adversaries. These capabilities will also be
important should deterrence fail. This New Triad is designed to
transform our strategic capabilities to deal with an uncertain future,
and reflects new thinking about the meaning and purpose of U.S.
strategic capabilities.
For example, during the Cold War the term ``strategic strike'' was
virtually synonymous with the employment of nuclear weapons. This is no
longer so. The development of precision targeting capabilities,
flexible and collaborative planning systems, net-centric national
command and control systems, and improved intelligence and surveillance
capabilities now enable us to envision using highly precise and
responsive conventional weaponry to achieve strategic effects that once
required nuclear weapons. Today, in appropriate areas, we can add
conventional Global Strike to the mix of capabilities able to achieve
strategic effects.
During the Cold War, the main challenge facing the United States
was deterring the former Soviet Union from using weapons of mass
destruction against the United States and its allies. At that time we
designed our strategic nuclear forces to deter a single foe, and
generally treated all others as ``lesser included cases.''
The new security environment is much-changed, however. As noted in
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released last month, Russia is
unlikely to pose a military threat to the United States or its allies
on the same scale or intensity as the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
although it remains a country in transition. It is no longer an
adversary but not a traditional ally. Of the major and emerging powers,
China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United
States, and there are potential flash points with which we must be
concerned, such as Taiwan.
At the same time the United States faces a threat from an expanding
number of hostile regimes and terrorist groups that seek to acquire and
use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Even when they do not pose a
direct threat to the United States, these States may threaten the U.S.
or its allies indirectly by transferring weapons or expertise to
terrorists. The United States cannot predict with confidence which
nation, nations, non-state actors, or a combination of the above may
pose a threat to its vital interests, or those of its friends and
allies, in the decades ahead. As the NPR noted: ``The September 11
attacks dramatically illustrated the unparalleled extremism, hostility,
and unpredictability of some foes. . . .''
In this new and uncertain environment, a ``one size fits all''
approach to deterrence is no longer appropriate; we must re-think our
approach to 21st century threats and tailor deterrence to assure our
allies and friends, and achieve specific effects against a wide array
of potential adversaries and circumstances, such as advanced military
competitors, regional WMD states, and non-state terrorist networks. To
do this we must have a broad range of credible strategic capabilities--
including a mix of nuclear and non-nuclear Global Strike capabilities,
defenses, and a revitalized and responsive infrastructure.
The NPR of 2001 set forth, and was based on, the following
assumptions:
Expect Surprise;
Unpredictable Future;
Deterrence continues to be important, but uncertain;
Future adversaries (e.g., rogue states) possess WMD;
Denial and deception complicate characterization of WMD
facilities;
Terrorists and non-state actors seek WMD;
China modernizing conventional and nuclear forces;
Taiwan a potential flash point; and
Russia no longer an adversary, but uncertain future.
Since its publication in December 2001, the logic, strategy, and
the fundamental assumptions of the NPR have been reviewed periodically
and subjected to rigorous internal scrutiny, for example, in the 2004-
2005 Strategic Capabilities Assessment. Based on the Defense
Intelligence Agency's assessment, the 2004-2005 Strategic Capabilities
Assessment concluded that the NPR's planning assumptions remain valid,
although conditions are trending toward--if anything--a more stressing
strategic landscape, for example, with respect to North Korea, Iran and
nuclear proliferation. Additionally, we are increasingly concerned over
the sale to others of disruptive weapons technologies by Russia--a
country in transition--as well as by others. These same assumptions
were revalidated by the 2006 QDR.
But the NPR was only a starting point for the transformation of
U.S. strategic capabilities and concepts. Since December 2001 the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM), and the Services have been working together to
develop detailed implementation plans and operational concepts. I would
like to highlight some examples of our progress to date:
1. New missions have been assigned to USSTRATCOM beyond its
continuing responsibility for strategic nuclear forces. These
include:
Global Strike--to include nuclear, non-nuclear
and non-kinetic effects;
Integration of Missile Defense;
Space Operations;
Integration of Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence;
Offensive Information Operations; and
Integrating and synchronizing DOD's role in
Combating WMD.
2. We have made significant progress in several areas, for
example:
a. We have fielded an initial ballistic missile
defense capability at Ft. Greely, Alaska; and expanded
international cooperation and participation in our
missile defense program.
b. We are reducing U.S. nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by
2012. We are on-track to meet our interim goal of 3,800
warheads by 2007.
We removed the last Peacekeeper
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) from
its silo in September 2005;
We completed the conversion to
Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Attack
Submarines (SSGNs) of two of the four Nuclear-
Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)
that are being retired from strategic service;
and
We implemented a new plan for the
nuclear stockpile that will cut the total
number of active and inactive warheads nearly
in half by 2012.
c. We also are making progress in developing non-
kinetic strike capabilities and improving planning,
intelligence, and command and control capabilities that
are needed to integrate New Triad capabilities
effectively.
3. There are, however, areas where we have made only limited
progress; these include:
fielding prompt conventional capabilities for
Global Strike;
transforming a Cold War nuclear arsenal to
meet new challenges; and
revitalizing the nuclear infrastructure.
We are working to make greater progress in these three areas in
order to realize the broad mix of capabilities called for by the NPR.
Instead of the legacy Cold War strategic posture, with its reliance on
high-yield, nuclear weapons delivered by ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers to deter the Soviet Union, we need to transform and strengthen
our posture to enable us to tailor deterrence against the full spectrum
of post-Cold War threats. This, in turn, will require delivering on new
capabilities that are credible and useful in affecting the
decisionmaking of potential adversaries, and are effective against
high-value, strategic targets.
For example, in a regional crisis against an adversary armed with
WMD, the credibility of our deterrent may turn on our ability to
threaten highly-valued assets of importance to that state's leadership,
while minimizing collateral damage. These assets may include WMD,
missiles, command and control, or leadership bunkers protected in hard
and deeply buried facilities. Conventional Global Strike capabilities
are meant to augment the existing military options for holding such
targets at risk, and expand the range of prompt, long-range strike
options available to the President--currently limited to nuclear
weapons. Thus, rather than rejecting deterrence, prompt, conventional
Global Strike capabilities are intended to strengthen deterrence in the
changed and evolving strategic environment.
As Secretary Rumsfeld emphasized in the Foreword to the NPR, our
direction is designed to ``improve our ability to deter attack,'' while
``reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons'' to do so. The NPR does
not reject deterrence in favor of ``nuclear warfighting,'' nor does it
``lower the nuclear threshold.'' By fielding a New Triad of
capabilities that includes conventional Global Strike assets, and
defenses, and a responsive infrastructure, we strengthen the overall
credibility of our deterrent posture and maintain the nuclear threshold
at an appropriately high level.
By placing greater emphasis on advanced non-nuclear and defensive
capabilities, we seek to increase the credibility of our deterrent
posture for many contingencies, while reducing the emphasis on nuclear
weapons in our strategic posture. The broad array of New Triad
capabilities can better assure our allies and friends that they should
continue their reliance on the U.S. strategic deterrent--that they need
not seek an alternative or independent nuclear capability for their
security--thereby strengthening our alliances and supporting our
nonproliferation goals. At the same time, the more flexible and capable
strategic posture that the New Triad represents will help dissuade
potential adversaries from investing in capabilities to challenge the
United States, and help deter aggression.
While our national strategy calls for reduced reliance on nuclear
weapons, these weapons will continue to play a critical role in the
defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends.
Nuclear weapons provide credible military options to deter a wide range
of threats, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
weapons, and large-scale conventional military forces. Nuclear weapons
possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold
at risk a wide variety of target classes--some of which cannot be held
at risk in any other fashion. Nuclear weapons will retain a vital role
in deterring WMD threats, assuring allies of U.S. security commitments,
holding at risk an adversary's assets and capabilities that cannot be
countered through non-nuclear means, and dissuading potential
adversaries from developing large-scale nuclear or conventional
threats.
To achieve that goal we need to sustain flexible and credible
nuclear forces. Sustaining such a force will help mitigate the risks
associated with the drawdown of nuclear forces, provide a broader range
of options to the President, and offer the means necessary to tailor
deterrence against a range of potential adversaries and circumstances.
However, to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent we need to
transform the nuclear stockpile so that the weapons we retain are
appropriate for the challenges and uncertainties we will face in the
coming decades. What we need is not a smaller version of the Cold War-
era nuclear stockpile; we need capabilities appropriate for 21st
century threats.
To accomplish the transformation of our nuclear stockpile it will
be necessary to restore the Nation's nuclear infrastructure. The
National Nuclear Security Administration has a plan for revitalizing
this essential leg of the New Triad. Revitalization is essential in
order to assure the long-term safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear
warheads, strengthen deterrence for the new security environment, and
provide a hedge against an unforeseen, catastrophic technical failure
of any element of the nuclear force, or adverse geopolitical changes.
To assist in transforming the composition of the nuclear stockpile,
and to help place the Nation's nuclear infrastructure on a sound
footing, it is imperative that we continue, without delay, to field a
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The purpose of the RRW program is
to ensure the long-term sustainability of a nuclear weapon stockpile
for U.S. national security by, among other things, eliminating
hazardous materials, and simplifying warhead manufacturing--all without
nuclear testing. If successful, RRW may enable further reductions in
the size of the stockpile by demonstrating a real capability to
manufacture highly reliable, certified replacement warheads. In this
respect, the RRW is a first step towards the responsive nuclear weapons
infrastructure called for in the NPR.
III. THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
As noted earlier, DOD has periodically reviewed the fundamental
assumptions of the NPR and subjected them to rigorous scrutiny. In the
recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), for example, senior civilian
and military leaders reviewed several areas associated with the
implementation of the NPR and development of the New Triad, and
concluded that:
1. The U.S. needs to tailor its strategy of deterrence to
each potential adversary;
2. The U.S. needs to make greater progress in fielding
prompt, accurate, non-nuclear Global Strike capabilities; and
3. The U.S. can make further, modest reductions in the
strategic nuclear force structure with minimal risk.
I would like to discuss each of these QDR conclusions in turn.
Tailored Deterrence
As I noted earlier, the U.S. needs to tailor its strategy of
deterrence to each potential adversary across a wide range of
scenarios. Tailored deterrence will require that we understand each
potential adversary to a greater degree than in the past. We must
constantly ask ourselves who we may need to deter, and what we may need
to deter them from doing. It also means having the capability to create
the specific and appropriate effects needed to influence the
decisionmaking of each potential adversary. Together with transforming
DOD operational capabilities, U.S. declaratory statements will also
need to be tailored so that our policy statements and our operational
capabilities work together to underpin our deterrence strategy.
Global Strike and the Conventional Trident Missile
As an element of a more tailored deterrent posture, the Department
seeks to deploy, within 2 years, an initial capability to promptly
engage targets globally with precision guided conventional weapons.
This initial prompt Global Strike capability will be achieved by arming
a small number of long-range Trident missiles with accurate, non-
nuclear warheads. The rationale for focusing on ballistic missiles, in
general, and on a non-nuclear Trident missile in particular, is that
Conventional Trident represents a near-term, affordable, relatively
off-the-shelf and low-risk option for providing the President of the
United States with an important, new capability. By deploying SSBNs
armed with Conventional Trident missiles we will close a longstanding
gap in our strike capability for engaging an adversary promptly and
precisely, any where in the world, without having to resort to nuclear
weapons.
I understand that there is a concern about the possibility that the
operational launch of a non-nuclear Trident missile might cause other
nations, like China and Russia, to mistake it for a nuclear attack. The
U.S. has employed dual-role weapon systems for many years, but we
recognize that a non-nuclear Trident missile aboard an SSBN will
represent a significant new development. I should point out that, for
the near-term, only Russia will have the ability to both detect and
respond promptly to ballistic missile launches. Fortunately, we already
have in place links between U.S. senior leaders and their Russian and
Chinese counterparts.
To mitigate the risk of misperception we are exploring a variety of
additional transparency and confidence-building measures. These
measures include advance notification and military-to-military talks so
that others understand our concept of operation for this new
capability. We are also exploring the proper command and control
procedures and release authority issues associated with deploying SSBNs
with conventionally-armed Trident missiles. Our experience with
hundreds of at-sea test launches over the past four decades, without
incident, demonstrates that appropriate transparency measures can
greatly reduce the potential for misunderstanding. We believe the
benefits to be gained from Conventional Trident are important and the
potential risks manageable.
In this context, it is important to remember that while every
military action involves risks, there may also be risks--and sometimes
regrets--in not acting. By developing and deploying a Conventional
Trident we will provide the President with one more option with which
to defend against threats to the United States.
We also are studying other, longer-term solutions, both sea- and
land-based, in order to broaden our portfolio of non-nuclear Global
Strike capabilities and provide even greater flexibility in our
strategic posture. The initiatives underway include assessing options
for kinetic and non-kinetic non-nuclear capabilities. For example, the
Air Force's Land Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives
study is seeking to identify a cost-effective set of global strike
solutions; the Army is studying a concept for fielding an Advanced
Hypersonic Weapon; and the Navy is studying the development of a
conventionally-armed Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile with a range
of about 1,500 nautical miles to increase the versatility of the cruise
missile-armed submarine (SSGN). In addition, there are other
initiatives underway across DOD that support the Prompt Global Strike
mission; these include major enabling capabilities such as the
transition to a net-centric based command, control, communications
architecture, and improved global situation awareness with enhanced
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools.
Further Reductions in the ICBM Force
As I noted earlier, we have made considerable progress to date in
drawing down our operationally-deployed strategic nuclear weapons to
the 1,700-2,200 level; this includes the withdrawal of all 50
Peacekeeper ICBMs from their silos, and the withdrawal of 4 SSBNs from
strategic service and conversion to SSGNs. In light of our progress in
making these reductions and fielding New Triad capabilities, the QDR
re-evaluated our strategic nuclear force posture. As a result, DOD's
senior leaders determined that--with minimal risk--we could make a
further, modest reduction in the number of nuclear-armed ICBMs by
retiring 50 Minuteman Ills. This represents a 10-percent reduction in
the size of the Minuteman III force as envisioned by the NPR in 2001,
but it will not affect the number of operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads we are planning to deploy by 2012.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A sustained partnership between the DOD and Congress will be needed
if we are to succeed in transforming our Nation's strategic
capabilities to meet the uncertainties and challenges ahead. The
Department will require your continued support to replace the legacy
Cold War force posture with a New Triad that is better suited to the
new security environment. In closing, I would like to summarize my main
points.
1. Conventional Trident Missile is a near-term means of
addressing the current lack of capability for prompt,
conventional Global Strike. The longer-term goal is to develop
a range of prompt Global Strike capabilities that can provide
the President with a wider range of options for addressing the
dangers of the new security environment.
2. Continued progress on ballistic missile defense is
essential. The Department has made great strides since the
President's decision in 2002 to field missile defenses, and we
appreciate the continued support of this committee as we field
this important capability.
3. Transformation of the nuclear force is not only a matter
of making reductions in operationally deployed strategic
nuclear weapons. Making tailored deterrence a reality, and
fielding a strategic force that is properly configured for the
21st century, will require us to make adjustments in our force
posture, in our residual nuclear stockpile, and in our
thinking.
Finally, as we transform U.S. strategic forces to deal with new
security challenges, we must also rethink important issues and ideas--
especially our understanding of deterrence. We cannot contend with 21st
century uncertainties with a Cold War-force posture, a Cold War nuclear
stockpile, or Cold War thinking.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Secretary Flory. General
Cartwright, we'd be pleased to hear your opening comments at
this time.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Nelson. I'm not going to go back over the threat and some of
the things that I think have been very clearly laid out by
Secretary Flory, but I would like to cover, starting with the
Triad and the construct of the New Triad, the offense, defense,
the infrastructure piece. Remember that this is underpinned by
a robust command and control system, the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and the planning
capabilities that allow the use of this Triad and the
integration of its capabilities in a more holistic fashion than
maybe has been the case in the past.
When you look at the Triad, the offensive piece, and that's
what we're here to address today, a subset of the offensive
piece is global strike, and that subset really is to hold at
risk important targets such as those that are associated with
WMD, missiles, command and control, hard and also the deeply-
buried-type targets. These are the types of targets that we are
focusing in on with global strike. A subset of global strike is
the Prompt Global Strike, which really starts to get at the
issue of those targets that will not necessarily emerge next to
where we're based or where our normal patrol routes are. It can
appear anyplace globally. It does not necessarily pay attention
to borders or overfly rights and things like that, for which
the significant regret factors of, say, a WMD or a type of
target that represents a WMD--can cause great regret factors
for the country. For these types of targets, we're trying to
create a set of choices for the Nation on how to address them.
Today, we hold prompt global targets of this type at risk
with our strategic or nuclear forces, and the question is, can
we expand because of the advances that we have made in
precision, because of the advances that we have made in command
and control, because of the advances that we're making in our
ISR intelligence capabilities. Are there a further set of
opportunities that we can use to hold at risk. Not all of these
targets will present themselves in a way that is necessarily
appropriate for a nuclear weapon, and that's just the diversity
of the threat, the realities of where we are moving in the
world. A nuclear weapon is still a viable part of our
inventory, but it is, as the Secretary said, one-size-does-not-
fit-all. What we would like to do is create an opportunity here
to field a weapon that will give us a broader and potentially
more appropriate choice for the Nation.
In looking at the construct of 24 of these weapons, 2 per
boat across the population, the intent here is to provide a
credible choice that will hold these unanticipated targets,
these fleeting targets, targets that don't stay in one place
for very long, don't give us a lot of indications and warning
that they're going to be there, to hold them at risk in a way
that we have not been able to do in the past with something
other than a nuclear weapon. We are asking to proceed on a path
that will field on the Trident missile a conventional warhead.
This warhead, by the way, is not explosive. It is inert.
Because of the energy that is associated with a Trident reentry
vehicle, the explosive, at least for this initial capability,
is not necessary, given the precision that we believe that we
can obtain.
I think that it's important to understand that over the
next 2 years, as we field this initial capability, the command
and control, the planning, the supporting ISR structure will be
developed along with the capability, and we are working now to
realize those gains. Included will be the surety measures, the
assurance that we are launching the right weapon at the right
target 100 percent of the time from the submarine. The
political and the military dialogue between governments that
must occur so that we understand what it is we're trying to
accomplish here, how we're going to use it, how it's going to
appear to the adversary and to allies and friends or
disinterested parties, if they are just merely watching, how
this will look.
These are critical. This will be accomplished through
tests, through exercises, through mil-to-mil dialogue,
political dialogue. All of these things are absolutely critical
to demonstrate clearly the capability. You'll also note that in
this dialogue, we have chosen to do this in an unclassified
form. This is an open hearing. We are talking about this
because it is important to have transparency in what we want to
do in the future in this capability, to not leave ambiguity in
the equation.
This is not a new capability. Since 1968, we have launched
433 of these warheads on these missiles without ambiguity
through notification processes, talking to the Russians and the
Chinese. You can imagine that in a period since 1968, with 433
plus launches, that we have had bad weather days, we have had
maintenance, we have had issues. The system that is in place to
keep people informed about what we are doing has worked well
for us, and we will continue to improve that system and improve
the dialogue through training and exercises. This conventional
Prompt Global Strike capability will be a credible choice that
will offer the Nation a broader set of tools to confront the
enemies that we face today and in the future, and we believe
it's essential to offer this choice to the Nation.
Let me go back and pick up just a couple of the questions
that Senator Nelson highlighted. The Minuteman reductions from
500 to 450. The dialogue there is an acknowledgment that we
would like this system to last well into the future, and we
have expectations on the life of the system. We have to match
that with test assets to ensure that as the system ages, we
understand the character of that aging, that we know what to
expect out of that system, given that it carries the weapons
that we carry on our Minuteman system. We have to have surety
in that system and only can do that through testing. We have to
keep a robust test program all the way through the life of the
program. When we looked at the three wings associated with the
Minuteman, there is a wing of 150, a wing of 200, and a wing of
150. It just seemed to be logical that we would create three
wings of 150, take the 50 assets, use them both for tests and
also, to some extent, for R&D, we have money in this budget
that is addressing the next generation system. We have to start
looking at the risk reduction activities, the test activities
that will allow us to understand where we want to go in the
future. This is not a reduction in the number of warheads
deployed. They will just merely be redistributed on the
missiles. So, there is not a reduction in warheads. This is a
reduction in the number of launch vehicles, and it allows us to
move forward into the future.
Senator Sessions. Probably not, it would be multiple
warheads?
General Cartwright. Right now, we're at a strategy that
would put 500 on 500, so one warhead each. Now 50 of the
missiles will have more than one warhead, and that would still
leave us with the ability to say that our crystal ball wasn't
perfect. We may find in the future that we have an adversary
that emerges. It still leaves empty slots and the capability to
quickly reconfigure appropriately for the adversaries that we
might face in the future that we didn't anticipate. So it
leaves flexibility to understand that we don't know everything
we need to know about the future.
On the cruise missile side of the equation, and Senator, I
believe you referred to the cruise missile study and the
tension that that causes with the desire to move forward on the
RRW. The study is essentially complete. We jointly, inside the
DOD, between policy and USSTRATCOM, have worked that study.
It's in the briefing phase. It will move it up through the
decision process. We understand the desire. There is only so
much resource out there. That resource is not only the dollars,
but it's also the intellectual capital associated with the
labs, it is the production capacity associated with the labs.
There are a lot of resources tied up in a smart and quick
decision, but there is also the consideration of the risks
associated with moving from one capability to the next, should
we decide that, or retaining a capability to ensure that we
have that into the future. We're trying to capture all of that,
do it as quickly as we can and make sure that we are well-
informed before we announce that decision, and that will be
something that will be brought up through the Department.
The last question I think that you brought up, that I'll
quickly address, is the question on the B-52s and the number of
B-52s. You'll also note in this budget the resources associated
with and the acceleration of the next generation of bomber. We
think that that's important. We think it's important to start
to accelerate that capability. There are several attributes
that are being discussed as we look at the next generation
capability. Certainly survivability has always been a big
issue, but also the difference between prompt--which means
something that goes fast and gets there quickly, versus
something that can get out there and have long loiter and be
able to stay and persist with large payloads on station--
understanding the tradeoffs associated with that. Are we
dealing with one asset, are we dealing with a family, how do we
bring those attributes to a common platform, what's the right
balance between that platform and the ballistic missile family
that we're fielding and will field in the next generation?
Those are all the things that are being discussed as we work
our way through this.
Again, there are limited resources. We are starting to move
in a direction that would free up the resources to accelerate
the fielding of the next generation bomber. I think it still
puts us, from a USSTRATCOM perspective, with sufficient bombers
to exercise those missions that have been assigned to
USSTRATCOM for the bombers, both in the B-2 and the B-52.
I'll stand ready for your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: Thank you for this
opportunity to review U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) progress
during the past year and to present our plan for the future. I will
discuss the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) role in validating and
updating our transformational approach, and request your continued
support for specific actions necessary to ensure our strategic
capabilities are correctly postured to meet the challenges of today and
tomorrow. 2006 is a year of unprecedented change. Our ultimate goals
are driving the pace of change: building strategic advantage, ensuring
the security of the American people and strengthening the community of
free nations.
ADAPTING TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT--TRANSFORMING WHILE WE FIGHT
One year ago, we spoke of global interdependence and its impact on
how we organize, plan and operate. We emphasized developing strong
links between U.S. strategic objectives and regional operations, as our
adversaries were employing asymmetric means to strike well beyond the
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. We also spoke of USSTRATCOM's new
mission assignments and the steps we had undertaken to transform our
command into an agile 21st century organization capable of deterring
our adversaries and bringing the full range of global strike,
defensive, command and control (C2), and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to bear against them if
necessary. We outlined an enormous transformational effort that had to
be accomplished in the context of an ongoing global conflict with
active combat operations and without the luxury of an operational
pause.
Throughout the last year, the men and women of USSTRATCOM have
engaged in that global conflict, often employing means not visible
either to the average American or to our adversaries. They met this
day-to-day challenge with professionalism and commitment while they
were also restructuring our organization to focus our efforts, conserve
our resources, and streamline support to other combatant commanders
around the world. I come to you today gratified by the progress these
fine men and women have made and energized to complete the task before
us.
USSTRATCOM TRANSFORMATION VECTORS
The Department of Defense (DOD) budget you enacted for 2006 enabled
a string of organizational and operational successes along all of our
transformation vectors.
We changed the way we are organized and operate. We implemented,
and by the end of 2006 will refine, the redistributed and functionally
aligned command structure described last year. This new structure is
already paying off in terms of decentralized operational employment and
increased operational speed. Our efforts resulted in:
A flattened, streamlined, and focused headquarters
staff charged with maintaining command and control of the
Nation's nuclear forces, providing strategic guidance and
advocacy for essential mission capabilities, and conducting
integrated and synchronized strategic-level planning necessary
for mission accomplishment in all mission areas.
Four interdependent Joint Functional Component
Commands (JFCCs): Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR); Network-Warfare (NW); Integrated Missile Defense (IMD)
and Space and Global Strike (S&GS). Day-to-day operational
planning and execution of specialized global capabilities now
reside at the component level, where commanders are able to
maintain focus on their primary mission and not be distracted
by staff support activities.
Integrated Information Operations (IO) support through
the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC). The JIOC is the
focal point for all operational and tactical IO planning
support to DOD users around the globe.
Improved security for DOD information systems through
the aggressive efforts of Joint Task Force--Global Network
Operations (JTF-GNO). JTF-GNO instituted stringent use controls
and trained system users to reduce vulnerabilities.
A collaborative, Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC), to deliver select DOD space capability to U.S.,
Allied, and other national users. When fully operational, JSpOC
will provide the full range of DOD space capabilities.
A new USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction (SCC-WMD) and a new Global Innovation and Strategy
Center (GISC) that recently completed their formative
processes, joining the fight with specialized technical skills
and solutions to unique mission challenges.
By making this unique organizational transformation we also
strengthened our operational relationships with the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and National Security Agency
(NSA) in order to leverage the tremendous resources and capabilities
resident in these organizations. Now we effectively bridge many
artificial barriers to communications and information sharing, and
bring enhanced combat power to the regional combatant commanders.
We made progress in our drive toward a New Triad of capabilities.
The New Triad is comprised of offensive and defensive capabilities
enabled by persistent global command and control (C2), intelligence, an
agile planning system, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The New
Triad provides improved flexibility in dealing with a wider range of
contingencies, while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons, in
order to assure our allies, dissuade competitors, and deter those who
plan to harm us, particularly with WMD.
Efforts to improve conventional global strike capability focused on
generating effects without being hindered by factors of time, distance,
basing rights, over-flight considerations or undue risk to American
service men and women. Recently the Department:
Bolstered the number of Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM) in the inventory, providing all weather, precision
strike in a smaller weapon footprint.
Fielded Tactical Tomahawk (TACTCOM) and the Joint Air
to Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), providing strike weapons
that operate from ranges outside enemy point defenses.
During the past year non-kinetic capabilities became an
increasingly important tool to deny our adversaries the opportunity to
communicate easily or to manipulate information in ways that further
their efforts to undermine stability around the world. We seek better
non-kinetic capabilities to improve our freedom of action at the lowest
level of conflict; to enhance deterrence; and support the sustained
ability to use our networks while denying the adversary a similar
capability. In this area we:
Expanded development of the applicable tactics,
techniques, and procedures to support use of information and
networks--cyberspace--as an environment for integrated
exploitation, offensive, and defensive operations.
Improved integration of non-kinetic effects into
operational planning, on a limited basis, in support of forces
involved in the global war on terrorism.
The President has committed the United States to sustaining a
credible nuclear deterrence capability with the lowest possible number
of nuclear weapons consistent with national security. USSTRATCOM's task
is to ensure our nuclear force remains ready to meet any contingency
while the nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable as we
prudently achieve the thresholds specified in the Moscow Treaty. To
this end we:
Sustained a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile in
cooperation with the National laboratories and the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
Took steps to improve the security and safety of the
deployed nuclear force.
Retired the last Peacekeeper Inter-Continental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) from service.
Reduced the number of operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads on the Minuteman III ICBM force.
Transferred the final ballistic missile submarine
scheduled for reconfiguration to carry conventionally armed
cruise missiles.
We continued pursuit of both active and passive defenses as a means
of deterring our adversaries by demonstrating our ability to deny their
attempts to coerce or harm the United States. During 2006 we will:
Conduct additional tests of a Standard Missile 3
(SM3), which is designed to engage mid and short range
ballistic missiles early in flight.
Conduct tests of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) missile, which is designed to engage mid to short-range
ballistic missiles late in flight.
Increase the number of emplaced Ground-Based
Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska and California. GBIs are designed
to engage long-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse of
their flight. We plan on an interceptor demonstration this
spring and up to two more interceptor tests by the end of 2006.
Refine our missile engagement tracking capability by
deploying sea-based and forward-based X-Band radars to
operational locations in the Pacific region, where, by the end
of 2006, they will join a global network of radars.
Upgrade the Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications System (C2BMC) to extend situational awareness
capability to Pacific Command and European Command by the end
of 2006.
Promote expanded interagency support and participation
in the Proliferation Security Initiative to further global
efforts to combat the spread of WMD.
At the heart of the New Triad are the key enablers of command and
control, intelligence, and planning. Through these enablers, and our
broad array of space capability, we create the agility to respond to a
wide range of global challenges. During 2006 we will:
Evolve the renovated USSTRATCOM Global Operations
Center to enhance collaboration among all geographically
distributed USSTRATCOM elements--defining the first step toward
a Global C2 capability for all New Triad forces.
Complete preparations for opening the first node in a
network of ground entry points designed to serve a nationally
distributed ground, air and sea network capable of providing
the diverse connectivity requirements of the New Triad and DOD
support to a broader national command capability using all
elements of national power.
Codify the output of the department-wide process
review designed to modify historically inefficient ISR force
apportionment practices to globally manage low-density, high-
demand ISR assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles and
reconnaissance aircraft.
Extrapolate the results of an exercise in which we
demonstrated the ability to achieve persistence through the
combination/integration of different intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) phenomenology, to better
fulfill combatant commander's intelligence requirements.
Capitalize on the longer dwell time of unmanned and
unattended sensors to produce greater persistence in global war
on terrorism operations.
Initiate a pilot program to determine essential global
strike command and control services with an explicit objective
of delivering a distributed, collaborative product. The pilot
program will take advantage of the Department's Data Strategy,
which calls for visible, accessible and understandable data,
and uses Services Oriented Architectures (SOA) to promote
flexibility and agility.
Initiate efforts to transition from a limited space
surveillance architecture to a more fully integrated
terrestrial and space-based approach to situational awareness.
A NATION AT WAR--CONTINUING TO TRANSFORM
When I came before you last year, it was clear the pace of change
and nature of the threats and challenges to our Nation were growing
rapidly. It was also clear that USSTRATCOM's legacy systems and
organizational relationships were not suitable for meeting emerging
challenges the Nation now faces. Our intent, this year, was to address
nuclear issues in the QDR in order to rationalize them in the context
of our overall capabilities. It is against this backdrop that we
entered the dialog of the 2006 QDR.
USSTRATCOM presented new ideas and concepts, which were widely
debated during the course of review proceedings. We entered this review
believing the New Triad concept was sound in principle, but that the
pace of attaining the new construct was lagging the national need. With
this in mind we focused on four objectives:
Determine which elements of our considerable nuclear
force structure are essential to future stability and which
might be retired in favor of more redundant and credible
conventional or non-kinetic capabilities called for by the 2001
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and 2005 Strategic Capabilities
Assessment.
Determine the next steps needed to fulfill our
commitment to an integrated missile defense capable of
defending the U.S., its deployed forces, friends, and allies.
Identify key enablers within the domains of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; communications,
space, and collaborative planning that could rapidly improve
our agility and responsiveness.
Identify structural barriers to effective integration
and synchronization of DOD efforts to combat weapons of mass
destruction.
The QDR served to remind us of two very important factors: first,
that the United States is a nation engaged in a long war; and second,
that our enemies in this long war seek weapons of mass destruction and
will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people
everywhere. Importantly, the QDR validated the need to adjust the U.S.
global military force posture by moving away from a static defense in
obsolete Cold War garrisons. While the review described many areas in
which we must shift emphasis, we believe three are of particular
importance to shaping our command and its approach to the future:
From nation-state threats--to decentralized networked
threats from non-state enemies.
From ``one size fits all'' deterrence--to tailored
deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer
competitors.
From a focus on kinetics--to a focus on effects.
We have taken the QDR's imperative for change as validation of our
desire to accelerate transformation in many areas. While we believe
progress has been made, more can be done in selected areas to improve
USSTRATCOM's posture and preparedness to respond to a wider range of
traditional, irregular, disruptive, or catastrophic challenges.
Beginning in 2007 we will take steps to:
Improve USSTRATCOM's nuclear deterrence posture. Key initiatives
include:
Reduce the number of deployed Minuteman III ballistic
missiles in order to provide assets to meet essential flight
test needs and ensure the viability of the Minuteman force.
This will better balance our legacy nuclear capabilities while
preserving our ability to reconstitute additional forces in
response to strategic surprise.
Study the requirement for a Minuteman III replacement.
We believe this is an essential step toward ensuring our future
national security needs.
Study the requirement for nuclear-armed cruise
missiles and look at alternative methods of storing these Cold
War era weapons. We believe that this study will provide
valuable input in support of developing an effective long term
strategy to maintain the nuclear stockpile.
Develop a wider range of conventional deterrent weapons. USSTRATCOM
championed the need for a prompt, precise conventional global strike
capability, to bridge the gap between prompt nuclear weapons and less
timely, but precise, conventional weapons. Key initiatives include:
Deploy an initial precision-guided conventional
Trident Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile capability within 2
years. The speed and range advantage of a conventional Trident
missile increases decision time and provides an alternative to
nuclear weapon use against fleeting, high value targets. The
conventional Trident missile would be particularly useful in
deterring or defeating those who seek to coerce or threaten the
U.S. with WMD.
Develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range
strike capability to be fielded by 2018.
Study alternative options for delivering prompt,
precise conventional warheads using advanced technologies such
as hypersonic vehicles from land, air, or the sea.
Develop non-kinetic capabilities to expand the range of effects we
can generate against certain targets. Without question we are on the
verge of a major technology shift to the Network Age. We see an
environment in which digital internet communication is more pervasive,
reliable, efficient, cheap, and rapid--even with the enormous increase
in volume, variety, and velocity of data. Key initiatives include:
Develop capabilities that promote the freedom of
action we enjoy in other mediums like, maritime and air.
Develop the doctrine, organization, training,
maintenance, logistics, personnel and facilities to defend our
Nation in this domain.
Enhance measures to improve information assurance and
network security.
Improve integrated defenses against short, intermediate, and
intercontinental range ballistic and cruise missiles, and develop
complementary capabilities to combat weapons of mass destruction. Key
initiatives include:
Develop and mature integrated air and missile defenses
that deter attacks, demonstrating the ability to deny an
adversary's objectives.
Integrate defensive systems among our international
partners in ways that promote assurance against attack.
Expand the Army's 20th Support Command's capabilities,
to enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid
deployment in support of WMD elimination.
Improve and expand U.S. forces' capabilities to
locate, track and tag shipments of WMD.
Expand our advanced technical render safe capacity and
implement measures to increase associated speed of response.
Improve our nuclear infrastructure. USSTRATCOM recognizes the
importance of an efficient and more responsive nuclear weapons
infrastructure to the Department's strategy of tailored deterrence. We
believe this is the essential element needed to ensure our weapons are
safe, secure, and reliable, to ensure we can respond to both
technological and political surprise, and to reduce our current
stockpile of nuclear warheads.
In May 2005, the Nuclear Weapons Council commissioned an 18-month
study, to determine the feasibility of replacing some W76 warheads with
a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and to examine the potential for
using RRW in lieu of the W78 warhead. This U.S. Navy led study will
include Air Force and Interagency participants and should issue a final
report in November 2006. We believe this study will be a useful tool in
addressing some of the concerns raised by the Report of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, dated January 2006.
The key initiative is to:
Determine the feasibility of replacing existing
warheads with a RRW.
Develop a more coherent global command and control capability and a
network-enabled architecture that moves information to the user, rather
than moving the user to the information. The New Triad needs a robust,
resilient global C2 system that builds on our legacy nuclear C2 system
and serves as the basis of a critical national-level capability
suitable for use in emergencies range from terrorist attacks to natural
disasters. Key initiatives include:
Transition the USSTRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command
Center, providing a survivable and enduring nuclear command and
control capability, to a new network of distributed ground-
based communications nodes; establishing a gateway to a robust
multi-functional global command and control capability.
Retire four National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC)
and upgrade the TACAMO command and control aircraft, to sustain
a survivable airborne link to strategic nuclear forces and
broaden our ability to support full functionality of the New
Triad.
Transition intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
activities from a legacy approach, directed largely at monitoring
nation states in two theaters, to a true global enterprise tailored to
meet regional needs. Key initiatives include:
Implement a new global intelligence approach focused
on achieving persistent collection capabilities against legacy
and emerging threats, with our U.S. Government and allied
partners, and improved synergy with the Intelligence Community.
Increase investment in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
to provide greater dwell capabilities in the effort to identify
and track mobile targets globally.
Improve space capabilities. The space mission area creates a
decisive strategic advantage for our National security, empowering
critical economic as well as defense related activities. Our dependence
on space capabilities, coupled with recent significant advances in
space operations demonstrated by others, establishes a true imperative
to protect our space assets and our freedom of action in space.
STRACTOM understands the need to stay at least one technology
generation ahead of any foreign or commercial space power. We must
improve space situational awareness and protection, and ensure
unfettered, reliable, and secure access to space. Key initiatives
include:
Improve responsive space access, satellite operations,
and other space enabling capabilities such as the space
professional cadre.
Integrate air and space capabilities to deliver
combined effects.
Realign resources to sustain existing space
surveillance capabilities.
USSTRATCOM REQUESTS YOUR SUPPORT TO MEET THE CHALLENGES WE FACE
Over the next 5 years, we must fully transform while remaining
engaged in a conflict in which our enemies will use any and all means
to achieve their objectives. We believe a more aggressive
transformation schedule than envisioned 5 years ago is essential to
maintain the strategic advantage needed to deter or defeat those who
would do us harm. If we do not accelerate this transition, we will face
these adversaries, who attack through asymmetric means, with the blunt
weapons of last resort that won the Cold War. That alone will not
preserve our future national security. In particular we are requesting
your support in the following areas:
Prompt, Precision Conventional Global Strike
Tailored deterrence requires a more complete range of capabilities
to address the wide spectrum of challenges that confront us today.
While the Department employs expeditionary forces around the globe, it
is unlikely we will have forces in every place we need them at the
crucial moment when we have an opportunity to stop a WMD-armed threat
far from our shores. The United States has the capability to engage
with high quality conventional forces around the world, given days or
perhaps weeks to respond. But if our general-purpose forces are not in
a position to respond rapidly, the need to defeat attacks against the
United States may require USSTRATCOM to interdict fleeting targets at
global range. We have the delivery capability on alert today, but
configured only with nuclear weapons. This choice is not credible
against many of the extremist adversaries we will face.
We recommend proceeding with development of the responsive,
conventional global strike alternative offered by the Conventional
Trident Modification (CTM). The President's budget request includes
funds for the modification of a number of submarine based Trident
Missiles to deliver conventional warheads with precision over thousands
of miles in tens of minutes.
Global Command and Control (GC2)
We are now faced with the task of recapitalizing our aging, Nuclear
Command and Control (NC2) network, which is a matter of prime
importance. Capitalizing on advances in technology, we envision a
transition from the single-purpose, stove-piped NC2 network that served
us during the Cold War, to a multi-functional, distributed, survivable,
and expandable Global Command and Control capability, leveraging the
assets and resources of the Global Information Grid and serving the
needs of our joint warfighters.
With your support for the President's budget request, we can
deliver a resilient air, land, and maritime GC2 capability that will
tie together all elements of New Triad power. Fully developed, the GC2
will enable collaboration between, and among, DOD and other government
agencies and partners, providing the core of a National Command
Capability to meet the broadening array of potential challenges we face
as a nation. A true National Command Capability will only be effective
with federally mandated standards for data tagging to facilitate
enhanced information sharing.
Reliable Replacement Warhead
Finally, if we are to break the cycle of maintaining and
refurbishing large numbers of Cold War-era nuclear warheads to guard
against uncertainty, we request your support to ensure a safe, secure,
reliable nuclear stockpile, and in the process transform the nuclear
weapons enterprise. Discussions over the past year within the executive
branch and Congress have increased understanding of the role for
nuclear weapons in our current environment, and the value of a
responsive defense infrastructure. USSTRATCOM supports the RRW as the
key to transforming our aging Cold War nuclear weapons stockpile. RRW
will enhance our long-term confidence in the stockpile and reduce the
need to retain high numbers of hedge weapons while exercising the
people, science, technology base and facilities required for sustaining
the nuclear weapons enterprise.
Maintaining the current stockpile of Cold War era weapons is a
challenge. If directed, we believe the time is right; the risk is
manageable; and the opportunity is at hand to choose weapons that will
best serve our future and allow us to further reduce our overall
stockpile size, in order to transition to and maintain a smaller but
safer, more secure, and more reliable nuclear weapon arsenal.
usstratcom transformational vectors building strategic advantage
USSTRATCOM plays an important role in leading national efforts to
send an unambiguous message to our adversaries and friends alike--we
will do whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to ensure the
forces of freedom possess a lasting strategic advantage against those
who would deny citizens of America and the world the security to govern
their own future. We will continue to be aggressive and resourceful in
offering our best advice in the pursuit of capabilities needed to meet
our National security requirements. With your help we can assure our
allies, dissuade unhealthy competition, deter coercive or damaging
acts, and above all else, defend our citizens and defeat our enemies.
Thank your for your continued support.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Admiral Young.
STATEMENT OF RADM CHARLES B. YOUNG, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
Admiral Young. Good afternoon, Senators. I do not have an
opening comment. I have submitted a statement for the record,
and I stand by to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Young follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Charles B. Young, USN
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Sessions, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
regarding Navy's role in Global Strike.
The hierarchy of policy documentation that reflects our National
strategy identifies the need for precise Global Strike. The President's
National Security Strategy (NSS) directs an active approach toward
countering transnational terrorist networks, rogue nations and
aggressive states that possess or are working to gain weapons of mass
destruction or effect (WMD/E). The National Defense Strategy further
charges the Department of Defense (DOD) to secure the United States
from direct attack, and to counter, at a safe distance, those who seek
to use WMD/E against us. To deter or otherwise prevent such an attack
against the United States, its allies or its interests, our National
Military Strategy emphasizes the need for rapid and accurate Global
Strike, by both nuclear and conventional means.
THE 2006 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
In accordance with the aforementioned strategic policy, the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 06) further explored the requirement
for Global Strike.
In particular, QDR 06 detailed the need for a Joint Maritime Force
capable of ``conventional Global Strikes against time-sensitive targets
. . . to counter political anti-access and irregular warfare
challenges.'' Today's Navy provides this capability via flexible,
forward-deployed assets such as Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary
Strike Groups, and Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN). Yet among the key
proposals made by QDR 06 was a refinement of our existing maritime
capability to include ``a wider range of conventional and non-kinetic
deterrent options.'' Specifically, QDR 06 proposed that a number of
TRIDENT submarine-launched ballistic missiles be converted for use in
conventional Global Strike.
CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT MODIFICATION
Conventional TRIDENT Modification (CTM) adapts the TRIDENT II (D-5)
missile system to deliver conventional (non-nuclear) effects at global
ranges. The TRIDENT Weapon System and the D-5 missile are well suited
for this role by virtue of the long range and payload capacity of the
D-5 missile, and the responsiveness and survivability of the TRIDENT
weapon system. Responsive, survivable and persistent, CTM will defeat a
diverse set of unpredictable threats without visible presence or risk
to U.S. forces, and with little or no warning prior to strike. CTM
implements the New Triad envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review, and
is an evolution of deterrence toward conventional weapons. CTM CONOPS
are currently under development at U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
CTM will use existing D-5 missiles, MK4 reentry bodies equipped
with aerodynamic controls, GPS-aided terminal guidance, and a
conventional warhead. Advanced error-correcting reentry vehicles with
GPS-aided Inertial Navigation Systems have been flight proven in a
previous D-5 test program. Total time from decision to weapons-on-
target is about 1 hour. CTM technology can be rapidly developed and
deployed within 24 months. The total cost of the program, including
operations, training, and support is $503 million. The CTM program is
fully funded, with $127 million budged in fiscal year 2007 and $376
million budgeted through fiscal year 2010. The CTM program will
leverage existing D5 investment and infrastructure to minimize risk to
operations, training and support funding.
FURTHER NAVY INVESTMENT
In addition to proposing a conventional Global Strike option, QDR
06 called for the continued maintenance of our existing nuclear
capability. Navy has several initiatives underway toward this end.
TRIDENT II D-5LE Program
TRIDENT II (D-5) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Life
Extension (LE) program will redesign and replace aging missile
electronics and guidance systems. Under this program, 108 additional
missiles will be procured in order to meet long-term inventory
requirements associated with the life extension of the Ohio class
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) from 30 to 45 years.
Redesign of missile electronics and guidance components is in progress,
and procurement of new D-5 LE missiles begins in fiscal year 2008. The
TRIDENT II (D-5) missile has been operational since 1990, providing the
backbone of America's strategic deterrence. The low-rate production
continuity procurement strategy has been extensively reviewed and
approved by DOD and the Congress, and has been in execution for nearly
15 years. This procurement strategy has proven successful, based on the
demonstrated performance of the TRIDENT II D-5 weapon system. The Navy
submitted a report to Congress in December 2002 that detailed the
impact of alternative full-funded procurement strategies and
recommended continuation of current production. Continued production of
critical components represents the best balance of cost and risk to
extend the life of the D-5 missile.
Tomahawk Cruise Missile
There are currently four variants of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile in
inventory-the Block II with a nuclear warhead, the Block III with
either a conventional unitary warhead or sub-munitions payload, and the
Block IV Tactical Tomahawk Missile (TACTOM) with the conventional
unitary warhead. All four Tomahawk variants provide all weather long-
range precision strike capability, supporting Sea Strike as an enabler
of Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups. The Block IV TACTOM
provides greater flexibility and responsiveness, at significantly
reduced life cycle cost, than previous Tomahawk variants. Significant
Block IV upgrades include flex targeting (with up to 15 pre-planned aim
points loaded prior to launch), in-flight retargeting, launch platform
mission planning, and a two-way ultra-high frequency (UHF) satellite
communications data link. The Tomahawk Block IV is currently in full
rate production and the Navy is committed to supporting the Tomahawk
Weapon System program. The fiscal year 2007 budget request supports
continued procurement of this deep-strike weapon due to inventory
reductions during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) combat operations. Tomahawk Cruise Missiles are currently
being procured in a 5-year, multi-year contract that saves
approximately 12 percent over annual procurement contacts.
SSGN Engineered Refueling Overhauls (EROs) and Conversions
The Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Attack Submarine (SSGN) project
refuels, overhauls, and converts the four oldest Ohio class SSBNs to
SSGNs. These SSGNs will provide a transformational warfighting
capability, carrying up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles and supporting
deployed special operating forces. The new SSGNs will also have
enhanced communication and improved masts and antennas for network
centric operations. The SSGN conversions are being executed via a
public-private partnership with Naval Shipyards. The first SSGN
conversion, the U.S.S. Ohio (SSGN-726), was delivered in December 2005
after 3 years in production. Future deliveries include the U.S.S.
Florida (SSGN 728) in April 2006, the U.S.S. Michigan (SSGN 727) in
December 2006, and the U.S.S. Georgia (SSGN 729) in September 2007.
SSBN Engineered Refueling Overhauls (EROs)
The Ohio class SSBN remains the backbone of USSTRATCOM's nuclear
strike capability. Comprised of 14 TRIDENT II D-5 configured hulls, the
Ohio-class SSBN remains the most survivable nuclear deterrent in the
U.S. strategic arsenal. In keeping with the Secretary of Defense's
Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S.S. Alabama (SSBN 731) began its ERO (in
conjunction with TRIDENT C4 to D-5 conversion). In fiscal year 2007,
the U.S.S. Alaska (SSBN 732) will begin its ERO at Norfolk Naval
Shipyard (NNSY). The Navy will continue with SSBN EROs at the rate of 1
per year, alternating between NNSY and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, in
order to sustain our strategic deterrent capability well into the
future.
INNOVATION
The Navy received an fiscal year 2006 congressional plus-up of $7.2
million to demonstrate the feasibility of the Submarine Launched
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM). Navy will use this money
to fabricate one launch chamber and one prototype full-scale rocket
motor, and to fund a subsequent test firing. Emphasis of this
demonstration will be on affordability, defined as the combination of
the lowest projected boost motor subsystem development cost, and the
lowest possible expected average unit cost for a notional inventory of
100 missiles. This effort will demonstrate several innovative motor
designs and manufacturing techniques in pursuit of an affordable SLIRBM
system.
SUMMARY
Our national strategic policy identifies the requirement for a
broad range of Global Strike capabilities. Due to its unrivaled access
to the global commons, the Navy is uniquely positioned to fulfill this
requirement. In response to the need for conventional Global Strike,
our CTM program is based on mature technologies and existing
components. It is compliant with all arms control agreements, and can
be developed and deployed within 24 months. Furthermore, we are
redesigning and replacing aging missile systems and platforms in order
to meet the long-term requirements of nuclear deterrence and Global
Strike. In the meantime, Navy will continue to work closely with
members of this subcommittee and Congress to refine our operational
concepts and investments in order to deliver the dominant power our
Nation expects. We look forward to our continued partnership in this
endeavor.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
General Gorenc.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. STANLEY GORENC, USAF, DIRECTOR,
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS
General Gorenc. I'm the same way, actually. It's a pleasure
to be here, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Gorenc follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Stanley Gorenc, USAF
INTRODUCTION
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss Air Force capabilities
with respect to Global Strike. It is important to pay tribute to the
airmen who are currently engaged in operations around the globe
projecting the full range of air, space, and cyberspace operations as a
part of a true joint and coalition team, multiplying the effectiveness
of our partners by providing sovereign options for the defense of the
United States of America and its global interests. We fly and we
fight--whether we are flying A-10s over Afghanistan; F-16s over Iraq;
communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit; piloting Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) patrolling Baghdad; or maintaining vigilance over
our Nation's homeland in an airborne warning and control system
aircraft. All airmen, no matter what their specialty, contribute to
this mission. Today there are approximately 30,000 Active-Duty, Air
National Guard, and Air Force Reserve airmen deployed around the world,
many in harm's way. These brave men and woman are performing what we
would say are traditional Air Force missions, such as providing close
air support for ground operations and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance from air and space-based systems, or nontraditional
duties, like convoy operations, provincial reconstitution teams,
military transition teams, detainee operations, protective service
details, and the list goes on. Your Air Force today is deployed to over
100 forward operating locations touching all 7 continents. Our
commitment to the combatant commanders extends well beyond airmen in
the Central Command area of responsibility. We have nearly 210,000
airmen actively supporting combatant commander operations worldwide.
These include nuclear alert operations, satellite operations, global
airlift, worldwide tanker operations, and Homeland defense obligations
of approximately 40-50 fighter aircraft, Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS), and a dozen tankers on duty protecting our skies.
Beyond that, we have another 195,000 airmen available for ``Surge
Operations,'' which are over and above planned deployments, the
majority of these airmen are Guard and Reserve Forces.
MAINTAINING OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT
The Department of Defense's (DOD) new strategy of employing a
capability-based vs. threat-based approach to planning led to the
ongoing transformation of the existing triad of U.S. strategic nuclear
forces. The old Triad, consisting of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and bomber aircraft armed
with cruise missiles and gravity weapons; is transitioning to become
part of a New Triad composed of a diverse portfolio of capabilities.
Elements of this New Triad will include nuclear and non-nuclear strike
capabilities, active and passive defenses, and robust research and
development programs and industrial infrastructure for developing,
building, and maintaining offensive and defensive weapon systems, all
tied together with advanced command, control, computers,
communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities. Maintaining and modernizing our traditional nuclear
strategic forces, at lower numbers is a key component in an effective
New Triad.
The Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the
backbone of our deterrent force, maintains its entire force on
continuous alert. Elements of the Minuteman system were originally
designed in the late 1950s and deployed operationally in October 1962;
the Minuteman III was deployed beginning in 1975. Modernization
programs have been crucial to this system, originally designed to last
just 10 years. Service life extension programs, nine in all and well
underway, ensure the ICBM force is reliable, survivable, safe, and
secure through 2020 when the follow-on system, the Land-Based Strategic
Deterrent (LBSD) becomes operational. Enhancements to LBSD will include
improved accuracy, range, and security with a reduced cost of
ownership.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed the Minuteman force
be reduced from 500 to 450 beginning in fiscal year 2007. This
reduction will maintain an effective, balanced nuclear force for
worldwide deterrence. The Air Force is currently evaluating which 50
ICBMs will be deactivated. We estimate the cost of deactivation will be
approximately $19.5 million. Post deactivation, around fiscal year
2010, the Air Force estimates an approximate recurring savings of $3.5
million. This figure does not include any manpower savings for the
missile operators, maintainers, depot support and training personnel
associated with the deactivation of a missile squadron, because these
positions will be distributed elsewhere within the Air Force as part of
rebalancing the Total Force.
The continuing advancements in conventional weapons capability,
specifically increased precision and stand-off weapon ranges, will also
allow us to reduce the Total Aircraft Inventory of B-52s from 76 to 56.
The savings from these reductions will be utilized to fund the
remaining bomber modernization effort, known as Phase One of the Long-
Range Strike effort.
LONG-RANGE STRIKE
Our forces must be simultaneously responsive to multiple combatant
commanders and be able to strike any point on the planet. To further
refine our rapid strike capabilities, the Air Force is transitioning to
a long-range strike strategy focusing on effects instead of platforms.
We view long-range strike as the capability to achieve desired effects
rapidly and persistently on any target set in any operational
environment. The Air Force has a three-phased approach to meet the
Nation's longrange strike requirements. Today, we provide deep strike
capabilities through a variety of platforms and weapons. In Phase One,
we will continue to modernize the legacy bomber fleet to upgrade,
strengthen and increase their combat effectiveness. Phase Two, what we
call the Next Generation Long-Range Strike effort, leverages near-term
technologies to start development of a long-range strike capability
that augments the current fleet around fiscal year 2018. In this phase,
we will develop and field a Regional Strike capability or set of
capabilities, with an emphasis on survivability and lethality
improvements. Phase Three encompasses the development of advanced
technologies today that will allow us to enable advances needed for the
envisioned capabilities in fiscal year 2035. These future capabilities
must combine speed, stealth, and payload to strike hardened, deeply
buried, or mobile targets, deep in enemy territory, in an anti-access
environment, in adverse weather and with survivable persistence.
PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE
The New Triad requires the future force to provide a tailored and
balanced deterrence capability that includes a wider range of
conventional prompt, precise global strike systems more agile than
current systems. This includes the ability to strike within hours, not
days, any high value target, regardless of anti-access threats or
denial of forward-based assets. To this end, United States Strategic
Command and the Air Force have partnered to close the identified gaps
with respect to this need. The effort is called Prompt Global Strike
(PGS), and it can be accomplished in a variety of ways, through kinetic
systems capable of placing conventional payloads precisely on target
within minutes of release, to non-kinetic means, such as computer
network attack. The initial capabilities document defining PGS was
written in May 2005. On 16 February 2006 the Air Force Requirements for
Operational Capability Council approved the PGS document. An analysis
of alternatives will begin spring 2006.
CYBERSPACE
Assured, rapid delivery of information to the right warfighters is
the foundation for all Air Force operations. Cyberspace is a logical
extension of our core competencies, enabling fast-moving effects across
the spectrum of war nearly eliminating time and distance as obstacles.
We must maintain our pre-eminence in cyberspace to ensure success in
any future conflict. Preparing for the future, the Air Force is
currently exploring innovative organizational constructs to ensure
unity in the procurement, operation, sustainment and defense of
information systems. This and other concepts are being explored by a
Cyberspace Task Force.
CONCLUSION
Your Air Force of today and of the future will strengthen the
entire joint and coalition team. Dominance of air, space, and
cyberspace paves the way to overall success. In keeping with the
current emphasis on innovation and transformation, the future Air Force
will be a more capable yet leaner force. As the keepers of our Nation's
readiness, Congress is in a position to help reach these essential
goals and for that we thank you for your unwavering support. For
America to hold its military advantage, the Air Force must continue to
improve its capabilities to keep pace with the realities of the future
battlespace. The United States Air Force is proud to support the joint
team and we look forward to addressing Air Force Global Strike issues
with your committee.
Senator Sessions. Well, good. Let me just pursue a little
bit with Mr. Flory and General Cartwright the Global Strike
concept. I know Senator Nelson is in a rush and now trying to
finish up here, but you mentioned Prompt Global Strike, what is
the difference from other Global Strike forces and under what
circumstances is it that a Prompt Global Strike is better or
necessary?
General Cartwright. The differentiation between Global
Strike and Prompt Global Strike, Global Strike today, we have
fielded, as the Secretary laid out, a set of new capabilities
in the past year that are very significant in Global Strike for
the conventional side of the equation. We have fielded a new
sea-launched cruise missile, the next generation of the
Tomahawk cruise missile that is sea-launched. We have fielded a
new air-launched cruise missile that goes on both our tactical
aircraft and our bombers, and we have added in additional joint
direct-attack munitions that were so effective in the last two
conflicts that we have fought. We have increased the
inventories there. Those have given us a Global Strike
capability that is very significant and very capable. You will
see this year two additional, what used to be SSBN-type
submarines for ballistic missiles, two of the four that have
been converted will field this year to SSGN, which allows
Special Operations Forces and these new sea-launched cruise
missiles to be used from that platform. So, we've added to the
Global Strike capability.
The difficulty here for Prompt Global Strike is, as I said,
the adversary may not choose to act near our bases or our
patrol areas. If that's the case, and we're dealing with
targets that are associated with weapons of mass destruction,
command and control, terrorist-type leadership targets, these
targets tend to be fleeting. They don't present themselves for
long periods of time. They tend to be targets that have great
second and third order consequence or regret for the Nation. If
it has to do with WMD and the delivery of WMD, say by a missile
or by a terrorist group, et cetera, you want to have the
opportunity to address these targets.
In many cases, nuclear weapons are not going to be an
appropriate choice for those types of targets. You want a
conventional alternative. For that small, highly important set
of targets, we are basically offering the capability to use a
conventional ballistic missile to reach out anyplace on the
face of the Earth, and a goal that we have set is to be able to
address these targets in 1 hour. We are working our way towards
that. The ability to have a command and control system that can
work in those kinds of time lines, the intelligence that it
takes to support that, and the planning factors and
capabilities that it takes to support it are all things that we
are now starting to field.
Senator Sessions. The aircraft that launched our sea-based
cruise missiles, are they just too slow?
General Cartwright. Too slow. What we have seen, and there
are numerous examples from the recent conflicts, first days of
the Iraq War, of dealing in time lines of 4 to 10 hours in
order to close on fleeting targets that are significant and
important to the Nation. The activities that were associated
with Afghanistan in trying to get up into the mountain areas,
it took us several weeks to get the overflight clearances and
all of the positioning of forces in order to be able to close
with what turned out to be some very high-value targets had we
been able to prosecute them.
You never know. I mean, I'm not here to tell you that we
missed a target, and that would have changed the whole shape of
the conflict. But there are targets out there that you'd like
to be able to get to very quickly that could potentially change
the whole course of the conflict, and those are the types of
things that we are looking at with this capability.
Mr. Flory. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Sessions. I can see that would be a benefit.
Secretary Flory?
Mr. Flory. If I could just add a general point, everything
that General Cartwright says is, I think, just right. Looking
at this from the perspective of the policymaker and looking at
this from the perspective of giving the President options, I
think it's helpful you focus on the promptness point and
appropriately because that's an extremely important point. We
have capabilities. We have capabilities that are accurate and
that can do a lot of good things, but to date, we don't have
anything that can get there quickly except for a nuclear
weapon, which is not the appropriate weapon to use in every
circumstance.
If we go back, I think it's instructive to look at the 9/11
Report and the discussion there of the difficulty that
President Clinton and his people had dealing with the Osama bin
Laden threat and dealing with particularly the period after the
African Embassy bombings in August 1998, which had demonstrated
that we were under attack from a very serious threat. They
worked very hard. Very dedicated, diligent, professionals
worked very hard to come up with options, to come up with
opportunities to do something about that threat. If you read
through the report, what you see constantly is concerns about
boots on the ground, concerns about basing access, concerns
about overflight, concerns about timing. Although less of an
issue there, you could also have concerns about air defenses
and all kinds of other things that could constrain the options
that a President might have.
I think the lesson we learned out of that is the need to
try to come up with this full spectrum of options for the
President so that in a difficult situation like that, and a
challenging situation like that, where the traditional options
for one reason or the other do not work or do not give him a
risk benefit calculation that is acceptable, that we can try
and fill in that gap, and that's the reason why we believe that
this conventional Trident system is something worth pursuing.
Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson?
Senator Bill Nelson. Is the kinetic energy on an incoming
D-5 warhead--is it such that it can penetrate the earth rather
deeply?
General Cartwright. We're still in the test phase, but as
you know from your background, we're dealing in the 1,500 feet
per second area. With a reentry vehicle, we're dealing
somewhere between 14,000 and 20,000 feet per second. That
energy is significant. We call them slumps. It's a shaped mass
that we use which we intend to use here as one of the
alternatives. With that kind of energy, the round survives, and
it just penetrates. Now, you have to look at the geology and
the continuity of the geologies to know how deep, but there's
not much doubt in our mind that it will have applicability
against hard targets, that it will have applicability against
buried targets. We need to do further testing to understand how
deep. Is that a fair interpretation?
Admiral Young. Yes, sir. There's a lot of variables there,
this round is not a penetrating warhead that we have read
about, it is a warhead that does penetrate the earth, but not
to significant amounts and certainly is dependent upon the type
of soil, the type of area that it is.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, this isn't the way you go at the
deeply hardened targets?
Admiral Young. No, sir, it is not.
Senator Bill Nelson. This is just a quick reaction?
Admiral Young. Yes, sir.
General Cartwright. It probably would, though, have both
the accuracy and the energy to close entrances and exits very
efficiently.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let's assume that this weapon is fired
from a submarine in the Atlantic for a target in Afghanistan
and you have a flight time of maybe 25 minutes. Now, how in the
world are you going to convince Russia that that's not a
nuclear weapon being fired at them since it's going to go right
over Russia?
General Cartwright. Two pieces: First, we'd have the option
of using a different trajectory. In other words, as we go
through the basing construct of where we would position the
submarines, we intend to optimize that so that we do not have
to do overfly, particularly of Russia. It's one of the things
that certainly was a factor in deciding to move to the sea-
based and mobile platform, was to have that option. That's the
first point. The second point--well, this is probably not the
appropriate place to talk about the exact characteristics of
what any country has in the way of warning. The Russians will
know very quickly, as they have all the way through the Cold
War and up to today, what the trajectory is and where the
impact points will be. That is well within their technology.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, that's the way then, Mr.
Secretary, that you say that you can let other people know that
this is not an incoming nuclear warhead?
Mr. Flory. Sir, I think there are a number of ways. First
of all, there are the observable characteristics, which, as
General Cartwright said, would fairly quickly become clear, say
to the Russians, that this was not something that was going to
Russia. It would also be one or maybe two systems, two weapons
coming at them, and I think that the Russians, first of all,
would be able to discriminate that. They'd understand that this
was a very small number of weapons, and I think they would
understand, particularly in the context of a possible pre-
notification from the United States, that not only had we told
them that this was not an all-out attack on Russia, but from
the fact that there are only a couple of missiles in the air,
that it wouldn't look like any kind of all-out attack that they
might, it wouldn't look like the way they would imagine us
conducting an attack against Russia if we desired to make an
attack against Russia.
Senator Bill Nelson. But if your protocol is to give the
President the opportunity within 1 hour to hit a high-value
target, you're not exactly going to want to have a lot of pre-
notification. So, how do you do that?
Mr. Flory. Senator, I don't think you need a lot of pre-
notification. You obviously need to have enough notification so
that it has the desired effect so that the message can be
passed. On the other hand, I think it's also true that in a
given situation, say an attack against a terrorist target in
Afghanistan, this is not something just as a matter of Russia's
policy. I don't think that Russia's going to have any objection
to, and it's not something that I think the Russians would feel
any particular inclination to want to warn the target about. I
think these are all factors that would clearly have to be part
of the decision. You're absolutely right in that the President,
in looking at a launch of this type, would have to weight all
of these factors, but I think there are things that can be
dealt with and could be weighed out in the decisionmaking
process at the time.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, if you found Osama bin Laden in
Chechnya, that'd be a more difficult decision?
Mr. Flory. That would be more complex, Senator.
General Cartwright. That's a fair assessment.
Mr. Flory. A fair statement. But the Russians might want to
handle that themselves.
Senator Bill Nelson. With one of our D-5s?
Mr. Flory. No, sir. However they chose to do it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Not if you only have an hour's notice.
If you have a high-value target that's going to move, you can't
pass that off.
Mr. Flory. I was responding to your second hypothetical.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, what's the rationale for
retiring the 37 B-52s since there has been an extensive
upgraded program?
General Cartwright. Twofold here, and then I'm certainly
happy to allow the Air Force to speak also. The first is that
as we move forward, originally we had thought about looking at
replacements out in the 2025 time line, and the reality is the
attributes that we are seeking for the next generation of
strike capability, whether it's manned or unmanned, in order to
continue to be survivable, in order to continue to deliver the
sophisticated weapons that we want to deliver in the future,
and in order to continue to be relevant with the three bombers
that we have today, we have to start to think about where do we
want to move, what kind of survivability characteristics do we
want to have in that fleet, how much of it should be manned
versus unmanned, how dynamic is the environment that the
aircraft or vehicle will have to live in as to whether or not
it could actually even be manned or unmanned, is it a family
like we have today, with some of them being more survivable
than others, some even have the longer range or different
persistence characteristics. Clearly, we need to be able to
move back and forth between conventional and nuclear if we are
to retain both types of capabilities into the future, which
right now I don't see any direction to move away from that.
So, in order to start to experiment and to understand what
the art of possible is, two things were decided in the QDR--one
was 2020--2025 may be too late. Let's accelerate that up and
get it closer to 2015 to 2020 timeframe, 2018 being an
objective that we're looking at right now; second, start to
explore what the attributes ought to be and what is doable in
the technical side that could be achieved by that timeframe. As
you indicated in the cruise missile activity and the RRW,
finding resource to do that, understanding the resource that
might be available, looking at the risks associated with what
can I slow down or do less of in order to generate that
resource. We have the B-1s. We have the B-2s. The B-2s have
just finished an upgrade and are working on their next
generation. The B-52s that we have are being upgraded, and we
have new weapons for all these platforms. Those weapons have
raised the efficiency of the platform, just like precision
brought to us the ability to get to what we call number of
targets per weapon and sortie versus number of sorties per
target.
The next generation weapons that we're fielding, these air-
launched cruise missiles, the joint direct-attack munitions, et
cetera, are much more efficient than they were in the past. So,
of the places that we had in order to take resource and to
start to move us towards the next generation capabilities, we
felt that we could take a reduction and take the risk in this
area in order to move forward, given that we have now a year
under our belt with these new weapons, and they're
demonstrating their worth, that it was the appropriate time to
take some risk.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are you assuming that you will have a
new bomber by 2018?
General Cartwright. That is our objective. In order to
protect against that assumption, we are only taking this many.
We're not taking an entire class of bomber out, and we are
continuing in the robust production of the new weapons.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are all your remaining B-52s going to
be at Barksdale?
General Cartwright. No, they'll be split. We'll have two
sites. The B-52s? Yes, two sites.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have a bunch of
questions. I'm going to submit them for the record. If I may,
since General Cartwright can't be here for next week's hearing
on missile defense, I need to ask him this question--the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system was deployed starting in
the fall of 2004, but it's not yet been put on constant
operational alert. There are still a bunch of integration
command and control issues being worked out, and you haven't
had a single successful intercept test. You'd want the system
to be placed on operational alert when it's ready and when it's
operationally effective, but we don't have that demonstrated
yet. So, before you put it on alert status 24/7, will you want
to have the confidence from a number of successful intercept
flight tests?
General Cartwright. Those questions, Senator, are right on
the mark. As we said last year when we went through this
discussion, there were many objectives that we wanted to get
highlighted and taken care of over the past year. We have had
great success in operationally realistic tests. We have had
operational tests across the face of the sensors, which was
critical. We have tested the command and control. We have not
had the successful intercept, but we now have a successful
flight of the operational system. That occurred here just
recently. We have two more tests that are scheduled this year,
the second of which is to be an operational intercept.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me just cut to the chase.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. What criteria are you going to use to
judge that it's ready for operational alert?
General Cartwright. We had what we called last year a
shakedown, which I walked through with the committee last year,
but it was putting operators on the system, getting the
operationally realistic activities. All of the lessons learned
that we went through are in the process of being incorporated
into the command and control of the system, into the sensors
and into the weapons. That upgrade is due to be completed
sometime in the summer of this year. Then we need to make sure
that it does what we want it to do--in other words, the command
and control performance like the war fighter needs it to
perform to give them the confidence the sensors do and the
weapons. The long pole in the tent, as you indicate, is the
intercept tests. But this summer, we should have a clear
understanding of the command and control piece and the sensor
piece. Then the weapon has to perform. We have to see
intercepts.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, it's possible that we won't have
this weapon on operational alert for another year?
General Cartwright. Yes, the Ground-Based Interceptor
(GBI), if it doesn't perform.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate
it.
Senator Sessions. Senator Dorgan.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you. First of all,
thank you for letting me listen in. We had a hearing this
morning in the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, and General
Moseley was there as well as Secretary Wynne talking about a
number of these issues. I wanted to come because I was
specifically interested in the B-52 issue, but I am also
intrigued about the cost of using an ICBM with a conventional
weapon. I will probably deal with that later at some point in
some other venue, but let me ask about B-52s if I might because
my understanding is that we used about 140 B-52s in the first
Gulf War. We had 82-84 B-52s cycle in and out of the
Afghanistan-Iraq theater, and we are proposing to go to 56 B-
52s. I was looking and the B-52 obviously is a bomb truck, a
platform, and it has great loiter time and has been used very
effectively. But I was looking at the cost per aircraft on our
bombers, and General Cartwright, you talked about it as did
General Moseley and others about the lack of money to do all
that we want to do. I mean, we have to economize, no question.
Senator Sessions. Senator Dorgan, I'll just tell you they
did start a vote a couple of minutes ago. Whatever your time
is, I just want to give you that heads up.
Senator Dorgan. I appreciate that. The average cost per
year per aircraft on the B-1 is about $16 million, B-2 about
$22.5 million, and the B-52 about $8 million. The B-52 has
about a 35-year additional life. I think on average our B-52s
have about 16, maybe 14,000 to 16,000 hours on them, probably a
third or a fourth the hours of the commercial aircraft you
board out here at National Airport, in most cases because they
are running them up at 50,000, 60,000, 70,000 hours. The fact
is it's an old carcass, but it's rejuvenated--new electronics,
the whole thing, much less expensive than the rest of the
bomber fleet. I wonder about the tension here between wanting
to save money and deciding to retire a substantial portion of
that part of the bomber fleet that is the least cost to
maintain, having low hours and new electronics.
General Cartwright. Sure.
Senator Dorgan. I just wanted to ask about that. If this is
a budget-driven decision, or if you had your druthers, would
you think you'd need more than 56 B-52 bombers?
General Cartwright. I'll give you my opinion.
Senator Dorgan. Sure.
General Cartwright. When we look at the bombers, cost is
certainly one metric. Wearing this uniform, I never thought I
would see a B-52 that was relevant in close air support, direct
contact with troops in areas. Yet, given the weapons that we
have today, the workhorse has, in fact, shown great utility.
That's not arguable, that's fact. But in the period of time
that you described, as we bring on these new weapons, the
things that made the B-52 relevant--the precision, the number
of munitions that could address a large number of targets and
persist over the target area for many hours, which that
airplane can do with tankers, now the weapons are becoming even
more efficient so you can hold at risk even more targets, more
diversity in the target sets.
In the survivability side of the equation, in persisting in
a target area, generally we look at two key attributes, that
is, the stealth of the aircraft and the ability to evade radars
and other types of sensors. Then generally, in times past, we
also use speed. Speed is, as pilots tend to refer to it, speed
is life because if you can go fast, you can also defeat a lot
of enemy capabilities. So, it appeared to us, in looking at
this as a judgment, that retaining the survivability attributes
of the B-2, retaining the speed survivability attributes of the
B-1, and retaining the equivalent efficiency of the B-52, but
reducing the numbers because you had increasing capability
across the munitions, gave us the best spread across the three
platforms.
Senator Dorgan. If I just observe the air-launched cruise
missiles, of course, are standoffs, so there you're just
dealing with the truck, and the most efficient truck there is
the B-52 by far.
General Cartwright. Right.
Senator Dorgan. One third the cost, one half the cost
comparing the other two bombers. In addition, I have been a big
supporter of the F-22. The reason we want to do that is we want
to clear the battlefield and clear the air above it and control
it at which point you then loiter above it, in most cases, and
use the bomb truck again with precision weapons such as Joint
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). It seems to me in those cases,
it will almost always augur for the most efficient bomber for
us, which is the B-52.
I was here, of course. I've been here through the B-1 and
the B-2. I understand why we built the B-2--low-level
penetration of Soviet airspace, the stealth and so on, but I
also think that we, at this point, are about to make a choice
that is at odds and is with significant tension of the desire
to save money and still accomplish the same mission. General
Cartwright, I respect your answer, and I've heard that answer
before, but I do think those of us that are pushing for the F-
22 are doing so for a reason and that is to control the
airspace and control the battlefield above the battlefield at
which point you bring in the bomber truck. I'm telling you,
it's pretty hard to find a bomber truck that is more efficient
than the B-52. If you want to save one third the money, you
bring in the bomber truck that can loiter longer and has low
hours and new avionics and costs one third the cost of the
other bombers. So, I just make the point. I hope, as we think
through this as a Congress and as a Pentagon, that we'll try to
think through not only the considerations you just described,
but the considerations that we're talking about with respect to
trying to fund this F-22 in a robust way in order to control
the airspace.
General Cartwright. I think those are valid considerations.
I would just lay out for you how, at least from my perspective,
we thought through the equation.
General Gorenc. Could I just add something also?
Senator Dorgan. Yes.
General Gorenc. With regards to this sir, I think you're
absolutely right.
Senator Sessions. Pull that microphone on up to you there.
There you go.
General Gorenc. What I was going to say, I think, sir,
you're absolutely right in the sense of when you start
comparing the different platforms and things of that sort, I
mean it really is a combination of platforms that is going to
give you the effect that you want on the battlefield. I think,
with regards to the B-52, the issue with this one is that you
have those weapons that, in fact, allow it to be more
survivable, more effective in the battle space. Consequently,
you may not necessarily need as many. It is a workhorse. We
have always said it has been, and when we were fielding the
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), basically a very
precise munition.
Senator Sessions. What would it be launched from?
General Gorenc. The B-52.
General Cartwright. And the B-2.
General Gorenc. And the B-2.
General Gorenc. It's advancing obviously to the others, but
there is also a JASSM-extended range, which will give it a 5-
engine model capability. In other words, more capability, which
will again make this platform more effective. I guess my point
is, to kind of piggyback here, is yes, this platform has been
with us for a long time. It's a great platform, but as the
capabilities of the weapon systems get enhanced, and as we
fight individuals who, in fact, need to be attacked from
different perspectives, I think you'll find that a combination
of platforms is the way to go.
Senator Sessions. Yes. Senator Dorgan, I'm going to go and
vote, and you take your time.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, just one point.
Senator Sessions. Okay.
Senator Dorgan. I think the precision weapons make the B-52
much more useful and interesting to the Pentagon because you do
the same thing as you do with other standoff trucks except at
less cost. We do need to talk about new bombers and so on. We
talked about it this morning. We have to find ways to fund all
of this, which means, with respect to what we're doing current,
that we need to find ways to save money.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. Those are valuable comments
because we all know there's that bow wave out there of
procurement issues that are coming up, and some tough choices
may have to be made. I am sorry, we do have a vote ongoing now,
and there's about 5 minutes left. So, I'll need to rush down.
We should be back within 10 or 12 minutes, and we'll be
recessed until then.
[Recess.]
Senator Sessions. We'll call the meeting back to order.
Thank you for staying with us, and I'm sorry to be called away.
We have to do those things every now and then--vote, that's
what they pay us for, I suppose. I'll ask whoever would want to
take the lead on this to deal with it first, and if any of you
might want to comment on it. The 2006 QDR recommends prompt
high-volume Global Strike to deter aggression or coercion and
if deterrent fails to provide a broader range of conditional
response options to the President. The Trident modification
entails the conversion of only 24 ballistic missiles. This is
not the high-volume strike capability envisioned by the QDR, I
don't think. Would you tell the committee about your respective
Service plans to fulfill the high-volume Global Strike
requirement of the QDR? Who wants to start?
General Cartwright. If I could, Mr. Chairman, and then let
the Services follow. But in the construct of Global Strike, we
talked today about the attribute of prompt, which is a subset
of the broader Global Strike capabilities. We also talked about
the significant fielding capabilities that have occurred over
the past year. In a concept format, the idea here is that there
are a set of high-value, time-sensitive targets. It is not a
large set, but there is a set of those. The Trident
modification is designed to get at that subset.
Following on behind that are these other capabilities that
we described that are associated with sea-launched, air-
launched capabilities, tactical aircraft. Given their speed and
range, they will, assuming you start from the same point, close
at varying rates, but what you get is a constant building of
pressure as you add the platforms and capabilities as they are
able to close the conflict, and the volume comes from that
ever-increasing additive value of platforms and capabilities
that close the conflict. So, no, Trident is not high volume,
but it gets at the key enabling targets that could potentially
change the character of the conflict, could easily alter how
long the conflict will go on, and it allows the time to hold
the enemy at risk as you close the high-volume fires over time.
Senator Sessions. The QDR actually called for high-volume
prompt.
General Cartwright. I understand.
Senator Sessions. I don't know, maybe they should have
written it like you just explained it.
General Cartwright. I'm not going there, sir.
Senator Sessions. Made good sense to me, but do you think
maybe they misspoke there?
General Cartwright. I'll give you my opinion. The question
of volume has more to do with what is the capability that we
want. The volume could, in fact, be reflective of how much you
are able to leverage with just a few choicely-placed rounds, so
to speak, versus large numbers of weapons being the volume side
of this. In other words, we do what is called nodal analysis.
If we hold a key point at risk, it holds the whole network at
risk oftentimes.
Senator Sessions. All right. Secretary Flory, do you want
to follow up on that, please?
Mr. Flory. I just was going to add the results, though, and
this is a somewhat longer-term option, but it helps get to the
high volume point. There are other systems that are in the
works--the Army hypersonic system, the Navy's short-range
ballistic missile system that's being looked at, and various
Air Force systems that the Air Force is looking at, but none of
them come online. The importance of the conventional Trident is
it's something that we think we could field in 2 years, while
these other systems I think the earliest one would come online
in 2012 or so.
General Cartwright. 2012 to 2015.
Mr. Flory. 2012 to 2015.
Senator Sessions. Let me just say this, Secretary Flory,
we'll have the Army hypersonic, and the Navy is working on a
different system? That would be a part of this mix.
The Air Force also. I'll ask you to mention those, but as
we do this in terms of cost, we need to ask ourselves do we
need three different systems? General, I don't know where you
all would do that, but let me ask about the other two Prompt
Global Strike capabilities that other Services would be working
on.
Admiral Young. The Navy's Prompt Global Strike is the
conventional Trident modification. We have no other program
that's going after that capability. We do have a large number
of other programs that are providing Global Strike capability:
our Carrier Strike Groups, our Expeditionary Strike Groups, and
our SSGN Strike Groups that are coming online. Their Strike
Groups provide a large volume of strike capability around the
areas where they are physically located. This goes to the point
that General Cartwright made earlier. They cannot be everyplace
where the adversary may be carrying out their actions. So
today, the Prompt Global Strike program that the Navy has is
the Trident conventional modification program.
Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, do you want to add to
that?
General Gorenc. I would like to mention a couple of things
actually. When you think about the high volume, you immediately
would go into the constrict of the bomber-type force. We in the
Air Force, of course, have that ongoing with the Phase I, which
is the modernization of the B-52, the B-1, the B-2, and all the
capabilities that have been highlighted that are enhanced and
everything else.
Of course, you are also looking at the 2018 timeframe with
our Phase II of looking at what are the options that we have
out there that explore the current technologies that would
potentially give you the manned, unmanned, or maybe a
combination of both.
Then, obviously into the future, our Phase III look, which
is, what else is out there that we really would like that maybe
would enhance some of the capabilities and things we were
looking at, which is speed and getting through an area very
fast and launching from different locations that will give you
that opportunity for the range and everything else. So, that is
the normal way you would kind of think about it from the high
volume.
Of course, we are also looking at the exact Prompt Global
Strike, which is the requirement for the promptness, which our
bomber fleet may not provide in this context of Prompt Global
Strike. Then you may be looking at some things like hypersonic
vehicles and things of that sort that could be launched into a
higher altitude and brought back much like an ICBM-type of a
capability, but not necessarily. We are looking at that. We are
exploring options and just seeing what we can, in fact, as an
Air Force provide to the Prompt Global Strike portion, although
we know the contribution that we normally have and provide in
the Global Strike overall construct.
Senator Sessions. I guess my question is, who is
coordinating this? Is there someone saying this is too many
different projects and we ought to all work together, or we
need each one of them, and is there a coordinator?
General Cartwright. As the advocate for this area,
USSTRATCOM looks across the range of capability, looks at the
risks attentive to not having a particular capability or the
quantity of the capability and how that matches up with the
risk and then acts as an advocate. In a business sense, we are
a noisy customer, a demanding customer. We are looking to the
Services and what they have in capability, what they have on
the drawing boards of the future and looking at the feasibility
and how well that matches up with what we think is our best
assessment of what we will need in the future. We allow and
really encourage tension in the system, competition in the
system for the concepts--in this case, looking at the Army
Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AAHW) system versus what the Navy
might be thinking about versus what the Air Force might look at
in the next generation of their Minuteman or other systems. We
try to get the knowledge points and not carry these programs
any longer than we have to, but gain the knowledge necessary to
make the best choices we can, knowing our crystal ball is not
perfect. They have to have some flexibility to adapt to the
future. From an advocacy standpoint, I see USSTRATCOM in that
seat.
Senator Sessions. It strikes me a bit like the unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). We ended up with all kinds of people
doing research, spending lots and lots of money, buying very
small numbers or too small numbers at pretty high rates per
copy, when if we could figure out a way to have one or two and
buy them at high volume, we would have probably saved a lot of
money. Are we confident we won't be into that now, and who
would be responsible for pulling the plug on the programs that
are not the most competitive?
General Cartwright. I certainly would be the first to stand
up and give you today, as I did with the B-52, our best
judgment and recommendation on that.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Flory, you think you have
sufficient review oversight in DOD to make sure that programs
don't go too long and that we identify the most beneficial
early?
Mr. Flory. Senator, I think we do. As General Cartwright
says, he is the consumer on this, and he is saying I want this
capability and people can compete to deliver the capability in
different ways. At some point the issue of duplication you
point to is a real one. There would have to be a necking down
decision of what, which of these things works best, which of
these things meets the warfighters' needs, which of these
things provide the most useful options for the President.
Senator Sessions. I think there is a tendency for any
Service to be working on something they want to be loyal to
theirs and believe it's going to be the final solution, and
they all may not be. With regard to AAHW, it flies within the
upper atmosphere to its target, the Army is developing that. It
could deliver lower cost per round of munition, a high-volume
strike capability. How do you see that in the mix? What's your
evaluation of that, and what are the other programs that are
under consideration?
General Cartwright. I'll take a whack at that. For the
high-speed, long-range precise capabilities, we have started
with the Trident modification, the D-5. But as we move forward,
we want to be able to understand where are the limitations in
our ability to carry that kind of strike forward into the
future. What are the technical limitations, what are the
operational limitations, policy limitations, et cetera? For
vehicles that maneuver at hypersonic speeds, we have technical
limitations today that need to be overcome. We are trying to
encourage that the laboratories and the R&D houses, whether
they be commercial or government, investigate from every angle
that they can think of how to solve some of these technical
challenges associated with these speeds. The Army Research Lab
and the AAHW system concept, which is a concept right now, is
one venue by which to do this that is offering promise. They
have a concept that looks like if they can overcome what are
common technical challenges across all of these programs, they
may well be in a position to see that concept mature. It could
also be that as they were to solve some of these technical
challenges, the technology could be migrated to another
platform. Then you start to look at cost versus schedule versus
performance and the capabilities the country needs, and you try
to, I don't want to say down-select, but you try to focus as
quickly as possible on what you think will match your need. The
Army concept is very attractive, but they must, like everyone
else, conquer some of these technical barriers. The sooner that
we can conquer them, then the sooner we can make decisions
about investment.
Senator Sessions. I know we're in a serious effort to
modernize our nuclear forces. Admiral Young, what about the
Navy force structure plans for sea-based deterrence? What do
you see for the future there?
Admiral Young. Sir, our program of record is the Trident D-
5 system. Our requirement is for 14 SSBNs that provide us with
12 operational SSBNs. The Navy has a plan that will take these
ships through a refueling cycle that will bring them into the
shipyard essentially one per year starting in 2007.
Senator Sessions. That will leave you how many deployed?
Admiral Young. That leaves us with 12 operational SSBNs.
We're taking these ships out to around the 2042 timeframe. My
responsibility is to take the weapon system, the strategic
weapon system, and have it meet that same operational
timeframe.
Senator Sessions. You're confident that these submarines
will be solid until 2042?
Admiral Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Isn't that great?
Admiral Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. How long will that be? How long will they
have been in service?
Admiral Young. That will be 45 years total. We have
obviously done a lot of engineering analysis to support those
findings. But my part of that is actually the D-5 system, and
we have a D-5 life extension program which is going to take the
D-5 missile and take the components on it that will be hit by
obsolescence, the electronic components. There are essentially
six packages on that system--two in the guidance and four in
the missile. We are going through, right now, the design of
those components so that in fiscal year 2008, we will start
buying our first D-5 life extension missiles. We'll bring those
online so they will Initial Operational Capability in 2013.
Along with that, we are also through a modernization program
continually modernizing the shipboard equipment. The fire
control, which also has a great deal of electronics, we are
upgrading that to put components on it that are supportable and
also give us the capability that the President, through
USSTRATCOM, needs to deploy the system through that timeframe.
Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, what about you and Air
Force plans for upgrading the nuclear land-based deterrent?
General Gorenc. Obviously, we're working hard to make sure
that we drop the weapons down or not the weapons necessarily,
but the ICBMs from 500 to 450. We're going to make sure, as
General Cartwright mentioned, that those get put into the
proper locations and are held as necessary. We'll continue
doing our testing as needed per year to make sure that the
weapons in fact are viable, and we're looking forward to just
continuing that modernization effort. Now, as we go forward and
look at the replacement for the missile, for the Minuteman III,
we are looking at all of those alternatives. We are studying
those now. There has been money spent on looking at ways to
continue making sure that we have a viable force for the future
and that we can continue providing the capabilities that the
commander needs out in the field, and we'll continue doing that
of course.
Senator Sessions. Did you express your view on the B-52
reduction, and did you get to complete your thought on that?
General Gorenc. I did.
Senator Sessions. Your position of the Air Force.
General Gorenc. I have to say, General Cartwright really
hit the nail on the head with this as far as the B-52 and where
we are going. In a sense, really what you are seeing here is
actually a demonstration of what this committee and all of us,
in fact, have done as we continue trying to enhance the
capabilities out there for the warfighter.
Senator Sessions. Are you talking about the way he
expressed that?
General Gorenc. Yes, the way he expressed it.
Senator Sessions. The overall concept calls for jointness
and analyzing the customer needs?
General Gorenc. Yes, I think so. As we look at platform
specifics, sometimes it's very easy for us to get so centric on
the platform itself that we forget about what it does. I don't
necessarily, for example, need 80 or 100 pieces of things to
perform a particular function if I know that I can, in fact,
perform that function with a little bit less because I have a
great capability, and I thought that the B-52 is a classic
example of a system that has proven very effective. Now,
because of the capabilities that you have put onto that
platform, you are able not necessarily to need as many. So,
that was a very good explanation, I thought, as far as how we
proceed and how we go forward.
I think another thing that I am noticing is and it relates,
in a sense, to your question earlier, Mr. Chairman, on how is
the Department actually looking and trading capabilities off. I
think that we, in fact, have a very good oversight on making
sure that we hold each other accountable within the Services to
make sure that we are not going and wasting resources in cases
where an individual who may look at it from the outside would
go jeez, I can't believe you're doing the same thing. There's a
reason why that's happening at that stage of the development.
In the future, when you actually procure, you'll find that
you're going to whittle it down and actually choose the right
thing. I think we're going in the right direction overall, sir.
Senator Sessions. I just received notice of another vote
that's started. We have a number of questions that are
important. We may submit those to you in written form. General
Cartwright and Secretary Flory, this is your second hearing
today? Is that right?
Mr. Flory. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Bless you. We thank you for your good
humor, but it is important. Would either of you care to comment
on the GBI sites that we may be looking at around the world,
Europe or that region, or is that something that you prefer not
to talk about at this time? I know that those matters involve
sensitivity to nations who may not be ready to talk about it.
Mr. Flory. Senator, I'll just leave it at this, we are
consulting with some countries. We have had consultations in
the past on this subject, possible third site deployment, and
those consultations are continuing.
Senator Sessions. All right. I want to thank you again for
what you are doing. We are benefitting this very moment in Iraq
in our strategic posture for decisions made 20 years ago. I
think we will probably see a decision process and a production
process get a little quicker than it has been over the past,
but it still takes time to conceive and develop and deploy a
complex weapon system. So, I am glad to hear your long-term
thoughts, that you are thinking ahead and that you have a plan
to get there. Congress may mess it up, but maybe not. We tend
to value your advice and pretty regularly follow it. Are there
any other comments you'd like to make for the record to clarify
anything that's been said earlier in our hearing today?
General Cartwright. No, sir.
Senator Sessions. All right. Thank you very much. This
subcommittee takes seriously our immense responsibilities and
we rely so much on you and your advice. With no further
business, we will be adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
MINUTEMAN III REDUCTIONS
1. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, please
explain the strategic rationale for reducing the Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) force structure from 500 single-warhead
Minuteman III missiles to a force of 450?
General Cartwright. A reduction from 500 to 450 Minuteman III
missiles enables two efforts without affecting the deterrent value of
our ICBM force. First, the reduction in operational Minuteman IIIs will
provide test assets necessary for ensuring a reliable missile force
into the future. Second, this reduction will preserve Multiple
Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capability on the ICBM force in
order to retain the capability and experience necessary to upload
additional warheads in the event of an unanticipated change in the
threat posture.
Mr. Flory. During the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) the
Department of Defense's (DOD) senior leaders reevaluated our strategic
nuclear force posture in light of both our progress in making nuclear
force reductions and in fielding New Triad capabilities. As a result,
they determined that--with minimal risk--we could make a further,
modest reduction in the number of nuclear-armed ICBMs by retiring 50
Minuteman IIIs.
With this reduction in ICBMs, the United States will continue to
maintain an effective, balanced nuclear force posture that provides a
secure deterrent while we continue to build the non-nuclear elements of
the Global Strike force structure. In addition, the modest reduction in
ICBMs will free up missiles for the flight test program.
2. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, what
impact, if any, will this reduction have on the U.S. nuclear deterrent
capability?
General Cartwright. The reduction in the number of missiles will
not affect the deterrent or warfighting value of our ICBM force. The
number of ICBM warheads remains at 500, while allowing continued
testing of missile assets to ensure reliability of the Minuteman III
missile system.
Mr. Flory. The 10 percent reduction in the size of the Minuteman
III force will not affect the number of operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads we are planning to deploy by 2012 (1,700-
2,200). The United States will continue to maintain an effective,
balanced nuclear force that provides a secure deterrent, and the
reduction of 50 Minuteman III ICBMs will not affect either the
deterrent or the warfighting value of our ICBM force.
3. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, what
are the international policy implications of placing multiple warheads
on some of the remaining 450 Minuteman ICBMs?
General Cartwright. There are no international policy implications
in retaining a Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle capability.
Mr. Flory. The United States maintains a MIRV capability in a
portion of the Minuteman III ICBM force as it is currently deployed.
The Department foresees no international policy implications in
retaining a MIRV capability in a portion of the Minuteman III ICBM
force.
4. Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, please explain how the
reduction of 50 Minuteman missiles will be accomplished?
General Gorenc. Air Force Space Command is currently studying the
most cost effective, safe, and expeditious way to draw down 50 ICBMs as
directed by the QDR.
5. Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, from which ICBM sites will
they be removed?
General Gorenc. Once Air Force Space Command completes their study,
they will propose a course of action to draw down the ICBM force in
accordance with the QDR.
6. Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, what are the costs or savings
associated with this plan?
General Gorenc. There is a $10.9 million operation and maintenance
(O&M) cost in the fiscal year 2007 budget request to cover
environmental cleanup actions, shipping and storage of removed
boosters, and placing the launch facilities in minimal caretaker
status. There are additional minor O&M costs expected in fiscal year
2008 and fiscal year 2009 to complete the inactivation. Manpower
savings of at least 135 spaces will be realized in fiscal year 2007,
with additional savings in fiscal year 2008 and beyond. In addition,
O&M and procurement savings are expected in future requests.
7. Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, does the Air Force plan to
place multiple warheads on some of the remaining 450 Minuteman
missiles?
General Gorenc. Yes, we will as long as U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) war plans direct a multiple warhead configuration
capability. USTRANSCOM will review targeting requirements and transmit
that data to Air Force Space Command. Air Force Space Command will
configure missiles with USTRANSCOM's force structure and warhead mix.
All remaining missiles will be capable of carrying between one and
three warheads.
8. Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, is there funding in the budget
request for this purpose?
General Gorenc. Yes. There is $10.9 million (O&M) in fiscal year
2007 to cover environmental cleanup actions, shipping and storage of
removed boosters, and placing the launch facilities in minimal
caretaker status.
ALTERNATIVES TO CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT MODIFICATION
9. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
Secretary Flory's prepared statement notes that the DOD is studying
other solutions, both sea- and land-based, for Prompt Global Strike.
For example, the Air Force is undergoing an analysis of alternatives
for the land-based strategic deterrent; the Army is studying a concept
for fielding an advanced hypersonic weapon; and the Navy is studying
the development of a conventionally-armed submarine launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) with a range of about 1,500 miles. How do these options
compare to Conventional Trident Modification (CTM)?
General Cartwright. The CTM is a hedge capability. It will provide
military utility across a range of target types and scenarios and is
scheduled for initial operational capability in fiscal year 2009.
Currently, competing systems will require technical advancements to
refine the systems capabilities adding additional time before
operational availability. The expected initial operational capability
of alternatives is beyond fiscal year 2013.
Mr. Flory. The Conventional Trident Missile is the only near-term
option for addressing the existing capability gap for prompt,
conventional Global Strike. The longer-term goal is to develop a range
of Prompt Global Strike capabilities that can provide the President
with a wider range of options for addressing the dangers of the new
security environment. The studies currently underway regarding other
options for conventional Global Strike capabilities have not been
completed. However, we anticipate that these options would require
significantly more time to develop and field than would the CTM.
10. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, why
do we need CTM today when there are other, potentially less
controversial options, just over the horizon?
General Cartwright. Currently, there are no other available near-
or mid-term Prompt Global Strike options that address the capability
gap before fiscal year 2013 at the earliest.
Mr. Flory. At any moment we could find ourselves in a situation for
which a near real-time response with a conventional Global Strike
capability could provide an important option for the President.
Unfortunately, our current capabilities for prompt, conventional, long-
range strike are limited. There is no near-term alternative to
Conventional Trident that can address the capability gap for prompt,
conventional Global Strike.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT
11. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, the Defense Science
Board completed a report in January on the nuclear weapons
infrastructure at the DOD and Department of Energy (DOE). The report
was classified but most of the recommendations and findings were not.
There are two findings and recommendations that I would ask that you
comment on. First, the recommendation that a new organizational
structure is needed for the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), and second, a need for greater clarity for requirements and the
understanding and knowledge that leads to requirements development. I
am concerned that at a minimum the recommendations on the
organizational structure are unworkable. On the other hand, the second
recommendation reflects a complaint that has existed for years and
largely reflects a criticism of the effectiveness of the Nuclear
Weapons Council. Would you please share your thoughts on this report?
General Cartwright. The Defense Science Board report was thorough
and thoughtful. U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) defers to the
Secretaries of Defense and Energy with respect to the management and
organizational structure of the nuclear weapon enterprise. However, I
am concerned about the long-term sustainability of the nuclear weapon
enterprise and believe that it must be transformed to one that is more
agile and sustainable to support current and future warfighter needs. I
also agree that greater clarity is needed in defining requirements
placed on the nuclear weapons enterprise.
ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR
12. Senator Bill Nelson. General Gorenc, the Fiscal Year 2006
Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts included $4 million in
the Air Force budget to conduct a sled test to study and understand the
physics of penetrating geologic media. This is the sled test designed
by the DOE Sandia National Lab as part of the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator study. What is the status of the sled test?
General Gorenc. The Secretary of Defense has elected to have the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) plan and conduct the penetrator
sled test. The Air Force is participating in the test planning process
at DTRA's request, but has only a limited role. Further, the $4 million
appropriated (less congressionally-mandated rescissions) to the Air
Force in fiscal year 2006 has been transferred to DTRA for execution.
Questions concerning penetrator sled test specifics should be addressed
to DTRA.
13. Senator Bill Nelson. General Gorenc, Secretary of Energy Bodman
said that the DOE would not conduct the sled test nor would it be
conducted at a DOE facility, including the Sandia National Lab. He also
said that if DOD wanted to conduct the sled test that Sandia would
provide the equipment and technical expertise. Has the Air Force
requested assistance and technical expertise from Sandia? If so, what
assistance has been requested?
General Gorenc. The Air Force has not requested any assistance or
technical expertise from the Sandia National Laboratories. The
Secretary of Defense has elected to have the DTRA plan and conduct the
penetrator sled test. The Air Force is providing limited assistance to
DTRA in the test planning process at their request.
14. Senator Bill Nelson. General Gorenc, is there any money in the
fiscal year 2007 Air Force budget request to support the sled test?
General Gorenc. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), the Air Force has requested $3.047 million in the Air
Force Operations and Maintenance account for post-test data reduction
and analysis of the data obtained from the fiscal year 2006 penetrator
sled test. As agreed between OSD, DTRA, and the Air Force, these funds
will be transferred to DTRA in fiscal year 2007 for execution.
15. General Gorenc, will the Air Force pay Sandia for the equipment
and technical expertise?
General Gorenc. No, the Air Force will not spend any additional
funds, other than the $4 million (less congressionally-mandated
rescissions) appropriated and already transferred to DTRA, on the
penetrator sled test in fiscal year 2006.
CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT D-5 BALLISTIC MISSILE
16. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, a
QDR decision is to field within 2 years an initial capability to
deliver conventional warheads using Trident D-5 missiles on ballistic
missile submarines to meet a prompt global strike mission. All the D-5
missiles on Trident ballistic missile submarines today carry nuclear
warheads.
The current plan is to buy 533 upgraded D-5 missiles. The flyaway
cost of a D-5 is approximately $32 million, when the research and
development costs are added in and distributed among the total number
of missiles the program acquisition unit cost is closer to $60 million
a piece. The acquisition unit cost is the full cost of a system. In
addition the cost to convert 24 of the missiles to a conventional
warhead would be $500 million. With initial production costs, upgrade
costs, and conversion costs, I estimate that per missile cost of the
conventional Trident is $80 million. Do you agree with this rough
estimate? If not, what is your estimate of the program acquisition cost
for each converted D-5 missile with four warheads?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM defers to the Navy Strategic Systems
Programs.
Admiral Young. While the Navy agrees with the $60 million and $80
million cost estimates for a Trident missile as discussed in the
question, we believe this is not an accurate measure for costing actual
flyaway costs. If you consider the research and development costs more
as sunk costs, the P-5 WPN budget exhibit includes a more
representative number for a single missile called the Missile Flyaway
Unit Cost. The fiscal year 2007 President's budget (PB) exhibit for
Trident II (WPN Line Item 1150) includes cost for the last original
(pre-LE) Trident II missiles procured in fiscal year 2005 reflecting a
missile flyaway cost of $24.5 million. Additive to that is $8.0
million, the cost of a full-rate production guidance system, for a
total flyaway cost of $32.5 million. None of these unit costs include
the warhead, which is funded by DOE.
If you consider the comparable flyaway unit cost of a single
flechette reentry body (RB), approximately $2.5 million, you could
conclude a flyaway CTM missile unit cost will be approximately $42.5
million [i.e., $32.5 million Missile and Guidance + $10 million RB (4
RBs x $2.5 million)].
17. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, the
current plan is to buy 533 D-5s, just enough D-5 missiles to meet the
requirements of the nuclear mission. If 24 D-5 missiles are converted,
will the Navy want to buy more D-5s to sustain the nuclear mission?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM defers to the Navy Strategic Systems
Programs.
Admiral Young. No, the Navy has not requested an increase in
inventory objective in the fiscal year 2007 President's budget. There
is no plan to increase the inventory objective at this time.
18. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, what
are the target scenarios for using a conventional D-5 missile?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. The target scenarios are
based on mission requirements. Generally, the CTM is planned to be
effective against high value, fleeting targets, such as weapons of mass
destruction, terrorists, missiles, radars, and integrated air defense
components to list a few. Any scenario that requires the need for a
prompt (within an hour) response to a threat could require the need for
CTM capabilities.
19. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, are
there other scenarios--other than terrorists or weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)--where you think long range ballistic missiles might
come into play?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. High-value time-sensitive and
emerging targets that cannot be held at risk with existing conventional
capabilities due to staging, deployment time, range to effect, or the
availability of specific weapon systems.
20. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, is
the primary reason for development of a conventional D-5 a preemptive
first strike mission?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. No. The primary reason
USSTRATCOM requires the development and employment of the conventional
D-5 is to provide the President with a broader range of options for a
timely response in a crisis. A rapid response capability allows
additional time to confirm intelligence sources and/or for
consultation, prior to making a strike decision. Adversaries continue
to increase their ability to leverage time, distance, and denied areas
to limit our ability to respond. Capability to deliver a conventional
payload nearly anywhere on the Earth will provide the President a
viable option to assure allies, dissuade competition, deter attacks,
and defeat threats, while simultaneously reducing our adversary's
freedom of action.
21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
doesn't the President already have options today--ones that are
improving--to hit these fleeting targets with existing or planned
weapons systems, including precision guided bombs and cruise missiles
on strategic and tactical aircraft, attack submarines, and unmanned
aerial vehicles?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Current capabilities
typically take hours to days to prepare and respond, to deliver desired
effect(s). Given sufficient time to prepare and stage assets, current
capabilities might well be the preferred option. There are
circumstances, though, where all other advanced conventional
capabilities fall short of prompt and responsive (closing in less than
60 minutes).
22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, in
practice, how much ``quicker'' would it be to use a conventional long-
range ballistic missile rather than other conventional assets, given
challenges associated with identifying and locating targets, receiving
authority to fire, and having submarines in position to shoot?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. The challenges associated
with identifying and locating targets, receiving authority to fire, and
having sufficient capability in place to achieve the objective are all
part of any strike decision calculus. The CTM requirement is driven by
our inability to access denied areas with existing conventional
capabilities and to hold fleeting high value targets at risk in a
prompt manner. In a crisis, where we do not have forward forces in
place, or are required to deploy forces to within striking distance,
CTM would reduce our response time from execution to effects on target
actually buys back decision time. Traditional air-breathing platforms
fly at about 500 miles per hour and can require hours to days to
prepare and deliver a strike. Conventional long-range ballistic
missiles can cover over 5,000 miles in under an hour. The flexibility
of the SSBN force allows them to operate freely around the world
placing any point on the globe within reach within an hour.
23. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, can
we develop the necessary intelligence support and command and control
systems to both locate and effectively hit potential targets?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Yes, but we must continue to
transition intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities
from a legacy approach, directed largely at monitoring nation states in
two theaters, to a true global enterprise tailored to meet regional
needs.
24. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
would this be a presidential decision to launch the $80 million
conventional D-5?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Yes, the President will
authorize the use of a CTM capability.
25. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, the
plan, as I understand it, is to have the Trident submarines carry a
combination of 22 nuclear D-5 missiles and two conventional D-5
missiles. It would be impossible to tell the difference between a
nuclear D-5 and a conventional D-5 for most or all of the flight path
if launched. How would other countries, notably Russia and China, but
also including France and England, know the difference between a
conventional and nuclear D-5 missile?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Robust notification
procedures would mitigate potential misinterpretation of U.S.
intentions by those countries that possess the systems required to
monitor ballistic missile in flight. Countries capable of monitoring
ballistic trajectories would be able to quickly forecast the target
area within tens of miles in seconds.
26. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
several weeks ago, Secretary Wynne testified that the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) notifications for test launches and
inspections to count warheads would help solve this problem of
distinguishing between a nuclear and non-nuclear D-5 missile launch.
Please explain how either of these measures would assist Russia in
determining that an operational launch from a U.S. SLBM was not a D-5
with a nuclear warhead? Would the START even allow Russia to confirm
whether a nuclear or non-nuclear warhead was on a D-5 at the dock?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. START notifications for test
launches, and inspection to count warheads will not assist Russia in
determining that an operational (combat) launch of a SLBM is not a D-5
with a nuclear warhead.
27. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, if
notification protocols were in place, how long would it take to provide
notification and assurance that a launch was conventional?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Notification protocols are in
place. The United States has over a dozen existing direct
communications links to counterparts in Russia. As an example, the
Moscow-Washington Direct Communications Link Hotline has been in place
since 1963 to affect 24/7 communications with the Russian Federation in
real time to assure strategic stability.
28. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, if
the whole goal of Prompt Global Strike is to be able to strike anywhere
in the world in less than 60 minutes, would a notification protocol
defeat the purpose of Prompt Global Strike?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. No. The need for a capability
to strike within 60 minutes does not imply that only 60 minutes will be
available in a crisis. It means that upon making a decision to strike
it will take less than 60 minutes to place warheads on a target.
Experience has shown that the time from preliminary warning to
confirmation of an impending attack might be relatively fleeting, but
details of the impending attack will likely emerge over a period of
hours. The DOD will always seek to improve the responsiveness of its
forces, in order to provide maximum flexibility, while details of the
threat emerge. During this fluid period of hours, leading up to a
strike decision, the President may choose to notify other world leaders
of imminent U.S. defensive actions. Because it is more responsive, CTM
buys time for consultation and intelligence confirmation before
committing forces in a provocative fashion.
29. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
could you please tell me the status of the request to provide all
studies and analyses that have been conducted by DOD addressing or
discussing the issues associated with this proposal?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. USSTRATCOM defers the
question to the OSD.
30. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
could you also provide a list of ongoing studies and any additional
studies that are planned or will have to be completed in the future?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Ongoing and additional
studies included the following:
(1) The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006
(2) The Strategic Capabilities Assessment, April 2005
(3) Defense Policy Board Study on Strategic Command
Initiatives, February 2006
(4) U.S. Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group (SAG),
74th SAG Plenary Policy Panel Report, December 2005
(5) U.S. Strategic Command, Conventional Kinetic Options for
Global Deterrence, September 2005
(6) Ballistic Missile ``Overflight'' An Assessment of the
Issues, Prepared for U.S. Space Command, December 2004
(7) Next Generation Long-Range Strike Analysis of
Alternatives
(8) Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives
(9) Land Based Strategic Deterrence Initial Capabilities
Document
31. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, has
anyone in the Department of State been consulted on this proposal and
have they expressed any concerns or raised any issues with the
proposal?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. USSTRATCOM has invited
Ambassador Joseph to participate in a table top exercise highlighting
the CTM on 20 April 2006.
32. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, will
Congress be receiving a reprogramming request to begin work on
conventionally armed D-5 missiles in fiscal year 2006?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. At this time the DOD has not
submitted a request for reprogramming.
33. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, has
any money already been spent in support of conventionally armed D-5
missiles, and if yes, on what specific activities was the money spent
and what was the source of the money?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM defers to the Navy Strategic Systems
Programs.
Admiral Young. To date, no Navy funds have been allocated or
expended in support of conventionally armed D-5 missiles.
34. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
would other countries who want to further develop long-range missiles
find this proposal an incentive or cover to proceed with their missile
programs?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. It is impossible to predict
what other countries are going to do. There are over 30 countries with
ballistic missile programs today. The development of ballistic missile
technology will likely continue whether this initiative goes forward or
not.
35. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, does
this plan undercut U.S. efforts to discourage others from developing
long-range ballistic missiles or lower the threshold for use of these
missiles?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. No. This plan is being
developed to provide a solution to the gap in prompt long-range
conventional kinetic strike capabilities. It does not lower the
threshold for use of other missile systems.
36. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
would this proposal increase the risk of accidental, mistaken, or
unauthorized use of ballistic missiles by other countries if they too
were to use the U.S. example and develop conventional long-range
ballistic missiles?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. No. The United States is the
only country out of the more than 30 that have ballistic missiles that
does not have a conventional ballistic missile capability. Other
countries will continue to develop their own ballistic missile programs
independent of any U.S. example.
37. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, has
any risk assessment been conducted to analyze the probability of a
retaliatory nuclear strike being initiated as a result of a
conventional D-5 operational launch?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. A disciplined risk assessment
approach to achieve a robust misinterpretation mitigation plan is
underway and will be validated through exercises and wargames.
B-52 RETIREMENTS
38. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, the
QDR recommended reducing the B-52H fleet to 56 aircraft from 93
aircraft. At a previous hearing, General Moseley and Secretary Wynne,
in response to a question from Senator Levin, agreed to provide copies
of all analyses and studies that have been conducted to support the
decision to retire 37 B-52H aircraft. What is the status of this
request?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM is not witting of the request nor
status.
General Gorenc. The Air Force performed an operational risk
assessment of the impact of a reduced B-52 force structure in light of
planned/programmed modernizations and improvements across the entire
Global Strike portfolio. This assessment concluded the proposed B-52
force structure/Global Strike portfolio met any single Combatant
Commander's Operational War Plan or Major Contingency Operation's
requirements. The specific conclusions of this assessment are
classified. We are prepared to discuss the assessment with the Senate
Armed Services Committee professional staff members.
39. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, no
documents have been produce to date. When can we expect the documents?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM is not witting of the request nor
status.
General Gorenc. Air Force Space Command is currently studying the
most cost effective, safe, and expeditious way to draw down 50 ICBMs as
directed by the QDR.
40. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
what is the rational for retiring 37 B-52s, particularly as a fairly
extensive upgrade program is well underway?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. The imperative for recapitalization to support the
Air Force's transformation is at the forefront of our need to draw down
the B-52 force structure. Retiring:
- older aircraft enables reinvestment to modernize the
capability of the entire fleet. As we continue down the path of
transformation we are willing to accept
- some near-term risk to field a more capable future force. The
modernized
bomber fleet will have greater lethality, be
more responsive and more survivable. There will be
improved lethality through numerous weapon
integration initiatives such as Joint Air-to-
Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), enhanced guided bomb
unit, and avionics mid-life improvements; increased
responsiveness through programs such as integrated
data link, combat network communications and
advanced high frequency radios; and ensured
survivability through threat awareness systems, low
- observability upgrades and electronic counter-measure
improvements.
The Air Force also continues development on a new land-based,
penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018. The Air
Force remains committed to offset the B-52 reduction and mitigate the
associated near-term risk by aggressively increasing the remaining
bomber fleet's capabilities through modernization.
41. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, why
was the decision made to terminate immediately the upgrade programs?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. The decision to exercise contract options for the
Electronic Countermeasure Improvement (ECMI) program and the Avionics
Midlife Improvement (AMI) program were required by the end of March
2006. The Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Wynne, decided not to
exercise the ECMI and AMI contract options in support of the
President's budget. We have not terminated the program as ongoing kits
installations continue. The B-52 program has currently procured 72 ECMI
kits and 81 AMI kits. This decision allows the Air Force to avoid
purchasing excess kits. Furthermore, it allows the Air Force to save
$19 million between the ECMI and AMI options.
42. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
doesn't immediate termination of the upgrade programs presuppose
congressional agreement to retire all 37 B-52Hs?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. The fiscal year 2007 President's budget draws down
the B-52 fleet, retiring the 17 attrition reserve aircraft in fiscal
year 2007, and reducing the total fleet size from 76 aircraft to 56
aircraft in fiscal year 2008. The decision to exercise contract options
for the ECMI program and the AMI program were required by the end of
March 2006. The Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Wynne, decided not
to exercise the ECMI and AMI contract options in support of the
President's budget. This decision allows the Air Force to avoid
purchasing excess kits, and to save $19 million between the ECMI and
AMI options. We have not terminated the program as ongoing kits
installations continue. The B-52 program has currently procured 72 ECMI
kits and 81 AMI kits. The Congressional Defense Subcommittees were
notified of the Air Force's intentions to not exercise the ECMI and AMI
contract options on 14 March 2006. The vendors were formally told that
the Air Force would not exercise the options on either contract on 31
March 2006. Both the ECMI and AMI contracts can be renegotiated if
additional kits are required.
43. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, the
B-52 is often referred to as the ``workhorse'' of the bomber fleet and,
according to Air Force analysis, can continue to fly until the late
2030s, or earlier 2040s, largely because the flying hours are spread
among a large number of airframes. With the reduction in the B-52
fleet, won't the number of contingency flying hours increase for the
remaining air frames thus hastening the time when the B-52 would
otherwise have to be retired?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. Despite the reduction in the B-52 fleet, the
programmed flying hours per aircraft will remain the same. As a result,
the remaining aircraft would continue to fly at the same utilization
(UTE) rate with the same expected service life.
An increase in flying hours is not the key driver in decreasing
service life. The key driver is how the aircraft is flown (i.e.,
usage). For example, in the past 5-6 years, Air Combat Command (ACC)
has reduced the low-level flight portion of their training syllabus in
favor of performing more high-altitude training. This shift in usage
significantly reduced stress on the airframe and effectively increased
the economic service life of the platform. Airframe health is
continuously monitored via the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program
(ASIP).
The Air Force will continue to closely manage the B-52 flying hour
and service life programs to yield the maximum years of service from
this airframe.
44. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
with only 56 B-52 bombers, what is the anticipated retirement date?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. Current projections for the retirement of the B-52
are beyond 2035 based on information known to date and coincident with
the projected fielding of a transformational long-range strike
capability. The reduction of B-52s from 76 total aircraft (not
including the 18 excess attrition reserve) to 56 total aircraft will be
accompanied by a proportional decrease in the annual flying hour
program. As a result, the retirement projection remains unchanged.
However, structural service life is only one factor in determining
retirement date of a weapon system. Other considerations include future
threats, unforeseen sustainment costs, and fielding of a replacement
capability.
45. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
what studies have been done to examine B-52 economic life?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. For the B-52, the first economic life study was
accomplished during the mid to late 1970s. The purpose was to determine
if the B-52 platform was a viable ALCM carrier for the out-years. Since
that initial study, economic life projections have been incorporated
into the B-52 ASIP as a matter of routine. The ASIP Individual Aircraft
Tracking Program performs this calculation using, as input, pilot usage
forms from each sortie. Based on the most recent calculations, the B-52
fleet has, on average, 18,516 hours of service life remaining for each
aircraft.
46. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, the
QDR also recommended development of a bomber alternative, referred to
as a land-based penetrating long-range strike capability, by 2018. What
additional capability could be developed and fielded by 2018 that
justifies retirement of the B-52s from a cost and performance basis?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. Through its operational requirements process and
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, the
Air Force has identified and validated long-range strike capability
requirements and shortfalls. These capabilities/effects-based processes
help improve the long-range strike force over time to ensure it has the
capabilities needed today and tomorrow. The Air Force plans to keep B-
52s as long as the capability/cost analysis justifies doing so; they
will likely remain in the inventory for several more decades. At the
same time, we are identifying and fielding new capabilities, such as
the JASSM and a next generation long-range strike system, that will
enable us to reduce/eliminate capability shortfalls so that we can
operate effectively in future adversary environments. To that end, the
Air Force has developed a three-phased long-range strike strategy:
Phase 1 - Continues the modernization of legacy bomber
fleet to upgrade, strengthen, and increase their combat
effectiveness
$3.98 billion (fiscal year 2007 President's
budget total for 3010/3600) to upgrade B-1, B-2, and B-
52
Phase 2 - Leverages near-term technologies to start
development of a long-range strike capability that augments
current fleet in 2018
2006 QDR directs Phase 2 effort
Considering manned, unmanned, and optionally
manned systems
ACC led Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) will
provide Air Force leadership with decision quality
information to support a Milestone A decision in early
2007
Phase 3 - Goes beyond 2018 with a system of systems
technology push for advanced improvements in speed, range,
accuracy, connectivity, and survivability in the 2035 timeframe
47. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
what are the options being considered for the bomber to be fielded by
2018?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. The options being considered for the bomber to be
fielded by 2018 are manned, unmanned, and optionally manned. As a
result of a request for information from the Air Force, industry has
responded with several propriety options including manned.
48. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
what is the anticipated cost of the 2018 bomber alternative per unit
and annual operating costs?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. We do not have enough information to provide a
specific answer at this time. The Air Force AoA will determine options
to meet an anticipated capability shortfall in the 2015-2020 timeframe.
The AoA is looking at a range of options, including modifications to
existing systems and potential new platforms. The AoA is limited to
technology mature enough to be fielded by 2018. The AoA is expected to
provide data to support the fiscal year 2008 President's budget
development. Full analysis and reports will be complete in the first
half of 2007.
49. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, how
does this compare to the B-52 flying hour cost of $11,384 per hour, the
least expensive of the bombers?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. We do not have enough information to provide an
answer at this time. The Air Force Next Generation Long Range Strike
AoA will determine options to meet an anticipated capability shortfall
in the 2015-2020 timeframe. The AoA is looking at a range of options,
including modifications to existing systems and potential new
platforms. The AoA is expected to provide data to support the fiscal
year 2008 President's budget development. Full analysis and reports
will be complete in the first half of 2007.
50. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, in
2003, the Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended reengining the B-52H
because the B-52H is ``the most versatile and cost effective weapon
system in the bomber inventory.'' Moreover the DSB agreed with the Next
Generation Bomber Study that ``aggressive modernization of bomber fleet
will provide new bomber equivalent capability at significantly less
cost.'' What has changed since then?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
General Gorenc. The Air Force must recapitalize and transform while
modernizing legacy platforms. A reduction in the number of B-52H
aircraft is possible given the enhanced conventional capabilities
across the Air Force since 2003; for instance, the JASSM fielded on the
B-1 and B-52 in the summer of 2005 and the 500# Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM) fielded on the B-2 in the winter of 2005. Further,
JASSM fields on the B-2 and F-16 in summer 2006. The 2007 President's
budget successfully balances the imperatives for recapitalization and
transformation against the need for sustaining legacy force structure.
W-80 NUCLEAR WARHEAD
51. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, General
Gorenc, and Secretary Flory, a study is currently underway to decide if
the Navy and Air Force nuclear cruise missiles should be retired. In
the meantime, the DOE is spending about $100 million per year to get
ready to begin a life extension for the W-80 nuclear warhead, the
warhead on the cruise missiles. Why not postpone the W-80 work until a
final decision is made on whether the cruise missiles and W-80 are
needed or not?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. The DOD, in conjunction with
the DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration, will examine
the way forward pending completion of the study in May.
General Gorenc. The DOD is in the final phase of a comprehensive
study on the post-2007 cruise missile requirements that includes the
current program of record for the W-80 nuclear warhead. Study findings
may result in changes to both the Air Force and DOE programs. However,
until the study is completed and results approved, any change to the
program of record is premature.
Mr. Flory. The W-80 life extension program has been underway since
1998. We are working towards a quick resolution of the force posture
issues associated with cruise missiles, which use the W-80 warhead. The
issues relate to decisions about the type of cruise missile, their
numbers, and length of time that we must retain cruise missiles to
support our deterrence strategy. We are making every effort to support
the current congressional budget deliberations on this matter.
52. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, General
Gorenc, and Secretary Flory, would it make sense, if the life extension
work on the W-80 is cancelled or postponed, to assign the first
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) to Livermore National Laboratory and
let Los Alamos work on the very difficult W-76 life extension, the
nuclear warhead for the D-5 missile?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. USSTRATCOM defers to the
National Nuclear Security Administration.
General Gorenc. The Nuclear Weapons Council established a joint Air
Force-Navy-NNSA RRW Project Officers Group (POG) to examine the
feasibility of the RRW concept. As an integral part of the joint
effort, the NNSA laboratories are independently developing design
concepts potentially applicable to both the SLBM and the ICBM. The POG
will assess the feasibility of the respective design options, and
present their findings and recommendations to the NWC in November 2006
for a decision as to the next step for RRW.
Mr. Flory. The primary linkage between the W-80 life extension
program and the RRW program is the extent that each program may compete
for limited resources in our stockpile transformation plan. The
competition between the two national laboratories for the best RRW
design should remain unbiased. A final decision is planned for late in
2006.
53. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, General
Gorenc, and Secretary Flory, wouldn't this be a more realistic option
to ensure success for the RRW?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. The success of the RRW
program is not dependent upon any one agency's efforts but on the
development of an integrated DOD, DOE, and NNSA strategy to move from
our legacy stockpile to a nuclear stockpile appropriate to the post-
Cold War security environment, with a foundation based on a
revitalized, appropriately sized NNSA complex.
General Gorenc. The joint Air Force-Navy-NNSA RRW POG is currently
evaluating potential design options for the RRW. The POG is scheduled
to present their findings and recommendations to the Nuclear Weapons
Council this November for a decision as to the next step for RRW.
Mr. Flory. Success of the RRW will depend primarily upon restoring
the nuclear weapons infrastructure that furnishes the capacity to
produce RRW designs in sufficient quantities to begin tranforming the
nuclear stockpile in meaningful ways. If additional resources are
needed for the RRW, options to provide the required resources will be
developed.
54. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, General
Gorenc, and Secretary Flory, what role does a decision to keep or
retire the air launched cruise missiles play in the decision to retire
37 B-52H bomber aircraft?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. USSTRATCOM respectfully
defers platform and system specific questions to those Service
representatives who maintain programmed funding and execution
responsibilities. Existing or planned capabilities and decisions
specific to the manning, training, and equipping of forces as part of
Service programmed capabilities in support of the combatant commanders
should be directed to the respective Service responsible for the
capability in question.
General Gorenc. USSTRATCOM operations plan requirements for air
launched cruise missiles is a contributing factor in the Air Force's
decision to retire 37 B-52H bomber aircraft. The remaining B-52H bomber
aircraft provide delivery capacity for USSTRATCOM operations plan air
launched cruise missile requirements.
Mr. Flory. The reduction in the dual-capable B-52 force is not
linked to a decision to keep or retire air-launched cruise missiles.
The size of the B-52 force is driven primarily by conventional
warfighting needs of regional combatant commanders and not by nuclear
force requirements.
55. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, General
Gorenc, and Secretary Flory, was the decision to retire in whole or in
part made in anticipation of the nuclear air launched cruise missiles?
General Cartwright and Admiral Young. The decision is pending, the
study is ongoing.
General Gorenc. USSTRATCOM operations plan requirements for air
launched cruise missiles are a contributing factor in the Air Force's
decision to retire 37 B-52H bomber aircraft. The remaining B-52H bomber
aircraft provide delivery capacity for USSTRATCOM operations plan air
launched cruise missiles requirements.
Mr. Flory. The size of the B-52 force is driven primarily by
conventional warfighting needs of regional combatant commanders and not
by nuclear force requirements. Over the last decade, we have made
significant advances in conventional weaponery. These advances have
made the B-52 highly efficient in terms of the probability of defeating
a target with a single advanced conventional weapon as compared to a
large number of ``dumb'' bombs. These improvements have translated into
improved efficiency and a reduced need for large numbers of the
aircraft by the combatant commanders.
RETIREMENT OF 50 MINUTEMAN III ICBMS
56. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, General Gorenc, and
Secretary Flory, a decision in the QDR is to retire 50 Minuteman III
ICBMs. There are currently 500 Minuteman III ICBMs being downloaded to
one nuclear warhead per missile from multiple nuclear warheads. When
the 50 are retired I understand that some of the remaining 450
Minuteman III ICBMs will be uploaded or maintained with multiple
nuclear warheads. Why is it necessary to retain multiple warheads on
the Minuteman III ICBMs?
General Cartwright. It is necessary to maintain the Nuclear Posture
Review directed 500 warheads. Doing so allows us to keep 50 missiles in
a Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle configuration while freeing
missiles/boosters to become test assets for the future.
General Gorenc. USSTRATCOM determines targeting requirements and
transmits that data to Air Force Space Command. As the force provider,
Air Force Space Command configures the ICBMs in accordance with
USSTRATCOM's warhead and force structure requirements.
Mr. Flory. The DOD is in the process of reconfiguring the Minuteman
III ICBM force with a mix of MIRVed and single-warhead systems while
reducing our operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the
Moscow Treaty limits (1,700-2,200). DOD has not reached a final
decision on the precise number of warheads that will be retained in the
Minuteman III force. However, a mix of ICBMs in both MIRVed and single-
warhead configurations will provide appropriate operational flexibility
as we move toward a more tailorable deterrent posture appropriate for
peer and near-peer competitors, regional WMD states, as well as non-
state actors.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT
57. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, on
many occasions administration witnesses talk about significant
reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile, and the 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) decision to ``transition from a threat-based
nuclear deterrent with large numbers of deployed and reserve weapons to
a deterrent based on capabilities, with a smaller nuclear weapons
stockpile.'' What dismantlement decisions have been made and
implemented since 2001 to achieve the reductions?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM defers to the NNSA for the
dismantlement schedule.
Mr. Flory. By the end of this fiscal year 2006, we will have
reduced the size of total stockpile by 25 percent since the conclusion
of the 2001 NPR. Current policy states that weapons no longer required
for deployment or for reliability replacements will be retired and
dismantled. By 2012, we plan to retire almost 50 percent of the total
stockpile that existed at the end of the NPR. Further reductions are
possible. But, we can only achieve significant additional reductions
through a capability to produce reliable replacement warheads. We need
a restored nuclear weapons infrastructure to accomplish this.
58. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, is
the total nuclear weapons stockpile, not just the deployed stockpile,
substantially smaller today than it was in 2000?
General Cartwright. Yes. Since 2000, the total nuclear weapons
stockpile has been reduced by about 21 percent.
Mr. Flory. Yes. By the end of fiscal year 2007 we will have reduced
the size of the total stockpile by 25 percent. We intend to reduce the
total stockpile by almost 50 percent by fiscal year 2012.
59. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
what part of the transition to a ``threat-based nuclear deterrent''
discussed in the 2001 NPR has occurred and what is planned?
General Cartwright. The United States has invested heavily in a new
generation of advanced conventional systems such as the JASSM and the
Tactical Tomahawk and reconfigured four ballistic missile submarines to
guided missile submarines, while retiring the Peacekeeper ballistic
missile system and reducing the number of deployed ICBM and SLBM
warheads. These actions, in combination with initial steps to deploy an
integrated missile defense system, have prepared the DOD to respond to
a wider range of potential adversaries while reducing reliance upon
nuclear weapons.
Mr. Flory. The NPR called for a transition to a ``capabilities
based'' strategic force posture.
In response to President Bush's call for a strategy that addressed
today's threats while preparing to meet future challenges, the DOD
presented a new defense strategy in its 2001 QDR. The new defense
strategy employs a capabilities-based approach to planning. The essence
of capabilities-based planning is to identify capabilities that
adversaries could employ and capabilities that could be available to
the United States, then evaluate their interaction. It replaces the
traditional threat-based approach that focused on specific adversaries
or regions of the world. Nuclear force planning employs the same
capabilities-based approach.
60. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
how many dismantlements are planned for fiscal year 2006 and for fiscal
year 2007 and which weapons will be dismantled in each year?
General Cartwright. The NNSA is responsible for scheduling and
executing the dismantlement of weapons that have been approved for
retirement.
Mr. Flory. Projections of future dismantlement activity are
classified. However, I can say that we have dismantled over 13,000
warheads since the end of the Cold War. NNSA is responsible for
scheduling and executing the dismantlement of weapons that have been
approved for retirement and can provide the actual weapon quantities
and types planned for dismantlement in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year
2007.
61. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
currently there are roughly four weapons in reserve or inactive or
other status in the stockpile for every weapon deployed. Under the 2001
NPR is there a goal to reduce this ratio?
General Cartwright. Yes. The overall goal is to reduce the size of
the inactive stockpile.
Mr. Flory. While I cannot address the specific figures used in your
question, two factors that dominate the ratio of deployed and non-
deployed strategic warheads are worth noting. First, we must retain a
responsive capability to deal with unexpected changes in the
international environment. Second, we currently must retain--where it
is possible--a number of specific types of warheads as a hedge against
the failure of another specific type of deployed warheads. We must
continue to maintain replacements until DOE has the infrastructure and
the certified capability to replace failed legacy warheads. According
to DOE plans, we do not anticipate a fully responsive infrastructure to
become available until after 2022.
62. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
will the reliable warhead program allow a reduction in this ratio?
General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM believes the RRW will enable a
reduction in the ratio. An objective of the RRW program is to improve
the manufacturability of designs and promote a responsive
infrastructure. Once this is achieved a reduction in the ratio between
deployed warheads and those retained in a reserve or inactive status
could be realized.
Mr. Flory. Yes. Our goal is to eliminate warheads that no longer
serve a significant role in U.S. national security strategy. When the
nuclear weapons infrastructure is restored, we will also be able to
retire warheads that are currently retained as reliability
replacements. According to DOE plans, we do not anticipate a fully
responsive infrastructure to become available until after 2022.
63. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
what is the goal?
General Cartwright. The goal is to retain the minimum number of
weapons required to meet operational needs and to respond to
technological or strategic surprises in a timely manner. This is done
through a combination of a responsive infrastructure and retention of
reserve/inactive weapons. The exact ratio of deployed to inactive/
reserve weapons is dependent upon the capability of the weapons complex
to respond to these surprises.
Mr. Flory. Our goal is to restore the nuclear warhead
infrastructure and then make appropriate reductions in the stockpile in
a way that manages risk for the Nation.
64. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
what is a reasonable ratio?
General Cartwright. The ratio is dependent upon the ability of the
infrastructure to meet operational needs and to respond to
technological or strategic surprises in a timely manner. This is
reviewed during the annual nuclear weapons stockpile memorandum
process.
Mr. Flory. With a restored infrastructure and the ability to
replace failed warheads or to respond quickly to negative shifts in the
international environment, I would expect the ratio of non-deployed
warheads to deployed warheads to drop significantly below current
levels. In that situation, I expect that we will maintain only those
non-deployed warheads in quantities necessary to support a responsive
capability and pipeline logistics activities to support maintenance and
modification activities.
65. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, a
decision to retire the W-62 warhead from the Minuteman III ICBM was
made in the 2001 NPR. Has there been a decision made to dismantle the
W-62? If so, when is the first dismantled scheduled?
General Cartwright. Yes. The NNSA is responsible for scheduling and
executing the dismantlement of weapons once they are retired therefore,
I would defer to the NNSA for dismantlement information.
Mr. Flory. Yes. We have already dismantled a number of W-62
warheads and are intending to dismantle more.
[Whereupon at 4:22 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:23 a.m. in
room SD-138, Dirksen Senate Office Building. Senator Jeff
Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Roberts,
Thune, Levin, Reed, and Bill Nelson.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Robert M. Soofer,
professional staff member; and Kristine L. Svinicki,
professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston and Jill L.
Simodejka.
Committee members' assistants present: Chris Arnold,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; and William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator
Bill Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Sessions. The subcommittee will come to order.
Good morning Gentlemen, I'm sorry, we've had a vote this
morning that got us off to a little bit of a slow start. I
think others will be joining us as the morning goes along.
I'm pleased to welcome our witnesses today, Peter Flory,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy; Lieutenant General Henry Obering, Director of the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA); Lieutenant General Larry Dodgen,
Commander of the U.S. Army Missile Defense Command who also
appears before us today as U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM)
Joint Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile
Defense--that's a mouthful; and David Duma, Acting Director for
Operational Test and Evaluation in the Department of Defense
(DOD).
Gentlemen, I thank you for your service to our Nation and
for taking time to join us today as this subcommittee meets to
receive testimony on the DOD fiscal year 2007 budget requests
for the Missile Defense Program. We are primarily interested in
the Department's progress toward building those missile defense
capabilities directed for deployment by the President in 2002,
including ground-based interceptors (GBIs), sea-based
interceptors, and associated radar and sensors, all of which
are essential components to a functioning system. In this
respect, I would commend the DOD for providing, in just 3 short
years, a measure of protection for the American people against
long-range ballistic missile threats to our homeland. Clearly
this initial defensive capability requires continued
refinement, which is why Congress continues to place emphasis
on an adequate testing program, a subject we hope to learn more
about today.
But perhaps, most important of all, I'll be interested to
hear from General Dodgen, who speaks on behalf of the
warfighters about the operational readiness of those missile
defense capabilities currently fielded, and whether the current
pace of deployment is adequate to stay ahead of the threat.
I realize that I don't have to remind our witnesses about
the ballistic missile threat, but for those less familiar with
the compelling rationale for missile defense, allow me to
paraphrase from the testimony before this committee of General
B.B. Bell, Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea--who is arguably the
combatant commander closest to the threat. General Bell notes
that the North Korean ballistic missile inventory includes over
600 short-range SCUD missiles, and as many as 200 medium-range
No-dong missiles, capable of reaching Japan. North Korea is
also preparing to field a new intermediate-range ballistic
missile which could reach U.S. facilities in Okinawa, Guam, and
possibly Alaska, and North Korea continues to develop a three-
stage missile which could reach the continental United States.
This assessment reinforces, in my mind, the need to field a
missile defense capability as promptly as possible, even while
we continue to improve and test those systems over time.
Senator Reed, do you have any opening comments?
Senator Reed. No, Mr. Chairman. Senator Nelson will be here
and I would just defer to him, to any statement he would make.
Senator Sessions. Senator Roberts?
Senator Roberts. No statement, thank you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, I'll recognize Senator Nelson,
the ranking member of our subcommittee, when he arrives. I
would like to ask each of you to give us an opening statement,
if you choose, and would ask you to limit those remarks to 5
minutes if you would, please.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
I am pleased to welcome our witnesses today: Peter Flory, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; Lieutenant
General Trey Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency;
Lieutenant General Larry Dodgen, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command--who also appears before us today as U.S.
Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component Commander for Integrated
Missile Defense; and David Duma, Acting Director for Operational Test
and Evaluation in the Department of Defense (DOD). Gentlemen, I thank
you for your service to our Nation and for taking the time to join us
here today.
The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the DOD fiscal
year 2007 budget request for the Missile Defense Program. We are
particularly interested in the Department's progress toward fielding
those missile defense capabilities directed for deployment by the
President in 2002, including ground-based interceptors, sea-based
interceptors, and associated radars and sensors.
In this respect, I would commend the DOD for providing, in just 3
short years, a measure of protection for the American people against
the long-range ballistic missile threat to our homeland. Clearly, this
initial defensive capability requires continued refinement, which is
why Congress continues to place emphasis on an adequate testing
program, a subject we hope to learn more about today.
But perhaps most important of all, I will be interested to hear
from General Dodgen, on behalf of the warfighters, about the
operational readiness of those missile defense capabilities currently
fielded, and whether the current pace of deployment is adequate to stay
ahead of the threat.
I realize that I don't have to remind our witnesses about the
ballistic missile threat, but for those less familiar with the
compelling rationale for missile defense, allow me to paraphrase from
the testimony before this committee of General B.B. Bell, Commander of
U.S. Forces in Korea, who is, arguably, the combatant commander closest
to the threat.
General Bell notes that the North Korean ballistic missile
inventory includes over 600 short-range SCUD missiles and as many as
200 medium-range No Dong missiles capable of reaching Japan. North
Korea is also preparing to field a new intermediate range ballistic
missile which could reach U.S. facilities in Okinawa, Guam, and
possibly Alaska; and North Korea continues to develop a three-stage
missile which could reach the continental United States. This
assessment reinforces in my mind the need to field missile defense
capabilities as promptly as possible, even while we continue to test
and improve these systems over time.
Having said this, let me now recognize my distinguished ranking
member, Senator Nelson of Florida, for any opening remarks he may have.
Senator Sessions. I believe we will start with Secretary
Flory.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER C.W. FLORY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Mr. Flory. Chairman Sessions, thank you, Senator Reed,
Senator Roberts, it's a pleasure to be before the subcommittee
today to provide a policy perspective on our Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) Program.
BMD has been a top priority of the President, of his
administration since day one, and it continues to be one today.
At the beginning of the President's first term, the United
States faced a very different security environment than the one
we had faced during the four and a half decades of the Cold
War. In the words of the former Director of Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Jim Woolsey, words which have been
cited quite frequently, ``With the demise of the Soviet Union,
we found that while we had slain a great dragon, the dragon had
been replaced by many dangerous snakes.'' In other words, the
end of the Cold War did not mean that there was not a threat
anymore, it simply meant that the United States would face
different, and different kinds of threats. One particularly
menacing such threat was the spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and the means of delivering them, in
particular, ballistic missiles.
To deal with this threat, President Bush in 2001 and 2002
took several bold steps. First, he announced that the United
States would exercise its right to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-
ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Second, he directed the DOD to
begin fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities
for the United States by the end of the year 2004. What this
did was to end what had been for decades, in effect, a research
and development-only approach to BMD and direct us to proceed
with deployment.
I'm pleased to say that today the United States has all of
the pieces in place needed to intercept an incoming long-range
ballistic missile. GBIs in Alaska and California, and a network
of ground, sea, and spaced-based sensors, a command and control
network, and particularly important, trained service men and
women who are ready to operate the system.
Now, in 2002 we were well aware that what we fielded in
2004 would be our initial capability, and that is why the
President directed us to continue improving the capabilities
every time through ongoing test and evaluation programs,
through research and development of promising new technologies,
and by making continuous improvements to the systems that we
had already fielded. You will hear more of the technical and
programmatic details of how we're going about this from our
fellow panel members in a couple of minutes.
First, I would like to take a few minutes to put the
program in strategic context in terms of the evolving threat,
and in terms of our overall defense strategy. Most important,
the threat posed by ballistic missiles as perceived by the
Nation in 2002 continues to grow, and the missiles we're
talking about are growing in range, complexity, and the threat
they pose. In 1990, around the time of the end of the Cold War,
16 countries possessed ballistic missiles of varying ranges. In
2006, 25 countries possessed these weapons, and the number of
countries that possess longer range, i.e., medium/intermediate
or intercontinental-range ballistic missiles of the kind that
can threaten our friends and allies, or that can threaten the
United States potentially, has increased from 5 to 9. Not only
is the number of nations possessing these weapons increasing,
but the group includes some of the world's most threatening and
least responsible regimes, in particular, North Korea and Iran.
As Lieutenant General Michael Maples, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), recently testified in an
unclassified session before this committee, North Korea
continues to invest in ballistic missiles--this is not only for
its own use, but for foreign sales as well. According to
General Maples, Pyongyang is likely developing intermediate and
intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Negroponte also
testified before the committee that, ``North Korea claims to
have nuclear weapons, a claim that we assess as probably true,
and has threatened to proliferate these weapons abroad.''
Turning to the Middle East, Iran represents a dangerous
nexus, combining a vigorous ballistic missile program, a desire
to develop nuclear weapons and a program to do so, and a
history of support for international terrorism. Terrorism has
been part of Iran's arsenal for decades, in fact, before the
September 11 attacks, more Americans have been Iranian-backed
terrorists like Hezbollah than by any other terrorist group.
Iran has now made ballistic missiles an important part of its
strategy as well.
As DNI Negroponte testified before the committee, ``The
danger that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapon and the ability
to integrate it with ballistic missiles Iran already possesses
is a reason for immediate concern. Iran already has the largest
inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and Tehran
views its ballistic missiles as an integral part of its
strategy to deter, and if necessary, retaliate against forces
in the region, including U.S. forces.'' In this environment,
recent statements by Iranian President Ahmadinejad threatening
the United States and its friends in the region, most notably
Israel, are of particular concern. In October 2005 Ahmadinejad
declared that, ``Israel must be wiped off the map, and God
willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon
experience a world without the United States and Zionism.'' The
Iranian president also said that, ``Anyone who recognizes
Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nations' fury.''
As noted, Iran's ballistic missile forces already cast a
shadow over U.S. friends and allies, and over our deployed
forces in the Middle East. The Intelligence Community (IC) also
assesses that Iran could flight test an ICBM by 2015. The
addition of nuclear warheads in an ICBM that could reach the
United States would further extend Iran's ability to coerce and
threaten others, now to include the United States. There's a
limit, Mr. Chairman, to the details we can get into on the
actual threat here, but I would commend to the subcommittee
members a recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that was
done on the ballistic missile threat which gets into these in a
lot more detail and specificity.
As we face these threats, BMDs remain an important part of
our overall defense strategy. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) outlined four broad defense policy goals--to
assure, dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defend and defeat.
Missile defenses support each element of this strategy: they
can assure allies and friends that ballistic missiles in the
hands of adversaries will not be able to deter the United
States from fulfilling its security commitments, or coerce our
allies, or to undermine the coalition; to dissuade potential
adversaries from investing in or developing ballistic missiles
by reducing the value of such programs; to deter ballistic
missile attacks and threats by reducing an adversary's
confidence that an attack would succeed; and lastly, by
defeating missile attacks against the United States, its
deployed forces, and its friends and allies in the event that
deterrence fails.
Last February, the DOD released the 2006 QDR. The 2006 QDR
recognizes that since 2001, the United States has found itself
engaged in a long war, a global conflict against violent
extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice and who
are actively seeking WMD. The QDR identifies a number of
priorities to guide the Department as it makes choices about
how best to defend the Nation and how best to help the Nation
win the long war. These priorities include defeating terrorist
networks, defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices
of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile
states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.
BMD can make important contributions to each of these
priorities. In particular, they can be used to defend the
homeland, and defeat the actual use of a ballistic missile
attack against the population in territory of the United States
or its deployed forces or its friends and allies, and by making
an adversary uncertain that an attack would succeed, that may
dissuade others from investing in missiles or deter their use
by those who have already acquired them--in other words,
supporting the four elements of the strategy in the 2001 QDR.
Mr. Chairman, some have questioned the attention and
resources we have devoted to BMD in the years following the
September 11 attacks. There's a concern that the main threat to
the United States today is terrorism and that a ballistic
missile attack against the United States is unlikely. The
terrorist threat is clearly a very serious threat to the United
States, but we believe it's important to develop capabilities
to deal with all threats. The U.S. Government was criticized in
the wake of the September 11 attacks for not, ``connecting the
dots on the terrorist threat,'' and ``for failing to prevent
the attacks.'' With respect to the ballistic missile threat, I
think the quotes I've given you before make it quite clear that
the dots are out there at this point for all to see, and to be
connected. I would not care to be before this committee in the
wake of a future ballistic missile attack on the territory and
people of the United States explaining why--given all that we
know today of ballistic missiles in the hands of dangerous
regimes--we had not acted and continued to act to defend the
American people.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Secretary, we have a time limit, if
you could wrap up as you choose.
Mr. Flory. I will wrap up, Mr. Chairman, I'd be happy to
answer questions briefly.
In 2002, the President also directed us, in addition to
fielding defenses for the United States, to cooperate with
friends and allies to extend the benefit of missile defense to
them. We are embarked upon a number of initiatives with
partners including the United Kingdom (U.K.), Denmark, Israel,
Germany, Australia, and Japan, which is our largest partner. We
also continue to seek practical areas of cooperation with
Russia on a bilateral basis as well as in the NATO-Russia
context.
Mr. Chairman, I will conclude on that note, and be happy to
answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Flory follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Peter C.W. Flory
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Nelson, members of the
subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be with you today to provide the
subcommittee with a policy perspective on the progress we've made to
date in the area of ballistic missile defense (BMD) and where we are
headed. BMD has been a top defense priority of the administration from
day one, and it remains a top priority.
I thought it might be useful to begin by reviewing how we got to
where we are today.
At the beginning of the administration, the United States faced a
very different security environment from the one we faced during the
4\1/2\ decades of the Cold War. Former Director of Central Intelligence
James Woolsey has pointed out that with the demise of the Soviet Union,
we found that while we had slain a great dragon, the dragon had been
replaced by many dangerous snakes. In other words, the end of the Cold
War did not mean that the United States no longer faced a threat;
rather, it meant that the United States would face different kinds of
threats.
One such threat was the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and the means of delivering them, in particular ballistic missiles.
Yet, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union prohibited us from fielding an effective defense against
this growing threat. Regimes in countries such as North Korea and Iran
and, at the time, Iraq understood that while they could not hope to
match the United States in conventional forces, they could gain
strategic leverage by investing in ballistic missiles. The strategic
wisdom of leaving the American people vulnerable to missile attack as a
matter of policy during the Cold War was--at best--debatable. The
wisdom of maintaining such a policy in the post-Cold War environment is
not. Without a defense against ballistic missiles, the American people
are vulnerable to the growing threat of missile attack. Without
defenses, a U.S. President faced with a threat to vital U.S. interests
from a rogue state armed with long-range missiles would have to take
into account the fact that the United States homeland could be at risk.
To deal with this threat, President Bush in 2001 and 2002 took
several bold steps. First, he announced that the United States would
exercise its right, which was enshrined in the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, to withdraw from the treaty. Second, he directed the Department
of Defense (DOD) to end what had been for decades a ``research and
development only'' approach to BMD, and to begin fielding an initial
set of missile defense capabilities for the United States by the end of
2004.
I am pleased to say that we have by and large met the goal set by
the President. In 2002, Fort Greely, Alaska, was an inactive
installation, having been on the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) list. Two years later, it was a missile defense interceptor
site. The United States today has all of the pieces in place needed to
intercept an incoming long-range ballistic missile: ground-based
interceptors in Alaska and California; a network of ground, sea, and
space-based sensors; a command and control network; and most
importantly, trained servicemen and women ready to operate the system.
Our BMD System today is primarily oriented toward continued development
and testing. But we believe that, although the system's capability is
limited and in its initial stage, the necessary elements are in place
to intercept a long-range ballistic missile.
Because of the importance of this mission, one of the first things
I did upon assuming my current position in the DOD was to take a trip
to Fort Greely. I want to tell you how impressed I was, not just with
the site itself--the buildings, the silos, the command and control
systems--but with the dedication, the professionalism, and the sense of
mission of the men and women who stand ready to operate the system. I
would encourage you all to visit Fort Greely. It is a long way for most
of you. I know that the men and women stationed there would appreciate
the visit, and that you will be as impressed as I was.
Our BMDs are not as capable today as they will be in the future.
The President knew in 2002 that what we fielded in 2004 would be our
initial capabilities. This is why he directed us to continue improving
these capabilities over time through an ongoing test and evaluation
program, through research and development of promising new
technologies, and by making continuous improvements to the systems we
have already fielded. You will hear more of the programmatic details of
how we are going about this from my fellow panel members in a few
minutes.
But first I would like to take a few minutes to put this program in
its strategic context, in terms of the evolving threat, and in terms of
our overall defense strategy.
First and foremost, the threat posed by ballistic missiles is
growing. The missiles we are talking about are growing in range,
complexity, and the threat they pose. In 1990, around the end of the
Cold War, 16 countries possessed ballistic missiles of varying ranges.
In 2006, 25 countries have them. The number of countries that possess
medium, intermediate, or intercontinental range ballistic missiles--
i.e., missiles that may reach our friends and allies, and in some cases
the U.S. homeland itself has increased from 5 to 9.
Not only is the number of nations possessing ballistic missiles
increasing, but this group includes some of the world's most
threatening and least responsible regimes, such as North Korea and
Iran.
As Lieutenant General Michael Maples, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), recently testified in an unclassified
session, North Korea continues to invest in ballistic missiles, not
only for its own use but for foreign sales as well. According to
Lieutenant General Maples, ``Pyongyang is likely developing
intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.'' For
over 50 years, U.S. servicemembers have stood on the border between
North and South Korea. We have known that if North Korea decided to
attack the South, these men and women would immediately be in harm's
way. The prospect of long-range ballistic missiles in the hands of the
North means that, for the first time, the American people too would be
in harm's way.
Iran represents a dangerous nexus, combining a vigorous ballistic
missile program, a desire to develop nuclear weapons, and a history of
support for international terrorism. The most recent edition of the
State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism (April 29, 2004)
describes Iran as the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism.
Terrorism has been part of Tehran's arsenal for decades. In fact,
before the September 11 attacks, more Americans had been killed by
Iranian-backed terrorists like Hezbollah than by any other terrorist
group. Iran has now made ballistic missiles an important part of its
defense strategy--scenes of Iranian missiles on display in military
parades are reminiscent of the Soviet Union. Further, as Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte recently testified before
Congress, Iran has engaged in a clandestine uranium enrichment program
for nearly two decades. It is the judgment of the Intelligence
Community (IC) that Iran does not yet possess a nuclear weapon or have
the necessary fissile material to do so, but the DNI testified that
``the danger that it will acquire a nuclear weapon and the ability to
integrate it with the ballistic missiles Iran already possesses is a
reason for immediate concern.''
In this environment, recent statements by Iranian President Ahmadi-
Nejad threatening the United States and its friends in the region, most
notably Israel, are of particular concern. In October 2005, Ahmadi-
Nejad declared that ``Israel must be wiped off the map. God willing,
with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world
without the United States and Zionism.'' He also said that ``anybody
who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation's
fury.''
The IC assesses that Iran could flight test an ICBM by 2015. Iran's
ballistic missiles already cast a shadow over U.S. friends and allies,
and our deployed forces, in the Middle East. The addition of nuclear
warheads and an ICBM that could reach the U.S. would further extend
Iran's ability to coerce others and threaten the U.S.
The United States continues to support efforts by the United
Nations Security Council to reach a diplomatic solution to the issue of
Iran's nuclear activities. But, we need to take steps to safeguard our
interests and the interests of friends and allies in the event
diplomatic efforts do not succeed. The Iranian case is just one example
of a WMD proliferation problem that, thanks to ballistic missile
technology, could directly threaten the American people. We must be
prepared for this possibility, and for others to follow suit. The
continued development and fielding of missile defenses is one vital
step to defend against such threats, as well as to reduce the
attractiveness, to other countries of concern, of such WMD and missile
technology.
As we face these threats, BMDs remain an important part of our
overall defense strategy. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
outlined four broad defense policy goals: to assure, dissuade, deter,
and if necessary defend and defeat. Missile defenses help to:
Assure allies and friends that ballistic missiles will
not be able to deter the U.S. from fulfilling its security
commitments, coerce our allies, or undermine a coalition;
Dissuade potential adversaries from investing in or
developing ballistic missiles by reducing the value of such
weapons;
Deter ballistic missile attacks and threats by
reducing an adversary's confidence in the success of an attack;
and
Defeat missile attacks against the United States, its
deployed forces, and its friends and allies in the event
deterrence fails.
In February, the DOD released the 2006 QDR. The QDR recognizes that
since the 2001 QDR, the United States has found itself engaged in a
``long war,'' a global conflict against violent extremists who use
terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who are actively seeking
weapons of mass destruction. We believe that ballistic missile defenses
play an important part in this long war. The QDR identifies a number of
priorities to guide the Department as it makes choices about how best
to help the Nation win the long war. These priorities include:
defeating terrorist networks; defending the homeland in depth; shaping
the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and preventing
hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of
mass destruction. Ballistic missile defenses can make a contribution to
each of these important priorities. They can be used to defend the
homeland and defeat the actual use of a ballistic missile against the
population and territory of the U.S., its deployed forces, or its
friends and allies. By making an adversary uncertain that a ballistic
missile attack will succeed, missile defenses may dissuade others from
investing in missiles, or deter their use by those who have already
acquired them.
Some have questioned the amount of attention we have paid to
ballistic missile defense in the years following the September 11
attacks, on the theory that the main threat to the U.S. is terrorism,
and a ballistic missile attack against the United States is unlikely. I
would turn that argument around somewhat. One of the lessons of
September 11 is that nothing is unthinkable. The United States must and
can prepare to defend itself against the widest range of threats
possible. Leaving ourselves vulnerable to a type of attack will only
increase the likelihood that an adversary will exploit that
vulnerability to threaten or attack us.
Further, the U.S. Government was criticized in the wake of
September 11 for not ``connecting the dots'' on the terrorist threat
and failing to act to prevent the attacks. With respect to the
ballistic missile threat, the dots are out there for all to see. I
would not care to be before this committee in the wake of a ballistic
missile attack explaining why, given all we know of ballistic missiles
in the hands of dangerous regimes, we had not acted to defend the
American people.
I spoke earlier about the ballistic missile defense goals laid out
by President Bush in 2002. The President directed us then not only to
field defenses for the United States, but also to cooperate with
friends and allies to extend the benefits of missile defenses to them
as well. Since then, we have embarked upon a number of important
missile defense initiatives with international friends and partners. We
have worked with the United Kingdom to upgrade the early warning radar
at Fylingdales so it can perform a ballistic missile defense mission;
we reached agreement with Denmark to allow us to upgrade the early
warning radar at Thule, Greenland; we continue to work with Israel on
the Arrow Ballistic Missile Defense Program; our own Patriot anti-
missile system is widely deployed and is available for export; Germany
and Italy are our partners in the Medium Extended Range Air Defense
System; after we signed a Framework Memorandum of Understanding on
missile defense cooperation in 2004 with Australia, Canberra has
expressed interest in cooperating on a number of potential missile
defense projects; and we are negotiating a Defense Technical
Cooperation Agreement with Russia to facilitate both government-to-
government as well as industry-to-industry missile defense cooperation,
while we continue to seek practical areas of cooperation with Russia on
a bilateral basis as well as in the NATO-Russia context.
One particularly good news story in international BMD is our
cooperation with Japan. Japan has committed to spending the equivalent
of roughly 1 billion U.S. dollars on BMD, making it our largest
international partner in missile defense. The United States and Japan
have agreed to work together to develop a more capable sea-based
interceptor that will improve the defense of both the U.S. and Japan. I
am especially pleased by the recent announcement that Japanese
officials have agreed to place of an X-band missile defense radar at
the Shariki Air Defense Missile Station. I hope this will lead soon to
a final agreement between our two countries to field this radar, which
will help defend both the U.S. and Japan from ballistic missile attack.
In addition, the U.S. and Japan are taking the steps necessary to share
BMD information with one another.
We also are considering fielding long-range missile defense
interceptors and radars in Europe. There is roughly $120 million in the
President's fiscal year 2007 budget request to begin work on this
project. Such a site would house interceptors very similar to those we
have currently fielded at Fort Greely, Alaska; and Vandenberg Air Force
Base, California. Fielding such a capability would improve the defense
of the United States against long-range missiles, especially those
launched from the Middle East. It also would begin to extend missile
defense to our European allies, protecting their populations from
attack and reducing the risk of coercion or blackmail.
The U.S. Government has held consultations with a number of Allies,
beginning in 2002, about their willingness to host missile defense
interceptors. We are continuing these consultations with allies who
have expressed interest, and we intend to conduct site surveys as
appropriate. We hope to be in a position to make an interagency
recommendation to the President on the issue later this year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your questions
and those of the subcommittee members after my colleagues have
presented their testimony.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
Lieutenant General Obering, we're delighted to have you
with us, Commander of the Army Space and Missile Defense
Command.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING III, USAF, DIRECTOR,
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
General Obering. Good morning Mr. Chairman, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, it's an honor to appear before you
today. I've prepared a written statement that I ask be entered
into the record.
Senator Sessions. We'll be glad to do that, and Secretary
Flory, we'll be glad to have your full remarks in the record
also.
Mr. Flory. Thank you, and I apologize for not asking for
that.
General Obering. Since I last addressed this committee
we've made good progress developing and fielding an integrated,
layered system to defend the United States, our deployed
forces, allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all
ranges, in all phases of flight. We have implemented improved
mission assurance processes, established an increasingly robust
and operationally focused test program, and continued the
fielding of the system. With the 2007 budget request, we plan
to expand the development, fielding, and verification of this
critically needed defense.
Proliferating ballistic missile systems increasingly pose a
danger to our national security. Last year there were nearly 80
foreign ballistic missile launches alone. Our program is
structured to meet this evolving threat. We balance the early
fielding of system elements with steady improvements through a
spiral development and test approach. We use knowledge points
to measure development progress by focusing on a set of
critical activities that define the program's risk. This
approach allows us to make informed decisions on whether and
how the development activity should advance.
2007 will be a very intense and demanding period for us. As
such, we're requesting $9.3 billion to support our program of
work, about $2.4 billion covers the continued fielding and
sustainment of system components, including the long-range,
ground-based, midcourse defenses; short- to intermediate-range
defenses involving the sea-based interceptors; and all
supporting radars, command, control, battle management, and
communications capabilities.
Approximately $6.9 billion will be invested in development
for evolution and testing of the system. As I've detailed our
request for 2007, though, I think it appropriate to review our
work with the budget that you previously approved.
Last year, members of the committee expressed significant
interest in a better review of the ground-based midcourse test
aborts and the future of our test program. The Independent
Review Team concluded we are on the right track, but we needed
to make adjustments in several areas including quality control,
systems engineering, and test readiness. I established a
Mission Readiness Task Force to assure these adjustments were
made, and I delayed the interceptor deployment in 2005
accordingly. We are now undertaking the additional
qualification tests, and have implemented stronger engineering
accountability, configuration management, and mission assurance
processes. These comprehensive reviews and our recent test
successes indicate that interceptor deployment should continue,
but I will pause again, if necessary.
We recently emplaced three more interceptors in Alaska on
our way to 16 total, including the California site by December.
This progress is critical, since we expect the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) element to be the backbone of our long-
range defense capability for years to come.
Missile defense testing, based on event-driven results,
continues to evolve to where ``we test as we fight and fight as
we test.'' We cooperate fully with the operational test
community and combatant commanders in their efforts to
characterize system effectiveness and readiness. Last year I
told you that we planned to conduct two long-range interceptor
tests in 2005. That did not happen because we were implementing
the recommendations of the Mission Readiness Task Force. With
the successful December flight of our operationally configured,
long range interceptor, we have resumed an aggressive test
program that includes up to three more flight tests planned
this year beginning this summer. These will include realistic
targets, operational sensors, operational crews, and
operational interceptors from operational silos, with two of
them planned as intercepts. We will adjust this schedule as
needed based on results. Overall, our program includes 38 major
system tests in 2006, and 37 in 2007.
Last year, Mr. Chairman, you voiced a concern about the
ability of the Cobra Dane radar to support the fire control
mission. I am pleased to say that this past September we flew a
threat representative, air-launched target across the face of
that radar, generating tracks that the operational fire control
system then used to produce an intercept solution. We are
confident in the capability of this radar. We also reached
another major milestone last month when we successfully tested
the upgraded Beale radar in California against a realistic
ICBM-class target launched from Alaska. Again, the
operationally configured fire control system generated an
intercept solution from the track data. Later this year, we
will deploy the first transportable Forward-Based X-Band Radar
to our very important ally, Japan, where it will provide
support for both a regional and homeland defense. In the U.K.,
we expect the upgraded Fylingdales radar to achieve initial
capability this year.
In our sea-based sensor program, we added 6 more Aegis
Long-Range Surveillance and Track destroyers, for a total of
11. We successfully tested this capability against targets
launched from Hawaii and California. In one of our most
ambitious efforts, I'm pleased to report that we completed
construction of the world's largest Sea-Based X-Band Radar. It
has completed extensive sea trials and high-power radiation
testing, and is currently in the Hawaii area after its long
journey from Texas this winter. Later this year, it will
complete its integration and checkout and be stationed in
Alaska.
Of our total 2007 budget request, $2.7 billion would go
towards long range midcourse defense. These funds would allow
us to continue to improve and build additional interceptors,
their silos, support equipment and facilities, as well as order
long lead items for the next fielding increment. We plan to
field and support up to a total of 22 interceptors and conduct
two more flight tests by the end of 2007.
We are also working hard to address the growing threat from
Iran. By placing a third long-range interceptor site in Europe
along with forward-based sensors in the region, we will meet
two major objectives laid out by the President: improved
coverage of the United States, and protection for our allies
and friends in Europe from ICBM attack. Current plans are to
deploy up to 10 interceptors in Europe by 2011, which will
expand our total long-range interceptor inventory to 50. The
2007 budget request covers funding for site surveys, planning,
facility and support infrastructure design, as well as
interceptor long lead items. For sensor coverage, we will
deliver a second Forward-Based X-Band Radar and begin a major
upgrade to Thule, Greenland radar.
I would like to turn now to our most important area--
command, control, battle management, and communications. This
infrastructure is the heart, soul, and brain of our defensive
capability and without it, we simply cannot execute the
mission. The global foundation we have established for our
Nation's leadership and combatant commanders is unmatched in
the world, but we have only just begun. We need to expand this
to include the integrated fire control that will allow us to
mix and match sensors and weapons as a significant force
multiplier. We also continue to work closely with the combatant
commanders to train and certify missile defense crews by
exercising the system with launch-ready demonstrations. The
$264 million we are requesting for these efforts is essential
to ensuring an effective missile defense system (MDS).
We are aggressively addressing threats posed by shorter-
range ballistic missiles. Nearly $2 billion in our 2007 budget
request is allocated evenly between our Aegis BMD and Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) programs to enable us to
field capabilities to counter these threats.
In addition to providing long-range surveillance and
tracking support, Aegis is providing a flexible, sea-mobile
intercept capability against shorter range ballistic missiles
(SRBM). This past year we added a second Aegis engagement
cruiser to our evolving architecture. In November, we
successfully used an Aegis cruiser to engage a separating
target carried on a medium-range ballistic missile. We plan to
conduct two more intercept tests this year and two more in 2007
using upgraded versions of the interceptor. By the end of 2007
we expect to have three engagement cruisers and seven
engagement destroyers available with up to 33 Standard Missile-
3 interceptors delivered.
In our THAAD program, we are coming off a very encouraging
flight test last November, when we put the redesigned
interceptor through its paces. We will continue to characterize
its performance and integrate this element into the system. We
plan to conduct four more flight tests in 2006, including the
first high endo-atmospheric intercept. In 2007 we plan to
conduct four intercept tests in both the exo- and endo-
atmospheric regions. We will continue our development efforts
and plan to field the first unit in Block 2008, with a second
unit available in Block 2010.
We have a plan, which we have submitted to the Under
Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, that
addresses a collaborative effort across the Department to
transition BMD elements to the Services. The plan will provide
information to the Services to facilitate their 2008 budget
submissions.
We have learned that there is no model that will fit all
cases. We currently have lead-service agreements to cover
Patriot Advanced Capability-3, Aegis BMD, THAAD, and the
Upgraded Early Warning Radars. We continue to work with the
Department on approval for the remaining elements. It is
important to note that this is a continual process and that
changes will occur based on capability maturity and fielding
schedules.
To keep ahead of future threats, there are several other
important development efforts funded in this budget. We
continue to follow a strategy of retaining alternative paths
until capability is proven. It is a knowledge-based approach.
Being able to address threats worldwide is vital and means
moving to space with precision tracking sensors. In 2007, we
plan to launch two Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS) demonstration satellites to begin critical
experimentation. We have budgeted $380 million for this
continuing development effort.
The Airborne Laser (ABL) reached all of its knowledge
points for last year when it achieved a full duration lase at
operational power and completed initial beam control, fire
control flight tests. Currently, we are installing the tracking
and atmospheric compensation lasers and preparing the aircraft
to accept the high-power laser modules in 2007.
Senator Sessions. General Obering, we do have some other
presentations, if you can begin to wrap up, but I am pleased.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Senator Roberts. He's discussing the ABL, which is really
very special and important to our national defense, I would
give them another 30 seconds.
Senator Sessions. Absolutely, we'll give them several
minutes, but we do have a limit.
Senator Roberts. I appreciate that.
Senator Sessions. The laser, go on and fully explain that.
General Obering. Yes, sir. We have planned a campaign of
flight tests that will lead to a lethal shoot-down of a
ballistic missile in 2008. Nearly $600 million of our budget
request is for this revolutionary work.
In our other boost phase development activity, the Kinetic
Energy Interceptor (KEI), we have focused on demonstrating a
mobile, land-based very high acceleration booster. This past
January we completed the successful static firing of a second
stage prototype and will continue static firing tests of the
booster's first and second stages in 2007. We have requested
almost $400 million for these efforts.
As threats grow in complexity, we will continue a volume
kill capability. The Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program is a
generational upgrade to our long range interceptors. In 2005,
we made progress in the development of the seeker and made the
decision to move to a lower risk propulsion system, which we
plan to hover test in 2009.
The committee members expressed interests last year in the
international efforts. We have concluded formal agreements with
four countries, and several more are pending. Japan continues
to make significant investments in multi-layered missile
defenses. Working closely with the Japanese since 1999 to
develop advanced Standard Missile-3 components, we successfully
flight tested a new nosecone just last month. In addition,
we've embarked with Japan on the co-development of the 21"
Standard Missile-3, which will have greatly expanded
performance and defending area capability.
If I turn our attention, finally, to our other allies, Mr.
Chairman, we concluded an agreement with Australia to expand
cooperative work on sensors. An agreement with Denmark allows
us to upgrade the Thule radar and integrate it into the system
by 2009, and we're undertaking a series of technical
development efforts with the U.K. in addition to our ongoing
work with Israel on the Arrow interceptor and will continue to
enhance its missile defenses against emerging threats.
Mr. Chairman, we certainly have our challenges, but for the
most part, this program is on track. The successes we've had
over the past year bear this out. I greatly appreciate the
committee's continued support and patience, but I want to take
this opportunity to thank the thousands of Americans and our
allies, both in government and industry, that are working hard
to make this missile defense a success. Thank you and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Obering follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering III, USAF
Good morning, Chairman Sessions, Senator Nelson, members of the
subcommittee. It is an honor to be here today to present the Department
of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2007 Missile Defense program and budget.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) mission remains one of developing and
progressively fielding a joint, integrated, and multilayered Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) system to defend the United States, our deployed
forces, and our allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all
ranges by engaging them in all phases of flight. I believe we are on
the right track to deliver the multilayered, integrated capabilities
that are necessary to counter current and emerging threats.
As was the case last year, our program is structured to balance the
initial fielding of system elements with steady improvements using
evolutionary development and a test approach that continuously
increases our confidence in the effectiveness of the BMD System. This
budget balances our capabilities across an evolving threat spectrum
that includes rogue nations with increasing ballistic missile
expertise.
We are requesting $9.3 billion to support our program of work in
fiscal year 2007. The $1.6 billion increase from 2006 reflects a return
to the annual investment level targeted by the Department for BMD and
is indicative of the robust phase we are entering in the development
and fielding of the integrated layered capability. Approximately $1
billion of this increase will be applied to fielding and sustainment,
and $600 million to continued development of the Ballistic Missile
Defense System. $2.4 billion of the fiscal year 2007 request covers the
continued incremental fielding and sustainment of long-range ground-
based midcourse defense components; our short- to intermediate-range
defense involving Aegis ships with their interceptors; and the
supporting sensors, command, control, battle management and
communication capabilities. This increase in funding for fielding and
sustainment of nearly a billion dollars from last year reflects the
success we have had across the program. About $6.9 billion will be
invested in continued component improvements, system capability
development, and testing.
I would like to review our accomplishments, as well as our
shortfalls, over the past year, explain our testing and fielding
strategies, and address the next steps in our evolutionary Ballistic
Missile Defense Program.
THE EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Proliferating and evolving ballistic missile systems and associated
technologies continue to pose dangers to our national security. In 2005
there were nearly 80 foreign ballistic missile launches around the
world. Nearly 60 launches last year involved short-range ballistic
missiles, approximately 10 involved medium- and intermediate-range
missiles, and about 10 involved long-range ballistic missiles.
North Korea and Iran have not relented in their pursuit of longer-
range ballistic missiles. Our current and near-term missile defense
fielding activities are a direct response to these dangers. There are
also other ballistic missile threats today for which we must be
prepared, and there will be others in the mid- to far-term. We must be
ready to operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System against new and
unexpected threats.
Our potential adversaries continue efforts to acquire ballistic
missile systems and technology. Ballistic missiles were used against
our forces, our allies and friends during the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars.
When combined with weapons of mass destruction, they could offer our
enemies an attractive counterbalance to the overwhelming conventional
superiority exhibited by U.S. and coalition forces during those wars.
We can expect that in the future our adversaries could use them to
threaten our foreign policy objectives or pursue a policy of terrorism
by holding our cities and other high value assets hostage. After all,
those who support global terrorism can hide behind the threats posed by
offensive missiles carrying highly destructive or lethal payloads. They
will use them to try to deny our forces access to a theater of conflict
or to coerce a withdrawal of our forces from that theater. Ballistic
missiles provide a way for our adversaries to attempt to achieve some
degree of strategic equality with us, especially at a time when
ballistic missile defense is still striving to catch up with the
progress made by ballistic missile offense over the past four decades.
MISSILE DEFENSE APPROACH--LAYERED DEFENSE
We believe that layered defenses integrated by a robust command and
control system, will improve the chances of engaging and destroying a
ballistic missile and its payload in-flight. This approach to missile
defense also makes the effectiveness of countermeasures much more
difficult, since countermeasures designed to work in one phase of
flight are not likely to work in another. It is much harder to overcome
a complex, multilayered defense. Layered defenses, a time-honored U.S.
approach to military operations, provide defense in depth and create
synergistic effects designed to frustrate an attack.
With the initial fielding in 2004 of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) components, the Aegis long range surveillance and track
ships, and the first integrated command, control, battle management and
communications (C2BMC) suites, we made history by establishing a
limited defensive capability for the United States against a possible
long-range ballistic missile attack from North Korea and the Middle
East. With the cooperation of our allies and friends, we plan to evolve
this defensive capability to make it more effective against all ranges
of threats in all phases of flight and expand the system over time with
additional interceptors, sensors, and layers.
Since we cannot be certain which specific ballistic missile threats
we will face in the future, or from where those threats will originate,
our long-term strategy is to strengthen and maximize the flexibility of
our missile defense capabilities. As we proceed with this program into
the next decade, we will move towards a missile defense force structure
that features greater sensor redundancy and sensitivity, interceptor
capability and mobility, and increasingly robust C2BMC capabilities. In
line with our multilayer approach, we will expand terminal defense
protection and place increasing emphasis on boost phase defenses.
We are effectively employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy
to field multiple system capabilities while maintaining an aggressive
test and development program. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
continues to evolve and refine desired capabilities, based on
warfighter need and technology maturity, through sound risk management.
Our goal continues to be one of fielding the best capabilities
possible, on schedule, on time, and within cost, in order to address
current and emerging threats.
COMPLETING THE FIELDING OF BLOCK 2004
Since I last appeared before this committee, we have made a number
of significant accomplishments to complete initial fielding of the
Block 2004 capability. We have also fallen short in some areas. When we
rolled this program out in 2002, we set out to deploy 10 Ground-Based
Interceptors (GBI) in 2004 and another 10 in 2005. A booster motor
plant explosion in 2003, which had a major impact across the missile
defense program, and the need to step back and undertake a mission
readiness review of the GMD program following two test failures caused
us to miss our fielding mark. I delayed the GBI deployment in 2005 and
made changes based on the recommendations of the mission readiness
review. I believe we are now back on track, but I will pause again if
necessary. We recently emplaced three more GBIs in silos at Fort
Greely, Alaska, for a total of nine, and two at Vandenberg Air Force
Base in California. This progress is critical because we expect the GMD
element to be the backbone of our national missile defense capability
for years to come. Today we continue with interceptor fielding and plan
to emplace additional GBIs, for a total of 16 by December of this year.
This past year we also added a second Aegis engagement cruiser and
delivered additional Standard Missile-3 interceptors to our evolving
sea-based architecture to address short- and medium-range threats in
the midcourse phase of flight. We did not advance as rapidly as we
hoped. We needed to resolve technical issues associated with the third
stage rocket motor and the solid divert and attitude control system to
take full advantage of interceptor performance designed to pace the
threat. However, we are close to the 10 to 20 sea-based interceptors we
projected for delivery in our initial program. Right now, I am
comfortable with where we stand in our sea-based interceptor deployment
plans. We will continue to grow our inventory of Standard Missile-3
interceptors for deployment aboard Aegis ships and, by the end of 2006,
outfit three Aegis destroyers and one additional cruiser with this
engagement capability. In addition to providing surveillance and
tracking support to the integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System,
Aegis provides a flexible sea-mobile capability to defeat short- to
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase.
In our sensors program, we upgraded the Beale Early Warning Radar
in California. The Beale radar complements and works synergistically
with the surveillance and tracking capabilities of the fully
operational Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, and together they will help us
defend against the longer-range threats coming out of East Asia. The
Beale radar will play an instrumental role in tests this year to
demonstrate the system's ability to intercept intercontinental-range
missiles using operationally configured assets.
This past year we added 6 more Aegis Long-Range Surveillance and
Track destroyers to our force, for a total of 11. These ships provide
much sought-after flexibility in our architecture, giving us more time
to engage enemy missiles and improving the performance of the entire
system.
We are making good progress in integrating the Sea-Based X-band
radar into the system. It is the most powerful radar of its kind in the
world and will provide the system a highly advanced detection and
discrimination capability. This past January the radar completed its
long journey from Texas, where it underwent extensive sea trials and
high-power radiation testing in the Gulf of Mexico, to Hawaii. This
spring its voyage continues to Adak, Alaska, where it will be home-
ported and put on station.
This past year the Forward-Based Radar, our transportable X-band
radar, successfully acquired and tracked intercontinental ballistic
missiles in tests conducted at Vandenberg Air Force Base. We are now
preparing to deploy the radar to provide precision track and
discrimination capabilities, which will improve regional and homeland
missile defense capabilities.
We also completed subsystem checkout of the Fylingdales radar in
the United Kingdom and achieved high-power radiation. We conducted the
necessary operator training at that site and are now in the middle of
completing an important series of ground tests that are necessary to
verify this system's capability, tests that had been deferred on the
recommendations of the Mission Readiness Task Force. We expect to
complete testing at Fylingdales later this year.
We have an extensive command, control, battle management, and
communications infrastructure to support all these elements, and we are
ready to provide complete operations and maintenance support to the
warfighter. We have taken the first step in integrating the BMD System,
which is necessary to establish an affordable and effective global,
layered defense. We have installed hardware and software at the United
States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), and United States Pacific Command (PACOM). C2BMC
capabilities include basic deliberative crisis planning and common
situational awareness at these combatant commands. In addition, we now
provide common situational awareness directly to the President of the
United States and the Secretary of Defense to aid in decisionmaking. In
addition to fielding these suites, we also completed five major
software release upgrades this past year, each improving the capability
of the command, control, battle management and communications system.
It is this global connective capability that allows us to combine
different sensors with different weapons. For example, we are
developing the Aegis BMD System so that it can support a ground-based
interceptor launch by sending tracking information to the fire control
system. A forward-deployed radar can cue and pass tracking information
on to, for example, a Patriot Advanced Capability-3 unit, or a
regionally deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
battery, or a GMD or Aegis BMD engagement ships. In other words, we
want to be able to mix and match sensor and interceptor resources to
give the system more capability by expanding the detection and
engagement zones. Our ability to integrate all of the weapons and
sensors into a single package that will use interceptors in the best
location to make the kill gives us a critical multiplier effect.
We work closely with STRATCOM and the combatant commanders to
certify missile defense crews at all echelons to ensure that they can
operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System. We have exercised the
command, fire control, battle management and communication capabilities
critical to the operation of the system.
We also are continuing to exercise the system to learn how best to
operate it, and we have demonstrated our ability to transition smoothly
from test to operations and back. In our exercises and tests, we have
worked through a number of operational capability demonstrations in
order to increase operational realism and complexity, certify crews and
safety procedures, and demonstrate the operational viability of the
system. The MDA will continue to coordinate with the warfighter to
implement developmental upgrades and improvements in the system to
maximize system capability. This is very important since we will
continue to improve the capabilities of the system over time, even as
we remain ready in the near-term to take advantage of its inherent
defensive capability should the need arise.
BUILDING CONFIDENCE THROUGH SPIRAL TESTING
We have consistently pursued a comprehensive and integrated
approach to missile defense testing and are gradually making our tests
more complex. Missile defense testing has evolved, and will continue to
evolve, based on results. We are not in a traditional development,
test, and production mode where we test a system, then produce hundreds
of units without further testing. We will always be testing and
improving this system, using a testing approach that cycles results
into our spiral development activities. This approach also means
fielding test assets in operational configurations. This dramatically
reduces time from development to operations in a mission area where,
until now, this nation has been defenseless.
Last year, following the two launch aborts of the interceptor for
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, I explained that we had
several concerns with quality control and reliability; but we did not
view the failures as major technical setbacks. In response to those
failures, I chartered an independent team to review our test processes,
procedures and management. The team concluded that the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense program met the challenge of providing an initial
defensive capability but found deficiencies in systems engineering,
ground qualification testing, flight test readiness certification,
contractor process control and program scheduling. The independent
review team recommended that the MDA reorient the missile defense
program to strengthen its emphasis on mission assurance.
I established a Mission Readiness Task Force under Admiral Kate
Paige to implement the corrective actions needed to ensure a return to
a successful flight test program. The task force identified steps to
strengthen our systems engineering and quality assurance processes and
provide the reliability and repeatability necessary for operational
success. As a result, we undertook a comprehensive review of these
system processes at each step along the way. We are also undertaking
the necessary ground and flight qualification tests to retire the risks
uncovered by the independent review team and the Mission Readiness Task
Force. To strengthen our test program, I diverted four long-range
interceptors slated for operational use into testing, with the intent
to replace them in 2007 if our test program was successful. Last year,
I asked the committee to have patience, knowing that the system's basic
functionality was not at risk. As a result of our aggressive actions, I
believe that mission assurance and system reliability are now on track.
We finished the year strongly with a string of test successes
across the board. These successes continue to build confidence in our
spiral development approach. In a major step forward, in September
2005, we flew a threat representative target across the operational
Cobra Dane radar and generated an intercept solution using the long-
range fire control system. We then flew the operational configuration
of the long-range interceptor in December 2005 and put the kill vehicle
through its paces. We not only achieved all of the test objectives for
that flight, but we also accomplished many of those objectives we
identified for the next flight test scheduled for this spring. Just
last month, we exercised an engagement sequence that used the Upgraded
Early Warning Radar at Beale Air Force Base in California to provide
tracking information to a simulated long-range interceptor from an
operational site at Vandenberg. Based on the many tests we have
conducted to date, including three successful flight tests of the
operational long-range booster now emplaced in Alaska and California,
we maintain our confidence in the system's basic design, its hit-to-
kill effectiveness, and its inherent operational capability. We will
continue to test this system to ensure it will remain mission ready.
We continue to work closely with the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Operational Test Agencies, and combatant commanders to
characterize the effectiveness and readiness of the system at every
stage in its development and fielding. This year the fielded BMD System
will undergo ever more challenging and operationally realistic testing.
We will begin the important next step of testing our long-range
ground-based defense with more operationally robust flight tests as a
part of the integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System With the next
tests involving the GBI, we will step up testing complexity and involve
operational crews, operational interceptor launch sites, and
operational sensors. These tests will involve an operationally
configured interceptor launched from Vandenberg that will attempt to
acquire and intercept a target missile launched out of the Kodiak
Launch Complex in Alaska. With the last two tests in this series, we
will demonstrate the ability of the system to perform more refined
acquisition and discrimination functions and the ability of the exo-
atmospheric kill vehicle to divert toward the target and intercept it.
We also plan to use tracking data from the Sea-Based X-band radar when
it is available to feed its data into system tests and operations. In
2007, as we return our focus to fielding long-range interceptors, we
plan one system intercept test and two flight tests, all three of which
will further demonstrate the operationally configured interceptor.
In our sea-based midcourse defense element, we have continued to
ratchet up the degree of realism and reduce testing limitations. This
past November, for the first time, we successfully used a U.S. Navy
Aegis cruiser to engage a separating target carried on a threat-
representative medium-range ballistic missile. A separating target is
more challenging to engage because it can fly faster and farther than
the boosting missile. In order to increase operational realism, we did
not notify the operational ship's crew of the target launch time, and
they were forced to react to a dynamic situation. We are planning three
more Aegis interceptor flight tests in 2006. Last month, we conducted a
very successful cooperative test with Japan involving a simulated
target to demonstrate the engagement performance of a modified SM-3
nosecone developed by the Japanese in the U.S./Japan Joint Cooperative
Research project. One of the upcoming U.S. Aegis intercept tests will
again involve a separating warhead. In 2007 we plan to conduct two
tests of the sea-based interceptor against short- and medium-range
targets.
Flight-testing involving the redesigned interceptor for the THAAD
began last November when we successfully demonstrated the separation
and operation of the production booster and kill vehicle. This year we
will conduct four more tests to characterize performance of the new
missile and the ability to integrate it into the BMD System. Later this
year we will also conduct the first intercept test high in the
atmosphere. In 2007 we plan to conduct four intercept tests as part of
our THAAD flight test program.
Also planned in 2007 are two Arrow system flight tests and one
Patriot combined developmental and operational test. The command,
control, battle management, and communications infrastructure will be
exercised in all of our system level tests.
Ground tests, wargames and modeling and simulation help demonstrate
interoperability, assess performance and specification compliance, and
develop doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. In 2007 we will
continue with our successful ground-testing, which involves warfighter
personnel and test hardware and software in the integrated system
configuration to demonstrate system connectivity and interoperability.
Upcoming tests will verify integration of the sea-based, forward-based,
and Fylingdales radars. The funds we are requesting also will support
additional capability demonstrations and readiness demonstrations led
by the warfighting community.
COMPLETING THE NEXT INCREMENT--BLOCK 2006
To keep ahead of rogue nation threats, we continue to hold to the
fielding commitments we made to the President for Block 2006, which
include investment in the necessary logistics support and command,
control, battle management and communications infrastructure. In 2006
and 2007, we will build on the successes we had in 2005 to improve
protection against a North Korean threat, provide protection against a
threat from the Middle East, expand coverage to allies and friends,
increase countermeasure resistance, and improve protection against
short-range ballistic missiles. We are also planning to field more
mobile, flexible interceptors and associated sensors to meet threats
from unanticipated launch locations.
For midcourse capability against the long-range threat, the GMD
element budget request for fiscal year 2007 of $2.7 billion will cover
continued development, ground and flight testing, fielding and support.
This is about $125 million more than we budgeted for fiscal year 2007
in last year's submission. The risk-reduction work prescribed by the
Mission Readiness Task Force has caused us to reduce the number of
interceptors fielded in 2007. This request includes up to 4 additional
ground-based interceptors, for a total of 20 interceptors in Alaska by
the end of 2007, their silos and associated support equipment and
facilities as well as the long-lead items for the next increment. The
increase in fiscal year 2007 funding from last year to this year is
attributed, in part, to increased sustainment, logistics and force
protection requirements, as well as to other needs associated with
preparing the system for operations. This budget submission also
continues the upgrade of the Thule early warning radar in Greenland and
its integration into the system.
The Royal Air Force Fylingdales early warning radar in the United
Kingdom will be fully integrated for missile defense purposes by fall
2006. It will provide sensor coverage against Middle East threats.
As part of our effort to make the system more robust, improve
defense of our allies, and address threat uncertainties, we are
continuing discussions with our allies in Europe regarding the
deployment of radars and a third site for ground-based interceptors.
Later this year we will be able to give greater definition to this
important evolutionary effort.
To address the short- to intermediate-range threat, we are
requesting approximately $1.9 billion to continue development and
testing of our sea-based midcourse capability, or Aegis BMD, and our
land-based THAAD terminal defense capability. System tests will involve
further demonstrations of the sea-based interceptor, and we will
continue enhancing the system's discrimination capability. We will
continue Standard Missile-3 improvements. We added approximately $49
million to the fiscal year 2007 request for Aegis BMD from last year to
this year to address the Divert and Attitude Control System and other
aspects of the system, including the development of a more capable 2-
color seeker for the SM-3 kill vehicle. We will continue purchases of
the SM-3 interceptor and the upgrading of Aegis ships to perform the
BMD mission. By the end of 2007 we will have three Aegis engagement
cruisers, seven engagement destroyers, and seven Long Range
Surveillance and Track destroyers. These sea-based sensors and weapons
will improve our ability to defend the homeland and our deployed troops
and our friends and allies. In fiscal year 2007 we will initiate work
with Japan for follow-on SM-3 development in order to increase its
range and lethality. We also will continue the THAAD development effort
that will lead to fielding the first unit in the 2008-2009 timeframe
with a second unit available in 2011.
We will continue to roll out sensors that we will net together to
detect and track threat targets and improve discrimination of the
target set in different phases of flight. In 2007, we will prepare a
second forward-based X-band radar for operations. We also are working
towards a 2007 launch of two Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS) test bed satellites. These demonstration satellites will perform
target acquisition and handover and explore approaches for closing the
fire control loop globally for the entire BMD System. In fiscal year
2007 we will undertake initial satellite check-out and prepare for
tests involving live targets. We are requesting approximately $380
million in fiscal year 2007 to execute this STSS activity, and $402
million for the Forward-Based Radar work.
For the Ballistic Missile Defense System to work effectively, all
of its separate elements must be integrated by a solid command,
control, battle management and communications foundation that spans
thousands of miles, multiple time zones, hundreds of kilometers in
space and several combatant command areas of responsibility. C2BMC
allows us to pass critical information from sensors to provide input
for critical engagement decisions. Combatant commanders can use the
C2BMC infrastructure to enhance planning and help synchronize globally
dispersed missile defense assets. These capabilities also can provide
our senior government leadership situational awareness of ballistic
missile launches and defense activities.
This C2BMC capability allows us to mix and match sensors, weapons
and command centers to dramatically expand our detection and engagement
capabilities over what can be achieved by the system's elements
operating individually. We cannot execute our basic mission without
this foundation.
With this year's budget request for $264 million for the C2BMC
activity, we will continue to use spiral development to incrementally
develop, test, and field hardware and software improvements. We will
press on with the development of the initial global integrated fire
control to integrate Aegis BMD, the forward-based radar, and Ground-
based Midcourse Defense assets. We plan to install additional planning
and situational awareness capabilities to facilitate executive
decisionmaking among the combatant commanders.
The MDA is committed to delivering the best capabilities to the
warfighter in a timely manner, and warfighter participation and input
is a critical part in the engineering process. Today, the Army National
Guard's 100th Missile Defense Brigade, Air Force's Space Warfare
Center, and Navy ships in the Pacific Fleet are on station and
operating the system. Our fiscal year 2007 request continues to fund
critical sustainment and fielding activities and ensure that system
developers have financial resources to support fielded components. We
will continue to work collaboratively with the combatant commanders and
the military Services as the system evolves to define and prioritize
requirements. Exercises, wargames, and seminars continue to be
important collaboration venues. We will also continue to support
training activities to ensure operational readiness, combat
effectiveness, and high-level system performance.
MOVING TOWARD THE FUTURE--BLOCK 2008 AND BEYOND
There is no silver bullet in missile defense, and strategic
uncertainty could surprise us tomorrow. So it is important that we
continue our aggressive parallel paths approach to building this
integrated, multilayered defensive system. There are several important
development efforts funded in this budget.
In executing our program we continue to follow a strategy of
retaining alternative development paths until capability is proven--a
knowledge-based funding approach. That means we are setting specific
targets, or knowledge points, that the development efforts have to
reach within certain periods of time. Knowledge points are not reviews,
but discrete activities in a development activity that produce data on
the most salient risks. The approach involves tradeoffs to address
sufficiency of defensive layers--boost, midcourse, terminal; diversity
of basing modes--land, sea, air, and space; and considerations of
technical, schedule, and cost performance. This is fundamental to how
we execute the development program, because it enables us to make
decisions as to what we will and will not fund based upon the proven
success of each program element.
For example, we are preserving decision flexibility with respect to
our boost phase programs until we understand what engagement
capabilities they can offer. We have requested approximately $984
million for these activities in fiscal year 2007. This past year the
revolutionary Airborne Laser (ABL) reached its knowledge points when it
achieved a full duration lase at operational power and completed
initial flight tests involving its beam control/fire control system.
The program's knowledge points for 2006 include flight testing of the
lasers used for target tracking and atmospheric compensation. This
testing, which will test the entire engagement sequence up through the
point where we fire the laser, will require use of a low-power laser
surrogate for the high-power laser. Once we have completed modification
of the aircraft which has begun in Wichita, Kansas, we will start
installation of the high-power laser modules in 2007. This will provide
us with the first ABL weapon system test bed and allow us to conduct a
campaign of flight tests with the full system. In addition to
installation of the high-power lasers, we will continue integration,
ground, and flight test activities in fiscal year 2007 to support ABL's
low-power beam control/fire control and battle management systems. We
will be working towards a lethal demonstration of the weapon system
against a boosting ballistic missile in 2008.
We still have many technical challenges with the Airborne Laser.
Yet the series of major achievements beginning in 2004, when we
achieved first light and first flight of the aircraft with its beam
control/fire control system, gives me reason to be optimistic that we
can produce an effective directed energy capability. An operational
Airborne Laser could provide a valuable boost-phase defense capability
against missiles of all ranges.
The Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) is a boost-phase effort in
response to a 2002 Defense Science Board Summer Study recommendation to
develop a terrestrial-based boost phase interceptor as an alternative
to the high-risk Airborne Laser development effort. Last year we
focused near-term efforts in our kinetic energy interceptor activity to
demonstrate key capabilities and reduce risks inherent in the
development of a land-based, mobile, very high acceleration booster. It
has always been our view that the KEI booster, which is envisioned as a
flexible and high-performance booster capable of defending large areas,
could be used as part of an affordable, competitive next-generation
upgrade for our midcourse or even terminal interceptors. A successful
KEI mobile missile defense capability would improve significantly our
ability to protect our allies and friends.
This past year we demonstrated important command, control, battle
management, and communications functions required for a boost intercept
mission, including the use of national sensor data for intercept
operations in the field. The key knowledge point for this program is
the demonstration of a very high acceleration booster. We began a
series of static firing tests of the first and second stages of the
booster and had a successful firing this past January. We plan a flight
test to verify the new booster in 2008.
Development of the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) system will offer a
generational upgrade to ground-based midcourse interceptors by
increasing their effectiveness in the presence of multiple warheads and
countermeasures. We are exploiting miniaturization technology to
develop a platform with many small kill vehicles to engage more than
one object in space. This effort will supplement other innovative
discrimination techniques we are developing for use in the midcourse
phase by destroying multiple threat objects in a single engagement. In
2005 we made progress in the development of the MKV seeker, but
resource constraints and technical shortfalls have caused a delay in
this development effort. We are now planning to conduct the hover test
in 2009. Our first intercept attempt using MKV is now scheduled for
2012. We are requesting $162 million in fiscal year 2007 to continue
the MKV development effort.
INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION
The global nature of the threat requires that we work closely with
our allies and friends to develop, field, and operate missile defenses.
We have made significant progress in fostering international support
for the development and operation of a Ballistic Missile Defense System
capable of intercepting ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases
of flight. We have been working closely with a number of allies and
friends of the United States to forge international partnerships. I
would like to highlight a few of our cooperative efforts.
The Government of Japan continues to make significant investments
toward the acquisition of a multilayered BMD System, with capability
upgrades to its Aegis destroyers and acquisition of the Standard
Missile-3 interceptor. We have worked closely with Japan since 1999 to
design and develop advanced interceptor components. This project
culminated in the flight test of an advanced SM-3 nosecone earlier this
year and ended this phase of our joint cooperative research.
Additionally, the MDA and Japan have agreed to co--develop a Block IIA
version of the SM-3 missile, which will significantly improve the
kinematics and warhead capability. We also have agreed to deploy an X-
band radar to Japan, which will enhance regional and homeland missile
defense capabilities. In addition, Japan and other allied nations
continue upgrading their Patriot fire units with Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 missiles and improved ground support equipment.
In addition to the Fylingdales radar development and integration
activities, we are undertaking a series of cooperative technical
development efforts with the United Kingdom. Newly installed
situational awareness displays in the United Kingdom also are
indicative of our close collaboration with our British allies in the
missile defense area.
Last year we signed an agreement with Denmark to upgrade the radar
at Thule and integrate it into the system. This radar will play an
important role in the system by providing additional track on hostile
missiles launched out of the Middle East.
We will continue to expand cooperative development work on sensors
and build on our longstanding defense relationship with the government
of Australia. In April 2005 we concluded a Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation agreement to enable collaborative work on specific
projects, including high frequency over-the-horizon radar, track fusion
and filtering, distributed aperture radar experiments, and modeling and
simulation.
We are continuing work with Israel to implement the Arrow System
Improvement Program and enhance its capability to defeat longer-range
ballistic missile threats emerging in the Middle East. This past
December Israel conducted a successful launch and intercept of a
maneuvering target using the Arrow missile. The United States and
Israel are coproducing components of the Arrow interceptor missile,
which will help Israel meet its defense requirements more quickly and
maintain the U.S. industrial work share.
We also have been in discussions with several allies located in or
near regions where the threat of ballistic missile use is high for the
forward placement of sensors, and we continue to support our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners in conducting a
feasibility study to examine potential architecture options for
defending European NATO population centers against longer-range missile
threats. This work builds upon ongoing work to define and develop a
NATO capability for protection of deployed forces. We have other
international interoperability and technical cooperation projects
underway and are working to establish formal agreements with other
governments.
CLOSING
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank this committee for its continued
support of the Missile Defense Program. When I appeared before you last
year, we faced numerous challenges. Over the past year, the dedicated
men and women of the MDA and our industrial partners met these
challenges head-on and overcame the difficulties we experienced in 2004
and early in 2005. The result was that in 2005 we made significant
progress. We had a series of successful tests that are unparalleled in
our development efforts to date. In 2006 and 2007 I am confident that
we will continue this success. I am proud to serve with these men and
women, and the country should be grateful for their unflagging efforts.
There have been many lessons learned, and I believe the processes
are in place to implement them as we field follow-on increments of the
system. I also believe that our program priorities foster long-term
growth in multilayered and integrated capabilities to address future
threats. There certainly are risks involved in the development and
fielding activities. However, I believe we have adequately structured
the program to manage and reduce those risks using a knowledge-based
approach that requires each program element to prove that it is worthy
of being fielded.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Sessions. Lieutenant General Dodgen, Commander of
Space and Missile Defense Command, and responsible for
Strategic Command's Integrated Missile Defense. So, you're the
customer of General Obering's product?
STATEMENT OF LTG LARRY J. DODGEN, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY
SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND, U.S. ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC
COMMAND
General Dodgen. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. We're pleased to hear from you.
General Dodgen. Mr. Chairman, members of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our
military and for the opportunity to appear before this
distinguished panel once again. This committee continues to be
a great friend of the Army and the Missile Defense Community,
particularly in the efforts to field missile defense forces to
our Nation and our allies.
I appear before this subcommittee in two roles, as stated
by you Senator Sessions. The first is a warfighting member of
the Joint Missile Defense Team, I am the Commander of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense
(JFCC-IMD). Part of the United States Strategic Command, the
JFCC-IMD is a joint user representative working closely with
the MDA, other Services, and combatant commanders to ensure
that our national goal of developing, testing, and deploying an
integrated MDS are met. In other words, sir, we operationalize
the system, and turn that over to the geographical combatant
commanders.
The second, as the Army proponent for missile defense and
proponent for the GMD system. Today I will focus my remarks and
my role as Commander of the JFCC-IMD, and also provide my view
of the BMD threat.
Regarding that threat, this committee has previously heard
from other departments, civilian leaders, and combatant
commanders about the need to ensure that our country has an
operational, robust, and flexible and integratable BMD
capability against a growing and increasingly complex ballistic
missile. The pace of global proliferation of ballistic missile
technology is increasing, as the IC notes several countries
producing ballistic missiles are selling that technology to
other countries that in turn are modifying, using increasingly
sophisticated systems to fit their own needs. We must devalue
ballistic missiles as tools of extortion and aggression,
undermining any confidence our adversaries might have in
threatening us or our allies. I strongly believe that continued
development and fielding of our Nation's ballistic missile
systems must stay ahead of the threat faced by combatant
commanders.
In my role as the JFCC-IMD Commander, I directly support
the STRATCOM combatant commander in planning the global missile
defenses. JFCC-IMD was established in January 2005, reaching
full operational capability just this past February 28 as one
of supporting STRATCOM's new triad concept. IMD is truly joint,
manned by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel and
is headquartered at the Joint National Integration Center at
Shriever Air Force Base in Colorado. This arrangement allows us
to leverage the existing robust infrastructure and our strong
partnership with the MDA to execute the IMD mission.
In the past year, the JFCC-IMD has aggressively executed
the global mission to plan, coordinate, and integrate missile
defenses. In collaboration with geographical combatant
commands, we are developing IMD plans that integrate theater
and national assets to provide the best protection.
The STRATCOM, in partner with MDA and Service combatant
commanders are setting the stage to evolve the Ballistic
Missile Defense Systems (BMDS) beyond its current capability,
to provide a more robust missile defense for homeland and
deployed forces.
Mr. Chairman, the Army is a full contributing member of the
joint BMD team, Army soldiers are trained, ready, and operating
the GMD System at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Schriever Air Force
Base, Colorado. Just a couple of years ago, we activated the
GMD Brigade in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and the subordinate
battalion at Fort Greely. These soldiers, as part of the joint
team, are our Nation's first line of defense against any launch
of an intercontinental ballistic missile toward our homeland. I
am proud to represent them along with other members of the
Army's Air and Missile Defense Community to develop and field
BMDs for our Nation, the deployed forces, friends, and allies.
With the ongoing support of this committee, the Army will
continue to transform to support the Army's future force, the
Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense System, and our global
BMDS.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak of these
important matters, and look forward to addressing any questions
you or the members of your subcommittee may have. I also
respectfully request that my written statement be submitted for
the record. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Dodgen follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Larry J. Dodgen, USA
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and members of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our military and
for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished panel, once
again. This committee continues to be a great friend of the Army and
the missile defense community, particularly in our efforts to field
missile defense forces for the Nation and our allies. I consider it a
privilege to be counted in the ranks with Mr. Flory, Mr. Duma, and
Lieutenant General Obering as advocates for a strong global missile
defense capability.
I appear before this committee in two roles. The first is as an
Army Commander for missile defense and a proponent for the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. The second is as a soldier in the Joint
Missile Defense Team and Commander of the Joint Functional Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD), a part of the United
States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and the joint user representative
working closely with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), other Services,
and combatant commanders to ensure that our national goals of
developing, testing, and deploying an integrated missile defense system
(IAMD) are met.
Mr. Chairman, as I reported last year, Army soldiers are trained,
ready, and operating the GMD System at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the
Joint National Integration Center (JNIC) at Schriever Air Force Base in
Colorado. Just a couple of years ago, we activated the GMD Brigade in
Colorado Springs, Colorado, and a subordinate GMD Battalion at Fort
Greely. These soldiers, as part of the Joint team, are our Nation's
first line of defense against any launch of an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) toward our shores. I am proud to represent
them along with the other members of the Army's Air and Missile Defense
(AMD) community.
USSTRATCOM JFCC-IMD
The JFCC-IMD was established in January 2005 as one element of
USSTRATCOM and reached full operational capability on early in 2006.
This organization complements the capabilities inherent in other
STRATCOM JFCCs and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) which plan, coordinate, and
integrate STRATCOM's other global missions of Space and Global Strike,
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Net Warfare and
Global Network Operations, and the newest element, the STRATCOM Center
for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).
The JFCC-IMD is manned by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
personnel. It is headquartered at the JNIC at Schriever Air Force Base,
Colorado. This arrangement enables us to execute the IMD mission by
leveraging the existing robust infrastructure and our strong
partnership with our collocated MDA team.
In the past year, STRATCOM, through the JFCC-IMD, has aggressively
executed its mission to globally plan, coordinate, and integrate
missile defense. In collaboration with geographic combatant commands,
we are developing IMD plans within a regional area of operations in the
context of STRATCOM's global mission instead of individual theater
plans.
Based on guidance from the Commander, STRATCOM, we have also
developed plans to take existing MDA assets, currently in test and
development status, and rapidly transition them, in an emergency, to an
operational warfighting capability. This allows STRATCOM to provide
additional critical IMD capabilities to the combatant commands in times
of crisis. Examples of this capability include early activation and
deployment of the AEGIS SM3 Missile and the sea-based and Forward Based
X-band Transportable (FBX-T) Radar to operational locations in the
Pacific region, where, by the end of 2006, they will join a global
network of radars. STRATCOM initiated planning efforts to integrate the
capabilities of all the JFCCs to support the ``New Strategic Triad,''
as it determines the next steps needed to fulfill our commitment to an
integrated missile defense capable of defending the U.S., its deployed
forces, friends, and allies.
JFCC-IMD works closely with the other JFCC elements of STRATCOM and
the combatant commands to make Offense-Defense Integration, ISR, and
the other mission areas integral aspects of how we fight, to ensure the
optimal application of limited resources.
The IMD community, led by the STRATCOM Commander and his Unified
Command Plan Authority, has conducted numerous capability and readiness
demonstrations, integrated flight and ground tests, and combatant
command exercises to develop and validate the operators' tactics,
techniques, and procedures. As we work toward our system's future
operational capability, increased warfighter involvement in the testing
and exercising of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) ensures
both the viability of the defense and the confidence of its operators.
STRATCOM, through the JFCC-IMD, is leading the planning of global
missile defenses with the development of the global IMD Concept of
Operations (CONOPs). The CONOPs relies on the development and
coordination of engagement sequence groups (ESGs) and the advocacy of
desired global missile defense characteristics and capabilities.
STRATCOM-developed global IMD CONOPs serves as a roadmap for the
warfighting community to guide the development of more detailed IMD
planning and execution. These CONOPs contains two fundamental
principles. First, the geographic component commanders execute the IMD
fight within their Areas of Responsibility (AORs). Second, multi-
mission sensors are centrally tasked by STRATCOM Commander to optimize
their use in forming ESGs.
As a key requirement for IMD planning, the identification of ESGs
as the optimal pairing of sensor and weapon capabilities required to
provide active missile defense for the designated defended area is
critical. The ESGs are a tool the IMD community uses to help operate
the BMDS by balancing operational necessity with the realities of
ongoing research, development, and testing in the near term. As more
elements and components are made available, ESGs will serve to optimize
our global missile defense system.
The STRATCOM commander represents all the component commands as the
advocate for IMD. He executes this responsibility at two levels. First,
for those elements already deployed, headquarters, STRATCOM J8, in
collaboration with the JFCC-IMD, conducts the Warfighter Involvement
Process (WIP) to evaluate the adequacy of the current capabilities of
the BMDS. This process can encompass anything from identifying simple
human interface changes or modifications to developing refined planning
tools. These needs are prioritized by STRATCOM for review and approval
and are provided to MDA for consideration. The second level of advocacy
focuses on future capability needs. These future elements and
components will provide additional capabilities that enable a more
robust, reliable, and capable system.
The critical element that ties the entire BMDS system together is
the Command and Control Battle Management Communications (C2BMC). C2BMC
is an essential evolutionary component of the BMDS that will greatly
enhance both planning and execution capabilities. C2BMC contributes to
all phases of BMD from optimizing planning to synchronizing the
automated execution of the BMDS. Upgrades to the Command, Control,
Battle Management, and Communications System will extend situational
awareness capability to Pacific Command (PACOM) and European Command
(EUCOM) by the end of 2006.
As our planning processes have matured over the past year, JFCC-
IMD's innovative use of new collaborative planning capabilities in
major combatant command exercises has demonstrated the effectiveness of
distributed crisis action planning. JFCC-IMD was able to support the
combatant commands with development of new defense designs and
optimized locations for BMDS in exercises such as STRATCOM's Global
Lightning and PACOM's Terminal Fury.
Through our partnership with MDA, the Services, and the warfighters
at the combatant commands, STRATCOM is setting the stage to evolve the
BMDS beyond its current capability to that of providing more robust
missile defense for the homeland, deployed forces, friends and allies.
We are actively engaged with MDA and the Services in the development
and deployment of BMDS elements and components ensuring a layered,
multi-phase operational capability for the combatant commands.
Air and Missile Defense--an Overview of the Fiscal Year 2007 Army
Budget Submission
In addition to deploying a GMD system, MDA, the Services, and the
combatant commanders are focused on improving Theater Air and Missile
Defense (TAMD) capabilities within the context of the evolving BMDS in
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Joint Integrating Concept.
Both GMD and TAMD systems are vital for the protection of our homeland,
deployed forces, friends, and allies. Air and missile defense is a key
component in support of the Army's core competency of providing
relevant and ready land power to combatant commanders.
I would now like to focus on the Army's fiscal year 2007 budget
submission for Air and Missile Defense (AMD) systems. The President's
budget, presented to Congress on February 6, includes approximately
$1.57 billion with which the Army proposes to perform current Army AMD
responsibilities and focus on future development and enhancements of
both terminal phase and short-range AMD systems. In short, the Army is
continuing major efforts to improve the ability to acquire, track,
intercept, and destroy theater air and missile threats.
The Army, as part of the joint team, is transforming its AMD forces
to meet the increasingly sophisticated and asymmetric threat
environment encountered by the joint warfighter. The Army has the lead
to conduct the IAMD Capabilities Based Assessment. This analysis will
comprise the front end of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Capabilities Integration Development System. The study will
identify key joint, agency and combat command IAMD capability gaps and
will recommend doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership
and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) transformation
actions. The document is envisioned to fulfill time-phased IAMD needs
across the range of military operations.
INTEGRATED AMD SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
The Army is transforming its Air Defense Force from its current
separate systems architecture to a component-based, network-centric,
IAMD System of Systems (SoS). The IAMD SoS program focuses on systems
integration, common battle command and control, joint enabling
networking, and logistics and training, to ensure operational
requirements, such as force protection, lethality, survivability,
transportability and maneuverability are achieved. The IAMD SoS program
will employ an evolutionary acquisition strategy consisting of a series
of increments leading to the objective capability. This SoS approach
calls for a restructuring of systems into components of sensors,
weapons and Battle Management Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence (BMC4I) with a standard set of interfaces
among these components using a standardized set of networks for
communication.
Technology insertions to the IAMD SoS will continue throughout each
increment as high-payoff technologies mature and are ready for
integration. Incremental development of the IAMD SoS allows the Army to
field new or improved capabilities to warfighters faster, by producing
and deploying systems and components as the technologies mature.
Funding in the proposed fiscal year 2007 President's budget supports
the first steps in achieving an IAMD SoS architecture.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE BATTALIONS
As part of Air Defense Transformation, the Army is creating
composite AMD battalions. These battalions address capability gaps,
which permit us to defeat cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) while maintaining our ability to defend critical assets from the
ballistic missile threat. The composite AMD battalions will capitalize
on the synergies of two previously separate disciplines: short-range
air defense and high-to-medium altitude air defense. The current plan
is to organize eight battalions as Patriot-pure units, four battalions
as AMD battalions, and create one battalion, in Korea, as a maneuver
AMD battalion. This transformation is underway.
Within the context just provided, allow me to briefly discuss each
of the programs that support the Army's AMD Transformation.
TERMINAL PHASE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES
The Patriot/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) capability
is designed to counter theater ballistic missile threats in their
terminal phase in addition to cruise missiles and other air-breathing
threats. Combining these systems with the Theater High Attitude Area
Defense (THAAD) System capability being developed by MDA with a planned
fielding in fiscal year 2009, brings an unprecedented level of
protection against missile attacks to deployed U.S. forces, friends,
and allies well into the future.
Patriot/PAC 3 and Meads Overview
Mr. Chairman, since the combat debut of the Patriot AMD System
during Operation Desert Storm, the Army has continued to implement a
series of improvements to address the lessons learned. During Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we saw the debut of the improved Patriot
Configuration-3 system, including the effective use of the Guidance
Enhanced Missile and the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missile.
PAC-3 is the latest evolution of the phased materiel improvement
program to Patriot. Combining developmental testing and operational
data, this program has enabled the development and deployment of a new
high-velocity, hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile with the range,
accuracy, and lethality necessary to effectively intercept and destroy
more sophisticated ballistic missile threats. Today's Patriot force is
a mixture of PAC-2 and PAC-3 configured units. To maximize the full
advantage of the PAC-3 capabilities, the Army is moving toward pure-
fleeting the entire Patriot force to the PAC-3 configuration.
As I highlighted last year, Patriot saved many lives when defending
against Iraqi ballistic missile attacks during OIF. However, there were
some operational deficiencies. The Army has undertaken steps to correct
them and address lessons learned. The Army has pursued two thrusts--
identification and execution of a $41.6 million program for nine
specific OIF fixes and continued aggressive participation in joint
interoperability improvements in situational awareness. All funded OIF
fixes are on schedule to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2007,
pending any materiel release issues.
The Patriot system remains the Army's mainstay TAMD system and our
Nation's only deployed land-based short-to-medium range BMDS
capability. The current Patriot force must be maintained through
sustainment and recapitalization efforts, until the MEADS is fielded,
projected to begin in 2015.
MEADS is a cooperative development program with Germany and Italy,
to collectively field an enhanced ground-based AMD capability. The
MEADS program, which supports the President's goal for international
cooperation in missile defense, will enable the joint integrated AMD
community to move beyond the critical asset defense designs we see
today. MEADS will provide theater level defense of critical assets and
continuous protection of a rapidly advancing maneuver force as part of
a Joint IAMD architecture. Major MEADS enhancements include 360-degree
sensor coverage, a netted and distributed battle manager that enables
integrated fire control, and a strategically deployable and tactically
mobile, AMD system. While the PAC-3 missile is the baseline missile for
the international MEADS program, the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE)
missile is being developed to meet U.S. operational requirements. MSE
will provide a more agile and lethal interceptor that increases the
engagement envelope.
Combined Patriot/MEADS Approach
With the approval of the Defense Acquisition Executive, the Army
embarked on a path to merge the Patriot and MEADS programs,
establishing the Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) with
the objective of achieving the MEADS capability through incremental
fielding of MEADS major end items into Patriot. Patriot/MEADS CAP is an
important capability that will operate within MDA's BMDS. It is in
fact, the number one Army priority system for defense against short and
medium-range Tactical Ballistic Missiles and air breathing threats
(i.e. cruise missiles and UAVs). The Patriot/MEADS CAP will be capable
of operating within a joint, interagency, and multinational
interdependent operational environment. It will provide wide-area
protection at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Patriot/MEADS CAP will also provide BMC4I, introduce lightweight
deployable launchers, upgrade the PAC-3 missile, and eventually provide
the full MEADS capability to the entire force. The MEADS system offers
a significant improvement in the ability to deploy strategically while
maintaining tactical mobility. The system uses a netted and distributed
architecture with modular and configurable battle elements, which
allows for integration with other Army and Joint sensors and shooters.
These features and capabilities will allow MEADS to achieve a robust
360-degree defense against all airborne threats. By establishing the
CAP, the joint integrated AMD architecture has become more robust.
First, MEADS enhancements are integrated into the existing system.
Second, as lessons are learned from the present missile defense
capability, they will be incorporated into the MEADS follow-on system.
We are confident that this path will provide our servicemembers,
allies, friends, and the Nation with the most capable AMD system
possible.
The Army and the entire missile defense community continue to
strive to improve our Nation's missile defense capabilities. The
Patriot and PAC-3/MEADS CAP research, development, and acquisition
budget request for fiscal year 2007 is approximately $916.5 million.
This request procures 108 PAC-3 missiles, purchases spares for the
system, and reflects the necessary Patriot development to keep the
system viable as we pursue development of PAC-3/MEADS CAP capabilities.
CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE
In the world today, there exists a real and growing threat from
land attack cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are inherently very
difficult targets to detect, engage, and destroy because of their small
size, low detection signature, and low altitude flight characteristics.
When armed with a WMD warhead, the effect of a cruise missile could be
catastrophic. It is clear that the required systems and capabilities
necessary to counter this emerging threat need to be accelerated to
field a cruise missile defense (CMD) capability as soon as possible.
The Army's CMD program is an integral piece of the Joint Cruise Missile
Defense architecture, and we are proud of our contributions to this
effort. Critical Army components of the Joint CMD architecture are
provided by the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated
Netted Sensor (JLENS), the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-
to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM), and an integrated fire control capability.
We are also working closely with the Joint community to assure
development of doctrine that synchronizes our military's full
capabilities against the cruise missile threat.
JLENS Overview
JLENS brings a critically needed capability to address the growing
CM threat. To support an elevated sensor, the JLENS program is
developing unique lightweight fire control and surveillance radars to
detect, track, and identify CM threats. JLENS will support engagements
using the SLAMRAAM/Complementary Low Altitude Weapon System (SLAMRAAM/
CLAWS), Navy Standard Missile, and Patriot/MEADS weapon systems. JLENS
uses advanced sensor and networking technologies to provide precision
tracking and 360-degree wide-area, over-the-horizon surveillance of
land-attack cruise missiles. The fiscal year 2007 JLENS funding request
of $264.5 million supports development of a full JLENS capability, with
the first unit equipped by 2011.
SLAMRAAM Overview
SLAMRAAM will provide a CMD system to maneuver forces with an
extended battlespace and a beyond line-of-sight, non-line-of-sight
engagement capability critical to countering the CM threat, as well as
UAV threats. SLAMRAAM uses the existing Joint AMRAAM missile currently
used by the Air Force and the Navy, thereby capitalizing on the Joint
harmony that the Department of Defense (DOD) is striving to achieve.
The Army and the Marine Corps are also executing a joint cooperative
development for SLAMRAAM/CLAWS to meet the needs of soldiers and
marines in homeland defense as well as overseas deployments. The fiscal
year 2007 funding request of $49 million supports the scheduled Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) target of 2011.
Sentinel Radar Overview
The Sentinel Radar is an advanced, three-dimensional, phased array
air defense radar and a critical component in the Army's ability to
conduct air surveillance for the maneuver force. Sentinel is a small,
mobile battlefield radar that supports the joint air defense sensor
network in detecting cruise missiles, UAVs, and helicopter threats,
thereby contributing directly to the overall Single Integrated Air
Picture (SIAP) and supporting multiple Homeland Defense missions. Its
Enhanced Target Range and Classification (ETRAC) radar upgrades will
enable it to support engagements at extended ranges and reduce the time
required to perform target classification. Additionally, these upgrades
support next generation combat identification for friendly air, thereby
reducing the possibility of fratricide and providing an enhanced
positive friendly and civil aviation identification capability. The
fiscal year 2007 funding request of $17.6 million provides for joint
identification and composite sensor netting development efforts, four
ETRAC system upgrade kits, and development and integration of
improvements to support joint interoperability.
AIR, SPACE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL
The Army is increasing its command and control capabilities on the
battlefield. The Army's Air and Missile Defense Commands (AAMDCs) will
help integrate TAMD operations, by integrating, coordinating, and
synchronizing Joint attack operations, active defense, passive defense,
and C4 operations in the theater, and also globally tie into our JFCC-
IMD.
Concurrent with the creation of AMD composite battalions, the Army
has developed, and is now in the process of fielding, air defense
airspace management (ADAM) cells throughout the force. ADAM cells will
perform four missions: plan AMD coverage, contribute to third-dimension
situation awareness and understanding, provide airspace management, and
integrate operational protection. With an emphasis on receiving and
sharing the joint air picture from multiple sources and assets through
the battle command network, ADAM cells will provide commanders with
situational awareness as well as the traditional friendly and threat
air picture, enabling commanders to effectively manage their aerial
assets. ADAM cells are already being fielded to the Army to meet
modularity requirements, with two ADAM cells at the division
headquarters and one to every brigade in the Army, to include both the
Active and Reserve Forces. This high-priority system has been supported
through supplemental appropriations to this point. The fiscal year 2007
funding request of $49.5 million provides 15 ADAM Cells for the Active
and Reserve components.
Also in the past year, the Army activated the 94th Air and Missile
Defense Command, supporting the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) theater of
operations. With the 94th AAMDC activation, there are three Army AMD
Commands; two in the active component and one in the Reserve component.
The 94th AAMDC, designed for joint and multinational operations, will
provide for missile defense in the Pacific theater and will assist in
planning theater-level air and missile defenses. The 94th AAMDC will
provide the PACOM commander with a more robust theater-based
capability. Moreover, the unit's presence in the Pacific adds depth,
because its capability will be readily available to the warfighting
commander.
The Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS), forward deployed today
in European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and PACOM, are
providing assured missile warnings to combatant commanders and assigned
forces through a direct downlink from space-based infrared assets into
the joint theater communications architecture. In addition to
protecting the deployed force, these systems alert the BMDS
architecture and enhance attack operations. The fiscal year 2007
funding request of $24.9 million sustains the forward deployed JTAGS
units supporting joint warfighters and postures the Army to participate
with the Air Force in a future ground mobile system compatible with the
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and follow-on sensors. The planned
Multiple Mission Mobile Processor (MP3) Program is being restructured
due to the delays in the SBIRS schedule.
COUNTER-ROCKET, ARTILLERY, MORTAR (C-RAM)
A significant danger in OIF/OEF today is posed by insurgents
employing indirect-fire tactics of quick-attack, low-trajectory, urban-
terrain-masked rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) strikes against U.S.
forward operating bases in Iraq. To combat this threat, the Army
developed C-RAM, an integrated solution of capabilities to provide
warning and intercept of RAM threats. C-RAM provides a holistic
approach to the Counter-RAM mission. Horizontal integration across the
core functions--command and control, shape, sense, warn, intercept,
respond and protect--is providing an integrated modular and scalable
capability. This capability provides timely warning of mortar attacks,
intercept and defeat of incoming rounds, and accurate location of
insurgent mortar crews, enabling a rapid, lethal response. C-RAM takes
advantage of existing systems and capabilities, combining them in a SoS
architecture to support the warfighter on today's battlefield. The
current C-RAM solution is truly joint, in that it uses fielded systems
from the Army, Navy and Air Force along with a commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) system. C-RAM has been supported through supplemental
appropriations. The Army will request funding for continued C-RAM
fielding in the upcoming supplemental request, and the C-RAM program
will be included in the Army's POM beginning in fiscal year 2008.
DIRECTED ENERGY INITIATIVES
The Army continues to explore directed energy capabilities for
weapon system development and integration into Army Transformation
applications. High Energy Laser (HEL) systems have the potential of
being combat multipliers, meeting air and missile defense needs in the
future and enhancing current force capabilities, such as addressing the
RAM threats. The ability of a HEL system to shoot down RAM targets has
been repeatedly demonstrated, with mature chemical laser technologies
proven by the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program.
Meanwhile, the Army's fiscal year 2007 science and technology
funding request of $32.8 million supports HEL technology development
focused on solid state laser technologies that will offer electric
operation and compatibility with the Future Combat System (FCS) by the
year 2018. The Army is participating in a Joint high-powered solid
state laser program with the Office of the Secretary of Defense High
Energy Laser Joint Technology Office and the other Services to pursue
several candidate solid state laser technologies with the operating
characteristics necessary for weapon system development. In fiscal year
2007, while leveraging the Joint program, the Army is initiating a HEL
Technology Demonstrator (HELTD) that will, by fiscal year 2013, have
the ability to shoot down RAM threats as a stepping stone toward
deployment of HELs in a FCS configuration. Ultimately, HELs are
expected to complement conventional offensive and defensive weapons at
a lower cost-per-shot than current systems.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, the Army, a full contributing member of the Joint
team, is relevant and ready, fighting the war on terrorism, deployed in
Southwest Asia and elsewhere, and deterring aggression throughout the
world, while transforming to meet future threats. With its
responsibilities for GMD and Patriot/MEADS, the Army is an integral
part of the Joint team to develop and field the BMDS in defense of the
Nation, deployed forces, friends, and allies. In my role as the Joint
Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile Defense, I will
continue the development of a Joint BMDS capability to protect our
warfighters and our Nation. The Army has stepped up to the land-attack
cruise missile defense challenge by aggressively developing the joint,
integrated, and networked sensor-to-shooter architecture necessary to
defeat the emerging threat. The fiscal year 2007 budget proposal
continues the transformation of the Army's ASMD Force to support the
Army's Future Force, the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
System, and our global BMDS, building on the ongoing success of our
theater AMD force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Transformation will
continue to define the characteristics of the emerging ASMD force and
determine how it can best support the Future Force operating in a
joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
matters and look forward to addressing any questions you or the other
committee members may have.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, General Dodgen.
Mr. Duma, you are responsible for the testing of the
program. We are delighted to hear your remarks at this time,
and we will make your full remarks a part of the record.
STATEMENT OF DAVID W. DUMA, ACTING DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST
AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Duma. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Chairman, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, I'm pleased to have this
opportunity to speak with you about the BMDS test program.
As requested by this committee, I will offer my insights on
oversight, development, testing, and fielding of BMDs. In doing
so, I will cover four areas.
First, I will recap the MDA test accomplishments during the
past year; second, I will discuss the organization and test
philosophy changes within the MDA; third, I will give you a
status of compliance with test requirements prescribed in the
recent National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA); and fourth,
I will highlight future challenges facing the test program of
the BMDS.
First, the results. The MDA testing program during 2005 was
adequate and appropriate to the developmental maturity of the
BMDS. The results of ground tests demonstrated that integration
into operability, tactics, doctrine, and procedures were
adequate to increase confidence in those aspects of the system.
For the first time, MDA successfully flew an operationally
configured combination of a Raytheon Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle, integrated onto an Orbital Sciences booster. The
successful flight test of threat-representative targets across
both the Cobra Dane and Beale Early Warning Radars demonstrated
the capability to provide target acquisition, tracking, and
queuing data. This test provided significant information
regarding the Cobra Dane capabilities and limitations. The
Aegis BMDS successfully completed two intercept missions with
the new SM-3 missile. One of these flights included the
intercept of a separating target. The ABL completed the passive
phase of flight test of the Beam Control/Fire Control system,
and completed the integration and operational demonstration of
six Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser modules.
The THAAD executed its FT-1 in 5 years, it flew its
redesigned missile on a non-intercept test to measure
interceptor kinematics and demonstrate performance.
Last year, the Forward-Based X-Band Radar Transportable
(FBX-T) demonstrated its ability to track long-range ballistic
missile launches. The Sea-Based X-Band Radar completed
integration testing in the Gulf of Mexico, and has arrived in
Hawaii to begin its checkout and integration into the BMDS test
bed.
Overall, the results of the integrated ground test, coupled
with the success of other element-level ground and flight test
events, indicate the BMDS system is maturing.
Second, the approach. The Department is changing the
oversight structure of the BMDS. A BMD Executive Board will
replace the Senior Executive Council as the senior oversight
body for missile defense activities. The board will review and
make recommendations regarding the implementation of strategic
policies and plans, program priorities, and investment options.
In this new oversight structure, I am a member of that board.
In addition, General Obering implemented several changes in
organization and test philosophy during the past year. These
changes more tightly integrate the developers, warfighters, and
operational testers and should better integrate the system
engineering functions with the test and evaluation functions
within MDA. They will also address efforts to address priority
items, such as validation and accreditation of models and
simulations.
Third, the NDAAs--over the last 2 years, Congress has asked
MDA and my office to accomplish several specific initiatives
with regard to operational testing of the BMDS. The NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2004 required operationally realistic testing of
the BMDS. This past year, MDA conducted numerous ground tests,
war games, and capability demonstrations using trained
warfighters to operate the systems. Incorporating trained
warfighters into the testing program is added to the
operational understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and
maturity of the BMDS. In fiscal year 2005, Congress required
the MDA to conduct an operationally realistic test of the BMDS.
Following two launch failures of the GMD system, and
recommendations from two independent review teams, General
Obering restructured the flight test program. The restructured
program includes two more risk-reduction flights--if they are
successful, General Obering plans to conduct operationally
realistic flight tests in fiscal year 2007.
In fiscal year 2006 language, Congress required the
operational test community to plan and conduct an operational
test of the capability provided by each block of the BMDS,
beginning with Block 2006. Toward this effort, MDA, the Joint
Operational Test Agency, and my office will develop an
integrated, evaluation-driven test strategy. This approach
should increase the quantity and quality of data, while
increasing the efficiencies of test resources. When the
evaluation plan is finished, MDA will include these tests in
the next revision to the Integrated Master Test Plan.
Fourth, the challenges. The complexity of the BMDS is
increasing, and testing the BMDS is becoming more challenging
as the Agency adds elements and capability. Testers must assess
performance and reliability during concurrent tests and
operations of a layered BMDS. Integration of the BMDS elements
and sensors that are still maturing, with operational legacy
systems is a difficult task. Fusing the data from each element
into a single, unambiguous operational picture is a significant
software development, integration, and testing challenge. Range
safety and environmental restrictions limit intercept
geometries to only a few scenarios. Meeting each of these
challenges requires a series of well-planned ground and flights
tests.
Over the long term, MDA should incrementally develop a
capability to support concurrent testing and operations,
including simulation over live testing to speed up the process.
This is similar to how we upgraded and tested the Cheyenne
Mountain without interfering with operations. When developed,
this capability will augment the capability for system tests
and evaluation to characterize operational effectiveness and
suitability, using actual hardware and warfighters in the loop.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, MDA experienced a difficult
year with its GMD system, but ended the year on several high
notes. Element successes indicate they are progressing toward
maturity. Last year, warfighters demonstrated that they could
operate the integrated ground system. The fact remains,
however, that we ground test for discovery, but we must flight
test to verify operational performance and validate
simulations. Successful flight tests with repeatable results
are the cornerstones for building confidence in the BMDS.
Warfighters must have confidence that the system will defend on
demand.
Senator, this concludes my opening remarks, and I welcome
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duma follows:]
Prepared Statement by David W. Duma
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you about the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) test program. As requested by this
committee, I will offer my insights on oversight, development, testing,
and fielding of ballistic missile defenses. In doing so, I will address
progress toward fielding those capabilities mentioned for deployment by
the President in 2002, including ground-based interceptors, seabased
interceptors, and associated sensors. I will cover four areas. First, I
will recap the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) test accomplishments during
the past year. Second, I will discuss organization and test philosophy
changes within MDA. Third, I will give you a status of compliance with
test requirements prescribed in recent National Defense Authorization
Acts (NDAA). Fourth, I will highlight future challenges facing the test
program of the BMDS.
The MDA testing program during 2005 was adequate and appropriate to
the developmental maturity of the BMDS.
1. The results of ground tests demonstrated that integration,
interoperability, tactics, doctrine, and procedures were
adequate to increase confidence in these aspects of the system.
2. For the first time, MDA successfully flew an operationally
configured combination of a Raytheon Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle integrated onto an Orbital Sciences booster. While the
flight was successful, it did not evaluate the fixes to the
ground support system that caused the previous flight test
launch failures. Plans are to demonstrate the ground system
fixes in subsequent flight-testing.
3. The successful flight of threat representative targets
across both the Cobra Dane and Beale Early Warning Radars
search and track volume demonstrated the capability to provide
target acquisition, tracking, and cuing data. MDA executed an
operationally realistic test scenario that provided significant
information regarding the Cobra Dane capabilities and
limitations. MDA also demonstrated they could successfully
launch a long-range threat representative target from an air
platform.
4. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System successfully
completed two intercept missions with the new SM-3 missile. One
of these flights included an intercept of a separating target.
5. The Airborne Laser completed the passive phase of flight
test of the Beam Control/Fire Control system, and completed the
integration and operational demonstration of six integrated
Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser modules.
6. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system
successfully executed its first flight test in 5 years. It flew
its redesigned missile on a nonintercept test to measure
interceptor kinematics and demonstrate performance.
7. Last year, two new sensors completed integration and some
combined developmental and operational testing. The Forward-
Based X-band Radar-Transportable (FBX-T) demonstrated its
ability to track long-range ballistic missile launches. The
SeaBased X-band radar completed integration testing in the Gulf
of Mexico and has arrived in Hawaii to begin its checkout and
integration into the BMDS test bed.
The results of the integrated ground tests, coupled with the
success of other element-level ground and flight test events, indicate
the BMDS is maturing.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is changing the oversight structure
of the BMDS. A Ballistic Missile Defense Executive Board will replace
the Senior Executive Council as the senior oversight body for missile
defense activities. It will not have the decision authority of the
Senior Executive Council, however. The board will review and make
recommendations regarding the implementation of strategic policies and
plans, program priorities, and investment options. This change
implements management and governance principles set for the in the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In this new oversight structure, I am
a member of the board. My Deputy for Missile Defense will co-chair the
Test and Evaluation Standing Committee.
In addition, General Obering implemented several changes in
organization and test philosophy during the past year. These changes
more tightly integrate the developers, warfighters, and operational
testers. They should also better integrate the system engineering
functions with the test and evaluation functions within MDA. These
changes, coupled with improvements in test planning, execution, and
analyses, should result in better definition of data requirements and
better, more efficient test execution.
As part of re-engineering his agency, General Obering established
the Responsible Test Organization and Combined Test Force under the
leadership and direction of his Deputy for Test and Assessment. The
Combined Test Force will plan and execute tests, and collect and
analyze data that will populate a database to support the technical and
operational evaluations of BMDS performance. The Combined Test Force
will include test personnel from each of the BMDS elements and the
Operational Test Agencies.
With the support of General Obering, I have commissioned the
Institute for Defense Analyses to examine and recommend a construct
that integrates the operational testers into the Combined Test Force.
The goal is to maintain the operational testers' independence and
credibility while economizing resources, eliminating duplication of
effort, and supporting Combined Test Force mission and objectives.
General Obering and I have also asked the Institute to investigate and
recommend how to best integrate each stakeholder's assessment needs
into the test planning, execution, data collection, analysis, and
evaluation processes. This should further streamline the test and
evaluation planning and execution process, while ensuring all
stakeholders efficiently and effectively meet their objectives.
Along with these organizational changes, MOA and the operational
test community have agreed on an integrated test planning approach for
future BMOS Blocks that supplements the Integrated Master Test Plan.
The current Integrated Master Test Plan covers the next 2 years of
testing and emphasizes BMOS testing that is operationally realistic.
Beginning with Block 2006, MDA, the joint operational test agency, and
my office will develop an integrated, ``evaluation-driven'' test plan.
This test planning philosophy brings discipline and structure to
planning Block testing based upon overall system evaluation needs,
while concurrently addressing individual element test requirements.
This approach should increase the quantity and quality of data while
increasing the efficient use of test resources. It will also enhance
efforts to address priority issues, such as verification, validation,
and accreditation of models and simulations.
Over the last few years, Congress has asked MDA and my office to
accomplish several specific initiatives with regard to operational
testing of the BMDS. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004 required
operationally realistic testing of the BMDS. This past year, MDA
conducted numerous ground tests, war games, and capability
demonstrations using trained warfighters to operate the systems. These
exercises included fully integrated ground and simulated missions
designed by the operational testers and warfighters. This year's update
to the Integrated Master Test Plan incorporates greater operational
realism in the areas of increased warfighter involvement in flight
tests; more end-to-end system testing; use of operationally
representative missiles; employment of operational tactics, techniques,
and procedures; and inclusion of more complex countermeasures.
Incorporating trained warfighters into the testing program has added to
the operational understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and
maturity of the BMDS.
In fiscal year 2005, Congress required the MDA to conduct a
realistic operational test of the BMDS. Following two launch failures
in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and recommendations from
two independent review teams, General Obering restructured the flight
test program. Flight-testing to date has not yet reduced the risk to
the point where General Obering is ready to execute an operationally
realistic flight test. The restructured program includes two more risk
reduction flights. If they are successful, General Obering plans to
conduct an operationally realistic flight test later this year.
In fiscal year 2006, Congress required the operational test
community to plan and conduct an operational test of the capability
provided by each block of the BMDS beginning with Block 2006. I have
taken action to begin this effort involving not only the operational
test community, but also the warfighters and MDA. When the evaluation
plan is finished, MDA will include these tests in the next revision of
the Integrated Master Test Plan.
The complexity of the BMDS is increasing. Elements are maturing and
being integrated into the system. Consequently, testing the BMDS is
becoming more challenging as the MDA adds elements and capability.
Testers must assess performance and reliability during concurrent test
and operations of a layered BMDS. Integration of the BMDS elements and
sensors that are still maturing with operational legacy systems is a
difficult task. Fusing the data that each element provides into a
single, unambiguous operational picture is a significant software
development, integration, and testing challenge. Range safety and
environmental restrictions limit intercept geometries to only a few
scenarios. Meeting each of these challenges is a big task--one that
requires a series of well-planned ground and flight tests.
Over the long term, MDA should incrementally develop a capability
to support concurrent testing and operations, including simulation over
live testing, to speed up the process. This is similar to how we
upgraded and tested Cheyenne Mountain without interfering with
operations. When developed, this capability will provide an alternative
means for system test and evaluation to characterize operational
effectiveness and suitability using actual hardware and warfighters in
the loop.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, MDA experienced a difficult year with
its Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, but ended the year on
several high notes. Element successes indicate they are progressing
toward maturity. Last year, warfighters demonstrated they could operate
the integrated ground system. The fact remains, however, that we ground
test for discovery, but we must flight test to verify operational
performance and validate simulations. Successful flight tests are the
cornerstones for building confidence in the BMDS. Warfighters must have
confidence the system will defend on demand.
This concludes my opening remarks and I welcome your questions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Duma. I will yield my time
here to Senator Roberts, chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, and a valuable member of our
committee.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, that's very kind of you.
Gentlemen, we thank you all for the service you are
providing to protect our country, we ask you to persevere.
Thank you for taking the time out of your very valuable
schedule to come before us, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this extremely valuable subcommittee meeting.
The scene was the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee--Mr. Chairman, it was before September 11--and we
had a very prestigious panel, I think Jean Kirkpatrick was one,
I'm trying to remember the others, and I asked them on emerging
threats, as this was prior to September 11 you have to
remember, ``what keeps you up at night?`` Of course, everybody
was concerned after the U.S.S. Cole, and after the embassy
bombings, and after the 1993 attempt on the World Trade Center
about the attack on the Homeland. It was Jean Kirkpatrick who
said ``access denial,'' in other words that a person who has a
ballistic missile, or a person who has an intercontinental
missile could basically tell the world, ``We have certain
national objectives,''
I think Iran would be a classic example, ``that if you
cross into our territory, there will be hell to pay.'' Access
denial was a big issue with me at that particular time,
especially since Secretary Flory, you indicated now 25
countries have that capability, and we're somewhere between 5
and 9 and growing. In regards to an ICBM, when you get a guy
like Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran, saying what he says--
which is rather incredulous to the western press--I think you
have to take it seriously, I think we have a real problem.
Now given that, General Obering, in regards to access
denial and what we can do about it, I would like to start with
the topic you and I have discussed, and that's the continued
development of the ABL. Last year the MDA did decimate the
ABLS, the primary boost phase system. What does it mean when
the ABL is the primary boost phase interceptor?
General Obering. Senator, what that means is that from a
flexibility perspective, the ABL can address multiple ranges of
missiles with that capability, that's very revolutionary
capability. From operational standoff distances, that is an
advantage that it has over the KEI, which is our other boost
phase alternative, and so from a flexibility standpoint, it has
the most capability overall. Also, it had demonstrated two
basic technical capabilities to operate, otherwise it had
achieved the full duration lase, it had reached an operational
power setting, we had gotten the initial beam control/fire
control flights on the aircraft, and so we felt like it was
making sufficient technical progress based on the knowledge
points we had designed for the system, that had become that
candidate. The KEI, which was the alternative, was originated
based on a Defense Science Board 2002 recommendation as an
alternative for that.
Senator Roberts. So you would still say the ABL is
considered the primary boost phase interceptor?
General Obering. Yes, I haven't changed from that.
Senator Roberts. All right. Over the last couple of years,
the ABL has met every major milestone, as you've indicated,
you've tested many. But I sort of browbeat the chairman into
letting you say, were the knowledge points scheduled, including
the combining lasing power for all six laser modules extensive
post-modification flight test and testing the laser at near
full power, and your answer is yes, this is the case. I think
I'm putting words in your mouth. Do you have any reason to
believe the ABL will not continue to reach the scheduled
milestone toward the knowledge points, up to and including the
lethal shoot down in 2008?
General Obering. At this time, no, sir, they are making
steady progress through the installation of the lasers, and the
preparation of the aircraft for the series of active ground
tests that will start this summer and the flight tests in the
fall. Having said that, we still have an awful lot of work to
do, there are still some major integration challenges. There's
two things that catch my attention when somebody says, ``Well,
we're just re-using software,'' and ``all it is is
integration,'' both of those should raise red flags. It's not
that we have many red flags to raise, but we have a lot of
integration activities to continue in that program, so I
believe that there is still some, I would say, not uncertainty,
but certainly. I think we have a lot of work ahead of us, and I
wanted to make sure that we were able to take full advantage of
the test schedule and the test program we've laid out for the
next 2 years. That is why, in our budget, we deferred the
purchase of the second aircraft.
Senator Roberts. Wow, let's not throw any red flags, I
don't like referees anyway. I'm concerned with the MDA's
decision to delay funding on the second aircraft. That's going
to have the effect of moving the shoot down for the second
aircraft and the program out to 2018. Now, if you go from 2008
to 2018, and then you look back at what your predictions are in
regard to what our adversaries have, that's very disconcerting
to me. If you have a 10-year delay from 2008, I don't know what
we'd do with the highly-skilled engineers we have working on
the first plane. There is going to be a dip in regards to that
kind of expertise, there's going to be--I think--some cost,
certainly, associated with reconstituting this workforce once
development of the second plane picks up after the shoot down
in 2008, we have sort of a one-shot Suzy. That was a
firecracker that I used to set off back in my days when I was
from a small town in Kansas, I don't want a one-shot Suzy, I
want a sure-shot, two-shot Suzy if, in fact, that is what we're
talking about. I know that you must defend the President's
budget request, but would you be pleased, sir, to have any
additional funds in the fiscal year 2007 budget to pull the ABL
second aircraft schedule back to the left?
General Obering. Sir, I would.
Senator Roberts. Could you give the answer yes?
General Obering. I would never turn down offers of
additional funds. What we would do is try to buy back some of
the risk that I think we still have laying ahead of us in the
program, if that were the case. But I do share your concern
with respect to the schedule. On the other hand, I want to make
sure that we have allowed ourselves enough time to do a design
turn on the aircraft. So a lot of those engineers you referred
to will be fully employed, working on that design turn in that
interim timeframe that we just discussed.
Senator Roberts. I thank you for your time, and I thank you
for your support. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Roberts. Senator Reed,
we appreciate you and your leadership, and your interest in
these important issues.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, thank you
gentlemen, for your testimony.
Mr. Secretary, I want to see if I can put in context one of
your comments in your prepared testimony where you say the
prospect of long-range missiles in the hands of North Korea
means that for the first time, the American people, too, would
be in harm's way. Aren't we forgetting the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of Chine in terms of having ICBMs with
nuclear capacities that put the country at risk?
Mr. Flory. Mr. Chairman, I don't have in front of me the
draft prepared testimony I submitted, if it was not clear than
the point would be, for the first time in a situation involving
North Korea that the American people would be at risk from
attack by North Korea.
Senator Reed. Okay, but essentially we've had several
decades in which we've had to wrestle with the very existential
threat from long-range missiles with nuclear warheads?
Mr. Flory. That is correct.
Senator Reed. Thank you. General Obering, the Mission
Readiness Task Force (MRTF) proposed and accepted and scheduled
a new test plan, and scheduled to get the GMD program back on
track, and frankly for many who were looking at the program, it
looked until this reevaluation as a rush to failure, rushing
through the gate very quickly. The proposal that the MRTF
recommended was to ground test and flight test over the course
of 1 year. The first two tests were intended to have no
targets, but to test the interceptor-related portions of the
system, first on Kwajalein and then from an operational site at
Vandenberg Air Force Base. Only with the third test did the
MRTF propose using a target, an outgoing intercept test instead
of demonstrating the ability of the intercept to define and
characterize the target, and only after all of these steps had
been successfully accomplished did the MRTF propose to attempt
to achieve an actual intercept in its tests.
Now MDA plans to build a target into the second test,
contrary to the MRTF plan, and to program the interceptor to
hit the target. Even though it is not being called an objective
of that test, as such, MDA is planning to track or intercept
three tests earlier than recommended by the MRTF. Why aren't
you adhering to the MRTF plan that you and DOD originally
agreed to, and again, in the context of I think a fundamental
attempt to reshape the program because of this tendency to rush
forward and fail?
General Obering. Okay, well there's a lot there, Senator,
let me back up if I could. First of all, we lay out and we
execute our testing based on results, and so what the MRTF
recommended is exactly what you describe, which we began to
execute. We got to our FT-1, and we actually had so much
success with that FT-1 with a kill vehicle flight, it actually
achieved many of the objectives we had slated for the second
flight test that the MRTF had recommended. Because of that
tremendous performance in the kill vehicle, we also went back,
we conferred and consulted with the MRTF and they agreed as
well that it was prudent to add a target to the second flight
test because of the success we had on the first one.
We are working very systematically through our ground
tests, as you said, we've had successful static fires of the
first stage, we've had additional qualification tests of the
vehicle and so we're gaining more and more confidence as we go
along. I feel comfortable that where we are right now in the
test profile is about where we should be. We will accelerate
and we will delay based upon the results as we go through. I
wouldn't describe it as a rush to failure, what I would
describe it as, as Secretary Flory pointed out, there is an
urgency out there that we have to get a capability.
I believe that we are moving ahead prudently, based on test
results that we have seen to date. We flew intercepts
successfully in 2001, with a prototype of the kill vehicle, and
we actually flew successful flights of the operational booster
that we have on the ground today in 2003 and that gave us the
confidence to begin this initial deployment.
Now one of the things the MRTF did cite is that we have
become in some areas more schedule driven than we should be and
that is why we took steps to adjust, that was not in any top-
down direction, though, that was all in how we were actually
implementing the program. I believe, as many would agree, that
the most expeditious schedule would be one in which you have
good quality control built in so that it's easier, and it's
always faster to do it right the first time than to have to do
it over and over again.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General. One of the points you
make is that you have to learn from each test, and for example,
the FT-2 test would be the first launch from Vandenberg, and
that's been skipped, essentially.
General Obering. No, sir. We actually have launched the
booster from Vandenberg before, now what we haven't done is
launched an interceptor with a kill vehicle from Vandenberg,
and this will be the first time that we do that, in the FT-2
that is coming up, and we will have a target from Alaska
involved in this series. We still have a lot to learn, I'll
grant that, in terms of overall, but we feel like we're at a
pretty good level right now, in terms of our confidence and its
performance.
Senator Reed. One of the points that the MRTF made is that
the flight test program can be broken down into specific
pieces, and you can incorporate specific aspects to test out,
but there's an overarching consideration that is getting to
reliability and repeatability of these tests. So there's a
logic to just having lots of tests, because if you can create
an effect in one test, if you don't do it a second time then
you might not be able to duplicate that, and that is one of the
concerns I have is as you decide to just skip from these
recommended tests, that you lose a little bit of that notion of
repetitive reliability, and being able to do it again and
again.
General Obering. Yes, sir. Let me describe why we moved to
Vandenberg to start with. We have flown the interceptor
successfully out of Kwajalein, and as I said, that flight was
so successful, we felt that we had achieved not only all of the
technical objectives for that flight, but many of the original
flight tests, too, as well.
Senator Reed. Can I interject, because my time is almost
up. Just for clarification, these were several tests that were
different items, the previous tests had failed because I
believe a fixture did not release the interceptor?
General Obering. That was one of them, there was a software
timing issue on the booster that was a fairly rare occurrence,
and there was a support arm that failed to clear out of
Kwajelein.
Senator Reed. But in the test you're describing now, the
support arm was illuminated, I believe.
General Obering. In the FT-1, yes, sir, by design, because
we're redesigning that ground support arm. The MRTF again
recommended and we concurred, that it could be delayed because
it is not considered a high-risk item.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General, and I hope we have a
second round, Mr. Chairman, because I have additional
questions. Again, thank you for your responses.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Secretary Flory, you talked about how the President
directed the DOD to end what had been decades of research and
development (R&D) to actually field an initial set of
capabilities by the end of 2004. I remember we had a full
discussion in the Senate in the late 1990s over that, and we
passed the Cochran-Lieberman resolution to direct that we
deploy as soon as practical, an MDS. Some observers directed
that with nine GBIs now fielded, we should delay the deployment
of additional GBIs until further operationally realistic
testing has been completed. Based on your assessment of the
threats, and we've heard others express comments about that
today--would you share with us your concerns about delaying
further deployment of GBI? I think this is a fundamental
question and is a part of our whole funding process here. What
is our evaluation of the threat, and what are our opportunities
for deployment?
Mr. Flory. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say, with
respect to stopping where we are, General Obering and Mr. Duma
and General Dodgen have laid out in detail how the program is
being managed, and the extensive testing and other measures
that are being employed to ensure an increase in reliability of
the system. I think we see a threat that is increasing, not
decreasing. I think it's very unlikely that if we held off on
deploying future interceptors that any of our adversaries would
hold off on doing the things that are giving us concern, or as
Senator Roberts said, keeping us awake at night.
I think one particularly important point and I can just add
to what I responded to Senator Reed earlier, it is true that
for decades there was no MDS over the United States, and that
at that time the Soviet Union and later, the People's Republic
of China, had missile systems that could threaten the United
States. What we did not have was regimes like the North Korean
regime or the Iranian regime and, particularly, the new
president of Iran, Ahmadinejad, who would eventually have
control over weapons of this type.
Senator Sessions. General Obering, briefly if we were to
delay the production and deployment from the numbers we are now
scheduled to carry out, that has a danger of increased cost
from breaking the assembly line?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Are there costs out there for delays
also?
General Obering. Yes, sir, and those typically can run as
many as the equivalent of four or five interceptors in terms of
those delay costs. But your point is a very, very good one, and
it is one that I think we need to reinforce more and more, and
that is we're not dealing in what we can put out the door
today. We're dealing with what we can get out the door in the
future--in 2 years from now, in 3 years from now, and so the
pace that we're on, the test program we're on, the aggressive
testing we're doing, I think will continue to support that type
of deployment and that type of fielding in order to make sure
that we have done as much as we possibly can do with the
knowledge points that we have, and the money that we have to
get the maximum capability that we can, and I think that we're
on about the optimum balance in doing that right now.
Senator Sessions. I think it is fair to say that we have a
low production rate, we can't go much lower without shutting
down the production system. Keeping at that system, in the long
run, is going to provide us the missiles we need for our
defense, and also keep costs per missile down.
General Dodgen, do you believe as the combatant commander
representative here that the delay in fielding of the GBI until
more operationally realistic testing has occurred is a good
idea?
General Dodgen. Mr. Chairman, I do not think that's a good
idea, I think where we are right now with the numbers of
interceptors we have, our operationalizing of the system, our
firing doctrine is more dictated by a limited inventory than it
is by the effectiveness. We need two things to happen, and I
think they're phased pretty well, we need the end-to-end test
which MDA is planning for later this year, to narrow our
uncertainty in the system, and then we need the increased
number of interceptors to come on board, so we can start
developing our firing doctrine to take full effect of those
interceptors and achieve the desired kill effect that we want,
as opposed to being limited by our inventory. Those things, I
think, are pretty well synched up, so any delay of one would
cause us not to be where we want to be.
Senator Sessions. What are you hearing from the combatant
commanders with regard to their concern about the threats
they're facing, and the need for this system?
General Dodgen. Senator, they've all been here and spoken
for themselves, but I would tell you that when I think of both
North Korea and Iran, I think there is great concern that they
will need defensive capability for their own theaters, and it
will have a part to play in the defense of their homelands, and
I think there's great concern on their part, and that's very
much reflected by the fact that there's still a considerable
Patriot force that is stationed overseas.
Senator Sessions. What about the status of Patriots and SM-
3 production, are we keeping pace with the needs there? Does
this budget keep us on track, or do we need to do more?
General Dodgen. We are comfortable, we have asked for 108
PAC-3 missiles, we're comfortable with that, because that is
complimented by PAC-2 gems, so we have a mix of missiles that
gives us a robust number on the terminal force, and we will
begin to build up PAC-3s in the out years. In addition to that,
the number of PAC-3s is somewhat in the future, will be turned
into THAAD missiles, and there will be a mix of those missiles
when they're available.
The SM-3 is just now starting to be operationalized, and
we're doing a joint capability mixed study right now on future
defense planning scenarios, both east and west to determine
just how many sea-based missiles we have, it's a very exciting
time, because the first time we'll be introducing a very
capable maritime capability to the combatant commanders who are
doing their operational concepts and concept of operations
(CONOPs), so STRATCOM will do a joint capability mixed study,
just to determine whether it's a mix of interceptors and
systems we need for the future, and our thoughts are that will
guide what we actually procure beyond where MDA is taking the
numbers now.
Senator Sessions. Thanks, General Dodgen.
Senator Levin, I would recognize you.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me pick up on a
question which Senator Reed was asking you, General Obering. It
has to do with this FT-2, which is planned for later in the
year. First of all, I believe it is different from the
recommendation of your own MRTF in that there is going to be a
real target in the test. I believe you were asked why you were
doing that, if not, would you explain why you are not following
the recommendation of your task force relative to that test?
General Obering. Sir, as I told Senator Reed, we've learned
quite a bit from the ground testing as well as the FT-1 we
conducted. We also wanted to get ourselves into a posture where
we could use an operational site, the operational configured
interceptor, and operational radar at Beale. In the context, in
the execution of the testing and because of the steps, all of
the test results we've been able to analyze to date, it says
that it is a prudent thing to do, and we have consulted with
the task force in making those adjustments.
Senator Levin. Did they agree with you after your
consultation? They now agree with you?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Would they put that in writing? Would you
get us their response on that?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Based on assessments of the most recent Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) flight test of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) in
December 2005, GBI ground tests, and the February 2006, flight test of
a target across the Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) test
results, the Mission Readiness Task Force (MRTF) concurred with the
recommendation to add a target missile to the upcoming GMD flight test
provided that the appropriate Military Standard 1540 (MIL-STD-1540)
qualification tests were successfully completed prior to the mission.
MIL-STD-1540 establishes uniform definitions, environmental criteria,
test requirements, and test methods for space vehicles, their
subsystems, and components.
Key to this decision was that many of the original flight test
objectives of the upcoming test were already accomplished during the
highly successful December and February missions. The MRTF unanimously
agreed that the next flight test involving a GBI demonstrate
performance of the GBI's Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) during the
last few seconds prior to intercept (which can only be achieved with a
target). The MRTF members felt adding a target to the upcoming flight
test would allow the GMD program to gain as much knowledge as possible
prior to the first intercept attempt (scheduled to occur later this
year depending upon the results of the upcoming GMD flight test and the
continued GBI ground testing).
The members of the MRTF who participated in the decision to add a
target to the upcoming GMD flight test of a GBI were as follows:
Brigadier General Pat O'Reilly
Mr. Don Mitchell
Mr. Charles A. Ordahl
Mr. John Silverstein
Senator Levin. As I understand it, you are going to try,
then, to intercept the target, is that correct?
General Obering. No, sir. It is if an intercept occurs it
will be a by-product of it. That it is the first time we are
flying the interceptor out of Vandenberg. We have flown a
target across the Beale radar, we have not flown the kill
vehicle, this version of the kill vehicle against the target as
it relates to the radar track information we get from the Beale
radar, so that will be the primary objective.
Senator Levin. I know that is your primary objective, but
is it not an objective to intercept the target?
General Obering. No, it is not at this time.
Senator Levin. You are putting the target out there without
any objective to intercept it?
General Obering. We're putting a target out there because
we want to be able to do the tracking of the target across the
radar, feeding that track data into the fire control system,
getting the interceptor into place, comparing that with the
target characterization that is seen by the interceptor, and so
an intercept could occur, yes, sir, but that is not the primary
objective.
Senator Levin. Is that a secondary objective?
General Obering. Yes, sir, it would be.
Senator Levin. A secondary objective?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. That, to me, is an objective. It may be
secondary, but it nonetheless is an objective. I think it's
important that we note that.
Mr. Duma, sometimes the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E) is directed by Congress to certify that a
weapons system is operationally effective. Can you certify
today that the system that we have deployed is operationally
effective?
Mr. Duma. No, Senator, today I cannot do that. However,
three tests that are upcoming for the GBS. One, as you just
discussed, with a zero-offset fly by as the scenario, will be
followed by two flight tests with planned intercept scenarios.
If these three tests are successful, then I believe that we
will have at least demonstrated the capability for the limited
defensive operations that was discussed previously. That gives
me some confidence that we have some repeatability, because you
have, essentially, three very similar scenarios of increasing
complexity.
Senator Levin. If those tests are not successful?
Mr. Duma. Then I would have to take a look at the test
results. Failure would be an indicator that the system is not
as mature as we think.
Senator Levin. That you are not yet operationally
effective?
Mr. Duma. That could be an indicator, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Now is it possible that we are not going to
ever be able to demonstrate operational effectiveness until
have tests showing operational effectiveness?
Mr. Duma. I'm sorry?
Senator Levin. Is it possible that we are not going to be
able to demonstrate the operational effectiveness of this
system? Isn't that always a possibility?
Mr. Duma. You'll never have 100 percent assurance that the
system will work.
Senator Levin. That is not my question. Is it possible you
are never going to be able to certify operational
effectiveness? Is it a possibility?
Mr. Duma. I don't think so. I think the planned test
program will build upon the test results and add that
complexity so that you gain the confidence that we need to
determine the system's operational effectiveness.
Senator Levin. It is not possible that we will never have
that confidence?
Mr. Duma. As long as the program continues to develop and
mature, we don't have that zero chance that you're asking for.
Senator Levin. No, I'm asking whether there is a 100
percent chance that you are going to certify that this system
is operationally effective at some point? You're saying, yes,
it's 100 percent chance you're going to certify this?
Mr. Duma. I'm saying with the current program, and the test
events scheduled, it's very likely that the system will
demonstrate ultimately that it is effective. If those test
results are not favorable, or the program changes direction,
becomes unfunded and it not become a national priority anymore,
than that's another ballgame that we're in.
Senator Levin. Then the outcome of that ballgame would be?
Mr. Duma. Then we wouldn't have an MDS.
Senator Levin. We would not have an operationally effective
MDS. It seems you're having trouble saying the words that it is
possible that you may never be able to certify operational
effectiveness, and it seems to me in your position, you always
have to accept that as a possibility. It's not the goal; it may
not be the likely outcome; but don't you have to, in your
position, acknowledge at least the possibility that you're not
going to be able to certify operational effectiveness of a
system that has not gone through the test?
Mr. Duma. Yes, I have reports I provide Congress, and if
there are significant failures in those test reports when the
system should be operationally effective, I can say in those
reports that I don't believe it is operationally effective or
suitable.
Senator Levin. My time is expired, thank you.
Senator Sessions. Senator Thune?
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
panel for being here today, and for your service to our
country.
General Obering, on page 3 of the MDA review, bullet five
states, ''Proliferation continues in quantity and quality.``
Can you comment on what trends MDA is identifying to support
that statement, and what level of sophistication of technology
materials are being proliferated?
General Obering. I can comment on it in general, I can't
get into specifics because of the classification of that. I can
tell you that we see increasing numbers of missiles that are
being fielded, we are seeing increasing numbers of missiles in
development, in threat or potential countries, we see
qualitative improvements in what we believe to be the
performance of those weapons, and we see cooperation among many
nations that we would consider to be threatening to the United
States' interest. That is of enough concern, and the timing of
those, that I do believe, as I mentioned earlier in my
testimony, there is a sense of urgency of how we're developing
and fielding this program.
Senator Thune. I believe that obviously missile defense
plays an important role in our national security, and the
concern to me is the threat that the U.S. faces from cruise
missiles and medium-range targets. I guess it's a broader
question, is the U.S. prepared to identify and destroy cruise
missiles or medium-range threats that can be transported and
launched within close proximity to the United States?
General Obering. Sir, I cannot comment on the cruise
missile mission because that's not my area, but on the medium-
range ballistic missiles (MRBM), that is a concern that we
have. We believe that it is a very technically viable threat
that we have to deal with. We are taking steps to provide us
with sensor coverage to be able to meet that threat, and we are
also fielding the interceptors that can handle that threat, and
of course the positioning of those would be up to the
warfighters and to the national leadership, but we certainly
are building the tools to be able to address that.
Senator Thune. I had the opportunity, General, not all that
long ago, to go to Edwards and look at the ABL program, and
obviously I think it's a platform that has great potential to
deal with some of these threats we're talking about today. I
know you covered some of this ground earlier with Senator
Roberts, but if you could, I would be interested in knowing
exactly what drove that decision and what impact that will have
on the time line for fielding the system with a successful
shoot down by 2008, and how does that effect the current cost
projections on ABL?
General Obering. Senator, first of all, the program has
been making very good progress to the point where they achieved
the knowledge points that we laid out for them in 2005. They
have a very aggressive schedule over the next couple of years
with the installation of the tracking laser, the airborne
compensation laser and the high-energy modules themselves. We
have a test program that gets the aircraft into ground testing
this summer and flight testing with a surrogate of the high-
energy laser this fall, then we will actually modify the
aircraft with the high-energy laser modules in 2007 for a
resumption of flight testing, to lead to a shoot down in 2008.
Now, having said all of that, I believe that we are going
to learn more and more as we go along, as we have to date with
the program. I think that there is a very high likelihood that
while we will make steady progress, we're going to have to
incorporate lessons learned. By the way, we're doing that right
now, in the tearing down and re-assembling of the laser, we're
going to have to make some adjustments based on the test
program that we uncovered in 2005, and I wanted to make sure
that we had allowed ourselves enough time to take advantage of
all the lessons that we're going to learn between now and 2008,
to be able to put that into a design package we can have
available for the second aircraft, and that's why we thought it
was prudent from that standpoint to delay the purchase order of
that aircraft, in order to accommodate that design turn. What
that means is that we will push out the availability of the
second aircraft to about mid-decade, mid-next decade for test
purposes, but we think it is a prudent thing to do in terms of
being able to incorporate all the lessons learned we're going
to be able to do over the next couple of years.
In terms of costing, I will tell you that the ABL program
is not mature enough at this point to try to estimate or
guesstimate what an aircraft cost would be because of the
modifications and the lessons we learn in the next couple of
years and how that may effect that, and Senator, very frankly,
we may get to a point where it is very technologically
achievable and it's very viable technically, but we may have
trouble making it operational. So, we have to learn that as
well, so that's another reason why we felt it would be prudent
to take our time as we do this.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that answer. It seems to me
that it's a technology that holds great promise. I know that
we're learning more all the time.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Thune. My hope would be we could keep as close to
schedule as possible, so that incorporating that technology and
making this system--by the time we can get it rolled out and
operational--it can do the job that it was intended to do. Like
I said, it just seems to me, at least, that this is something
that in light of the threats we've talked about today, it has
great potential as a part of our readiness in the future. I
commend you for the work that has been done on it to date, and
encourage you to keep pressing forward with that, and let us
know what we can do to be helpful in that regard. So thank you,
and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, we're glad to have Senator
Nelson, a ranking member of this committee here with us. He's a
great partner in these efforts, he understands them and cares
about them.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may have
my opening statement entered into the record, I have been on
the floor handling an amendment.
Senator Sessions. We'd be delighted to make that part of
the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses
today.
Last year, after two flight test failures, General Obering
established an Independent Review Team and a Mission Readiness Task
Force to help put the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and
its testing program back on track. I want to commend you, General
Obering, for taking that corrective step and for adopting their
recommendations.
It was the right thing to do because it is important to make the
system work effectively. The Mission Readiness Task Force concluded
that it was more important to use four interceptors for ground
testing--to get the technology right--than for operational deployment.
I agree.
I think it is crucial that we adhere closely to their
recommendations and plans, and not take shortcuts or diversions that
could lead to a repeat of the problems that plagued the GMD system. As
a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report points out, by
accelerating the deployment schedule for GMD, the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) strayed from a knowledge-based and event driven
acquisition program, and numerous problems resulted.
There are three major topics I want to focus on today. First is
testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. Congress has passed
legislation for the past several years to improve our missile defense
testing, to help ensure that the system will work in an operationally
effective manner. That is why Congress has been pressing for more
operationally realistic testing, and for testing that will allow us to
characterize the operational capability of the system.
Second, there are a number of issues relating to the GMD that need
to be discussed. I would note that although the GMD element has not yet
had a successful intercept test, and the Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation says we don't have enough test information to have
confidence in its capability, this budget request seeks long lead funds
for the last of the 50 ground-based interceptors, which the Department
plans to deploy in Europe.
Third, we need to think about the issue of missile defense and
space. Although funds are not requested in this year's budget, next
year, the MDA expects to request funds for a space ``test bed.'' This
issue needs to be explored deliberately and fully in public debate.
There are a number of concerns about the potentially negative
consequences of deploying missile defense weapons in space, and we
should not back into such a policy by default.
At the appropriate time, we will be able to determine if there is a
need to go beyond our current terrestrial-based activities, whether it
would improve our security, and whether going to space would be
affordable. Knowing all the missile defense efforts we have under way
now, and the threats we seek to counter, I remain deeply skeptical.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duma, last year Congress passed legislation to enhance
the testing and evaluation of the BMD System. It is public law,
and it requires the operational test components to create a
plan to test and evaluate the operational capability of each
block sequence of the BMD System, and it says that each plan is
subject to your review and approval. It also requires that the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation shall report to
Congress at the conclusion of test and evaluation for each of
that block period of time with an assessment of the adequacy of
the testing and the characterization of the operational
effectiveness, the suitability, and the survivability of the
system, and so if you would share with the committee the status
of the implementation of this provision of the law, including
whether the test and evaluation plan for block 2006--which
started in January of this year and goes to the end of 2007--
whether the test and evaluation plan for that time period has
been prepared and approved by you?
Mr. Duma. The integrated master test plan has been
updated--as a matter of fact, it was signed by all the parties
concerned within the last 2 weeks. That test plan covers a
period of 2 years, however we have been updating it on an
annual basis. As General Obering stated, because the system is
still in development, much of the test plan is based on the
test results that we get, and so adjustments are made to the
actual test events, and in some cases the objectives of those
events, that test plan is signed.
Now, that covers the period for the block 2006. There is
still some work to be done in determining exactly the
capability to be delivered in block 2006, and a CONOPs to
employ that capability. Those efforts are still ongoing, I
expect those to be completed, that involves the Joint
Operational Test Agency, the MDA, and my office.
The warfighters in STRATCOM are the ones working on the
CONOPs. I expect at the end of the block 2006 phase, if you
will, which will be December 2007, that we will have test
results that I would be able to report in January of that year.
That, I might point out that I also have two other reporting
requirements for Congress, I submitted an unclassified report
as part of my annual report which comes out about the same
time, and I also have a reporting requirement that is due on
February 15 of each year. So each year I have the ability to
give you a status of the test program for the MDA in addition
to the individual evaluations of a block.
Senator Bill Nelson. Where is your characterization of the
operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of
the system that's supposed to be reported to us in Congress?
Mr. Duma. That is due after the block 2006, which would be
January 2008.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you're not going to report that to
us until that time?
Mr. Duma. Not that particular one, but I will on an annual
basis provide the unclassified report, part of my annual report
and a classified report on February 15. I do that every year
now, by a different law.
Senator Bill Nelson. You're talking about the law on the
Integrated Missile Test Plan?
Mr. Duma. No, that section 234 is for block 2006. The test
report is due to Congress upon the completion of block 2006.
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, and when is that test and
evaluation plan for 2006 going to be done and reported to
Congress?
Mr. Duma. The test plan is prepared, that is what I just
said, we signed within the last 2 weeks. The evaluation of the
test results isn't due until January 2008.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, you're missing the
requirement of last year's law. You're talking about a former
requirement of Integrated Missile Test Plan, last year's law,
Public Law 109-163, section 234, requires the operational test
components to create a plan to test and evaluate the
operational capability of the BMD System, and that should be
reported to this Congress.
Mr. Duma. That plan is in work, that is what I said in my
earlier statement, it involves the CONOPs, and what is
specifically to be delivered in block 2006, that is being
worked now. The Integrated Master Test Plan is what was just
recently signed and approved by my office, and the Operational
Test Agency of General Obering.
Senator Bill Nelson. That was not my question, the
Integrated Test Plan, the question was about the requirement of
the law. So, you're saying you're preparing that plan now?
Mr. Duma. That is correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. You're going to report that plan, not
until January 2008?
Mr. Duma. No, no, no, no. That plan is being worked, the
results of the test events from that plan will be reported in
January 2008.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, when are you going to report to
this committee on when you've reviewed the plan, and assuming
that you have approved it?
Mr. Duma. That's in the works, I need a CONOPs from the
warfighter, I need the capability to be delivered from the MDA.
Those are two prerequisites to be able to complete that plan.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, needless to say, you see there
is a good deal of skepticism that we come to the table, because
we've had people sit in front of us before and express that
they're going to give us information, and then we don't get
that information. I can tell you, this Senator on this
committee is going to require that, and I will look forward, as
you have offered in good conscience here to bring forth that
information when you have evaluated it and share it with this
committee.
Mr. Duma. Senator, I'll be glad to do that.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right.
In a recent report on BMD, Mr. Duma, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) writes that, ``MDA cannot estimate
the performance capability of block 2004 assets because it has
not successfully completed an end-to-end test of the GMD
element using production-representative hardware. Doubts about
the rigor of the quality control procedures have also raised
additional questions about the performance of the fielded GMD
interceptors.'' Do you agree with that GAO report?
Mr. Duma. I haven't seen that report, but I would say I do
agree with that statement you just read. The quality control
issues were raised at a hearing last year before this body,
that is what caused General Obering to institute two
independent reviews to look at that. He has taken actions to
correct those quality problems, whether those actions are
effective or not, we won't know until we complete the flight
test. We had one flight test that was done in December which
met its objectives, we have three more remaining to be able to
complete that flight test program. There was essentially a 1-
year delay in the flight test program because of those two
failed launches a little over a year ago.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, according to the
recent GAO report on the BMD, because of the quality control
problems, it's possible that unreliable parts or parts that
were inappropriate for space applications were installed in the
first nine interceptors that were deployed in Alaska and
California. GAO reports that, ``An MDA audit found evidence
that the reliability of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle's (EKV)
design could not be determined, and any estimates of its
serviceable life are likely unsupportable, and that
contractor's production processes are immature and that the
contractor cannot build a consistent and reliable product.'' I
quote, and I'm quoting the GAO report. ``This creates
uncertainty about the performance of those interceptors, MDA
has reportedly considered a number of options for dealing with
this problem, including the possibility of using the missiles
for reliability tests, or sending the interceptors back to the
manufacturer for disassembly and re-manufacture.'' GAO reports
that, ``Program officials have recommended that MDA remove the
interceptors when theirs is scheduled for upgrades and replace
any parts found to be faulty.'' So, is it possible the parts
now in the first nine interceptors could hinder or degrade the
performance of the interceptors if they were used
operationally?
General Obering. Senator, let me address that. First of
all, I have the utmost respect for the GAO, but I will tell you
I was not very impressed with that work. I thought that they
extracted information and came to some conclusions that were
not necessarily contiguous in that regard.
Let me point specifically to the quality control issues.
What we did was we went in and audited the contractor's
facilities, as was indicated in the report. I have sent audit
teams into the various plants facilities. We had one location
that came back that was problematic and all the other ones
across the BMD, seemed to be within reason of what you would
expect. What we discovered in the one plant was that the EKV
production facility was that we had a lot of what we call
``scrap and rework.'' We would get parts and supplies in we
would have to have reworked before they were acceptable.
A couple of things to remember about this, first of all,
every interceptor that is sitting in that silo in Alaska and
California has been acceptance tested, in other words they are
acceptance tested, the parts, before they were installed and
before they were deployed into those silos. They were
acceptance tested, what we call the ``maximum predicted
environments,'' we did not do sufficient qualification testing
for how much robustness in terms of added margin to those tests
and that is what we've gone back through over the past year to
go do.
Now, to answer your question directly, anything is
possible. Just within the last 2 months, I had all of the
experts sitting around to include the quality control teams
that did those audits and we walked through and said, ``Is
there any reason why we have discovered anything that would
cause us to begin to pull the interceptors out of the silos?''
The answer came back, ``No, there is not.'' We have some
things, some processes, as I said, some accountability in terms
of both systems, engineering, and the parts control and
configuration management that we have much improved at the
contractor's facilities, and better government insight into
that. I think we've taken some steps there.
Also, I will tell you that the FT-1, as I mentioned to
Senator Reed, that kill vehicle and worked those up to war
production representative, they were the configuration of
exactly what we have in the audit today, and they performed
exactly as we had hoped and had planned. I don't share the
pessimism that came out of the conclusions that the GAO
concluded from the same set of information that we had looked
at within the agency.
Senator Bill Nelson. You don't think there was any poor
quality control at the manufacturing?
General Obering. So there's no doubt, there was. There was
poor quality control. But what I'm telling you, is I believe
we've taken the steps and I think the contractor has taken the
steps to address those.
Senator Bill Nelson. Poor quality control of a critical
component of the GMD system.
General Obering. Yes, sir, which means we would have to go
back and re-work that component to make sure that it met the
acceptance test criteria before it was employed.
Senator Bill Nelson. But as you fix this problem in the
future, are you going to test the nonmissiles to see if they
have the right parts installed?
General Obering. Sir, that is part of the comprehensive
reviews we have already been doing, they have been part of this
process, this review, comprehensive review all along.
Senator Bill Nelson. So the answer to that is yes?
General Obering. Yes, sir, we know what the parts are that
are on those vehicles.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Duma, you might just share with us
what your operation test and evaluation division is, and you're
statutorily created, is that right? What are your
responsibilities with regards to testing?
Mr. Duma. The office was statutorily created in the mid-
1980s, I have three reporting requirements I have to oversee to
ensure that operational testing is adequate, and that it's
adequate to determine operational effectiveness and
suitability. My office also received the live-fire test and
evaluation office that was created separately by different law
about 2 years later. That office was in a different part of the
Department. In 1994, Congress passed a law that moved that
office into the Operational Test and Evaluation Office. My
responsibilities now are the adequacy of testing, operational
effectiveness, operational suitability, and live-fire test and
evaluation, which includes lethality and survivability.
Senator Sessions. If you feel like a testing program is
inadequate, is that part of the regular reports you submit to
Congress?
Mr. Duma. It is.
Senator Sessions. General Obering, based upon your
leadership on this system, do you doubt that we have a limited
emergency capability at this point in time?
General Obering. No, Senator, I don't doubt that, I believe
that. Will it perform 100 percent precisely, as we had hoped?
Not in all cases, but I believe that we do have sufficient
confidence that the system will perform, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. The testing and development plans that
you have in place were designed to make it more robust and more
capable as the months and years go by?
General Obering. Yes, sir. In fact, if we're successful in
the next two flight tests, we plan to make the next one even
more aggressive than we currently have laid out.
Senator Sessions. Is there a CONOPs now in place for
conducting limited defensive operations? I guess I would start
with General Dodgen. What about that? What kind of concept do
you have for conducting limited defensive operations?
General Dodgen. CONOPs for limited defensive operation is
in place, and that's been agreed to. Operational orders have
been developed, actually the JFCC is now working on the CONOPs
and how to fight the global system. Meaning when we have the
extra components that are coming in the radars to the east,
we're not building a CONOP on how to fight that system on a
global basis. So, I think on a standpoint of limited defensive
operation, those things have been set.
But at this time, in answer to the question you asked me to
address at the very beginning, which was an operational
assessment of operational readiness, we've had the warfighters
on the system for almost 2 years now, 24/7.
Senator Sessions. Let's be plain, the warfighters on the
system, that means if we detect a threat, a missile threat?
General Dodgen. We have contingency capabilities.
Senator Sessions. You have a system in place today?
General Dodgen. That is correct.
Senator Sessions. Excuse me, go ahead.
General Dodgen. The warfighters have been on the system for
some time. They've participated the viable piece of the way we
work with the MDA that are operators, the soldiers and all the
pieces of equipment are in every operational test, and every
test that is done with the MDA, there is complete openness
between the developmental operational activities and the
operational activities. That creates a lot of confidence in the
system, and the operators often identify some of the faults
with the software that are regenerated in subsequent software
builds. The soldiers are on the system, ready, and they
understand the capability. A year ago, General Cartwright
characterized the capability as a ''thin line of defense.``
This is all about getting better and continually getting
better, and so software improvements into the system which
allow us to bring extra sensors into the system, more
interceptors into the ground, more knowledge about the
capability of the systems add more robustness to where we are.
I think we're at the point right now where we're getting ready
to be able to separate developmental activities from
operational activities because we have separated our command
and control notes, or are getting ready to separate those
things, that will allow us to add a great redundancy and
robustness in very short order.
The thing that is lacking to reduce some of the uncertainty
so that we can gain full advantage of all of the improvements
we've made in the system over the next year is that end-to-end
test when that's done that will modify our operational posture.
But we have capabilities that we have identified through the
Secretary of Defense and the President that have called upon,
that this Nation can act within the indications and warning, to
safeguard us, if necessary.
Senator Sessions. How long would it take to put the system
on alert?
General Dodgen. Senator, in private session I would
certainly tell you.
Senator Sessions. But you have those things in place? Have
you determined what that is?
General Dodgen. Those things are managed on an hourly
basis, how far away you are from capability.
Senator Sessions. I just want to drive home this issue and
get straight to the American people, while this program is
continuing to be developed and tested and verified, its
capability is being determined, fully. It is now in place and
operational and you, the combatant commander representative
have the capacity to call on it if we're attacked by a missile,
is that correct?
General Dodgen. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Sessions. General Obering, do you want to add
anything to that?
General Obering. No, sir, I think you said it very well,
and General Dodgen answered it very directly.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
associate myself with Senator Nelson's comments about the
importance of stepping up to the last year's legislative
initiatives with respect to oversight and testing. I also want
to commend Senator Nelson because he was the architect of that
language, thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, if you understand some
degree of skepticism, I want you to know General Obering, that
your predecessor sat right there in front of this committee and
told us at one point that we were going to have completely
researched and developed and ready for operation an ABL, and,
of course, that didn't turn out to be anywhere. He said within
10 months, and that didn't turn out to be anywhere close. So
thank you, Senator Reed, I just want you to understand some of
the degree of skepticism.
General Obering. Can I comment to that, please, Senator?
That is the reason in my opening statements I hit, and why we
have incorporated so hard, knowledge points in our program, and
that is what we will continue to focus on and to achieve.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General. Mr. Duma, I want to get a
sense of where the system is today, the ballistic missile
system. This is an operationally deployed system that has not
been operationally tested, is that an accurate assessment?
Mr. Duma. All of the pieces are in place, they are in the
field, yes, sir, and it has not completed any operational
testing.
Senator Reed. Is there any other situation where we have
declared a system to be operationally deployed, but we have no
operational testing of the system?
Mr. Duma. There are systems that have been deployed to
tactical theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan that have been
developed and fielded directly without operational testing.
Those have not been what we would call Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAP).
Senator Reed. Right, those were systems, in fact, I think
we've deployed a lot of systems where, we tried to just drop
counter IED and others that are just off the shelf, get it out
there, try it--but I think that is what causes some question,
criticism, and comment when it comes to this system. The mere
fact that a major defense system was declared operationally
deployed, but we haven't conducted one operational test. That
seems to defy logic of perhaps not the experts, but certainly
most people. There's also another clarification, the system is
not on alert today, is that correct General Dodgen? It is not
on alert?
General Dodgen. It is not on alert.
Senator Reed. So in your response to Senator Sessions, you
would have to give warnings and indications, and then you would
have to declare the system on alert to actually be in a posture
to try to intercept a missile, is that correct?
General Dodgen. I think when I say it's not on alert, what
I say is that we haven't been ordered to alert by command
authorities. I think we're watching indications and warning on
a minute-by-minute basis on our operational view so we're
getting a clear view and the combatant commanders can then
request that it go on alert, or move to a more operationally-
ready posture.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir. Now let me get back to Mr.
Duma. I think this was part of the discussion you were having
with Senator Nelson. Even though you are the objective
evaluator of the operational capacity of the system, the strap-
down commander could declare this even more operational
independent of your judgment. He could say, ``Well, we're going
to alert, and we're declaring another step.'' Is that true in
terms of the breakdown of responsibilities?
Mr. Duma. That is true. My role in this particular program
is very unique. The statutes that Senator Sessions talked about
that created my office require operational testings be
completed on a system before it goes into full-rate production.
Also, the Services are required to use low-rate initial
production items that are production representative in
operational testing. Those rules were suspended, or waived, for
the missile defense program several years ago. In fact, the
role of my office really is one of an advisory nature for the
test program. Clearly they're in developmental testing, we're
trying to make it as operationally realistic as possible.
When the missiles failed to launch a little over a year
ago, General Obering chartered the independent review teams and
the Mission Readiness Task Force efforts. One of the
realizations by the leadership in the MDA was just how early in
development it really was. I credit them with taking a very
prudent approach for corrective action on that, and that is
what delayed the Flight Test Program by a year, in essence.
But, having said all of that, there was a significant
amount of ground testing that was done during that year. The
most significant portion of that was involving the warfighters.
That was one of the things that I felt needed to be done that
was done during this last year. As I said in my opening
statement, the warfighter understanding of the capabilities,
the limitations, and the actual maturity of the system was
enhanced through that ground testing. What we lack is that
final end-to-end operational test through intercept. That just
hasn't happened yet.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you another question, Mr. Duma.
That final operational test, would essentially be a salvo of at
least two interceptors per target, handling a multiple
engagement, maybe several warheads coming in. Is that a fair
description of a baseline operational test?
Mr. Duma. As the system matures, that certainly would be
something in the realm of possibility, but what we're looking
at to declare the limited defensive operations is something
less than that, it is a single incoming missile with a simple
missile, if you will. Okay, that is what the next three tests,
that is the scenario that you're looking at, but the system is
going to mature. For instance, there are already discussions
going on that if those tests are successful, maybe even that
third test in that series, we ought to be adding counter
measures to it already, those discussions are ongoing General
Obering and I have had those discussions, they are active in
the test community with the MDA, and so to get to more advanced
countermeasures, multiple launches, that's part of that
maturation process and that is beyond the limited defensive
operations that the next series of tests is designed to look
at.
General Dodgen. Senator Reed, could I draw an analogy to
the PAC-3 system, if I may? When the PAC-3, we're going to
constantly test our system, it could be driven by future
threats we want to be addressed and what to go against. When
Operation Iraqi Freedom hit, the PAC-3 system had not been
certified for release by the operational tester, it had done
some operational testing. The warfighter, Commander of CENTCOM
commanded those missiles go forward to Kuwait and a conditional
release was granted because they had not been certified. They
went immediately into theater the next day, and were very
successful, particularly in protecting the land component
commanders in Kuwait. Now, I think that's an example where
there actually had been some operational testing, but it had
not been certified by the tester to go forward, but the
combatant commander said, ``There's military utility here, and
we need to deploy this.''
Senator Reed. Expediency will always require us to do what
we have to do, but I would be much more comfortable in a
situation where we have some operational testing, at least,
before we declared the system operational, and also I think
PAC-3 is an example where Mr. Duma's agency was involved as a
major defense acquisition, step-by-step with a robust valor. I
think, and I must say, one of the reasons this program has
suffered is because we have decided to do something unusual and
take out the desk agencies from the contractor supervision. My
time has expired, I want to thank the chairman for his
patience.
Senator Sessions. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duma, this system has not had any operational testing
and an operationally configured system has never had a
successful intercept test. We have had a number of test-like
failures. I understand that you have reported, and tell me if
I'm accurate in this, that there is ``insufficient evidence to
support a confident assessment of the systems capabilities.''
Is that inaccurate?
Mr. Duma. Yes, Senator, that is accurate. The February
report that my office submitted a year ago evaluated the
engagement sequence groups, there were point estimates and had
confidence intervals on them. These estimates are in the report
that I submitted to Congress. In my report this year, I
indicated that I couldn't change my assessment from what I
reported a year ago, because I had no additional flight testing
with which to change either those point estimates or those
confidence intervals on the performance.
Senator Levin. So, OT&E says insufficient evidence to
support a confident assessment. That is still their position?
Secretary Flory, you, in front of the House, said last month
that we are confident that it could intercept a long-range
ballistic missile. Now your OT&E Acting Director says there is
insufficient evidence to support a confident assessment, but
you told the House that you are confident. How do you square
those two statements?
Mr. Flory. Senator Levin, I looked at this question
yesterday in preparing for this hearing, and I recall the
discussion that took place at the last hearing, and
particularly the testimony that was given after I testified in
the last hearing where the word ``confidential'' was used by
Mr. Duma, General Obering, and it became apparent that I'd used
a word that was a term of art in the technical and testing
community. So I decided in my testimony today not to use that
phrase again, because I realized I had given the impression
that I was, in effect, making a technical judgment, and what I
said today was, based upon that reflection, that the elements
were in place to intercept the missile.
Senator Levin. The elements are in place where intercept is
possible?
Mr. Flory. Where intercept is possible. I don't have my
exact statement in front of me.
Senator Levin. But in terms of your confidence level, you
are not saying you are confident that it will happen?
Mr. Flory. I'm not making a tester's or operational
judgment on confidence. I believe the elements are in place, I
think it can be done, but I'm not making that kind of formal
assessment.
Senator Levin. First of all, I'm glad to hear that. I think
there has been too much hype, too much exaggeration about the
system and what it will do. It is a system which has not yet
been operationally tested. Hopefully it will be able to have a
capability. But in terms of confidence level that it will do
so, that level of confidence has not been expressed yet by your
technical people. I think it is important that you make that
modification which you just described.
In terms of the production of the missiles, the
interceptors, what is the inventory objective? Objective, I
think is the right word, I'm not sure which of our two Generals
I should look to with that question.
General Obering. Sir, I can tell you what we have
programmed, we have a total of 50 interceptors programmed in
inventory, 10 of which we would deploy to a third site.
Senator Levin. Then it is your current plan to then
terminate production at that point?
General Obering. We would level off, we would not terminate
production, we would have to continue to produce, because we're
going to take those missiles and we're going to fire them out
of the silos and test and replace them in their silos, so we
would continue a production program to be able to do that.
Senator Levin. So except for some test interceptors to fill
the place of the ones that had been used, production would end
in terms of regularly deployed interceptors?
General Obering. Yes, sir, but we would keep the line such
that if we needed to ramp up for threat reasons or for
contingencies we could do so.
Senator Levin. How many interceptors a year would you need
to keep the line open? Keep it warm?
General Obering. We're producing at about the rate of one
every 2 months or one every month and a half, something like
that, and that would be a warm level that we could continue to
sustain.
Senator Levin. You mean the current level?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. So you would maintain the current level to
keep the base warm?
General Obering. That depends upon how many tests we want
to continue to do, how many modifications we want to include.
There are several things we are going to plan for this, we're
going to upgrade the kill vehicle on these interceptors so we
will have a multiple kill vehicle capability that would go on
to the boosters that we have in the silos today and so I'm sure
there's going to be a test program that will accommodate that.
We'll double ramp-up our testing.
Senator Levin. Do you know what the minimum number of
missiles is that is required to keep the base warm?
General Obering. We're about there, we're about there right
now, sir.
Senator Levin. So, you have to produce a missile and a half
a month in order to keep your base warm?
General Obering. Not a missile and a half a month, it would
be about a missile every 2 months.
Senator Levin. I'm sorry, a missile every 2 months in order
to keep your production base warm. Which means forever, because
if you always want to be ready then you are going to have to
continue to have to produce one every other month.
General Obering. As long as we want to continue that
testing profile and continue that contingency profile, yes,
sir.
Senator Levin. What do they cost, these missiles?
General Obering. They are roughly about $40 million an
interceptor.
Senator Levin. Okay, my time is up, thank you. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. I would like to see if we can clarify
what we mean by not having an operational testing of this
system. That does not mean that component parts of it haven't
been tested, but that the system is now deployed in Alaska with
the advanced radar warning system and that the entire system
has not been tested as of yet, is that correct?
General Obering. Senator, if I could answer that, and maybe
Mr. Duma would like to chime in. Here's what we've done: We
have successfully intercepted four or five times with the
prototype of the kill vehicle we have in the ground, the basic
functionality, the basic technology. We believe we've proven
the processing power, we have the margin on the divert system,
we have demonstrated the algorithms, we've demonstrated that
when we put this kill vehicle in its terminal game it does a
pretty good job.
Senator Sessions. Now those were tests that occurred in
October 2002?
General Obering. 2001, 2002, in that timeframe, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. You actually did a hit-to-kill an
incoming missile? Missile-to-missile?
General Obering. Yes, we did.
Senator Sessions. It impacted and destroyed?
General Obering. Yes, sir, we did.
Senator Sessions. That's exactly the same system we now
have deployed to Alaska?
General Obering. No, sir, we actually improved and upgraded
the kill vehicle to make it more robust, to make it more
producible, to make it easier to produce, obviously. We flight
tested the booster that is in the ground, we did that
successfully in 2003. We put it together, the kill vehicle and
the booster for a flight test last December. So, we have done
the fly-out of the interceptor from the silo, into the terminal
game and that was a successful flight test in December, as I
mentioned earlier, so successful we decided to accelerate our
test program.
But we had two other very important tests this past year we
haven't really emphasized enough. One, we air-launched a target
out of the back of a C-17 over the face of the Cobra Dane
radar. There were many that were skeptical that we could use
this radar in our MDS. This was an operationally realistic test
in terms of the threat representation of the target in
actuality, it was even more challenging than we would have
outlined, probably, in an operationally realistic test, because
of what the threat target represented to the radar. The radar
performed, the operational fire control system performed, that
is the hardware and the software that makes up the fire control
system, and we generate a weapons test plan to intercept
solutions on this track.
Another major test we did against the Beale radar where we
flew a target out of Alaska, across the face of that radar,
just this year, in 2006--in fact, we were more than surprised
in the sense of how much more accurate that radar was than we
had anticipated in real-life testing. So, while we have not put
it all together as we have said, end-to-end, we have taken the
major functional steps of all of these components, and
exercised or tested them at any one time.
One thing that Mr. Duma pointed out also, I think very
accurately, is a key element of this is the operative sitting
of the council, how comfortable they feel with the system and
its ability and its performance. We have done testing and
transitioning of the system many, many times with the
warfighter, exercised those in war games as well as exercises
and ground tests and that is one reason they also feel
comfortable. So, while we have not done all of the end-to-end
testing we need to do with the operationally realistic testing
we plan to do this year, we've certainly done as much testing
as I believe that we needed to do to give us confidence to
proceed. We have deployed weapons into combat before without
even some of the level of testing we're talking about, in
recent conflicts.
Senator Sessions. If an incoming missile is coming, I'm
glad you're there and we have a realistic possibility of seeing
that missile knocked down rather than successfully hitting the
United States.
General Dodgen, the operational command forces are working
with General Dodgen's team now at the T sites?
General Dodgen. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Sessions. The goal would be eventually that General
Dodgen's people would depart, and it would be operational
completely, is that correct? I mean, that's the general
concept?
General Dodgen. I think given the nature of this system, I
think there will always be a partnership between the MDA and
the soldiers that man the system, and that partnership mandates
that complete openness going back and forth, and I would just
echo what General Obering said that we have transitioned this
system to a ready state many times. We know how to do this as a
team, so we're confident in those procedures, we have done the
tests together and I think there is a shared confidence in the
system.
Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, you said that you were
glad that they are there, and my response would be I hope
they're there, but what I've always been taught is that you go
through research and development first, before and then do your
testing before something is declared operational. I hope
they're there. General Dodgen, a few minutes ago in response to
a question, gave another example of taking the PAC-3 and
deploying it while it was still being tested. General Dodgen,
that was the third generation of the Patriot missile, was it
not?
General Dodgen. It had been through some operational
testing and it was fairly mature. But my point was that it had
not been certified for release by the testing community.
Senator Bill Nelson. But a lot different from developing a
BMD System from scratch?
General Dodgen. Senator Nelson, I will tell you that the
end-to-end test for later this year is important to
understanding our capabilities and to further our capabilities
and increase our capabilities, and the warfighter is very much
focused on being a part of that and understanding our
capabilities after that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Look, all of us want to get in the
same place at the end of the day and that's to have a
successful system. We're here to try to help you try to get
there, but I want to see us come along and get to it without a
bunch of obfuscation and false promises, which is what we seem
to have had in the past several years.
General Obering, before we can build a deployment site in a
European nation, we have to first select a host nation, reach a
formal agreement with that host nation, work out the details of
the deployment--I understand that we have not reached such an
agreement yes, since we have not chosen a host nation for a
third deployment site. The GAO notes that although MDA planned
to install a web browser in the United Kingdom in 2005 to
provide them with situational awareness, the installation was
delayed because DOD did not complete final policy agreements as
scheduled. Similarly, there has been a delay in the deployment
to Japan of the Forward-Based X-Band Portable Radar because of
delayed negotiations with Japan on the location of the radar.
Now, these are less complex matters than the building of an
MDS, and the deployment of a base like Fort Greely. Tell me, is
it possible that we will not reach agreement with a European
nation this year on deploying the GBIs on their soil?
General Obering. Senator, I will answer part of that, and
then maybe Secretary Flory can answer part of that as well, and
what I would like to do is focus on the technical aspect of
your question. By the way, you brought up a very good point on
the deployment of the Japanese radar, it's one thing that the
GAO report totally failed to address. They ignored almost a
billion dollar program in our scope of work on our sensors in
these forward-deployed radars, and in fact we accelerated the
deployment of the Forward-Based X-Band Radar that originally
was based on our initial conjecture was going to be in block 6.
We actually accelerated the delivery of that into the block 4
timeframe. I believe that our allies, Japan, have really done a
great job in working with us and it shows what teamwork and
partnership can do to accelerate a program like that because of
what we both perceive the urgency to be.
Now, having said that, to be very honest, nobody has
accused MDA of not being able to spend money, and we have a
program of work loaded in the 2007 budget request that would go
to the third site you just talked about. I believe that we can
certainly--given the go-ahead--expend the money that we have
planned for 2007 to do the site planning, the soil sampling,
the facility design and layout, the legacy we have here, as you
have said, is we've done this at Fort Greely, we've done this
at Vandenberg, so this is not starting from scratch, we're
hitting the ground running, here. So we have a lot of
experience under our belt in this regard. We do have several
nations that have expressed a strong desire to work with us on
this, and I will let Secretary Flory answer the likelihood of
whether we would have a decision this year.
Mr. Flory. Thank you, General. Senator Nelson, I don't
know, I'm not going to give you a likelihood in terms of a
percentage, I would say that it's conceivable we might not have
agreement, but it's not what I expect to happen. We have
consulted with a number of countries since 2002, we are
continuing to consult, and we're certainly working hard to have
a decision this year.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, don't we have a problem
that we need a third site system to be effective in defending
Europe against an Iranian medium-range or intermediate-range
missile?
Mr. Flory. Senator, I'll defer to General Obering on the
specific technical capabilities. The primary, the goals of
deploying a system would be both to improve the defense of the
United States, and to extend the missile defense protection to
the countries of Europe. General Obering, if you want to get to
the specific capabilities.
General Obering. Yes, sir, we do need a third site to be
able to protect our deployed forces in the region, our allies
and our friends from an ICBM class target or a high
intermediate-range missile class target, yes, sir, we do.
Senator Bill Nelson. I think it's interesting to note that
the Director of the DIA did not even mention anything about
working on ICBMs. He said at a worldwide threat hearing in
February that Iran's efforts were on a regional ballistic
missile that could reach Tel Aviv. If Iran wanted to strike
targets in Europe with ballistic missiles, it appears much more
likely that they would develop a regional missile before they
would develop an ICBM.
Mr. Flory. Senator, if I could just say a word on the
threat. The IC has assessed that Iran could develop and could
flight test an ICBM in 2015. I mentioned earlier there's a new
national intelligence testimony that gets into a lot more of
the details of this in a way we can't discuss here, but we do
have serious concerns, and I think it was the DNI who testified
before this committee, I'd have to double-check that, about the
serious concern posed by Iran's pursuit both of nuclear
capability and long-range ballistic missiles.
Senator Sessions. I think you've given us the rationale of
the deployment of a European-based missile. I would just say
that Iran or any other hostile nation in that area needs to
know that the United States and its allies are not going to
remain vulnerable to attack, from that kind of missile attack
that can include a WMD as a part of it, and that we have that
capability. I think we will have support in Europe to do that
and I think as a matter of policy we have to continue to
proceed with that concept. Secretary Flory, I guess, would you
have any comments about that?
Mr. Flory. Mr. Chairman, I agree fully with what you said,
and I would make the point that we have concerns about Iran's
missile capabilities on several levels: its regional
capabilities, its capabilities that could allow it to threaten
Europe, its capabilities that could allow it to threaten the
United States. It's important to recognize the capability,
assuming Iran continues to move in the direction it's going of
developing greater and greater capabilities.
Iran's ability to threaten Europe would also be a threat
both to European populations and European countries, it would
also be a threat to the United States and our ability to
conduct a robust foreign policy in defense of our interests.
For example, if the Iranian government were able to hold Europe
at risk, it wouldn't be necessary to hold the U.S. itself at
risk, in order to have a significant deterrent effect on the
United States in trying to blackmail the United States from not
carrying out any particular action or set of actions that we
might feel we needed to carry out in order to defend out
interests in the Middle East. So, the gradual extension of the
Iranian missile shadow, eventually the Iranian nuclear shadow,
is something that every time it moves outward, it further
threatens our friends and allies. Also, it further constraints
our ability.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, you said that very well, and
that is the way I see it, and we don't need our friends and
allies held hostage to the legitimate national security of the
United States. Senator Nelson, do you have some more? Then
we'll wrap up.
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, sir. General Dodgen, could you
tell us the remaining issues that need to be resolved before
the system would be placed on alert?
General Dodgen. I would say that as a minimum the software
build we are currently in which would allow us to expand the
system and create a redundancy needs to be completed and that
will be done very quickly. There are other considerations,
whether or not a complete end-to-end test needs to be done
before we put in on full-time alert is a different matter but
what I am telling you is the command and control issues, the
ability to go to that full-time alert posture will be set very
quickly and then I think that's the minimum that is probably
necessary. But the system will always get better, Senator, and
I appreciate your interest in pushing us down that road.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about the sensor integration
issues?
General Dodgen. I think that is tied to the software
pieces, I think when you have the software ready, then you can
bring the forward-deployed sensors in and get those tested and
when those things are done, I include that as a part of that
command and control software build, when that is done, I
consider that the minimum to move forward.
Senator Bill Nelson. So your conclusion is that you get the
software development like you want it and then General
Cartwright is going to be ready to recommend that the system be
placed on alert?
General Dodgen. I can't speak for General Cartwright, but I
would say that. In my opinion, those things of getting those
extra sensors in and creating that look east and west, and
having that redundancy in our command and control system so we
can continue concurrent development and operations is vital to
us going to full-time defensive operations. The qualitative
piece will always be debated, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. We will follow that up with General
Cartwright all right.
General Obering, I want to talk to you about space-based
interceptors. In your March 20 presentation to a conference,
you asked, ``Do we need to go to space with interceptors?''
Then you also asked if a space layer would significantly
enhance system performance and responsiveness. Will
terrestrial-base BMD assets be sufficient to deal with
increasingly sophisticated and shifting threats? I think these
are legitimate questions, this is a significant issue. Now, the
question is, can we afford it? We already have a great deal of
missile defense activity taking place to handle the threats,
we're concerned about the possibility of North Korea and Iran
developing, as we discussed here, long-range ballistic missiles
and deploying a limited number of the missiles. If long-range
ballistic missile threat remains limited, and if we're not
trying to build a capability to defeat the ballistic missiles
of Russia and China, do you think that the terrestrial-based
system should be adequate to accomplish the mission? Instead of
a space-based?
General Obering. Sir, that's a good question. The reason
why we would add a space-based layer, first of all, we think it
is very important that we have the sensing layer in space.
Because we believe it is the most cost-effective way to go
where you can get precision-tracking sensors in space to allow
you the flexibility to cover the globe, so to speak, with
respect to any emerging threat in the future.
The next question becomes, if you think you can predict
with certainty what threats we're going to face over the next
20 or 30 years, then we can certainly keep populating the world
with terrestrial-based and fixed-site interceptors and sensors.
If we believe that we're not going to be able to do that very
accurately, then we believe that a very modest space-based
layer may be the way to go there. But there are some questions
to ask and there are some questions to answer about the
technical viability of that, and that is why we believe that
before we take that step we ought to do some experimentation to
understand what it is capable and what it is not capable of in
that regard.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is it U.S. policy to have a system to
defeat the long-range missiles of Russia and China?
General Obering. Sir, the system we have fielded today does
not address a threat from Russia nor Chinese missiles, it does
not do that. We believe in our development program it's always
prudent because you make sure that you can at least understand
where these various countries are headed from a technical
perspective, and we try to make sure that we do that in a
development program, but we're not fielding a system today to
address those countries.
Senator Bill Nelson. So the present system is not part of a
U.S. policy that would defeat the long-range missiles of Russia
and China?
General Obering. No, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, in your prepared statement,
you discuss examining tradeoffs to determine what to fund, and
that is what we're basically trying to get to here. What's
Congress going to decide with regard to the funding of all of
this? One of the areas to examine is the diversity of basing
modes, including space. Does your statement imply that you're
already planning on using those layers in space as a basing
mode for the missile defense?
General Obering. No, sir. It does imply that from a
sensor's perspective as well as from whether you're talking
about sea or land-based as well, but we do not have a space-
based interceptor program laid into our program today.
Senator Bill Nelson. Can you assure this subcommittee that
you do not have any plans to place a BMD in space?
General Obering. As we're sitting here today, Senator, I do
not. Now, that does not mean that we may not come back to you
tomorrow, based upon where we would like to take this
capability, but as we're sitting here today, no, we do not.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have any plans to put a kill
vehicle in a N-Fire satellite?
General Obering. I wish we could have, sir, but we're not
going to be able to. The kill vehicle we were going to put on
that experimental platform was not mature enough and was not
ready, so we replaced it with a communications terminal.
Senator Bill Nelson. Last year, I asked the Under Secretary
for Acquisition to explain the unbudgeted out-year funding
wedge that appeared in fiscal year 2006. His answer was
basically that the projected funds would be paid by the
Services for deployment of certain systems. This year we see
the deployment funding wedge again, starting in 2008 with a
notation that it suggest it will be for deployment. Can you
explain what the funding line is supposed to represent? Whether
it's actually budgeted or programmed?
General Obering. Yes, sir. What that's supposed to
represent is a departmental commitment that anywhere from $1.5
to $2 billion in that vicinity will be allocated for deployment
and for fielding and sustainment of the system and that is
about what we've been targeting and what we've been tracking,
too, but the Department also likes to make us work for our
money, so that is why you see that notation like that, is
because we have to achieve our knowledge points and achieve the
progress we need to before they allocate that to our budget.
Senator Bill Nelson. You are a key person in this whole
thing, and you posed the question at the March conference that
you spoke to, saying how much defense is enough? So, what is
your sense of how much is enough?
General Obering. Senator, for what we are facing today, and
from where I sit today, the perspective lies, I think that the
allocation by the Department, by the President, the missile
defense is about right. I think it will allow us to keep pace
with the rogue nation threats we've talked about, that we see
developing on our TVs every day. I believe that we have it
about right with respect to the balance between fielding,
sustainment, and development of future capabilities for the
system, but we will have to continually evaluate that as we go
along, but from where I sit today I am pretty comfortable with
where that investment is, which is not a very large percentage
of our overall defense budget.
Senator Bill Nelson. This committee wants to see that
successful test.
General Obering. Yes, sir, so do I.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Mr. Flory. Just to make it clear, I do too.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Duma, you're an objective evaluator.
Mr. Duma. I'll take the results of the test and report it.
Senator Sessions. This has been a very good hearing. I
think we've had a very interesting interchange about a part of
our defense posture that is very important. We thank you, each
of you, for the time and commitment you have given to it. It's
important, I believe, to our national defense, and I believe
we're on track. I believe the fundamentals of this program have
been clearly proven and that the technology is there, it's just
going to be a challenge of bringing it all together in this
system and proving the system is workable, and continuing to
enhance that capability as the threats continue to increase.
So, we thank you for that, we will keep the hearing open for
written questions for 48 hours.
Senator Sessions. I would note, General Obering and General
Dodgen, that I will be submitting some questions concerning
BRAC and how we're moving along with that, we've talked about
that previously. Personally, I appreciate your forthcoming
attitude about that. We would like to see BRAC, once we've made
these commitments, stay on track to full completion.
Thank you, if there's nothing else, we will adjourn.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
TRANSITION ISSUES
1. Senator Sessions. General Dodgen and General Obering, a
September 2005 Government Accountability Office report notes that
``there is uncertainty as to which assets may eventually be transferred
to each military Service and under what conditions those transfers
should occur. This uncertainty makes it difficult for the Services to
plan to address the requirements of Department of Defense (DOD)
acquisition regulations and realign their budgets to support the
missile defense mission.''
This uncertainty has implications for the fielding of missile
defense capabilities to the warfighter. For example, the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) plans to build only 48 Theater High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) missiles, with the assumption that the Army will
procure further missiles. Yet the Army has no funding for THAAD in its
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Likewise, the MDA has reduced its
deliveries of the sea-based interceptor (SM-3) from 100 to
approximately 80 over the FYDP, yet there is no sign that the Navy
plans to procure additional SM-3 missiles.
If the Services don't start to budget for missile defense, the MDA
will have its research and development budget increasingly whittled
down as deliveries of missile defense capabilities capture a larger
share of the missile defense budget. Who in the DOD can assure us that
the Services will start to budget for the procurement and operations of
missile defense capabilities?
General Dodgen. The Department continues to work through the
decisions to ensure an effective layered missile defense system is
fielded to protect our Nation and deployed forces. Many critical
decisions have already been decided and major accomplishments have been
realized. For instance, funding for manning and maintenance of the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System at Fort Greely as well as the
initial fire units of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense
Operational System are part of the Army's FYDP. Total funding
requirements for these programs will continue to be a shared MDA and
Army responsibility.
Using its Unified Command Plan authority to advocate for
warfighters' missile defense capability, United States Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) has initiated the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) study
to determine the optimal mix of sensor and weapon assets to achieve
desired operational effects necessary for an effective global missile
defense. The JCM study, which will be updated annually to identify
necessary capability mixes need by the warfighters, is supported by the
Geographical Combatant Commands (GCC), Joint Staff, and the Services.
A major goal of the initial JCM is to address the most pressing
funding issues in the 08-13 FYDP. While this year's JCM is still being
worked, the emerging results indicate the significant value of the
upper-tier systems (SM-3 and THAAD) in all GCCs' areas of
responsibility. While the exact details of transition may not be
finalized in this budget cycle, JCM results will be used to ensure we
have continuity in these programs as we build a robust capability.
General Obering. I can assure you that the Department, MDA, and the
Services are analyzing what capabilities to buy, when to transition
them, and when to program the resources necessary to do so. General
Dodgen initiated a capability mix study last year to determine the
right combinations of missile defense capabilities we should buy. The
Joint Functional Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense is
conducting the study and we expect their results later this year. The
study analyzes both the threat and the appropriate combinations of
interceptors and sensors necessary to counter that threat in 2012,
2015, and 2020. The study will also identify key decision points to
influence budgeting for the fiscal years 2008-2013 FYDP and the fiscal
years 2010-2015 FYDP.
Since January 2005, we have aggressively engaged our Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) stakeholders--the Services, the combatant
commands, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff, regarding
when to transition and when to program the resources. We have developed
our first transition plan that addresses the sufficient lead time
necessary for the Services to procure, operate, and sustain the BMDS.
In April 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics requested the Services concur with the plan
and identify issues needing further resolution.
KINETIC ENERGY INTERCEPTOR
2. Senator Sessions. General Obering, your testimony notes that MDA
is requesting $984 million in fiscal year 2007 to preserve decision
flexibility with respect to the two boost phase programs, Airborne
Laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI). If both ABL and KEI
achieve their key knowledge points, how do you decide which system to
buy?
General Obering. If both ABL and KEI succeed in achieving their key
knowledge points, and if they both prove to be cost effective, ABL will
become the boost phase element of the BMDS and land-based KEI with
Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) will become the mobile upgrade to the
midcourse element.
3. Senator Sessions. General Obering, would you consider going
forward with both?
General Obering. If both ABL and KEI succeed in achieving their key
knowledge points, and if they both prove to be cost effective, ABL will
become the boost phase element of the BMDS and land-based KEI with MKV
will become the mobile upgrade to the midcourse element.
4. Senator Sessions. General Obering, could one consider KEI in a
broader context as the block upgrade to current interceptors like
Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) and SM-3?
General Obering. The mobile KEI capabilities complement our fixed
site GBI and sea-based SM-3 interceptor investments. The MDA is
pursuing the KEI to fill BMDS boost/ascent and midcourse phase
performance gaps that require a mobile, high acceleration and heavy
lift booster as an enabling capability. Our initial focus is a land-
based KEI with a future evolution option of sea-basing. We are working
with the Navy in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 to select the
best value sea-based platform for KEI integration. This mobile booster
capability cannot be achieved via modifications to the existing GBI or
SM-3 systems. We need a new design, based on mature component
technologies, to perform the boost/ascent phase mission; we also need a
range of high-payoff mobile midcourse defense responses, such as a
forward-based KEI to deliver heavy payloads such as MKV or other
advanced discrimination payloads that engage the threat early in its
flight prior to subsequent GBI or SM-3 shots. The early boost/ascent
and midcourse shots that the KEI capability offers is an important
evolutionary element or our layered defense strategy to keep pace with
the threat.
5. Senator Sessions. General Obering, the fiscal year 2007 budget
request for KEI ($406 million) is almost double last year's
appropriation. Can you execute such a steep increase?
General Obering. Yes. I am very confident we can execute the budget
request and deliver the promised products. The KEI program enters a
period of significant hardware development and test next year. Booster
flight detailed design, long lead procurements, avionics ground tests,
and four rocket motor static fires account for a significant portion of
the 2007 budget request. We are also continuing a series of important
fire control tests to prove out our capability to engage ballistic
missiles with kinetic weapons in the boost and ascent phases of flight.
In addition, the program is executing critical systems engineering and
test infrastructure work across all the integrated product teams
leading to a System Design Review event in July 2007. Our KEI team
(Government, prime contractor, and suppliers) has a detailed plan in
place for executing the fiscal year 2007 work packages. All fiscal year
2007 activities and risk reduction tie to the agency's 2008 knowledge-
based decision point.
CONCURRENT TEST AND OPERATIONS
6. Senator Sessions. Mr. Duma, today, if we need to bring the
Ground-Based Missile Defense (GMD) system into alert status, this means
the system cannot be used for testing. Maintaining both alert status
and a testing program places increasing strain on man and machine. Your
written testimony notes that ``Over the long term, MDA should
incrementally develop a capability to support concurrent testing and
operations. . .'' Why do you say that?
Mr. Duma. The capability to test and train on the operational
configured GMD system as it evolves is critical to ensuring the
effectiveness, suitability, and readiness of the integrated fielded
capability. Currently, MDA has funded additional equipment in fiscal
year 2006 that will allow the GMD element to achieve a limited initial
concurrent test and operations capability. Collectively, we must
define, fund, develop, and employ a concurrent test and operations
capability for the full BMDS. The full BMDS capability should be
similar in concept to the capability that the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade
program acquired and used for training and testing the ``on-line''
Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment mission capability. I
support a solution that provides robust end-to-end system-level testing
that evaluates the full tactical hardware and software. The concurrent
test and operations solution should allow MDA to test the fully
integrated operational system, flight test interceptors, and launch
equipment using warfighters and operational tactics, techniques, and
procedures, while the combatant commands maintain an on-alert posture
for the BMDS.
7. Senator Sessions. Mr. Duma, shouldn't we have this capability as
soon as possible to ensure the operational effectiveness of the GMD
system, even while we continue to test to improve the system?
Mr. Duma. Yes. In fact, the GMD element has funded additional
equipment in fiscal year 2006 that will allow the GMD element to
achieve a limited initial concurrent test and operations capability.
However, as MDA integrates additional defensive capability into BMDS, a
corresponding concurrent test and operations capability should be
developed and employed. This concurrent test and operations capability
must reflect the operational configuration of the full BMDS capability.
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE RELATED EFFORTS
8. Senator Sessions. General Dodgen, please provide me a current
status of your base realignment and closure (BRAC) related efforts and
your move to Redstone Arsenal.
General Dodgen. We are making rapid progress in complying with the
BRAC directive to relocate the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
headquarters element to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Since the command
presently occupies the initial facility at the Von Braun Complex on
Redstone Arsenal, our relocation is not slowed due to construction or
leasing of necessary facilities. We have developed an implementation
plan that takes care of our employees and ensures continuity of
operations for the command. Rotating military personnel, along with
civilians desiring to move with the command, will start to report to
Redstone this summer. We anticipate compliance with the BRAC directive
by 30 September 2007.
9. Senator Sessions. General Obering, would you comment on the
current status of BRAC preparation undertaken by the MDA. I know your
task is much larger than General Dodgen's. Specifically, are you aware
of a special emergency military construction (MILCON) supplemental
designed to provide you more funds for your projects in the FYDP? I do
not believe there is such a thing.
General Obering. The MDA is committed to implementing the BRAC
initiatives. We are working with the DOD and the Army Corps of
Engineers to develop a realistic BRAC MILCON funding request to support
the necessary construction at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama and Fort
Belvoir, Virginia to accommodate BRAC move requirements. We are not
aware of any special emergency military construction supplemental
designed to provide MDA more funds for BRAC projects.
10. Senator Sessions. General Obering, what are your MILCON
concerns at this time impacting execution in fiscal year 2008?
General Obering. The MDA is committed to implementing its BRAC
recommendation within the statutory 6-year implementation period. We
are working with the DOD and the Army to develop an implementation plan
to both define the requirement and establish its phasing.
11. Senator Sessions. General Obering, you and I work closely
together, can we expect to have all the money we need in the fiscal
year 2008 MILCON budget to cover the three buildings required to house
the MDA and Redstone Arsenal?
General Obering. The Department is committed to fully funding all
BRAC recommendations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
possibility that gmd testing will not succeed
12. Senator Levin. Mr. Duma, at the hearing there was some
confusion about a question I asked concerning whether it is possible
that the GMD test program will not demonstrate success, and thus will
not provide confidence that the system is operationally effective. Just
as there is a possibility that the testing will prove successful, is
there a possibility that it will not prove successful, and that it will
not demonstrate that it is operationally effective?
Mr. Duma. Yes, there is always a possibility that testing of any
acquisition program will show that it is not effective and suitable.
DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT
13. Senator Levin. General Obering, a recent DOD Inspector General
(IG) report concluded, among other things, that the MDA ``had not
completed a systems engineering plan or planned fully for system
sustainment. Therefore, the MDA is at risk of not successfully
developing an integrated BMDS.'' There are other findings and
recommendations in the report. Given the hundreds of millions of
dollars that the MDA spends on systems engineering, and the primacy of
the objective to develop an integrated missile defense system, this
appears to be a remarkable finding. Can you explain how these lapses in
system engineering planning occurred and what you are doing to resolve
them?
General Obering. The MDA takes seriously the recommendations
contained in the DOD IG's report. In our reply of 3 April 2006, MDA
noted that MDA Systems Engineering developed an initial BMDS Systems
Engineering Process to reflect a capability-based, spiral acquisition
methodology--quite unlike other traditional processes. The DOD IG
concurred with our comments and stated MDA provided systems engineering
guidance to the elements of the BMDS.
This process was implemented for the BMDS as part of Block 04. In
collaboration with the BMDS elements, this process was modified,
through the MDA Configuration Control Board, for BMDS Block 06 and is
being documented in the BMDS System Engineering Plan that will be
released this spring. When released, the plan will be distributed
agency-wide to reestablish consistent guidance across the BMDS.
14. Senator Levin. General Obering, have you provided your
responses to the IG's office, as was requested by April 3?
General Obering. Yes. On 3 April 2006 MDA provided a full response
to the DOD IG to the Final Audit Report #D-2006-060 for the Audit of
Systems Engineering Planning for the BMDS.
15. Senator Levin. General Obering, the report also indicates that
MDA revised its ``policy so that auditors from the DOD Office of IG
receive expeditious and unrestricted access to documents in future
audits.'' Was it MDA policy previously not to provide such expeditious
and unrestricted access to IG auditors?
General Obering. No. MDA policy is, and has always been, to
cooperate with audit agencies, respond constructively and promptly, and
take appropriate corrective actions based on audit agencies' reports.
Additionally, it is MDA policy that all MDA staff cooperates with
auditors and provides accurate, complete information pertinent to the
subject under review and responds expeditiously to audit agencies'
requests.
SPACE-BASED BMD WEAPONS
16. Senator Levin. General Obering, does the planned funding for
the space ``test bed'' put the country on a course to deploy weapons in
space?
General Obering. Developing a space test bed does not necessarily
put the United States on a course to deploy weapons in space. We need
to integrate space capabilities into the BMDS in order to ensure global
access and meet the evolving threat. The space test bed will allow us
to assess the ability of existing and future space systems to support
the missile defense mission area, particularly in the areas of global
communications and sensor capability. These systems will have value to
the BMDS regardless of any particular interceptor basing mode.
We also plan to explore the addition of a space-based defensive
layer to complement the evolutionary BMDS. We believe that a mix of
terrestrial and space-basing offers the most effective global defense
against ballistic missiles. Initially, funding will be used to conduct
focused sensor and communications experiments demonstrating the
viability of space based capabilities for the BMDS. MDA believes it is
prudent to conduct experimentation to understand what it is capable and
what is not capable in that regard.
COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA
17. Senator Levin. Secretary Flory, your prepared testimony states
that ``we are negotiating a Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement
with Russia to facilitate both government-to-government as well as
industry-to-industry missile defense cooperation, while we continue to
seek practical areas of cooperation with Russia on a bilateral basis as
well as in the NATO-Russia context.'' We have not yet had any
substantial success in such cooperation. Section 1226 of last year's
National Defense Authorization Act expressed the support of Congress
for such cooperation, and suggested a number of specific ideas. What
has the Department done on those ideas, and what progress do you expect
from the current efforts?
Mr. Duma. The Russian Government has told us that they do not want
to agree to any missile defense cooperative projects until both sides
agree on a Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement. The USG has
respected those wishes.
In the meantime, the DOD has pursued several transparency
initiatives. In September 2005, we informed the Russian Government
about an upcoming test of the U.S. missile defense system because the
flight path of the test missile was relatively close to Russian
territory. DOD invited the Russian Government to send an official to
observe the test and to receive a briefing. Defense Minister Ivanov
subsequently sent a message to Secretary Rumsfeld thanking him for
inviting an observer and stating that such concrete steps demonstrated
a new level of trust in the relationship between the two armed forces.
In addition, DOD has regularly briefed senior Russian officials on our
missile defense programs.
DOD has also pursued a series of missile defense exercises with the
Russian armed forces. These exercises alternate between Moscow and the
United States. Their purpose is to establish procedures that will allow
both militaries to operate missile defenses cooperatively in the event
that they deploy under combat conditions in the same theatre. Hundreds
of military personnel have participated in these exercises on both
sides.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
SECTION 234 TEST PLAN
18. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, at the hearing there seemed to
be some confusion on the issue of the question on the status of section
234 of Public Law 109-163. My question related to the status of
implementation of the test plan for Block 2006, as required by section
234, rather than the Integrated Master Test Plan. Since we are already
in Block 06, the test plan should be available to influence the testing
activities for Block 2006. What is the current status of the effort to
prepare the test plan and who is participating?
Mr. Duma. The Service Operational Test Agencies prepared the
Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Assessment Plan, in coordination
with my office and the MDA. I approved the plan on June 30, 2006, and
sent copies to the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Committees.
19. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, is there any current holdup to
the preparation of the plan? If so, what is it?
Mr. Duma. No. The Service Operational Test Agencies prepared the
Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Assessment Plan, in coordination
with my office and the MDA. I approved the plan on June 30, 2006, and
sent copies to the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Committees.
20. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, when do you expect to receive
the plan for your review and approval? Please notify the committee when
you have received the plan, when you have approved the plan (assuming
you do), and please send a copy of the approved plan.
Mr. Duma. The Service Operational Test Agencies prepared the
Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Assessment Plan, in coordination
with my office and the MDA. I approved the plan on June 30, 2006, and
sent copies to the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Committees.
EUROPEAN ``THIRD SITE'' ISSUES
21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, the fiscal year 2007
budget request includes $119 million in funding for a number of
activities associated with designing and building a third deployment
site for GBIs for the GMD system, including long-lead funds for 10
interceptors to deploy in Europe (GBIs 41-50). What is the total
estimated cost of building the third site, building and deploying the
10 interceptors, and deploying the associated radars that would operate
in conjunction with the interceptors?
General Obering. Total costs associated with the planned European
Activities are:
$1,650 million for European Missile Field including:
$317 million for Launch Complex Hardware and
Site Activation Support (Procurement and Installation
of Silos, Launch Support Equipment), Interceptor
Emplacement
$141 million for Communications Equipment and
Connectivity to the GMD Fire Control/Communication
Network to Include Satellite and Secure Communication
$669 million for Missile Field Construction:
Planning and Design of the Site, Site Preparation,
Construction of Supporting Facilities and Primary
Mission Facilities
$358 million for Government Furnished
Equipment, Services, Management, and Program Protection
$165 million for System Engineering, Sub-
System Checkout Testing, Embedded Test Node, and System
Test Lab Upgrade
$484 million for Block 2010 GBIs (Procurement and
Integration of 10 Kill Vehicles and 10 Boosters)
$603 million is the current estimated costs for C2BMC,
from fiscal years 2008-2011. This cost includes development of
the site; equipment installation costs; procurement or
connection of the Defense Satellite Communication System
(DSCS); and operation and support costs
$220 million is the current estimated costs to
upgrade, transport, and site the GBR-P to the European Site.
However, funding for this effort is not contained in the fiscal
year 2007 President's budget submit
$46.4 million is the current estimated costs to
deployment and site construction of FBX-T
Finally, the success of the European Site requires the use of a
midcourse sensor (GBR-P) or a forward based radar (FBX-T) working in
concert with forward deployed interceptors. Optimally, all three
elements, the European Site interceptor field, the midcourse sensor,
and a forward-based radar, provide the best missile defense coverage
for the U.S. and European friends and allies. However, a forward based
radar, deployed in the European area of operations as a stand-alone
system, still significantly enhances U.S. based interceptor fields'
(Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Bases) ability to defend against
emerging ballistic missile threats within the region.
22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, is it correct that the
United States is expecting to pay for these costs, other than some in-
kind contributions provided by the relevant host nation?
General Obering. Yes. The costs for the missile defense site in
Europe we have provided you will be paid by the United States.
23. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, which nations is the
system supposed to protect against a potential future Iranian long-
range missile threat?
General Obering. A European third GBI site will protect the United
States against a potential future Iranian long-range ballistic missile
threat (range greater than 5,500 kilometers) and Europe against both a
potential future Iranian intermediate range ballistic missile threat
(range from 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and also some medium-range
ballistic missile threats (approximate ranges of 2,500 to 3,000
kilometers). The amount of protection is dependent both on the
placement of the site and on the placement of a search and track sensor
on the European continent.
24. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, is it the U.S., is it
part of Europe, or a combination?
General Obering. It is a combination of protection of both the
United States and Europe. A European third GBI site will protect the
United States against a potential future Iranian long-range ballistic
missile threat (range greater than 5,500 kilometers) and Europe against
both a potential future Iranian intermediate range ballistic missile
threat (range from 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and also some medium
range ballistic missile threats (approximate ranges of 2,500 to 3,000
kilometers). The amount of protection is dependent both on the
placement of the interceptor site and on the forward placement of a
search and track sensor on the European continent.
EUROPEAN GBI EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST A THEATER MISSILE
25. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, if Iran wanted to strike
targets in Europe with ballistic missiles, it appears that they could
develop a regional missile before they would develop an
intercontinental missile. Would the GMD/GBI third site system be
effective in defending Europe against Iranian medium-range or
intermediate-range missiles?
General Obering. It is reasonable to expect that Iran would develop
a regional ballistic missile before they would develop an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (range greater than 5,500
kilometers). A regional ballistic missile would be the equivalent of
what MDA defines as intermediate range ballistic missiles (range from
3,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and medium range ballistic missiles (range
from 1,000 to 3,000 kilometers). A European GBI site would be effective
in defending Europe against Iranian regional ballistic missiles
depending on the range. The GBI could defend against Iranian
intermediate range ballistic missiles (range from 3,000 to 5,500
kilometers) and some medium range ballistic missiles (approximately
2,500 to 3,000 kilometers). Other BMDS assets such as THAAD and Aegis
BMD do provide defense against medium-range ballistic missiles
including those in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers.
ROGUE INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO UNITED STATES
26. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering and General Dodgen, at our
worldwide threats hearing in February, the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), Ambassador Negroponte, and the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DDIA), General Maples, did not even
mention in their prepared testimony the efforts of North Korea or Iran
to develop long-range ballistic missiles. They did discuss their
efforts to develop regional missiles. In answer to a question about
North Korea, General Maples said: ``We assess that they are in the
process of developing an ICBM that would be capable of delivering a
nuclear warhead, but they have not done so yet, nor have they tested
it.''
At a later hearing, General Bell, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea,
said that he agreed with General Maples' characterization of North
Korea's ballistic missile programs, and added that: ``Up through the
late 1990s, there was a fairly active program in North Korea to develop
that missile technology and potentially to test it. In the years since
the late 1990s, the last 6 years, 7 years, we have seen very little
activity by the North Koreans to actively continue to develop and test
long-range missile systems. There is no doubt in my mind that they have
the capability to begin more technological investigation and to begin a
regimen to lead to testing and potentially to lead to fielding. But
there's no evidence of it right now.'' Do you agree or disagree with
these assessments of the DNI, DDIA, and the Commander of U.S. Forces
Korea?
General Obering. MDA has no basis upon which to disagree with the
DNI, DDIA, and General Bell's intelligence assessments. MDA relies on
Intelligence Community (IC) assessments as one portion of the range of
threats that the BMDS is designed to protect against. As the system
developer, MDA is not in a position to provide or assess intelligence,
or to generate requirements. Rather, MDA must develop the BMDS based on
current assessment of not only what is intelligence based, but what is
within the realm of the possible engineering so as not to be surprised.
The BMDS must look beyond assessments of current potential adversary
capabilities to ensure the ability of the United States to deal with
unforeseen future threats. MDA's evolutionary acquisition program,
therefore, addresses the evolving ballistic missile threat.
General Dodgen. I concur with the threat assessments made by
Ambassador Negroponte, General Maples, and General Bell during their
recent testimony concerning North Korea's ICBM development efforts. In
August 1998, North Korea did demonstrate a rudimentary capability to
launch a long-range ballistic missile airframe. Although we have seen
very little activity to actively develop and test an ICBM since that
event, we believe the North Korean regime still continues to pursue and
develop ballistic missile/space launch technology that can be used to
advance their long-range missile capabilities. From a warfighter
perspective, it cannot be overlooked that North Korean has recently
developed and tested other classes of ballistic missiles and have
continued to pursue opportunities to export these capabilities to other
countries on numerous occasions. The significant evidence of a
continuously improving North Korean ballistic missile capability, with
the added intent to export, certainly should continue to motivate our
desires to stay ahead of the proliferating threat with our missile
defense programs.
CHANGING DOD OVERSIGHT OF BMD PROGRAMS
27. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, Mr. Duma's prepared
testimony described briefly a changing DOD oversight structure for the
BMD System and program, consistent with the Quadrennial Defense Review.
His statement mentions a new BMD Executive Board. Could you describe
the proposed new structure and your role in implementing it?
General Obering. This Executive Board, with membership drawn from
OSD, the Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and STRATCOM, will
recommend and oversee implementation of strategic policies and plans,
program priorities, and investment options to protect our Nation and
our allies from any form of ballistic missile attack. The Board will
provide guidance to MDA as it develops and fields initial capabilities
and conducts spiral development to upgrade the elements and components
that make up the BMDS. The Board will also consider the evolving
priorities and requirements of the warfighting community as it
formulates recommendations on the way forward in missile defense.
The BMD Executive Board will enhance the DOD's decisionmaking
process by focusing exclusively on issues related to the BMDS. The
precise details of the charter, including the membership and decision
authority of the BMD Executive Board, are still being determined.
28. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, how do you believe it
will improve oversight of the BMD program, and when do you expect the
new Executive Board will be in place?
General Obering. In 2001 the Secretary of Defense formed the Senior
Executive Council (SEC) to provide counsel on the application of sound
business practices across the DOD. BMD is one of a broad range of
mission areas overseen by the SEC. The BMD Executive Board will not
have decision authority like the SEC, but it will help enhance the
Department's decision making process by focusing exclusively on issues
related to the BMDS.
The Board, with senior official membership drawn from OSD, the
Services, JCS, and STRATCOM, will recommend and oversee implementation
of strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and investment
options to protect our Nation and our allies from any form of ballistic
missile attack. The Board will incorporate evolving requirements into a
comprehensive acquisition strategy to develop and field operational
missile defense capability. It will improve information flow among key
stakeholders: the MDA, Office of the Secretary of Defense, combatant
commanders, DOD components, the Joint Staff, and the National Security
Council and IC. The Board will establish a viable means to achieve our
goals within the context of technical capability and established
resource levels.
The Board will guide new ideas and technologies as they develop
into initial capabilities, and subsequently into fully mature solutions
ready for fielding and inclusion into the missile defense system. The
Board will also consider the evolving priorities and requirements of
the warfighting community as it formulates recommendations on the way
forward.
I expect the BMD Executive Board will be in place by some time this
summer.
u.s.-israel missile defense cooperation
29. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, for years, the United
States has been concerned with the aggressive nature of Iran and its
desire to develop a nuclear weapons capability and the missile systems
to deliver it. Israel, in partnership with the United States, has been
focused on the advanced development, production, and deployment of an
anti-ballistic missile system called the Arrow. I understand that the
Arrow is the only Israeli system deployed that can address this threat.
Given the growing missile threat in the Middle East, can we do more to
accelerate the production of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system,
increase deterrence in the region, and help stabilize the situation?
General Obering. Since 1986, the United States and Israel have
jointly developed the Arrow Weapon System (AWS) to provide Israel an
indigenous capability to defend against short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles. The current focus of the Arrow System Improvement
Program (ASIP) is to upgrade the AWS to counter evolving longer-range
and more challenging ballistic missile threats. The current ASIP
program ends in fiscal year 2008.
Israel seeks to develop a ``hermetic'' or zero leakage
defense system. The Israeli Ministry of Defense has identified
new threats in the region with non-conventional capabilities.
While the current Israeli Missile Defense Architecture has some
capability against these emerging threats, it does not provide
an adequate number of opportunities to ensure a zero leakage
defense.
The Israel Missile Defense Organization wants to start
discussions in fiscal year 2007 regarding a possible post-ASIP
program to counter emerging threats. They have requested an
additional $8 million to start a joint study and conceptual
design of the necessary enhancements. The proposed post-ASIP
program, Arrow Missile Segment Enhancement program, will add an
upper-tier level of defense to the current Arrow II interceptor
to provide additional engagement opportunities.
MDA has expected a follow-on program to begin at the
conclusion of the current ASIP agreement. This program is
outlined in the President's budget as ``Arrow Block 5'' and
includes $55.0 million in fiscal year 2009, $57.7 million in
fiscal year 2010, and $59.4 million in fiscal year 2011. While
MDA plans for a follow-on program to continue Arrow
enhancements, there are indications that the ASIP program may
slip into fiscal year 2009 and recommends focusing on the
current Arrow program vice beginning any follow-on program.
Additionally, MDA recommends looking at U.S. systems (like
THAAD) to satisfy the Israeli requirements for an upper tier
system to meet this growing threat.
30. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, if Congress were to
authorize and appropriate additional funds for Arrow coproduction, is
there the necessary production capability to execute the program?
General Obering. Yes.
Background: Since 2004, this program has enabled Boeing to support
Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) in producing components for the Arrow
interceptor, increasing monthly production capabilities by 300 percent
and thus drastically shortening the acquisition time line for reaching
Israeli Air Force's operational requirements. Components produced by
Boeing are shipped to IAI for final integration and assembly. On 29
September 2005, the first coproduced Arrow Interceptor was delivered to
the Israel Missile Defense Organization.
The State of Israel has requested an additional $50
million for fiscal year 2007. This would be an addition to the
$13 million from the President's budget request for Arrow
Weapon System coproduction to make further progress towards
meeting Israel's defense requirements. Each Coproduced Arrow II
Interceptor costs $2.6 million.
MDA has budgeted $13 million in fiscal year 2007 for
coproduction. Israel plans to contribute $6 million (should
additional U.S. funding be provided), Israeli will increase
their contribution to maintain the 67 percent/33 percent cost
share. If Israel receives this add, this will be the last year
for the coproduction program as Arrow II interceptor inventory
will meet Israeli Air Force requirements. Due to this, there is
minimal benefit to increasing production to reduce the
acquisition time line.
31. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, research and development
on technologies that protect against additional threats such as shorter
range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles may also benefit from
Arrow's mature capability. I understand MDA has programmed $2.0 million
for fiscal year 2007, in addition to funds already provided by Congress
for fiscal year 2006. What would this funding accomplish by the end of
fiscal year 2007 and what is the plan to continue this research in 2008
and beyond?
General Obering. These funds were to be used in the U.S. for a
study to explore possible U.S. benefits from the Israeli Short Range
Ballistic Missile Defense (SRBMD) system. At this time MDA has not
committed to the SRBMD program and is not seeking funding for this
effort.
Background: In March 2005, Israel initiated an 18-month feasibility
study of a low-cost SRBMD capability as an enhancement to the AWS.
Israel requires a wide-area active defense system against the current
and growing threat to Israeli civilians from short-range, relatively
low-tech, and inexpensive ballistic missiles. The current Israeli
Missile Defense Architecture (Patriot and Arrow) has capability against
some of these short-range missile threats but does not provide a cost-
effective defense. The goal is $300,000 per missile cost vs. the $2-3
million per Arrow or Patriot missile. For fiscal year 2006, Congress
made $10 million available for a joint feasibility study designated the
SRBMD initiative.
For fiscal year 2007, Israel requested an additional
$25 million to begin the first phase of Full Scale Development
of a short-range BMDS. The goal for fiscal year 2007 is to
complete the Preliminary Design Review.
For fiscal year 2008 and beyond, Israel plans on
requesting $40 million a year to continue Full Scale
Development. Additionally, MDA's independent cost analysis
estimate of total research and development and production costs
for this proposed short-range system is $500 million.
[Whereupon at 12:44 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006
U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:34 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Thune, Reed,
and Bill Nelson.
Majority staff member present: Robert M. Soofer,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
minority counsel; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Jill L. Simodejka and Pendred K.
Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss: Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator
Kennedy; Erik Raven, assistant to Senator Byrd; and William K.
Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Sessions. The hearing will come to order.
Senator Reed, we're glad you're with us, and I think
Senator Nelson will join us. I'm pleased to welcome our
witnesses today, the Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Under Secretary
of the Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) Executive
Agent for Space, a dual hat there; Lieutenant General Kevin P.
Chilton, USAF, Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component
Commander for Space and Global Strike; Lieutenant General
Michael A. Hamel, USAF, Commander of the Air Force Space and
Missile Systems Center; Rear Admiral Kenneth W. Deutsch, USN?
Admiral Deutsch. Sprechen sie Deutsch, sir.
Senator Sessions. Deutsch. Right? Nein. [Laughter.]
You're the Director of the Net-Centric Warfare Division for
the Navy.
Admiral Deutsch. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain--and that's the
correct pronunciation?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes.
Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain is the Acting Director for
Acquisition and Sourcing Management for the United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO). So, you're the
independent evaluator here, and we appreciate your report and
opinion.
I thank the witnesses for taking time to be with us, and
for their continuing commitment to our Nation's security.
The subcommittee today meets to receive testimony on the
military space programs of the DOD in review of the National
Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2007. The
subcommittee intends to address the budgetary and programmatic
aspects of satellite and space launch programs and to
investigate the progress that has been made by the DOD to
improve the space acquisition process that had some
difficulties, for sure.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request for all nonclassified
military activities is approximately $10.5 billion, of which $6
billion is for research and development (R&D), a large sum,
$2.3 billion is for procurement, and $2.2 billion for
operations and maintenance. The current generation of military
space systems is being modernized in virtually every mission
area: strategic missile warning, assured communications,
navigations, and intelligence and surveillance.
I would just note that satellite capabilities are
absolutely critical to the defense of our country, for the
operation of all our military Services, effectively. Even the
Army now, with their Future Combat Systems (FCS), is utterly
dependent upon the capabilities that you procure and produce
for us. But, at the same time, virtually all of our
modernization programs have suffered substantial problems with
regard to cost, schedule, and technical performance, which has
been estimated to cost the taxpayers some $1.7 billion in 2007
alone, so that's a lot of money, and it's a problem we need to
address.
We welcome the new leadership in the Air Force space
community and understand that this problem has been taken
seriously, that you have moved quickly to effect reforms in the
acquisition process. We hope to hear more about these reforms,
in the hope of restoring congressional confidence in the
acquisition of our military space programs. We want our
Congress to feel confident about that when these budgetary
requests come forward.
Finally, we intend to review the current state of U.S.
military space capabilities in support of the warfighter, and,
related to this, the progress and potential for smaller, less
expensive, and less complex space assets to support the theater
warfighter in a timely manner.
[The prepared statement by Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
The hearing will come to order. Senator Nelson, welcome. I am
pleased to welcome our witnesses today: the Honorable Ronald M. Sega,
Under Secretary of the Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD)
Executive Agent for Space; Lieutenant General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF,
Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component Commander for Space and
Global Strike; Lieutenant General Michael A. Hamel, USAF, Commander of
the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center; Rear Admiral Kenneth W.
Deutsch, USN, Director of Net-Centric Warfare for the Navy; and Ms.
Cristina T. Chaplain, Acting Director for Acquisition and Sourcing
Management for the U.S. Government Accountability Office. I thank the
witnesses for taking time to be with us and for their continuing
commitment to our Nation's security.
The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the military
space programs of the DOD in review of the National Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2007. The subcommittee intends to
address the budgetary and programmatic aspects of satellite and space
launch platforms and investigate the progress that has been made by the
process.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request for all nonclassified military
space activities is approximately $10.5 billion, of which $6 billion is
for research and development, $2.3 billion for procurement, and $2.2
billion for operations and maintenance.
The current generation of military space systems are being
modernized in virtually every mission area: strategic missile warning;
assured communications; navigation; and intelligence and surveillance.
At the same time, virtually every modernization program has suffered
substantial problems with regard to cost, schedule, and technical
performance, which will cost the taxpayer some $1.7 billion in fiscal
year 2007 alone.
We welcome the new leadership in the Air Force space community and
understand they have moved quickly to effect reforms in the acquisition
process. We hope to hear today more about these reforms in the hope of
restoring congressional confidence in the acquisition of our military
space programs.
Finally, we intend to review the current state of U.S. military
space capabilities in support of the warfighter and, related to this,
the progress and potential for smaller, less expensive, and less
complex space assets to support the theater warfighter in a timely
manner.
Let me now recognize my distinguished ranking member, Senator
Nelson of Florida, for any opening remarks he may have.
Senator Sessions. Senator Reed, if you would like to make
some opening comments now, I'd be glad to receive those.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No, I don't. Senator
Nelson might have some opening comments, but I'm interested in
hearing the witnesses and thank them for being here today.
Senator Sessions. Well, good, and we appreciate you.
Someone has said, when you deal with programs, there are
some questions that need to be asked. Is it a need or a want?
We want a lot of things, but we may not need them all. If it is
a need, when do we need it, and how much will it cost? How
vital is that need compared to other needs that may be as
vital, or more so? What are we going to have to give up to meet
that need? So, those are some questions I think most of you
understand and recognize as you do your jobs, but questions
that are important.
Secretary Sega, we're delighted to have you with us. We'd
be delighted to hear your comments at this time. We have about
a 5-minute round for each of you to speak. You can also make
your remarks a part of the record and make more limited
remarks, if you choose.
Mr. Secretary?
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD M. SEGA, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE
Dr. Sega. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and
distinguished members of the committee, I'm honored to appear
before you today to discuss national security space. I thank
you for allowing the written statement to be included as part
of the record.
As Under Secretary of the Air Force and the DOD Executive
Agent for Space, I am committed to improving space capabilities
upon which our commanders and forces depend to conduct their
missions. I thank this committee and the entire Congress for
your support to national security space efforts.
Today, I want to outline the importance of space to our
warfighters, and focus on three key areas for national
security, and actually highlighting, principally, one, in terms
of acquisition.
During the last hurricane season, we witnessed weather
satellites tracking hurricanes and rescuers using global
positioning systems (GPS) and satellite imagery to direct
relief efforts to the hardest hit areas, Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita being the clearest examples.
I'd like to relate two lesser known examples of the
effectiveness of space systems. My first example concerns space
support to the humanitarian missions in the Philippines. Space
capabilities played a key role in our relief effort for a
massive mudslide that buried an entire village on the island of
Leyte. Within hours of the disaster, a Hawaii Air National
Guard Combat Communications Unit that was in the area on an
exercise, and switched into real-world humanitarian relief.
They used an Eagle Vision system to quickly merge some archival
commercial satellite imagery with mapping software, called
Falcon View, and produced photos and gridded maps of the area,
enabling them to locate fields that aircrews could, in fact,
operate out of. Then they used the Eagle Vision to order,
collect, and process new commercial imagery of the affected
area, and they shared this information with U.S. responders, as
well as the Philippine government agencies. This included
images that compared the area before and after the mudslide,
and enabled the authorities to move effectively to plan the
rescue and relief operations. This same Guard unit returned to
Hawaii shortly thereafter and began, immediately, rescue and
recovery efforts in the island of Kauai.
The second example comes from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
specifically in March 2003. It was a planned night parachute
drop by the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade. Weather was rough
during that time. Of course, the mountains in northern Iraq are
also very rough, and Captain--now a Major-select--John Roberts
was very concerned. I had the privilege of talking to him just
a few weeks ago. He was at an undisclosed location in Iraq. His
10 years in Air Force service included 9 of which were directly
assigned to U.S. Army units. He's eight jumps away from master
jump wings. In March 2003, he was assigned to the 173rd
Airborne Brigade in Italy. The plan was to jump into northern
Iraq to secure that area.
The week prior, all predictions were the weather was going
to be horrible on the planned jump night. Brigade Commander
Still said, ``This is the night, and got to make it work.''
John spent the week studying model satellite photos, talking to
his counterparts in the weather area in U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) and U.S. Air Force, Europe (USAFE). All the
information was bad. On March 26, 2003, which is jump day, he
was now down to using satellite imagery to review the predicted
weather window, which he saw as 1 hour in length as a front
would move past.
As he told me, he was betting his bars that day that the
predicted short window of opportunity would lift and convinced
the folks to change the takeoff time to match this weather
time. Brigade in flight was on 16 C-17s. First 10 included
troops numbering over 1,000, as I understand it, and the second
group of, in this case 6, was with the equipment. An hour out,
the ground team said the weather was still no-go, 800-foot
ceilings, blowing snow. John came on the satellite phone to the
brigade commander in the C-17 and convinced him to proceed,
obviously keeping an eye on this weather satellite imagery.
Thirty minutes out, the weather's still bad. Fifteen minutes
out, the sky begins to clear, the jump happens on time. One
hour after the jump, the weather closes back in. John landed
the next day, the C-17, with this unit. For the Army folks, he
could do no wrong.
So, that's one example of someone that has used satellites
to full advantage to effect military operations. Major-select
John Roberts will be heading in June to Alabama to teach at
Maxwell Air Force Base.
Senator Sessions. That's a fabulous story. It's a life-and-
death question, many times, with that capability. That's a good
story.
Dr. Sega. Thank you.
The satellite assets, as you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
are essential at various levels of military in planning and
operations, but clearly are also important to our economy,
homeland security, and other disaster response activities.
I would like to focus on three areas of national security
space. The first is to improve the integration of space
capabilities across the national security space community, as
well as with the air, land, and sea capabilities. The second
area is to get back to basics in acquisition. I will go into
that in a bit more detail. The third is to ensure the viability
and proficiency of our space professionals and the science and
technology workforce.
I would like to refer to this one chart I have over my
right-hand shoulder.
The approach is a ``back to basics'' approach, and it has
several components, one of which is to look at acquisition in
terms of stages. This case, from the lower left of science and
technology, building in technology maturity to a stage of
technology development, to a next stage of systems development
and systems production. The approach is to lower the risk in
the system production phase while, at the same time, increasing
risk that we take to push the frontiers hard in the science and
technology, and, to a certain extent, the technology
development phase.
The goal is to identify clearly the requirements and the
technologies available as you start block one. So, as we build
in maturity of the technologies from this lower stage and
moving on up this chart, science and technology, technology
development, systems development, reaching a stage of roughly
technology readiness level six as we begin block one, but also
we need to work with the users, very continuously, in a
collaborative way as we identify what is in block one. As we
ask the users, ``What do you need?'' we are now in dialogue.
They're asking, ``What do you have?'' and converging on, ``What
is important that will meet needs in a specific time, with
specific capability, with what we know we can build?'' So, the
end result should be a decrease of the acquisition cycle time.
Looking at program managers staying on for that reduced
time through the extent of the block-one approach, technologies
that are not ready for block one, we've relegated to later
blocks. So, the requirements process is important, technology
maturity is important, fundamentals in systems engineering are
important, cost estimation and schedule.
If I could give one example of this, is--what we have in
the President's budget request in fiscal year 2007, is
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT).
Through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process, the
warfighters, combatant commanders (COCOMs), and folks in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services did
an extensive review of what we should have, going forward, in
the DOD. One of those capabilities was satellite
communications.
It was determined, through that process, that the
technologies that were identified as matured, not only
identified by us internally, but also by GAO and Congress,
constitute a block one.
Senator Sessions. Would you, we assume that those that are
listening may understand what TSAT is, and most of us do, but
maybe you can give us a quick synopsis of what you plan for the
TSAT program. What its capabilities are?
Dr. Sega. I certainly will.
Its name is derived from Transformational Satellite
Communications System, and the main features that TSAT has that
other satellites do not have includes a laser communications
crosslink. So, with a laser communications crosslinks, the
bandwidth, the capacity on that communications channel, is much
higher than you can do with radio frequency (RF). The second
major feature on that satellite is a router. It becomes a part
of a network now in space. We have other pieces of our larger
network that are being built that also provide the structure
and the framework for network-centric operations. One of those
would be the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). It's becoming
more of a communications node on the network.
The TSAT is a sophisticated communications system enabling
us to more effectively communicate with Army forces, FCS, when
they're on the move, and to bring the information back, as you
would in a more modern Internet protocol packet-based system.
Our current systems are like a switch, like the old operator
that used to plug in from one wire of one person that wanted to
communicate, and connect them to someone else with another wire
at the operator station. What we have in space, is this switch
of an operator connecting one to another. TSAT provides us a
router in space at high bandwidth. That is a fundamental change
from what we have done in the past, and it is an enabler for
what we want to do in the future.
Now, we also, then, by reducing what we are expecting out
of block one, reduce the weight of the satellite's estimate
from over 5,000 pounds in the payload to less than 3,500
pounds. So, we began a more conservative approach of building
this on time and on schedule.
Now, working with the warfighters, we also increased the
bandwidth capacity on systems that we're well familiar with, KA
band. Capability of the satellite actually was increased by a
factor of two in this trade space that the technical community,
the acquisition community, was making with the warfighters. In
the budget request in 2007 is block one and some money that'll
continue the systems development phase that will continue
working on that technology that wasn't right, and then, when it
is ready, move into satellites three, four, and beyond.
We also looked at the cost estimation. Consistent with GAO
recommendations, the Young panel and others, what you see in
the budget in fiscal year 2007 is an 80 percent confidence
figure in terms of our budget estimates, as well. So, more
conservative approach into the systems production phase of
TSAT, as one example coming out of this budget request the
block approach and incremental approach to continuing providing
increased capability for the warfighter.
So, they will be getting a increased capability in a rhythm
of arrival at fielded capabilities as we move on in time. The
production base will also see a rhythm of production occurring
in time, so there'll be more stability from a production
standpoint.
We need to also be careful on how our investment portfolio
looks, in terms of what is in the next-generation systems
development, the one after that, technology development, and
still the generation after that, science and technology, so it
fits together? So, we're maturing technology as we move forward
up the chart. We're also maturing our people, giving our folks
more opportunity to get hands-on experience in these lower
levels of this staged development. So, when they also are
moving up in experience, they will have the technical instincts
to be experienced managers as they move up to managing some of
these more sophisticated systems.
So that's the block approach, going forward. That's an
example, on the very large side.
On the smaller side is a renewed emphasis in smaller
satellites. Here we're looking at going forward in a strategy
of bringing together more of our laboratories and our product
centers. So we have an example of that in XSS-11, that was
scheduled to be built from start to finish in 36 months and
around $80 million. It was bumped onto a couple of different
boosters, and it ended up at 39 months. It's been on orbit for
almost a year now, and working quite effectively with the Air
Force Research Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base, Space and
Missile Systems Command, working there, and contractor
Lockheed-Martin, being flown there, out of Albuquerque.
So, small satellites, and a subset of those are TacSats,
tactical satellites, will be part of our future, going forward.
It fits very well in this construct, also.
I've certainly taken quite a bit of time here.
Space is clearly important. I think we all share that. Mr.
Chairman, I appreciate the continued support of Congress and
this committee to ensure we have what is necessary to deliver
vital capabilities to our warfighters. I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sega follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Ronald M. Sega
INTRODUCTION
It is my distinct honor to appear before the committee today to
discuss our National Security Space activities as Under Secretary of
the Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent for
Space. As the DOD Executive Agent for Space, my role is to ``develop,
coordinate, and integrate plans and programs for space systems and the
acquisition of DOD space Major Defense Acquisition Programs to provide
operational space force capabilities to ensure the United States has
the space power to achieve its national security objectives.''
The President's budget, released on February 6, 2006, ``focuses
taxpayer resources on national priorities like the war on terrorism,
health care, energy research and strengthening our global
competitiveness,'' and includes defense spending to ``maintain a high
level of military readiness, develop and procure new weapon systems to
ensure U.S. battlefield superiority, and support our service members
and their families.'' This budget ``reflects the Department's continued
shift in emphasis away from the static posture and forces of the last
century toward the highly mobile and expeditionary forces, and
accompanying warfighting capabilities, needed in the century ahead.''
As discussed in the Secretary of the Air Force's and Chief of Staff
of the Air Force's testimony in the 2006 Air Force Posture Statement,
``The U.S. depends upon the Air Force to supply critical space
capabilities to meet the needs of Joint operations worldwide, and also
the needs of national missions across the instruments of diplomatic,
informational, military and economic power.'' These space capabilities
enable the U.S. to assure allies, dissuade military competition, deter
threats and decisively defeat adversaries. The National Security Space
community must address the 21st century defense challenges by
``modernizing critical capabilities across the spectrum of global
strike, navigation, weather, communication, missile warning, launch,
surveillance, counterspace and ground-based space systems.''
Today, I want to outline the importance of space to our warfighters
and then focus on three key areas for national security space. The
first is to improve the integration of space capabilities across the
national security space community, as well as with air, land, and sea-
based capabilities. The second area is to get ``back-to-basics'' in
space acquisition. The third is to ensure the viability and proficiency
of our space professionals and science and technology (S&T) workforce.
Before I discuss each of these areas, it is important to reiterate
the importance of space capabilities to our Nation. Space pervades many
aspects of everyday life in America. Space services enter homes,
businesses, schools, hospitals, and government offices to affect
transportation, health, telecommunications, weather forecasting,
education, commerce, agriculture, and energy. Space services are
transforming major aspects of commercial and social activity and will
continue to do so as emerging technologies increase the satellite
capabilities. Our Nation's ability to respond to events around the
world is heavily enabled by space-based capabilities whether defending
our borders, facilitating disaster assistance at home or aiding
disaster victims in the Far East.
From a military standpoint, leveraging our space capabilities
provides the U.S. with an asymmetric advantage over our adversaries in
our fight to win the ``Long War,'' the global war on terror. Today's
fast-paced military environment requires global connectivity between
many fast-moving elements. Satellite communications (SATCOM) is the
backbone that connects forces to allow an intercontinental flow of
information whether in remote deserts or crowded urban terrain.
Space-based warning systems help to defend our forces abroad as
well as the American homeland from ballistic missile attack. Successful
cueing of defensive systems allows timely responses to attacks. This
past December, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology
and Logistics certified and restructured the Space Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) High program. As part of the certification, it was
determined that this program is essential to national security, there
are no other lower cost alternatives, the program cost estimate is
reasonable, and the management structure is adequate. The first
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit satellite (GEO-1) is now planned to launch
in fall 2008. Given the continued importance of the missions, the
Department will work with Congress to initiate a new, competitor
capability in parallel with the SBIRS program to ensure that the
Nation's missile warning capability is sustained and that support to
theater and strategic missile defense, technical intelligence, and
battlespace characterization is also achieved. This proposed program
should exploit new technologies to provide the Department with
additional options for making decisions related to these mission areas.
The Department will also conduct enhanced oversight of the SBIRS
program to ensure that cost, schedule, and performance are closely
monitored.
Battle-space awareness, coupled with precision weapons such as
those guided by Global Positioning System (GPS), allows our forces to
successfully engage enemy targets with a minimal number of weapons and
limited collateral damage. In fact, precision strike is no longer just
a goal; it is an expectation.
Space-based ISR systems, by providing global presence and
increasing persistence, provide data that make it possible for military
commanders and national decision makers to lift the fog of war over the
battlespace. Detailed information from space systems helps us utilize
limited national resources more effectively. Only with space systems
can we consistently observe remote or denied areas to help us better
prepare for and respond to threats. In addition to military
applications, space-related capabilities also help national leaders
make foreign policy decisions by supplying key data for diplomatic
decisionmaking, helping verify treaty compliance, and monitoring
diplomatic crises.
Future ISR systems, such as Space Radar, will give users more
persistent, worldwide, day, night, and all-weather knowledge of enemy
movement. When integrated with other space-based systems and
terrestrial systems, this additional source of information will provide
more robust battle space awareness.
Space capabilities also play an important role in disaster response
and homeland security. For example, our weather satellites observed
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and provided data for forecasting their
strengths and impacts. After these storms disrupted many normal means
of navigation and communication, response teams relied on GPS for
precise navigation and used SATCOM to coordinate their efforts. Space-
derived data aided the disaster response in many ways to help alleviate
the severity of these disasters.
Aside from commercial industries that use space services directly,
space has a pervasive economic and social impact. Many banking and
financial firms employ GPS timing to synchronize their encrypted
computer networks. With the rise of computer-based stock trading and e-
commerce, precise timing of transactions is becoming more important,
and GPS is a key mechanism for distributing these necessary timing
signals.
Maintaining the asymmetric advantages we enjoy today in space will
continue to be vital to U.S. national security in the future.
Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly demonstrate that space-
enabled warfare is the way we will fight current and future battles.
Plans for future military capabilities across the entire DOD reflect
this new reality. For example, the Army's Future Combat System (FCS)
will operate in more complex battle environments requiring a mix of
manned and unmanned systems connected by a network. To provide global
connectivity, that network will rely on space-based communication
systems. The Transformational Satellite (TSAT) Communications Program
is being developed to support the extension of the Global Information
Grid (GIG) to deployed and mobile users, allowing the warfighter and
other users increased agility and effectiveness in dispersed,
decentralized and constantly changing environments.
In order to provide continuous, reliable space services, we must
ensure access to space. This past year I had the opportunity to witness
the final Titan IV launch. Culminating a nearly 50 year history of the
Titan program, this launch out of our West Coast facility at Vandenberg
Air Force Base, extended a record 44 consecutive successful national
security launches. We are maintaining this assured access to space by
using the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) as we
simultaneously investigate new Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
launch options.
The Air Force is continuing its pursuit of ORS small satellite
capabilities with the potential to rapidly deploy and employ
communication, ISR, and other space capabilities. The range of
opportunities for small satellites includes not only rapid response
capabilities such as TACSATs, but also development of small satellites
as standard elements or backups for global constellation operations,
and as enablers for more aggressive S&T and technology/system
development programs.
Since space capabilities are so vital to our defense as well as our
everyday life, they must be protected. As we become more operationally
tied to space systems, future adversaries will try to deny us the
asymmetric advantages that space provides us. The Space Commission
pointed out in 2001 that the U.S. is an attractive candidate for a
``Space Pearl Harbor.'' We saw the beginnings of this with GPS jamming
in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While the United States supports the
peaceful use of space by all, it has been our Nation's policy since
1996 to ensure hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space, and
to counter, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile
purposes, preferably using temporary or reversible manners.
The first step in protecting our space capabilities is improving
our Space Situation Awareness (SSA). SSA forms the foundation for all
of space control and includes traditional space surveillance,
collection and processing of space intelligence data, analysis of the
space environment, and the fusion of these elements to contribute to a
better understanding of the space domain.
Space control activities also emphasize the protection of our
national security interests against potential vulnerabilities and
rapidly evolving threats. We are increasing our focus on ensuring our
assets will meet operational requirements in a growing and changing
threat environment.
Our DOD Space areas of emphasis--integration, acquisition basic
back to basics, and workforce development--are aimed at continued
access and successful exploitation of space in support of our
warfighters.
INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE CAPABILITIES
Efficient operation of on-orbit and ground assets requires
integrating space capabilities with other operational military systems
and between the military and intelligence communities. While our space
systems function well individually, we need them to work together for
maximum effect on the battlefield. We have learned from our experience
integrating air and space operations into Combined Air Operations
Centers (CAOC) that our systems should complement one another rather
than compete against each other. The best overall effect should be
realized by a mix of integrated systems; combining orbiting platforms
with manned and unmanned aircraft, ground-based assets, and other
systems, linked together so they share data, and cue one another.
Space capabilities serve the interests of a wide array of
stakeholders: the DOD, including the combatant commanders and fielded
forces; the Department of State (DOS); the Department of Commerce; and
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Intelligence
Community. As the DOD Executive Agent for Space, I have had the
opportunity to visit five of the combatant commands--Pacific Command
(PACOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),
Central Command (CENTCOM), and Special Operations Command (SOCOM)--to
discuss first-hand their needs and requirements. I also work with the
Joint Staff and the Army, Navy, and Air Force space components to gain
similar insights. Through ongoing interaction with the Defense space
acquisition community, government laboratories, Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers (FFRDCs), industry, academia, and the Director of
the National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO), we are enhancing links
between the warfighters and the acquisition community. In particular,
the activities of the DOD Executive Agent for Space and the DNRO, Dr.
Don Kerr, must be coordinated. I assure you that Don Kerr and I work
closely together to provide continuity and focus to the overall
National Security Space portfolio. This is especially important as we
consider the need to improve planning, development, acquisition, and
management of our space capabilities.
The government relies on a robust space industrial base to provide
the systems, technologies, and services necessary to maintain our space
capabilities. A good example is the commercial SATCOM industry. The DOD
depends on a vast network of commercial ground and space-based systems
to meet its telecommunications needs. In particular, commercial SATCOM
is a large part of the space communication system that supports the
warfighter. Current estimates are that commercial SATCOM provided about
60 percent of the wideband SATCOM during Operation Enduring Freedom and
up to 80 percent of the SATCOM during OIF.
The strategic relevance of space as a force multiplier underscores
the necessity for government to ensure we have a strong industrial base
that will satisfy our requirements now and in the future. The Space
Industrial Base Council, co-chaired by Dr. Kerr and myself, is a forum
to address space industry issues and bring together stakeholders from
across government to provide coordinated attention and action on space
industrial base issues. We have also taken steps to include industry
and academia to help inform and implement our initiatives.
BACK TO BASICS IN SPACE ACQUISITION
My second area of emphasis is to get ``back to basics'' in space
acquisitions to maximize the probability for success in our space
acquisition programs. Acquisition links technology with operations--
turning ideas into real, tangible items and delivering those items to
the field. It is a continuous process with four distinct but
interrelated stages. The first stage is S&T, where we conduct basic
research and explore the possibilities of new technologies. In the
second, technology development, we evaluate the utility of discoveries
made in the S&T stage. The third stage is systems development. Here, we
take the most promising technologies and mature them to higher
readiness levels so they can be integrated into operational platforms
in the fourth stage, system production.
In this acquisition construct, technology is matured through the
four stages to move from the lab bench to the test range to operations.
We are emphasizing early technology development to ensure mature
technology is available for our production systems. Basic research in
science and technology generates knowledge and helps develop our
scientists and engineers in our laboratories, universities, and
research centers. This kind of cutting-edge work is inherently high
risk--discoveries take hard work and insight but are not predictable--
but we want to take risk in the earlier stages. For instance, the Air
Force Research Laboratory is exploring everything from material
properties of beryllium-aluminum alloys, ceramic-matrix composites, and
``aerogel''-based thermal insulation, to the operating characteristics
of components and systems such as spinning disk lasers, and on-orbit
vibration isolation systems. The DOD investment in space-related S&T
has doubled over the last 4 years.
Once we find a promising technology, we investigate its utility in
the Technology Development stage. For example, back in September, the
STP-R1 experimental satellite--the ``Streak''--launched from Vandenberg
Air Force Base on a Minotaur rocket. It has a payload that will study
the low Earth orbit environment, but also has an objective to
demonstrate an approach of rapid response, short duration missions. It
is one of many projects sponsored by the DARPA and run by the Air Force
Space Test Program office at Kirtland.
Thus, in the two supporting stages of science and technology and
technology development, the approach is to take more risk and push the
frontier harder. We will allow those that are creating new ideas and
exploring new technologies greater opportunity to push their ideas
forward.
After we prove a concept or demonstrate the technology, we mature
it until we are confident it will work reliably in space. We build that
confidence and performance during the Systems Development stage, where
we get new technologies ready to incorporate into operational systems.
The XSS-11, built at Kirtland Air Force Base and launched from
Vandenberg Air Force Base last April, is an excellent example of a
space Systems Development effort. The XSS-11 did more than prove a
concept and check out technology and techniques for future space
missions; it also helped improve the quality, experience and knowledge
of our workforce. The program managers and engineers operated on a
tight schedule and budget, and even after several technical problems
and three different launch platforms they had the vehicle ready to
launch within 3 months of the original 36-month development timeline
and within a few million dollars of the original budget estimate.
Finally, once we have mature technology, we move into the fourth stage,
System Production. As an example, we launched the first modified Global
Positioning System (GPS) IIR (GPS IIR-M) satellite in September 2005.
It will provide the same GPS signals as earlier GPS IIRs, plus two new
military signals and another civilian signal. Since the early GPS I
series, the program has evolved through a block approach where each
increment has provided additional capabilities. GPS satellites are
operational assets used by troops in the field. We must minimize the
risk involved as we produce these systems and in the System Production
stage, we want to integrate mature technologies while employing a
disciplined systems engineering process. We must also design in
testability and modularity so that we have a path to spiral newly
matured technologies into operational systems. We are reducing the risk
in that final stage of System Production by starting with more matured
technologies, more stable requirements, and more discipline in the
systems design.
This idea of managing the risk, or apportioning risk in a more
controlled manner is important. You can view it as a redistribution of
risk where the higher risk is in those beginning stages while we lower
the risk in System Production, incorporating only proven technologies
and focusing on taking smaller, more manageable steps. By doing so, we
allow a constant, ongoing rhythm of design, build, launch, and operate.
I believe that developing this rhythm of activity will reduce the
acquisition cycle time, insert stability into our production lines and
workforce, and enable us to field better systems over time, all while
increasing confidence in our production schedule and cost. Ultimately,
the warfighter should receive a rhythm of needed, timely, affordable
capability.
The restructured TSAT program reflects this new approach to meeting
warfighter requirements through major discrete increments or blocks.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) endorsed this TSAT approach as the
way to begin accelerating some needed network capability for the
warfighter. Consistent with congressional inputs, we have focused on
technology maturity to define the first block for TSAT. The new program
will reduce the risk for the first two satellites by providing basic
laser communications capabilities and processor/routers in a Block 1
configuration. Higher risk technologies such as a more capable laser
communication capability and more capable Internet Protocol Packet-
based processing can be incorporated into later blocks of satellites.
Block 1 directly corresponds to those technologies that the TSAT
Program Office and Government Accountability Office agreed are mature
consistent with this phase of the program. We also have increased the
budgetary confidence levels of TSAT from 50 percent to 80 percent.
In addition, we recently announced an award of the TSAT Mission
Operations System (TMOS) contract--the ground segment for TSAT. Going
forward with TMOS allows for better development and horizontal
integration with other GIG systems. The networking capabilities
provided by TMOS are the cornerstone to the future Military
Communications Satellite architecture (AEHF and TSAT) and its interface
with the GIG. Since the space segment interface requirements will be
consistent with the TMOS design, our approach simplifies design trades
for the space segment contractors. The TMOS contract source selection
criteria also reflected a decision process which weighted proposal risk
and contractor past performance over system mission capability and
cost.
This overall approach reduces technology and integration risk and
increases our confidence in timely delivery of capabilities to the
warfighter--an approach consistent with the 2003 Young Panel
recommendations. We are exploring this same approach for Space Radar
and GPS III.
We also need to get back to basics in our acquisition practices. A
back-to-basics approach hinges on: first, managing risk better;
strengthening collaborations between the players involved in the
acquisition process; implementing more rigorous systems engineering
processes; and, improving the way we recruit and train our acquisitions
workforce.
I previously mentioned the various National Security Space
stakeholders. As we get back to basics, we need to strengthen
collaboration across the space community between technical experts,
acquisition personnel, logisticians, and operators to ensure we are
developing the systems we really need. There must be an early, detailed
dialogue between all the players on warfighters needs balanced against
a realistic assessment of what capability can be provided. We are
working with the Joint Staff and combatant commanders to implement this
approach. We should be able to provide significant new capability
quicker and be more cost effective while continuing to work towards the
full stated objectives in later generations. For example, deliver a
first increment/block of system capability that meets 70-80 percent of
the original stated objectives in a more timely fashion while working
toward greater capability in future blocks. Key to this effort is to
implement and maintain strong discipline in developing and stabilizing
system requirements--another facet of sound system engineering.
A critical part of implementing the back to basics philosophy is a
heavy emphasis on applying proven systems engineering practices and
raising the expertise of our systems engineers. The Air Force's Space
and Missile Systems Center (SMC) has instituted a rigorous training
program that includes classroom time, hands-on laboratory experience,
Master's level courses, and education with industry. SMC has also
captured best practices from across the community while working with
the NRO, industry, FFRDCs, and technical societies to develop interface
standards. One key aspect of improving the way we manage acquisition
risk, and a key facet of our continuous emphasis on system engineering,
is to better estimate the cost and schedule through a stronger cost
estimation team and applying a more conservative approach in the System
Production stage. If we have high confidence in the success of an
acquisition program because we matured the technology starting with a
strong S&T base, then we also have more confidence in our production
cost and schedule estimates.
SPACE PROFESSIONALS/SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WORKFORCE
We have a great team of space professionals in the military, civil
service, and industry. We know that many of our experienced people are
retiring and we need to focus on the basics of recruiting, training,
and mentoring to balance out our space workforce and maintain a strong,
dynamic cadre of space professionals--innovators, original thinkers,
and people with solid engineering instincts.
To continue to develop, attract, and retain top talent, I urge you
to continue supporting programs such as the National Defense Education
Program (NDEP)--which started as a pilot program in fiscal year 2005
called the Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation
(SMART). NDEP targets undergraduates and graduate students studying
science, math, and engineering. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget
request (DOD-wide budget line) for NDEP is roughly twice that of the
fiscal year 2006 request.
As important as it is to recruit and train talented performers, it
is also important for us to give them the opportunity to work with
increasing levels of technology, consistent with the four stages in the
space acquisition framework. They should have the opportunity to
develop program management and systems engineering skills and gain
experience on progressively more complex systems. This will teach them
what risks to take, how to make tough decisions, and expand their
knowledge base. Science and Technology and Technology Development
efforts provide excellent opportunities for this kind of growth.
Our efforts to increase the expertise of the space force are
comprehensive. We provide oversight of the space cadre through the
Space Professional Oversight Board, co-chaired by the DNRO and myself,
which includes representatives from all military services. In addition,
AFSPC's National Security Space Institute is expanding and recently
completed checkout and startup of their 300 level training course, with
the first offerings including students from all Services, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
Finally, we recently held the first National Security Space Program
Manager's Conference to discuss, analyze, and exchange best practices
and experiences. It was hosted by the Air Force's Space and Missile
Center and attended by space acquisition officers from the Air Force,
NRO, DARPA, Army, Navy, and the laboratories.
conclusion
Space capabilities are essential at all levels of military planning
and operations. To win the long war, we must leverage our space
contributions along with all elements of national power. As the DOD
Executive Agent for Space, I am confident that the directions outlined
here will help us improve the way we use existing space assets, acquire
new capabilities, and integrate with other stakeholders relying on the
National Security Space community today and into the future. Thank you
for the opportunity to present our approach and our emphasis on
integration, back to basics in acquisition, and our space workforce.
I appreciate the continued support Congress and this committee have
given to help deliver vital space capabilities, and I look forward to
working with you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Next is, I believe, Admiral Deutsch.
Admiral Deutsch. Thank you, sir. If I may, I'd like to just
ask that my comments be introduced into your record, and unless
you have any questions or a response that you'd like from me
now, I'll save my comments for later.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Deutsch follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Kenneth W. Deutsch, USN
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored
to appear before you today to address Navy space activities. As the
acting Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communications Network, we
provide the space and cyberspace capabilities necessary to support the
warfighting efforts of the long war against terrorism and to support
the naval forces of the future.
Space and cyberspace are critical to FORCEnet. FORCEnet, the means
by which the power of sensors, networks, weapons, warriors and
platforms are networked in a combat force, integrates Sea Strike, Sea
Shield, Sea Basing, and Sea Shaping, the pillars of Sea Power 21.
FORCEnet is the catalyst that makes naval transformation possible and
will allow the Navy to support the long war against terror, defend the
homeland, and counter potential adversaries.
space support to the navy warfighter
The 21st century environment is one of increasing challenges and
complex environments, requiring greater speed of decision and precision
in action. Warfare today and in the future is about speed--acting
quickly in the global commons of the seas, space, and cyberspace before
an adversary saturates or even penetrates our defenses. It will also be
about persistence--having the duration and vantage point to find
threats and counter them with precision. In the future, assured access
to the spectrum of space capabilities will be the key to giving
decision makers the advantage of speed and the forewarning of
persistence to respond to the full range of military operations, from
the global war on terror to major combat operations.
Admiral Spruance once defined Sea Power as ``pushing our front
lines as far forward as possible.'' In addition to integrating space
capabilities throughout the naval forces and shaping joint
deliberations to assure combat effectiveness, we will work to push our
front lines into space in order to meet future challenges. Navy ships
at sea are extremely dependent on space-based assets for beyond line of
sight communications, threat information and situational awareness. We
want to be able to operate from the commons--sea, cyberspace and
space--with a continuum of affordable options. The Navy is interested
in space as a key part of FORCEnet. Integrating space capabilities,
particularly military satellite communications, Intelligence
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), environmental sensing, and
position, navigation, and timing throughout the naval force to make
space tactically relevant is fundamental to our Sea Power 21 vision.
THE NAVY'S INVESTMENT
The Navy's space investment portfolio reflects our partnership with
the Department of Defense's (DOD) Executive Agent for Space and the
rest of the National Security Space community--as well as our maritime
responsibilities. We rely on the Air Force and National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) to acquire most of the major space platforms,
collaborating on the required capabilities, and then we purchase user
equipment for the fleet. The Navy's Space Cadre works closely with
these entities, providing the leadership and technical expertise
necessary to leverage the Navy's interests in space throughout the
entire acquisition process. We also take the lead in tackling maritime
challenges through our participation in the Science and Technology/
Research and Development (S&T/R&D) process.
MOBILE USER OBJECTIVE SYSTEM
The Navy's major space segment responsibility to the joint
community is the narrowband satellite communications constellation.
Today it consists of Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) Follow-on UFO and will
be replaced by Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) in 2010. The MUOS
program is preparing for the Key Decision Point (C) Defense Space
Acquisition Board in July 2006. The program is currently on cost and on
schedule for an initial operational capability (IOC) in 2010. MUOS will
provide ``communications on the move'', through double canopy foliage
and in urban environments to small antennas used by disadvantaged
users. MUOS is the common denominator for command and control providing
the capability to communicate from tactical to theater levels, to
allies and coalition partners and between defense and non-defense
agencies. MUOS will allow a more comprehensive and coordinated approach
to regional engagement, providing the capability to synchronize efforts
with other Services, agencies, and allied nations.
MUOS is critical to satisfying the demand for tactical satellite
communications. During Operation Enduring Freedom, UFO and LEASAT 5
were unable to support 20 percent of narrowband tactical UHF satellite
communication requirements. Additionally, in the 2010 timeframe, LEASAT
5 will reach end of its service life and UFO is expected to reach an
unacceptable level of availability in August 2009 leaving a potential
gap before MUOS is operational. Complete loss of these UHF satellite
communication resources would have a significant impact on combat
operations if not replaced by MUOS. Today, UFO supports approximately
500 accesses worldwide. Based on evolving future warfighting concepts
in support of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), access requirements
have grown by at least a factor of four and MOUS as envisioned will be
able to support that requirement. As Lockheed Martin refines its
design, we expect this capacity to grow.
ORS
Keeping with the objective to maximize space support to the Navy
Warfighter, we are interested in Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
because of its potential to provide a more affordable way to get beyond
the line of sight of communication capabilities and rapid-reaction ISR
sensors, on orbit, in a tactically relevant timeframe to respond to
asymmetric challenges and hedge against uncertainty. In a resource-
constrained environment, it is crucial to not over match capability to
requirement. It is equally important to not under match capability to
requirement, putting mission accomplishment and lives at risk.
Increasing the options available for the warfighter with a balanced,
tiered architecture for space capabilities increases the warfighter's
ability to get exactly the right capability to match his need.
The Joint Task Force Commander needs a wide spectrum of options,
capabilities, and timeframes to choose from to meet his operational
requirement. ORS could offer an additional element in a tiered system
that includes unmanned aerial vehicles, manned aircraft, high altitude
air ships and traditional big space systems. It is a potentially cost
effective way to provide the connectivity that the Sea Base needs to
mass distributed forces effects. ORS can fill in gaps and provide
options for space support in areas that lack sufficient coverage from
national systems or reduce the vulnerability and uncertainty of
depending on commercial satellite communications or sensors during
times of conflict. ORS will be particularly useful for equipping the
littoral combat ship with increased capability to monitor netted
undersea sensors from standoff distances. It also offers potential for
improving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). By working with existing
space systems, ORS can help increase the revisit rate for contacts,
which is the key to tracking in dense maritime shipping environments.
As part of the joint TacSat and ORS effort, the Office of Naval
Research is investing $15 million of S&T funds each year in moderate-
to-high-risk projects that result in significant prototypes through the
Space Innovative Naval Prototype program. Investments are focused on
naval capability gaps that space can fill such as ship tracking, data
exfiltration from buoys, submarine detection and cueing and littoral
characterization. In addition to the Space Innovative Naval Prototype
investment, Navy actively participates in the joint TacSat efforts
along with Air Force Space Command, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Army and Marine Corps. Naval Research
Lab (NRL) in coordination with the Office of Force Transformation built
TacSat-1 with a shiptracking payload in less than 12 months for $9.3
million plus $5 million in space parts. It is awaiting launch on a new
commercial launch vehicle from SpaceX this year. In coordination with
AFRL, NRL is providing secondary payloads for TacSat-2 and TacSat-3. As
the result of a joint selection process, NRL is designing and building
TacSat-4 to provide communications on the move, data exfiltration from
buoys and blue force tracking over a theater size area. The TacSat
experiments are already making significant progress on developing
consensus on standards and novel approaches to reduce costs for small
satellites. The true test will be when the fleet and other users start
to experiment with TacSats in an operational environment.
ORS also has the potential to change future space acquisition by
introducing a new business model for space. The current TacSat series
of S&T experiments, and the potential for a small satellite operations
capability, can be viewed as an acquisition experiment. ORS cycle times
dictate an acquisition business rhythm that acquires and delivers a
capability quickly and is flexible enough to adapt to operator feedback
to improve the next capability iteration. Development and acceptance of
standards, use of a cyclical business process and cultivation of
multiple vendors are all likely outcomes from ORS that have the
potential to positively impact the Navy and joint warfighters.
SPACE CADRE
The Navy's success in effectively integrating space assets to
enhance our naval force depends on the experience and the skill of the
Navy Space Cadre. Vice Admiral McArthur, Commander, Naval Network
Warfare Command, provides strategic guidance on priorities for the
development and employment of the Navy Space Cadre as the Navy's Space
Cadre Functional Authority. As a leader on the National Security Space-
Space Professional Oversight Board (the senior officer forum for the
discussion and resolution of matters concerning space professional
development within the DOD), he led Navy participation in the
development of the National Security Space Human Capital Strategy. He
is updating the Navy Space Cadre's Strategy for Our People, which
outlines our vision and way ahead.
The Navy Space Cadre is a distinct body of expertise horizontally
and vertically integrated within the Navy's Active-Duty, Reserve, and
civilian components organized to operationalize space. Members of Navy
Space Cadre are assigned to the NRO, the National Security Space
Office, USSTRATCOM, several Joint Program Offices, and throughout the
fleet. The Space Cadre will continue to provide the critical insight
and technical expertise necessary to leverage Navy, DOD, and other
agency investments in space and optimize warfighting capabilities.
The Navy Space Cadre Advisor is working closely with her Service
counterparts to meet both Navy and National Security Space goals and
ensure that the Space Cadre is equipped with the proper balance of
education and experience. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Space
Systems Operations and Space Systems Engineering curricula continue to
provide the Navy and other Services graduate education, post-graduate
(Engineer) degrees and doctoral degrees. Additionally, NPS offers an
online Space Systems Certificate Program in which participants receive
instruction on the integration of space capabilities across joint
forces and a better understanding of what space effects can
realistically provide with reference to networks, sensors and weapons.
The Navy sends select Space Cadre members to courses offered by the
National Security Space Institute that focus on the application and
employment of space capabilities at the tactical and operational levels
as a force enhancer and multiplier. We also have a formal Educational
Alliance with the Air Force through a memorandum of agreement between
NPS and the Air Force Institute of Technology, with the goal of
leveraging strengths and eliminating duplication in space education.
SUMMARY
Our mission remains bringing the fight to our enemies. The
increasing dependence of our world on the seas, coupled with growing
uncertainty of other nations' ability or desire to ensure access in a
future conflict, will continue to drive the need for naval forces and
the capability to project decisive joint power by access through the
seas, space and cyberspace. Accordingly, we will continue to fight the
global war on terror while transforming for the future fight. We will
continue to refine our operational concepts and appropriate technology
investments to deliver the kind of dominant military power from the sea
envisioned in Sea Power 21. We will continue to pursue the operational
concepts--such as MDA--even as we invest in technology and systems to
enable naval vessels to deliver decisive, effects-based combat power in
every tactical and operational dimension. We understand that space
capabilities will be critical to our efforts and must be integrated
throughout the naval force . . . and we understand that because the
future of the Navy is tied to space, we must succeed in growing and
maintaining our space cadre. We also look forward to continuing our
strong partnership with our Joint Brethren--a relationship that has
brought us many successes to date.
Fully integrating the warfighting capabilities that space systems
present to our warfighters is one of my priorities. To that end, Navy
will continue to be a full joint partner in space.
Senator Sessions. Very good.
Next is Lieutenant General Chilton.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, JOINT FUNCTIONAL
COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR SPACE AND GLOBAL STRIKE, U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND
General Chilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson,
Senator Reed.
It's really a pleasure for me to be here today to represent
the men and women of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) on
behalf of General Cartwright, who sends his regrets for not
being able to join us today.
My job at STRATCOM is Commander of the Joint Functional
Component Command for Space and Global Strike. In addition, I
have the privilege of being the Commander of the ``Mighty
Eighth'' Air Force in the United States Air Force. I have the
great privilege to serve in those capacities.
Today, though, I'd like to, of course, speak about my role
in STRATCOM.
I think it would be hard to argue against the fact that we
have great capabilities in space today in the DOD. Indeed, some
might argue that we have space superiority today. I believe
there's a compelling need for us to maintain and sustain this
superiority as we move off into the future. When you consider
who our ultimate customers are, this is an easy argument to
support, I would suggest, because our customers, ultimately,
are the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who rely on
these space assets day in and day out to conduct operations in
defense of our country.
Our warfighters have grown used to using the assets that
space brings to the fight today. They certainly deserve to
continue to have those assets available to them, as well as
improvements and new and better capabilities.
The soldier in the trench ought to be able to find out and
know on demand who is on the other side of the hill that he's
going to face. The sailor ought to have insight into what
forces are hulled down over the horizon to his force. The
airman should know what's going on below that cloud deck below
him, and have that information readily available to him. These
are the kind of capabilities that we need to continue to
enhance and bring forward for our warfighters, in addition to
sustaining such capabilities that the GPS constellation brings
today, the ability to precisely locate yourself on the barren
wasteland of a desert or in the densest jungle of the world or
out on the open sea. Perhaps even more importantly now, after
the latest weapons that we've seen developed, to be able to
leverage the precision guidance capability that GPS brings to
the weapons systems that we can bring to bear on our
adversaries.
Our warriors also need voice and data connectivity so that
they can receive orders up and down their chain and communicate
horizontally within their organizations at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels, so that we can stay one step
ahead of our adversaries in the battlefield of the future.
Dr. Sega gave a great example of how we can understand,
observe, and predict weather with our space assets, a
capability that can really have an important and dramatic
impact on the outcome of an operation. We need to be able to
continue to make sure we have this knowledge and insight so
that we can use weather to our advantage in the future, and to
the disadvantage of our adversary.
Of course, we've grown accustomed to missile warning, not
only at the strategic level for our Nation, but at the tactical
level, as well, in theater. Our troops deserve to have that
capability provided to them, so that they know exactly what
protective measures to take when they come under attack.
Our space assets today remain a key enabler for many of
these capabilities; in some cases, the only provider of these
capabilities to our warriors.
A good military person always tries to put on the hat of
the adversary and reflect back on how you would fight that
particular individual when you go to combat. If I were to put
on the hat of adversary and look at the U.S. dependence on
space and how accustomed we have grown to using it, I would
also be tempted to look at that as a vulnerability that I may
want to try to exploit to help level the playing field in any
future conflict. Indeed, it is not only our warriors who would
be affected by attacks on our space infrastructure, but the
economy of the United States and the quality of life that we've
come to enjoy just day in and day out in our daily lives, from
GPS to satellite communications and more.
So, our adversaries, I suggest, understand our dependence.
From that perspective, I think it's important that we pay
attention to defense--not only increasing the capabilities we
have, but defending those capabilities now and into the future.
We have to be equipped to assure our allies and to deter and
defeat our adversaries, should they decide to go after our
space capabilities.
The QDR gave us a good look into the future of what our
needs might be when it said future forces will place a premium
on capabilities that are responsive and survivable. So, I'd
like to talk a little bit about responsive space operations.
Now, Senator Nelson, I know your background, having flown
on the space shuttle. It's a marvelous vehicle that can do
incredible things even today that are hard to imagine. But to
call it responsive in getting off the launch pad, I think you
would probably agree that responsive probably is not the right
adjective for it, given the number of times that you scrubbed,
getting ready to fly. This fact doesn't diminish the importance
of that capability.
On the other hand, what the military would like to see, and
what we'd like to have as a capability in the future, is a
truly responsive capability to put assets into space, something
that takes hours, not months, to launch; a satellite that can
be put up quickly and then made to operate quickly. There's
several elements of this concept. We have to address how we
launch satellites. We have to address the booster to make sure
it's responsive, as well. We have to address satellite design
to make sure once it's up on orbit it doesn't take 3 months to
check out, but just hours or minutes. Then we have to address
the command and control of those constellations if they're
truly going to be responsive, so that they can serve our
purposes when they're up.
STRATCOM is a big advocate for what we call responsive
space operations, or you may have heard it called operationally
responsive space, or several other acronyms, but all are names
for this capability to put up small constellations of
satellites quickly, in an affordable manner.
To what purpose? A couple of scenarios I can think of. One
might be where there are activities that we are suspicious of
going on over what we would call ``denied airspace'' today,
deep inside a country where we could not bring to bear air-
breathing assets to focus intelligence, surveillance, or
reconnaissance (ISR) on. It may be that we want to increase the
amount of intelligence we're gathering on that particular area
for that particular crisis period or to defuse a potential
crisis. This would be a good opportunity to be able to launch a
small, relatively inexpensive constellation that could increase
our ISR coverage in that particular area of concern.
Also, with the global war we're fighting today against
terrorists, one cannot predict where next the crisis will
develop around the globe. In this regard, there could be a
scenario where multiple crises develop that could put stress on
our current capability to surveil and keep track of those
crises. Again, another scenario where perhaps a responsive
space capability to supplement or augment our current
capabilities, whether they be in surveillance or
communications, could be advantageous to the warfighter.
Shifting back here to the concept of space defense, and
XSS-11, which Dr. Sega brought up, responsive space capability
might be good for the case where one of our satellites on orbit
has something go wrong with it, and we don't know what caused
the problem. Having the capability to quickly launch a small
satellite that could go up and surveil our own satellites to
determine if that damage to the satellite or the reason it
became inoperative, was caused by a systems failure, a natural
failure, or by the actions of an adversary, could be very
important in defusing a potential crisis situation in the
future.
The capabilities that we have today, and the ones that we
see on the drawing board in the future that Dr. Sega has
painted here on acquisition, make these exciting times to be
involved in the space business. The challenges we have in front
of us, too, also make it a very exciting time for me to be a
part of this. I'm very appreciative of that opportunity.
I look forward to our working together to meet both these
challenges and explore new opportunities as we move forward.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for giving me the
opportunity to make these opening remarks, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF
Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and members of the subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to review U.S. Strategic Command's
(USSTRATCOM) and specifically Joint Functional Component Commander
Space and Global Strike's (JFCC- S&GS) progress during the past year
and to present our plan for the future. 2006 is a year of unprecedented
change. Our ultimate goals are driving the pace of change: building
strategic advantage, ensuring the security of the American people and
strengthening the community of free nations.
ADAPTING TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT--TRANSFORMING WHILE WE FIGHT
One year ago, we spoke of global interdependence and its impact on
how we organize, plan and operate. We emphasized developing strong
links between U.S. strategic objectives and regional operations, as our
adversaries were employing asymmetric means to strike well beyond the
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. We also spoke of our new mission
assignments and the steps we had undertaken to transform our command
into an agile 21st century organization capable of deterring our
adversaries and bringing the full range of global strike, defensive,
command and control (C2), and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to bear against them if necessary. We
outlined an enormous transformational effort that had to be
accomplished in the context of an ongoing global conflict with active
combat operations and without the luxury of an operational pause.
Throughout the last year, the men and women of USSTRATCOM have
engaged in that global conflict, often employing means not visible
either to the average American or to our adversaries. They met this
day-to-day challenge with professionalism and commitment while they
were also restructuring our organization to focus our efforts, conserve
our resources, and streamline support to other combatant commanders
around the world. I come to you today gratified by the progress these
fine men and women have made and energized to complete the task before
us.
USSTRATCOM TRANSFORMATION VECTORS
The Department of Defense (DOD) budget you enacted for 2006 enabled
a string of organizational and operational successes along all of
USSTRATCOM's transformation vectors.
We changed the way we are organized and operate. We implemented,
and by the end of 2006 will refine, the redistributed and functionally
aligned command structure described last year. This new structure is
already paying off in terms of decentralized operational employment and
increased operational speed.
Our efforts resulted in four interdependent Joint
Functional Component Commands (JFCCs): Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); Network-Warfare (NW);
Integrated Missile Defense (IMD) in addition to Space and
Global Strike. Day-to-day operational planning and execution of
specialized global capabilities now reside at the component
level, where commanders are able to maintain focus on their
primary mission and not be distracted by staff support
activities.
As Commander, JFCC-S&GS, I am responsible to the
Commander, USSTRATCOM to integrate all elements of military
power to conduct, plan, present global strike effects and also
direct the deliberate planning and execution of assigned space
missions. * One of JFCC-S&GS significant accomplishments last
year was the establishment of a collaborative Joint Space
Operations Center (JSpOC) to deliver select DOD space
capability to U.S., Allied, and other national users. When
fully operational, JSpOC will provide the full range of DOD
space capabilities.
By making this unique organizational transformation we also
strengthened our operational relationships with the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and National Security Agency
(NSA) in order to leverage the tremendous resources and capabilities
resident in these organizations. Now we effectively bridge many
artificial barriers to communications and information sharing, and
bring enhanced combat power to the regional combatant commanders.
We made progress in our drive toward a New Triad of capabilities.
The New Triad is comprised of offensive and defensive capabilities
enabled by persistent global command and control (C2), intelligence, an
agile planning system, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The New
Triad provides improved flexibility in dealing with a wider range of
contingencies, while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons, in
order to assure our allies, dissuade competitors, and deter those who
plan to harm us, particularly with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Space is integral to many of the capabilities represented in the New
Triad.
Efforts to improve conventional global strike capability focused on
generating effects without being hindered by factors of time, distance,
basing rights, over-flight considerations or undue risk to American
service men and women. Recently the Department:
Bolstered the number of Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM) in the inventory, providing all weather, precision
strike in a smaller weapon footprint.
Fielded Tactical Tomahawk (TACTCOM) and the Joint Air
to Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), providing strike weapons
that operate from ranges outside enemy point defenses.
During the past year non-kinetic capabilities became an
increasingly important tool to deny our adversaries the opportunity to
communicate easily or to manipulate information in ways that further
their efforts to undermine stability around the world. We seek better
non-kinetic capabilities to improve our freedom of action at the lowest
level of conflict; to enhance deterrence; and support the sustained
ability to use our networks while denying the adversary a similar
capability. In this area we:
Expanded development of the applicable tactics,
techniques, and procedures to support use of information and
networks--cyberspace--as an environment for integrated
exploitation, offensive, and defensive operations.
Improved integration of non-kinetic effects into
operational planning, on a limited basis, in support of forces
involved in the global war on terrorism.
The President has committed the United States to sustaining a
credible nuclear deterrence capability with the lowest possible number
of nuclear weapons consistent with national security. USSTRATCOM's task
is to ensure our nuclear force remains ready to meet any contingency
while the nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable as we
prudently achieve the thresholds specified in the Moscow Treaty. To
this end we:
Sustained a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile in
cooperation with the national laboratories and the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
Took steps to improve the security and safety of the
deployed nuclear force.
Retired the last Peacekeeper Inter-Continental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) from service.
Reduced the number of operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads on the Minuteman III ICBM force.
Transferred the final ballistic missile submarine
scheduled for reconfiguration to carry conventionally armed
cruise missiles.
At the heart of the New Triad are the key enablers of command and
control, intelligence, and planning. Through these enablers, and our
broad array of space capability, we create the agility to respond to a
wide range of global challenges. During 2006 we will:
Evolve the renovated USSTRATCOM Global Operations
Center to enhance collaboration among all geographically
distributed USSTRATCOM elements--defining the first step toward
a Global C2 capability for all New Triad forces.
Complete preparations for opening the first node in a
network of ground entry points designed to serve a nationally
distributed ground, air and sea network capable of providing
the diverse connectivity requirements of the New Triad and DOD
support to a broader national command capability using all
elements of national power.
Capitalize on the longer dwell time of unmanned and
unattended sensors to produce greater persistence in global war
on terrorism operations.
Initiate a pilot program to determine essential global
strike command and control services with an explicit objective
of delivering a distributed, collaborative product. The pilot
program will take advantage of the Department's Data Strategy,
which calls for visible, accessible and understandable data,
and uses Services Oriented Architectures (SOA) to promote
flexibility and agility.
Initiate efforts to transition from a limited space
surveillance architecture to a more fully integrated
terrestrial and space-based approach to situational awareness.
Improve Space Capabilities
The space mission area creates a decisive strategic advantage for
our national security, empowering critical economic as well as defense
related activities. Our dependence on space capabilities, coupled with
recent significant advances in space operations demonstrated by others,
establishes a true imperative to protect our space assets and our
freedom of action in space. USSTRATCOM understands the need to stay at
least one technology generation ahead of any foreign or commercial
space power. We must improve space situational awareness and
protection, and ensure unfettered, reliable, and secure access to
space. Key initiatives include:
Improve responsive space access, satellite operations,
and other space enabling capabilities such as the space
professional cadre.
Integrate air and space capabilities to deliver
combined effects.
Realign resources to sustain existing space
surveillance capabilities.
Improve warfighter access to the Nation's full
spectrum of space capabilities.
USSTRATCOM REQUESTS YOUR SUPPORT TO MEET THE CHALLENGES WE FACE
Over the next 5 years, we must fully transform while remaining
engaged in a conflict in which our enemies will use any and all means
to achieve their objectives. We believe a more aggressive
transformation schedule than envisioned 5 years ago is essential to
maintain the strategic advantage needed to deter or defeat those who
would do us harm. If we do not accelerate this transition, we will face
these adversaries, who attack through asymmetric means, with the blunt
weapons of last resort that won the Cold War. That alone will not
preserve our future national security. In particular we are requesting
your support in the following areas:
Prompt, Precision Conventional Global Strike
Tailored deterrence requires a more complete range of capabilities
to address the wide spectrum of challenges that confront us today.
While the Department employs expeditionary forces around the globe, it
is unlikely we will have forces in every place we need them at the
crucial moment when we have an opportunity to stop a WMD-armed threat
far from our shores. The United States has the capability to engage
with high quality conventional forces around the world, given days or
perhaps weeks to respond. But if our general-purpose forces are not in
a position to respond rapidly, the need to defeat attacks against the
United States may require USSTRATCOM to interdict fleeting targets at
global ranges. We have the delivery capability on alert today, but
configured only with nuclear weapons. This choice is not credible
against many of the extremist adversaries we will face.
We recommend proceeding with development of the responsive,
conventional global strike alternative offered by the Conventional
Trident Modification (CTM). The President's budget request includes
funds for the modification of a number of submarine based Trident
Missiles to deliver conventional warheads with precision over thousands
of miles in tens of minutes.
Global Command and Control (GC2)
We are now faced with the task of recapitalizing our aging, Nuclear
Command and Control (NC2) network, which is a matter of prime
importance. Capitalizing on advances in technology, we envision a
transition from the single-purpose, stove-piped NC2 network that served
us during the Cold War, to a multi-functional, distributed, survivable,
and expandable Global Command and Control capability, leveraging the
assets and resources of the Global Information Grid and serving the
needs of our joint warfighters.
With your support for the President's budget request, we can
deliver a resilient air, land, and maritime GC2 capability that will
tie together all elements of New Triad power. Fully developed, the GC2
will enable collaboration between, and among, DOD and other government
agencies and partners, providing the core of a National Command
Capability to meet the broadening array of potential challenges we face
as a nation. A true National Command Capability will only be effective
with federally mandated standards for data tagging to facilitate
enhanced information sharing.
Reliable Replacement Warhead
Finally, if we are to break the cycle of maintaining and
refurbishing large numbers of Cold War-era nuclear warheads to guard
against uncertainty, we request your support to ensure a safe, secure,
reliable nuclear stockpile, and in the process transform the nuclear
weapons enterprise. Discussions over the past year within the executive
branch and Congress have increased understanding of the role for
nuclear weapons in our current environment, and the value of a
responsive defense infrastructure. USSTRATCOM supports the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) as the key to transforming our aging Cold War
nuclear weapons stockpile. RRW will enhance our long-term confidence in
the stockpile and reduce the need to retain high numbers of hedge
weapons while exercising the people, science, technology base, and
facilities required for sustaining the nuclear weapons enterprise.
Maintaining the current stockpile of Cold War era weapons is a
challenge. If directed, we believe the time is right; the risk is
manageable; and the opportunity is at hand to choose weapons that will
best serve our future and allow us to further reduce our overall
stockpile size, in order to transition to and maintain a smaller but
safer, more secure, and more reliable nuclear weapon arsenal.
USSTRATCOM TRANSFORMATIONAL VECTORS BUILDING STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE
USSTRATCOM plays an important role in leading national efforts to
send an unambiguous message to our adversaries and friends alike--we
will do whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to ensure the
forces of freedom possess a lasting strategic advantage against those
who would deny citizens of America and the world the security to govern
their own future. We will continue to be aggressive and resourceful in
offering our best advice in the pursuit of capabilities needed to meet
our national security requirements. With your help we can assure our
allies, dissuade unhealthy competition, deter coercive or damaging
acts, and above all else, defend our citizens and defeat our enemies.
Thank your for your continued support.
Senator Sessions. A good presentation, General Chilton.
General Hamel.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MICHAEL A. HAMEL, USAF, COMMANDER, SPACE
AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND
General Hamel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Nelson, Senator Reed. It is a true privilege for me to be able
to appear before this committee today. I am pleased to be able
to represent the Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center.
I would like to say that we have a critically important
mission, a very proud heritage, and a highly-skilled workforce
of some 4,500 people that are performing our space acquisition
mission.
Space has evolved since the mid-1950s as a fledgling
research effort to the point today where it has been pointed
out that we are an indispensable element of our Nation's joint
warfighting capabilities. I'm privileged to serve as the
Commander of the Space and Missile Center, as well as the Air
Force's Program Executive Officer for Space, and, in that
capacity, have responsibility for developing, acquiring,
fielding, and supporting a broad set of satellites, launch
vehicles, missile systems, radars, ground systems, and user
equipment for joint force operators.
Now, we are very proud of the accomplishments over the
years which we have been able to achieve, including, most
recently, having set the longest successful string of
successive launch missions in the history of the military space
business. We have the most robust set of satellites on orbit,
performing missions, and, as you pointed out here, they are
truly integrated into every aspect of air, land, and maritime
warfare on a global basis. We also have a fantastic set of
products that are in the development pipeline.
We also recognize that we have problems. I would like to,
today, be able to reassure you that we are addressing these
problems with full focus and determination.
If I might, just in a minute here, give you an idea of the
kind of things that we're doing to get acquisition on track.
Our overarching strategy, as Dr. Sega said, is really based
upon the idea of getting back to basics. We are reestablishing
structure and discipline and rigor by applying strong systems
engineering principles across all of our programs and
processes. We're ensuring that we have testing built into the
systems from very early on, that we have mission assurance
processes that are to be applied from the very beginning of a
program. Likewise, we understand that it's not just about the
technical aspects of the program, but it's also about how it is
we manage costs and schedule and risk throughout. In that vein,
we are actually improving our cost-estimating capabilities so
we have higher confidence, when we propose programs, that,
indeed, we can deliver on our promises.
Another focus of our ``back to basics'' process is
redefining and renewing partnerships across the space
community. That means developers such as the organization that
I am in charge of, and our operators that are represented by
General Chilton and other users out there, soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines across the joint force operations, and
industry, whom we depend upon to actually produce the systems
that will be put into operations. As I refer to it, space is a
team sport, and it requires all players play with high
efficiency and effectiveness to deliver a winning score.
Another priority is to make sure that we get an absolutely
top quality acquisition workforce. People are our most
important asset. We are going about a revitalization of the
workforce that includes military, civilians, federally-funded
R&D centers, as well as working with industry to ensure that we
have the right skill sets. We're trying to attract, retain,
train, educate, and mentor a whole new generation of space
acquisition professionals to ensure that, indeed, we're up to
the task. As I like to say it, we know what the recipe is, but
we also have to make sure that we have the right cooks in order
to be able to produce the products that we expect.
Another thing we're doing at the Space and Missile Center
is presenting a horizontal integration capability. What I mean
by that is, is that instead of having individual stovepipe
programs, we are trying to build in cross-program capabilities
and engineering architectures, program management, acquisition
strategies in contracting, so that we learn across the many
programs and actually apply the best practices, and, likewise,
reach to other organizations and agencies, such as the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), as well as National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) and others, to really apply
best practices across all of our programs so that we are,
indeed, a learning organization.
Dr. Sega talked extensively about the incremental block
development approach, and we are applying that to programs
across the board. He spoke about the TSAT, but we are,
likewise, applying this to the GPS program to space-based space
surveillance and other programs to ensure that we take this
very measured, deliberate approach in developing and fielding
capabilities.
I'll tell you, sir, that it's going to take time to achieve
full results, but we really are making significant progress in
rebuilding our acquisition and development capabilities,
getting our troubled programs on track, and ensuring that new
programs that we're pursuing are going to have the full rigor
and discipline to be able to deliver the capabilities that we
promise from the very beginning.
We appreciate very much the support we have from Congress
for the programs, as well as the budgets we're requesting,
because we believe that these are essential for ensuring that
our Nation and its military forces will retain their unique
advantages in the battlefield from space.
I appreciate the opportunity for a few opening remarks, and
will submit my formal statement for the record, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Hamel follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Michael A Hamel, USAF
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it's a
great honor to appear before you today to represent the Air Force (AF)
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and discuss the budgets and
progress of AF space acquisition programs. SMC has a critically
important mission, a proud heritage and a highly-skilled force of some
4,500 space acquisition professionals. Our roots date back to 1954 when
the U.S. Air Force activated the Western Development Division under the
leadership of Brigadier General Bernard Schriever to develop
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the Nation. Ultimately,
those early innovations laid the foundation for our Nation's entire
military space program. Now, more than 50 years later, we are leading
the development and acquisition of critical military space capabilities
for the 21st century. The space frontier is critical to our Nation's
warfighters and SMC delivers the operational capabilities to control
and exploit the ultimate high ground of space.
Space has evolved since the mid-1950s from a fledgling research
organization to an indispensable element of our Nation's joint
warfighting capabilities. I am privileged to serve as the Commander of
SMC and the AF Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Space and am
responsible for developing, acquiring, fielding and supporting a
comprehensive set of satellites, launch vehicles, missiles, radars,
ground systems, and user equipment. SMC has been the premier space
development and acquisition organization within the Department of
Defense (DOD), and provides the majority of space operational
capabilities for the AF and DOD.
SMC TODAY
Today, SMC is simultaneously supporting and sustaining current
operational capabilities in-orbit, developing the next generation of
space and ground systems, and demonstrating advanced systems and
technologies that will transform future military operations. The
progress and accomplishments we've achieved in the recent past are most
impressive. In the launch business, we have successfully transitioned
from our legacy launch systems to the new, more flexible family of
reliable launch vehicles. The last of the Titan launch vehicles
thundered into the history books in October 2005 setting the new record
for consecutive major launch successes at 43 in a row. The new evolved,
expendable launch vehicles--Atlas V and Delta IV--are proving their
value with every new launch--the most recent being National Aeronautics
and Space Administration's (NASA) New Horizons Pluto mission to space
on 19 January 2006.
Our satellite constellations are capable and robust, performing
well beyond their designs. For example, our defense weather satellites
were designed for 3 years of life, yet Flight Vehicle 13 just reached
11 years of on-orbit service. These systems continue to provide
operational service which we've come to depend on, and sometimes take
for granted.
Although the Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIS) program has
experienced significant difficulties, we have recently delivered two
sensors to fly on host satellite platforms and are well along in
testing of the geostationary orbit sensor and satellite bus. This
system promises to provide much improved capabilities to detect, warn
and defend against ballistic missiles, as well as provide new
battlefield and intelligence information. We're looking forward to
launching this very important system within a few years.
The Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) constellation has
transformed military operations, as well as civil transportation,
banking, communications, energy and many other aspects of modern life.
Last fall we launched the first modernized GPS satellite, which
provides important new signals and services for both military and civil
users, and have improved accuracy to users by some 15 percent. While we
continue to improve on orbit capabilities and user services, the GPS
constellation is aging. We are aggressively working to develop and
deploy new GPSIIF satellites and to pursue the next generation system,
GPSIII.
We are developing a full array of advanced satellite communications
systems that will provide wideband, protected, broadcast, tactical and
data relay capabilities for joint expeditionary operations. Modern
military operations requires massive quantities of information and
communications across the battlefield and around the globe--space based
communications systems provide the rapid, responsive means to link
commanders, combat forces and information across the battlespace. We
have a number of developmental products in the pipeline. The Advanced
Extremely High Frequency satellite, the Wideband Gapfiller Satellite
and the Transformational Satellite program will offer combatant
commanders options unthinkable only a few years before.
In addition to individual programs, SMC is also realigning its
organization and processes to improve program development and execution
across the space enterprise. We are reinstituting our space
developmental planning organization to better refine concepts,
technologies and future programs. We are restoring our systems
engineering, architectures, program management, cost estimating, test
and evaluation and program control capabilities across the entire
center. These efforts will ensure better understanding of the costs,
risks, and performance of new concepts and technologies before
committing to major acquisition programs and improve execution of
system developments and procurements.
We're proud of our accomplishments but also recognize we have
problems, which we are addressing with full focus and determination.
We've experienced cost overruns and schedule slips in too many of our
space programs, which has delayed delivery of operational capability to
the Warfighter, undermined our credibility, and reduced confidence in
the space development community. There are many underlying causes for
the erosion of our space acquisition performance, which have been
identified in various DOD studies and reviews and there is clear
consensus on steps we need to take to restore acquisition performance.
We know the ``recipe for success'' in space acquisition and have a
comprehensive plan to get space acquisition back on track.
BACK TO BASICS
Our overarching strategy to restore acquisition performance is to
get ``back-to-basics.'' We're reestablishing structure and discipline
by applying strong systems engineering practices in the early stages of
each program; by addressing mission assurance from the beginning; and
by thorough testing of components and systems early and often. We are
reestablishing standards and specifications in our contracts to insure
common language and expectation with industry. A rigorous mission
assurance process is being applied to all launch and satellite programs
to insure strict adherence to design, parts, testing and quality
control standards from system development through on-orbit checkout.
Cost estimating is a critical element of the space acquisition
process. We're working hard to improve schedule planning, cost
estimating and risk assessment on all programs to better forecast how
many taxpayer dollars will be needed for each mission. It is critical
that we provide lawmakers with accurate estimates to increase
confidence when making decisions on these systems. We must better
understand cost, schedule, requirements and risk trades if we are to
make informed program decision and better assure mission success. We're
also restoring strong program control functions and expertise within
our systems program offices. This will allow us to more effectively
plan, monitor and assess contactors' cost, schedule and technical
performance in individual programs and across families of systems. The
program control function is critical to maintaining a true picture of
program status and baseline control.
Another focus area of SMCs ``back to basics'' strategy is renewing
and redefining partnerships across the space enterprise--developers,
operators, users and industry. Space is a ``team sport'' and every
member of the team must perform to their highest level if we are to be
successful. The stakes are high and the environment is unforgiving--we
do not get two chances to do it right. We have established a
``benchmarking'' process with all our major contractors to provide
candid two-way feedback to foster ''best practices'' and continuous
improvement. The space enterprise is founded on a healthy set of checks
and balances that are focused on mission success. Personal initiative
and accountability are essential at all levels since a single lapse in
attention to detail can spell the difference between success and total
failure. Effective teamwork between government and industry--prime
contractors, subcontractors and suppliers--is essential. We can't
succeed without each other.
SMC is increasingly focused on our customers--space operators,
joint warfighters and civil partners. We must understand their needs in
an unpredictable world, filled with uncertain threats and rapidly
changing situations. SMC strives to meet their needs with responsive
development processes and the timely fielding of capabilities. We
increase our ability to respond by partnering with the Air Force
Research Lab, Air Force Material Command, U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), and other Services and agencies to ensure we provide for
their needs technically and operationally. The space community will
achieve its full potential only if we reduce fragmentation and
conflicting agendas. As the use and dependence on space grows across
the military, it is imperative that the national security space
community work in a more coordinated, collaborative, and interdependent
fashion.
Last month, Under Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Ronald Sega, and
SMC co-sponsored a National Security Space Program Managers' Conference
to expand teamwork and lines of communication between program managers
across the National security space community--NRO, MDA, Electronics
Systems Center (AFMC) and Navy and Army space organizations. This
collaboration helps share experiences and ``best practices'', provides
more problem-solving resources, and promotes cross-flow of experience
and workforce. Instead of competing for valuable resources, such as
dollars and personnel, we leverage what we have across the space
enterprise.
Reductions in the space acquisition workforce of the past decade
and the loss of critical skills have had direct and significant impacts
on mission success and program performance. A top priority for the AF
and SMC is to rebuild the space acquisition workforce. We depend on a
mix of military, civilian, federally-funded research and development
contractors (FFRDC) and other support contractors to manage the complex
developments and contracts. SMC has aggressive efforts underway to
improve recruiting, retention, education, training, and mentoring of
our workforce. Through partnerships with the educational, industrial,
and governmental institutions, we are working to increase the cadre of
highly talented and experienced space acquisition people to meet the
needs across the community. SMC is working to attract more officers and
civilians with technical degrees and higher levels of experience. We
have established educational programs with universities, military
institutes (such as the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)) and defense contractors to enhance
understanding of system engineering and program management. Assignment
length for military personnel has been extended from 3 to 4 years to
insure they gain increased depth of experience, and that we improve
continuity and accountability in programs. We've also created
opportunities for leadership development, assigning more civilians as
deputy program managers, sending greater numbers to Squadron Officers
School, Air Command and Staff College and the Air War College.
We depend upon the Aerospace Corporation and other FFRDCs to
provide deep technical and engineering expertise and continuity in our
programs. We also augment our workforce with other systems engineering
and technical assistance (SETA) contractors. We cannot do our job
without these critical partners. Continued tight budgets will likely
increase pressures to limit or reduce support contracts--we will work
to be more efficient, but it is essential that we maintain critical
skills if we are to effectively manage the billions of dollars in
development programs.
Another priority for SMC is to improve horizontal integration
across our programs and the broader space enterprise. This includes
organizing to enhance engineering and architectural standards and
processes; implement best business practices for contracting,
incentives, and budgeting; improve development planning, modeling and
analysis and technology planning. Horizontal integration of expertise
across the space acquisition enterprise creates efficiencies of
resources and mission accomplishment using ``best practices'' and
world-class processes across the portfolio. Understanding mission
requirements and common architectural solutions will allow individual
program offices to share experiences, resources, and solutions based on
common systems engineering principles. The payoff of this horizontal
integration is that the systems SMC delivers to space operators and
joint commanders will enable more integrated and responsive air, land,
maritime, space and cyberspace operations.
Another key to improving acquisition performance in space programs
is the AF's effort to implement a new business model for space
acquisition. We are establishing and applying a block or incremental
approach to developing, acquiring and fielding space systems across the
Air Force. The objective of this approach is to reduce program cycle
time and redistribute risk across a program's life cycle, from early
phases of technology maturation through system development and
operational system procurement. We'll more consciously allocate risk
across different phases in the life cycle of programs. The highest risk
will be in the earliest stage of science and technology--production
programs will be based on mature technology for the lowest risk. We
will insure more mature technologies, more stable requirements, and
more discipline in end-to-end systems design. The expectation is that
cycle times will be reduced and that we'll be able to maintain cost and
schedule with higher confidence, and produce more effective
capabilities sooner by synchronizing science and technology, technology
development, systems development and demonstration, and systems
production. The Global Positioning System, Space Based Radar, Space
Based Space Surveillance System, and Transformational Communication
Satellite programs are pioneering the process now.
CONCLUSION
Space capabilities have become an integrated and indispensable
element in virtually all joint military operations. They provide the
means to plan and execute operations across the globe, and enable
unprecedented speed, precision and effectiveness. Today the U.S. enjoys
an asymmetric military and national security advantage from these
cutting edge systems. Further, space is increasingly important in civil
and commercial applications and serves as an engine of economic and
technological leadership. Maintaining our military advantage demands
that we continue to develop and field the most advanced and affordable
space capabilities possible. We have experienced many problems in space
acquisition in the Air Force and across the government and industry. We
know the root causes of these problems and have a comprehensive, ``back
to basics'' strategy for restoring our space acquisition performance.
It will take time to achieve full results, but we are making
significant progress in rebuilding our capabilities, getting troubled
programs on track and insuring important new programs are set on a
solid foundation from the beginning. We appreciate the support from
Congress for the programs and budgets that are essential to insuring
our Nation and its military forces retain the unique advantages we
derive from space. SMC and its partners in government and industry are
committed to making space acquisition the model across the DOD and to
provide our military forces the finest space capabilities possible.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, we'll make those a part of the
record. Ms. Chaplain, GAO.
Ms. Chaplain. GAO.
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, ACTING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION
AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Chaplain. Chairman Sessions, Senator Nelson, and
Senator Reed, thank you for inviting me to participate in this
afternoon's hearing on DOD space acquisitions. Today, I'll be
discussing why we need to improve DOD's return on investment in
space, and how we can do so.
DOD space systems play an increasingly critical role in
supporting military operations and our economy, but the
programs focused on acquiring these systems are experiencing
problems that are driving up costs by billions of dollars,
stretching schedules by years, and increasing performance
risks. Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that
DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider new
ways to achieve the same capability. It is in such a position
today with its new missile detection and its weather monitoring
satellite programs.
Taken together, acquisition problems are having a dramatic
effect on DOD's space investment portfolio. Over the next 5
years, there'll be about $12 billion less available for new
systems, as well as for the discovery of promising new
technologies, because of cost growth.
While DOD is pushing to start new highly ambitious
programs, such as the TSAT or Space Radar, broader analysis of
the Nation's fiscal future indicate that spending for weapons
systems may need to be reduced, rather than increased, to
address growing deficits.
This investment picture makes it critical to address root
problems that make space programs unexecutable. These include
competition for funding, which encourages low-cost estimating,
optimistic scheduling, and overpromising, and also a tendency
to start programs too early--that is, before there is assurance
that design capabilities can be achieved within available
resources and time constraints.
Our previous recommendations have focused on addressing
these and other root causes, but DOD has chosen not to fully
implement them on large acquisitions. Recently, however, with
new leadership, the Air Force has embraced adopting the best
practices we have recommended. In Dr. Sega's view, they
represent a common-sense approach that was followed in much
earlier space efforts.
The Air Force has also recently taken steps to put its TSAT
program on a more executable track. It has reduced its
expectations in the level of sophistication of its first two
satellites so that it can meet schedule goals. It is also
holding off on entering formal acquisition of the program until
critical technologies are proven.
These are good steps when looking at TSAT as an individual
program. It is important, however, that the Air Force ensure
warfighters accept lower capability and that it makes sense to
pursue the current approach versus the alternative of buying
additional communications satellites that are further along in
production.
On the broader scale, there are steps that can be taken to
facilitate the Air Force's ``back to basic'' approach for all
space programs. First, the Air Force, with others, can develop
an overall investment strategy that identifies funding
priorities. This will help balance investments between legacy
programs and new programs, as well as between science and
technology activities and acquisition activities. Optimally,
DOD would do this for its entire weapons system investment
portfolio so that it can assure that all new programs are
affordable.
Second, the Air Force can change policies to adopt best
practices. For example, the Air Force's space acquisition
policy could be further revised to ensure that a true
evolutionary approach is being pursued, and that blocks, or
increments, will include only technologies that have been
sufficiently matured.
Other steps, which range from enhancing workforce capacity
to increasing opportunities for testing new technologies in
space, are detailed in my written statement.
In closing, implementing best practices for space
acquisitions will not be an easy undertaking. DOD, as a whole,
still operates in an environment that encourages competition
for funding, and, thus, behaviors that have been detrimental to
meeting cost and schedule goals. Moreover, the changes being
proposed will require significant shifts in thinking about how
space systems should be developed and changes in incentives.
Lastly, while it may be easier to focus on bringing change
program by program, it is important to ensure that change occur
within the context of the entire space investment portfolio.
This will require tough tradeoff decisions, but it'll ensure
that the right mix of programs are being pursued, and that user
needs can be met in a timely and cost-effective fashion.
This concludes my statement. I respectfully request that my
written statement be submitted for the record, and I'll be
happy to answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be
here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) space
acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions to acquire space-based
capabilities to support current military and other government
operations as well as to enable DOD to transform the way it collects
and disseminates information, gathers data on its adversaries, and
attacks targets. In fiscal year 2007 alone, DOD expects to spend almost
$20 billion to develop and procure satellites and other space systems,
including nearly $7 billion on the major space systems.\1\ Despite its
growing investment in space, however, DOD's space system acquisitions
have experienced problems over the past several decades that have
driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even billions of dollars,
stretched schedules by years, and increased performance risks. In some
cases, capabilities have not been delivered to the warfighter after
decades of development.
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\1\ Estimates of fiscal year 2007 spending are based on DOD's
Fiscal Year 2006 Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) plan. The fiscal
year 2007 FYDP plan was not available to us at the time of this
testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of these problems, DOD is now contending with important
trade-off decisions such as whether to continue investing in long
beleaguered efforts or undertake more promising alternatives. At the
same time, leadership now recognizes the need to substantially change
DOD's current space acquisition approach and the value of adopting
practices that will lay a better foundation for program execution.
Within this context, I will discuss our findings on space acquisition
problems, recent steps DOD has taken in an effort to address these
problems, and the changes that still need to occur if DOD is to break
the cycle of acquisition problems.
space acquisition problems persist
The majority of satellite programs we have reviewed over the past 2
decades experienced problems during their acquisition that drove up
costs and schedules and increased technical risks. Several programs
were restructured by DOD in the face of delays and cost growth. At
times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing
DOD to nearly double its investment in face of technical and other
problems without realizing a better return on its investment. Along
with the cost increases, many programs are experiencing significant
schedule delays--as much as 6 years--postponing delivery of promised
capabilities to the warfighter.
Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had
to go back to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the
same capability. It is in such a position today, with its Space-based
Infrared System (SBIRS)-High program and possibly its National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program,
both of which have been mired in expanding cost and schedule setbacks.
More specifically, DOD's investment in SBIRS-High, a critical
missile warning system, has been pushed to over $10.5 billion from the
initial $4.1 billion estimate made over 9 years earlier. This 160-
percent increase in estimated costs triggered a fourth Nunn-McCurdy \2\
breach (see 10 U.S.C. 2433), requiring a review by the Secretary of
Defense and a report to Congress, and resulted in the program being
restructured for a third time, in late 2005. With costs and timelines
spiraling out of control, DOD reduced the number of satellites it plans
to procure--pushing the average per unit procurement cost up to 224-
percent above 2002 baseline costs--and is now pursuing an alternative
to SBIRS-High while it continues with the scaled back program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2433. This oversight mechanism originated with
an amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982. It
was made permanent in the following year's authorization act and has
been amended several times. Generally, the law requires DOD to review
programs and report to Congress whenever cost growth reaches specified
thresholds. The statute is commonly known as the Nunn-McCurdy amendment
based on the names of the sponsors of the original legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial cost and schedule estimates for NPOESS--a new satellite
constellation intended to replace existing weather and environmental
monitoring satellites--have also proven unreliable. NPOESS is managed
by a tri-agency Integrated Program Office consisting of DOD, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. In January 2006, the program
reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach, at the 25-percent threshold,
due to continuing technical problems, including problems with the
development of key sensors. Specifically, in early 2005, DOD learned
that a subcontractor could not meet cost and schedule targets due to
significant technical issues on an imaging sensor known as the visible/
infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS) sensor--including problems
with the cryoradiator, excessive vibration of sensor parts, and errors
in the sensor's solar calibration. These technical problems were
further complicated by subcontractor management problems. To address
these issues, DOD provided additional funds for VIIRS, capped
development funding for other critical technologies, and revised its
schedule to keep the program moving forward. We also reported that
based on our own analysis of contractor trends, the program will most
likely overrun costs by $1.4 billion.\3\ Given the challenges currently
facing the program, the scheduled first launch date slipped 17 months
to September 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major Weapon
Programs, GAO-06-391 (Washington, DC: March 31, 2006).
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Another recent example of problems is evident in the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program. We reported in the past that
this program experienced cost increases due to requirements changes,
inadequate contract strategies, and funding shortfalls. We also
reported that DOD had to cut back its planned purchase of satellites
from five to three as a result. The outcome has been an 84-percent unit
cost increase--each AEHF satellite is now estimated to cost about $2.1
billion. More recently, we reported that scheduling delays and the late
delivery of cryptographic equipment have culminated into nearly a 3-
year delay in the launch of the first satellite and that the program
still faces schedule risk due to the continued concurrent development
of two critical path items managed and developed outside the program.
Acquisition problems have not been limited to the development of
home-grown systems. DOD's purchase of an ostensible commercial
satellite for the use of communications, the Wideband Gapfiller
Satellite (WGS), is experiencing about a 70-percent cost growth, due in
part to the problems a subcontractor was experiencing in assembling the
satellites. Improperly installed fasteners on the satellites'
subcomponents have resulted in rework on the first satellite and
extensive inspections of all three satellites currently being
fabricated. The cost for WGS has increased about $746.3 million but DOD
estimates that about $276.2 million of this amount is largely due to
cost growth associated with a production gap between satellites three
and four. The launch of the first satellite has now been delayed for
over 3 years and is currently scheduled for June 2007. The delay will
increase program costs and add at least 22 months to the time it takes
to obtain an initial operational capability from the system.
Figure 1 shows that, overall for fiscal years 2006 through 2011,
estimated costs for DOD's major space acquisition programs have
increased a total of about $12.2 billion--or nearly 44-percent in
total--above initial estimates. Figure 2 breaks out this trend among
key major space acquisitions.
As both figures illustrate, cost increases have had a dramatic
impact on DOD's overall space portfolio. To cover the added costs of
poorly performing programs, DOD has shifted scarce resources away from
other programs, creating a cascade of cost and schedule inefficiencies.
For example, to fund other space programs, DOD has had to push off the
start of a new version of the Global Positioning System (GPS), which
has forced costs to increase for the current version under development.
Meanwhile, DOD is also contending with cost increases within its
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. These are largely due
to misjudgments about the extent to which DOD could rely on commercial
demand to leverage its investment. Nevertheless, the resulting $12.6
billion increase has added pressures to make tradeoffs.
At the same time that DOD is juggling resources on existing
programs, it is undertaking two new efforts--the Transformational
Satellite Communications System (TSAT) program and Space Radar
program--which are expected to be among the most ambitious, expensive,
and complex space systems ever. Moreover, DOD is relying heavily on
their planned capabilities to fundamentally enable DOD to transform how
military operations are conducted. In fact, many other weapon systems
will be interfaced with these satellites and highly dependent on them
for their own success. Together, these systems have been preliminarily
estimated to cost about $40 billion. While DOD is planning to undertake
the new systems, broader analyses of the Nation's fiscal future
indicate that spending for weapon systems may need to be reduced,
rather than increased, to address growing deficits.
UNDERLYING CAUSES OF ACQUISITION PROBLEMS
Our reviews have identified a number of causes behind the problems
just described, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad
scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a
competition for funding which encourages low cost estimating,
optimistic scheduling, over promising, suppressing bad news, and for
space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess
potentially better alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy at the
expense of realism and sound management. Invariably, with too many
programs in its portfolio, DOD and even Congress are forced to
continually shift funds to and from programs--often undermining well-
performing programs to pay for poorly performing ones.
Second, DOD starts its space programs too early, that is, before it
has assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved
within available resources and time constraints. This tendency is
caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs
attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving out
technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology
invention into acquisition, programs experience technical problems that
have reverberating effects and require large amounts of time and money
to fix. When programs have a large number of interdependencies, even
minor ``glitches'' can cause disruptions.
A companion problem for all weapon systems is that DOD allows new
requirements to be added well into the acquisition phase. Many times,
these significantly stretch the technology challenges (and
consequently, budgets) the program is already facing. This was
particularly evident in SBIRS-High up until 2004. While experiences
would caution DOD not to pile on new requirements, customers often
demand them fearing there may not be another chance to get new
capabilities since programs can take a decade or longer to complete.
Third, space programs have historically attempted to satisfy all
requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or
the maturity of the technologies to achieve the full capability.
Increasingly, DOD has preferred to make fewer, but heavier, larger, and
complex ``Battlestar Galactica-like'' satellites, that perform a
multitude of missions rather than larger constellations of smaller,
less complex satellites that gradually increase in sophistication. This
has stretched technology challenges beyond the capability of many
potential contractors and vastly increased the complexities related to
software--a problem that affected SBIRS-High and AEHF, for example.
Our reviews have identified additional factors that contribute to
space acquisition problems, though less directly affecting cost and
schedule problems we have reported on. For example, consolidations
within defense supplier base for space programs have made it more
difficult for DOD to incorporate competition into acquisition
strategies. Since 1985, there were at least ten fully competent prime
contractors competing for the large programs and a number that could
compete for subcontracts. Arguably today, there are only two
contractors that could handle DOD's most complex space programs. DOD
has exacerbated this problem by not seeking opportunities to
restructure its acquisitions to maximize competition, particularly for
the small suppliers who have a high potential to introduce novel
solutions and innovations into space acquisitions. In the 1990s, DOD
also structured contracts in a way that reduced oversight and shifted
key decisionmaking responsibility onto contractors. DOD later found
that this approach--known as Total System Performance Responsibility
(TSPR)--magnified problems related to requirements creep and poor
contractor performance.
Another factor contributing to problems is the diverse array of
officials and organizations involved with a space program, which has
made it even more difficult to pare back and control requirements. The
Space Radar system, for example, is expected to play a major role in
transforming military as well as intelligence-collecting operations and
other critical governmental functions, such as homeland security. As a
result, its constituency includes combatant commanders, all of the
military services, intelligence agencies, and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). The GPS not only serves the military, it
provides critical services to civilian users, the transportation
sector, the information technology sector, among many other industries.
In addition, short tenures for top leadership and program managers
within the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
has lessened the sense of accountability for acquisition problems and
further encouraged a short-term view of success, according to officials
we have interviewed. Though still in a pre-acquisition phase, TSAT and
Space Radar have already had one program director each. The SBIRS-High
program, meanwhile, has seen at least three program directors. At the
highest levels of leadership, for many years, DOD did not invest
responsibilities for its space activities in any one individual--
leaving no one in charge of establishing an integrated vision for space
or of mediating between competing demands. In 1994, it established such
a position within the OSD, but dissolved this position in 1998. In
2002, DOD established a space leadership position within the Under
Secretary position in the Air Force, combined it with the directorship
of the National Reconnaissance Office in order to better integrate DOD
and intelligence space activities, and allowed the Under Secretary to
have milestone decision authority for major space systems acquisitions.
After the first Under Secretary of the Air Force in charge of space
retired in 2005, DOD split these responsibilities and temporarily
reclaimed milestone decision authority for all major space programs.
Changes in leadership and reorganizations are common across DOD, but
again, they make it more difficult to enforce accountability and
maintain the right levels of support for acquisition programs.
Lastly, there are capacity shortfalls that have constrained DOD's
ability to optimize and oversee its space programs. These include:
shortages in the pipeline of scientists and engineers, shortages of
experts in systems and software engineering, and uneven levels of
experience among program managers. Contractors are also facing
workforce pressures similar to those experienced by the government,
that is, not enough technical expertise to develop complex space
systems. In addition, we have reported that there is a lack of low-cost
launch opportunities, which are needed to increase the level of
experimental testing in space.
DOD HAS EXPRESSED ITS COMMITMENT TO IMPROVE ITS APPROACH TO SPACE
ACQUISITIONS
DOD has recently expressed a commitment to improve its approach to
space acquisitions and embrace many of the recommendations we have made
in the past.
Our previous recommendations have been focused on providing a sound
foundation for program execution. Namely, we have recommended that DOD
separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental
path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at
program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstratable knowledge
to make decisions to move to next phases. In addition, we have called
on DOD to develop an overall investment strategy for space in order to
help DOD rebalance its investments in space acquisition programs as it
continues to contend with cost increases from its programs.
These recommendations are based on a body of work that we have
undertaken over the last several years that examines weapon acquisition
issues from a perspective that draws upon lessons learned from best
product development practices. Leading commercial firms expect that
their program managers will deliver high-quality products on time and
within budget. Doing otherwise could result in the customer walking
away. Thus, those firms have created an environment and adopted
practices that put their program managers in a good position to succeed
in meeting these expectations. Collectively, these practices comprise a
process that is anchored in knowledge. It is a process in which
technology development and product development are treated differently
and managed separately. The process of developing technology culminates
in discovery--the gathering of knowledge--and must, by its nature,
allow room for unexpected results and delays. Leading firms do not ask
their program or product managers to develop technology. Rather, they
give responsibility for maturing technologies to science and technology
organizations. The process of developing a product culminates in
delivery and, therefore, gives great weight to design and production.
The firms demand--and receive--specific knowledge about a new product
before production begins. A program does not go forward unless a strong
business case on which the program was originally justified continues
to hold true.
While the practices we have recommended represent commonly accepted
sound business practices, until recently, they have not been accepted
by DOD's space acquisition community for large space acquisitions. By
contrast, these practices were implemented for the development of a
small, experimental satellite, intended for direct use by a combatant
command, (known as TacSat 1). We recently reported that by including
only mature technologies and limiting new requirements, DOD was able to
develop the satellite for less than $10 million (including surplus
hardware valued at $5 million) and within 12 months.
In disagreeing with our recommendations, DOD asserted its desire to
push programs to advance technologies as far as possible. Other reasons
that space officials have given for extending technology development
into acquisition include the greater ability to secure funding for
costly technology development within an acquisition program versus a
science and technology program, a belief among the acquisition
community that labs in charge of developing space technologies do not
understand their needs, as well as communication gaps between the S&T
and acquisition communities.
Moreover, while DOD officials told us they were pursuing
evolutionary development for space systems, we found that they were
beginning programs by challenging programs managers to achieve
significant leaps in capability with the intention of abandoning those
efforts later in the development cycle should too many problems be
encountered. This is not a true evolutionary approach, as it leaves DOD
facing increased technical challenges at the beginning of a program and
thus, increased risks, and it raises the expectations on the part of
stakeholders who may be unwilling to accept less capability later on.
Two of the systems we were most concerned about in this respect were
and TSAT and Space Radar--they were already expected to cost about $40
billion. DOD was planning to start these acquisitions even when many of
their critical technologies were still immature and it was pursuing a
highly ambitious path in terms of the technology push. Given that these
systems were among the most complex programs ever undertaken for space,
they were being counted on to enable wider DOD transformation efforts,
and DOD was already contending with highly problematic space efforts,
we believed DOD could not afford to pursue such risky approaches for
TSAT and Space Radar.
Since we last testified before this subcommittee in July 2005, DOD
has appointed a new Under Secretary of the Air Force to be in charge of
space acquisitions, who, in turn, has embraced adopting best practices,
or, as he terms it, ``going back to the basics.'' Specifically, the
Under Secretary has expressed a desire to
Delegate the maturation of technologies--to the point
of being tested in a relevant environment or operational
environment, if appropriate--to the S&T community.
Adopt an evolutionary development approach in which
new systems would be developed in a series of increments, or
blocks. Any desired technology that is not expected to be
matured in time to start a new block would be assigned to a
later block. Each block would have a discrete beginning and end
point.
Fund S&T appropriately so that significant technology
breakthroughs can be continually pursued.
Improve collaboration on requirements--consulting with
warfighters on the content of each new block.
In addition, the Under Secretary is focused on estimating cost and
funding new acquisitions to an 80-percent confidence level;
strengthening systems engineering and strengthening the acquisition
workforce.
Aspects of this approach have recently been incorporated in to
DOD's TSAT program. For the first block, satellites 1 and 2, the Air
Force has reduced its expectations in the level of sophistication of
these satellites to increase the confidence in the schedule for
launching the first satellite in 2014. Higher performing levels of the
technologies to support laser communications and an Internet-like
processor router will be pushed off to a subsequent block, along with
the multi-access laser communications--a more robust laser capable of
transmitting vast amounts of data within seconds. Program officials
have also stated that the TSAT program will not enter into product
development, that is, formal acquisition, until its critical
technologies are proven.
These are good steps when looking at TSAT as an individual program.
It is important, however, that the Air Force ensure warfighters accept
lower capability and that it makes sense to pursue the current approach
versus the alternative of buying more Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) or Wide Gapfiller Satellites (WGS).
KEYS TO REALIZING DOD'S NEW GOALS FOR SPACE ACQUISITIONS
DOD's desire to adopt best practices for space acquisition is a
positive and necessary first step toward reform. However, these changes
will not be easy to undertake. They require significant shifts in
thinking about how space systems should be developed; changes in
incentives and perceptions; as well as further policy and process
changes. Moreover, they will need to be made within a larger
acquisition environment that still encourages a competition for funding
and consequently pressures programs to view success as the ability to
secure the next installment rather than the end goal of delivering
capabilities when and as promised. In addition, DOD's space leaders
will be challenged to sustain a commitment to adopting best practices,
given the myriad of missions and programs that compete for the
attention of DOD's leadership and resources, frequent turnover in
leadership positions, and potential resistance from the many diverse
organizations involved with space acquisitions.
There are steps, however, that DOD can take to substantially
mitigate these challenges.
First, DOD can guide its decisions to start space
acquisition programs with an overall investment strategy. More
specifically, DOD could identify overall capabilities and how
to achieve them, that is, what role space will play versus
other air-, sea-, and land-based assets; identify priorities
for funding space acquisitions; and implement mechanisms that
would enforce the strategy and measure progress. Optimally, DOD
would do this for its entire weapon system investment portfolio
so that space systems that are expected to play a critical role
in transformation could be prioritized along with other legacy
and transformational systems and so that DOD could reduce
pressures associated with competition for funding. But in the
absence of a department-wide strategy, DOD could reexamine and
prioritize its space portfolio with an eye toward balancing
investments between legacy programs and new programs as well as
between S&T programs and acquisition programs. In addition, DOD
could prioritize S&T investments. This is particularly
important since DOD is undertaking a range of initiatives--
collectively known as operationally responsive space (ORS)--
designed to facilitate evolutionary development, more testing
of technologies before acquisition, and ultimately enable DOD
to deliver space-based capabilities to the warfighter much
faster and quicker. While ORS investments hold great potential,
there are other S&T projects competing for the same resources,
including those focused on discovering and developing
technologies and materials that could greatly enhance future
capabilities, reduce costs, and maintain U.S. superiority in
space.
Second, DOD could revise policies and processes
supporting space as needed to adopt the best practices being
embraced. For example, DOD's space acquisition policy could be
further revised to ensure that a true evolutionary approach is
being pursued and that blocks, or increments, will include only
technologies that have been sufficiently matured. DOD could
also implement processes and policies, as needed, that
stabilize requirements, particularly for acquisitions that are
being shared with other stakeholders, such as the Intelligence
Community, and that ensure warfighters are bought into
capabilities being pursued for each new system increment. In
recent years, it has instituted processes for some individual
systems, such as SBIRS-High, that could serve as a model.
Third, DOD could continue to address other capacity
shortfalls. These include shortages of staff with science and
engineering backgrounds; shortages of experience within the
program manager workforce; limited opportunities and funding
for testing for space technologies; and the lack of low-cost
launch vehicles. At the same time, DOD could continue to work
toward strengthening relationships between the S&T and
acquisition communities and coordination within the S&T
community. The Under Secretary is uniquely positioned to do
this given his previous position as DOD's Director of Defense
Research and Engineering and his participation in previous
efforts to develop a strategy for space S&T.
Fourth, we have recommended that DOD take steps
departmentwide to hold people and programs accountable when
best practices are not pursued. This will require DOD to
empower program managers to make decisions related to funding,
staffing, and moving into subsequent phases and to match
program manager tenure with development or delivery of a
product. It may also require DOD to tailor career paths and
performance management systems to incentivize longer tenures.
Until these actions have been taken, space leaders could take
steps now to ensure space program managers have the right
levels of experience to execute large programs and have
sufficient authority so that they can be held accountable.
Likewise, DOD's space leaders can take steps to hold its
contractors accountable by structuring contracts so that
incentives actually motivate contractors to achieve desired
acquisition outcomes and withholding award fees when those
goals are not met.
In closing, we are encouraged with the acquisition approach being
embraced by DOD's space leadership. It can enable DOD to begin to match
resources to requirements before starting new programs and therefore,
better position programs for success. Successful implementation,
however, will hinge on the ability of DOD's current space leaders to
instill and sustain commitment to adopting best practices over the
short and long term. In doing so, best practice approaches should be
reflected in policy and manifested in decisions on individual programs
or reform will be blunted. They should also be accompanied by an
investment strategy for space, and ultimately DOD, to separate wants
from needs and to alleviate longstanding pressures associated with
competition within DOD to win funding. By embracing a model that
incorporates all these elements, DOD can achieve better outcomes for
its space programs.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
In preparing for this testimony, we relied on previously issued GAO
reports on assessments of individual space programs, incentives and
pressures that drive space system acquisition problems, common problems
affecting space system acquisitions, space science and technology
strategy, and DOD's space acquisition policy, as well as our reports on
best practices for weapon systems development. We also analyzed DOD's
Selected Acquisition Reports to assess cost increases and investment
trends. In addition, we met with the Air Force Under Secretary to
discuss his ``back to basics'' approach. We conducted our review
between March 6 and April 3, 2006, in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
For future information, please contact Cristina Chaplain at 202-
512-4841 or [email protected]. Individuals making contributions to this
testimony include, Art Gallegos, Robert Ackley, Maricela Cherveny,
Sharron Candon, Jean Harker, Leslie Kaas Pollock, and Karen Sloan.
Table 1 highlights recent findings from our reports on cost and
schedule overruns for DOD's current and planned space programs. The
table also notes that many programs are still addressing past mistakes
in acquisition approaches and contractor oversight as well as
technical, design, and manufacturing problems.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. We'll make that a part of the
record. We appreciate your work and evaluation.
It's great to have the ranking member, Senator Nelson,
here. I've had some opening comments. I'll let him make his
comments now, and do his round of questioning if he's ready.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll just
submit the opening statement for the record.
Senator Sessions. We'll make your statement a part of the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
I join Senator Sessions in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon
and I look forward to a good discussion on a number of key space
issues. We have a late start today, as a result of the committee's full
hearing schedule, so I will be brief in highlighting just a few issues.
Serious problems with most of the space acquisition programs
continue, although some improvements are being seen, notably in the
Transformational Communications Satellite Program (TSAT).
As the Government Accountability Office has noted, the bow wave of
funding increases in the space programs in the next 5 years brought
about as a result of cost overruns in the space acquisition program is
$12 billion--a staggering amount. This shortfall comes on top of
significant projected growth in the same period in the Space Radar,
TSAT, and other new programs. As the Nation most dependent on space
systems for military as well as for civilian use, paying for the space
programs is important but it is going to be difficult. These programs
have to have discipline, stable, realistic requirements, realistic
budgets and schedules, and mature technology to be sustained. There
will continue to be a reluctance to start very costly new space
programs if Congress doesn't have confidence in the requirements, the
technology, the cost and the schedule.
In the TSAT program, there are improvements but they are recent and
fragile, however, and there is a long way to go, and a lot of work to
be done, before the TSAT hoped-for launch date at the end of 2014. I
remain concerned that terminating the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
satellite early, in anticipation of a successful TSAT launch in 2014,
may still be overly ambitious.
In addition to TSAT, I look forward to hearing about the Space
Radar program and the status of the United Launch Alliance, the Boeing
and Lockheed Martin joint venture for the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle program, the Navy's program for ultra high frequency
communications and plans to minimize any potential gaps in that
capability, and the status of the designation and training of Services'
space cadres.
In closing, I urge our witnesses to look seriously at less costly
options for meeting space capabilities. These ideas, such as the notion
of operationally responsive space, and smaller, less sophisticated
satellites that can be replaced and upgraded on a more frequent basis,
should also be explored.
Thank you each for appearing here today. I look forward to a good
discussion. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Bill Nelson. Shall I get into the questions?
Senator Sessions. I would be pleased if you can start.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, it's good to see you again. Let's talk, you
and General Chilton, about the operationally responsive space
for some missions--preassembled, modular, assembled on demand,
launched within hours. They could be commercial satellites for
a focused short term. There are many options here to explore.
Let me ask you all some questions.
Is TacSat-2 fully funded?
Dr. Sega. Sir, my understanding is, TacSat-2 is fully
funded. The launch portion will be fully funded by, I believe,
the end of this fiscal year. We do have a reprogramming
activity to fully fund the launch of TacSac-2.
Senator Bill Nelson. TacSat-3?
Dr. Sega. I may need some help with that.
General Hamel. Yes, sir, if I might. In both cases, the
TacSat-2 and TacSat-3 are fully funded, and, in fact, are well
along in their development.
Senator Sessions. Would you explain TacSat?
General Hamel. Excuse me, sir, yes. TacSat is the acronym
for tactical satellites, and these are a series of families of
experiments that are being pursued by the DOD. They are being
done by various laboratories. The first one of these vehicles
would be flying later this year. TacSat-1 is being sponsored by
the Naval Research Lab. TacSat-2 and TacSat-3 are being done,
led by the Air Force's Research Lab. As I say, both of those
are well along in their development. We are, in fact, now
soliciting for the actual launch contract being ordered, some
year in advance for that. So, we are, indeed, on course for
that.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about number 4?
General Hamel. Sir, that has not yet been awarded. We will
be looking at that as a future year commitment, in terms of the
budgets.
Senator Bill Nelson. What is the future vision for this
operationally responsive space?
Dr. Sega. I could start the answer to that question,
Senator Nelson, and then hand it off, because it involves the
operational concepts from the warfighter. It involves a robust
science and technology program to continue new ideas coming
forward. It involves the acquisition strategy, so that the
design is correct to allow a modular approach to building the
satellites. So, there's a technical aspect, an acquisition
aspect, as well as operations and how you would actually employ
them.
If I can go back to my previous 4 years as Director of
Defense Research and Engineering, we had several initiatives.
One of those was the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI) to
frame the technology development, going forward. It had three
pillars: a high-speed hypersonics portion, space access, and
space technology. Out of the space access portion came a joint
program between Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and the Air Force, called Falcon. One aspect of Falcon
was small launch vehicles. So, we're looking at the
underpinnings of providing the launch capacity to enable
operational response to space through that program. So, an
effort was established for the booster phase.
The third phase in space technology was responsive
payloads. As General Chilton mentioned, if you have a
responsive booster, it's important that when the satellite gets
to orbit, you don't have an extensive checkout time, you don't
have an extensive time for it to outgas and those things that
many satellites have had to do in the past. So, responsive
payload technologies was also worked over the previous several
years.
I would view this area in terms of a small-sat strategy.
One part of that is TacSats that can be deployed quickly for
the tactical commander. Another part is to look at smaller
satellites to perform some of the missions that we're currently
performing. So, they would be an integral part of our
constellations, and we replenish them as necessary in time, but
we'd also have the capacity of replenishing rapidly, if that
was the case. We also have the opportunity in the small
satellites to wring out some systems in technology development,
as well as science and technology.
So, these pieces, I believe, fit together. If we design
these properly and TacSat-3 is a great example, and I'd invite
those that can to visit Air Force Research Laboratory in
Albuquerque to look at the modular approach to some of this,
the systems design to enable some of the attributes in which
you've just mentioned. We're putting together a strategy for
this small-sat efforts to include the laboratories, the product
centers, the users, Army, Navy, and Air Force, across the
board.
General Chilton. Sir, I think Dr. Sega gave a good summary
of that. I could just refer back to the scenarios that I
addressed earlier, and also point out that if tomorrow we were
to go to war in another part of the world, we would go to war
with what we have in space today, and there is no option to
launch an additional satellite quickly to supplement it. We
could perhaps adjust our constellations if we needed to focus
additional capability in that area. What we don't have is a
quick-response capability that could augment where there are
shortfalls. As I mentioned, inspect where we had questions, or
perhaps even replace, should an adversary just decide to take
out one of our current capabilities.
These are the operational concepts that we have in the back
of our minds when we think about having that capability for the
warfighter.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, a priority of the STRATCOM is
putting a nuclear detection sensor on the GPS system. What are
your plans for those sensors to be on future GPS satellites?
General Chilton. Sir, I'll have to take that question for
the record.
What I can say is that we do have this requirement for the
capability to be able to do nuclear detection from orbit, so we
can determine if a nuclear device has gone off anywhere on the
planet. Personally, I'm agnostic as to the platform it's on, so
long as the capability is there.
But let me take that for the record, sir, to get back to
you with regard to the GPS constellation, specifically.
[The information referred to follows:]
STRATCOM has a requirement to be able to do nuclear detection from
orbit so that a determination can be made as to whether a nuclear
device has been detonated anywhere on the planet. Air Force Space
Command is our force provider for nuclear detonation detection, and
Space and Missile Systems Center, our acquisition arm for nuclear
detonation sensors. STRATCOM is agnostic as to the platform this sensor
will be placed upon, so long as the capability exists within a timely
manner.
Senator Sessions. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
all for your testimony this afternoon.
Secretary Sega, this week we had a subcommittee hearing on
missile defense, and one of the topics that we discussed was
the future space programs of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
Today, MDA has the Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS) program for warning and sensing, the N-FIRE for plume
characterization. But MDA is looking at other potential space
programs, beginning in 2008. Will those programs be coordinated
with you, or are they operating on their own space and own
direction?
Dr. Sega. Senator Reed, as we move forward we're working on
integration across space, how different space systems will
interact better than they have in the past. There's work to be
done to fully integrate how we are developing and operating
space systems across space, as well as how they would interact
with air and surface and sometimes subsurface assets. So,
that's a work in progress.
Senator Reed. So, they do not fall under your capacity as
DOD Executive Agent for Space. Is that officially?
I must say, I'm encouraged by your acquisition policy
discussions. I think it's sensible. You've taken the
suggestions of GAO and other outside stakeholders. I presume,
also, that MDA is not part of this acquisition policy, because
they don't fall within your purview.
Dr. Sega. The concept of going back to basics is one that I
think is going beyond the programs that we are discussing today
within this portfolio. I think that it's one that I meet with
General Obering and the MDA folks. My deputy, Gary Payton, who
came from MDA can apply this type of approach. I think we would
be better off. I do believe the integration and coordination is
important, not only for MDA, but also the NRO.
Senator Reed. But at this juncture it's more of cooperation
and collaboration, rather than being within your authority for
space acquisition?
Dr. Sega. That's correct, sir.
Senator Reed. A final question with respect to this set of
issues. MDA is going to report to a board of directors. That's
one of the things they indicated to us. Will you be part of
this board of directors?
Dr. Sega. I have to see how that forms out.
Senator Reed. All right. Very good.
There is another aspect at MDA that I think touches on
space, and one that could potentially raise concern. That is
the proposed space test bed that they are talking about. There
is no funding requested in fiscal year 2007, and MDA officials
have said that no decision will be taken on whether to pursue
the space test bed until 2008. The budget documents state that
the space test bed is, ``an essential element of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) acquisition plan,'' and that
would assume, to me, if it is an essential element of the
acquisition plan, that they have made more decisions than they
are indicating in their documentation.
You are the DOD Executive Agent for Space. Can you explain
the status of the test bed, your role in the decision, what
it's going to do? It seems to me this could be a very central
part of our space policy. If you're the space executive, you
should know.
Dr. Sega. As we go forward and settle these areas in test
and one of those is a capacity to test on the ground, the
capacity to test with air simulators, if you will for example,
Space Radar, to test them there, as well as the ability to test
assets, with space as part of the component--is one that we're
in the process of working through. If there's any further
follow-on?
General Hamel. Sir, if I might. We have a good
relationship, if you will, in terms of executing the many of
these space programs with the MDA. In fact, the Space Tracking
Surveillance System, as well as N-FIRE, is actually managed by
people that are co-located in my organization. In fact, I
support them with contracting and engineering and the like.
Much of the program direction and the architectures are
actually directly overseen by General Obering. As a result, we
have a less active role in terms of that, but it's certainly in
terms of the lessons learned and how we're actually going about
executing the programs. Such things as target vehicles are
actually provided by my organization, so we have very much an
execution-level support, our relationship with them.
Senator Reed. I appreciate that. It seems to me, though,
the essence of your position as the Executive Agency for Space
is that you would have significant influence on all these
programs, particularly one that could essentially establish
literally a test bed in space, which might imply even testing
things other than satellites, testing weapons, et cetera. I
respect your comments today, but there is this lack of clarity
as to exactly where the central point is. Are these agencies
coordinating with you because they feel like it, or because you
have the responsibility and the authority to make them
coordinate? I think that's an issue that we have to look at
much more thoroughly.
I appreciate your comments today, both of you.
General Chilton, a final question. In your key initiatives
for Strategic Command for Space, you have a couple of concepts
which roll right off the tongue, but I'm not quite sure I know
what they mean. ``Integrate air and space capabilities to
deliver combined effects.''
General Chilton. We're doing that today already with the
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), you may have heard of
that?
Senator Reed. Yes.
General Chilton. JDAM is essentially a package, a tail-fin
configuration and a GPS receiver and an Inertial Navigation
System (INS) package that we can put on one of our bombs,
either a 2,000-pound class or 500-pound class bomb. The bomb is
guided to the target using information that was relayed from
the airplane platform that drops it. Then the bomb is updated
inflight from the satellite information. This is a good example
today of where we're integrating space capabilities with our
air-breathing assets and those type weapons.
Senator Reed. Great. I have two others, which you might
answer and those are precisely what helps us understand realign
resources to sustain existing space surveillance capabilities.
General Chilton. Today, with regard to the discussion on
vulnerabilities, my belief is, one of the first things you need
to do to understand how vulnerable we are, and to understand
the environment that we're operating in, is to have a good
capability to surveil that environment and understand what's up
there.
Senator Reed. Okay.
General Chilton. Classically, we've done a great job of
keeping track of things in space, debris, so that when the
space shuttle launches, or we launch a commercial satellite,
even before we launch, we run computer programs that are
tracking the debris up there to make sure we launch between the
debris, or aren't going go up into a position where we could be
struck. We even maneuver, on occasion, the International Space
Station to avoid debris that we detect up there.
So, we have a good capability to count the dots up there,
if you will. But to really understand the environment, you need
to know what those dots are. What is that satellite that just
was launched by another country? What is its true purpose and
capability? Ultimately, through surveillance and what we call
``space situational awareness development,'' you, hopefully,
can divine intent. A very similar scenario that you could
imagine in an airplane environment is where you're trying to go
surveil enemy territory or even international territory to
understand the environment, how many dots are out there. Are
those dots civilian airplanes? Are those dots military
airplanes and what is their intent? Similar thing in space. So,
we need to take the step beyond counting what's up there and
cataloging it and tracking it, to understanding its purpose and
intent and capability. That's what we mean by ``increasing our
surveillance capability.''
Senator Reed. Thank you very much for all of your testimony
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You're very gracious. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Dr. Sega, we've recently heard reports of continuing
problems on the highly-expensive and time-consuming efforts on
such programs as Space-Based Infrared Radar System (SBIRS)-
High, our early warning launch satellite, and NPOES, the
weather satellite. The DOD is paying a considerable price for
mistakes we made some years ago, mistakes largely rooted in
optimistic assumptions about cost, technological maturity, and
the time needed to get the job done.
How is the Air Force and DOD applying the lessons learned
from those mistakes?
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, those are two of the examples that
led us to the ``back-to-basics'' approach and the block
approach. The technologies were not mature in either of the
cited programs when they began. The requirements were many, in
terms of what the expectation of the satellite would perform.
The role of government was a bit reduced as these programs
started in the mid-1990s.
The lessons learned from those two programs, and
recommendations that have been forwarded by internal/external
groups, including GAO, have formed the basis of the principles
by which we are going forward. General Hamel mentioned many of
those, in terms of the discipline, in terms of management and
the systems engineering, testability, and going through solid
technical side. There's also better cost estimation in simply
not taking on more than what we know how to do, so that
acquisition time is reduced. I believe you also will find
increased accountability. As those requirements are stable, the
time to complete is identified, and the tasks at hand are
known, and the starting point is matured technologies. So, I
think they formed part of the thought process that led to a
``back-to-basics'' approach, a block incremental approach,
going forward.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the Space Radar, TSAT--can
you guarantee us or give us some confidence that those programs
are not likely to suffer the same kind of difficulties?
Dr. Sega. We have put in the principles for example, in
TSAT, the technologies are either at the five or six level,
currently, with the next year is to mature the remaining ones
that are at the technology readiness level five or six. At that
point, we enter into the competition to, in fact, go to what
would be, in this approach, the beginning point, if you will,
of a block one.
Senator Sessions. Let me just see if I can put this in
plain English. Not that you're not, but what you've decided
with TSAT is that the first one, you're going to put in it the
capabilities that you have great confidence in, that's mature.
As time goes by, and as the technology matures, the next
satellites can be more sophisticated and have more capability.
Is that the way this acquisition block approach is?
Dr. Sega. Yes.
Senator Sessions. Is that what it boils down to?
Dr. Sega. Yes. So, incrementally, building in there, but
each step of the way--and, in fact, a continuous process. I
view it as important to have the users, the warfighters
involved from day one, all the way through the process, as well
as the technical people, the acquisition folks, the logistics
folks, operators, so that as we identify what should be in
block one. We're also engaged as to have the needs changed for
a block two from what we had previously thought would be in
block two.
Senator Sessions. Needs are based on the warfighter or the
customers' needs will also impact what you put in the next
block.
Dr. Sega. Correct. We will converge on what is in a block
two, from a user standpoint, as well as a provider standpoint.
So, we will work hard on that systems development for what
would be available for a block two, as well as what needs are
available, and then we define that as well.
We have a sense of where we want to go on TSAT for block
two, as we had a bit more aggressive goals, in terms of the
capacity of the laser communications and the capacity of the
router.
Senator Sessions. What about the Space Radar? How are you
coming along in setting your goals and expectations there?
Dr. Sega. In Space Radar, currently, we are going through
the Joint Staff and through Vice Admiral Chanik to these
process leading up to an assessment by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) process, in conjunction with our folks
on the acquisition, to identify what would be available in a
block one, and what its value would be. It's only after that
convergence view that we lock in what we want to do on a block
one.
Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, you've evaluated this. The
``back to basics'' program, the acquisition stages, block
approach that's been described. Is that responsive to the
concerns GAO has stated? How would you evaluate the situation
today?
Ms. Chaplain. The approach that Dr. Sega described, that
he's taking with TSAT and wants to take with other programs,
aligns with the best practices we recommend. One of the most
critical things we think programs need to do is match resources
with requirements before they ever start. One of the most
important aspects of that is making sure you've proved out your
technologies before you ever start, before you make that
commitment to spend large amounts of money on a program.
For many years, space programs have not been doing that,
and--as have another number of other weapons systems. So this
is like the first biggest step that needs to be made to get a
program on a more executable track.
That said, we have concerns about both TSAT and Space Radar
that need to be addressed. TSAT, the spending's going to go up
some $400 million next year. We are still trying to find out
exactly where that money's going to be spent in enough detail
to give us assurance that the spending is wise. Warfighter
acceptance: we are still hammering that down through
discussions with the Air Force, to the extent the warfighters
have accepted the trades that have already been made on TSAT.
The effect of the new TSAT capabilities on systems like
Space Radar and Future Combat Systems (FCS): the Army's FCS is
going to depend highly on the environment that TSAT supports to
send information to among all these Army systems. If there's
less capability than accepted, is FCS going to still work in
that environment? Same with Space Radar. If Space Radar can't
quite use all of the TSAT as it's laid out now, what's going to
be used in its place to make sure Space Radar can still send
that kind of information?
Then, of course, we have the larger question of
affordability. We have cost overruns on a lot of these other
programs. Can we afford TSAT now? This kind of question really
needs to be looked in the larger DOD weapons system portfolio
for trades.
Space Radar, we're still looking at this system, and we
plan to do some more detailed review on it. But we have a
number of questions at this point that we've been asking
ourselves. Again, affordability. This is going to be a very
expensive program, and is this affordable within the context of
the whole portfolio? Requirements: are there too many on the
program right now, or do we have just the requirements we need?
Cost sharing: has that been worked out with the Intelligence
Community and DOD? We're still looking into that question. We
would like to also understand what the level of
sophistication's going to be in the first increment of Space
Radar, and I don't think we've learned that yet. Again, the
trades between TSAT and Space Radar, is this going to all work
out as planned?
The schedule at our first preliminary review looks kind of
ambitious, so we would like to learn more about the schedule
and what exactly it's going to involve and how DOD's really
going to achieve all the milestones it intends to achieve once
it starts its acquisition.
Those are a lot of questions, and they make us wonder, is
it time now to start a Space Radar acquisition, or do we need
to step back and think through it more and what it means in the
larger context of the entire space investment portfolio?
Senator Sessions. Let me just briefly, Dr. Sega, ask you on
the Space Radar, how much will it cost, and do we have an
agreement with the Intelligence Community on cost sharing?
Dr. Sega. We have an agreement with the Intelligence
Community. This would be a joint program. The financial
contributions from the Intelligence Community are still being
worked. The cost of the Space Radar program, if I could kind of
frame this up, in terms of the capability and the
sophistication of block one, is in the process of being
defined. That will be done in a similar way that we did TSAT,
with the users and acquisition people working together. In that
case, it was the QDR. In this case, the combatant commands and
through the JROC process will be involved on the requirements
and also on the technology side.
We will take advantage of the technology we've been
developing for decades in phased arrays. They have been
developed on a ground-based system. We have sophisticated
electronically steerable arrays in our F-18, our F-22, Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF). So, the basis of the technical piece has
been worked for decades now.
Senator Sessions. What about on the cost? What can you tell
us, as specifically as you can, what cost you're projecting?
Dr. Sega. I appreciate the question.
Senator Sessions. Ultimately, we may not know what all
we'll utilize and how much, but what can you foresee now?
Dr. Sega. A misperception is the number of satellites that
would be needed in Space Radar. That's why some of this
architectural piece will be done. Some of the numbers end up
very large if your assumption is a large number of satellites.
If it's more in the eight to nine kind of category of
satellites, obviously the cost is much less than 20-some
satellites. So, that architectural trade, in terms of the use
of Space Radar to not only cue other assets in space, but also
cue airborne platforms, some of which have radars on them--
Joint STARS, our other airplanes have a lot of radars--and to
help them in the overall awareness and battlespace
characterization, is going to be important. So, how it is used,
and what value it has, in terms of leveraging a radar image
from space in some of the denied areas that General Chilton
talked about, and how it interacts with the other system,
determine the number of radars that are needed and the
sophistication that you'd need on block one. So, I'd like to
give you a solid number, but there's a lot of variables right
now that prohibit that.
Senator Sessions. What is just the numbers, as you recall,
for the fiscal year 2007 request? What do you project through
the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The 5-year projection?
Dr. Sega. Yes. The numbers are roughly in the $260 to $270
million in fiscal year 2007--I can get the exact number--and a
bit over $4 billion over the FYDP.
[The information referred to follows:]
The President's budget for fiscal year 2007, as submitted on
February 6, 2006, included $266.4 million in research, development,
test, and engineering funding for Space Radar across the FYDP, which
covers fiscal years 2007-2011.
Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, just briefly, your concern
is that it may be higher than that before the 5 years is up?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes.
Senator Sessions. $4 billion?
Ms. Chaplain. Our concern is, we don't know how much it
costs, and that won't be known until the architecture's defined
and all the trades are made.
Senator Sessions. This basically represents what we might
call a ``guesstimate''?
Ms. Chaplain. Right.
Senator Sessions. Because it is based on 20 or 9
satellites, Dr. Sega? Or do you know yet? So you can't really
be specific, because the technology is not there, and you've
not made a firm decision?
Dr. Sega. Right.
Senator Sessions. Capabilities are per satellite?
Dr. Sega. That is correct.
Senator Sessions. That's how sometimes we get into
problems, I guess, Ms. Chaplain would say, because we are not
real sure. I won't pursue that in more depth, but I think it
does point out the difficulties you face. We can't dismiss the
fact that some of these things need to get started, and they
need to be produced, and you can't know all the difficulties
until you get into it. We know that. But to the extent to which
we can be more predictive and act on more mature technology, as
you have said you intend to do, I think that can eliminate some
of the surprises that hit the budget awfully hard. Would you
agree, just briefly?
Dr. Sega. Absolutely. That definition is critically
important to us, maintaining cost and schedule and discipline
in the programs going forward.
Senator Sessions. Congress has the responsibility. It's the
taxpayers' money. You're talking about $1 billion here and $1
billion there. It's real money, and there are other programs
that desperately need resources.
Senator Thune, thank you for coming, and thank you for your
active participation in our committee.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, just on that, there are
some estimates as high as $40 million on that program. Can we
afford that, Mr. Secretary?
Dr. Sega. Senator Nelson, in the smaller constellations, I
have not seen a number that high. I'd like to have General
Chilton address this a bit, because the recent inputs from the
combatant commanders, in terms of needs for night, all-weather
capability, is one of the principal reasons that's driving us
toward bringing on this capability.
General Chilton. I'd be happy to.
I think one of the things we learned back in Operation
Desert Storm, and we all saw on our televisions, was the
spectacular advantage we had over our adversary back in 1991 in
being able to fight at night. Night-vision goggle technology,
stealth technology, going in at night, those visions over
Baghdad of pilots going downtown and coming out unscathed were
pretty spectacular.
As we move forward to later conflicts in the 1990s, on into
Bosnia or Kosovo there, I think what we learned the advantages
of the technologies I talked about earlier, with the JDAM and
space integration, but also the shortfalls of operating in a
nondesert environment, where there's real weather and you don't
necessarily own the night as well as you do when you have
favorable weather conditions. We learned the leveraging
advantage of being able to see through the weather with this
radar imaging technology that we have fielded on some of our
airplanes, to include the B-2 bomber and the F-15E and the F-18
now being able to have that capability from space, where you
could see, with good resolution, day, night, all weather, into
enemy territory, would be a tremendous leveraging advantage for
our warfighters in the field.
I'd just kind of walk you through these technological
breakthroughs or identifications that I think really do give us
a great capability.
In the past, the combatant commanders have not had as much
of an input into the requirements for these types of systems.
That's started to change over the past year. General
Cartwright, along with the Commander of the Joint Forces
Command, General Smith, co-chair a forum called the Senior
Warfighters Forum, where they get together the vice commanders
of all of the combatant commands from around the world--
CENTCOM, Southern Command, Pacific Command, et cetera--and they
sit down, and work to help define the requirements for where we
need to go forward in the future.
It is this type of forum that will be working in close
concert with the developers to lay out the requirements that we
would need to define what that radar satellite ought to look
like and the numbers that you would need to support it.
So, that work is ongoing, but a good bit of work is still
in front of us, as mentioned.
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the members of
the panel for being with us today, and for your insights on a
lot of these issues.
Secretary Sega, I do have a question that pertains to
something I was involved with in the National Defense
Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2006, and that required the
Department to submit to the committees a report on the
feasibility and advisability of using the Space Radar for
topographical mapping for scientific and civil purposes. My
understanding is that work is underway, and is there an interim
report that has been prepared or anything you might be able to
share with us?
Dr. Sega. Senator Thune, I'd characterize it as a rough
draft now, but it should be in final form. As I understand it
from our folks, I think the due date is by May 1, as I recall
the due date on the report. They have worked through various
examples where an X-band radar is quite useful. So, there's
also a forum that is in place for those to look at the needs
across the community. The representative for civil needs is, I
think, out of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) office that
attends these meetings. So, there is input into the process in
development of the radar, but there's also examples, I believe,
that will be present in the report as it comes forward.
Senator Thune. Is that something that you say is in draft
form. By May 1, would we have access to something that we could
see?
Dr. Sega. That's my understanding.
Senator Thune. Okay, good.
Do you think that it would be worthwhile to establish
another unclassified frequency for Space Radar, where other
agencies, such as Department of Agriculture, Department of
Energy, USGS, as you mentioned, et cetera, could use,
especially if they were willing to help with cost sharing?
Dr. Sega. At this point, having not done the analysis, I
don't know what the level of need is and whether the frequency
that we are focusing on, X-band, is the correct one for that
community. So, I'd allow that process to work out and
understand what the needs are and how they would be addressed
by radar as we have examples of other radars that have
different frequency bands for example, the Canadian radar sat,
I believe, is a C-band-based radar. So, I think understanding
the needs and how they would be addressed would be the next
step.
Senator Thune. Yes, if they were willing to participate in
the cost, if there's a capacity to do it, there are a lot of
needs that I think are--and I'm just giving you a couple of
areas, in the area of agriculture, vegetation classification,
vegetation land cover, crop identification, forest health,
things that could really be--the technology could be enormously
helpful in some of these other civilian areas. It's something
that we've had some folks in my State who have had an interest
in pursuing, and I would encourage and welcome your input and
consideration of that as a possibility, as well. It's something
that I think has some value, obviously, to the other agencies
that would benefit from it.
General Chilton, changing gears for just a minute, one of
the joint command components under your command is Integrated
Missile Defense. In your statement, you say that the United
States is reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons in order
to assure our allies and dissuade competitors, and deter those
who plan to harm us, particularly with weapons of mass
destruction. Now, while we may be reducing our dependence on
nuclear weapons, it appears evident that nations hostile to us
are embracing a reliance on nuclear weapons. I guess I'm
interested in knowing what your assessment is of the nuclear
delivery capabilities of countries like North Korea and Iran,
and are we able and in a position to counter those threats?
General Chilton. Sir, first of all, if I could make one
minor correction, my boss, General Cartwright, oversees me, as
the Space and Global Strike Commander, and my colleague,
Lieutenant General Larry Dodgen, is the Commander for
Integrated Missile Defense (IMD). General Dodgen does not work
for me. So, we're peers in the organization. I hesitate to
tread into his area for IMD.
I could comment, though, on a couple of areas with regard
to reliance on nuclear weapons and options with regard to
global strike that General Cartwright has expounded on and that
fall right in my lane.
The change in the Cold War paradigm and the fact that we've
gone from a military posture and national military strategy,
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, where nuclear weapons were what we
used to deter their activities. We've found today that there
are adversaries out there, two of which you've named, that
perhaps may not be deterred by our nuclear might, and to that
group I'd add, the fellows in organizations like al Qaeda, who
couldn't care less whether or not we have nuclear weapons. So,
with regard to that, STRATCOM is looking for other
alternatives, be they conventional, kinetic, nonkinetic
options, to deter, dissuade, and then ultimately defeat our
adversary, weapons that would not be what you might call self-
deterring in their use. Would you really commit a nuclear
weapon against that target, or can you better, or perhaps
equally, service that target with a conventional weapon that
may be more acceptable to the international community, and,
indeed, to the American public to employ? Those kind of
philosophies is what we're talking about in that particular
statement with regard to reliance on nuclear weapons.
A little bit on the adversary and threat, certainly in my
lane, in Space and Global Strike. When you look at a country
like North Korea, who claim they have a nuclear program, and
you look at their capability and their missile development
technology through Scuds, Nodongs, and the Taepo Dong missiles,
you have to be concerned. Even recently, in the newspaper
you've seen Iran come out touting the improvements in their
ballistic missile capabilities publicly, and advertising those
capabilities, and how capable they are, and intend to become.
So, certainly along those lines, when you look at those
capabilities, you have to take that into account.
The New Triad that is discussed in the DOD talks not only
about offensive capabilities and flexible infrastructure, but
also about a defensive capability to help us give the same
certainty that we had back when it was us and the Soviet Union
just holding nuclear weapons over each other. We now have this
concept that you not only have to have a credible striking
capability that has to be both nuclear, conventional, and
nonkinetic, but you also have to have a credible defense, and
then a flexible infrastructure that could respond to an attack
and continue to sustain our way of life and our operations.
I hope I've answered your questions along those lines of
the statement. If I haven't, sir, I'd be happy to expand some
more on those.
Senator Thune. I think that gets to the heart of what I was
asking. They've handed me my note that says my time's expired.
I will yield back to the chairman.
Thank you very much.
General Chilton. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, is the Navy interested in
space? [Laughter.]
The answer is yes. I'll answer for you. I want to
compliment you that your Multiple User Objective System (MUOS)
program is on budget and on schedule.
Admiral, answer for us how does the Navy remain fully
engaged in space programs, or does it just become a user of
space technology?
Admiral Deutsch. Senator Nelson, thank you and yes is the
answer. We are very much interested in space. I will take that
compliment on MUOS, but I'll be much more comfortable when the
first satellite is launched in 2014. I'll finally open up that
bottle of champagne when all five are in orbit.
The Navy is very much interested in space, and I think we
are very engaged, as we talked earlier. Our requirements
process is rather robust. We make sure that what we need is
injected in the joint system. As far as what we would like to
have in areas like operationally responsive space (ORS), we
remain engaged very robustly with our fellow warfighters. I'm
fairly confident that we remain engaged, and we will in the
future.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. So, you're definitely interested
in ORS?
Admiral Deutsch. Sir, we are very interested in the
capabilities that ORS provides.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Mr. Secretary, let's talk about EELV. What's the status of
the merger process?
Dr. Sega. The United Launch Alliance proposal was submitted
to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a request from the FTC
to the DOD to provide information, and that has----
Senator Sessions. Let me just interrupt. We're dealing with
the launch vehicle that--the numbers expected to be needed were
reduced, and two providers have discussed merger. So, we'll
have a single source, rather than two sources on the vehicle.
So, maybe you, from there, can give us the status of where that
process is today, as Senator Nelson asked.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you support the access to space
through two launch providers?
Dr. Sega. Let me just segment the questions up here a
little bit.
The two boosters, for medium and heavy launch, are the
Delta 4 and Atlas 5, different propellants, different engines
in the two systems. With the proposed merger of the Boeing and
Lockheed Martin launch teams to one, they still will be
providing two different propulsion systems and propellant
combinations as we go forward. Both of them are relatively new
boosters, Delta 4 and Atlas 5. Both have been very successful
in their early launches. We are providing our inputs. We are
positive toward the concept, but there are a lot of details. We
are not the deciding authority in the U.S. Government on that
merger, but, rather, the FTC. So, in the Air Force, we provide
our information and answer the questions that are asked to the
Office of Secretary of Defense, who in turn meets with the FTC,
answers their questions, and they're working through the proper
process, and the FTC will be the deciding party.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are you providing the FTC with the
information it needs?
Dr. Sega. I believe so.
Senator Bill Nelson. We need to get on with it. It'll solve
a lot of the EELV issues, won't it?
Dr. Sega. We believe that the two teams will, in fact, be
able to share some of the expertise knowledge that they have in
a positive way. But there are many considerations, and I need
to leave those decisions to the folks that are supposed to make
them.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let's assume that the FTC approves the
merger. Then are you satisfied, as the Secretary, that you're
going to have the assured access to space through two launch
providers?
Dr. Sega. Assured launch--assured access to space is the
principle which we will hold firm to. It is an enabler for us
to get space capabilities on orbit and serve the warfighter.
The details of how we get that are also very important, so I
would wait until seeing how the outcome turns out before giving
an assessment.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now, are you raising the question here
before our committee as to whether or not there should be a
merger?
Dr. Sega. I'm saying that the folks that you have in front
of you right now are not the ones that are deciding it. We've
provided the information to it. I'm positive, as is the Air
Force, on the concept of bringing these two launch providers
together. The assumption, as we develop the EELV program, and
potentially--and General Hamel could comment on this as well on
some of the details--but it was assuming a commercial market
which did not occur. So, there's a limited number of launch
needs that our Nation has for medium- and heavy-lift launch
vehicle. So, it's important that we focus on assured access to
space. This may be an opportunity that, in fact, aids us in
getting that assured access to space. It has many positive
features, but we have to do due diligence on a merger so it is
in the best interest of the U.S. Government that other people
in that industry, as well as those that want to provide
satellites for launches. I remain positive on this concept.
Senator Bill Nelson. Who makes the policy decision that the
merger will give us assured access to space?
Dr. Sega. Our input on the national security aspects of
this merger are from the DOD. I would consider one of the prime
inputs, but not the only one, to the FTC.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are we relying on the FTC to make the
policy decision that the merger gives us assured access to
space? Are we relying on you? Are we relying on the Secretary
of the Air Force? Are we relying on Secretary Rumsfeld?
Dr. Sega. The organization within the DOD that has been the
lead in providing that input to the FTC has been the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. The Air Force has been the prime supporter of data
required to make the decision that is the right one. Our
concern is access to space. We make the case. We have made the
case, in terms of what we believe is the pros and cons of this
particular proposal.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, are we relying on Secretary Krieg
for that input? Who do we bring to this committee to give us
the answer to the policy question that the merger is going to
give us, in their opinion, assured access to space?
Dr. Sega. I would view that we look at the risk, we look at
mission assurance and I will turn this over to General Hamel
here in a bit in terms of what they have done at SMC to enable
us to have 43 successful operational launches. If you count the
test flight out of Florida, in the Delta 4, it's 44. The
mission assurance process and what they see day-to-day, in
terms of what enables us to have the mission assurance in the
launch business.
General Hamel. Sir, if I might just add a bit to this, that
currently we have two separate launch vehicle providers for the
Atlas 5 and the Delta 4. We are taking those from previous
commercial contracts now to government-managed efforts. Our
national policy is, we will have assured access. We will do
that with the two independent companies, if need be, and that's
the basis of our budget request. However, if it turns out the
FTC, based upon inputs from all parties, including the
companies, DOD, concludes that it's in the best interest to
allow this merger to proceed, then we'll be in a position then
to continue to have assured access with a single joint venture,
but, by the same token, we can maintain the assured access by
having two independent contracts. We do see benefits, in terms
of efficiencies and mission assurance benefits, under a joint
venture, but, again, that is subject to other people's
decision.
Senator Bill Nelson. Who are those other people?
General Hamel. Sir, it would be the FTC, as Dr. Sega says.
Clearly, the DOD is going to be making inputs, and is in
consultations at this point. But there will be competitiveness
questions, and other issues will be brought before the FTC.
Senator Bill Nelson. I think what our committee would like
to know is, who, at the end of the day, is going to be
responsible, and is going to sign off that this merger between
two companies in this new kind of venture, called United Launch
Alliance, is, in fact, going to give us the assured access to
space? Not the vehicles. We know the vehicles work. We're
talking about the new kind of arrangement of operations. Is
that a decision that's already made?
Dr. Sega. Senator Nelson, I'm concerned that the processes
are good, and that General Hamel and his organization assures
us that each and every booster is ready to go. So, we can't not
pay attention to the details of every booster. We look at the
overall processes. I think there are different business models
that would still allow us to have the highest quality booster
possible for the particular launch, and give us the mission
assurance that is our bottom line.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Hamel, let me ask you how does
the Air Force intend to implement block three?
General Hamel. Sir, as I mentioned, the original concept of
the program for EELV was a joint government/industry
partnership. As a result, it was done as a commercial
development. As a result of the collapse of the commercial
satellite communications market, there's no longer as much
demand for commercial launch services. So, we are transitioning
these contracts from--which had previously been commercial
contracts, now to a more classical defense contract. We're
going from what's referred to as a Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR), FAR Part 12, to a FAR Part 15 contract. So,
our intent here is with each of the two companies, Lockheed
Martin and Boeing, to put in place contracts that will allow us
to manage the engineering workforce, the supplier chain, and
the infrastructure to assure that we maintain critical skills,
and then separate contracts would be let with each of the two
companies in order to buy, on a firm, fixed-price basis, the
individual boosters, as we order them.
Our intent, as I say, is to move to a government-managed
launch capability, as well as a launch booster procurement
basis. That's what we're in the midst of, at this time.
Senator Bill Nelson. For example, how far in advance does a
launch vehicle have to be assigned to a particular satellite?
General Hamel. Sir, typically, under our current
arrangements, we will order specific launches for specific
satellites 24 months in advance of the need date.
Senator Bill Nelson. Will the new United Launch Alliance
give you more flexibility in assigning those launch vehicle
assignments?
General Hamel. Sir, I don't believe that it's going to make
a material difference. We will still look at what is the best
provider, whether it's done as two separate contracts or if
it's merged together under the United Launch Alliance.
Senator Bill Nelson. The concept behind EELV is to give you
the flexibility that you could launch on short notice. So, what
is ``short notice''?
General Hamel. Sir, typically we'll order a launch, as I
said, 2 years in advance. In some cases, we may choose to do
all of the integration work. In other words, understanding the
loads and the electrical interfaces for both a Delta 4, as well
as an Atlas 5. If we actually did the integration work for a
particular satellite for either vehicle, we could go as close
as 10 to 12 months in advance of a launch of actually planning
which of the two boosters we would fly on. This is
significantly shorter-term decisions than what we currently
have, where you typically are years in advance of having to
select a particular booster. We will have much greater
flexibility with the EELV.
Senator Bill Nelson. Does this cut out a third party, like
Space-X, that might want to develop a heavy booster?
General Hamel. No, sir, absolutely not. As we've said, that
any qualified provider that can meet our mission requirements
and has requisite demonstrated success, we will make calls, on
an annual basis, as to who would be able to provide us a launch
option. Again, that would be ordered up 2 years in advance.
Senator Sessions. All right. We talk about the commercial
satellite services. I believe that commercial satellites
provide about 80 percent of our communication needs during OIF.
Will the DOD continue to rely on commercial satellite
communications in the near- and mid-term? What steps are you
taking to ensure that the commercial satellite services the
Government needs will be there when we need it? Are we in
pretty good shape there, or are you--do you have serious
concerns there?
Dr. Sega. Senator Sessions, we are using commercial
satellite providers. Communications, as you mentioned, is, I
would say, about the 80 percent figure in OIF. It is our
planning, going forward, is it'll be an integral part of our
communications architecture. So, we do work with the satellite
providers, com providers. The actual ordering of satellite
services from the commercial providers is through the Defense
Information Systems Agency, not through our offices, but though
a defense agency for the actual contracts with the commercial
providers. But we also work with them and try to be helpful, in
terms of information exchange that their product to us is the
best it can be. But it's an integrated part of our
communications architecture going forward.
Senator Sessions. I notice that Ms. Chaplain noted in her
testimony that over 5 years, $12 billion less has been
available to spend on acquisition and development as a result
of cost overruns, I guess costs and expenses on these kind of
programs that were not anticipated. Now, I know that happens in
private business. It happens anywhere. We need to do a better
job about that.
Probably you may have some counterpoints that you would
make to say $12 billion may not be perfectly accurate. I don't
know. Usually there are two sides to those kind of issues. But
I would just note that I do think, and I am pleased to hear,
that you're beginning to address the root causes of this, as
GAO has pointed out, and that apparently your predecessors were
not so sensitive to the recommendations that the GAO has
recommended, and that you are addressing these issues by
lowering technical risk, assuring realistic cost estimates, and
not biting off more than you can chew. Those are things that
just have to be done, because we do face a dangerous time that
has been referred to as a bow wave of demands coming upon us in
not too many years. So, we're interested in that.
I hope that this will continue to be a high priority of
yours. The Secretary of Defense--I assume that's why he put you
there, to make sure that we address this issue in an effective
way. In fact, I think it was.
Ms. Chaplain, let me just ask these questions about the
general program, and then I think we'll wrap it up. We've had a
good exchange this afternoon.
One of the suggestions and concerns expressed by GAO was
that competition for funding among good ideas--a lot of people
have a lot of good ideas in Air Force, the whole DOD, and the
other branches of the Government--and that DOD has had a
difficult time in prioritizing and setting priorities for which
ones need to be given funding. So, do you concur with that, Dr.
Sega, that that has been one of our problems? Can we develop
not only an Air Force-wide, but a DOD-wide process to help
eliminate that problem that seems to be a driving factor in
cost overruns?
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, when resources are limited and
there are several options on the table, then there'll be a
competition. But I believe that as we look at what is most
effective for the joint warfighter and what, as General Chilton
said, effects you're trying to achieve, then you look at the
trades of different ways of solving that problem. So, their
involvement is absolutely crucial in us identifying an
investment portfolio in the acquisition community that's
bringing the maximum result and effect to their needs.
Senator Sessions. General Chilton.
General Chilton. Yes, I'd agree completely. I'd just
highlight that at this point in time, we're in a difficult
situation in space with regard to recapitalization. I can't
think of a single constellation that we have up there now,
whether it be the early warning satellite constellation or the
GPS constellation or a communications constellation, the Ultra
High Frequency (UHV) the Navy uses, or the Super High Frequency
(SHF) that the Army uses. I can't think of a single one that we
don't have a program in development to replace them right now,
all coming together at exactly the same time.
Yet, every one of these things is important to the
warfighter. We've become accustomed to using them. We've
tailored the way we fight our fights around these things, and
we need them.
So, these are tough times to make these hard decisions, and
I, for one, am very encouraged by the steps that I've heard
that the Air Force is taking to bring cost and schedule and
risk under control, as Dr. Sega has laid out here, because I
think that is going to be very important if we're going to
deliver these capabilities to the warfighter in a timely
manner.
Senator Sessions. You've made clear what the soldier and
the sailor and the airman and marine need to see over that
hill, across the horizon, see where those threats are. It's
absolutely a critical part of our Nation's defense capability.
It's part of our strength, and we never want to commit our
personnel in harm's way and have them blindsided when we could
well have protected them from those kind of threats. I really
do believe this is a critical area.
We have the operationally responsive space, which allows
for capability of bringing in some lower-cost services that can
be available to us. We will hopefully see, as time goes by,
that, in some things, in terms of satellites, costs have gone
down. But one reason we have so few commercial launches is that
the satellites are lasting longer than were projected, and one
satellite can do what it used to take multiple satellites to
do. They're lasting longer, and they do what four of them used
to do. Now you don't need to launch as many. So, those kind of
cost savings also need to be a part of our future.
The capability must be there, and we need to make sure that
it's met. You can count on this subcommittee to be responsive
to your reasonable requests to make sure that this Nation has
preeminent capabilities in space.
Dr. Sega?
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, I have one correction for Senator
Thune that was passed up I think. Apparently, I was a little
optimistic on the report that I know is in draft. To answer his
question, the interim results will be available June 1, rather
than what I said. I wanted to put that in the record.
Senator Sessions. I will make that part of the record.
Does anyone else have anything to add before we adjourn?
[No response.]
Thank you very much for your service to your country. It's
obvious to me, and, I think, to anyone who's observed this
hearing, that you are people of great capability and
experience, and we're glad you're there providing for the
defense of America.
We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
BASICS APPROACH VS. CURRENT SPACE ACQUISITION POLICY
1. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, with your emphasis on returning
space programs ``back to basics,'' should the National Security Space
(NSS) acquisition policy be revised so that it is more closely aligned
with the ``back to basics'' approach?
Dr. Sega. The fundamental tenets of the ``back to basics'' approach
are consistent with NSS Space Policy 03-01. Specifically, NSS 03-01
states that Evolutionary Acquisition, of which a bloc or incremental
approach is one process, is the preferred strategy for the acquisition
of mature technology. The repositioning of the System Design Review
(SDR) before Key Decision Point B (KDP-B) in the 27 December 2004
iteration of NSS 03-01 was an important step to improve risk
management. NSS 03-01 requires capability documents to be updated
before each KDP to strengthen collaboration between the requirements
and acquisition communities. Finally, NSS 03-01 directs program offices
to elevate system engineering principles to the same level as cost and
schedule programmatic considerations.
SPACE RADAR
2. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, Congress has been concerned about
the ambitious nature of the Space Radar program, its potential costs,
and requirements coordination with the Intelligence Community (IC). How
will the Air Force integrate the ``back to basics'' approach on Space
Radar?
Dr. Sega. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the IC have already
begun a common path towards requirements definition. The Initial
Requirements Document for Space Radar was validated by both the IC's
Mission Requirements Board (MRB) and by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) in February 2006. This provides top-level
qualitative requirements for the program. The Capability Development
Document, which specifies the quantitative detailed requirements, is in
development between DOD and IC user communities and on schedule to
support Key Decision Point B.
The Space Radar plan is not to proceed into Phase B until
technology is mature. We have incorporated lessons learned (from the
Young Panel report, and other space programs) into the Space Radar
acquisition strategy and cost estimating to provide more accurate
assessments of Space Radar program cost and risk.
To implement a ``back to basics'' approach, the Space Radar program
is developing an evolutionary acquisition approach that would reduce
program risks. Results of this work will include definition of a Block
1 satellite program, with an estimated cost of the first satellite, a
total estimated cost for Block 1, and a life cycle cost estimate for
developing, building, and operating the constellation.
3. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, what is the basic architecture for
Space Radar? For example, how many satellites do you anticipate for the
entire constellation?
Dr. Sega. In response to the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD),
validated by the JROC and the MRB and the Draft Capabilities
Development Document requirements, we have identified a Government
Reference Architecture which contains nine satellites in low earth
orbit (plus one spare) and an interdependent ground capability which
will interface with other space and airborne systems to support the
horizontal integration of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities.
4. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, how much do you estimate it will
cost to develop and acquire the full Space Radar capability?
Dr. Sega. We are developing the program in measured steps, in order
to reduce early program risks. Results of this work will include a
total estimated cost for nine satellites in low earth orbit (plus one
spare) and investment in the ground segment. We continue to work on an
updated cost estimate (the initial program office estimate falls in the
range of $20-$25 billion) of the Government Reference Architecture
(GRA) as it is refined by the JROC and the MRB processes.
5. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, what guarantees do we have that the
IC will share in the development costs?
Dr. Sega. In January 2005, the Secretary of Defense and Director of
Central Intelligence committed to pursue a common Space Radar designed
to satisfy needs of both the National Intelligence Community and the
joint warfighter. In recent Space Radar Executive Committee meetings,
senior Office of the Director of National Intelligence staff have
reiterated their support for the Secretary of Defense/Director of
Central Intelligence agreement.
6. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, when can we expect a concrete cost
share agreement?
Dr. Sega. The January 2005 Secretary of Defense/Director of Central
Intelligence agreement directed the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management to recommend an approach for cost sharing of program
acquisition in the fiscal year 2008 budget deliberations. Once the
acquisition approach is further defined, an estimate supporting this
approach will be used for initial cost sharing discussions between the
DOD and the IC. Final cost sharing allocations will be based on a
single agreed upon Independent Cost Estimate, at which point discrete
costs can be allocated and programmed by the appropriate agency.
SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE
7. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega and General Hamel, there have been
concerns in recent years about consolidations within the space
industrial base, the decreasing pipeline of scientists and engineers,
and even concerns about whether large space contractors have the
capability to get the job right. Is the current and projected U.S.
space industrial base sufficient to meet national security requirements
for the next 15 years?
Dr. Sega. Attracting and retaining well-qualified scientists and
engineers into the National Security Space (NSS) community, both within
the government and among our many industry partners, is one of the
critical areas which we are addressing. More and more, our Tier 1
(prime) contractors depend on our equally vital Tier 2/3/4 suppliers.
Data concerning the availability of scientists and engineers is
limited.
The NSS Space Industrial Base Council, which I co-chair, is in the
process of addressing some of these issues. Among the specific
initiatives now underway is the development and population of an
enduring data base by the Aerospace Corporation to be used to assess
the availability of key space professionals within industry, starting
first with the Tier 1 members and then moving on to Tiers 2/3/4. We
have tasked the National Security Space Office (NSSO) to work with
senior leaders in both the government and industry to follow-up on key
recommendations contained in many of the recent space studies. The
``back to basics'' acquisition approach emphasizes the commitment to
recruit and train a strong space workforce.
General Hamel. The current and projected U.S. space industrial base
is sufficient to meet national security requirements for the next 15
years; but it needs our continued attention.
Due to the unique aspects of the space environment, space system
components and parts often require uniquely designed, manufactured and
tested products/practices not typical of terrestrial and aeronautical
commercial and military systems. Consequently there are numerous niche
suppliers whose business base is primarily space and subject to ups and
downs of the overall space market. Several component and part suppliers
have expressed concerns with their financial viability in the space
market and the ability to provide a reasonable return on investment, as
well as the ability to properly capitalize and invest in the
development of advanced products for future systems.
The NSS community emphasizes Government investments (e.g., Title
III; Mantech; S&T) to facilitate a strong and responsive industrial
base with respect to technology and industrial needs; however, the
available funds are limited. The Space Industrial Base Council,
established, and chaired by DOD Executive Agent for Space, proactively
identifies and addresses NSS industrial base concerns, and includes
subcontractors and major vendors. NSS is establishing policies to
address strategic technologies and sound source/make-or-buy analyses.
Additionally, we emphasize to prime contractors their responsibility to
enhance their own subcontractor management planning and surveillance.
With respect to people and skill base, the prime contractors are
able to staff the necessary personnel to meet needs, but depth of
experience is a challenge. However, they expressed concerns about the
health of their subcontractors and major vendors and potential
personnel lay-offs if future programs do not materialize. Challenges
exist in the areas of systems and software engineering, but all of our
contractors have comprehensive programs in place to address this
concern. They are actively working with universities to ensure key
skills are available; using mentoring programs to ensure knowledge
transfer, and retaining older workforce and employing knowledge
transfer processes.
8. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega and General Hamel, are contractors
sufficiently motivated to get the job right?
Dr. Sega. Our industry partners are motivated to engage in
activities that not only ensure corporate, shareholders, and market
expectations, but also to deliver world-class space systems that meet
or exceed our requirements. The government motivates industry by using
past performance as a factor in the source selection process and
appropriately applying incentives and award fees during the life cycle
of the program. The current emphasis on ``back to basics'' is re-
energizing the space acquisition community to consider contractor
incentives more vigorously early in program development.
General Hamel. We are working to improve the Government/contractor
relationship, via the type of contract used, so we sufficiently
motivate the contractor to achieve total mission assurance. We have
used Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contracts to motivate contractor
performance. Unfortunately, we found CPAF contracts did not work in
many instances because award fee often focused on processes rather than
product. As a result, we are beginning to change our contract incentive
structures by increasing the use of Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF)
contracts and tying the amount of fee earned to measurable performance
objectives. In addition to the use of objective performance incentives,
we will ensure a rigorous linkage between the incentive fees earned by
contractors and the performance assessments we input into the
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). These
performance assessments evaluate contractor past performance, a key
factor in determining whether or not a contractor will be awarded
future contracts. The strong linkage between objective contract
performance incentives, past performance, and mission assurance is the
best way to hold contractors accountable to consistently provide
quality, on-time products and services to support our warfighters.
THE NEED FOR BETTER PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
9. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, how is the Air Force Space and
Missiles Systems Center (SMC) assuring that program managers have the
right expertise and experience to manage their programs?
General Hamel. We are assuring program managers have the right
expertise and experience to manage their programs by providing
increased opportunity for education and training, creating a forum to
exchange a body of knowledge, and utilizing the space professional
database to identify/assign personnel with the right experience from
across the Air Force.
SMC has developed a ``schoolhouse'' capability to provide space
acquisition training that augments training available through the
Defense Acquisition University, Air Force Institute of Technology, and
other non-space specific sources. We are training our folks through the
Space 100 and Space 200 course provided through the National Security
Space Institute, as well. We have identified our best and brightest to
participate in a Naval Post Graduate School systems engineering
distance learning program.
In February 2006, Dr. Sega instituted a National Security Space
Program Manager's Conference to create a forum for program managers
across space acquisition to share best practices and exchange lessons
learned. This cross-flow of ideas and experiences is a great first step
in creating a body of knowledge that our program managers can rely on
to increase their expertise and bolster their own experiences.
Finally, Air Force Space Command is chartered with Space
Professional Development. Part of this effort identified those
military/civilians across the Air Force with space experience. We are
now able to target acquisition professionals with maximum space
experience to come to SMC. Recruiting these people raises the average
experience level of our workforce as well as providing mentoring for
our more junior space professionals.
10. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, is SMC attracting the best and
brightest in the field?
General Hamel. We are doing all we can to attract the best and the
brightest by exploiting as many recruiting tools as we can, creating
more opportunities for stable civilian positions, and making SMC a
great place to work.
SMC is utilizing recruiting tools like the Presidential Management
Fellows, Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments, retired
annuitants, and intern programs such as Palace Acquires and Copper
Caps. We are also visiting Air Force professional developmental
education venues like Air Command and Staff College and the Air Force
Institute of Technology to advertise the great opportunities in space
acquisition. Our system program directors are personally recruiting,
making by-name requests for experienced and talented officers.
To create more opportunity for top-notch civilians to advance and
to keep transitioning military at the Center, we are actively pursuing
military to civilian position conversions. Additionally, we are
exploring the potential to convert Assistance and Advisory Service jobs
to civilian positions.
Finally, we are working hard to make SMC a great place to work so
we can attract and retain the best and brightest. We have brand new
facilities--the Schriever Space Complex--which offer a consolidated and
modern work environment. We maximize the use of annual retention
allowances and civilian hiring/compensation (e.g., bonuses, locality,
housing, etc.) to offset the higher cost of living in the Los Angeles
area.
11. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, do SMC program managers have
enough control over resources and decisions to be held accountable for
meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals?
General Hamel. Our program managers do have enough control over
resources and decisions to be held accountable for meeting cost,
schedule, and performance goals; but we have to make sure we don't
commit to more than we can deliver when setting program requirements,
strategies, plans and goals.
We capture all previous acquisition results/lessons learned during
our Acquisition Review Processes (i.e. Strategy Review, Source
Selections, Program Reviews, Proposal Developments) and incorporate
them into subsequent acquisitions. In doing so we attempt to ensure
cost realism, create conservative schedules, mature requirements, and
solid risk management/mitigation practices and create balanced program
oversight. We collect and distribute, in conjunction with the Aerospace
Corporation, management watch list items during pre-award activities
and Independent Program Assessments. We evaluate accuracy of cost
estimates, planning for integration/interfaces, software complexity,
SPO staffing, adherence to proven policies and processes, and test
rigor. SMC incorporates, across the portfolio, Defense Acquisition
Performance Assessment recommendations and USECAF block/incremental
acquisition approach, Lean Initiatives, and SMART OPS 21
recommendations to ensure we set our programs and program managers up
for success.
12. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, in what ways can you, as
Commander of SMC, instill and sustain tenure and accountability of your
program managers?
General Hamel. Space and Missile Systems Center has programs
underway to recruit, attract, retain, reward, and better educate/train
the space acquisition workforce. Specifically, we have extended tour
lengths for acquisition personnel to 4 years, we actively recruit
people with substantial expertise in space development and ensure
stability of our people in key program leadership positions. We are
also reinvigorating processes and competencies in core functions--
systems engineering, cost/pricing, test planning and execution, program
and technical reviews, scheduling, mission assurance--to improve our
program managers' tool sets and bring consistency and predictability
back into space acquisitions. Extensive benchmarking across the space
portfolio and a newly established National Security Space Program
Managers Conference are providing our program managers forums for
sharing lessons learned and reinvigorating capabilities via best
practices. I've also focused on dialogue between acquirers and
warfighters to help us look beyond individual programs and consider
mission area effects. Making program managers responsible for this
``horizontal integration'' empowers them to look for opportunities for
synergies, multiplier effects, and cost avoidances. All these efforts,
aimed to help our program managers be successful, are vital both to
reinvigorating space acquisition/innovation and to sustaining tenure/
accountability in our space professional.
13. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, how does SMC gain early
knowledge about impending problems in acquisition programs?
General Hamel. We've put several tools in place to help us gain
early knowledge about impending problems on our programs. One of the
most important tools are technical Program Management Reviews to focus
on changes in cost, schedule, and technical baselines, as well as
managing realized risks. We have been doing this for about a year now,
and we review one program each week, which allows me and my key
functional experts to see each program in detail three to four times
per year--greatly increasing our situational awareness. As the reviews
mature we are working on making them more metrics-based to help us
identify and address problems in our ``headlights'' rather than after
they develop.
We also rely heavily on our Aerospace Corporation partners. Each
week, Aerospace briefs SMC senior leadership and program directors on
an overarching ``watch list.'' The ``watch list'' includes both
program-specific and cross-cutting risks that Aerospace helps us track
and mitigate.
Another ``early warning'' area that we are committed to improving
is earned value management. Hand-in-hand with reinvigorating our cost
estimating function, we are working to make earned value management a
viable program management tool. SMC now has earned value experts on
staff to provide education and assistance to the program offices. We've
also teamed more tightly with the Defense Contract Management Agency to
ensure that our industry partners earned value management systems are
in-place, certified, and being utilized to track progress.
14. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, can you describe what is
currently being done and what shortcomings remain in estimating costs
for space systems?
General Hamel. I have centralized cost estimating and assessment at
SMC by creating a new Cost Analysis Division within my Financial
Management Directorate. This organizational structure provides for
independent reviews and a center of expertise for consistent cost
analysis throughout SMC. Updated Program Office Estimates (POEs) are
required at each major milestone. The new centralized Cost Division
executes independent assessments of these POEs. In addition, I direct
Independent Cost Assessments (ICAs) to be conducted from time to time
on specific areas/programs of concern. These ICAs are also led by the
new Center Cost Division, teaming at times with AFCAA and the OSD CAIG.
In addition, we have instituted an IPT arrangement with AFCAA, NRO, and
Navy Space programs to share best practices within the cost
communities.
We have not completely restored our organic cost expertise--this
will take some time--with robust recruiting and training--to fix
completely. Also, we continue to work to improve the fidelity of the
data in our cost models. My Cost IPT is working more closely with
industry to improve our data collection efforts but this, again, will
take time as well as resources to remedy.
15. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, according to the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) recent survey, what are the top obstacles
to achieving program success from the point of view of program
managers?
Ms. Chaplain. As part of a 2005 review \1\ on program management
best practices, we surveyed DOD's major weapon program managers,
including some managing space programs, who cited the following as
``top'' obstacles to achieving successful outcomes in an open ended
question:
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\1\ GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program
Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes, GAO-06-110 (Washington, DC: Nov.
30, 2005).
funding instability (about 36 percent),
requirements instability (13 percent),
staffing problems (8 percent),