    [Senate Hearing 109-827]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 109-827, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2766

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   ----------

                         MARCH 7, 29, APRIL 4, 6, 2006

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                  2007--Part 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                                     S. Hrg. 109-827, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2766

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                         MARCH 7, 29, APRIL 4, 6, 2006

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            BILL NELSON, Florida
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota

                        Charles S. Abell, Staff Director

                 Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

                                     ______

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

                        JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman

    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            BILL NELSON, Florida
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

                                      (ii)
    ?

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
      Nuclear Weapons and Defense Environmental Cleanup Activities of the
    Department of Energy in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for
         Fiscal Year 2007 and the Future Years Nuclear Security Program
                                 march 7, 2006

                                                                       Page

    Brooks, Ambassador Linton F., Under Secretary for Nuclear
      Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security
      Administration, U.S. Department of Energy......................     4
    Rispoli, James A., Assistant Secretary for Environmental
      Management, U.S. Department of Energy..........................    25

                        Global Strike Plans and Programs
                                 march 29, 2006

    Flory, Hon. Peter C.W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      International Security Policy..................................    83
    Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Commander, U.S. Strategic
      Command........................................................    93
    Young, RADM Charles B., USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs   102
    Gorenc, Maj. Gen. Stanley, USAF, Director, Operational Capability
      Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space
      Operations, Headquarters.......................................   105

                            Missile Defense Programs
                                 april 4, 2006

    Flory, Hon. Peter C.W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      International Security Policy..................................   139
    Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III, USAF, Director, Missile Defense
      Agency.........................................................   145
    Dodgen, LTG Larry J., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and Missile
      Defense Command, U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command............   158
    Duma, David W., Acting Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
      Department of Defense..........................................   166

                            Military Space Programs
                                 april 6, 2006

    Sega, Hon. Ronald M., Under Secretary of the Air Force...........   211
    Chilton, Lt. Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Joint Functional Component
      Commander for Space and Global Strike, U.S. Strategic Command..   224
    Hamel, Lt. Gen. Michael A., USAF, Commander, Space and Missile
      Systems Center, Air Force Space Command........................   230
    Chaplain, Cristina T., Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
      Management Team, Government Accountability Office..............   235

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2006

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

      NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP ACTIVITIES OF THE
    DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR
         FISCAL YEAR 2007 AND THE FUTURE YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:47 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Senator Jeff Sessions (chairman of the
    subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Graham, and
    Bill Nelson.
        Majority staff members present: Robert M. Soofer,
    professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel;
    and Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member.
        Minority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
    counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Micah H. Harris and Jill L.
    Simodejka.
        Committee members' assistants present: Meredith Beck and
    Matthew R. Rimkunas, assistants to Senator Graham; Stuart C.
    Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and William K. Sutey,
    assistant to Senator Bill Nelson.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. The subcommittee will come to order.
    Senator Nelson has some conflicts in schedule and I know he is
    trying to get here, but I think it would be best for us to go
    ahead and get started and he can join us when he can. He is
    interested in being here. He is the ranking Democratic member
    of the committee.
        The Subcommittee on Strategic Forces meets this afternoon
    to receive testimony on the President's request for fiscal year
    2007 for the Department of Energy (DOE) activities under the
    jurisdiction of this subcommittee. I'm pleased to welcome our
    witnesses today, Linton F. Brooks, Administrator of National
    Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Under Secretary of
    Energy. Mr. Brooks, good to have you here, and James A.
    Rispoli, Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
    Management (EM). We are glad to have you. I thank you for your
    service to our country and for taking the time and effort to
    join us today.
        We will begin this hearing in open session. Should it
    become necessary to discuss any classified nuclear weapons or
    other security matters, this hearing will move to Russell Room
    222 for a closed session at an appropriate time. The
    subcommittee will address as many matters as possible here in
    this open setting.
        The Subcommittee on Strategic Forces has jurisdiction over
    approximately 60 percent of the entire DOE budget, which is
    remarkable, amounting to $14.1 billion in the fiscal year 2007
    budget request. Today we will receive testimony on the largest
    programs which comprise the DOE activities as they have been
    associated with the Department of Defense (DOD).
        Specifically, we will examine the nuclear weapons
    activities of the NNSA and the Defense EM program. Within the
    context of the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for
    these programs, we will examine the current state of health of
    these programs as well as some notable challenges and apparent
    impediments to success.
        A critical task for this subcommittee is to exercise its
    oversight functions with respect to U.S. nuclear forces.
    Nuclear weapons are the most formidable weapons in our arsenal
    and under the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) just released,
    nuclear weapons continue to play the central role in our
    posture. We must be confident, therefore, that we are investing
    the taxpayers' dollars in a nuclear weapons program that will
    deliver the results expected.
        Administrator Brooks, the subcommittee is interested in
    hearing your assessment of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    (SSP) which is charged with maintaining the safety, security,
    and reliability and effectiveness of our current nuclear
    stockpile, as well as the progress towards development of the
    responsive infrastructure called for in the Nuclear Posture
    Review (NPR) of 2001.
        The subcommittee is also interested in your views on the
    potential future transformation of the nuclear weapons
    stockpile, including the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), as
    well as your reaction to the Secretary of Energy advisory board
    report titled ``Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapons Complex
    of the Future.''
        Mr. Rispoli, the subcommittee is interested in your
    perspective as the Assistant Secretary of Energy for EM on the
    progress to date and the outlook when tackling their main
    challenges in addressing the environmental legacy of the
    Department's atomic energy program. You have only been there
    since last August, but probably been there just enough to know
    what the problems are. We would like to talk about those.
        The environmental cleanup program is currently experiencing
    some spectacular failures, some of which I have discussed with
    the Secretary of Energy during his appearance before the full
    Armed Services Committee. We will explore these issues in
    greater detail today.
        In your invitation to appear, you were also asked to
    address as a component of your testimony a number of policies
    and issues in the EM program which you were not able to address
    during your confirmation last year, but which you had committed
    to address upon assuming duties as assistant secretary.
        Senator Nelson, it's great to have you. Thank you for your
    commitment to our Nation's defense and your expertise that you
    bring to this subcommittee and to the full Armed Services
    Committee. You're a valued member. So this subcommittee looks
    forward to receiving that testimony as part of your written
    statement.
        During his appearance before the full committee 3 weeks
    ago, I asked Secretary Bodman and expressed to him in plain
    terms my concerns about the efficiency with which DOE is
    carrying out its responsibilities as authorized by this
    committee. This country finds itself in a budget environment in
    which not a dollar can be wasted. Congress must have confidence
    that the funds are prudently expended and that programs are
    well managed.
        I stated to the Secretary of Energy and I will say the same
    today that I am unconvinced that we are getting all we can for
    every dollar. While not accepting every aspect of my
    characterization of DOE programs, the Secretary in general
    agreed that DOE should do better, must do better. He stated
    that he considers it his job to find efficiencies and to fix
    them. However, it's not a job he can do alone.
        I have pledged to the Secretary that through the execution
    of this subcommittee's oversight responsibilities, we are going
    to help him focus on those efforts and certainly you will be
    key persons in helping the Secretary achieve those goals. So
    these are some of the issues that we will explore in our
    hearing today and let me now recognize my distinguished ranking
    member, Senator Nelson of Florida, for any remarks he has.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to
    highlight a couple of issues. The first is the RRW. That
    program and its relationship to the overall SSP. This
    relatively new effort, if successful, should enable maintenance
    of a reliable nuclear deterrent without nuclear weapons testing
    and with a significantly smaller stockpile of nuclear weapons
    than we have currently.
        But the RRW program is a challenging program and at the
    same time that the Department is getting the RRW program, you
    are also continuing to work on the life extension programs for
    the legacy nuclear warheads, particularly the W-76 and the W-
    80.
        In addition, you are working on modernizing and hopefully
    consolidating some aspects of the nuclear weapons
    infrastructure. That's a significant task in itself. So I'm
    concerned, is there too much going on to get accomplished? Last
    week, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of
    the Air Force talked about putting 6 pounds of work in a 5-
    pound bag.
        Mr. Ambassador, I think you might be considering trying to
    put too much into the same pound bag. If the RRW is to achieve
    its goals, the DOD has to be a willing partner and look
    seriously at all of the requirements it has developed for you.
    Without the direct budgetary responsibility, perhaps DOD is
    asking too much and money is being spent on projects that we
    will eventually not need. DOD is stretched too far and without
    relief from some of what is probably not needed, the RRW may be
    then running out of money for what it needs, or you don't have
    time if you're working on these other things to get the RRW. So
    we want to explore this.
        Mr. Secretary, you're the manager of the largest
    construction project in the United States. At the moment, there
    are significant cost, schedule, and technological issues with
    this facility that is needed to treat millions of gallons of
    high-level radioactive waste stored in increasingly fragile
    underground storage tanks at the Hanford site. How we meet the
    commitments to Washington State and other States to complete
    the cleanup begun in the early 1990s is of serious concern to
    this committee.
        I want you to discuss the plans for the EM program and tell
    us how to ensure that the cleanup is completed and that the
    health and safety of the work force and the community are
    protected. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Nelson. You make some
    excellent points and I think there is a concern that's been
    recognized for sometime, as Senator Nelson said, that perhaps
    DOD incorrectly thinking it's really not their money, has asked
    for more out of DOE than is necessary.
        I think that is perhaps true or has some truth to it.
    Likewise, I think that there is a possibility that another
    factor is at work, and it goes back to my days as United States
    attorney when I worked with probably 8 or 10 different Federal
    agencies and you learn how to work together or compete with one
    another. When they sign what they call memorandums of
    understanding (MOUs) which are very much like treaties between
    two sovereign powers, it really causes some difficulties.
        I think there is also a danger that since DOE gets the
    money they get and any money that they save does not really go
    back to DOE programs, that they don't have the same incentive
    to cut costs and to manage efficiently as an agency, that they
    at least have an opportunity to save some money and use it for
    other things they give higher priority to.
        So those are some of the things we'll be asking about here,
    about how this system is working. This is an awful lot of money
    that's involved and I think the taxpayers just want to give
    oversight to it. Mr. Ambassador, would you give us your
    thoughts.

     STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINTON F. BROOKS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
     NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
               ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Ambassador Brooks. Thank you, sir. I welcome the
    opportunity to discuss our budget request and I appreciate the
    committee's past strong support. I have submitted a statement
    for the record and I'd like to just summarize a few quick
    points.
        Before I do that, I'd also like to note for the committee
    the presence of the new Deputy Administrator for Defense
    Programs, Tom D'Agostino. Mr. D'Agostino was confirmed by the
    Senate 2 weeks ago and sworn in last week, and I'm very
    grateful for the committee's very prompt action on him and I
    think you will enjoy working with him. He is an outstanding
    public servant.
        The President's budget supports three main NNSA objectives,
    nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons nonproliferation,
    and nuclear reactors. My written statement talks about
    nonproliferation and reactors. I'd like to speak about where we
    are in the weapons program.
        First of all, it's very important for the committee to
    understand that the stockpile remains safe and reliable. We
    base this assessment on experiments, computation, analysis,
    laboratory tests of component warheads and systems, and the
    Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy make an annual
    certification to this effect.
        But as we draw down the stockpile, we have to consider the
    long-term implications of successive warhead refurbishments.
    Each refurbishment takes us a little further away from the
    configuration that we had when we tested, and that raises
    concerns not this month, not this year, probably not this
    decade, but it raises concerns sooner or later about our
    ability to ensure stockpile reliability and safety without
    testing.
        So to manage that risk, we need to transform the stockpile
    and we need to transform the supporting infrastructure. Our
    concept for doing so depends, as Senator Nelson and, Mr.
    Chairman, you both mentioned, on the RRW. The idea here, as the
    committee understands, is to relax the Cold War design
    constraints, constraints that were perfectly sensible in the
    military situation of 20 years ago, but are not sensible for
    the military situation today. Those constraints maximize yield
    to weight ratios.
        By relaxing them, we can design replacement components that
    are easier to manufacture, safer and more secure, eliminate
    environmentally dangerous materials which also saves money and
    increases design margins. This both ensures long-term
    reliability and reduces the chance that any future
    administration and any future Congress will be faced with the
    question of having to consider testing again.
        We have two independent design teams from nuclear weapons
    laboratories exploring specific options. In addition to the
    benefit that we will get from the RRW, the design itself is
    important because it gives us the opportunity to train the next
    generation of weapons designers and engineers. Most of those
    who actually were involved in the design of nuclear weapons are
    nearing the end of their careers.
        Both teams are confident in their design. Both teams are
    confident that they will meet requirements and their designs
    will be certifiable without nuclear testing. We'll get
    preliminary designs this month, and then there will be a fairly
    intense peer review process. In the fall, we'll select one of
    those two designs for further effort.
        It is going to be important, however, if we are to get the
    benefits of the RRW that we pay great attention to the weapons
    complex. Now, it's important to understand the weapons complex
    of today is significantly different from the weapons complex
    that helped win the Cold War. We've seen dramatic reductions
    both in size and funding. In 1990 our weapons complex employed
    nearly 60,000 people. Today we have about half that number. The
    footprint of our facilities is reduced from 70 million square
    feet to 40 million square feet and we closed four facilities as
    shown in the chart which I believe you have copies of,
    including major Cold War facilities like the Rocky Flats plant
    in Colorado and Pinellas plant in Florida.
        But the complex still isn't right and I think we have to
    implement what the President outlined in his NPR, a modern
    responsive infrastructure that can sustain the Nation's nuclear
    deterrent while being able to respond to DOD needs quickly and
    effectively. I think right now we can respond effectively but
    nobody would say that we can respond quickly.
        We are carrying out an intensive effort to establish
    exactly what that complex should look like. Last summer, we
    received the report of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
    Task Force, sometimes called the Overskei Report. Our challenge
    is to gain the advantages that that report set forth in a way
    that's affordable.
        Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the importance of being wise
    stewards of the taxpayers' money. The vision set forth in that
    report is a compelling vision. It's a very thoughtful job, but
    in the near term it's also an expensive process. What we are
    looking to do is gain the advantages of that vision without
    that expense and we will report to the committee in more detail
    on our thinking later this spring.
        Let me mention a couple of other challenges that you and we
    are faced with in this budget. In the long term, the United
    States needs the ability to manufacture plutonium pits, the
    triggers for nuclear weapons. Last year, although supported by
    the authorizers, Congress declined to appropriate planning
    funds for a modern pit facility.
        As a result, we are not seeking any funds in this year's
    budget. Instead, we are focusing on an interim capability at
    Los Alamos. We will work with Congress over the coming years as
    part of this overall infrastructure plan to identify an
    approach to the long-term pit requirements.
        As Senator Nelson mentioned, we have DOD requirements for
    life extension programs. Last year, reductions in the life
    extension programs of the W-76 increased the risk of meeting
    the DOD schedules in 2007. A reduction in the W-80 cruise
    missile warhead will in fact delay deployment, and will
    increase costs and delay introduction. So this committee has
    always been a strong supporter of life extension programs which
    provide the most direct support of the DOD and I hope you will
    continue to be.
        Last year, Congress significantly reduced funds for the
    facilities and infrastructure recapitalization program. That's
    a program to revitalize the fiscal infrastructure of the
    weapons complex and to basically get us out of the hole we got
    ourselves into in the '90s by underfunding maintenance.
        We have agreed that we would terminate that program in
    2011, but the program was reduced last year. I no longer
    believe that is possible to meet the 2011 deadline, and we will
    seek a 2-year extension. We are, however, committed to the idea
    that this is a temporary program to get us well after which it
    will be our responsibility to keep ourselves well.
        Senator Sessions. This is an existing program?
        Ambassador Brooks. A program to work off the backlog in
    deferred maintenance. We inherited a fairly substantial
    backlog. Our goal is to stabilize that backlog and then reduce
    it to within industry standards and then thereafter to maintain
    it.
        We are, as the Chairman said, conscious of the need to be
    wise stewards of the public money. As a result of that,
    compared to the projections we gave this committee 2 years ago,
    we have reduced our weapons program by about $860 million,
    about half of that for deficit reduction, the other half
    redirected primarily to nonproliferation.
        Our request this year I believe to be balanced and
    responsible and if approved by Congress, it will let us
    continue transforming the stockpile structure, increase
    nonproliferation measures, and enhance Navy force projection. I
    hope the committee will support it. Thank you, sir, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Brooks follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

        Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal
    year 2007 budget request for the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA). This is my fourth appearance before this
    committee as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, and I want to
    thank all of the Members for their strong support for our important
    national security responsibilities.

                                    OVERVIEW

        In the sixth year of this administration, with the strong support
    of Congress, NNSA has achieved a level of stability that is required
    for accomplishing our long-term missions. Our fundamental
    responsibilities for the United States include three national security
    missions:

             assure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons
            stockpile while at the same time transforming that stockpile
            and the infrastructure that supports it;
             reduce the threat posed by nuclear proliferation; and
             provide reliable and safe nuclear reactor propulsion systems
            for the U.S. Navy.

        The budget request for $9.3 billion, an increase of $211 million,
    supports these NNSA missions.
    Weapons Activities
        The NNSA is committed to ensuring the long-term reliability, safety
    and security of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. Stockpile Stewardship
    is working; the stockpile remains safe and reliable. This assessment is
    based not on nuclear tests, but on cutting-edge scientific and
    engineering experiments and analysis, including extensive laboratory
    and flight tests of warhead components and subsystems. Each year, we
    are gaining a more complete understanding of the complex physical
    processes underlying the performance of our aging nuclear stockpile.
    However, as we continue to draw down the stockpile to the levels
    established in the Treaty of Moscow--between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed
    strategic nuclear weapons. We must consider the long-term implications
    of successive warhead refurbishments for the weapons remaining in the
    stockpile. Successive refurbishments will take us further from the
    tested configurations and it is becoming more difficult and costly to
    certify warhead remanufacture despite the extraordinary success of the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).
        If we were starting to build the stockpile from scratch today we
    would take a much different approach than we took during the Cold War.
    Most of today's warheads were designed to maximize explosive yield with
    minimum size and weight so that many warheads could be carried on a
    single delivery vehicle. As a result, weapons designers designed closer
    to the so-called ``cliffs'' in performance. If we were designing the
    stockpile today, we would manage risk differently, trading size and
    weight for increased performance margins and ease of manufacture and
    maintenance.
        Second, the legacy stockpile was not designed for longevity. During
    the Cold War we introduced new weapons routinely, turning over most of
    the stockpile every 15-20 years. Today, our weapons are aging and now
    are being rebuilt in life extension programs that are both difficult
    and costly. Rebuilding nuclear weapons will never be cheap, but Cold
    War decisions to use certain hazardous materials mean that, in today's
    health and safety culture, warheads are much more costly to
    remanufacture.
        Furthermore, we continue to evolve our deterrent posture from its
    Cold War origins to one that requires far fewer weapons. Decisions the
    President announced in 2004 will result, by 2012, in the smallest total
    stockpile since the Eisenhower administration. Even with these
    unprecedented reductions, however, the stockpile--especially the
    components we keep in reserve--is probably too large.
        Finally, with regard to physical security, we must consider new
    technology to ensure these weapons can never be used by those who wish
    to harm us. During the Cold War the main security threat to our nuclear
    forces was from espionage. Today, that threat remains, but to it has
    been added a post-September 11 threat of well-armed and competent
    terrorist suicide teams seeking to gain access to a warhead or to
    special nuclear materials in order to cause a nuclear detonation in
    place. This change has dramatically increased security costs. If we
    were designing the stockpile today, we would apply new technologies and
    approaches to warhead design as a means to reduce physical security
    costs.
        Fortunately, we know how to address all of these problems.
        The administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), completed in
    December 2001, called for a transition from a threat-based nuclear
    deterrent with large numbers of deployed and Reserve weapons to a
    deterrent based on capabilities, with a smaller nuclear weapons
    stockpile and greater reliance on the capability and responsiveness of
    the Department of Defense (DOD) and NNSA infrastructure to respond to
    threats. Success in realizing this vision for transformation will
    enable us to achieve over the long term a smaller stockpile, one that
    is safer and more secure, one that offers a reduced likelihood that we
    will ever again need to conduct an underground nuclear test, and one
    that enables a much more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure.
    Most importantly, this effort can go far to ensure a credible deterrent
    for the 21st century that will reduce the likelihood we will ever have
    to employ our nuclear capabilities in defense of the Nation--through
    demonstration of responsiveness in design and production, demonstration
    of confidence in our abilities, cleanup of portions of the Cold War
    legacy and demonstration of America's will to maintain nuclear
    preeminence. We have worked closely with the DOD to identify initial
    steps on the path to a responsive nuclear infrastructure.
        What do we mean by ``responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure?''
    By ``responsive'' we refer to the resilience of the nuclear enterprise
    to unanticipated events or emerging threats, and the ability to
    anticipate innovations by an adversary and to counter them before our
    deterrent is degraded. Unanticipated events could include complete
    failure of a deployed warhead type or the need to respond to new and
    emerging geopolitical threats. The elements of a responsive
    infrastructure include the people, the science and technology base, and
    the facilities and equipment to support a right-sized nuclear weapons
    enterprise. But more than that, it involves a transformation in
    engineering and production practices that will enable us to respond
    rapidly and flexibly to emerging needs. Specifically, a responsive
    infrastructure must provide capabilities, on appropriate timescales and
    in support of DOD requirements, to:

             Dismantle warheads;
             Ensure warheads are available to augment the operationally
            deployed force;
             Identify, understand, and fix stockpile problems;
             Design, develop, certify, and begin production of refurbished
            or replacement warheads;
             Maintain capability to design, develop, and begin production
            of new or adapted warheads, if required;
             Produce required quantities of warheads; and
             Sustain underground nuclear test readiness.

        As we and the DOD take the first steps down this path, we clearly
    recognize that the ``enabler'' for transformation is our concept for
    the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The RRW would relax Cold War
    design constraints that maximized yield to weight ratios and thereby
    allow us to design replacement components that are easier to
    manufacture, are safer and more secure, eliminate environmentally
    dangerous materials, and increase design margins, thus ensuring long-
    term confidence in reliability and a correspondingly reduced chance we
    will ever need to resort to nuclear testing.
        The combination of the RRW and a responsive infrastructure--each
    enabled by the other--may be genuinely transformational. The reduced
    stockpile the President approved in 2004 still retains a significant
    non-deployed nuclear stockpile as a hedge against technical problems or
    geopolitical changes. Once we demonstrate that we can produce warheads
    on a timescale in which geopolitical threats could emerge, we would no
    longer need to retain extra warheads to hedge against unexpected
    geopolitical changes.
        In addition to the mission of continuously maintaining the safety,
    security, reliability, and operational readiness of the Nation's
    nuclear deterrent, establishing the capabilities to achieve and sustain
    this transformation is a central focus of our activities.
    Transformation will, of course, take time. We are starting now with
    improving business and operating practices, both in the Federal
    workforce and across the nuclear weapons complex, and through restoring
    and modernizing key production capabilities. Full infrastructure
    changes, however, will take a couple of decades. I believe by 2030 we
    can achieve a responsive infrastructure that will provide capabilities,
    if required, to produce weapons with different or modified military
    capabilities. As important, through the RRW program we will revitalize
    our weapons design community to meet the challenge of being able to
    adapt an existing weapon within 18 months and design, develop, and
    begin production of a new design within 3-4 years of a decision to
    enter engineering development--goals that were established in 2004.
        As part of the transformation process we are also actively
    reviewing the recommendations of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
    Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force to prepare a
    comprehensive plan for transforming the nuclear weapons complex. Many
    of the recommendations are consistent with initiatives that NNSA was
    already considering or is implementing (design of a RRW, consolidation
    of Special Nuclear Materials, accelerating dismantlement of retired
    weapons, managing the evolving complex to enhance responsiveness and
    sustainability, and establishing an Office of Transformation). The
    analysis of this report and its recommendations is underway and should
    be completed and presented to Congress by this spring.
        Transformation presents some significant near term challenges, one
    of which is pit production. The NNSA considers an appropriate pit
    production capacity to be essential to its long-term evolution to a
    more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. We are disappointed,
    therefore, that Congress declined to fund planning for a modern pit
    production facility in fiscal year 2006. As a result, we did not seek
    funding for this facility in fiscal year 2007; although we remain
    convinced that increased pit production capacity is essential to our
    long-term evolution to a more responsive nuclear weapons
    infrastructure. In coming months, we will work with Congress to
    identify an agreed approach to fund long-term pit production capacity.
    In the meantime, we plan to increase the Los Alamos National Laboratory
    (LANL) pit manufacturing capacity to 30-40 pits per year by the end of
    fiscal year 2012 in order to support the RRW. This production rate,
    however, will be insufficient to meet our assessed long-term pit
    production needs.
        Another significant near term challenge is ensuring the security of
    our people, our nuclear weapons, our weapons-usable materials, our
    information, and our infrastructure from harm, theft or compromise. The
    job has become more difficult and costly as a result of two factors:
    the increased post-September 11 threat to nuclear warheads and
    associated fissile materials coupled with the primacy of ``denying
    access'' to these key assets--a much more rigorous security standard
    than ``containment'' of the asset. We will meet the requirements of the
    2003 Design Basis Threat (DBT) by the end of this fiscal year. We
    expect to be compliant with the 2005 DBT revisions at the two most
    sensitive locations, the Secure Transportation Asset and the Pantex
    Weapons Plant by the end of fiscal year 2008 as required by
    Departmental policy.
        The world in 2030 will not be more predictable than it is today,
    but this vision of our future nuclear weapons posture is enabled by
    what we have learned from 10 years of experience with science-based
    Stockpile Stewardship, from planning for and carrying out life
    extension programs for our legacy stockpile, and from coming to grips
    with national security needs of the 21st century as laid out in the
    NPR. A world of a successful responsive infrastructure isn't the only
    plausible future of course. But it is one we should strive for. It
    offers the best hope of achieving the President's vision of the
    smallest stockpile consistent with our Nation's security. That's why we
    are embracing this vision of stockpile and infrastructure
    transformation. We should not underestimate the challenge of
    transforming the enterprise, but it is clearly the right path for us to
    take.
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
        Let me now turn to our nuclear nonproliferation and threat
    reduction programs. Acquisition of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) capabilities, technologies, and expertise by rogue
    states or terrorists poses a grave threat to the United States and
    international security. The pursuit of nuclear weapons by terrorists
    and states of concern makes it clear that our threat detection programs
    are urgently required, must be successful, and must proceed on an
    accelerated basis. The NNSA budget request addresses this urgency and
    demonstrates the President's commitment to prevent, contain, and roll
    back the proliferation of nuclear weapons-usable materials, technology,
    and expertise.
        Our programs are structured around a comprehensive and multi-
    layered approach to threat reduction and nuclear nonproliferation. We
    work with more than 70 countries to secure dangerous nuclear and
    radioactive materials, halt the production of fissile material, detect
    the illegal trafficking or diversion of nuclear material, and
    ultimately dispose of surplus weapons-usable materials. We also work
    with multilateral institutions including the International Atomic
    Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to strengthen
    nuclear safeguards and improve the nuclear export control regulatory
    infrastructure in other countries. This multi-layered approach is
    intended to identify and address potential vulnerabilities within the
    international nonproliferation regime, reduce the incentive for
    terrorists and rogue states to obtain WMD, and limit terrorists' access
    to deadly weapons and materials.
        A significant amount of our work falls at the intersection of
    nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear materials. The United
    States is setting an example by making a firm commitment to reducing
    its nuclear arsenal and recycling substantial quantities of weapons-
    usable highly enriched uranium for peaceful, civilian, energy-
    generating purposes. In 1994, the United States declared 174 tons of
    highly enriched uranium (HEU) to be in excess of our national security
    needs. The great bulk of that material is now in the process of being
    downblended for use in civilian nuclear power reactors. Last year, we
    announced that 17.4 metric tons (MT) of this material will be
    downblended and set aside to establish a fuel bank in support of our
    efforts to develop an international reliable fuel supply mechanism, an
    issue I will return to later in my statement.
        In addition, in May 2004, President Bush announced plans to reduce
    our Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile by nearly half, to its smallest
    size since the Eisenhower administration. This decision enables us to
    begin to dispose of a significant amount of weapons-grade nuclear
    material. Last year, the administration committed to remove an
    additional 200 MT of HEU--enough material for approximately 8,000
    nuclear warheads--from any further use as fissile material in U.S.
    nuclear weapons. This represents the largest amount of special nuclear
    material ever removed from the stockpile in the history of the U.S.
    nuclear weapons program. The bulk of this material will be retained for
    use in propulsion systems for our Nation's nuclear Navy--a step that
    will allow us to postpone the need to construct a new uranium high-
    enrichment facility for at least 50 years. Twenty MT of this HEU will
    be down-blended to LEU for use in civilian nuclear power reactors or
    research reactors.
        We are also working with the Russian Federation to eliminate 34 MT
    of weapons-usable plutonium in each country that will be converted into
    mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and burned in nuclear power reactors. We believe
    we have now resolved the impasse over liability that has long delayed
    the plutonium disposition program and the construction of the MOX plant
    at our Savannah River Site.
        Much of our work focuses on emerging issues such as detecting
    clandestine nuclear supply networks, monitoring efforts by more
    countries to acquire nuclear weapons, and preventing the spread of
    nuclear fuel cycle technology. We have taken a number of steps to shut
    down illicit supply networks and keep nuclear materials out of the
    hands of terrorists as reflected in U.S. leadership in support of the
    Proliferation Security Initiative, Security Council Resolution 1540,
    criminalizing proliferation, and in strengthening international export
    control regimes.
        We have worked to expand our programs designed to stop nuclear
    smuggling and nuclear terrorism by cooperatively developing and
    employing radiological and nuclear detection equipment at key border
    crossings, airports, and major seaports, or ``megaports,'' worldwide.
    NNSA also assists and trains customs officials at home and abroad to
    detect the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials,
    as well as dual-use commodities that might be useful in weapons of mass
    destruction programs. We are also expanding our efforts to secure and
    transform global inventories of weapons-usable materials. Our programs
    include the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to reduce and
    secure fissile and radioactive material worldwide; our International
    Material Protection and Cooperation (MPC&A) program which has
    accelerated efforts to improve the security of weapons usable material
    in Russia and elsewhere; and our efforts to complete the conversion of
    research reactors throughout the world to the use of low enriched
    uranium within the next decade. There are also two complementary
    programs that address the repatriation of fresh and spent HEU material
    from Russian-supplied research reactors and U.S.-origin material from
    research reactors around the world
        Cooperation with Russia on nonproliferation is nothing new for the
    United States, but this cooperation has been heightened following the
    rise of global terrorism and the events of September 11, 2001. The
    Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation issued by Presidents
    Bush and Putin at their Bratislava meeting last year is but one example
    of the significant progress we have made over the last 5 years. This
    joint statement has helped expedite our cooperative work with Russia.
    For example, as a result of the Bush-Putin Bratislava joint statement,
    we were able to make the return of fresh and spent HEU fuel from U.S.
    and Russian-design research reactors in third countries a top priority,
    as well as a plan for joint work to develop low-enriched uranium fuel
    for use in these reactors. As a result, we were able to complete the
    conversion of a Russian-supplied research reactor located in the Czech
    Republic to low-enriched fuel and to airlift a significant amount of
    HEU from the Czech Technical University reactor located near Prague for
    safe and secure storage in Russia. We have also made significant
    progress on the other Bratislava joint statement items, and we expect
    this cooperation and success will continue.
        Beyond the threat of nuclear terrorism, illicit networks engaging
    in nuclear trade, and additional states seeking nuclear weapons
    capability, the nonproliferation community also faces another
    significant challenge--revitalizing nuclear energy throughout the globe
    in a manner that also advances our nonproliferation interests. We have
    the opportunity to reshape our collective approach to ensure that
    nonproliferation is the cornerstone of the next evolution of civilian
    nuclear power and fuel cycle technology. The challenge before us is to
    make sure we design--from the very beginning--technologies and
    political arrangements that limit the spread of sensitive fuel cycle
    capabilities and ensure that rogue states do not use civilian nuclear
    power as cover for a covert nuclear weapons program.
        Last month, the administration announced the Global Nuclear Energy
    Partnership (GNEP) as part of President Bush's Advanced Energy
    Initiative. GNEP is a comprehensive strategy to enable an expansion of
    nuclear power in the U.S. and around the world, to promote nuclear
    nonproliferation goals; and to help resolve nuclear waste disposal
    issues. Fundamental to GNEP is a new approach to fuel cycle technology.
    Under this proposed new approach, countries with secure, advanced
    nuclear fuel cycle capabilities would offer commercially competitive
    and reliable access to nuclear fuel services--fresh fuel and recovery
    of used fuel--to other countries in exchange for their commitment to
    forgo the development of enrichment and recycling technology.
        Over the next year, we will work with other elements of the
    Department to establish GNEP, paying special attention to developing
    advanced safeguards and developing the parameters for international
    cooperation. Since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
    the world has sought to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
    while expanding the benefits of nuclear technology. I believe that GNEP
    takes us closer to that goal. By allowing us to move beyond abstract
    discussions to tangible actions that will benefit directly those who
    join us in this partnership. GNEP will offer us the opportunity to take
    the international lead in making nonproliferation an integral part of
    our global nuclear safety and security culture.
    Naval Reactors
        Also contributing to the Department's national security mission is
    the Department's Naval Reactors Program, whose mission is to provide
    the U.S. Navy with safe, militarily-effective nuclear propulsion plants
    and ensure their continued safe, reliable and long-lived operation.
    Nuclear propulsion enhances our warship capabilities by providing the
    ability to sprint where needed and arrive on station; ready to conduct
    sustained combat operations when America's interests are threatened.
    Nuclear propulsion plays a vital role in ensuring the Navy's forward
    presence and its ability to project power anywhere in the world.
        The Naval Reactors Program has a broad mandate, maintaining
    responsibility for nuclear propulsion from cradle to grave. Over 40
    percent of the Navy's major combatants are nuclear-powered, including
    aircraft carriers, attack submarines, and strategic submarines, which
    provide the Nation's most survivable deterrent.

                   FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET REQUEST BY PROGRAM

        The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request totals $9.3
    billion, an increase of $211 million or 2.3 percent. We are managing
    our program activities within a disciplined 5-year budget and planning
    envelope. We are doing it successfully enough to be able to address the
    administration's high priority initiatives to reduce global nuclear
    danger in Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and provide for needed
    funding increases in some of our programs within an overall modest
    growth rate.
    Weapons Activities
        The fiscal year 2007 budget request for the programs funded within
    the Weapons Activities appropriation is $6.41 billion, less than a 1-
    percent increase over fiscal year 2006. This request supports the
    requirements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program consistent with the
    administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the revised stockpile
    plan submitted to Congress in June 2004. Our request places a high
    priority on accomplishing the near-term workload and supporting
    technologies for the stockpile along with the long-term science and
    technology investments to ensure the design and production capability
    and capacity to support ongoing missions. This request also supports
    the facilities and infrastructure that must be responsive to new or
    emerging threats.
        Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) is an area of special emphasis this
    year with a fiscal year 2007 request of $1.41 billion, a 3-percent
    increase over fiscal year 2006. In fiscal year 2007, we will be
    accelerating efforts for dismantlement of retired warheads and
    consolidation of special nuclear materials across the nuclear weapons
    complex. Both of these efforts will contribute to increasing the
    overall security at NNSA sites. DSW also supports routine maintenance
    and repair of the stockpile; refurbishes warheads through the Life
    Extension Programs; and, maintains the capability to design,
    manufacture, and certify new warheads, for the foreseeable future. DSW
    also supports managing the strategy, driving the change, and performing
    the crosscutting initiatives required to achieve responsiveness
    objectives envisioned in the NPR. Our focus remains on the stockpile,
    to ensure that the nuclear warheads and bombs in the U.S. nuclear
    weapons stockpile are safe, secure, and reliable.
        Progress in other parts of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)
    continues. The fiscal year 2007 request for the six Campaigns is $1.94
    billion, a 9 percent decrease from fiscal year 2006. The Campaigns
    focus on scientific and technical efforts and capabilities essential
    for assessment, certification, maintenance, and life extension of the
    stockpile and have allowed NNSA to move to ``science-based''
    stewardship. These campaigns are evidence of NNSA excellence and
    innovation in science, engineering and computing that, though focused
    on the nuclear weapons mission, have much broader application.
        Specifically, $425 million for the Science and Engineering
    Campaigns provides the basic scientific understanding and the
    technologies required to support the workload and the completion of new
    scientific and experimental facilities. We will continue to maintain
    the ability to conduct underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test
    Site if required, but let me be clear, nothing at this time indicates
    the need for resumption of underground testing for the foreseeable
    future.
        The Readiness Campaign, with a request of $206 million, develops
    and delivers design-to-manufacture capabilities to meet the evolving
    and urgent needs of the stockpile and supports the transformation of
    the nuclear weapons complex into an agile and more responsive
    enterprise.
        The request of $618 million for the Advanced Simulation and
    Computing Campaign supports the schedule to enhance the computational
    tools and technologies necessary to support the continued assessment
    and certification of the refurbished weapons, aging weapons components,
    and a RRW program without underground nuclear tests. As we enhance
    these tools to link the historical test base of more than 1,000 nuclear
    tests to computer simulations, we can continue to assess whether the
    stockpile is safe, secure, reliable, and performs as required.
        The $451 million request for the Inertial Confinement Fusion
    Ignition and High Yield Campaign is focused on the execution of the
    first ignition experiment at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) in
    2010 and provides facilities and capabilities for high-energy-density
    physics experiments in support of the SSP. To achieve the ignition
    milestone, $255 million will support construction of NIF and the NIF
    Demonstration Program and $168 million will support the National
    Ignition Campaign. The ability of NIF to assess the thermonuclear burn
    regime in nuclear weapons via ignition experiments is of particular
    importance. NIF will be the only facility capable of probing in the
    laboratory the extreme conditions of density and temperature found in
    exploding nuclear weapons.
        The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign request of $238
    million continues work to manufacture and certify the W88 pit in 2007
    and to address issues associated with manufacturing future pit types
    including the RRW and increasing pit production capacity at Los Alamos
    National Laboratory.
        Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) and Facilities
            and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP)
        In fiscal year 2007 we are requesting $1.98 billion for the
    maintenance and operation of existing facilities, remediation and
    disposition of excess facilities, and construction of new facilities.
    This is of critical importance to enable NNSA to move toward a more
    supportable and responsive infrastructure.
        Of this amount, $1.69 billion is requested for Readiness in
    Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF), an increase of 3 percent from
    fiscal year 2006, with $1.4 billion in Operations and Maintenance and
    $281 million for RTBF Construction. RTBF operates and maintains current
    facilities, and ensures the long-term vitality of the NNSA complex
    through a multi-year program of infrastructure construction.
        This request also includes $291 million for the Facilities and
    Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP), a separate and distinct
    program that is complementary to the ongoing RTBF efforts. The FIRP
    mission is to restore, rebuild and revitalize the physical
    infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. FIRP works in
    partnership with RTBF to assure that facilities and infrastructure are
    restored to an appropriate condition to support the mission, and to
    institutionalize responsible and accountable facility management
    practices. FIRP activities include reducing deferred maintenance,
    recapitalizing the infrastructure, and reducing the maintenance base by
    eliminating excess real property. The FIRP recapitalization projects
    are key to restoring the facilities that house the people, equipment,
    and material necessary to the SSP, the primary NNSA mission. FIRP
    Facility Disposition activities reduce Environment, Safety and Health
    (ES&H) and safeguards and security liabilities, address footprint
    reduction of the complex, and reduce long-term costs and risks. The
    primary objective of FIRP Infrastructure Planning is to ensure that
    projects are adequately planned in advance of project start.
        Last year, Congress significantly reduced funds for the FIRP
    program. This reduction, coming on reductions in planned levels
    dictated by fiscal constraints, means that the original (and
    Congressionally mandated) goal of eliminating the maintenance backlog
    and terminating the FIRP program by 2011 is no longer attainable. This
    matter may require legislation extending the FIRP program to 2013. We
    remain committed to the concept of FIRP as a temporary, ``get well''
    program and to the long-term, sustained funding of maintenance within
    the RTBF program.
        Secure Transportation Asset
        In fiscal year 2007, the budget requests $209 million for Secure
    Transportation Asset (STA), a minor decrease from fiscal year 2006
    levels, for meeting the Department's transportation requirements for
    nuclear weapons, components, and special nuclear materials shipments.
    The workload requirements for this program will escalate significantly
    in the future to support the dismantlement and maintenance schedule for
    the nuclear weapons stockpile and the Secretarial initiative to
    consolidate the storage of nuclear material. The challenge to increase
    secure transport capacity is coupled with and impacted by increasingly
    complex national security concerns. To support the escalating workload
    while maintaining the safety and security of shipments, STA is
    increasing the cumulative number of Safeguard Transporters in operation
    by 3 per year, with a target total of 51 in fiscal year 2011.
        Environmental Projects and Operations
        We are requesting $17.2 million for Environmental Projects and
    Operations. The $17.2 million request is for a new function, Long Term
    Response Actions/Long-Term Stewardship, which covers continuing
    environmental stewardship at NNSA sites after the completion of
    Environmental Management (EM) activities. This new program at each site
    begins when EM cleanup activities are completed, and will continue for
    several years. Activities comprise routine inspections of landfill
    covers/caps, and maintenance of pump and treatment systems, and
    starting in fiscal year 2007, will be performed at three NNSA sites:
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Kansas City Plant, and Sandia
    National Laboratories.
        The fiscal year 2007-2011 budget request does not include the
    transfer of legacy environmental management activities at NNSA sites
    that was proposed in the fiscal year 2006 budget request. However, the
    responsibility for newly generated waste at the Lawrence Livermore
    National Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security Complex was
    transferred to the NNSA in fiscal year 2006, and is managed in the
    Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities GPRA unit.
        Nuclear Weapons Incident Response
        The fiscal year 2007 request for Nuclear Weapons Incident Response
    is $135 million, an increase of 15 percent over fiscal year 2006. The
    NNSA Emergency Operations remains the U.S. government's primary
    capability for radiological and nuclear emergency response in support
    of homeland security. The program is continuing efforts to enhance
    emergency response capabilities, and the budget request supports all
    assets as planned, with emphasis on recruitment and training of
    personnel called into action during emergency situations. The fiscal
    year 2007 increase is primarily associated with the research and
    development efforts of the Render Safe Research and Development
    program. This budget realigns this research and development funding to
    emergency response where the program is managed.
        Safeguards and Security
        The fiscal year 2007 request for Safeguards and Security is $754
    million. This budget supports two security-related activities. The
    budget request proposes that the physical security portion of NNSA's
    Safeguards and Security GPRA Unit be renamed ``Defense Nuclear
    Security'', consistent with the responsible NNSA organization. This
    program is responding to a revision in threat guidance affecting
    physical security at all NNSA sites. Meeting the Design Basis Threat
    will require further upgrades to equipment, personnel and facilities,
    and NNSA is committed to completing these activities. The Cyber
    Security program activities, managed by the NNSA Chief Information
    Officer, comprise the rest of this account, and the fiscal year 2007
    request is essentially level with the fiscal year 2006 funding level.
    The Request includes funding for the DOE Diskless Conversion
    initiative. Meeting the post-September 11 security requirements has
    required a significant long-term investment, reflecting DOE's
    continuing commitment to meet these requirements.
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program goal is to detect,
    prevent, and reverse the proliferation of WMDs while mitigating nuclear
    risk worldwide. Our programs address the danger that hostile nations or
    terrorist groups may acquire weapons of mass destruction or weapons-
    usable material, dual-use production or technology, or WMD
    capabilities. Our primary focus in this regard is securing or disposing
    of vulnerable stockpiles of weapon-usable materials, technology, and
    expertise in Russia and other countries of concern. The
    administration's request of $1.73 billion to support NNSA activities to
    reduce the global weapons of mass destruction proliferation threat
    represents almost a 7-percent increase over the budget for comparable
    fiscal year 2006 activities.
        The administration's fiscal year 2007 Fissile Material Disposition
    budget request is $638 million, an increase of $169 million over fiscal
    year 2006. This increase reflects the progress in implementing the
    plutonium disposition program in the past year. Of this amount, $551
    million will be allocated toward disposing of surplus U.S. and Russian
    plutonium and $87 million will be allocated toward the disposition of
    surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium. The plutonium disposition
    program, the Department's largest nonproliferation program, plans to
    dispose of 68 MT of surplus Russian and U.S. weapons-grade plutonium by
    fabricating it into MOX fuel for use in civilian nuclear power-
    generating reactors. The United States and Russia successfully
    completed negotiations of a liability protocol for the program, and
    senior Russian government officials have assured the United States that
    this protocol will be signed in the near future. DOE has also been
    working to validate the U.S. MOX project cost and schedule baseline as
    part of our project management process, and we will have a validated
    baseline in place before construction begins. DOE received
    authorization to begin construction of the MOX facility from the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, began site preparation work for the MOX
    facility at the Savannah River Site, and implemented a number of
    improvements to strengthen the management of the MOX project. Current
    plans call for construction of the U.S. MOX facility to start in 2006,
    with operations to start in 2015. The administration's budget request
    is essential for continuing this work in fiscal year 2007, which will
    be a peak construction year. Now that the liability issue is nearing
    resolution, high-level U.S.-Russian discussions are taking place to
    confirm the technical and financial details for the Russian
    construction program.
        The administration's fiscal year 2007 budget request of $107
    million for the GTRI is a 10-percent increase over fiscal year 2006 and
    supports the urgency carried in ambitious completion dates and
    objectives set by the program. GTRI represents the Department's latest
    effort to identify, secure, recover, and/or facilitate the disposition
    of the vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials worldwide that pose
    a threat to the United States and the international community. Since
    the creation of GTRI, we have enjoyed a number of successes. Under our
    radiological threat reduction program, we have completed security
    upgrades at more than 340 facilities around the world. As a result of
    the Bush-Putin Bratislava joint statement on enhanced nuclear security
    cooperation, we have established a prioritized schedule for the
    repatriation of U.S.-origin and Russian-origin research reactor nuclear
    fuel located in third countries. As part of our nuclear materials
    threat reduction efforts under GTRI, three successful shipments in
    fiscal year 2005 to repatriate Russian-origin fresh HEU from the Czech
    Republic (two shipments) and Latvia.
        In accordance with the President's Bratislava commitment, we have
    also begun working with the Russian Federation to repatriate Russian-
    origin spent fuel. We have also conducted several successful shipments
    to repatriate U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel from Japan, the
    Netherlands, Sweden, Greece, and Austria. We have converted three
    research reactors in the Netherlands, Libya, and the Czech Republic
    from the use of HEU to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel so
    far in 2006, and we have completed physical security upgrades at three
    priority sites housing dangerous materials in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
    Uzbekistan.
        The International Material Protection and Cooperation fiscal year
    2007 budget request of $413 million is a 2 percent decrease from fiscal
    year 2006. For more than a decade, the United States has worked
    cooperatively with the Russian Federation and other former Soviet
    republics to secure nuclear weapons and weapons material that may be at
    risk of theft or diversion. As part of the Bush-Putin Bratislava joint
    statement, we agreed to accelerate security upgrades at Russian sites
    holding weapons-usable materials and warheads. The Bratislava joint
    statement also provided for a comprehensive joint action plan for
    cooperation on security upgrades of Russian nuclear facilities at
    Rosatom and Ministry of Defense sites. In addition, this statement
    called for enhanced cooperation in the areas of nuclear regulatory
    development, sustainability, secure transportation, MPC&A expertise
    training, and protective force equipment. A number of major milestones
    for this cooperative program are on the horizon, and the fiscal year
    2007 budget ensures that sufficient funding will be available to meet
    these milestones. Security upgrades for Russian Rosatom facilities will
    be completed by the end of 2008--2 years ahead of schedule. By the end
    of 2008 we will also complete cooperative upgrades at the nuclear
    warhead storage sites of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and the
    Russian Ministry of Defense sites. By the end of fiscal year 2007, we
    will have provided security upgrades at more than 80 percent of all the
    nuclear sites in Russia at which we now plan cooperative work.
        The administration's budget request will enable us to expand and
    accelerate the deployment of radiation detection systems at key transit
    points within Russia and accelerate installation of such equipment in
    five other priority countries to prevent attempts to smuggle nuclear or
    radiological materials across land borders. Through our Megaports
    initiative, we plan to deploy radiation detection capabilities at three
    additional major seaports in fiscal year 2007 to pre-screen cargo
    containers destined for the United States for nuclear and radiological
    materials, thereby increasing the number of completed ports to 13.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $207 million for the
    Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) is an
    increase of 18 percent from fiscal year 2006. The EWGPP program is
    working toward completing the permanent shut down of the three
    remaining weapons grade plutonium production reactors in Russia at
    Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Every week, these reactors currently produce
    enough fissile material for several nuclear weapons. The overall EWGPP
    plan is to shutdown these reactors permanently and replace the heat and
    electricity these reactors supply to local communities with energy
    generated by fossil fuel plants by December 2008 in Seversk and
    December 2010 in Zheleznogorsk. The reactors will shut down immediately
    when the fossil plants are completed. The first validated estimate of
    total program cost--$1.2 billion--was determined in January 2004. After
    extensive negotiations with Russia, we achieved $200 million in cost
    savings. Also, under the authority to accept international funding as
    provided in the Ronald W. Reagan Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2005, we have received pledges of $30 million from six Global
    Partnership participants. Construction of the fossil fuel plant at
    Seversk started in late 2004, and the start of construction of the
    fossil fuel plant at Zheleznogorsk was recently approved. The increased
    funding as part of the fiscal year 2007 budget request allows for both
    construction projects to remain on schedule and thereby hold the line
    on cost.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget requests $269 million for
    Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development. This effort
    includes a number of programs that make unique contributions to
    national security by researching the technological advancements
    necessary to detect and prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear
    materials. The Proliferation Detection program advances basic and
    applied technologies for the nonproliferation community with dual-use
    benefit to national counterproliferation and counterterrorism missions.
    Specifically, this program develops the tools, technologies,
    techniques, and expertise for the identification, location, and
    analysis of the facilities, materials, and processes of undeclared and
    proliferant WMD programs. The Proliferation Detection program conducts
    fundamental research in fields such as radiation detection, providing
    support to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
    Intelligence Community. The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring program builds
    the Nation's operational sensors that monitor from space the entire
    planet to detect and report surface, atmospheric, or space nuclear
    detonations. This program also produces and updates the regional
    geophysical datasets enabling operation of the Nation's ground-based
    seismic monitoring networks to detect and report underground
    detonations.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget request for Nonproliferation and
    International Security is $127 million. This figure cannot be directly
    compared to fiscal year 2006 because of a budget structure change that
    has realigned the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and
    HEU Transparency programs to this GPRA unit. Through this program the
    Department provides technical and policy expertise in support of U.S.
    efforts to strengthen international nonproliferation institutions and
    arrangements, fosters implementation of nonproliferation requirements
    through engagement with foreign partners, and helps develop the
    mechanisms necessary for transparent and verifiable nuclear reductions
    worldwide. This budget request addresses our need to tackle key policy
    challenges including efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system,
    attempts to block and reverse proliferation in Iran and North Korea,
    attention to augmenting U.S. cooperation with China, India, and Russia,
    and our plan to build-up the nonproliferation component of the Global
    Nuclear Energy Partnership.
    Naval Reactors
        The Naval Reactors fiscal year 2007 budget request of $795 million
    is an increase of $13.5 million from fiscal year 2006. The program's
    development work ensures that nuclear propulsion technology provides
    options for maintaining and upgrading current capabilities, as well as
    for meeting future threats to U.S. security.
        The majority of funding supports the program's number-one priority
    of ensuring the safety and reliability of the 104 operating naval
    nuclear propulsion plants. This work involves continual testing,
    analysis, and monitoring of plant and core performance, which becomes
    more critical as the reactor plants age. The nature of this business
    demands a careful, measured approach to developing and verifying
    nuclear technology; designing needed components, systems, and
    processes; and implementing them in existing and future plant designs.
    Most of this work is accomplished at Naval Reactors' DOE laboratories.
    These laboratories have made significant advancements in extending core
    lifetime, developing robust materials and components, and creating an
    array of predictive capabilities.
        Long-term program goals have been to increase core energy, to
    achieve life-of-the-ship cores, and to eliminate the need to refuel
    nuclear powered ships. Efforts associated with this objective have
    resulted in planned core lives that are sufficient for the 30-plus year
    submarine (based on past usage rates) and an extended core life planned
    for CVN 21 (the next generation aircraft carrier). The need for nuclear
    propulsion will only increase over time as the uncertainty of
    conventional fuel cost and availability grows.
        Naval Reactors' Operations and Maintenance budget request is
    categorized into six areas: Reactor Technology and Analysis; Plant
    Technology; Materials Development and Verification; Evaluation and
    Servicing; Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Operations and Test Support; and
    Facility Operations.
        The $212 million requested for Reactor Technology and Analysis will
    support continued work on the design for the new reactor plant for the
    next generation of aircraft carriers, CVN-21. These efforts also
    support the design of the Transformational Technology Core (TTC), a new
    high-energy core that is a direct outgrowth of the Program's advanced
    reactor technology and materials development and verification work.
        Reactor Technology and Analysis also develops and improves the
    analysis tools, which can be used to safely extend service life beyond
    our previous experience base. The increasing average age of our Navy's
    existing reactor plants, along with future extended service lives, a
    higher pace of operation and reduced maintenance periods, place a
    greater emphasis on our work in thermal-hydraulics, structural
    mechanics, fluid mechanics, and vibration analysis. These factors,
    along with longer-life cores, mean that for years to come, these
    reactors will be operating beyond our previously proven experience
    base.
        The $131 million requested for Plant Technology provides funding to
    develop, test, and analyze components and systems that transfer,
    convert, control, and measure reactor power in a ship's power plant.
    Reactor plant performance, reliability, and safety are maintained
    through a full understanding of component performance and system
    condition over the life of each ship. Naval Reactors is developing
    components to address known limitations and to improve reliability of
    instrumentation and power distribution equipment to replace aging,
    technologically obsolete equipment. Additional technology development
    in the areas of chemistry, energy conversion, instrumentation and
    control, plant arrangement, and component design will continue to
    support the Navy's operational requirements.
        The $118 million requested for Materials Development and
    Verification funds material analyses and testing to provide the high-
    performance materials necessary to ensure that naval nuclear propulsion
    plants meet Navy goals for extended warship operation and greater power
    capability. More explicitly, materials in the reactor core and reactor
    plant must perform safely and reliably for the extended life of the
    ship.
        The $179 million requested for Evaluation and Servicing sustains
    the operation, maintenance, and servicing of Naval Reactors' operating
    prototype reactor plants. Reactor core and reactor plant materials,
    components, and systems in these plants provide important research and
    development data and experience under actual operating conditions.
    These data aid in predicting and subsequently preventing problems that
    could develop in Fleet reactors. With proper maintenance, upgrades, and
    servicing, the two prototype plants will continue to meet testing needs
    for at least the next decade.
        Evaluation and Servicing funds also support the implementation of a
    dry spent fuel storage production line that will put naval spent fuel
    currently stored in water pits at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and
    Engineering Center and at the Expended Core Facility (ECF) on the Naval
    Reactors facility in Idaho into dry storage. Additionally, these funds
    support ongoing decontamination and decommissioning of inactive nuclear
    facilities at all Naval Reactors sites to address their ``cradle to
    grave'' stewardship responsibility for these legacies, and minimize the
    potential for any environmental releases.
        The $64.6 million requested for Advanced Test Reactor Operations
    and Test Support sustains the ongoing activities of the INL ATR
    facility, owned and operated by the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science,
    and Technology.
        In addition to the budget request for the important technical work
    discussed above, program direction and facilities funding is required
    for continued support of the Program's operations and infrastructure.
    The $57 million requested for facilities operations will maintain and
    modernize the Program's facilities, including the Bettis and Knolls
    laboratories as well as ECF and Kesselring Site Operations (KSO),
    through capital equipment purchases and general plant projects. The
    $2.8 million requested for construction funds will be used to complete
    construction of a materials development facility and to support the
    design of a materials research technology complex. Finally, the $31.2
    million requested for program direction will support Naval Reactors'
    DOE personnel at headquarters and the Program's field offices,
    including salaries, benefits, travel, and other expenses.
    Office of the Administrator
        The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $387 million is an increase
    of 14.2 percent over the fiscal year 2006 appropriation. NNSA completed
    the reengineering of its Federal workforce last year and has begun to
    recruit to fill critical skill gaps in safety, security, facilities,
    and business positions, in addition to the Future Leaders Intern
    program initiated in fiscal year 2005. The fiscal year 2007 request
    increases to provide additional personnel and support for mission
    growth in the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation area, as well as in
    safety and security functions. The remainder of the increase reflects
    functional transfers to NNSA of 18 people from other Departmental
    elements, and fact of life changes including pay adjustments, increased
    space and occupancy charges, and cost of living increases in pay and
    benefits. We plan to support a slightly higher workforce level than in
    previous years, reflecting support for mission growth areas and skill
    gap closures.
        Historically Black Colleges and Universities Support
        A research and education partnership program with the Historically
    Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) and the Massie Chairs of
    Excellence was initiated by Congress in the Office of the Administrator
    appropriation in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006. NNSA has
    established an effective program to target national security research
    opportunities for these institutions to increase their participation in
    national security-related research and to train and recruit HBCU
    graduates for employment within NNSA. The NNSA's goal is a stable $10
    million effort annually. The majority of the efforts directly support
    program activities, and it is expected that programs funded by the
    Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors
    appropriations will fund research with the HBCUs in areas including
    engineering, radiochemistry, material and computational sciences and
    sensor development. A targeted effort in education and curriculum
    development, and support for the Massie Chairs, will also be continued.

                               MANAGEMENT ISSUES

        NNSA has fully embraced the President's Management Agenda through
    the completion of the NNSA re-engineering initiative by creating a more
    robust and effective NNSA organization. Additionally, NNSA's success
    has been recognized with consistently ``Green'' ratings from the DOE,
    including Budget and Performance Integration. NNSA's Planning,
    Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation (PPBE) process was implemented
    simultaneously with the standup of the new NNSA organization, and is
    now the established management construct that integrates management,
    financial data and performance information in a multi-year context.
        The PPBE process is in its fifth year of implementation, and
    provides a fully integrated, multi-year perspective. The linkages
    within NNSA mirror the Headquarters and field organization structures,
    and are supported by management processes, contracting, funds control
    and accounting documentation. The cascade and linkages are quite
    evident in our updated NNSA Strategic Plan, issued last November.
        We take very seriously the responsibility to manage the resources
    of the American people effectively and I am glad that our management
    efforts are achieving such results.
        Finally, to provide more effective supervision of high-hazard
    nuclear operations, I have established a Chief, Defense Nuclear Safety
    position and appointed an experienced safety professional to the
    position. I believe this will help us balance the need for consistent
    standards with my stress on the authority and responsibility of the
    local site managers.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In conclusion, I am confident that we are headed in the right
    direction. Our budget request will support continuing our progress in
    protecting and certifying our nuclear deterrent, transforming our
    stockpile and infrastructure, reducing the global danger from
    proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, and enhancing the force
    projection capabilities of the U.S. nuclear Navy. It will enable us to
    continue to maintain the safety and security of our people,
    information, materials, and infrastructure. Above all, it will meet the
    national security needs of the United States in the 21st century.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. A statistical appendix
    follows that contains the budget figures supporting our request. My
    colleagues and I would be pleased to answer any questions on the
    justification for the requested budget.
                                     ______

                    National Nuclear Security Administration
                    appropriation and program summary tables
                      outyear appropriation summary tables
                         fiscal year 2007 budget tables

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Secretary Rispoli.

        STATEMENT OF JAMES A. RISPOLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
          ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Rispoli. Good afternoon, Chairman Sessions, Senator
    Nelson, Senator Graham, other members of the subcommittee. I'm
    pleased to be here today to answer your questions on the fiscal
    year 2007 budget request in EM. I want to thank you and this
    subcommittee for your support. Over the last 4 years, we have
    made major strides in achieving results. We have made
    significant progress in shifting focus from risk management to
    real risk reduction and cleanup, an achievement not possible
    without the strong leadership and support of this subcommittee.
        During 2006 we expect to complete regulatory actions
    associated with closure of the Rocky Flats site and to complete
    cleanup at up to eight other sites, including Fernald, Mound,
    Columbus and Ashtabula in Ohio--I would note that as of now, we
    have a congressional add from last year that added some scope
    to the work at Mound which will be done during 2007--the
    Lawrence Livermore National Lab main site, Lawrence Berkeley
    National Lab in California, the Kansas City plant in Missouri,
    and the Sandia National Laboratory site in New Mexico.
        With this 2007 budget request, achieving our short-term
    completion goals for risk reduction and cleanup are achievable
    with the intention to complete cleanup of eight more sites by
    2009. Just a few examples of these are the contamination issues
    of the Pantex Plant in Texas, the East Tennessee Technology
    Park in Tennessee, the Lawrence Livermore National Lab Site 300
    in California, and the Energy Technology Engineering Center in
    California.
        As with many complex and diversified programs, challenges
    are not always apparent. The challenges that we face in the
    cleanup are not always attractive. EM foresaw some of these
    challenges, but others were not foreseen or were unexpected. We
    have taken steps to regain momentum on these projects, but we
    are realistic and recognize that overly optimistic assumptions,
    statutory and legal issues, and some unrealized technology
    advancement have led us to setbacks.
        One of the most visible projects on which our progress has
    slowed is the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford which was
    mentioned earlier. We believe the Waste Treatment Plant project
    you referred to is the largest and most complex construction
    project in the Nation. It has encountered significant design
    and construction setbacks.
        As we know, the Department has received, and this was
    mentioned as well, the report from the After Action Review
    team. With the help of that report, we have identified problems
    specific to this project and also some problems that we
    recognize could be systemic problems in the national program.
    We remain committed to fix these problems and complete the
    project and begin operations to treat the significant tank
    waste issues there at the Hanford site.
        The investment we have requested in our 2007 budget for
    Defense EM activities totals $5.4 billion and consists of one
    Defense appropriation, that of Defense environmental cleanup.
    With that investment, we will focus and emphasize on the
    following three areas. First, ensure that safety is number one.
    I don't mean safety for just the workers. I mean safety for the
    site and for the community around the site.
        We place a premium on protecting the workers and the
    environment, and we are introducing an integration of safety
    and project management. What I'm getting to there is that
    safety has to be included in all of the design aspects for
    these projects, not just the operational aspect, that has begun
    at the earliest stages of design aspects. It's absolutely
    essential to superior performance.
        Second, we need to ensure the appropriate levels of
    safeguards and security. It's crucial that we maintain
    vigilance in our security to protect our citizens. The EM
    program is responsible for tons of surplus nuclear material.
    There is an overall increase in the safeguards and security
    budget for EM in 2007.
        Third, we need to ensure risk reduction and cleanup
    completion. Risk reduction requires a pragmatic approach to
    cleanup and occurs in various stages which involve the
    elimination, prevention, or mitigation of risk. Our major focus
    of risk reduction is stabilization of high risk materials
    through validation and adherence to cost and schedule targets,
    effective identification and management of risk, and the design
    of contracts that drive outstanding performance.
        A small selection of planned activity and milestones at two
    of our largest sites in 2007 are at Hanford, to ramp up
    construction of the waste treatment plant that's been referred
    to, to maintain radioactive waste forms in a safe, compliant
    condition, and continue on with single shell tank waste
    retrievals and complete containerization and consolidation of
    the K-West Basin and sludge at the K-West Basin.
        At the Savannah River Site (SRS), we will complete
    consolidation of on-site plutonium, continue to stabilize
    radioactive liquid-based underground storage tanks, and
    complete the shipment of drum legacy transuranic waste to the
    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). In particular, I'm pleased
    to thank this subcommittee for section 3116 from the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 that enables us
    to dispose of low level waste at SRS and other sites in a
    prudent, safe, and compliant way.
        The first determination using this statutory authority was
    made by the Secretary in January 2006 and we have two more
    wastes in the pipeline right now for similar action.
    Significant results and emerging challenges went hand in hand
    last year. The fiscal year 2007 budget request supports a
    critical portion of the Department's environmental stewardship
    responsibilities. We will build on our successes in EM missions
    in a manner that is protecting the environment.
        I'm committed to working with all interested parties to
    resolve these issues and work with this subcommittee and
    Congress to address any of your concerns. The Senate Armed
    Services Committee, and this subcommittee in particular, are
    key supporters of our Nation's cleanup efforts. I look forward
    to a continuing dialogue with you on this subcommittee.
        This concludes my formal statement and my full statement is
    submitted for the record. I'd be pleased to answer any
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rispoli follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by James A. Rispoli

        Good Afternoon, Chairman Sessions and members of the subcommittee.
    I am pleased to be here today to answer your questions on the fiscal
    year 2007 budget request for the Environmental Management (EM) program.
    I want to thank you and your subcommittee for your support of the EM
    program.
        Since my appointment in August 2005, I have been visiting
    Department of Energy (DOE) sites and familiarizing myself with the
    breadth of work that EM has the crucial mission to accomplish. I have
    been impressed with the dedication and focus of the workforce to remedy
    the environmental legacy of the Cold War, a task that is both
    inherently challenging and innately beneficial to our country. As I
    have become more informed on the sheer immensity of the challenges that
    face the program, I have a greater understanding of the progress we
    have made and the significant challenges that lie before us.
        Over the last 4 years, EM has made major strides in achieving
    results. To our credit, the program has made significant progress in
    shifting focus from risk management to risk reduction and cleanup
    completion, an achievement not possible without the strong leadership
    and support of this committee. In fact, in 2005, we physically
    completed the cleanup of the Rocky Flats site, Colorado, produced 257
    canisters of vitrified high level waste at the Savannah River Site
    (SRS), South Carolina, ready for repository disposal, and completed the
    Melton Valley legacy waste cleanup at the Oak Ridge Reservation,
    Tennessee, while beginning the decontamination and decommissioning of
    the last remaining gaseous diffusion plant facilities at Oak Ridge.
    During 2006, we expect to complete regulatory actions associated with
    Rocky Flats closure and complete cleanup at up to eight other sites.
    The eight other sites targeted for cleanup completion and/or closure
    are:

             Fernald, Ohio
             Mound, Ohio \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ With the possible exception of OU-1, which is being addressed
    now as a result of fiscal year 2006 Appropriations Act direction.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Kansas City Plant, Missouri
             Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Main Site,
            California
             Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, California
             Ashtabula Environmental Management Project, Ohio
             Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico
             Columbus Environmental Management Project, Ohio

        The fiscal year 2007 budget request builds on the past success of
    cleanup and closure and sets our course for accomplishing our cleanup
    responsibilities. The fiscal year 2007 EM budget request is $5.39
    billion for defense activities, a decrease of $760 million from the
    fiscal year 2006 appropriation, an indicator of our anticipated success
    with completion and closure of Rocky Flats in Colorado and several
    other sites in 2006. The fiscal year 2007 budget request reflects a
    balance of reducing risk and completing cleanup with other Departmental
    and national priorities. Overall, our request puts a high priority on
    tank waste treatment and radioactive waste disposition while preserving
    our site completion and closure impetus.
        This budget request will make possible a ramp up in construction of
    key components of the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford, Washington,
    which had been slowed in 2005 and 2006, and continues safe management
    and retrieval of waste from single shell tanks at Hanford, in pace with
    the Waste Treatment Plant delays. This request increases funding for
    the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project in Idaho to support
    shipments of transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and
    the construction of the Sodium Bearing Waste Facility to treat liquid
    tank waste. This request reflects an increase to support the critical
    path to closure for the East Tennessee Technology Park in Oak Ridge.
        At the SRS, this request will support ongoing stabilization of the
    site's stored nuclear materials, including funding for a container
    surveillance capability and consolidating the site's own plutonium into
    a single location. The request also provides for management and
    disposition of liquid tank waste, including funding for design and
    construction of the Salt Waste Processing Facility.
        In addition, the request supports ongoing cleanup at National
    Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sites, such as the Nevada Test
    Site, Pantex Plant, and Lawrence Livermore-Site 300. It also supports
    the first full year of remote-handled transuranic waste disposal at the
    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico.
        With this budget request, our short-term completion goals for risk
    reduction and cleanup are achievable, with the intention to complete
    cleanup of eight more sites by 2009. They are:

             Argonne National Laboratory-East, Illinois
             Pantex Plant, Texas
             East Tennessee Technology Park, Tennessee
             Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Site 300,
            California
             Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, California
             Energy Technology Engineering Center, California
             Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York
             Inhalation Toxicology Laboratory, New Mexico

        The structure of fiscal year 2007 congressional budget request
    focuses on each site. This structure has three appropriations: Defense,
    Non-Defense, and Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
    Decommissioning. This structure will allow the consolidation of all
    site activities for visibility, accountability and performance. With
    this fiscal year 2007 budget request, we are proposing several shifts
    between program offices with the completion of cleanup.

             With the completion of cleanup at Rocky Flats in
            fiscal year 2006, this request transfers site responsibility
            from EM to the Office of Legacy Management. However, EM's
            request does include funding for Rocky Flats for the final
            Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
            Liability Act Record of Decision.
             With the physical completion of cleanup work at
            Fernald, this request transfers responsibility from EM to the
            Office of Legacy Management for Fernald.
             This request transfers the work scope associated with
            the Nevada Offsites (Project Chariot, Amchitka Island, and the
            Salmon Site; Central Nevada Test Area, Gasbuggy Site, Gnome
            Coach Site, Project Shoal Area, Rio Blanco Site, and the
            Rulison Site) from EM to the Office of Legacy Management.
             This request transfers long-term response actions at
            the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory from EM to the Office
            of Science.
             With completion of active remediation work planned in
            fiscal year 2006 at Sandia National Laboratory, Kansas City
            Plant, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Main Site,
            this request transfers long-term response actions from EM to
            the NNSA.

        EM envisions that as cleanup work is completed at sites with
    continuing missions, EM will transfer long-term surveillance and
    monitoring activities to the cognizant program office or, for those
    sites without a continuing mission, to the Office of Legacy Management.
        Your support of this request will keep the cleanup program on track
    to meet the commitments and produce results worthy of the investment of
    the American people. We have shown we can deliver meaningful results
    important to accomplishing a technically complex mission. With your
    support, we will continue to show results important for today as well
    as far into the future.

                             RESULTS AND CHALLENGES

        The risk reduction, cleanup completion strategy has borne key
    results. We will build on this success and commit our efforts to refine
    our processes, taking advantage of opportunities and breakthroughs to
    meet or exceed past expectations of performance. For instance, as of
    the end of last year EM had cumulatively accomplished the following:

             Packaged and certified 5,541 containers of enriched
            uranium (out of 9,110 containers required over the cleanup
            lifecycle) for long-term storage.
             Packaged 11,307 metric tons of depleted uranium (out
            of 685,161 metric tons required over the cleanup lifecycle) in
            a suitable form for disposition.
             Disposed of 960,143 cubic meters of legacy low-level
            waste and mixed low-level waste (contaminated with hazardous
            chemicals), out of 1,532,871 cubic meters required over the
            cleanup lifecycle.
             Eliminated 9 out of the 13 highly secure and costly
            special nuclear materials storage areas, or Material Access
            Areas.
             Completed decommissioning, deactivation, dismantlement
            and/or demolition of 1,106 out of 3,113 industrial facilities.
             Completed remediation of a total of 5,858 release
            sites (that is, discrete areas of contamination), out of 10,516
            release sites required over the cleanup lifecycle.

        In addition, on a site-specific level, we have:

             Consulted with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under
            section 3116 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
            Fiscal Year 2005 and made the first waste determination to
            allow certain low-level waste from reprocessing to be disposed
            of onsite at the SRS in South Carolina, thereby reducing the
            risks associated with the approximately 36.4 million gallons of
            radioactive waste stored in the underground tanks there.
             Retrieved the first 13,000 of 75,000 drum equivalents
            of suspect transuranic waste 5 months ahead of the Tri-Party
            Agreement (TPA) regulatory milestone at Hanford in Washington.
             Completed the first ``wet to dry'' spent nuclear fuel
            transfer campaign at the Idaho National Laboratory, with
            Training Research and Isotope Production, General Atomics
            (TRIGA) spent nuclear fuel now being held in dry storage.
             Completed disposal of all low-level waste generated
            during the Cold War era (>12,000 cubic meters) 1 year early at
            the Savannah River Site.
             Disposed of over 8,000 tons of scrap metal from
            Portsmouth, Ohio.
             Completed disposal of the remaining inventory of
            hazardous waste generated during the Cold War era and over
            8,000 cubic meters of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)--
            contaminated low-level waste from Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

        These results provide only one perspective or ``snapshot'' of the
    progress EM has made in risk reduction and cleanup. As with a photo,
    these accomplishments present only a limited view of the total program.
    With EM, as with many complex and diversified programs, the challenges
    behind achieving these results are not always apparent. EM foresaw some
    of these challenges, but other challenges were unexpected. Some
    challenges assail us from the technology perspective as we face some of
    the most difficult issues in environmental cleanup. Other challenges do
    not necessarily manifest themselves until we experience poor
    performance or missed milestones. More recently, due to poor
    performance and inadequate oversight, we have been challenged with
    losing ground in completing design and construction on some key
    projects. We are taking steps to regain momentum we have lost on these
    projects, but we are realistic and recognize that overly optimistic
    assumptions, statutory and legal issues, and unrealized technology
    advancements have led us to setbacks we are now experiencing within
    several key projects across the program.
        One of the most visible projects on which our progress has slowed
    is the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford. The Waste Treatment Plant
    project perhaps the largest, most complex environmental construction
    project in the Nation has encountered design and construction setbacks.
    We remain committed to fix the problems, complete the project, and
    begin operations to treat the radioactive tank waste at the site. We
    have both internal and independent external reviews underway to
    evaluate the major project management, project control, business, and
    technical systems and processes, to ensure we fully understand what is
    required to complete the project and begin operations. An After Action
    Review by an external independent firm to assess the causes of the
    issues surrounding the project was recently completed. Actions are
    currently being implemented as appropriate to ensure the project is
    being planned and executed responsibly, to bring it back to acceptable
    performance.
        Other examples of challenges to cleanup progress include delays in
    facility design and construction in South Carolina to address
    protection of workers under certain accident scenarios associated with
    postulated seismic events, delays in sludge cleanup from spent nuclear
    fuel basins in Washington to address more difficult conditions than
    foreseen and allocation of cleanup resources to allow us to implement
    security upgrades to safely store our special nuclear materials. We are
    establishing realistic project baselines to account for these
    developments and to refocus our efforts.
        We are addressing these challenges while strengthening our ability
    to address future challenges. For example, we have had performance
    issues with EM work at Los Alamos and have not had an integrated
    baseline yet that we are able to validate. But we are making
    significant progress toward a new baseline. Additionally, we have a new
    contract in place that is focused on finding new ways of doing business
    in all areas of site operations, including cleanup and waste
    disposition. We believe the new contract and a successful baseline
    validation will offer us new opportunities to continue significant risk
    reduction and cleanup with our fiscal year 2007 funding.
        We have demonstrated that we can deliver. We will not falter in our
    responsibilities to meet our mission objectives. We have and are taking
    immediate steps to strengthen our performance by refining processes to
    emphasize safety, project management, acquisitions, contract execution
    and human capital.

                                RENEWED EMPHASIS

        First and paramount to our success is safety--it is our top
    priority. Safety affects all involved--Federal employees, contractors,
    the site, and the community. We will continue to maintain and demand
    the highest safety performance in all that we do. We have taken steps
    to fully integrate safety into our project designs earlier than ever,
    assure our line project teams have the necessary experience, expertise,
    and training, and utilize a constant real-time feedback of lessons
    learned. Every worker deserves to go home as healthy as she or he was
    when they came to the job in the morning. No schedule, no milestone, is
    worth any injury to our workforce. Safety is a cornerstone in the
    execution of good project management.
        In order to successfully execute our portfolio of projects, we are
    instilling a rigorous project management mindset that will be ingrained
    in all projects. Our performance has not been acceptable on several key
    projects. My goal over the next couple of years is that at least 90
    percent of our projectized portfolio will perform on or better than our
    cost and schedule targets. The management tools used to plan, execute,
    and monitor projects must be integrated into our business processes.
    Our success will depend on our ability to build in this rigor. We will
    target the shortcomings in our project management by using both DOE and
    industry standard project management and business management tools. I
    am personally conducting Quarterly Performance Reviews of all EM
    projects, and have directed my senior staff to carry out monthly
    project reviews. This includes fully implementing our management
    systems, following through on corrective actions, and better applying
    risk management principles--that is, identifying project uncertainties,
    developing mitigation measures and contingency, and holding responsible
    managers accountable for their resolution. I believe that this
    approach, strong and effective project management will be the key to
    our success.
        To ensure effective project management, we must also apply the
    proper procurement vehicles to meet our acquisition strategy. Clearly,
    opportunities exist to improve our acquisition practices.
        EM is an ``Acquisition'' organization. We accomplish our mission
    through procurement and execution of our projects. It is vital that EM
    acquire the best services and attract the best the contractor
    community, including small business, has to offer. I have recently
    proposed and will shortly implement a new organizational structure,
    including a new Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Acquisition and
    Project Management. This new organization will integrate the two
    functions of procurement planning and project management, a significant
    step in building up the expertise to carry out our responsibilities. We
    will sharpen our skills through training and refocus our enterprise to
    reflect our acquisition responsibilities. With this organizational
    integration of project management and contract acquisition/
    administration, EM will be positioned to provide technical excellence
    commensurate with the responsibilities with which we have been
    entrusted.
        Complementing these refinements, we must ensure that our projects
    are managed by highly skilled, competent and dedicated leaders and
    staff, both Federal and contractor, who have the responsibility and the
    authority to meet the EM program's objectives. We have in place a
    rigorous certification program for our project managers. Our goal is to
    certify all EM Federal project managers for each project by May 2006.
        We want to assure ourselves that we have the right skills mix to
    get the job done. We will provide our employees career development,
    rewards, and support. I firmly believe that an organization is never
    better than its people. Our employees, both Federal and contractor,
    hold the key to our success as an agency.
        Our desire is that at Headquarters and each site, our key
    acquisition and technical personnel have knowledge of technical issues,
    project management, and business management at an equivalent level of
    expertise as their contractor counterparts to promote meaningful,
    cogent dialogue on substantive issues. Our job as a Federal agency is
    management and oversight, to be responsible stewards of the public's
    trust and resources. Therefore, we must have a highly qualified and
    technically proficient management team and staff. My aim is to have a
    high performing organization, sustained by a career oriented workforce,
    driven to produce results that are important now and into the future.

                      THE FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET REQUEST

        The investment we have requested in our fiscal year 2007 budget
    will continue the Department's success in achieving its mission of risk
    reduction and cleanup completion. The Department's fiscal year 2007
    budget request for defense EM activities totals $5,390 million. The
    request consists of one defense appropriation, Defense Environmental
    Cleanup.
        Ensure safety is number one: The budget request continues to place
    the highest priority on protecting workers, the public, and the
    environment. EM is introducing new fervor in the integration of safety
    and project management, validation and adherence to cost and schedule
    baselines, effective identification and management of risks, and the
    design of contracts that drive outstanding performance. Safety is
    central to superior performance.
        Ensure the appropriate levels of safeguards and security: It is
    crucial that we maintain vigilance in our security to protect our
    citizens. The EM program is responsible for tons of surplus nuclear
    material. There is an overall increase in the safeguards and security
    budget in fiscal year 2007 due to additional security requirements at
    Savannah River, as a result of revisions to the Department's Design
    Basis Threat (DBT) policy--the performance based standard, which each
    of our sites must meet to ensure an acceptable level of protection.
    Hanford has fully met the 2003 DBT policy, and will be reviewing the
    2005 DBT policy as the Department is considering options for
    consolidation of special nuclear material throughout the complex.
        Risk reduction and cleanup completion: Risk reduction requires a
    pragmatic approach to cleanup and occurs in various stages, which
    involve the elimination, prevention, or mitigation of risk. Because
    safe disposal of many materials will take a number of years to
    complete, our major focus of risk reduction is stabilization of high-
    risk materials:

             High-curie, long-lived isotope liquid waste;
             Special nuclear materials;
             Sodium bearing liquid and other radioactive waste in
            tanks;
             Deteriorating spent nuclear fuel in leaky or poor
            integrity basins;
             Remote-handled transuranic waste and high transuranic
            content solid waste stored on the surface;
             Decommissioning of highly-contaminated facilities.

        Although these items are to be considered when setting priorities,
    their relative ranking may vary from site to site. Risk reduction is a
    major consideration in the development of the site baselines. Examples
    of planned activities and milestones for fiscal year 2007 that
    correspond to site-specific risk categories are:
        Hanford
             Ramp up construction of the Waste Treatment and
            Immobilization Plant (WTP) Pretreatment and High-Level Waste
            facilities.

                     The WTP is the primary facility to immobilize
                    (vitrify) the radioactive tank waste at the Hanford
                    Site. The WTP complex includes five major components:
                    Pretreatment facility, Low-Activity Waste facility,
                    High-Level Waste facility, Analytical Laboratory, and
                    the Balance of Facilities. In fiscal year 2007,
                    construction will ramp up on the two facilities slowed
                    in 2006 to address revised seismic criteria: the
                    Pretreatment facility, which will separate the
                    radioactive tank waste into low-activity and high-level
                    fractions, and the High-Level Waste facility which will
                    vitrify the high-level fraction into glass, ready for
                    disposal at a Federal repository.

             Maintain tank farms in safe, compliant condition and
            continue single-shell tank waste retrievals to maintain
            adequate double-shell tank space.

                     The double-shell tank system has limited
                    capacity to receive wastes from the single-shell tanks
                    and that is anticipated to continue to be the case
                    until the WTP can provide tank waste treatment. The
                    fiscal year 2007 budget request supports a reduced rate
                    of single-shell tank waste retrievals that can be
                    sustained with the available double-shell tank capacity
                    until tank waste treatment can commence.

             Complete containerization and consolidation of K-East
            and K-West Basin sludge in the K-West Basin.

                     The K-Basins are located about one quarter
                    mile from the Columbia River. This project involves
                    removing radioactive sludge, debris, and water from wet
                    storage in the K-Basins to safe, interim storage or
                    final disposition away from the Columbia River. The K-
                    Basin facilities are well past their design lives and
                    are a major threat to the environment due to the
                    potential for basin leakage to the surrounding soil and
                    the Columbia River. The request is an increase over
                    fiscal year 2006 and reflects additional work scope due
                    to more challenging, as-found conditions of sludge and
                    debris; implementation of improved techniques for
                    sludge containerization; and application of a
                    systematic approach to design, testing, and operation
                    of sludge transfer activities.

             Continue retrieval of suspect transuranic waste and
            shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

                     Hanford has several thousand containers of
                    previously generated suspect transuranic waste stored
                    in the ground in a retrievable configuration.
                    Approximately 2,400 cubic meters of suspect transuranic
                    waste will be retrieved, an increase of approximately
                    600 cubic meters over fiscal year 2006.
                    Characterization and shipment of confirmed transuranic
                    waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for final
                    disposal will reduce the risks to facility workers as
                    well as reduce the safeguard and security vulnerability
                    associated with this waste. This action represents
                    final disposal of this waste in an environmentally
                    protective repository.

             Increase River Corridor remedial action activities for
            Reactor Areas D, F, and H; and complete three high priority
            waste site interim remedial actions in the 300 area.

                     The River Corridor Closure Project focuses on
                    areas and facilities adjacent to the Columbia River and
                    includes remediation of contaminated waste sites;
                    decontamination, decommissioning, and demolition of
                    facilities; and placing eight reactors into interim
                    safe storage condition. This also includes digging up
                    contaminated soil and disposing of waste in the onsite
                    Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility, an
                    engineered landfill away from the river.

             Maintain Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) complex
            facilities, including vaults.

                     The PFP Complex consists of several buildings
                    that were used for defense production of plutonium
                    nitrates, oxides, and metal from 1950 through 1989. The
                    end state for the PFP is the dismantlement of all
                    facilities to slab-on-grade. The continuing presence of
                    special nuclear materials has caused a delay in
                    decommissioning and decontamination of PFP facilities.
                    However, safe, secure maintenance of the existing
                    facility continues as we finalize plans for
                    consolidation of the material, as does dismantlement
                    and demolition of ancillary PFP facilities.
    Idaho
             Continue transuranic waste shipments to the Waste
            Isolation Pilot Plant.

                     These actions will serve to reduce operating,
                    surveillance, and maintenance costs while at the same
                    time reducing risk and enhancing long-term safety and
                    security.

             Complete design and initiate construction of the
            Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment facility to treat tank
            radioactive wastes.

                     This project supports the EM goal of reducing
                    the risk of stored liquid radioactive waste. This
                    action will reduce the potential risk to human health
                    by preventing the potential migration of contamination
                    into the Snake River Plain Aquifer which is a sole
                    source aquifer used to supply water to the people of
                    southeastern Idaho.

             Close the first three emptied underground storage
            tanks at Idaho.

                     Removing the liquid waste decreases the risks
                    they pose to human health and the environment,
                    including the underlying Snake River Plain Aquifer.

             Initiate final demolition of the Loss of Fluid Test
            Reactor.

                     This will be the first of four high-risk
                    reactor dispositions under the current cleanup
                    contract. These actions will reduce potential risk by
                    deactivating high risk excess nuclear buildings at the
                    Idaho National Laboratory that have reached the end of
                    their useful lives.
    Oak Ridge
             Ship 75 percent of stored contact-handled transuranic
            waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

                     This waste is stored in above grade-storage
                    trenches and in earthen trenches. Processing and off-
                    site disposal of the waste prevents the risk of release
                    to the environment and the continued cost of waste
                    storage and monitoring.

             Initiate remediation field work at David Witherspoon
            1630 Site.

                     This action will reduce the risks posed to
                    workers and the surrounding community from uranium and
                    polychlorinated biphenyls contamination in the soil.

             Perform surveillance and maintenance of Building 3019.

                     This action will provide storage of the
                    Uranium-233 inventory in Building 3019 while we
                    evaluate alternatives to disposition the Uranium-233
                    inventory.
    Los Alamos National Laboratory
             Characterize 1,800 cubic meters of contact-handled
            transuranic waste and prepare oversized transuranic waste items
            for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

                     Characterization and shipment of this waste to
                    the Waste Isolation Pilot Project for final disposal
                    will reduce the risks to facility workers as well as
                    reduce the safeguard and security vulnerability
                    associated with this waste. This action represents
                    final disposal of this waste in an environmentally
                    protective repository.
    Savannah River Site
             Complete consolidation of on-site plutonium to K Area.

                     This action will consolidate Savannah River's
                    own plutonium from various on-site storage locations
                    into one existing Category 1 Special Nuclear Materials
                    Storage Facility to meet Design Basis Threat criteria.

             Continue to stabilize liquid waste from underground
            storage tanks.

                     Complete design and initiate site preparation,
                    long lead procurement, and construction of Salt Waste
                    Processing Facility.
                     Produce 250 canisters of vitrified high-level
                    waste.
                     Use the Interim Salt Processing System to
                    develop cesium removal capability.

             Complete treatment of legacy mixed low-level waste and
            complete shipment of drummed legacy transuranic waste to the
            Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

                     Characterization and shipment of this waste to
                    the Waste Isolation Pilot Project for final disposal
                    will reduce the risks to facility workers as well as
                    reduce the safeguard and security vulnerability
                    associated with this waste.
    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
             Complete first full year of remote-handled transuranic
            waste receipt and disposal.

                     The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad,
                    New Mexico, is the Nation's mined geologic repository
                    for the permanent disposal of defense-generated
                    transuranic waste. All retrievably stored transuranic
                    waste comes to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for
                    receipt, handling, and disposal. This will remove these
                    wastes from around the complex where they constitute a
                    major health and safety risk, into a centralized, safe
                    disposal configuration in New Mexico.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Significant results and emerging challenges went hand in hand this
    last year. We will build on our successes in completing the EM mission
    in a manner that is protective of the environment and public while
    demonstrating fiscal responsibility. This fiscal year 2007 budget
    request supports a critical portion of the Department's environmental
    stewardship responsibilities. It will enable the next steps in
    accomplishing the cleanup mission from past operations in support of
    the Cold War while balancing the effective implementation of other
    departmental and national priorities for the American people.
        I am committed to work with all interested parties to resolve
    issues and will work with this committee and Congress to address any of
    your concerns or interests. DOE, our regulators, the communities and
    our contractors are partners in this effort. Our success relies on this
    partnership. As a partnership, we all succeed or we all fail together.
        The Senate Armed Services Committee and this subcommittee in
    particular, are key supporters of the Nation's cleanup efforts. I look
    forward to a continuing dialog with you and the subcommittee. This
    concludes my formal statement for the record. I will be pleased to
    answer any questions at this time.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Senator Nelson,
    I know, has another appointment he must keep and I'd be glad to
    let you at this time go forward, Senator Nelson, if you'd like
    to proceed.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will confer
    with the Secretary with regard to that subject matter for you,
    and we can follow up on the record if we need any additional.
    Let me concentrate on the Ambassador, though. The National
    Ignition Facility (NIF), what is being changed in the baseline?
    What impact will these changes have on the cost of this caper?
        Ambassador Brooks. The baseline for the NIF is remaining on
    schedule. We continue to be on track to conduct an ignition
    experiment in 2010. What we have done in order to remain on
    track is reduce other expenditures, for example, at the Sandia
    Z Machine and the Omega Machine in Rochester, New York.
        Although in the 1990s, the NIF had some project management
    problems, over the last 5 years, it has been consistently on
    schedule and on budget. I see it has a remarkable safety record
    and I see no reason that any of that will change. I expect that
    we will conduct the first ignition experiment on schedule in
    2010.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So you see no technological challenges
    that will not allow you to do the ignition in 2010?
        Ambassador Brooks. I want to be very careful. I know the
    Secretary doesn't like us to promise things we can't deliver.
    We can promise we are going to do an ignition experiment in
    2010. It's never been done before. Whether or not it will work
    the first time is something we are just not going to know, but
    I am confident that we are on track with the budget we have
    submitted and support we have had in the past for 2010. Yes,
    sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. How about your funding profile? Have
    you got enough in order to complete the construction in 2008?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. To ignite in 2010?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let's talk about the RRW. Will there
    be several RRW types in the stockpile?
        Ambassador Brooks. I think so. Here's what I think will
    happen, and I need to make it clear, some of these are
    decisions that have not been made yet and shouldn't be made
    yet.
        We are concentrating first on a warhead that will be
    suitable for use on several launched ballistic missiles. The
    reason for that is that the W-76, which is the most numerous
    warhead on our launched ballistic missiles, is the largest
    single warhead type in the inventory. Although we have no
    reason to believe there is a problem with it, were there a
    problem, we will lack a good deal of flexibility. So what we
    want to do is give ourselves greater diversity so we want to
    concentrate on that first.
        Ultimately, and ultimately probably means 15 years, maybe
    18 years, maybe 20 years, we will need to have more than one
    type of RRW because we never want to put the United States in a
    position where a single failure could invalidate the deterrent.
    But exactly when we start on a second design, I don't think we
    know, and I don't think we are really going to know until we
    see the results of this design competition.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is the new nuclear weapon going to use
    the traditional nuclear weapons acquisition process or is it
    going to be a modified nuclear weapon process?
        Ambassador Brooks. We are still wrestling with that. The
    traditional nuclear weapons acquisition process is cumbersome.
    I think that we believe, consistent with the need to have
    efficiency, that we need to find a way to streamline that while
    still providing adequate opportunity for congressional
    oversight.
        I don't want to try and circumvent congressional
    involvement, but we spend a fair amount of the time within the
    building that we are going to try and find ways to shorten it.
    But we have not focused on the details of that yet, other than
    acknowledging to each other that we need a process. We have a
    very ambitious goal for responsive infrastructure and those
    goals will need more efficient management as well as more
    efficient infrastructure.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Would you develop an RRW if you and
    the laboratory directors determined that it was necessary to
    conduct a nuclear weapons test?
        Ambassador Brooks. No. But I don't think that's going to
    come up. In fact, the whole concept of increasing design margin
    is to decrease the chance of that ever being anything other
    than a hypothetical question. But in the same way, we are
    specifying that this first design fit in a particular artillery
    shell and have the same military characteristics as the
    existing warheads, we are specifying that it be developed
    without nuclear testing.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The goal of the RRW is to meet the new
    military requirements?
        Ambassador Brooks. No, sir. Same military requirements.
    Same military characteristics. Same delivery systems aimed at
    the same target. The goal is that when my counterparts from the
    DOD are sitting before this committee in 15 years, they have
    the same confidence in the stockpile that we have today, even
    though in those 15 years, nobody has done any testing and
    everything has gotten older.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. My final line of questioning is
    that you all are planning a life extension for the full
    complement of W-76, and the full complement of W-80, while both
    weapons design laboratories are also working on the designs for
    the RRW. As you said, it could replace some or part of the W-76
    life extension.
        Now, General Cartwright has recommended that the Air Force
    and the Navy cruise missiles that carry the W-80 be retired.
    Between now and the first production of the W-80 warhead in
    2010, the NNSA is going to spend a half million dollars getting
    ready to conduct the life extension program.
        So the obvious question is, why not postpone the W-80 work
    until a final decision is made on whether it's needed or not.
    If you did not, it would have the result of slowing down the
    work on the W-76, which you want to have ready.
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. First, I prefer not to comment
    on what the senior officer in another department may or may not
    have recommended, but accepting your characterization for a
    moment, at the present time, the DOD continues to support and
    the President has continued to approve the long-term retention
    of the W-80. Our planning is based on those requirements.
        Obviously, if those requirements change, it would be silly
    to spend money to extend the life of a system with no delivery
    platform, but I think that's a decision that is now premature.
    Senator, a lot of things get considered in government. I think
    that it is not in the interest of good management to prejudge
    decisions that have to get made by cabinet officers and the
    President. I can see my responsibility as meeting the
    requirements set by the DOD. Right now those requirements
    require us to do a W-80 life extension. I'm certainly aware
    that discussions go on, and if things change, we'll change.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are
    concerned that you can't get it all done.
        Ambassador Brooks. Mr. Chairman, can I take just a moment?
        Senator Sessions. Please.
        Ambassador Brooks. First of all, there are financial
    issues. These things cost money. The laboratory effort on the
    RRW does not draw on the same people and skills as life
    extension programs. I think there are issues of the life
    extension program which we are working on. Those issues are
    primarily on the production side, rather than the laboratory
    side.
        I think frankly, the reason to be worried about the number
    of things we are trying to do is not our fiscal ability, but
    our physical ability. Right now, the RRW is a relatively small
    number--sort of frightening to use $27 million as a small
    number, but is a relatively small fraction of our budget.
        If it has the promise it's going to have, the resources for
    it will grow. The most logical place to get those resources is
    from truncating life extension programs. The question that we
    are wrestling with is how certain do we have to be that the RRW
    concept is really going to: (A) work, and (B) fit in with the
    country's priorities before we start shifting resources away.
    That's a constant discussion. My guess is that in the next year
    or 2, you will see us walk away from some of the life
    extension, but that's assuming decisions that have not been
    made yet.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. Senator Nelson, I think that
    comes back to the point of view that, in many ways, your work
    at DOE is similar to a contractor producing what DOD says it
    needs, is that correct?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes. That's correct.
        Senator Sessions. In general, you're reluctant to start
    opining contrary to what the DOD says?
        Ambassador Brooks. It's not just the DOD. The stockpile
    that we maintain is approved by the President of the United
    States and I conceive of my job of doing what the President
    tells me to do.
        Senator Sessions. He probably has not personally examined
    it all and probably based on recommendations of DOD. My only
    point is that sometimes if the two of you got together, we
    could both save some money it seems.
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. Some of the new leadership in
    the weapons area in DOD are General Cartwright, who was
    mentioned, and Under Secretary Krieg and I are wrestling with
    that. We are all very conscious that we can do anything but we
    can't do everything.
        Senator Sessions. That's what I said. Senator Graham, it's
    great to have you with us. I would yield to you at this time.
    Maybe if you would give us a little history lesson and how it
    was that you and the people of South Carolina were able to
    speed up your cleanup and save the taxpayers money at the same
    time. It's a story too seldom replicated in our Nation.
        Senator Graham. What a great lead in. One, you helped us.
    It was a 48-48 vote and just to make a complete record here,
    South Carolina was willing to work with the DOE to take 50
    tanks that had been filled with waste winning the Cold War, and
    you come up with a logical way to clean those tanks up, leaving
    some of the stream behind in a way that was environmentally
    sound that would speed up cleanup by 23 years and save $16
    billion.
        Senator Sessions. $16 billion.
        Senator Graham. $16 billion.
        Senator Sessions. That's eight DDG ships.
        Senator Graham. That could be done throughout the whole
    system if people would just use common sense. The heel of the
    tank you could scrape it forever and what comes out of the heel
    could be sent to Yucca Mountain, clogging it up or you could
    treat what was left behind and make it low level waste and
    close these tanks up 23 years ahead of schedule and save $16
    billion. The reason I wanted to do it is the biggest threat to
    South Carolina is for the tanks to leak.
        As soon as you get the material out of the tanks and treat
    what is left in the heel, you're good to go. I wouldn't ask my
    State to jeopardize its environment, but I did ask my State to
    negotiate an agreement that makes sense to allow accelerated
    cleanup and save money that need not be spent.
        Unfortunately, this leads me to my first line of inquiry.
    The political heat was unbelievable and because of Senator
    Sessions and others we were able to win the day. What has
    happened, Mr. Chairman, is that as we get ready to implement
    the plan that we passed, DOE changed its seismic standards and
    we are 2 years behind schedule and we really weren't consulted.
        I went out on a limb with my governor to allow new
    standards to be created that would leave a small portion behind
    that we can stand to have behind. Now we are 2 years behind and
    it was sort of we were blindsided and the whole effort to get
    the tanks cleaned up and the waste out has run into problems.
    Mr. Secretary, where are we and how are we going to get back on
    schedule?
        Mr. Rispoli. Thank you for that question, Senator.
    Obviously, we have a very good rapport we believe with the
    State of South Carolina.
        Senator Graham. In all honesty, Mr. Secretary, they were
    blindsided by the change of seismic standards and it created a
    lot of problems back home.
        Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir. We obviously did not do as good as
    we should have done in coordinating the seismic issue that has
    been pending for years now. We had to bring it to closure.
    You're absolutely correct. We did not do a good job of
    coordinating that seismic standard with the regulatory people
    of South Carolina.
        For clarification for the members of the committee, the
    issue is not really the seismic standard. The issue is the
    degree of protection that you provide to the workers in the
    facility and the site and the community should there be a
    seismic event. The seismic standard itself was not at issue.
    It's really the degree of protection, and the decision that was
    eventually and finally made shortly after I was sworn in was to
    go with a higher degree of protection for the workers for the
    site and for the community because we see that safety has to
    override any other consideration.
        Senator Graham. If I may interrupt, Mr. Secretary, we agree
    with that. But I don't think I was taking a risk. I thought I
    was doing something good for South Carolina by agreeing to a
    plan to get the waste out of the tanks so they won't leak, and
    I rejected the extreme environmentalist argument that the
    footprint left cannot be treated because it can. Mr. Chairman,
    what was left behind is no threat to South Carolina. Why spend
    $16 billion cleaning up something that doesn't need to be
    cleaned up?
        But now, we are off track and you're saying that we are
    worried about our safety. We should have known that before we
    did this deal.
        Mr. Rispoli. I don't disagree with you. I would point out
    that we have other steps. Since it's a phased program, we have
    two other treatment processes that will come on line to begin
    retrieving tank waste. This is the lower activity tank waste
    that can be treated through other processes that will begin
    sooner, so that we don't wait from now until 2011 when the
    major project is operational to begin to treat.
        Senator Graham. So you feel comfortable we are going to get
    back on schedule?
        Mr. Rispoli. I feel comfortable we will begin treating tank
    waste with these other processes. We have the waste
    determination by the Secretary using the 3116 authority that
    will enable us to close tanks. We want them, just as you do, to
    get on with closing tanks by removing the waste, treating the
    waste through these interim processes through the salt waste
    processing facility when it's built and operational. I believe
    we have the same exact objectives.
        I note again that we felt we had to make the facility safe.
    Why would we build a facility knowing that it was not meeting
    technical requirements of the Department?
        Senator Graham. Will new tanks be required because of this
    delay?
        Mr. Rispoli. We do not foresee the need for new tanks. We
    recognize that we have a tank waste management issue. We
    believe that by bringing the new facilities, the interim
    facilities on line, we can deal with the tank waste that will
    be processed in those and avoid an issue where we would have
    tank waste and stop it.
        Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I think this would be good
    for the committee to hear if you would indulge me. I want to
    thank the administration in this regard and applaud you. I have
    been representing SRS in Congress and the Senate for over a
    decade now. All we did was talk about cleaning up. We spent
    billions of dollars talking and nothing ever gets cleaned up.
        This administration has come along and set some reasonable
    standards and we are actually beginning to clean things up and
    South Carolina will be better off if we can neutralize this
    waste. If we can do it in a common sense way, the taxpayer will
    be better off, the environment will be better off. I don't want
    to spend 23 years doing something that doesn't take 23 years
    and spend $16 billion for really no gain.
        Now, I want to turn to another topic. South Carolina, Mr.
    Chairman, several years ago, agreed to accept 34 tons of
    weapons grade plutonium that has been deemed to be excess of
    our defense needs. We took plutonium from Rocky Flats to South
    Carolina so they could close Rocky Flats up earlier and save
    hundreds of millions of dollars in storage.
        The deal was you send it to South Carolina and we will
    convert this excess plutonium, weapons grade plutonium into
    mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, which is commercial grade fuel. It will
    take this off the market, it can never be captured by
    terrorists and used to do bad things because the Russians were
    going to do the same thing with 34 tons of excess plutonium in
    their inventory.
        I don't worry much about our inventory in terms of being
    guarded and safe, but I worry a lot about what goes on in
    Russia. Mr. Chairman, South Carolina stepped up to the plate
    again and we took plutonium that we did not generate with the
    hope and the idea, the promise that it would be turned into
    something. Guess what? It was supposed to start in 2009. Now
    it's 2015.
        So I have 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium. We are way
    behind schedule. The cost of the MOX program has over doubled
    and I mention this, Ambassador Brooks, because I think you're
    bringing some solutions to the table. If you can reassure my
    chairman and me that we are going to get on with this, South
    Carolina is not going to be stuck with this plutonium and the
    world would be safer, I would appreciate it.
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. Senator, we are going to break
    ground and begin construction on a MOX fuel vitrification
    facility later this year, sometime in the early fall. We are
    working with the Russian Federation to try and find ways to
    accelerate their elimination of plutonium through using a
    different approach than we have looked at which would start
    early use through reactors called the BN-600.
        We have, since I was last before this committee, put lead
    test assemblies into reactors. We have the technical data to
    confirm that MOX fuel, as the process will manufacture at this
    particular site and is manufactured in France, will in fact
    work.
        We have Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses so we
    are going to go ahead. We have been delayed for a variety of
    reasons, primarily a somewhat arcane and now resolved issue
    with the Russian Federation over the liability of their
    program.
        We are absolutely committed to eliminating this material
    for a whole bunch of reasons. Principally because it's part of
    an agreement with the Russian Federation to eliminate theirs.
    It frees up space so that I can further consolidate and improve
    security, and frankly, this is awful stuff we don't need
    anymore and we need to get rid of it.
        We are committed to do that and I think we are going to be
    showing you tangible proof of that commitment with the
    construction later this year.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you both.
    I know these problems are hard to solve, but I think South
    Carolina has done its fair share and then some of doing it the
    right way and economical way and smart way. Mr. Chairman, thank
    you for your support because without it we could not have
    gotten this done. I just think it's important for this
    committee to provide the oversight. Promises made are promises
    kept.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Graham. Having been
    through some of that same type issue with regard to poison
    gases, sarin at Anniston, people are just not very reasonable
    in accepting stuff from outside the State. They just don't want
    to hear it, even though you might be defending them. I was
    surprised that we won. But it's a problem. South Carolina did
    the right thing, and it is a commitment that I think you should
    follow through on.
        I also believe that we need to consider further the
    techniques of cleanups that you did in South Carolina at other
    sites. Mr. Rispoli, subsequent to their decision, I understand
    that there was a NRC report that was affirming that procedure.
    Would you share with us what happened? That was after we had
    this tight vote that we had in the Senate.
        Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, I believe you're referring to
    the consultation that we did with the NRC? The way that that is
    set up and the way that it's working, we submitted our first
    consultation in February 2005, following the October passage of
    the law.
        The NRC concluded their consultation which was a back and
    forth process on December 28, so it was about a 10-month
    process because I mentioned we have two more in the pipeline
    with the NRC. One is for tanks 18 and 19. It's a matter for the
    site in South Carolina. The other is for a similar issue in the
    State of Idaho.
        The report when it was finally concluded was favorable,
    basically supported the determination that we made. I have been
    in direct dialogue with the senior executive that works
    directly for the commission to begin a process to try to
    improve and streamline it. It took us 10 months to do the first
    one. It will likely take us 9 months to do the next two.
        The NRC has agreed that we need to streamline that process
    so that we can do this better, faster, and more efficiently. We
    see this authority that you have supported for us as being
    absolutely key to prudent solutions of these problems. I just
    want to make it go smoother because we don't expect this to be
    the end. We expect this to be the front edge of what we need to
    do.
        Senator Sessions. Are these the same kind of tanks and same
    kind of waste that we are looking at at Hanford?
        Mr. Rispoli. We have single and double shell tanks in both
    places. The waste is varied at each place. The wastes are quite
    different depending upon tank height.
        Senator Graham. If you were able to get such an agreement
    at Idaho and Washington, how much sooner could you clean up the
    tanks at those places and how much money could you save?
        Mr. Rispoli. I think the key to what this statutory
    authority gave us is the tremendous amount of savings to the
    American taxpayer by being able to dispose of larger volume,
    much lower radioactivity content waste in that way, either in
    the tanks or in the first case, the first one that went
    through, the salt stone disposal facility where it will be
    actually put into a repository right onsite. So that the real
    savings I believe is the monetary savings. In both phases, we
    run a vitrification plant at Savannah River.
        Senator Graham. We saved $16 billion in South Carolina. Do
    you have any reason to believe it will be lesser at other
    sites?
        Mr. Rispoli. No, sir. If you look at volumes of waste,
    Hanford is a very, very significant challenge for the Nation
    because of the tank waste we need to deal with there as well.
        Senator Sessions. Is there a bigger site than Hanford?
        Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, I would hesitate to speculate
    because I don't know how much of the waste would be applicable
    for that type of disposition. Clearly it's a sizable amount.
    Well over 100 tanks there. Certainly it would be a sizable
    savings to be able to go through with a similar process.
        Senator Graham. Fifty tanks in South Carolina.
        Senator Sessions. This is a matter we would rather
    confront. I don't know whether this is a matter of regulation,
    statute, or consent decree or just an agreement between the
    State of Washington and DOE. How precisely has the plan been
    established to go forward in a way different from the South
    Carolina plant? What is the legal authority for that?
        Mr. Rispoli. If I may explain that the Department initially
    had the intention of disposing of waste in a way like this. It
    was being done under departmental directives that were
    challenged in court, and the initial rulings went against the
    Department in that case.
        The Department appealed, the appeals court found
    differently than the court that made the initial judgment, and
    just yesterday, the 6th of March, the initial court set aside
    its ruling because the argument is that since the Department
    did not actually propose to do it at Hanford, therefore, the
    case was not ripe for a judgment, so that was set aside.
        The Department is left with its own directive which in many
    ways parallels Section 3116 authority that you had given to us.
    What we do not know is if we were to progress on that path
    again, whether there would once again be third party
    intervention in bringing the lawsuit against our intention to
    do that.
        Senator Graham. If I may, I think the way it happened, the
    importance of the legislation that you have passed was it gave
    legal authority for the DOE in South Carolina to negotiate a
    deal. It was very much similar to what they had proposed to
    begin with, and that's where the savings in accelerated cleanup
    came from.
        South Carolina is a huge beneficiary in the sense that we
    are getting 50 tanks cleaned up 23 years ahead of time, and
    what is left behind in my opinion presents no danger to the
    site and does save $16 billion and we could do this throughout
    the whole complex.
        Mr. Rispoli. Clearly, the three places this is most
    applicable would be Savannah River, Idaho, and the Hanford site
    in Washington State. By the way, the court case was specific to
    the State of Idaho, as I believe you know.
        Senator Sessions. So the court case has been set aside, a
    judgment has been set aside in Idaho. What about the legal
    status in the State of Washington?
        Mr. Rispoli. The best way I can answer that is that the
    Department does have its own directive that would permit us to
    do something very similar and very parallel in the absence of
    3116 authority. Obviously, the way that we would like to
    proceed is to use a prudent, safe and reliable method of doing
    that since we are talking about disposing in those tanks on
    site a very low portion of radioactivity, even though the
    volume is higher. Clearly that's the way that we would like to
    proceed with that type of a determination.
        Senator Sessions. Does it take legislation to allow you to
    do that or are you saying if do you it you expect someone will
    file a lawsuit? You think you have the authority today?
        Mr. Rispoli. We have our departmental authority today. We
    do not have the legal coverage of section 3116 that you
    provided in the two States that it was specific to.
        Senator Graham. South Carolina was willing to be bound by
    this.
        Senator Sessions. So the State of Washington perhaps is
    not.
        Mr. Rispoli. That would be my understanding.
        Senator Graham. Yes.
        Mr. Rispoli. I was not in this position at that time, but
    that would be my understanding.
        Senator Sessions. I want to just ask this so I get it
    straight. If you decided that the process utilized in South
    Carolina is safe and the NRC agrees and you'd like to use it in
    Idaho, I believe you have the authority to do that. What would
    be the situation in Washington if you decide to do it there?
        Mr. Rispoli. We would clearly have to work with the State
    regulatory body, which we, by the way, I believe have very good
    relations with. We have many significant issues in the State of
    Washington, primarily caused by the delay in the large Waste
    Treatment Plant project. We work very well with the State in
    working our way through those. Clearly we would have to work
    with the State to propose a path forward to close those tanks
    at the appropriate time.
        Senator Sessions. But at this time, is there any agreement
    in place that says you have to complete or remove the tanks, a
    commitment on behalf of the DOE?
        Mr. Rispoli. Not that I'm aware of, Mr. Chairman, but I
    would like to confirm that for the record. Not that I'm aware
    of.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of Energy (DOE) had agreed to several enforceable
    milestones that relate to tank closures in the Federal Facility
    Compliance Agreement with State of Washington and Environmental
    Protection Agency regulators. These milestones set expectations for
    retrieval of more than 99 percent of the waste preparatory to tank
    closure. They also recognize that some waste may remain in the tanks.
    Our current plans are to conduct a waste incidental to reprocessing
    determination pursuant to DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste
    Management, and obtain any necessary State approvals prior to closing
    these tanks. We have informed the State that we will not meet some of
    the tank closure milestone dates, and we anticipate renegotiation of
    these milestones in connection with other milestones relating to delays
    on the completion of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant.
        In parallel, the DOE is engaging the public and the State in
    preparing an environmental impact statement (EIS) which will analyze
    the environmental implications of alternative means of cleanup of the
    tanks and residues. A selection of the cleanup alternative will be made
    available only after public comment on the analysis per the National
    Environmental Policy Act. Additionally, the single-shell tank closure
    plan has been submitted to State of Washington regulators in compliance
    with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The State has informed
    DOE that it will defer approval of that plan until the EIS is issued.

        Senator Sessions. I don't want to rush into anything like
    that and affect people's lives and people who have ideas about
    it. But this is a great nation and we do not have an unlimited
    amount of money, and we have to use reasonable judgment on some
    of these matters.
        Some of the lawsuits that are being filed are being filed
    by people who do not want us to have any nuclear weapons at all
    and always oppose nuclear weapons, nuclear power and anything
    related to it, which is not the consensus of the Nation and
    never has been the consensus of the Nation. So we have to be
    careful that somehow we just feel like we have to spend more
    than we have to. So I hope that you will review that.
        With regard to Hanford, let me proceed and discuss some of
    the details there that concern me. The Waste Treatment Plant
    project under construction now has been examined lately as an
    extreme example, and therefore, some might say is not
    representative of the program. But we are at the point where
    DOE and Congress are beginning to receive some very thoughtful
    analysis of what went wrong or is wrong with the project. I
    would like to quote from some of the recent review findings and
    ask for your opinion.
        I would first note that the panel of outside experts which
    was chartered by DOE to conduct an after action review
    described a waste treatment project in this fashion--I would
    note, Mr. Rispoli, that was before you took office.
        So they describe it this way, ``the largest and most
    complex chemical plant design and construction project ever
    undertaken in the United States and possibly the world.'' Given
    that this is the largest DOE project currently under
    construction, I was surprised to read the following, again
    quoting from the after action review, ``DOE headquarters was
    not given copies of the weekly reports nor did they attend the
    project quarterly reviews. No EM staff at headquarters
    monitored the status or issues of the Waste Treatment
    project.''
        Now, it's important to note that this is a project whose
    cost baseline during this time was increasing from an estimate
    of about $6 billion to over $10 billion, as well as an
    accompanying schedule delay of approximately 4 years from
    original plans.
        There are over 300 Federal employees at DOE headquarters in
    the EM program office, as well as additional employees in the
    DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction Management. The
    employees in the Office of Engineering and Construction
    Management, who were receiving information about the project
    for over 2 years, accepted project status reports that
    continually indicated nearly flawless performance of the
    project against its costs and schedule baseline.
        Again, according to the action report, ``such reporting
    should have alerted reviewers that something was amiss. The
    likelihood of a multibillion dollar project remaining perfectly
    on schedule and budget month after month is exceptionally low,
    especially with the technology issues regularly raised in
    correlated briefing charts available to headquarters.''
        My question is what is your understanding of how this
    reporting situation was allowed to occur and persist? What are
    the DOE's guidelines on schedule reporting on projects of this
    magnitude? In your view, do the systems which are in place on
    cost and schedule reporting give the DOE an accurate picture of
    the current project status?
        Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, I think that report has been
    very helpful to us. I think that having read it yourself, you
    would agree that it's pretty straight from the shoulder and
    easy to understand what went wrong. I can summarize it this
    way. There were technical issues at that plant. The cost and
    schedule targets, the base lines, as we call them, were set
    very early in the engineering cycle and the technical issue
    because of its size and complexity were not fully appreciated.
    I think the report certainly reflects that.
        Senator Sessions. I don't want to interrupt your thought,
    having asked you a whole bunch of questions and now I interrupt
    you. But, I think the implication of the report and review is,
    my goodness, this was a $6 billion project that you have, it
    seemed like there was enough intensity of concern in oversight
    of it. Would you agree that's one of the thrusts of that
    report?
        Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir. I agree that is certainly a thrust
    of the report.
        Senator Sessions. Huge.
        Mr. Rispoli. The quotes that you gave, we concur with those
    findings. I would mention that I've been in the engineering and
    construction business for over 35 years. It's absolutely
    essential that when you're running any project, whether it be
    modest or large or complex or simple, you must simply have
    monthly reviews to know what is going on. You have to have good
    data and you have to have monthly reviews and face to face
    reviews. As that report indicated, those basic tenets of good
    management of a project were not apparently being reported. We
    have corrected that.
        I, myself, since having been sworn in in August, just
    finished our second round of quarterly project reviews of all
    of our projects, of the Waste Treatment Plant. I now get bi-
    weekly reports on that project, but we have completed face to
    face quarterly reviews where the site managers come in and we
    don't keep our staff out of the room.
        In fact, we welcome the staff into the room so that they
    can challenge the information that's being presented and
    question whether or not we are doing things the best way and
    whether or not the data is valid. Obviously I mentioned the
    technical, but the way the project needs to be managed, I can
    assure you we're managing it that way now. I can think of no
    other thing we could be doing that we are not doing to manage
    this project the way it's being managed given its size and
    complexity.
        Third, the report indicated what I would call institutional
    problems. You would have noted that the staff out there to
    manage this was like 100 people. There was one contracting
    officer. We have ordered that more contracting people be hired.
    We ordered that a contracting attorney be hired. We recognize
    that we had staff shortfalls so we had difficulties that
    covered the gamut from technical to project management which
    most of what you quoted was related to project management, and
    also institutional issues and we are addressing all of those
    issues.
        Senator Sessions. It does sound like you've gotten this
    under control. The way you explained it is impressive. From
    what I understand, you understand these kind of project
    management requirements from the previous experience and that
    you are bringing some order to that for which we are grateful.
        I have to tell you, the taxpayers get tired of it. I don't
    know how many billion dollars has been misappropriated here or
    could have been saved with top flight management from the
    beginning, but this is pretty tiresome. This is a lot of money
    and we may have to take--they were discussing maybe taking $3
    billion out of the defense budget. That's going to be very
    painful this year because we have to spend the money somewhere
    else, somebody says. The point of the matter is as big as this
    government is, there is not one dollar to waste and I am glad
    you're moving on top of that and we want to help you.
        Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would just like to
    point out, noting that Senator Graham is not with us at this
    moment, but there is a major difference between the State of
    South Carolina and the State of Washington, and that is in the
    State of South Carolina, we have already been vitrifying waste
    for a number of years. We have already been accomplishing
    actual processing of tank waste and given the significance of
    the volume and the nature of the waste at Hanford and the fact
    that we have not yet built this plant to begin processing
    waste, I understand why the people of the State of Washington,
    why we need to work with them so closely because they perceive
    the same type of thing that you do that we set out to do
    something. We have not yet succeeded, and I will assure you we
    are determined to succeed. We are absolutely committed to
    succeeding in this effort.
        Senator Sessions. One of the other things I have to ask you
    because I think the American people are entitled to an answer,
    the after action review says ``the approach''--they talk about
    lack of staff oversight that ``precluded consideration of
    potentially costly high-risk issues until they came to a head
    in 2004.''
        They said the management approach precluded consideration
    of some of these high risk issues until they came to a head in
    2004. ``The approach seems intended to allow the waste
    treatment project to proceed unimpeded long enough so that by
    the time the cost increases surfaced, senior leaders had little
    choice but to find the funds to complete the project.''
        How do you respond to that?
        Mr. Rispoli. I understand what the statement is meant to
    imply, Mr. Chairman. I think most of us would agree that's
    speculation. I don't know that anyone can conclusively state
    that that was the case. Certainly that was the speculation made
    by the review team that did that after action review.
        Senator Sessions. Have you taken any steps to take
    disciplinary action against any contractor or any DOE employees
    who presumably held positions of high trust who allowed this
    matter to get to the state it got to? Again, I know this was
    all before you took office.
        Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir. I will tell you that when this
    problem came to the Secretary of Energy's attention, he became
    personally engaged and we began having regulatory meetings with
    Mr. Riley Bechtel, the actual owner and name giver to the
    company that we are dealing with. I can assure you that neither
    we nor they are happy with our subsequent performance on this
    effort. Some of the people that were involved are already gone.
    For example, the reviews that were not appearing at
    headquarters, the people engaged with that, many of them have
    already moved on to other things.
        There have been several changes of personnel both among the
    Federal side and on the contractor side at the site. It is my
    belief that the problems were not isolated to the site or the
    feds or the contractor at the site. I think as you can read
    about it, it was a basic failure of our ability to manage a
    project of this size.
        I again assure you that the Secretary immediately put some
    actions in place back last July when he was briefed on this
    subject. He put some very significant actions in place. Then
    after the first draft of that report where it came to be, we
    likewise did similar types of things to improve management both
    at the site and at the headquarters.
        Senator Sessions. It looks like you began to get control on
    that. We have some major decisions to make in the future. I
    hope that you will not be hesitant to speak up on the policy
    questions to the extent of the cleanup required, the issues
    that South Carolina has dealt with, and whether or not those
    same principles could be applied there, and do so in a way that
    certainly does not shut off or deny people in Washington and
    Idaho the right to be consulted and discuss it, but
    fundamentally it's our problem, I say our, Federal
    Government's, United States. Surely, if we work at it, with
    good science and care, we will make some progress.
        Mr. Ambassador, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
    recently issued a report titled ``Recommendations for Nuclear
    Weapons Complex of the Future.'' This report, conducted at the
    direction of Congress and completed by a panel of experts from
    outside the DOE, envisioned a vastly changed nuclear weapons
    complex.
        The report recommended shutting down current facilities and
    creating one large ``consolidated'' new location. A report was
    prepared at the direction of Congress and attempted to take a
    fresh look at the nuclear weapons complex as it exists and
    compared it to the nuclear weapons complex we need now. Among
    the principal findings of the reports were the following: ``The
    DOD does not provide DOE with unified integrated weapons
    requirements and the DOD does not appear to trust DOE's ability
    to respond with predictability.''
        I guess that's a lot like what Senator Nelson talked about
    at the beginning. Then it goes on another one: ``The DOE has
    burdened the nuclear weapons complex with rules and regulations
    that focus on process rather than mission safety.'' It goes on:
    ``Cost benefit analysis and risk informed decisions are absent,
    resulting in a risk averse posture at all management levels.''
        Then in summary, they say this: ``The task force found a
    nuclear weapons complex neither robust nor agile nor responsive
    with little evidence of a master plan.''
        This report was issued in July 2005 and was presented to
    the Secretary of Energy shortly thereafter. It describes a
    nuclear weapons complex that functions minimally and that as
    currently configured will not be able to support us in the
    future, that got an apparently bad grade. Maybe you can call it
    an F. Why has the DOE not yet put forward a response or a
    rebuttal of some kind to react to this report? I would think
    that being criticized in this fashion DOE would feel compelled
    to respond at least in some way. That's pretty dramatic
    criticism, I think. Do you share any of the concerns of this
    report and can we expect a response?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. I think we share most of the
    concerns of the report. I don't think we disagree in any major
    way on the assessment of some of the problems. What we are
    trying to do is figure out a fiscally responsive, responsible
    way to deal with the solutions. Let me take a couple of the
    points.
        With the new assignment of General Cartwright, with Under
    Secretary Krieg and Under Secretary Edelman and I, we are
    working to get greater clarity in DOD requirements. You see
    this in the very close way the two departments are working
    together on the RRW. Although this sounds like it's old news,
    it was actually after much of the analysis was done that the
    two departments worked together on the very large stockpile
    reductions announced by the President in the summer of 2004.
        We are not yet perfect in this regard, but we are
    substantially better. The issue of the internal operation of
    DOE facilities is something that the Secretary and the Deputy
    Secretary and I are personally working on. We are working on a
    formal methodology for risk, making risk informed decisions
    rather than trying to make decisions that are zero risk. I
    think the criticism that the Department has become risk averse
    is true.
        I think that fixing that while not letting the pendulum
    swing too far, if you go far enough back in history of this
    Department and predecessor organizations, you'll find
    spectacular examples of hurting people. We have not done that
    in the last 5 years. We want to improve our performance, but we
    don't want to hurt anybody. So getting that exact balance is
    something that we are still working on.
        There has been no rebuttal to this report because largely
    we agree. We agree with the report's conclusion that the RRW
    should be central. We agree with the report's conclusion that
    there should be accelerated dismantlements and we have been
    asked in this year's budget for additional funding to
    dismantle. I expect dismantlement to go up by roughly 50
    percent between 2006 and 2007. We agree with the report's
    requirement or recommendation for the consolidation of nuclear
    material.
        Where the problem comes for us is in this single complex.
    The report would take facilities at the Pantex plant in Texas,
    the Y-12 plant in Tennessee, and the plutonium-related work at
    the Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) and put it all together in a
    single facility. The report does not specify where that
    facility might be. The problem is that whatever the merits of
    doing that, it would require substantially more money than I
    think we are likely to see in the near term.
        Senator Sessions. The DOD has been through those things,
    they call them Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC)
    and they claim that if you analyze it correctly, you can
    ascertain whether your savings will be worth it. A lot of times
    people say it's easier to consolidate, but consolidation may
    cost more than it's worth. But there are ways, are there not,
    to analyze whether or not you could improve efficiency and save
    by some consolidation?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. I think the Overskei panel
    itself has some views, which I think are estimates of potential
    savings. All of their estimates are only valid to one
    significant figure. As they look over 25 years in the future,
    they believe their recommendations would save a certain amount
    of money. The problem is you save it in the last 15 years but
    you spend it in the next 10.
        Senator Sessions. That is true. Perhaps not that big a
    deal. DOD's base closures were supposed to pay for themselves
    in 5 years, or they were not going to close the base. I'm not
    sure they were accurate. Let me just follow then. But let's ask
    you this. DOD did not provide you with unified integrated
    weapons requirements. You've taken steps to make that happen?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. We have.
        Senator Sessions. You should. If there are not sufficient
    responses there, then I think this Congress can pass
    legislation that we require the kind of consultation that's
    necessary.
        With regard to the DOE rules that focus on process rather
    than mission safety, what steps have you taken with regard to
    that?
        Ambassador Brooks. We are in the process of an extensive
    internal look to try and decide how we move beyond the present
    situation of very cumbersome safety rules without moving away
    from fundamental safety. We are looking at a variety of things.
    I met with all my Federal site managers on this subject about
    10 days ago.
        We have had a couple of additional looks, the Secretary and
    the Deputy Secretary and I met.
        Senator Sessions. You and the Secretary personally conveyed
    to your employees that you agree with the report that says that
    the risk informed decisions are absent and resulting in a risk
    averse posture?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. You want that to end?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. We have done things to fix
    that.
        Senator Sessions. It would take you a while with
    bureaucracy.
        Ambassador Brooks. I need to be candid with Congress. It
    has taken us a while to get to where we are and it's going to
    take us a while to get where we need to be, but we are
    committed to getting there.
        Senator Sessions. I'll ask both of you this. We are
    concerned that DOE has started an effort to make use of
    alternatively financed construction projects. NNSA already has
    within it a project that was started without notifying this
    committee. Apparently it has two additional projects under
    review that are ready to begin. Ambassador Brooks, how many
    projects has NNSA started? How many are under review, and how
    many are planned to begin in fiscal year 2006?
        Ambassador Brooks. There are two projects at Y-12 which are
    the two where, to be blunt, we screwed up. We notified the
    appropriators and failed to notify the authorizers. We will not
    make that mistake again.
        The projects, had we properly notified the committee, you
    would be pleased with because we are saving the taxpayers'
    money through private financing and we are going to get things
    that will help consolidate 1,200 people and get us out of a lot
    of old and expensive and poor facilities. But we should have
    notified the committee and we did not.
        There are those two. There is a project at Los Alamos. I am
    not aware of anything that is under consideration that has been
    discussed with me. That doesn't mean I won't have people
    wandering around the complex thinking of these ideas and I will
    provide to the committee anything that is under active
    consideration. I am not aware of anything new.
        I am aware that there is a general belief that where it is
    appropriate, these kind of alternate financing approaches can
    be beneficial to the taxpayer.
        Senator Sessions. Congress has to understand what is going
    on in our oversight capacity.
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Really, we have some concerns here. I
    think we want to be more engaged perhaps than we have been in
    the past in how your plans are going.
        Ambassador Brooks. Certainly, sir. I do not believe there
    is anything active right now, but I will provide either
    confirmation of that fact or correction for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The process for developing an alternative for financing
    construction is as follows: The contractor develops (with oversight
    from the NNSA site office) a proposal that is submitted to the DOE
    Office of Engineering and Construction Management (OECM) for review. If
    OECM and the NNSA program believe the proposal has merit, it is
    submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and
    approval. If approved, the contractor will engage a private development
    firm to secure the financing and land needed for construction. In some
    cases land is obtained via a lease or deed from NNSA or DOE. If the
    Department does not provide the land, the commitment of the government
    is generally limited to reimbursing the contractor for the reasonable
    cost of leasing the building. This commitment is usually limited at one
    year's lease cost subject to review each year if the contractor decides
    to continue to lease the building.
        Status of Current Defense Programs Projects:
    Los Alamos Science Complex
        What was proposed:Bioscience Building proposed to provide LANL with
    a multipurpose facility, ``for responsive research and development and
    industrial infrastructure needed to develop, build, and maintain
    nuclear offensive forces and defensive systems.''
        Status: Disapproved the analysis found a bias towards the lease
    alternative and the total rent far exceeded total project cost. Not
    pursued.
    Albuquerque Transportation and Technology Center
        What was proposed: Project provides physical facilities to be used
    in support of the Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program, including
    capabilities for STA fleet storage.
        Status: OMB approval was received and presented to Congress as an
    alternative lease under GSA. Congress approved. Contractor is seeking
    financing.
    Y-12 Administrative and Technical Support Facilities
        What was proposed: Project will provide technical and
    administrative offices, cafeteria, occupational health clinic, human
    resources, administrative purchasing, visitors center and badging
    office, technical computing, and small laboratories for use by the
    contractor.
        Status: Was originally submitted as the Oak Ridge National Security
    Complex. OECM rejected the proposal, which was reworked by the
    contractor and resubmitted. The analyses confirmed a valid business
    case for choosing to proceed with the alternative of private
    development with operating lease. Reviewed and approved by OMB.
    Construction is presently underway.

        Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, how many projects has
    EM started, how many are under review, and how many are planned
    for fiscal year 2006?
        Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, do you mean in the sense of
    private financing?
        Senator Sessions. Yes.
        Mr. Rispoli. I'm not aware of any, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, there may be some more
    questions that I will submit to you for the record and we'll
    keep the record open for 2 days for questions. I'm calling on
    you and I think our full committee would call on you to
    reaffirm, reestablish your relationship with the Senate to the
    extent that we know that you are focused on representing the
    taxpayers' interest in the defense of the United States, that
    you're prepared to challenge the employees and contractors,
    most of which are contract employees, in an aggressive way to
    ensure that the taxpayers are being well-served by the work.
        It's a difficult thing. Government works in ways that will
    never be perfectly efficient. They are just not going to
    happen. But a good management kind of lead can break down some
    of the barriers and can be effective. I think many of the
    problems that we have seen that clearly cost billions of
    dollars and if not dealt with have cost us billions more in the
    future represent a lack of will at the management level. With
    good, strong will and determination, you see what the problems
    are, how they can be fixed, not take surface answers, dig
    deeply and challenge some of the ideas that may be percolating
    can be real helpful to us. I thank you for your work.
        Mr. Rispoli, you have a big challenge, I think, with this
    cleanup. You know it's something we have to do. We will
    probably spend a billion dollars in Anniston cleaning up poison
    gas. I can't help but believe we could have done it for less,
    but we would have done it safely or carefully and we will
    probably spend $17 billion cleaning up poison gas facilities
    around the country. Then we have the nuclear sites.
        When you consider the flesh and bone that we need to have a
    strong national defense, this is money draining away from us.
    So if we can keep those costs at a level all the time while
    getting the same results that we need to maintain safety, you
    will make all of us over here happy. Anything else you would
    like to add before we dismiss? Any responses or anything you'd
    like to say?
        Ambassador Brooks. No.
        Mr. Rispoli. Just in closing, again, Mr. Chairman, thank
    you for your continued support and we look forward to working
    with you.
        Senator Sessions. You have a critical role in our Nation's
    defense and we look forward to working with you. Thank you. We
    are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

                    DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

        1. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, in
    1988, Congress established an external oversight board--the Defense
    Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)--to review the safety aspects
    of Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear activities. In recent
    experience, however, failure to resolve technical issues raised by the
    DNFSB has resulted in the need for very costly interruptions in
    projects while construction was already underway or has required
    expensive retrofitting or redesign. The most notable examples have been
    differences over the appropriate seismic standards at the Hanford Waste
    Treatment Project, as well as the Salt Waste Processing Facility at
    Savannah River in South Carolina. There have also been differences of
    opinion between DOE and the Board regarding the appropriate safety
    classification for a plutonium facility at Los Alamos National
    Laboratory (LANL). What is the process, if one exists, for resolving
    technical issues between DOE and the DNFSB?
        Ambassador Brooks. The DOE guidelines, processes, functions, and
    responsibilities for interfacing with the DNFSB are delineated in the
    Department's Manual 140.1-1B, Interfacing with the DNFSB. This is
    derived from the DNFSB's enabling legislation which specifies the
    processes for accepting, rejecting, and implementing a DNFSB
    recommendation. The DNFSB communicates issues with the Department
    through a variety of mechanisms including formal recommendations,
    formal reporting requirements, letters requesting action and
    information, and letters providing information. The Department's
    process used to resolve a technical issue is based on the DNFSB's
    mechanism used to communicate it to the Department. In general the
    action officer develops the strategy and obtains approval from the
    responsible line manager. The Department's process encourages close
    communication with the DNFSB and its staff through briefings,
    discussions, site visits, and other informal interactions.
        With respect to safety classification of the ventilation system for
    the plutonium facility at LANL, National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) is conducting specific studies to understand the
    effectiveness of existing safety systems at LANL and to determine what
    modifications are needed to improve safety. The NNSA and LANL's
    approach for addressing the safety classification of the ventilation
    system and the status of analytical studies have been discussed with
    the DNFSB.
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE processes, functions, and responsibilities for
    interfacing with the DNFSB are delineated in DOE's Manual 140.1-1B,
    Interfacing with the DNFSB. Usually, matters are resolved at the staff
    level. Occasionally, issues must be vetted at the executive level to be
    resolved. Ultimately, the DOE is the arbiter of the safety bases for
    its facilities.

        2. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, is
    there a process which allows DOE to either accept or reject the DNFSB
    recommendations prior to the need for these costly interventions?
        Ambassador Brooks. The Department's Manual 140.1-1B, Interfacing
    with the DNFSB, establishes a process for accepting and rejecting
    formal DNFSB recommendations. This process is specified in the DNSFB's
    enabling legislation. The Department's process encourages issues to be
    resolved early with the DNFSB and its staff through briefings,
    discussions, site visits, and other informal interactions.
        Mr. Rispoli. Yes, section 315 of the Atomic Energy Act sets forth
    the process by which the Secretary can either accept or reject a DNFSB
    recommendation.

        3. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, if
    there were a more formalized process within which the DNFSB could raise
    concerns, such as at the completion of preliminary design and final
    design, and then DOE could react to those reviews by the DNFSB--would
    that be a better system for containing the costs on these projects?
        Ambassador Brooks. The DNFSB's enabling legislation establishes a
    formal process that requires the DNFSB to review the design of a new
    defense nuclear facility before construction begins and to recommend to
    the Secretary, within a reasonable time, such modifications of the
    design as the DNFSB considers necessary to ensure adequate protection
    of public health and safety. The legislation also requires that during
    the construction of any defense nuclear facility, the DNFSB is to
    periodically review and monitor the construction and submit to the
    Secretary recommendations relating to the construction of that
    facility, as the DNFSB considers necessary to ensure adequate
    protection of public health and safety. The DNFSB and its staff are
    encouraged to participate in the Department's own review of the design
    and especially in the development of the preliminary documented safety
    analysis to avoid having significant changes identified later. The NNSA
    encourages the DNFSB site representatives to participate in the daily
    developmental activities, such as meetings to resolve design issues,
    for the same purpose.
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE is revising its specific processes for
    improving how safety is incorporated into design of new nuclear defense
    facilities, especially in the early project planning phases. As part of
    that improvement process, the DOE is revising Order 413.3, Project
    Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, originally issued in
    October 2000. Based on experience and feedback, we have identified a
    number of potential improvements to clarify and strengthen the order to
    facilitate early integration of safety in the design, and the continued
    focus on safety during the construction, testing, and turnover of
    projects. A public meeting was conducted on December 7, 2005, where the
    DNFSB concerns and DOE efforts were discussed. The public meeting
    focused on the timely incorporation of safety into the design and
    construction of defense nuclear facilities, and thus DOE is improving
    its directive in this regard.

              HEALTH AND PENSION BENEFITS FOR DOE CONTRACT WORKERS

        4. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, in
    debate on the defense authorization bill last year, there were a number
    of proposed amendments dealing with the health and pension benefits of
    DOE contract workers. Most notably, the Senate defeated an amendment
    which would have enhanced the benefits of contractor employees at the
    DOE Rocky Flats Site by crediting them with additional service time
    against the contract. There were other amendments filed to the bill
    that seemed to be intended to ``lock in'' the health and pension
    benefits of contractor employees at other DOE sites. One amendment was
    structured to prohibit DOE from entering into any contract for work at
    a DOE site if the contract would have resulted in benefits for contract
    workers which were less lucrative than those provided to current
    contract workers. Why does DOE play such an intimate role in the
    establishment of the benefits packages offered by its contractors?
        Ambassador Brooks. NNSA accomplishes its mission primarily through
    its contractors and their highly skilled and specialized workforce.
    Because of the rather unique skills these employees possess they
    generally work for the NNSA contractor throughout their careers. Even
    when the government competes its management and operating (M&O)
    contracts the majority of the employees simply transfer to the new M&O
    contractor. In this way the government retains the benefit of the
    skilled workforce and the flexibility afforded by the workers being
    employees of the contractor rather than the Federal Government. In many
    instances, the critical skills necessary to accomplish the NNSA mission
    can be found only in a limited number of places, e.g. the scientists
    and engineers at our national laboratories.
        Virtually all of the costs incurred by the M&O contractor,
    including the costs associated with pensions and benefits, are
    reimbursed to the contractor by the government. So, while the NNSA does
    not treat contractor employees as its own, the long-term relationship
    and the reimbursement of virtually all costs has led to NNSA working
    closely with its contractors on the design of the pension and benefits.
    Contracts typically require approval by the contracting officer of the
    pension and benefit plan documents, and of any changes to those plans
    that increase the costs reimbursed by the government.
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE requires all prime contractors to meet
    Employee Retirement Income Security Act, U.S. Department of Labor, and
    U.S. Internal Revenue Service requirements as pension and benefit plan
    sponsors, while assuring judicious expenditure of public funds.
    Additional requirements are outlined in the DOE Acquisition Regulation
    (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 48, Chapter 9) and in the DOE Order
    350.1 Chg 1, Contractor Human Resource Management Programs. Because
    these benefits represent considerable costs to the Department and are
    reflected in the terms and conditions of our contracts, the DOE
    provides oversight to ensure appropriate pension and health plans are
    developed and administered. The DOE does not manage or administer any
    contractor pension or health plans, nor do we have representatives on
    any governing boards.
        The DOE is committed to fulfilling its obligations under its
    contracts regarding the reimbursement of contractor employee pension
    and health benefit costs, but is focusing on methods to mitigate the
    cost volatility and liability growth and to improve the predictability
    of the DOE annual cost reimbursement obligations for contractor pension
    costs.

        5. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, is this approach
    unique, compared with the contracting approaches of other Federal
    departments?
        Ambassador Brooks. While I believe that the National Aeronautics
    and Space Administration (NASA) utilizes a similar approach to the
    management and operation of its facilities, I cannot speak with
    certainty about the approach other agencies use.
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE is one of nine agencies that use Federally
    Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) to conduct its
    research and scientific work. According to the Congressional Research
    Service (CRS), these centers were developed during and after World War
    II as hybrid organizations to meet a Federal need through the use of
    private organizations. At that time, there was recognition of a
    national emergency requirement to recruit and retain scientific and
    engineering talent for the war effort. DOE's Oak Ridge and LANL were
    established at that time as government-owned, contractor-operated
    (GOCO) facilities, with hiring and employee pension and benefits
    programs developed and put in place by the contractor operator/
    employer, not the Federal Government. This system of GOCO facilities,
    with a contractor workforce, has been used by the DOE since that time
    to carry out many of the DOE's major mission efforts, including weapons
    production, scientific research and environmental cleanup.
        The DOE is unique among Federal agencies with respect to the extent
    it utilizes the GOCO approach to accomplishing the agency's missions.
    However, the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies, including
    the NASA (the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, operated by Caltech), the
    Federal Aviation Administration, the National Institutes of Health, the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Department of Homeland Security also
    have FFRDCs operated by contractors with contractor employees. In all
    agencies, Federal contracting officers are responsible for making
    determinations of allowable human resource management contractor costs,
    consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation and applicable
    contract terms and conditions.

        6. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, can you provide
    examples of other Federal agencies that have a similar level of
    involvement in managing workforce issues associated with the employees
    of its contractors?
        Ambassador Brooks. I do not have detailed insight into other
    Federal agencies to sufficiently address this question.
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE and eight other Federal agencies use FFRDCs to
    conduct scientific research and development work. The DOE has 16 large
    research laboratories which are FFRDCs. The FFRDCs are operated by
    contractors (e.g., educational institutions, nonprofit entities, or
    for-profit entities), with non-Federal workforces and non-Federal pay
    and benefits systems. In all agencies, Federal contracting officers are
    responsible for making determinations of allowable human resource
    management contractor costs, consistent with the Federal Acquisition
    Regulation and applicable contract terms and conditions.
        In response to rapidly increasing costs for employee pension and
    benefits, most of these FFRDC contractors have restructured their
    benefits programs. According to the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) and the CRS, FFRDCs at other agencies are using defined
    contribution pension plans (e.g., 401k type plans) and like most
    employers, do not provide supplemental medical care coverage for those
    retirees who qualify for Medicare. On April 27, 2006, DOE issued DOE
    Notice 351.1, Contractor Employee Pension and Medical Benefits Policy
    that sets forth the DOE's policy on reimbursement of costs for
    contractor employee benefits. Under this policy, new employees will be
    offered market-based pension and medical plans.

                   SECURITY COSTS AND MATERIALS CONSOLIDATION

        7. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, a
    number of committees of Congress, including this one, have urged DOE in
    the strongest possible terms to move forward on the consolidation of
    the storage of nuclear materials across the DOE complex. Congress has
    urged this consolidation in the face of escalating costs to secure
    these materials against the threats that we now realize exist since the
    attacks of September 11. What is DOE doing to address the cost of
    security?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has been moving aggressively to improve
    the security of nuclear materials, while continuing our stewardship of
    the nuclear weapons stockpile. The NNSA has recently completed the
    relocation of Category I/II nuclear materials from the Criticality
    Experiments Facility at LANL to more secure facilities within LANL and
    at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Nevada Test Site. Current
    consolidation efforts include eliminating the need for a Category I/II
    materials at Sandia National Laboratories site in Albuquerque, and
    construction of new facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex
    (Y-12). The new facilities will allow the consolidation of highly
    enriched uranium into facilities that are easier to protect and more
    efficient to operate.
        To date, over 90 metric tons of surplus highly enriched uranium
    have been eliminated as part of the fissile materials disposition
    program. Disposition of additional excess materials is necessary to
    support the Y-12 onsite consolidation effort, and to support the future
    de-inventory of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The NNSA is
    working with other departmental elements to establish disposition paths
    for materials that are excess to national security requirements. Each
    of these actions enhances our security posture, reduces security costs,
    or allows us to avoid unnecessary security upgrades at existing
    facilities.
        Mr. Rispoli. Consolidation of nuclear materials to fewer sites and
    disposition of nuclear materials are two strategies that will do the
    most to reduce the future cost of security. Also, EM continues to
    evaluate the application of new technologies to reduce the recurring
    costs associated with manpower intensive operations. Since 2001, EM has
    consolidated special nuclear materials from 14 material access areas
    (MAAs) to 3 MAAs, which are facilities that store Category I materials.
    Additionally, the DOE has established the Nuclear Materials Disposition
    and Consolidation Coordination Committee (NMDCCC) of which EM is an
    active member. The purpose of the NMDCCC is to ensure integration of
    individual program disposition and consolidation efforts thus
    identifying opportunities for resource sharing.

        8. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
    specifically, what are you doing within your program to bring about the
    consolidation of materials and activities which will drive down program
    costs?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has taken action to eliminate Category
    I/II nuclear materials from multiple facilities in the nuclear weapons
    complex and we are making progress in consolidation and disposition of
    nuclear materials. However, materials consolidation is a complex issue
    requiring consideration of site mission requirements, the availability
    of materials processing, storage, transportation, and disposition
    capabilities, and negotiation with State governments. The NNSA holds a
    large inventory of excess nuclear materials. For some of these
    materials, we have the programs and processes in place to disposition
    them. Our programs to blend down highly enriched uranium (HEU) have
    resulted in eliminating over 90 metric tons of HEU.
        To continue our progress, additional disposition capabilities are
    needed. We are constructing facilities at the SRS to convert excess
    plutonium to nuclear fuel for use in electric power generation.
    However, there are many materials that cannot be converted to nuclear
    fuel and until disposition pathways are established, consolidation
    options are limited. Consolidation to a site without disposition
    capabilities would be counterproductive, consuming limited packaging,
    secure transportation, and security resources, but without leading to
    the elimination of the material. The NNSA is working to establish new
    disposition and consolidation capabilities, such as the highly enriched
    uranium facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex, and plutonium
    disposition facilities at the SRS. Meanwhile, we are working with other
    departmental elements to optimize the use of existing disposition
    capabilities. For example, the NNSA has identified approximately 7.5
    tons of nuclear materials that can be processed at SRS, using currently
    available capabilities.
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE has established the NMDCCC to address these
    issues. The Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment, the
    Administrator of the NNSA, and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
    for EM comprise the executive steering committee and report to the
    Deputy Secretary. This committee's initial focus is on establishing a
    path forward for surplus plutonium at the Hanford Site to avoid
    significant funding expenditures at Hanford to meet the latest security
    requirements.

        9. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli, the
    DOE NMDCCC is, as I understand it, the third manifestation of a
    committee established by DOE to address this issue, under different
    names and different chairmen, and yet none of these committees have yet
    issued or implemented any recommendations resulting in actual
    consolidation of nuclear material between DOE sites. When will we see
    any results from these efforts?
        Ambassador Brooks. Nuclear material management within the DOE has
    been very fragmented, with each program setting its own priorities,
    leaving a legacy of orphaned materials. We recognize the consequences
    of this stovepipe style of management. Communication among programs has
    improved significantly, partly as a result of Department-wide
    consolidation committees. The strategic plan, under development by the
    NMDCCC, will address the issue of departmental management of nuclear
    materials. The strategic plan will create a framework for resolving
    some of the more complex material disposition and consolidation
    problems faced by the Department. In conjunction with the development
    of the strategic plan, the NMDCCC is working to develop, in priority
    order, implementation plans to address specific consolidation/
    disposition initiatives. The first priority is development of an
    implementation plan for consolidation of plutonium from the Hanford
    Site in Washington, and excess plutonium from the national
    laboratories.
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE's NMDCCC does have a new chairman with an
    extensive background in nuclear materials management. This committee is
    making progress on a variety of issues, and is undertaking to
    thoroughly evaluate consolidation and disposition issues and thereafter
    to include recommendations to the Department as appropriate. Both the
    NNSA and the Office of EM are active members of the NMDCCC. The
    principal mission of this committee is to provide a forum to perform
    cross-cutting nuclear materials disposition and consolidation planning
    with the objective of developing implementation plans for consolidation
    and/or disposition as appropriate, so that out-year programmatic and
    security costs to the Department are minimized.

                CONSTRUCTION IRREGULARITIES AT Y-12 IN TENNESSEE

        10. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, at its Y-12 Site in
    Tennessee, DOE is constructing the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials
    Facility. The principal purpose of this facility is to provide a
    consolidated location for the receipt and storage of this Nation's
    stockpile of highly enriched uranium. The new facility will meet all
    safety and environmental requirements--which current storage locations
    do not--and will provide a substantially more hardened and secure
    facility for enriched uranium storage. DOE recently had to halt
    construction of this facility, however, when it was discovered that the
    reinforcing steel called for in the approved facility design was not
    being installed. What is the status of this project?
        Ambassador Brooks. Construction activity is gradually resuming at
    the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, with the intention to
    resume full construction activities by early April depending on the
    rate at which workers can be recalled or rehired. As of March 7, 2006,
    about a third of the project's work force had returned to the site to
    restart steel placements and some non-building structure construction,
    such as utility accesses and concrete pads that are required for the
    project but not part of the building itself. The contractor is also
    putting up structural steel in the mechanical support areas of the
    building. This setback was indicative of a quality-control problem that
    required a number of fixes. The contractor has taken aggressive steps
    to improve the systems, processes, and procedures for project
    management, quality control/assurance, and line management oversight
    for this project. In parallel, the NNSA has increased its oversight of
    the project to ensure that the contractor's assurance systems,
    processes, and procedures are achieving the necessary changes in the
    project's performance.

        11. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, what is your evaluation of
    the extent of the problem and what corrective actions are being
    implemented?
        Ambassador Brooks. Although peer reviews of the technical solutions
    are not complete, it appears likely that all the non-compliant
    conditions can be corrected without tearing out the existing
    construction and starting anew (the large margins in the initial design
    plus the quality of the conforming work are large contributors to this
    likely outcome). Normal construction activity will resume during the
    week of April 3, 2006.
        The quality assurance problems have been given personal attention
    by the senior corporate executives of all contractors and all involved
    have reviewed and strengthened their oversight systems, processes, and
    procedures for this project. This includes many changes in personnel
    including: (1) the replacement of the quality assurance inspector who
    failed to identify the missing reinforcing steel bars prior to concrete
    placement, (2) the addition of numerous oversight and quality control/
    assurance personnel, and (3) the addition and replacement of project
    and construction management personnel. With respect to the NNSA, the
    Federal Project Director has assigned a dedicated team of five
    personnel to oversee all aspects of this project to replace the matrix
    support he had before these issues surfaced. Numerous changes have been
    made to reflect the Federal and contractor oversight procedures used at
    Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) at the SRS, which have proved to be
    successful.

        12. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, how are the contractor and
    project managers being held accountable for this interruption in
    construction activities and any associated costs arising from it?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has formally notified the Y-12 Site
    Office of NNSA's intention to reflect this poor performance and the
    effectiveness of corrective actions in the fiscal year 2006 award fee
    determination for BWXT Y-12, the management and operating contractor.
    Implicit in this notification is that we will evaluate BWXT Y-12 in
    part on the effectiveness of its efforts to hold accountable and to
    recover costs to the greatest extent possible from the construction
    subcontractor (with whom the Federal Government has no privity of
    contract). A multi-year Performance Based Incentive is in place with a
    primary focus on project baseline cost and schedule performance. Once
    the upcoming Baseline Change Proposal is submitted and approved the
    Performance Baseline Incentive will be adjusted accordingly to
    establish the correct incentive and work to complete the newly
    established baseline on or before the baseline schedule and within or
    under the cost baseline. Finally, the contractor has implemented
    personnel actions including replacing senior project and construction
    management personnel.

                 PRICE ANDERSON ACT VIOLATIONS AT LIVERMORE LAB

        13. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, last week the DOE issued a
    notice of violation to LLNL for nuclear safety violations.
    Specifically, the notice of violation stated that the lab ``did not
    appropriately respond to observed and changing radiological conditions;
    and radioactive material was allowed to be removed from the site
    without fully understanding the contamination levels and without the
    appropriate controls.'' The events cited in the notice took place in
    2004. Can you explain why the process of issuing this safety citation
    took so long?
        Ambassador Brooks. The recent LLNL safety citation had a longer
    timeline than most enforcement actions due to some unique circumstances
    surrounding the case. Specifically, this enforcement case was extended
    over time to include an initial key event in August 2004, a second key
    event in April 2005, and several ongoing and longstanding programmatic
    compliance issues.
        In June 2004, a routine DOE/NNSA Price-Anderson Enforcement Program
    Review identified that LLNL was not effectively implementing key
    aspects of its own Price-Anderson self-regulatory program that the
    Department relies on for applying enforcement discretion. Specifically,
    if a contractor is effective at identifying and aggressively fixing
    nuclear safety noncompliances before any real consequences, the
    Department will typically refrain from issuing a citation.
        Following this review DOE/NNSA decided to allow LLNL a 6-month
    period (June 2004 to January 2005) to improve its self-regulating
    performance partly due to the limited immediate consequences of the
    identified issues. A January-February 2005 follow-up review indicated
    LLNL had made limited progress in addressing the identified issues. In
    addition, an investigation into an August 2004 radiological event
    involving a Mobile Waste Characterization Facility (MOVER) indicated
    that LLNL's ineffective performance was now resulting in undesirable
    consequences. In March 2005, DOE/NNSA representatives decided to expand
    the scope of the MOVER investigation and include other longstanding
    nuclear safety performance issues. This investigation was completed in
    August 2005 and included an April 2005 LLNL event involving the
    unauthorized removal of radioactive contamination from the site.
        In late October 2005, an informal enforcement conference was held
    with LLNL senior management consistent with DOE/NNSA protocols. This
    informal hearing allows the contractor to comment on the factual
    accuracy of the investigation, discuss underlying causes and corrective
    actions, and request mitigation towards any pending citation. A
    proposed citation was completed in December 2005. In February 2006, the
    citation was issued under my signature.

        14. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, your letter to the
    Director of Livermore, conveying the notice stated the following:

              ``I am also disappointed by the longstanding and recurring
            nature of many of the deficiencies associated with the
            violations. This recurring aspect casts significant doubt on
            the Laboratory's ability to effectively analyze and correct
            performance problems.''

        What measures are you putting in place to address this larger
    issue?
        Ambassador Brooks. In my letter to the LLNL Director, I conveyed my
    disappointment in the Laboratory's track record of failing to correct
    identified deficiencies in a timely manner. Senior Laboratory managers
    acknowledged the need for significant improvements in the Laboratory's
    safety culture. We are committed to addressing identified concerns and
    have been working aggressively over the past year on corrective actions
    to prevent reoccurrence and ensure that high-quality safety programs
    are in place at LLNL.
        Our actions to date have included:

             A thorough causal analysis of both the MOVER and
            Phosphorous spill events has determined the underlying root
            causes resulting in the implementation of new radiation
            protection procedures, employee training, incident response
            communication, and quality assurance processes.
             Strengthening senior Laboratory management
            accountability and instituting safety contracts with senior
            managers to hold individuals personally accountable. These
            contracts, required by the Director of the Laboratory,
            stipulate that senior managers personally certify safety
            practices within their organizations. This includes conducting
            senior management walk-downs and detailed physical reviews of
            Laboratory-wide hazard activities. Laboratory managers are
            working to develop and implement a culture that encourages all
            employees to stop work at any time if safety could possibly be
            compromised.
             Instituted a new Laboratory Office of Institutional
            Performance Analysis (OIPA) that now tracks all external
            assessments and required closeout dates. OIPA also analyzes
            performance data to identify potential issues and applies a
            ``lessons learned'' strategy systemically across the
            laboratory. A new senior management council regularly reviews
            the work of OIPA, providing additional quality assurance. The
            Lab's internal Price-Anderson Amendments Act (PAAA) office
            structure and program expectations have been aggressively
            strengthened. PAAA personnel have implemented new causal
            analysis, verification, and validation procedures.
             Specific improvements in other areas such as
            configuration management, the formality of operations within
            our nuclear facilities, incident response and safety
            procedures, and radiation protection program staffing to
            enhance and strengthen nuclear safety at LLNL.
             From the DOE and NNSA perspective, I have increased
            the level of Federal oversight at the Livermore Site Office,
            assisted by nuclear safety experts from the NNSA Chief of
            Defense Nuclear Safety Office, to monitor and assess LLNL
            implementation of nuclear safety requirements. I will evaluate
            Laboratory performance in complying with nuclear safety
            requirements and the effectiveness of corrective actions as
            part of the annual contractor performance review.

                                 TEST READINESS

        15. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 requires DOE to achieve a level
    of ``test readiness'' which would allow the resumption of underground
    nuclear testing within 18 months of a Presidential decision to conduct
    a test. Under the law, DOE is to achieve this level of readiness no
    later than October 1, 2006. I understand, however, that Congress has
    not appropriated sufficient funds to allow the NNSA to support this
    deadline. Is it true that DOE forecasts it cannot meet the statutory
    deadline?
        Ambassador Brooks. While the NNSA has made considerable progress in
    improving its test readiness posture over the last 4 years, reducing
    the readiness time from 36 months to 24, Congress did not provide the
    funding requested by the President to achieve an 18-month test
    readiness posture by the end of fiscal year 2006, as required by
    section 3113 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2004. Therefore, test readiness posture at October 1, 2006, will be
    about 24 months.

        16. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, in your view, does a
    readiness posture of 24 months represent an acceptable level of
    technical risk?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, we believe that this significant
    improvement to 24 months is adequate for meeting our national security
    needs.

        17. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, in other words, since a
    problem would likely have to be severe for this country to debate a
    return to nuclear testing, when faced with a serious problem such as
    this, in your technical judgment is it prudent to have to wait 2
    additional years until we are ready to conduct a test to diagnose the
    problem?
        Ambassador Brooks. As previously discussed, Congress did not fully
    provide the funds requested by the President to achieve an 18-month
    test readiness posture by the end of fiscal year 2006. However, we do
    believe that 24 months is adequate for meeting our national security
    needs.

                          RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

        18. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, at the direction of
    Congress, DOE is currently conducting a joint feasibility study--with
    the DOD--on a RRW. This study will analyze a technical approach to
    warhead design and maintenance which could potentially eliminate many
    of the most costly and hazardous materials which are used in the
    current nuclear stockpile. The nuclear weapons experts at the national
    laboratories appear to be confident that it will be possible to field a
    RRW without needing to resume underground nuclear weapons testing. Do
    you share their confidence and why?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, I do share the confidence of those who
    believe that we will be able to field a RRW without needing to resume
    underground nuclear testing. While I am not a nuclear weapon designer,
    I trust the judgment of expert nuclear weapon designers who inform me
    that it is possible to field a warhead without underground testing,
    especially if that warhead has ties to a previously tested
    configuration. The intent of the RRW program is to identify nuclear and
    non-nuclear replacement components that could be fielded without
    nuclear testing. Feasible RRW options will be based on our database of
    historical nuclear tests as well as from the experience of the
    remaining designers and engineers who have successfully fielded our
    current stockpile. The advances of our Stockpile Stewardship Program
    (SSP) enable us to better understand nuclear explosive performance
    through modeling, simulation, and experiments. The RRW designs are
    explicitly chosen for higher margin in primary performance so that
    certification analysis based on quantification of margins and
    uncertainties will provide greater confidence than that provided by
    today's high yield-to-weight designs as they continue to age or are
    modified as part of the refurbishment program. That combination of
    historical test information, modern SSP tools (e.g., high energy
    density physics and the Advanced Simulation & Computing program),
    improved margins, experienced designers and engineers, along with
    relaxed military requirements for yield-to-weight ratios, will enable
    us to design and certify nuclear components with high confidence. As a
    result, fielding RRW systems will likely reduce the possibility that
    the U.S. will need to conduct a nuclear test for certification or to
    diagnose or remedy a stockpile reliability problem.

                       PIT PRODUCTION AND PLUTONIUM AGING

        19. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, the United States ceased
    production of plutonium pits when Rocky Flats was closed in 1989 and is
    now trying to reconstitute a modest production line for pits at LANL.
    What challenges--technical, operational, or cultural--is DOE
    encountering in trying to increase the rate of production of pits at
    Los Alamos?
        Ambassador Brooks. There are many challenges confronting the DOE
    and the LANL in increasing the rate of production of pits at the
    plutonium facility at TA-55/PF-4. The PF-4 facility was designed over
    30 years ago to support plutonium research and development instead of
    the current multiple missions that include pit production. Major
    challenges to improve the pit production capacity of PF-4 include the
    physical limitations of the facility, equipment configuration and
    installation, personnel qualification and retention, and continued
    support of multiple plutonium missions. The TA-55/PF-4 facility
    supports a number of important national missions in addition to pit
    production. For example, continuing Pu-238 missions supporting the
    NASA, both conventional and enhanced surveillance activities for pits,
    special recovery activities, non-proliferation activities, and small-
    scale physics testing. All of these activities use TA-55/PF-4 space
    that limits the ability to expand the pit manufacturing mission. The
    NNSA and LANL are working to resolve these challenges, and are
    committed to establishing a pit production capacity of 10 W88 pits per
    year in fiscal year 2007.

        20. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, will the production at Los
    Alamos be sufficient to sustain the stockpile over the long-term?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA plans to increase the LANL pit
    manufacturing capacity to 30-40 pits per year by the end of fiscal year
    2012. This production rate, however, is insufficient to meet DOD
    projected requirements. The NNSA submitted a report to Congress in
    January 2005 that identified the need for at least a 125-pit per year
    capacity starting in 2021. This is based on a 60-year pit lifetime and
    a stockpile based on the planned 2012 stockpile size approved by the
    President and provided to Congress in a June 2004 report. Although we
    expect more refined pit lifetime estimates by the end of fiscal year
    2006, future pit production capacity requirements are likely to be
    driven more by stockpile transformation than legacy pit lifetimes. We
    are currently working with the DOD to develop long-term stockpile
    quantities and transformation rates that would provide the requirement
    basis for a long-term pit production capacity. Once we validate those
    requirements through the Nuclear Weapons Council, we will work with
    Congress to establish a plan for an infrastructure that can support the
    longer-term need for pits.

        21. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, in 2005, Congress directed
    DOE to initiate more detailed study of the aging of plutonium pits used
    in nuclear weapons to determine how long we might expect the current
    pits to last. What is the status of this investigation?
        Ambassador Brooks. By the end of fiscal year 2006, we will have
    system-specific pit lifetime estimates that have been subject to peer
    review between the weapons physics laboratories (LLNL and LANL) and
    external review by a panel of scientific experts known as JASON.

                           SETTING BUDGET PRIORITIES

        22. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, I am concerned that DOE
    spending plans are influenced by the most vocal outside groups, or by
    compliance agreements made years ago, and not through a careful
    analysis of what environmental situations pose the greatest risk, and
    how much cleanup is needed at each site in relation to the future use
    of the site. Under the current program, is the DOE focused on cleaning
    up the worst problems?
        Mr. Rispoli. The fiscal year 2007 budget request reflects a crucial
    balance of reducing risk and completing cleanup--an integrated strategy
    to meet the program's objectives. Overall, our request puts a high
    priority on safely dealing with tank waste, special nuclear materials,
    and spent nuclear fuel disposition--our highest risk materials--while
    preserving our commitments to site completion and closure.

        23. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, is the DOE cleanup budget
    prioritized by risk or are budgets set by the deadlines in the cleanup
    agreements?
        Mr. Rispoli. In formulating the budget request, we prioritize
    cleanup work based on a judicious integration of risk, statutory and
    regulatory requirements (including cleanup agreements),
    interdependencies with communities and other DOE locations, and
    contract and workforce efficiencies. Our aim is to forecast the needs
    of the program in meeting the mission objectives of risk reduction and
    cleanup completion while being good stewards of the U.S. taxpayer's
    funds.

        24. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, the cleanup agreement
    between DOE, the EPA, and Washington State--called the Tri-Party
    Agreement--was originally signed in 1989. A panel of outside experts
    reviewing the Hanford cleanup characterized this agreement as follows:
    ``the milestones (in the agreement) were established well before all
    the underlying science and technology had been developed.'' In
    addition, according to reports, Under Secretary of Energy David Garman
    made the following statement in a speech on February 16, 2006:

              ``Let's just be honest here; we're going to be in the legacy
            cleanup business for a while. I think it's important for us to
            get honest about that. To get honest about what our
            capabilities are. To be honest about what kinds of timeframes
            we're looking at.''

        In your view, does it make sense to review the regulatory
    agreements in place governing these cleanups--either on a periodic
    basis or in cases where substantial new data or science is now
    available?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Hanford TPA Action Plan contains a process and a
    form by which changes can be made to the TPA as the Hanford cleanup
    progresses. Processes for changes to milestones are contained in all of
    our regulatory agreements. The DOE and its regulators continuously
    review these agreements for needed changes to milestones that may
    result from technological advances and other issues.
        Under the terms of the Hanford TPA, there have been approximately
    440 approved change requests, six amendments, and three modifications
    known as ``Directors Determinations.'' Within these changes, the
    parties have agreed to add approximately 860 new milestones, delete
    approximately 160 milestones, and extend approximately 200 milestones.
    Essentially, these agreements in particular (and others in general) are
    revised as situations warrant.

        25. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, if the drive to execute
    these cleanups on their original schedules is causing a substantial
    upward pressure on the cost of cleanup, does DOE have an obligation to
    revisit the existing commitments?
        Mr. Rispoli. We are obligated to look at any opportunity that would
    provide a similar or increased level of cleanup and risk reduction at
    an improved schedule or lower cost to the U.S. public. We invite input
    from our cleanup partners and other stakeholders that would enhance the
    cost-effective completion of our mission objectives while meeting their
    expectations.

                        WASTE INCIDENTAL TO REPROCESSING

        26. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, 2 years ago, Congress
    conducted substantial debate on the issue of residues or ``heels'' left
    in nuclear waste storage tanks. Congress ultimately granted DOE the
    authority to leave some small amount of this residue in place, after
    DOE had physically emptied as much nuclear waste from each tank as
    possible. This waste was defined as ``waste incidental to
    reprocessing.'' How has DOE used this new authority?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE is implementing Section 3116 of the Ronald W.
    Reagan National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005
    at the SRS and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the two sites
    covered by the legislation.
        On January 17, 2006, the Secretary made the first waste
    determination under section 3116 for salt waste disposal at SRS, after
    an approximately 10-month long consultation with the NRC. DOE is now
    pursuing the necessary permits from the State of South Carolina.
        DOE is currently consulting with the NRC on two other waste
    determinations involving stabilized residual waste. The first concerns
    INL tank residual waste, tanks, and associated components. The second
    concerns residual waste in tanks at SRS.

        27. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, the new authority requires
    DOE to consult with the NRC in these matters. Has the NRC found this
    approach to tank cleanup to be protective of public health?
        Mr. Rispoli. In late December 2005, the NRC issued a Technical
    Evaluation Report (TER) for the DOE draft waste determination for salt
    waste disposal at the SRS. This NRC assessment was limited to the salt
    waste disposal determination prepared by DOE. The NRC concluded that
    there is reasonable assurance that DOE can meet the criteria provided
    in the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 in section 3116
    (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)(A)(i), provided that certain assumptions
    made in DOE's analyses are verified via monitoring. The NRC reached
    this conclusion based on information provided by DOE to the NRC in
    letters dated March 31, June 30, September 15, and September 30, 2005.
        There are three applicable criteria for determining that certain
    wastes from reprocessing are not high-level waste. NRC's position on
    each criterion follows:

             ``Given that there is reasonable assurance that DOE's
            proposed approach can meet the other criteria in the NDAA,
            including the performance objectives of 10 Code of Federal
            Regulations (CFR) 61, Subpart C [Licensing Requirements for
            Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste], and that there appears to
            be no other properties of the waste that would require deep
            geologic disposal, the NRC finds that there is reasonable
            assurance that Criterion One [that the waste does not require
            permanent isolation in a deep geologic repository for spent
            fuel or high-level radioactive waste] of the NDAA can be met.''
             ``[T]he NRC has concluded that there is reasonable
            assurance that DOE can meet Criterion Two [that the waste has
            had highly radioactive radionuclides removed to the maximum
            extent practical] with its proposed approach.''
             ``[T]he NRC has concluded that there is reasonable
            assurance that DOE can meet Criterion Three, which by reference
            incorporates the performance objectives of 10 CFR 61, Subpart
            C.''

        The NRC's conclusions presented in the TER are based on the
    information provided by DOE. The NRC asserted, ``If, in the future, DOE
    determines it is necessary to revise its assumptions, analysis, design
    or waste management approach and those changes are important to meeting
    the criteria of the NDAA, DOE should consult once again with the NRC
    regarding the enclosed TER.''

        28. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, this authority does not
    apply to the waste tanks at Hanford in Washington. Is there something
    unique about the chemistry of the waste in those tanks or could the
    extension of this authority to Hanford tank waste result in an improved
    and more cost effective cleanup for the Hanford tanks?
        Mr. Rispoli. While different reprocessing technologies and unique
    radionuclide removal programs were employed at Hanford, the SRS, and
    the INL, the chemical make-up of the waste does not preclude extension
    of this authority to Hanford tank waste. In fact, with the exception of
    the final waste form for some of the wastes, the strategy for
    retrieval, treatment, and disposal of tank wastes at the Hanford Site
    is consistent with that of the SRS.

         BUDGET PROPOSAL TO HIRE A PROJECT MANAGEMENT AGENT AT HANFORD

        29. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, the fiscal year 2007
    budget request includes a proposal to hire a contractor--referred to as
    a ``project management agent''--to oversee or manage the work that is
    being done by another contractor (Bechtel) at the Hanford Waste
    Treatment Plant (WTP). This reads like an unusual proposal to hire one
    government contractor to manage another government contractor. Could
    you please explain the proposal that is contained in the budget request
    for the hiring of this new ``project management agent'' at Hanford?
        Mr. Rispoli. The project management agent would be what is termed
    in the commercial construction industry as the owner's representative,
    with the DOE being the owner. During peak construction and
    commissioning of the WTP, this agent will have up to five full-time
    senior personnel, each with expertise in managing large projects of
    similar complexity. The agent will serve in an advisory role to the DOE
    and will not direct Bechtel National, Inc., the Hanford WTP contractor.
    The agent would advise DOE on: design conformance with contract
    requirements; cost containment, quality assurance, and safety
    compliance; effectiveness of management processes such as change
    control and invoice reviews; and contingency issue anticipation. The
    goal is for the agent to provide a broad range of experience and advice
    to the DOE's Federal Project Director overseeing the WTP project.
        This type of service is common in the engineering and construction
    industry, and DOE has successfully employed this type of service on
    several past projects.

        30. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, what is Congress being
    asked to fund and, if funded, what organizational structure would
    result?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the
    major construction of the WTP, Subproject 01-D-416, includes proposed
    funding to obtain project management oversight assistance and personnel
    to serve in an advisory role to the DOE's Federal Project Director for
    the WTP project. The Federal Project Director reports to the Manager,
    Office of River Protection. The goal is for the advisor(s) to provide a
    broad range of experience and advice to the Federal Project Director
    and to the Headquarters office dedicated to oversight of this project,
    to help assure successful completion of the WTP.

        31. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, DOE is also requesting
    funds to hire additional Federal staff to manage the WTP project. Will
    the Federal staff then oversee both contractors?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE Federal Project Director and other senior
    Federal staff will oversee both the WTP contractor, Bechtel National
    Inc., and the project management agent.

        32. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, DOE has now put in place a
    number of review teams and senior management teams, as part of the
    ``recovery'' plan at the WTP. Could you please provide a diagram or
    narrative explaining the current reporting and organizational structure
    in place for this project?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE's accountability for the Hanford Waste
    Treatment and Immobilization Plant project flows from the Deputy
    Secretary, as the Secretarial Acquisition Executive, to the Assistant
    Secretary for EM, to the Chief Operating Officer for EM, to the
    Manager, Office of River Protection, to the Federal Project Director.
    The Office of Project Recovery serves in an oversight and advocacy role
    at the Headquarters' Office of EM. The Director for the Office of
    Project Recovery reports directly to the Assistant Secretary for EM.

                           REEXAMINATION OF RESPONSES

        33. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, in your invitation to
    appear, you were asked to address, as a component of your testimony, a
    number of policies and issues confronting the EM program which you were
    not able to address during your confirmation last year, but which you
    had committed to address upon assuming your duties as Assistant
    Secretary. Since you did not provide those views as part of your
    testimony for the hearing, I am renewing the subcommittee's request for
    this information by resubmitting these questions, originally asked of
    you during your confirmation proceedings. Please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: The
    Assistant Secretary for EM is responsible for cleanup activities
    occurring at DOE sites across the country. What are your views on the
    roles and responsibilities of field managers relative to those of EM
    headquarters managers?
        Mr. Rispoli. The field managers are responsible for ensuring that
    the cleanup work is done in a safe and effective manner, and in
    compliance with applicable laws and regulations. They are responsible
    for managing the projects imbedded in the contracts through which the
    Office of EM accomplishes its work. Headquarters managers are
    responsible for developing policy and providing guidance that affects
    field operations. Headquarters managers also provide oversight of the
    field activities to ensure the work is carried out consistent with DOE
    and EM policies.

        34. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What
    is your view of EM's organizational structure?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM is currently in the process of
    modifying its headquarters organizational structure to place greater
    emphasis on acquisition and project management, safety, and technical
    expertise. Our primary goal is to manage our projectized portfolio with
    90 percent of our projects performing on, or better than, cost and
    schedule targets. We must do this safely, for the protection of the
    workers, the site, and the communities where our sites are located. The
    proposed organizational structure better supports these goals by
    establishing clear lines of responsibility and accountability to
    improve overall program performance.

        35. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Is
    there a well-delineated and consistent chain of command and reporting
    structure from the field staff to headquarters staff, from the
    contractors to DOE officials, and from the Office of EM to the
    Secretary of Energy and other DOE officials?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM is in the process of modifying its
    headquarters structure to improve program performance. One method of
    accomplishing this is to establish clear lines of responsibility and
    accountability at the most appropriate level within programs and
    projects. Our proposed organizational structure solidifies roles and
    responsibilities of each office in EM. Clearly understood roles and
    responsibilities will improve interaction between field and
    headquarters staff, and between Federal and contractor personnel.
    Unchanged will be the line chain of command, which is exercised by the
    Chief Operating Officer at Headquarters, directly to each EM site
    manager. I intend to ensure all staff know their decisionmaking
    authority and understand the chain of command for elevating issues when
    necessary.

        36. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Do the
    field offices have enough autonomy and flexibility to work with the
    contractors at the sites to get the cleanup finished in a safe and
    efficient manner? In your opinion, should the field offices have more
    autonomy than they currently have?
        Mr. Rispoli. I believe sufficient autonomy and flexibility exist
    within field offices to enable Federal staff to work with site
    contractors effectively in completing cleanup activities in an
    efficient manner. We are focusing on improving the understanding that
    field office staff and headquarters staff have of their roles and
    responsibilities within this process to maximize the effective use of
    their capabilities. The entire focus is based upon the fundamental
    principle that headquarters staff exist to assist the Chief Operating
    Officer and the line organization to get the job done safely and
    effectively.

        37. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: The EM
    program has used a variety of contracting methods, including management
    and operating cost plus award fee contracts, cost plus incentive fee
    contracts, and performance-based, fix-priced contracts. What is your
    view of the role of these, or other, contracting methods, and what
    principles do you believe DOE should follow when entering into EM
    contracts in the future?
        Mr. Rispoli. As I stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee in
    June 2005, there should be a common, disciplined approach to our
    acquisitions and contract management for the Department's EM projects.
    This approach should offer the necessary latitude for tailoring each
    contract to suit the individual challenges and risks associated with
    each situation.
        Since most of EM's cleanup activities are accomplished through the
    use of a contract workforce, our acquisition strategies, contract
    usage, and contract management are of paramount importance. That is why
    EM's headquarters reorganized structure includes a Deputy Assistant
    Secretary for Acquisition and Project Management, whose function will
    be to lead development of acquisition strategies and contract vehicles
    that set clear responsibilities, specific tasks, and facilitate
    improved contract management by commercial contractors as well as by
    Federal onsite officials.
        When entering into contracts in the future, I expect the type of
    contract to be selected on a case-by-case basis considering the scope
    and complexity of the work, the uncertainties and risks involved, the
    period of performance, and the incentive arrangement. This includes
    appropriate use of management and operations arrangements, cost-plus-
    incentive-fee contracts, performance-based contracts, and fixed-price
    contracts for projects with well-defined work scope.
        I expect to continue aggressive contracting strategies to clean up
    and close sites that have clearly defined scopes of work and end
    states. The goal is to write solicitations that incentivize safety,
    innovation, cost savings, and schedule acceleration, where appropriate,
    and to complement our emphasis on a strengthened project management
    program.

        38. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: The
    DOE has offered changing views, over the lifetime of the EM program, as
    to whether the program should focus on cleaning up the sites now within
    its purview or whether the program should have an ongoing mission of
    cleaning up all surplus DOE facilities, as the facilities become
    excess, over time. Do you believe there is a point at which the EM
    program should stop taking surplus buildings, facilities, or waste
    streams from other components of the DOE into the EM program for
    decommissioning, decontamination, and disposal?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE recognizes that it has significant
    environmental liabilities that are not currently the responsibility of
    any program. The DOE is currently in the process of evaluating options
    for handling these unassigned and unfunded environmental liabilities.

        39. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What
    requirements would you place on the other DOE programs before you would
    take additional buildings, facilities, or waste into the EM program?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE is currently in the process of evaluating
    options for handling unassigned and unfunded environmental liabilities
    and expects to identify a path forward by the end of fiscal year 2006.
    As part of the transfer of any facility from one program to another
    program for decontamination and decommissioning, I would envision that
    the transferring program would be required to stabilize that facility
    so that any immediate risk would be mitigated. A complete set of
    transfer requirements will be developed as part of the process of
    resolving this issue.

        40. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Do you
    believe it is an appropriate policy for the EM program to ``go out of
    business'' at some point and leave the remainder of newly generated
    waste as the responsibility of existing DOE programs? If not, how
    should newly generated wastes be managed and which program (EM or the
    program generating the waste) should budget for these activities?
        Mr. Rispoli. Yes, I believe it is the appropriate policy that the
    DOE program that generates the waste is responsible for its management
    and disposal. This is standard industry practice, since it provides an
    internal driver for the generator to develop a cost-effective waste
    management program that incorporates waste minimization approaches. As
    a result, over the last several years, responsibility for management of
    newly generated waste has been transferred to the generator or landlord
    program at the various sites. The Office of EM maintains responsibility
    for the management of newly generated waste at sites where it is the
    landlord program.

        41. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: In
    developing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,
    this committee did not adopt the proposal in the President's budget
    request of transferring certain EM activities from the EM program into
    the NNSA. In the committee's view, such a transfer would not comply
    with the legislation which established the NNSA. What is the DOE's
    interpretation of these provisions of the NNSA Act which relate to the
    possible transfer of cleanup activities into the NNSA? What is your
    interpretation?
        Mr. Rispoli. Title XXXII of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65 as amended, the ``Act'')
    established the NNSA as a separately organized agency within the DOE.
    The Act provides that the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security serves
    as the Administrator of NNSA. The Secretary of Energy may transfer to
    NNSA ``any . . . mission or function that the Secretary, in
    consultation with the Administrator and Congress, determines to be
    consistent with the mission of the [NNSA].'' (NNSA Act Sec. 3291(b)).
    (Section 3291(c) of the Act allows, but does not require, the Secretary
    to ``transfer responsibility for'' any environmental remediation or
    waste management activity to another non NNSA element of the DOE.)
    Furthermore, the Act provides that the Administrator shall ensure that
    the NNSA complies with all applicable environmental statutes and
    requirements, and requires that the operations and activities of NNSA
    are carried out in a manner that protects public health, safety, and
    the environment. (NNSA Act Sec. Sec. 3261, 3211). In light of the
    Secretary's authority to transfer functions to NNSA that are consistent
    with NNSA's mission and the Administrator's responsibility for ensuring
    that NNSA complies with environmental requirements and protects the
    environment, the DOE's interpretation is that the NNSA Act allows the
    Secretary to transfer these functions to NNSA after consulting with the
    Administrator and Congress, and that the Administrator would have the
    authority and responsibility for carrying them out. My interpretation
    is the same as the DOE's.

        42. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: During
    her confirmation hearing before this committee on June 7, 2001, Ms.
    Jessie Hill Roberson, your predecessor in this position, testified that
    it was her goal to ``make changes that have lasting and permanent
    impact on this program.'' Do you believe that the EM program is best
    served, at this point in time, by a continuation of the focus on
    accelerated cleanup begun under Assistant Secretary Roberson?
        Mr. Rispoli. Yes. As has been demonstrated in the past, EM's
    cleanup philosophy has proven to deliver results. Cleanup at as many as
    nine sites will be completed by the end of 2006, including Rocky Flats,
    Fernald, Miamisburg, Columbus, Ashtabula, Lawrence Berkeley National
    Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--Main Site, Sandia
    National Laboratories, and Kansas City Plant. In addition to these
    important site completions, EM has completed many of the activities
    focused on addressing the highest risks in tank waste management and
    nuclear material stabilization. EM will continue to maintain a focus on
    completion of site cleanup, which eliminates so-called ``hotel costs''
    in order to optimize cost savings, with an additional eight sites or
    areas (Argonne National Laboratory--East, Brookhaven National
    Laboratory, East Tennessee Technology Park at Oak Ridge, Energy
    Technology Engineering Center, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-
    Site 300, Inhalation Toxicology Laboratory, Pantex Plant, and the
    Stanford Linear Accelerator Center) projected to be completed in the
    2007 to 2009 timeframe.

        43. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: One of
    the initiatives undertaken by Assistant Secretary Roberson was the
    development of end states documents for each major site in the EM
    program, depicting the residual contamination levels remaining at each
    site after the completion of cleanup. What is the status of the
    development of end states for each major site?
        Mr. Rispoli. End state vision documents have been developed for
    almost all of the major sites. The Hanford end state document is
    nearing completion, and all other major sites have completed their
    final draft end state documentation. Some sites have been exempt from
    the process because the sites are scheduled to close in 2006 or 2007.
    Each end state document takes into account residual contamination
    levels and the appropriate alternatives for remediation. The process of
    evaluating and refining end states will continue as new information
    becomes available, new remediation technologies are developed, and
    alternatives for future land use emerge. These documents will be used
    to inform the applicable regulatory processes in determining ultimate
    cleanup goals and associated remediation activities.

        44. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Were
    these documents intended to receive the concurrence of State and
    Federal environmental regulators at each site, and if so, which sites
    received such concurrence?
        Mr. Rispoli. The end state documents reflect consultation among DOE
    and State and Federal environmental regulators. They were formulated in
    cooperation with the regulators and in consultation with affected
    governments, including Tribal nations, as well as stakeholders. The
    existing regulatory process, i.e., the Comprehensive Environmental
    Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, is the appropriate vehicle
    to provide for such consultation. The purpose of the consultative and
    iterative processes is to provide that the final end state vision for
    each site will have consultation with all affected parties.

        45. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What
    is the status of these documents at sites which did not receive
    concurrence?
        Mr. Rispoli. No sites have received concurrence on their end states
    vision documents. The end state documents are intended to reflect a
    consultation among DOE, and State and Federal environmental regulators.
    DOE continues to work with the regulators to develop end states that
    are protective, sustainable, and appropriate for the future use of the
    site and surrounding areas.

        46. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Did
    the EM program intend for the end states documents to be the starting
    point of a discussion with regulators about changes to the existing
    regulations and compliance agreements that guide cleanup? If so, would
    you pursue such discussions with regulators?
        Mr. Rispoli. The end state documents are intended to be the product
    of a consultative process involving regulators and stakeholders that
    uses risk-informed decisionmaking to ensure that sites are remediated
    to a level that is protective, sustainable, and appropriate for the
    future use of the site and surrounding areas. The development of these
    documents is one way in which the DOE continues to work with its
    regulators and stakeholders to achieve the best, mutually beneficial
    cleanup. The DOE has cleanup agreements in place at most of its sites;
    these agreements were developed in accordance with laws governing
    cleanup, such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
    Compensation, and Liability Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
    Act, and the Atomic Energy Act. DOE, in cooperation with the regulators
    and stakeholders, may consider revising existing cleanup agreements if
    the parties agree that such changes substantially improve the
    effectiveness of the cleanup.

        47. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: One of
    the promises of accelerated cleanup was that by applying additional
    funds in the near-term to achieve the early completion of cleanup at
    certain sites, more funds would be available for the remaining sites
    where cleanup is expected to take longer. In other words, if DOE got a
    few sites done and out of the way, there would be more room in the
    budget to tackle other sites. Do you believe this promise of
    accelerated cleanup has yet been realized, and if not, why not?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE has achieved several successes in its
    accelerated cleanup efforts, including the physical cleanup of the
    Rocky Flats Site along with up to eight additional sites planned for
    completion in 2006 and as many as another nine sites by 2009. There
    remains a strong focus on cleanup and closure.

        48. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Do you
    believe that the EM program has conducted sufficient technology
    development so that a treatment and disposition pathway exists for all
    identified waste streams under the program?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM conducts selected technology
    development and deployment activities to support the treatment and
    disposition pathways for most of the identified waste streams under the
    program. EM will continue developing new or improved technologies that
    address limitations in current characterization and treatment
    capabilities. Further, because of the long time frame associated with
    cleaning up and closing the sites, EM will be conducting technology
    development activities well into the future, including those for wastes
    currently without disposition pathways. The technology development
    focus is on treating and disposing of high-level tank wastes, stored
    transuranic waste, deactivation and decommissioning, and groundwater
    and soils.

        49. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: If any
    orphan waste streams--those for which there is no identified
    disposition pathway--exist within the EM program, what technology
    development or other efforts would you undertake to address them?
        Mr. Rispoli. To directly support the Office of EM's accelerated
    cleanup, the EM Technology Development and Deployment (TD&D) Program is
    aligned and driven by site cleanup priorities. The technology
    development focus is on treating and disposing of high-level tank
    wastes, stored transuranic waste, deactivation and decommissioning, and
    groundwater and soils. The field sites and headquarters staff identify,
    select, and fund higher-risk, higher-cost technology alternative
    projects that are outside of a site's prime contract and/or baseline
    scope/schedule. If an orphan waste stream(s) project meets the
    selection criteria, then one or more alternative project(s) would be
    funded to resolve it. But, since orphan streams are those of unique or
    unusual compositions, and tend to be site-specific and of limited
    quantities, they might not meet the criteria for funding through the
    mechanism of TD&D alternative projects. Instead, technology development
    projects to address the orphan waste streams, when identified and
    requested by the sites, are then addressed on a case-by-case basis, and
    if approved, are funded through the Technical Assistance Program. This
    includes two closely related programs: quick-response technical
    consulting (Technical Expertise) and short-duration technology projects
    (Technical Solutions Projects). As designed, the direct assistance is
    provided by EM Headquarters to develop lower-cost, lower-risk technical
    improvements to accelerate closure of the sites. I believe it is
    essential for our complex cleanups to have a TD&D program. This is an
    essential component of our ability to address limitations, for example,
    in current radioactive waste characterization and treatment
    capabilities.

        50. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What,
    in your view, are the continuing requirements for developing and
    fielding new technologies, and what are the highest priorities?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM program's technology investment
    strategy is linked specifically to site Performance Management Plans
    and life-cycle baselines, site end states, and corporate performance
    measures. The strategy is based upon eliminating technology gaps or
    deficiencies in capabilities, reducing technological risk in current
    site baselines, improving performance, and lowering costs of current
    operations. Technology investments are selected using criteria focused
    on integrating the resulting product with site operations to ensure the
    greatest impact to the EM mission in terms of risk and cost reductions.
    The technology development focus is on treating and disposing of high-
    level tank wastes, stored transuranic waste, deactivation and
    decommissioning, and groundwater and soils.

        51. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: During
    fiscal year 2006, the EM program is scheduled to complete cleanup at
    the following closure sites: Rocky Flats, Mound, and Fernald. In each
    case, DOE must decide how to administer or transfer the post-closure
    pension and medical benefits for cleanup workers at these sites. DOE
    has indicated that it intends to keep the responsibility for
    administering these benefits with the cleanup contractors, post-
    closure. Has DOE evaluated any cost efficiencies that would be gained
    by pooling the sponsorship and functional management of post-closure
    benefits into a single purpose contract; one that could be competed for
    and awarded to one of a number of companies that specialize in the
    administration of such benefits?
        Mr. Rispoli. Physical work was completed at the Rocky Flats site
    last October. Sponsorship and management and administration for the
    pension and welfare benefit plans for retirees are in the process of
    being transferred from the Rocky Flats contractor, Kaiser-Hill Company,
    L.L.C (K-H) to a K-H corporate affiliate, CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc.
    Work at the Mound site is due to be completed in September 2006 and at
    Fernald in September 2006 or sooner. Prior to that time, the Department
    will determine what direction to provide to the contractors regarding
    the disposition of the pension and retiree benefit plans at those
    sites.
        In instances where a site is closed without a successor contractor,
    in the near-term, DOE intends to budget sufficient funds to settle
    pension plan obligations at the earliest practicable date. DOE is
    analyzing alternative vehicles to provide long-term contractor retiree
    medical benefits.
        DOE has not evaluated the costs of pooling the sponsorship and
    functional management of post-closure pension benefits into a single
    contract. The Department has not pursued this because the pension
    benefit plans still will require appropriate legal sponsors. The
    Department neither can legally sponsor qualified pension plans for
    private sector employees nor assign sponsorship authority it does not
    have to an entity that has no corporate relationship to contractor
    employees.

        52. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question:
    Assuming the EM program is funded at the level of the fiscal year 2006
    budget request, will there be any sites under the EM program where
    sufficient funding will not be available to make payments to employee
    pension plans at the levels mandated under the Employee Retirement
    Income Security Act (ERISA)?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM's fiscal year 2006 budget request and
    subsequent fiscal year 2006 congressional appropriations provide
    sufficient funding to make payments to employee pension plans at the
    levels mandated under the ERISA.

        53. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Are
    you aware of any sites under the EM program where making ERISA-mandated
    pension plan payments will result in such a drain on available funding
    that the furlough or involuntary separation of employees at the site
    will be necessary?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM's fiscal year 2006 budget request and
    subsequent fiscal year 2006 congressional appropriations provide
    sufficient funding to make payments to employee pension plans at the
    levels mandated under the ERISA without work force impacts.

        54. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Your
    duties will involve the review and approval of workforce restructuring
    plans at sites under the EM program. Please describe your general
    approach and philosophy in reviewing workforce restructuring plans.
    Given the nature of their work, cleanup workers are fundamentally in a
    position of ``working themselves out of a job.'' How do you believe
    this particular challenge is best handled from both a corporate
    perspective and as a manager of these workers?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM reviews workforce restructuring plans
    to ensure that activities are conducted in accordance with DOE policies
    and directives. EM's objective is to ensure that the contractor's
    strategy effectively accomplishes the site's mission by retaining
    employees with the skills, knowledge, and abilities necessary to
    effectively and safely meet current and future missions within budget.
    As a result of cleanup progress and the subsequent reprioritization of
    work scope, workforce restructurings will continue, as we strive to use
    skills efficiently and in a way that minimizes involuntary separations.
    Individuals involuntarily separated from positions performing cleanup
    work for DOE contractors may qualify for preferences in hiring at DOE
    facilities and additional recall or bumping rights under applicable
    collective bargaining agreements.

        55. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: The
    Federal Government and the State of Idaho have been in dispute
    regarding whether and to what extent DOE is obligated to remediate
    substantial quantities of buried waste that underlie the INL. What is
    the status of any pending litigation involving this dispute and what is
    the DOE position regarding its cleanup obligations for this waste?
        Mr. Rispoli. This issue of the proper interpretation of provisions
    of the 1995 Settlement Agreement with regard to buried waste dispute
    has been tried before the Idaho District Court and the parties are
    awaiting that court's decision. The DOE's position is that the cleanup
    of buried waste is governed by the three party cleanup agreement among
    DOE, the EPA, and the State of Idaho (the 1991 Federal Facility
    Agreement and Consent Order) and not by the 1995 Settlement Agreement.

        56. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: How is
    DOE addressing any environmental risks associated with this waste?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE is addressing environmental risks associated
    with buried waste under the three-party cleanup agreement among DOE,
    the EPA, and the State of Idaho (the 1991 Federal Facility Agreement
    and Consent Order). DOE completed a draft Remedial Investigation and
    Baseline Risk Assessment for the buried waste and submitted it to the
    regulators in December 2005. DOE is also conducting certain waste
    retrieval activities and plans to complete additional studies and
    develop a remedial decision by 2008. All of these activities are being
    conducted according to processes established under the Comprehensive
    Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and the
    National Contingency Plan.

        57. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question:
    Completion of cleanup at a number of EM sites depends on the timely
    shipment of quantities of transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico for disposal. In some cases, DOE is
    under regulatory deadlines for completing shipments to WIPP. What
    regulatory deadlines does the EM program currently face related to WIPP
    shipments and what is the current progress against those deadlines?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE currently faces regulatory deadlines related
    to shipments of transuranic (TRU) waste to the WIPP at the INL and the
    LANL.
        INL must comply with milestones contained in the Idaho Settlement
    Agreement. The milestones in this agreement that DOE currently faces
    are:

             After January 1, 2003, a running average of no fewer
            than 2,000 cubic meters per year shall be shipped out of the
            State of Idaho over 3-year period intervals (thus 6,000 cubic
            meters by December 31, 2005). INL shipped 6,000 cubic meters of
            TRU waste to the WIPP by February 21, 2006, and as of April 1,
            2006, INL had shipped over 6,500 cubic meters of TRU waste to
            WIPP since January 2003. DOE will need to ship an additional
            6,000 cubic meters by December 31, 2008.
             Additionally, a milestone requires that DOE shall ship
            all TRU waste now located at the INL, currently estimated at
            65,000 cubic meters in volume, to the WIPP or other such
            facility by a target date of December 31, 2015, and in no event
            later than December 31, 2018. In total, as of April 2006, INL
            has made over 1,300 shipments and disposed of more than 10,400
            cubic meters of TRU waste at the WIPP.

        The Los Alamos Compliance Order on Consent signed on March 1, 2005
    with the State of New Mexico, states that LANL's environmental
    restoration will occur by fiscal year 2015. This is tied to a DOE
    planning commitment that all legacy TRU waste will be removed by 2012.
    As of April 2006, LANL has shipped more than 140 shipments consisting
    of more than 800 cubic meters of TRU waste to the WIPP and continues to
    consistently make three to four shipments per week to the WIPP. It is
    estimated that LANL has approximately 10,000 cubic meters of TRU waste
    remaining to be shipped to WIPP.

        58. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Are
    you aware of any issues that jeopardize DOE's ability to meet these
    deadlines? If so, what is DOE doing to address these issues?
        Mr. Rispoli. I am not aware of any issues that would affect the
    remaining two Idaho Settlement Agreement Milestones regarding shipment
    to the WIPP of certain stored waste from the State of Idaho. These
    milestones involve meeting deadlines for waste movement, including
    shipping 2,000 cubic meters per year out of the State of Idaho and
    shipping all stored TRU waste at the INL to WIPP by December 31, 2015,
    or not later than December 31, 2018.
        The commitment in the Los Alamos Consent Order to complete
    environmental restoration by fiscal year 2015 is tied to a DOE planning
    commitment to complete legacy waste disposition by 2012. We believe
    that the new contract we have with Los Alamos National Security LLC (a
    limited liability corporation made up of Bechtel National, Inc., the
    University of California, BWX Technologies, Inc., and the Washington
    Group International, Inc.) will address these performance issues, offer
    us new opportunities to continue significant cleanup and risk
    reduction, and deliver progress towards a new baseline. To that end,
    senior officials within the DOE have asked for the involvement of
    senior executives of the parent companies of the new contractor to
    deliver efficiencies and a baseline that can withstand scrutiny and can
    be validated by the DOE. We assure you that we remain committed to the
    Los Alamos Compliance Order on Consent with the State of New Mexico
    (March 2005) and its environmental milestones.

        59. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What,
    if any, additional permits or permit modifications are needed for WIPP
    in order to meet these deadlines?
        Mr. Rispoli. The INL and the LANL have contact-handled transuranic
    (CH-TRU) waste and waste which may be determined to be remote-handled
    transuranic (RH-TRU) waste that need to be disposed of at the WIPP.
    Getting CH-TRU and RH-TRU from INL and LANL to WIPP contributes to
    meeting the Idaho Settlement Agreement and the LANL Consent Order
    deadlines.
        Currently, WIPP is only authorized to receive CH-TRU. DOE is in the
    process of seeking a permit modification from the New Mexico
    Environment Department (NMED) to allow for disposal of RH-TRU at WIPP,
    as well as changes in requirements for the disposal of CH-TRU as
    required by section 311 of Public Law 108-137.

        60. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question:
    Cleanup under the EM program occurs not only at closure sites, but at
    DOE national laboratories and other sites with ongoing missions. These
    locations are sometimes distinguished from the closure sites by use of
    the term enduring sites. Does the EM program approach cleanup
    differently at closure sites than at enduring sites?
        Mr. Rispoli. No. The Office of EM's approach is the same at both
    closure sites and enduring sites. The operating principles for EM are
    to reduce risk and environmental liabilities, in accordance with
    applicable statutes and regulations. The EM program continues to
    eliminate significant environmental, health, and safety risks at all of
    its sites. At all of its sites, EM performs risk reduction and site
    closure or cleanup completion (in the case of sites with enduring
    missions) with its regulators and stakeholders to determine the most
    appropriate remediation schedules and approaches. EM continues to stay
    focused on its cleanup mission across the DOE complex and is working
    aggressively to enhance and refine project management approaches and to
    address the challenges inherent in this multifaceted environmental
    cleanup program.

        61. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: How
    should the EM program best manage the interfaces between its cleanup
    operations and other ongoing missions at the enduring sites?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM works closely with the Field Office
    Managers, who have responsibility for all of the missions that are
    conducted at the site, and the other Program Secretarial Offices in the
    DOE to ensure that the cleanup mission is conducted safely and remains
    focused on reducing both risk and environmental liabilities. When it
    has been necessary, Memoranda of Understanding have been put in place
    for issues at several sites that clarify responsibilities for complex
    situations.

        62. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Does
    the EM program prioritize work differently at enduring sites, and if
    so, in what way?
        Mr. Rispoli. No. The Office of EM's approach is the same at both
    closure sites and enduring sites. The operating principles for EM are
    to reduce risk and environmental liabilities, in accordance with
    applicable statutes and regulations. The EM program continues to
    eliminate significant environmental, health, and safety risks at all of
    its sites. At all of its sites, EM performs risk reduction and site
    closure or cleanup completion (in the case of sites with enduring
    missions) with its regulators and stakeholders to determine the most
    appropriate remediation schedules and approaches. EM continues to stay
    focused on its cleanup mission across the DOE complex and is working
    aggressively to enhance and refine project management approaches and to
    address the challenges inherent in this multifaceted environmental
    cleanup program.

        63. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question:
    Secretary Bodman testified before this committee that DOE sites will
    not achieve compliance with the current design basis threat until 2008.
    Given the seriousness of the need to secure nuclear materials, both
    abroad and at home, do you believe that this is a sufficiently rapid
    response to the threats currently outlined by the intelligence
    community, and against which DOE has agreed it must defend at its
    nuclear sites?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE continually assesses information from the
    Intelligence Community as it relates to protection strategies employed
    at our facilities. While DOE has continued to strengthen the
    capabilities to defend against potential threat levels at our Category
    I quantity nuclear facilities, these facilities and our critical
    nuclear materials are at low risk based upon today's required
    protection criteria. We are continuing implementation of security
    enhancements through changes in tactics, manpower, and technology. Some
    of the security-effective and cost-effective solutions to design basis
    threat changes rely on capital improvements that require several years
    to design, procure, install, and/or construct. These active and passive
    technological capabilities, coupled with the sites' protective forces,
    provide a robust security posture ensuring our critical facilities and
    materials do not become an elevated risk overnight. Likewise, this
    robustness enables us to take immediate compensatory measures should
    there be an unexpected, sudden change to the actual threat.
        Periodic assessments, enhancement plans, and plans to eliminate
    targets provide an appropriate security posture at our facilities to
    ensure low risk. We are proceeding at the appropriate pace to ensure
    threats will be met in an effective, timely, and efficient manner.

        64. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: What
    actions would you undertake to consolidate and more rapidly secure any
    special nuclear material existing within the EM program?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM is focused on the disposition of
    special nuclear materials. Our consolidation decisions are closely
    connected to the ultimate disposition of these materials.
        Additionally, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for EM, is
    Chairman of the DOE's NMDCCC. Identifying a path forward for the
    plutonium-239 at our Hanford Site is EM's highest priority for the
    NMDCCC chiefly because of the urgency associated with removal of this
    material in order to avoid the expenditure of significant funding at
    Hanford to meet the latest security requirements.

        65. Senator Sessions. Secretary Rispoli, please reexamine your
    response to the Senate Armed Services Committee provided on June 24,
    2005, and provide your informed views on the following question: Do you
    agree that, even with a primary focus on accelerating cleanup, it is
    still an essential responsibility of the EM program to secure these
    materials against the threats existing now?
        Mr. Rispoli. The protection of weapons-usable nuclear materials is
    an essential responsibility of the Office of EM. As we clean up the
    former nuclear weapons complex, we are meeting this responsibility at
    our sites with appropriate safeguards and security systems, equipment,
    and manpower.
        Through the NMDCCC, the DOE is evaluating consolidation options to
    further secure these critical nuclear materials and minimize costs to
    maximize cleanup resources.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                            COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION

        66. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the 2001 Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR) calls for a transition from a threat-based nuclear
    deterrent with large numbers of nuclear weapons to a deterrent based on
    capabilities with a smaller nuclear weapons stockpile and ``greater
    reliance on the capability and responsiveness of the DOD and the NNSA
    infrastructure to respond to threats.'' Last June, the Energy Advisory
    Board issued a report, also known as the Overskei Report, suggesting a
    variety of ways to make the complex more responsive and more efficient.
    The Overskei Report concludes that the current NNSA plan to modernize
    the production complex in place was not effective and that the current
    complex ``is neither robust, nor agile, nor responsive, with little
    evidence of a master plan.'' Neither DOE nor NNSA has responded to this
    report. What is the responsive infrastructure required by the NPR?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA responsive infrastructure required by
    the NPR is the industrial capability for weapon design, certification,
    manufacturing, surveillance, maintenance, and disposition required to
    support our nuclear deterrent in an uncertain world. A responsive
    infrastructure provides a national security capability to respond to a
    major technical stockpile issue or a geopolitical change before an
    adversary could gain an advantage. Specifically, it allows us to
    replace large numbers of deployed and reserve weapons so that the
    augmentation or hedge component of the stockpile would not need to be
    maintained at current levels.
        The NPR established responsive infrastructure as the third leg of
    the ``New Triad,'' making it equally important to strike and defensive
    forces as part of our nuclear security strategy. The NNSA
    infrastructure vision is a responsive set of national laboratories
    complemented by modern production centers of excellence. This
    responsive infrastructure includes the people, the science and
    technology base, the facilities, and equipment to support a right-sized
    nuclear weapons enterprise as well as practical and streamlined
    business practices that will enable us to be agile and respond rapidly
    to emerging needs. This responsive infrastructure must provide proven
    and demonstrable capabilities, on appropriate timescales, and in
    support of DOD requirements, to:

             Ensure needed warheads are available to augment the
            operationally deployed force;
             Identify, understand, and fix stockpile problems;
             Design, develop, certify, and begin production of
            refurbished or replacement warheads;
             Maintain capability to design, develop, and begin
            production of new or adapted warheads, if required;
             Produce required quantities of warheads;
             Dismantle warheads; and
             Sustain adequate underground nuclear test readiness.

        67. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, what steps has NNSA
    taken to implement all or any of the recommendations in the Overskei
    Report?
        Ambassador Brooks. The DOE has been actively reviewing the
    recommendations of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB)
    Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force to prepare a
    comprehensive plan for transforming the nuclear weapons complex. Many
    of the recommendations are consistent with initiatives that the NNSA
    was already considering or is implementing. These initiatives include
    design of a RRW, consolidation of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM),
    accelerating dismantlement of retired weapons, managing the evolving
    complex to enhance responsiveness and sustainability, and establishing
    an Office of Transformation. With respect to the Consolidated Nuclear
    Production Complex (CNPC), the Complex 2030 preferred scenario
    consolidates production activities to distributed centers of excellence
    that minimize the number of facilities and size of the total and
    security footprint at each site. The cost profile and risk of
    implementation to ongoing activities are reduced compared to a CNPC
    implementation. For example, the CNPC option offers significant
    challenges in the selection of a location that would accept the large
    quantities of SNM and production activities, and how to minimize costs
    particularly during the construction of the CNPC. The concept of
    consolidated production centers of excellence allows NNSA to maintain
    expertise developed over decades of meeting stockpile deliverables,
    and, at the same time, allow us to more effectively manage costs and
    risks over the long-term. The NNSA seriously evaluated the CNPC
    alternative but found it to be both more costly in the near-term and
    risky to implement (e.g., adverse impact to ongoing activities like
    life extension programs). However, as we proceed with the scoping
    process for a potential programmatic environmental impact statement, we
    expect that a CNPC will be considered as an alternative.

        68. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, in your statement, you
    mention that NNSA has established an Office of Transformation. What is
    the job of this office?
        Ambassador Brooks. The Office of Transformation has not yet been,
    but will be, established in 2006. The function of this office is to
    drive change and to transform the nuclear weapons complex by
    establishing the path forward to our 2030 vision and managing execution
    of the Responsive Infrastructure Strategy Implementation Plan (RISIP),
    as well as all subordinate plans. The RISIP defines how the NNSA will
    achieve its 2030 vision and includes implementing strategies, goals,
    actions, and metrics. The Director of the Office of Transformation will
    be a senior NNSA Federal leader reporting to the Deputy Administrator
    for Defense Programs.

        69. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, when the NNSA begins to
    develop plans for the responsive infrastructure, what are the
    requirements that the infrastructure must meet?
        Ambassador Brooks. As required by the NPR, the infrastructure must
    be responsive to unanticipated stockpile issues, technological
    surprise, adverse geopolitical change, and it must enable increased
    reliance on deterrence measured by capability. To assist in our
    planning process, we have worked with the DOD to develop quantitative
    metrics to measure our progress towards ``responsiveness.'' Following
    the NPR and the 2003 Stockpile Stewardship Conference, an initial set
    of these metrics was negotiated. These metrics provide quantified
    targets, e.g., resolve a new stockpile issue within 18 months. We have
    since updated these metrics and now anticipate monitoring our progress
    towards responsiveness in nine specific areas related to requirements
    for cost, dismantlement, augmentation, addressing stockpile problems,
    developing and producing warheads, demonstrating nuclear competencies,
    and sustaining underground test readiness. The Nuclear Weapons Council
    is expected to consider these responsive infrastructure metrics in June
    2006.

        70. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, for instance, what is
    the planning assumption for the size of the stockpile, how many weapons
    should be assembled and dismantled each year, and how many pits and
    secondaries should be manufactured each year?
        Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]

                              DESIGN BASIS THREAT

        71. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
    in 2003 the DOE issued a new Design Basis Threat (DBT) for which DOE
    installations must establish their security posture. This DBT was
    revised in December 2005. The goal is to have all installations and
    facilities meet the 2003 DBT by the end of 2006 and meet the 2005 DBT
    by the end of 2008. Could each of you identify any issues with any
    sites or facilities that would prevent reaching these goals?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA is on-track to meet its commitment to
    implement the 2003 DBT upgrades by the end of this fiscal year, which
    has been a tremendous endeavor on the part of our sites. Regarding the
    2005 DBT, the Department has requested that each site provide a
    detailed vulnerability analysis to validate the upgrades and resources
    required. The results of the site vulnerability analysis are being
    evaluated and we are looking closely at the options and impacts
    associated with the various upgrades so that risk management decisions
    can be made. We will achieve compliance with the November 2005 DBT at
    our two most critical activities (Pantex and our transportation
    safeguards asset) by the end of fiscal year 2008 and we are continuing
    diligently to identify requirements and funding at our other nuclear
    sites in order to achieve compliance as soon as possible.
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM sites are implementing appropriate
    security measures to meet the 2003 DBT levels. The DOE has approved an
    exception to implementation of the 2005 DBT at Hanford to accommodate
    continued storage of surplus plutonium at the site pending an EM
    decision on off-site consolidation of the surplus plutonium. EM
    facilities with an enduring mission are expected to fully implement the
    2005 DBT requirements by the end of 2008.

        72. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
    do each of you have sufficient money in your budgets to meet the DBT
    goals?
        Ambassador Brooks. The 2007 budget has sufficient resources to
    accomplish the security upgrades to meet the new DBT at our two most
    critical operations, Pantex and the Office of Secure Transportation.
    For the remaining four sites, the budgets and schedules will be
    determined by the results of the ongoing vulnerability analyses and
    next year's budgeting process. NNSA is committed to doing as much as
    possible in the near-term to meet the DBT compliance requirements, and
    will maintain effective and robust security at all of its nuclear
    sites.
        Mr. Rispoli. The fiscal year 2007 budget request fully supports
    EM's goals and departmental decisions for the DBT implementation.

        73. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
    in reviewing the 2007 budget request, there seems to be a number of
    projects with increased costs as a result of the revised DBT. Have each
    of you been able to identify ways to meet the DBT with technology, as
    opposed to more guards and guns, that will save money?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has been working tirelessly at finding
    innovative solutions to meet the challenges of the new security
    regimen. We have found that by maintaining our focus on the basics the
    Department can dramatically curtail the growth of protective forces.
    The basics include: hardening our facilities, creating vehicle standoff
    distances, increasing delay times, and improving the training,
    lethality, and survivability of the protective forces. The combination
    of these techniques, with innovative technologies such as remotely
    fired weapons and enhanced detection and assessment systems has given
    NNSA greater advantage in defending our nuclear sites. As NNSA plans
    for upgrades to meet the 2005 DBT, we continue to focus our efforts in
    the use of physical barriers and technology solutions rather than
    simply increasing the size of the protective force.
        Mr. Rispoli. Technology innovations, such as enhanced detection and
    assessment equipment, passive barriers, and upgraded weaponry, are
    being actively employed at the SRS and the Hanford Site to meet DBT
    requirements. These technologies enhance system protection
    effectiveness and minimize protective force-level increases.

        74. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the DBT is designed to
    ensure that nuclear weapons and materials are secure. Does the DOD use
    the same DBT for developing security at its facilities where nuclear
    weapons are stored?
        Ambassador Brooks. The DOD and DOE use different approaches to
    providing a security foundational document (DBT), but we use the same
    intelligence and techniques in providing onsite protection. The two
    departments are working very closely on building common threat analyses
    modeling tools and security strategy development approaches. NNSA is
    confident that in the coming months and years you will see us working
    closer with our colleagues in the DOD on this very important topic.

        75. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, does it have the same
    time lines as DOE to come into compliance with the DBT?
        Ambassador Brooks. I would defer to the DOD to answer questions
    regarding any timelines it may have in meeting compliance requirements.
    In the DOE, we will be compliant with the May 2003 DBT by the end of
    this fiscal year.

                   CONSOLIDATION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS

        76. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
    one of the key recommendations of the Overskei Report was to
    consolidate all Category I and II special nuclear materials and weapons
    components at one site. Do you believe that it is possible to
    consolidate all of these materials into one site? If not one site, then
    how many?
        Ambassador Brooks. We take the recommendations of the Secretary of
    Energy Advisory Board Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force
    very seriously and have been evaluating options to consolidate Category
    I and II quantities of special nuclear materials (SNM). Currently,
    seven of the eight locations that are part of the nuclear weapons
    complex have Category I/II quantities of SNM on their site.
    Consolidation to a single site would be extremely challenging. Our
    preferred approach is to significantly reduce the number of sites and
    the number of locations within any given site that have these materials
    (e.g., separate centers of excellence for uranium operations, plutonium
    operations, weapons assembly/disassembly, and testing).
        Mr. Rispoli. Consolidation to a single site would be extremely
    challenging. One of the primary objectives of the NMDCCC is to
    determine how to consolidate materials most effectively and to minimize
    the number of sites.

        77. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Secretary Rispoli,
    what Category I and II materials do each of your programs have and what
    are each of you doing to consolidate materials?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA sites that have Category I and II
    materials are the Y-12 National Security Complex, Pantex Plant, Nevada
    Test Site, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National
    Laboratories. Office of EM materials are located primarily at the SRS
    and at Hanford, but there are also relatively small quantities at Los
    Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. EM is also
    assuming responsibility for disposition of U-233 materials consolidated
    at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
        The NNSA has construction projects to improve nuclear materials
    storage, security, and processing capabilities at Y-12 and Los Alamos
    National Laboratory, and disposition capabilities at the SRS. Materials
    at Hanford, Sandia National Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore
    National Laboratory and excess materials at Los Alamos National
    Laboratory will be relocated to sites with appropriate disposition
    capabilities, or where the material is needed in support of
    prograrnmatic requirements.
        Mr. Rispoli. Within EM, the majority of our Category I materials
    are in a form of plutonium or uranium. The majority of the EM Category
    II materials are in a form of spent fuel, smaller quantities of
    plutonium or uranium, and solutions or residues in process systems.
    Onsite consolidation to a single-protected area has been completed at
    the Hanford Site and is scheduled to be complete at the SRS by the end
    of 2006. EM is working to clarify and finalize our disposition pathways
    and to determine a site to remove the SNM from Hanford, subject to
    compliance with applicable law including the National Environmental
    Policy Act. Additionally, the DOE has established the NMDCCC, of which
    EM is an active member. The purpose of the NMDCCC is to ensure
    integration of individual program disposition and consolidation efforts
    thus identifying opportunities for resource sharing.

        78. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, do you anticipate the
    NNSA will declare additional material excess in the next 10 years?
        Ambassador Brooks. In October 2005 the DOE announced a decision to
    restrict up to 200 metric tons of HEU from any further use as fissile
    material in nuclear weapons. Of that amount, approximately 20 metric
    tons was declared excess to programmatic requirements, and will be
    blended down to low enriched uranium for civilian power reactors or
    other uses. Approximately 20 metric tons was reserved for space and
    research reactors, and approximately 160 metric tons was reserved for
    naval reactors. Most of this material is in the form of assembled
    weapons components. As these weapon assemblies are disassembled, the
    materials will be evaluated to determine the appropriate disposition.
    Materials that do not meet the specification for use in the naval
    reactors program will be declared excess, and will be blended down to
    low enriched uranium. There are no current plans to declare additional
    plutonium excess.

        79. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, is the EM program ready to
    take responsibility for all excess category I and II material and begin
    to consolidate that material?
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE currently is evaluating how best to manage the
    excess Category I and II nuclear material within the DOE complex.
    Surplus nuclear material associated with nonproliferation commitments
    is managed by the Office of Fissile Material Disposition in the NNSA.

        80. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, one of the key sites that
    could be used to consolidate materials is the SRS. Could additional
    materials be stored at SRS? What are you doing to work with the State
    of South Carolina to bring more materials to SRS?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Office of EM is focused on the disposition of SNM.
    Our consolidation decisions are closely connected to the ultimate
    disposition of these materials. Although the SRS has the capacity to
    store additional SNM, no final decision has been reached on shipping
    this material to a receiver site. The Secretary of Energy established
    the NMDCCC. This DOE-wide committee is chaired by the Principal Deputy
    Assistant Secretary for EM who reports to the Deputy Secretary of
    Energy for this purpose. The NMDCCC is in the process of evaluating
    this issue and expects to prepare a series of recommendations on
    consolidation. Meeting security requirements in a timely manner is a
    primary consideration. Other factors being considered include initial
    and life-cycle cost, transportation, National Environmental Policy Act
    analysis, timing, and equity issues.

                                  RENDER SAFE

        81. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the new Quadrennial
    Defense Review mentions on several occasions the need to be able to
    ``render-safe'' WMD. The NNSA has for years been responsible for the
    technical aspects of rendering safe nuclear devices. Is DOD expanding
    the render safe mission for nuclear devices and what is NNSA doing to
    support this expanded mission?
        Ambassador Brooks. NNSA continues to work very closely with the
    DOD. Presently, DOD has communicated the desire to enhance the
    capability of its generic (Tier 3) Explosive Ordnance Disposal
    capability. We do not expect this to add NNSA requirements, however.
    The DOD is still evaluating whether there is a need to develop any
    additional render-safe capability beyond the Tier 3 enhancement. NNSA
    nevertheless will continue to work closely with DOD to provide the
    support DOD requires.

                    DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

        82. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Mr. Rispoli, at
    times the DNFSB raises issues of operational safety in the design and
    construction of new buildings. Failure to resolve promptly the seismic
    concerns raised by the DNFSB at the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant has
    lead in part to the cost growth at that facility. Currently, the NNSA
    and the DNFSB are unable to resolve a nuclear safety issue associated
    with ventilation concerns at the new nuclear materials complex at Los
    Alamos National Lab, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility
    Replacement (CMRR) project. The DNFSB doesn't develop safety
    regulations, it identifies the appropriate regulations and is tasked
    with overseeing the DOE's proper implementation of the safety
    regulations. Is there a clear process to resolve the issues raised by
    the DNFSB?
        Ambassador Brooks. The DOE processes, functions, and
    responsibilities for interfacing with the DNFSB are delineated in the
    Department's Manual 140.1-1B, Interfacing with the Defense Nuclear
    Facilities Safety Board. This is derived from the DNFSB's enabling
    legislation which specifies the processes for accepting, rejecting, and
    implementing a DNFSB recommendation. The DNFSB communicates issues with
    the Department through a variety of mechanisms including formal
    recommendations, formal reporting requirements, letters requesting
    action and information, and letters providing information. The process
    used to resolve a technical issue is based on the mechanism used to
    communicate it to the Department. The Department's process encourages
    close communication with the DNFSB and its staff through briefings,
    discussions, site visits, and other informal interactions.
        With respect to the specific classification of the ventilation
    system for the CMRR nuclear facility, the NNSA has performed
    preliminary analyses of the facility based on the conceptual design and
    concludes that the ventilation system will likely be classified as a
    safety system; however, verification of the safety classification
    properly awaits completion of the Preliminary Design and the
    Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis, activities which are just
    recently started. The designation of safety classification follows
    current protocols and procedures.
        Mr. Rispoli. The DOE processes, functions, and responsibilities for
    interfacing with the DNFSB are delineated in DOE Manual 140.1-1B,
    Interfacing with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. The
    processes for the Secretary of Energy include rejecting a DNFSB
    recommendation and reporting that implementation is impracticable.
    Further, the DNFSB enabling legislation requires the DOE to notify the
    President and Congress if implementation is not possible due to
    funding. While not addressed specifically in the manual, the processes
    used for correspondence from the DNFSB are the same. To date, the DOE's
    interfacings with the DNFSB have provided an agreed upon solution to
    safety issues.

        83. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, what is the process to
    resolve the safety issues at the CMRR while that facility is still in
    the design phase?
        Ambassador Brooks. DOE Order 413.3, Project Management for the
    Acquisition of Capital Assets, and DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety,
    provide design phase processes for the Department. The Department's
    Manual 140.1-1B, Interfacing with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Satety
    Board, establishes processes for interfacing with the DNFSB. The
    process is specified in the DNSFB's enabling legislation. The
    Department's process encourages early resolution of issues with the
    DNFSB and its staff through briefings, discussion, site visits, and
    other informal interactions. Where technical differences of opinion
    cannot be resolved informally and the DNFSB determines the issue
    requires formal resolution or more formal discussion, the DNFSB
    communicates to the Department through a variety of mechanisms
    including formal recommendations, formal reporting requirements or
    letters requesting action. DOE then determines how best to address the
    issue and interacts with the DNFSB and its staff to determine an
    agreeable path forward to resolution. In the case of the CMRR,
    discussions regarding technical differences are ongoing.

                         HANFORD WASTE TREATMENT PLANT

        84. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, your organization is in the
    process of building the WTP in Hanford, Washington, to vitrify the
    millions of gallons of high-level radioactive waste stored there in
    underground tanks. There have been many issues with the construction of
    that facility and the related management of the storage tanks. These
    include multiple process and design changes, funding issues, an
    inability to resolve issues with respect to the appropriate seismic and
    other technical criteria, and substantial increases in the cost of
    concrete and steel. Early indications are that the cost of the facility
    may be on the order of $10 to $15 billion. Ironically the very first
    cost estimates for the WTP was in this range. How will the seismic
    issue be resolved and on what time schedule?
        Mr. Rispoli. Since your question refers to earlier estimates for
    the Hanford WTP, I would first like to point out that all prior planned
    designs for the WTP would have provided only one-fourth of the high-
    level waste immobilization capacity. The current plant is sized to
    treat and immobilize 100 percent of the high-level waste, thus
    eliminating the need for a second, very sizable plant that the DOE's
    prior plan envisioned. In addition, major advancements in technology
    have been recognized that will improve WTP performance. These
    advancements include development of an ion exchange material to more
    effectively and less expensively remove radioactive cesium from tank
    waste liquids; improvement of the throughput capacity for the large
    glass furnaces making glass out of radioactive waste; and enhanced
    blending ability of pumps to maintain a consistent mix of the waste. We
    anticipate that the benefits from these improvements will avoid the
    necessity of building a second plant for high-level waste, improve
    turnaround time, reduce personnel exposure, reduce performance risk,
    reduce operating cost, and reduce the total number of canisters
    produced, thereby decreasing the volume of material ultimately sent to
    a repository for permanent disposal.
        With respect to the seismic issue, the DNFSB has been concerned
    with DOE's seismic assumptions used for WTP design. Last year, DOE
    developed interim seismic criteria based on agreement with the DNFSB on
    ground motion values. The WTP prime contractor, Bechtel National, Inc.,
    used the interim seismic criteria to check the engineering calculations
    for the designs already completed and the structures already built.
    Bechtel National, Inc., submitted to the DOE a revision to the
    structural design criteria which incorporates the DOE's current best
    understanding of the seismic hazard at Hanford, and the WTP, as well as
    the assumptions from the interim seismic criteria. The DOE is reviewing
    this revision to the structural design criteria. The DOE has also
    engaged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to independently review this
    latest revision to the structural design criteria. The DOE will discuss
    this latest revision to the structural design criteria with the DNFSB
    and carefully consider its recommendation regarding the criteria, if
    any. The DOE expects the reviews and discussions to be completed by
    late summer 2006, to permit proceeding with construction of those
    portions of the facilities affected by the concern with the seismic
    criteria.

        85. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, how will a real cost estimate
    be completed and on what time scale?
        Mr. Rispoli. The WTP prime contractor, Bechtel National, Inc.,
    provided to the DOE an updated Estimate-at-Completion (EAC) for the
    project in December 2005. DOE completed two independent expert reviews
    in March 2006 and provided to Congress: 1) an evaluation of the
    technical adequacy of the design to meet the contract performance
    rates; and 2) an assessment of the confidence in the cost and schedule
    as submitted by Bechtel in the December 2005 EAC. In addition, the
    contractor will deliver an updated EAC to reflect available funding for
    fiscal year 2006 and impacts of results of the independent technical
    and cost reviews. The contractor is to provide this revision to DOE by
    May 31, 2006.
        DOE has also engaged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to perform an
    independent expert review of the EAC, and, if acceptable, to validate
    the EAC. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has retained a number of
    recognized industry experts working with its own senior staff. The U.S.
    Army Corps of Engineers' report is scheduled to be completed by late
    summer 2006.
        Based on the results from the reviews, the DOE expects to establish
    a sound cost and schedule to complete the Hanford WTP. The objective is
    to ensure this project will be well-managed. We owe it to Congress,
    regional stakeholders, and the U.S. taxpayers that the substantial
    investment in the WTP is receiving the highest level of talent and
    attention the DOE can provide.

        86. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, will there be any independent
    validation of the cost, the design, and the vitrification process?
        Mr. Rispoli.
    Cost
        The WTP prime contractor, Bechtel National, Inc., provided the DOE
    an updated detailed EAC for the project in December 2005. Several
    actions are occurring to develop a realistic project estimate and
    schedule. The DOE has implemented and received an independent expert
    cost review by senior industry professionals to assess the confidence
    in the cost and schedule as submitted in December 2005. This review was
    completed in March 2006. In late May 2006, the contractor will deliver
    an updated EAC based on the available funding for fiscal year 2006 and
    the impacts of results of the best and brightest technical and cost
    reviews. DOE also engaged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to perform
    an independent expert review of the EAC and to validate the EAC. The
    U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has retained a number of recognized
    industry experts working alongside its own senior staff. The U.S. Army
    Corps of Engineers' report is scheduled to be completed by late summer
    2006.
    Design
        DOE completed an independent expert review in March 2006 and
    provided to Congress an evaluation of the technical adequacy of the
    design. The report indicated the WTP will work as designed, but
    identified 28 issues which needed to be resolved in order for the WTP
    to meet the contract performance rates. The review indicated all these
    issues can be resolved with existing technology. The contractor has
    begun incorporating the fix for a number of these issues and working
    with the DOE on alternatives for the remainder of these issues.
    Vitrification
        DOE has had an in-depth technology development program for
    vitrification systems over the past 20 years, to include the joule
    heated melter being designed for the Hanford WTP. The DOE has also had
    several vitrification systems in-use over the past 10 years: one at the
    West Valley Demonstration Project, New York, and two at the SRS, South
    Carolina (Defense Waste Processing Facility, and M-Area Vitrification
    Facility). In addition, there has been extensive testing of glass
    making in pilot facilities at the Duratek Inc., laboratory in Columbia,
    Maryland, and at the Catholic University's Vitreous State Laboratory in
    Washington, DC.
        Based on the results from the professional reviews and years of
    experience and testing, the DOE has a high-level of assurance in the
    design, vitrification process, and the development of a sound cost and
    schedule to complete the Hanford WTP.

        87. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, what is the current status of
    construction at the WTP?
        Mr. Rispoli. The Hanford WTP consists of five subproject
    facilities: Pretreatment Facility, High-Level Waste Facility, Low-
    Activity Waste Facility, Analytical Laboratory, and Balance of
    Facilities. As of the end of fiscal year 2005, approximately $2.9
    billion had been spent on design, procurement, and construction
    activities. Based on the contractor's December 2005 EAC, the percent
    completion for the three elements (design, procurement and
    construction) of the project, as of the end of fiscal year 2005, are:
    design--68 percent; procurement/materials--44 percent; and
    construction--28 percent.

        88. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, the delays at the WTP will
    cause the DOE to miss many of the commitments to the State of
    Washington. One of the commitments that will not be met is pumping the
    waste from the single shell tanks. How many single shell tanks will be
    pumped out with the fiscal year 2007 budget request?
        Mr. Rispoli. Waste retrieval is anticipated to be completed on four
    single-shell tanks in fiscal year 2006 (C-204, C-103, C-201, and S-
    112). Waste retrieval will be initiated and completed on two single-
    shell tanks, C-108 and C-109, in fiscal year 2007. Retrieval on single-
    shell tank Tank S-102 is also anticipated to be completed in late
    fiscal year 2007 or early fiscal year 2008.

        89. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, no funding is provided for
    the bulk vitrification project in fiscal year 2007. Does this mean the
    DOE is cancelling the project?
        Mr. Rispoli. No. The DOE anticipates analyzing the bulk
    vitrification alternative in the upcoming Tank Closure and Waste
    Management Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to the National
    Environmental Policy Act. In addition, DOE would develop a
    Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System (DBVS) Project baseline that
    can be used to determine the path forward for the full DBVS Project
    tests. Substantial work has been performed to improve the basis for
    estimating project costs in accordance with DOE Order 413.3, Project
    Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. Using funding
    requested through fiscal year 2006, in fiscal year 2006-2007, DOE plans
    to complete the DBVS design; validate project costs; complete full-
    scale cold tests at the vendor's Richland, Washington, site; conduct an
    independent review by a senior professional team from private industry,
    and academia; conduct an External Independent Review; complete a
    project baseline; and progress through the critical decision process
    for the DBVS required by DOE Order 413.3.

        90. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, if the project is terminated
    for 2007 and reconstituted at a later date, what is the increased cost,
    how much time will be lost, and what plans have been made to recover
    the workforce or hire and retrain a new workforce for the project?
        Mr. Rispoli. There is no plan to terminate the project. Rather,
    extensive activities are planned or are underway to develop a cost and
    schedule baseline and other information required to proceed through the
    critical decision process required by DOE Order 413.3, Project
    Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. In order to establish
    a baseline, there must be a valid basis to measure costs and schedules
    against. Until a valid baseline is in place, DOE cannot know what
    impacts there might be to the contractor workforce, if any.

        91. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, will cancellation of the bulk
    vitrification result in a failure to meet commitments to the State of
    Washington?
        Mr. Rispoli. There is no plan to terminate the project. Rather,
    extensive activities are planned or are underway to develop a cost and
    schedule baseline and other information required to proceed through the
    critical decision process required by DOE Order 413.3, Project
    Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. In order to establish
    a baseline, there must be a valid basis to measure costs and schedules
    against. Until a valid baseline is in place, DOE cannot know what
    impacts there might be to the contractor workforce, if any.

        92. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, how many commitments to the
    State of Washington will not be met in fiscal year 2007 or beyond given
    the fiscal year 2007 budget request?
        Mr. Rispoli. There are no TPA milestones that will be missed due to
    the fiscal year 2007 budget. However, some milestones are at risk
    because of other issues, such as overly optimistic assumptions that
    were in place when the milestones were established (e.g., failure to
    anticipate various technical issues that have since come to light),
    risk prioritization, bringing certain projects into line with the DOE's
    Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets directive,
    further waste site characterization, increased volume projections, and
    prioritizing field data collection activities over paper generation
    activities. The DOE plans to manage these risks and to use its best
    efforts to meet the milestones. At this time, completion of hot
    commissioning of the WTP, Milestone M-62-10, remains the only milestone
    beyond fiscal year 2007 at risk because of the aforementioned issues.

        93. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, has DOE started any
    discussions with the State of Washington to modify the various
    commitments under the TPA?
        Mr. Rispoli. Currently, the Richland Operations Office is
    discussing changes in Central Plateau Cleanup and Waste Management.
    These discussions involve adjusting milestones to allow for further
    characterization of waste sites and adjusting waste treatment
    milestones to reflect revised retrieval volume projections. The TPA
    parties recognized changes would be necessary and included a formal
    change control process in the TPA. The DOE uses its best efforts to
    initiate discussions or notify the document signatories of potential
    milestone impacts in a timely manner. For example, the Office of River
    Protection notified the Washington State Department of Ecology and the
    Region 10 Offices of the TPA milestones impacted by the delays in the
    construction and operation of the WTP on January 31, 2006.
    Additionally, the Office of River Protection initiated discussions in
    February 2006 with the Washington State Department of Ecology regarding
    other near-term TPA milestones that were impacted by the WTP delays or
    other performance and technical issues.

                       ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNICAL EXPERTISE

        94. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Rispoli, what additional steps could
    you take to utilize the DOE national laboratories to ensure that
    shortfalls in EM technical expertise are addressed?
        Mr. Rispoli. I consider the DOE's national laboratories an
    important resource to assist the DOE environmental cleanup mission. As
    such, continued use of the national laboratory technical experts in the
    Office of EM technical projects and activities is vital. EM is in
    partnership with four national laboratories to obtain assistance in
    identifying emerging issues and providing more technical assistance
    across the EM complex. The labs can provide rapid response to address
    current technical problems impeding site cleanup by evaluating new and
    innovative approaches that result in cost savings or improvements to
    waste disposition pathways. In addition, national laboratory technical
    experts participate in longer duration evaluations to develop
    alternatives to the larger site baselines in order to decrease life-
    cycle schedule and costs. National laboratories also conduct research
    in collaboration with Russian scientists and engineers to develop high-
    level waste treatment technologies, for example.
        EM is placing an increased emphasis on strengthening the technical
    competencies of its Federal workforce through a multi-pronged approach.
    This evolving approach includes the certification and qualification of
    employees, development and sponsorship of training courses in specific
    EM technical competencies, increased recruitment of mid-level and
    career intern employees with technical experience and education, and
    encouragement of employee participation in technical and professional
    societies.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                          NUCLEAR STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS

        95. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, many times in your prepared
    statement you talk about reductions, significant reductions, in the
    nuclear weapons stockpile and you state that the 2001 NPR called for a
    ``transition from a threat-based nuclear deterrent with large numbers
    of deployed and reserve weapons to a deterrent based on capabilities,
    with a smaller nuclear weapons stockpile.'' What dismantlement
    decisions have been made and implemented since 2001 to achieve the
    reductions?
        Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]

        96. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, in what way is the stockpile
    smaller today than it was in 2000?
        Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]

        97. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, what part of the transition
    discussed in the 2001 NPR has occurred and what is planned?
        Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]

        98. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, how many dismantlements are
    planned for fiscal year 2006 and for fiscal year 2007 and which weapons
    will be dismantled in each year?
        Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]

        99. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, currently there are roughly
    four weapons in reserve or inactive or other status in the stockpile
    for every weapon deployed. Under the 2001 NPR, is there a goal to
    reduce this ratio?
        Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]

        100. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, will the RRW program allow a
    reduction in this ratio? What is the goal and what is a reasonable
    ratio?
        Ambassador Brooks. Last April, before this committee, I provided a
    statement indicating that the RRW, if ongoing studies validated the
    feasibility of RRW designs, will be the ``enabler'' to achieve the
    infrastructure and stockpile transformation that is needed for the
    Nation's future nuclear deterrent. Once we establish a responsive
    infrastructure, can demonstrate that we can produce RRWs on a timescale
    in which geopolitical threats could emerge, and can respond in a timely
    way to technical problems in the stockpile, then I believe we can go
    much further in reducing non-deployed warheads.
        If we can demonstrate feasibility of higher margin replacement
    warheads and components that increase confidence in the stockpile, we
    believe this will allow further reductions in the stockpile.
    Additionally, we believe these more easily manufactured replacement
    warheads will provide an opportunity to transform to a more responsive,
    cost effective, and efficient infrastructure that will then provide
    more opportunities for additional stockpile reductions. A more
    responsive infrastructure will allow less reliance on the non-deployed
    stockpile for risk reduction, and lead to more reliance on the
    infrastructure (i.e., ability to produce additional or repair warheads
    in sufficient quantity) in responding to technical failures or new and
    emerging threats of the 21st century. Our ability to reduce the
    stockpile in the years beyond 2012 will depend critically on continued
    progress in achieving the RRW and responsive infrastructure goals.

        101. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, you state in your testimony
    that by 2012 the stockpile will be ``the smallest stockpile since the
    Eisenhower administration.'' What is the annual dismantlement plan to
    achieve this reduction?
        Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]

        102. Senator Reed. Ambassador Brooks, how do you quantify this
    reduction based on the total number of weapons in the stockpile today--
    50 percent, 25 percent, 10 percent?
        Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]

        [Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 2006

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                         Washington DC.

                        GLOBAL STRIKE PLANS AND PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions and Bill
    Nelson.
        Other Senators present: Senator Byron L. Dorgan
        Majority staff members present: Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.,
    professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
    member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; and
    Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    minority counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
    member.
        Staff assistants present: Jill L. Simodejka and Pendred K.
    Wilson.
        Committee members' assistants present: Arch Galloway II,
    assistant to Senator Sessions; and William K. Sutey, assistant
    to Senator Bill Nelson.

              STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. The meeting will come to order. I'm
    pleased to welcome our witnesses today--General James
    Cartwright, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command
    (USSTRATCOM); Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    International Security Policy; Rear Admiral Charles Young,
    Director of the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs; and Major
    General Stanley Gorenc, Director for the Air Force Operational
    Capabilities Requirements. That's a mouthful.
        General Gorenc. It is a mouthful.
        Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, I thank you for your service
    to your Nation. Many good things have occurred, and I know you
    are thinking creatively and long range and to try to configure
    us in a way we need to be for the short-term future and the
    long-term future, and we're glad to have you join us today. We
    will receive testimony today on the Department of Defense's
    (DOD) policy plans and programs for global or strategic strike.
    During the Cold War, the term ``strategic strike'' was
    associated with the use of long-range nuclear forces to deter
    the former Soviet Union. Today, strategic forces must provide
    the President and the warfighter a range of capabilities to
    address a new global security environment where rogue states
    armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and violent
    extremists have to be added to the list of strategic
    challenges. This new concept for strategic strike, now commonly
    referred to as global strike, was codified in the 2001 Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR) conducted by the DOD.
        Oh, Senator Nelson, great to have you with us. One of the
    principal tenets of the NPR was a greater emphasis on advanced
    conventional weapons as a means to reduce dependency on nuclear
    forces to provide an offensive deterrent. While the United
    States is well on its way toward reducing the nuclear forces of
    some 2,200 operationally deployed warheads, by 2012, it is less
    clear that our improved conventional strike capabilities are
    maturing as quickly as they should be. For example, the June
    2005 Prompt Global Strike Plan submitted to Congress noted,
    ``For the near future, in the event of a rapidly-developing
    crisis, the DOD will not have non-nuclear, long-range precision
    strike options for consideration by the national leadership.''
    The budget request before us includes $127 million in fiscal
    year 2007 to address this gap in the near-term by modifying 24
    of the existing nuclear-armed Trident D-5 Submarine-Launched
    Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) that carry conventional warheads,
    not nuclear. The capability to strike virtually anywhere on the
    face of the Earth within 60 minutes could provide the President
    with the means to preempt dangerous threats to the United
    States and its allies and could well become one of the more
    important deterrent tools in our Nation's strategic arsenal.
    One example that might serve to illustrate the potential
    importance of this capability is that at the outset of the
    March 2003 campaign in Iraq, the United States launched an
    attack with F-117 fighters and sea-launched cruise missiles in
    an attempt to decapitate the Iraqi leadership.
        According to the press reports, this strike took 4 hours to
    execute. Despite the fact that U.S. forces were already
    deployed in the region. Wouldn't it be in our interest to have
    the capability to launch our strike within 30 or 60 minutes? We
    are mindful, however, that there may be risks associated with
    plans to collocate conventional and nuclear Trident missiles on
    the same submarine. How, for example, would other nuclear
    powers interpret U.S. intentions during a launch? In
    determining whether to go forward with this program, we will
    need to weigh carefully the potential benefits of this new
    capability against the perceived risks. To help us make this
    determination, the committee also needs to be aware of other
    prompt global strike capabilities to include land-based options
    available to the Department in the near-term and over time.
        While addressing non-nuclear strike options, we must bear
    in mind that nuclear weapons are uniquely capable of holding
    certain critical targets at risk and that the size and
    structure of our nuclear deterrent forces will continue to play
    an important role in our national security posture. It is in
    this context that we will consider the Department's plans to
    reduce the number of operationally-deployed Minuteman III
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from 500 to 450.
    These are just some of the issues we intend to explore in our
    hearing today. Let me now recognize my distinguished ranking
    member, Senator Nelson of Florida. I appreciate his partnership
    and his interest in matters relating to our Nation's defense.
        Senator Nelson, we welcome any remarks you have.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have three
    issues to discuss today--(1) the proposal to convert the 24
    Trident D-5 Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles to carry 4 non-
    nuclear warheads each and replace 2 of the 24 nuclear D-5
    missiles on 12 Trident submarines with 2 non-nuclear D-5
    missiles; (2) the proposal to retire 38 B-52H bombers by 2008.
    The most immediate issue, however, is the decision to terminate
    the two B-52 upgrade programs by the end of this month,
    effectively foreclosing the consideration of this proposal by
    Congress; and (3) the lack of a decision with respect to the
    nuclear cruise missiles--should they be retired or retained?
    While this discussion is going on within the DOD, the
    Department of Energy (DOE) is spending $100 million per year to
    begin a life extension program on the W-80 Nuclear Warhead in
    2010, the nuclear warhead that is flown by all three cruise
    missiles. The decision needs to be made quickly on the
    missiles. If the W-80 is to be retired, then we shouldn't waste
    the $100 million per year.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. Senator Dorgan, we are
    delighted to have you as a guest of our committee. Do you want
    to say something before we begin with our guests?
        Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thanks for inviting me. I'm
    anxious to hear the testimony today, and I appreciate your
    willingness to allow me to sit in.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much. Then we'll start
    with Secretary Flory. Each of you that desire to make an
    opening statement, we'd be delighted to hear you. If you'd like
    to give abbreviated remarks and submit full remarks for the
    record, we'll accept that also.
        Secretary Flory.

      STATEMENT OF HON. PETER C.W. FLORY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
               DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

        Mr. Flory. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission,
    I'll do just that. I will give a shorter opening statement and
    ask that my entire statement please be included in the record.
        Senator Sessions. Very well.
        Mr. Flory. Chairman Sessions, Senator Nelson, Senator
    Dorgan, I welcome the opportunity to testify before the
    subcommittee today to describe our progress in transforming the
    Nation's strategic capabilities. I want to thank you and the
    other members of the subcommittee for your continued support in
    this important endeavor. The successful transformation of our
    capabilities will require a sustained partnership between the
    DOD and Congress.
        As the recently published National Security Strategy (NSS)
    notes, the new strategic environment requires new approaches to
    deterrence and defense. Our deterrence strategy, as the
    chairman pointed out in his opening remarks, no longer rests
    solely on our ability to inflict devastating consequences on
    potential foes. Today, a more discriminate approach and a
    broader range of options and capabilities--including both
    offenses and defenses--contribute to the deterrence of state
    and non-state actors by denying them their objectives and, if
    necessary, by responding with overwhelming force.
        Our strategy for transforming U.S. strategic forces is
    contained in the NPR of December 2001. The NPR was written in
    response to congressional direction, and reflected Presidential
    guidance to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons to the
    lowest levels consistent with U.S. national security and our
    commitments to allies.
        The NPR called for an overhaul of U.S. strategic forces and
    concepts and provided a framework to guide their future
    development in a new and uncertain environment that we found
    ourselves in following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The
    NPR did a number of things. Notably, it directed reductions in
    the number of operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads
    from around 6,000 to levels between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012.
    The NPR also established a so-called New Triad composed of
    offensive strike systems to include nuclear, non-nuclear, and
    non-kinetic capabilities that can generate strategic effects
    promptly and precisely and at great range. It also included
    defenses, both active and passive, as well as a responsive
    defense infrastructure which includes the U.S. nuclear weapons
    complex to provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet
    emerging threats.
        When fully implemented, the New Triad can provide the range
    of capabilities and options needed for a credible deterrent
    against a wide range of potential adversaries whose values and
    calculations of risk, gain, and loss may be very different from
    and, in many ways, harder to discern than those of past
    adversaries. These capabilities will also be important should
    deterrence fail. The New Triad is designed to transform our
    strategic capabilities to deal with an uncertain future, and it
    reflects new thinking about the meaning and purpose of U.S.
    strategic capabilities.
        For example, during the Cold War, the term strategic strike
    was virtually synonymous with the employment of nuclear
    weapons. This is no longer so. The development of precision
    targeting, flexible and collaborative planning, and improved
    intelligence and surveillance capabilities now enables us to
    envision using highly precise and responsive conventional
    systems to achieve strategic effects. So today, in appropriate
    areas, we are adding and need to continue to add conventional
    global strike to the mix of our capabilities.
        During the Cold War, we also designed our strategic nuclear
    forces to deter a single foe, the Soviet Union, and generally
    treated all others as lesser-included cases.
        Today, a one-size-fits-all approach to deterrence is no
    longer appropriate. Today, we must tailor deterrence to fulfill
    a number of functions: to assure our allies and friends; to
    achieve specific effects against a wide range of potential
    adversaries and circumstances, such as advanced military
    competitors or nuclear competitors, regional WMD states, and
    non-state terrorist networks.
        We cannot predict with confidence which nations or nation,
    which non-state actors, or which combination of the above may
    pose a threat to our vital interest or those of our friends and
    allies and how such a threat might materialize and what form
    and attack it might take. As the NPR noted, the September 11
    attacks dramatically illustrated the unparalleled extremism,
    hostility, and unpredictability of some foes.
        The NPR was only a starting point for the transformation of
    our strategic capabilities and concepts. Since December 2001,
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff,
    USSTRATCOM, and the Services have been working together to
    develop detailed implementation plans and operational concepts.
    I would like to highlight some examples of our progress to
    date. New missions have been assigned to USSTRATCOM to General
    Cartwright here and his crew out in Omaha beyond their
    continuing responsibility for strategic nuclear forces. These
    include global strike, integration of missile defense, space
    operations, integration of command, control, communications,
    and intelligence, offensive information operations, and
    integrating and synchronizing DOD's role in combating WMDs. I
    know General Cartwright will have more to say on his response
    to these many challenging tasks.
        We have made significant progress in a number of areas. For
    example, we have fielded an initial ballistic missile defense
    capability at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force
    Base, and we have initiated additional cooperation and
    participation in our missile defense program. We are reducing
    U.S. nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally-
    deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012 and are on track to
    meet our interim goal of 3,800 warheads by 2007.
        We are also making progress in developing non-kinetic
    strike capabilities and improving planning, intelligence, and
    command and control capabilities to integrate our New Triad
    effectively.
        There are some areas, however, as you pointed out, Mr.
    Chairman, where we have made less progress. These include
    fielding prompt conventional capabilities for global strike,
    transforming a Cold War nuclear arsenal to meet new challenges,
    and revitalizing our nuclear infrastructure.
        We are working hard to make greater progress in these areas
    to realize the full potential and the broad mix of capabilities
    called for in the NPR. For example, we need the systems to be
    in a position where in a regional crisis against an adversary
    armed with WMD, the credibility of our deterrent may turn on
    our ability to threaten highly-valued assets of importance to
    that state's leadership while minimizing collateral damage.
    These assets may include WMD, missiles, command and control
    facilities, or leadership bunkers, any one of which may be
    protected in hard or deeply-buried facilities. Conventional
    global strike capabilities are needed to augment our existing
    military options for holding such targets at risk, and we need
    to expand the range of prompt, long-range strike options
    available to the President, options which are currently limited
    to nuclear weapons.
        Fielding this New Triad will strengthen the overall
    credibility of our deterrent posture and maintain the nuclear
    threshold at an appropriately high level and reduce our
    reliance on nuclear weapons.
        At the same time, this more flexible and capable strategic
    posture can help address all four pillars of our defense
    strategy. I mentioned earlier the capability to assure our
    allies and friends to help dissuade potential adversaries from
    investing in capabilities to challenge the United States and to
    help deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression.
        While our national strategy calls for reduced reliance on
    nuclear weapons, these weapons will continue to play a critical
    role. Nuclear weapons provide credible military options to
    deter a wide range of threats, including chemical, biological,
    radiological, and nuclear weapons as well as large-scale
    aggression. Nuclear weapons possess unique properties that give
    the United States options to hold at risk target classes that
    cannot be countered through non-nuclear means.
        What we need here is not a smaller version of a Cold War-
    era nuclear stockpile, we need capabilities that are
    appropriate for the 21st century.
        To accomplish the transformation of our nuclear stockpile,
    it will be necessary to restore the Nation's nuclear
    infrastructure. Revitalizing and restoring the nuclear weapons
    infrastructure is essential to assure the long-term safety and
    reliability of U.S. nuclear warheads and to provide a hedge
    against an unforeseen, catastrophic technical failure and any
    element of our nuclear force or against adverse geopolitical
    changes.
        To assist in transforming the stockpile and to help place
    the nuclear infrastructure on a sound footing, one important
    near-term initiative is the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).
    The RRW program will ensure the long-term sustainability of a
    stockpile by, among other things, eliminating hazardous
    materials and simplifying warhead manufacturing--all of this to
    be done without nuclear testing. If successful, the RRW may
    enable further reductions in the size of the stockpile by
    demonstrating a real capability to manufacture highly RRWs. In
    this respect, the RRW may be a first step towards the
    responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure called for by the
    NPR.
        The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that was completed in
    February was another extensive review of all of the
    Department's capabilities that took a very close look at
    deterrence and the capabilities that we need to maintain our
    deterrence.
        Among other things leading into the QDR, we had a another
    study in 2004-2005, which reviewed the fundamental assumptions
    of the NPR. This was the Strategic Capabilities Assessment. In
    the course of that, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
    reviewed our original planning assumptions, the original
    planning assumptions that had guided the decisions we made,
    both to reduce our nuclear warheads and to develop the New
    Triad and noted that those assumptions were still valid.
    However, DIA pointed out that to the extent that conditions
    were changing, to the extend that the trend was different from
    what was predicted, it was trending, if anything, toward a
    more-stressing rather than a less-stressing strategic
    landscape--for example, with respect to developments in North
    Korea, Iran, and general nuclear proliferation. These same
    assumptions were reviewed and revalidated in the 2006 QDR when,
    as I mentioned earlier, the senior civilian and military
    leadership of the Department reviewed areas associated with
    implementation of the NPR and development of the New Triad and
    our overall defensive posture. As I noted earlier, the U.S.
    needs to tailor its strategy of deterrence to each potential
    adversary across a wide range of scenarios.
        Specifically, the QDR concluded that the U.S. needs to
    tailor its strategy of deterrence to each potential adversary,
    that we need to make greater progress in fielding prompt,
    accurate, non-nuclear global strike capabilities and that we
    can also make further modest reductions in the strategic
    nuclear force structure with minimal risk. I will touch briefly
    on each of these QDR conclusions. First, with respect to
    tailored deterrence, the U.S. needs to tailor its deterrence to
    each potential adversary across a wide range of scenarios. This
    means having the capability to create specific and appropriate
    effects to influence the decisionmaking of each potential
    adversary. Tailored deterrence will require that we understand
    each potential adversary to a greater degree than in the past.
    As I noted earlier, this may actually be harder to do than it
    was in the past. Tailored deterrence also means that our
    declaratory statements will need to be tailored so that our
    policy statements and our operational capabilities work
    together to send the same message and to strengthen deterrence.
        Second, with respect to global strike and the need to
    deploy a conventional global strike capability, as an element
    of a more-tailored, deterrent posture, we need to deploy,
    within 2 years, an initial capability that will allow us to
    promptly engage targets globally with precision-guided
    conventional weapons. This is the conventional Trident missile
    system, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, that you mentioned in
    your opening remarks. The way we plan to achieve this is by
    arming a small number of long-range Trident missiles with
    accurate, non-nuclear warheads. This system would represent a
    near-term, affordable, relatively off-the-shelf and low-risk
    option for providing the President of the United States with an
    important capability that he does not have today. By deploying
    conventional Trident, we close a longstanding gap in our
    conventional strike capability for engaging an adversary
    promptly and precisely anywhere in the world.
        I understand there is concern, and this was mentioned in
    your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman and Senator Nelson, that
    there is a risk that the operational launch of a non-nuclear
    Trident missile might cause other nations--for example, Russia
    or China, to mistake such a launch for a nuclear attack. The
    U.S. has employed dual-role weapon systems in many years, and
    in fact, has done a number of missile tests from Trident and
    other submarines. But we recognize that a non-nuclear Trident
    missile aboard an SSBN will, in fact, represent a significant
    new development, and this is a concern that we take very
    seriously. I should point out that for the near-term, only
    Russia will have the ability to detect and respond promptly to
    ballistic missile launches of any kind. I think it's important
    to note that we already have in place, both with respect to
    Russian leaders--and is also concerned about the Chinese
    leadership--we have, with respect to the Russian and Chinese
    leaders, hotlines and other means for emergency communications
    that would be an important part of our strategy for mitigating
    any potential risk of misperception here.
        In addition to hotlines and the potential for advanced
    notification of a launch, we have other means for creating
    transparency and building confidence. One of those would
    include military-to-military talks between our respective
    forces so that others would understand our concept of
    operations for this new capability. Other options would include
    ways in which we could structure and operate the system to
    provide a notably different launch phenomenology, for example,
    different tasking and authorization procedures so that a launch
    of one of these systems would not, in fact, look just like a
    launch of a nuclear system.
        Again, we take seriously the risks that have been expressed
    about the possibility of a misperception. We think we have
    measures in place that would be able to mitigate this risk, and
    we think that it's on balance. The benefits that could be
    gained from this system are substantial, and the risks, while
    are there things that need to be taken seriously, they are
    things that we can confidently manage.
        In this context, it is important to remember that while any
    military action involves risks, there may also be risks and
    sometimes, very serious regrets in not acting. By developing
    and deploying this system, what we intend to do is to provide
    the President with one more option with which he can choose to
    act or not act or however he wants to proceed with respect to
    threats against the United States. It's a question of filling
    in a range of options that is not fully filled in right now.
        My last point, with respect to the further reductions in
    the ICBM force, we have made considerable progress in reducing
    our operationally-deployed strategic weapons, as I noted
    earlier. In light of this progress, the QDR has reevaluated our
    strategic nuclear force posture and determined that with
    minimal and acceptable risk, we could make further modest
    reductions and retire 50 Minuteman IIIs. This represents a 10-
    percent reduction in the size of the Minuteman III force as
    envisioned by the NPR in 2001.
        Mr. Chairman, once again, in conclusion, we need a
    sustained partnership between the DOD and Congress if we are to
    transform our Nation's strategic capabilities to meet the
    uncertainties and challenges ahead. The Department will require
    your and the subcommittee's and the chairman's and the full
    committee's and the entire Congress's support as we continue to
    replace the legacy Cold War force posture with a New Triad that
    will protect our Nation in the new security environment.
        I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Flory follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by Peter C.W. Flory

                               I. OPENING REMARKS

        Chairman Sessions, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee: I welcome the opportunity to testify before the
    subcommittee to describe our progress in transforming the Nation's
    strategic capabilities. I know that you understand the importance of
    this effort and that you recognize the need to replace a force posture
    configured for the Cold War with a New Triad that is better suited to
    the new security environment. I want to thank the members of the
    committee for your continued support in this effort. Successful
    transformation of our capabilities will require a sustained partnership
    between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress.

             II. THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW: A CATALYST FOR CHANGE

        As the recently published National Security Strategy (NSS) notes,
    the new strategic environment requires new approaches to deterrence and
    defense. Our deterrence strategy no longer rests solely on an ability
    to inflict devastating consequences on potential foes. Today, a more
    discriminate approach and a broader range of capabilities--including
    both offenses and defenses--contribute to deterrence of state and non-
    state actors, by denying them their objectives and, if necessary, by
    responding with overwhelming force.
        Our strategy for transforming U.S. strategic forces is contained in
    the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of December 2001. The NPR was written
    in response to congressional direction, and reflected Presidential
    guidance to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons to the lowest
    levels consistent with U.S. national security and our commitments to
    allies.
        The NPR called for an overhaul of U.S. strategic forces and
    concepts, and provided a framework to guide the future development of
    these forces in the new and uncertain environment we found following
    the attacks of September 11, 2001. The NPR directed reductions in the
    number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from around
    6,000 to levels between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. The NPR also
    established a New Triad composed of:

             Offensive strike systems--to include nuclear, non-
            nuclear, and non-kinetic capabilities that can generate
            strategic effects promptly and precisely, and at great range;
             Defenses--both active and passive; and
             A responsive defense infrastructure--including the
            U.S. nuclear weapons complex--to provide new capabilities in a
            timely fashion to meet emerging threats.

        These New Triad capabilities will be integrated by improved
    planning, intelligence, and command and control.
        When fully implemented, the New Triad can provide the range of
    capabilities and options needed for a credible deterrent against a
    range of potential adversaries whose values and calculations of risk,
    gain and loss may be very different from--and more difficult to discern
    than--those of past adversaries. These capabilities will also be
    important should deterrence fail. This New Triad is designed to
    transform our strategic capabilities to deal with an uncertain future,
    and reflects new thinking about the meaning and purpose of U.S.
    strategic capabilities.
        For example, during the Cold War the term ``strategic strike'' was
    virtually synonymous with the employment of nuclear weapons. This is no
    longer so. The development of precision targeting capabilities,
    flexible and collaborative planning systems, net-centric national
    command and control systems, and improved intelligence and surveillance
    capabilities now enable us to envision using highly precise and
    responsive conventional weaponry to achieve strategic effects that once
    required nuclear weapons. Today, in appropriate areas, we can add
    conventional Global Strike to the mix of capabilities able to achieve
    strategic effects.
        During the Cold War, the main challenge facing the United States
    was deterring the former Soviet Union from using weapons of mass
    destruction against the United States and its allies. At that time we
    designed our strategic nuclear forces to deter a single foe, and
    generally treated all others as ``lesser included cases.''
        The new security environment is much-changed, however. As noted in
    the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released last month, Russia is
    unlikely to pose a military threat to the United States or its allies
    on the same scale or intensity as the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
    although it remains a country in transition. It is no longer an
    adversary but not a traditional ally. Of the major and emerging powers,
    China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United
    States, and there are potential flash points with which we must be
    concerned, such as Taiwan.
        At the same time the United States faces a threat from an expanding
    number of hostile regimes and terrorist groups that seek to acquire and
    use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Even when they do not pose a
    direct threat to the United States, these States may threaten the U.S.
    or its allies indirectly by transferring weapons or expertise to
    terrorists. The United States cannot predict with confidence which
    nation, nations, non-state actors, or a combination of the above may
    pose a threat to its vital interests, or those of its friends and
    allies, in the decades ahead. As the NPR noted: ``The September 11
    attacks dramatically illustrated the unparalleled extremism, hostility,
    and unpredictability of some foes. . . .''
        In this new and uncertain environment, a ``one size fits all''
    approach to deterrence is no longer appropriate; we must re-think our
    approach to 21st century threats and tailor deterrence to assure our
    allies and friends, and achieve specific effects against a wide array
    of potential adversaries and circumstances, such as advanced military
    competitors, regional WMD states, and non-state terrorist networks. To
    do this we must have a broad range of credible strategic capabilities--
    including a mix of nuclear and non-nuclear Global Strike capabilities,
    defenses, and a revitalized and responsive infrastructure.
        The NPR of 2001 set forth, and was based on, the following
    assumptions:

             Expect Surprise;
             Unpredictable Future;
             Deterrence continues to be important, but uncertain;
             Future adversaries (e.g., rogue states) possess WMD;
            Denial and deception complicate characterization of WMD
            facilities;
             Terrorists and non-state actors seek WMD;
             China modernizing conventional and nuclear forces;
            Taiwan a potential flash point; and
             Russia no longer an adversary, but uncertain future.

        Since its publication in December 2001, the logic, strategy, and
    the fundamental assumptions of the NPR have been reviewed periodically
    and subjected to rigorous internal scrutiny, for example, in the 2004-
    2005 Strategic Capabilities Assessment. Based on the Defense
    Intelligence Agency's assessment, the 2004-2005 Strategic Capabilities
    Assessment concluded that the NPR's planning assumptions remain valid,
    although conditions are trending toward--if anything--a more stressing
    strategic landscape, for example, with respect to North Korea, Iran and
    nuclear proliferation. Additionally, we are increasingly concerned over
    the sale to others of disruptive weapons technologies by Russia--a
    country in transition--as well as by others. These same assumptions
    were revalidated by the 2006 QDR.
        But the NPR was only a starting point for the transformation of
    U.S. strategic capabilities and concepts. Since December 2001 the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic
    Command (USSTRATCOM), and the Services have been working together to
    develop detailed implementation plans and operational concepts. I would
    like to highlight some examples of our progress to date:

              1. New missions have been assigned to USSTRATCOM beyond its
            continuing responsibility for strategic nuclear forces. These
            include:

                     Global Strike--to include nuclear, non-nuclear
                    and non-kinetic effects;
                     Integration of Missile Defense;
                     Space Operations;
                     Integration of Command, Control,
                    Communications, and Intelligence;
                     Offensive Information Operations; and
                     Integrating and synchronizing DOD's role in
                    Combating WMD.

              2. We have made significant progress in several areas, for
            example:

                      a. We have fielded an initial ballistic missile
                    defense capability at Ft. Greely, Alaska; and expanded
                    international cooperation and participation in our
                    missile defense program.
                      b. We are reducing U.S. nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200
                    operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by
                    2012. We are on-track to meet our interim goal of 3,800
                    warheads by 2007.

                             We removed the last Peacekeeper
                            Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) from
                            its silo in September 2005;
                             We completed the conversion to
                            Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Attack
                            Submarines (SSGNs) of two of the four Nuclear-
                            Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)
                            that are being retired from strategic service;
                            and
                             We implemented a new plan for the
                            nuclear stockpile that will cut the total
                            number of active and inactive warheads nearly
                            in half by 2012.

                      c. We also are making progress in developing non-
                    kinetic strike capabilities and improving planning,
                    intelligence, and command and control capabilities that
                    are needed to integrate New Triad capabilities
                    effectively.

              3. There are, however, areas where we have made only limited
            progress; these include:

                     fielding prompt conventional capabilities for
                    Global Strike;
                     transforming a Cold War nuclear arsenal to
                    meet new challenges; and
                     revitalizing the nuclear infrastructure.

        We are working to make greater progress in these three areas in
    order to realize the broad mix of capabilities called for by the NPR.
    Instead of the legacy Cold War strategic posture, with its reliance on
    high-yield, nuclear weapons delivered by ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
    bombers to deter the Soviet Union, we need to transform and strengthen
    our posture to enable us to tailor deterrence against the full spectrum
    of post-Cold War threats. This, in turn, will require delivering on new
    capabilities that are credible and useful in affecting the
    decisionmaking of potential adversaries, and are effective against
    high-value, strategic targets.
        For example, in a regional crisis against an adversary armed with
    WMD, the credibility of our deterrent may turn on our ability to
    threaten highly-valued assets of importance to that state's leadership,
    while minimizing collateral damage. These assets may include WMD,
    missiles, command and control, or leadership bunkers protected in hard
    and deeply buried facilities. Conventional Global Strike capabilities
    are meant to augment the existing military options for holding such
    targets at risk, and expand the range of prompt, long-range strike
    options available to the President--currently limited to nuclear
    weapons. Thus, rather than rejecting deterrence, prompt, conventional
    Global Strike capabilities are intended to strengthen deterrence in the
    changed and evolving strategic environment.
        As Secretary Rumsfeld emphasized in the Foreword to the NPR, our
    direction is designed to ``improve our ability to deter attack,'' while
    ``reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons'' to do so. The NPR does
    not reject deterrence in favor of ``nuclear warfighting,'' nor does it
    ``lower the nuclear threshold.'' By fielding a New Triad of
    capabilities that includes conventional Global Strike assets, and
    defenses, and a responsive infrastructure, we strengthen the overall
    credibility of our deterrent posture and maintain the nuclear threshold
    at an appropriately high level.
        By placing greater emphasis on advanced non-nuclear and defensive
    capabilities, we seek to increase the credibility of our deterrent
    posture for many contingencies, while reducing the emphasis on nuclear
    weapons in our strategic posture. The broad array of New Triad
    capabilities can better assure our allies and friends that they should
    continue their reliance on the U.S. strategic deterrent--that they need
    not seek an alternative or independent nuclear capability for their
    security--thereby strengthening our alliances and supporting our
    nonproliferation goals. At the same time, the more flexible and capable
    strategic posture that the New Triad represents will help dissuade
    potential adversaries from investing in capabilities to challenge the
    United States, and help deter aggression.
        While our national strategy calls for reduced reliance on nuclear
    weapons, these weapons will continue to play a critical role in the
    defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends.
    Nuclear weapons provide credible military options to deter a wide range
    of threats, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
    weapons, and large-scale conventional military forces. Nuclear weapons
    possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold
    at risk a wide variety of target classes--some of which cannot be held
    at risk in any other fashion. Nuclear weapons will retain a vital role
    in deterring WMD threats, assuring allies of U.S. security commitments,
    holding at risk an adversary's assets and capabilities that cannot be
    countered through non-nuclear means, and dissuading potential
    adversaries from developing large-scale nuclear or conventional
    threats.
        To achieve that goal we need to sustain flexible and credible
    nuclear forces. Sustaining such a force will help mitigate the risks
    associated with the drawdown of nuclear forces, provide a broader range
    of options to the President, and offer the means necessary to tailor
    deterrence against a range of potential adversaries and circumstances.
        However, to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent we need to
    transform the nuclear stockpile so that the weapons we retain are
    appropriate for the challenges and uncertainties we will face in the
    coming decades. What we need is not a smaller version of the Cold War-
    era nuclear stockpile; we need capabilities appropriate for 21st
    century threats.
        To accomplish the transformation of our nuclear stockpile it will
    be necessary to restore the Nation's nuclear infrastructure. The
    National Nuclear Security Administration has a plan for revitalizing
    this essential leg of the New Triad. Revitalization is essential in
    order to assure the long-term safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear
    warheads, strengthen deterrence for the new security environment, and
    provide a hedge against an unforeseen, catastrophic technical failure
    of any element of the nuclear force, or adverse geopolitical changes.
        To assist in transforming the composition of the nuclear stockpile,
    and to help place the Nation's nuclear infrastructure on a sound
    footing, it is imperative that we continue, without delay, to field a
    Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The purpose of the RRW program is
    to ensure the long-term sustainability of a nuclear weapon stockpile
    for U.S. national security by, among other things, eliminating
    hazardous materials, and simplifying warhead manufacturing--all without
    nuclear testing. If successful, RRW may enable further reductions in
    the size of the stockpile by demonstrating a real capability to
    manufacture highly reliable, certified replacement warheads. In this
    respect, the RRW is a first step towards the responsive nuclear weapons
    infrastructure called for in the NPR.

                      III. THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

        As noted earlier, DOD has periodically reviewed the fundamental
    assumptions of the NPR and subjected them to rigorous scrutiny. In the
    recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), for example, senior civilian
    and military leaders reviewed several areas associated with the
    implementation of the NPR and development of the New Triad, and
    concluded that:

              1. The U.S. needs to tailor its strategy of deterrence to
            each potential adversary;
              2. The U.S. needs to make greater progress in fielding
            prompt, accurate, non-nuclear Global Strike capabilities; and
              3. The U.S. can make further, modest reductions in the
            strategic nuclear force structure with minimal risk.

        I would like to discuss each of these QDR conclusions in turn.
    Tailored Deterrence
        As I noted earlier, the U.S. needs to tailor its strategy of
    deterrence to each potential adversary across a wide range of
    scenarios. Tailored deterrence will require that we understand each
    potential adversary to a greater degree than in the past. We must
    constantly ask ourselves who we may need to deter, and what we may need
    to deter them from doing. It also means having the capability to create
    the specific and appropriate effects needed to influence the
    decisionmaking of each potential adversary. Together with transforming
    DOD operational capabilities, U.S. declaratory statements will also
    need to be tailored so that our policy statements and our operational
    capabilities work together to underpin our deterrence strategy.
    Global Strike and the Conventional Trident Missile
        As an element of a more tailored deterrent posture, the Department
    seeks to deploy, within 2 years, an initial capability to promptly
    engage targets globally with precision guided conventional weapons.
    This initial prompt Global Strike capability will be achieved by arming
    a small number of long-range Trident missiles with accurate, non-
    nuclear warheads. The rationale for focusing on ballistic missiles, in
    general, and on a non-nuclear Trident missile in particular, is that
    Conventional Trident represents a near-term, affordable, relatively
    off-the-shelf and low-risk option for providing the President of the
    United States with an important, new capability. By deploying SSBNs
    armed with Conventional Trident missiles we will close a longstanding
    gap in our strike capability for engaging an adversary promptly and
    precisely, any where in the world, without having to resort to nuclear
    weapons.
        I understand that there is a concern about the possibility that the
    operational launch of a non-nuclear Trident missile might cause other
    nations, like China and Russia, to mistake it for a nuclear attack. The
    U.S. has employed dual-role weapon systems for many years, but we
    recognize that a non-nuclear Trident missile aboard an SSBN will
    represent a significant new development. I should point out that, for
    the near-term, only Russia will have the ability to both detect and
    respond promptly to ballistic missile launches. Fortunately, we already
    have in place links between U.S. senior leaders and their Russian and
    Chinese counterparts.
        To mitigate the risk of misperception we are exploring a variety of
    additional transparency and confidence-building measures. These
    measures include advance notification and military-to-military talks so
    that others understand our concept of operation for this new
    capability. We are also exploring the proper command and control
    procedures and release authority issues associated with deploying SSBNs
    with conventionally-armed Trident missiles. Our experience with
    hundreds of at-sea test launches over the past four decades, without
    incident, demonstrates that appropriate transparency measures can
    greatly reduce the potential for misunderstanding. We believe the
    benefits to be gained from Conventional Trident are important and the
    potential risks manageable.
        In this context, it is important to remember that while every
    military action involves risks, there may also be risks--and sometimes
    regrets--in not acting. By developing and deploying a Conventional
    Trident we will provide the President with one more option with which
    to defend against threats to the United States.
        We also are studying other, longer-term solutions, both sea- and
    land-based, in order to broaden our portfolio of non-nuclear Global
    Strike capabilities and provide even greater flexibility in our
    strategic posture. The initiatives underway include assessing options
    for kinetic and non-kinetic non-nuclear capabilities. For example, the
    Air Force's Land Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives
    study is seeking to identify a cost-effective set of global strike
    solutions; the Army is studying a concept for fielding an Advanced
    Hypersonic Weapon; and the Navy is studying the development of a
    conventionally-armed Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile with a range
    of about 1,500 nautical miles to increase the versatility of the cruise
    missile-armed submarine (SSGN). In addition, there are other
    initiatives underway across DOD that support the Prompt Global Strike
    mission; these include major enabling capabilities such as the
    transition to a net-centric based command, control, communications
    architecture, and improved global situation awareness with enhanced
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools.
    Further Reductions in the ICBM Force
        As I noted earlier, we have made considerable progress to date in
    drawing down our operationally-deployed strategic nuclear weapons to
    the 1,700-2,200 level; this includes the withdrawal of all 50
    Peacekeeper ICBMs from their silos, and the withdrawal of 4 SSBNs from
    strategic service and conversion to SSGNs. In light of our progress in
    making these reductions and fielding New Triad capabilities, the QDR
    re-evaluated our strategic nuclear force posture. As a result, DOD's
    senior leaders determined that--with minimal risk--we could make a
    further, modest reduction in the number of nuclear-armed ICBMs by
    retiring 50 Minuteman Ills. This represents a 10-percent reduction in
    the size of the Minuteman III force as envisioned by the NPR in 2001,
    but it will not affect the number of operationally deployed strategic
    nuclear warheads we are planning to deploy by 2012.

                             IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

        A sustained partnership between the DOD and Congress will be needed
    if we are to succeed in transforming our Nation's strategic
    capabilities to meet the uncertainties and challenges ahead. The
    Department will require your continued support to replace the legacy
    Cold War force posture with a New Triad that is better suited to the
    new security environment. In closing, I would like to summarize my main
    points.

              1. Conventional Trident Missile is a near-term means of
            addressing the current lack of capability for prompt,
            conventional Global Strike. The longer-term goal is to develop
            a range of prompt Global Strike capabilities that can provide
            the President with a wider range of options for addressing the
            dangers of the new security environment.
              2. Continued progress on ballistic missile defense is
            essential. The Department has made great strides since the
            President's decision in 2002 to field missile defenses, and we
            appreciate the continued support of this committee as we field
            this important capability.
              3. Transformation of the nuclear force is not only a matter
            of making reductions in operationally deployed strategic
            nuclear weapons. Making tailored deterrence a reality, and
            fielding a strategic force that is properly configured for the
            21st century, will require us to make adjustments in our force
            posture, in our residual nuclear stockpile, and in our
            thinking.

        Finally, as we transform U.S. strategic forces to deal with new
    security challenges, we must also rethink important issues and ideas--
    especially our understanding of deterrence. We cannot contend with 21st
    century uncertainties with a Cold War-force posture, a Cold War nuclear
    stockpile, or Cold War thinking.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Secretary Flory. General
    Cartwright, we'd be pleased to hear your opening comments at
    this time.

     STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
                           STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Nelson. I'm not going to go back over the threat and some of
    the things that I think have been very clearly laid out by
    Secretary Flory, but I would like to cover, starting with the
    Triad and the construct of the New Triad, the offense, defense,
    the infrastructure piece. Remember that this is underpinned by
    a robust command and control system, the intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and the planning
    capabilities that allow the use of this Triad and the
    integration of its capabilities in a more holistic fashion than
    maybe has been the case in the past.
        When you look at the Triad, the offensive piece, and that's
    what we're here to address today, a subset of the offensive
    piece is global strike, and that subset really is to hold at
    risk important targets such as those that are associated with
    WMD, missiles, command and control, hard and also the deeply-
    buried-type targets. These are the types of targets that we are
    focusing in on with global strike. A subset of global strike is
    the Prompt Global Strike, which really starts to get at the
    issue of those targets that will not necessarily emerge next to
    where we're based or where our normal patrol routes are. It can
    appear anyplace globally. It does not necessarily pay attention
    to borders or overfly rights and things like that, for which
    the significant regret factors of, say, a WMD or a type of
    target that represents a WMD--can cause great regret factors
    for the country. For these types of targets, we're trying to
    create a set of choices for the Nation on how to address them.
        Today, we hold prompt global targets of this type at risk
    with our strategic or nuclear forces, and the question is, can
    we expand because of the advances that we have made in
    precision, because of the advances that we have made in command
    and control, because of the advances that we're making in our
    ISR intelligence capabilities. Are there a further set of
    opportunities that we can use to hold at risk. Not all of these
    targets will present themselves in a way that is necessarily
    appropriate for a nuclear weapon, and that's just the diversity
    of the threat, the realities of where we are moving in the
    world. A nuclear weapon is still a viable part of our
    inventory, but it is, as the Secretary said, one-size-does-not-
    fit-all. What we would like to do is create an opportunity here
    to field a weapon that will give us a broader and potentially
    more appropriate choice for the Nation.
        In looking at the construct of 24 of these weapons, 2 per
    boat across the population, the intent here is to provide a
    credible choice that will hold these unanticipated targets,
    these fleeting targets, targets that don't stay in one place
    for very long, don't give us a lot of indications and warning
    that they're going to be there, to hold them at risk in a way
    that we have not been able to do in the past with something
    other than a nuclear weapon. We are asking to proceed on a path
    that will field on the Trident missile a conventional warhead.
    This warhead, by the way, is not explosive. It is inert.
    Because of the energy that is associated with a Trident reentry
    vehicle, the explosive, at least for this initial capability,
    is not necessary, given the precision that we believe that we
    can obtain.
        I think that it's important to understand that over the
    next 2 years, as we field this initial capability, the command
    and control, the planning, the supporting ISR structure will be
    developed along with the capability, and we are working now to
    realize those gains. Included will be the surety measures, the
    assurance that we are launching the right weapon at the right
    target 100 percent of the time from the submarine. The
    political and the military dialogue between governments that
    must occur so that we understand what it is we're trying to
    accomplish here, how we're going to use it, how it's going to
    appear to the adversary and to allies and friends or
    disinterested parties, if they are just merely watching, how
    this will look.
        These are critical. This will be accomplished through
    tests, through exercises, through mil-to-mil dialogue,
    political dialogue. All of these things are absolutely critical
    to demonstrate clearly the capability. You'll also note that in
    this dialogue, we have chosen to do this in an unclassified
    form. This is an open hearing. We are talking about this
    because it is important to have transparency in what we want to
    do in the future in this capability, to not leave ambiguity in
    the equation.
        This is not a new capability. Since 1968, we have launched
    433 of these warheads on these missiles without ambiguity
    through notification processes, talking to the Russians and the
    Chinese. You can imagine that in a period since 1968, with 433
    plus launches, that we have had bad weather days, we have had
    maintenance, we have had issues. The system that is in place to
    keep people informed about what we are doing has worked well
    for us, and we will continue to improve that system and improve
    the dialogue through training and exercises. This conventional
    Prompt Global Strike capability will be a credible choice that
    will offer the Nation a broader set of tools to confront the
    enemies that we face today and in the future, and we believe
    it's essential to offer this choice to the Nation.
        Let me go back and pick up just a couple of the questions
    that Senator Nelson highlighted. The Minuteman reductions from
    500 to 450. The dialogue there is an acknowledgment that we
    would like this system to last well into the future, and we
    have expectations on the life of the system. We have to match
    that with test assets to ensure that as the system ages, we
    understand the character of that aging, that we know what to
    expect out of that system, given that it carries the weapons
    that we carry on our Minuteman system. We have to have surety
    in that system and only can do that through testing. We have to
    keep a robust test program all the way through the life of the
    program. When we looked at the three wings associated with the
    Minuteman, there is a wing of 150, a wing of 200, and a wing of
    150. It just seemed to be logical that we would create three
    wings of 150, take the 50 assets, use them both for tests and
    also, to some extent, for R&D, we have money in this budget
    that is addressing the next generation system. We have to start
    looking at the risk reduction activities, the test activities
    that will allow us to understand where we want to go in the
    future. This is not a reduction in the number of warheads
    deployed. They will just merely be redistributed on the
    missiles. So, there is not a reduction in warheads. This is a
    reduction in the number of launch vehicles, and it allows us to
    move forward into the future.
        Senator Sessions. Probably not, it would be multiple
    warheads?
        General Cartwright. Right now, we're at a strategy that
    would put 500 on 500, so one warhead each. Now 50 of the
    missiles will have more than one warhead, and that would still
    leave us with the ability to say that our crystal ball wasn't
    perfect. We may find in the future that we have an adversary
    that emerges. It still leaves empty slots and the capability to
    quickly reconfigure appropriately for the adversaries that we
    might face in the future that we didn't anticipate. So it
    leaves flexibility to understand that we don't know everything
    we need to know about the future.
        On the cruise missile side of the equation, and Senator, I
    believe you referred to the cruise missile study and the
    tension that that causes with the desire to move forward on the
    RRW. The study is essentially complete. We jointly, inside the
    DOD, between policy and USSTRATCOM, have worked that study.
    It's in the briefing phase. It will move it up through the
    decision process. We understand the desire. There is only so
    much resource out there. That resource is not only the dollars,
    but it's also the intellectual capital associated with the
    labs, it is the production capacity associated with the labs.
    There are a lot of resources tied up in a smart and quick
    decision, but there is also the consideration of the risks
    associated with moving from one capability to the next, should
    we decide that, or retaining a capability to ensure that we
    have that into the future. We're trying to capture all of that,
    do it as quickly as we can and make sure that we are well-
    informed before we announce that decision, and that will be
    something that will be brought up through the Department.
        The last question I think that you brought up, that I'll
    quickly address, is the question on the B-52s and the number of
    B-52s. You'll also note in this budget the resources associated
    with and the acceleration of the next generation of bomber. We
    think that that's important. We think it's important to start
    to accelerate that capability. There are several attributes
    that are being discussed as we look at the next generation
    capability. Certainly survivability has always been a big
    issue, but also the difference between prompt--which means
    something that goes fast and gets there quickly, versus
    something that can get out there and have long loiter and be
    able to stay and persist with large payloads on station--
    understanding the tradeoffs associated with that. Are we
    dealing with one asset, are we dealing with a family, how do we
    bring those attributes to a common platform, what's the right
    balance between that platform and the ballistic missile family
    that we're fielding and will field in the next generation?
    Those are all the things that are being discussed as we work
    our way through this.
        Again, there are limited resources. We are starting to move
    in a direction that would free up the resources to accelerate
    the fielding of the next generation bomber. I think it still
    puts us, from a USSTRATCOM perspective, with sufficient bombers
    to exercise those missions that have been assigned to
    USSTRATCOM for the bombers, both in the B-2 and the B-52.
        I'll stand ready for your questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: Thank you for this
    opportunity to review U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) progress
    during the past year and to present our plan for the future. I will
    discuss the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) role in validating and
    updating our transformational approach, and request your continued
    support for specific actions necessary to ensure our strategic
    capabilities are correctly postured to meet the challenges of today and
    tomorrow. 2006 is a year of unprecedented change. Our ultimate goals
    are driving the pace of change: building strategic advantage, ensuring
    the security of the American people and strengthening the community of
    free nations.

          ADAPTING TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT--TRANSFORMING WHILE WE FIGHT

        One year ago, we spoke of global interdependence and its impact on
    how we organize, plan and operate. We emphasized developing strong
    links between U.S. strategic objectives and regional operations, as our
    adversaries were employing asymmetric means to strike well beyond the
    battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. We also spoke of USSTRATCOM's new
    mission assignments and the steps we had undertaken to transform our
    command into an agile 21st century organization capable of deterring
    our adversaries and bringing the full range of global strike,
    defensive, command and control (C2), and intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to bear against them if
    necessary. We outlined an enormous transformational effort that had to
    be accomplished in the context of an ongoing global conflict with
    active combat operations and without the luxury of an operational
    pause.
        Throughout the last year, the men and women of USSTRATCOM have
    engaged in that global conflict, often employing means not visible
    either to the average American or to our adversaries. They met this
    day-to-day challenge with professionalism and commitment while they
    were also restructuring our organization to focus our efforts, conserve
    our resources, and streamline support to other combatant commanders
    around the world. I come to you today gratified by the progress these
    fine men and women have made and energized to complete the task before
    us.

                       USSTRATCOM TRANSFORMATION VECTORS

        The Department of Defense (DOD) budget you enacted for 2006 enabled
    a string of organizational and operational successes along all of our
    transformation vectors.
        We changed the way we are organized and operate. We implemented,
    and by the end of 2006 will refine, the redistributed and functionally
    aligned command structure described last year. This new structure is
    already paying off in terms of decentralized operational employment and
    increased operational speed. Our efforts resulted in:

             A flattened, streamlined, and focused headquarters
            staff charged with maintaining command and control of the
            Nation's nuclear forces, providing strategic guidance and
            advocacy for essential mission capabilities, and conducting
            integrated and synchronized strategic-level planning necessary
            for mission accomplishment in all mission areas.
             Four interdependent Joint Functional Component
            Commands (JFCCs): Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
            (ISR); Network-Warfare (NW); Integrated Missile Defense (IMD)
            and Space and Global Strike (S&GS). Day-to-day operational
            planning and execution of specialized global capabilities now
            reside at the component level, where commanders are able to
            maintain focus on their primary mission and not be distracted
            by staff support activities.
             Integrated Information Operations (IO) support through
            the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC). The JIOC is the
            focal point for all operational and tactical IO planning
            support to DOD users around the globe.
             Improved security for DOD information systems through
            the aggressive efforts of Joint Task Force--Global Network
            Operations (JTF-GNO). JTF-GNO instituted stringent use controls
            and trained system users to reduce vulnerabilities.
             A collaborative, Joint Space Operations Center
            (JSpOC), to deliver select DOD space capability to U.S.,
            Allied, and other national users. When fully operational, JSpOC
            will provide the full range of DOD space capabilities.
             A new USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
            Destruction (SCC-WMD) and a new Global Innovation and Strategy
            Center (GISC) that recently completed their formative
            processes, joining the fight with specialized technical skills
            and solutions to unique mission challenges.

        By making this unique organizational transformation we also
    strengthened our operational relationships with the Defense
    Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),
    Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and National Security Agency
    (NSA) in order to leverage the tremendous resources and capabilities
    resident in these organizations. Now we effectively bridge many
    artificial barriers to communications and information sharing, and
    bring enhanced combat power to the regional combatant commanders.
        We made progress in our drive toward a New Triad of capabilities.
    The New Triad is comprised of offensive and defensive capabilities
    enabled by persistent global command and control (C2), intelligence, an
    agile planning system, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The New
    Triad provides improved flexibility in dealing with a wider range of
    contingencies, while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons, in
    order to assure our allies, dissuade competitors, and deter those who
    plan to harm us, particularly with WMD.
        Efforts to improve conventional global strike capability focused on
    generating effects without being hindered by factors of time, distance,
    basing rights, over-flight considerations or undue risk to American
    service men and women. Recently the Department:

             Bolstered the number of Joint Direct Attack Munitions
            (JDAM) in the inventory, providing all weather, precision
            strike in a smaller weapon footprint.
             Fielded Tactical Tomahawk (TACTCOM) and the Joint Air
            to Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), providing strike weapons
            that operate from ranges outside enemy point defenses.

        During the past year non-kinetic capabilities became an
    increasingly important tool to deny our adversaries the opportunity to
    communicate easily or to manipulate information in ways that further
    their efforts to undermine stability around the world. We seek better
    non-kinetic capabilities to improve our freedom of action at the lowest
    level of conflict; to enhance deterrence; and support the sustained
    ability to use our networks while denying the adversary a similar
    capability. In this area we:

             Expanded development of the applicable tactics,
            techniques, and procedures to support use of information and
            networks--cyberspace--as an environment for integrated
            exploitation, offensive, and defensive operations.
             Improved integration of non-kinetic effects into
            operational planning, on a limited basis, in support of forces
            involved in the global war on terrorism.

        The President has committed the United States to sustaining a
    credible nuclear deterrence capability with the lowest possible number
    of nuclear weapons consistent with national security. USSTRATCOM's task
    is to ensure our nuclear force remains ready to meet any contingency
    while the nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable as we
    prudently achieve the thresholds specified in the Moscow Treaty. To
    this end we:

             Sustained a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile in
            cooperation with the National laboratories and the National
            Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
             Took steps to improve the security and safety of the
            deployed nuclear force.
             Retired the last Peacekeeper Inter-Continental
            Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) from service.
             Reduced the number of operationally deployed strategic
            nuclear warheads on the Minuteman III ICBM force.
             Transferred the final ballistic missile submarine
            scheduled for reconfiguration to carry conventionally armed
            cruise missiles.

        We continued pursuit of both active and passive defenses as a means
    of deterring our adversaries by demonstrating our ability to deny their
    attempts to coerce or harm the United States. During 2006 we will:

             Conduct additional tests of a Standard Missile 3
            (SM3), which is designed to engage mid and short range
            ballistic missiles early in flight.
             Conduct tests of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
            (THAAD) missile, which is designed to engage mid to short-range
            ballistic missiles late in flight.
             Increase the number of emplaced Ground-Based
            Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska and California. GBIs are designed
            to engage long-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse of
            their flight. We plan on an interceptor demonstration this
            spring and up to two more interceptor tests by the end of 2006.
             Refine our missile engagement tracking capability by
            deploying sea-based and forward-based X-Band radars to
            operational locations in the Pacific region, where, by the end
            of 2006, they will join a global network of radars.
             Upgrade the Command, Control, Battle Management, and
            Communications System (C2BMC) to extend situational awareness
            capability to Pacific Command and European Command by the end
            of 2006.
             Promote expanded interagency support and participation
            in the Proliferation Security Initiative to further global
            efforts to combat the spread of WMD.

        At the heart of the New Triad are the key enablers of command and
    control, intelligence, and planning. Through these enablers, and our
    broad array of space capability, we create the agility to respond to a
    wide range of global challenges. During 2006 we will:

             Evolve the renovated USSTRATCOM Global Operations
            Center to enhance collaboration among all geographically
            distributed USSTRATCOM elements--defining the first step toward
            a Global C2 capability for all New Triad forces.
             Complete preparations for opening the first node in a
            network of ground entry points designed to serve a nationally
            distributed ground, air and sea network capable of providing
            the diverse connectivity requirements of the New Triad and DOD
            support to a broader national command capability using all
            elements of national power.
             Codify the output of the department-wide process
            review designed to modify historically inefficient ISR force
            apportionment practices to globally manage low-density, high-
            demand ISR assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles and
            reconnaissance aircraft.
             Extrapolate the results of an exercise in which we
            demonstrated the ability to achieve persistence through the
            combination/integration of different intelligence,
            surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) phenomenology, to better
            fulfill combatant commander's intelligence requirements.
             Capitalize on the longer dwell time of unmanned and
            unattended sensors to produce greater persistence in global war
            on terrorism operations.
             Initiate a pilot program to determine essential global
            strike command and control services with an explicit objective
            of delivering a distributed, collaborative product. The pilot
            program will take advantage of the Department's Data Strategy,
            which calls for visible, accessible and understandable data,
            and uses Services Oriented Architectures (SOA) to promote
            flexibility and agility.
             Initiate efforts to transition from a limited space
            surveillance architecture to a more fully integrated
            terrestrial and space-based approach to situational awareness.

                    A NATION AT WAR--CONTINUING TO TRANSFORM

        When I came before you last year, it was clear the pace of change
    and nature of the threats and challenges to our Nation were growing
    rapidly. It was also clear that USSTRATCOM's legacy systems and
    organizational relationships were not suitable for meeting emerging
    challenges the Nation now faces. Our intent, this year, was to address
    nuclear issues in the QDR in order to rationalize them in the context
    of our overall capabilities. It is against this backdrop that we
    entered the dialog of the 2006 QDR.
        USSTRATCOM presented new ideas and concepts, which were widely
    debated during the course of review proceedings. We entered this review
    believing the New Triad concept was sound in principle, but that the
    pace of attaining the new construct was lagging the national need. With
    this in mind we focused on four objectives:

             Determine which elements of our considerable nuclear
            force structure are essential to future stability and which
            might be retired in favor of more redundant and credible
            conventional or non-kinetic capabilities called for by the 2001
            Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and 2005 Strategic Capabilities
            Assessment.
             Determine the next steps needed to fulfill our
            commitment to an integrated missile defense capable of
            defending the U.S., its deployed forces, friends, and allies.
             Identify key enablers within the domains of
            intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; communications,
            space, and collaborative planning that could rapidly improve
            our agility and responsiveness.
             Identify structural barriers to effective integration
            and synchronization of DOD efforts to combat weapons of mass
            destruction.

        The QDR served to remind us of two very important factors: first,
    that the United States is a nation engaged in a long war; and second,
    that our enemies in this long war seek weapons of mass destruction and
    will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people
    everywhere. Importantly, the QDR validated the need to adjust the U.S.
    global military force posture by moving away from a static defense in
    obsolete Cold War garrisons. While the review described many areas in
    which we must shift emphasis, we believe three are of particular
    importance to shaping our command and its approach to the future:

             From nation-state threats--to decentralized networked
            threats from non-state enemies.
             From ``one size fits all'' deterrence--to tailored
            deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer
            competitors.
             From a focus on kinetics--to a focus on effects.

        We have taken the QDR's imperative for change as validation of our
    desire to accelerate transformation in many areas. While we believe
    progress has been made, more can be done in selected areas to improve
    USSTRATCOM's posture and preparedness to respond to a wider range of
    traditional, irregular, disruptive, or catastrophic challenges.
    Beginning in 2007 we will take steps to:
        Improve USSTRATCOM's nuclear deterrence posture. Key initiatives
    include:

             Reduce the number of deployed Minuteman III ballistic
            missiles in order to provide assets to meet essential flight
            test needs and ensure the viability of the Minuteman force.
            This will better balance our legacy nuclear capabilities while
            preserving our ability to reconstitute additional forces in
            response to strategic surprise.
             Study the requirement for a Minuteman III replacement.
            We believe this is an essential step toward ensuring our future
            national security needs.
             Study the requirement for nuclear-armed cruise
            missiles and look at alternative methods of storing these Cold
            War era weapons. We believe that this study will provide
            valuable input in support of developing an effective long term
            strategy to maintain the nuclear stockpile.

        Develop a wider range of conventional deterrent weapons. USSTRATCOM
    championed the need for a prompt, precise conventional global strike
    capability, to bridge the gap between prompt nuclear weapons and less
    timely, but precise, conventional weapons. Key initiatives include:

             Deploy an initial precision-guided conventional
            Trident Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile capability within 2
            years. The speed and range advantage of a conventional Trident
            missile increases decision time and provides an alternative to
            nuclear weapon use against fleeting, high value targets. The
            conventional Trident missile would be particularly useful in
            deterring or defeating those who seek to coerce or threaten the
            U.S. with WMD.
             Develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range
            strike capability to be fielded by 2018.
             Study alternative options for delivering prompt,
            precise conventional warheads using advanced technologies such
            as hypersonic vehicles from land, air, or the sea.

        Develop non-kinetic capabilities to expand the range of effects we
    can generate against certain targets. Without question we are on the
    verge of a major technology shift to the Network Age. We see an
    environment in which digital internet communication is more pervasive,
    reliable, efficient, cheap, and rapid--even with the enormous increase
    in volume, variety, and velocity of data. Key initiatives include:

             Develop capabilities that promote the freedom of
            action we enjoy in other mediums like, maritime and air.
             Develop the doctrine, organization, training,
            maintenance, logistics, personnel and facilities to defend our
            Nation in this domain.
             Enhance measures to improve information assurance and
            network security.

        Improve integrated defenses against short, intermediate, and
    intercontinental range ballistic and cruise missiles, and develop
    complementary capabilities to combat weapons of mass destruction. Key
    initiatives include:

             Develop and mature integrated air and missile defenses
            that deter attacks, demonstrating the ability to deny an
            adversary's objectives.
             Integrate defensive systems among our international
            partners in ways that promote assurance against attack.
             Expand the Army's 20th Support Command's capabilities,
            to enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid
            deployment in support of WMD elimination.
             Improve and expand U.S. forces' capabilities to
            locate, track and tag shipments of WMD.
             Expand our advanced technical render safe capacity and
            implement measures to increase associated speed of response.

        Improve our nuclear infrastructure. USSTRATCOM recognizes the
    importance of an efficient and more responsive nuclear weapons
    infrastructure to the Department's strategy of tailored deterrence. We
    believe this is the essential element needed to ensure our weapons are
    safe, secure, and reliable, to ensure we can respond to both
    technological and political surprise, and to reduce our current
    stockpile of nuclear warheads.
        In May 2005, the Nuclear Weapons Council commissioned an 18-month
    study, to determine the feasibility of replacing some W76 warheads with
    a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and to examine the potential for
    using RRW in lieu of the W78 warhead. This U.S. Navy led study will
    include Air Force and Interagency participants and should issue a final
    report in November 2006. We believe this study will be a useful tool in
    addressing some of the concerns raised by the Report of the Defense
    Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, dated January 2006.
    The key initiative is to:

             Determine the feasibility of replacing existing
            warheads with a RRW.

        Develop a more coherent global command and control capability and a
    network-enabled architecture that moves information to the user, rather
    than moving the user to the information. The New Triad needs a robust,
    resilient global C2 system that builds on our legacy nuclear C2 system
    and serves as the basis of a critical national-level capability
    suitable for use in emergencies range from terrorist attacks to natural
    disasters. Key initiatives include:

             Transition the USSTRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command
            Center, providing a survivable and enduring nuclear command and
            control capability, to a new network of distributed ground-
            based communications nodes; establishing a gateway to a robust
            multi-functional global command and control capability.
             Retire four National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC)
            and upgrade the TACAMO command and control aircraft, to sustain
            a survivable airborne link to strategic nuclear forces and
            broaden our ability to support full functionality of the New
            Triad.

        Transition intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    activities from a legacy approach, directed largely at monitoring
    nation states in two theaters, to a true global enterprise tailored to
    meet regional needs. Key initiatives include:

             Implement a new global intelligence approach focused
            on achieving persistent collection capabilities against legacy
            and emerging threats, with our U.S. Government and allied
            partners, and improved synergy with the Intelligence Community.
             Increase investment in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
            to provide greater dwell capabilities in the effort to identify
            and track mobile targets globally.

        Improve space capabilities. The space mission area creates a
    decisive strategic advantage for our National security, empowering
    critical economic as well as defense related activities. Our dependence
    on space capabilities, coupled with recent significant advances in
    space operations demonstrated by others, establishes a true imperative
    to protect our space assets and our freedom of action in space.
    STRACTOM understands the need to stay at least one technology
    generation ahead of any foreign or commercial space power. We must
    improve space situational awareness and protection, and ensure
    unfettered, reliable, and secure access to space. Key initiatives
    include:

             Improve responsive space access, satellite operations,
            and other space enabling capabilities such as the space
            professional cadre.
             Integrate air and space capabilities to deliver
            combined effects.
             Realign resources to sustain existing space
            surveillance capabilities.

        USSTRATCOM REQUESTS YOUR SUPPORT TO MEET THE CHALLENGES WE FACE

        Over the next 5 years, we must fully transform while remaining
    engaged in a conflict in which our enemies will use any and all means
    to achieve their objectives. We believe a more aggressive
    transformation schedule than envisioned 5 years ago is essential to
    maintain the strategic advantage needed to deter or defeat those who
    would do us harm. If we do not accelerate this transition, we will face
    these adversaries, who attack through asymmetric means, with the blunt
    weapons of last resort that won the Cold War. That alone will not
    preserve our future national security. In particular we are requesting
    your support in the following areas:
    Prompt, Precision Conventional Global Strike
        Tailored deterrence requires a more complete range of capabilities
    to address the wide spectrum of challenges that confront us today.
    While the Department employs expeditionary forces around the globe, it
    is unlikely we will have forces in every place we need them at the
    crucial moment when we have an opportunity to stop a WMD-armed threat
    far from our shores. The United States has the capability to engage
    with high quality conventional forces around the world, given days or
    perhaps weeks to respond. But if our general-purpose forces are not in
    a position to respond rapidly, the need to defeat attacks against the
    United States may require USSTRATCOM to interdict fleeting targets at
    global range. We have the delivery capability on alert today, but
    configured only with nuclear weapons. This choice is not credible
    against many of the extremist adversaries we will face.
        We recommend proceeding with development of the responsive,
    conventional global strike alternative offered by the Conventional
    Trident Modification (CTM). The President's budget request includes
    funds for the modification of a number of submarine based Trident
    Missiles to deliver conventional warheads with precision over thousands
    of miles in tens of minutes.
    Global Command and Control (GC2)
        We are now faced with the task of recapitalizing our aging, Nuclear
    Command and Control (NC2) network, which is a matter of prime
    importance. Capitalizing on advances in technology, we envision a
    transition from the single-purpose, stove-piped NC2 network that served
    us during the Cold War, to a multi-functional, distributed, survivable,
    and expandable Global Command and Control capability, leveraging the
    assets and resources of the Global Information Grid and serving the
    needs of our joint warfighters.
        With your support for the President's budget request, we can
    deliver a resilient air, land, and maritime GC2 capability that will
    tie together all elements of New Triad power. Fully developed, the GC2
    will enable collaboration between, and among, DOD and other government
    agencies and partners, providing the core of a National Command
    Capability to meet the broadening array of potential challenges we face
    as a nation. A true National Command Capability will only be effective
    with federally mandated standards for data tagging to facilitate
    enhanced information sharing.
    Reliable Replacement Warhead
        Finally, if we are to break the cycle of maintaining and
    refurbishing large numbers of Cold War-era nuclear warheads to guard
    against uncertainty, we request your support to ensure a safe, secure,
    reliable nuclear stockpile, and in the process transform the nuclear
    weapons enterprise. Discussions over the past year within the executive
    branch and Congress have increased understanding of the role for
    nuclear weapons in our current environment, and the value of a
    responsive defense infrastructure. USSTRATCOM supports the RRW as the
    key to transforming our aging Cold War nuclear weapons stockpile. RRW
    will enhance our long-term confidence in the stockpile and reduce the
    need to retain high numbers of hedge weapons while exercising the
    people, science, technology base and facilities required for sustaining
    the nuclear weapons enterprise.
        Maintaining the current stockpile of Cold War era weapons is a
    challenge. If directed, we believe the time is right; the risk is
    manageable; and the opportunity is at hand to choose weapons that will
    best serve our future and allow us to further reduce our overall
    stockpile size, in order to transition to and maintain a smaller but
    safer, more secure, and more reliable nuclear weapon arsenal.
        usstratcom transformational vectors building strategic advantage
        USSTRATCOM plays an important role in leading national efforts to
    send an unambiguous message to our adversaries and friends alike--we
    will do whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to ensure the
    forces of freedom possess a lasting strategic advantage against those
    who would deny citizens of America and the world the security to govern
    their own future. We will continue to be aggressive and resourceful in
    offering our best advice in the pursuit of capabilities needed to meet
    our National security requirements. With your help we can assure our
    allies, dissuade unhealthy competition, deter coercive or damaging
    acts, and above all else, defend our citizens and defeat our enemies.
    Thank your for your continued support.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Admiral Young.

     STATEMENT OF RADM CHARLES B. YOUNG, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
                            SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Admiral Young. Good afternoon, Senators. I do not have an
    opening comment. I have submitted a statement for the record,
    and I stand by to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Young follows:]

                Prepared Statement by RADM Charles B. Young, USN

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Chairman Sessions, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
    Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
    regarding Navy's role in Global Strike.
        The hierarchy of policy documentation that reflects our National
    strategy identifies the need for precise Global Strike. The President's
    National Security Strategy (NSS) directs an active approach toward
    countering transnational terrorist networks, rogue nations and
    aggressive states that possess or are working to gain weapons of mass
    destruction or effect (WMD/E). The National Defense Strategy further
    charges the Department of Defense (DOD) to secure the United States
    from direct attack, and to counter, at a safe distance, those who seek
    to use WMD/E against us. To deter or otherwise prevent such an attack
    against the United States, its allies or its interests, our National
    Military Strategy emphasizes the need for rapid and accurate Global
    Strike, by both nuclear and conventional means.

                      THE 2006 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

        In accordance with the aforementioned strategic policy, the 2006
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 06) further explored the requirement
    for Global Strike.
        In particular, QDR 06 detailed the need for a Joint Maritime Force
    capable of ``conventional Global Strikes against time-sensitive targets
    . . . to counter political anti-access and irregular warfare
    challenges.'' Today's Navy provides this capability via flexible,
    forward-deployed assets such as Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary
    Strike Groups, and Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN). Yet among the key
    proposals made by QDR 06 was a refinement of our existing maritime
    capability to include ``a wider range of conventional and non-kinetic
    deterrent options.'' Specifically, QDR 06 proposed that a number of
    TRIDENT submarine-launched ballistic missiles be converted for use in
    conventional Global Strike.

                       CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT MODIFICATION

        Conventional TRIDENT Modification (CTM) adapts the TRIDENT II (D-5)
    missile system to deliver conventional (non-nuclear) effects at global
    ranges. The TRIDENT Weapon System and the D-5 missile are well suited
    for this role by virtue of the long range and payload capacity of the
    D-5 missile, and the responsiveness and survivability of the TRIDENT
    weapon system. Responsive, survivable and persistent, CTM will defeat a
    diverse set of unpredictable threats without visible presence or risk
    to U.S. forces, and with little or no warning prior to strike. CTM
    implements the New Triad envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review, and
    is an evolution of deterrence toward conventional weapons. CTM CONOPS
    are currently under development at U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
        CTM will use existing D-5 missiles, MK4 reentry bodies equipped
    with aerodynamic controls, GPS-aided terminal guidance, and a
    conventional warhead. Advanced error-correcting reentry vehicles with
    GPS-aided Inertial Navigation Systems have been flight proven in a
    previous D-5 test program. Total time from decision to weapons-on-
    target is about 1 hour. CTM technology can be rapidly developed and
    deployed within 24 months. The total cost of the program, including
    operations, training, and support is $503 million. The CTM program is
    fully funded, with $127 million budged in fiscal year 2007 and $376
    million budgeted through fiscal year 2010. The CTM program will
    leverage existing D5 investment and infrastructure to minimize risk to
    operations, training and support funding.

                            FURTHER NAVY INVESTMENT

        In addition to proposing a conventional Global Strike option, QDR
    06 called for the continued maintenance of our existing nuclear
    capability. Navy has several initiatives underway toward this end.
    TRIDENT II D-5LE Program
        TRIDENT II (D-5) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Life
    Extension (LE) program will redesign and replace aging missile
    electronics and guidance systems. Under this program, 108 additional
    missiles will be procured in order to meet long-term inventory
    requirements associated with the life extension of the Ohio class
    Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) from 30 to 45 years.
    Redesign of missile electronics and guidance components is in progress,
    and procurement of new D-5 LE missiles begins in fiscal year 2008. The
    TRIDENT II (D-5) missile has been operational since 1990, providing the
    backbone of America's strategic deterrence. The low-rate production
    continuity procurement strategy has been extensively reviewed and
    approved by DOD and the Congress, and has been in execution for nearly
    15 years. This procurement strategy has proven successful, based on the
    demonstrated performance of the TRIDENT II D-5 weapon system. The Navy
    submitted a report to Congress in December 2002 that detailed the
    impact of alternative full-funded procurement strategies and
    recommended continuation of current production. Continued production of
    critical components represents the best balance of cost and risk to
    extend the life of the D-5 missile.
    Tomahawk Cruise Missile
        There are currently four variants of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile in
    inventory-the Block II with a nuclear warhead, the Block III with
    either a conventional unitary warhead or sub-munitions payload, and the
    Block IV Tactical Tomahawk Missile (TACTOM) with the conventional
    unitary warhead. All four Tomahawk variants provide all weather long-
    range precision strike capability, supporting Sea Strike as an enabler
    of Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups. The Block IV TACTOM
    provides greater flexibility and responsiveness, at significantly
    reduced life cycle cost, than previous Tomahawk variants. Significant
    Block IV upgrades include flex targeting (with up to 15 pre-planned aim
    points loaded prior to launch), in-flight retargeting, launch platform
    mission planning, and a two-way ultra-high frequency (UHF) satellite
    communications data link. The Tomahawk Block IV is currently in full
    rate production and the Navy is committed to supporting the Tomahawk
    Weapon System program. The fiscal year 2007 budget request supports
    continued procurement of this deep-strike weapon due to inventory
    reductions during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring
    Freedom (OEF) combat operations. Tomahawk Cruise Missiles are currently
    being procured in a 5-year, multi-year contract that saves
    approximately 12 percent over annual procurement contacts.
    SSGN Engineered Refueling Overhauls (EROs) and Conversions
        The Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Attack Submarine (SSGN) project
    refuels, overhauls, and converts the four oldest Ohio class SSBNs to
    SSGNs. These SSGNs will provide a transformational warfighting
    capability, carrying up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles and supporting
    deployed special operating forces. The new SSGNs will also have
    enhanced communication and improved masts and antennas for network
    centric operations. The SSGN conversions are being executed via a
    public-private partnership with Naval Shipyards. The first SSGN
    conversion, the U.S.S. Ohio (SSGN-726), was delivered in December 2005
    after 3 years in production. Future deliveries include the U.S.S.
    Florida (SSGN 728) in April 2006, the U.S.S. Michigan (SSGN 727) in
    December 2006, and the U.S.S. Georgia (SSGN 729) in September 2007.
    SSBN Engineered Refueling Overhauls (EROs)
        The Ohio class SSBN remains the backbone of USSTRATCOM's nuclear
    strike capability. Comprised of 14 TRIDENT II D-5 configured hulls, the
    Ohio-class SSBN remains the most survivable nuclear deterrent in the
    U.S. strategic arsenal. In keeping with the Secretary of Defense's
    Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S.S. Alabama (SSBN 731) began its ERO (in
    conjunction with TRIDENT C4 to D-5 conversion). In fiscal year 2007,
    the U.S.S. Alaska (SSBN 732) will begin its ERO at Norfolk Naval
    Shipyard (NNSY). The Navy will continue with SSBN EROs at the rate of 1
    per year, alternating between NNSY and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, in
    order to sustain our strategic deterrent capability well into the
    future.

                                   INNOVATION

        The Navy received an fiscal year 2006 congressional plus-up of $7.2
    million to demonstrate the feasibility of the Submarine Launched
    Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM). Navy will use this money
    to fabricate one launch chamber and one prototype full-scale rocket
    motor, and to fund a subsequent test firing. Emphasis of this
    demonstration will be on affordability, defined as the combination of
    the lowest projected boost motor subsystem development cost, and the
    lowest possible expected average unit cost for a notional inventory of
    100 missiles. This effort will demonstrate several innovative motor
    designs and manufacturing techniques in pursuit of an affordable SLIRBM
    system.

                                    SUMMARY

        Our national strategic policy identifies the requirement for a
    broad range of Global Strike capabilities. Due to its unrivaled access
    to the global commons, the Navy is uniquely positioned to fulfill this
    requirement. In response to the need for conventional Global Strike,
    our CTM program is based on mature technologies and existing
    components. It is compliant with all arms control agreements, and can
    be developed and deployed within 24 months. Furthermore, we are
    redesigning and replacing aging missile systems and platforms in order
    to meet the long-term requirements of nuclear deterrence and Global
    Strike. In the meantime, Navy will continue to work closely with
    members of this subcommittee and Congress to refine our operational
    concepts and investments in order to deliver the dominant power our
    Nation expects. We look forward to our continued partnership in this
    endeavor.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
        General Gorenc.

        STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. STANLEY GORENC, USAF, DIRECTOR,
    OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
                 AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS

        General Gorenc. I'm the same way, actually. It's a pleasure
    to be here, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Gorenc follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Stanley Gorenc, USAF

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Thank you for the opportunity to discuss Air Force capabilities
    with respect to Global Strike. It is important to pay tribute to the
    airmen who are currently engaged in operations around the globe
    projecting the full range of air, space, and cyberspace operations as a
    part of a true joint and coalition team, multiplying the effectiveness
    of our partners by providing sovereign options for the defense of the
    United States of America and its global interests. We fly and we
    fight--whether we are flying A-10s over Afghanistan; F-16s over Iraq;
    communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit; piloting Unmanned
    Aerial Systems (UAS) patrolling Baghdad; or maintaining vigilance over
    our Nation's homeland in an airborne warning and control system
    aircraft. All airmen, no matter what their specialty, contribute to
    this mission. Today there are approximately 30,000 Active-Duty, Air
    National Guard, and Air Force Reserve airmen deployed around the world,
    many in harm's way. These brave men and woman are performing what we
    would say are traditional Air Force missions, such as providing close
    air support for ground operations and intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance from air and space-based systems, or nontraditional
    duties, like convoy operations, provincial reconstitution teams,
    military transition teams, detainee operations, protective service
    details, and the list goes on. Your Air Force today is deployed to over
    100 forward operating locations touching all 7 continents. Our
    commitment to the combatant commanders extends well beyond airmen in
    the Central Command area of responsibility. We have nearly 210,000
    airmen actively supporting combatant commander operations worldwide.
    These include nuclear alert operations, satellite operations, global
    airlift, worldwide tanker operations, and Homeland defense obligations
    of approximately 40-50 fighter aircraft, Airborne Warning and Control
    System (AWACS), and a dozen tankers on duty protecting our skies.
    Beyond that, we have another 195,000 airmen available for ``Surge
    Operations,'' which are over and above planned deployments, the
    majority of these airmen are Guard and Reserve Forces.

                       MAINTAINING OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT

        The Department of Defense's (DOD) new strategy of employing a
    capability-based vs. threat-based approach to planning led to the
    ongoing transformation of the existing triad of U.S. strategic nuclear
    forces. The old Triad, consisting of intercontinental ballistic
    missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and bomber aircraft armed
    with cruise missiles and gravity weapons; is transitioning to become
    part of a New Triad composed of a diverse portfolio of capabilities.
    Elements of this New Triad will include nuclear and non-nuclear strike
    capabilities, active and passive defenses, and robust research and
    development programs and industrial infrastructure for developing,
    building, and maintaining offensive and defensive weapon systems, all
    tied together with advanced command, control, computers,
    communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    capabilities. Maintaining and modernizing our traditional nuclear
    strategic forces, at lower numbers is a key component in an effective
    New Triad.
        The Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the
    backbone of our deterrent force, maintains its entire force on
    continuous alert. Elements of the Minuteman system were originally
    designed in the late 1950s and deployed operationally in October 1962;
    the Minuteman III was deployed beginning in 1975. Modernization
    programs have been crucial to this system, originally designed to last
    just 10 years. Service life extension programs, nine in all and well
    underway, ensure the ICBM force is reliable, survivable, safe, and
    secure through 2020 when the follow-on system, the Land-Based Strategic
    Deterrent (LBSD) becomes operational. Enhancements to LBSD will include
    improved accuracy, range, and security with a reduced cost of
    ownership.
        The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed the Minuteman force
    be reduced from 500 to 450 beginning in fiscal year 2007. This
    reduction will maintain an effective, balanced nuclear force for
    worldwide deterrence. The Air Force is currently evaluating which 50
    ICBMs will be deactivated. We estimate the cost of deactivation will be
    approximately $19.5 million. Post deactivation, around fiscal year
    2010, the Air Force estimates an approximate recurring savings of $3.5
    million. This figure does not include any manpower savings for the
    missile operators, maintainers, depot support and training personnel
    associated with the deactivation of a missile squadron, because these
    positions will be distributed elsewhere within the Air Force as part of
    rebalancing the Total Force.
        The continuing advancements in conventional weapons capability,
    specifically increased precision and stand-off weapon ranges, will also
    allow us to reduce the Total Aircraft Inventory of B-52s from 76 to 56.
    The savings from these reductions will be utilized to fund the
    remaining bomber modernization effort, known as Phase One of the Long-
    Range Strike effort.

                               LONG-RANGE STRIKE

        Our forces must be simultaneously responsive to multiple combatant
    commanders and be able to strike any point on the planet. To further
    refine our rapid strike capabilities, the Air Force is transitioning to
    a long-range strike strategy focusing on effects instead of platforms.
    We view long-range strike as the capability to achieve desired effects
    rapidly and persistently on any target set in any operational
    environment. The Air Force has a three-phased approach to meet the
    Nation's longrange strike requirements. Today, we provide deep strike
    capabilities through a variety of platforms and weapons. In Phase One,
    we will continue to modernize the legacy bomber fleet to upgrade,
    strengthen and increase their combat effectiveness. Phase Two, what we
    call the Next Generation Long-Range Strike effort, leverages near-term
    technologies to start development of a long-range strike capability
    that augments the current fleet around fiscal year 2018. In this phase,
    we will develop and field a Regional Strike capability or set of
    capabilities, with an emphasis on survivability and lethality
    improvements. Phase Three encompasses the development of advanced
    technologies today that will allow us to enable advances needed for the
    envisioned capabilities in fiscal year 2035. These future capabilities
    must combine speed, stealth, and payload to strike hardened, deeply
    buried, or mobile targets, deep in enemy territory, in an anti-access
    environment, in adverse weather and with survivable persistence.

                              PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

        The New Triad requires the future force to provide a tailored and
    balanced deterrence capability that includes a wider range of
    conventional prompt, precise global strike systems more agile than
    current systems. This includes the ability to strike within hours, not
    days, any high value target, regardless of anti-access threats or
    denial of forward-based assets. To this end, United States Strategic
    Command and the Air Force have partnered to close the identified gaps
    with respect to this need. The effort is called Prompt Global Strike
    (PGS), and it can be accomplished in a variety of ways, through kinetic
    systems capable of placing conventional payloads precisely on target
    within minutes of release, to non-kinetic means, such as computer
    network attack. The initial capabilities document defining PGS was
    written in May 2005. On 16 February 2006 the Air Force Requirements for
    Operational Capability Council approved the PGS document. An analysis
    of alternatives will begin spring 2006.

                                   CYBERSPACE

        Assured, rapid delivery of information to the right warfighters is
    the foundation for all Air Force operations. Cyberspace is a logical
    extension of our core competencies, enabling fast-moving effects across
    the spectrum of war nearly eliminating time and distance as obstacles.
    We must maintain our pre-eminence in cyberspace to ensure success in
    any future conflict. Preparing for the future, the Air Force is
    currently exploring innovative organizational constructs to ensure
    unity in the procurement, operation, sustainment and defense of
    information systems. This and other concepts are being explored by a
    Cyberspace Task Force.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Your Air Force of today and of the future will strengthen the
    entire joint and coalition team. Dominance of air, space, and
    cyberspace paves the way to overall success. In keeping with the
    current emphasis on innovation and transformation, the future Air Force
    will be a more capable yet leaner force. As the keepers of our Nation's
    readiness, Congress is in a position to help reach these essential
    goals and for that we thank you for your unwavering support. For
    America to hold its military advantage, the Air Force must continue to
    improve its capabilities to keep pace with the realities of the future
    battlespace. The United States Air Force is proud to support the joint
    team and we look forward to addressing Air Force Global Strike issues
    with your committee.

        Senator Sessions. Well, good. Let me just pursue a little
    bit with Mr. Flory and General Cartwright the Global Strike
    concept. I know Senator Nelson is in a rush and now trying to
    finish up here, but you mentioned Prompt Global Strike, what is
    the difference from other Global Strike forces and under what
    circumstances is it that a Prompt Global Strike is better or
    necessary?
        General Cartwright. The differentiation between Global
    Strike and Prompt Global Strike, Global Strike today, we have
    fielded, as the Secretary laid out, a set of new capabilities
    in the past year that are very significant in Global Strike for
    the conventional side of the equation. We have fielded a new
    sea-launched cruise missile, the next generation of the
    Tomahawk cruise missile that is sea-launched. We have fielded a
    new air-launched cruise missile that goes on both our tactical
    aircraft and our bombers, and we have added in additional joint
    direct-attack munitions that were so effective in the last two
    conflicts that we have fought. We have increased the
    inventories there. Those have given us a Global Strike
    capability that is very significant and very capable. You will
    see this year two additional, what used to be SSBN-type
    submarines for ballistic missiles, two of the four that have
    been converted will field this year to SSGN, which allows
    Special Operations Forces and these new sea-launched cruise
    missiles to be used from that platform. So, we've added to the
    Global Strike capability.
        The difficulty here for Prompt Global Strike is, as I said,
    the adversary may not choose to act near our bases or our
    patrol areas. If that's the case, and we're dealing with
    targets that are associated with weapons of mass destruction,
    command and control, terrorist-type leadership targets, these
    targets tend to be fleeting. They don't present themselves for
    long periods of time. They tend to be targets that have great
    second and third order consequence or regret for the Nation. If
    it has to do with WMD and the delivery of WMD, say by a missile
    or by a terrorist group, et cetera, you want to have the
    opportunity to address these targets.
        In many cases, nuclear weapons are not going to be an
    appropriate choice for those types of targets. You want a
    conventional alternative. For that small, highly important set
    of targets, we are basically offering the capability to use a
    conventional ballistic missile to reach out anyplace on the
    face of the Earth, and a goal that we have set is to be able to
    address these targets in 1 hour. We are working our way towards
    that. The ability to have a command and control system that can
    work in those kinds of time lines, the intelligence that it
    takes to support that, and the planning factors and
    capabilities that it takes to support it are all things that we
    are now starting to field.
        Senator Sessions. The aircraft that launched our sea-based
    cruise missiles, are they just too slow?
        General Cartwright. Too slow. What we have seen, and there
    are numerous examples from the recent conflicts, first days of
    the Iraq War, of dealing in time lines of 4 to 10 hours in
    order to close on fleeting targets that are significant and
    important to the Nation. The activities that were associated
    with Afghanistan in trying to get up into the mountain areas,
    it took us several weeks to get the overflight clearances and
    all of the positioning of forces in order to be able to close
    with what turned out to be some very high-value targets had we
    been able to prosecute them.
        You never know. I mean, I'm not here to tell you that we
    missed a target, and that would have changed the whole shape of
    the conflict. But there are targets out there that you'd like
    to be able to get to very quickly that could potentially change
    the whole course of the conflict, and those are the types of
    things that we are looking at with this capability.
        Mr. Flory. Mr. Chairman?
        Senator Sessions. I can see that would be a benefit.
    Secretary Flory?
        Mr. Flory. If I could just add a general point, everything
    that General Cartwright says is, I think, just right. Looking
    at this from the perspective of the policymaker and looking at
    this from the perspective of giving the President options, I
    think it's helpful you focus on the promptness point and
    appropriately because that's an extremely important point. We
    have capabilities. We have capabilities that are accurate and
    that can do a lot of good things, but to date, we don't have
    anything that can get there quickly except for a nuclear
    weapon, which is not the appropriate weapon to use in every
    circumstance.
        If we go back, I think it's instructive to look at the 9/11
    Report and the discussion there of the difficulty that
    President Clinton and his people had dealing with the Osama bin
    Laden threat and dealing with particularly the period after the
    African Embassy bombings in August 1998, which had demonstrated
    that we were under attack from a very serious threat. They
    worked very hard. Very dedicated, diligent, professionals
    worked very hard to come up with options, to come up with
    opportunities to do something about that threat. If you read
    through the report, what you see constantly is concerns about
    boots on the ground, concerns about basing access, concerns
    about overflight, concerns about timing. Although less of an
    issue there, you could also have concerns about air defenses
    and all kinds of other things that could constrain the options
    that a President might have.
        I think the lesson we learned out of that is the need to
    try to come up with this full spectrum of options for the
    President so that in a difficult situation like that, and a
    challenging situation like that, where the traditional options
    for one reason or the other do not work or do not give him a
    risk benefit calculation that is acceptable, that we can try
    and fill in that gap, and that's the reason why we believe that
    this conventional Trident system is something worth pursuing.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is the kinetic energy on an incoming
    D-5 warhead--is it such that it can penetrate the earth rather
    deeply?
        General Cartwright. We're still in the test phase, but as
    you know from your background, we're dealing in the 1,500 feet
    per second area. With a reentry vehicle, we're dealing
    somewhere between 14,000 and 20,000 feet per second. That
    energy is significant. We call them slumps. It's a shaped mass
    that we use which we intend to use here as one of the
    alternatives. With that kind of energy, the round survives, and
    it just penetrates. Now, you have to look at the geology and
    the continuity of the geologies to know how deep, but there's
    not much doubt in our mind that it will have applicability
    against hard targets, that it will have applicability against
    buried targets. We need to do further testing to understand how
    deep. Is that a fair interpretation?
        Admiral Young. Yes, sir. There's a lot of variables there,
    this round is not a penetrating warhead that we have read
    about, it is a warhead that does penetrate the earth, but not
    to significant amounts and certainly is dependent upon the type
    of soil, the type of area that it is.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So, this isn't the way you go at the
    deeply hardened targets?
        Admiral Young. No, sir, it is not.
        Senator Bill Nelson. This is just a quick reaction?
        Admiral Young. Yes, sir.
        General Cartwright. It probably would, though, have both
    the accuracy and the energy to close entrances and exits very
    efficiently.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let's assume that this weapon is fired
    from a submarine in the Atlantic for a target in Afghanistan
    and you have a flight time of maybe 25 minutes. Now, how in the
    world are you going to convince Russia that that's not a
    nuclear weapon being fired at them since it's going to go right
    over Russia?
        General Cartwright. Two pieces: First, we'd have the option
    of using a different trajectory. In other words, as we go
    through the basing construct of where we would position the
    submarines, we intend to optimize that so that we do not have
    to do overfly, particularly of Russia. It's one of the things
    that certainly was a factor in deciding to move to the sea-
    based and mobile platform, was to have that option. That's the
    first point. The second point--well, this is probably not the
    appropriate place to talk about the exact characteristics of
    what any country has in the way of warning. The Russians will
    know very quickly, as they have all the way through the Cold
    War and up to today, what the trajectory is and where the
    impact points will be. That is well within their technology.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So, that's the way then, Mr.
    Secretary, that you say that you can let other people know that
    this is not an incoming nuclear warhead?
        Mr. Flory. Sir, I think there are a number of ways. First
    of all, there are the observable characteristics, which, as
    General Cartwright said, would fairly quickly become clear, say
    to the Russians, that this was not something that was going to
    Russia. It would also be one or maybe two systems, two weapons
    coming at them, and I think that the Russians, first of all,
    would be able to discriminate that. They'd understand that this
    was a very small number of weapons, and I think they would
    understand, particularly in the context of a possible pre-
    notification from the United States, that not only had we told
    them that this was not an all-out attack on Russia, but from
    the fact that there are only a couple of missiles in the air,
    that it wouldn't look like any kind of all-out attack that they
    might, it wouldn't look like the way they would imagine us
    conducting an attack against Russia if we desired to make an
    attack against Russia.
        Senator Bill Nelson. But if your protocol is to give the
    President the opportunity within 1 hour to hit a high-value
    target, you're not exactly going to want to have a lot of pre-
    notification. So, how do you do that?
        Mr. Flory. Senator, I don't think you need a lot of pre-
    notification. You obviously need to have enough notification so
    that it has the desired effect so that the message can be
    passed. On the other hand, I think it's also true that in a
    given situation, say an attack against a terrorist target in
    Afghanistan, this is not something just as a matter of Russia's
    policy. I don't think that Russia's going to have any objection
    to, and it's not something that I think the Russians would feel
    any particular inclination to want to warn the target about. I
    think these are all factors that would clearly have to be part
    of the decision. You're absolutely right in that the President,
    in looking at a launch of this type, would have to weight all
    of these factors, but I think there are things that can be
    dealt with and could be weighed out in the decisionmaking
    process at the time.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So, if you found Osama bin Laden in
    Chechnya, that'd be a more difficult decision?
        Mr. Flory. That would be more complex, Senator.
        General Cartwright. That's a fair assessment.
        Mr. Flory. A fair statement. But the Russians might want to
    handle that themselves.
        Senator Bill Nelson. With one of our D-5s?
        Mr. Flory. No, sir. However they chose to do it.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Not if you only have an hour's notice.
    If you have a high-value target that's going to move, you can't
    pass that off.
        Mr. Flory. I was responding to your second hypothetical.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General, what's the rationale for
    retiring the 37 B-52s since there has been an extensive
    upgraded program?
        General Cartwright. Twofold here, and then I'm certainly
    happy to allow the Air Force to speak also. The first is that
    as we move forward, originally we had thought about looking at
    replacements out in the 2025 time line, and the reality is the
    attributes that we are seeking for the next generation of
    strike capability, whether it's manned or unmanned, in order to
    continue to be survivable, in order to continue to deliver the
    sophisticated weapons that we want to deliver in the future,
    and in order to continue to be relevant with the three bombers
    that we have today, we have to start to think about where do we
    want to move, what kind of survivability characteristics do we
    want to have in that fleet, how much of it should be manned
    versus unmanned, how dynamic is the environment that the
    aircraft or vehicle will have to live in as to whether or not
    it could actually even be manned or unmanned, is it a family
    like we have today, with some of them being more survivable
    than others, some even have the longer range or different
    persistence characteristics. Clearly, we need to be able to
    move back and forth between conventional and nuclear if we are
    to retain both types of capabilities into the future, which
    right now I don't see any direction to move away from that.
        So, in order to start to experiment and to understand what
    the art of possible is, two things were decided in the QDR--one
    was 2020--2025 may be too late. Let's accelerate that up and
    get it closer to 2015 to 2020 timeframe, 2018 being an
    objective that we're looking at right now; second, start to
    explore what the attributes ought to be and what is doable in
    the technical side that could be achieved by that timeframe. As
    you indicated in the cruise missile activity and the RRW,
    finding resource to do that, understanding the resource that
    might be available, looking at the risks associated with what
    can I slow down or do less of in order to generate that
    resource. We have the B-1s. We have the B-2s. The B-2s have
    just finished an upgrade and are working on their next
    generation. The B-52s that we have are being upgraded, and we
    have new weapons for all these platforms. Those weapons have
    raised the efficiency of the platform, just like precision
    brought to us the ability to get to what we call number of
    targets per weapon and sortie versus number of sorties per
    target.
        The next generation weapons that we're fielding, these air-
    launched cruise missiles, the joint direct-attack munitions, et
    cetera, are much more efficient than they were in the past. So,
    of the places that we had in order to take resource and to
    start to move us towards the next generation capabilities, we
    felt that we could take a reduction and take the risk in this
    area in order to move forward, given that we have now a year
    under our belt with these new weapons, and they're
    demonstrating their worth, that it was the appropriate time to
    take some risk.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are you assuming that you will have a
    new bomber by 2018?
        General Cartwright. That is our objective. In order to
    protect against that assumption, we are only taking this many.
    We're not taking an entire class of bomber out, and we are
    continuing in the robust production of the new weapons.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are all your remaining B-52s going to
    be at Barksdale?
        General Cartwright. No, they'll be split. We'll have two
    sites. The B-52s? Yes, two sites.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have a bunch of
    questions. I'm going to submit them for the record. If I may,
    since General Cartwright can't be here for next week's hearing
    on missile defense, I need to ask him this question--the
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense system was deployed starting in
    the fall of 2004, but it's not yet been put on constant
    operational alert. There are still a bunch of integration
    command and control issues being worked out, and you haven't
    had a single successful intercept test. You'd want the system
    to be placed on operational alert when it's ready and when it's
    operationally effective, but we don't have that demonstrated
    yet. So, before you put it on alert status 24/7, will you want
    to have the confidence from a number of successful intercept
    flight tests?
        General Cartwright. Those questions, Senator, are right on
    the mark. As we said last year when we went through this
    discussion, there were many objectives that we wanted to get
    highlighted and taken care of over the past year. We have had
    great success in operationally realistic tests. We have had
    operational tests across the face of the sensors, which was
    critical. We have tested the command and control. We have not
    had the successful intercept, but we now have a successful
    flight of the operational system. That occurred here just
    recently. We have two more tests that are scheduled this year,
    the second of which is to be an operational intercept.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let me just cut to the chase.
        General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What criteria are you going to use to
    judge that it's ready for operational alert?
        General Cartwright. We had what we called last year a
    shakedown, which I walked through with the committee last year,
    but it was putting operators on the system, getting the
    operationally realistic activities. All of the lessons learned
    that we went through are in the process of being incorporated
    into the command and control of the system, into the sensors
    and into the weapons. That upgrade is due to be completed
    sometime in the summer of this year. Then we need to make sure
    that it does what we want it to do--in other words, the command
    and control performance like the war fighter needs it to
    perform to give them the confidence the sensors do and the
    weapons. The long pole in the tent, as you indicate, is the
    intercept tests. But this summer, we should have a clear
    understanding of the command and control piece and the sensor
    piece. Then the weapon has to perform. We have to see
    intercepts.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So, it's possible that we won't have
    this weapon on operational alert for another year?
        General Cartwright. Yes, the Ground-Based Interceptor
    (GBI), if it doesn't perform.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate
    it.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Dorgan.
        Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you. First of all,
    thank you for letting me listen in. We had a hearing this
    morning in the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, and General
    Moseley was there as well as Secretary Wynne talking about a
    number of these issues. I wanted to come because I was
    specifically interested in the B-52 issue, but I am also
    intrigued about the cost of using an ICBM with a conventional
    weapon. I will probably deal with that later at some point in
    some other venue, but let me ask about B-52s if I might because
    my understanding is that we used about 140 B-52s in the first
    Gulf War. We had 82-84 B-52s cycle in and out of the
    Afghanistan-Iraq theater, and we are proposing to go to 56 B-
    52s. I was looking and the B-52 obviously is a bomb truck, a
    platform, and it has great loiter time and has been used very
    effectively. But I was looking at the cost per aircraft on our
    bombers, and General Cartwright, you talked about it as did
    General Moseley and others about the lack of money to do all
    that we want to do. I mean, we have to economize, no question.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Dorgan, I'll just tell you they
    did start a vote a couple of minutes ago. Whatever your time
    is, I just want to give you that heads up.
        Senator Dorgan. I appreciate that. The average cost per
    year per aircraft on the B-1 is about $16 million, B-2 about
    $22.5 million, and the B-52 about $8 million. The B-52 has
    about a 35-year additional life. I think on average our B-52s
    have about 16, maybe 14,000 to 16,000 hours on them, probably a
    third or a fourth the hours of the commercial aircraft you
    board out here at National Airport, in most cases because they
    are running them up at 50,000, 60,000, 70,000 hours. The fact
    is it's an old carcass, but it's rejuvenated--new electronics,
    the whole thing, much less expensive than the rest of the
    bomber fleet. I wonder about the tension here between wanting
    to save money and deciding to retire a substantial portion of
    that part of the bomber fleet that is the least cost to
    maintain, having low hours and new electronics.
        General Cartwright. Sure.
        Senator Dorgan. I just wanted to ask about that. If this is
    a budget-driven decision, or if you had your druthers, would
    you think you'd need more than 56 B-52 bombers?
        General Cartwright. I'll give you my opinion.
        Senator Dorgan. Sure.
        General Cartwright. When we look at the bombers, cost is
    certainly one metric. Wearing this uniform, I never thought I
    would see a B-52 that was relevant in close air support, direct
    contact with troops in areas. Yet, given the weapons that we
    have today, the workhorse has, in fact, shown great utility.
    That's not arguable, that's fact. But in the period of time
    that you described, as we bring on these new weapons, the
    things that made the B-52 relevant--the precision, the number
    of munitions that could address a large number of targets and
    persist over the target area for many hours, which that
    airplane can do with tankers, now the weapons are becoming even
    more efficient so you can hold at risk even more targets, more
    diversity in the target sets.
        In the survivability side of the equation, in persisting in
    a target area, generally we look at two key attributes, that
    is, the stealth of the aircraft and the ability to evade radars
    and other types of sensors. Then generally, in times past, we
    also use speed. Speed is, as pilots tend to refer to it, speed
    is life because if you can go fast, you can also defeat a lot
    of enemy capabilities. So, it appeared to us, in looking at
    this as a judgment, that retaining the survivability attributes
    of the B-2, retaining the speed survivability attributes of the
    B-1, and retaining the equivalent efficiency of the B-52, but
    reducing the numbers because you had increasing capability
    across the munitions, gave us the best spread across the three
    platforms.
        Senator Dorgan. If I just observe the air-launched cruise
    missiles, of course, are standoffs, so there you're just
    dealing with the truck, and the most efficient truck there is
    the B-52 by far.
        General Cartwright. Right.
        Senator Dorgan. One third the cost, one half the cost
    comparing the other two bombers. In addition, I have been a big
    supporter of the F-22. The reason we want to do that is we want
    to clear the battlefield and clear the air above it and control
    it at which point you then loiter above it, in most cases, and
    use the bomb truck again with precision weapons such as Joint
    Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). It seems to me in those cases,
    it will almost always augur for the most efficient bomber for
    us, which is the B-52.
        I was here, of course. I've been here through the B-1 and
    the B-2. I understand why we built the B-2--low-level
    penetration of Soviet airspace, the stealth and so on, but I
    also think that we, at this point, are about to make a choice
    that is at odds and is with significant tension of the desire
    to save money and still accomplish the same mission. General
    Cartwright, I respect your answer, and I've heard that answer
    before, but I do think those of us that are pushing for the F-
    22 are doing so for a reason and that is to control the
    airspace and control the battlefield above the battlefield at
    which point you bring in the bomber truck. I'm telling you,
    it's pretty hard to find a bomber truck that is more efficient
    than the B-52. If you want to save one third the money, you
    bring in the bomber truck that can loiter longer and has low
    hours and new avionics and costs one third the cost of the
    other bombers. So, I just make the point. I hope, as we think
    through this as a Congress and as a Pentagon, that we'll try to
    think through not only the considerations you just described,
    but the considerations that we're talking about with respect to
    trying to fund this F-22 in a robust way in order to control
    the airspace.
        General Cartwright. I think those are valid considerations.
    I would just lay out for you how, at least from my perspective,
    we thought through the equation.
        General Gorenc. Could I just add something also?
        Senator Dorgan. Yes.
        General Gorenc. With regards to this sir, I think you're
    absolutely right.
        Senator Sessions. Pull that microphone on up to you there.
    There you go.
        General Gorenc. What I was going to say, I think, sir,
    you're absolutely right in the sense of when you start
    comparing the different platforms and things of that sort, I
    mean it really is a combination of platforms that is going to
    give you the effect that you want on the battlefield. I think,
    with regards to the B-52, the issue with this one is that you
    have those weapons that, in fact, allow it to be more
    survivable, more effective in the battle space. Consequently,
    you may not necessarily need as many. It is a workhorse. We
    have always said it has been, and when we were fielding the
    Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), basically a very
    precise munition.
        Senator Sessions. What would it be launched from?
        General Gorenc. The B-52.
        General Cartwright. And the B-2.
        General Gorenc. And the B-2.
        General Gorenc. It's advancing obviously to the others, but
    there is also a JASSM-extended range, which will give it a 5-
    engine model capability. In other words, more capability, which
    will again make this platform more effective. I guess my point
    is, to kind of piggyback here, is yes, this platform has been
    with us for a long time. It's a great platform, but as the
    capabilities of the weapon systems get enhanced, and as we
    fight individuals who, in fact, need to be attacked from
    different perspectives, I think you'll find that a combination
    of platforms is the way to go.
        Senator Sessions. Yes. Senator Dorgan, I'm going to go and
    vote, and you take your time.
        Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, just one point.
        Senator Sessions. Okay.
        Senator Dorgan. I think the precision weapons make the B-52
    much more useful and interesting to the Pentagon because you do
    the same thing as you do with other standoff trucks except at
    less cost. We do need to talk about new bombers and so on. We
    talked about it this morning. We have to find ways to fund all
    of this, which means, with respect to what we're doing current,
    that we need to find ways to save money.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. Those are valuable comments
    because we all know there's that bow wave out there of
    procurement issues that are coming up, and some tough choices
    may have to be made. I am sorry, we do have a vote ongoing now,
    and there's about 5 minutes left. So, I'll need to rush down.
    We should be back within 10 or 12 minutes, and we'll be
    recessed until then.
        [Recess.]
        Senator Sessions. We'll call the meeting back to order.
    Thank you for staying with us, and I'm sorry to be called away.
    We have to do those things every now and then--vote, that's
    what they pay us for, I suppose. I'll ask whoever would want to
    take the lead on this to deal with it first, and if any of you
    might want to comment on it. The 2006 QDR recommends prompt
    high-volume Global Strike to deter aggression or coercion and
    if deterrent fails to provide a broader range of conditional
    response options to the President. The Trident modification
    entails the conversion of only 24 ballistic missiles. This is
    not the high-volume strike capability envisioned by the QDR, I
    don't think. Would you tell the committee about your respective
    Service plans to fulfill the high-volume Global Strike
    requirement of the QDR? Who wants to start?
        General Cartwright. If I could, Mr. Chairman, and then let
    the Services follow. But in the construct of Global Strike, we
    talked today about the attribute of prompt, which is a subset
    of the broader Global Strike capabilities. We also talked about
    the significant fielding capabilities that have occurred over
    the past year. In a concept format, the idea here is that there
    are a set of high-value, time-sensitive targets. It is not a
    large set, but there is a set of those. The Trident
    modification is designed to get at that subset.
        Following on behind that are these other capabilities that
    we described that are associated with sea-launched, air-
    launched capabilities, tactical aircraft. Given their speed and
    range, they will, assuming you start from the same point, close
    at varying rates, but what you get is a constant building of
    pressure as you add the platforms and capabilities as they are
    able to close the conflict, and the volume comes from that
    ever-increasing additive value of platforms and capabilities
    that close the conflict. So, no, Trident is not high volume,
    but it gets at the key enabling targets that could potentially
    change the character of the conflict, could easily alter how
    long the conflict will go on, and it allows the time to hold
    the enemy at risk as you close the high-volume fires over time.
        Senator Sessions. The QDR actually called for high-volume
    prompt.
        General Cartwright. I understand.
        Senator Sessions. I don't know, maybe they should have
    written it like you just explained it.
        General Cartwright. I'm not going there, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Made good sense to me, but do you think
    maybe they misspoke there?
        General Cartwright. I'll give you my opinion. The question
    of volume has more to do with what is the capability that we
    want. The volume could, in fact, be reflective of how much you
    are able to leverage with just a few choicely-placed rounds, so
    to speak, versus large numbers of weapons being the volume side
    of this. In other words, we do what is called nodal analysis.
    If we hold a key point at risk, it holds the whole network at
    risk oftentimes.
        Senator Sessions. All right. Secretary Flory, do you want
    to follow up on that, please?
        Mr. Flory. I just was going to add the results, though, and
    this is a somewhat longer-term option, but it helps get to the
    high volume point. There are other systems that are in the
    works--the Army hypersonic system, the Navy's short-range
    ballistic missile system that's being looked at, and various
    Air Force systems that the Air Force is looking at, but none of
    them come online. The importance of the conventional Trident is
    it's something that we think we could field in 2 years, while
    these other systems I think the earliest one would come online
    in 2012 or so.
        General Cartwright. 2012 to 2015.
        Mr. Flory. 2012 to 2015.
        Senator Sessions. Let me just say this, Secretary Flory,
    we'll have the Army hypersonic, and the Navy is working on a
    different system? That would be a part of this mix.
        The Air Force also. I'll ask you to mention those, but as
    we do this in terms of cost, we need to ask ourselves do we
    need three different systems? General, I don't know where you
    all would do that, but let me ask about the other two Prompt
    Global Strike capabilities that other Services would be working
    on.
        Admiral Young. The Navy's Prompt Global Strike is the
    conventional Trident modification. We have no other program
    that's going after that capability. We do have a large number
    of other programs that are providing Global Strike capability:
    our Carrier Strike Groups, our Expeditionary Strike Groups, and
    our SSGN Strike Groups that are coming online. Their Strike
    Groups provide a large volume of strike capability around the
    areas where they are physically located. This goes to the point
    that General Cartwright made earlier. They cannot be everyplace
    where the adversary may be carrying out their actions. So
    today, the Prompt Global Strike program that the Navy has is
    the Trident conventional modification program.
        Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, do you want to add to
    that?
        General Gorenc. I would like to mention a couple of things
    actually. When you think about the high volume, you immediately
    would go into the constrict of the bomber-type force. We in the
    Air Force, of course, have that ongoing with the Phase I, which
    is the modernization of the B-52, the B-1, the B-2, and all the
    capabilities that have been highlighted that are enhanced and
    everything else.
        Of course, you are also looking at the 2018 timeframe with
    our Phase II of looking at what are the options that we have
    out there that explore the current technologies that would
    potentially give you the manned, unmanned, or maybe a
    combination of both.
        Then, obviously into the future, our Phase III look, which
    is, what else is out there that we really would like that maybe
    would enhance some of the capabilities and things we were
    looking at, which is speed and getting through an area very
    fast and launching from different locations that will give you
    that opportunity for the range and everything else. So, that is
    the normal way you would kind of think about it from the high
    volume.
        Of course, we are also looking at the exact Prompt Global
    Strike, which is the requirement for the promptness, which our
    bomber fleet may not provide in this context of Prompt Global
    Strike. Then you may be looking at some things like hypersonic
    vehicles and things of that sort that could be launched into a
    higher altitude and brought back much like an ICBM-type of a
    capability, but not necessarily. We are looking at that. We are
    exploring options and just seeing what we can, in fact, as an
    Air Force provide to the Prompt Global Strike portion, although
    we know the contribution that we normally have and provide in
    the Global Strike overall construct.
        Senator Sessions. I guess my question is, who is
    coordinating this? Is there someone saying this is too many
    different projects and we ought to all work together, or we
    need each one of them, and is there a coordinator?
        General Cartwright. As the advocate for this area,
    USSTRATCOM looks across the range of capability, looks at the
    risks attentive to not having a particular capability or the
    quantity of the capability and how that matches up with the
    risk and then acts as an advocate. In a business sense, we are
    a noisy customer, a demanding customer. We are looking to the
    Services and what they have in capability, what they have on
    the drawing boards of the future and looking at the feasibility
    and how well that matches up with what we think is our best
    assessment of what we will need in the future. We allow and
    really encourage tension in the system, competition in the
    system for the concepts--in this case, looking at the Army
    Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AAHW) system versus what the Navy
    might be thinking about versus what the Air Force might look at
    in the next generation of their Minuteman or other systems. We
    try to get the knowledge points and not carry these programs
    any longer than we have to, but gain the knowledge necessary to
    make the best choices we can, knowing our crystal ball is not
    perfect. They have to have some flexibility to adapt to the
    future. From an advocacy standpoint, I see USSTRATCOM in that
    seat.
        Senator Sessions. It strikes me a bit like the unmanned
    aerial vehicles (UAVs). We ended up with all kinds of people
    doing research, spending lots and lots of money, buying very
    small numbers or too small numbers at pretty high rates per
    copy, when if we could figure out a way to have one or two and
    buy them at high volume, we would have probably saved a lot of
    money. Are we confident we won't be into that now, and who
    would be responsible for pulling the plug on the programs that
    are not the most competitive?
        General Cartwright. I certainly would be the first to stand
    up and give you today, as I did with the B-52, our best
    judgment and recommendation on that.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Flory, you think you have
    sufficient review oversight in DOD to make sure that programs
    don't go too long and that we identify the most beneficial
    early?
        Mr. Flory. Senator, I think we do. As General Cartwright
    says, he is the consumer on this, and he is saying I want this
    capability and people can compete to deliver the capability in
    different ways. At some point the issue of duplication you
    point to is a real one. There would have to be a necking down
    decision of what, which of these things works best, which of
    these things meets the warfighters' needs, which of these
    things provide the most useful options for the President.
        Senator Sessions. I think there is a tendency for any
    Service to be working on something they want to be loyal to
    theirs and believe it's going to be the final solution, and
    they all may not be. With regard to AAHW, it flies within the
    upper atmosphere to its target, the Army is developing that. It
    could deliver lower cost per round of munition, a high-volume
    strike capability. How do you see that in the mix? What's your
    evaluation of that, and what are the other programs that are
    under consideration?
        General Cartwright. I'll take a whack at that. For the
    high-speed, long-range precise capabilities, we have started
    with the Trident modification, the D-5. But as we move forward,
    we want to be able to understand where are the limitations in
    our ability to carry that kind of strike forward into the
    future. What are the technical limitations, what are the
    operational limitations, policy limitations, et cetera? For
    vehicles that maneuver at hypersonic speeds, we have technical
    limitations today that need to be overcome. We are trying to
    encourage that the laboratories and the R&D houses, whether
    they be commercial or government, investigate from every angle
    that they can think of how to solve some of these technical
    challenges associated with these speeds. The Army Research Lab
    and the AAHW system concept, which is a concept right now, is
    one venue by which to do this that is offering promise. They
    have a concept that looks like if they can overcome what are
    common technical challenges across all of these programs, they
    may well be in a position to see that concept mature. It could
    also be that as they were to solve some of these technical
    challenges, the technology could be migrated to another
    platform. Then you start to look at cost versus schedule versus
    performance and the capabilities the country needs, and you try
    to, I don't want to say down-select, but you try to focus as
    quickly as possible on what you think will match your need. The
    Army concept is very attractive, but they must, like everyone
    else, conquer some of these technical barriers. The sooner that
    we can conquer them, then the sooner we can make decisions
    about investment.
        Senator Sessions. I know we're in a serious effort to
    modernize our nuclear forces. Admiral Young, what about the
    Navy force structure plans for sea-based deterrence? What do
    you see for the future there?
        Admiral Young. Sir, our program of record is the Trident D-
    5 system. Our requirement is for 14 SSBNs that provide us with
    12 operational SSBNs. The Navy has a plan that will take these
    ships through a refueling cycle that will bring them into the
    shipyard essentially one per year starting in 2007.
        Senator Sessions. That will leave you how many deployed?
        Admiral Young. That leaves us with 12 operational SSBNs.
    We're taking these ships out to around the 2042 timeframe. My
    responsibility is to take the weapon system, the strategic
    weapon system, and have it meet that same operational
    timeframe.
        Senator Sessions. You're confident that these submarines
    will be solid until 2042?
        Admiral Young. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Isn't that great?
        Admiral Young. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. How long will that be? How long will they
    have been in service?
        Admiral Young. That will be 45 years total. We have
    obviously done a lot of engineering analysis to support those
    findings. But my part of that is actually the D-5 system, and
    we have a D-5 life extension program which is going to take the
    D-5 missile and take the components on it that will be hit by
    obsolescence, the electronic components. There are essentially
    six packages on that system--two in the guidance and four in
    the missile. We are going through, right now, the design of
    those components so that in fiscal year 2008, we will start
    buying our first D-5 life extension missiles. We'll bring those
    online so they will Initial Operational Capability in 2013.
    Along with that, we are also through a modernization program
    continually modernizing the shipboard equipment. The fire
    control, which also has a great deal of electronics, we are
    upgrading that to put components on it that are supportable and
    also give us the capability that the President, through
    USSTRATCOM, needs to deploy the system through that timeframe.
        Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, what about you and Air
    Force plans for upgrading the nuclear land-based deterrent?
        General Gorenc. Obviously, we're working hard to make sure
    that we drop the weapons down or not the weapons necessarily,
    but the ICBMs from 500 to 450. We're going to make sure, as
    General Cartwright mentioned, that those get put into the
    proper locations and are held as necessary. We'll continue
    doing our testing as needed per year to make sure that the
    weapons in fact are viable, and we're looking forward to just
    continuing that modernization effort. Now, as we go forward and
    look at the replacement for the missile, for the Minuteman III,
    we are looking at all of those alternatives. We are studying
    those now. There has been money spent on looking at ways to
    continue making sure that we have a viable force for the future
    and that we can continue providing the capabilities that the
    commander needs out in the field, and we'll continue doing that
    of course.
        Senator Sessions. Did you express your view on the B-52
    reduction, and did you get to complete your thought on that?
        General Gorenc. I did.
        Senator Sessions. Your position of the Air Force.
        General Gorenc. I have to say, General Cartwright really
    hit the nail on the head with this as far as the B-52 and where
    we are going. In a sense, really what you are seeing here is
    actually a demonstration of what this committee and all of us,
    in fact, have done as we continue trying to enhance the
    capabilities out there for the warfighter.
        Senator Sessions. Are you talking about the way he
    expressed that?
        General Gorenc. Yes, the way he expressed it.
        Senator Sessions. The overall concept calls for jointness
    and analyzing the customer needs?
        General Gorenc. Yes, I think so. As we look at platform
    specifics, sometimes it's very easy for us to get so centric on
    the platform itself that we forget about what it does. I don't
    necessarily, for example, need 80 or 100 pieces of things to
    perform a particular function if I know that I can, in fact,
    perform that function with a little bit less because I have a
    great capability, and I thought that the B-52 is a classic
    example of a system that has proven very effective. Now,
    because of the capabilities that you have put onto that
    platform, you are able not necessarily to need as many. So,
    that was a very good explanation, I thought, as far as how we
    proceed and how we go forward.
        I think another thing that I am noticing is and it relates,
    in a sense, to your question earlier, Mr. Chairman, on how is
    the Department actually looking and trading capabilities off. I
    think that we, in fact, have a very good oversight on making
    sure that we hold each other accountable within the Services to
    make sure that we are not going and wasting resources in cases
    where an individual who may look at it from the outside would
    go jeez, I can't believe you're doing the same thing. There's a
    reason why that's happening at that stage of the development.
    In the future, when you actually procure, you'll find that
    you're going to whittle it down and actually choose the right
    thing. I think we're going in the right direction overall, sir.
        Senator Sessions. I just received notice of another vote
    that's started. We have a number of questions that are
    important. We may submit those to you in written form. General
    Cartwright and Secretary Flory, this is your second hearing
    today? Is that right?
        Mr. Flory. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Bless you. We thank you for your good
    humor, but it is important. Would either of you care to comment
    on the GBI sites that we may be looking at around the world,
    Europe or that region, or is that something that you prefer not
    to talk about at this time? I know that those matters involve
    sensitivity to nations who may not be ready to talk about it.
        Mr. Flory. Senator, I'll just leave it at this, we are
    consulting with some countries. We have had consultations in
    the past on this subject, possible third site deployment, and
    those consultations are continuing.
        Senator Sessions. All right. I want to thank you again for
    what you are doing. We are benefitting this very moment in Iraq
    in our strategic posture for decisions made 20 years ago. I
    think we will probably see a decision process and a production
    process get a little quicker than it has been over the past,
    but it still takes time to conceive and develop and deploy a
    complex weapon system. So, I am glad to hear your long-term
    thoughts, that you are thinking ahead and that you have a plan
    to get there. Congress may mess it up, but maybe not. We tend
    to value your advice and pretty regularly follow it. Are there
    any other comments you'd like to make for the record to clarify
    anything that's been said earlier in our hearing today?
        General Cartwright. No, sir.
        Senator Sessions. All right. Thank you very much. This
    subcommittee takes seriously our immense responsibilities and
    we rely so much on you and your advice. With no further
    business, we will be adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

                            MINUTEMAN III REDUCTIONS

        1. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, please
    explain the strategic rationale for reducing the Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) force structure from 500 single-warhead
    Minuteman III missiles to a force of 450?
        General Cartwright. A reduction from 500 to 450 Minuteman III
    missiles enables two efforts without affecting the deterrent value of
    our ICBM force. First, the reduction in operational Minuteman IIIs will
    provide test assets necessary for ensuring a reliable missile force
    into the future. Second, this reduction will preserve Multiple
    Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capability on the ICBM force in
    order to retain the capability and experience necessary to upload
    additional warheads in the event of an unanticipated change in the
    threat posture.
        Mr. Flory. During the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) senior leaders reevaluated our strategic
    nuclear force posture in light of both our progress in making nuclear
    force reductions and in fielding New Triad capabilities. As a result,
    they determined that--with minimal risk--we could make a further,
    modest reduction in the number of nuclear-armed ICBMs by retiring 50
    Minuteman IIIs.
        With this reduction in ICBMs, the United States will continue to
    maintain an effective, balanced nuclear force posture that provides a
    secure deterrent while we continue to build the non-nuclear elements of
    the Global Strike force structure. In addition, the modest reduction in
    ICBMs will free up missiles for the flight test program.

        2. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, what
    impact, if any, will this reduction have on the U.S. nuclear deterrent
    capability?
        General Cartwright. The reduction in the number of missiles will
    not affect the deterrent or warfighting value of our ICBM force. The
    number of ICBM warheads remains at 500, while allowing continued
    testing of missile assets to ensure reliability of the Minuteman III
    missile system.
        Mr. Flory. The 10 percent reduction in the size of the Minuteman
    III force will not affect the number of operationally deployed
    strategic nuclear warheads we are planning to deploy by 2012 (1,700-
    2,200). The United States will continue to maintain an effective,
    balanced nuclear force that provides a secure deterrent, and the
    reduction of 50 Minuteman III ICBMs will not affect either the
    deterrent or the warfighting value of our ICBM force.

        3. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, what
    are the international policy implications of placing multiple warheads
    on some of the remaining 450 Minuteman ICBMs?
        General Cartwright. There are no international policy implications
    in retaining a Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle capability.
        Mr. Flory. The United States maintains a MIRV capability in a
    portion of the Minuteman III ICBM force as it is currently deployed.
    The Department foresees no international policy implications in
    retaining a MIRV capability in a portion of the Minuteman III ICBM
    force.

        4. Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, please explain how the
    reduction of 50 Minuteman missiles will be accomplished?
        General Gorenc. Air Force Space Command is currently studying the
    most cost effective, safe, and expeditious way to draw down 50 ICBMs as
    directed by the QDR.

        5. Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, from which ICBM sites will
    they be removed?
        General Gorenc. Once Air Force Space Command completes their study,
    they will propose a course of action to draw down the ICBM force in
    accordance with the QDR.

        6. Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, what are the costs or savings
    associated with this plan?
        General Gorenc. There is a $10.9 million operation and maintenance
    (O&M) cost in the fiscal year 2007 budget request to cover
    environmental cleanup actions, shipping and storage of removed
    boosters, and placing the launch facilities in minimal caretaker
    status. There are additional minor O&M costs expected in fiscal year
    2008 and fiscal year 2009 to complete the inactivation. Manpower
    savings of at least 135 spaces will be realized in fiscal year 2007,
    with additional savings in fiscal year 2008 and beyond. In addition,
    O&M and procurement savings are expected in future requests.

        7. Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, does the Air Force plan to
    place multiple warheads on some of the remaining 450 Minuteman
    missiles?
        General Gorenc. Yes, we will as long as U.S. Transportation Command
    (USTRANSCOM) war plans direct a multiple warhead configuration
    capability. USTRANSCOM will review targeting requirements and transmit
    that data to Air Force Space Command. Air Force Space Command will
    configure missiles with USTRANSCOM's force structure and warhead mix.
    All remaining missiles will be capable of carrying between one and
    three warheads.

        8. Senator Sessions. General Gorenc, is there funding in the budget
    request for this purpose?
        General Gorenc. Yes. There is $10.9 million (O&M) in fiscal year
    2007 to cover environmental cleanup actions, shipping and storage of
    removed boosters, and placing the launch facilities in minimal
    caretaker status.

               ALTERNATIVES TO CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT MODIFICATION

        9. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
    Secretary Flory's prepared statement notes that the DOD is studying
    other solutions, both sea- and land-based, for Prompt Global Strike.
    For example, the Air Force is undergoing an analysis of alternatives
    for the land-based strategic deterrent; the Army is studying a concept
    for fielding an advanced hypersonic weapon; and the Navy is studying
    the development of a conventionally-armed submarine launched ballistic
    missile (SLBM) with a range of about 1,500 miles. How do these options
    compare to Conventional Trident Modification (CTM)?
        General Cartwright. The CTM is a hedge capability. It will provide
    military utility across a range of target types and scenarios and is
    scheduled for initial operational capability in fiscal year 2009.
    Currently, competing systems will require technical advancements to
    refine the systems capabilities adding additional time before
    operational availability. The expected initial operational capability
    of alternatives is beyond fiscal year 2013.
        Mr. Flory. The Conventional Trident Missile is the only near-term
    option for addressing the existing capability gap for prompt,
    conventional Global Strike. The longer-term goal is to develop a range
    of Prompt Global Strike capabilities that can provide the President
    with a wider range of options for addressing the dangers of the new
    security environment. The studies currently underway regarding other
    options for conventional Global Strike capabilities have not been
    completed. However, we anticipate that these options would require
    significantly more time to develop and field than would the CTM.

        10. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, why
    do we need CTM today when there are other, potentially less
    controversial options, just over the horizon?
        General Cartwright. Currently, there are no other available near-
    or mid-term Prompt Global Strike options that address the capability
    gap before fiscal year 2013 at the earliest.
        Mr. Flory. At any moment we could find ourselves in a situation for
    which a near real-time response with a conventional Global Strike
    capability could provide an important option for the President.
    Unfortunately, our current capabilities for prompt, conventional, long-
    range strike are limited. There is no near-term alternative to
    Conventional Trident that can address the capability gap for prompt,
    conventional Global Strike.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                          DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT

        11. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, the Defense Science
    Board completed a report in January on the nuclear weapons
    infrastructure at the DOD and Department of Energy (DOE). The report
    was classified but most of the recommendations and findings were not.
    There are two findings and recommendations that I would ask that you
    comment on. First, the recommendation that a new organizational
    structure is needed for the National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA), and second, a need for greater clarity for requirements and the
    understanding and knowledge that leads to requirements development. I
    am concerned that at a minimum the recommendations on the
    organizational structure are unworkable. On the other hand, the second
    recommendation reflects a complaint that has existed for years and
    largely reflects a criticism of the effectiveness of the Nuclear
    Weapons Council. Would you please share your thoughts on this report?
        General Cartwright. The Defense Science Board report was thorough
    and thoughtful. U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) defers to the
    Secretaries of Defense and Energy with respect to the management and
    organizational structure of the nuclear weapon enterprise. However, I
    am concerned about the long-term sustainability of the nuclear weapon
    enterprise and believe that it must be transformed to one that is more
    agile and sustainable to support current and future warfighter needs. I
    also agree that greater clarity is needed in defining requirements
    placed on the nuclear weapons enterprise.

                        ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR

        12. Senator Bill Nelson. General Gorenc, the Fiscal Year 2006
    Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts included $4 million in
    the Air Force budget to conduct a sled test to study and understand the
    physics of penetrating geologic media. This is the sled test designed
    by the DOE Sandia National Lab as part of the Robust Nuclear Earth
    Penetrator study. What is the status of the sled test?
        General Gorenc. The Secretary of Defense has elected to have the
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) plan and conduct the penetrator
    sled test. The Air Force is participating in the test planning process
    at DTRA's request, but has only a limited role. Further, the $4 million
    appropriated (less congressionally-mandated rescissions) to the Air
    Force in fiscal year 2006 has been transferred to DTRA for execution.
    Questions concerning penetrator sled test specifics should be addressed
    to DTRA.

        13. Senator Bill Nelson. General Gorenc, Secretary of Energy Bodman
    said that the DOE would not conduct the sled test nor would it be
    conducted at a DOE facility, including the Sandia National Lab. He also
    said that if DOD wanted to conduct the sled test that Sandia would
    provide the equipment and technical expertise. Has the Air Force
    requested assistance and technical expertise from Sandia? If so, what
    assistance has been requested?
        General Gorenc. The Air Force has not requested any assistance or
    technical expertise from the Sandia National Laboratories. The
    Secretary of Defense has elected to have the DTRA plan and conduct the
    penetrator sled test. The Air Force is providing limited assistance to
    DTRA in the test planning process at their request.

        14. Senator Bill Nelson. General Gorenc, is there any money in the
    fiscal year 2007 Air Force budget request to support the sled test?
        General Gorenc. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD), the Air Force has requested $3.047 million in the Air
    Force Operations and Maintenance account for post-test data reduction
    and analysis of the data obtained from the fiscal year 2006 penetrator
    sled test. As agreed between OSD, DTRA, and the Air Force, these funds
    will be transferred to DTRA in fiscal year 2007 for execution.

        15. General Gorenc, will the Air Force pay Sandia for the equipment
    and technical expertise?
        General Gorenc. No, the Air Force will not spend any additional
    funds, other than the $4 million (less congressionally-mandated
    rescissions) appropriated and already transferred to DTRA, on the
    penetrator sled test in fiscal year 2006.

                   CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT D-5 BALLISTIC MISSILE

        16. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, a
    QDR decision is to field within 2 years an initial capability to
    deliver conventional warheads using Trident D-5 missiles on ballistic
    missile submarines to meet a prompt global strike mission. All the D-5
    missiles on Trident ballistic missile submarines today carry nuclear
    warheads.
        The current plan is to buy 533 upgraded D-5 missiles. The flyaway
    cost of a D-5 is approximately $32 million, when the research and
    development costs are added in and distributed among the total number
    of missiles the program acquisition unit cost is closer to $60 million
    a piece. The acquisition unit cost is the full cost of a system. In
    addition the cost to convert 24 of the missiles to a conventional
    warhead would be $500 million. With initial production costs, upgrade
    costs, and conversion costs, I estimate that per missile cost of the
    conventional Trident is $80 million. Do you agree with this rough
    estimate? If not, what is your estimate of the program acquisition cost
    for each converted D-5 missile with four warheads?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM defers to the Navy Strategic Systems
    Programs.
        Admiral Young. While the Navy agrees with the $60 million and $80
    million cost estimates for a Trident missile as discussed in the
    question, we believe this is not an accurate measure for costing actual
    flyaway costs. If you consider the research and development costs more
    as sunk costs, the P-5 WPN budget exhibit includes a more
    representative number for a single missile called the Missile Flyaway
    Unit Cost. The fiscal year 2007 President's budget (PB) exhibit for
    Trident II (WPN Line Item 1150) includes cost for the last original
    (pre-LE) Trident II missiles procured in fiscal year 2005 reflecting a
    missile flyaway cost of $24.5 million. Additive to that is $8.0
    million, the cost of a full-rate production guidance system, for a
    total flyaway cost of $32.5 million. None of these unit costs include
    the warhead, which is funded by DOE.
        If you consider the comparable flyaway unit cost of a single
    flechette reentry body (RB), approximately $2.5 million, you could
    conclude a flyaway CTM missile unit cost will be approximately $42.5
    million [i.e., $32.5 million Missile and Guidance + $10 million RB (4
    RBs x $2.5 million)].

        17. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, the
    current plan is to buy 533 D-5s, just enough D-5 missiles to meet the
    requirements of the nuclear mission. If 24 D-5 missiles are converted,
    will the Navy want to buy more D-5s to sustain the nuclear mission?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM defers to the Navy Strategic Systems
    Programs.
        Admiral Young. No, the Navy has not requested an increase in
    inventory objective in the fiscal year 2007 President's budget. There
    is no plan to increase the inventory objective at this time.

        18. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, what
    are the target scenarios for using a conventional D-5 missile?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. The target scenarios are
    based on mission requirements. Generally, the CTM is planned to be
    effective against high value, fleeting targets, such as weapons of mass
    destruction, terrorists, missiles, radars, and integrated air defense
    components to list a few. Any scenario that requires the need for a
    prompt (within an hour) response to a threat could require the need for
    CTM capabilities.

        19. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, are
    there other scenarios--other than terrorists or weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD)--where you think long range ballistic missiles might
    come into play?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. High-value time-sensitive and
    emerging targets that cannot be held at risk with existing conventional
    capabilities due to staging, deployment time, range to effect, or the
    availability of specific weapon systems.

        20. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, is
    the primary reason for development of a conventional D-5 a preemptive
    first strike mission?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. No. The primary reason
    USSTRATCOM requires the development and employment of the conventional
    D-5 is to provide the President with a broader range of options for a
    timely response in a crisis. A rapid response capability allows
    additional time to confirm intelligence sources and/or for
    consultation, prior to making a strike decision. Adversaries continue
    to increase their ability to leverage time, distance, and denied areas
    to limit our ability to respond. Capability to deliver a conventional
    payload nearly anywhere on the Earth will provide the President a
    viable option to assure allies, dissuade competition, deter attacks,
    and defeat threats, while simultaneously reducing our adversary's
    freedom of action.

        21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
    doesn't the President already have options today--ones that are
    improving--to hit these fleeting targets with existing or planned
    weapons systems, including precision guided bombs and cruise missiles
    on strategic and tactical aircraft, attack submarines, and unmanned
    aerial vehicles?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Current capabilities
    typically take hours to days to prepare and respond, to deliver desired
    effect(s). Given sufficient time to prepare and stage assets, current
    capabilities might well be the preferred option. There are
    circumstances, though, where all other advanced conventional
    capabilities fall short of prompt and responsive (closing in less than
    60 minutes).

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, in
    practice, how much ``quicker'' would it be to use a conventional long-
    range ballistic missile rather than other conventional assets, given
    challenges associated with identifying and locating targets, receiving
    authority to fire, and having submarines in position to shoot?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. The challenges associated
    with identifying and locating targets, receiving authority to fire, and
    having sufficient capability in place to achieve the objective are all
    part of any strike decision calculus. The CTM requirement is driven by
    our inability to access denied areas with existing conventional
    capabilities and to hold fleeting high value targets at risk in a
    prompt manner. In a crisis, where we do not have forward forces in
    place, or are required to deploy forces to within striking distance,
    CTM would reduce our response time from execution to effects on target
    actually buys back decision time. Traditional air-breathing platforms
    fly at about 500 miles per hour and can require hours to days to
    prepare and deliver a strike. Conventional long-range ballistic
    missiles can cover over 5,000 miles in under an hour. The flexibility
    of the SSBN force allows them to operate freely around the world
    placing any point on the globe within reach within an hour.

        23. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, can
    we develop the necessary intelligence support and command and control
    systems to both locate and effectively hit potential targets?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Yes, but we must continue to
    transition intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities
    from a legacy approach, directed largely at monitoring nation states in
    two theaters, to a true global enterprise tailored to meet regional
    needs.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
    would this be a presidential decision to launch the $80 million
    conventional D-5?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Yes, the President will
    authorize the use of a CTM capability.

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, the
    plan, as I understand it, is to have the Trident submarines carry a
    combination of 22 nuclear D-5 missiles and two conventional D-5
    missiles. It would be impossible to tell the difference between a
    nuclear D-5 and a conventional D-5 for most or all of the flight path
    if launched. How would other countries, notably Russia and China, but
    also including France and England, know the difference between a
    conventional and nuclear D-5 missile?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Robust notification
    procedures would mitigate potential misinterpretation of U.S.
    intentions by those countries that possess the systems required to
    monitor ballistic missile in flight. Countries capable of monitoring
    ballistic trajectories would be able to quickly forecast the target
    area within tens of miles in seconds.

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
    several weeks ago, Secretary Wynne testified that the Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty (START) notifications for test launches and
    inspections to count warheads would help solve this problem of
    distinguishing between a nuclear and non-nuclear D-5 missile launch.
    Please explain how either of these measures would assist Russia in
    determining that an operational launch from a U.S. SLBM was not a D-5
    with a nuclear warhead? Would the START even allow Russia to confirm
    whether a nuclear or non-nuclear warhead was on a D-5 at the dock?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. START notifications for test
    launches, and inspection to count warheads will not assist Russia in
    determining that an operational (combat) launch of a SLBM is not a D-5
    with a nuclear warhead.

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, if
    notification protocols were in place, how long would it take to provide
    notification and assurance that a launch was conventional?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Notification protocols are in
    place. The United States has over a dozen existing direct
    communications links to counterparts in Russia. As an example, the
    Moscow-Washington Direct Communications Link Hotline has been in place
    since 1963 to affect 24/7 communications with the Russian Federation in
    real time to assure strategic stability.

        28. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, if
    the whole goal of Prompt Global Strike is to be able to strike anywhere
    in the world in less than 60 minutes, would a notification protocol
    defeat the purpose of Prompt Global Strike?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. No. The need for a capability
    to strike within 60 minutes does not imply that only 60 minutes will be
    available in a crisis. It means that upon making a decision to strike
    it will take less than 60 minutes to place warheads on a target.
    Experience has shown that the time from preliminary warning to
    confirmation of an impending attack might be relatively fleeting, but
    details of the impending attack will likely emerge over a period of
    hours. The DOD will always seek to improve the responsiveness of its
    forces, in order to provide maximum flexibility, while details of the
    threat emerge. During this fluid period of hours, leading up to a
    strike decision, the President may choose to notify other world leaders
    of imminent U.S. defensive actions. Because it is more responsive, CTM
    buys time for consultation and intelligence confirmation before
    committing forces in a provocative fashion.

        29. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
    could you please tell me the status of the request to provide all
    studies and analyses that have been conducted by DOD addressing or
    discussing the issues associated with this proposal?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. USSTRATCOM defers the
    question to the OSD.

        30. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
    could you also provide a list of ongoing studies and any additional
    studies that are planned or will have to be completed in the future?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. Ongoing and additional
    studies included the following:

              (1) The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006
              (2) The Strategic Capabilities Assessment, April 2005
              (3) Defense Policy Board Study on Strategic Command
            Initiatives, February 2006
              (4) U.S. Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group (SAG),
            74th SAG Plenary Policy Panel Report, December 2005
              (5) U.S. Strategic Command, Conventional Kinetic Options for
            Global Deterrence, September 2005
              (6) Ballistic Missile ``Overflight'' An Assessment of the
            Issues, Prepared for U.S. Space Command, December 2004
              (7) Next Generation Long-Range Strike Analysis of
            Alternatives
              (8) Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives
              (9) Land Based Strategic Deterrence Initial Capabilities
            Document

        31. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, has
    anyone in the Department of State been consulted on this proposal and
    have they expressed any concerns or raised any issues with the
    proposal?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. USSTRATCOM has invited
    Ambassador Joseph to participate in a table top exercise highlighting
    the CTM on 20 April 2006.

        32. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, will
    Congress be receiving a reprogramming request to begin work on
    conventionally armed D-5 missiles in fiscal year 2006?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. At this time the DOD has not
    submitted a request for reprogramming.

        33. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, has
    any money already been spent in support of conventionally armed D-5
    missiles, and if yes, on what specific activities was the money spent
    and what was the source of the money?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM defers to the Navy Strategic Systems
    Programs.
        Admiral Young. To date, no Navy funds have been allocated or
    expended in support of conventionally armed D-5 missiles.

        34. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
    would other countries who want to further develop long-range missiles
    find this proposal an incentive or cover to proceed with their missile
    programs?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. It is impossible to predict
    what other countries are going to do. There are over 30 countries with
    ballistic missile programs today. The development of ballistic missile
    technology will likely continue whether this initiative goes forward or
    not.

        35. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, does
    this plan undercut U.S. efforts to discourage others from developing
    long-range ballistic missiles or lower the threshold for use of these
    missiles?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. No. This plan is being
    developed to provide a solution to the gap in prompt long-range
    conventional kinetic strike capabilities. It does not lower the
    threshold for use of other missile systems.

        36. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young,
    would this proposal increase the risk of accidental, mistaken, or
    unauthorized use of ballistic missiles by other countries if they too
    were to use the U.S. example and develop conventional long-range
    ballistic missiles?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. No. The United States is the
    only country out of the more than 30 that have ballistic missiles that
    does not have a conventional ballistic missile capability. Other
    countries will continue to develop their own ballistic missile programs
    independent of any U.S. example.

        37. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Admiral Young, has
    any risk assessment been conducted to analyze the probability of a
    retaliatory nuclear strike being initiated as a result of a
    conventional D-5 operational launch?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. A disciplined risk assessment
    approach to achieve a robust misinterpretation mitigation plan is
    underway and will be validated through exercises and wargames.

                                B-52 RETIREMENTS

        38. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, the
    QDR recommended reducing the B-52H fleet to 56 aircraft from 93
    aircraft. At a previous hearing, General Moseley and Secretary Wynne,
    in response to a question from Senator Levin, agreed to provide copies
    of all analyses and studies that have been conducted to support the
    decision to retire 37 B-52H aircraft. What is the status of this
    request?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM is not witting of the request nor
    status.
        General Gorenc. The Air Force performed an operational risk
    assessment of the impact of a reduced B-52 force structure in light of
    planned/programmed modernizations and improvements across the entire
    Global Strike portfolio. This assessment concluded the proposed B-52
    force structure/Global Strike portfolio met any single Combatant
    Commander's Operational War Plan or Major Contingency Operation's
    requirements. The specific conclusions of this assessment are
    classified. We are prepared to discuss the assessment with the Senate
    Armed Services Committee professional staff members.

        39. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, no
    documents have been produce to date. When can we expect the documents?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM is not witting of the request nor
    status.
        General Gorenc. Air Force Space Command is currently studying the
    most cost effective, safe, and expeditious way to draw down 50 ICBMs as
    directed by the QDR.

        40. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
    what is the rational for retiring 37 B-52s, particularly as a fairly
    extensive upgrade program is well underway?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. The imperative for recapitalization to support the
    Air Force's transformation is at the forefront of our need to draw down
    the B-52 force structure. Retiring:

            - older aircraft enables reinvestment to modernize the
            capability of the entire fleet. As we continue down the path of
            transformation we are willing to accept
            - some near-term risk to field a more capable future force. The
            modernized

                     bomber fleet will have greater lethality, be
                    more responsive and more survivable. There will be
                    improved lethality through numerous weapon
                     integration initiatives such as Joint Air-to-
                    Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), enhanced guided bomb
                    unit, and avionics mid-life improvements; increased
                    responsiveness through programs such as integrated
                     data link, combat network communications and
                    advanced high frequency radios; and ensured
                    survivability through threat awareness systems, low

            - observability upgrades and electronic counter-measure
            improvements.

        The Air Force also continues development on a new land-based,
    penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018. The Air
    Force remains committed to offset the B-52 reduction and mitigate the
    associated near-term risk by aggressively increasing the remaining
    bomber fleet's capabilities through modernization.

        41. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, why
    was the decision made to terminate immediately the upgrade programs?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. The decision to exercise contract options for the
    Electronic Countermeasure Improvement (ECMI) program and the Avionics
    Midlife Improvement (AMI) program were required by the end of March
    2006. The Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Wynne, decided not to
    exercise the ECMI and AMI contract options in support of the
    President's budget. We have not terminated the program as ongoing kits
    installations continue. The B-52 program has currently procured 72 ECMI
    kits and 81 AMI kits. This decision allows the Air Force to avoid
    purchasing excess kits. Furthermore, it allows the Air Force to save
    $19 million between the ECMI and AMI options.

        42. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
    doesn't immediate termination of the upgrade programs presuppose
    congressional agreement to retire all 37 B-52Hs?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. The fiscal year 2007 President's budget draws down
    the B-52 fleet, retiring the 17 attrition reserve aircraft in fiscal
    year 2007, and reducing the total fleet size from 76 aircraft to 56
    aircraft in fiscal year 2008. The decision to exercise contract options
    for the ECMI program and the AMI program were required by the end of
    March 2006. The Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Wynne, decided not
    to exercise the ECMI and AMI contract options in support of the
    President's budget. This decision allows the Air Force to avoid
    purchasing excess kits, and to save $19 million between the ECMI and
    AMI options. We have not terminated the program as ongoing kits
    installations continue. The B-52 program has currently procured 72 ECMI
    kits and 81 AMI kits. The Congressional Defense Subcommittees were
    notified of the Air Force's intentions to not exercise the ECMI and AMI
    contract options on 14 March 2006. The vendors were formally told that
    the Air Force would not exercise the options on either contract on 31
    March 2006. Both the ECMI and AMI contracts can be renegotiated if
    additional kits are required.

        43. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, the
    B-52 is often referred to as the ``workhorse'' of the bomber fleet and,
    according to Air Force analysis, can continue to fly until the late
    2030s, or earlier 2040s, largely because the flying hours are spread
    among a large number of airframes. With the reduction in the B-52
    fleet, won't the number of contingency flying hours increase for the
    remaining air frames thus hastening the time when the B-52 would
    otherwise have to be retired?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. Despite the reduction in the B-52 fleet, the
    programmed flying hours per aircraft will remain the same. As a result,
    the remaining aircraft would continue to fly at the same utilization
    (UTE) rate with the same expected service life.
        An increase in flying hours is not the key driver in decreasing
    service life. The key driver is how the aircraft is flown (i.e.,
    usage). For example, in the past 5-6 years, Air Combat Command (ACC)
    has reduced the low-level flight portion of their training syllabus in
    favor of performing more high-altitude training. This shift in usage
    significantly reduced stress on the airframe and effectively increased
    the economic service life of the platform. Airframe health is
    continuously monitored via the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program
    (ASIP).
        The Air Force will continue to closely manage the B-52 flying hour
    and service life programs to yield the maximum years of service from
    this airframe.

        44. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
    with only 56 B-52 bombers, what is the anticipated retirement date?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. Current projections for the retirement of the B-52
    are beyond 2035 based on information known to date and coincident with
    the projected fielding of a transformational long-range strike
    capability. The reduction of B-52s from 76 total aircraft (not
    including the 18 excess attrition reserve) to 56 total aircraft will be
    accompanied by a proportional decrease in the annual flying hour
    program. As a result, the retirement projection remains unchanged.
    However, structural service life is only one factor in determining
    retirement date of a weapon system. Other considerations include future
    threats, unforeseen sustainment costs, and fielding of a replacement
    capability.

        45. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
    what studies have been done to examine B-52 economic life?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. For the B-52, the first economic life study was
    accomplished during the mid to late 1970s. The purpose was to determine
    if the B-52 platform was a viable ALCM carrier for the out-years. Since
    that initial study, economic life projections have been incorporated
    into the B-52 ASIP as a matter of routine. The ASIP Individual Aircraft
    Tracking Program performs this calculation using, as input, pilot usage
    forms from each sortie. Based on the most recent calculations, the B-52
    fleet has, on average, 18,516 hours of service life remaining for each
    aircraft.

        46. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, the
    QDR also recommended development of a bomber alternative, referred to
    as a land-based penetrating long-range strike capability, by 2018. What
    additional capability could be developed and fielded by 2018 that
    justifies retirement of the B-52s from a cost and performance basis?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. Through its operational requirements process and
    the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, the
    Air Force has identified and validated long-range strike capability
    requirements and shortfalls. These capabilities/effects-based processes
    help improve the long-range strike force over time to ensure it has the
    capabilities needed today and tomorrow. The Air Force plans to keep B-
    52s as long as the capability/cost analysis justifies doing so; they
    will likely remain in the inventory for several more decades. At the
    same time, we are identifying and fielding new capabilities, such as
    the JASSM and a next generation long-range strike system, that will
    enable us to reduce/eliminate capability shortfalls so that we can
    operate effectively in future adversary environments. To that end, the
    Air Force has developed a three-phased long-range strike strategy:

             Phase 1 - Continues the modernization of legacy bomber
            fleet to upgrade, strengthen, and increase their combat
            effectiveness

                     $3.98 billion (fiscal year 2007 President's
                    budget total for 3010/3600) to upgrade B-1, B-2, and B-
                    52

             Phase 2 - Leverages near-term technologies to start
            development of a long-range strike capability that augments
            current fleet in 2018

                     2006 QDR directs Phase 2 effort
                     Considering manned, unmanned, and optionally
                    manned systems
                     ACC led Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) will
                    provide Air Force leadership with decision quality
                    information to support a Milestone A decision in early
                    2007

             Phase 3 - Goes beyond 2018 with a system of systems
            technology push for advanced improvements in speed, range,
            accuracy, connectivity, and survivability in the 2035 timeframe

        47. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
    what are the options being considered for the bomber to be fielded by
    2018?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. The options being considered for the bomber to be
    fielded by 2018 are manned, unmanned, and optionally manned. As a
    result of a request for information from the Air Force, industry has
    responded with several propriety options including manned.

        48. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc,
    what is the anticipated cost of the 2018 bomber alternative per unit
    and annual operating costs?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. We do not have enough information to provide a
    specific answer at this time. The Air Force AoA will determine options
    to meet an anticipated capability shortfall in the 2015-2020 timeframe.
    The AoA is looking at a range of options, including modifications to
    existing systems and potential new platforms. The AoA is limited to
    technology mature enough to be fielded by 2018. The AoA is expected to
    provide data to support the fiscal year 2008 President's budget
    development. Full analysis and reports will be complete in the first
    half of 2007.

        49. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, how
    does this compare to the B-52 flying hour cost of $11,384 per hour, the
    least expensive of the bombers?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. We do not have enough information to provide an
    answer at this time. The Air Force Next Generation Long Range Strike
    AoA will determine options to meet an anticipated capability shortfall
    in the 2015-2020 timeframe. The AoA is looking at a range of options,
    including modifications to existing systems and potential new
    platforms. The AoA is expected to provide data to support the fiscal
    year 2008 President's budget development. Full analysis and reports
    will be complete in the first half of 2007.

        50. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and General Gorenc, in
    2003, the Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended reengining the B-52H
    because the B-52H is ``the most versatile and cost effective weapon
    system in the bomber inventory.'' Moreover the DSB agreed with the Next
    Generation Bomber Study that ``aggressive modernization of bomber fleet
    will provide new bomber equivalent capability at significantly less
    cost.'' What has changed since then?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM respectfully defers platform and
    system specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Gorenc. The Air Force must recapitalize and transform while
    modernizing legacy platforms. A reduction in the number of B-52H
    aircraft is possible given the enhanced conventional capabilities
    across the Air Force since 2003; for instance, the JASSM fielded on the
    B-1 and B-52 in the summer of 2005 and the 500# Joint Direct Attack
    Munition (JDAM) fielded on the B-2 in the winter of 2005. Further,
    JASSM fields on the B-2 and F-16 in summer 2006. The 2007 President's
    budget successfully balances the imperatives for recapitalization and
    transformation against the need for sustaining legacy force structure.

                              W-80 NUCLEAR WARHEAD

        51. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, General
    Gorenc, and Secretary Flory, a study is currently underway to decide if
    the Navy and Air Force nuclear cruise missiles should be retired. In
    the meantime, the DOE is spending about $100 million per year to get
    ready to begin a life extension for the W-80 nuclear warhead, the
    warhead on the cruise missiles. Why not postpone the W-80 work until a
    final decision is made on whether the cruise missiles and W-80 are
    needed or not?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. The DOD, in conjunction with
    the DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration, will examine
    the way forward pending completion of the study in May.
        General Gorenc. The DOD is in the final phase of a comprehensive
    study on the post-2007 cruise missile requirements that includes the
    current program of record for the W-80 nuclear warhead. Study findings
    may result in changes to both the Air Force and DOE programs. However,
    until the study is completed and results approved, any change to the
    program of record is premature.
        Mr. Flory. The W-80 life extension program has been underway since
    1998. We are working towards a quick resolution of the force posture
    issues associated with cruise missiles, which use the W-80 warhead. The
    issues relate to decisions about the type of cruise missile, their
    numbers, and length of time that we must retain cruise missiles to
    support our deterrence strategy. We are making every effort to support
    the current congressional budget deliberations on this matter.

        52. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, General
    Gorenc, and Secretary Flory, would it make sense, if the life extension
    work on the W-80 is cancelled or postponed, to assign the first
    Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) to Livermore National Laboratory and
    let Los Alamos work on the very difficult W-76 life extension, the
    nuclear warhead for the D-5 missile?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. USSTRATCOM defers to the
    National Nuclear Security Administration.
        General Gorenc. The Nuclear Weapons Council established a joint Air
    Force-Navy-NNSA RRW Project Officers Group (POG) to examine the
    feasibility of the RRW concept. As an integral part of the joint
    effort, the NNSA laboratories are independently developing design
    concepts potentially applicable to both the SLBM and the ICBM. The POG
    will assess the feasibility of the respective design options, and
    present their findings and recommendations to the NWC in November 2006
    for a decision as to the next step for RRW.
        Mr. Flory. The primary linkage between the W-80 life extension
    program and the RRW program is the extent that each program may compete
    for limited resources in our stockpile transformation plan. The
    competition between the two national laboratories for the best RRW
    design should remain unbiased. A final decision is planned for late in
    2006.

        53. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, General
    Gorenc, and Secretary Flory, wouldn't this be a more realistic option
    to ensure success for the RRW?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. The success of the RRW
    program is not dependent upon any one agency's efforts but on the
    development of an integrated DOD, DOE, and NNSA strategy to move from
    our legacy stockpile to a nuclear stockpile appropriate to the post-
    Cold War security environment, with a foundation based on a
    revitalized, appropriately sized NNSA complex.
        General Gorenc. The joint Air Force-Navy-NNSA RRW POG is currently
    evaluating potential design options for the RRW. The POG is scheduled
    to present their findings and recommendations to the Nuclear Weapons
    Council this November for a decision as to the next step for RRW.
        Mr. Flory. Success of the RRW will depend primarily upon restoring
    the nuclear weapons infrastructure that furnishes the capacity to
    produce RRW designs in sufficient quantities to begin tranforming the
    nuclear stockpile in meaningful ways. If additional resources are
    needed for the RRW, options to provide the required resources will be
    developed.

        54. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, General
    Gorenc, and Secretary Flory, what role does a decision to keep or
    retire the air launched cruise missiles play in the decision to retire
    37 B-52H bomber aircraft?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. USSTRATCOM respectfully
    defers platform and system specific questions to those Service
    representatives who maintain programmed funding and execution
    responsibilities. Existing or planned capabilities and decisions
    specific to the manning, training, and equipping of forces as part of
    Service programmed capabilities in support of the combatant commanders
    should be directed to the respective Service responsible for the
    capability in question.
        General Gorenc. USSTRATCOM operations plan requirements for air
    launched cruise missiles is a contributing factor in the Air Force's
    decision to retire 37 B-52H bomber aircraft. The remaining B-52H bomber
    aircraft provide delivery capacity for USSTRATCOM operations plan air
    launched cruise missile requirements.
        Mr. Flory. The reduction in the dual-capable B-52 force is not
    linked to a decision to keep or retire air-launched cruise missiles.
    The size of the B-52 force is driven primarily by conventional
    warfighting needs of regional combatant commanders and not by nuclear
    force requirements.

        55. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, General
    Gorenc, and Secretary Flory, was the decision to retire in whole or in
    part made in anticipation of the nuclear air launched cruise missiles?
        General Cartwright and Admiral Young. The decision is pending, the
    study is ongoing.
        General Gorenc. USSTRATCOM operations plan requirements for air
    launched cruise missiles are a contributing factor in the Air Force's
    decision to retire 37 B-52H bomber aircraft. The remaining B-52H bomber
    aircraft provide delivery capacity for USSTRATCOM operations plan air
    launched cruise missiles requirements.
        Mr. Flory. The size of the B-52 force is driven primarily by
    conventional warfighting needs of regional combatant commanders and not
    by nuclear force requirements. Over the last decade, we have made
    significant advances in conventional weaponery. These advances have
    made the B-52 highly efficient in terms of the probability of defeating
    a target with a single advanced conventional weapon as compared to a
    large number of ``dumb'' bombs. These improvements have translated into
    improved efficiency and a reduced need for large numbers of the
    aircraft by the combatant commanders.

                      RETIREMENT OF 50 MINUTEMAN III ICBMS

        56. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, General Gorenc, and
    Secretary Flory, a decision in the QDR is to retire 50 Minuteman III
    ICBMs. There are currently 500 Minuteman III ICBMs being downloaded to
    one nuclear warhead per missile from multiple nuclear warheads. When
    the 50 are retired I understand that some of the remaining 450
    Minuteman III ICBMs will be uploaded or maintained with multiple
    nuclear warheads. Why is it necessary to retain multiple warheads on
    the Minuteman III ICBMs?
        General Cartwright. It is necessary to maintain the Nuclear Posture
    Review directed 500 warheads. Doing so allows us to keep 50 missiles in
    a Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle configuration while freeing
    missiles/boosters to become test assets for the future.
        General Gorenc. USSTRATCOM determines targeting requirements and
    transmits that data to Air Force Space Command. As the force provider,
    Air Force Space Command configures the ICBMs in accordance with
    USSTRATCOM's warhead and force structure requirements.
        Mr. Flory. The DOD is in the process of reconfiguring the Minuteman
    III ICBM force with a mix of MIRVed and single-warhead systems while
    reducing our operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the
    Moscow Treaty limits (1,700-2,200). DOD has not reached a final
    decision on the precise number of warheads that will be retained in the
    Minuteman III force. However, a mix of ICBMs in both MIRVed and single-
    warhead configurations will provide appropriate operational flexibility
    as we move toward a more tailorable deterrent posture appropriate for
    peer and near-peer competitors, regional WMD states, as well as non-
    state actors.

                         NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT

        57. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, on
    many occasions administration witnesses talk about significant
    reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile, and the 2001 Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR) decision to ``transition from a threat-based
    nuclear deterrent with large numbers of deployed and reserve weapons to
    a deterrent based on capabilities, with a smaller nuclear weapons
    stockpile.'' What dismantlement decisions have been made and
    implemented since 2001 to achieve the reductions?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM defers to the NNSA for the
    dismantlement schedule.
        Mr. Flory. By the end of this fiscal year 2006, we will have
    reduced the size of total stockpile by 25 percent since the conclusion
    of the 2001 NPR. Current policy states that weapons no longer required
    for deployment or for reliability replacements will be retired and
    dismantled. By 2012, we plan to retire almost 50 percent of the total
    stockpile that existed at the end of the NPR. Further reductions are
    possible. But, we can only achieve significant additional reductions
    through a capability to produce reliable replacement warheads. We need
    a restored nuclear weapons infrastructure to accomplish this.

        58. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, is
    the total nuclear weapons stockpile, not just the deployed stockpile,
    substantially smaller today than it was in 2000?
        General Cartwright. Yes. Since 2000, the total nuclear weapons
    stockpile has been reduced by about 21 percent.
        Mr. Flory. Yes. By the end of fiscal year 2007 we will have reduced
    the size of the total stockpile by 25 percent. We intend to reduce the
    total stockpile by almost 50 percent by fiscal year 2012.

        59. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
    what part of the transition to a ``threat-based nuclear deterrent''
    discussed in the 2001 NPR has occurred and what is planned?
        General Cartwright. The United States has invested heavily in a new
    generation of advanced conventional systems such as the JASSM and the
    Tactical Tomahawk and reconfigured four ballistic missile submarines to
    guided missile submarines, while retiring the Peacekeeper ballistic
    missile system and reducing the number of deployed ICBM and SLBM
    warheads. These actions, in combination with initial steps to deploy an
    integrated missile defense system, have prepared the DOD to respond to
    a wider range of potential adversaries while reducing reliance upon
    nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Flory. The NPR called for a transition to a ``capabilities
    based'' strategic force posture.
        In response to President Bush's call for a strategy that addressed
    today's threats while preparing to meet future challenges, the DOD
    presented a new defense strategy in its 2001 QDR. The new defense
    strategy employs a capabilities-based approach to planning. The essence
    of capabilities-based planning is to identify capabilities that
    adversaries could employ and capabilities that could be available to
    the United States, then evaluate their interaction. It replaces the
    traditional threat-based approach that focused on specific adversaries
    or regions of the world. Nuclear force planning employs the same
    capabilities-based approach.

        60. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
    how many dismantlements are planned for fiscal year 2006 and for fiscal
    year 2007 and which weapons will be dismantled in each year?
        General Cartwright. The NNSA is responsible for scheduling and
    executing the dismantlement of weapons that have been approved for
    retirement.
        Mr. Flory. Projections of future dismantlement activity are
    classified. However, I can say that we have dismantled over 13,000
    warheads since the end of the Cold War. NNSA is responsible for
    scheduling and executing the dismantlement of weapons that have been
    approved for retirement and can provide the actual weapon quantities
    and types planned for dismantlement in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year
    2007.

        61. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
    currently there are roughly four weapons in reserve or inactive or
    other status in the stockpile for every weapon deployed. Under the 2001
    NPR is there a goal to reduce this ratio?
        General Cartwright. Yes. The overall goal is to reduce the size of
    the inactive stockpile.
        Mr. Flory. While I cannot address the specific figures used in your
    question, two factors that dominate the ratio of deployed and non-
    deployed strategic warheads are worth noting. First, we must retain a
    responsive capability to deal with unexpected changes in the
    international environment. Second, we currently must retain--where it
    is possible--a number of specific types of warheads as a hedge against
    the failure of another specific type of deployed warheads. We must
    continue to maintain replacements until DOE has the infrastructure and
    the certified capability to replace failed legacy warheads. According
    to DOE plans, we do not anticipate a fully responsive infrastructure to
    become available until after 2022.

        62. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
    will the reliable warhead program allow a reduction in this ratio?
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM believes the RRW will enable a
    reduction in the ratio. An objective of the RRW program is to improve
    the manufacturability of designs and promote a responsive
    infrastructure. Once this is achieved a reduction in the ratio between
    deployed warheads and those retained in a reserve or inactive status
    could be realized.
        Mr. Flory. Yes. Our goal is to eliminate warheads that no longer
    serve a significant role in U.S. national security strategy. When the
    nuclear weapons infrastructure is restored, we will also be able to
    retire warheads that are currently retained as reliability
    replacements. According to DOE plans, we do not anticipate a fully
    responsive infrastructure to become available until after 2022.

        63. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
    what is the goal?
        General Cartwright. The goal is to retain the minimum number of
    weapons required to meet operational needs and to respond to
    technological or strategic surprises in a timely manner. This is done
    through a combination of a responsive infrastructure and retention of
    reserve/inactive weapons. The exact ratio of deployed to inactive/
    reserve weapons is dependent upon the capability of the weapons complex
    to respond to these surprises.
        Mr. Flory. Our goal is to restore the nuclear warhead
    infrastructure and then make appropriate reductions in the stockpile in
    a way that manages risk for the Nation.

        64. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory,
    what is a reasonable ratio?
        General Cartwright. The ratio is dependent upon the ability of the
    infrastructure to meet operational needs and to respond to
    technological or strategic surprises in a timely manner. This is
    reviewed during the annual nuclear weapons stockpile memorandum
    process.
        Mr. Flory. With a restored infrastructure and the ability to
    replace failed warheads or to respond quickly to negative shifts in the
    international environment, I would expect the ratio of non-deployed
    warheads to deployed warheads to drop significantly below current
    levels. In that situation, I expect that we will maintain only those
    non-deployed warheads in quantities necessary to support a responsive
    capability and pipeline logistics activities to support maintenance and
    modification activities.

        65. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright and Secretary Flory, a
    decision to retire the W-62 warhead from the Minuteman III ICBM was
    made in the 2001 NPR. Has there been a decision made to dismantle the
    W-62? If so, when is the first dismantled scheduled?
        General Cartwright. Yes. The NNSA is responsible for scheduling and
    executing the dismantlement of weapons once they are retired therefore,
    I would defer to the NNSA for dismantlement information.
        Mr. Flory. Yes. We have already dismantled a number of W-62
    warheads and are intending to dismantle more.

        [Whereupon at 4:22 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2006

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                            MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:23 a.m. in
    room SD-138, Dirksen Senate Office Building. Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Roberts,
    Thune, Levin, Reed, and Bill Nelson.
        Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
    and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Robert M. Soofer,
    professional staff member; and Kristine L. Svinicki,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff member present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston and Jill L.
    Simodejka.
        Committee members' assistants present: Chris Arnold,
    assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
    Senator Sessions; and William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator
    Bill Nelson.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. The subcommittee will come to order.
        Good morning Gentlemen, I'm sorry, we've had a vote this
    morning that got us off to a little bit of a slow start. I
    think others will be joining us as the morning goes along.
        I'm pleased to welcome our witnesses today, Peter Flory,
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
    Policy; Lieutenant General Henry Obering, Director of the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA); Lieutenant General Larry Dodgen,
    Commander of the U.S. Army Missile Defense Command who also
    appears before us today as U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM)
    Joint Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile
    Defense--that's a mouthful; and David Duma, Acting Director for
    Operational Test and Evaluation in the Department of Defense
    (DOD).
        Gentlemen, I thank you for your service to our Nation and
    for taking time to join us today as this subcommittee meets to
    receive testimony on the DOD fiscal year 2007 budget requests
    for the Missile Defense Program. We are primarily interested in
    the Department's progress toward building those missile defense
    capabilities directed for deployment by the President in 2002,
    including ground-based interceptors (GBIs), sea-based
    interceptors, and associated radar and sensors, all of which
    are essential components to a functioning system. In this
    respect, I would commend the DOD for providing, in just 3 short
    years, a measure of protection for the American people against
    long-range ballistic missile threats to our homeland. Clearly
    this initial defensive capability requires continued
    refinement, which is why Congress continues to place emphasis
    on an adequate testing program, a subject we hope to learn more
    about today.
        But perhaps, most important of all, I'll be interested to
    hear from General Dodgen, who speaks on behalf of the
    warfighters about the operational readiness of those missile
    defense capabilities currently fielded, and whether the current
    pace of deployment is adequate to stay ahead of the threat.
        I realize that I don't have to remind our witnesses about
    the ballistic missile threat, but for those less familiar with
    the compelling rationale for missile defense, allow me to
    paraphrase from the testimony before this committee of General
    B.B. Bell, Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea--who is arguably the
    combatant commander closest to the threat. General Bell notes
    that the North Korean ballistic missile inventory includes over
    600 short-range SCUD missiles, and as many as 200 medium-range
    No-dong missiles, capable of reaching Japan. North Korea is
    also preparing to field a new intermediate-range ballistic
    missile which could reach U.S. facilities in Okinawa, Guam, and
    possibly Alaska, and North Korea continues to develop a three-
    stage missile which could reach the continental United States.
        This assessment reinforces, in my mind, the need to field a
    missile defense capability as promptly as possible, even while
    we continue to improve and test those systems over time.
    Senator Reed, do you have any opening comments?
        Senator Reed. No, Mr. Chairman. Senator Nelson will be here
    and I would just defer to him, to any statement he would make.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Roberts?
        Senator Roberts. No statement, thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, I'll recognize Senator Nelson,
    the ranking member of our subcommittee, when he arrives. I
    would like to ask each of you to give us an opening statement,
    if you choose, and would ask you to limit those remarks to 5
    minutes if you would, please.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions

        I am pleased to welcome our witnesses today: Peter Flory, Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; Lieutenant
    General Trey Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency;
    Lieutenant General Larry Dodgen, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and
    Missile Defense Command--who also appears before us today as U.S.
    Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component Commander for Integrated
    Missile Defense; and David Duma, Acting Director for Operational Test
    and Evaluation in the Department of Defense (DOD). Gentlemen, I thank
    you for your service to our Nation and for taking the time to join us
    here today.
        The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the DOD fiscal
    year 2007 budget request for the Missile Defense Program. We are
    particularly interested in the Department's progress toward fielding
    those missile defense capabilities directed for deployment by the
    President in 2002, including ground-based interceptors, sea-based
    interceptors, and associated radars and sensors.
        In this respect, I would commend the DOD for providing, in just 3
    short years, a measure of protection for the American people against
    the long-range ballistic missile threat to our homeland. Clearly, this
    initial defensive capability requires continued refinement, which is
    why Congress continues to place emphasis on an adequate testing
    program, a subject we hope to learn more about today.
        But perhaps most important of all, I will be interested to hear
    from General Dodgen, on behalf of the warfighters, about the
    operational readiness of those missile defense capabilities currently
    fielded, and whether the current pace of deployment is adequate to stay
    ahead of the threat.
        I realize that I don't have to remind our witnesses about the
    ballistic missile threat, but for those less familiar with the
    compelling rationale for missile defense, allow me to paraphrase from
    the testimony before this committee of General B.B. Bell, Commander of
    U.S. Forces in Korea, who is, arguably, the combatant commander closest
    to the threat.
        General Bell notes that the North Korean ballistic missile
    inventory includes over 600 short-range SCUD missiles and as many as
    200 medium-range No Dong missiles capable of reaching Japan. North
    Korea is also preparing to field a new intermediate range ballistic
    missile which could reach U.S. facilities in Okinawa, Guam, and
    possibly Alaska; and North Korea continues to develop a three-stage
    missile which could reach the continental United States. This
    assessment reinforces in my mind the need to field missile defense
    capabilities as promptly as possible, even while we continue to test
    and improve these systems over time.
        Having said this, let me now recognize my distinguished ranking
    member, Senator Nelson of Florida, for any opening remarks he may have.

        Senator Sessions. I believe we will start with Secretary
    Flory.

      STATEMENT OF HON. PETER C.W. FLORY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
               DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

        Mr. Flory. Chairman Sessions, thank you, Senator Reed,
    Senator Roberts, it's a pleasure to be before the subcommittee
    today to provide a policy perspective on our Ballistic Missile
    Defense (BMD) Program.
        BMD has been a top priority of the President, of his
    administration since day one, and it continues to be one today.
    At the beginning of the President's first term, the United
    States faced a very different security environment than the one
    we had faced during the four and a half decades of the Cold
    War. In the words of the former Director of Central
    Intelligence Agency (CIA), Jim Woolsey, words which have been
    cited quite frequently, ``With the demise of the Soviet Union,
    we found that while we had slain a great dragon, the dragon had
    been replaced by many dangerous snakes.'' In other words, the
    end of the Cold War did not mean that there was not a threat
    anymore, it simply meant that the United States would face
    different, and different kinds of threats. One particularly
    menacing such threat was the spread of weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) and the means of delivering them, in
    particular, ballistic missiles.
        To deal with this threat, President Bush in 2001 and 2002
    took several bold steps. First, he announced that the United
    States would exercise its right to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-
    ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Second, he directed the DOD to
    begin fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities
    for the United States by the end of the year 2004. What this
    did was to end what had been for decades, in effect, a research
    and development-only approach to BMD and direct us to proceed
    with deployment.
        I'm pleased to say that today the United States has all of
    the pieces in place needed to intercept an incoming long-range
    ballistic missile. GBIs in Alaska and California, and a network
    of ground, sea, and spaced-based sensors, a command and control
    network, and particularly important, trained service men and
    women who are ready to operate the system.
        Now, in 2002 we were well aware that what we fielded in
    2004 would be our initial capability, and that is why the
    President directed us to continue improving the capabilities
    every time through ongoing test and evaluation programs,
    through research and development of promising new technologies,
    and by making continuous improvements to the systems that we
    had already fielded. You will hear more of the technical and
    programmatic details of how we're going about this from our
    fellow panel members in a couple of minutes.
        First, I would like to take a few minutes to put the
    program in strategic context in terms of the evolving threat,
    and in terms of our overall defense strategy. Most important,
    the threat posed by ballistic missiles as perceived by the
    Nation in 2002 continues to grow, and the missiles we're
    talking about are growing in range, complexity, and the threat
    they pose. In 1990, around the time of the end of the Cold War,
    16 countries possessed ballistic missiles of varying ranges. In
    2006, 25 countries possessed these weapons, and the number of
    countries that possess longer range, i.e., medium/intermediate
    or intercontinental-range ballistic missiles of the kind that
    can threaten our friends and allies, or that can threaten the
    United States potentially, has increased from 5 to 9. Not only
    is the number of nations possessing these weapons increasing,
    but the group includes some of the world's most threatening and
    least responsible regimes, in particular, North Korea and Iran.
        As Lieutenant General Michael Maples, the Director of the
    Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), recently testified in an
    unclassified session before this committee, North Korea
    continues to invest in ballistic missiles--this is not only for
    its own use, but for foreign sales as well. According to
    General Maples, Pyongyang is likely developing intermediate and
    intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.
        Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Negroponte also
    testified before the committee that, ``North Korea claims to
    have nuclear weapons, a claim that we assess as probably true,
    and has threatened to proliferate these weapons abroad.''
        Turning to the Middle East, Iran represents a dangerous
    nexus, combining a vigorous ballistic missile program, a desire
    to develop nuclear weapons and a program to do so, and a
    history of support for international terrorism. Terrorism has
    been part of Iran's arsenal for decades, in fact, before the
    September 11 attacks, more Americans have been Iranian-backed
    terrorists like Hezbollah than by any other terrorist group.
    Iran has now made ballistic missiles an important part of its
    strategy as well.
        As DNI Negroponte testified before the committee, ``The
    danger that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapon and the ability
    to integrate it with ballistic missiles Iran already possesses
    is a reason for immediate concern. Iran already has the largest
    inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and Tehran
    views its ballistic missiles as an integral part of its
    strategy to deter, and if necessary, retaliate against forces
    in the region, including U.S. forces.'' In this environment,
    recent statements by Iranian President Ahmadinejad threatening
    the United States and its friends in the region, most notably
    Israel, are of particular concern. In October 2005 Ahmadinejad
    declared that, ``Israel must be wiped off the map, and God
    willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon
    experience a world without the United States and Zionism.'' The
    Iranian president also said that, ``Anyone who recognizes
    Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nations' fury.''
        As noted, Iran's ballistic missile forces already cast a
    shadow over U.S. friends and allies, and over our deployed
    forces in the Middle East. The Intelligence Community (IC) also
    assesses that Iran could flight test an ICBM by 2015. The
    addition of nuclear warheads in an ICBM that could reach the
    United States would further extend Iran's ability to coerce and
    threaten others, now to include the United States. There's a
    limit, Mr. Chairman, to the details we can get into on the
    actual threat here, but I would commend to the subcommittee
    members a recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that was
    done on the ballistic missile threat which gets into these in a
    lot more detail and specificity.
        As we face these threats, BMDs remain an important part of
    our overall defense strategy. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR) outlined four broad defense policy goals--to
    assure, dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defend and defeat.
    Missile defenses support each element of this strategy: they
    can assure allies and friends that ballistic missiles in the
    hands of adversaries will not be able to deter the United
    States from fulfilling its security commitments, or coerce our
    allies, or to undermine the coalition; to dissuade potential
    adversaries from investing in or developing ballistic missiles
    by reducing the value of such programs; to deter ballistic
    missile attacks and threats by reducing an adversary's
    confidence that an attack would succeed; and lastly, by
    defeating missile attacks against the United States, its
    deployed forces, and its friends and allies in the event that
    deterrence fails.
        Last February, the DOD released the 2006 QDR. The 2006 QDR
    recognizes that since 2001, the United States has found itself
    engaged in a long war, a global conflict against violent
    extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice and who
    are actively seeking WMD. The QDR identifies a number of
    priorities to guide the Department as it makes choices about
    how best to defend the Nation and how best to help the Nation
    win the long war. These priorities include defeating terrorist
    networks, defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices
    of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile
    states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.
        BMD can make important contributions to each of these
    priorities. In particular, they can be used to defend the
    homeland, and defeat the actual use of a ballistic missile
    attack against the population in territory of the United States
    or its deployed forces or its friends and allies, and by making
    an adversary uncertain that an attack would succeed, that may
    dissuade others from investing in missiles or deter their use
    by those who have already acquired them--in other words,
    supporting the four elements of the strategy in the 2001 QDR.
        Mr. Chairman, some have questioned the attention and
    resources we have devoted to BMD in the years following the
    September 11 attacks. There's a concern that the main threat to
    the United States today is terrorism and that a ballistic
    missile attack against the United States is unlikely. The
    terrorist threat is clearly a very serious threat to the United
    States, but we believe it's important to develop capabilities
    to deal with all threats. The U.S. Government was criticized in
    the wake of the September 11 attacks for not, ``connecting the
    dots on the terrorist threat,'' and ``for failing to prevent
    the attacks.'' With respect to the ballistic missile threat, I
    think the quotes I've given you before make it quite clear that
    the dots are out there at this point for all to see, and to be
    connected. I would not care to be before this committee in the
    wake of a future ballistic missile attack on the territory and
    people of the United States explaining why--given all that we
    know today of ballistic missiles in the hands of dangerous
    regimes--we had not acted and continued to act to defend the
    American people.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Secretary, we have a time limit, if
    you could wrap up as you choose.
        Mr. Flory. I will wrap up, Mr. Chairman, I'd be happy to
    answer questions briefly.
        In 2002, the President also directed us, in addition to
    fielding defenses for the United States, to cooperate with
    friends and allies to extend the benefit of missile defense to
    them. We are embarked upon a number of initiatives with
    partners including the United Kingdom (U.K.), Denmark, Israel,
    Germany, Australia, and Japan, which is our largest partner. We
    also continue to seek practical areas of cooperation with
    Russia on a bilateral basis as well as in the NATO-Russia
    context.
        Mr. Chairman, I will conclude on that note, and be happy to
    answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Flory follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Peter C.W. Flory
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Nelson, members of the
    subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be with you today to provide the
    subcommittee with a policy perspective on the progress we've made to
    date in the area of ballistic missile defense (BMD) and where we are
    headed. BMD has been a top defense priority of the administration from
    day one, and it remains a top priority.
        I thought it might be useful to begin by reviewing how we got to
    where we are today.
        At the beginning of the administration, the United States faced a
    very different security environment from the one we faced during the
    4\1/2\ decades of the Cold War. Former Director of Central Intelligence
    James Woolsey has pointed out that with the demise of the Soviet Union,
    we found that while we had slain a great dragon, the dragon had been
    replaced by many dangerous snakes. In other words, the end of the Cold
    War did not mean that the United States no longer faced a threat;
    rather, it meant that the United States would face different kinds of
    threats.
        One such threat was the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    and the means of delivering them, in particular ballistic missiles.
    Yet, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the U.S. and the
    Soviet Union prohibited us from fielding an effective defense against
    this growing threat. Regimes in countries such as North Korea and Iran
    and, at the time, Iraq understood that while they could not hope to
    match the United States in conventional forces, they could gain
    strategic leverage by investing in ballistic missiles. The strategic
    wisdom of leaving the American people vulnerable to missile attack as a
    matter of policy during the Cold War was--at best--debatable. The
    wisdom of maintaining such a policy in the post-Cold War environment is
    not. Without a defense against ballistic missiles, the American people
    are vulnerable to the growing threat of missile attack. Without
    defenses, a U.S. President faced with a threat to vital U.S. interests
    from a rogue state armed with long-range missiles would have to take
    into account the fact that the United States homeland could be at risk.
        To deal with this threat, President Bush in 2001 and 2002 took
    several bold steps. First, he announced that the United States would
    exercise its right, which was enshrined in the Anti-Ballistic Missile
    Treaty, to withdraw from the treaty. Second, he directed the Department
    of Defense (DOD) to end what had been for decades a ``research and
    development only'' approach to BMD, and to begin fielding an initial
    set of missile defense capabilities for the United States by the end of
    2004.
        I am pleased to say that we have by and large met the goal set by
    the President. In 2002, Fort Greely, Alaska, was an inactive
    installation, having been on the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure
    (BRAC) list. Two years later, it was a missile defense interceptor
    site. The United States today has all of the pieces in place needed to
    intercept an incoming long-range ballistic missile: ground-based
    interceptors in Alaska and California; a network of ground, sea, and
    space-based sensors; a command and control network; and most
    importantly, trained servicemen and women ready to operate the system.
    Our BMD System today is primarily oriented toward continued development
    and testing. But we believe that, although the system's capability is
    limited and in its initial stage, the necessary elements are in place
    to intercept a long-range ballistic missile.
        Because of the importance of this mission, one of the first things
    I did upon assuming my current position in the DOD was to take a trip
    to Fort Greely. I want to tell you how impressed I was, not just with
    the site itself--the buildings, the silos, the command and control
    systems--but with the dedication, the professionalism, and the sense of
    mission of the men and women who stand ready to operate the system. I
    would encourage you all to visit Fort Greely. It is a long way for most
    of you. I know that the men and women stationed there would appreciate
    the visit, and that you will be as impressed as I was.
        Our BMDs are not as capable today as they will be in the future.
    The President knew in 2002 that what we fielded in 2004 would be our
    initial capabilities. This is why he directed us to continue improving
    these capabilities over time through an ongoing test and evaluation
    program, through research and development of promising new
    technologies, and by making continuous improvements to the systems we
    have already fielded. You will hear more of the programmatic details of
    how we are going about this from my fellow panel members in a few
    minutes.
        But first I would like to take a few minutes to put this program in
    its strategic context, in terms of the evolving threat, and in terms of
    our overall defense strategy.
        First and foremost, the threat posed by ballistic missiles is
    growing. The missiles we are talking about are growing in range,
    complexity, and the threat they pose. In 1990, around the end of the
    Cold War, 16 countries possessed ballistic missiles of varying ranges.
    In 2006, 25 countries have them. The number of countries that possess
    medium, intermediate, or intercontinental range ballistic missiles--
    i.e., missiles that may reach our friends and allies, and in some cases
    the U.S. homeland itself has increased from 5 to 9.
        Not only is the number of nations possessing ballistic missiles
    increasing, but this group includes some of the world's most
    threatening and least responsible regimes, such as North Korea and
    Iran.
        As Lieutenant General Michael Maples, the Director of the Defense
    Intelligence Agency (DIA), recently testified in an unclassified
    session, North Korea continues to invest in ballistic missiles, not
    only for its own use but for foreign sales as well. According to
    Lieutenant General Maples, ``Pyongyang is likely developing
    intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.'' For
    over 50 years, U.S. servicemembers have stood on the border between
    North and South Korea. We have known that if North Korea decided to
    attack the South, these men and women would immediately be in harm's
    way. The prospect of long-range ballistic missiles in the hands of the
    North means that, for the first time, the American people too would be
    in harm's way.
        Iran represents a dangerous nexus, combining a vigorous ballistic
    missile program, a desire to develop nuclear weapons, and a history of
    support for international terrorism. The most recent edition of the
    State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism (April 29, 2004)
    describes Iran as the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism.
        Terrorism has been part of Tehran's arsenal for decades. In fact,
    before the September 11 attacks, more Americans had been killed by
    Iranian-backed terrorists like Hezbollah than by any other terrorist
    group. Iran has now made ballistic missiles an important part of its
    defense strategy--scenes of Iranian missiles on display in military
    parades are reminiscent of the Soviet Union. Further, as Director of
    National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte recently testified before
    Congress, Iran has engaged in a clandestine uranium enrichment program
    for nearly two decades. It is the judgment of the Intelligence
    Community (IC) that Iran does not yet possess a nuclear weapon or have
    the necessary fissile material to do so, but the DNI testified that
    ``the danger that it will acquire a nuclear weapon and the ability to
    integrate it with the ballistic missiles Iran already possesses is a
    reason for immediate concern.''
        In this environment, recent statements by Iranian President Ahmadi-
    Nejad threatening the United States and its friends in the region, most
    notably Israel, are of particular concern. In October 2005, Ahmadi-
    Nejad declared that ``Israel must be wiped off the map. God willing,
    with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world
    without the United States and Zionism.'' He also said that ``anybody
    who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation's
    fury.''
        The IC assesses that Iran could flight test an ICBM by 2015. Iran's
    ballistic missiles already cast a shadow over U.S. friends and allies,
    and our deployed forces, in the Middle East. The addition of nuclear
    warheads and an ICBM that could reach the U.S. would further extend
    Iran's ability to coerce others and threaten the U.S.
        The United States continues to support efforts by the United
    Nations Security Council to reach a diplomatic solution to the issue of
    Iran's nuclear activities. But, we need to take steps to safeguard our
    interests and the interests of friends and allies in the event
    diplomatic efforts do not succeed. The Iranian case is just one example
    of a WMD proliferation problem that, thanks to ballistic missile
    technology, could directly threaten the American people. We must be
    prepared for this possibility, and for others to follow suit. The
    continued development and fielding of missile defenses is one vital
    step to defend against such threats, as well as to reduce the
    attractiveness, to other countries of concern, of such WMD and missile
    technology.
        As we face these threats, BMDs remain an important part of our
    overall defense strategy. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
    outlined four broad defense policy goals: to assure, dissuade, deter,
    and if necessary defend and defeat. Missile defenses help to:

             Assure allies and friends that ballistic missiles will
            not be able to deter the U.S. from fulfilling its security
            commitments, coerce our allies, or undermine a coalition;
             Dissuade potential adversaries from investing in or
            developing ballistic missiles by reducing the value of such
            weapons;
             Deter ballistic missile attacks and threats by
            reducing an adversary's confidence in the success of an attack;
            and
             Defeat missile attacks against the United States, its
            deployed forces, and its friends and allies in the event
            deterrence fails.

        In February, the DOD released the 2006 QDR. The QDR recognizes that
    since the 2001 QDR, the United States has found itself engaged in a
    ``long war,'' a global conflict against violent extremists who use
    terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who are actively seeking
    weapons of mass destruction. We believe that ballistic missile defenses
    play an important part in this long war. The QDR identifies a number of
    priorities to guide the Department as it makes choices about how best
    to help the Nation win the long war. These priorities include:
    defeating terrorist networks; defending the homeland in depth; shaping
    the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and preventing
    hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of
    mass destruction. Ballistic missile defenses can make a contribution to
    each of these important priorities. They can be used to defend the
    homeland and defeat the actual use of a ballistic missile against the
    population and territory of the U.S., its deployed forces, or its
    friends and allies. By making an adversary uncertain that a ballistic
    missile attack will succeed, missile defenses may dissuade others from
    investing in missiles, or deter their use by those who have already
    acquired them.
        Some have questioned the amount of attention we have paid to
    ballistic missile defense in the years following the September 11
    attacks, on the theory that the main threat to the U.S. is terrorism,
    and a ballistic missile attack against the United States is unlikely. I
    would turn that argument around somewhat. One of the lessons of
    September 11 is that nothing is unthinkable. The United States must and
    can prepare to defend itself against the widest range of threats
    possible. Leaving ourselves vulnerable to a type of attack will only
    increase the likelihood that an adversary will exploit that
    vulnerability to threaten or attack us.
        Further, the U.S. Government was criticized in the wake of
    September 11 for not ``connecting the dots'' on the terrorist threat
    and failing to act to prevent the attacks. With respect to the
    ballistic missile threat, the dots are out there for all to see. I
    would not care to be before this committee in the wake of a ballistic
    missile attack explaining why, given all we know of ballistic missiles
    in the hands of dangerous regimes, we had not acted to defend the
    American people.
        I spoke earlier about the ballistic missile defense goals laid out
    by President Bush in 2002. The President directed us then not only to
    field defenses for the United States, but also to cooperate with
    friends and allies to extend the benefits of missile defenses to them
    as well. Since then, we have embarked upon a number of important
    missile defense initiatives with international friends and partners. We
    have worked with the United Kingdom to upgrade the early warning radar
    at Fylingdales so it can perform a ballistic missile defense mission;
    we reached agreement with Denmark to allow us to upgrade the early
    warning radar at Thule, Greenland; we continue to work with Israel on
    the Arrow Ballistic Missile Defense Program; our own Patriot anti-
    missile system is widely deployed and is available for export; Germany
    and Italy are our partners in the Medium Extended Range Air Defense
    System; after we signed a Framework Memorandum of Understanding on
    missile defense cooperation in 2004 with Australia, Canberra has
    expressed interest in cooperating on a number of potential missile
    defense projects; and we are negotiating a Defense Technical
    Cooperation Agreement with Russia to facilitate both government-to-
    government as well as industry-to-industry missile defense cooperation,
    while we continue to seek practical areas of cooperation with Russia on
    a bilateral basis as well as in the NATO-Russia context.
        One particularly good news story in international BMD is our
    cooperation with Japan. Japan has committed to spending the equivalent
    of roughly 1 billion U.S. dollars on BMD, making it our largest
    international partner in missile defense. The United States and Japan
    have agreed to work together to develop a more capable sea-based
    interceptor that will improve the defense of both the U.S. and Japan. I
    am especially pleased by the recent announcement that Japanese
    officials have agreed to place of an X-band missile defense radar at
    the Shariki Air Defense Missile Station. I hope this will lead soon to
    a final agreement between our two countries to field this radar, which
    will help defend both the U.S. and Japan from ballistic missile attack.
    In addition, the U.S. and Japan are taking the steps necessary to share
    BMD information with one another.
        We also are considering fielding long-range missile defense
    interceptors and radars in Europe. There is roughly $120 million in the
    President's fiscal year 2007 budget request to begin work on this
    project. Such a site would house interceptors very similar to those we
    have currently fielded at Fort Greely, Alaska; and Vandenberg Air Force
    Base, California. Fielding such a capability would improve the defense
    of the United States against long-range missiles, especially those
    launched from the Middle East. It also would begin to extend missile
    defense to our European allies, protecting their populations from
    attack and reducing the risk of coercion or blackmail.
        The U.S. Government has held consultations with a number of Allies,
    beginning in 2002, about their willingness to host missile defense
    interceptors. We are continuing these consultations with allies who
    have expressed interest, and we intend to conduct site surveys as
    appropriate. We hope to be in a position to make an interagency
    recommendation to the President on the issue later this year.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your questions
    and those of the subcommittee members after my colleagues have
    presented their testimony.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
        Lieutenant General Obering, we're delighted to have you
    with us, Commander of the Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command.

      STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING III, USAF, DIRECTOR,
                         MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

        General Obering. Good morning Mr. Chairman, distinguished
    members of the subcommittee, it's an honor to appear before you
    today. I've prepared a written statement that I ask be entered
    into the record.
        Senator Sessions. We'll be glad to do that, and Secretary
    Flory, we'll be glad to have your full remarks in the record
    also.
        Mr. Flory. Thank you, and I apologize for not asking for
    that.
        General Obering. Since I last addressed this committee
    we've made good progress developing and fielding an integrated,
    layered system to defend the United States, our deployed
    forces, allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all
    ranges, in all phases of flight. We have implemented improved
    mission assurance processes, established an increasingly robust
    and operationally focused test program, and continued the
    fielding of the system. With the 2007 budget request, we plan
    to expand the development, fielding, and verification of this
    critically needed defense.
        Proliferating ballistic missile systems increasingly pose a
    danger to our national security. Last year there were nearly 80
    foreign ballistic missile launches alone. Our program is
    structured to meet this evolving threat. We balance the early
    fielding of system elements with steady improvements through a
    spiral development and test approach. We use knowledge points
    to measure development progress by focusing on a set of
    critical activities that define the program's risk. This
    approach allows us to make informed decisions on whether and
    how the development activity should advance.
        2007 will be a very intense and demanding period for us. As
    such, we're requesting $9.3 billion to support our program of
    work, about $2.4 billion covers the continued fielding and
    sustainment of system components, including the long-range,
    ground-based, midcourse defenses; short- to intermediate-range
    defenses involving the sea-based interceptors; and all
    supporting radars, command, control, battle management, and
    communications capabilities.
        Approximately $6.9 billion will be invested in development
    for evolution and testing of the system. As I've detailed our
    request for 2007, though, I think it appropriate to review our
    work with the budget that you previously approved.
        Last year, members of the committee expressed significant
    interest in a better review of the ground-based midcourse test
    aborts and the future of our test program. The Independent
    Review Team concluded we are on the right track, but we needed
    to make adjustments in several areas including quality control,
    systems engineering, and test readiness. I established a
    Mission Readiness Task Force to assure these adjustments were
    made, and I delayed the interceptor deployment in 2005
    accordingly. We are now undertaking the additional
    qualification tests, and have implemented stronger engineering
    accountability, configuration management, and mission assurance
    processes. These comprehensive reviews and our recent test
    successes indicate that interceptor deployment should continue,
    but I will pause again, if necessary.
        We recently emplaced three more interceptors in Alaska on
    our way to 16 total, including the California site by December.
    This progress is critical, since we expect the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) element to be the backbone of our long-
    range defense capability for years to come.
        Missile defense testing, based on event-driven results,
    continues to evolve to where ``we test as we fight and fight as
    we test.'' We cooperate fully with the operational test
    community and combatant commanders in their efforts to
    characterize system effectiveness and readiness. Last year I
    told you that we planned to conduct two long-range interceptor
    tests in 2005. That did not happen because we were implementing
    the recommendations of the Mission Readiness Task Force. With
    the successful December flight of our operationally configured,
    long range interceptor, we have resumed an aggressive test
    program that includes up to three more flight tests planned
    this year beginning this summer. These will include realistic
    targets, operational sensors, operational crews, and
    operational interceptors from operational silos, with two of
    them planned as intercepts. We will adjust this schedule as
    needed based on results. Overall, our program includes 38 major
    system tests in 2006, and 37 in 2007.
        Last year, Mr. Chairman, you voiced a concern about the
    ability of the Cobra Dane radar to support the fire control
    mission. I am pleased to say that this past September we flew a
    threat representative, air-launched target across the face of
    that radar, generating tracks that the operational fire control
    system then used to produce an intercept solution. We are
    confident in the capability of this radar. We also reached
    another major milestone last month when we successfully tested
    the upgraded Beale radar in California against a realistic
    ICBM-class target launched from Alaska. Again, the
    operationally configured fire control system generated an
    intercept solution from the track data. Later this year, we
    will deploy the first transportable Forward-Based X-Band Radar
    to our very important ally, Japan, where it will provide
    support for both a regional and homeland defense. In the U.K.,
    we expect the upgraded Fylingdales radar to achieve initial
    capability this year.
        In our sea-based sensor program, we added 6 more Aegis
    Long-Range Surveillance and Track destroyers, for a total of
    11. We successfully tested this capability against targets
    launched from Hawaii and California. In one of our most
    ambitious efforts, I'm pleased to report that we completed
    construction of the world's largest Sea-Based X-Band Radar. It
    has completed extensive sea trials and high-power radiation
    testing, and is currently in the Hawaii area after its long
    journey from Texas this winter. Later this year, it will
    complete its integration and checkout and be stationed in
    Alaska.
        Of our total 2007 budget request, $2.7 billion would go
    towards long range midcourse defense. These funds would allow
    us to continue to improve and build additional interceptors,
    their silos, support equipment and facilities, as well as order
    long lead items for the next fielding increment. We plan to
    field and support up to a total of 22 interceptors and conduct
    two more flight tests by the end of 2007.
        We are also working hard to address the growing threat from
    Iran. By placing a third long-range interceptor site in Europe
    along with forward-based sensors in the region, we will meet
    two major objectives laid out by the President: improved
    coverage of the United States, and protection for our allies
    and friends in Europe from ICBM attack. Current plans are to
    deploy up to 10 interceptors in Europe by 2011, which will
    expand our total long-range interceptor inventory to 50. The
    2007 budget request covers funding for site surveys, planning,
    facility and support infrastructure design, as well as
    interceptor long lead items. For sensor coverage, we will
    deliver a second Forward-Based X-Band Radar and begin a major
    upgrade to Thule, Greenland radar.
        I would like to turn now to our most important area--
    command, control, battle management, and communications. This
    infrastructure is the heart, soul, and brain of our defensive
    capability and without it, we simply cannot execute the
    mission. The global foundation we have established for our
    Nation's leadership and combatant commanders is unmatched in
    the world, but we have only just begun. We need to expand this
    to include the integrated fire control that will allow us to
    mix and match sensors and weapons as a significant force
    multiplier. We also continue to work closely with the combatant
    commanders to train and certify missile defense crews by
    exercising the system with launch-ready demonstrations. The
    $264 million we are requesting for these efforts is essential
    to ensuring an effective missile defense system (MDS).
        We are aggressively addressing threats posed by shorter-
    range ballistic missiles. Nearly $2 billion in our 2007 budget
    request is allocated evenly between our Aegis BMD and Terminal
    High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) programs to enable us to
    field capabilities to counter these threats.
        In addition to providing long-range surveillance and
    tracking support, Aegis is providing a flexible, sea-mobile
    intercept capability against shorter range ballistic missiles
    (SRBM). This past year we added a second Aegis engagement
    cruiser to our evolving architecture. In November, we
    successfully used an Aegis cruiser to engage a separating
    target carried on a medium-range ballistic missile. We plan to
    conduct two more intercept tests this year and two more in 2007
    using upgraded versions of the interceptor. By the end of 2007
    we expect to have three engagement cruisers and seven
    engagement destroyers available with up to 33 Standard Missile-
    3 interceptors delivered.
        In our THAAD program, we are coming off a very encouraging
    flight test last November, when we put the redesigned
    interceptor through its paces. We will continue to characterize
    its performance and integrate this element into the system. We
    plan to conduct four more flight tests in 2006, including the
    first high endo-atmospheric intercept. In 2007 we plan to
    conduct four intercept tests in both the exo- and endo-
    atmospheric regions. We will continue our development efforts
    and plan to field the first unit in Block 2008, with a second
    unit available in Block 2010.
        We have a plan, which we have submitted to the Under
    Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, that
    addresses a collaborative effort across the Department to
    transition BMD elements to the Services. The plan will provide
    information to the Services to facilitate their 2008 budget
    submissions.
        We have learned that there is no model that will fit all
    cases. We currently have lead-service agreements to cover
    Patriot Advanced Capability-3, Aegis BMD, THAAD, and the
    Upgraded Early Warning Radars. We continue to work with the
    Department on approval for the remaining elements. It is
    important to note that this is a continual process and that
    changes will occur based on capability maturity and fielding
    schedules.
        To keep ahead of future threats, there are several other
    important development efforts funded in this budget. We
    continue to follow a strategy of retaining alternative paths
    until capability is proven. It is a knowledge-based approach.
        Being able to address threats worldwide is vital and means
    moving to space with precision tracking sensors. In 2007, we
    plan to launch two Space Tracking and Surveillance System
    (STSS) demonstration satellites to begin critical
    experimentation. We have budgeted $380 million for this
    continuing development effort.
        The Airborne Laser (ABL) reached all of its knowledge
    points for last year when it achieved a full duration lase at
    operational power and completed initial beam control, fire
    control flight tests. Currently, we are installing the tracking
    and atmospheric compensation lasers and preparing the aircraft
    to accept the high-power laser modules in 2007.
        Senator Sessions. General Obering, we do have some other
    presentations, if you can begin to wrap up, but I am pleased.
        Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?
        Senator Sessions. Yes.
        Senator Roberts. He's discussing the ABL, which is really
    very special and important to our national defense, I would
    give them another 30 seconds.
        Senator Sessions. Absolutely, we'll give them several
    minutes, but we do have a limit.
        Senator Roberts. I appreciate that.
        Senator Sessions. The laser, go on and fully explain that.
        General Obering. Yes, sir. We have planned a campaign of
    flight tests that will lead to a lethal shoot-down of a
    ballistic missile in 2008. Nearly $600 million of our budget
    request is for this revolutionary work.
        In our other boost phase development activity, the Kinetic
    Energy Interceptor (KEI), we have focused on demonstrating a
    mobile, land-based very high acceleration booster. This past
    January we completed the successful static firing of a second
    stage prototype and will continue static firing tests of the
    booster's first and second stages in 2007. We have requested
    almost $400 million for these efforts.
        As threats grow in complexity, we will continue a volume
    kill capability. The Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program is a
    generational upgrade to our long range interceptors. In 2005,
    we made progress in the development of the seeker and made the
    decision to move to a lower risk propulsion system, which we
    plan to hover test in 2009.
        The committee members expressed interests last year in the
    international efforts. We have concluded formal agreements with
    four countries, and several more are pending. Japan continues
    to make significant investments in multi-layered missile
    defenses. Working closely with the Japanese since 1999 to
    develop advanced Standard Missile-3 components, we successfully
    flight tested a new nosecone just last month. In addition,
    we've embarked with Japan on the co-development of the 21"
    Standard Missile-3, which will have greatly expanded
    performance and defending area capability.
        If I turn our attention, finally, to our other allies, Mr.
    Chairman, we concluded an agreement with Australia to expand
    cooperative work on sensors. An agreement with Denmark allows
    us to upgrade the Thule radar and integrate it into the system
    by 2009, and we're undertaking a series of technical
    development efforts with the U.K. in addition to our ongoing
    work with Israel on the Arrow interceptor and will continue to
    enhance its missile defenses against emerging threats.
        Mr. Chairman, we certainly have our challenges, but for the
    most part, this program is on track. The successes we've had
    over the past year bear this out. I greatly appreciate the
    committee's continued support and patience, but I want to take
    this opportunity to thank the thousands of Americans and our
    allies, both in government and industry, that are working hard
    to make this missile defense a success. Thank you and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Obering follows:]

           Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering III, USAF

        Good morning, Chairman Sessions, Senator Nelson, members of the
    subcommittee. It is an honor to be here today to present the Department
    of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2007 Missile Defense program and budget.
    The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) mission remains one of developing and
    progressively fielding a joint, integrated, and multilayered Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD) system to defend the United States, our deployed
    forces, and our allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all
    ranges by engaging them in all phases of flight. I believe we are on
    the right track to deliver the multilayered, integrated capabilities
    that are necessary to counter current and emerging threats.
        As was the case last year, our program is structured to balance the
    initial fielding of system elements with steady improvements using
    evolutionary development and a test approach that continuously
    increases our confidence in the effectiveness of the BMD System. This
    budget balances our capabilities across an evolving threat spectrum
    that includes rogue nations with increasing ballistic missile
    expertise.
        We are requesting $9.3 billion to support our program of work in
    fiscal year 2007. The $1.6 billion increase from 2006 reflects a return
    to the annual investment level targeted by the Department for BMD and
    is indicative of the robust phase we are entering in the development
    and fielding of the integrated layered capability. Approximately $1
    billion of this increase will be applied to fielding and sustainment,
    and $600 million to continued development of the Ballistic Missile
    Defense System. $2.4 billion of the fiscal year 2007 request covers the
    continued incremental fielding and sustainment of long-range ground-
    based midcourse defense components; our short- to intermediate-range
    defense involving Aegis ships with their interceptors; and the
    supporting sensors, command, control, battle management and
    communication capabilities. This increase in funding for fielding and
    sustainment of nearly a billion dollars from last year reflects the
    success we have had across the program. About $6.9 billion will be
    invested in continued component improvements, system capability
    development, and testing.
        I would like to review our accomplishments, as well as our
    shortfalls, over the past year, explain our testing and fielding
    strategies, and address the next steps in our evolutionary Ballistic
    Missile Defense Program.

                       THE EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

        Proliferating and evolving ballistic missile systems and associated
    technologies continue to pose dangers to our national security. In 2005
    there were nearly 80 foreign ballistic missile launches around the
    world. Nearly 60 launches last year involved short-range ballistic
    missiles, approximately 10 involved medium- and intermediate-range
    missiles, and about 10 involved long-range ballistic missiles.
        North Korea and Iran have not relented in their pursuit of longer-
    range ballistic missiles. Our current and near-term missile defense
    fielding activities are a direct response to these dangers. There are
    also other ballistic missile threats today for which we must be
    prepared, and there will be others in the mid- to far-term. We must be
    ready to operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System against new and
    unexpected threats.
        Our potential adversaries continue efforts to acquire ballistic
    missile systems and technology. Ballistic missiles were used against
    our forces, our allies and friends during the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars.
    When combined with weapons of mass destruction, they could offer our
    enemies an attractive counterbalance to the overwhelming conventional
    superiority exhibited by U.S. and coalition forces during those wars.
    We can expect that in the future our adversaries could use them to
    threaten our foreign policy objectives or pursue a policy of terrorism
    by holding our cities and other high value assets hostage. After all,
    those who support global terrorism can hide behind the threats posed by
    offensive missiles carrying highly destructive or lethal payloads. They
    will use them to try to deny our forces access to a theater of conflict
    or to coerce a withdrawal of our forces from that theater. Ballistic
    missiles provide a way for our adversaries to attempt to achieve some
    degree of strategic equality with us, especially at a time when
    ballistic missile defense is still striving to catch up with the
    progress made by ballistic missile offense over the past four decades.

                   MISSILE DEFENSE APPROACH--LAYERED DEFENSE

        We believe that layered defenses integrated by a robust command and
    control system, will improve the chances of engaging and destroying a
    ballistic missile and its payload in-flight. This approach to missile
    defense also makes the effectiveness of countermeasures much more
    difficult, since countermeasures designed to work in one phase of
    flight are not likely to work in another. It is much harder to overcome
    a complex, multilayered defense. Layered defenses, a time-honored U.S.
    approach to military operations, provide defense in depth and create
    synergistic effects designed to frustrate an attack.
        With the initial fielding in 2004 of the Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) components, the Aegis long range surveillance and track
    ships, and the first integrated command, control, battle management and
    communications (C2BMC) suites, we made history by establishing a
    limited defensive capability for the United States against a possible
    long-range ballistic missile attack from North Korea and the Middle
    East. With the cooperation of our allies and friends, we plan to evolve
    this defensive capability to make it more effective against all ranges
    of threats in all phases of flight and expand the system over time with
    additional interceptors, sensors, and layers.
        Since we cannot be certain which specific ballistic missile threats
    we will face in the future, or from where those threats will originate,
    our long-term strategy is to strengthen and maximize the flexibility of
    our missile defense capabilities. As we proceed with this program into
    the next decade, we will move towards a missile defense force structure
    that features greater sensor redundancy and sensitivity, interceptor
    capability and mobility, and increasingly robust C2BMC capabilities. In
    line with our multilayer approach, we will expand terminal defense
    protection and place increasing emphasis on boost phase defenses.
        We are effectively employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy
    to field multiple system capabilities while maintaining an aggressive
    test and development program. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
    continues to evolve and refine desired capabilities, based on
    warfighter need and technology maturity, through sound risk management.
    Our goal continues to be one of fielding the best capabilities
    possible, on schedule, on time, and within cost, in order to address
    current and emerging threats.

                     COMPLETING THE FIELDING OF BLOCK 2004

        Since I last appeared before this committee, we have made a number
    of significant accomplishments to complete initial fielding of the
    Block 2004 capability. We have also fallen short in some areas. When we
    rolled this program out in 2002, we set out to deploy 10 Ground-Based
    Interceptors (GBI) in 2004 and another 10 in 2005. A booster motor
    plant explosion in 2003, which had a major impact across the missile
    defense program, and the need to step back and undertake a mission
    readiness review of the GMD program following two test failures caused
    us to miss our fielding mark. I delayed the GBI deployment in 2005 and
    made changes based on the recommendations of the mission readiness
    review. I believe we are now back on track, but I will pause again if
    necessary. We recently emplaced three more GBIs in silos at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, for a total of nine, and two at Vandenberg Air Force
    Base in California. This progress is critical because we expect the GMD
    element to be the backbone of our national missile defense capability
    for years to come. Today we continue with interceptor fielding and plan
    to emplace additional GBIs, for a total of 16 by December of this year.
        This past year we also added a second Aegis engagement cruiser and
    delivered additional Standard Missile-3 interceptors to our evolving
    sea-based architecture to address short- and medium-range threats in
    the midcourse phase of flight. We did not advance as rapidly as we
    hoped. We needed to resolve technical issues associated with the third
    stage rocket motor and the solid divert and attitude control system to
    take full advantage of interceptor performance designed to pace the
    threat. However, we are close to the 10 to 20 sea-based interceptors we
    projected for delivery in our initial program. Right now, I am
    comfortable with where we stand in our sea-based interceptor deployment
    plans. We will continue to grow our inventory of Standard Missile-3
    interceptors for deployment aboard Aegis ships and, by the end of 2006,
    outfit three Aegis destroyers and one additional cruiser with this
    engagement capability. In addition to providing surveillance and
    tracking support to the integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System,
    Aegis provides a flexible sea-mobile capability to defeat short- to
    intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase.
        In our sensors program, we upgraded the Beale Early Warning Radar
    in California. The Beale radar complements and works synergistically
    with the surveillance and tracking capabilities of the fully
    operational Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, and together they will help us
    defend against the longer-range threats coming out of East Asia. The
    Beale radar will play an instrumental role in tests this year to
    demonstrate the system's ability to intercept intercontinental-range
    missiles using operationally configured assets.
        This past year we added 6 more Aegis Long-Range Surveillance and
    Track destroyers to our force, for a total of 11. These ships provide
    much sought-after flexibility in our architecture, giving us more time
    to engage enemy missiles and improving the performance of the entire
    system.
        We are making good progress in integrating the Sea-Based X-band
    radar into the system. It is the most powerful radar of its kind in the
    world and will provide the system a highly advanced detection and
    discrimination capability. This past January the radar completed its
    long journey from Texas, where it underwent extensive sea trials and
    high-power radiation testing in the Gulf of Mexico, to Hawaii. This
    spring its voyage continues to Adak, Alaska, where it will be home-
    ported and put on station.
        This past year the Forward-Based Radar, our transportable X-band
    radar, successfully acquired and tracked intercontinental ballistic
    missiles in tests conducted at Vandenberg Air Force Base. We are now
    preparing to deploy the radar to provide precision track and
    discrimination capabilities, which will improve regional and homeland
    missile defense capabilities.
        We also completed subsystem checkout of the Fylingdales radar in
    the United Kingdom and achieved high-power radiation. We conducted the
    necessary operator training at that site and are now in the middle of
    completing an important series of ground tests that are necessary to
    verify this system's capability, tests that had been deferred on the
    recommendations of the Mission Readiness Task Force. We expect to
    complete testing at Fylingdales later this year.
        We have an extensive command, control, battle management, and
    communications infrastructure to support all these elements, and we are
    ready to provide complete operations and maintenance support to the
    warfighter. We have taken the first step in integrating the BMD System,
    which is necessary to establish an affordable and effective global,
    layered defense. We have installed hardware and software at the United
    States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), United States Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM), and United States Pacific Command (PACOM). C2BMC
    capabilities include basic deliberative crisis planning and common
    situational awareness at these combatant commands. In addition, we now
    provide common situational awareness directly to the President of the
    United States and the Secretary of Defense to aid in decisionmaking. In
    addition to fielding these suites, we also completed five major
    software release upgrades this past year, each improving the capability
    of the command, control, battle management and communications system.
        It is this global connective capability that allows us to combine
    different sensors with different weapons. For example, we are
    developing the Aegis BMD System so that it can support a ground-based
    interceptor launch by sending tracking information to the fire control
    system. A forward-deployed radar can cue and pass tracking information
    on to, for example, a Patriot Advanced Capability-3 unit, or a
    regionally deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
    battery, or a GMD or Aegis BMD engagement ships. In other words, we
    want to be able to mix and match sensor and interceptor resources to
    give the system more capability by expanding the detection and
    engagement zones. Our ability to integrate all of the weapons and
    sensors into a single package that will use interceptors in the best
    location to make the kill gives us a critical multiplier effect.
        We work closely with STRATCOM and the combatant commanders to
    certify missile defense crews at all echelons to ensure that they can
    operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System. We have exercised the
    command, fire control, battle management and communication capabilities
    critical to the operation of the system.
        We also are continuing to exercise the system to learn how best to
    operate it, and we have demonstrated our ability to transition smoothly
    from test to operations and back. In our exercises and tests, we have
    worked through a number of operational capability demonstrations in
    order to increase operational realism and complexity, certify crews and
    safety procedures, and demonstrate the operational viability of the
    system. The MDA will continue to coordinate with the warfighter to
    implement developmental upgrades and improvements in the system to
    maximize system capability. This is very important since we will
    continue to improve the capabilities of the system over time, even as
    we remain ready in the near-term to take advantage of its inherent
    defensive capability should the need arise.

                   BUILDING CONFIDENCE THROUGH SPIRAL TESTING

        We have consistently pursued a comprehensive and integrated
    approach to missile defense testing and are gradually making our tests
    more complex. Missile defense testing has evolved, and will continue to
    evolve, based on results. We are not in a traditional development,
    test, and production mode where we test a system, then produce hundreds
    of units without further testing. We will always be testing and
    improving this system, using a testing approach that cycles results
    into our spiral development activities. This approach also means
    fielding test assets in operational configurations. This dramatically
    reduces time from development to operations in a mission area where,
    until now, this nation has been defenseless.
        Last year, following the two launch aborts of the interceptor for
    the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, I explained that we had
    several concerns with quality control and reliability; but we did not
    view the failures as major technical setbacks. In response to those
    failures, I chartered an independent team to review our test processes,
    procedures and management. The team concluded that the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense program met the challenge of providing an initial
    defensive capability but found deficiencies in systems engineering,
    ground qualification testing, flight test readiness certification,
    contractor process control and program scheduling. The independent
    review team recommended that the MDA reorient the missile defense
    program to strengthen its emphasis on mission assurance.
        I established a Mission Readiness Task Force under Admiral Kate
    Paige to implement the corrective actions needed to ensure a return to
    a successful flight test program. The task force identified steps to
    strengthen our systems engineering and quality assurance processes and
    provide the reliability and repeatability necessary for operational
    success. As a result, we undertook a comprehensive review of these
    system processes at each step along the way. We are also undertaking
    the necessary ground and flight qualification tests to retire the risks
    uncovered by the independent review team and the Mission Readiness Task
    Force. To strengthen our test program, I diverted four long-range
    interceptors slated for operational use into testing, with the intent
    to replace them in 2007 if our test program was successful. Last year,
    I asked the committee to have patience, knowing that the system's basic
    functionality was not at risk. As a result of our aggressive actions, I
    believe that mission assurance and system reliability are now on track.
        We finished the year strongly with a string of test successes
    across the board. These successes continue to build confidence in our
    spiral development approach. In a major step forward, in September
    2005, we flew a threat representative target across the operational
    Cobra Dane radar and generated an intercept solution using the long-
    range fire control system. We then flew the operational configuration
    of the long-range interceptor in December 2005 and put the kill vehicle
    through its paces. We not only achieved all of the test objectives for
    that flight, but we also accomplished many of those objectives we
    identified for the next flight test scheduled for this spring. Just
    last month, we exercised an engagement sequence that used the Upgraded
    Early Warning Radar at Beale Air Force Base in California to provide
    tracking information to a simulated long-range interceptor from an
    operational site at Vandenberg. Based on the many tests we have
    conducted to date, including three successful flight tests of the
    operational long-range booster now emplaced in Alaska and California,
    we maintain our confidence in the system's basic design, its hit-to-
    kill effectiveness, and its inherent operational capability. We will
    continue to test this system to ensure it will remain mission ready.
        We continue to work closely with the Director, Operational Test and
    Evaluation, Operational Test Agencies, and combatant commanders to
    characterize the effectiveness and readiness of the system at every
    stage in its development and fielding. This year the fielded BMD System
    will undergo ever more challenging and operationally realistic testing.
        We will begin the important next step of testing our long-range
    ground-based defense with more operationally robust flight tests as a
    part of the integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System With the next
    tests involving the GBI, we will step up testing complexity and involve
    operational crews, operational interceptor launch sites, and
    operational sensors. These tests will involve an operationally
    configured interceptor launched from Vandenberg that will attempt to
    acquire and intercept a target missile launched out of the Kodiak
    Launch Complex in Alaska. With the last two tests in this series, we
    will demonstrate the ability of the system to perform more refined
    acquisition and discrimination functions and the ability of the exo-
    atmospheric kill vehicle to divert toward the target and intercept it.
    We also plan to use tracking data from the Sea-Based X-band radar when
    it is available to feed its data into system tests and operations. In
    2007, as we return our focus to fielding long-range interceptors, we
    plan one system intercept test and two flight tests, all three of which
    will further demonstrate the operationally configured interceptor.
        In our sea-based midcourse defense element, we have continued to
    ratchet up the degree of realism and reduce testing limitations. This
    past November, for the first time, we successfully used a U.S. Navy
    Aegis cruiser to engage a separating target carried on a threat-
    representative medium-range ballistic missile. A separating target is
    more challenging to engage because it can fly faster and farther than
    the boosting missile. In order to increase operational realism, we did
    not notify the operational ship's crew of the target launch time, and
    they were forced to react to a dynamic situation. We are planning three
    more Aegis interceptor flight tests in 2006. Last month, we conducted a
    very successful cooperative test with Japan involving a simulated
    target to demonstrate the engagement performance of a modified SM-3
    nosecone developed by the Japanese in the U.S./Japan Joint Cooperative
    Research project. One of the upcoming U.S. Aegis intercept tests will
    again involve a separating warhead. In 2007 we plan to conduct two
    tests of the sea-based interceptor against short- and medium-range
    targets.
        Flight-testing involving the redesigned interceptor for the THAAD
    began last November when we successfully demonstrated the separation
    and operation of the production booster and kill vehicle. This year we
    will conduct four more tests to characterize performance of the new
    missile and the ability to integrate it into the BMD System. Later this
    year we will also conduct the first intercept test high in the
    atmosphere. In 2007 we plan to conduct four intercept tests as part of
    our THAAD flight test program.
        Also planned in 2007 are two Arrow system flight tests and one
    Patriot combined developmental and operational test. The command,
    control, battle management, and communications infrastructure will be
    exercised in all of our system level tests.
        Ground tests, wargames and modeling and simulation help demonstrate
    interoperability, assess performance and specification compliance, and
    develop doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. In 2007 we will
    continue with our successful ground-testing, which involves warfighter
    personnel and test hardware and software in the integrated system
    configuration to demonstrate system connectivity and interoperability.
    Upcoming tests will verify integration of the sea-based, forward-based,
    and Fylingdales radars. The funds we are requesting also will support
    additional capability demonstrations and readiness demonstrations led
    by the warfighting community.

                   COMPLETING THE NEXT INCREMENT--BLOCK 2006

        To keep ahead of rogue nation threats, we continue to hold to the
    fielding commitments we made to the President for Block 2006, which
    include investment in the necessary logistics support and command,
    control, battle management and communications infrastructure. In 2006
    and 2007, we will build on the successes we had in 2005 to improve
    protection against a North Korean threat, provide protection against a
    threat from the Middle East, expand coverage to allies and friends,
    increase countermeasure resistance, and improve protection against
    short-range ballistic missiles. We are also planning to field more
    mobile, flexible interceptors and associated sensors to meet threats
    from unanticipated launch locations.
        For midcourse capability against the long-range threat, the GMD
    element budget request for fiscal year 2007 of $2.7 billion will cover
    continued development, ground and flight testing, fielding and support.
    This is about $125 million more than we budgeted for fiscal year 2007
    in last year's submission. The risk-reduction work prescribed by the
    Mission Readiness Task Force has caused us to reduce the number of
    interceptors fielded in 2007. This request includes up to 4 additional
    ground-based interceptors, for a total of 20 interceptors in Alaska by
    the end of 2007, their silos and associated support equipment and
    facilities as well as the long-lead items for the next increment. The
    increase in fiscal year 2007 funding from last year to this year is
    attributed, in part, to increased sustainment, logistics and force
    protection requirements, as well as to other needs associated with
    preparing the system for operations. This budget submission also
    continues the upgrade of the Thule early warning radar in Greenland and
    its integration into the system.
        The Royal Air Force Fylingdales early warning radar in the United
    Kingdom will be fully integrated for missile defense purposes by fall
    2006. It will provide sensor coverage against Middle East threats.
        As part of our effort to make the system more robust, improve
    defense of our allies, and address threat uncertainties, we are
    continuing discussions with our allies in Europe regarding the
    deployment of radars and a third site for ground-based interceptors.
    Later this year we will be able to give greater definition to this
    important evolutionary effort.
        To address the short- to intermediate-range threat, we are
    requesting approximately $1.9 billion to continue development and
    testing of our sea-based midcourse capability, or Aegis BMD, and our
    land-based THAAD terminal defense capability. System tests will involve
    further demonstrations of the sea-based interceptor, and we will
    continue enhancing the system's discrimination capability. We will
    continue Standard Missile-3 improvements. We added approximately $49
    million to the fiscal year 2007 request for Aegis BMD from last year to
    this year to address the Divert and Attitude Control System and other
    aspects of the system, including the development of a more capable 2-
    color seeker for the SM-3 kill vehicle. We will continue purchases of
    the SM-3 interceptor and the upgrading of Aegis ships to perform the
    BMD mission. By the end of 2007 we will have three Aegis engagement
    cruisers, seven engagement destroyers, and seven Long Range
    Surveillance and Track destroyers. These sea-based sensors and weapons
    will improve our ability to defend the homeland and our deployed troops
    and our friends and allies. In fiscal year 2007 we will initiate work
    with Japan for follow-on SM-3 development in order to increase its
    range and lethality. We also will continue the THAAD development effort
    that will lead to fielding the first unit in the 2008-2009 timeframe
    with a second unit available in 2011.
        We will continue to roll out sensors that we will net together to
    detect and track threat targets and improve discrimination of the
    target set in different phases of flight. In 2007, we will prepare a
    second forward-based X-band radar for operations. We also are working
    towards a 2007 launch of two Space Tracking and Surveillance System
    (STSS) test bed satellites. These demonstration satellites will perform
    target acquisition and handover and explore approaches for closing the
    fire control loop globally for the entire BMD System. In fiscal year
    2007 we will undertake initial satellite check-out and prepare for
    tests involving live targets. We are requesting approximately $380
    million in fiscal year 2007 to execute this STSS activity, and $402
    million for the Forward-Based Radar work.
        For the Ballistic Missile Defense System to work effectively, all
    of its separate elements must be integrated by a solid command,
    control, battle management and communications foundation that spans
    thousands of miles, multiple time zones, hundreds of kilometers in
    space and several combatant command areas of responsibility. C2BMC
    allows us to pass critical information from sensors to provide input
    for critical engagement decisions. Combatant commanders can use the
    C2BMC infrastructure to enhance planning and help synchronize globally
    dispersed missile defense assets. These capabilities also can provide
    our senior government leadership situational awareness of ballistic
    missile launches and defense activities.
        This C2BMC capability allows us to mix and match sensors, weapons
    and command centers to dramatically expand our detection and engagement
    capabilities over what can be achieved by the system's elements
    operating individually. We cannot execute our basic mission without
    this foundation.
        With this year's budget request for $264 million for the C2BMC
    activity, we will continue to use spiral development to incrementally
    develop, test, and field hardware and software improvements. We will
    press on with the development of the initial global integrated fire
    control to integrate Aegis BMD, the forward-based radar, and Ground-
    based Midcourse Defense assets. We plan to install additional planning
    and situational awareness capabilities to facilitate executive
    decisionmaking among the combatant commanders.
        The MDA is committed to delivering the best capabilities to the
    warfighter in a timely manner, and warfighter participation and input
    is a critical part in the engineering process. Today, the Army National
    Guard's 100th Missile Defense Brigade, Air Force's Space Warfare
    Center, and Navy ships in the Pacific Fleet are on station and
    operating the system. Our fiscal year 2007 request continues to fund
    critical sustainment and fielding activities and ensure that system
    developers have financial resources to support fielded components. We
    will continue to work collaboratively with the combatant commanders and
    the military Services as the system evolves to define and prioritize
    requirements. Exercises, wargames, and seminars continue to be
    important collaboration venues. We will also continue to support
    training activities to ensure operational readiness, combat
    effectiveness, and high-level system performance.

                MOVING TOWARD THE FUTURE--BLOCK 2008 AND BEYOND

        There is no silver bullet in missile defense, and strategic
    uncertainty could surprise us tomorrow. So it is important that we
    continue our aggressive parallel paths approach to building this
    integrated, multilayered defensive system. There are several important
    development efforts funded in this budget.
        In executing our program we continue to follow a strategy of
    retaining alternative development paths until capability is proven--a
    knowledge-based funding approach. That means we are setting specific
    targets, or knowledge points, that the development efforts have to
    reach within certain periods of time. Knowledge points are not reviews,
    but discrete activities in a development activity that produce data on
    the most salient risks. The approach involves tradeoffs to address
    sufficiency of defensive layers--boost, midcourse, terminal; diversity
    of basing modes--land, sea, air, and space; and considerations of
    technical, schedule, and cost performance. This is fundamental to how
    we execute the development program, because it enables us to make
    decisions as to what we will and will not fund based upon the proven
    success of each program element.
        For example, we are preserving decision flexibility with respect to
    our boost phase programs until we understand what engagement
    capabilities they can offer. We have requested approximately $984
    million for these activities in fiscal year 2007. This past year the
    revolutionary Airborne Laser (ABL) reached its knowledge points when it
    achieved a full duration lase at operational power and completed
    initial flight tests involving its beam control/fire control system.
    The program's knowledge points for 2006 include flight testing of the
    lasers used for target tracking and atmospheric compensation. This
    testing, which will test the entire engagement sequence up through the
    point where we fire the laser, will require use of a low-power laser
    surrogate for the high-power laser. Once we have completed modification
    of the aircraft which has begun in Wichita, Kansas, we will start
    installation of the high-power laser modules in 2007. This will provide
    us with the first ABL weapon system test bed and allow us to conduct a
    campaign of flight tests with the full system. In addition to
    installation of the high-power lasers, we will continue integration,
    ground, and flight test activities in fiscal year 2007 to support ABL's
    low-power beam control/fire control and battle management systems. We
    will be working towards a lethal demonstration of the weapon system
    against a boosting ballistic missile in 2008.
        We still have many technical challenges with the Airborne Laser.
    Yet the series of major achievements beginning in 2004, when we
    achieved first light and first flight of the aircraft with its beam
    control/fire control system, gives me reason to be optimistic that we
    can produce an effective directed energy capability. An operational
    Airborne Laser could provide a valuable boost-phase defense capability
    against missiles of all ranges.
        The Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) is a boost-phase effort in
    response to a 2002 Defense Science Board Summer Study recommendation to
    develop a terrestrial-based boost phase interceptor as an alternative
    to the high-risk Airborne Laser development effort. Last year we
    focused near-term efforts in our kinetic energy interceptor activity to
    demonstrate key capabilities and reduce risks inherent in the
    development of a land-based, mobile, very high acceleration booster. It
    has always been our view that the KEI booster, which is envisioned as a
    flexible and high-performance booster capable of defending large areas,
    could be used as part of an affordable, competitive next-generation
    upgrade for our midcourse or even terminal interceptors. A successful
    KEI mobile missile defense capability would improve significantly our
    ability to protect our allies and friends.
        This past year we demonstrated important command, control, battle
    management, and communications functions required for a boost intercept
    mission, including the use of national sensor data for intercept
    operations in the field. The key knowledge point for this program is
    the demonstration of a very high acceleration booster. We began a
    series of static firing tests of the first and second stages of the
    booster and had a successful firing this past January. We plan a flight
    test to verify the new booster in 2008.
        Development of the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) system will offer a
    generational upgrade to ground-based midcourse interceptors by
    increasing their effectiveness in the presence of multiple warheads and
    countermeasures. We are exploiting miniaturization technology to
    develop a platform with many small kill vehicles to engage more than
    one object in space. This effort will supplement other innovative
    discrimination techniques we are developing for use in the midcourse
    phase by destroying multiple threat objects in a single engagement. In
    2005 we made progress in the development of the MKV seeker, but
    resource constraints and technical shortfalls have caused a delay in
    this development effort. We are now planning to conduct the hover test
    in 2009. Our first intercept attempt using MKV is now scheduled for
    2012. We are requesting $162 million in fiscal year 2007 to continue
    the MKV development effort.

                          INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION

        The global nature of the threat requires that we work closely with
    our allies and friends to develop, field, and operate missile defenses.
    We have made significant progress in fostering international support
    for the development and operation of a Ballistic Missile Defense System
    capable of intercepting ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases
    of flight. We have been working closely with a number of allies and
    friends of the United States to forge international partnerships. I
    would like to highlight a few of our cooperative efforts.
        The Government of Japan continues to make significant investments
    toward the acquisition of a multilayered BMD System, with capability
    upgrades to its Aegis destroyers and acquisition of the Standard
    Missile-3 interceptor. We have worked closely with Japan since 1999 to
    design and develop advanced interceptor components. This project
    culminated in the flight test of an advanced SM-3 nosecone earlier this
    year and ended this phase of our joint cooperative research.
    Additionally, the MDA and Japan have agreed to co--develop a Block IIA
    version of the SM-3 missile, which will significantly improve the
    kinematics and warhead capability. We also have agreed to deploy an X-
    band radar to Japan, which will enhance regional and homeland missile
    defense capabilities. In addition, Japan and other allied nations
    continue upgrading their Patriot fire units with Patriot Advanced
    Capability-3 missiles and improved ground support equipment.
        In addition to the Fylingdales radar development and integration
    activities, we are undertaking a series of cooperative technical
    development efforts with the United Kingdom. Newly installed
    situational awareness displays in the United Kingdom also are
    indicative of our close collaboration with our British allies in the
    missile defense area.
        Last year we signed an agreement with Denmark to upgrade the radar
    at Thule and integrate it into the system. This radar will play an
    important role in the system by providing additional track on hostile
    missiles launched out of the Middle East.
        We will continue to expand cooperative development work on sensors
    and build on our longstanding defense relationship with the government
    of Australia. In April 2005 we concluded a Research, Development, Test
    and Evaluation agreement to enable collaborative work on specific
    projects, including high frequency over-the-horizon radar, track fusion
    and filtering, distributed aperture radar experiments, and modeling and
    simulation.
        We are continuing work with Israel to implement the Arrow System
    Improvement Program and enhance its capability to defeat longer-range
    ballistic missile threats emerging in the Middle East. This past
    December Israel conducted a successful launch and intercept of a
    maneuvering target using the Arrow missile. The United States and
    Israel are coproducing components of the Arrow interceptor missile,
    which will help Israel meet its defense requirements more quickly and
    maintain the U.S. industrial work share.
        We also have been in discussions with several allies located in or
    near regions where the threat of ballistic missile use is high for the
    forward placement of sensors, and we continue to support our North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners in conducting a
    feasibility study to examine potential architecture options for
    defending European NATO population centers against longer-range missile
    threats. This work builds upon ongoing work to define and develop a
    NATO capability for protection of deployed forces. We have other
    international interoperability and technical cooperation projects
    underway and are working to establish formal agreements with other
    governments.

                                    CLOSING

        Mr. Chairman, I want to thank this committee for its continued
    support of the Missile Defense Program. When I appeared before you last
    year, we faced numerous challenges. Over the past year, the dedicated
    men and women of the MDA and our industrial partners met these
    challenges head-on and overcame the difficulties we experienced in 2004
    and early in 2005. The result was that in 2005 we made significant
    progress. We had a series of successful tests that are unparalleled in
    our development efforts to date. In 2006 and 2007 I am confident that
    we will continue this success. I am proud to serve with these men and
    women, and the country should be grateful for their unflagging efforts.
        There have been many lessons learned, and I believe the processes
    are in place to implement them as we field follow-on increments of the
    system. I also believe that our program priorities foster long-term
    growth in multilayered and integrated capabilities to address future
    threats. There certainly are risks involved in the development and
    fielding activities. However, I believe we have adequately structured
    the program to manage and reduce those risks using a knowledge-based
    approach that requires each program element to prove that it is worthy
    of being fielded.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

        Senator Sessions. Lieutenant General Dodgen, Commander of
    Space and Missile Defense Command, and responsible for
    Strategic Command's Integrated Missile Defense. So, you're the
    customer of General Obering's product?

      STATEMENT OF LTG LARRY J. DODGEN, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY
     SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND, U.S. ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC
                                COMMAND

        General Dodgen. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. We're pleased to hear from you.
        General Dodgen. Mr. Chairman, members of the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our
    military and for the opportunity to appear before this
    distinguished panel once again. This committee continues to be
    a great friend of the Army and the Missile Defense Community,
    particularly in the efforts to field missile defense forces to
    our Nation and our allies.
        I appear before this subcommittee in two roles, as stated
    by you Senator Sessions. The first is a warfighting member of
    the Joint Missile Defense Team, I am the Commander of the Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense
    (JFCC-IMD). Part of the United States Strategic Command, the
    JFCC-IMD is a joint user representative working closely with
    the MDA, other Services, and combatant commanders to ensure
    that our national goal of developing, testing, and deploying an
    integrated MDS are met. In other words, sir, we operationalize
    the system, and turn that over to the geographical combatant
    commanders.
        The second, as the Army proponent for missile defense and
    proponent for the GMD system. Today I will focus my remarks and
    my role as Commander of the JFCC-IMD, and also provide my view
    of the BMD threat.
        Regarding that threat, this committee has previously heard
    from other departments, civilian leaders, and combatant
    commanders about the need to ensure that our country has an
    operational, robust, and flexible and integratable BMD
    capability against a growing and increasingly complex ballistic
    missile. The pace of global proliferation of ballistic missile
    technology is increasing, as the IC notes several countries
    producing ballistic missiles are selling that technology to
    other countries that in turn are modifying, using increasingly
    sophisticated systems to fit their own needs. We must devalue
    ballistic missiles as tools of extortion and aggression,
    undermining any confidence our adversaries might have in
    threatening us or our allies. I strongly believe that continued
    development and fielding of our Nation's ballistic missile
    systems must stay ahead of the threat faced by combatant
    commanders.
        In my role as the JFCC-IMD Commander, I directly support
    the STRATCOM combatant commander in planning the global missile
    defenses. JFCC-IMD was established in January 2005, reaching
    full operational capability just this past February 28 as one
    of supporting STRATCOM's new triad concept. IMD is truly joint,
    manned by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel and
    is headquartered at the Joint National Integration Center at
    Shriever Air Force Base in Colorado. This arrangement allows us
    to leverage the existing robust infrastructure and our strong
    partnership with the MDA to execute the IMD mission.
        In the past year, the JFCC-IMD has aggressively executed
    the global mission to plan, coordinate, and integrate missile
    defenses. In collaboration with geographical combatant
    commands, we are developing IMD plans that integrate theater
    and national assets to provide the best protection.
        The STRATCOM, in partner with MDA and Service combatant
    commanders are setting the stage to evolve the Ballistic
    Missile Defense Systems (BMDS) beyond its current capability,
    to provide a more robust missile defense for homeland and
    deployed forces.
        Mr. Chairman, the Army is a full contributing member of the
    joint BMD team, Army soldiers are trained, ready, and operating
    the GMD System at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Schriever Air Force
    Base, Colorado. Just a couple of years ago, we activated the
    GMD Brigade in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and the subordinate
    battalion at Fort Greely. These soldiers, as part of the joint
    team, are our Nation's first line of defense against any launch
    of an intercontinental ballistic missile toward our homeland. I
    am proud to represent them along with other members of the
    Army's Air and Missile Defense Community to develop and field
    BMDs for our Nation, the deployed forces, friends, and allies.
    With the ongoing support of this committee, the Army will
    continue to transform to support the Army's future force, the
    Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense System, and our global
    BMDS.
        I appreciate having the opportunity to speak of these
    important matters, and look forward to addressing any questions
    you or the members of your subcommittee may have. I also
    respectfully request that my written statement be submitted for
    the record. Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Dodgen follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by LTG Larry J. Dodgen, USA

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and members of the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our military and
    for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished panel, once
    again. This committee continues to be a great friend of the Army and
    the missile defense community, particularly in our efforts to field
    missile defense forces for the Nation and our allies. I consider it a
    privilege to be counted in the ranks with Mr. Flory, Mr. Duma, and
    Lieutenant General Obering as advocates for a strong global missile
    defense capability.
        I appear before this committee in two roles. The first is as an
    Army Commander for missile defense and a proponent for the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. The second is as a soldier in the Joint
    Missile Defense Team and Commander of the Joint Functional Component
    Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD), a part of the United
    States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and the joint user representative
    working closely with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), other Services,
    and combatant commanders to ensure that our national goals of
    developing, testing, and deploying an integrated missile defense system
    (IAMD) are met.
        Mr. Chairman, as I reported last year, Army soldiers are trained,
    ready, and operating the GMD System at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the
    Joint National Integration Center (JNIC) at Schriever Air Force Base in
    Colorado. Just a couple of years ago, we activated the GMD Brigade in
    Colorado Springs, Colorado, and a subordinate GMD Battalion at Fort
    Greely. These soldiers, as part of the Joint team, are our Nation's
    first line of defense against any launch of an intercontinental
    ballistic missile (ICBM) toward our shores. I am proud to represent
    them along with the other members of the Army's Air and Missile Defense
    (AMD) community.

                              USSTRATCOM JFCC-IMD

        The JFCC-IMD was established in January 2005 as one element of
    USSTRATCOM and reached full operational capability on early in 2006.
    This organization complements the capabilities inherent in other
    STRATCOM JFCCs and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) which plan, coordinate, and
    integrate STRATCOM's other global missions of Space and Global Strike,
    Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Net Warfare and
    Global Network Operations, and the newest element, the STRATCOM Center
    for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).
        The JFCC-IMD is manned by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
    personnel. It is headquartered at the JNIC at Schriever Air Force Base,
    Colorado. This arrangement enables us to execute the IMD mission by
    leveraging the existing robust infrastructure and our strong
    partnership with our collocated MDA team.
        In the past year, STRATCOM, through the JFCC-IMD, has aggressively
    executed its mission to globally plan, coordinate, and integrate
    missile defense. In collaboration with geographic combatant commands,
    we are developing IMD plans within a regional area of operations in the
    context of STRATCOM's global mission instead of individual theater
    plans.
        Based on guidance from the Commander, STRATCOM, we have also
    developed plans to take existing MDA assets, currently in test and
    development status, and rapidly transition them, in an emergency, to an
    operational warfighting capability. This allows STRATCOM to provide
    additional critical IMD capabilities to the combatant commands in times
    of crisis. Examples of this capability include early activation and
    deployment of the AEGIS SM3 Missile and the sea-based and Forward Based
    X-band Transportable (FBX-T) Radar to operational locations in the
    Pacific region, where, by the end of 2006, they will join a global
    network of radars. STRATCOM initiated planning efforts to integrate the
    capabilities of all the JFCCs to support the ``New Strategic Triad,''
    as it determines the next steps needed to fulfill our commitment to an
    integrated missile defense capable of defending the U.S., its deployed
    forces, friends, and allies.
        JFCC-IMD works closely with the other JFCC elements of STRATCOM and
    the combatant commands to make Offense-Defense Integration, ISR, and
    the other mission areas integral aspects of how we fight, to ensure the
    optimal application of limited resources.
        The IMD community, led by the STRATCOM Commander and his Unified
    Command Plan Authority, has conducted numerous capability and readiness
    demonstrations, integrated flight and ground tests, and combatant
    command exercises to develop and validate the operators' tactics,
    techniques, and procedures. As we work toward our system's future
    operational capability, increased warfighter involvement in the testing
    and exercising of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) ensures
    both the viability of the defense and the confidence of its operators.
        STRATCOM, through the JFCC-IMD, is leading the planning of global
    missile defenses with the development of the global IMD Concept of
    Operations (CONOPs). The CONOPs relies on the development and
    coordination of engagement sequence groups (ESGs) and the advocacy of
    desired global missile defense characteristics and capabilities.
        STRATCOM-developed global IMD CONOPs serves as a roadmap for the
    warfighting community to guide the development of more detailed IMD
    planning and execution. These CONOPs contains two fundamental
    principles. First, the geographic component commanders execute the IMD
    fight within their Areas of Responsibility (AORs). Second, multi-
    mission sensors are centrally tasked by STRATCOM Commander to optimize
    their use in forming ESGs.
        As a key requirement for IMD planning, the identification of ESGs
    as the optimal pairing of sensor and weapon capabilities required to
    provide active missile defense for the designated defended area is
    critical. The ESGs are a tool the IMD community uses to help operate
    the BMDS by balancing operational necessity with the realities of
    ongoing research, development, and testing in the near term. As more
    elements and components are made available, ESGs will serve to optimize
    our global missile defense system.
        The STRATCOM commander represents all the component commands as the
    advocate for IMD. He executes this responsibility at two levels. First,
    for those elements already deployed, headquarters, STRATCOM J8, in
    collaboration with the JFCC-IMD, conducts the Warfighter Involvement
    Process (WIP) to evaluate the adequacy of the current capabilities of
    the BMDS. This process can encompass anything from identifying simple
    human interface changes or modifications to developing refined planning
    tools. These needs are prioritized by STRATCOM for review and approval
    and are provided to MDA for consideration. The second level of advocacy
    focuses on future capability needs. These future elements and
    components will provide additional capabilities that enable a more
    robust, reliable, and capable system.
        The critical element that ties the entire BMDS system together is
    the Command and Control Battle Management Communications (C2BMC). C2BMC
    is an essential evolutionary component of the BMDS that will greatly
    enhance both planning and execution capabilities. C2BMC contributes to
    all phases of BMD from optimizing planning to synchronizing the
    automated execution of the BMDS. Upgrades to the Command, Control,
    Battle Management, and Communications System will extend situational
    awareness capability to Pacific Command (PACOM) and European Command
    (EUCOM) by the end of 2006.
        As our planning processes have matured over the past year, JFCC-
    IMD's innovative use of new collaborative planning capabilities in
    major combatant command exercises has demonstrated the effectiveness of
    distributed crisis action planning. JFCC-IMD was able to support the
    combatant commands with development of new defense designs and
    optimized locations for BMDS in exercises such as STRATCOM's Global
    Lightning and PACOM's Terminal Fury.
        Through our partnership with MDA, the Services, and the warfighters
    at the combatant commands, STRATCOM is setting the stage to evolve the
    BMDS beyond its current capability to that of providing more robust
    missile defense for the homeland, deployed forces, friends and allies.
    We are actively engaged with MDA and the Services in the development
    and deployment of BMDS elements and components ensuring a layered,
    multi-phase operational capability for the combatant commands.
        Air and Missile Defense--an Overview of the Fiscal Year 2007 Army
    Budget Submission
        In addition to deploying a GMD system, MDA, the Services, and the
    combatant commanders are focused on improving Theater Air and Missile
    Defense (TAMD) capabilities within the context of the evolving BMDS in
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Joint Integrating Concept.
    Both GMD and TAMD systems are vital for the protection of our homeland,
    deployed forces, friends, and allies. Air and missile defense is a key
    component in support of the Army's core competency of providing
    relevant and ready land power to combatant commanders.
        I would now like to focus on the Army's fiscal year 2007 budget
    submission for Air and Missile Defense (AMD) systems. The President's
    budget, presented to Congress on February 6, includes approximately
    $1.57 billion with which the Army proposes to perform current Army AMD
    responsibilities and focus on future development and enhancements of
    both terminal phase and short-range AMD systems. In short, the Army is
    continuing major efforts to improve the ability to acquire, track,
    intercept, and destroy theater air and missile threats.
        The Army, as part of the joint team, is transforming its AMD forces
    to meet the increasingly sophisticated and asymmetric threat
    environment encountered by the joint warfighter. The Army has the lead
    to conduct the IAMD Capabilities Based Assessment. This analysis will
    comprise the front end of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Joint Capabilities Integration Development System. The study will
    identify key joint, agency and combat command IAMD capability gaps and
    will recommend doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership
    and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) transformation
    actions. The document is envisioned to fulfill time-phased IAMD needs
    across the range of military operations.

                        INTEGRATED AMD SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS

        The Army is transforming its Air Defense Force from its current
    separate systems architecture to a component-based, network-centric,
    IAMD System of Systems (SoS). The IAMD SoS program focuses on systems
    integration, common battle command and control, joint enabling
    networking, and logistics and training, to ensure operational
    requirements, such as force protection, lethality, survivability,
    transportability and maneuverability are achieved. The IAMD SoS program
    will employ an evolutionary acquisition strategy consisting of a series
    of increments leading to the objective capability. This SoS approach
    calls for a restructuring of systems into components of sensors,
    weapons and Battle Management Command, Control, Communications,
    Computers, and Intelligence (BMC4I) with a standard set of interfaces
    among these components using a standardized set of networks for
    communication.
        Technology insertions to the IAMD SoS will continue throughout each
    increment as high-payoff technologies mature and are ready for
    integration. Incremental development of the IAMD SoS allows the Army to
    field new or improved capabilities to warfighters faster, by producing
    and deploying systems and components as the technologies mature.
    Funding in the proposed fiscal year 2007 President's budget supports
    the first steps in achieving an IAMD SoS architecture.

                       AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE BATTALIONS

        As part of Air Defense Transformation, the Army is creating
    composite AMD battalions. These battalions address capability gaps,
    which permit us to defeat cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles
    (UAVs) while maintaining our ability to defend critical assets from the
    ballistic missile threat. The composite AMD battalions will capitalize
    on the synergies of two previously separate disciplines: short-range
    air defense and high-to-medium altitude air defense. The current plan
    is to organize eight battalions as Patriot-pure units, four battalions
    as AMD battalions, and create one battalion, in Korea, as a maneuver
    AMD battalion. This transformation is underway.
        Within the context just provided, allow me to briefly discuss each
    of the programs that support the Army's AMD Transformation.

                   TERMINAL PHASE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

        The Patriot/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) capability
    is designed to counter theater ballistic missile threats in their
    terminal phase in addition to cruise missiles and other air-breathing
    threats. Combining these systems with the Theater High Attitude Area
    Defense (THAAD) System capability being developed by MDA with a planned
    fielding in fiscal year 2009, brings an unprecedented level of
    protection against missile attacks to deployed U.S. forces, friends,
    and allies well into the future.
    Patriot/PAC 3 and Meads Overview
        Mr. Chairman, since the combat debut of the Patriot AMD System
    during Operation Desert Storm, the Army has continued to implement a
    series of improvements to address the lessons learned. During Operation
    Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we saw the debut of the improved Patriot
    Configuration-3 system, including the effective use of the Guidance
    Enhanced Missile and the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missile.
    PAC-3 is the latest evolution of the phased materiel improvement
    program to Patriot. Combining developmental testing and operational
    data, this program has enabled the development and deployment of a new
    high-velocity, hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile with the range,
    accuracy, and lethality necessary to effectively intercept and destroy
    more sophisticated ballistic missile threats. Today's Patriot force is
    a mixture of PAC-2 and PAC-3 configured units. To maximize the full
    advantage of the PAC-3 capabilities, the Army is moving toward pure-
    fleeting the entire Patriot force to the PAC-3 configuration.
        As I highlighted last year, Patriot saved many lives when defending
    against Iraqi ballistic missile attacks during OIF. However, there were
    some operational deficiencies. The Army has undertaken steps to correct
    them and address lessons learned. The Army has pursued two thrusts--
    identification and execution of a $41.6 million program for nine
    specific OIF fixes and continued aggressive participation in joint
    interoperability improvements in situational awareness. All funded OIF
    fixes are on schedule to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2007,
    pending any materiel release issues.
        The Patriot system remains the Army's mainstay TAMD system and our
    Nation's only deployed land-based short-to-medium range BMDS
    capability. The current Patriot force must be maintained through
    sustainment and recapitalization efforts, until the MEADS is fielded,
    projected to begin in 2015.
        MEADS is a cooperative development program with Germany and Italy,
    to collectively field an enhanced ground-based AMD capability. The
    MEADS program, which supports the President's goal for international
    cooperation in missile defense, will enable the joint integrated AMD
    community to move beyond the critical asset defense designs we see
    today. MEADS will provide theater level defense of critical assets and
    continuous protection of a rapidly advancing maneuver force as part of
    a Joint IAMD architecture. Major MEADS enhancements include 360-degree
    sensor coverage, a netted and distributed battle manager that enables
    integrated fire control, and a strategically deployable and tactically
    mobile, AMD system. While the PAC-3 missile is the baseline missile for
    the international MEADS program, the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE)
    missile is being developed to meet U.S. operational requirements. MSE
    will provide a more agile and lethal interceptor that increases the
    engagement envelope.
    Combined Patriot/MEADS Approach
        With the approval of the Defense Acquisition Executive, the Army
    embarked on a path to merge the Patriot and MEADS programs,
    establishing the Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) with
    the objective of achieving the MEADS capability through incremental
    fielding of MEADS major end items into Patriot. Patriot/MEADS CAP is an
    important capability that will operate within MDA's BMDS. It is in
    fact, the number one Army priority system for defense against short and
    medium-range Tactical Ballistic Missiles and air breathing threats
    (i.e. cruise missiles and UAVs). The Patriot/MEADS CAP will be capable
    of operating within a joint, interagency, and multinational
    interdependent operational environment. It will provide wide-area
    protection at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
        Patriot/MEADS CAP will also provide BMC4I, introduce lightweight
    deployable launchers, upgrade the PAC-3 missile, and eventually provide
    the full MEADS capability to the entire force. The MEADS system offers
    a significant improvement in the ability to deploy strategically while
    maintaining tactical mobility. The system uses a netted and distributed
    architecture with modular and configurable battle elements, which
    allows for integration with other Army and Joint sensors and shooters.
    These features and capabilities will allow MEADS to achieve a robust
    360-degree defense against all airborne threats. By establishing the
    CAP, the joint integrated AMD architecture has become more robust.
    First, MEADS enhancements are integrated into the existing system.
    Second, as lessons are learned from the present missile defense
    capability, they will be incorporated into the MEADS follow-on system.
    We are confident that this path will provide our servicemembers,
    allies, friends, and the Nation with the most capable AMD system
    possible.
        The Army and the entire missile defense community continue to
    strive to improve our Nation's missile defense capabilities. The
    Patriot and PAC-3/MEADS CAP research, development, and acquisition
    budget request for fiscal year 2007 is approximately $916.5 million.
    This request procures 108 PAC-3 missiles, purchases spares for the
    system, and reflects the necessary Patriot development to keep the
    system viable as we pursue development of PAC-3/MEADS CAP capabilities.

                             CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

        In the world today, there exists a real and growing threat from
    land attack cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are inherently very
    difficult targets to detect, engage, and destroy because of their small
    size, low detection signature, and low altitude flight characteristics.
    When armed with a WMD warhead, the effect of a cruise missile could be
    catastrophic. It is clear that the required systems and capabilities
    necessary to counter this emerging threat need to be accelerated to
    field a cruise missile defense (CMD) capability as soon as possible.
    The Army's CMD program is an integral piece of the Joint Cruise Missile
    Defense architecture, and we are proud of our contributions to this
    effort. Critical Army components of the Joint CMD architecture are
    provided by the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated
    Netted Sensor (JLENS), the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-
    to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM), and an integrated fire control capability.
    We are also working closely with the Joint community to assure
    development of doctrine that synchronizes our military's full
    capabilities against the cruise missile threat.
    JLENS Overview
        JLENS brings a critically needed capability to address the growing
    CM threat. To support an elevated sensor, the JLENS program is
    developing unique lightweight fire control and surveillance radars to
    detect, track, and identify CM threats. JLENS will support engagements
    using the SLAMRAAM/Complementary Low Altitude Weapon System (SLAMRAAM/
    CLAWS), Navy Standard Missile, and Patriot/MEADS weapon systems. JLENS
    uses advanced sensor and networking technologies to provide precision
    tracking and 360-degree wide-area, over-the-horizon surveillance of
    land-attack cruise missiles. The fiscal year 2007 JLENS funding request
    of $264.5 million supports development of a full JLENS capability, with
    the first unit equipped by 2011.
    SLAMRAAM Overview
        SLAMRAAM will provide a CMD system to maneuver forces with an
    extended battlespace and a beyond line-of-sight, non-line-of-sight
    engagement capability critical to countering the CM threat, as well as
    UAV threats. SLAMRAAM uses the existing Joint AMRAAM missile currently
    used by the Air Force and the Navy, thereby capitalizing on the Joint
    harmony that the Department of Defense (DOD) is striving to achieve.
    The Army and the Marine Corps are also executing a joint cooperative
    development for SLAMRAAM/CLAWS to meet the needs of soldiers and
    marines in homeland defense as well as overseas deployments. The fiscal
    year 2007 funding request of $49 million supports the scheduled Initial
    Operational Capability (IOC) target of 2011.
    Sentinel Radar Overview
        The Sentinel Radar is an advanced, three-dimensional, phased array
    air defense radar and a critical component in the Army's ability to
    conduct air surveillance for the maneuver force. Sentinel is a small,
    mobile battlefield radar that supports the joint air defense sensor
    network in detecting cruise missiles, UAVs, and helicopter threats,
    thereby contributing directly to the overall Single Integrated Air
    Picture (SIAP) and supporting multiple Homeland Defense missions. Its
    Enhanced Target Range and Classification (ETRAC) radar upgrades will
    enable it to support engagements at extended ranges and reduce the time
    required to perform target classification. Additionally, these upgrades
    support next generation combat identification for friendly air, thereby
    reducing the possibility of fratricide and providing an enhanced
    positive friendly and civil aviation identification capability. The
    fiscal year 2007 funding request of $17.6 million provides for joint
    identification and composite sensor netting development efforts, four
    ETRAC system upgrade kits, and development and integration of
    improvements to support joint interoperability.

              AIR, SPACE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL

        The Army is increasing its command and control capabilities on the
    battlefield. The Army's Air and Missile Defense Commands (AAMDCs) will
    help integrate TAMD operations, by integrating, coordinating, and
    synchronizing Joint attack operations, active defense, passive defense,
    and C4 operations in the theater, and also globally tie into our JFCC-
    IMD.
        Concurrent with the creation of AMD composite battalions, the Army
    has developed, and is now in the process of fielding, air defense
    airspace management (ADAM) cells throughout the force. ADAM cells will
    perform four missions: plan AMD coverage, contribute to third-dimension
    situation awareness and understanding, provide airspace management, and
    integrate operational protection. With an emphasis on receiving and
    sharing the joint air picture from multiple sources and assets through
    the battle command network, ADAM cells will provide commanders with
    situational awareness as well as the traditional friendly and threat
    air picture, enabling commanders to effectively manage their aerial
    assets. ADAM cells are already being fielded to the Army to meet
    modularity requirements, with two ADAM cells at the division
    headquarters and one to every brigade in the Army, to include both the
    Active and Reserve Forces. This high-priority system has been supported
    through supplemental appropriations to this point. The fiscal year 2007
    funding request of $49.5 million provides 15 ADAM Cells for the Active
    and Reserve components.
        Also in the past year, the Army activated the 94th Air and Missile
    Defense Command, supporting the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) theater of
    operations. With the 94th AAMDC activation, there are three Army AMD
    Commands; two in the active component and one in the Reserve component.
    The 94th AAMDC, designed for joint and multinational operations, will
    provide for missile defense in the Pacific theater and will assist in
    planning theater-level air and missile defenses. The 94th AAMDC will
    provide the PACOM commander with a more robust theater-based
    capability. Moreover, the unit's presence in the Pacific adds depth,
    because its capability will be readily available to the warfighting
    commander.
        The Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS), forward deployed today
    in European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and PACOM, are
    providing assured missile warnings to combatant commanders and assigned
    forces through a direct downlink from space-based infrared assets into
    the joint theater communications architecture. In addition to
    protecting the deployed force, these systems alert the BMDS
    architecture and enhance attack operations. The fiscal year 2007
    funding request of $24.9 million sustains the forward deployed JTAGS
    units supporting joint warfighters and postures the Army to participate
    with the Air Force in a future ground mobile system compatible with the
    Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and follow-on sensors. The planned
    Multiple Mission Mobile Processor (MP3) Program is being restructured
    due to the delays in the SBIRS schedule.

                   COUNTER-ROCKET, ARTILLERY, MORTAR (C-RAM)

        A significant danger in OIF/OEF today is posed by insurgents
    employing indirect-fire tactics of quick-attack, low-trajectory, urban-
    terrain-masked rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) strikes against U.S.
    forward operating bases in Iraq. To combat this threat, the Army
    developed C-RAM, an integrated solution of capabilities to provide
    warning and intercept of RAM threats. C-RAM provides a holistic
    approach to the Counter-RAM mission. Horizontal integration across the
    core functions--command and control, shape, sense, warn, intercept,
    respond and protect--is providing an integrated modular and scalable
    capability. This capability provides timely warning of mortar attacks,
    intercept and defeat of incoming rounds, and accurate location of
    insurgent mortar crews, enabling a rapid, lethal response. C-RAM takes
    advantage of existing systems and capabilities, combining them in a SoS
    architecture to support the warfighter on today's battlefield. The
    current C-RAM solution is truly joint, in that it uses fielded systems
    from the Army, Navy and Air Force along with a commercial-off-the-shelf
    (COTS) system. C-RAM has been supported through supplemental
    appropriations. The Army will request funding for continued C-RAM
    fielding in the upcoming supplemental request, and the C-RAM program
    will be included in the Army's POM beginning in fiscal year 2008.

                          DIRECTED ENERGY INITIATIVES

        The Army continues to explore directed energy capabilities for
    weapon system development and integration into Army Transformation
    applications. High Energy Laser (HEL) systems have the potential of
    being combat multipliers, meeting air and missile defense needs in the
    future and enhancing current force capabilities, such as addressing the
    RAM threats. The ability of a HEL system to shoot down RAM targets has
    been repeatedly demonstrated, with mature chemical laser technologies
    proven by the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program.
        Meanwhile, the Army's fiscal year 2007 science and technology
    funding request of $32.8 million supports HEL technology development
    focused on solid state laser technologies that will offer electric
    operation and compatibility with the Future Combat System (FCS) by the
    year 2018. The Army is participating in a Joint high-powered solid
    state laser program with the Office of the Secretary of Defense High
    Energy Laser Joint Technology Office and the other Services to pursue
    several candidate solid state laser technologies with the operating
    characteristics necessary for weapon system development. In fiscal year
    2007, while leveraging the Joint program, the Army is initiating a HEL
    Technology Demonstrator (HELTD) that will, by fiscal year 2013, have
    the ability to shoot down RAM threats as a stepping stone toward
    deployment of HELs in a FCS configuration. Ultimately, HELs are
    expected to complement conventional offensive and defensive weapons at
    a lower cost-per-shot than current systems.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman, the Army, a full contributing member of the Joint
    team, is relevant and ready, fighting the war on terrorism, deployed in
    Southwest Asia and elsewhere, and deterring aggression throughout the
    world, while transforming to meet future threats. With its
    responsibilities for GMD and Patriot/MEADS, the Army is an integral
    part of the Joint team to develop and field the BMDS in defense of the
    Nation, deployed forces, friends, and allies. In my role as the Joint
    Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile Defense, I will
    continue the development of a Joint BMDS capability to protect our
    warfighters and our Nation. The Army has stepped up to the land-attack
    cruise missile defense challenge by aggressively developing the joint,
    integrated, and networked sensor-to-shooter architecture necessary to
    defeat the emerging threat. The fiscal year 2007 budget proposal
    continues the transformation of the Army's ASMD Force to support the
    Army's Future Force, the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
    System, and our global BMDS, building on the ongoing success of our
    theater AMD force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Transformation will
    continue to define the characteristics of the emerging ASMD force and
    determine how it can best support the Future Force operating in a
    joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
        I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
    matters and look forward to addressing any questions you or the other
    committee members may have.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, General Dodgen.
        Mr. Duma, you are responsible for the testing of the
    program. We are delighted to hear your remarks at this time,
    and we will make your full remarks a part of the record.

     STATEMENT OF DAVID W. DUMA, ACTING DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST
                 AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Duma. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Chairman, distinguished
    members of the subcommittee, I'm pleased to have this
    opportunity to speak with you about the BMDS test program.
        As requested by this committee, I will offer my insights on
    oversight, development, testing, and fielding of BMDs. In doing
    so, I will cover four areas.
        First, I will recap the MDA test accomplishments during the
    past year; second, I will discuss the organization and test
    philosophy changes within the MDA; third, I will give you a
    status of compliance with test requirements prescribed in the
    recent National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA); and fourth,
    I will highlight future challenges facing the test program of
    the BMDS.
        First, the results. The MDA testing program during 2005 was
    adequate and appropriate to the developmental maturity of the
    BMDS. The results of ground tests demonstrated that integration
    into operability, tactics, doctrine, and procedures were
    adequate to increase confidence in those aspects of the system.
    For the first time, MDA successfully flew an operationally
    configured combination of a Raytheon Exoatmospheric Kill
    Vehicle, integrated onto an Orbital Sciences booster. The
    successful flight test of threat-representative targets across
    both the Cobra Dane and Beale Early Warning Radars demonstrated
    the capability to provide target acquisition, tracking, and
    queuing data. This test provided significant information
    regarding the Cobra Dane capabilities and limitations. The
    Aegis BMDS successfully completed two intercept missions with
    the new SM-3 missile. One of these flights included the
    intercept of a separating target. The ABL completed the passive
    phase of flight test of the Beam Control/Fire Control system,
    and completed the integration and operational demonstration of
    six Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser modules.
        The THAAD executed its FT-1 in 5 years, it flew its
    redesigned missile on a non-intercept test to measure
    interceptor kinematics and demonstrate performance.
        Last year, the Forward-Based X-Band Radar Transportable
    (FBX-T) demonstrated its ability to track long-range ballistic
    missile launches. The Sea-Based X-Band Radar completed
    integration testing in the Gulf of Mexico, and has arrived in
    Hawaii to begin its checkout and integration into the BMDS test
    bed.
        Overall, the results of the integrated ground test, coupled
    with the success of other element-level ground and flight test
    events, indicate the BMDS system is maturing.
        Second, the approach. The Department is changing the
    oversight structure of the BMDS. A BMD Executive Board will
    replace the Senior Executive Council as the senior oversight
    body for missile defense activities. The board will review and
    make recommendations regarding the implementation of strategic
    policies and plans, program priorities, and investment options.
    In this new oversight structure, I am a member of that board.
        In addition, General Obering implemented several changes in
    organization and test philosophy during the past year. These
    changes more tightly integrate the developers, warfighters, and
    operational testers and should better integrate the system
    engineering functions with the test and evaluation functions
    within MDA. They will also address efforts to address priority
    items, such as validation and accreditation of models and
    simulations.
        Third, the NDAAs--over the last 2 years, Congress has asked
    MDA and my office to accomplish several specific initiatives
    with regard to operational testing of the BMDS. The NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2004 required operationally realistic testing of
    the BMDS. This past year, MDA conducted numerous ground tests,
    war games, and capability demonstrations using trained
    warfighters to operate the systems. Incorporating trained
    warfighters into the testing program is added to the
    operational understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and
    maturity of the BMDS. In fiscal year 2005, Congress required
    the MDA to conduct an operationally realistic test of the BMDS.
    Following two launch failures of the GMD system, and
    recommendations from two independent review teams, General
    Obering restructured the flight test program. The restructured
    program includes two more risk-reduction flights--if they are
    successful, General Obering plans to conduct operationally
    realistic flight tests in fiscal year 2007.
        In fiscal year 2006 language, Congress required the
    operational test community to plan and conduct an operational
    test of the capability provided by each block of the BMDS,
    beginning with Block 2006. Toward this effort, MDA, the Joint
    Operational Test Agency, and my office will develop an
    integrated, evaluation-driven test strategy. This approach
    should increase the quantity and quality of data, while
    increasing the efficiencies of test resources. When the
    evaluation plan is finished, MDA will include these tests in
    the next revision to the Integrated Master Test Plan.
        Fourth, the challenges. The complexity of the BMDS is
    increasing, and testing the BMDS is becoming more challenging
    as the Agency adds elements and capability. Testers must assess
    performance and reliability during concurrent tests and
    operations of a layered BMDS. Integration of the BMDS elements
    and sensors that are still maturing, with operational legacy
    systems is a difficult task. Fusing the data from each element
    into a single, unambiguous operational picture is a significant
    software development, integration, and testing challenge. Range
    safety and environmental restrictions limit intercept
    geometries to only a few scenarios. Meeting each of these
    challenges requires a series of well-planned ground and flights
    tests.
        Over the long term, MDA should incrementally develop a
    capability to support concurrent testing and operations,
    including simulation over live testing to speed up the process.
    This is similar to how we upgraded and tested the Cheyenne
    Mountain without interfering with operations. When developed,
    this capability will augment the capability for system tests
    and evaluation to characterize operational effectiveness and
    suitability, using actual hardware and warfighters in the loop.
        Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, MDA experienced a difficult
    year with its GMD system, but ended the year on several high
    notes. Element successes indicate they are progressing toward
    maturity. Last year, warfighters demonstrated that they could
    operate the integrated ground system. The fact remains,
    however, that we ground test for discovery, but we must flight
    test to verify operational performance and validate
    simulations. Successful flight tests with repeatable results
    are the cornerstones for building confidence in the BMDS.
    Warfighters must have confidence that the system will defend on
    demand.
        Senator, this concludes my opening remarks, and I welcome
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Duma follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by David W. Duma

        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
    pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you about the Ballistic
    Missile Defense System (BMDS) test program. As requested by this
    committee, I will offer my insights on oversight, development, testing,
    and fielding of ballistic missile defenses. In doing so, I will address
    progress toward fielding those capabilities mentioned for deployment by
    the President in 2002, including ground-based interceptors, seabased
    interceptors, and associated sensors. I will cover four areas. First, I
    will recap the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) test accomplishments during
    the past year. Second, I will discuss organization and test philosophy
    changes within MDA. Third, I will give you a status of compliance with
    test requirements prescribed in recent National Defense Authorization
    Acts (NDAA). Fourth, I will highlight future challenges facing the test
    program of the BMDS.
        The MDA testing program during 2005 was adequate and appropriate to
    the developmental maturity of the BMDS.

              1. The results of ground tests demonstrated that integration,
            interoperability, tactics, doctrine, and procedures were
            adequate to increase confidence in these aspects of the system.
              2. For the first time, MDA successfully flew an operationally
            configured combination of a Raytheon Exoatmospheric Kill
            Vehicle integrated onto an Orbital Sciences booster. While the
            flight was successful, it did not evaluate the fixes to the
            ground support system that caused the previous flight test
            launch failures. Plans are to demonstrate the ground system
            fixes in subsequent flight-testing.
              3. The successful flight of threat representative targets
            across both the Cobra Dane and Beale Early Warning Radars
            search and track volume demonstrated the capability to provide
            target acquisition, tracking, and cuing data. MDA executed an
            operationally realistic test scenario that provided significant
            information regarding the Cobra Dane capabilities and
            limitations. MDA also demonstrated they could successfully
            launch a long-range threat representative target from an air
            platform.
              4. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System successfully
            completed two intercept missions with the new SM-3 missile. One
            of these flights included an intercept of a separating target.
              5. The Airborne Laser completed the passive phase of flight
            test of the Beam Control/Fire Control system, and completed the
            integration and operational demonstration of six integrated
            Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser modules.
              6. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system
            successfully executed its first flight test in 5 years. It flew
            its redesigned missile on a nonintercept test to measure
            interceptor kinematics and demonstrate performance.
              7. Last year, two new sensors completed integration and some
            combined developmental and operational testing. The Forward-
            Based X-band Radar-Transportable (FBX-T) demonstrated its
            ability to track long-range ballistic missile launches. The
            SeaBased X-band radar completed integration testing in the Gulf
            of Mexico and has arrived in Hawaii to begin its checkout and
            integration into the BMDS test bed.

        The results of the integrated ground tests, coupled with the
    success of other element-level ground and flight test events, indicate
    the BMDS is maturing.
        The Department of Defense (DOD) is changing the oversight structure
    of the BMDS. A Ballistic Missile Defense Executive Board will replace
    the Senior Executive Council as the senior oversight body for missile
    defense activities. It will not have the decision authority of the
    Senior Executive Council, however. The board will review and make
    recommendations regarding the implementation of strategic policies and
    plans, program priorities, and investment options. This change
    implements management and governance principles set for the in the
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In this new oversight structure, I am
    a member of the board. My Deputy for Missile Defense will co-chair the
    Test and Evaluation Standing Committee.
        In addition, General Obering implemented several changes in
    organization and test philosophy during the past year. These changes
    more tightly integrate the developers, warfighters, and operational
    testers. They should also better integrate the system engineering
    functions with the test and evaluation functions within MDA. These
    changes, coupled with improvements in test planning, execution, and
    analyses, should result in better definition of data requirements and
    better, more efficient test execution.
        As part of re-engineering his agency, General Obering established
    the Responsible Test Organization and Combined Test Force under the
    leadership and direction of his Deputy for Test and Assessment. The
    Combined Test Force will plan and execute tests, and collect and
    analyze data that will populate a database to support the technical and
    operational evaluations of BMDS performance. The Combined Test Force
    will include test personnel from each of the BMDS elements and the
    Operational Test Agencies.
        With the support of General Obering, I have commissioned the
    Institute for Defense Analyses to examine and recommend a construct
    that integrates the operational testers into the Combined Test Force.
    The goal is to maintain the operational testers' independence and
    credibility while economizing resources, eliminating duplication of
    effort, and supporting Combined Test Force mission and objectives.
    General Obering and I have also asked the Institute to investigate and
    recommend how to best integrate each stakeholder's assessment needs
    into the test planning, execution, data collection, analysis, and
    evaluation processes. This should further streamline the test and
    evaluation planning and execution process, while ensuring all
    stakeholders efficiently and effectively meet their objectives.
        Along with these organizational changes, MOA and the operational
    test community have agreed on an integrated test planning approach for
    future BMOS Blocks that supplements the Integrated Master Test Plan.
    The current Integrated Master Test Plan covers the next 2 years of
    testing and emphasizes BMOS testing that is operationally realistic.
    Beginning with Block 2006, MDA, the joint operational test agency, and
    my office will develop an integrated, ``evaluation-driven'' test plan.
    This test planning philosophy brings discipline and structure to
    planning Block testing based upon overall system evaluation needs,
    while concurrently addressing individual element test requirements.
    This approach should increase the quantity and quality of data while
    increasing the efficient use of test resources. It will also enhance
    efforts to address priority issues, such as verification, validation,
    and accreditation of models and simulations.
        Over the last few years, Congress has asked MDA and my office to
    accomplish several specific initiatives with regard to operational
    testing of the BMDS. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004 required
    operationally realistic testing of the BMDS. This past year, MDA
    conducted numerous ground tests, war games, and capability
    demonstrations using trained warfighters to operate the systems. These
    exercises included fully integrated ground and simulated missions
    designed by the operational testers and warfighters. This year's update
    to the Integrated Master Test Plan incorporates greater operational
    realism in the areas of increased warfighter involvement in flight
    tests; more end-to-end system testing; use of operationally
    representative missiles; employment of operational tactics, techniques,
    and procedures; and inclusion of more complex countermeasures.
    Incorporating trained warfighters into the testing program has added to
    the operational understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and
    maturity of the BMDS.
        In fiscal year 2005, Congress required the MDA to conduct a
    realistic operational test of the BMDS. Following two launch failures
    in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and recommendations from
    two independent review teams, General Obering restructured the flight
    test program. Flight-testing to date has not yet reduced the risk to
    the point where General Obering is ready to execute an operationally
    realistic flight test. The restructured program includes two more risk
    reduction flights. If they are successful, General Obering plans to
    conduct an operationally realistic flight test later this year.
        In fiscal year 2006, Congress required the operational test
    community to plan and conduct an operational test of the capability
    provided by each block of the BMDS beginning with Block 2006. I have
    taken action to begin this effort involving not only the operational
    test community, but also the warfighters and MDA. When the evaluation
    plan is finished, MDA will include these tests in the next revision of
    the Integrated Master Test Plan.
        The complexity of the BMDS is increasing. Elements are maturing and
    being integrated into the system. Consequently, testing the BMDS is
    becoming more challenging as the MDA adds elements and capability.
    Testers must assess performance and reliability during concurrent test
    and operations of a layered BMDS. Integration of the BMDS elements and
    sensors that are still maturing with operational legacy systems is a
    difficult task. Fusing the data that each element provides into a
    single, unambiguous operational picture is a significant software
    development, integration, and testing challenge. Range safety and
    environmental restrictions limit intercept geometries to only a few
    scenarios. Meeting each of these challenges is a big task--one that
    requires a series of well-planned ground and flight tests.
        Over the long term, MDA should incrementally develop a capability
    to support concurrent testing and operations, including simulation over
    live testing, to speed up the process. This is similar to how we
    upgraded and tested Cheyenne Mountain without interfering with
    operations. When developed, this capability will provide an alternative
    means for system test and evaluation to characterize operational
    effectiveness and suitability using actual hardware and warfighters in
    the loop.
        Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, MDA experienced a difficult year with
    its Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, but ended the year on
    several high notes. Element successes indicate they are progressing
    toward maturity. Last year, warfighters demonstrated they could operate
    the integrated ground system. The fact remains, however, that we ground
    test for discovery, but we must flight test to verify operational
    performance and validate simulations. Successful flight tests are the
    cornerstones for building confidence in the BMDS. Warfighters must have
    confidence the system will defend on demand.
        This concludes my opening remarks and I welcome your questions.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Duma. I will yield my time
    here to Senator Roberts, chairman of the Senate Select
    Committee on Intelligence, and a valuable member of our
    committee.
        Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, that's very kind of you.
        Gentlemen, we thank you all for the service you are
    providing to protect our country, we ask you to persevere.
    Thank you for taking the time out of your very valuable
    schedule to come before us, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
    holding this extremely valuable subcommittee meeting.
        The scene was the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee--Mr. Chairman, it was before September 11--and we
    had a very prestigious panel, I think Jean Kirkpatrick was one,
    I'm trying to remember the others, and I asked them on emerging
    threats, as this was prior to September 11 you have to
    remember, ``what keeps you up at night?`` Of course, everybody
    was concerned after the U.S.S. Cole, and after the embassy
    bombings, and after the 1993 attempt on the World Trade Center
    about the attack on the Homeland. It was Jean Kirkpatrick who
    said ``access denial,'' in other words that a person who has a
    ballistic missile, or a person who has an intercontinental
    missile could basically tell the world, ``We have certain
    national objectives,''
        I think Iran would be a classic example, ``that if you
    cross into our territory, there will be hell to pay.'' Access
    denial was a big issue with me at that particular time,
    especially since Secretary Flory, you indicated now 25
    countries have that capability, and we're somewhere between 5
    and 9 and growing. In regards to an ICBM, when you get a guy
    like Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran, saying what he says--
    which is rather incredulous to the western press--I think you
    have to take it seriously, I think we have a real problem.
        Now given that, General Obering, in regards to access
    denial and what we can do about it, I would like to start with
    the topic you and I have discussed, and that's the continued
    development of the ABL. Last year the MDA did decimate the
    ABLS, the primary boost phase system. What does it mean when
    the ABL is the primary boost phase interceptor?
        General Obering. Senator, what that means is that from a
    flexibility perspective, the ABL can address multiple ranges of
    missiles with that capability, that's very revolutionary
    capability. From operational standoff distances, that is an
    advantage that it has over the KEI, which is our other boost
    phase alternative, and so from a flexibility standpoint, it has
    the most capability overall. Also, it had demonstrated two
    basic technical capabilities to operate, otherwise it had
    achieved the full duration lase, it had reached an operational
    power setting, we had gotten the initial beam control/fire
    control flights on the aircraft, and so we felt like it was
    making sufficient technical progress based on the knowledge
    points we had designed for the system, that had become that
    candidate. The KEI, which was the alternative, was originated
    based on a Defense Science Board 2002 recommendation as an
    alternative for that.
        Senator Roberts. So you would still say the ABL is
    considered the primary boost phase interceptor?
        General Obering. Yes, I haven't changed from that.
        Senator Roberts. All right. Over the last couple of years,
    the ABL has met every major milestone, as you've indicated,
    you've tested many. But I sort of browbeat the chairman into
    letting you say, were the knowledge points scheduled, including
    the combining lasing power for all six laser modules extensive
    post-modification flight test and testing the laser at near
    full power, and your answer is yes, this is the case. I think
    I'm putting words in your mouth. Do you have any reason to
    believe the ABL will not continue to reach the scheduled
    milestone toward the knowledge points, up to and including the
    lethal shoot down in 2008?
        General Obering. At this time, no, sir, they are making
    steady progress through the installation of the lasers, and the
    preparation of the aircraft for the series of active ground
    tests that will start this summer and the flight tests in the
    fall. Having said that, we still have an awful lot of work to
    do, there are still some major integration challenges. There's
    two things that catch my attention when somebody says, ``Well,
    we're just re-using software,'' and ``all it is is
    integration,'' both of those should raise red flags. It's not
    that we have many red flags to raise, but we have a lot of
    integration activities to continue in that program, so I
    believe that there is still some, I would say, not uncertainty,
    but certainly. I think we have a lot of work ahead of us, and I
    wanted to make sure that we were able to take full advantage of
    the test schedule and the test program we've laid out for the
    next 2 years. That is why, in our budget, we deferred the
    purchase of the second aircraft.
        Senator Roberts. Wow, let's not throw any red flags, I
    don't like referees anyway. I'm concerned with the MDA's
    decision to delay funding on the second aircraft. That's going
    to have the effect of moving the shoot down for the second
    aircraft and the program out to 2018. Now, if you go from 2008
    to 2018, and then you look back at what your predictions are in
    regard to what our adversaries have, that's very disconcerting
    to me. If you have a 10-year delay from 2008, I don't know what
    we'd do with the highly-skilled engineers we have working on
    the first plane. There is going to be a dip in regards to that
    kind of expertise, there's going to be--I think--some cost,
    certainly, associated with reconstituting this workforce once
    development of the second plane picks up after the shoot down
    in 2008, we have sort of a one-shot Suzy. That was a
    firecracker that I used to set off back in my days when I was
    from a small town in Kansas, I don't want a one-shot Suzy, I
    want a sure-shot, two-shot Suzy if, in fact, that is what we're
    talking about. I know that you must defend the President's
    budget request, but would you be pleased, sir, to have any
    additional funds in the fiscal year 2007 budget to pull the ABL
    second aircraft schedule back to the left?
        General Obering. Sir, I would.
        Senator Roberts. Could you give the answer yes?
        General Obering. I would never turn down offers of
    additional funds. What we would do is try to buy back some of
    the risk that I think we still have laying ahead of us in the
    program, if that were the case. But I do share your concern
    with respect to the schedule. On the other hand, I want to make
    sure that we have allowed ourselves enough time to do a design
    turn on the aircraft. So a lot of those engineers you referred
    to will be fully employed, working on that design turn in that
    interim timeframe that we just discussed.
        Senator Roberts. I thank you for your time, and I thank you
    for your support. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Roberts. Senator Reed,
    we appreciate you and your leadership, and your interest in
    these important issues.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, thank you
    gentlemen, for your testimony.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to see if I can put in context one of
    your comments in your prepared testimony where you say the
    prospect of long-range missiles in the hands of North Korea
    means that for the first time, the American people, too, would
    be in harm's way. Aren't we forgetting the Soviet Union and the
    People's Republic of Chine in terms of having ICBMs with
    nuclear capacities that put the country at risk?
        Mr. Flory. Mr. Chairman, I don't have in front of me the
    draft prepared testimony I submitted, if it was not clear than
    the point would be, for the first time in a situation involving
    North Korea that the American people would be at risk from
    attack by North Korea.
        Senator Reed. Okay, but essentially we've had several
    decades in which we've had to wrestle with the very existential
    threat from long-range missiles with nuclear warheads?
        Mr. Flory. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. General Obering, the Mission
    Readiness Task Force (MRTF) proposed and accepted and scheduled
    a new test plan, and scheduled to get the GMD program back on
    track, and frankly for many who were looking at the program, it
    looked until this reevaluation as a rush to failure, rushing
    through the gate very quickly. The proposal that the MRTF
    recommended was to ground test and flight test over the course
    of 1 year. The first two tests were intended to have no
    targets, but to test the interceptor-related portions of the
    system, first on Kwajalein and then from an operational site at
    Vandenberg Air Force Base. Only with the third test did the
    MRTF propose using a target, an outgoing intercept test instead
    of demonstrating the ability of the intercept to define and
    characterize the target, and only after all of these steps had
    been successfully accomplished did the MRTF propose to attempt
    to achieve an actual intercept in its tests.
        Now MDA plans to build a target into the second test,
    contrary to the MRTF plan, and to program the interceptor to
    hit the target. Even though it is not being called an objective
    of that test, as such, MDA is planning to track or intercept
    three tests earlier than recommended by the MRTF. Why aren't
    you adhering to the MRTF plan that you and DOD originally
    agreed to, and again, in the context of I think a fundamental
    attempt to reshape the program because of this tendency to rush
    forward and fail?
        General Obering. Okay, well there's a lot there, Senator,
    let me back up if I could. First of all, we lay out and we
    execute our testing based on results, and so what the MRTF
    recommended is exactly what you describe, which we began to
    execute. We got to our FT-1, and we actually had so much
    success with that FT-1 with a kill vehicle flight, it actually
    achieved many of the objectives we had slated for the second
    flight test that the MRTF had recommended. Because of that
    tremendous performance in the kill vehicle, we also went back,
    we conferred and consulted with the MRTF and they agreed as
    well that it was prudent to add a target to the second flight
    test because of the success we had on the first one.
        We are working very systematically through our ground
    tests, as you said, we've had successful static fires of the
    first stage, we've had additional qualification tests of the
    vehicle and so we're gaining more and more confidence as we go
    along. I feel comfortable that where we are right now in the
    test profile is about where we should be. We will accelerate
    and we will delay based upon the results as we go through. I
    wouldn't describe it as a rush to failure, what I would
    describe it as, as Secretary Flory pointed out, there is an
    urgency out there that we have to get a capability.
        I believe that we are moving ahead prudently, based on test
    results that we have seen to date. We flew intercepts
    successfully in 2001, with a prototype of the kill vehicle, and
    we actually flew successful flights of the operational booster
    that we have on the ground today in 2003 and that gave us the
    confidence to begin this initial deployment.
        Now one of the things the MRTF did cite is that we have
    become in some areas more schedule driven than we should be and
    that is why we took steps to adjust, that was not in any top-
    down direction, though, that was all in how we were actually
    implementing the program. I believe, as many would agree, that
    the most expeditious schedule would be one in which you have
    good quality control built in so that it's easier, and it's
    always faster to do it right the first time than to have to do
    it over and over again.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General. One of the points you
    make is that you have to learn from each test, and for example,
    the FT-2 test would be the first launch from Vandenberg, and
    that's been skipped, essentially.
        General Obering. No, sir. We actually have launched the
    booster from Vandenberg before, now what we haven't done is
    launched an interceptor with a kill vehicle from Vandenberg,
    and this will be the first time that we do that, in the FT-2
    that is coming up, and we will have a target from Alaska
    involved in this series. We still have a lot to learn, I'll
    grant that, in terms of overall, but we feel like we're at a
    pretty good level right now, in terms of our confidence and its
    performance.
        Senator Reed. One of the points that the MRTF made is that
    the flight test program can be broken down into specific
    pieces, and you can incorporate specific aspects to test out,
    but there's an overarching consideration that is getting to
    reliability and repeatability of these tests. So there's a
    logic to just having lots of tests, because if you can create
    an effect in one test, if you don't do it a second time then
    you might not be able to duplicate that, and that is one of the
    concerns I have is as you decide to just skip from these
    recommended tests, that you lose a little bit of that notion of
    repetitive reliability, and being able to do it again and
    again.
        General Obering. Yes, sir. Let me describe why we moved to
    Vandenberg to start with. We have flown the interceptor
    successfully out of Kwajalein, and as I said, that flight was
    so successful, we felt that we had achieved not only all of the
    technical objectives for that flight, but many of the original
    flight tests, too, as well.
        Senator Reed. Can I interject, because my time is almost
    up. Just for clarification, these were several tests that were
    different items, the previous tests had failed because I
    believe a fixture did not release the interceptor?
        General Obering. That was one of them, there was a software
    timing issue on the booster that was a fairly rare occurrence,
    and there was a support arm that failed to clear out of
    Kwajelein.
        Senator Reed. But in the test you're describing now, the
    support arm was illuminated, I believe.
        General Obering. In the FT-1, yes, sir, by design, because
    we're redesigning that ground support arm. The MRTF again
    recommended and we concurred, that it could be delayed because
    it is not considered a high-risk item.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General, and I hope we have a
    second round, Mr. Chairman, because I have additional
    questions. Again, thank you for your responses.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Secretary Flory, you talked about how the President
    directed the DOD to end what had been decades of research and
    development (R&D) to actually field an initial set of
    capabilities by the end of 2004. I remember we had a full
    discussion in the Senate in the late 1990s over that, and we
    passed the Cochran-Lieberman resolution to direct that we
    deploy as soon as practical, an MDS. Some observers directed
    that with nine GBIs now fielded, we should delay the deployment
    of additional GBIs until further operationally realistic
    testing has been completed. Based on your assessment of the
    threats, and we've heard others express comments about that
    today--would you share with us your concerns about delaying
    further deployment of GBI? I think this is a fundamental
    question and is a part of our whole funding process here. What
    is our evaluation of the threat, and what are our opportunities
    for deployment?
        Mr. Flory. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say, with
    respect to stopping where we are, General Obering and Mr. Duma
    and General Dodgen have laid out in detail how the program is
    being managed, and the extensive testing and other measures
    that are being employed to ensure an increase in reliability of
    the system. I think we see a threat that is increasing, not
    decreasing. I think it's very unlikely that if we held off on
    deploying future interceptors that any of our adversaries would
    hold off on doing the things that are giving us concern, or as
    Senator Roberts said, keeping us awake at night.
        I think one particularly important point and I can just add
    to what I responded to Senator Reed earlier, it is true that
    for decades there was no MDS over the United States, and that
    at that time the Soviet Union and later, the People's Republic
    of China, had missile systems that could threaten the United
    States. What we did not have was regimes like the North Korean
    regime or the Iranian regime and, particularly, the new
    president of Iran, Ahmadinejad, who would eventually have
    control over weapons of this type.
        Senator Sessions. General Obering, briefly if we were to
    delay the production and deployment from the numbers we are now
    scheduled to carry out, that has a danger of increased cost
    from breaking the assembly line?
        General Obering. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Are there costs out there for delays
    also?
        General Obering. Yes, sir, and those typically can run as
    many as the equivalent of four or five interceptors in terms of
    those delay costs. But your point is a very, very good one, and
    it is one that I think we need to reinforce more and more, and
    that is we're not dealing in what we can put out the door
    today. We're dealing with what we can get out the door in the
    future--in 2 years from now, in 3 years from now, and so the
    pace that we're on, the test program we're on, the aggressive
    testing we're doing, I think will continue to support that type
    of deployment and that type of fielding in order to make sure
    that we have done as much as we possibly can do with the
    knowledge points that we have, and the money that we have to
    get the maximum capability that we can, and I think that we're
    on about the optimum balance in doing that right now.
        Senator Sessions. I think it is fair to say that we have a
    low production rate, we can't go much lower without shutting
    down the production system. Keeping at that system, in the long
    run, is going to provide us the missiles we need for our
    defense, and also keep costs per missile down.
        General Dodgen, do you believe as the combatant commander
    representative here that the delay in fielding of the GBI until
    more operationally realistic testing has occurred is a good
    idea?
        General Dodgen. Mr. Chairman, I do not think that's a good
    idea, I think where we are right now with the numbers of
    interceptors we have, our operationalizing of the system, our
    firing doctrine is more dictated by a limited inventory than it
    is by the effectiveness. We need two things to happen, and I
    think they're phased pretty well, we need the end-to-end test
    which MDA is planning for later this year, to narrow our
    uncertainty in the system, and then we need the increased
    number of interceptors to come on board, so we can start
    developing our firing doctrine to take full effect of those
    interceptors and achieve the desired kill effect that we want,
    as opposed to being limited by our inventory. Those things, I
    think, are pretty well synched up, so any delay of one would
    cause us not to be where we want to be.
        Senator Sessions. What are you hearing from the combatant
    commanders with regard to their concern about the threats
    they're facing, and the need for this system?
        General Dodgen. Senator, they've all been here and spoken
    for themselves, but I would tell you that when I think of both
    North Korea and Iran, I think there is great concern that they
    will need defensive capability for their own theaters, and it
    will have a part to play in the defense of their homelands, and
    I think there's great concern on their part, and that's very
    much reflected by the fact that there's still a considerable
    Patriot force that is stationed overseas.
        Senator Sessions. What about the status of Patriots and SM-
    3 production, are we keeping pace with the needs there? Does
    this budget keep us on track, or do we need to do more?
        General Dodgen. We are comfortable, we have asked for 108
    PAC-3 missiles, we're comfortable with that, because that is
    complimented by PAC-2 gems, so we have a mix of missiles that
    gives us a robust number on the terminal force, and we will
    begin to build up PAC-3s in the out years. In addition to that,
    the number of PAC-3s is somewhat in the future, will be turned
    into THAAD missiles, and there will be a mix of those missiles
    when they're available.
        The SM-3 is just now starting to be operationalized, and
    we're doing a joint capability mixed study right now on future
    defense planning scenarios, both east and west to determine
    just how many sea-based missiles we have, it's a very exciting
    time, because the first time we'll be introducing a very
    capable maritime capability to the combatant commanders who are
    doing their operational concepts and concept of operations
    (CONOPs), so STRATCOM will do a joint capability mixed study,
    just to determine whether it's a mix of interceptors and
    systems we need for the future, and our thoughts are that will
    guide what we actually procure beyond where MDA is taking the
    numbers now.
        Senator Sessions. Thanks, General Dodgen.
        Senator Levin, I would recognize you.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me pick up on a
    question which Senator Reed was asking you, General Obering. It
    has to do with this FT-2, which is planned for later in the
    year. First of all, I believe it is different from the
    recommendation of your own MRTF in that there is going to be a
    real target in the test. I believe you were asked why you were
    doing that, if not, would you explain why you are not following
    the recommendation of your task force relative to that test?
        General Obering. Sir, as I told Senator Reed, we've learned
    quite a bit from the ground testing as well as the FT-1 we
    conducted. We also wanted to get ourselves into a posture where
    we could use an operational site, the operational configured
    interceptor, and operational radar at Beale. In the context, in
    the execution of the testing and because of the steps, all of
    the test results we've been able to analyze to date, it says
    that it is a prudent thing to do, and we have consulted with
    the task force in making those adjustments.
        Senator Levin. Did they agree with you after your
    consultation? They now agree with you?
        General Obering. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. Would they put that in writing? Would you
    get us their response on that?
        General Obering. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Based on assessments of the most recent Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) flight test of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) in
    December 2005, GBI ground tests, and the February 2006, flight test of
    a target across the Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) test
    results, the Mission Readiness Task Force (MRTF) concurred with the
    recommendation to add a target missile to the upcoming GMD flight test
    provided that the appropriate Military Standard 1540 (MIL-STD-1540)
    qualification tests were successfully completed prior to the mission.
    MIL-STD-1540 establishes uniform definitions, environmental criteria,
    test requirements, and test methods for space vehicles, their
    subsystems, and components.
        Key to this decision was that many of the original flight test
    objectives of the upcoming test were already accomplished during the
    highly successful December and February missions. The MRTF unanimously
    agreed that the next flight test involving a GBI demonstrate
    performance of the GBI's Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) during the
    last few seconds prior to intercept (which can only be achieved with a
    target). The MRTF members felt adding a target to the upcoming flight
    test would allow the GMD program to gain as much knowledge as possible
    prior to the first intercept attempt (scheduled to occur later this
    year depending upon the results of the upcoming GMD flight test and the
    continued GBI ground testing).
        The members of the MRTF who participated in the decision to add a
    target to the upcoming GMD flight test of a GBI were as follows:

             Brigadier General Pat O'Reilly
             Mr. Don Mitchell
             Mr. Charles A. Ordahl
             Mr. John Silverstein

        Senator Levin. As I understand it, you are going to try,
    then, to intercept the target, is that correct?
        General Obering. No, sir. It is if an intercept occurs it
    will be a by-product of it. That it is the first time we are
    flying the interceptor out of Vandenberg. We have flown a
    target across the Beale radar, we have not flown the kill
    vehicle, this version of the kill vehicle against the target as
    it relates to the radar track information we get from the Beale
    radar, so that will be the primary objective.
        Senator Levin. I know that is your primary objective, but
    is it not an objective to intercept the target?
        General Obering. No, it is not at this time.
        Senator Levin. You are putting the target out there without
    any objective to intercept it?
        General Obering. We're putting a target out there because
    we want to be able to do the tracking of the target across the
    radar, feeding that track data into the fire control system,
    getting the interceptor into place, comparing that with the
    target characterization that is seen by the interceptor, and so
    an intercept could occur, yes, sir, but that is not the primary
    objective.
        Senator Levin. Is that a secondary objective?
        General Obering. Yes, sir, it would be.
        Senator Levin. A secondary objective?
        General Obering. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. That, to me, is an objective. It may be
    secondary, but it nonetheless is an objective. I think it's
    important that we note that.
        Mr. Duma, sometimes the Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation (OT&E) is directed by Congress to certify that a
    weapons system is operationally effective. Can you certify
    today that the system that we have deployed is operationally
    effective?
        Mr. Duma. No, Senator, today I cannot do that. However,
    three tests that are upcoming for the GBS. One, as you just
    discussed, with a zero-offset fly by as the scenario, will be
    followed by two flight tests with planned intercept scenarios.
    If these three tests are successful, then I believe that we
    will have at least demonstrated the capability for the limited
    defensive operations that was discussed previously. That gives
    me some confidence that we have some repeatability, because you
    have, essentially, three very similar scenarios of increasing
    complexity.
        Senator Levin. If those tests are not successful?
        Mr. Duma. Then I would have to take a look at the test
    results. Failure would be an indicator that the system is not
    as mature as we think.
        Senator Levin. That you are not yet operationally
    effective?
        Mr. Duma. That could be an indicator, yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. Now is it possible that we are not going to
    ever be able to demonstrate operational effectiveness until
    have tests showing operational effectiveness?
        Mr. Duma. I'm sorry?
        Senator Levin. Is it possible that we are not going to be
    able to demonstrate the operational effectiveness of this
    system? Isn't that always a possibility?
        Mr. Duma. You'll never have 100 percent assurance that the
    system will work.
        Senator Levin. That is not my question. Is it possible you
    are never going to be able to certify operational
    effectiveness? Is it a possibility?
        Mr. Duma. I don't think so. I think the planned test
    program will build upon the test results and add that
    complexity so that you gain the confidence that we need to
    determine the system's operational effectiveness.
        Senator Levin. It is not possible that we will never have
    that confidence?
        Mr. Duma. As long as the program continues to develop and
    mature, we don't have that zero chance that you're asking for.
        Senator Levin. No, I'm asking whether there is a 100
    percent chance that you are going to certify that this system
    is operationally effective at some point? You're saying, yes,
    it's 100 percent chance you're going to certify this?
        Mr. Duma. I'm saying with the current program, and the test
    events scheduled, it's very likely that the system will
    demonstrate ultimately that it is effective. If those test
    results are not favorable, or the program changes direction,
    becomes unfunded and it not become a national priority anymore,
    than that's another ballgame that we're in.
        Senator Levin. Then the outcome of that ballgame would be?
        Mr. Duma. Then we wouldn't have an MDS.
        Senator Levin. We would not have an operationally effective
    MDS. It seems you're having trouble saying the words that it is
    possible that you may never be able to certify operational
    effectiveness, and it seems to me in your position, you always
    have to accept that as a possibility. It's not the goal; it may
    not be the likely outcome; but don't you have to, in your
    position, acknowledge at least the possibility that you're not
    going to be able to certify operational effectiveness of a
    system that has not gone through the test?
        Mr. Duma. Yes, I have reports I provide Congress, and if
    there are significant failures in those test reports when the
    system should be operationally effective, I can say in those
    reports that I don't believe it is operationally effective or
    suitable.
        Senator Levin. My time is expired, thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Thune?
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
    panel for being here today, and for your service to our
    country.
        General Obering, on page 3 of the MDA review, bullet five
    states, ''Proliferation continues in quantity and quality.``
    Can you comment on what trends MDA is identifying to support
    that statement, and what level of sophistication of technology
    materials are being proliferated?
        General Obering. I can comment on it in general, I can't
    get into specifics because of the classification of that. I can
    tell you that we see increasing numbers of missiles that are
    being fielded, we are seeing increasing numbers of missiles in
    development, in threat or potential countries, we see
    qualitative improvements in what we believe to be the
    performance of those weapons, and we see cooperation among many
    nations that we would consider to be threatening to the United
    States' interest. That is of enough concern, and the timing of
    those, that I do believe, as I mentioned earlier in my
    testimony, there is a sense of urgency of how we're developing
    and fielding this program.
        Senator Thune. I believe that obviously missile defense
    plays an important role in our national security, and the
    concern to me is the threat that the U.S. faces from cruise
    missiles and medium-range targets. I guess it's a broader
    question, is the U.S. prepared to identify and destroy cruise
    missiles or medium-range threats that can be transported and
    launched within close proximity to the United States?
        General Obering. Sir, I cannot comment on the cruise
    missile mission because that's not my area, but on the medium-
    range ballistic missiles (MRBM), that is a concern that we
    have. We believe that it is a very technically viable threat
    that we have to deal with. We are taking steps to provide us
    with sensor coverage to be able to meet that threat, and we are
    also fielding the interceptors that can handle that threat, and
    of course the positioning of those would be up to the
    warfighters and to the national leadership, but we certainly
    are building the tools to be able to address that.
        Senator Thune. I had the opportunity, General, not all that
    long ago, to go to Edwards and look at the ABL program, and
    obviously I think it's a platform that has great potential to
    deal with some of these threats we're talking about today. I
    know you covered some of this ground earlier with Senator
    Roberts, but if you could, I would be interested in knowing
    exactly what drove that decision and what impact that will have
    on the time line for fielding the system with a successful
    shoot down by 2008, and how does that effect the current cost
    projections on ABL?
        General Obering. Senator, first of all, the program has
    been making very good progress to the point where they achieved
    the knowledge points that we laid out for them in 2005. They
    have a very aggressive schedule over the next couple of years
    with the installation of the tracking laser, the airborne
    compensation laser and the high-energy modules themselves. We
    have a test program that gets the aircraft into ground testing
    this summer and flight testing with a surrogate of the high-
    energy laser this fall, then we will actually modify the
    aircraft with the high-energy laser modules in 2007 for a
    resumption of flight testing, to lead to a shoot down in 2008.
        Now, having said all of that, I believe that we are going
    to learn more and more as we go along, as we have to date with
    the program. I think that there is a very high likelihood that
    while we will make steady progress, we're going to have to
    incorporate lessons learned. By the way, we're doing that right
    now, in the tearing down and re-assembling of the laser, we're
    going to have to make some adjustments based on the test
    program that we uncovered in 2005, and I wanted to make sure
    that we had allowed ourselves enough time to take advantage of
    all the lessons that we're going to learn between now and 2008,
    to be able to put that into a design package we can have
    available for the second aircraft, and that's why we thought it
    was prudent from that standpoint to delay the purchase order of
    that aircraft, in order to accommodate that design turn. What
    that means is that we will push out the availability of the
    second aircraft to about mid-decade, mid-next decade for test
    purposes, but we think it is a prudent thing to do in terms of
    being able to incorporate all the lessons learned we're going
    to be able to do over the next couple of years.
        In terms of costing, I will tell you that the ABL program
    is not mature enough at this point to try to estimate or
    guesstimate what an aircraft cost would be because of the
    modifications and the lessons we learn in the next couple of
    years and how that may effect that, and Senator, very frankly,
    we may get to a point where it is very technologically
    achievable and it's very viable technically, but we may have
    trouble making it operational. So, we have to learn that as
    well, so that's another reason why we felt it would be prudent
    to take our time as we do this.
        Senator Thune. I appreciate that answer. It seems to me
    that it's a technology that holds great promise. I know that
    we're learning more all the time.
        General Obering. Yes, sir.
        Senator Thune. My hope would be we could keep as close to
    schedule as possible, so that incorporating that technology and
    making this system--by the time we can get it rolled out and
    operational--it can do the job that it was intended to do. Like
    I said, it just seems to me, at least, that this is something
    that in light of the threats we've talked about today, it has
    great potential as a part of our readiness in the future. I
    commend you for the work that has been done on it to date, and
    encourage you to keep pressing forward with that, and let us
    know what we can do to be helpful in that regard. So thank you,
    and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, we're glad to have Senator
    Nelson, a ranking member of this committee here with us. He's a
    great partner in these efforts, he understands them and cares
    about them.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may have
    my opening statement entered into the record, I have been on
    the floor handling an amendment.
        Senator Sessions. We'd be delighted to make that part of
    the record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses
    today.
        Last year, after two flight test failures, General Obering
    established an Independent Review Team and a Mission Readiness Task
    Force to help put the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and
    its testing program back on track. I want to commend you, General
    Obering, for taking that corrective step and for adopting their
    recommendations.
        It was the right thing to do because it is important to make the
    system work effectively. The Mission Readiness Task Force concluded
    that it was more important to use four interceptors for ground
    testing--to get the technology right--than for operational deployment.
    I agree.
        I think it is crucial that we adhere closely to their
    recommendations and plans, and not take shortcuts or diversions that
    could lead to a repeat of the problems that plagued the GMD system. As
    a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report points out, by
    accelerating the deployment schedule for GMD, the Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA) strayed from a knowledge-based and event driven
    acquisition program, and numerous problems resulted.
        There are three major topics I want to focus on today. First is
    testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. Congress has passed
    legislation for the past several years to improve our missile defense
    testing, to help ensure that the system will work in an operationally
    effective manner. That is why Congress has been pressing for more
    operationally realistic testing, and for testing that will allow us to
    characterize the operational capability of the system.
        Second, there are a number of issues relating to the GMD that need
    to be discussed. I would note that although the GMD element has not yet
    had a successful intercept test, and the Director of Operational Test
    and Evaluation says we don't have enough test information to have
    confidence in its capability, this budget request seeks long lead funds
    for the last of the 50 ground-based interceptors, which the Department
    plans to deploy in Europe.
        Third, we need to think about the issue of missile defense and
    space. Although funds are not requested in this year's budget, next
    year, the MDA expects to request funds for a space ``test bed.'' This
    issue needs to be explored deliberately and fully in public debate.
    There are a number of concerns about the potentially negative
    consequences of deploying missile defense weapons in space, and we
    should not back into such a policy by default.
        At the appropriate time, we will be able to determine if there is a
    need to go beyond our current terrestrial-based activities, whether it
    would improve our security, and whether going to space would be
    affordable. Knowing all the missile defense efforts we have under way
    now, and the threats we seek to counter, I remain deeply skeptical.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Duma, last year Congress passed legislation to enhance
    the testing and evaluation of the BMD System. It is public law,
    and it requires the operational test components to create a
    plan to test and evaluate the operational capability of each
    block sequence of the BMD System, and it says that each plan is
    subject to your review and approval. It also requires that the
    Director of Operational Test and Evaluation shall report to
    Congress at the conclusion of test and evaluation for each of
    that block period of time with an assessment of the adequacy of
    the testing and the characterization of the operational
    effectiveness, the suitability, and the survivability of the
    system, and so if you would share with the committee the status
    of the implementation of this provision of the law, including
    whether the test and evaluation plan for block 2006--which
    started in January of this year and goes to the end of 2007--
    whether the test and evaluation plan for that time period has
    been prepared and approved by you?
        Mr. Duma. The integrated master test plan has been
    updated--as a matter of fact, it was signed by all the parties
    concerned within the last 2 weeks. That test plan covers a
    period of 2 years, however we have been updating it on an
    annual basis. As General Obering stated, because the system is
    still in development, much of the test plan is based on the
    test results that we get, and so adjustments are made to the
    actual test events, and in some cases the objectives of those
    events, that test plan is signed.
        Now, that covers the period for the block 2006. There is
    still some work to be done in determining exactly the
    capability to be delivered in block 2006, and a CONOPs to
    employ that capability. Those efforts are still ongoing, I
    expect those to be completed, that involves the Joint
    Operational Test Agency, the MDA, and my office.
        The warfighters in STRATCOM are the ones working on the
    CONOPs. I expect at the end of the block 2006 phase, if you
    will, which will be December 2007, that we will have test
    results that I would be able to report in January of that year.
    That, I might point out that I also have two other reporting
    requirements for Congress, I submitted an unclassified report
    as part of my annual report which comes out about the same
    time, and I also have a reporting requirement that is due on
    February 15 of each year. So each year I have the ability to
    give you a status of the test program for the MDA in addition
    to the individual evaluations of a block.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Where is your characterization of the
    operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of
    the system that's supposed to be reported to us in Congress?
        Mr. Duma. That is due after the block 2006, which would be
    January 2008.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So you're not going to report that to
    us until that time?
        Mr. Duma. Not that particular one, but I will on an annual
    basis provide the unclassified report, part of my annual report
    and a classified report on February 15. I do that every year
    now, by a different law.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You're talking about the law on the
    Integrated Missile Test Plan?
        Mr. Duma. No, that section 234 is for block 2006. The test
    report is due to Congress upon the completion of block 2006.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, and when is that test and
    evaluation plan for 2006 going to be done and reported to
    Congress?
        Mr. Duma. The test plan is prepared, that is what I just
    said, we signed within the last 2 weeks. The evaluation of the
    test results isn't due until January 2008.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, you're missing the
    requirement of last year's law. You're talking about a former
    requirement of Integrated Missile Test Plan, last year's law,
    Public Law 109-163, section 234, requires the operational test
    components to create a plan to test and evaluate the
    operational capability of the BMD System, and that should be
    reported to this Congress.
        Mr. Duma. That plan is in work, that is what I said in my
    earlier statement, it involves the CONOPs, and what is
    specifically to be delivered in block 2006, that is being
    worked now. The Integrated Master Test Plan is what was just
    recently signed and approved by my office, and the Operational
    Test Agency of General Obering.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That was not my question, the
    Integrated Test Plan, the question was about the requirement of
    the law. So, you're saying you're preparing that plan now?
        Mr. Duma. That is correct.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You're going to report that plan, not
    until January 2008?
        Mr. Duma. No, no, no, no. That plan is being worked, the
    results of the test events from that plan will be reported in
    January 2008.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, when are you going to report to
    this committee on when you've reviewed the plan, and assuming
    that you have approved it?
        Mr. Duma. That's in the works, I need a CONOPs from the
    warfighter, I need the capability to be delivered from the MDA.
    Those are two prerequisites to be able to complete that plan.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, needless to say, you see there
    is a good deal of skepticism that we come to the table, because
    we've had people sit in front of us before and express that
    they're going to give us information, and then we don't get
    that information. I can tell you, this Senator on this
    committee is going to require that, and I will look forward, as
    you have offered in good conscience here to bring forth that
    information when you have evaluated it and share it with this
    committee.
        Mr. Duma. Senator, I'll be glad to do that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right.
        In a recent report on BMD, Mr. Duma, the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) writes that, ``MDA cannot estimate
    the performance capability of block 2004 assets because it has
    not successfully completed an end-to-end test of the GMD
    element using production-representative hardware. Doubts about
    the rigor of the quality control procedures have also raised
    additional questions about the performance of the fielded GMD
    interceptors.'' Do you agree with that GAO report?
        Mr. Duma. I haven't seen that report, but I would say I do
    agree with that statement you just read. The quality control
    issues were raised at a hearing last year before this body,
    that is what caused General Obering to institute two
    independent reviews to look at that. He has taken actions to
    correct those quality problems, whether those actions are
    effective or not, we won't know until we complete the flight
    test. We had one flight test that was done in December which
    met its objectives, we have three more remaining to be able to
    complete that flight test program. There was essentially a 1-
    year delay in the flight test program because of those two
    failed launches a little over a year ago.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, according to the
    recent GAO report on the BMD, because of the quality control
    problems, it's possible that unreliable parts or parts that
    were inappropriate for space applications were installed in the
    first nine interceptors that were deployed in Alaska and
    California. GAO reports that, ``An MDA audit found evidence
    that the reliability of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle's (EKV)
    design could not be determined, and any estimates of its
    serviceable life are likely unsupportable, and that
    contractor's production processes are immature and that the
    contractor cannot build a consistent and reliable product.'' I
    quote, and I'm quoting the GAO report. ``This creates
    uncertainty about the performance of those interceptors, MDA
    has reportedly considered a number of options for dealing with
    this problem, including the possibility of using the missiles
    for reliability tests, or sending the interceptors back to the
    manufacturer for disassembly and re-manufacture.'' GAO reports
    that, ``Program officials have recommended that MDA remove the
    interceptors when theirs is scheduled for upgrades and replace
    any parts found to be faulty.'' So, is it possible the parts
    now in the first nine interceptors could hinder or degrade the
    performance of the interceptors if they were used
    operationally?
        General Obering. Senator, let me address that. First of
    all, I have the utmost respect for the GAO, but I will tell you
    I was not very impressed with that work. I thought that they
    extracted information and came to some conclusions that were
    not necessarily contiguous in that regard.
        Let me point specifically to the quality control issues.
    What we did was we went in and audited the contractor's
    facilities, as was indicated in the report. I have sent audit
    teams into the various plants facilities. We had one location
    that came back that was problematic and all the other ones
    across the BMD, seemed to be within reason of what you would
    expect. What we discovered in the one plant was that the EKV
    production facility was that we had a lot of what we call
    ``scrap and rework.'' We would get parts and supplies in we
    would have to have reworked before they were acceptable.
        A couple of things to remember about this, first of all,
    every interceptor that is sitting in that silo in Alaska and
    California has been acceptance tested, in other words they are
    acceptance tested, the parts, before they were installed and
    before they were deployed into those silos. They were
    acceptance tested, what we call the ``maximum predicted
    environments,'' we did not do sufficient qualification testing
    for how much robustness in terms of added margin to those tests
    and that is what we've gone back through over the past year to
    go do.
        Now, to answer your question directly, anything is
    possible. Just within the last 2 months, I had all of the
    experts sitting around to include the quality control teams
    that did those audits and we walked through and said, ``Is
    there any reason why we have discovered anything that would
    cause us to begin to pull the interceptors out of the silos?''
    The answer came back, ``No, there is not.'' We have some
    things, some processes, as I said, some accountability in terms
    of both systems, engineering, and the parts control and
    configuration management that we have much improved at the
    contractor's facilities, and better government insight into
    that. I think we've taken some steps there.
        Also, I will tell you that the FT-1, as I mentioned to
    Senator Reed, that kill vehicle and worked those up to war
    production representative, they were the configuration of
    exactly what we have in the audit today, and they performed
    exactly as we had hoped and had planned. I don't share the
    pessimism that came out of the conclusions that the GAO
    concluded from the same set of information that we had looked
    at within the agency.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You don't think there was any poor
    quality control at the manufacturing?
        General Obering. So there's no doubt, there was. There was
    poor quality control. But what I'm telling you, is I believe
    we've taken the steps and I think the contractor has taken the
    steps to address those.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Poor quality control of a critical
    component of the GMD system.
        General Obering. Yes, sir, which means we would have to go
    back and re-work that component to make sure that it met the
    acceptance test criteria before it was employed.
        Senator Bill Nelson. But as you fix this problem in the
    future, are you going to test the nonmissiles to see if they
    have the right parts installed?
        General Obering. Sir, that is part of the comprehensive
    reviews we have already been doing, they have been part of this
    process, this review, comprehensive review all along.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So the answer to that is yes?
        General Obering. Yes, sir, we know what the parts are that
    are on those vehicles.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Duma, you might just share with us
    what your operation test and evaluation division is, and you're
    statutorily created, is that right? What are your
    responsibilities with regards to testing?
        Mr. Duma. The office was statutorily created in the mid-
    1980s, I have three reporting requirements I have to oversee to
    ensure that operational testing is adequate, and that it's
    adequate to determine operational effectiveness and
    suitability. My office also received the live-fire test and
    evaluation office that was created separately by different law
    about 2 years later. That office was in a different part of the
    Department. In 1994, Congress passed a law that moved that
    office into the Operational Test and Evaluation Office. My
    responsibilities now are the adequacy of testing, operational
    effectiveness, operational suitability, and live-fire test and
    evaluation, which includes lethality and survivability.
        Senator Sessions. If you feel like a testing program is
    inadequate, is that part of the regular reports you submit to
    Congress?
        Mr. Duma. It is.
        Senator Sessions. General Obering, based upon your
    leadership on this system, do you doubt that we have a limited
    emergency capability at this point in time?
        General Obering. No, Senator, I don't doubt that, I believe
    that. Will it perform 100 percent precisely, as we had hoped?
    Not in all cases, but I believe that we do have sufficient
    confidence that the system will perform, yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. The testing and development plans that
    you have in place were designed to make it more robust and more
    capable as the months and years go by?
        General Obering. Yes, sir. In fact, if we're successful in
    the next two flight tests, we plan to make the next one even
    more aggressive than we currently have laid out.
        Senator Sessions. Is there a CONOPs now in place for
    conducting limited defensive operations? I guess I would start
    with General Dodgen. What about that? What kind of concept do
    you have for conducting limited defensive operations?
        General Dodgen. CONOPs for limited defensive operation is
    in place, and that's been agreed to. Operational orders have
    been developed, actually the JFCC is now working on the CONOPs
    and how to fight the global system. Meaning when we have the
    extra components that are coming in the radars to the east,
    we're not building a CONOP on how to fight that system on a
    global basis. So, I think on a standpoint of limited defensive
    operation, those things have been set.
        But at this time, in answer to the question you asked me to
    address at the very beginning, which was an operational
    assessment of operational readiness, we've had the warfighters
    on the system for almost 2 years now, 24/7.
        Senator Sessions. Let's be plain, the warfighters on the
    system, that means if we detect a threat, a missile threat?
        General Dodgen. We have contingency capabilities.
        Senator Sessions. You have a system in place today?
        General Dodgen. That is correct.
        Senator Sessions. Excuse me, go ahead.
        General Dodgen. The warfighters have been on the system for
    some time. They've participated the viable piece of the way we
    work with the MDA that are operators, the soldiers and all the
    pieces of equipment are in every operational test, and every
    test that is done with the MDA, there is complete openness
    between the developmental operational activities and the
    operational activities. That creates a lot of confidence in the
    system, and the operators often identify some of the faults
    with the software that are regenerated in subsequent software
    builds. The soldiers are on the system, ready, and they
    understand the capability. A year ago, General Cartwright
    characterized the capability as a ''thin line of defense.``
    This is all about getting better and continually getting
    better, and so software improvements into the system which
    allow us to bring extra sensors into the system, more
    interceptors into the ground, more knowledge about the
    capability of the systems add more robustness to where we are.
    I think we're at the point right now where we're getting ready
    to be able to separate developmental activities from
    operational activities because we have separated our command
    and control notes, or are getting ready to separate those
    things, that will allow us to add a great redundancy and
    robustness in very short order.
        The thing that is lacking to reduce some of the uncertainty
    so that we can gain full advantage of all of the improvements
    we've made in the system over the next year is that end-to-end
    test when that's done that will modify our operational posture.
    But we have capabilities that we have identified through the
    Secretary of Defense and the President that have called upon,
    that this Nation can act within the indications and warning, to
    safeguard us, if necessary.
        Senator Sessions. How long would it take to put the system
    on alert?
        General Dodgen. Senator, in private session I would
    certainly tell you.
        Senator Sessions. But you have those things in place? Have
    you determined what that is?
        General Dodgen. Those things are managed on an hourly
    basis, how far away you are from capability.
        Senator Sessions. I just want to drive home this issue and
    get straight to the American people, while this program is
    continuing to be developed and tested and verified, its
    capability is being determined, fully. It is now in place and
    operational and you, the combatant commander representative
    have the capacity to call on it if we're attacked by a missile,
    is that correct?
        General Dodgen. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. General Obering, do you want to add
    anything to that?
        General Obering. No, sir, I think you said it very well,
    and General Dodgen answered it very directly.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    associate myself with Senator Nelson's comments about the
    importance of stepping up to the last year's legislative
    initiatives with respect to oversight and testing. I also want
    to commend Senator Nelson because he was the architect of that
    language, thank you, Senator.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, if you understand some
    degree of skepticism, I want you to know General Obering, that
    your predecessor sat right there in front of this committee and
    told us at one point that we were going to have completely
    researched and developed and ready for operation an ABL, and,
    of course, that didn't turn out to be anywhere. He said within
    10 months, and that didn't turn out to be anywhere close. So
    thank you, Senator Reed, I just want you to understand some of
    the degree of skepticism.
        General Obering. Can I comment to that, please, Senator?
    That is the reason in my opening statements I hit, and why we
    have incorporated so hard, knowledge points in our program, and
    that is what we will continue to focus on and to achieve.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General. Mr. Duma, I want to get a
    sense of where the system is today, the ballistic missile
    system. This is an operationally deployed system that has not
    been operationally tested, is that an accurate assessment?
        Mr. Duma. All of the pieces are in place, they are in the
    field, yes, sir, and it has not completed any operational
    testing.
        Senator Reed. Is there any other situation where we have
    declared a system to be operationally deployed, but we have no
    operational testing of the system?
        Mr. Duma. There are systems that have been deployed to
    tactical theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan that have been
    developed and fielded directly without operational testing.
    Those have not been what we would call Major Defense
    Acquisition Programs (MDAP).
        Senator Reed. Right, those were systems, in fact, I think
    we've deployed a lot of systems where, we tried to just drop
    counter IED and others that are just off the shelf, get it out
    there, try it--but I think that is what causes some question,
    criticism, and comment when it comes to this system. The mere
    fact that a major defense system was declared operationally
    deployed, but we haven't conducted one operational test. That
    seems to defy logic of perhaps not the experts, but certainly
    most people. There's also another clarification, the system is
    not on alert today, is that correct General Dodgen? It is not
    on alert?
        General Dodgen. It is not on alert.
        Senator Reed. So in your response to Senator Sessions, you
    would have to give warnings and indications, and then you would
    have to declare the system on alert to actually be in a posture
    to try to intercept a missile, is that correct?
        General Dodgen. I think when I say it's not on alert, what
    I say is that we haven't been ordered to alert by command
    authorities. I think we're watching indications and warning on
    a minute-by-minute basis on our operational view so we're
    getting a clear view and the combatant commanders can then
    request that it go on alert, or move to a more operationally-
    ready posture.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir. Now let me get back to Mr.
    Duma. I think this was part of the discussion you were having
    with Senator Nelson. Even though you are the objective
    evaluator of the operational capacity of the system, the strap-
    down commander could declare this even more operational
    independent of your judgment. He could say, ``Well, we're going
    to alert, and we're declaring another step.'' Is that true in
    terms of the breakdown of responsibilities?
        Mr. Duma. That is true. My role in this particular program
    is very unique. The statutes that Senator Sessions talked about
    that created my office require operational testings be
    completed on a system before it goes into full-rate production.
    Also, the Services are required to use low-rate initial
    production items that are production representative in
    operational testing. Those rules were suspended, or waived, for
    the missile defense program several years ago. In fact, the
    role of my office really is one of an advisory nature for the
    test program. Clearly they're in developmental testing, we're
    trying to make it as operationally realistic as possible.
        When the missiles failed to launch a little over a year
    ago, General Obering chartered the independent review teams and
    the Mission Readiness Task Force efforts. One of the
    realizations by the leadership in the MDA was just how early in
    development it really was. I credit them with taking a very
    prudent approach for corrective action on that, and that is
    what delayed the Flight Test Program by a year, in essence.
        But, having said all of that, there was a significant
    amount of ground testing that was done during that year. The
    most significant portion of that was involving the warfighters.
    That was one of the things that I felt needed to be done that
    was done during this last year. As I said in my opening
    statement, the warfighter understanding of the capabilities,
    the limitations, and the actual maturity of the system was
    enhanced through that ground testing. What we lack is that
    final end-to-end operational test through intercept. That just
    hasn't happened yet.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask you another question, Mr. Duma.
    That final operational test, would essentially be a salvo of at
    least two interceptors per target, handling a multiple
    engagement, maybe several warheads coming in. Is that a fair
    description of a baseline operational test?
        Mr. Duma. As the system matures, that certainly would be
    something in the realm of possibility, but what we're looking
    at to declare the limited defensive operations is something
    less than that, it is a single incoming missile with a simple
    missile, if you will. Okay, that is what the next three tests,
    that is the scenario that you're looking at, but the system is
    going to mature. For instance, there are already discussions
    going on that if those tests are successful, maybe even that
    third test in that series, we ought to be adding counter
    measures to it already, those discussions are ongoing General
    Obering and I have had those discussions, they are active in
    the test community with the MDA, and so to get to more advanced
    countermeasures, multiple launches, that's part of that
    maturation process and that is beyond the limited defensive
    operations that the next series of tests is designed to look
    at.
        General Dodgen. Senator Reed, could I draw an analogy to
    the PAC-3 system, if I may? When the PAC-3, we're going to
    constantly test our system, it could be driven by future
    threats we want to be addressed and what to go against. When
    Operation Iraqi Freedom hit, the PAC-3 system had not been
    certified for release by the operational tester, it had done
    some operational testing. The warfighter, Commander of CENTCOM
    commanded those missiles go forward to Kuwait and a conditional
    release was granted because they had not been certified. They
    went immediately into theater the next day, and were very
    successful, particularly in protecting the land component
    commanders in Kuwait. Now, I think that's an example where
    there actually had been some operational testing, but it had
    not been certified by the tester to go forward, but the
    combatant commander said, ``There's military utility here, and
    we need to deploy this.''
        Senator Reed. Expediency will always require us to do what
    we have to do, but I would be much more comfortable in a
    situation where we have some operational testing, at least,
    before we declared the system operational, and also I think
    PAC-3 is an example where Mr. Duma's agency was involved as a
    major defense acquisition, step-by-step with a robust valor. I
    think, and I must say, one of the reasons this program has
    suffered is because we have decided to do something unusual and
    take out the desk agencies from the contractor supervision. My
    time has expired, I want to thank the chairman for his
    patience.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Duma, this system has not had any operational testing
    and an operationally configured system has never had a
    successful intercept test. We have had a number of test-like
    failures. I understand that you have reported, and tell me if
    I'm accurate in this, that there is ``insufficient evidence to
    support a confident assessment of the systems capabilities.''
    Is that inaccurate?
        Mr. Duma. Yes, Senator, that is accurate. The February
    report that my office submitted a year ago evaluated the
    engagement sequence groups, there were point estimates and had
    confidence intervals on them. These estimates are in the report
    that I submitted to Congress. In my report this year, I
    indicated that I couldn't change my assessment from what I
    reported a year ago, because I had no additional flight testing
    with which to change either those point estimates or those
    confidence intervals on the performance.
        Senator Levin. So, OT&E says insufficient evidence to
    support a confident assessment. That is still their position?
    Secretary Flory, you, in front of the House, said last month
    that we are confident that it could intercept a long-range
    ballistic missile. Now your OT&E Acting Director says there is
    insufficient evidence to support a confident assessment, but
    you told the House that you are confident. How do you square
    those two statements?
        Mr. Flory. Senator Levin, I looked at this question
    yesterday in preparing for this hearing, and I recall the
    discussion that took place at the last hearing, and
    particularly the testimony that was given after I testified in
    the last hearing where the word ``confidential'' was used by
    Mr. Duma, General Obering, and it became apparent that I'd used
    a word that was a term of art in the technical and testing
    community. So I decided in my testimony today not to use that
    phrase again, because I realized I had given the impression
    that I was, in effect, making a technical judgment, and what I
    said today was, based upon that reflection, that the elements
    were in place to intercept the missile.
        Senator Levin. The elements are in place where intercept is
    possible?
        Mr. Flory. Where intercept is possible. I don't have my
    exact statement in front of me.
        Senator Levin. But in terms of your confidence level, you
    are not saying you are confident that it will happen?
        Mr. Flory. I'm not making a tester's or operational
    judgment on confidence. I believe the elements are in place, I
    think it can be done, but I'm not making that kind of formal
    assessment.
        Senator Levin. First of all, I'm glad to hear that. I think
    there has been too much hype, too much exaggeration about the
    system and what it will do. It is a system which has not yet
    been operationally tested. Hopefully it will be able to have a
    capability. But in terms of confidence level that it will do
    so, that level of confidence has not been expressed yet by your
    technical people. I think it is important that you make that
    modification which you just described.
        In terms of the production of the missiles, the
    interceptors, what is the inventory objective? Objective, I
    think is the right word, I'm not sure which of our two Generals
    I should look to with that question.
        General Obering. Sir, I can tell you what we have
    programmed, we have a total of 50 interceptors programmed in
    inventory, 10 of which we would deploy to a third site.
        Senator Levin. Then it is your current plan to then
    terminate production at that point?
        General Obering. We would level off, we would not terminate
    production, we would have to continue to produce, because we're
    going to take those missiles and we're going to fire them out
    of the silos and test and replace them in their silos, so we
    would continue a production program to be able to do that.
        Senator Levin. So except for some test interceptors to fill
    the place of the ones that had been used, production would end
    in terms of regularly deployed interceptors?
        General Obering. Yes, sir, but we would keep the line such
    that if we needed to ramp up for threat reasons or for
    contingencies we could do so.
        Senator Levin. How many interceptors a year would you need
    to keep the line open? Keep it warm?
        General Obering. We're producing at about the rate of one
    every 2 months or one every month and a half, something like
    that, and that would be a warm level that we could continue to
    sustain.
        Senator Levin. You mean the current level?
        General Obering. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. So you would maintain the current level to
    keep the base warm?
        General Obering. That depends upon how many tests we want
    to continue to do, how many modifications we want to include.
    There are several things we are going to plan for this, we're
    going to upgrade the kill vehicle on these interceptors so we
    will have a multiple kill vehicle capability that would go on
    to the boosters that we have in the silos today and so I'm sure
    there's going to be a test program that will accommodate that.
    We'll double ramp-up our testing.
        Senator Levin. Do you know what the minimum number of
    missiles is that is required to keep the base warm?
        General Obering. We're about there, we're about there right
    now, sir.
        Senator Levin. So, you have to produce a missile and a half
    a month in order to keep your base warm?
        General Obering. Not a missile and a half a month, it would
    be about a missile every 2 months.
        Senator Levin. I'm sorry, a missile every 2 months in order
    to keep your production base warm. Which means forever, because
    if you always want to be ready then you are going to have to
    continue to have to produce one every other month.
        General Obering. As long as we want to continue that
    testing profile and continue that contingency profile, yes,
    sir.
        Senator Levin. What do they cost, these missiles?
        General Obering. They are roughly about $40 million an
    interceptor.
        Senator Levin. Okay, my time is up, thank you. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. I would like to see if we can clarify
    what we mean by not having an operational testing of this
    system. That does not mean that component parts of it haven't
    been tested, but that the system is now deployed in Alaska with
    the advanced radar warning system and that the entire system
    has not been tested as of yet, is that correct?
        General Obering. Senator, if I could answer that, and maybe
    Mr. Duma would like to chime in. Here's what we've done: We
    have successfully intercepted four or five times with the
    prototype of the kill vehicle we have in the ground, the basic
    functionality, the basic technology. We believe we've proven
    the processing power, we have the margin on the divert system,
    we have demonstrated the algorithms, we've demonstrated that
    when we put this kill vehicle in its terminal game it does a
    pretty good job.
        Senator Sessions. Now those were tests that occurred in
    October 2002?
        General Obering. 2001, 2002, in that timeframe, yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. You actually did a hit-to-kill an
    incoming missile? Missile-to-missile?
        General Obering. Yes, we did.
        Senator Sessions. It impacted and destroyed?
        General Obering. Yes, sir, we did.
        Senator Sessions. That's exactly the same system we now
    have deployed to Alaska?
        General Obering. No, sir, we actually improved and upgraded
    the kill vehicle to make it more robust, to make it more
    producible, to make it easier to produce, obviously. We flight
    tested the booster that is in the ground, we did that
    successfully in 2003. We put it together, the kill vehicle and
    the booster for a flight test last December. So, we have done
    the fly-out of the interceptor from the silo, into the terminal
    game and that was a successful flight test in December, as I
    mentioned earlier, so successful we decided to accelerate our
    test program.
        But we had two other very important tests this past year we
    haven't really emphasized enough. One, we air-launched a target
    out of the back of a C-17 over the face of the Cobra Dane
    radar. There were many that were skeptical that we could use
    this radar in our MDS. This was an operationally realistic test
    in terms of the threat representation of the target in
    actuality, it was even more challenging than we would have
    outlined, probably, in an operationally realistic test, because
    of what the threat target represented to the radar. The radar
    performed, the operational fire control system performed, that
    is the hardware and the software that makes up the fire control
    system, and we generate a weapons test plan to intercept
    solutions on this track.
        Another major test we did against the Beale radar where we
    flew a target out of Alaska, across the face of that radar,
    just this year, in 2006--in fact, we were more than surprised
    in the sense of how much more accurate that radar was than we
    had anticipated in real-life testing. So, while we have not put
    it all together as we have said, end-to-end, we have taken the
    major functional steps of all of these components, and
    exercised or tested them at any one time.
        One thing that Mr. Duma pointed out also, I think very
    accurately, is a key element of this is the operative sitting
    of the council, how comfortable they feel with the system and
    its ability and its performance. We have done testing and
    transitioning of the system many, many times with the
    warfighter, exercised those in war games as well as exercises
    and ground tests and that is one reason they also feel
    comfortable. So, while we have not done all of the end-to-end
    testing we need to do with the operationally realistic testing
    we plan to do this year, we've certainly done as much testing
    as I believe that we needed to do to give us confidence to
    proceed. We have deployed weapons into combat before without
    even some of the level of testing we're talking about, in
    recent conflicts.
        Senator Sessions. If an incoming missile is coming, I'm
    glad you're there and we have a realistic possibility of seeing
    that missile knocked down rather than successfully hitting the
    United States.
        General Dodgen, the operational command forces are working
    with General Dodgen's team now at the T sites?
        General Dodgen. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. The goal would be eventually that General
    Dodgen's people would depart, and it would be operational
    completely, is that correct? I mean, that's the general
    concept?
        General Dodgen. I think given the nature of this system, I
    think there will always be a partnership between the MDA and
    the soldiers that man the system, and that partnership mandates
    that complete openness going back and forth, and I would just
    echo what General Obering said that we have transitioned this
    system to a ready state many times. We know how to do this as a
    team, so we're confident in those procedures, we have done the
    tests together and I think there is a shared confidence in the
    system.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, you said that you were
    glad that they are there, and my response would be I hope
    they're there, but what I've always been taught is that you go
    through research and development first, before and then do your
    testing before something is declared operational. I hope
    they're there. General Dodgen, a few minutes ago in response to
    a question, gave another example of taking the PAC-3 and
    deploying it while it was still being tested. General Dodgen,
    that was the third generation of the Patriot missile, was it
    not?
        General Dodgen. It had been through some operational
    testing and it was fairly mature. But my point was that it had
    not been certified for release by the testing community.
        Senator Bill Nelson. But a lot different from developing a
    BMD System from scratch?
        General Dodgen. Senator Nelson, I will tell you that the
    end-to-end test for later this year is important to
    understanding our capabilities and to further our capabilities
    and increase our capabilities, and the warfighter is very much
    focused on being a part of that and understanding our
    capabilities after that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Look, all of us want to get in the
    same place at the end of the day and that's to have a
    successful system. We're here to try to help you try to get
    there, but I want to see us come along and get to it without a
    bunch of obfuscation and false promises, which is what we seem
    to have had in the past several years.
        General Obering, before we can build a deployment site in a
    European nation, we have to first select a host nation, reach a
    formal agreement with that host nation, work out the details of
    the deployment--I understand that we have not reached such an
    agreement yes, since we have not chosen a host nation for a
    third deployment site. The GAO notes that although MDA planned
    to install a web browser in the United Kingdom in 2005 to
    provide them with situational awareness, the installation was
    delayed because DOD did not complete final policy agreements as
    scheduled. Similarly, there has been a delay in the deployment
    to Japan of the Forward-Based X-Band Portable Radar because of
    delayed negotiations with Japan on the location of the radar.
    Now, these are less complex matters than the building of an
    MDS, and the deployment of a base like Fort Greely. Tell me, is
    it possible that we will not reach agreement with a European
    nation this year on deploying the GBIs on their soil?
        General Obering. Senator, I will answer part of that, and
    then maybe Secretary Flory can answer part of that as well, and
    what I would like to do is focus on the technical aspect of
    your question. By the way, you brought up a very good point on
    the deployment of the Japanese radar, it's one thing that the
    GAO report totally failed to address. They ignored almost a
    billion dollar program in our scope of work on our sensors in
    these forward-deployed radars, and in fact we accelerated the
    deployment of the Forward-Based X-Band Radar that originally
    was based on our initial conjecture was going to be in block 6.
    We actually accelerated the delivery of that into the block 4
    timeframe. I believe that our allies, Japan, have really done a
    great job in working with us and it shows what teamwork and
    partnership can do to accelerate a program like that because of
    what we both perceive the urgency to be.
        Now, having said that, to be very honest, nobody has
    accused MDA of not being able to spend money, and we have a
    program of work loaded in the 2007 budget request that would go
    to the third site you just talked about. I believe that we can
    certainly--given the go-ahead--expend the money that we have
    planned for 2007 to do the site planning, the soil sampling,
    the facility design and layout, the legacy we have here, as you
    have said, is we've done this at Fort Greely, we've done this
    at Vandenberg, so this is not starting from scratch, we're
    hitting the ground running, here. So we have a lot of
    experience under our belt in this regard. We do have several
    nations that have expressed a strong desire to work with us on
    this, and I will let Secretary Flory answer the likelihood of
    whether we would have a decision this year.
        Mr. Flory. Thank you, General. Senator Nelson, I don't
    know, I'm not going to give you a likelihood in terms of a
    percentage, I would say that it's conceivable we might not have
    agreement, but it's not what I expect to happen. We have
    consulted with a number of countries since 2002, we are
    continuing to consult, and we're certainly working hard to have
    a decision this year.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, don't we have a problem
    that we need a third site system to be effective in defending
    Europe against an Iranian medium-range or intermediate-range
    missile?
        Mr. Flory. Senator, I'll defer to General Obering on the
    specific technical capabilities. The primary, the goals of
    deploying a system would be both to improve the defense of the
    United States, and to extend the missile defense protection to
    the countries of Europe. General Obering, if you want to get to
    the specific capabilities.
        General Obering. Yes, sir, we do need a third site to be
    able to protect our deployed forces in the region, our allies
    and our friends from an ICBM class target or a high
    intermediate-range missile class target, yes, sir, we do.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I think it's interesting to note that
    the Director of the DIA did not even mention anything about
    working on ICBMs. He said at a worldwide threat hearing in
    February that Iran's efforts were on a regional ballistic
    missile that could reach Tel Aviv. If Iran wanted to strike
    targets in Europe with ballistic missiles, it appears much more
    likely that they would develop a regional missile before they
    would develop an ICBM.
        Mr. Flory. Senator, if I could just say a word on the
    threat. The IC has assessed that Iran could develop and could
    flight test an ICBM in 2015. I mentioned earlier there's a new
    national intelligence testimony that gets into a lot more of
    the details of this in a way we can't discuss here, but we do
    have serious concerns, and I think it was the DNI who testified
    before this committee, I'd have to double-check that, about the
    serious concern posed by Iran's pursuit both of nuclear
    capability and long-range ballistic missiles.
        Senator Sessions. I think you've given us the rationale of
    the deployment of a European-based missile. I would just say
    that Iran or any other hostile nation in that area needs to
    know that the United States and its allies are not going to
    remain vulnerable to attack, from that kind of missile attack
    that can include a WMD as a part of it, and that we have that
    capability. I think we will have support in Europe to do that
    and I think as a matter of policy we have to continue to
    proceed with that concept. Secretary Flory, I guess, would you
    have any comments about that?
        Mr. Flory. Mr. Chairman, I agree fully with what you said,
    and I would make the point that we have concerns about Iran's
    missile capabilities on several levels: its regional
    capabilities, its capabilities that could allow it to threaten
    Europe, its capabilities that could allow it to threaten the
    United States. It's important to recognize the capability,
    assuming Iran continues to move in the direction it's going of
    developing greater and greater capabilities.
        Iran's ability to threaten Europe would also be a threat
    both to European populations and European countries, it would
    also be a threat to the United States and our ability to
    conduct a robust foreign policy in defense of our interests.
    For example, if the Iranian government were able to hold Europe
    at risk, it wouldn't be necessary to hold the U.S. itself at
    risk, in order to have a significant deterrent effect on the
    United States in trying to blackmail the United States from not
    carrying out any particular action or set of actions that we
    might feel we needed to carry out in order to defend out
    interests in the Middle East. So, the gradual extension of the
    Iranian missile shadow, eventually the Iranian nuclear shadow,
    is something that every time it moves outward, it further
    threatens our friends and allies. Also, it further constraints
    our ability.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, you said that very well, and
    that is the way I see it, and we don't need our friends and
    allies held hostage to the legitimate national security of the
    United States. Senator Nelson, do you have some more? Then
    we'll wrap up.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, sir. General Dodgen, could you
    tell us the remaining issues that need to be resolved before
    the system would be placed on alert?
        General Dodgen. I would say that as a minimum the software
    build we are currently in which would allow us to expand the
    system and create a redundancy needs to be completed and that
    will be done very quickly. There are other considerations,
    whether or not a complete end-to-end test needs to be done
    before we put in on full-time alert is a different matter but
    what I am telling you is the command and control issues, the
    ability to go to that full-time alert posture will be set very
    quickly and then I think that's the minimum that is probably
    necessary. But the system will always get better, Senator, and
    I appreciate your interest in pushing us down that road.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What about the sensor integration
    issues?
        General Dodgen. I think that is tied to the software
    pieces, I think when you have the software ready, then you can
    bring the forward-deployed sensors in and get those tested and
    when those things are done, I include that as a part of that
    command and control software build, when that is done, I
    consider that the minimum to move forward.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So your conclusion is that you get the
    software development like you want it and then General
    Cartwright is going to be ready to recommend that the system be
    placed on alert?
        General Dodgen. I can't speak for General Cartwright, but I
    would say that. In my opinion, those things of getting those
    extra sensors in and creating that look east and west, and
    having that redundancy in our command and control system so we
    can continue concurrent development and operations is vital to
    us going to full-time defensive operations. The qualitative
    piece will always be debated, Senator.
        Senator Bill Nelson. We will follow that up with General
    Cartwright all right.
        General Obering, I want to talk to you about space-based
    interceptors. In your March 20 presentation to a conference,
    you asked, ``Do we need to go to space with interceptors?''
    Then you also asked if a space layer would significantly
    enhance system performance and responsiveness. Will
    terrestrial-base BMD assets be sufficient to deal with
    increasingly sophisticated and shifting threats? I think these
    are legitimate questions, this is a significant issue. Now, the
    question is, can we afford it? We already have a great deal of
    missile defense activity taking place to handle the threats,
    we're concerned about the possibility of North Korea and Iran
    developing, as we discussed here, long-range ballistic missiles
    and deploying a limited number of the missiles. If long-range
    ballistic missile threat remains limited, and if we're not
    trying to build a capability to defeat the ballistic missiles
    of Russia and China, do you think that the terrestrial-based
    system should be adequate to accomplish the mission? Instead of
    a space-based?
        General Obering. Sir, that's a good question. The reason
    why we would add a space-based layer, first of all, we think it
    is very important that we have the sensing layer in space.
    Because we believe it is the most cost-effective way to go
    where you can get precision-tracking sensors in space to allow
    you the flexibility to cover the globe, so to speak, with
    respect to any emerging threat in the future.
        The next question becomes, if you think you can predict
    with certainty what threats we're going to face over the next
    20 or 30 years, then we can certainly keep populating the world
    with terrestrial-based and fixed-site interceptors and sensors.
    If we believe that we're not going to be able to do that very
    accurately, then we believe that a very modest space-based
    layer may be the way to go there. But there are some questions
    to ask and there are some questions to answer about the
    technical viability of that, and that is why we believe that
    before we take that step we ought to do some experimentation to
    understand what it is capable and what it is not capable of in
    that regard.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is it U.S. policy to have a system to
    defeat the long-range missiles of Russia and China?
        General Obering. Sir, the system we have fielded today does
    not address a threat from Russia nor Chinese missiles, it does
    not do that. We believe in our development program it's always
    prudent because you make sure that you can at least understand
    where these various countries are headed from a technical
    perspective, and we try to make sure that we do that in a
    development program, but we're not fielding a system today to
    address those countries.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So the present system is not part of a
    U.S. policy that would defeat the long-range missiles of Russia
    and China?
        General Obering. No, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General, in your prepared statement,
    you discuss examining tradeoffs to determine what to fund, and
    that is what we're basically trying to get to here. What's
    Congress going to decide with regard to the funding of all of
    this? One of the areas to examine is the diversity of basing
    modes, including space. Does your statement imply that you're
    already planning on using those layers in space as a basing
    mode for the missile defense?
        General Obering. No, sir. It does imply that from a
    sensor's perspective as well as from whether you're talking
    about sea or land-based as well, but we do not have a space-
    based interceptor program laid into our program today.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Can you assure this subcommittee that
    you do not have any plans to place a BMD in space?
        General Obering. As we're sitting here today, Senator, I do
    not. Now, that does not mean that we may not come back to you
    tomorrow, based upon where we would like to take this
    capability, but as we're sitting here today, no, we do not.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have any plans to put a kill
    vehicle in a N-Fire satellite?
        General Obering. I wish we could have, sir, but we're not
    going to be able to. The kill vehicle we were going to put on
    that experimental platform was not mature enough and was not
    ready, so we replaced it with a communications terminal.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Last year, I asked the Under Secretary
    for Acquisition to explain the unbudgeted out-year funding
    wedge that appeared in fiscal year 2006. His answer was
    basically that the projected funds would be paid by the
    Services for deployment of certain systems. This year we see
    the deployment funding wedge again, starting in 2008 with a
    notation that it suggest it will be for deployment. Can you
    explain what the funding line is supposed to represent? Whether
    it's actually budgeted or programmed?
        General Obering. Yes, sir. What that's supposed to
    represent is a departmental commitment that anywhere from $1.5
    to $2 billion in that vicinity will be allocated for deployment
    and for fielding and sustainment of the system and that is
    about what we've been targeting and what we've been tracking,
    too, but the Department also likes to make us work for our
    money, so that is why you see that notation like that, is
    because we have to achieve our knowledge points and achieve the
    progress we need to before they allocate that to our budget.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You are a key person in this whole
    thing, and you posed the question at the March conference that
    you spoke to, saying how much defense is enough? So, what is
    your sense of how much is enough?
        General Obering. Senator, for what we are facing today, and
    from where I sit today, the perspective lies, I think that the
    allocation by the Department, by the President, the missile
    defense is about right. I think it will allow us to keep pace
    with the rogue nation threats we've talked about, that we see
    developing on our TVs every day. I believe that we have it
    about right with respect to the balance between fielding,
    sustainment, and development of future capabilities for the
    system, but we will have to continually evaluate that as we go
    along, but from where I sit today I am pretty comfortable with
    where that investment is, which is not a very large percentage
    of our overall defense budget.
        Senator Bill Nelson. This committee wants to see that
    successful test.
        General Obering. Yes, sir, so do I.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Mr. Flory. Just to make it clear, I do too.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Duma, you're an objective evaluator.
        Mr. Duma. I'll take the results of the test and report it.
        Senator Sessions. This has been a very good hearing. I
    think we've had a very interesting interchange about a part of
    our defense posture that is very important. We thank you, each
    of you, for the time and commitment you have given to it. It's
    important, I believe, to our national defense, and I believe
    we're on track. I believe the fundamentals of this program have
    been clearly proven and that the technology is there, it's just
    going to be a challenge of bringing it all together in this
    system and proving the system is workable, and continuing to
    enhance that capability as the threats continue to increase.
    So, we thank you for that, we will keep the hearing open for
    written questions for 48 hours.
        Senator Sessions. I would note, General Obering and General
    Dodgen, that I will be submitting some questions concerning
    BRAC and how we're moving along with that, we've talked about
    that previously. Personally, I appreciate your forthcoming
    attitude about that. We would like to see BRAC, once we've made
    these commitments, stay on track to full completion.
        Thank you, if there's nothing else, we will adjourn.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

                               TRANSITION ISSUES

        1. Senator Sessions. General Dodgen and General Obering, a
    September 2005 Government Accountability Office report notes that
    ``there is uncertainty as to which assets may eventually be transferred
    to each military Service and under what conditions those transfers
    should occur. This uncertainty makes it difficult for the Services to
    plan to address the requirements of Department of Defense (DOD)
    acquisition regulations and realign their budgets to support the
    missile defense mission.''
        This uncertainty has implications for the fielding of missile
    defense capabilities to the warfighter. For example, the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) plans to build only 48 Theater High-Altitude Area
    Defense (THAAD) missiles, with the assumption that the Army will
    procure further missiles. Yet the Army has no funding for THAAD in its
    Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Likewise, the MDA has reduced its
    deliveries of the sea-based interceptor (SM-3) from 100 to
    approximately 80 over the FYDP, yet there is no sign that the Navy
    plans to procure additional SM-3 missiles.
        If the Services don't start to budget for missile defense, the MDA
    will have its research and development budget increasingly whittled
    down as deliveries of missile defense capabilities capture a larger
    share of the missile defense budget. Who in the DOD can assure us that
    the Services will start to budget for the procurement and operations of
    missile defense capabilities?
        General Dodgen. The Department continues to work through the
    decisions to ensure an effective layered missile defense system is
    fielded to protect our Nation and deployed forces. Many critical
    decisions have already been decided and major accomplishments have been
    realized. For instance, funding for manning and maintenance of the
    Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System at Fort Greely as well as the
    initial fire units of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense
    Operational System are part of the Army's FYDP. Total funding
    requirements for these programs will continue to be a shared MDA and
    Army responsibility.
        Using its Unified Command Plan authority to advocate for
    warfighters' missile defense capability, United States Strategic
    Command (STRATCOM) has initiated the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) study
    to determine the optimal mix of sensor and weapon assets to achieve
    desired operational effects necessary for an effective global missile
    defense. The JCM study, which will be updated annually to identify
    necessary capability mixes need by the warfighters, is supported by the
    Geographical Combatant Commands (GCC), Joint Staff, and the Services.
        A major goal of the initial JCM is to address the most pressing
    funding issues in the 08-13 FYDP. While this year's JCM is still being
    worked, the emerging results indicate the significant value of the
    upper-tier systems (SM-3 and THAAD) in all GCCs' areas of
    responsibility. While the exact details of transition may not be
    finalized in this budget cycle, JCM results will be used to ensure we
    have continuity in these programs as we build a robust capability.
        General Obering. I can assure you that the Department, MDA, and the
    Services are analyzing what capabilities to buy, when to transition
    them, and when to program the resources necessary to do so. General
    Dodgen initiated a capability mix study last year to determine the
    right combinations of missile defense capabilities we should buy. The
    Joint Functional Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense is
    conducting the study and we expect their results later this year. The
    study analyzes both the threat and the appropriate combinations of
    interceptors and sensors necessary to counter that threat in 2012,
    2015, and 2020. The study will also identify key decision points to
    influence budgeting for the fiscal years 2008-2013 FYDP and the fiscal
    years 2010-2015 FYDP.
        Since January 2005, we have aggressively engaged our Ballistic
    Missile Defense System (BMDS) stakeholders--the Services, the combatant
    commands, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff, regarding
    when to transition and when to program the resources. We have developed
    our first transition plan that addresses the sufficient lead time
    necessary for the Services to procure, operate, and sustain the BMDS.
    In April 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics requested the Services concur with the plan
    and identify issues needing further resolution.

                           KINETIC ENERGY INTERCEPTOR

        2. Senator Sessions. General Obering, your testimony notes that MDA
    is requesting $984 million in fiscal year 2007 to preserve decision
    flexibility with respect to the two boost phase programs, Airborne
    Laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI). If both ABL and KEI
    achieve their key knowledge points, how do you decide which system to
    buy?
        General Obering. If both ABL and KEI succeed in achieving their key
    knowledge points, and if they both prove to be cost effective, ABL will
    become the boost phase element of the BMDS and land-based KEI with
    Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) will become the mobile upgrade to the
    midcourse element.

        3. Senator Sessions. General Obering, would you consider going
    forward with both?
        General Obering. If both ABL and KEI succeed in achieving their key
    knowledge points, and if they both prove to be cost effective, ABL will
    become the boost phase element of the BMDS and land-based KEI with MKV
    will become the mobile upgrade to the midcourse element.

        4. Senator Sessions. General Obering, could one consider KEI in a
    broader context as the block upgrade to current interceptors like
    Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) and SM-3?
        General Obering. The mobile KEI capabilities complement our fixed
    site GBI and sea-based SM-3 interceptor investments. The MDA is
    pursuing the KEI to fill BMDS boost/ascent and midcourse phase
    performance gaps that require a mobile, high acceleration and heavy
    lift booster as an enabling capability. Our initial focus is a land-
    based KEI with a future evolution option of sea-basing. We are working
    with the Navy in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 to select the
    best value sea-based platform for KEI integration. This mobile booster
    capability cannot be achieved via modifications to the existing GBI or
    SM-3 systems. We need a new design, based on mature component
    technologies, to perform the boost/ascent phase mission; we also need a
    range of high-payoff mobile midcourse defense responses, such as a
    forward-based KEI to deliver heavy payloads such as MKV or other
    advanced discrimination payloads that engage the threat early in its
    flight prior to subsequent GBI or SM-3 shots. The early boost/ascent
    and midcourse shots that the KEI capability offers is an important
    evolutionary element or our layered defense strategy to keep pace with
    the threat.

        5. Senator Sessions. General Obering, the fiscal year 2007 budget
    request for KEI ($406 million) is almost double last year's
    appropriation. Can you execute such a steep increase?
        General Obering. Yes. I am very confident we can execute the budget
    request and deliver the promised products. The KEI program enters a
    period of significant hardware development and test next year. Booster
    flight detailed design, long lead procurements, avionics ground tests,
    and four rocket motor static fires account for a significant portion of
    the 2007 budget request. We are also continuing a series of important
    fire control tests to prove out our capability to engage ballistic
    missiles with kinetic weapons in the boost and ascent phases of flight.
    In addition, the program is executing critical systems engineering and
    test infrastructure work across all the integrated product teams
    leading to a System Design Review event in July 2007. Our KEI team
    (Government, prime contractor, and suppliers) has a detailed plan in
    place for executing the fiscal year 2007 work packages. All fiscal year
    2007 activities and risk reduction tie to the agency's 2008 knowledge-
    based decision point.

                         CONCURRENT TEST AND OPERATIONS

        6. Senator Sessions. Mr. Duma, today, if we need to bring the
    Ground-Based Missile Defense (GMD) system into alert status, this means
    the system cannot be used for testing. Maintaining both alert status
    and a testing program places increasing strain on man and machine. Your
    written testimony notes that ``Over the long term, MDA should
    incrementally develop a capability to support concurrent testing and
    operations. . .'' Why do you say that?
        Mr. Duma. The capability to test and train on the operational
    configured GMD system as it evolves is critical to ensuring the
    effectiveness, suitability, and readiness of the integrated fielded
    capability. Currently, MDA has funded additional equipment in fiscal
    year 2006 that will allow the GMD element to achieve a limited initial
    concurrent test and operations capability. Collectively, we must
    define, fund, develop, and employ a concurrent test and operations
    capability for the full BMDS. The full BMDS capability should be
    similar in concept to the capability that the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade
    program acquired and used for training and testing the ``on-line''
    Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment mission capability. I
    support a solution that provides robust end-to-end system-level testing
    that evaluates the full tactical hardware and software. The concurrent
    test and operations solution should allow MDA to test the fully
    integrated operational system, flight test interceptors, and launch
    equipment using warfighters and operational tactics, techniques, and
    procedures, while the combatant commands maintain an on-alert posture
    for the BMDS.

        7. Senator Sessions. Mr. Duma, shouldn't we have this capability as
    soon as possible to ensure the operational effectiveness of the GMD
    system, even while we continue to test to improve the system?
        Mr. Duma. Yes. In fact, the GMD element has funded additional
    equipment in fiscal year 2006 that will allow the GMD element to
    achieve a limited initial concurrent test and operations capability.
    However, as MDA integrates additional defensive capability into BMDS, a
    corresponding concurrent test and operations capability should be
    developed and employed. This concurrent test and operations capability
    must reflect the operational configuration of the full BMDS capability.

                  BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE RELATED EFFORTS

        8. Senator Sessions. General Dodgen, please provide me a current
    status of your base realignment and closure (BRAC) related efforts and
    your move to Redstone Arsenal.
        General Dodgen. We are making rapid progress in complying with the
    BRAC directive to relocate the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
    headquarters element to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Since the command
    presently occupies the initial facility at the Von Braun Complex on
    Redstone Arsenal, our relocation is not slowed due to construction or
    leasing of necessary facilities. We have developed an implementation
    plan that takes care of our employees and ensures continuity of
    operations for the command. Rotating military personnel, along with
    civilians desiring to move with the command, will start to report to
    Redstone this summer. We anticipate compliance with the BRAC directive
    by 30 September 2007.

        9. Senator Sessions. General Obering, would you comment on the
    current status of BRAC preparation undertaken by the MDA. I know your
    task is much larger than General Dodgen's. Specifically, are you aware
    of a special emergency military construction (MILCON) supplemental
    designed to provide you more funds for your projects in the FYDP? I do
    not believe there is such a thing.
        General Obering. The MDA is committed to implementing the BRAC
    initiatives. We are working with the DOD and the Army Corps of
    Engineers to develop a realistic BRAC MILCON funding request to support
    the necessary construction at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama and Fort
    Belvoir, Virginia to accommodate BRAC move requirements. We are not
    aware of any special emergency military construction supplemental
    designed to provide MDA more funds for BRAC projects.

        10. Senator Sessions. General Obering, what are your MILCON
    concerns at this time impacting execution in fiscal year 2008?
        General Obering. The MDA is committed to implementing its BRAC
    recommendation within the statutory 6-year implementation period. We
    are working with the DOD and the Army to develop an implementation plan
    to both define the requirement and establish its phasing.

        11. Senator Sessions. General Obering, you and I work closely
    together, can we expect to have all the money we need in the fiscal
    year 2008 MILCON budget to cover the three buildings required to house
    the MDA and Redstone Arsenal?
        General Obering. The Department is committed to fully funding all
    BRAC recommendations.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                 possibility that gmd testing will not succeed
        12. Senator Levin. Mr. Duma, at the hearing there was some
    confusion about a question I asked concerning whether it is possible
    that the GMD test program will not demonstrate success, and thus will
    not provide confidence that the system is operationally effective. Just
    as there is a possibility that the testing will prove successful, is
    there a possibility that it will not prove successful, and that it will
    not demonstrate that it is operationally effective?
        Mr. Duma. Yes, there is always a possibility that testing of any
    acquisition program will show that it is not effective and suitable.

                          DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

        13. Senator Levin. General Obering, a recent DOD Inspector General
    (IG) report concluded, among other things, that the MDA ``had not
    completed a systems engineering plan or planned fully for system
    sustainment. Therefore, the MDA is at risk of not successfully
    developing an integrated BMDS.'' There are other findings and
    recommendations in the report. Given the hundreds of millions of
    dollars that the MDA spends on systems engineering, and the primacy of
    the objective to develop an integrated missile defense system, this
    appears to be a remarkable finding. Can you explain how these lapses in
    system engineering planning occurred and what you are doing to resolve
    them?
        General Obering. The MDA takes seriously the recommendations
    contained in the DOD IG's report. In our reply of 3 April 2006, MDA
    noted that MDA Systems Engineering developed an initial BMDS Systems
    Engineering Process to reflect a capability-based, spiral acquisition
    methodology--quite unlike other traditional processes. The DOD IG
    concurred with our comments and stated MDA provided systems engineering
    guidance to the elements of the BMDS.
        This process was implemented for the BMDS as part of Block 04. In
    collaboration with the BMDS elements, this process was modified,
    through the MDA Configuration Control Board, for BMDS Block 06 and is
    being documented in the BMDS System Engineering Plan that will be
    released this spring. When released, the plan will be distributed
    agency-wide to reestablish consistent guidance across the BMDS.

        14. Senator Levin. General Obering, have you provided your
    responses to the IG's office, as was requested by April 3?
        General Obering. Yes. On 3 April 2006 MDA provided a full response
    to the DOD IG to the Final Audit Report #D-2006-060 for the Audit of
    Systems Engineering Planning for the BMDS.

        15. Senator Levin. General Obering, the report also indicates that
    MDA revised its ``policy so that auditors from the DOD Office of IG
    receive expeditious and unrestricted access to documents in future
    audits.'' Was it MDA policy previously not to provide such expeditious
    and unrestricted access to IG auditors?
        General Obering. No. MDA policy is, and has always been, to
    cooperate with audit agencies, respond constructively and promptly, and
    take appropriate corrective actions based on audit agencies' reports.
    Additionally, it is MDA policy that all MDA staff cooperates with
    auditors and provides accurate, complete information pertinent to the
    subject under review and responds expeditiously to audit agencies'
    requests.

                            SPACE-BASED BMD WEAPONS

        16. Senator Levin. General Obering, does the planned funding for
    the space ``test bed'' put the country on a course to deploy weapons in
    space?
        General Obering. Developing a space test bed does not necessarily
    put the United States on a course to deploy weapons in space. We need
    to integrate space capabilities into the BMDS in order to ensure global
    access and meet the evolving threat. The space test bed will allow us
    to assess the ability of existing and future space systems to support
    the missile defense mission area, particularly in the areas of global
    communications and sensor capability. These systems will have value to
    the BMDS regardless of any particular interceptor basing mode.
        We also plan to explore the addition of a space-based defensive
    layer to complement the evolutionary BMDS. We believe that a mix of
    terrestrial and space-basing offers the most effective global defense
    against ballistic missiles. Initially, funding will be used to conduct
    focused sensor and communications experiments demonstrating the
    viability of space based capabilities for the BMDS. MDA believes it is
    prudent to conduct experimentation to understand what it is capable and
    what is not capable in that regard.

                            COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

        17. Senator Levin. Secretary Flory, your prepared testimony states
    that ``we are negotiating a Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement
    with Russia to facilitate both government-to-government as well as
    industry-to-industry missile defense cooperation, while we continue to
    seek practical areas of cooperation with Russia on a bilateral basis as
    well as in the NATO-Russia context.'' We have not yet had any
    substantial success in such cooperation. Section 1226 of last year's
    National Defense Authorization Act expressed the support of Congress
    for such cooperation, and suggested a number of specific ideas. What
    has the Department done on those ideas, and what progress do you expect
    from the current efforts?
        Mr. Duma. The Russian Government has told us that they do not want
    to agree to any missile defense cooperative projects until both sides
    agree on a Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement. The USG has
    respected those wishes.
        In the meantime, the DOD has pursued several transparency
    initiatives. In September 2005, we informed the Russian Government
    about an upcoming test of the U.S. missile defense system because the
    flight path of the test missile was relatively close to Russian
    territory. DOD invited the Russian Government to send an official to
    observe the test and to receive a briefing. Defense Minister Ivanov
    subsequently sent a message to Secretary Rumsfeld thanking him for
    inviting an observer and stating that such concrete steps demonstrated
    a new level of trust in the relationship between the two armed forces.
    In addition, DOD has regularly briefed senior Russian officials on our
    missile defense programs.
        DOD has also pursued a series of missile defense exercises with the
    Russian armed forces. These exercises alternate between Moscow and the
    United States. Their purpose is to establish procedures that will allow
    both militaries to operate missile defenses cooperatively in the event
    that they deploy under combat conditions in the same theatre. Hundreds
    of military personnel have participated in these exercises on both
    sides.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                             SECTION 234 TEST PLAN

        18. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, at the hearing there seemed to
    be some confusion on the issue of the question on the status of section
    234 of Public Law 109-163. My question related to the status of
    implementation of the test plan for Block 2006, as required by section
    234, rather than the Integrated Master Test Plan. Since we are already
    in Block 06, the test plan should be available to influence the testing
    activities for Block 2006. What is the current status of the effort to
    prepare the test plan and who is participating?
        Mr. Duma. The Service Operational Test Agencies prepared the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Assessment Plan, in coordination
    with my office and the MDA. I approved the plan on June 30, 2006, and
    sent copies to the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Committees.

        19. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, is there any current holdup to
    the preparation of the plan? If so, what is it?
        Mr. Duma. No. The Service Operational Test Agencies prepared the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Assessment Plan, in coordination
    with my office and the MDA. I approved the plan on June 30, 2006, and
    sent copies to the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Committees.

        20. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, when do you expect to receive
    the plan for your review and approval? Please notify the committee when
    you have received the plan, when you have approved the plan (assuming
    you do), and please send a copy of the approved plan.
        Mr. Duma. The Service Operational Test Agencies prepared the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Assessment Plan, in coordination
    with my office and the MDA. I approved the plan on June 30, 2006, and
    sent copies to the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Committees.

                         EUROPEAN ``THIRD SITE'' ISSUES

        21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, the fiscal year 2007
    budget request includes $119 million in funding for a number of
    activities associated with designing and building a third deployment
    site for GBIs for the GMD system, including long-lead funds for 10
    interceptors to deploy in Europe (GBIs 41-50). What is the total
    estimated cost of building the third site, building and deploying the
    10 interceptors, and deploying the associated radars that would operate
    in conjunction with the interceptors?
        General Obering. Total costs associated with the planned European
    Activities are:

             $1,650 million for European Missile Field including:

                     $317 million for Launch Complex Hardware and
                    Site Activation Support (Procurement and Installation
                    of Silos, Launch Support Equipment), Interceptor
                    Emplacement
                     $141 million for Communications Equipment and
                    Connectivity to the GMD Fire Control/Communication
                    Network to Include Satellite and Secure Communication
                     $669 million for Missile Field Construction:
                    Planning and Design of the Site, Site Preparation,
                    Construction of Supporting Facilities and Primary
                    Mission Facilities
                     $358 million for Government Furnished
                    Equipment, Services, Management, and Program Protection
                     $165 million for System Engineering, Sub-
                    System Checkout Testing, Embedded Test Node, and System
                    Test Lab Upgrade

             $484 million for Block 2010 GBIs (Procurement and
            Integration of 10 Kill Vehicles and 10 Boosters)
             $603 million is the current estimated costs for C2BMC,
            from fiscal years 2008-2011. This cost includes development of
            the site; equipment installation costs; procurement or
            connection of the Defense Satellite Communication System
            (DSCS); and operation and support costs
             $220 million is the current estimated costs to
            upgrade, transport, and site the GBR-P to the European Site.
            However, funding for this effort is not contained in the fiscal
            year 2007 President's budget submit
             $46.4 million is the current estimated costs to
            deployment and site construction of FBX-T

        Finally, the success of the European Site requires the use of a
    midcourse sensor (GBR-P) or a forward based radar (FBX-T) working in
    concert with forward deployed interceptors. Optimally, all three
    elements, the European Site interceptor field, the midcourse sensor,
    and a forward-based radar, provide the best missile defense coverage
    for the U.S. and European friends and allies. However, a forward based
    radar, deployed in the European area of operations as a stand-alone
    system, still significantly enhances U.S. based interceptor fields'
    (Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Bases) ability to defend against
    emerging ballistic missile threats within the region.

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, is it correct that the
    United States is expecting to pay for these costs, other than some in-
    kind contributions provided by the relevant host nation?
        General Obering. Yes. The costs for the missile defense site in
    Europe we have provided you will be paid by the United States.

        23. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, which nations is the
    system supposed to protect against a potential future Iranian long-
    range missile threat?
        General Obering. A European third GBI site will protect the United
    States against a potential future Iranian long-range ballistic missile
    threat (range greater than 5,500 kilometers) and Europe against both a
    potential future Iranian intermediate range ballistic missile threat
    (range from 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and also some medium-range
    ballistic missile threats (approximate ranges of 2,500 to 3,000
    kilometers). The amount of protection is dependent both on the
    placement of the site and on the placement of a search and track sensor
    on the European continent.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, is it the U.S., is it
    part of Europe, or a combination?
        General Obering. It is a combination of protection of both the
    United States and Europe. A European third GBI site will protect the
    United States against a potential future Iranian long-range ballistic
    missile threat (range greater than 5,500 kilometers) and Europe against
    both a potential future Iranian intermediate range ballistic missile
    threat (range from 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and also some medium
    range ballistic missile threats (approximate ranges of 2,500 to 3,000
    kilometers). The amount of protection is dependent both on the
    placement of the interceptor site and on the forward placement of a
    search and track sensor on the European continent.

              EUROPEAN GBI EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST A THEATER MISSILE

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, if Iran wanted to strike
    targets in Europe with ballistic missiles, it appears that they could
    develop a regional missile before they would develop an
    intercontinental missile. Would the GMD/GBI third site system be
    effective in defending Europe against Iranian medium-range or
    intermediate-range missiles?
        General Obering. It is reasonable to expect that Iran would develop
    a regional ballistic missile before they would develop an
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (range greater than 5,500
    kilometers). A regional ballistic missile would be the equivalent of
    what MDA defines as intermediate range ballistic missiles (range from
    3,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and medium range ballistic missiles (range
    from 1,000 to 3,000 kilometers). A European GBI site would be effective
    in defending Europe against Iranian regional ballistic missiles
    depending on the range. The GBI could defend against Iranian
    intermediate range ballistic missiles (range from 3,000 to 5,500
    kilometers) and some medium range ballistic missiles (approximately
    2,500 to 3,000 kilometers). Other BMDS assets such as THAAD and Aegis
    BMD do provide defense against medium-range ballistic missiles
    including those in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers.

        ROGUE INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO UNITED STATES

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering and General Dodgen, at our
    worldwide threats hearing in February, the Director of National
    Intelligence (DNI), Ambassador Negroponte, and the Director of the
    Defense Intelligence Agency (DDIA), General Maples, did not even
    mention in their prepared testimony the efforts of North Korea or Iran
    to develop long-range ballistic missiles. They did discuss their
    efforts to develop regional missiles. In answer to a question about
    North Korea, General Maples said: ``We assess that they are in the
    process of developing an ICBM that would be capable of delivering a
    nuclear warhead, but they have not done so yet, nor have they tested
    it.''
        At a later hearing, General Bell, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea,
    said that he agreed with General Maples' characterization of North
    Korea's ballistic missile programs, and added that: ``Up through the
    late 1990s, there was a fairly active program in North Korea to develop
    that missile technology and potentially to test it. In the years since
    the late 1990s, the last 6 years, 7 years, we have seen very little
    activity by the North Koreans to actively continue to develop and test
    long-range missile systems. There is no doubt in my mind that they have
    the capability to begin more technological investigation and to begin a
    regimen to lead to testing and potentially to lead to fielding. But
    there's no evidence of it right now.'' Do you agree or disagree with
    these assessments of the DNI, DDIA, and the Commander of U.S. Forces
    Korea?
        General Obering. MDA has no basis upon which to disagree with the
    DNI, DDIA, and General Bell's intelligence assessments. MDA relies on
    Intelligence Community (IC) assessments as one portion of the range of
    threats that the BMDS is designed to protect against. As the system
    developer, MDA is not in a position to provide or assess intelligence,
    or to generate requirements. Rather, MDA must develop the BMDS based on
    current assessment of not only what is intelligence based, but what is
    within the realm of the possible engineering so as not to be surprised.
    The BMDS must look beyond assessments of current potential adversary
    capabilities to ensure the ability of the United States to deal with
    unforeseen future threats. MDA's evolutionary acquisition program,
    therefore, addresses the evolving ballistic missile threat.
        General Dodgen. I concur with the threat assessments made by
    Ambassador Negroponte, General Maples, and General Bell during their
    recent testimony concerning North Korea's ICBM development efforts. In
    August 1998, North Korea did demonstrate a rudimentary capability to
    launch a long-range ballistic missile airframe. Although we have seen
    very little activity to actively develop and test an ICBM since that
    event, we believe the North Korean regime still continues to pursue and
    develop ballistic missile/space launch technology that can be used to
    advance their long-range missile capabilities. From a warfighter
    perspective, it cannot be overlooked that North Korean has recently
    developed and tested other classes of ballistic missiles and have
    continued to pursue opportunities to export these capabilities to other
    countries on numerous occasions. The significant evidence of a
    continuously improving North Korean ballistic missile capability, with
    the added intent to export, certainly should continue to motivate our
    desires to stay ahead of the proliferating threat with our missile
    defense programs.

                     CHANGING DOD OVERSIGHT OF BMD PROGRAMS

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, Mr. Duma's prepared
    testimony described briefly a changing DOD oversight structure for the
    BMD System and program, consistent with the Quadrennial Defense Review.
    His statement mentions a new BMD Executive Board. Could you describe
    the proposed new structure and your role in implementing it?
        General Obering. This Executive Board, with membership drawn from
    OSD, the Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and STRATCOM, will
    recommend and oversee implementation of strategic policies and plans,
    program priorities, and investment options to protect our Nation and
    our allies from any form of ballistic missile attack. The Board will
    provide guidance to MDA as it develops and fields initial capabilities
    and conducts spiral development to upgrade the elements and components
    that make up the BMDS. The Board will also consider the evolving
    priorities and requirements of the warfighting community as it
    formulates recommendations on the way forward in missile defense.
        The BMD Executive Board will enhance the DOD's decisionmaking
    process by focusing exclusively on issues related to the BMDS. The
    precise details of the charter, including the membership and decision
    authority of the BMD Executive Board, are still being determined.

        28. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, how do you believe it
    will improve oversight of the BMD program, and when do you expect the
    new Executive Board will be in place?
        General Obering. In 2001 the Secretary of Defense formed the Senior
    Executive Council (SEC) to provide counsel on the application of sound
    business practices across the DOD. BMD is one of a broad range of
    mission areas overseen by the SEC. The BMD Executive Board will not
    have decision authority like the SEC, but it will help enhance the
    Department's decision making process by focusing exclusively on issues
    related to the BMDS.
        The Board, with senior official membership drawn from OSD, the
    Services, JCS, and STRATCOM, will recommend and oversee implementation
    of strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and investment
    options to protect our Nation and our allies from any form of ballistic
    missile attack. The Board will incorporate evolving requirements into a
    comprehensive acquisition strategy to develop and field operational
    missile defense capability. It will improve information flow among key
    stakeholders: the MDA, Office of the Secretary of Defense, combatant
    commanders, DOD components, the Joint Staff, and the National Security
    Council and IC. The Board will establish a viable means to achieve our
    goals within the context of technical capability and established
    resource levels.
        The Board will guide new ideas and technologies as they develop
    into initial capabilities, and subsequently into fully mature solutions
    ready for fielding and inclusion into the missile defense system. The
    Board will also consider the evolving priorities and requirements of
    the warfighting community as it formulates recommendations on the way
    forward.
        I expect the BMD Executive Board will be in place by some time this
    summer.

                    u.s.-israel missile defense cooperation
        29. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, for years, the United
    States has been concerned with the aggressive nature of Iran and its
    desire to develop a nuclear weapons capability and the missile systems
    to deliver it. Israel, in partnership with the United States, has been
    focused on the advanced development, production, and deployment of an
    anti-ballistic missile system called the Arrow. I understand that the
    Arrow is the only Israeli system deployed that can address this threat.
    Given the growing missile threat in the Middle East, can we do more to
    accelerate the production of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system,
    increase deterrence in the region, and help stabilize the situation?
        General Obering. Since 1986, the United States and Israel have
    jointly developed the Arrow Weapon System (AWS) to provide Israel an
    indigenous capability to defend against short- and medium-range
    ballistic missiles. The current focus of the Arrow System Improvement
    Program (ASIP) is to upgrade the AWS to counter evolving longer-range
    and more challenging ballistic missile threats. The current ASIP
    program ends in fiscal year 2008.

             Israel seeks to develop a ``hermetic'' or zero leakage
            defense system. The Israeli Ministry of Defense has identified
            new threats in the region with non-conventional capabilities.
            While the current Israeli Missile Defense Architecture has some
            capability against these emerging threats, it does not provide
            an adequate number of opportunities to ensure a zero leakage
            defense.
             The Israel Missile Defense Organization wants to start
            discussions in fiscal year 2007 regarding a possible post-ASIP
            program to counter emerging threats. They have requested an
            additional $8 million to start a joint study and conceptual
            design of the necessary enhancements. The proposed post-ASIP
            program, Arrow Missile Segment Enhancement program, will add an
            upper-tier level of defense to the current Arrow II interceptor
            to provide additional engagement opportunities.
             MDA has expected a follow-on program to begin at the
            conclusion of the current ASIP agreement. This program is
            outlined in the President's budget as ``Arrow Block 5'' and
            includes $55.0 million in fiscal year 2009, $57.7 million in
            fiscal year 2010, and $59.4 million in fiscal year 2011. While
            MDA plans for a follow-on program to continue Arrow
            enhancements, there are indications that the ASIP program may
            slip into fiscal year 2009 and recommends focusing on the
            current Arrow program vice beginning any follow-on program.
            Additionally, MDA recommends looking at U.S. systems (like
            THAAD) to satisfy the Israeli requirements for an upper tier
            system to meet this growing threat.

        30. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, if Congress were to
    authorize and appropriate additional funds for Arrow coproduction, is
    there the necessary production capability to execute the program?
        General Obering. Yes.
        Background: Since 2004, this program has enabled Boeing to support
    Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) in producing components for the Arrow
    interceptor, increasing monthly production capabilities by 300 percent
    and thus drastically shortening the acquisition time line for reaching
    Israeli Air Force's operational requirements. Components produced by
    Boeing are shipped to IAI for final integration and assembly. On 29
    September 2005, the first coproduced Arrow Interceptor was delivered to
    the Israel Missile Defense Organization.

             The State of Israel has requested an additional $50
            million for fiscal year 2007. This would be an addition to the
            $13 million from the President's budget request for Arrow
            Weapon System coproduction to make further progress towards
            meeting Israel's defense requirements. Each Coproduced Arrow II
            Interceptor costs $2.6 million.
             MDA has budgeted $13 million in fiscal year 2007 for
            coproduction. Israel plans to contribute $6 million (should
            additional U.S. funding be provided), Israeli will increase
            their contribution to maintain the 67 percent/33 percent cost
            share. If Israel receives this add, this will be the last year
            for the coproduction program as Arrow II interceptor inventory
            will meet Israeli Air Force requirements. Due to this, there is
            minimal benefit to increasing production to reduce the
            acquisition time line.

        31. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, research and development
    on technologies that protect against additional threats such as shorter
    range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles may also benefit from
    Arrow's mature capability. I understand MDA has programmed $2.0 million
    for fiscal year 2007, in addition to funds already provided by Congress
    for fiscal year 2006. What would this funding accomplish by the end of
    fiscal year 2007 and what is the plan to continue this research in 2008
    and beyond?
        General Obering. These funds were to be used in the U.S. for a
    study to explore possible U.S. benefits from the Israeli Short Range
    Ballistic Missile Defense (SRBMD) system. At this time MDA has not
    committed to the SRBMD program and is not seeking funding for this
    effort.
        Background: In March 2005, Israel initiated an 18-month feasibility
    study of a low-cost SRBMD capability as an enhancement to the AWS.
    Israel requires a wide-area active defense system against the current
    and growing threat to Israeli civilians from short-range, relatively
    low-tech, and inexpensive ballistic missiles. The current Israeli
    Missile Defense Architecture (Patriot and Arrow) has capability against
    some of these short-range missile threats but does not provide a cost-
    effective defense. The goal is $300,000 per missile cost vs. the $2-3
    million per Arrow or Patriot missile. For fiscal year 2006, Congress
    made $10 million available for a joint feasibility study designated the
    SRBMD initiative.

             For fiscal year 2007, Israel requested an additional
            $25 million to begin the first phase of Full Scale Development
            of a short-range BMDS. The goal for fiscal year 2007 is to
            complete the Preliminary Design Review.
             For fiscal year 2008 and beyond, Israel plans on
            requesting $40 million a year to continue Full Scale
            Development. Additionally, MDA's independent cost analysis
            estimate of total research and development and production costs
            for this proposed short-range system is $500 million.

        [Whereupon at 12:44 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006

                                    U.S. Senate
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                            MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:34 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Thune, Reed,
    and Bill Nelson.
        Majority staff member present: Robert M. Soofer,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    minority counsel; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff
    member.
        Staff assistants present: Jill L. Simodejka and Pendred K.
    Wilson.
        Committee members' assistants present: Arch Galloway II,
    assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
    Senator Chambliss: Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator
    Kennedy; Erik Raven, assistant to Senator Byrd; and William K.
    Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson.

              STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. The hearing will come to order.
        Senator Reed, we're glad you're with us, and I think
    Senator Nelson will join us. I'm pleased to welcome our
    witnesses today, the Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Under Secretary
    of the Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) Executive
    Agent for Space, a dual hat there; Lieutenant General Kevin P.
    Chilton, USAF, Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component
    Commander for Space and Global Strike; Lieutenant General
    Michael A. Hamel, USAF, Commander of the Air Force Space and
    Missile Systems Center; Rear Admiral Kenneth W. Deutsch, USN?
        Admiral Deutsch. Sprechen sie Deutsch, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Deutsch. Right? Nein. [Laughter.]
        You're the Director of the Net-Centric Warfare Division for
    the Navy.
        Admiral Deutsch. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain--and that's the
    correct pronunciation?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes.
        Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain is the Acting Director for
    Acquisition and Sourcing Management for the United States
    Government Accountability Office (GAO). So, you're the
    independent evaluator here, and we appreciate your report and
    opinion.
        I thank the witnesses for taking time to be with us, and
    for their continuing commitment to our Nation's security.
        The subcommittee today meets to receive testimony on the
    military space programs of the DOD in review of the National
    Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2007. The
    subcommittee intends to address the budgetary and programmatic
    aspects of satellite and space launch programs and to
    investigate the progress that has been made by the DOD to
    improve the space acquisition process that had some
    difficulties, for sure.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget request for all nonclassified
    military activities is approximately $10.5 billion, of which $6
    billion is for research and development (R&D), a large sum,
    $2.3 billion is for procurement, and $2.2 billion for
    operations and maintenance. The current generation of military
    space systems is being modernized in virtually every mission
    area: strategic missile warning, assured communications,
    navigations, and intelligence and surveillance.
        I would just note that satellite capabilities are
    absolutely critical to the defense of our country, for the
    operation of all our military Services, effectively. Even the
    Army now, with their Future Combat Systems (FCS), is utterly
    dependent upon the capabilities that you procure and produce
    for us. But, at the same time, virtually all of our
    modernization programs have suffered substantial problems with
    regard to cost, schedule, and technical performance, which has
    been estimated to cost the taxpayers some $1.7 billion in 2007
    alone, so that's a lot of money, and it's a problem we need to
    address.
        We welcome the new leadership in the Air Force space
    community and understand that this problem has been taken
    seriously, that you have moved quickly to effect reforms in the
    acquisition process. We hope to hear more about these reforms,
    in the hope of restoring congressional confidence in the
    acquisition of our military space programs. We want our
    Congress to feel confident about that when these budgetary
    requests come forward.
        Finally, we intend to review the current state of U.S.
    military space capabilities in support of the warfighter, and,
    related to this, the progress and potential for smaller, less
    expensive, and less complex space assets to support the theater
    warfighter in a timely manner.
        [The prepared statement by Senator Sessions follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions

        The hearing will come to order. Senator Nelson, welcome. I am
    pleased to welcome our witnesses today: the Honorable Ronald M. Sega,
    Under Secretary of the Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD)
    Executive Agent for Space; Lieutenant General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF,
    Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component Commander for Space and
    Global Strike; Lieutenant General Michael A. Hamel, USAF, Commander of
    the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center; Rear Admiral Kenneth W.
    Deutsch, USN, Director of Net-Centric Warfare for the Navy; and Ms.
    Cristina T. Chaplain, Acting Director for Acquisition and Sourcing
    Management for the U.S. Government Accountability Office. I thank the
    witnesses for taking time to be with us and for their continuing
    commitment to our Nation's security.
        The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the military
    space programs of the DOD in review of the National Defense
    Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2007. The subcommittee intends to
    address the budgetary and programmatic aspects of satellite and space
    launch platforms and investigate the progress that has been made by the
    process.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget request for all nonclassified military
    space activities is approximately $10.5 billion, of which $6 billion is
    for research and development, $2.3 billion for procurement, and $2.2
    billion for operations and maintenance.
        The current generation of military space systems are being
    modernized in virtually every mission area: strategic missile warning;
    assured communications; navigation; and intelligence and surveillance.
    At the same time, virtually every modernization program has suffered
    substantial problems with regard to cost, schedule, and technical
    performance, which will cost the taxpayer some $1.7 billion in fiscal
    year 2007 alone.
        We welcome the new leadership in the Air Force space community and
    understand they have moved quickly to effect reforms in the acquisition
    process. We hope to hear today more about these reforms in the hope of
    restoring congressional confidence in the acquisition of our military
    space programs.
        Finally, we intend to review the current state of U.S. military
    space capabilities in support of the warfighter and, related to this,
    the progress and potential for smaller, less expensive, and less
    complex space assets to support the theater warfighter in a timely
    manner.
        Let me now recognize my distinguished ranking member, Senator
    Nelson of Florida, for any opening remarks he may have.

        Senator Sessions. Senator Reed, if you would like to make
    some opening comments now, I'd be glad to receive those.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No, I don't. Senator
    Nelson might have some opening comments, but I'm interested in
    hearing the witnesses and thank them for being here today.
        Senator Sessions. Well, good, and we appreciate you.
        Someone has said, when you deal with programs, there are
    some questions that need to be asked. Is it a need or a want?
    We want a lot of things, but we may not need them all. If it is
    a need, when do we need it, and how much will it cost? How
    vital is that need compared to other needs that may be as
    vital, or more so? What are we going to have to give up to meet
    that need? So, those are some questions I think most of you
    understand and recognize as you do your jobs, but questions
    that are important.
        Secretary Sega, we're delighted to have you with us. We'd
    be delighted to hear your comments at this time. We have about
    a 5-minute round for each of you to speak. You can also make
    your remarks a part of the record and make more limited
    remarks, if you choose.
        Mr. Secretary?

     STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD M. SEGA, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
                                 FORCE

        Dr. Sega. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and
    distinguished members of the committee, I'm honored to appear
    before you today to discuss national security space. I thank
    you for allowing the written statement to be included as part
    of the record.
        As Under Secretary of the Air Force and the DOD Executive
    Agent for Space, I am committed to improving space capabilities
    upon which our commanders and forces depend to conduct their
    missions. I thank this committee and the entire Congress for
    your support to national security space efforts.
        Today, I want to outline the importance of space to our
    warfighters, and focus on three key areas for national
    security, and actually highlighting, principally, one, in terms
    of acquisition.
        During the last hurricane season, we witnessed weather
    satellites tracking hurricanes and rescuers using global
    positioning systems (GPS) and satellite imagery to direct
    relief efforts to the hardest hit areas, Hurricanes Katrina and
    Rita being the clearest examples.
        I'd like to relate two lesser known examples of the
    effectiveness of space systems. My first example concerns space
    support to the humanitarian missions in the Philippines. Space
    capabilities played a key role in our relief effort for a
    massive mudslide that buried an entire village on the island of
    Leyte. Within hours of the disaster, a Hawaii Air National
    Guard Combat Communications Unit that was in the area on an
    exercise, and switched into real-world humanitarian relief.
    They used an Eagle Vision system to quickly merge some archival
    commercial satellite imagery with mapping software, called
    Falcon View, and produced photos and gridded maps of the area,
    enabling them to locate fields that aircrews could, in fact,
    operate out of. Then they used the Eagle Vision to order,
    collect, and process new commercial imagery of the affected
    area, and they shared this information with U.S. responders, as
    well as the Philippine government agencies. This included
    images that compared the area before and after the mudslide,
    and enabled the authorities to move effectively to plan the
    rescue and relief operations. This same Guard unit returned to
    Hawaii shortly thereafter and began, immediately, rescue and
    recovery efforts in the island of Kauai.
        The second example comes from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
    specifically in March 2003. It was a planned night parachute
    drop by the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade. Weather was rough
    during that time. Of course, the mountains in northern Iraq are
    also very rough, and Captain--now a Major-select--John Roberts
    was very concerned. I had the privilege of talking to him just
    a few weeks ago. He was at an undisclosed location in Iraq. His
    10 years in Air Force service included 9 of which were directly
    assigned to U.S. Army units. He's eight jumps away from master
    jump wings. In March 2003, he was assigned to the 173rd
    Airborne Brigade in Italy. The plan was to jump into northern
    Iraq to secure that area.
        The week prior, all predictions were the weather was going
    to be horrible on the planned jump night. Brigade Commander
    Still said, ``This is the night, and got to make it work.''
    John spent the week studying model satellite photos, talking to
    his counterparts in the weather area in U.S. Central Command
    (CENTCOM) and U.S. Air Force, Europe (USAFE). All the
    information was bad. On March 26, 2003, which is jump day, he
    was now down to using satellite imagery to review the predicted
    weather window, which he saw as 1 hour in length as a front
    would move past.
        As he told me, he was betting his bars that day that the
    predicted short window of opportunity would lift and convinced
    the folks to change the takeoff time to match this weather
    time. Brigade in flight was on 16 C-17s. First 10 included
    troops numbering over 1,000, as I understand it, and the second
    group of, in this case 6, was with the equipment. An hour out,
    the ground team said the weather was still no-go, 800-foot
    ceilings, blowing snow. John came on the satellite phone to the
    brigade commander in the C-17 and convinced him to proceed,
    obviously keeping an eye on this weather satellite imagery.
    Thirty minutes out, the weather's still bad. Fifteen minutes
    out, the sky begins to clear, the jump happens on time. One
    hour after the jump, the weather closes back in. John landed
    the next day, the C-17, with this unit. For the Army folks, he
    could do no wrong.
        So, that's one example of someone that has used satellites
    to full advantage to effect military operations. Major-select
    John Roberts will be heading in June to Alabama to teach at
    Maxwell Air Force Base.
        Senator Sessions. That's a fabulous story. It's a life-and-
    death question, many times, with that capability. That's a good
    story.
        Dr. Sega. Thank you.
        The satellite assets, as you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
    are essential at various levels of military in planning and
    operations, but clearly are also important to our economy,
    homeland security, and other disaster response activities.
        I would like to focus on three areas of national security
    space. The first is to improve the integration of space
    capabilities across the national security space community, as
    well as with the air, land, and sea capabilities. The second
    area is to get back to basics in acquisition. I will go into
    that in a bit more detail. The third is to ensure the viability
    and proficiency of our space professionals and the science and
    technology workforce.
        I would like to refer to this one chart I have over my
    right-hand shoulder.
        The approach is a ``back to basics'' approach, and it has
    several components, one of which is to look at acquisition in
    terms of stages. This case, from the lower left of science and
    technology, building in technology maturity to a stage of
    technology development, to a next stage of systems development
    and systems production. The approach is to lower the risk in
    the system production phase while, at the same time, increasing
    risk that we take to push the frontiers hard in the science and
    technology, and, to a certain extent, the technology
    development phase.
        The goal is to identify clearly the requirements and the
    technologies available as you start block one. So, as we build
    in maturity of the technologies from this lower stage and
    moving on up this chart, science and technology, technology
    development, systems development, reaching a stage of roughly
    technology readiness level six as we begin block one, but also
    we need to work with the users, very continuously, in a
    collaborative way as we identify what is in block one. As we
    ask the users, ``What do you need?'' we are now in dialogue.
    They're asking, ``What do you have?'' and converging on, ``What
    is important that will meet needs in a specific time, with
    specific capability, with what we know we can build?'' So, the
    end result should be a decrease of the acquisition cycle time.
        Looking at program managers staying on for that reduced
    time through the extent of the block-one approach, technologies
    that are not ready for block one, we've relegated to later
    blocks. So, the requirements process is important, technology
    maturity is important, fundamentals in systems engineering are
    important, cost estimation and schedule.
        If I could give one example of this, is--what we have in
    the President's budget request in fiscal year 2007, is
    Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT).
    Through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process, the
    warfighters, combatant commanders (COCOMs), and folks in the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services did
    an extensive review of what we should have, going forward, in
    the DOD. One of those capabilities was satellite
    communications.
        It was determined, through that process, that the
    technologies that were identified as matured, not only
    identified by us internally, but also by GAO and Congress,
    constitute a block one.
        Senator Sessions. Would you, we assume that those that are
    listening may understand what TSAT is, and most of us do, but
    maybe you can give us a quick synopsis of what you plan for the
    TSAT program. What its capabilities are?
        Dr. Sega. I certainly will.
        Its name is derived from Transformational Satellite
    Communications System, and the main features that TSAT has that
    other satellites do not have includes a laser communications
    crosslink. So, with a laser communications crosslinks, the
    bandwidth, the capacity on that communications channel, is much
    higher than you can do with radio frequency (RF). The second
    major feature on that satellite is a router. It becomes a part
    of a network now in space. We have other pieces of our larger
    network that are being built that also provide the structure
    and the framework for network-centric operations. One of those
    would be the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). It's becoming
    more of a communications node on the network.
        The TSAT is a sophisticated communications system enabling
    us to more effectively communicate with Army forces, FCS, when
    they're on the move, and to bring the information back, as you
    would in a more modern Internet protocol packet-based system.
    Our current systems are like a switch, like the old operator
    that used to plug in from one wire of one person that wanted to
    communicate, and connect them to someone else with another wire
    at the operator station. What we have in space, is this switch
    of an operator connecting one to another. TSAT provides us a
    router in space at high bandwidth. That is a fundamental change
    from what we have done in the past, and it is an enabler for
    what we want to do in the future.
        Now, we also, then, by reducing what we are expecting out
    of block one, reduce the weight of the satellite's estimate
    from over 5,000 pounds in the payload to less than 3,500
    pounds. So, we began a more conservative approach of building
    this on time and on schedule.
        Now, working with the warfighters, we also increased the
    bandwidth capacity on systems that we're well familiar with, KA
    band. Capability of the satellite actually was increased by a
    factor of two in this trade space that the technical community,
    the acquisition community, was making with the warfighters. In
    the budget request in 2007 is block one and some money that'll
    continue the systems development phase that will continue
    working on that technology that wasn't right, and then, when it
    is ready, move into satellites three, four, and beyond.
        We also looked at the cost estimation. Consistent with GAO
    recommendations, the Young panel and others, what you see in
    the budget in fiscal year 2007 is an 80 percent confidence
    figure in terms of our budget estimates, as well. So, more
    conservative approach into the systems production phase of
    TSAT, as one example coming out of this budget request the
    block approach and incremental approach to continuing providing
    increased capability for the warfighter.
        So, they will be getting a increased capability in a rhythm
    of arrival at fielded capabilities as we move on in time. The
    production base will also see a rhythm of production occurring
    in time, so there'll be more stability from a production
    standpoint.
        We need to also be careful on how our investment portfolio
    looks, in terms of what is in the next-generation systems
    development, the one after that, technology development, and
    still the generation after that, science and technology, so it
    fits together? So, we're maturing technology as we move forward
    up the chart. We're also maturing our people, giving our folks
    more opportunity to get hands-on experience in these lower
    levels of this staged development. So, when they also are
    moving up in experience, they will have the technical instincts
    to be experienced managers as they move up to managing some of
    these more sophisticated systems.
        So that's the block approach, going forward. That's an
    example, on the very large side.
        On the smaller side is a renewed emphasis in smaller
    satellites. Here we're looking at going forward in a strategy
    of bringing together more of our laboratories and our product
    centers. So we have an example of that in XSS-11, that was
    scheduled to be built from start to finish in 36 months and
    around $80 million. It was bumped onto a couple of different
    boosters, and it ended up at 39 months. It's been on orbit for
    almost a year now, and working quite effectively with the Air
    Force Research Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base, Space and
    Missile Systems Command, working there, and contractor
    Lockheed-Martin, being flown there, out of Albuquerque.
        So, small satellites, and a subset of those are TacSats,
    tactical satellites, will be part of our future, going forward.
    It fits very well in this construct, also.
        I've certainly taken quite a bit of time here.
        Space is clearly important. I think we all share that. Mr.
    Chairman, I appreciate the continued support of Congress and
    this committee to ensure we have what is necessary to deliver
    vital capabilities to our warfighters. I thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Sega follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Ronald M. Sega

                                  INTRODUCTION

        It is my distinct honor to appear before the committee today to
    discuss our National Security Space activities as Under Secretary of
    the Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent for
    Space. As the DOD Executive Agent for Space, my role is to ``develop,
    coordinate, and integrate plans and programs for space systems and the
    acquisition of DOD space Major Defense Acquisition Programs to provide
    operational space force capabilities to ensure the United States has
    the space power to achieve its national security objectives.''
        The President's budget, released on February 6, 2006, ``focuses
    taxpayer resources on national priorities like the war on terrorism,
    health care, energy research and strengthening our global
    competitiveness,'' and includes defense spending to ``maintain a high
    level of military readiness, develop and procure new weapon systems to
    ensure U.S. battlefield superiority, and support our service members
    and their families.'' This budget ``reflects the Department's continued
    shift in emphasis away from the static posture and forces of the last
    century toward the highly mobile and expeditionary forces, and
    accompanying warfighting capabilities, needed in the century ahead.''
        As discussed in the Secretary of the Air Force's and Chief of Staff
    of the Air Force's testimony in the 2006 Air Force Posture Statement,
    ``The U.S. depends upon the Air Force to supply critical space
    capabilities to meet the needs of Joint operations worldwide, and also
    the needs of national missions across the instruments of diplomatic,
    informational, military and economic power.'' These space capabilities
    enable the U.S. to assure allies, dissuade military competition, deter
    threats and decisively defeat adversaries. The National Security Space
    community must address the 21st century defense challenges by
    ``modernizing critical capabilities across the spectrum of global
    strike, navigation, weather, communication, missile warning, launch,
    surveillance, counterspace and ground-based space systems.''
        Today, I want to outline the importance of space to our warfighters
    and then focus on three key areas for national security space. The
    first is to improve the integration of space capabilities across the
    national security space community, as well as with air, land, and sea-
    based capabilities. The second area is to get ``back-to-basics'' in
    space acquisition. The third is to ensure the viability and proficiency
    of our space professionals and science and technology (S&T) workforce.
        Before I discuss each of these areas, it is important to reiterate
    the importance of space capabilities to our Nation. Space pervades many
    aspects of everyday life in America. Space services enter homes,
    businesses, schools, hospitals, and government offices to affect
    transportation, health, telecommunications, weather forecasting,
    education, commerce, agriculture, and energy. Space services are
    transforming major aspects of commercial and social activity and will
    continue to do so as emerging technologies increase the satellite
    capabilities. Our Nation's ability to respond to events around the
    world is heavily enabled by space-based capabilities whether defending
    our borders, facilitating disaster assistance at home or aiding
    disaster victims in the Far East.
        From a military standpoint, leveraging our space capabilities
    provides the U.S. with an asymmetric advantage over our adversaries in
    our fight to win the ``Long War,'' the global war on terror. Today's
    fast-paced military environment requires global connectivity between
    many fast-moving elements. Satellite communications (SATCOM) is the
    backbone that connects forces to allow an intercontinental flow of
    information whether in remote deserts or crowded urban terrain.
        Space-based warning systems help to defend our forces abroad as
    well as the American homeland from ballistic missile attack. Successful
    cueing of defensive systems allows timely responses to attacks. This
    past December, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology
    and Logistics certified and restructured the Space Based Infrared
    System (SBIRS) High program. As part of the certification, it was
    determined that this program is essential to national security, there
    are no other lower cost alternatives, the program cost estimate is
    reasonable, and the management structure is adequate. The first
    Geosynchronous Earth Orbit satellite (GEO-1) is now planned to launch
    in fall 2008. Given the continued importance of the missions, the
    Department will work with Congress to initiate a new, competitor
    capability in parallel with the SBIRS program to ensure that the
    Nation's missile warning capability is sustained and that support to
    theater and strategic missile defense, technical intelligence, and
    battlespace characterization is also achieved. This proposed program
    should exploit new technologies to provide the Department with
    additional options for making decisions related to these mission areas.
    The Department will also conduct enhanced oversight of the SBIRS
    program to ensure that cost, schedule, and performance are closely
    monitored.
        Battle-space awareness, coupled with precision weapons such as
    those guided by Global Positioning System (GPS), allows our forces to
    successfully engage enemy targets with a minimal number of weapons and
    limited collateral damage. In fact, precision strike is no longer just
    a goal; it is an expectation.
        Space-based ISR systems, by providing global presence and
    increasing persistence, provide data that make it possible for military
    commanders and national decision makers to lift the fog of war over the
    battlespace. Detailed information from space systems helps us utilize
    limited national resources more effectively. Only with space systems
    can we consistently observe remote or denied areas to help us better
    prepare for and respond to threats. In addition to military
    applications, space-related capabilities also help national leaders
    make foreign policy decisions by supplying key data for diplomatic
    decisionmaking, helping verify treaty compliance, and monitoring
    diplomatic crises.
        Future ISR systems, such as Space Radar, will give users more
    persistent, worldwide, day, night, and all-weather knowledge of enemy
    movement. When integrated with other space-based systems and
    terrestrial systems, this additional source of information will provide
    more robust battle space awareness.
        Space capabilities also play an important role in disaster response
    and homeland security. For example, our weather satellites observed
    Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and provided data for forecasting their
    strengths and impacts. After these storms disrupted many normal means
    of navigation and communication, response teams relied on GPS for
    precise navigation and used SATCOM to coordinate their efforts. Space-
    derived data aided the disaster response in many ways to help alleviate
    the severity of these disasters.
        Aside from commercial industries that use space services directly,
    space has a pervasive economic and social impact. Many banking and
    financial firms employ GPS timing to synchronize their encrypted
    computer networks. With the rise of computer-based stock trading and e-
    commerce, precise timing of transactions is becoming more important,
    and GPS is a key mechanism for distributing these necessary timing
    signals.
        Maintaining the asymmetric advantages we enjoy today in space will
    continue to be vital to U.S. national security in the future.
    Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly demonstrate that space-
    enabled warfare is the way we will fight current and future battles.
    Plans for future military capabilities across the entire DOD reflect
    this new reality. For example, the Army's Future Combat System (FCS)
    will operate in more complex battle environments requiring a mix of
    manned and unmanned systems connected by a network. To provide global
    connectivity, that network will rely on space-based communication
    systems. The Transformational Satellite (TSAT) Communications Program
    is being developed to support the extension of the Global Information
    Grid (GIG) to deployed and mobile users, allowing the warfighter and
    other users increased agility and effectiveness in dispersed,
    decentralized and constantly changing environments.
        In order to provide continuous, reliable space services, we must
    ensure access to space. This past year I had the opportunity to witness
    the final Titan IV launch. Culminating a nearly 50 year history of the
    Titan program, this launch out of our West Coast facility at Vandenberg
    Air Force Base, extended a record 44 consecutive successful national
    security launches. We are maintaining this assured access to space by
    using the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) as we
    simultaneously investigate new Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
    launch options.
        The Air Force is continuing its pursuit of ORS small satellite
    capabilities with the potential to rapidly deploy and employ
    communication, ISR, and other space capabilities. The range of
    opportunities for small satellites includes not only rapid response
    capabilities such as TACSATs, but also development of small satellites
    as standard elements or backups for global constellation operations,
    and as enablers for more aggressive S&T and technology/system
    development programs.
        Since space capabilities are so vital to our defense as well as our
    everyday life, they must be protected. As we become more operationally
    tied to space systems, future adversaries will try to deny us the
    asymmetric advantages that space provides us. The Space Commission
    pointed out in 2001 that the U.S. is an attractive candidate for a
    ``Space Pearl Harbor.'' We saw the beginnings of this with GPS jamming
    in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While the United States supports the
    peaceful use of space by all, it has been our Nation's policy since
    1996 to ensure hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space, and
    to counter, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile
    purposes, preferably using temporary or reversible manners.
        The first step in protecting our space capabilities is improving
    our Space Situation Awareness (SSA). SSA forms the foundation for all
    of space control and includes traditional space surveillance,
    collection and processing of space intelligence data, analysis of the
    space environment, and the fusion of these elements to contribute to a
    better understanding of the space domain.
        Space control activities also emphasize the protection of our
    national security interests against potential vulnerabilities and
    rapidly evolving threats. We are increasing our focus on ensuring our
    assets will meet operational requirements in a growing and changing
    threat environment.
        Our DOD Space areas of emphasis--integration, acquisition basic
    back to basics, and workforce development--are aimed at continued
    access and successful exploitation of space in support of our
    warfighters.

              INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE CAPABILITIES

        Efficient operation of on-orbit and ground assets requires
    integrating space capabilities with other operational military systems
    and between the military and intelligence communities. While our space
    systems function well individually, we need them to work together for
    maximum effect on the battlefield. We have learned from our experience
    integrating air and space operations into Combined Air Operations
    Centers (CAOC) that our systems should complement one another rather
    than compete against each other. The best overall effect should be
    realized by a mix of integrated systems; combining orbiting platforms
    with manned and unmanned aircraft, ground-based assets, and other
    systems, linked together so they share data, and cue one another.
        Space capabilities serve the interests of a wide array of
    stakeholders: the DOD, including the combatant commanders and fielded
    forces; the Department of State (DOS); the Department of Commerce; and
    the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Intelligence
    Community. As the DOD Executive Agent for Space, I have had the
    opportunity to visit five of the combatant commands--Pacific Command
    (PACOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),
    Central Command (CENTCOM), and Special Operations Command (SOCOM)--to
    discuss first-hand their needs and requirements. I also work with the
    Joint Staff and the Army, Navy, and Air Force space components to gain
    similar insights. Through ongoing interaction with the Defense space
    acquisition community, government laboratories, Defense Advanced
    Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Federally Funded Research and
    Development Centers (FFRDCs), industry, academia, and the Director of
    the National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO), we are enhancing links
    between the warfighters and the acquisition community. In particular,
    the activities of the DOD Executive Agent for Space and the DNRO, Dr.
    Don Kerr, must be coordinated. I assure you that Don Kerr and I work
    closely together to provide continuity and focus to the overall
    National Security Space portfolio. This is especially important as we
    consider the need to improve planning, development, acquisition, and
    management of our space capabilities.
        The government relies on a robust space industrial base to provide
    the systems, technologies, and services necessary to maintain our space
    capabilities. A good example is the commercial SATCOM industry. The DOD
    depends on a vast network of commercial ground and space-based systems
    to meet its telecommunications needs. In particular, commercial SATCOM
    is a large part of the space communication system that supports the
    warfighter. Current estimates are that commercial SATCOM provided about
    60 percent of the wideband SATCOM during Operation Enduring Freedom and
    up to 80 percent of the SATCOM during OIF.
        The strategic relevance of space as a force multiplier underscores
    the necessity for government to ensure we have a strong industrial base
    that will satisfy our requirements now and in the future. The Space
    Industrial Base Council, co-chaired by Dr. Kerr and myself, is a forum
    to address space industry issues and bring together stakeholders from
    across government to provide coordinated attention and action on space
    industrial base issues. We have also taken steps to include industry
    and academia to help inform and implement our initiatives.

                      BACK TO BASICS IN SPACE ACQUISITION

        My second area of emphasis is to get ``back to basics'' in space
    acquisitions to maximize the probability for success in our space
    acquisition programs. Acquisition links technology with operations--
    turning ideas into real, tangible items and delivering those items to
    the field. It is a continuous process with four distinct but
    interrelated stages. The first stage is S&T, where we conduct basic
    research and explore the possibilities of new technologies. In the
    second, technology development, we evaluate the utility of discoveries
    made in the S&T stage. The third stage is systems development. Here, we
    take the most promising technologies and mature them to higher
    readiness levels so they can be integrated into operational platforms
    in the fourth stage, system production.
        In this acquisition construct, technology is matured through the
    four stages to move from the lab bench to the test range to operations.
    We are emphasizing early technology development to ensure mature
    technology is available for our production systems. Basic research in
    science and technology generates knowledge and helps develop our
    scientists and engineers in our laboratories, universities, and
    research centers. This kind of cutting-edge work is inherently high
    risk--discoveries take hard work and insight but are not predictable--
    but we want to take risk in the earlier stages. For instance, the Air
    Force Research Laboratory is exploring everything from material
    properties of beryllium-aluminum alloys, ceramic-matrix composites, and
    ``aerogel''-based thermal insulation, to the operating characteristics
    of components and systems such as spinning disk lasers, and on-orbit
    vibration isolation systems. The DOD investment in space-related S&T
    has doubled over the last 4 years.
        Once we find a promising technology, we investigate its utility in
    the Technology Development stage. For example, back in September, the
    STP-R1 experimental satellite--the ``Streak''--launched from Vandenberg
    Air Force Base on a Minotaur rocket. It has a payload that will study
    the low Earth orbit environment, but also has an objective to
    demonstrate an approach of rapid response, short duration missions. It
    is one of many projects sponsored by the DARPA and run by the Air Force
    Space Test Program office at Kirtland.
        Thus, in the two supporting stages of science and technology and
    technology development, the approach is to take more risk and push the
    frontier harder. We will allow those that are creating new ideas and
    exploring new technologies greater opportunity to push their ideas
    forward.
        After we prove a concept or demonstrate the technology, we mature
    it until we are confident it will work reliably in space. We build that
    confidence and performance during the Systems Development stage, where
    we get new technologies ready to incorporate into operational systems.
        The XSS-11, built at Kirtland Air Force Base and launched from
    Vandenberg Air Force Base last April, is an excellent example of a
    space Systems Development effort. The XSS-11 did more than prove a
    concept and check out technology and techniques for future space
    missions; it also helped improve the quality, experience and knowledge
    of our workforce. The program managers and engineers operated on a
    tight schedule and budget, and even after several technical problems
    and three different launch platforms they had the vehicle ready to
    launch within 3 months of the original 36-month development timeline
    and within a few million dollars of the original budget estimate.
    Finally, once we have mature technology, we move into the fourth stage,
    System Production. As an example, we launched the first modified Global
    Positioning System (GPS) IIR (GPS IIR-M) satellite in September 2005.
    It will provide the same GPS signals as earlier GPS IIRs, plus two new
    military signals and another civilian signal. Since the early GPS I
    series, the program has evolved through a block approach where each
    increment has provided additional capabilities. GPS satellites are
    operational assets used by troops in the field. We must minimize the
    risk involved as we produce these systems and in the System Production
    stage, we want to integrate mature technologies while employing a
    disciplined systems engineering process. We must also design in
    testability and modularity so that we have a path to spiral newly
    matured technologies into operational systems. We are reducing the risk
    in that final stage of System Production by starting with more matured
    technologies, more stable requirements, and more discipline in the
    systems design.
        This idea of managing the risk, or apportioning risk in a more
    controlled manner is important. You can view it as a redistribution of
    risk where the higher risk is in those beginning stages while we lower
    the risk in System Production, incorporating only proven technologies
    and focusing on taking smaller, more manageable steps. By doing so, we
    allow a constant, ongoing rhythm of design, build, launch, and operate.
    I believe that developing this rhythm of activity will reduce the
    acquisition cycle time, insert stability into our production lines and
    workforce, and enable us to field better systems over time, all while
    increasing confidence in our production schedule and cost. Ultimately,
    the warfighter should receive a rhythm of needed, timely, affordable
    capability.
        The restructured TSAT program reflects this new approach to meeting
    warfighter requirements through major discrete increments or blocks.
    The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) endorsed this TSAT approach as the
    way to begin accelerating some needed network capability for the
    warfighter. Consistent with congressional inputs, we have focused on
    technology maturity to define the first block for TSAT. The new program
    will reduce the risk for the first two satellites by providing basic
    laser communications capabilities and processor/routers in a Block 1
    configuration. Higher risk technologies such as a more capable laser
    communication capability and more capable Internet Protocol Packet-
    based processing can be incorporated into later blocks of satellites.
    Block 1 directly corresponds to those technologies that the TSAT
    Program Office and Government Accountability Office agreed are mature
    consistent with this phase of the program. We also have increased the
    budgetary confidence levels of TSAT from 50 percent to 80 percent.
        In addition, we recently announced an award of the TSAT Mission
    Operations System (TMOS) contract--the ground segment for TSAT. Going
    forward with TMOS allows for better development and horizontal
    integration with other GIG systems. The networking capabilities
    provided by TMOS are the cornerstone to the future Military
    Communications Satellite architecture (AEHF and TSAT) and its interface
    with the GIG. Since the space segment interface requirements will be
    consistent with the TMOS design, our approach simplifies design trades
    for the space segment contractors. The TMOS contract source selection
    criteria also reflected a decision process which weighted proposal risk
    and contractor past performance over system mission capability and
    cost.
        This overall approach reduces technology and integration risk and
    increases our confidence in timely delivery of capabilities to the
    warfighter--an approach consistent with the 2003 Young Panel
    recommendations. We are exploring this same approach for Space Radar
    and GPS III.
        We also need to get back to basics in our acquisition practices. A
    back-to-basics approach hinges on: first, managing risk better;
    strengthening collaborations between the players involved in the
    acquisition process; implementing more rigorous systems engineering
    processes; and, improving the way we recruit and train our acquisitions
    workforce.
        I previously mentioned the various National Security Space
    stakeholders. As we get back to basics, we need to strengthen
    collaboration across the space community between technical experts,
    acquisition personnel, logisticians, and operators to ensure we are
    developing the systems we really need. There must be an early, detailed
    dialogue between all the players on warfighters needs balanced against
    a realistic assessment of what capability can be provided. We are
    working with the Joint Staff and combatant commanders to implement this
    approach. We should be able to provide significant new capability
    quicker and be more cost effective while continuing to work towards the
    full stated objectives in later generations. For example, deliver a
    first increment/block of system capability that meets 70-80 percent of
    the original stated objectives in a more timely fashion while working
    toward greater capability in future blocks. Key to this effort is to
    implement and maintain strong discipline in developing and stabilizing
    system requirements--another facet of sound system engineering.
        A critical part of implementing the back to basics philosophy is a
    heavy emphasis on applying proven systems engineering practices and
    raising the expertise of our systems engineers. The Air Force's Space
    and Missile Systems Center (SMC) has instituted a rigorous training
    program that includes classroom time, hands-on laboratory experience,
    Master's level courses, and education with industry. SMC has also
    captured best practices from across the community while working with
    the NRO, industry, FFRDCs, and technical societies to develop interface
    standards. One key aspect of improving the way we manage acquisition
    risk, and a key facet of our continuous emphasis on system engineering,
    is to better estimate the cost and schedule through a stronger cost
    estimation team and applying a more conservative approach in the System
    Production stage. If we have high confidence in the success of an
    acquisition program because we matured the technology starting with a
    strong S&T base, then we also have more confidence in our production
    cost and schedule estimates.

              SPACE PROFESSIONALS/SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WORKFORCE

        We have a great team of space professionals in the military, civil
    service, and industry. We know that many of our experienced people are
    retiring and we need to focus on the basics of recruiting, training,
    and mentoring to balance out our space workforce and maintain a strong,
    dynamic cadre of space professionals--innovators, original thinkers,
    and people with solid engineering instincts.
        To continue to develop, attract, and retain top talent, I urge you
    to continue supporting programs such as the National Defense Education
    Program (NDEP)--which started as a pilot program in fiscal year 2005
    called the Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation
    (SMART). NDEP targets undergraduates and graduate students studying
    science, math, and engineering. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget
    request (DOD-wide budget line) for NDEP is roughly twice that of the
    fiscal year 2006 request.
        As important as it is to recruit and train talented performers, it
    is also important for us to give them the opportunity to work with
    increasing levels of technology, consistent with the four stages in the
    space acquisition framework. They should have the opportunity to
    develop program management and systems engineering skills and gain
    experience on progressively more complex systems. This will teach them
    what risks to take, how to make tough decisions, and expand their
    knowledge base. Science and Technology and Technology Development
    efforts provide excellent opportunities for this kind of growth.
        Our efforts to increase the expertise of the space force are
    comprehensive. We provide oversight of the space cadre through the
    Space Professional Oversight Board, co-chaired by the DNRO and myself,
    which includes representatives from all military services. In addition,
    AFSPC's National Security Space Institute is expanding and recently
    completed checkout and startup of their 300 level training course, with
    the first offerings including students from all Services, National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National
    Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
        Finally, we recently held the first National Security Space Program
    Manager's Conference to discuss, analyze, and exchange best practices
    and experiences. It was hosted by the Air Force's Space and Missile
    Center and attended by space acquisition officers from the Air Force,
    NRO, DARPA, Army, Navy, and the laboratories.
                                   conclusion
        Space capabilities are essential at all levels of military planning
    and operations. To win the long war, we must leverage our space
    contributions along with all elements of national power. As the DOD
    Executive Agent for Space, I am confident that the directions outlined
    here will help us improve the way we use existing space assets, acquire
    new capabilities, and integrate with other stakeholders relying on the
    National Security Space community today and into the future. Thank you
    for the opportunity to present our approach and our emphasis on
    integration, back to basics in acquisition, and our space workforce.
        I appreciate the continued support Congress and this committee have
    given to help deliver vital space capabilities, and I look forward to
    working with you.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Next is, I believe, Admiral Deutsch.
        Admiral Deutsch. Thank you, sir. If I may, I'd like to just
    ask that my comments be introduced into your record, and unless
    you have any questions or a response that you'd like from me
    now, I'll save my comments for later.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Deutsch follows:]

               Prepared Statement by RADM Kenneth W. Deutsch, USN

        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored
    to appear before you today to address Navy space activities. As the
    acting Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communications Network, we
    provide the space and cyberspace capabilities necessary to support the
    warfighting efforts of the long war against terrorism and to support
    the naval forces of the future.
        Space and cyberspace are critical to FORCEnet. FORCEnet, the means
    by which the power of sensors, networks, weapons, warriors and
    platforms are networked in a combat force, integrates Sea Strike, Sea
    Shield, Sea Basing, and Sea Shaping, the pillars of Sea Power 21.
    FORCEnet is the catalyst that makes naval transformation possible and
    will allow the Navy to support the long war against terror, defend the
    homeland, and counter potential adversaries.
                      space support to the navy warfighter
        The 21st century environment is one of increasing challenges and
    complex environments, requiring greater speed of decision and precision
    in action. Warfare today and in the future is about speed--acting
    quickly in the global commons of the seas, space, and cyberspace before
    an adversary saturates or even penetrates our defenses. It will also be
    about persistence--having the duration and vantage point to find
    threats and counter them with precision. In the future, assured access
    to the spectrum of space capabilities will be the key to giving
    decision makers the advantage of speed and the forewarning of
    persistence to respond to the full range of military operations, from
    the global war on terror to major combat operations.
        Admiral Spruance once defined Sea Power as ``pushing our front
    lines as far forward as possible.'' In addition to integrating space
    capabilities throughout the naval forces and shaping joint
    deliberations to assure combat effectiveness, we will work to push our
    front lines into space in order to meet future challenges. Navy ships
    at sea are extremely dependent on space-based assets for beyond line of
    sight communications, threat information and situational awareness. We
    want to be able to operate from the commons--sea, cyberspace and
    space--with a continuum of affordable options. The Navy is interested
    in space as a key part of FORCEnet. Integrating space capabilities,
    particularly military satellite communications, Intelligence
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), environmental sensing, and
    position, navigation, and timing throughout the naval force to make
    space tactically relevant is fundamental to our Sea Power 21 vision.

                             THE NAVY'S INVESTMENT

        The Navy's space investment portfolio reflects our partnership with
    the Department of Defense's (DOD) Executive Agent for Space and the
    rest of the National Security Space community--as well as our maritime
    responsibilities. We rely on the Air Force and National Reconnaissance
    Office (NRO) to acquire most of the major space platforms,
    collaborating on the required capabilities, and then we purchase user
    equipment for the fleet. The Navy's Space Cadre works closely with
    these entities, providing the leadership and technical expertise
    necessary to leverage the Navy's interests in space throughout the
    entire acquisition process. We also take the lead in tackling maritime
    challenges through our participation in the Science and Technology/
    Research and Development (S&T/R&D) process.

                          MOBILE USER OBJECTIVE SYSTEM

        The Navy's major space segment responsibility to the joint
    community is the narrowband satellite communications constellation.
    Today it consists of Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) Follow-on UFO and will
    be replaced by Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) in 2010. The MUOS
    program is preparing for the Key Decision Point (C) Defense Space
    Acquisition Board in July 2006. The program is currently on cost and on
    schedule for an initial operational capability (IOC) in 2010. MUOS will
    provide ``communications on the move'', through double canopy foliage
    and in urban environments to small antennas used by disadvantaged
    users. MUOS is the common denominator for command and control providing
    the capability to communicate from tactical to theater levels, to
    allies and coalition partners and between defense and non-defense
    agencies. MUOS will allow a more comprehensive and coordinated approach
    to regional engagement, providing the capability to synchronize efforts
    with other Services, agencies, and allied nations.
        MUOS is critical to satisfying the demand for tactical satellite
    communications. During Operation Enduring Freedom, UFO and LEASAT 5
    were unable to support 20 percent of narrowband tactical UHF satellite
    communication requirements. Additionally, in the 2010 timeframe, LEASAT
    5 will reach end of its service life and UFO is expected to reach an
    unacceptable level of availability in August 2009 leaving a potential
    gap before MUOS is operational. Complete loss of these UHF satellite
    communication resources would have a significant impact on combat
    operations if not replaced by MUOS. Today, UFO supports approximately
    500 accesses worldwide. Based on evolving future warfighting concepts
    in support of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), access requirements
    have grown by at least a factor of four and MOUS as envisioned will be
    able to support that requirement. As Lockheed Martin refines its
    design, we expect this capacity to grow.

                                      ORS

        Keeping with the objective to maximize space support to the Navy
    Warfighter, we are interested in Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
    because of its potential to provide a more affordable way to get beyond
    the line of sight of communication capabilities and rapid-reaction ISR
    sensors, on orbit, in a tactically relevant timeframe to respond to
    asymmetric challenges and hedge against uncertainty. In a resource-
    constrained environment, it is crucial to not over match capability to
    requirement. It is equally important to not under match capability to
    requirement, putting mission accomplishment and lives at risk.
    Increasing the options available for the warfighter with a balanced,
    tiered architecture for space capabilities increases the warfighter's
    ability to get exactly the right capability to match his need.
        The Joint Task Force Commander needs a wide spectrum of options,
    capabilities, and timeframes to choose from to meet his operational
    requirement. ORS could offer an additional element in a tiered system
    that includes unmanned aerial vehicles, manned aircraft, high altitude
    air ships and traditional big space systems. It is a potentially cost
    effective way to provide the connectivity that the Sea Base needs to
    mass distributed forces effects. ORS can fill in gaps and provide
    options for space support in areas that lack sufficient coverage from
    national systems or reduce the vulnerability and uncertainty of
    depending on commercial satellite communications or sensors during
    times of conflict. ORS will be particularly useful for equipping the
    littoral combat ship with increased capability to monitor netted
    undersea sensors from standoff distances. It also offers potential for
    improving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). By working with existing
    space systems, ORS can help increase the revisit rate for contacts,
    which is the key to tracking in dense maritime shipping environments.
        As part of the joint TacSat and ORS effort, the Office of Naval
    Research is investing $15 million of S&T funds each year in moderate-
    to-high-risk projects that result in significant prototypes through the
    Space Innovative Naval Prototype program. Investments are focused on
    naval capability gaps that space can fill such as ship tracking, data
    exfiltration from buoys, submarine detection and cueing and littoral
    characterization. In addition to the Space Innovative Naval Prototype
    investment, Navy actively participates in the joint TacSat efforts
    along with Air Force Space Command, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), U.S.
    Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Army and Marine Corps. Naval Research
    Lab (NRL) in coordination with the Office of Force Transformation built
    TacSat-1 with a shiptracking payload in less than 12 months for $9.3
    million plus $5 million in space parts. It is awaiting launch on a new
    commercial launch vehicle from SpaceX this year. In coordination with
    AFRL, NRL is providing secondary payloads for TacSat-2 and TacSat-3. As
    the result of a joint selection process, NRL is designing and building
    TacSat-4 to provide communications on the move, data exfiltration from
    buoys and blue force tracking over a theater size area. The TacSat
    experiments are already making significant progress on developing
    consensus on standards and novel approaches to reduce costs for small
    satellites. The true test will be when the fleet and other users start
    to experiment with TacSats in an operational environment.
        ORS also has the potential to change future space acquisition by
    introducing a new business model for space. The current TacSat series
    of S&T experiments, and the potential for a small satellite operations
    capability, can be viewed as an acquisition experiment. ORS cycle times
    dictate an acquisition business rhythm that acquires and delivers a
    capability quickly and is flexible enough to adapt to operator feedback
    to improve the next capability iteration. Development and acceptance of
    standards, use of a cyclical business process and cultivation of
    multiple vendors are all likely outcomes from ORS that have the
    potential to positively impact the Navy and joint warfighters.

                                  SPACE CADRE

        The Navy's success in effectively integrating space assets to
    enhance our naval force depends on the experience and the skill of the
    Navy Space Cadre. Vice Admiral McArthur, Commander, Naval Network
    Warfare Command, provides strategic guidance on priorities for the
    development and employment of the Navy Space Cadre as the Navy's Space
    Cadre Functional Authority. As a leader on the National Security Space-
    Space Professional Oversight Board (the senior officer forum for the
    discussion and resolution of matters concerning space professional
    development within the DOD), he led Navy participation in the
    development of the National Security Space Human Capital Strategy. He
    is updating the Navy Space Cadre's Strategy for Our People, which
    outlines our vision and way ahead.
        The Navy Space Cadre is a distinct body of expertise horizontally
    and vertically integrated within the Navy's Active-Duty, Reserve, and
    civilian components organized to operationalize space. Members of Navy
    Space Cadre are assigned to the NRO, the National Security Space
    Office, USSTRATCOM, several Joint Program Offices, and throughout the
    fleet. The Space Cadre will continue to provide the critical insight
    and technical expertise necessary to leverage Navy, DOD, and other
    agency investments in space and optimize warfighting capabilities.
        The Navy Space Cadre Advisor is working closely with her Service
    counterparts to meet both Navy and National Security Space goals and
    ensure that the Space Cadre is equipped with the proper balance of
    education and experience. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Space
    Systems Operations and Space Systems Engineering curricula continue to
    provide the Navy and other Services graduate education, post-graduate
    (Engineer) degrees and doctoral degrees. Additionally, NPS offers an
    online Space Systems Certificate Program in which participants receive
    instruction on the integration of space capabilities across joint
    forces and a better understanding of what space effects can
    realistically provide with reference to networks, sensors and weapons.
    The Navy sends select Space Cadre members to courses offered by the
    National Security Space Institute that focus on the application and
    employment of space capabilities at the tactical and operational levels
    as a force enhancer and multiplier. We also have a formal Educational
    Alliance with the Air Force through a memorandum of agreement between
    NPS and the Air Force Institute of Technology, with the goal of
    leveraging strengths and eliminating duplication in space education.

                                    SUMMARY

        Our mission remains bringing the fight to our enemies. The
    increasing dependence of our world on the seas, coupled with growing
    uncertainty of other nations' ability or desire to ensure access in a
    future conflict, will continue to drive the need for naval forces and
    the capability to project decisive joint power by access through the
    seas, space and cyberspace. Accordingly, we will continue to fight the
    global war on terror while transforming for the future fight. We will
    continue to refine our operational concepts and appropriate technology
    investments to deliver the kind of dominant military power from the sea
    envisioned in Sea Power 21. We will continue to pursue the operational
    concepts--such as MDA--even as we invest in technology and systems to
    enable naval vessels to deliver decisive, effects-based combat power in
    every tactical and operational dimension. We understand that space
    capabilities will be critical to our efforts and must be integrated
    throughout the naval force . . . and we understand that because the
    future of the Navy is tied to space, we must succeed in growing and
    maintaining our space cadre. We also look forward to continuing our
    strong partnership with our Joint Brethren--a relationship that has
    brought us many successes to date.
        Fully integrating the warfighting capabilities that space systems
    present to our warfighters is one of my priorities. To that end, Navy
    will continue to be a full joint partner in space.

        Senator Sessions. Very good.
        Next is Lieutenant General Chilton.

    STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, JOINT FUNCTIONAL
    COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR SPACE AND GLOBAL STRIKE, U.S. STRATEGIC
                                COMMAND

        General Chilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson,
    Senator Reed.
        It's really a pleasure for me to be here today to represent
    the men and women of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) on
    behalf of General Cartwright, who sends his regrets for not
    being able to join us today.
        My job at STRATCOM is Commander of the Joint Functional
    Component Command for Space and Global Strike. In addition, I
    have the privilege of being the Commander of the ``Mighty
    Eighth'' Air Force in the United States Air Force. I have the
    great privilege to serve in those capacities.
        Today, though, I'd like to, of course, speak about my role
    in STRATCOM.
        I think it would be hard to argue against the fact that we
    have great capabilities in space today in the DOD. Indeed, some
    might argue that we have space superiority today. I believe
    there's a compelling need for us to maintain and sustain this
    superiority as we move off into the future. When you consider
    who our ultimate customers are, this is an easy argument to
    support, I would suggest, because our customers, ultimately,
    are the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who rely on
    these space assets day in and day out to conduct operations in
    defense of our country.
        Our warfighters have grown used to using the assets that
    space brings to the fight today. They certainly deserve to
    continue to have those assets available to them, as well as
    improvements and new and better capabilities.
        The soldier in the trench ought to be able to find out and
    know on demand who is on the other side of the hill that he's
    going to face. The sailor ought to have insight into what
    forces are hulled down over the horizon to his force. The
    airman should know what's going on below that cloud deck below
    him, and have that information readily available to him. These
    are the kind of capabilities that we need to continue to
    enhance and bring forward for our warfighters, in addition to
    sustaining such capabilities that the GPS constellation brings
    today, the ability to precisely locate yourself on the barren
    wasteland of a desert or in the densest jungle of the world or
    out on the open sea. Perhaps even more importantly now, after
    the latest weapons that we've seen developed, to be able to
    leverage the precision guidance capability that GPS brings to
    the weapons systems that we can bring to bear on our
    adversaries.
        Our warriors also need voice and data connectivity so that
    they can receive orders up and down their chain and communicate
    horizontally within their organizations at the tactical,
    operational, and strategic levels, so that we can stay one step
    ahead of our adversaries in the battlefield of the future.
        Dr. Sega gave a great example of how we can understand,
    observe, and predict weather with our space assets, a
    capability that can really have an important and dramatic
    impact on the outcome of an operation. We need to be able to
    continue to make sure we have this knowledge and insight so
    that we can use weather to our advantage in the future, and to
    the disadvantage of our adversary.
        Of course, we've grown accustomed to missile warning, not
    only at the strategic level for our Nation, but at the tactical
    level, as well, in theater. Our troops deserve to have that
    capability provided to them, so that they know exactly what
    protective measures to take when they come under attack.
        Our space assets today remain a key enabler for many of
    these capabilities; in some cases, the only provider of these
    capabilities to our warriors.
        A good military person always tries to put on the hat of
    the adversary and reflect back on how you would fight that
    particular individual when you go to combat. If I were to put
    on the hat of adversary and look at the U.S. dependence on
    space and how accustomed we have grown to using it, I would
    also be tempted to look at that as a vulnerability that I may
    want to try to exploit to help level the playing field in any
    future conflict. Indeed, it is not only our warriors who would
    be affected by attacks on our space infrastructure, but the
    economy of the United States and the quality of life that we've
    come to enjoy just day in and day out in our daily lives, from
    GPS to satellite communications and more.
        So, our adversaries, I suggest, understand our dependence.
    From that perspective, I think it's important that we pay
    attention to defense--not only increasing the capabilities we
    have, but defending those capabilities now and into the future.
    We have to be equipped to assure our allies and to deter and
    defeat our adversaries, should they decide to go after our
    space capabilities.
        The QDR gave us a good look into the future of what our
    needs might be when it said future forces will place a premium
    on capabilities that are responsive and survivable. So, I'd
    like to talk a little bit about responsive space operations.
        Now, Senator Nelson, I know your background, having flown
    on the space shuttle. It's a marvelous vehicle that can do
    incredible things even today that are hard to imagine. But to
    call it responsive in getting off the launch pad, I think you
    would probably agree that responsive probably is not the right
    adjective for it, given the number of times that you scrubbed,
    getting ready to fly. This fact doesn't diminish the importance
    of that capability.
        On the other hand, what the military would like to see, and
    what we'd like to have as a capability in the future, is a
    truly responsive capability to put assets into space, something
    that takes hours, not months, to launch; a satellite that can
    be put up quickly and then made to operate quickly. There's
    several elements of this concept. We have to address how we
    launch satellites. We have to address the booster to make sure
    it's responsive, as well. We have to address satellite design
    to make sure once it's up on orbit it doesn't take 3 months to
    check out, but just hours or minutes. Then we have to address
    the command and control of those constellations if they're
    truly going to be responsive, so that they can serve our
    purposes when they're up.
        STRATCOM is a big advocate for what we call responsive
    space operations, or you may have heard it called operationally
    responsive space, or several other acronyms, but all are names
    for this capability to put up small constellations of
    satellites quickly, in an affordable manner.
        To what purpose? A couple of scenarios I can think of. One
    might be where there are activities that we are suspicious of
    going on over what we would call ``denied airspace'' today,
    deep inside a country where we could not bring to bear air-
    breathing assets to focus intelligence, surveillance, or
    reconnaissance (ISR) on. It may be that we want to increase the
    amount of intelligence we're gathering on that particular area
    for that particular crisis period or to defuse a potential
    crisis. This would be a good opportunity to be able to launch a
    small, relatively inexpensive constellation that could increase
    our ISR coverage in that particular area of concern.
        Also, with the global war we're fighting today against
    terrorists, one cannot predict where next the crisis will
    develop around the globe. In this regard, there could be a
    scenario where multiple crises develop that could put stress on
    our current capability to surveil and keep track of those
    crises. Again, another scenario where perhaps a responsive
    space capability to supplement or augment our current
    capabilities, whether they be in surveillance or
    communications, could be advantageous to the warfighter.
        Shifting back here to the concept of space defense, and
    XSS-11, which Dr. Sega brought up, responsive space capability
    might be good for the case where one of our satellites on orbit
    has something go wrong with it, and we don't know what caused
    the problem. Having the capability to quickly launch a small
    satellite that could go up and surveil our own satellites to
    determine if that damage to the satellite or the reason it
    became inoperative, was caused by a systems failure, a natural
    failure, or by the actions of an adversary, could be very
    important in defusing a potential crisis situation in the
    future.
        The capabilities that we have today, and the ones that we
    see on the drawing board in the future that Dr. Sega has
    painted here on acquisition, make these exciting times to be
    involved in the space business. The challenges we have in front
    of us, too, also make it a very exciting time for me to be a
    part of this. I'm very appreciative of that opportunity.
        I look forward to our working together to meet both these
    challenges and explore new opportunities as we move forward.
    Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for giving me the
    opportunity to make these opening remarks, and I look forward
    to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and members of the subcommittee:
    Thank you for this opportunity to review U.S. Strategic Command's
    (USSTRATCOM) and specifically Joint Functional Component Commander
    Space and Global Strike's (JFCC- S&GS) progress during the past year
    and to present our plan for the future. 2006 is a year of unprecedented
    change. Our ultimate goals are driving the pace of change: building
    strategic advantage, ensuring the security of the American people and
    strengthening the community of free nations.

          ADAPTING TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT--TRANSFORMING WHILE WE FIGHT

        One year ago, we spoke of global interdependence and its impact on
    how we organize, plan and operate. We emphasized developing strong
    links between U.S. strategic objectives and regional operations, as our
    adversaries were employing asymmetric means to strike well beyond the
    battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. We also spoke of our new mission
    assignments and the steps we had undertaken to transform our command
    into an agile 21st century organization capable of deterring our
    adversaries and bringing the full range of global strike, defensive,
    command and control (C2), and intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to bear against them if necessary. We
    outlined an enormous transformational effort that had to be
    accomplished in the context of an ongoing global conflict with active
    combat operations and without the luxury of an operational pause.
        Throughout the last year, the men and women of USSTRATCOM have
    engaged in that global conflict, often employing means not visible
    either to the average American or to our adversaries. They met this
    day-to-day challenge with professionalism and commitment while they
    were also restructuring our organization to focus our efforts, conserve
    our resources, and streamline support to other combatant commanders
    around the world. I come to you today gratified by the progress these
    fine men and women have made and energized to complete the task before
    us.

                       USSTRATCOM TRANSFORMATION VECTORS

        The Department of Defense (DOD) budget you enacted for 2006 enabled
    a string of organizational and operational successes along all of
    USSTRATCOM's transformation vectors.
        We changed the way we are organized and operate. We implemented,
    and by the end of 2006 will refine, the redistributed and functionally
    aligned command structure described last year. This new structure is
    already paying off in terms of decentralized operational employment and
    increased operational speed.

             Our efforts resulted in four interdependent Joint
            Functional Component Commands (JFCCs): Intelligence,
            Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); Network-Warfare (NW);
            Integrated Missile Defense (IMD) in addition to Space and
            Global Strike. Day-to-day operational planning and execution of
            specialized global capabilities now reside at the component
            level, where commanders are able to maintain focus on their
            primary mission and not be distracted by staff support
            activities.
             As Commander, JFCC-S&GS, I am responsible to the
            Commander, USSTRATCOM to integrate all elements of military
            power to conduct, plan, present global strike effects and also
            direct the deliberate planning and execution of assigned space
            missions. * One of JFCC-S&GS significant accomplishments last
            year was the establishment of a collaborative Joint Space
            Operations Center (JSpOC) to deliver select DOD space
            capability to U.S., Allied, and other national users. When
            fully operational, JSpOC will provide the full range of DOD
            space capabilities.

        By making this unique organizational transformation we also
    strengthened our operational relationships with the Defense
    Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),
    Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and National Security Agency
    (NSA) in order to leverage the tremendous resources and capabilities
    resident in these organizations. Now we effectively bridge many
    artificial barriers to communications and information sharing, and
    bring enhanced combat power to the regional combatant commanders.
        We made progress in our drive toward a New Triad of capabilities.
    The New Triad is comprised of offensive and defensive capabilities
    enabled by persistent global command and control (C2), intelligence, an
    agile planning system, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The New
    Triad provides improved flexibility in dealing with a wider range of
    contingencies, while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons, in
    order to assure our allies, dissuade competitors, and deter those who
    plan to harm us, particularly with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
    Space is integral to many of the capabilities represented in the New
    Triad.
        Efforts to improve conventional global strike capability focused on
    generating effects without being hindered by factors of time, distance,
    basing rights, over-flight considerations or undue risk to American
    service men and women. Recently the Department:

             Bolstered the number of Joint Direct Attack Munitions
            (JDAM) in the inventory, providing all weather, precision
            strike in a smaller weapon footprint.
             Fielded Tactical Tomahawk (TACTCOM) and the Joint Air
            to Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), providing strike weapons
            that operate from ranges outside enemy point defenses.

        During the past year non-kinetic capabilities became an
    increasingly important tool to deny our adversaries the opportunity to
    communicate easily or to manipulate information in ways that further
    their efforts to undermine stability around the world. We seek better
    non-kinetic capabilities to improve our freedom of action at the lowest
    level of conflict; to enhance deterrence; and support the sustained
    ability to use our networks while denying the adversary a similar
    capability. In this area we:

             Expanded development of the applicable tactics,
            techniques, and procedures to support use of information and
            networks--cyberspace--as an environment for integrated
            exploitation, offensive, and defensive operations.
             Improved integration of non-kinetic effects into
            operational planning, on a limited basis, in support of forces
            involved in the global war on terrorism.

        The President has committed the United States to sustaining a
    credible nuclear deterrence capability with the lowest possible number
    of nuclear weapons consistent with national security. USSTRATCOM's task
    is to ensure our nuclear force remains ready to meet any contingency
    while the nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable as we
    prudently achieve the thresholds specified in the Moscow Treaty. To
    this end we:

             Sustained a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile in
            cooperation with the national laboratories and the National
            Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
             Took steps to improve the security and safety of the
            deployed nuclear force.
             Retired the last Peacekeeper Inter-Continental
            Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) from service.
             Reduced the number of operationally deployed strategic
            nuclear warheads on the Minuteman III ICBM force.
             Transferred the final ballistic missile submarine
            scheduled for reconfiguration to carry conventionally armed
            cruise missiles.

        At the heart of the New Triad are the key enablers of command and
    control, intelligence, and planning. Through these enablers, and our
    broad array of space capability, we create the agility to respond to a
    wide range of global challenges. During 2006 we will:

             Evolve the renovated USSTRATCOM Global Operations
            Center to enhance collaboration among all geographically
            distributed USSTRATCOM elements--defining the first step toward
            a Global C2 capability for all New Triad forces.
             Complete preparations for opening the first node in a
            network of ground entry points designed to serve a nationally
            distributed ground, air and sea network capable of providing
            the diverse connectivity requirements of the New Triad and DOD
            support to a broader national command capability using all
            elements of national power.
             Capitalize on the longer dwell time of unmanned and
            unattended sensors to produce greater persistence in global war
            on terrorism operations.
             Initiate a pilot program to determine essential global
            strike command and control services with an explicit objective
            of delivering a distributed, collaborative product. The pilot
            program will take advantage of the Department's Data Strategy,
            which calls for visible, accessible and understandable data,
            and uses Services Oriented Architectures (SOA) to promote
            flexibility and agility.
             Initiate efforts to transition from a limited space
            surveillance architecture to a more fully integrated
            terrestrial and space-based approach to situational awareness.
    Improve Space Capabilities
        The space mission area creates a decisive strategic advantage for
    our national security, empowering critical economic as well as defense
    related activities. Our dependence on space capabilities, coupled with
    recent significant advances in space operations demonstrated by others,
    establishes a true imperative to protect our space assets and our
    freedom of action in space. USSTRATCOM understands the need to stay at
    least one technology generation ahead of any foreign or commercial
    space power. We must improve space situational awareness and
    protection, and ensure unfettered, reliable, and secure access to
    space. Key initiatives include:

             Improve responsive space access, satellite operations,
            and other space enabling capabilities such as the space
            professional cadre.
             Integrate air and space capabilities to deliver
            combined effects.
             Realign resources to sustain existing space
            surveillance capabilities.
             Improve warfighter access to the Nation's full
            spectrum of space capabilities.

        USSTRATCOM REQUESTS YOUR SUPPORT TO MEET THE CHALLENGES WE FACE

        Over the next 5 years, we must fully transform while remaining
    engaged in a conflict in which our enemies will use any and all means
    to achieve their objectives. We believe a more aggressive
    transformation schedule than envisioned 5 years ago is essential to
    maintain the strategic advantage needed to deter or defeat those who
    would do us harm. If we do not accelerate this transition, we will face
    these adversaries, who attack through asymmetric means, with the blunt
    weapons of last resort that won the Cold War. That alone will not
    preserve our future national security. In particular we are requesting
    your support in the following areas:
    Prompt, Precision Conventional Global Strike
        Tailored deterrence requires a more complete range of capabilities
    to address the wide spectrum of challenges that confront us today.
    While the Department employs expeditionary forces around the globe, it
    is unlikely we will have forces in every place we need them at the
    crucial moment when we have an opportunity to stop a WMD-armed threat
    far from our shores. The United States has the capability to engage
    with high quality conventional forces around the world, given days or
    perhaps weeks to respond. But if our general-purpose forces are not in
    a position to respond rapidly, the need to defeat attacks against the
    United States may require USSTRATCOM to interdict fleeting targets at
    global ranges. We have the delivery capability on alert today, but
    configured only with nuclear weapons. This choice is not credible
    against many of the extremist adversaries we will face.
        We recommend proceeding with development of the responsive,
    conventional global strike alternative offered by the Conventional
    Trident Modification (CTM). The President's budget request includes
    funds for the modification of a number of submarine based Trident
    Missiles to deliver conventional warheads with precision over thousands
    of miles in tens of minutes.
    Global Command and Control (GC2)
        We are now faced with the task of recapitalizing our aging, Nuclear
    Command and Control (NC2) network, which is a matter of prime
    importance. Capitalizing on advances in technology, we envision a
    transition from the single-purpose, stove-piped NC2 network that served
    us during the Cold War, to a multi-functional, distributed, survivable,
    and expandable Global Command and Control capability, leveraging the
    assets and resources of the Global Information Grid and serving the
    needs of our joint warfighters.
        With your support for the President's budget request, we can
    deliver a resilient air, land, and maritime GC2 capability that will
    tie together all elements of New Triad power. Fully developed, the GC2
    will enable collaboration between, and among, DOD and other government
    agencies and partners, providing the core of a National Command
    Capability to meet the broadening array of potential challenges we face
    as a nation. A true National Command Capability will only be effective
    with federally mandated standards for data tagging to facilitate
    enhanced information sharing.
    Reliable Replacement Warhead
        Finally, if we are to break the cycle of maintaining and
    refurbishing large numbers of Cold War-era nuclear warheads to guard
    against uncertainty, we request your support to ensure a safe, secure,
    reliable nuclear stockpile, and in the process transform the nuclear
    weapons enterprise. Discussions over the past year within the executive
    branch and Congress have increased understanding of the role for
    nuclear weapons in our current environment, and the value of a
    responsive defense infrastructure. USSTRATCOM supports the Reliable
    Replacement Warhead (RRW) as the key to transforming our aging Cold War
    nuclear weapons stockpile. RRW will enhance our long-term confidence in
    the stockpile and reduce the need to retain high numbers of hedge
    weapons while exercising the people, science, technology base, and
    facilities required for sustaining the nuclear weapons enterprise.
        Maintaining the current stockpile of Cold War era weapons is a
    challenge. If directed, we believe the time is right; the risk is
    manageable; and the opportunity is at hand to choose weapons that will
    best serve our future and allow us to further reduce our overall
    stockpile size, in order to transition to and maintain a smaller but
    safer, more secure, and more reliable nuclear weapon arsenal.

        USSTRATCOM TRANSFORMATIONAL VECTORS BUILDING STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE

        USSTRATCOM plays an important role in leading national efforts to
    send an unambiguous message to our adversaries and friends alike--we
    will do whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to ensure the
    forces of freedom possess a lasting strategic advantage against those
    who would deny citizens of America and the world the security to govern
    their own future. We will continue to be aggressive and resourceful in
    offering our best advice in the pursuit of capabilities needed to meet
    our national security requirements. With your help we can assure our
    allies, dissuade unhealthy competition, deter coercive or damaging
    acts, and above all else, defend our citizens and defeat our enemies.
    Thank your for your continued support.

        Senator Sessions. A good presentation, General Chilton.
        General Hamel.

    STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MICHAEL A. HAMEL, USAF, COMMANDER, SPACE
          AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

        General Hamel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Nelson, Senator Reed. It is a true privilege for me to be able
    to appear before this committee today. I am pleased to be able
    to represent the Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center.
    I would like to say that we have a critically important
    mission, a very proud heritage, and a highly-skilled workforce
    of some 4,500 people that are performing our space acquisition
    mission.
        Space has evolved since the mid-1950s as a fledgling
    research effort to the point today where it has been pointed
    out that we are an indispensable element of our Nation's joint
    warfighting capabilities. I'm privileged to serve as the
    Commander of the Space and Missile Center, as well as the Air
    Force's Program Executive Officer for Space, and, in that
    capacity, have responsibility for developing, acquiring,
    fielding, and supporting a broad set of satellites, launch
    vehicles, missile systems, radars, ground systems, and user
    equipment for joint force operators.
        Now, we are very proud of the accomplishments over the
    years which we have been able to achieve, including, most
    recently, having set the longest successful string of
    successive launch missions in the history of the military space
    business. We have the most robust set of satellites on orbit,
    performing missions, and, as you pointed out here, they are
    truly integrated into every aspect of air, land, and maritime
    warfare on a global basis. We also have a fantastic set of
    products that are in the development pipeline.
        We also recognize that we have problems. I would like to,
    today, be able to reassure you that we are addressing these
    problems with full focus and determination.
        If I might, just in a minute here, give you an idea of the
    kind of things that we're doing to get acquisition on track.
    Our overarching strategy, as Dr. Sega said, is really based
    upon the idea of getting back to basics. We are reestablishing
    structure and discipline and rigor by applying strong systems
    engineering principles across all of our programs and
    processes. We're ensuring that we have testing built into the
    systems from very early on, that we have mission assurance
    processes that are to be applied from the very beginning of a
    program. Likewise, we understand that it's not just about the
    technical aspects of the program, but it's also about how it is
    we manage costs and schedule and risk throughout. In that vein,
    we are actually improving our cost-estimating capabilities so
    we have higher confidence, when we propose programs, that,
    indeed, we can deliver on our promises.
        Another focus of our ``back to basics'' process is
    redefining and renewing partnerships across the space
    community. That means developers such as the organization that
    I am in charge of, and our operators that are represented by
    General Chilton and other users out there, soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines across the joint force operations, and
    industry, whom we depend upon to actually produce the systems
    that will be put into operations. As I refer to it, space is a
    team sport, and it requires all players play with high
    efficiency and effectiveness to deliver a winning score.
        Another priority is to make sure that we get an absolutely
    top quality acquisition workforce. People are our most
    important asset. We are going about a revitalization of the
    workforce that includes military, civilians, federally-funded
    R&D centers, as well as working with industry to ensure that we
    have the right skill sets. We're trying to attract, retain,
    train, educate, and mentor a whole new generation of space
    acquisition professionals to ensure that, indeed, we're up to
    the task. As I like to say it, we know what the recipe is, but
    we also have to make sure that we have the right cooks in order
    to be able to produce the products that we expect.
        Another thing we're doing at the Space and Missile Center
    is presenting a horizontal integration capability. What I mean
    by that is, is that instead of having individual stovepipe
    programs, we are trying to build in cross-program capabilities
    and engineering architectures, program management, acquisition
    strategies in contracting, so that we learn across the many
    programs and actually apply the best practices, and, likewise,
    reach to other organizations and agencies, such as the National
    Reconnaissance Office (NRO), as well as National Aeronautics
    and Space Administration (NASA) and others, to really apply
    best practices across all of our programs so that we are,
    indeed, a learning organization.
        Dr. Sega talked extensively about the incremental block
    development approach, and we are applying that to programs
    across the board. He spoke about the TSAT, but we are,
    likewise, applying this to the GPS program to space-based space
    surveillance and other programs to ensure that we take this
    very measured, deliberate approach in developing and fielding
    capabilities.
        I'll tell you, sir, that it's going to take time to achieve
    full results, but we really are making significant progress in
    rebuilding our acquisition and development capabilities,
    getting our troubled programs on track, and ensuring that new
    programs that we're pursuing are going to have the full rigor
    and discipline to be able to deliver the capabilities that we
    promise from the very beginning.
        We appreciate very much the support we have from Congress
    for the programs, as well as the budgets we're requesting,
    because we believe that these are essential for ensuring that
    our Nation and its military forces will retain their unique
    advantages in the battlefield from space.
        I appreciate the opportunity for a few opening remarks, and
    will submit my formal statement for the record, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Hamel follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Michael A Hamel, USAF

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it's a
    great honor to appear before you today to represent the Air Force (AF)
    Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and discuss the budgets and
    progress of AF space acquisition programs. SMC has a critically
    important mission, a proud heritage and a highly-skilled force of some
    4,500 space acquisition professionals. Our roots date back to 1954 when
    the U.S. Air Force activated the Western Development Division under the
    leadership of Brigadier General Bernard Schriever to develop
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the Nation. Ultimately,
    those early innovations laid the foundation for our Nation's entire
    military space program. Now, more than 50 years later, we are leading
    the development and acquisition of critical military space capabilities
    for the 21st century. The space frontier is critical to our Nation's
    warfighters and SMC delivers the operational capabilities to control
    and exploit the ultimate high ground of space.
        Space has evolved since the mid-1950s from a fledgling research
    organization to an indispensable element of our Nation's joint
    warfighting capabilities. I am privileged to serve as the Commander of
    SMC and the AF Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Space and am
    responsible for developing, acquiring, fielding and supporting a
    comprehensive set of satellites, launch vehicles, missiles, radars,
    ground systems, and user equipment. SMC has been the premier space
    development and acquisition organization within the Department of
    Defense (DOD), and provides the majority of space operational
    capabilities for the AF and DOD.

                                   SMC TODAY

        Today, SMC is simultaneously supporting and sustaining current
    operational capabilities in-orbit, developing the next generation of
    space and ground systems, and demonstrating advanced systems and
    technologies that will transform future military operations. The
    progress and accomplishments we've achieved in the recent past are most
    impressive. In the launch business, we have successfully transitioned
    from our legacy launch systems to the new, more flexible family of
    reliable launch vehicles. The last of the Titan launch vehicles
    thundered into the history books in October 2005 setting the new record
    for consecutive major launch successes at 43 in a row. The new evolved,
    expendable launch vehicles--Atlas V and Delta IV--are proving their
    value with every new launch--the most recent being National Aeronautics
    and Space Administration's (NASA) New Horizons Pluto mission to space
    on 19 January 2006.
        Our satellite constellations are capable and robust, performing
    well beyond their designs. For example, our defense weather satellites
    were designed for 3 years of life, yet Flight Vehicle 13 just reached
    11 years of on-orbit service. These systems continue to provide
    operational service which we've come to depend on, and sometimes take
    for granted.
        Although the Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIS) program has
    experienced significant difficulties, we have recently delivered two
    sensors to fly on host satellite platforms and are well along in
    testing of the geostationary orbit sensor and satellite bus. This
    system promises to provide much improved capabilities to detect, warn
    and defend against ballistic missiles, as well as provide new
    battlefield and intelligence information. We're looking forward to
    launching this very important system within a few years.
        The Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) constellation has
    transformed military operations, as well as civil transportation,
    banking, communications, energy and many other aspects of modern life.
    Last fall we launched the first modernized GPS satellite, which
    provides important new signals and services for both military and civil
    users, and have improved accuracy to users by some 15 percent. While we
    continue to improve on orbit capabilities and user services, the GPS
    constellation is aging. We are aggressively working to develop and
    deploy new GPSIIF satellites and to pursue the next generation system,
    GPSIII.
        We are developing a full array of advanced satellite communications
    systems that will provide wideband, protected, broadcast, tactical and
    data relay capabilities for joint expeditionary operations. Modern
    military operations requires massive quantities of information and
    communications across the battlefield and around the globe--space based
    communications systems provide the rapid, responsive means to link
    commanders, combat forces and information across the battlespace. We
    have a number of developmental products in the pipeline. The Advanced
    Extremely High Frequency satellite, the Wideband Gapfiller Satellite
    and the Transformational Satellite program will offer combatant
    commanders options unthinkable only a few years before.
        In addition to individual programs, SMC is also realigning its
    organization and processes to improve program development and execution
    across the space enterprise. We are reinstituting our space
    developmental planning organization to better refine concepts,
    technologies and future programs. We are restoring our systems
    engineering, architectures, program management, cost estimating, test
    and evaluation and program control capabilities across the entire
    center. These efforts will ensure better understanding of the costs,
    risks, and performance of new concepts and technologies before
    committing to major acquisition programs and improve execution of
    system developments and procurements.
        We're proud of our accomplishments but also recognize we have
    problems, which we are addressing with full focus and determination.
    We've experienced cost overruns and schedule slips in too many of our
    space programs, which has delayed delivery of operational capability to
    the Warfighter, undermined our credibility, and reduced confidence in
    the space development community. There are many underlying causes for
    the erosion of our space acquisition performance, which have been
    identified in various DOD studies and reviews and there is clear
    consensus on steps we need to take to restore acquisition performance.
    We know the ``recipe for success'' in space acquisition and have a
    comprehensive plan to get space acquisition back on track.

                                 BACK TO BASICS

        Our overarching strategy to restore acquisition performance is to
    get ``back-to-basics.'' We're reestablishing structure and discipline
    by applying strong systems engineering practices in the early stages of
    each program; by addressing mission assurance from the beginning; and
    by thorough testing of components and systems early and often. We are
    reestablishing standards and specifications in our contracts to insure
    common language and expectation with industry. A rigorous mission
    assurance process is being applied to all launch and satellite programs
    to insure strict adherence to design, parts, testing and quality
    control standards from system development through on-orbit checkout.
        Cost estimating is a critical element of the space acquisition
    process. We're working hard to improve schedule planning, cost
    estimating and risk assessment on all programs to better forecast how
    many taxpayer dollars will be needed for each mission. It is critical
    that we provide lawmakers with accurate estimates to increase
    confidence when making decisions on these systems. We must better
    understand cost, schedule, requirements and risk trades if we are to
    make informed program decision and better assure mission success. We're
    also restoring strong program control functions and expertise within
    our systems program offices. This will allow us to more effectively
    plan, monitor and assess contactors' cost, schedule and technical
    performance in individual programs and across families of systems. The
    program control function is critical to maintaining a true picture of
    program status and baseline control.
        Another focus area of SMCs ``back to basics'' strategy is renewing
    and redefining partnerships across the space enterprise--developers,
    operators, users and industry. Space is a ``team sport'' and every
    member of the team must perform to their highest level if we are to be
    successful. The stakes are high and the environment is unforgiving--we
    do not get two chances to do it right. We have established a
    ``benchmarking'' process with all our major contractors to provide
    candid two-way feedback to foster ''best practices'' and continuous
    improvement. The space enterprise is founded on a healthy set of checks
    and balances that are focused on mission success. Personal initiative
    and accountability are essential at all levels since a single lapse in
    attention to detail can spell the difference between success and total
    failure. Effective teamwork between government and industry--prime
    contractors, subcontractors and suppliers--is essential. We can't
    succeed without each other.
        SMC is increasingly focused on our customers--space operators,
    joint warfighters and civil partners. We must understand their needs in
    an unpredictable world, filled with uncertain threats and rapidly
    changing situations. SMC strives to meet their needs with responsive
    development processes and the timely fielding of capabilities. We
    increase our ability to respond by partnering with the Air Force
    Research Lab, Air Force Material Command, U.S. Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM), and other Services and agencies to ensure we provide for
    their needs technically and operationally. The space community will
    achieve its full potential only if we reduce fragmentation and
    conflicting agendas. As the use and dependence on space grows across
    the military, it is imperative that the national security space
    community work in a more coordinated, collaborative, and interdependent
    fashion.
        Last month, Under Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Ronald Sega, and
    SMC co-sponsored a National Security Space Program Managers' Conference
    to expand teamwork and lines of communication between program managers
    across the National security space community--NRO, MDA, Electronics
    Systems Center (AFMC) and Navy and Army space organizations. This
    collaboration helps share experiences and ``best practices'', provides
    more problem-solving resources, and promotes cross-flow of experience
    and workforce. Instead of competing for valuable resources, such as
    dollars and personnel, we leverage what we have across the space
    enterprise.
        Reductions in the space acquisition workforce of the past decade
    and the loss of critical skills have had direct and significant impacts
    on mission success and program performance. A top priority for the AF
    and SMC is to rebuild the space acquisition workforce. We depend on a
    mix of military, civilian, federally-funded research and development
    contractors (FFRDC) and other support contractors to manage the complex
    developments and contracts. SMC has aggressive efforts underway to
    improve recruiting, retention, education, training, and mentoring of
    our workforce. Through partnerships with the educational, industrial,
    and governmental institutions, we are working to increase the cadre of
    highly talented and experienced space acquisition people to meet the
    needs across the community. SMC is working to attract more officers and
    civilians with technical degrees and higher levels of experience. We
    have established educational programs with universities, military
    institutes (such as the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and
    the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)) and defense contractors to enhance
    understanding of system engineering and program management. Assignment
    length for military personnel has been extended from 3 to 4 years to
    insure they gain increased depth of experience, and that we improve
    continuity and accountability in programs. We've also created
    opportunities for leadership development, assigning more civilians as
    deputy program managers, sending greater numbers to Squadron Officers
    School, Air Command and Staff College and the Air War College.
        We depend upon the Aerospace Corporation and other FFRDCs to
    provide deep technical and engineering expertise and continuity in our
    programs. We also augment our workforce with other systems engineering
    and technical assistance (SETA) contractors. We cannot do our job
    without these critical partners. Continued tight budgets will likely
    increase pressures to limit or reduce support contracts--we will work
    to be more efficient, but it is essential that we maintain critical
    skills if we are to effectively manage the billions of dollars in
    development programs.
        Another priority for SMC is to improve horizontal integration
    across our programs and the broader space enterprise. This includes
    organizing to enhance engineering and architectural standards and
    processes; implement best business practices for contracting,
    incentives, and budgeting; improve development planning, modeling and
    analysis and technology planning. Horizontal integration of expertise
    across the space acquisition enterprise creates efficiencies of
    resources and mission accomplishment using ``best practices'' and
    world-class processes across the portfolio. Understanding mission
    requirements and common architectural solutions will allow individual
    program offices to share experiences, resources, and solutions based on
    common systems engineering principles. The payoff of this horizontal
    integration is that the systems SMC delivers to space operators and
    joint commanders will enable more integrated and responsive air, land,
    maritime, space and cyberspace operations.
        Another key to improving acquisition performance in space programs
    is the AF's effort to implement a new business model for space
    acquisition. We are establishing and applying a block or incremental
    approach to developing, acquiring and fielding space systems across the
    Air Force. The objective of this approach is to reduce program cycle
    time and redistribute risk across a program's life cycle, from early
    phases of technology maturation through system development and
    operational system procurement. We'll more consciously allocate risk
    across different phases in the life cycle of programs. The highest risk
    will be in the earliest stage of science and technology--production
    programs will be based on mature technology for the lowest risk. We
    will insure more mature technologies, more stable requirements, and
    more discipline in end-to-end systems design. The expectation is that
    cycle times will be reduced and that we'll be able to maintain cost and
    schedule with higher confidence, and produce more effective
    capabilities sooner by synchronizing science and technology, technology
    development, systems development and demonstration, and systems
    production. The Global Positioning System, Space Based Radar, Space
    Based Space Surveillance System, and Transformational Communication
    Satellite programs are pioneering the process now.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Space capabilities have become an integrated and indispensable
    element in virtually all joint military operations. They provide the
    means to plan and execute operations across the globe, and enable
    unprecedented speed, precision and effectiveness. Today the U.S. enjoys
    an asymmetric military and national security advantage from these
    cutting edge systems. Further, space is increasingly important in civil
    and commercial applications and serves as an engine of economic and
    technological leadership. Maintaining our military advantage demands
    that we continue to develop and field the most advanced and affordable
    space capabilities possible. We have experienced many problems in space
    acquisition in the Air Force and across the government and industry. We
    know the root causes of these problems and have a comprehensive, ``back
    to basics'' strategy for restoring our space acquisition performance.
    It will take time to achieve full results, but we are making
    significant progress in rebuilding our capabilities, getting troubled
    programs on track and insuring important new programs are set on a
    solid foundation from the beginning. We appreciate the support from
    Congress for the programs and budgets that are essential to insuring
    our Nation and its military forces retain the unique advantages we
    derive from space. SMC and its partners in government and industry are
    committed to making space acquisition the model across the DOD and to
    provide our military forces the finest space capabilities possible.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, we'll make those a part of the
    record. Ms. Chaplain, GAO.
        Ms. Chaplain. GAO.

    STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, ACTING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION
     AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Chaplain. Chairman Sessions, Senator Nelson, and
    Senator Reed, thank you for inviting me to participate in this
    afternoon's hearing on DOD space acquisitions. Today, I'll be
    discussing why we need to improve DOD's return on investment in
    space, and how we can do so.
        DOD space systems play an increasingly critical role in
    supporting military operations and our economy, but the
    programs focused on acquiring these systems are experiencing
    problems that are driving up costs by billions of dollars,
    stretching schedules by years, and increasing performance
    risks. Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that
    DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider new
    ways to achieve the same capability. It is in such a position
    today with its new missile detection and its weather monitoring
    satellite programs.
        Taken together, acquisition problems are having a dramatic
    effect on DOD's space investment portfolio. Over the next 5
    years, there'll be about $12 billion less available for new
    systems, as well as for the discovery of promising new
    technologies, because of cost growth.
        While DOD is pushing to start new highly ambitious
    programs, such as the TSAT or Space Radar, broader analysis of
    the Nation's fiscal future indicate that spending for weapons
    systems may need to be reduced, rather than increased, to
    address growing deficits.
        This investment picture makes it critical to address root
    problems that make space programs unexecutable. These include
    competition for funding, which encourages low-cost estimating,
    optimistic scheduling, and overpromising, and also a tendency
    to start programs too early--that is, before there is assurance
    that design capabilities can be achieved within available
    resources and time constraints.
        Our previous recommendations have focused on addressing
    these and other root causes, but DOD has chosen not to fully
    implement them on large acquisitions. Recently, however, with
    new leadership, the Air Force has embraced adopting the best
    practices we have recommended. In Dr. Sega's view, they
    represent a common-sense approach that was followed in much
    earlier space efforts.
        The Air Force has also recently taken steps to put its TSAT
    program on a more executable track. It has reduced its
    expectations in the level of sophistication of its first two
    satellites so that it can meet schedule goals. It is also
    holding off on entering formal acquisition of the program until
    critical technologies are proven.
        These are good steps when looking at TSAT as an individual
    program. It is important, however, that the Air Force ensure
    warfighters accept lower capability and that it makes sense to
    pursue the current approach versus the alternative of buying
    additional communications satellites that are further along in
    production.
        On the broader scale, there are steps that can be taken to
    facilitate the Air Force's ``back to basic'' approach for all
    space programs. First, the Air Force, with others, can develop
    an overall investment strategy that identifies funding
    priorities. This will help balance investments between legacy
    programs and new programs, as well as between science and
    technology activities and acquisition activities. Optimally,
    DOD would do this for its entire weapons system investment
    portfolio so that it can assure that all new programs are
    affordable.
        Second, the Air Force can change policies to adopt best
    practices. For example, the Air Force's space acquisition
    policy could be further revised to ensure that a true
    evolutionary approach is being pursued, and that blocks, or
    increments, will include only technologies that have been
    sufficiently matured.
        Other steps, which range from enhancing workforce capacity
    to increasing opportunities for testing new technologies in
    space, are detailed in my written statement.
        In closing, implementing best practices for space
    acquisitions will not be an easy undertaking. DOD, as a whole,
    still operates in an environment that encourages competition
    for funding, and, thus, behaviors that have been detrimental to
    meeting cost and schedule goals. Moreover, the changes being
    proposed will require significant shifts in thinking about how
    space systems should be developed and changes in incentives.
        Lastly, while it may be easier to focus on bringing change
    program by program, it is important to ensure that change occur
    within the context of the entire space investment portfolio.
    This will require tough tradeoff decisions, but it'll ensure
    that the right mix of programs are being pursued, and that user
    needs can be met in a timely and cost-effective fashion.
        This concludes my statement. I respectfully request that my
    written statement be submitted for the record, and I'll be
    happy to answer any questions you have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be
    here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) space
    acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions to acquire space-based
    capabilities to support current military and other government
    operations as well as to enable DOD to transform the way it collects
    and disseminates information, gathers data on its adversaries, and
    attacks targets. In fiscal year 2007 alone, DOD expects to spend almost
    $20 billion to develop and procure satellites and other space systems,
    including nearly $7 billion on the major space systems.\1\ Despite its
    growing investment in space, however, DOD's space system acquisitions
    have experienced problems over the past several decades that have
    driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even billions of dollars,
    stretched schedules by years, and increased performance risks. In some
    cases, capabilities have not been delivered to the warfighter after
    decades of development.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Estimates of fiscal year 2007 spending are based on DOD's
    Fiscal Year 2006 Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) plan. The fiscal
    year 2007 FYDP plan was not available to us at the time of this
    testimony.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As a result of these problems, DOD is now contending with important
    trade-off decisions such as whether to continue investing in long
    beleaguered efforts or undertake more promising alternatives. At the
    same time, leadership now recognizes the need to substantially change
    DOD's current space acquisition approach and the value of adopting
    practices that will lay a better foundation for program execution.
    Within this context, I will discuss our findings on space acquisition
    problems, recent steps DOD has taken in an effort to address these
    problems, and the changes that still need to occur if DOD is to break
    the cycle of acquisition problems.
                       space acquisition problems persist
        The majority of satellite programs we have reviewed over the past 2
    decades experienced problems during their acquisition that drove up
    costs and schedules and increased technical risks. Several programs
    were restructured by DOD in the face of delays and cost growth. At
    times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing
    DOD to nearly double its investment in face of technical and other
    problems without realizing a better return on its investment. Along
    with the cost increases, many programs are experiencing significant
    schedule delays--as much as 6 years--postponing delivery of promised
    capabilities to the warfighter.
        Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had
    to go back to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the
    same capability. It is in such a position today, with its Space-based
    Infrared System (SBIRS)-High program and possibly its National Polar-
    orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program,
    both of which have been mired in expanding cost and schedule setbacks.
        More specifically, DOD's investment in SBIRS-High, a critical
    missile warning system, has been pushed to over $10.5 billion from the
    initial $4.1 billion estimate made over 9 years earlier. This 160-
    percent increase in estimated costs triggered a fourth Nunn-McCurdy \2\
    breach (see 10 U.S.C. 2433), requiring a review by the Secretary of
    Defense and a report to Congress, and resulted in the program being
    restructured for a third time, in late 2005. With costs and timelines
    spiraling out of control, DOD reduced the number of satellites it plans
    to procure--pushing the average per unit procurement cost up to 224-
    percent above 2002 baseline costs--and is now pursuing an alternative
    to SBIRS-High while it continues with the scaled back program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2433. This oversight mechanism originated with
    an amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982. It
    was made permanent in the following year's authorization act and has
    been amended several times. Generally, the law requires DOD to review
    programs and report to Congress whenever cost growth reaches specified
    thresholds. The statute is commonly known as the Nunn-McCurdy amendment
    based on the names of the sponsors of the original legislation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Initial cost and schedule estimates for NPOESS--a new satellite
    constellation intended to replace existing weather and environmental
    monitoring satellites--have also proven unreliable. NPOESS is managed
    by a tri-agency Integrated Program Office consisting of DOD, the
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration. In January 2006, the program
    reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach, at the 25-percent threshold,
    due to continuing technical problems, including problems with the
    development of key sensors. Specifically, in early 2005, DOD learned
    that a subcontractor could not meet cost and schedule targets due to
    significant technical issues on an imaging sensor known as the visible/
    infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS) sensor--including problems
    with the cryoradiator, excessive vibration of sensor parts, and errors
    in the sensor's solar calibration. These technical problems were
    further complicated by subcontractor management problems. To address
    these issues, DOD provided additional funds for VIIRS, capped
    development funding for other critical technologies, and revised its
    schedule to keep the program moving forward. We also reported that
    based on our own analysis of contractor trends, the program will most
    likely overrun costs by $1.4 billion.\3\ Given the challenges currently
    facing the program, the scheduled first launch date slipped 17 months
    to September 2010.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major Weapon
    Programs, GAO-06-391 (Washington, DC: March 31, 2006).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Another recent example of problems is evident in the Advanced
    Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program. We reported in the past that
    this program experienced cost increases due to requirements changes,
    inadequate contract strategies, and funding shortfalls. We also
    reported that DOD had to cut back its planned purchase of satellites
    from five to three as a result. The outcome has been an 84-percent unit
    cost increase--each AEHF satellite is now estimated to cost about $2.1
    billion. More recently, we reported that scheduling delays and the late
    delivery of cryptographic equipment have culminated into nearly a 3-
    year delay in the launch of the first satellite and that the program
    still faces schedule risk due to the continued concurrent development
    of two critical path items managed and developed outside the program.
        Acquisition problems have not been limited to the development of
    home-grown systems. DOD's purchase of an ostensible commercial
    satellite for the use of communications, the Wideband Gapfiller
    Satellite (WGS), is experiencing about a 70-percent cost growth, due in
    part to the problems a subcontractor was experiencing in assembling the
    satellites. Improperly installed fasteners on the satellites'
    subcomponents have resulted in rework on the first satellite and
    extensive inspections of all three satellites currently being
    fabricated. The cost for WGS has increased about $746.3 million but DOD
    estimates that about $276.2 million of this amount is largely due to
    cost growth associated with a production gap between satellites three
    and four. The launch of the first satellite has now been delayed for
    over 3 years and is currently scheduled for June 2007. The delay will
    increase program costs and add at least 22 months to the time it takes
    to obtain an initial operational capability from the system.
        Figure 1 shows that, overall for fiscal years 2006 through 2011,
    estimated costs for DOD's major space acquisition programs have
    increased a total of about $12.2 billion--or nearly 44-percent in
    total--above initial estimates. Figure 2 breaks out this trend among
    key major space acquisitions.

        As both figures illustrate, cost increases have had a dramatic
    impact on DOD's overall space portfolio. To cover the added costs of
    poorly performing programs, DOD has shifted scarce resources away from
    other programs, creating a cascade of cost and schedule inefficiencies.
    For example, to fund other space programs, DOD has had to push off the
    start of a new version of the Global Positioning System (GPS), which
    has forced costs to increase for the current version under development.
    Meanwhile, DOD is also contending with cost increases within its
    Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. These are largely due
    to misjudgments about the extent to which DOD could rely on commercial
    demand to leverage its investment. Nevertheless, the resulting $12.6
    billion increase has added pressures to make tradeoffs.
        At the same time that DOD is juggling resources on existing
    programs, it is undertaking two new efforts--the Transformational
    Satellite Communications System (TSAT) program and Space Radar
    program--which are expected to be among the most ambitious, expensive,
    and complex space systems ever. Moreover, DOD is relying heavily on
    their planned capabilities to fundamentally enable DOD to transform how
    military operations are conducted. In fact, many other weapon systems
    will be interfaced with these satellites and highly dependent on them
    for their own success. Together, these systems have been preliminarily
    estimated to cost about $40 billion. While DOD is planning to undertake
    the new systems, broader analyses of the Nation's fiscal future
    indicate that spending for weapon systems may need to be reduced,
    rather than increased, to address growing deficits.

                   UNDERLYING CAUSES OF ACQUISITION PROBLEMS

        Our reviews have identified a number of causes behind the problems
    just described, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad
    scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a
    competition for funding which encourages low cost estimating,
    optimistic scheduling, over promising, suppressing bad news, and for
    space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess
    potentially better alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy at the
    expense of realism and sound management. Invariably, with too many
    programs in its portfolio, DOD and even Congress are forced to
    continually shift funds to and from programs--often undermining well-
    performing programs to pay for poorly performing ones.
        Second, DOD starts its space programs too early, that is, before it
    has assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved
    within available resources and time constraints. This tendency is
    caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs
    attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving out
    technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology
    invention into acquisition, programs experience technical problems that
    have reverberating effects and require large amounts of time and money
    to fix. When programs have a large number of interdependencies, even
    minor ``glitches'' can cause disruptions.
        A companion problem for all weapon systems is that DOD allows new
    requirements to be added well into the acquisition phase. Many times,
    these significantly stretch the technology challenges (and
    consequently, budgets) the program is already facing. This was
    particularly evident in SBIRS-High up until 2004. While experiences
    would caution DOD not to pile on new requirements, customers often
    demand them fearing there may not be another chance to get new
    capabilities since programs can take a decade or longer to complete.
        Third, space programs have historically attempted to satisfy all
    requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or
    the maturity of the technologies to achieve the full capability.
    Increasingly, DOD has preferred to make fewer, but heavier, larger, and
    complex ``Battlestar Galactica-like'' satellites, that perform a
    multitude of missions rather than larger constellations of smaller,
    less complex satellites that gradually increase in sophistication. This
    has stretched technology challenges beyond the capability of many
    potential contractors and vastly increased the complexities related to
    software--a problem that affected SBIRS-High and AEHF, for example.
        Our reviews have identified additional factors that contribute to
    space acquisition problems, though less directly affecting cost and
    schedule problems we have reported on. For example, consolidations
    within defense supplier base for space programs have made it more
    difficult for DOD to incorporate competition into acquisition
    strategies. Since 1985, there were at least ten fully competent prime
    contractors competing for the large programs and a number that could
    compete for subcontracts. Arguably today, there are only two
    contractors that could handle DOD's most complex space programs. DOD
    has exacerbated this problem by not seeking opportunities to
    restructure its acquisitions to maximize competition, particularly for
    the small suppliers who have a high potential to introduce novel
    solutions and innovations into space acquisitions. In the 1990s, DOD
    also structured contracts in a way that reduced oversight and shifted
    key decisionmaking responsibility onto contractors. DOD later found
    that this approach--known as Total System Performance Responsibility
    (TSPR)--magnified problems related to requirements creep and poor
    contractor performance.
        Another factor contributing to problems is the diverse array of
    officials and organizations involved with a space program, which has
    made it even more difficult to pare back and control requirements. The
    Space Radar system, for example, is expected to play a major role in
    transforming military as well as intelligence-collecting operations and
    other critical governmental functions, such as homeland security. As a
    result, its constituency includes combatant commanders, all of the
    military services, intelligence agencies, and the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS). The GPS not only serves the military, it
    provides critical services to civilian users, the transportation
    sector, the information technology sector, among many other industries.
        In addition, short tenures for top leadership and program managers
    within the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
    has lessened the sense of accountability for acquisition problems and
    further encouraged a short-term view of success, according to officials
    we have interviewed. Though still in a pre-acquisition phase, TSAT and
    Space Radar have already had one program director each. The SBIRS-High
    program, meanwhile, has seen at least three program directors. At the
    highest levels of leadership, for many years, DOD did not invest
    responsibilities for its space activities in any one individual--
    leaving no one in charge of establishing an integrated vision for space
    or of mediating between competing demands. In 1994, it established such
    a position within the OSD, but dissolved this position in 1998. In
    2002, DOD established a space leadership position within the Under
    Secretary position in the Air Force, combined it with the directorship
    of the National Reconnaissance Office in order to better integrate DOD
    and intelligence space activities, and allowed the Under Secretary to
    have milestone decision authority for major space systems acquisitions.
    After the first Under Secretary of the Air Force in charge of space
    retired in 2005, DOD split these responsibilities and temporarily
    reclaimed milestone decision authority for all major space programs.
    Changes in leadership and reorganizations are common across DOD, but
    again, they make it more difficult to enforce accountability and
    maintain the right levels of support for acquisition programs.
        Lastly, there are capacity shortfalls that have constrained DOD's
    ability to optimize and oversee its space programs. These include:
    shortages in the pipeline of scientists and engineers, shortages of
    experts in systems and software engineering, and uneven levels of
    experience among program managers. Contractors are also facing
    workforce pressures similar to those experienced by the government,
    that is, not enough technical expertise to develop complex space
    systems. In addition, we have reported that there is a lack of low-cost
    launch opportunities, which are needed to increase the level of
    experimental testing in space.

       DOD HAS EXPRESSED ITS COMMITMENT TO IMPROVE ITS APPROACH TO SPACE
                                  ACQUISITIONS

        DOD has recently expressed a commitment to improve its approach to
    space acquisitions and embrace many of the recommendations we have made
    in the past.
        Our previous recommendations have been focused on providing a sound
    foundation for program execution. Namely, we have recommended that DOD
    separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental
    path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at
    program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstratable knowledge
    to make decisions to move to next phases. In addition, we have called
    on DOD to develop an overall investment strategy for space in order to
    help DOD rebalance its investments in space acquisition programs as it
    continues to contend with cost increases from its programs.
        These recommendations are based on a body of work that we have
    undertaken over the last several years that examines weapon acquisition
    issues from a perspective that draws upon lessons learned from best
    product development practices. Leading commercial firms expect that
    their program managers will deliver high-quality products on time and
    within budget. Doing otherwise could result in the customer walking
    away. Thus, those firms have created an environment and adopted
    practices that put their program managers in a good position to succeed
    in meeting these expectations. Collectively, these practices comprise a
    process that is anchored in knowledge. It is a process in which
    technology development and product development are treated differently
    and managed separately. The process of developing technology culminates
    in discovery--the gathering of knowledge--and must, by its nature,
    allow room for unexpected results and delays. Leading firms do not ask
    their program or product managers to develop technology. Rather, they
    give responsibility for maturing technologies to science and technology
    organizations. The process of developing a product culminates in
    delivery and, therefore, gives great weight to design and production.
    The firms demand--and receive--specific knowledge about a new product
    before production begins. A program does not go forward unless a strong
    business case on which the program was originally justified continues
    to hold true.
        While the practices we have recommended represent commonly accepted
    sound business practices, until recently, they have not been accepted
    by DOD's space acquisition community for large space acquisitions. By
    contrast, these practices were implemented for the development of a
    small, experimental satellite, intended for direct use by a combatant
    command, (known as TacSat 1). We recently reported that by including
    only mature technologies and limiting new requirements, DOD was able to
    develop the satellite for less than $10 million (including surplus
    hardware valued at $5 million) and within 12 months.
        In disagreeing with our recommendations, DOD asserted its desire to
    push programs to advance technologies as far as possible. Other reasons
    that space officials have given for extending technology development
    into acquisition include the greater ability to secure funding for
    costly technology development within an acquisition program versus a
    science and technology program, a belief among the acquisition
    community that labs in charge of developing space technologies do not
    understand their needs, as well as communication gaps between the S&T
    and acquisition communities.
        Moreover, while DOD officials told us they were pursuing
    evolutionary development for space systems, we found that they were
    beginning programs by challenging programs managers to achieve
    significant leaps in capability with the intention of abandoning those
    efforts later in the development cycle should too many problems be
    encountered. This is not a true evolutionary approach, as it leaves DOD
    facing increased technical challenges at the beginning of a program and
    thus, increased risks, and it raises the expectations on the part of
    stakeholders who may be unwilling to accept less capability later on.
    Two of the systems we were most concerned about in this respect were
    and TSAT and Space Radar--they were already expected to cost about $40
    billion. DOD was planning to start these acquisitions even when many of
    their critical technologies were still immature and it was pursuing a
    highly ambitious path in terms of the technology push. Given that these
    systems were among the most complex programs ever undertaken for space,
    they were being counted on to enable wider DOD transformation efforts,
    and DOD was already contending with highly problematic space efforts,
    we believed DOD could not afford to pursue such risky approaches for
    TSAT and Space Radar.
        Since we last testified before this subcommittee in July 2005, DOD
    has appointed a new Under Secretary of the Air Force to be in charge of
    space acquisitions, who, in turn, has embraced adopting best practices,
    or, as he terms it, ``going back to the basics.'' Specifically, the
    Under Secretary has expressed a desire to

             Delegate the maturation of technologies--to the point
            of being tested in a relevant environment or operational
            environment, if appropriate--to the S&T community.
             Adopt an evolutionary development approach in which
            new systems would be developed in a series of increments, or
            blocks. Any desired technology that is not expected to be
            matured in time to start a new block would be assigned to a
            later block. Each block would have a discrete beginning and end
            point.
             Fund S&T appropriately so that significant technology
            breakthroughs can be continually pursued.
             Improve collaboration on requirements--consulting with
            warfighters on the content of each new block.

        In addition, the Under Secretary is focused on estimating cost and
    funding new acquisitions to an 80-percent confidence level;
    strengthening systems engineering and strengthening the acquisition
    workforce.
        Aspects of this approach have recently been incorporated in to
    DOD's TSAT program. For the first block, satellites 1 and 2, the Air
    Force has reduced its expectations in the level of sophistication of
    these satellites to increase the confidence in the schedule for
    launching the first satellite in 2014. Higher performing levels of the
    technologies to support laser communications and an Internet-like
    processor router will be pushed off to a subsequent block, along with
    the multi-access laser communications--a more robust laser capable of
    transmitting vast amounts of data within seconds. Program officials
    have also stated that the TSAT program will not enter into product
    development, that is, formal acquisition, until its critical
    technologies are proven.
        These are good steps when looking at TSAT as an individual program.
    It is important, however, that the Air Force ensure warfighters accept
    lower capability and that it makes sense to pursue the current approach
    versus the alternative of buying more Advanced Extremely High Frequency
    (AEHF) or Wide Gapfiller Satellites (WGS).

            KEYS TO REALIZING DOD'S NEW GOALS FOR SPACE ACQUISITIONS

        DOD's desire to adopt best practices for space acquisition is a
    positive and necessary first step toward reform. However, these changes
    will not be easy to undertake. They require significant shifts in
    thinking about how space systems should be developed; changes in
    incentives and perceptions; as well as further policy and process
    changes. Moreover, they will need to be made within a larger
    acquisition environment that still encourages a competition for funding
    and consequently pressures programs to view success as the ability to
    secure the next installment rather than the end goal of delivering
    capabilities when and as promised. In addition, DOD's space leaders
    will be challenged to sustain a commitment to adopting best practices,
    given the myriad of missions and programs that compete for the
    attention of DOD's leadership and resources, frequent turnover in
    leadership positions, and potential resistance from the many diverse
    organizations involved with space acquisitions.
        There are steps, however, that DOD can take to substantially
    mitigate these challenges.

             First, DOD can guide its decisions to start space
            acquisition programs with an overall investment strategy. More
            specifically, DOD could identify overall capabilities and how
            to achieve them, that is, what role space will play versus
            other air-, sea-, and land-based assets; identify priorities
            for funding space acquisitions; and implement mechanisms that
            would enforce the strategy and measure progress. Optimally, DOD
            would do this for its entire weapon system investment portfolio
            so that space systems that are expected to play a critical role
            in transformation could be prioritized along with other legacy
            and transformational systems and so that DOD could reduce
            pressures associated with competition for funding. But in the
            absence of a department-wide strategy, DOD could reexamine and
            prioritize its space portfolio with an eye toward balancing
            investments between legacy programs and new programs as well as
            between S&T programs and acquisition programs. In addition, DOD
            could prioritize S&T investments. This is particularly
            important since DOD is undertaking a range of initiatives--
            collectively known as operationally responsive space (ORS)--
            designed to facilitate evolutionary development, more testing
            of technologies before acquisition, and ultimately enable DOD
            to deliver space-based capabilities to the warfighter much
            faster and quicker. While ORS investments hold great potential,
            there are other S&T projects competing for the same resources,
            including those focused on discovering and developing
            technologies and materials that could greatly enhance future
            capabilities, reduce costs, and maintain U.S. superiority in
            space.
             Second, DOD could revise policies and processes
            supporting space as needed to adopt the best practices being
            embraced. For example, DOD's space acquisition policy could be
            further revised to ensure that a true evolutionary approach is
            being pursued and that blocks, or increments, will include only
            technologies that have been sufficiently matured. DOD could
            also implement processes and policies, as needed, that
            stabilize requirements, particularly for acquisitions that are
            being shared with other stakeholders, such as the Intelligence
            Community, and that ensure warfighters are bought into
            capabilities being pursued for each new system increment. In
            recent years, it has instituted processes for some individual
            systems, such as SBIRS-High, that could serve as a model.
             Third, DOD could continue to address other capacity
            shortfalls. These include shortages of staff with science and
            engineering backgrounds; shortages of experience within the
            program manager workforce; limited opportunities and funding
            for testing for space technologies; and the lack of low-cost
            launch vehicles. At the same time, DOD could continue to work
            toward strengthening relationships between the S&T and
            acquisition communities and coordination within the S&T
            community. The Under Secretary is uniquely positioned to do
            this given his previous position as DOD's Director of Defense
            Research and Engineering and his participation in previous
            efforts to develop a strategy for space S&T.
             Fourth, we have recommended that DOD take steps
            departmentwide to hold people and programs accountable when
            best practices are not pursued. This will require DOD to
            empower program managers to make decisions related to funding,
            staffing, and moving into subsequent phases and to match
            program manager tenure with development or delivery of a
            product. It may also require DOD to tailor career paths and
            performance management systems to incentivize longer tenures.
            Until these actions have been taken, space leaders could take
            steps now to ensure space program managers have the right
            levels of experience to execute large programs and have
            sufficient authority so that they can be held accountable.
            Likewise, DOD's space leaders can take steps to hold its
            contractors accountable by structuring contracts so that
            incentives actually motivate contractors to achieve desired
            acquisition outcomes and withholding award fees when those
            goals are not met.

        In closing, we are encouraged with the acquisition approach being
    embraced by DOD's space leadership. It can enable DOD to begin to match
    resources to requirements before starting new programs and therefore,
    better position programs for success. Successful implementation,
    however, will hinge on the ability of DOD's current space leaders to
    instill and sustain commitment to adopting best practices over the
    short and long term. In doing so, best practice approaches should be
    reflected in policy and manifested in decisions on individual programs
    or reform will be blunted. They should also be accompanied by an
    investment strategy for space, and ultimately DOD, to separate wants
    from needs and to alleviate longstanding pressures associated with
    competition within DOD to win funding. By embracing a model that
    incorporates all these elements, DOD can achieve better outcomes for
    its space programs.

                             SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

        In preparing for this testimony, we relied on previously issued GAO
    reports on assessments of individual space programs, incentives and
    pressures that drive space system acquisition problems, common problems
    affecting space system acquisitions, space science and technology
    strategy, and DOD's space acquisition policy, as well as our reports on
    best practices for weapon systems development. We also analyzed DOD's
    Selected Acquisition Reports to assess cost increases and investment
    trends. In addition, we met with the Air Force Under Secretary to
    discuss his ``back to basics'' approach. We conducted our review
    between March 6 and April 3, 2006, in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards.

                          CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

        For future information, please contact Cristina Chaplain at 202-
    512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Individuals making contributions to this
    testimony include, Art Gallegos, Robert Ackley, Maricela Cherveny,
    Sharron Candon, Jean Harker, Leslie Kaas Pollock, and Karen Sloan.
        Table 1 highlights recent findings from our reports on cost and
    schedule overruns for DOD's current and planned space programs. The
    table also notes that many programs are still addressing past mistakes
    in acquisition approaches and contractor oversight as well as
    technical, design, and manufacturing problems.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you. We'll make that a part of the
    record. We appreciate your work and evaluation.
        It's great to have the ranking member, Senator Nelson,
    here. I've had some opening comments. I'll let him make his
    comments now, and do his round of questioning if he's ready.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll just
    submit the opening statement for the record.
        Senator Sessions. We'll make your statement a part of the
    record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson

        I join Senator Sessions in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon
    and I look forward to a good discussion on a number of key space
    issues. We have a late start today, as a result of the committee's full
    hearing schedule, so I will be brief in highlighting just a few issues.
        Serious problems with most of the space acquisition programs
    continue, although some improvements are being seen, notably in the
    Transformational Communications Satellite Program (TSAT).
        As the Government Accountability Office has noted, the bow wave of
    funding increases in the space programs in the next 5 years brought
    about as a result of cost overruns in the space acquisition program is
    $12 billion--a staggering amount. This shortfall comes on top of
    significant projected growth in the same period in the Space Radar,
    TSAT, and other new programs. As the Nation most dependent on space
    systems for military as well as for civilian use, paying for the space
    programs is important but it is going to be difficult. These programs
    have to have discipline, stable, realistic requirements, realistic
    budgets and schedules, and mature technology to be sustained. There
    will continue to be a reluctance to start very costly new space
    programs if Congress doesn't have confidence in the requirements, the
    technology, the cost and the schedule.
        In the TSAT program, there are improvements but they are recent and
    fragile, however, and there is a long way to go, and a lot of work to
    be done, before the TSAT hoped-for launch date at the end of 2014. I
    remain concerned that terminating the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
    satellite early, in anticipation of a successful TSAT launch in 2014,
    may still be overly ambitious.
        In addition to TSAT, I look forward to hearing about the Space
    Radar program and the status of the United Launch Alliance, the Boeing
    and Lockheed Martin joint venture for the Evolved Expendable Launch
    Vehicle program, the Navy's program for ultra high frequency
    communications and plans to minimize any potential gaps in that
    capability, and the status of the designation and training of Services'
    space cadres.
        In closing, I urge our witnesses to look seriously at less costly
    options for meeting space capabilities. These ideas, such as the notion
    of operationally responsive space, and smaller, less sophisticated
    satellites that can be replaced and upgraded on a more frequent basis,
    should also be explored.
        Thank you each for appearing here today. I look forward to a good
    discussion. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Shall I get into the questions?
        Senator Sessions. I would be pleased if you can start.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, it's good to see you again. Let's talk, you
    and General Chilton, about the operationally responsive space
    for some missions--preassembled, modular, assembled on demand,
    launched within hours. They could be commercial satellites for
    a focused short term. There are many options here to explore.
    Let me ask you all some questions.
        Is TacSat-2 fully funded?
        Dr. Sega. Sir, my understanding is, TacSat-2 is fully
    funded. The launch portion will be fully funded by, I believe,
    the end of this fiscal year. We do have a reprogramming
    activity to fully fund the launch of TacSac-2.
        Senator Bill Nelson. TacSat-3?
        Dr. Sega. I may need some help with that.
        General Hamel. Yes, sir, if I might. In both cases, the
    TacSat-2 and TacSat-3 are fully funded, and, in fact, are well
    along in their development.
        Senator Sessions. Would you explain TacSat?
        General Hamel. Excuse me, sir, yes. TacSat is the acronym
    for tactical satellites, and these are a series of families of
    experiments that are being pursued by the DOD. They are being
    done by various laboratories. The first one of these vehicles
    would be flying later this year. TacSat-1 is being sponsored by
    the Naval Research Lab. TacSat-2 and TacSat-3 are being done,
    led by the Air Force's Research Lab. As I say, both of those
    are well along in their development. We are, in fact, now
    soliciting for the actual launch contract being ordered, some
    year in advance for that. So, we are, indeed, on course for
    that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. How about number 4?
        General Hamel. Sir, that has not yet been awarded. We will
    be looking at that as a future year commitment, in terms of the
    budgets.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What is the future vision for this
    operationally responsive space?
        Dr. Sega. I could start the answer to that question,
    Senator Nelson, and then hand it off, because it involves the
    operational concepts from the warfighter. It involves a robust
    science and technology program to continue new ideas coming
    forward. It involves the acquisition strategy, so that the
    design is correct to allow a modular approach to building the
    satellites. So, there's a technical aspect, an acquisition
    aspect, as well as operations and how you would actually employ
    them.
        If I can go back to my previous 4 years as Director of
    Defense Research and Engineering, we had several initiatives.
    One of those was the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI) to
    frame the technology development, going forward. It had three
    pillars: a high-speed hypersonics portion, space access, and
    space technology. Out of the space access portion came a joint
    program between Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
    (DARPA) and the Air Force, called Falcon. One aspect of Falcon
    was small launch vehicles. So, we're looking at the
    underpinnings of providing the launch capacity to enable
    operational response to space through that program. So, an
    effort was established for the booster phase.
        The third phase in space technology was responsive
    payloads. As General Chilton mentioned, if you have a
    responsive booster, it's important that when the satellite gets
    to orbit, you don't have an extensive checkout time, you don't
    have an extensive time for it to outgas and those things that
    many satellites have had to do in the past. So, responsive
    payload technologies was also worked over the previous several
    years.
        I would view this area in terms of a small-sat strategy.
    One part of that is TacSats that can be deployed quickly for
    the tactical commander. Another part is to look at smaller
    satellites to perform some of the missions that we're currently
    performing. So, they would be an integral part of our
    constellations, and we replenish them as necessary in time, but
    we'd also have the capacity of replenishing rapidly, if that
    was the case. We also have the opportunity in the small
    satellites to wring out some systems in technology development,
    as well as science and technology.
        So, these pieces, I believe, fit together. If we design
    these properly and TacSat-3 is a great example, and I'd invite
    those that can to visit Air Force Research Laboratory in
    Albuquerque to look at the modular approach to some of this,
    the systems design to enable some of the attributes in which
    you've just mentioned. We're putting together a strategy for
    this small-sat efforts to include the laboratories, the product
    centers, the users, Army, Navy, and Air Force, across the
    board.
        General Chilton. Sir, I think Dr. Sega gave a good summary
    of that. I could just refer back to the scenarios that I
    addressed earlier, and also point out that if tomorrow we were
    to go to war in another part of the world, we would go to war
    with what we have in space today, and there is no option to
    launch an additional satellite quickly to supplement it. We
    could perhaps adjust our constellations if we needed to focus
    additional capability in that area. What we don't have is a
    quick-response capability that could augment where there are
    shortfalls. As I mentioned, inspect where we had questions, or
    perhaps even replace, should an adversary just decide to take
    out one of our current capabilities.
        These are the operational concepts that we have in the back
    of our minds when we think about having that capability for the
    warfighter.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General, a priority of the STRATCOM is
    putting a nuclear detection sensor on the GPS system. What are
    your plans for those sensors to be on future GPS satellites?
        General Chilton. Sir, I'll have to take that question for
    the record.
        What I can say is that we do have this requirement for the
    capability to be able to do nuclear detection from orbit, so we
    can determine if a nuclear device has gone off anywhere on the
    planet. Personally, I'm agnostic as to the platform it's on, so
    long as the capability is there.
        But let me take that for the record, sir, to get back to
    you with regard to the GPS constellation, specifically.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        STRATCOM has a requirement to be able to do nuclear detection from
    orbit so that a determination can be made as to whether a nuclear
    device has been detonated anywhere on the planet. Air Force Space
    Command is our force provider for nuclear detonation detection, and
    Space and Missile Systems Center, our acquisition arm for nuclear
    detonation sensors. STRATCOM is agnostic as to the platform this sensor
    will be placed upon, so long as the capability exists within a timely
    manner.

        Senator Sessions. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
    all for your testimony this afternoon.
        Secretary Sega, this week we had a subcommittee hearing on
    missile defense, and one of the topics that we discussed was
    the future space programs of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
    Today, MDA has the Space Tracking and Surveillance System
    (STSS) program for warning and sensing, the N-FIRE for plume
    characterization. But MDA is looking at other potential space
    programs, beginning in 2008. Will those programs be coordinated
    with you, or are they operating on their own space and own
    direction?
        Dr. Sega. Senator Reed, as we move forward we're working on
    integration across space, how different space systems will
    interact better than they have in the past. There's work to be
    done to fully integrate how we are developing and operating
    space systems across space, as well as how they would interact
    with air and surface and sometimes subsurface assets. So,
    that's a work in progress.
        Senator Reed. So, they do not fall under your capacity as
    DOD Executive Agent for Space. Is that officially?
        I must say, I'm encouraged by your acquisition policy
    discussions. I think it's sensible. You've taken the
    suggestions of GAO and other outside stakeholders. I presume,
    also, that MDA is not part of this acquisition policy, because
    they don't fall within your purview.
        Dr. Sega. The concept of going back to basics is one that I
    think is going beyond the programs that we are discussing today
    within this portfolio. I think that it's one that I meet with
    General Obering and the MDA folks. My deputy, Gary Payton, who
    came from MDA can apply this type of approach. I think we would
    be better off. I do believe the integration and coordination is
    important, not only for MDA, but also the NRO.
        Senator Reed. But at this juncture it's more of cooperation
    and collaboration, rather than being within your authority for
    space acquisition?
        Dr. Sega. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Reed. A final question with respect to this set of
    issues. MDA is going to report to a board of directors. That's
    one of the things they indicated to us. Will you be part of
    this board of directors?
        Dr. Sega. I have to see how that forms out.
        Senator Reed. All right. Very good.
        There is another aspect at MDA that I think touches on
    space, and one that could potentially raise concern. That is
    the proposed space test bed that they are talking about. There
    is no funding requested in fiscal year 2007, and MDA officials
    have said that no decision will be taken on whether to pursue
    the space test bed until 2008. The budget documents state that
    the space test bed is, ``an essential element of the Ballistic
    Missile Defense System (BMDS) acquisition plan,'' and that
    would assume, to me, if it is an essential element of the
    acquisition plan, that they have made more decisions than they
    are indicating in their documentation.
        You are the DOD Executive Agent for Space. Can you explain
    the status of the test bed, your role in the decision, what
    it's going to do? It seems to me this could be a very central
    part of our space policy. If you're the space executive, you
    should know.
        Dr. Sega. As we go forward and settle these areas in test
    and one of those is a capacity to test on the ground, the
    capacity to test with air simulators, if you will for example,
    Space Radar, to test them there, as well as the ability to test
    assets, with space as part of the component--is one that we're
    in the process of working through. If there's any further
    follow-on?
        General Hamel. Sir, if I might. We have a good
    relationship, if you will, in terms of executing the many of
    these space programs with the MDA. In fact, the Space Tracking
    Surveillance System, as well as N-FIRE, is actually managed by
    people that are co-located in my organization. In fact, I
    support them with contracting and engineering and the like.
    Much of the program direction and the architectures are
    actually directly overseen by General Obering. As a result, we
    have a less active role in terms of that, but it's certainly in
    terms of the lessons learned and how we're actually going about
    executing the programs. Such things as target vehicles are
    actually provided by my organization, so we have very much an
    execution-level support, our relationship with them.
        Senator Reed. I appreciate that. It seems to me, though,
    the essence of your position as the Executive Agency for Space
    is that you would have significant influence on all these
    programs, particularly one that could essentially establish
    literally a test bed in space, which might imply even testing
    things other than satellites, testing weapons, et cetera. I
    respect your comments today, but there is this lack of clarity
    as to exactly where the central point is. Are these agencies
    coordinating with you because they feel like it, or because you
    have the responsibility and the authority to make them
    coordinate? I think that's an issue that we have to look at
    much more thoroughly.
        I appreciate your comments today, both of you.
        General Chilton, a final question. In your key initiatives
    for Strategic Command for Space, you have a couple of concepts
    which roll right off the tongue, but I'm not quite sure I know
    what they mean. ``Integrate air and space capabilities to
    deliver combined effects.''
        General Chilton. We're doing that today already with the
    Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), you may have heard of
    that?
        Senator Reed. Yes.
        General Chilton. JDAM is essentially a package, a tail-fin
    configuration and a GPS receiver and an Inertial Navigation
    System (INS) package that we can put on one of our bombs,
    either a 2,000-pound class or 500-pound class bomb. The bomb is
    guided to the target using information that was relayed from
    the airplane platform that drops it. Then the bomb is updated
    inflight from the satellite information. This is a good example
    today of where we're integrating space capabilities with our
    air-breathing assets and those type weapons.
        Senator Reed. Great. I have two others, which you might
    answer and those are precisely what helps us understand realign
    resources to sustain existing space surveillance capabilities.
        General Chilton. Today, with regard to the discussion on
    vulnerabilities, my belief is, one of the first things you need
    to do to understand how vulnerable we are, and to understand
    the environment that we're operating in, is to have a good
    capability to surveil that environment and understand what's up
    there.
        Senator Reed. Okay.
        General Chilton. Classically, we've done a great job of
    keeping track of things in space, debris, so that when the
    space shuttle launches, or we launch a commercial satellite,
    even before we launch, we run computer programs that are
    tracking the debris up there to make sure we launch between the
    debris, or aren't going go up into a position where we could be
    struck. We even maneuver, on occasion, the International Space
    Station to avoid debris that we detect up there.
        So, we have a good capability to count the dots up there,
    if you will. But to really understand the environment, you need
    to know what those dots are. What is that satellite that just
    was launched by another country? What is its true purpose and
    capability? Ultimately, through surveillance and what we call
    ``space situational awareness development,'' you, hopefully,
    can divine intent. A very similar scenario that you could
    imagine in an airplane environment is where you're trying to go
    surveil enemy territory or even international territory to
    understand the environment, how many dots are out there. Are
    those dots civilian airplanes? Are those dots military
    airplanes and what is their intent? Similar thing in space. So,
    we need to take the step beyond counting what's up there and
    cataloging it and tracking it, to understanding its purpose and
    intent and capability. That's what we mean by ``increasing our
    surveillance capability.''
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much for all of your testimony
    today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You're very gracious. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Dr. Sega, we've recently heard reports of continuing
    problems on the highly-expensive and time-consuming efforts on
    such programs as Space-Based Infrared Radar System (SBIRS)-
    High, our early warning launch satellite, and NPOES, the
    weather satellite. The DOD is paying a considerable price for
    mistakes we made some years ago, mistakes largely rooted in
    optimistic assumptions about cost, technological maturity, and
    the time needed to get the job done.
        How is the Air Force and DOD applying the lessons learned
    from those mistakes?
        Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, those are two of the examples that
    led us to the ``back-to-basics'' approach and the block
    approach. The technologies were not mature in either of the
    cited programs when they began. The requirements were many, in
    terms of what the expectation of the satellite would perform.
    The role of government was a bit reduced as these programs
    started in the mid-1990s.
        The lessons learned from those two programs, and
    recommendations that have been forwarded by internal/external
    groups, including GAO, have formed the basis of the principles
    by which we are going forward. General Hamel mentioned many of
    those, in terms of the discipline, in terms of management and
    the systems engineering, testability, and going through solid
    technical side. There's also better cost estimation in simply
    not taking on more than what we know how to do, so that
    acquisition time is reduced. I believe you also will find
    increased accountability. As those requirements are stable, the
    time to complete is identified, and the tasks at hand are
    known, and the starting point is matured technologies. So, I
    think they formed part of the thought process that led to a
    ``back-to-basics'' approach, a block incremental approach,
    going forward.
        Senator Sessions. With regard to the Space Radar, TSAT--can
    you guarantee us or give us some confidence that those programs
    are not likely to suffer the same kind of difficulties?
        Dr. Sega. We have put in the principles for example, in
    TSAT, the technologies are either at the five or six level,
    currently, with the next year is to mature the remaining ones
    that are at the technology readiness level five or six. At that
    point, we enter into the competition to, in fact, go to what
    would be, in this approach, the beginning point, if you will,
    of a block one.
        Senator Sessions. Let me just see if I can put this in
    plain English. Not that you're not, but what you've decided
    with TSAT is that the first one, you're going to put in it the
    capabilities that you have great confidence in, that's mature.
    As time goes by, and as the technology matures, the next
    satellites can be more sophisticated and have more capability.
    Is that the way this acquisition block approach is?
        Dr. Sega. Yes.
        Senator Sessions. Is that what it boils down to?
        Dr. Sega. Yes. So, incrementally, building in there, but
    each step of the way--and, in fact, a continuous process. I
    view it as important to have the users, the warfighters
    involved from day one, all the way through the process, as well
    as the technical people, the acquisition folks, the logistics
    folks, operators, so that as we identify what should be in
    block one. We're also engaged as to have the needs changed for
    a block two from what we had previously thought would be in
    block two.
        Senator Sessions. Needs are based on the warfighter or the
    customers' needs will also impact what you put in the next
    block.
        Dr. Sega. Correct. We will converge on what is in a block
    two, from a user standpoint, as well as a provider standpoint.
    So, we will work hard on that systems development for what
    would be available for a block two, as well as what needs are
    available, and then we define that as well.
        We have a sense of where we want to go on TSAT for block
    two, as we had a bit more aggressive goals, in terms of the
    capacity of the laser communications and the capacity of the
    router.
        Senator Sessions. What about the Space Radar? How are you
    coming along in setting your goals and expectations there?
        Dr. Sega. In Space Radar, currently, we are going through
    the Joint Staff and through Vice Admiral Chanik to these
    process leading up to an assessment by the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council (JROC) process, in conjunction with our folks
    on the acquisition, to identify what would be available in a
    block one, and what its value would be. It's only after that
    convergence view that we lock in what we want to do on a block
    one.
        Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, you've evaluated this. The
    ``back to basics'' program, the acquisition stages, block
    approach that's been described. Is that responsive to the
    concerns GAO has stated? How would you evaluate the situation
    today?
        Ms. Chaplain. The approach that Dr. Sega described, that
    he's taking with TSAT and wants to take with other programs,
    aligns with the best practices we recommend. One of the most
    critical things we think programs need to do is match resources
    with requirements before they ever start. One of the most
    important aspects of that is making sure you've proved out your
    technologies before you ever start, before you make that
    commitment to spend large amounts of money on a program.
        For many years, space programs have not been doing that,
    and--as have another number of other weapons systems. So this
    is like the first biggest step that needs to be made to get a
    program on a more executable track.
        That said, we have concerns about both TSAT and Space Radar
    that need to be addressed. TSAT, the spending's going to go up
    some $400 million next year. We are still trying to find out
    exactly where that money's going to be spent in enough detail
    to give us assurance that the spending is wise. Warfighter
    acceptance: we are still hammering that down through
    discussions with the Air Force, to the extent the warfighters
    have accepted the trades that have already been made on TSAT.
        The effect of the new TSAT capabilities on systems like
    Space Radar and Future Combat Systems (FCS): the Army's FCS is
    going to depend highly on the environment that TSAT supports to
    send information to among all these Army systems. If there's
    less capability than accepted, is FCS going to still work in
    that environment? Same with Space Radar. If Space Radar can't
    quite use all of the TSAT as it's laid out now, what's going to
    be used in its place to make sure Space Radar can still send
    that kind of information?
        Then, of course, we have the larger question of
    affordability. We have cost overruns on a lot of these other
    programs. Can we afford TSAT now? This kind of question really
    needs to be looked in the larger DOD weapons system portfolio
    for trades.
        Space Radar, we're still looking at this system, and we
    plan to do some more detailed review on it. But we have a
    number of questions at this point that we've been asking
    ourselves. Again, affordability. This is going to be a very
    expensive program, and is this affordable within the context of
    the whole portfolio? Requirements: are there too many on the
    program right now, or do we have just the requirements we need?
    Cost sharing: has that been worked out with the Intelligence
    Community and DOD? We're still looking into that question. We
    would like to also understand what the level of
    sophistication's going to be in the first increment of Space
    Radar, and I don't think we've learned that yet. Again, the
    trades between TSAT and Space Radar, is this going to all work
    out as planned?
        The schedule at our first preliminary review looks kind of
    ambitious, so we would like to learn more about the schedule
    and what exactly it's going to involve and how DOD's really
    going to achieve all the milestones it intends to achieve once
    it starts its acquisition.
        Those are a lot of questions, and they make us wonder, is
    it time now to start a Space Radar acquisition, or do we need
    to step back and think through it more and what it means in the
    larger context of the entire space investment portfolio?
        Senator Sessions. Let me just briefly, Dr. Sega, ask you on
    the Space Radar, how much will it cost, and do we have an
    agreement with the Intelligence Community on cost sharing?
        Dr. Sega. We have an agreement with the Intelligence
    Community. This would be a joint program. The financial
    contributions from the Intelligence Community are still being
    worked. The cost of the Space Radar program, if I could kind of
    frame this up, in terms of the capability and the
    sophistication of block one, is in the process of being
    defined. That will be done in a similar way that we did TSAT,
    with the users and acquisition people working together. In that
    case, it was the QDR. In this case, the combatant commands and
    through the JROC process will be involved on the requirements
    and also on the technology side.
        We will take advantage of the technology we've been
    developing for decades in phased arrays. They have been
    developed on a ground-based system. We have sophisticated
    electronically steerable arrays in our F-18, our F-22, Joint
    Strike Fighter (JSF). So, the basis of the technical piece has
    been worked for decades now.
        Senator Sessions. What about on the cost? What can you tell
    us, as specifically as you can, what cost you're projecting?
        Dr. Sega. I appreciate the question.
        Senator Sessions. Ultimately, we may not know what all
    we'll utilize and how much, but what can you foresee now?
        Dr. Sega. A misperception is the number of satellites that
    would be needed in Space Radar. That's why some of this
    architectural piece will be done. Some of the numbers end up
    very large if your assumption is a large number of satellites.
    If it's more in the eight to nine kind of category of
    satellites, obviously the cost is much less than 20-some
    satellites. So, that architectural trade, in terms of the use
    of Space Radar to not only cue other assets in space, but also
    cue airborne platforms, some of which have radars on them--
    Joint STARS, our other airplanes have a lot of radars--and to
    help them in the overall awareness and battlespace
    characterization, is going to be important. So, how it is used,
    and what value it has, in terms of leveraging a radar image
    from space in some of the denied areas that General Chilton
    talked about, and how it interacts with the other system,
    determine the number of radars that are needed and the
    sophistication that you'd need on block one. So, I'd like to
    give you a solid number, but there's a lot of variables right
    now that prohibit that.
        Senator Sessions. What is just the numbers, as you recall,
    for the fiscal year 2007 request? What do you project through
    the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The 5-year projection?
        Dr. Sega. Yes. The numbers are roughly in the $260 to $270
    million in fiscal year 2007--I can get the exact number--and a
    bit over $4 billion over the FYDP.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The President's budget for fiscal year 2007, as submitted on
    February 6, 2006, included $266.4 million in research, development,
    test, and engineering funding for Space Radar across the FYDP, which
    covers fiscal years 2007-2011.

        Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, just briefly, your concern
    is that it may be higher than that before the 5 years is up?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes.
        Senator Sessions. $4 billion?
        Ms. Chaplain. Our concern is, we don't know how much it
    costs, and that won't be known until the architecture's defined
    and all the trades are made.
        Senator Sessions. This basically represents what we might
    call a ``guesstimate''?
        Ms. Chaplain. Right.
        Senator Sessions. Because it is based on 20 or 9
    satellites, Dr. Sega? Or do you know yet? So you can't really
    be specific, because the technology is not there, and you've
    not made a firm decision?
        Dr. Sega. Right.
        Senator Sessions. Capabilities are per satellite?
        Dr. Sega. That is correct.
        Senator Sessions. That's how sometimes we get into
    problems, I guess, Ms. Chaplain would say, because we are not
    real sure. I won't pursue that in more depth, but I think it
    does point out the difficulties you face. We can't dismiss the
    fact that some of these things need to get started, and they
    need to be produced, and you can't know all the difficulties
    until you get into it. We know that. But to the extent to which
    we can be more predictive and act on more mature technology, as
    you have said you intend to do, I think that can eliminate some
    of the surprises that hit the budget awfully hard. Would you
    agree, just briefly?
        Dr. Sega. Absolutely. That definition is critically
    important to us, maintaining cost and schedule and discipline
    in the programs going forward.
        Senator Sessions. Congress has the responsibility. It's the
    taxpayers' money. You're talking about $1 billion here and $1
    billion there. It's real money, and there are other programs
    that desperately need resources.
        Senator Thune, thank you for coming, and thank you for your
    active participation in our committee.
        Senator Thune. Thank you.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, just on that, there are
    some estimates as high as $40 million on that program. Can we
    afford that, Mr. Secretary?
        Dr. Sega. Senator Nelson, in the smaller constellations, I
    have not seen a number that high. I'd like to have General
    Chilton address this a bit, because the recent inputs from the
    combatant commanders, in terms of needs for night, all-weather
    capability, is one of the principal reasons that's driving us
    toward bringing on this capability.
        General Chilton. I'd be happy to.
        I think one of the things we learned back in Operation
    Desert Storm, and we all saw on our televisions, was the
    spectacular advantage we had over our adversary back in 1991 in
    being able to fight at night. Night-vision goggle technology,
    stealth technology, going in at night, those visions over
    Baghdad of pilots going downtown and coming out unscathed were
    pretty spectacular.
        As we move forward to later conflicts in the 1990s, on into
    Bosnia or Kosovo there, I think what we learned the advantages
    of the technologies I talked about earlier, with the JDAM and
    space integration, but also the shortfalls of operating in a
    nondesert environment, where there's real weather and you don't
    necessarily own the night as well as you do when you have
    favorable weather conditions. We learned the leveraging
    advantage of being able to see through the weather with this
    radar imaging technology that we have fielded on some of our
    airplanes, to include the B-2 bomber and the F-15E and the F-18
    now being able to have that capability from space, where you
    could see, with good resolution, day, night, all weather, into
    enemy territory, would be a tremendous leveraging advantage for
    our warfighters in the field.
        I'd just kind of walk you through these technological
    breakthroughs or identifications that I think really do give us
    a great capability.
        In the past, the combatant commanders have not had as much
    of an input into the requirements for these types of systems.
    That's started to change over the past year. General
    Cartwright, along with the Commander of the Joint Forces
    Command, General Smith, co-chair a forum called the Senior
    Warfighters Forum, where they get together the vice commanders
    of all of the combatant commands from around the world--
    CENTCOM, Southern Command, Pacific Command, et cetera--and they
    sit down, and work to help define the requirements for where we
    need to go forward in the future.
        It is this type of forum that will be working in close
    concert with the developers to lay out the requirements that we
    would need to define what that radar satellite ought to look
    like and the numbers that you would need to support it.
        So, that work is ongoing, but a good bit of work is still
    in front of us, as mentioned.
        Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the members of
    the panel for being with us today, and for your insights on a
    lot of these issues.
        Secretary Sega, I do have a question that pertains to
    something I was involved with in the National Defense
    Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2006, and that required the
    Department to submit to the committees a report on the
    feasibility and advisability of using the Space Radar for
    topographical mapping for scientific and civil purposes. My
    understanding is that work is underway, and is there an interim
    report that has been prepared or anything you might be able to
    share with us?
        Dr. Sega. Senator Thune, I'd characterize it as a rough
    draft now, but it should be in final form. As I understand it
    from our folks, I think the due date is by May 1, as I recall
    the due date on the report. They have worked through various
    examples where an X-band radar is quite useful. So, there's
    also a forum that is in place for those to look at the needs
    across the community. The representative for civil needs is, I
    think, out of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) office that
    attends these meetings. So, there is input into the process in
    development of the radar, but there's also examples, I believe,
    that will be present in the report as it comes forward.
        Senator Thune. Is that something that you say is in draft
    form. By May 1, would we have access to something that we could
    see?
        Dr. Sega. That's my understanding.
        Senator Thune. Okay, good.
        Do you think that it would be worthwhile to establish
    another unclassified frequency for Space Radar, where other
    agencies, such as Department of Agriculture, Department of
    Energy, USGS, as you mentioned, et cetera, could use,
    especially if they were willing to help with cost sharing?
        Dr. Sega. At this point, having not done the analysis, I
    don't know what the level of need is and whether the frequency
    that we are focusing on, X-band, is the correct one for that
    community. So, I'd allow that process to work out and
    understand what the needs are and how they would be addressed
    by radar as we have examples of other radars that have
    different frequency bands for example, the Canadian radar sat,
    I believe, is a C-band-based radar. So, I think understanding
    the needs and how they would be addressed would be the next
    step.
        Senator Thune. Yes, if they were willing to participate in
    the cost, if there's a capacity to do it, there are a lot of
    needs that I think are--and I'm just giving you a couple of
    areas, in the area of agriculture, vegetation classification,
    vegetation land cover, crop identification, forest health,
    things that could really be--the technology could be enormously
    helpful in some of these other civilian areas. It's something
    that we've had some folks in my State who have had an interest
    in pursuing, and I would encourage and welcome your input and
    consideration of that as a possibility, as well. It's something
    that I think has some value, obviously, to the other agencies
    that would benefit from it.
        General Chilton, changing gears for just a minute, one of
    the joint command components under your command is Integrated
    Missile Defense. In your statement, you say that the United
    States is reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons in order
    to assure our allies and dissuade competitors, and deter those
    who plan to harm us, particularly with weapons of mass
    destruction. Now, while we may be reducing our dependence on
    nuclear weapons, it appears evident that nations hostile to us
    are embracing a reliance on nuclear weapons. I guess I'm
    interested in knowing what your assessment is of the nuclear
    delivery capabilities of countries like North Korea and Iran,
    and are we able and in a position to counter those threats?
        General Chilton. Sir, first of all, if I could make one
    minor correction, my boss, General Cartwright, oversees me, as
    the Space and Global Strike Commander, and my colleague,
    Lieutenant General Larry Dodgen, is the Commander for
    Integrated Missile Defense (IMD). General Dodgen does not work
    for me. So, we're peers in the organization. I hesitate to
    tread into his area for IMD.
        I could comment, though, on a couple of areas with regard
    to reliance on nuclear weapons and options with regard to
    global strike that General Cartwright has expounded on and that
    fall right in my lane.
        The change in the Cold War paradigm and the fact that we've
    gone from a military posture and national military strategy,
    vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, where nuclear weapons were what we
    used to deter their activities. We've found today that there
    are adversaries out there, two of which you've named, that
    perhaps may not be deterred by our nuclear might, and to that
    group I'd add, the fellows in organizations like al Qaeda, who
    couldn't care less whether or not we have nuclear weapons. So,
    with regard to that, STRATCOM is looking for other
    alternatives, be they conventional, kinetic, nonkinetic
    options, to deter, dissuade, and then ultimately defeat our
    adversary, weapons that would not be what you might call self-
    deterring in their use. Would you really commit a nuclear
    weapon against that target, or can you better, or perhaps
    equally, service that target with a conventional weapon that
    may be more acceptable to the international community, and,
    indeed, to the American public to employ? Those kind of
    philosophies is what we're talking about in that particular
    statement with regard to reliance on nuclear weapons.
        A little bit on the adversary and threat, certainly in my
    lane, in Space and Global Strike. When you look at a country
    like North Korea, who claim they have a nuclear program, and
    you look at their capability and their missile development
    technology through Scuds, Nodongs, and the Taepo Dong missiles,
    you have to be concerned. Even recently, in the newspaper
    you've seen Iran come out touting the improvements in their
    ballistic missile capabilities publicly, and advertising those
    capabilities, and how capable they are, and intend to become.
    So, certainly along those lines, when you look at those
    capabilities, you have to take that into account.
        The New Triad that is discussed in the DOD talks not only
    about offensive capabilities and flexible infrastructure, but
    also about a defensive capability to help us give the same
    certainty that we had back when it was us and the Soviet Union
    just holding nuclear weapons over each other. We now have this
    concept that you not only have to have a credible striking
    capability that has to be both nuclear, conventional, and
    nonkinetic, but you also have to have a credible defense, and
    then a flexible infrastructure that could respond to an attack
    and continue to sustain our way of life and our operations.
        I hope I've answered your questions along those lines of
    the statement. If I haven't, sir, I'd be happy to expand some
    more on those.
        Senator Thune. I think that gets to the heart of what I was
    asking. They've handed me my note that says my time's expired.
    I will yield back to the chairman.
        Thank you very much.
        General Chilton. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, is the Navy interested in
    space? [Laughter.]
        The answer is yes. I'll answer for you. I want to
    compliment you that your Multiple User Objective System (MUOS)
    program is on budget and on schedule.
        Admiral, answer for us how does the Navy remain fully
    engaged in space programs, or does it just become a user of
    space technology?
        Admiral Deutsch. Senator Nelson, thank you and yes is the
    answer. We are very much interested in space. I will take that
    compliment on MUOS, but I'll be much more comfortable when the
    first satellite is launched in 2014. I'll finally open up that
    bottle of champagne when all five are in orbit.
        The Navy is very much interested in space, and I think we
    are very engaged, as we talked earlier. Our requirements
    process is rather robust. We make sure that what we need is
    injected in the joint system. As far as what we would like to
    have in areas like operationally responsive space (ORS), we
    remain engaged very robustly with our fellow warfighters. I'm
    fairly confident that we remain engaged, and we will in the
    future.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. So, you're definitely interested
    in ORS?
        Admiral Deutsch. Sir, we are very interested in the
    capabilities that ORS provides.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
        Mr. Secretary, let's talk about EELV. What's the status of
    the merger process?
        Dr. Sega. The United Launch Alliance proposal was submitted
    to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a request from the FTC
    to the DOD to provide information, and that has----
        Senator Sessions. Let me just interrupt. We're dealing with
    the launch vehicle that--the numbers expected to be needed were
    reduced, and two providers have discussed merger. So, we'll
    have a single source, rather than two sources on the vehicle.
    So, maybe you, from there, can give us the status of where that
    process is today, as Senator Nelson asked.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you support the access to space
    through two launch providers?
        Dr. Sega. Let me just segment the questions up here a
    little bit.
        The two boosters, for medium and heavy launch, are the
    Delta 4 and Atlas 5, different propellants, different engines
    in the two systems. With the proposed merger of the Boeing and
    Lockheed Martin launch teams to one, they still will be
    providing two different propulsion systems and propellant
    combinations as we go forward. Both of them are relatively new
    boosters, Delta 4 and Atlas 5. Both have been very successful
    in their early launches. We are providing our inputs. We are
    positive toward the concept, but there are a lot of details. We
    are not the deciding authority in the U.S. Government on that
    merger, but, rather, the FTC. So, in the Air Force, we provide
    our information and answer the questions that are asked to the
    Office of Secretary of Defense, who in turn meets with the FTC,
    answers their questions, and they're working through the proper
    process, and the FTC will be the deciding party.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are you providing the FTC with the
    information it needs?
        Dr. Sega. I believe so.
        Senator Bill Nelson. We need to get on with it. It'll solve
    a lot of the EELV issues, won't it?
        Dr. Sega. We believe that the two teams will, in fact, be
    able to share some of the expertise knowledge that they have in
    a positive way. But there are many considerations, and I need
    to leave those decisions to the folks that are supposed to make
    them.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let's assume that the FTC approves the
    merger. Then are you satisfied, as the Secretary, that you're
    going to have the assured access to space through two launch
    providers?
        Dr. Sega. Assured launch--assured access to space is the
    principle which we will hold firm to. It is an enabler for us
    to get space capabilities on orbit and serve the warfighter.
    The details of how we get that are also very important, so I
    would wait until seeing how the outcome turns out before giving
    an assessment.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Now, are you raising the question here
    before our committee as to whether or not there should be a
    merger?
        Dr. Sega. I'm saying that the folks that you have in front
    of you right now are not the ones that are deciding it. We've
    provided the information to it. I'm positive, as is the Air
    Force, on the concept of bringing these two launch providers
    together. The assumption, as we develop the EELV program, and
    potentially--and General Hamel could comment on this as well on
    some of the details--but it was assuming a commercial market
    which did not occur. So, there's a limited number of launch
    needs that our Nation has for medium- and heavy-lift launch
    vehicle. So, it's important that we focus on assured access to
    space. This may be an opportunity that, in fact, aids us in
    getting that assured access to space. It has many positive
    features, but we have to do due diligence on a merger so it is
    in the best interest of the U.S. Government that other people
    in that industry, as well as those that want to provide
    satellites for launches. I remain positive on this concept.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Who makes the policy decision that the
    merger will give us assured access to space?
        Dr. Sega. Our input on the national security aspects of
    this merger are from the DOD. I would consider one of the prime
    inputs, but not the only one, to the FTC.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are we relying on the FTC to make the
    policy decision that the merger gives us assured access to
    space? Are we relying on you? Are we relying on the Secretary
    of the Air Force? Are we relying on Secretary Rumsfeld?
        Dr. Sega. The organization within the DOD that has been the
    lead in providing that input to the FTC has been the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics. The Air Force has been the prime supporter of data
    required to make the decision that is the right one. Our
    concern is access to space. We make the case. We have made the
    case, in terms of what we believe is the pros and cons of this
    particular proposal.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So, are we relying on Secretary Krieg
    for that input? Who do we bring to this committee to give us
    the answer to the policy question that the merger is going to
    give us, in their opinion, assured access to space?
        Dr. Sega. I would view that we look at the risk, we look at
    mission assurance and I will turn this over to General Hamel
    here in a bit in terms of what they have done at SMC to enable
    us to have 43 successful operational launches. If you count the
    test flight out of Florida, in the Delta 4, it's 44. The
    mission assurance process and what they see day-to-day, in
    terms of what enables us to have the mission assurance in the
    launch business.
        General Hamel. Sir, if I might just add a bit to this, that
    currently we have two separate launch vehicle providers for the
    Atlas 5 and the Delta 4. We are taking those from previous
    commercial contracts now to government-managed efforts. Our
    national policy is, we will have assured access. We will do
    that with the two independent companies, if need be, and that's
    the basis of our budget request. However, if it turns out the
    FTC, based upon inputs from all parties, including the
    companies, DOD, concludes that it's in the best interest to
    allow this merger to proceed, then we'll be in a position then
    to continue to have assured access with a single joint venture,
    but, by the same token, we can maintain the assured access by
    having two independent contracts. We do see benefits, in terms
    of efficiencies and mission assurance benefits, under a joint
    venture, but, again, that is subject to other people's
    decision.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Who are those other people?
        General Hamel. Sir, it would be the FTC, as Dr. Sega says.
    Clearly, the DOD is going to be making inputs, and is in
    consultations at this point. But there will be competitiveness
    questions, and other issues will be brought before the FTC.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I think what our committee would like
    to know is, who, at the end of the day, is going to be
    responsible, and is going to sign off that this merger between
    two companies in this new kind of venture, called United Launch
    Alliance, is, in fact, going to give us the assured access to
    space? Not the vehicles. We know the vehicles work. We're
    talking about the new kind of arrangement of operations. Is
    that a decision that's already made?
        Dr. Sega. Senator Nelson, I'm concerned that the processes
    are good, and that General Hamel and his organization assures
    us that each and every booster is ready to go. So, we can't not
    pay attention to the details of every booster. We look at the
    overall processes. I think there are different business models
    that would still allow us to have the highest quality booster
    possible for the particular launch, and give us the mission
    assurance that is our bottom line.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Hamel, let me ask you how does
    the Air Force intend to implement block three?
        General Hamel. Sir, as I mentioned, the original concept of
    the program for EELV was a joint government/industry
    partnership. As a result, it was done as a commercial
    development. As a result of the collapse of the commercial
    satellite communications market, there's no longer as much
    demand for commercial launch services. So, we are transitioning
    these contracts from--which had previously been commercial
    contracts, now to a more classical defense contract. We're
    going from what's referred to as a Federal Acquisition
    Regulation (FAR), FAR Part 12, to a FAR Part 15 contract. So,
    our intent here is with each of the two companies, Lockheed
    Martin and Boeing, to put in place contracts that will allow us
    to manage the engineering workforce, the supplier chain, and
    the infrastructure to assure that we maintain critical skills,
    and then separate contracts would be let with each of the two
    companies in order to buy, on a firm, fixed-price basis, the
    individual boosters, as we order them.
        Our intent, as I say, is to move to a government-managed
    launch capability, as well as a launch booster procurement
    basis. That's what we're in the midst of, at this time.
        Senator Bill Nelson. For example, how far in advance does a
    launch vehicle have to be assigned to a particular satellite?
        General Hamel. Sir, typically, under our current
    arrangements, we will order specific launches for specific
    satellites 24 months in advance of the need date.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Will the new United Launch Alliance
    give you more flexibility in assigning those launch vehicle
    assignments?
        General Hamel. Sir, I don't believe that it's going to make
    a material difference. We will still look at what is the best
    provider, whether it's done as two separate contracts or if
    it's merged together under the United Launch Alliance.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The concept behind EELV is to give you
    the flexibility that you could launch on short notice. So, what
    is ``short notice''?
        General Hamel. Sir, typically we'll order a launch, as I
    said, 2 years in advance. In some cases, we may choose to do
    all of the integration work. In other words, understanding the
    loads and the electrical interfaces for both a Delta 4, as well
    as an Atlas 5. If we actually did the integration work for a
    particular satellite for either vehicle, we could go as close
    as 10 to 12 months in advance of a launch of actually planning
    which of the two boosters we would fly on. This is
    significantly shorter-term decisions than what we currently
    have, where you typically are years in advance of having to
    select a particular booster. We will have much greater
    flexibility with the EELV.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Does this cut out a third party, like
    Space-X, that might want to develop a heavy booster?
        General Hamel. No, sir, absolutely not. As we've said, that
    any qualified provider that can meet our mission requirements
    and has requisite demonstrated success, we will make calls, on
    an annual basis, as to who would be able to provide us a launch
    option. Again, that would be ordered up 2 years in advance.
        Senator Sessions. All right. We talk about the commercial
    satellite services. I believe that commercial satellites
    provide about 80 percent of our communication needs during OIF.
    Will the DOD continue to rely on commercial satellite
    communications in the near- and mid-term? What steps are you
    taking to ensure that the commercial satellite services the
    Government needs will be there when we need it? Are we in
    pretty good shape there, or are you--do you have serious
    concerns there?
        Dr. Sega. Senator Sessions, we are using commercial
    satellite providers. Communications, as you mentioned, is, I
    would say, about the 80 percent figure in OIF. It is our
    planning, going forward, is it'll be an integral part of our
    communications architecture. So, we do work with the satellite
    providers, com providers. The actual ordering of satellite
    services from the commercial providers is through the Defense
    Information Systems Agency, not through our offices, but though
    a defense agency for the actual contracts with the commercial
    providers. But we also work with them and try to be helpful, in
    terms of information exchange that their product to us is the
    best it can be. But it's an integrated part of our
    communications architecture going forward.
        Senator Sessions. I notice that Ms. Chaplain noted in her
    testimony that over 5 years, $12 billion less has been
    available to spend on acquisition and development as a result
    of cost overruns, I guess costs and expenses on these kind of
    programs that were not anticipated. Now, I know that happens in
    private business. It happens anywhere. We need to do a better
    job about that.
        Probably you may have some counterpoints that you would
    make to say $12 billion may not be perfectly accurate. I don't
    know. Usually there are two sides to those kind of issues. But
    I would just note that I do think, and I am pleased to hear,
    that you're beginning to address the root causes of this, as
    GAO has pointed out, and that apparently your predecessors were
    not so sensitive to the recommendations that the GAO has
    recommended, and that you are addressing these issues by
    lowering technical risk, assuring realistic cost estimates, and
    not biting off more than you can chew. Those are things that
    just have to be done, because we do face a dangerous time that
    has been referred to as a bow wave of demands coming upon us in
    not too many years. So, we're interested in that.
        I hope that this will continue to be a high priority of
    yours. The Secretary of Defense--I assume that's why he put you
    there, to make sure that we address this issue in an effective
    way. In fact, I think it was.
        Ms. Chaplain, let me just ask these questions about the
    general program, and then I think we'll wrap it up. We've had a
    good exchange this afternoon.
        One of the suggestions and concerns expressed by GAO was
    that competition for funding among good ideas--a lot of people
    have a lot of good ideas in Air Force, the whole DOD, and the
    other branches of the Government--and that DOD has had a
    difficult time in prioritizing and setting priorities for which
    ones need to be given funding. So, do you concur with that, Dr.
    Sega, that that has been one of our problems? Can we develop
    not only an Air Force-wide, but a DOD-wide process to help
    eliminate that problem that seems to be a driving factor in
    cost overruns?
        Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, when resources are limited and
    there are several options on the table, then there'll be a
    competition. But I believe that as we look at what is most
    effective for the joint warfighter and what, as General Chilton
    said, effects you're trying to achieve, then you look at the
    trades of different ways of solving that problem. So, their
    involvement is absolutely crucial in us identifying an
    investment portfolio in the acquisition community that's
    bringing the maximum result and effect to their needs.
        Senator Sessions. General Chilton.
        General Chilton. Yes, I'd agree completely. I'd just
    highlight that at this point in time, we're in a difficult
    situation in space with regard to recapitalization. I can't
    think of a single constellation that we have up there now,
    whether it be the early warning satellite constellation or the
    GPS constellation or a communications constellation, the Ultra
    High Frequency (UHV) the Navy uses, or the Super High Frequency
    (SHF) that the Army uses. I can't think of a single one that we
    don't have a program in development to replace them right now,
    all coming together at exactly the same time.
        Yet, every one of these things is important to the
    warfighter. We've become accustomed to using them. We've
    tailored the way we fight our fights around these things, and
    we need them.
        So, these are tough times to make these hard decisions, and
    I, for one, am very encouraged by the steps that I've heard
    that the Air Force is taking to bring cost and schedule and
    risk under control, as Dr. Sega has laid out here, because I
    think that is going to be very important if we're going to
    deliver these capabilities to the warfighter in a timely
    manner.
        Senator Sessions. You've made clear what the soldier and
    the sailor and the airman and marine need to see over that
    hill, across the horizon, see where those threats are. It's
    absolutely a critical part of our Nation's defense capability.
    It's part of our strength, and we never want to commit our
    personnel in harm's way and have them blindsided when we could
    well have protected them from those kind of threats. I really
    do believe this is a critical area.
        We have the operationally responsive space, which allows
    for capability of bringing in some lower-cost services that can
    be available to us. We will hopefully see, as time goes by,
    that, in some things, in terms of satellites, costs have gone
    down. But one reason we have so few commercial launches is that
    the satellites are lasting longer than were projected, and one
    satellite can do what it used to take multiple satellites to
    do. They're lasting longer, and they do what four of them used
    to do. Now you don't need to launch as many. So, those kind of
    cost savings also need to be a part of our future.
        The capability must be there, and we need to make sure that
    it's met. You can count on this subcommittee to be responsive
    to your reasonable requests to make sure that this Nation has
    preeminent capabilities in space.
        Dr. Sega?
        Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, I have one correction for Senator
    Thune that was passed up I think. Apparently, I was a little
    optimistic on the report that I know is in draft. To answer his
    question, the interim results will be available June 1, rather
    than what I said. I wanted to put that in the record.
        Senator Sessions. I will make that part of the record.
        Does anyone else have anything to add before we adjourn?
    [No response.]
        Thank you very much for your service to your country. It's
    obvious to me, and, I think, to anyone who's observed this
    hearing, that you are people of great capability and
    experience, and we're glad you're there providing for the
    defense of America.
        We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

              BASICS APPROACH VS. CURRENT SPACE ACQUISITION POLICY

        1. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, with your emphasis on returning
    space programs ``back to basics,'' should the National Security Space
    (NSS) acquisition policy be revised so that it is more closely aligned
    with the ``back to basics'' approach?
        Dr. Sega. The fundamental tenets of the ``back to basics'' approach
    are consistent with NSS Space Policy 03-01. Specifically, NSS 03-01
    states that Evolutionary Acquisition, of which a bloc or incremental
    approach is one process, is the preferred strategy for the acquisition
    of mature technology. The repositioning of the System Design Review
    (SDR) before Key Decision Point B (KDP-B) in the 27 December 2004
    iteration of NSS 03-01 was an important step to improve risk
    management. NSS 03-01 requires capability documents to be updated
    before each KDP to strengthen collaboration between the requirements
    and acquisition communities. Finally, NSS 03-01 directs program offices
    to elevate system engineering principles to the same level as cost and
    schedule programmatic considerations.

                                  SPACE RADAR

        2. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, Congress has been concerned about
    the ambitious nature of the Space Radar program, its potential costs,
    and requirements coordination with the Intelligence Community (IC). How
    will the Air Force integrate the ``back to basics'' approach on Space
    Radar?
        Dr. Sega. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the IC have already
    begun a common path towards requirements definition. The Initial
    Requirements Document for Space Radar was validated by both the IC's
    Mission Requirements Board (MRB) and by the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council (JROC) in February 2006. This provides top-level
    qualitative requirements for the program. The Capability Development
    Document, which specifies the quantitative detailed requirements, is in
    development between DOD and IC user communities and on schedule to
    support Key Decision Point B.
        The Space Radar plan is not to proceed into Phase B until
    technology is mature. We have incorporated lessons learned (from the
    Young Panel report, and other space programs) into the Space Radar
    acquisition strategy and cost estimating to provide more accurate
    assessments of Space Radar program cost and risk.
        To implement a ``back to basics'' approach, the Space Radar program
    is developing an evolutionary acquisition approach that would reduce
    program risks. Results of this work will include definition of a Block
    1 satellite program, with an estimated cost of the first satellite, a
    total estimated cost for Block 1, and a life cycle cost estimate for
    developing, building, and operating the constellation.

        3. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, what is the basic architecture for
    Space Radar? For example, how many satellites do you anticipate for the
    entire constellation?
        Dr. Sega. In response to the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD),
    validated by the JROC and the MRB and the Draft Capabilities
    Development Document requirements, we have identified a Government
    Reference Architecture which contains nine satellites in low earth
    orbit (plus one spare) and an interdependent ground capability which
    will interface with other space and airborne systems to support the
    horizontal integration of intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance capabilities.

        4. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, how much do you estimate it will
    cost to develop and acquire the full Space Radar capability?
        Dr. Sega. We are developing the program in measured steps, in order
    to reduce early program risks. Results of this work will include a
    total estimated cost for nine satellites in low earth orbit (plus one
    spare) and investment in the ground segment. We continue to work on an
    updated cost estimate (the initial program office estimate falls in the
    range of $20-$25 billion) of the Government Reference Architecture
    (GRA) as it is refined by the JROC and the MRB processes.

        5. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, what guarantees do we have that the
    IC will share in the development costs?
        Dr. Sega. In January 2005, the Secretary of Defense and Director of
    Central Intelligence committed to pursue a common Space Radar designed
    to satisfy needs of both the National Intelligence Community and the
    joint warfighter. In recent Space Radar Executive Committee meetings,
    senior Office of the Director of National Intelligence staff have
    reiterated their support for the Secretary of Defense/Director of
    Central Intelligence agreement.

        6. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, when can we expect a concrete cost
    share agreement?
        Dr. Sega. The January 2005 Secretary of Defense/Director of Central
    Intelligence agreement directed the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
    Management to recommend an approach for cost sharing of program
    acquisition in the fiscal year 2008 budget deliberations. Once the
    acquisition approach is further defined, an estimate supporting this
    approach will be used for initial cost sharing discussions between the
    DOD and the IC. Final cost sharing allocations will be based on a
    single agreed upon Independent Cost Estimate, at which point discrete
    costs can be allocated and programmed by the appropriate agency.

                             SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE

        7. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega and General Hamel, there have been
    concerns in recent years about consolidations within the space
    industrial base, the decreasing pipeline of scientists and engineers,
    and even concerns about whether large space contractors have the
    capability to get the job right. Is the current and projected U.S.
    space industrial base sufficient to meet national security requirements
    for the next 15 years?
        Dr. Sega. Attracting and retaining well-qualified scientists and
    engineers into the National Security Space (NSS) community, both within
    the government and among our many industry partners, is one of the
    critical areas which we are addressing. More and more, our Tier 1
    (prime) contractors depend on our equally vital Tier 2/3/4 suppliers.
    Data concerning the availability of scientists and engineers is
    limited.
        The NSS Space Industrial Base Council, which I co-chair, is in the
    process of addressing some of these issues. Among the specific
    initiatives now underway is the development and population of an
    enduring data base by the Aerospace Corporation to be used to assess
    the availability of key space professionals within industry, starting
    first with the Tier 1 members and then moving on to Tiers 2/3/4. We
    have tasked the National Security Space Office (NSSO) to work with
    senior leaders in both the government and industry to follow-up on key
    recommendations contained in many of the recent space studies. The
    ``back to basics'' acquisition approach emphasizes the commitment to
    recruit and train a strong space workforce.
        General Hamel. The current and projected U.S. space industrial base
    is sufficient to meet national security requirements for the next 15
    years; but it needs our continued attention.
        Due to the unique aspects of the space environment, space system
    components and parts often require uniquely designed, manufactured and
    tested products/practices not typical of terrestrial and aeronautical
    commercial and military systems. Consequently there are numerous niche
    suppliers whose business base is primarily space and subject to ups and
    downs of the overall space market. Several component and part suppliers
    have expressed concerns with their financial viability in the space
    market and the ability to provide a reasonable return on investment, as
    well as the ability to properly capitalize and invest in the
    development of advanced products for future systems.
        The NSS community emphasizes Government investments (e.g., Title
    III; Mantech; S&T) to facilitate a strong and responsive industrial
    base with respect to technology and industrial needs; however, the
    available funds are limited. The Space Industrial Base Council,
    established, and chaired by DOD Executive Agent for Space, proactively
    identifies and addresses NSS industrial base concerns, and includes
    subcontractors and major vendors. NSS is establishing policies to
    address strategic technologies and sound source/make-or-buy analyses.
    Additionally, we emphasize to prime contractors their responsibility to
    enhance their own subcontractor management planning and surveillance.
        With respect to people and skill base, the prime contractors are
    able to staff the necessary personnel to meet needs, but depth of
    experience is a challenge. However, they expressed concerns about the
    health of their subcontractors and major vendors and potential
    personnel lay-offs if future programs do not materialize. Challenges
    exist in the areas of systems and software engineering, but all of our
    contractors have comprehensive programs in place to address this
    concern. They are actively working with universities to ensure key
    skills are available; using mentoring programs to ensure knowledge
    transfer, and retaining older workforce and employing knowledge
    transfer processes.

        8. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega and General Hamel, are contractors
    sufficiently motivated to get the job right?
        Dr. Sega. Our industry partners are motivated to engage in
    activities that not only ensure corporate, shareholders, and market
    expectations, but also to deliver world-class space systems that meet
    or exceed our requirements. The government motivates industry by using
    past performance as a factor in the source selection process and
    appropriately applying incentives and award fees during the life cycle
    of the program. The current emphasis on ``back to basics'' is re-
    energizing the space acquisition community to consider contractor
    incentives more vigorously early in program development.
        General Hamel. We are working to improve the Government/contractor
    relationship, via the type of contract used, so we sufficiently
    motivate the contractor to achieve total mission assurance. We have
    used Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contracts to motivate contractor
    performance. Unfortunately, we found CPAF contracts did not work in
    many instances because award fee often focused on processes rather than
    product. As a result, we are beginning to change our contract incentive
    structures by increasing the use of Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF)
    contracts and tying the amount of fee earned to measurable performance
    objectives. In addition to the use of objective performance incentives,
    we will ensure a rigorous linkage between the incentive fees earned by
    contractors and the performance assessments we input into the
    Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). These
    performance assessments evaluate contractor past performance, a key
    factor in determining whether or not a contractor will be awarded
    future contracts. The strong linkage between objective contract
    performance incentives, past performance, and mission assurance is the
    best way to hold contractors accountable to consistently provide
    quality, on-time products and services to support our warfighters.

                     THE NEED FOR BETTER PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

        9. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, how is the Air Force Space and
    Missiles Systems Center (SMC) assuring that program managers have the
    right expertise and experience to manage their programs?
        General Hamel. We are assuring program managers have the right
    expertise and experience to manage their programs by providing
    increased opportunity for education and training, creating a forum to
    exchange a body of knowledge, and utilizing the space professional
    database to identify/assign personnel with the right experience from
    across the Air Force.
        SMC has developed a ``schoolhouse'' capability to provide space
    acquisition training that augments training available through the
    Defense Acquisition University, Air Force Institute of Technology, and
    other non-space specific sources. We are training our folks through the
    Space 100 and Space 200 course provided through the National Security
    Space Institute, as well. We have identified our best and brightest to
    participate in a Naval Post Graduate School systems engineering
    distance learning program.
        In February 2006, Dr. Sega instituted a National Security Space
    Program Manager's Conference to create a forum for program managers
    across space acquisition to share best practices and exchange lessons
    learned. This cross-flow of ideas and experiences is a great first step
    in creating a body of knowledge that our program managers can rely on
    to increase their expertise and bolster their own experiences.
        Finally, Air Force Space Command is chartered with Space
    Professional Development. Part of this effort identified those
    military/civilians across the Air Force with space experience. We are
    now able to target acquisition professionals with maximum space
    experience to come to SMC. Recruiting these people raises the average
    experience level of our workforce as well as providing mentoring for
    our more junior space professionals.

        10. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, is SMC attracting the best and
    brightest in the field?
        General Hamel. We are doing all we can to attract the best and the
    brightest by exploiting as many recruiting tools as we can, creating
    more opportunities for stable civilian positions, and making SMC a
    great place to work.
        SMC is utilizing recruiting tools like the Presidential Management
    Fellows, Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments, retired
    annuitants, and intern programs such as Palace Acquires and Copper
    Caps. We are also visiting Air Force professional developmental
    education venues like Air Command and Staff College and the Air Force
    Institute of Technology to advertise the great opportunities in space
    acquisition. Our system program directors are personally recruiting,
    making by-name requests for experienced and talented officers.
        To create more opportunity for top-notch civilians to advance and
    to keep transitioning military at the Center, we are actively pursuing
    military to civilian position conversions. Additionally, we are
    exploring the potential to convert Assistance and Advisory Service jobs
    to civilian positions.
        Finally, we are working hard to make SMC a great place to work so
    we can attract and retain the best and brightest. We have brand new
    facilities--the Schriever Space Complex--which offer a consolidated and
    modern work environment. We maximize the use of annual retention
    allowances and civilian hiring/compensation (e.g., bonuses, locality,
    housing, etc.) to offset the higher cost of living in the Los Angeles
    area.

        11. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, do SMC program managers have
    enough control over resources and decisions to be held accountable for
    meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals?
        General Hamel. Our program managers do have enough control over
    resources and decisions to be held accountable for meeting cost,
    schedule, and performance goals; but we have to make sure we don't
    commit to more than we can deliver when setting program requirements,
    strategies, plans and goals.
        We capture all previous acquisition results/lessons learned during
    our Acquisition Review Processes (i.e. Strategy Review, Source
    Selections, Program Reviews, Proposal Developments) and incorporate
    them into subsequent acquisitions. In doing so we attempt to ensure
    cost realism, create conservative schedules, mature requirements, and
    solid risk management/mitigation practices and create balanced program
    oversight. We collect and distribute, in conjunction with the Aerospace
    Corporation, management watch list items during pre-award activities
    and Independent Program Assessments. We evaluate accuracy of cost
    estimates, planning for integration/interfaces, software complexity,
    SPO staffing, adherence to proven policies and processes, and test
    rigor. SMC incorporates, across the portfolio, Defense Acquisition
    Performance Assessment recommendations and USECAF block/incremental
    acquisition approach, Lean Initiatives, and SMART OPS 21
    recommendations to ensure we set our programs and program managers up
    for success.

        12. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, in what ways can you, as
    Commander of SMC, instill and sustain tenure and accountability of your
    program managers?
        General Hamel. Space and Missile Systems Center has programs
    underway to recruit, attract, retain, reward, and better educate/train
    the space acquisition workforce. Specifically, we have extended tour
    lengths for acquisition personnel to 4 years, we actively recruit
    people with substantial expertise in space development and ensure
    stability of our people in key program leadership positions. We are
    also reinvigorating processes and competencies in core functions--
    systems engineering, cost/pricing, test planning and execution, program
    and technical reviews, scheduling, mission assurance--to improve our
    program managers' tool sets and bring consistency and predictability
    back into space acquisitions. Extensive benchmarking across the space
    portfolio and a newly established National Security Space Program
    Managers Conference are providing our program managers forums for
    sharing lessons learned and reinvigorating capabilities via best
    practices. I've also focused on dialogue between acquirers and
    warfighters to help us look beyond individual programs and consider
    mission area effects. Making program managers responsible for this
    ``horizontal integration'' empowers them to look for opportunities for
    synergies, multiplier effects, and cost avoidances. All these efforts,
    aimed to help our program managers be successful, are vital both to
    reinvigorating space acquisition/innovation and to sustaining tenure/
    accountability in our space professional.

        13. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, how does SMC gain early
    knowledge about impending problems in acquisition programs?
        General Hamel. We've put several tools in place to help us gain
    early knowledge about impending problems on our programs. One of the
    most important tools are technical Program Management Reviews to focus
    on changes in cost, schedule, and technical baselines, as well as
    managing realized risks. We have been doing this for about a year now,
    and we review one program each week, which allows me and my key
    functional experts to see each program in detail three to four times
    per year--greatly increasing our situational awareness. As the reviews
    mature we are working on making them more metrics-based to help us
    identify and address problems in our ``headlights'' rather than after
    they develop.
        We also rely heavily on our Aerospace Corporation partners. Each
    week, Aerospace briefs SMC senior leadership and program directors on
    an overarching ``watch list.'' The ``watch list'' includes both
    program-specific and cross-cutting risks that Aerospace helps us track
    and mitigate.
        Another ``early warning'' area that we are committed to improving
    is earned value management. Hand-in-hand with reinvigorating our cost
    estimating function, we are working to make earned value management a
    viable program management tool. SMC now has earned value experts on
    staff to provide education and assistance to the program offices. We've
    also teamed more tightly with the Defense Contract Management Agency to
    ensure that our industry partners earned value management systems are
    in-place, certified, and being utilized to track progress.

        14. Senator Sessions. General Hamel, can you describe what is
    currently being done and what shortcomings remain in estimating costs
    for space systems?
        General Hamel. I have centralized cost estimating and assessment at
    SMC by creating a new Cost Analysis Division within my Financial
    Management Directorate. This organizational structure provides for
    independent reviews and a center of expertise for consistent cost
    analysis throughout SMC. Updated Program Office Estimates (POEs) are
    required at each major milestone. The new centralized Cost Division
    executes independent assessments of these POEs. In addition, I direct
    Independent Cost Assessments (ICAs) to be conducted from time to time
    on specific areas/programs of concern. These ICAs are also led by the
    new Center Cost Division, teaming at times with AFCAA and the OSD CAIG.
    In addition, we have instituted an IPT arrangement with AFCAA, NRO, and
    Navy Space programs to share best practices within the cost
    communities.
        We have not completely restored our organic cost expertise--this
    will take some time--with robust recruiting and training--to fix
    completely. Also, we continue to work to improve the fidelity of the
    data in our cost models. My Cost IPT is working more closely with
    industry to improve our data collection efforts but this, again, will
    take time as well as resources to remedy.

        15. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, according to the Government
    Accountability Office's (GAO) recent survey, what are the top obstacles
    to achieving program success from the point of view of program
    managers?
        Ms. Chaplain. As part of a 2005 review \1\ on program management
    best practices, we surveyed DOD's major weapon program managers,
    including some managing space programs, who cited the following as
    ``top'' obstacles to achieving successful outcomes in an open ended
    question:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program
    Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes, GAO-06-110 (Washington, DC: Nov.
    30, 2005).

             funding instability (about 36 percent),
             requirements instability (13 percent),
             staffing problems (8 percent),
             excessive oversight (7 percent), and
             inexperienced leadership (7 percent).

        Although the majority of respondents to our survey believed that
    the initial baselines of their programs were reasonable, a significant
    group, about 24 percent, responded that their program parameters were
    not reasonable at the start, and 45 program managers responded that
    their program had been rebaselined one or more times for cost and
    schedule increases. In addition, 18 percent said one or more key
    technologies fell below best practice standards for maturity.
        Our reviews of space programs are consistent with these views--we
    have found technologies to be immature at program start for major space
    programs. Further, in delving deeper into the root causes behind these
    problems, we have found that competition for funding has incentivized
    programs to produce optimistic cost and schedule estimates, over
    promise on capability, suppress bad news, and forsake the opportunity
    to identify potentially better alternatives. In addition, because DOD
    starts more weapons programs than it can afford, it invariably finds
    itself in the position of having to shift funds to sustain programs--
    often to the point of undermining well-performing programs to pay for
    poorly performing ones. We also have found that DOD starts its space
    programs too early, that is, before it has assurance that the
    capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources
    (time, money, technology, people, etc.) and time constraints, and it
    allows new requirements to be added well into the acquisition phase, a
    course of action that can further stretch technology challenges. This
    is encouraged by the funding process, as acquisition programs tend to
    attract the majority of research, development, test, and evaluation
    (RDT&E) dollars. Many officials working within the space community
    agreed that these were key underlying causes of acquisition problems
    during a review we conducted last year.\2\ In addition, officials we
    spoke with also cited pressures resulting from having a diverse array
    of officials and organizations involved with the space acquisition
    process, tensions between the science and technology (S&T) and
    acquisition communities as to who is better suited to translate
    technology concepts into reality, pressures resulting from short
    tenures among staff critical to achieving acquisition success, and
    difficulties in overseeing contractors.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Incentives and Pressures That Drive
    Problems Affecting Satellite and Related Acquisitions, GAO-05-570R
    (Washington, DC: June 23, 2005).

        16. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, do you believe the Air Force is
    addressing these obstacles?
        Ms. Chaplain. The Air Force has recently taken steps to put is
    Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) program on a
    more executable track by reducing its expectations in the level of
    sophistication for the first two satellites so that it can meet its
    schedule goals. It is also holding off entering product development of
    the first increment until critical technologies are proven. If the Air
    Force adheres to this commitment for TSAT and applies it to Space
    Radar, as it has also informally committed to do, then it would be
    addressing some of the obstacles noted above. For example, it would
    reduce the risk of funding instability since cost estimates would be
    more realistic. In addition, the Air Force has committed to estimating
    cost and funding new acquisitions to an 80-percent confidence level,
    strengthening systems engineering, and strengthening the acquisition
    workforce. For some specific programs, the Air Force has applied
    additional mechanisms to regulate requirements. These actions could
    also remove obstacles, if effectively implemented.
        However, as we testified, such actions should be accompanied by an
    investment strategy for space, and ultimately DOD's entire weapons
    portfolio, to separate wants from needs and to alleviate longstanding
    pressures associated with competition within DOD to win funding. DOD
    could also instill the best practices it is now embracing into its
    space acquisition policy. In addition, we have recommended that DOD, as
    a whole, take steps to hold people and programs accountable when best
    practices are not pursued. This will require DOD to empower program
    managers to make decisions related to funding, staffing, and moving
    into subsequent phases and to match program manager tenure with
    delivery of a product. It may also require DOD to tailor career paths
    and performance management systems to provide incentives for longer
    tenures. By embracing a model that incorporates all these elements, DOD
    can achieve better outcomes for its space programs. By not doing so,
    there will still be incentives and allowances to overpromise
    capability, underestimate cost and schedule, and to start programs
    prematurely, which, in turn, can eventually undo other improvement
    efforts.

                            SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

        17. Senator Sessions. General Chilton, as DOD's operational manager
    for satellite communications, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) plays a
    lead role in coordinating the use of both military satellite
    communications and leased commercial satellite communications assets.
    What steps could we take to better use the available commercial
    satellite fleets?
        General Chilton. DOD is currently conducting an analysis of the
    commercial satellite procurement process which will result in specific
    recommendations to improve DOD's strategic partnership with the
    commercial satellite industry. However, providing centralized funding
    would enable long-term global procurement of bulk commercial satellite
    bandwidth. Such contracts could include provisions to ensure rapid
    redeployment and resizing of bandwidth as mission requirements change.
    Long-term bulk procurements will allow DOD to develop long-term
    relationships with industry and leverage the cost benefits of being a
    high-priority, high-volume, high-value customer. Any centralized
    funding plan must provide for a means to scale the capabilities of DOD
    gateways to meet warfighter needs and include provisions for satellite
    network planning, management, and control.

        18. Senator Sessions. General Chilton, what additional tools does
    STRATCOM need to improve the acquisition and planning process for using
    commercial satellite capacity?
        General Chilton. The DOD has designated the Defense Information
    Systems Agency (DISA) as the acquisition and planning agent for
    commercial satellite bandwidth. To realize improved commercial
    satellite service, DISA requires centralized funding to acquire,
    manage, plan, monitor, and assess the utilization of leased commercial
    bandwidth. In addition to leased bandwidth, this effort would require
    the following tools: (1) a Bandwidth Management and Scheduling Tool;
    (2) a Local and Remote Terminal Modeling Tool; (3) a Specific Real-Time
    Remote Spectrum Monitoring Capability Tool; (4) a Real-time Assessment
    Tool for determining Reserve and unused satellite bandwidth; and (5) a
    Schedule Mission Planning Tool for military and commercial satellite
    resources.

                     SPACE CAPABILITIES FOR THE WARFIGHTER

        19. Senator Sessions. General Chilton, what are the warfighter's
    priorities with respect to needed improvements to our space
    capabilities?
        General Chilton. Warfighter priorities include capability
    enhancements to:

             Space Situational Awareness (SSA). SSA is the Space
            Control mission foundation, enabling an understanding of the
            space environment (rapid acquisition and fielding of
            capabilities that can detect, geolocate, and characterize
            threats to space systems will provide the unambiguous
            distinction between hostile action and natural environmental
            space effects).

                     Without adequate SSA there is increased risk
                    of on-orbit collision, unnecessary orbital maneuvers,
                    ineffective overflight warning, sluggish attack/anomaly
                    detection/resolution, unfocused intelligence
                    collection, lack of timely predictive battlespace
                    awareness, and ineffective space control prevention/
                    negation operations.

             Responsive access to space (a new business model, next
            generation boosters and more efficient launch operations,
            launch-on-demand and store-on-orbit concept development).
             Technological advances in miniaturization, materials,
            production, and automation (make payloads smaller with more on
            each booster and reducing vulnerability to loss).
             Automation and integration of space command and
            control capabilities.
             Integration of all current and future SSA capabilities
            into a common user defined operational picture.

        20. Senator Sessions. Admiral Deutsch and General Hamel, would you
    care to add anything from the perspective of the Navy and Air Force?
        Admiral Deutsch. The Navy is interested in space as a key part of
    FORCEnet. Our priority is to integrate space capabilities, particularly
    military satellite communications: intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR); environmental sensing and position, navigation,
    and timing (PNT) throughout the naval force to make space tactically
    relevant. Wide-area surveillance capabilities, both active and passive,
    as well as robust communications, including comms-on-the-move, will
    support tactical strike, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, special
    operations, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), and other high priority
    mission areas. An emerging priority, which cuts across all warfare
    areas, is data exfiltration (e.g. the capability to move data from
    distributed sensors to command and control (C2) nodes).
        The Navy also wants to see improvements in Space Situational
    Awareness (SSA) and protection. The Navy needs greater fidelity in the
    Common Operational Picture (COP) including SSA. Integrating SSA data
    into the COP is crucial to dynamically adapting to changes in space
    system availability (e.g. ISR, SATCOM, etc.) to maintain warfighting
    effectiveness.
        Keeping with the objective to maximize space support to the Navy
    warfighter, we are interested in Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
    because of its potential to provide a more affordable way to get beyond
    the line of sight of communication capabilities and rapid-reaction ISR
    sensors, on orbit, in a tactically relevant timeframe to respond to
    asymmetric challenges and hedge against uncertainty.
        General Hamel. While there are many areas for improvement in our
    space capabilities, I would defer to our users to determine
    warfighter's priorities. Faster, better, cheaper, persistent, and more
    reliable are always desirable--responsiveness is key. We're very proud
    that we're able to launch rockets into space, but the fact remains,
    simply launching hardware to space does nothing to enable America's
    joint warfighters. It's only after the systems are switched-on,
    checked-out, and given thumbs-up that the payoff begins. The mission of
    the Space and Missile Systems Center is to deliver operationally
    responsive systems to the warfighter and our Nation. Delivering these
    integrated warfighting effects and capabilities is part and parcel to
    our existence. By enabling and being responsive to the needs of
    warfighters we contribute to the Air Force's primary focus: winning the
    global war on terror. Through innovative use of heritage systems and
    evolving technologies, we remain committed to providing the world's
    finest space capabilities to the world's finest warfighters. To that
    end, it's incumbent on us to remain receptive to the needs of combatant
    commanders leveraging our resources to satisfy their requirements.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                       EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE

        21. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega and General Hamel, the next batch
    of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) launches to be put on
    contract, the Buy III has been delayed, as I understand it, largely as
    a result of the delay in Federal Trade Commission (FTC) approval of the
    United Launch Alliance. Are there any other factors in the delay and
    when will the Buy III launches be put on contract?
        Dr. Sega. The timing in the Buy III EELV Launch Services (ELS)
    contract awards is not related to the FTC's approval of ULA. The Buy
    III contracts will be awarded regardless of FTC's approval or
    disapproval of the ULA proposal. Implementing the new EELV acquisition
    strategy involves moving from a commercial-based procurement program to
    a more traditional government procurement program and has been
    challenging. The contracts require a government standard accounting
    system that was not used by either contractor under the previous
    commercial services contracts. All Buy III contracts are being audited
    by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to ensure full compliance
    in this transition. We expect to award our Buy III ELS contracts in the
    near future as these audits are completed.
        General Hamel. The delay in the Buy III contract awards are not
    related to the FTC's approval of United Launch Alliance (ULA). The Buy
    III contracts must be awarded regardless of ULA's approval or
    disapproval by the FTC. The delays in Buy III are due to the complexity
    of implementing the new EELV acquisition strategy. Specifically, moving
    from a commercial based procurement program to a more traditional
    government procurement program has been extremely challenging. The
    contracts require a government standard cost accounting system that was
    not used by either contractor under the previous commercial services
    contracts. All Buy III contracts are being audited by the Defense
    Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to ensure full compliance with this
    requirement. We expect to continue awarding our Buy III contracts over
    the next few months as these audits are completed.

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega and General Hamel, the Fiscal
    Year 2006 Defense Appropriations Act Statement of Managers language
    directs the Air Force to eliminate multi-year allocations, pre-awards,
    and block buys from Buy III. Could you explain how the Air Force plans
    to implement Buy III and could you discuss the issues that the
    Appropriations Committee was attempting to address in its language?
        Dr. Sega. The Air Force is implementing Buy III in compliance with
    the fiscal year 2006 congressional language. We will award the EELV
    launch capability contracts for a 2-year period and will award on an
    annual basis, without multiyear allocation, pre-awards and block buys.
    The annual call for proposals for EELV launch services will allow any
    potential EELV certified provider the opportunity to compete in the
    program.
        General Hamel. The Air Force is fully compliant with the Fiscal
    Year 2006 DOD Appropriations Conference Report. Per the conference
    report, the Air Force fully intends to assign and procure the remaining
    19 Buy III EELV launch services on an annual basis. This means that
    every year through the projected 4 years of Buy III launches, the USAF
    will assign and procure only the launch services that must be ordered
    in the next fiscal year for launch 2 years later. No additional action
    is required to comply with the conferees' language because the 21 Apr
    05 EELV Launch Services Request for Proposal notified the contractors
    that ``The Government Reserves the right to award, reallocate, and/or
    reschedule these unawarded launch service missions, or to not make any
    launch service awards.''

        23. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega and General Hamel, how far in
    advance does a launch vehicle have to be assigned to a particular
    satellite or satellite program and why?
        Dr. Sega. The EELV program funds the launch service 2 years prior
    to the launch date. In some cases, with a very complex satellite type
    that has not been previously integrated, the initial satellite
    integration work is begun prior to this 2-year period. However, the
    final allocation is done on an annual basis 2 years prior to launch.
        General Hamel. The EELV program funds the launch service 2 years
    prior to the launch date. In some cases, with a new satellite type that
    has not previously been integrated, the initial satellite integration
    work is begun prior to this 2-year period. The final allocation is done
    at least 2 years prior to launch to allow sufficient time to fully
    integrate the spacecraft and the chosen launch vehicle.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega and General Hamel, will the
    United Launch Alliance result in a more flexible approach to launch
    vehicle assignments?
        Dr. Sega. We believe it will. The efficiencies gained in
    engineering, manufacturing, and operations under the United Launch
    Alliance joint venture will continue EELV's progress to obtain a
    standard interface to the satellites. Launch vehicle assignment will
    continue, however, to be assigned 2 years prior to launch.
        General Hamel. Yes, we believe it will. The efficiencies gained in
    engineering, manufacturing, and operations under the United Launch
    Alliance joint venture will continue EELV's drive for a standard
    interface to the satellites. However, launch vehicle assignment will
    continue to be assigned 2 years prior to launch for the foreseeable
    future.

                            SPACE ACQUISITION POLICY

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, first I want to thank GAO
    for its excellent discussion of the problems and progress in space
    acquisition programs. That some programs have exceeded 100 percent cost
    growth and have been delayed for more than 6 years is an
    extraordinarily troubling circumstance. On page 4 of your statement
    there is a chart that shows the difference between initial and most
    recent cost estimates for space programs. The difference is on the
    order of more than $2 billion per year. GAO highlights three key issues
    that I would like to walk through.
        The first problem is that DOD starts more space and weapons
    programs that it can afford, ``which pressures programs to
    underestimate costs and over promise capabilities.'' Can you provide a
    few examples of this problem in space programs and if and how the
    problem is being addressed?
        Ms. Chaplain. Actual costs for nearly every major space acquisition
    we review each year as part of our annual weapon system assessment have
    greatly exceeded earlier estimates--a clear indication that programs
    consistently underestimate costs. For example, the Space Based Infrared
    System (SBIRS)-High cost estimate climbed from about $4 billion as of
    October 1996 to over $10 billion in September 2005, and costs are
    expected to increase further. Estimated costs for the Evolved
    Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program have climbed from about $15
    billion in October 1998 to $27 billion in August 2005 with 43 fewer
    launches to be purchased than anticipated. Estimated costs for the
    Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite program (AEHF) increased
    from $5.6 billion as of October 2001 to $6.2 billion as of August 2005,
    with quantities decreasing from five to three satellites. Estimated
    costs for the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
    Satellite System (NPOESS) grew from $5.9 billion in August 2002 to
    nearly $8 billion in September 2005. Our past reports have also
    identified cases where programs have overpromised capabilities. For
    example, the SBIRS-Low program started under the assumption that the
    satellites would be able to detect and track multiple objects and
    differentiate a threatening warhead from decoys, even though that
    technology challenge was exceedingly high. In fact, the program was
    never able to achieve this capability. It was eventually shutdown in
    the face of cost and schedule overruns that came with addressing
    technology challenges. The SBIRS-High program began with the assumption
    that there would be four satellites in geosynchronous orbit, but more
    than 10 years later, DOD plans to reduce the number of satellites it
    will procure and still does not have the assurance it needs that the
    missile detection capability can be achieved in time to replace the
    existing detection system. In addition, DOD has initiated efforts to
    develop a parallel competing capability with the SBIRS-High program.
    Similarly, the NPOESS program is now considering dropping some of its
    planned capability because of technology and design-related challenges.
        DOD has been taking actions to improve cost estimating and we are
    in the process of assessing these actions. As mentioned above, for
    example, it has committed to estimating cost and funding new
    acquisitions to an 80-percent confidence level. In addition, the Air
    Force is requiring the use of independent cost estimates--rather than
    estimates produced by a program office or a contractor. It is also
    committed to strengthening its cost-estimating capabilities--in terms
    of people, methodologies, and tools. In regard to the issue of
    overpromising capability, the Air Force has deferred pursuing some of
    its more ambitious capabilities on its TSAT program, so that the
    program can be better positioned to meet its schedule. We do not know
    at this point whether it will be doing the same for its new Space Radar
    program. As we underscored in our testimony, it is important that these
    and other individual actions be made within a framework of broader,
    systemic improvements to DOD's overall acquisition process, the
    acquisition workforce, and an overall investment strategy.

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, the second problem is that
    DOD ``starts its space programs too early, that is, before it is sure
    the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available
    resources and time constraints.'' Can you provide a few examples of
    this problem in space programs and if and how the problem is being
    addressed?
        Ms. Chaplain. Many of our annual reviews of major space
    acquisitions show that programs have started with relatively low levels
    of technology maturity--meaning DOD does not have assurance that the
    technologies can work as intended. This includes, AEHF, NPOESS, SBIRS-
    High, and SBIRS-Low--now known as the Space Tracking and Surveillance
    System. Exceptions include the Navy's Mobile User Objective System
    (MUOS) (though the program later added two additional technologies that
    did not meet best practices standards for maturity) and the Global
    Positioning System Block IIF. At times, we have found that key sensors
    to be included in new satellites were not fully tested, or even
    prototyped, before being included in a program. In other cases,
    technologies used to support the health of the overall satellite, such
    as cooling systems, were immature. In other cases, software needs were
    vastly underestimated. In the case of AEHF, technical resources to
    support security needs were underestimated.
        Many programs we have studied felt the need to start the
    acquisition process before such needs were better understood because
    acquisition programs tend to attract more funding than science and
    technology efforts. In addition, in the case of space, programs have
    historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step,
    regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies
    to achieve the full capability. While this is partly attributable to a
    desire to speed delivery of capability, it has perversely slowed down
    programs, since programs were at increased risk of facing costly and
    disruptive technical and design problems.
        As noted previously, DOD has committed to delay the development of
    one new major space program--TSAT--until technology needs are better
    understood. It has also committed to deliver new space-based
    capabilities in an incremental fashion so that acquisition efforts can
    be more executable and the science and technology base can be more
    engaged in major space programs. It has not taken such action yet on
    other new programs, notably Space Radar, though it has informally
    committed to. In addition, DOD's space acquisition policy still allows
    major acquisitions to begin without demonstrating that technology can
    work as intended.

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, the third issue is the DOD
    has ``allowed new requirements to be added well into the acquisition
    phase.'' I would also add that sometimes the original requirements may
    be unrealistic or unaffordable and that this too may be part of the
    problem. Can you provide a few examples of the requirements problem in
    space programs and if and how the problem is being addressed?
        Ms. Chaplain. Our past reports have pointed to requirements setting
    problems in the AEHF, NPOESS, and SBIRS-High programs. In the case of
    SBIRS-High, we pointed to problems related to not adequately defining
    requirements upfront. These were further detailed in subsequent DOD
    studies, including those by the SBIRS-High Independent Review Team and
    the Defense Science Board. Both noted that the acquisition approach the
    Air Force was following, known as Total System Performance
    Responsibility, placed too much responsibility on the part of the
    contractor to negotiate requirements, and that the process eventually
    broke down. In the case of NPOESS, we reported in the early phases of
    the program that the Air Force and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration had difficulty resolving diverging requirements. In the
    case of AEHF, we reported that DOD substantially and frequently altered
    requirements and design in the early phases of the program. While
    considered necessary, some changes increased costs by hundreds of
    millions of dollars and caused scheduling delays on a program that DOD
    was trying to accelerate in order to address a potential capability
    gap. DOD has since rejected the acquisition approaches that led to
    requirements-setting problems on both SBIRS-High and AEHF. It has also
    instituted control mechanisms to regulate requirements on SBIRS-High.
    In our testimony, we noted that DOD could take further steps to
    strengthen requirements setting by implementing processes and policies,
    as needed, which stabilize requirements for acquisitions, like NPOESS,
    that are being shared with other agencies.
        We have also reported on programs that took on unrealistic or
    potentially unaffordable requirements. The SBIRS-Low program's pursuit
    of discrimination capability is an older example of such a program.
    More recently, we have pointed to affordability and feasibility issues
    related to Space Radar and the TSAT programs, which together, have been
    preliminarily estimated to cost about $40 billion. Specifically, we
    have stated that DOD was planning to start these acquisitions even when
    many of their critical technologies were still immature, and it was
    pursuing a highly ambitious path in terms of the technology push. Given
    that these systems were among the most complex programs ever undertaken
    for space, they were being counted on to enable wider DOD
    transformation efforts, and DOD was already contending with highly
    problematic space efforts, we believed that DOD could not afford to
    pursue such risky approaches for TSAT and Space Radar. As noted
    earlier, DOD has taken steps to ensure it is pursuing realistic
    requirements for TSAT, and it has informally committed to do the same
    for Space Radar.

        28. Senator Bill Nelson. General Hamel, the Young Panel, which
    reviewed space acquisition programs, also identified the manner in
    which space programs are funded as a reason for cost growth. The Young
    Panel believed that the programs should have a sufficient contingency
    to address small issues, while they are still small, and that programs
    should be funded at the 80 percent confidence level. Which Air Force
    programs are funded at the 80 percent level?
        General Hamel. TSAT is the only program in my portfolio currently
    funded at the 80 percent confidence level. In general, we work very
    hard in the Air Force to preserve appropriate management reserve for
    our program managers--depending on the program's level of risk,
    relative priority, and the pool of available funding. Funding all
    programs to an 80 percent confidence level would be extremely
    challenging.

        29. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, do you plan to make this a
    requirement for all space acquisition programs?
        Dr. Sega. We will fund programs at an increased confidence level
    based on our assessment of the program's risk. For example, the TSAT
    program was funded to a higher confidence level in the fiscal year 2007
    President's budget request.

        30. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, in your testimony you state that
    you want to adopt a ``back to basics'' approach to space acquisition
    and you talk about four distinct stages. The third stage is where the
    technology is matured ``until we are confident it will work reliably in
    space.'' Does this include full systems testing?
        Dr. Sega. Our intent is that when we enter stage four in the
    acquisition process (Systems Production), we will have reduced the
    technical risk to an acceptable level and the cost and schedule risk
    will have fallen commensurately. Stage four is when full system testing
    will occur. For the most part, entering the fourth stage from the third
    stage (Systems Development) with TRL-6 technologies is sufficient to
    reduce and manage program risk.

        31. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, is the integration issue
    resolved?
        Dr. Sega. For space systems there is little opportunity for a test
    flight to identify and resolve problems that arise during assembly of
    the asset. However, we are taking steps to minimize integration risk.
    First, the incorporation of mature technology and good systems
    engineering will reduce risk in production of space systems. For
    example, manufacturing and integration of proven technologies allows
    more controlled risk management. Systems that can interface with common
    test equipment will simplify and speed up qualification testing.
    Second, we are putting a greater emphasis on industry standards for
    space components. Space certified parts and components that are tested
    and certified as space-worthy can be confidently used without extensive
    follow-on testing and should be easier to integrate into space-rated
    subsystems.

                                  SPACE RADAR

        32. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, General Hamel,
    Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, is there a clear definition of each
    Technical Readiness Level (TRL) that all of you agree on and that
    exists in writing and that clearly applies to space programs?
        Dr. Sega. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook, table 10.5.2.1,
    defines the TRLs as shown in the table below.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Technology Readiness
        Technology Readiness Level          Description                           Level              Description
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1. Basic principles observed and   Lowest level of                    6. System/subsystem   Representative model
     reported.                          technology                         model or prototype    or prototype
                                        readiness.                         demonstration in a    system, which is
                                        Scientific research                relevant              well beyond that of
                                        begins to be                       environment.          TRL 5, is tested in
                                        translated into                                          a relevant
                                        applied research                                         environment.
                                        and development.                                         Represents a major
                                        Examples might                                           step up in a
                                        include paper                                            technology's
                                        studies of a                                             demonstrated
                                        technology's basic                                       readiness.
                                        properties.
    2. Technology concept and/or       Invention begins.                  7. System prototype   Prototype near, or
     application formulated.            Once basic                         demonstration in an   at, planned
                                        principles are                     operational           operational system.
                                        observed, practical                environment.          Represents a major
                                        applications can be                                      step up from TRL 6,
                                        invented.                                                requiring
                                        Applications are                                         demonstration of an
                                        speculative and                                          actual system
                                        there may be no                                          prototype in an
                                        proof or detailed                                        operational
                                        analysis to support                                      environment such as
                                        the assumptions.                                         an aircraft,
                                        Examples are                                             vehicle, or space.
                                        limited to analytic
                                        studies.
    3. Analytical and experimental     Active research and                8. Actual system      Technology has been
     critical function and/or           deveiopment is                     completed and         proven to work in
     characteristic proof of concept.   initiated. This                    qualified through     its final form and
                                        includes analytical                test and              under expected
                                        studies and                        demonstration.        conditions. In
                                        laboratory studies                                       almost all cases,
                                        to physically                                            this TRL represents
                                        validate analytical                                      the end of true
                                        predictions of                                           system development.
                                        separate elements
                                        of the technology.
    4. Component and/or breadboard     Basic technological                9. Actual system      Actual application
     validation in laboratory           components are                     proven through        of the technology
     environment.                       integrated to                      successful mission    in its final form
                                        establish that they                operations.           and under mission
                                        will work together.                                      conditions, such as
                                        This is relatively                                       those encountered
                                        ``low fidelity''                                         in operational test
                                        compared to the                                          and evaluation.
                                        eventual system.
    5. Component and/or breadboard     Fidelity of
     validation in relevant             breadboard
     environment.                       technology
                                        increases
                                        significantly. The
                                        basic technological
                                        components are
                                        integrated with
                                        reasonably
                                        realistic
                                        supporting elements
                                        so it can be tested
                                        in a simulated
                                        environment.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        General Chilton. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook, table 10.5.2.1,
    defines Technology Readiness Levels. There is common agreement that for
    a satellite program, the ``operational environment'' referenced in the
    definition of TRL 7 is space (i.e., on orbit).
        General Hamel. There are common descriptions of Technology
    Readiness Levels in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, but they are
    overarching for all technologies--not specific to space technologies.
    There is common agreement that the ``operational environment'' in TRL 7
    is ``on-orbit'' for space systems.
        For reference, the following Technology Readiness Levels apply:

             TRL 1: Basic principles observed and reported.
             TRL 2: Technology concept and/or application formulated.
             TRL 3: Analytical and experimental critical function and/or
            characteristic proof-of-concept.
             TRL 4: Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory
            environment.
             TRL 5: Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant
            environment.
             TRL 6: System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a
            relevant environment (ground or space).
             TRL 7: System prototype demonstration in a operational
            environment.
             TRL 8: Actual system completed and ``flight qualified''
            through test and demonstration.
             TRL 9: Actual system ``flight proven'' through successful
            mission operations.

        Admiral Deutsch. The National Security Space Acquisition Policy
    (0301, 27 December 2004) uses the definitions of Technology Readiness
    Levels in the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.2
    Acquisition System Guidebook, which it specifically references. Per the
    DODI, it applies to ``The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
    Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint
    Staff), the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of
    the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, DOD Field Activities,
    and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense
    (hereafter referred to collectively as ``the DOD components'').
        While TRL definitions are clear, they are subject to interpretation
    in the context of assessing technology maturity and design risk.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Technology Readiness Level                   Description
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1. Basic principles observed and reported.  Lowest level of technology
                                                 readiness. Scientific
                                                 research begins to be
                                                 translated into applied
                                                 research and development.
                                                 Examples might include
                                                 paper studies of a
                                                 technology's basic
                                                 properties.
    2. Technology concept and/or application    Invention begins. Once basic
     formulated.                                 principles are observed,
                                                 practical applications can
                                                 be invented. Applications
                                                 are speculative and there
                                                 may be no proof or detailed
                                                 analysis to support the
                                                 assumptions. Examples are
                                                 limited to analytic
                                                 studies.
    3. Analytical and experimental critical     Active research and
     function and/or characteristic proof of     development is initiated.
     concept.                                    This includes analytical
                                                 studies and laboratory
                                                 studies to physically
                                                 validate analytical
                                                 predictions of separate
                                                 elements of the technology.
                                                 Examples include components
                                                 that are not yet integrated
                                                 or representative.
    4. Component and/or breadboard validation   Basic technological
     in laboratory environment.                  components are integrated
                                                 to establish that they will
                                                 work together. This is
                                                 relatively ``low fidelity''
                                                 compared to the eventual
                                                 system. Examples include
                                                 integration of ``ad hoc''
                                                 hardware in the laboratory.
    5. Component and/or breadboard validation   Fidelity of breadboard
     in relevant environment.                    technology increases
                                                 significantly. The basic
                                                 technological components
                                                 are integrated with
                                                 reasonably realistic
                                                 supporting elements so it
                                                 can be tested in a
                                                 simulated environment.
                                                 Examples include ``high
                                                 fidelity'' laboratory
                                                 integration of components.
    6. System/subsystem model or prototype      Representative model or
     demonstration in a relevant environment.    prototype system, which is
                                                 well beyond that of TRL 5,
                                                 is tested in a relevant
                                                 environment. Represents a
                                                 major step up in a
                                                 technology's demonstrated
                                                 readiness. Examples include
                                                 testing a prototype in a
                                                 high-fidelity laboratory
                                                 environment or in simulated
                                                 operational environment.
    7. System prototype demonstration in an     Prototype near, or at,
     operational environment.                    planned operational system.
                                                 Represents a major step up
                                                 from TRL 6, requiring
                                                 demonstration of an actual
                                                 system prototype in an
                                                 operational environment
                                                 such as an aircraft,
                                                 vehicle, or space. Examples
                                                 include testing the
                                                 prototype in a test bed
                                                 aircraft.
    8. Actual system completed and qualified    Technology has been proven
     through test and demonstration.             to work in its final form
                                                 and under expected
                                                 conditions. In almost all
                                                 cases, this TRL represents
                                                 the end of true system
                                                 development. Examples
                                                 include developmental test
                                                 and evaluation of the
                                                 system in its intended
                                                 weapon system to determine
                                                 if it meets design
                                                 specifications.
    9. Actual system proven through successful  Actual application of the
     mission operations.                         technology in its final
                                                 form and under mission
                                                 conditions, such as those
                                                 encountered in operational
                                                 test and evaluation.
                                                 Examples include using the
                                                 system under operational
                                                 mission conditions.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Ms. Chaplain. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    (NASA) developed the original ranking and definitions of technology
    maturity levels. GAO and DOD agree on the TRL definitions--in its
    reports, GAO continues to reference the TRL scale for assessing
    critical technologies from DOD's Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook
    (app 6, dated October 30, 2002). However, for space system
    acquisitions, GAO and DOD have disagreements on what the TRLs should be
    at major decision points. According to our work on best practices,
    product development should be initiated after critical technologies
    have been incorporated into a system prototype and tested in an
    operational environment--meaning the cold-radiated vacuum of space. Our
    prior reports have recognized that space systems are uniquely difficult
    to test in a true operational environment. However, DOD has found ways
    to test sensors and other critical technologies on experimental
    satellites. Nonetheless, DOD continues to stand up formal space system
    acquisitions too early--before critical technologies have been tested
    in operational or relevant environments--that is, before DOD has
    assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved. This
    causes DOD to extend technology invention to its acquisitions, which
    have reverberating effects and require large amounts of time and money
    to fix. In these cases, DOD points to its National Security Space
    Acquisition Policy, which allows it to take such an approach--unlike
    DOD's acquisition policy for non-space acquisitions, where TRL 7
    (testing in an operational environment) is preferred before product
    development is initiated (TRL 6 is required). As long as GAO continues
    to base its reviews of space programs on best practices and DOD
    continues to use the wide leeway afforded in its space acquisition
    policy regarding critical technologies and their maturity levels to
    initiate product development, GAO and DOD will continue to have
    disagreements in this area.

        33. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, General Hamel,
    Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, what is the difference between TRL 6
    and 7 and what is the advantage or disadvantage of being at level 6 or
    7 of the Conceptual Design Review (CDR)?
        Dr. Sega. TRL 6 refers to a representative model or prototype
    system that has been tested in a relevant environment. This relevant
    environment can be a high-fidelity laboratory (e.g. Thermal Vacuum
    Chamber) or a simulated environment. TRL 7 refers to a prototype
    similar to the operational system tested in the operational environment
    (i.e. on orbit). Traditionally, successful space programs have achieved
    TRL 6 by Critical Design Review through space qualification of
    components and selected subsystems.
        General Chilton. TRL 6 refers to a system/subsystem model or
    prototype demonstration in a relevant environment, such as a high
    fidelity laboratory or simulated operational environment. TRL 7 refers
    to a system prototype demonstration in an operational environment, in
    the case of space systems, in space, and represents a major step up
    from TRL 6. Because TRL 7 may only be properly achieved through test on
    orbit, most programs have not pursued TRL 7 by CDR.
        General Hamel. TRL Level 7 requires the demonstration of an actual
    system prototype in an operational environment, where as TRL level 6 is
    a representative model or prototype in a relevant environment. CDR is
    the primary review gate to assure the design is adequate to meet system
    performance needs before starting the manufacture of the system and its
    components. The advantage of a technology or technologies being at TRL
    level 7 at CDR is the increased degree of confidence the system
    solution will perform as intended in its application and environment.
        The challenging aspect of space acquisition is that satellites
    cannot be proven in an operational environment until they are on orbit,
    so reaching TRL 7 at CDR is not practical. However, we have been
    successful in achieving TRL 6 (tested in a relevant environment)
    through space qualification of components and selected subsystems, and
    with prototype systems that represent the functional capability of the
    system.
        Admiral Deutsch. The definitions for TRL 6 and 7 are provided. The
    main difference is that TRL 7 represents a capability that has been
    proven in an operational environment using a system prototype (near
    flight-like engineering design model).

    6. System/subsystem model or prototype      Representative model or
     demonstration in a relevant environment.    prototype system, which is
                                                 well beyond that of TRL 5,
                                                 is tested in a relevant
                                                 environment. Represents a
                                                 major step up in a
                                                 technology's demonstrated
                                                 readiness. Examples include
                                                 testing a prototype in a
                                                 high-fidelity laboratory
                                                 environment or in simulated
                                                 operational environment.
    7. System prototype demonstration in an     Prototype near, or at,
     operational environment.                    planned operational system.
                                                 Represents a major step up
                                                 from TRL 6, requiring
                                                 demonstration of an actual
                                                 system prototype in an
                                                 operational environment
                                                 such as an aircraft,
                                                 vehicle, or space. Examples
                                                 include testing the
                                                 prototype in a test bed
                                                 aircraft.

        GAO normally looks for a minimum of TRL 6 at CDR. The advantage of
    TRL 7 at CDR is that program risk has been further reduced, and cost
    and schedule information are more accurate.
        Ms. Chaplain. The main difference between TRL 6 and 7 is the
    testing environment. For TRL 6, the testing environment would be a
    laboratory or a simulated operational environment, and for TRL 7, the
    testing environment would be an operational environment--meaning in
    space. According to GAO's work on best practices, achieving a high
    level of technology maturity at program start is an important indicator
    of whether available resources in terms of knowledge, time, money, and
    capacity match the customer's requirements. In addition, the key
    measure for a successful critical design review (CDR) is when 90
    percent of the design drawings have been submitted to manufacturing.
    When space programs reach CDR and TRLs are below 6, it is unlikely that
    a high percentage of design drawings would have been released to
    manufacturing, thereby increasing program risk at this juncture.
    Another key point to remember is that CDR is the point at which
    programs begin ordering long-lead parts to build the first few
    satellites. This investment in hardware is at risk if the technologies
    do not prove out to work as intended. Achieving TRL 6 or 7 by CDR is a
    matter of risk--if the critical technologies in question are supremely
    important and have no space-based heritage, then it is warranted to
    test the technologies in space before proceeding through CDR. For TSAT,
    some critical technologies have a heritage of being tested or operated
    in space, and they are all slated to be at TRL 6 at the time of CDR--an
    approach that GAO did not fault.

        34. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, could you talk about the
    requirement for Space Radar, and how STRATCOM coordinates or interacts
    with the IC in identifying the requirements?
        General Chilton. STRATCOM has consistently identified and
    documented enhanced capabilities which would allow advanced threat
    tagging, tracking, and location. These capabilities have been
    documented through the DOD Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). The
    command utilizes Senior Warfighter Forums (SWARF) to identify,
    consolidate, and resolve combatant commander capability requirements,
    co-leading DOD working groups with the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence. STRATCOM advocates requirements for combatant commanders
    through the Intelligence Technologies Investment Program (ITIP).
        STRATCOM's participation in requirements development for the Space
    Radar system takes place at the Space Radar Executive Steering Group
    (ESG), Executive Committee (EXCOM), and Requirements and Capabilities
    Group (RCG). Representation at each level includes DOD and ODNI
    participants who come together in support of the 13 Jan 05 Joint
    Secretary of Defense--Director of Central Intelligence memorandum in
    which they committed to pursue a Space Radar capability that ``will
    satisfy the needs of both the national Intelligence Community customers
    and the joint warfighters; fully integrate with other national and
    joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.''
    Additionally, STRATCOM in coordination with the RCG membership, is
    planning experimentation and demonstrations to develop a responsive
    Concept of Operations.

        35. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, and General
    Hamel, an additional concern about Space Radar is how much will it
    cost. The Space Radar, if successful, would provide substantial new
    capability to find, identify, track, and monitor moving and stationary
    targets. What is the best ballpark cost of the system--there have been
    estimates as high as $40 billion--can we afford this capability? Is
    there any alternative?
        Dr. Sega. We are developing the program in measured steps, in order
    to reduce early program risks. Results of this work will include a
    total estimated cost for nine satellites in low earth orbit (plus one
    spare) and investment in the ground segment. We continue to work on an
    updated cost estimate of the Government Reference Architecture (GRA) as
    it is refined by the JROC and the MRB processes. The initial program
    office estimate falls in the range of $20-$25 billion.
        Several studies in the past have looked at alternatives for a Space
    Radar capability, some included participation of the IC. Results of
    these studies concluded that a single low earth orbit constellation for
    national and military users was the most cost-effective solution, and
    the planned Electronically Scanned Array technology provided the best
    cost benefit tradeoff.
        General Chilton. STRATCOM respectfully defers platform and system
    specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Hamel. The Space Radar program is not within my portfolio
    and, therefore, it is inappropriate for me to comment.

        36. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, the Space Radar Integrated
    Program Office has improved the overall management of the program. I
    remain concerned, however, that all potential users of Space Radar have
    not committed to utilize the program and to jointly fund the program.
    What is the process to have this program jointly funded and utilized?
        Dr. Sega. All Space Radar stakeholders are jointly developing
    requirements and concept of operations (CONOPs). Recently, both the DOD
    and IC validated the ICD. In response to the validated ICD, we have
    identified a Government Reference Architecture which contains nine
    satellites in low earth orbit (plus one spare) and an interdependent
    ground capability which will interface with other space and airborne
    systems to support ISR horizontal integration.

                   TRANSFORMATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE

        37. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, General Hamel,
    and Ms. Chaplain, the TSAT program, though still very early in the
    process, appears to have begun to adopt some of the recommendations of
    the GAO as well as the Young Panel and is focusing on technology
    maturity. Integration of the satellite appears to be the next difficult
    step for the TSAT program. What plans are in place to ensure successful
    integration?
        Dr. Sega. Integration and testing is indeed a critical step
    forward. We are planning for it by incorporating lessons learned from
    other space programs and from independent voices. The restructured
    block-build TSAT is funded at a higher confidence level, providing
    added risk margins throughout the cost estimate for unforeseen problems
    that will be encountered in development and integration. Similarly, the
    program schedule has been adjusted to accommodate more measured
    progress, specifically to provide additional time for integration
    efforts. The block approach reduces integration risk by reducing
    critical technologies that need to be integrated into the satellites.
    Lessons learned from the integration efforts on the TSAT Block 1
    satellites will be used to improve the integration effort on the TSAT
    Block 2 satellites.
        General Chilton. The TSAT Program Office has been organized with a
    Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) section to work the
    integration of the spacecraft contractor, the Mission Operations System
    contractor, and the terminal program offices. Overall system
    requirements documents are developed first. These system requirements
    documents drive the requirements documents for the spacecraft,
    operations system, and terminals that the contractors design to. Key
    events in the TSAT schedule include program reviews, where all TSAT
    components are examined to ensure interoperability with associated
    components and within the overall system.
        General Hamel. Integration and testing of subsystems and at the
    system level are indeed critical steps. We plan for it by incorporating
    lessons learned from other space programs and from independent voices.
    The restructured Block TSAT is funded at a higher confidence level,
    providing added risk margins throughout the cost estimate for
    unforeseen problems encountered in development and integration.
    Similarly, we adjusted the program schedule to a slower, more measured
    progress specifically to provide additional time for the engineering
    development and integration efforts. In itself, the block approach
    reduces integration risk by reducing the weight and capacity, and thus
    the complexity, of the initial satellites. We will capture lessons
    learned from the integration efforts on the Block 1 satellites and use
    them to improve the integration effort of the Block 2 satellites.
        We have invested significantly in the key technology and systems
    for TSAT to reduce risk. Detailed engineering, design, and
    manufacturing of subsystems lie ahead.
        Ms. Chaplain. The TSAT program is taking several steps to ensure
    its integration efforts are successful. First, according to program
    officials, the plan is to demonstrate critical technologies at TRL 6
    when key integration tests are conducted in fiscal year 2007. Second,
    the program plans to use the results of its first round of integration
    tests to refine the testing to be conducted during a second round of
    more comprehensive integration testing. Third, the program is
    conducting a series of independent tests to verify results of
    contractor testing as it incrementally builds toward the two main
    integration tests facing the program-tests of the Next Generation
    Processor Router and Optical Standards Validation Suite. The program
    office plans to have knowledge on how these two major subcomponents
    work to reduce risk by uncovering technical problems before awarding
    the space segment contract for the design and assembly of the
    satellites. Finally, the TSAT program also plans to assess the results
    of the main integration tests before making a decision to enter the
    production development phase.

        38. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, what actions would you
    recommend to the program managers to ensure successful integration?
        Ms. Chaplain. According to GAO's prior work on best practices,
    leading firms ensure that (1) the right validation events--tests,
    simulations, and other means for demonstrating product maturity--occur
    at the right times, (2) each validation event produces quality results,
    and (3) the knowledge gained from an event is used to improve the
    product. Fully disclosing the results of tests (from low-level brass
    board tests to the main integration tests) and documenting the actions
    taken to address shortcomings further validates product knowledge. It
    is imperative that problems are fully addressed before rushing efforts
    to begin the next round of testing. It is also important that program
    managers use the test and evaluation parameters originally established,
    and any changes should be fully disclosed along with the reasons for
    doing so. Finally, the program manager needs assurance that all testing
    that has been done is reflective of the capabilities that the program
    is trying to deliver. Rigorous and sophisticated testing early and
    often will uncover problems when they are relatively easy and
    inexpensive to fix. Waiting too long to fully stress and test
    components will put the program in a risky position.
        In preparing answers to your questions, we relied on our prior work
    on DOD's space acquisition policy, best practices in weapon system
    acquisitions, and our reviews of specific space acquisitions as well as
    DOD studies. In addition, for specific space systems development and
    cost growth, we relied on our annual assessment of selected major
    weapon programs. Because we relied on previously issued work, we did
    not obtain comments from DOD on a draft of this letter. We conducted
    our work from April 2006 through May 2006 in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards.

        39. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, and General
    Hamel, I understand that the decision has been made to terminate the
    Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program early, and substitute
    TSAT for the AEHF satellites 4 and 5. What is the last date to buy the
    fourth AEHF satellite without a production break if there is an issue
    with the first TSAT?
        Dr. Sega. To avoid a production break, advanced procurement for
    AEHF 4 needed to be included in the fiscal year 2006 appropriated
    budget. No advanced procurement money was included.
        General Chilton. The last date to program for the fourth AEHF
    satellite was in the fiscal year 2006 program objectives memoranda.
    There is already a production break for making a fourth AEHF satellite.
        General Hamel. To avoid a production break AEHF 4 required advanced
    procurement funding in fiscal year 2006 and production funding in
    fiscal year 2007. The advanced procurement funding was not included in
    the Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Bill.

       national polar orbiting operational environmental satellite system
        40. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega and General Hamel, the NPOESS is
    a joint NASA, DOD, and NOAA program with the funding equally divided
    between the Department of Commerce and the DOD. There are serious
    problems with several of the sensor development programs, which
    resulted in a Nunn-McCurdy breach in November. Program certification,
    required as result of the breach, is due in June. Do you believe that
    the program will be recertified, and that funding for the program will
    continue to be split equally between DOD and Commerce?
        Dr. Sega. All three agencies--DOD, Commerce, and NASA--actively
    participated in the Office of the Secretary of Defense-led Nunn-McCurdy
    certification process. The NPOESS program was recertified on June 5,
    2006, by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
    and Logistics. Funding for the program will continue to be split
    equally between DOD and Commerce.
        General Hamel. The NPOESS program is not within my portfolio and,
    therefore, it is inappropriate for me to comment.

                        SPACE-BASED INFRARED SYSTEM-HIGH

        41. Senator Bill Nelson. General Hamel, could you please provide an
    update on the status of the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) segment of
    the SBIRS-High system, and the new contracting approach? I note that
    the two High Earth Orbit (HEO) sensors have been delivered.
        General Hamel. We continue to make good progress on the GEO
    segment. The GEO 1 payload completed its first thermal-vacuum test in
    January 2006 and the hardware continues testing roughly running on
    schedule. GEO 1 spacecraft functional test officially started on 18
    April 2006 with the first Safe-to-Mate activities at the Lockheed
    Martin facility in Sunnyvale, California. Other GEO 1 hardware (star
    trackers, communication and power system components, etc.) are also
    making progress in multiple locations. The various flight software
    products are also progressing, but exhibit the typical first-time
    development/integration challenges. Status of these efforts is a
    continuing focus item at all the senior reviews and several independent
    assessments have been conducted. However, all discrepancies currently
    identified can be resolved.
        As a result of the December 2005 certification decision, the SBIRS
    program was restructured and is authorized to complete the current
    contract (2 HEO, 2 GEO, and all associated ground systems). The
    production decision, in fiscal year 2007, for procurement of an
    additional GEO satellite (GEO 3) is predicated on confidence the first
    GEO satellite can perform its mission. If USD(AT&L) directs the
    procurement of a SBIRS GEO 3, then the implementing details, i.e.
    contract type, profit, incentives, required contractor reports,
    incorporation of military standards and specifications, etc., will be
    finalized.
        An additional result of the December 2005 certification decision
    was an USD(AT&L) direction to establish an alternative program
    capability to ensure that the Nation's missile warning capability is
    sustained. The Acquisition Decision Memorandum stated that ``the
    parallel program will pursue an approach with acceptable technical risk
    that offers DSP-like missile warning capability and can ensure a launch
    availability date of fiscal year 2015.'' This program will start in
    fiscal year 2006 using warfighter rapid acquisition funds; the fiscal
    year 2007 President's budget includes $103 million for technology
    development for the parallel program.
        As you noted, both HEO sensor payloads were delivered for
    integration on the host spacecraft. The sensitivity of the delivered
    payloads is greater than required and is expected to provide a
    significant increase in capability to the warfighter.

        42. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega and General Chilton, the SBIRS-
    High program is a companion program to the Space Tracking and
    Surveillance System (STSS) program in the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
    How closely coordinated are these two programs?
        Dr. Sega. Although program management direction and funding for
    STSS comes directly from MDA, MDA routinely provides program updates to
    Air Force leadership (SMC and Air Force Space Command) and is planning
    to eventually transition the STSS Block 2012 program to the Air Force.
    Programmatically, both the SBIRS-High and STSS programs are physically
    colocated in the same building at the SMC, in Los Angeles, enabling
    close technical interaction and sharing of lessons learned between the
    two programs. In fact, the same System Program Director who reports to
    both MDA and Air Force leadership leads SBIRS-High and STSS.
        General Chilton. The SBIRS-Low program was transferred from the Air
    Force to the MDA in December 2002. MDA restructured SBIRS-Low into the
    STSS to meet Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) requirements. STSS
    is fundamentally different from the old SBIRS-Low program. STSS will
    require cueing from SBIRS-High and other BMDS sensors to achieve its
    global midcourse tracking objectives. The SBIRS-High program and the
    STSS program are beginning the initial transition planning phase. MDA
    is coordinating the initial STSS transition plan with the Air Force.
    The transition planning should ensure close coordination between the
    two programs.

        43. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega and General Chilton, the ground
    station designed and built to fly the two satellite systems is
    operational. Will the STSS still be flown from the recently completed
    ground station?
        Dr. Sega. The STSS Block 2006 satellites will be flown from the
    Missile Defense Space Experimentation Center (MDSEC) located at the
    Joint National Integration Center (JNIC) at Schriever Air Force Base.
    Since the Block 2006 satellites are R&D BMDS test bed assets, they will
    be flown from the MDSEC, which operates all of MDA's R&D space assets.
    MDA and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) are currently developing and
    finalizing a transition plan for the STSS Block 2012 satellite
    constellation. The initial satellites in this constellation will likely
    also be flown out of the MDSEC but will transfer to an Air Force ground
    station of choice--to be determined at a future date. As part of this
    transition, MDA has made space available at the MDSEC for AFSPC
    operators to begin to learn to operate the STSS Block 2006 satellites
    so that a smooth transition of the STSS Block 2012 satellites can
    occur.
        General Chilton. The STSS Block 2006 satellites will be flown from
    the MDSEC located at the Joint National Integration Center at Schriever
    AFB, Colorado. The MDA and AFSPC are developing the initial transition
    plan for the STSS Block 2012 satellites. The transition plan will
    detail the STSS location upon completion.

                         OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

        44. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, General Hamel,
    and Admiral Deutsch, the idea of ORS is that for some missions, or to
    augment some requirements, it might be possible to use small,
    commercial-like satellites that could be quickly launched with small
    launch vehicles. These satellites could be preassembled, or modular and
    assembled on demand, and launched within hours or days. Or they could
    be small commercial-like satellites for a focused short-term mission
    that could be designed, built, and launched within a year or two. While
    there are many options to explore, the capability to quickly and
    cheaply build and launch the small satellites must be established. Some
    progress has been made but much remains to be done. Is TacSat-2 fully
    funded, both launch and satellite development?
        Dr. Sega. TacSat-2 satellite development and launch are fully
    funded. The launch vehicle for the planned November 2006 launch was
    funded in fiscal year 2006 budget.
        General Chilton. STRATCOM respectfully defers platform and system
    specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Hamel. The payload development for TacSat-2 and TacSat-3 is
    fully funded; however, there is a $3.5 million shortfall in fiscal year
    2006 for the development of the satellite bus. The Air Force has a
    below threshold reprogramming solution and is implementing that now.
    There is also an fiscal year 2007 $9.0 million shortfall for TacSat
    launches that the Air Force will correct with an additional below-
    threshold reprogramming next fiscal year.
        The funding for TacSat comes from several sources--Air Force
    Research Laboratories, National Reconnaissance Office, AFSPC, Naval
    Research Lab (NRL)/Office of Naval Research (ONR), as well as the Army.
    The Air Force recognizes that multiple stakeholders require increased
    attention to coordination and mission partnering efforts. In the fiscal
    year 2007 President's budget, with the formation of the ORS program
    element, the Air Force is attempting to consolidate funding for
    responsive payloads, spacelift, and launch/traffic control to address
    this challenge.
        Admiral Deutsch. Air Force is responsible for TacSat-2 and Navy
    fully funded its portion of a secondary payload in accordance with the
    TacSat-2 Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Memorandum of
    Agreement (MOA). Air Force Research Lab and the Space and Missile
    Center Detachment 12--Space Test Program also contributed funding for
    payload development and integration onto the satellite, per the ACTD
    MOA. Air Force is responsible for launch.

        45. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, General Hamel,
    and Admiral Deutsch, is TacSat-3 fully funded, both launch and
    satellite development?
        Dr. Sega. TacSat-3 payload development is fully funded. However,
    there is a $2.5 million shortfall in the TacSat-3 bus development and
    the Air Force is reprogramming to resolve this shortfall. The launch
    acquisition will require an additional $19.0 million in a fiscal year
    2007 reprogramming adjustment to be handled within the Air Force.
        General Chilton. STRATCOM respectfully defers platform and system
    specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Hamel. The payload development for TacSat-2 and TacSat-3 is
    fully funded; however, there is a $3.5 million shortfall in fiscal year
    2006 for the development of the satellite bus. The Air Force has a
    below threshold reprogramming solution and is implementing that now.
    There is also a fiscal year 2007 $9.0 million shortfall for TacSat
    launches that the Air Force will correct with an additional below-
    threshold reprogramming next fiscal year.
        The funding for TacSat comes from several sources--Air Force
    Research Laboratories, National Reconnaissance Office, AFSPC, NRL/ONR,
    as well as the Army. The Air Force recognizes that multiple
    stakeholders require increased attention to coordination and mission
    partnering efforts. In the fiscal year 2007 President's budget, with
    the formation of the ORS program element, the Air Force is attempting
    to consolidate funding for responsive payloads, spacelift, and launch/
    traffic control to address this challenge.
        Admiral Deutsch. Air Force has overall responsibility for TacSat-3
    and Navy fully funded a secondary payload. Air Force is responsible for
    launch.

        46. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, General Hamel,
    and Admiral Deutsch, what is the funding plan for TacSat-4?
        Dr. Sega. The funding for the TacSat-4 launch vehicle is part of
    the AFSPC fiscal year 2008 budget proposal currently being evaluated at
    Headquarters Air Force. NRL is the lead for production of the TacSat-4
    satellite. The ONR is funding spacecraft development and integration,
    AFSPC and SMC, Detachment 12 (Det 12) are funding the launch vehicle,
    and the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Office of Force
    Transformation (OFT) is funding the modular bus.
        General Chilton. STRATCOM respectfully defers platform and system
    specific questions to those Service representatives who maintain
    programmed funding and execution responsibilities. Existing or planned
    capabilities and decisions specific to the manning, training, and
    equipping of forces as part of Service programmed capabilities in
    support of the combatant commanders should be directed to the
    respective Service responsible for the capability in question.
        General Hamel. The funding for the TacSat-4 launch vehicle is part
    of the AFSPC fiscal year 2008 budget proposal currently being evaluated
    at Headquarters Air Force. NRL is the lead for production of the
    TacSat-4 satellite. The ONR is funding spacecraft development and
    integration, AFSPC is funding the launch vehicle, and the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense's OFT is funding the modular bus.
        Admiral Deutsch. TacSat-4 is a joint effort with Navy funding
    payload development and 1 year of operations, the OFT funding the
    standard satellite bus and Air Force funding launch. Navy fully funded
    TacSat-4 payload development at $20 million over 2\1/2\ years beginning
    in fiscal year 2006 through the ONR's Space Innovative Naval Prototypes
    program. Navy is also funding $2.8 million for ground station
    infrastructure and 1 year of satellite operations.

                            FUTURE SPACE INITIATIVES

        47. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee held a hearing on missile defense on Tuesday of this week.
    One of the topics that we discussed briefly was the future space
    program at the MDA. Of course, today MDA has the STSS program for
    warning and sensing, and N-fire for plume characterization, but the MDA
    is looking at other potential space programs beginning in 2008. Will
    those programs be coordinated with you?
        Dr. Sega. Yes. The Director, MDA, the Assistant Secretary of the
    Air Force for Acquisition, and the Under Secretary of the Air Force
    have established an MDA-AF Board of Directors (BoD) to resolve
    acquisition and operational issues, which is being superseded by the
    MDA-Joint Service BoD. The BoD interacts during the development,
    transition, production, and deployment of Air Force air and space
    missile defense capabilities. In addition, an Air Force liaison team
    was formed, and made resident in MDA, to support bilateral coordination
    and communication.

        48. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, will they fall under your
    capacity as the DOD Executive Agent for Space?
        Dr. Sega. Space efforts under MDA are the responsibility of the
    Director of MDA. Once these efforts transition to the military, the
    programs will fall under the DOD Executive Agent for Space.

        49. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, will the National Space
    Acquisition Policy apply to those programs?
        Dr. Sega. As long as these efforts are under MDA management they do
    not fall under the National Security Space Acquisition Policy. Once
    these efforts are transitioned to a Service depending on the program,
    they will be consistent with the National Security Space Acquisition
    Policy.

        50. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, will they be consistent with
    current space policy that effects are reversible and temporary?
        Dr. Sega. The current MDA programs are outside of my direct
    responsibilities as the DOD Executive Agent for Space and Under
    Secretary of the Air Force. Lieutenant General Obering can provide more
    details on these programs.

        51. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, specifically I am curious about
    the proposed space test bed at MDA. While there is no funding for the
    space test bed requested in fiscal year 2007, and MDA officials have
    said that no decision will be taken on whether to pursue the space test
    bed until 2008, the budget documents state that the space test bed is
    ``an essential element of the BMDS acquisition plan.'' This would
    indicate that a decision has been made. As the DOD Executive Agent for
    Space can you explain the status of the test bed and your role in the
    decision?
        Dr. Sega. The space test bed you are referring to is a MDA program
    and outside of my direct responsibilities as the DOD Executive Agent
    for Space. As a member of MDA's BoD, I do provide advice and counsel to
    Lieutenant General Obering on space systems and activities. I also
    review MDA's plans and programs to ensure that we are adequately
    leveraging MDA's R&D efforts as well as ensuring we are adequately
    integrating future BMD operational systems into our capabilities. This
    involvement supports a consistent approach across all the national
    space systems.

        52. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, in addition, the MDA budget
    request for the micro satellite project lists three experiments, one of
    which is the target risk reduction experiment. The purpose of this
    experiment is described as a demonstration ``of the ability of micro
    satellites to serve as cooperative targets for the ballistic missile
    defense system.'' Given that a micro satellite's characteristics are
    quite different from those of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,
    what is the purpose of the experiment?
        Dr. Sega. The program you are referring to is an MDA program and
    outside of my direct responsibilities as the DOD Executive Agent for
    Space. Lieutenant General Obering can provide more details on this
    program.

        53. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, wouldn't hitting a micro
    satellite with an interceptor be the equivalent of an anti-satellite
    weapons test?
        Dr. Sega. The program you are referring to is a MDA program and
    outside of my direct responsibilities as the DOD Executive Agent for
    Space. Lieutenant General Obering can provide more details on this
    program.

        54. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, who is the milestone decision
    authority for this project?
        Dr. Sega. In accordance with DODD 5134.9, MDA, the milestone
    decision authority for the Micro Satellite Targets Systems--Risk
    Reduction project is the Director, MDA.

        55. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, what is your role in this
    program?
        Dr. Sega. As the DOD Executive Agent for Space, I coordinate with
    the MDA on space projects. My role is to examine how best to apply
    potential technology applications that are being studied.

        56. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, recent press reports indicate
    that the MDA is going to report to a BoD. Will you be part of this BoD?
    If not, how do you exercise your DOD Executive Agent for Space
    authority in conjunction with MDA?
        Dr. Sega. The Director of the MDA reports to the USD (AT&L). As a
    member of MDA's BoD, I do provide advice and counsel to Lieutenant
    General Obering on space systems and activities. As with other MDA
    programs that relate to space, my job is to maintain a high level of
    awareness of those programs through staff involvement.

        [Whereupon, at 5:23 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]