[Senate Hearing 109-827]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-827, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2766
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
----------
MARCH 10, 29; APRIL 5, 2006
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007--Part 5 EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
S. Hrg. 109-827 Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2766
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
MARCH 10, 29; APRIL 5, 2006
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Charles S. Abell, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
JOHN CORNYN, Texas, Chairman
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina E. BENAJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Roles and Missions of the Department of Defense Regarding
HomelandDefense and Support to Civil Authorities
march 10, 2006
Page
McHale, Hon. Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense........................................................ 4
Inge, LTG Joseph R., USA, Deputy Commander, United States
NorthernCommand................................................ 13
Blum, LTG H. Steven, USA, Chief, National Guard Bureau........... 17
Rodriguez, Major General Charles R., Adjutant General, Texas
MilitaryForces................................................. 41
U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy and the Roles and Missions of
Departmentof Defense and the Department of Energy in Nonproliferation
march 29, 2006
Flory, Hon. Peter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International SecurityPolicy................................... 62
Cartwright, Gen. James, USMC, Commander, United States Strategic
Command........................................................ 75
Paul, Hon. Jerald S., Principal Deputy Administrator of National
NuclearSecurity Administration, Department of Energy........... 82
Department of Defense's Role in Combating Terrorism
april 5, 2006
O'Connell, Hon. Thomas W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operationsand Low-Intensity Conflict................... 132
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
----------
FRIDAY, MARCH 10, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGARDING HOMELAND
DEFENSE AND SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
Cornyn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Cornyn, Thune, and
Reed.
Also present: Senator Levin.
Committee staff member present: John H. Quirk V, security
clerk.
Majority staff members present: Sandra E. Luff,
professional staff member; Elaine A. McCusker, professional
staff member; David M. Morriss, counsel; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, general
counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston and Benjamin
L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Russell J.
Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory,
assistant to Senator Thune; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed, and William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Cornyn. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to
order. The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the
Department of Defense's (DOD) role in homeland defense and
support to civil authorities.
We welcome our distinguished witnesses today, including the
Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense; Lieutenant General Joseph R. Inge, Deputy
Commander of Northern Command (NORTHCOM); and Lieutenant
General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB).
I'd also like to recognize someone from my home State,
Major General Charles Rodriguez, who's attending the hearing
today. General Rodriguez is the adjutant general for the State
of Texas, and has done a superb job. I saw him in action during
the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and we're grateful
to have his service, not only to our State, but our Nation.
I commend each of our witnesses for the leadership you
provide. I've had a chance to review your written statements,
and they're all outstanding and quite comprehensive. We will,
of course, invite you to make an opening statement, and then
we'll have some questions.
I also hope that you will convey to the fine men and women
under your charge, both military and civilian, the Nation's
gratitude for their selfless service and commitment to our
Nation's defense. We recognize that we must view homeland
defense, in a post-September 11, 2001, environment, in a--
perhaps even in a different way. Moreover, recent events along
the U.S./Mexican border, coupled with the discovery of the Otay
Mesa Tunnel, highlight the need for our continued vigilance and
the close cooperation between the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the DOD in protecting our Nation's borders
and keeping us safe.
As public servants, our most solemn obligation is to
protect the American people. Simply stated, the security of the
United States and defense of the Homeland is job number one.
While our forward-deployed forces are our first line of defense
in the global war on terrorism, the readiness of our Armed
Forces to defend the Homeland and to assist civilian
authorities in identifying threats, gathering and analyzing
intelligence, preventing or responding to an attack or other
national emergencies are of paramount importance to the
subcommittee. We welcome your insights on developments in your
respective organizations, as well as your personal assessments
of the fiscal year 2007 defense budget request.
Lieutenant General Inge and Lieutenant General Blum, the
subcommittee also looks forward to hearing your assessment with
regard to how you integrate the total force into the execution
of your mission. We're specifically interested in how you
coordinate and synchronize the elements of your mission that
are in support of the DHS. We're also interested in your views
regarding the establishment of unity of effort, as well as
unity of command when the Active-Duty, Reserve component, and
the National Guard Forces are employed in response to a
catastrophic national disaster, pandemic, or attack on the
Homeland.
Secretary McHale and Lieutenant General Inge, we seek your
comments and insight on the recommendations outlined in the
Federal response to Hurricane Katrina lessons learned. We're
particularly interested in the recommendations that outlines
that the DOD should lead the Federal response, in extraordinary
circumstances. Under what circumstances would you like to see
the DOD take such a role?
In addition, the subcommittee seeks your assessment
regarding the steps being taken to identify gaps, as well as
redundancies, between Federal agencies that share a role in
homeland security and homeland defense. Of particular interest
is how your organizations synchronize your support to the DHS
with regard to the land, air, and maritime defense of our
borders, and how resident DOD technology and capabilities are
being leveraged and shared with the DHS in their execution of
the border defense mission.
The subcommittee is also interested in any authorities that
you believe should be reexamined in light of the recently
published Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), as well as the
Federal response to Hurricane Katrina lessons learned.
Again, we welcome each of our witnesses this morning. We
certainly want to convey to you our appreciation for your
service to our great Nation and the seriousness of the
responsibilities with which you have been charged. We stand
ready to assist you, in any way that is within our power, in
the discharge of those very important duties in defense of our
Nation.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming the members of the panel.
Secretary McHale, General Inge, and General Blum, thank you for
the service to the Nation.
I'm particularly glad to see Secretary McHale here, after
serving with the Secretary in the House of Representatives, and
I know his commitment to the men and women of the Armed Forces,
particularly the Marine Corps. So, thanks for that, Paul.
We extend our thanks, obviously, to all of you, and to the
valiant men and women that you lead. Thank you so much.
This is the first hearing of the subcommittee, and the
first Armed Services hearing since the Hurricane Katrina
disaster to explore DOD's role in support of Federal
authorities during a natural or manmade disaster. The DOD,
NORTHCOM, and especially the National Guard played a tremendous
and pivotal role in helping the victims of the disaster in
Louisiana and along the Gulf Coast. Indeed, there was a stark
contrast between the military's response and the response of
the DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Nevertheless, I believe that DOD's ability to support civil
authorities can be improved, and I think most, if not all, the
witnesses have indicated such in comments before other
audiences, other hearings before Congress.
The White House view of the lessons learned from the
response to Hurricane Katrina stated ``Limitations under
Federal law and DOD policy caused the Active-Duty military to
be dependent on requests for assistance. These limitations
result in slowed application of DOD resources during the
initial response. Further Active-Duty military and National
Guard operations were not coordinated, and serve two different
bosses--one, the President, and the other, the Governor.'' This
review makes 11 recommendations, and I hope to hear from the
witnesses today on the conclusion of this review and on the
recommendations.
I also hope to hear more about the DOD's homeland defense
efforts, including developments relating to North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and our cooperation with
Canada, air and maritime security, how the interface between
NORTHCOM and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is
functioning, and DOD's ability to prevent, respond, and manage
the aftermath of a terrorist attack or other catastrophic
event.
The public's confidence, frankly, has been shaken by the
Federal response to Hurricane Katrina, particularly since the
administration has asserted, since September 11, 2001, that
we've been improving our emergency capacity. I'm not
convinced--and more importantly I don't think the American
public is convinced--that we are fully prepared to respond to a
terrorist event if it were to happen today or tomorrow or the
next several days or months ahead. I'd like your views on this
subject, what we've learned with respect to Hurricane Katrina
and how well we're ready to respond to a catastrophic event, if
it occurs in the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Reed. I appreciate the
way that our staffs and you and I are able to work together to
discharge our responsibilities. It's a pleasure working with
you.
We'd like now to hear from our witnesses, starting with
Assistant Secretary McHale, and then General Inge, and then
General Blum. If you would keep your comments to within 10
minutes or so, we want to give you plenty of time to say what
you want to say, and then we have a lot of questions we want to
ask.
So, Secretary McHale, we'll turn to you first.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL McHALE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE
Mr. McHale. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, it is a pleasure to be back
in your company again--distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to describe DOD's
role in protecting the United States from foreign attack and in
responding to the consequences of attacks and natural
disasters.
Mr. Chairman, you indicated, accurately, that my formal
statement has been submitted for the record. If I may, I'll
simply proceed to a very brief summary of that testimony.
Senator Cornyn. Very well.
Mr. McHale. The 2005 National Defense Strategy designates
securing the United States from direct attack as DOD's first
objective. DOD gives top priority to dissuading, deterring, and
defeating those who would seek to harm the United States, with
a paramount emphasis upon enemies potentially armed with
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Protecting the United States Homeland requires a global,
active, and layered defense strategy. There is no home game,
there is no away game. We are engaged in a global conflict. In
that global conflict, the defense of the U.S. Homeland is the
preeminent duty.
It is the primary mission of the DHS to prevent terrorist
attacks within the United States, including stopping terrorists
form crossing our borders, coming through our ports, or
hijacking aircraft inside or outside of the United States.
Similarly, the Attorney General leads our Nation's law
enforcement effort to detect, prevent, and investigate
terrorist activity within the United States. DOD's
responsibility is to employ our warfighting capabilities,
subject to constitutional and statutory authority, in a
military defense of U.S. lives, property, and individual
freedom.
DOD has primary responsibility for defending U.S. airspace
and protecting the Nation's air approaches. Since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, more than 41,000 fighter, aerial
refueling, and airborne early-warning sorties have been flown,
while more than 2,000 air patrols have responded to actual
incidents and suspicious flight operations.
We have fighters positioned throughout the United States
and Canada capable of defending major population centers and
high-value infrastructure within minutes. Within the National
Capital Region (NCR), where we are located today, the DOD
conducts irregular air patrols, maintains a dedicated 24/7
fighter capability based at Andrews Air Force Base, and has a
dedicated ground missile defense system to provide around-the-
clock coverage of the NCR. In addition, last year, DOD provided
a sophisticated visual warning system to warn wayward pilots.
In the maritime domain, including the international waters,
the maritime approaches to the United States, our territorial
seas, and other U.S. navigable waters, we have a defense and a
highly effective partnership executed by the United States Navy
and the United States Coast Guard. The U.S. Navy defends the
sea approaches to the United States and works with the Coast
Guard to patrol international waters and our territorial seas.
In December 2004, DOD and DHS signed a memorandum of
agreement (MOA) that incorporated the U.S. Coast Guard in
support of DOD maritime homeland defense operations. A similar
MOA that would include DOD in support of the Coast Guard
maritime homeland security operations is currently awaiting
final approval.
As noted earlier, it is the primary mission of DHS to
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. In
addition, the Attorney General leads our Nation's law
enforcement effort to detect, prevent, and investigate
terrorist activity, again, within the United States.
Accordingly, DOD does not have the assigned responsibility to
stop terrorists from coming across our borders, to stop
terrorists from coming through U.S. ports, or to stop
terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside of the
United States. These responsibilities belong to DHS. Nor does
DOD have the authority to seek out and arrest terrorists in the
United States. These responsibilities belong to the Department
of Justice (DOJ).
DOD does have a role in providing support to civil
authorities, when appropriate and permitted by law. For
instance, DOD Active and Reserve component forces, and the
National Guard, have provided a wide variety of
counternarcotics missions along the southwest border of the
United States since 1989. Congress recognized the possible
interplay between drug trafficking and terrorism, and included,
in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2004, a provision
that addressed the authority of the Secretary of Defense to
expand the mission of DOD joint task forces from
counternarcotics to include counterterrorism activities.
Again, as noted earlier, at the direction of the President
or the Secretary of Defense, the DOD provides military support
to civil authorities as part of a comprehensive national
response to prevent and protect against terrorist incidents or
to recover from an attack or natural disaster.
In 2003, DOD acted on 75 requests for assistance (RFA) from
more than 20 civilian agencies. In 2004, DOD acted on 99 RFAs
from domestic civilian agencies, as noted by Senator Reed just
a few moments ago.
DOD's deployment in response to the catastrophic effects of
Hurricane Katrina was the largest, fastest civil support
mission in the history of the United States. Between August 29
and September 10, 2005, more than 72,000 Federal military and
National Guard personnel were deployed in response to Hurricane
Katrina, more than twice the previous record deployment in
response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992.
During the response to Hurricane Katrina, DOD acted on more
than 90 hurricane-related RFAs from civil authorities. Many of
these requests were approved orally by the Secretary of
Defense. I would note, parenthetically, including one RFA
approved orally and quickly that had an estimated cost of $1
billion. These RFAs were in execution when the paperwork caught
up, several days later. DOD felt a sense of urgency, and acted
upon it.
In addition to Hurricane Katrina, DOD acted on more than
140 requests for assistance in 2005, including responses to
Hurricanes Dennis, Ophelia, and Rita.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, again, as noted by
Senator Reed, President Bush ordered a comprehensive review of
the Federal response. The White House recommendations correlate
well with our internal DOD lessons-learned effort. We have
already begun to implement improvements.
For example, DOD is developing pre-scripted requests for
assistance that would speed the response to a catastrophic
event. We are completing a contingency plan defining NORTHCOM's
role in providing support to DHS during domestic contingencies.
We are developing a framework to provide initial damage
reconnaissance. I would note, that was one of our areas of
deficiency during Hurricane Katrina. Battle damage assessment,
as we would perform it overseas, or an assessment of the damage
associated with a natural event here in the United States, was
not as successful as it should have been, because we relied too
heavily on what turned out to be inaccurate media reports.
That's not a criticism of the media. It's simply a strong
motivation, a requirement, for the DOD to develop independent
capabilities for rapid, accurate damage assessments following
either terrorist attacks or naturally occurring catastrophic
disasters within the United States.
We are also participating in the interagency revision of
the National Search and Rescue Plan.
In conclusion, we recognize that the defense of the United
States Homeland, our people, property, and freedom, is DOD's
most fundamental duty. Men and women in military uniform,
Active, Reserve, and National Guard, will continue to meet that
obligation with passion, professionalism, and a resolute sense
of purpose.
Mr. Chairman, I'll look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McHale follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Paul McHale
introduction
Chairman Cornyn, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the
subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to address you today on the
Department of Defense's (DOD) important role in protecting the United
States from enemy attacks and responding to the consequences of attacks
and natural disasters.
As noted in the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
the United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war. Since
the attacks of September 11, 2001, our Nation has fought a global war
against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice,
and who want to destroy our free way of life. Our enemies seek weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and, if they are successful, will likely
attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere.
As we wage this long war, we must also be prepared for other
threats. Hostile states could attack the United States using WMD
delivered by missiles or by means such as commercial shipping or
general aviation. They could attack surreptitiously through surrogates,
and, of course, there is also the danger that the WMD capabilities of
some states could fall into the hands of, or be given to, terrorists
who could use them to attack the United States.
In addition to their duties overseas, U.S. forces have taken on
greater roles at home since this long war began. Immediately following
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, U.S. forces were called upon
to assist in securing the Homeland. Working alongside other Federal
agencies, DOD answered the call. At the President's direction, Active
and Reserve Forces: conducted combat air patrols over major cities to
prevent follow-on attacks; reinforced the Nation's land borders;
guarded shipping lanes; protected harbors; secured critical
infrastructure; and guarded airports and other transportation hubs
temporarily until the establishment of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). Specialized anti-terrorism and chemical and
biological incident response forces also deployed to Washington, DC, in
the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks.
Whether at home or abroad, defending our Nation, fighting our wars,
or responding to disasters, the men and women of our military--Active,
Guard, and Reserve--have proven that they are dedicated, adaptable, and
ready to answer the call to duty.
protecting the united states
The 2005 National Defense Strategy designates securing the United
States from direct attack as our first objective. DOD gives top
priority to dissuading, deterring, and defeating those who seek to harm
the United States directly, with a paramount emphasis upon enemies
potentially armed with WMD. Protecting the U.S. Homeland requires a
global, active, and layered defense strategy. There is no ``home
game.'' There is no ``away game.'' There is only one game. We are
engaged in a global conflict. In that global conflict, the defense of
the U.S. Homeland is the preeminent duty. Therefore, Homeland Defense
must be seen as an integral part of a global, active, layered defense--
a defense in depth that has as its single goal to secure the United
States and its citizens from attack. In addition to the National
Defense Strategy, last year we also completed DOD's first Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support. By articulating strategic goals and
objectives, we add coherence and direction to relevant activities
across the DOD that include: deterring and preventing attacks;
protecting critical defense and designated civilian infrastructure;
providing situational understanding; and preparing for and responding
to incidents.
To secure our freedom and safeguard the American way of life we
cannot depend on passive or reactive defenses. A purely passive defense
would be subject to enemy reconnaissance and inevitable defeat. By
contrast, an active, layered defense relies on early warning of an
emerging threat in order to quickly deploy and execute a decisive
response. An active defense is a powerful deterrent, dissuading enemies
and denying them the operational initiative.
U.S. forces are prepared to: intercept and defeat threats against
U.S. territory, within U.S. territorial waters and airspace, and at a
distance from the Homeland; protect against and mitigate the
consequences of any attack; and/or conduct military operations in
response to any attack.
Here at home, it is the primary mission of the DHS to prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States, including stopping
terrorists from coming across our borders, coming through our ports, or
hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States. The Attorney
General leads our Nation's law enforcement effort to detect, prevent,
and investigate terrorist activity within the United States. DOD's
responsibility is to employ our warfighting capabilities, subject to
constitutional and statutory authority, in a military defense of U.S.
lives, property, and individual freedom.
dod's homeland defense and civil support posture
All U.S. military commands throughout the world have a role to play
in the active defense-in-depth of the United States. Three military
commands--U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)--
are directly involved in the defense of the U.S. Homeland.
Additionally, the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is the lead
combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing military efforts
to combat WMD, including ensuring the force structure and necessary
resources are in place to help all combatant commands defeat WMD.
To meet emerging threats, DOD is postured to deter, defend against,
and defeat threats to the United States in the air, maritime, and land
domains.
Air Defense
In the air domain, DOD has primary responsibility for defending
U.S. airspace and protecting the Nation's air approaches. The air
domain is guarded, patrolled, and monitored by the bi-national U.S.-
Canada NORAD. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, more
than 42,000 fighter, aerial refueling, and airborne early warning
sorties have been flown, while more than 2,000 air patrols have
responded to actual incidents and suspicious flight operations. We also
have air defense alert fighters positioned throughout the United States
and Canada that are capable of reaching major population centers and
high-value infrastructure within minutes. The number of alert fighters
can be increased or decreased according to emerging threat levels.
We continually adjust our posture in order to protect the National
Capitol Region (NCR), the seat of the U.S. Government. The DOD conducts
irregular air patrols,, maintains a dedicated 24-hours-a-day/7-days-a-
week alert fighter response based at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland,
and has a dedicated ground missile defense system located to provide
around-the-clock coverage for the NCR. In addition, last year, DOD
provided the Visual Warning System (VWS) to warn wayward pilots to
contact the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic
controllers immediately and to depart from restricted airspace. We also
detailed DOD liaison officers to serve at the TSA-hosted NCR
Coordination Center (NCRCC) on a full-time basis and provided key
interagency operations centers and the NCRCC access to DOD's classified
conferencing capability, which is used for DOD coordination and
decision making during the response to hostile domestic air threats.
In addition, DOD has begun deploying missile interceptors at Fort
Greeley, Alaska, to protect the U.S. Homeland from ballistic missile
attack even as system development, testing, and fielding continue.
Maritime Domain
The maritime domain--including international waters, the maritime
approaches to the United States, our territorial seas, and other U.S.
navigable waters--is guarded by a highly effective partnership between
the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Navy defends the sea
approaches to the United States and works with the U.S. Coast Guard to
patrol international waters and our territorial seas.
In December 2004, DOD and DHS signed a memorandum of agreement that
incorporated the U.S. Coast Guard in support of DOD maritime homeland
defense operations. This memorandum of agreement established a joint
command, control, and coordination structure using existing DOD and
U.S. Coast Guard operations centers. A similar memorandum of agreement
that would include DOD in support of U.S. Coast Guard maritime homeland
security operations is currently awaiting final approval. This close
coordination is essential to our ability to interdict terrorists and
others attempting to enter the United States, possibly with WMD
materiel and components, via the maritime domain.
This year, the Secretary of Defense approved a new NORTHCOM
Maritime Homeland Defense Execute Order, which provides readily
accessible forces, procedures, coordination requirements, and rules of
engagement to counter all threats to the U.S. Homeland, including WMD
proliferation.
Additionally, in multiple theaters in the global war on terror,
forward-deployed U.S. Navy assets work with other agencies to identify,
track, and intercept threats before they threaten the United States.
Land Domain
It is the primary mission of DHS to prevent terrorist attacks
within the United States. The Attorney General leads our Nation's law
enforcement efforts to detect, prevent, and investigate terrorist
activity within the United States. Accordingly, DOD does not have the
assigned responsibility to stop terrorists coming across our borders,
to stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports, or to stop
terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States
(these responsibilities belong to DHS). Nor does DOD have the authority
to seek out and arrest terrorists in the United States (these
responsibilities belong to DOJ). DOD does have a role in providing
support to civil authorities, when appropriate and as permitted by law.
DOD has deployed numerous assets both to defend the U.S. Homeland and
to assist civil authorities:
Quick Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces,
highly trained U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps units, are
postured to respond to a wide range of potential threats to the
U.S. Homeland, including critical infrastructure protection.
The U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident
Response Force (CBIRF), headquartered at Indian Head, Maryland,
can deploy to assist local, State, or Federal agencies and
military commanders in consequence management operations by
providing: capabilities for detection and identification;
casualty search, rescue, and personnel decontamination; and
emergency medical care and stabilization of contaminated
personnel. CBIRF was instrumental in responding to the
discovery of ricin in the Dirksen Senate Office Building in
February 2004.
Joint Task Force Civil Support, headquartered in Fort
Monroe, Virginia; Joint Task Force Consequence Management East,
headquartered at Fort Gillem, Georgia; and Joint Task Force
Consequence Management West, headquartered at Fort Sam Houston,
Texas, can provide consequence management support to civil
authorities in the case of WMD attacks.
Joint Force Headquarters NCR, based at Fort McNair in
Washington, DC, is responsible for land homeland defense, civil
support, and consequence management in the NCR.
Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), headquartered at Fort
Bliss, Texas, supports counterdrug, counterterrorism, and other
operations to countertransnational threats.
Joint Task Force Alaska, based at Elmendorf Air Force
Base, Alaska, is responsible for land homeland defense and
civil support operations in Alaska, and Joint Task Force
Homeland Defense, based at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, has these
responsibilities in Hawaii and U.S. territories, possessions,
and protectorates in the Pacific.
dod's role in the security of the united states borders
In accordance with section 202 of title 6, U.S. Code, DHS is
responsible for ``[s]ecuring the borders, territorial waters, ports,
terminals, waterways, and air, land, and sea transportation systems of
the United States'' and ``[p]reventing the entry of terrorists and the
instruments of terrorism into the United States.'' DOD's role in the
execution of this responsibility, as noted earlier, is to provide
support to DHS, when requested, appropriate, lawful, and approved by
the President or the Secretary of Defense.
DOD Active and Reserve component forces and the National Guard have
conducted a wide variety of counternarcotics missions along the
southwest border of the United States since 1989. That support to
civilian law enforcement has included activities such as surface and
aerial reconnaissance; minor construction; establishing tactical
observation posts, training, intelligence analysis, linguist support,
and transportation; and conducting training exercises along the border
to provide terrain denial. DOD also supports requests from DOJ, DHS,
and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Task Force
Headquarters for unique military assistance, such as reconnaissance
(ground-based, aviation-based, and maritime), logistics,
transportation, engineer support along the southwest border, as well as
intelligence programs and training.
Since September 11, 2001, policy and operational changes in DOD
have improved the alignment of resources and efforts where there is a
potential relationship between terrorism and narcotics trafficking.
Congress recognized the possible interplay between drug trafficking and
terrorism and included in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 a provision that addressed the authority of the
Secretary of Defense to expand the mission of DOD joint task forces
from counternarcotics to include counterterrorism activities.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD has also
engaged in a number of activities to assist civil authorities in
improving the security of our borders:
March-August 2002. DOD mobilized some 1,600 National
Guard personnel along the northern and southern borders to
support the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and the Border Patrol, in their
heightened post-September 11 security posture.
October-November 2003. A Predator B Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV), scheduled for future delivery to DOD, operated
in support of DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Operation Safeguard, a humanitarian/law enforcement effort to
protect lives of illegal aliens and enforce immigration law
during crossings along the southwest border into the United
States. Operation Safeguard provided an opportunity for DOD to
demonstrate UAV capabilities to border authorities. Operation
Safeguard also served to highlight the policy, legal, and
infrastructure issues that must be examined in tandem with
technology development. These include challenges associated
with the use of UAVs in controlled domestic airspace as well as
the extensive infrastructure (e.g., communications,
exploitation tools, imagery analysts) required to process and
exploit information collected by UAVs.
June-September 2004. DOD UAVs operated in support of
the Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI), which sought to
detect illegal entry and smuggling/drug activity along the
Arizona-Mexico border, and to aid in the rescue of lost or
injured persons.
November 2004-January 2005.
JTF-N supported the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) Operation Winter Freeze, an operation
to interdict suspected transnational threats along the
U.S.-Canadian border in the Swanton and Buffalo sectors
(New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York). The military
provided aerial reconnaissance and interdiction sorties
and augmented two Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) detection
checkpoints.
Army Hunter UAVs flew sorties to detect
illegal entry/drug activity along the Arizona--Mexico
border in support of the ABCI.
June 2005. DOD supported a DHS bi-national interagency
exercise, ``Operation San Juan,'' involving CBP and Royal
Canadian Mounted Police activities along the northwest border
in Washington State. DOD provided surveillance radars, ground
sensors, and military personnel to operate them.
September 2005. DOD supported DHS CBP by providing
flight operations support at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to UAV
operations supporting counterterrorism border enforcement
efforts.
October-November 2005. JTF-N supported DHS CBP's
efforts to interdict transnational threats in the El Paso
Sector by conducting multi-sensor operations (ground-based
forward-looking infrared, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles,
ground sensors, ground surveillance radars) in Hidalgo, Grant,
Luna, and Dona Ana counties of New Mexico.
defense support of civil authorities
At the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense, the DOD
supports civil authorities--as appropriate and consistent with the law
and the imperative to sustain military readiness--for designated
activities and as part of a comprehensive national response to prevent
and protect against terrorist incidents or to recover from an attack or
a disaster.
DOD has significant resources that may be available to support
civil authorities. In Incidents of National Significance, DOD's support
is provided consistent with the National Response Plan (NRP), which was
published in December 2004. The Secretary of Defense retains command of
military forces providing defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)--
sometimes referred to as ``civil support''--as with all other military
operations. In accordance with the NRP, when requested, and upon
approval of the Secretary of Defense, DOD provides DSCA during domestic
incidents. Accordingly, DOD is considered a support agency for all of
the NRP's emergency support functions.
There are three primary mechanisms by which DOD takes part in a
Federal response to a domestic incident. Federal assistance, including
assistance from DOD, can be provided: (1) at the direction of the
President; (2) at the request of another Federal agency under the
Economy Act, or (3) in response to a request from DHS's Federal
Emergency Management Agency under the Stafford Act. The second and
third mechanisms require a request for assistance and approval of the
Secretary of Defense.
DOD resources employed in support of domestic civil authorities are
under the command and control of Commander, NORTHCOM, for responses in
the Continental United States, Alaska, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia; or Commander, PACOM,
for Hawaii and U.S. territories, possessions, and protectorates in the
Pacific region.
DOD has continued its long tradition of DSCA while maintaining its
primary mission of fighting and winning the Nation's wars. In 2003, DOD
acted on 75 RFAs from more than 20 civilian agencies. In 2004, DOD
acted on 99 RFAs from domestic civilian agencies. DOD's response to the
catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina was the largest and most
rapid military deployment within the United States since the Civil War.
More than 72,000 Federal military and National Guard personnel were
deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina--more than twice the number
that deployed in response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (more than
29,000). These forces were directly employed in saving lives through
extensive search and rescue, evacuation, and medical assistance. Other
military capabilities employed during the response included 23 ships,
68 fixed-wing aircraft, 293 helicopters, amphibious landing craft,
space-based imagery, night vision capabilities, port and waterway
surveillance, mortuary teams, and large-scale construction support
provided through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Navy
Seabees. Additionally, nine DOD installations served as logistical
staging areas for the delivery of supplies and as sites for Federal
Medical Shelters. Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, was designated
as the central collection point for foreign relief donations. During
the response to Hurricane Katrina, DOD acted on more than 90 hurricane-
related RFAs from civil authorities requiring a broad range of military
capabilities. Some of these requests were approved orally by the
Secretary of Defense or the acting Deputy Secretary of Defense, and
were in execution when the approval paperwork caught up later. DOD felt
a sense of urgency and acted upon it, as provided for within the NRP.
In addition to Hurricane Katrina, DOD acted on more than 140 requests
for assistance in 2005, including responses to Hurricanes Dennis,
Ophelia, and Rita, and the provision of UAV support to DHS border
security activities.
the total force
The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which was
published 2 months prior to Hurricane Katrina, reflects a Total Force
approach to homeland defense and domestic civil support missions,
incorporating the capabilities of trained and equipped Active-Duty,
National Guard, and Reserve Forces. This approach preserves the
historic Federal relationship between the various levels of government
while, at the same time, recognizing the unique capabilities of the
Total Force to respond immediately to American citizens who are
desperately in need. The Total Force--Active, Reserve, and National
Guard--is even now engaged in activities at home and abroad that
promote the security and interests of our Nation. The National Guard,
in particular, provides unique capabilities in every U.S. State and
Territory. The modern-day National Guard effectively operates as an
operational force for military missions at home and abroad and can
answer no-notice calls by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or
the Governors to respond to natural or man-made catastrophic incidents
here at home.
The DOD planned for and employed a balance of Active, Reserve, and
National Guard capabilities in responding to Hurricane Katrina. In
contrast to Hurricane Andrew (1992), in which National Guard Forces
constituted 24 percent of the military response, National Guard Forces
represented more than 70 percent of the military force for Hurricane
Katrina. Even while 75,000 National Guard members were deployed
overseas, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Blum and the
various state Adjutants General, the National Guard amassed more than
30,000 personnel in 96 hours in response to Hurricane Katrina. At the
height of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, the National Guard deployed
a total of 50,000 military personnel. National Guard personnel from
every State, Territory, and the District of Columbia were involved in
Hurricane Katrina response operations. Further, National Guard Weapons
of Mass Destruction--Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) from 14 States
deployed to provide state-of-the-art communications capabilities to
local authorities and assistance and advice on identifying and handling
hazardous materials from damaged infrastructure.
The National Guard provides important capabilities to NORTHCOM and
PACOM, including situational awareness capabilities, intelligence and
information feeds, chemical-biological weapons of mass destruction
response force packages, and forward-deployed command and control
apparatuses and joint logistics bases, as needed.
In the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized
the Secretary of Defense to provide funds to the Governor of a State
for the use of the National Guard in a title 32 status (State control/
Federal funding) for approved homeland defense activities. This new
authority recognizes both the truly global nature of the current war
and the special capabilities and contributions of the National Guard--a
force located in every State and Territory, very familiar with the
local geography, officials, and population, and well versed in working
with other U.S. agencies. Under this authority, National Guard Forces
will be engaged directly in the defense of the U.S. Homeland in a
manner not seen since the early days of our country.
hurricane katrina lessons learned
Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent sustained flooding of New
Orleans exposed significant flaws in our national preparedness for
catastrophic events and our Nation's capacity to respond to them.
Emergency plans at all levels of government were put to the test and
came up short. As a result, President Bush, in his September 15, 2005,
address to the Nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans, made it clear
that the Federal Government will make the necessary changes to be
``better prepared for any challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that
could threaten our people.''
President Bush subsequently ordered a comprehensive review of the
Federal response to Hurricane Katrina--this review resulted in the
publication of ``The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned.'' Regarding DOD, the review states:
The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that
the Department of Defense (DOD) has the capability to play a
critical role in the Nation's response to catastrophic events.
During the Katrina response, DOD--both National Guard and
Active-Duty Forces--demonstrated that along with the Coast
Guard it was one of the only Federal departments that possessed
real operational capabilities to translate Presidential
decisions into prompt, effective action on the ground. In
addition to possessing operational personnel in large numbers
that have been trained and equipped for their missions, DOD
brought robust communications infrastructure, logistics, and
planning capabilities. Since DOD, first and foremost, has its
critical overseas mission, the solution to improving the
Federal response to future catastrophes cannot simply be ``let
the Department of Defense do it.'' Yet DOD capabilities must be
better identified and integrated into the Nation's response
plans.
The White House recommendations correlate well with our internal
lessons learned effort. We have already begun to implement improvements
with an urgent focus on the operational challenges associated with this
year's upcoming hurricane season. For example, DOD is:
Developing pre-scripted requests for assistance that
would speed the response to a catastrophic event;
Completing a contingency plan defining NORTHCOM's role
in planning and executing support to DHS during domestic
contingencies;
Reviewing its Immediate Response Authority with a view
to making appropriate changes if necessary;
Providing a strategic planner as a detailee to the
DHS's Policy Directorate and reviewing DOD personnel support to
DHS in terms of both numbers and expertise to identify
appropriate adjustments;
Developing a framework to provide initial damage
reconnaissance, including those capabilities provided by the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National
Security Agency (NSA), as part of a STRATCOM civil support
plan;
Proposing legislation that would allow more effective
and rapid mobilization of applicable Reserve units to conduct
all-hazards civil support missions in response to disasters;
Participating in the interagency revision of the
National Search and Rescue Plan, including disaster response
operations and address air traffic control and coordination;
and
Pursuing better integration of Federal military force
and State National Guard during planning and exercises. In the
future, integrated planning can be enhanced by anticipating
incidents and their operational requirements, as well as by
training and exercising for the 15 National Planning Scenarios
developed by DHS. NORTHCOM is developing detailed operational
plans for all foreseeable mission requests. Additionally,
beginning in February 2006, NORTHCOM will participate in DHS's
effort to review emergency plans in all 54 States and
Territories. We will integrate the lessons learned from the
response to Hurricane Katrina into future exercises to minimize
or mitigate military command and control difficulties during
responses to future disasters. Finally, when justified by the
disabling impact of a catastrophic incident upon State and
local authorities and the need to act swiftly to save lives,
the President has the necessary authorities to Federalize
National Guard Forces and establish ``unity of effort'' by
establishing a unity of command, placing all military forces--
Active, Reserve, and National Guard--in title 10 status.
conclusion
As stated in the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support,
the United States faces ruthless enemies who seek to break our will by
exploiting America's fundamental freedoms. Our adversaries are eager to
employ violence against Americans at home. In this environment, DOD's
paramount goal will continue to be the defense of the U.S. Homeland
from direct attack.
A new kind of enemy requires a new concept for defending the U.S.
Homeland. The terrorist enemy now considers the U.S. Homeland a
preeminent part of the global theater of combat, and so must we. We
cannot depend on passive or reactive defenses but must seize the
initiative from adversaries.
The active, layered defense articulated in the Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support seamlessly integrates U.S.
capabilities in the forward regions of the world, the global commons,
the geographic approaches to the U.S. territory, and within the United
States. Whether in a leading, supporting, or enabling role, the DOD,
guided by this Strategy and consistent with U.S. law, will work with a
sense of urgency to protect the U.S. Homeland and the American people.
Defending the U.S. Homeland--our people, property, and freedom--is
our most fundamental duty. Failure is not an option.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, Secretary McHale.
General Inge, we'd be pleased to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF LTG JOSEPH R. INGE, USA, DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
General Inge. Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
report on NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil support
operations.
As we enter our fourth year at NORTHCOM, we are mission
capable, and we are responding to the needs of the Nation. Our
primary focus is on homeland defense, deterring, preventing,
and defeating attacks. We also stand ready to assist primary
agencies in responding quickly to manmade and natural
disasters, as directed.
When we became NORTHCOM some 4 years ago, we inherited a
family of plans from various organizations across the land. In
conjunction with taskings from the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan, we have built those plans into a family of plans. We now
have some 12 plans that are either complete or very near
complete. These plans are the foundation of our ability to
deter, prevent, and defeat threats to our Nation, and to assist
civil authorities when called upon by the President or the
Secretary of Defense.
To refine these plans and to hone our ability to accomplish
our missions, we conduct frequent and demanding exercises. Our
exercises scenarios have simulated a wide range of homeland
defense and civil support challenges. These challenges have
been exercised in the air, the land, the sea, both natural and
manmade.
To date, over 150 Federal, State, local, and
multifunctional nongovernmental organizations (NGO) have
participated in our exercises. After each of these, we conduct
a comprehensive review to identify lessons learned. We adjust
our operations and our plans, in accordance with these lessons
learned, to improve our ability to protect Americans and supply
primary agencies in times of crisis. I would also add that we
adjust a similar rigorous after-action review process after
each event, in terms of a real operation.
Day-to-day, we sustain continuous situational awareness and
readiness to defend the United States against a range of
threats in all domains. Our operations center is up and running
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. It is manned by
a team of qualified and competent professionals interfaced with
other agencies within Government, and, particularly, I would
add, with the National Guard. We are networked with our
subordinate commands and stand ready to respond immediately in
time of crisis.
NORTHCOM has four subordinate headquarters, that I believe
you are aware. Briefly, Joint Forces National Capital Region,
located here, at Fort McNair, is responsible for land-based
homeland defense, civil support, and incident management within
the NCR. Joint Task Force Civil Support is located in Fort
Monroe, Virginia, and command and control's DOD forces that
respond to catastrophic chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosive events. Joint Task Force
Alaska, located at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska, is under
PACOM for normal operations. If Alaska-based forces are needed
for homeland defense or civil support operations, NORTHCOM will
command and control the forces through Joint Task Force Alaska.
Joint Task Force North, located at Fort Bliss, Texas, supports
law enforcement agencies in counterdrug, counterterrorism, and
border patrol operations along the northern and southwest U.S.
borders.
In addition, the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have
established dedicated service components for NORTHCOM. These
commands are 5th United States Army, located at Fort Sam
Houston, Texas; 1st Air Force, Air Force North, located at
Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida; Marine Forces North, located
in New Orleans, Louisiana; and the Commanders of Fleet Forces
Command located in Norfolk, Virginia, is designated as the
Navy's supporting command to NORTHCOM.
In the area of civil support, DOD has a long history of
supporting civil authorities, providing specialized skills and
assets that can rapidly stabilize and improve situations in the
wake of catastrophic events. All DOD support is provided at the
direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense and in
accordance with the National Response Plan and applicable laws.
In the past year, we have supported the President's State
of the Union Address, the United Nations 60th General Assembly,
National Interagency Fire Center, combating wildfires in
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, and many other States in the
western United States. We have supported Customs and Border
Protection--just to name a few.
In 2005, we supported the DHS in four hurricanes, including
the unprecedented response to Hurricane Katrina. We continue to
support law enforcement in combating illegal drugs and other
transnational threats. Federal laws and policies allow us to
assist law enforcement agencies in conducting their mission and
securing our borders. All DOD involvement in border security
operations is solely in support of civilian law enforcement
agencies.
We actively coordinate with other agencies, including the
DHS and the National Guard, to develop stronger working
relationships with State, regional, local, and international
partners. We will never operate alone. We know this. In
everything we do--planning, exercising, conducting realworld
operations--we continue to improve our ability to support civil
authorities in responding to disasters, while never losing
focus of our primary mission, which is defending our Homeland.
Our enemies should make no mistake about our resolve or our
capabilities.
We thank the members of this committee for their steadfast
support to our men and women in uniform, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Inge follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Joseph R. Inge, USA
Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, and members of the subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss homeland defense and civil
support operations.
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is responsible for homeland
defense, sustaining continuous situational awareness and readiness to
protect the United States against a range of symmetric and asymmetric
threats in all domains. Day-to-day, we are focused on deterring,
preventing and defeating attacks against our Homeland. We also stand
ready to assist primary agencies in responding quickly to manmade and
natural disasters, when directed by the President or Secretary of
Defense. To better serve Americans in their time of need, we are
actively coordinating with other Federal agencies and developing
stronger working relationships with State and local partners.
NORTHCOM conducts maritime operations to deter terrorist operations
and prevent attacks against the United States and its allies. During
the past year, we analyzed and disseminated to government leaders
information on the global maritime environment to facilitate
situational awareness and decision making. NORTHCOM pursued and
effectively garnered national and international support and
strengthened partnerships to deter and disrupt terrorist activity. We
also monitored threats of interest in the global maritime environment.
For land domain operations, NORTHCOM postures and positions forces
to deter and prevent attacks. Quick and rapid response forces and
consequence management forces are maintained at appropriate alert
levels to meet potential threats. During the 2004 national election
period, we provided assistance for border security, conducted airport
vulnerability assessments, and deployed forces trained for radiological
detection at the request of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the direction of the Department of Defense (DOD).
our Homeland is protected from air threats primarily by the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORTHCOM and NORAD work
closely together in defending our Nation's airspace. Across the United
States and Canada, armed fighters are on alert and flying irregular air
patrols to identify and intercept suspect aircraft. Since September 11,
2001, as part of Operation Noble Eagle, NORAD has flown more than
42,000 accident-free sorties and scrambled or diverted fighters more
than 2,000 times in response to potential asymmetric threats. In
addition, NORAD remains postured to defend against strategic airborne
threats to the United States and Canada. NORTHCOM is responsible for
air operations within our area of responsibility such as evacuation and
movement of people and high-value cargo via military airlift. In
addition, NORTHCOM has the capability to use NORAD air defense alert
aircraft to conduct unilateral operations as required and directed.
The DOD has a long history of supporting civil authorities with
specialized skills and assets that can rapidly stabilize and improve
the situation in the wake of catastrophic events. All requested DOD
support is provided at the direction of the President or Secretary of
Defense and in accordance with the National Response Plan and
applicable laws, including the Stafford Act and the Economy Act.
NORTHCOM provides defense support of civil authorities primarily
through our subordinate commands Joint Task Force Civil Support at Fort
Monroe, Virginia; Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region at
Fort McNair, Washington DC; Joint Task Force Alaska at Elmendorf Air
Force Base, Alaska and Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) at Fort Bliss,
Texas. In addition, the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps have
established dedicated Service Components for NORTHCOM. These commands
include: Army North located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Air Force North
located at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, and Marine Forces North
located in New Orleans, Louisiana. The Commander Fleet Forces Command,
located at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, is designated as the Navy's
Supporting Commander to NORTHCOM.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigns the Secretary of Homeland
Security the responsibility for security of our Nation's borders.
NORTHCOM's role in the border security mission is to provide support to
civil authorities, principally the DHS. We provide such support under
chapter 18 of title 10. When Customs and Border Protection requests the
military's support, the Office of the Secretary of Defense evaluates
their request, and as directed, NORTHCOM provides the necessary
support. NORTHCOM's involvement in border security operations is always
in support of civilian law enforcement agencies. Coordinated by JTF-N,
our force providers continue to support law enforcement agencies in the
war against illegal drugs and other transnational threats through the
application of emerging DOD-unique technologies. This includes
intelligence and operational support missions. Intelligence support
includes employing military intelligence analysts to develop
operational intelligence products that we can share with our
interagency partners for their use in early cuing, warning, and
interdiction operations. Operational support includes detection
missions using a variety of sensors that are unique to the DOD in order
to improve a supported law enforcement agency's ability to detect,
monitor and interdict transnational threats. Construction of roads,
bridges and fences, as well as installing area lighting to improve the
ability of law enforcement officers to move, identify and respond to
threats crossing the border are also a part of this mission category.
In addition to assisting the law enforcement agencies that request
such support, JTF-North's intelligence and operational support missions
provide military training opportunities for the title 10 and National
Guard Forces that conduct them. JTF-North recruits units to volunteer
for these missions by soliciting forces from all Services, both Active
and Reserve components. Through JTF-N, NORTHCOM employed unmanned
aerial systems along the southwest border in support of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection. While obtaining unmanned aerial system training,
these flights greatly assisted in the detection and apprehension of
those engaged in illegal drug trafficking in New Mexico and Arizona.
During 2005, NORTHCOM supported DHS in responding to four
hurricanes. For Hurricane Katrina, we established Joint Task Force
Katrina to oversee title 10 operations for the most complex civil
support mission in the history of the U.S. military. DOD provided
Defense Coordinating Officers and Elements, DOD bases for mobilization
centers, airlift, ground transportation assets, aerial damage
assessment, satellite communications, airborne and waterborne search
and rescue, subsistence, water purification, mosquito abatement and
medical support. We are actively involved in efforts to compile lessons
learned and incorporate them into future operations. One very important
lesson we learned pertains to unity of effort and unity of command.
NORTHCOM was in charge of 22,500 Active-Duty Forces. Additionally,
there were 50,000 National Guardsmen in state status (title 32 and
state Active-Duty). Commanding and directing 22,500 Active-Duty Forces
and coordinating with the National Guard the efforts of over 50,000
state status National Guard troops presented challenges. We embrace the
fact that the National Guard will play a pivotal role in disasters.
However, the Nation should have the capability to effect unity of
effort among Active-Duty Forces and state status National Guard Forces
when assembling and directing a large-scale, multi-state and
international response to a catastrophic event. We are prepared to
respond as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.
Another lesson learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina
relates to communications. We need immediate, reliable communications
that are survivable, flexible and interoperable with our civilian
partners. These communications must be mobile, secure and both voice
and data capable.
As we act to support civil authorities in responding to natural
disasters, we never lose focus on our primary mission of homeland
defense. We thank the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee
for their unwavering support of NORAD and NORTHCOM. We are grateful for
all that you have done to ensure our men and women in uniform have the
tools they need to keep our Nation and the American people safe and
free. Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, General Inge.
General Blum, we would be glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF LTG H. STEVEN BLUM, USA, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD
BUREAU
General Blum. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thanks for the opportunity to appear here
today and talk about your National Guard and its role in
homeland defense in support of homeland security, as well as
the great job we do overseas when we're called into Federal
service.
The Army and the Air National Guard this past year have had
a very historic year. We had more people overseas than at any
other time since World War II. We made up over 50 percent of
the Army's combat formations in Iraq. We're training the Afghan
national army, keeping the peace in the Sinai, maintaining the
peace in the Balkans, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and sending citizen
airmen and soldiers to 40 other nations in the global war on
terrorism. At the same time, we had our busiest year ever in
terms of military response to natural disasters.
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma were not the only
things the National Guard did last year. We were called out for
several hundred local- and State-level emergencies brought on
by either industrial accidents, civil unrest, critical
infrastructure protection, or the effects--the weather patterns
that affected the States of our great Nation.
We are leveraging existing combat capabilities and
technologies that we use to fight the war. We are a full-
spectrum force, and we apply those same skill sets, experience,
knowledge, and technologies here at home when we're called out
either by the Governors or the President to execute our duties.
Your National Guard has 10 essential core elements that we
feel are necessary to be able to do homeland defense or
homeland readiness indicators, as we call them. They fall into
the categories of aviation, engineering, civil support teams,
security forces, medical, transportation, maintenance,
logistics, and, of course, what we used to call command and
control (C2), or we do call command and control everywhere else
in the world, but here at home, I think C2 takes a different
definition. It's not really C2 we're talking about. We're
talking about communications and coordination. So, we have a
Joint Force Headquarters in every single State and Territory
that is superbly able to do that, not only with military forces
of all the Services, but with the interagency and the
intergovernmental response that was required for the State or
the region or the Nation.
Last, and not least--in fact, almost most important--are
communications. We are leveraging all of these capabilities,
and have established certain protocols, organizations, and
capabilities as gap fillers. They are not to take the place of
existing title 10 organizations, they are to fill the gap, the
capabilities gap, that exists in the early hours of an incident
while we are discovering what we are facing and when the
American people expect their first military responders to
probably be their local National Guard units.
So, what we have done is, we've set up a Joint Force
Headquarters in every State and Territory. We've set up a Joint
Operations Center that has 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week, 365-day
operational coverage, so that we can basically provide a shared
awareness with all of those interagency, intergovernmental
partners, and military partners, on the Active-Duty side,
such--particularly noteworthy is NORTHCOM--so that we have a
shared awareness of what's going on and a better idea of how
we're going to work together to solve the problem.
We have, of course, the Civil Support Teams that Congress
has authorized. They are moving out, and have proven their
worth. We sent--I think it was 17, total, responded to
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. What they brought, that
communications van that is embedded in that Civil Support Team,
proved to be invaluable, because it was one of the few systems
that would connect the DOD communications technology with the
civilian first-response community's technologies and
communications capabilities.
In addition, we have stood up what we call CERFPs, which
are Chem-Bio Response Force Packages. We have 12 of those. Now,
with Congress's assistance and direction, we will stand five
more up, so we'll have a total of 17. They are arrayed all over
the United States, so that no region of the United States is
left uncovered.
We have something called a Joint Continental United States
Communications Support Environment, which is a lot of words
that actually mean we take all of the existing technologies in
the Air Force and the Army that are resident in the National
Guard, and we optimize them so that they can be most useful in
feeding situational awareness in a common relative operating
picture to NORTHCOM and PACOM in Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam, and
that we're able to pass information in a secure method or a
nonsecure method, to include video teleconferencing (VTC), so
that everybody really knows what actually is occurring and what
needs to be done in any catastrophe.
I think what I'll do, in the interest of time, is shorten
my statement and give you more time for questions, and close in
saying that the successful integration of the interagency and
intergovernmental, and the civilian and the military
organizations, are absolutely essential in any disaster that
ever befalls this Nation. The National Guard has a 368-year
history of being able to do that quite well. We have a great
deal of pride in how well we respond, but we recognize we could
do better.
Senator Reed is exactly right, no military organization is
ever satisfied with its performance. There are several areas we
could improve. They are listed in my report. But mostly they
revolve around resourcing, equipment, training and exercising,
and planning so that we can be better prepared next time than
we even were the last time.
Thank you very much for the opportunity. I await your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Blum follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG H. Steven Blum, USA
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the
National Guard's role in homeland defense. In addition to the overseas
fight, you can rest assured, the National Guard stands ready to protect
the Homeland and provide military assets to assist civilian authorities
at the request of the Governors or the President, through a rapid,
integrated response across the Nation. Geographical distribution,
community integration, and other traditional strengths make the
National Guard an effective and cost efficient force for many homeland
defense (HLD) and civil support requirements at both the State and
Federal levels. In preparing for these missions, the National Guard has
examined the emerging threats and searched for capability gaps we must
overcome to be successful. I want to stress meeting these needs does
not demand a dedicated HLD force structure, rather, they can be
addressed through enhanced capabilities for existing warfighting force
structure.
The National Guard is a balanced force which operates across the
full spectrum of military engagement from close order combat to
military support to civil authorities. Training and preparation for the
overseas warfighting mission provides National Guard Forces with the
vast majority of the preparation required for HLD and civil support.
These requirements do not focus solely on material solutions; they also
identify needed cultural changes--specifically regarding coordination
and unity of effort across multiple agencies and intergovernmental
seams. The emphasis of our homeland defense mission is on prevention,
pre-event deterrence, and responding within hours after a major
incident.
As I'll discuss in a moment, the National Guard's response to
homeland defense since September 11, and more recently during Hurricane
Katrina has been tremendous. Still, there is room for improvement.
Capability and synchronization gaps between local first responders and
follow-on State and Federal forces exist and must be addressed to
ensure a fully secure America. In June 2005, the Department of Defense
(DOD) published the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
followed shortly in August by Joint Publication 3-26 Homeland Security.
This document emphasizes the need to ``Lead, Support, and Enable'' by
executing missions to prevent and repel attacks; working with civil
authorities as part of a national response to attack or disaster; and
sharing expertise with domestic as well as our international partners.
This broad homeland security direction on Homeland Defense and Civil
Support (HLD/CS) focuses reliance upon National Guard capabilities
within an active, layered defense strategy for the United States.
HLD is mission one for the National Guard. Governors count on the
National Guard to be the first military responder and call on Guard
assets at their disposal within the first hours of an event, which
makes resourcing critical. The National Guard must be able to support
the Governors' requirements on an immediate basis, and respond with the
right capabilities, to the right location, at the right time. The
States have indicated to the National Guard Bureau that there are
certain capabilities they feel they need to meet emergencies. At the
National Guard Bureau we express these in the following list of 10
essential capabilities each State, Territory, and the District of
Columbia must maintain at all times: (1) Aviation, (2) Engineering, (3)
Civil Support Teams, (4) Security, (5) Medical, (6) Transportation, (7)
Maintenance, (8) Logistics, (9) Joint Force Headquarters, and (10)
Communications.
We are seeking to further leverage the capacity currently existing
in these 10 essential capabilities to address identified gaps through
the development of the following initiatives and concepts.
(1) Joint Force Headquarters-State (JFHQ-State). JFHQ-State
is a joint command and control entity in each State and
Territory. It is integrated into national consequence
management and contingency planning structures. JFHQs provide
situational updates (common operating picture) information to
national level headquarters before and during any contingency
operation and Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward Movements,
and Integration for all inbound military forces. Federal law
provides a mechanism whereby a National Guard officer can
command Federal troops. Such a commander at the head of a Joint
Task Force-State (JTF-State) can assume tactical control of all
military units--State National Guard, other National Guard
Forces, Active component and Reserves. JTF-State commander can
be a dual-hatted commander of both title 32 and title 10 forces
as demonstrated in the 2004 G8 Summit, Democratic and
Republican National Conventions.
(2) Joint Force Headquarters Joint Operations Centers (JFHQ
JOC). The JOC is a network composed of the National Guard
Bureau JOC and a JOC in the 54 States and Territories. JFHQ JOC
serves as the primary entity for coordinating, facilitating,
and synchronizing efforts in support of their states,
information requirements of National Guard Bureau and customers
at the Federal level during natural disasters, National Special
Security Events (NSSE), exercises and domestic activities. Each
JFHQ JOC has redundant connectivity: DOD architecture of NIPR
and SPIR; a High Frequency (HF) network with classified and
unclassified voice and data information; and commercial
systems.
(3) National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological/
Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response
Force Package (NG CERFP). The National Guard developed and
fielded 12 NG CERFP teams to provide a regional capability to
respond to incidents involving chemical, biological,
radiological or high explosive threats. Each team is designed
to rapidly (less than 96 hours) provide the capability to
locate and extract victims from a CBRNE incident site and
perform mass patient/casualty decontamination and medical
triage and stabilization. The CERFP augments the capabilities
of the Civil Support Teams (CST). The incremental training and
equipment for this capability is specialized, compatible with
the first responders, and interoperable with the incident
command system. Congress provided direction and, for fiscal
year 2006, funding to establish an additional 5 teams bringing
the total to 17.
(4) Critical Infrastructure Program-Mission Assurance
Assessments (CIP-MAA). National Guard CIP-MAA teams--formerly
referred to as Full-Spectrum Vulnerability Assessment teams--
execute the pre-planning needed to educate the civilian
agencies on basic force protection and emergency response.
Additionally, these teams are building relationships with first
responders, owners of critical infrastructure and National
Guard planners in the States and Territories. CIP-MAA teams
deploy traditional National Guard Forces in a timely fashion to
assist in protection of the Nation's critical infrastructure,
including vital elements of the Defense Industrial Base.
Currently, 6 ``pilot'' teams staffed by 14 specially trained
National Guard personnel conduct vulnerability assessments.
(5) National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF). Being based in so
many communities, the National Guard has proven time and again
that it can muster forces and be on the scene of an incident
within hours. Each of the 54 States and Territories is
currently training a battalion size reaction force that can
respond anywhere in the state with an initial 75 to 125 person
element within a minimum of 4 to 8 hours. So, generally, we can
get a company of troops on the ground within hours and a
battalion in place overnight. These reaction forces provided
crucial support to law enforcement in the response to Hurricane
Katrina. The NGRF is task-organized from existing units and can
provide Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), site
security, and security and support during CBRNE contingency
operations.
(6) Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment (JCCSE).
The National Guard has successfully established a JCCSE
nationwide. Each JFHQ established Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN) linkages. The HSIN is an unsecured collection of
Department of Homeland Security systems designed to facilitate
information sharing and collaboration. Additionally, each Joint
Force Joint Operation Center (JF JOC) has secure/non-secure
real-time operational network linkages in addition to secure
video teleconference capabilities. This is critical to
providing real time operational connectivity as well as a
common operating picture to local, State, and Federal agencies.
(7) Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-
CSTs). Include 22 Army and Air National Guard-Active Guard
Reserve (AGR) personnel organized, trained, and equipped to
enter contaminated areas and identify contaminants within a
short period of time. They have extensive reach-back
communications capability to facilitate off-site evaluation and
support from various laboratories. They are equipped with
mobile laboratories capable of providing identification of
chemical or biological materials. To date, the National Guard
has fielded 36 CSTs and will have 55 teams by fiscal year 2007.
(8) Aviation Security and Support (S&S) Battalions. As part
of the Army's overall aviation transformation, the Army
National Guard has been able to convert and grow some valuable
dual-purpose aviation structure that will be readily available
and responsive to homeland security/defense needs, in addition
to their normal Army operational mission. The ARNG officially
activated 6of these 24-aircraft S&S Battalions on October 1,
2005, and placed them in readily responsive locations across 44
States.
We are, once again, on point to test many of these measures as we
are fast approaching another hurricane season. In this post-Katrina era
we find that the best preparation for the next potential disaster is
history.
With that said, I am particularly proud of the timeliness and
magnitude of the National Guard's efforts in advance of Hurricane
Katrina and our response in its immediate aftermath. National Guard
Forces were in the water and on the streets of New Orleans rescuing
people within 4 hours of Katrina's passing. Over 50,000 National Guard
personnel hailing from every State and Territory responded to calls for
support of the affected region.
This response was phenomenal; however, it is the ``lessons
learned'' from Katrina that require--in fact, demand--our immediate
attention. Through conversations with troops on the ground, commanders,
Senate and House hearings, and most recently the White House's February
report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,
released by Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, the National Guard has three major issue
areas that need to be addressed--resourcing, interoperability, command
and control of all military forces, and training.
resourcing
Even prior to September 11, the National Guard did not have all of
the equipment it is required to have. The pace of combat has placed
even further challenges on us. In order to ensure that deploying units
are fully equipped and ready to support operations anywhere in the
world, we have transferred over 101,000 items of equipment in support
of these missions. This situation has presented the National Guard with
challenges in keeping our inventories here at home fully supplied with
critical items such as trucks, radios, and heavy engineering equipment.
With the help of Congress and the President, we have made an excellent
start in filling these equipment gaps, and the President's budget will
allow the National Guard to continue on the road to recovery. Over the
fiscal years 2006-2011 timeframe, the administration plans to invest
$19.2 billion and $4.4 billion in the Army and Air National Guard,
respectively, demonstrating an unwavering commitment to providing the
resources necessary to protect our Homeland.
We are also addressing this through force structure rebalancing and
the use the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) as an
essential force multiplier. This agreement among the States enhances a
Governor's response capabilities by providing access to regional forces
and equipment. Without question, EMAC enabled the National Guard to
overcome many of the equipment/resource obstacles faced during
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The National Guard Bureau Joint Operations
Center (NGB JOC) served as the coordination point for the various EMAC
requests before sending the requests out to the states and territories.
We provided needed advice and assistance to Governors in identifying,
selecting, requesting and deploying Guard forces needed in the affected
states.
Maintaining essential capabilities across the National Guard, amid
ongoing overseas operations, Active component/Reserve component
rebalance, modularity conversions, and National Strategy adjustments is
an evolving task. Nevertheless, the National Guard Bureau attempts to
synchronize all of these activities to ensure at least 50 percent of a
given State's National Guard is always available for State missions,
and HLD operations.
interoperability
The recently released White House report, The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned spoke to the need for
interoperability. It said, ``lack of interoperable communications was
apparent at the tactical level, resulting from the fact that emergency
responders, National Guard, and Active-Duty military use different
equipment.'' As for the National Guard Forces, the first 48 hours after
the hurricane made landfall saw the Guard literally using boats and
helicopters to communicate. Our specialized command, control,
cummunications, and computers packages, though limited in number, were
able to bridge the frequency gap between military and civilian
personnel in many locations. An in-depth look at interoperability is
ongoing and there is a ``sense of urgency'' inside the Army and the DOD
about meeting the National Guard's equipment needs.
command and control
The infusion of the Active-Duty Forces into the Hurricane Katrina
response effort presented some challenges at the operational level.
There were some gaps in communication, coordination and integration
into ongoing National Guard and emergency response operations already
underway by the affected States. The situation was occasionally
exacerbated by incompatible communication systems, lack of familiarity
with the local area, and lack of involvement in the pre-hurricane
planning.
The efficacy of the creation of the Joint Forces Headquarters-State
was proven in the National Guard portion of the response as both of the
affected states were able to integrate forces from 53 other States and
Territories and the District of Columbia. Further, the Joint Forces
Headquarters-State could have provided reception, staging, and onward
integration for the Federal forces deployed by NORTHCOM to support the
civil authorities in the affected States.
In addition to the benefits of JFHQ-State I've already discussed, a
Joint Task Force-State (JTF-State) can, with State-Federal concurrence,
assume tactical control of all military units ordered to respond to a
contingency operation or disaster. This includes all State National
Guard, other National Guard Forces, Active component as well as
Reserves. The JTF-State commander can be a dual-hatted commander of
both title 32 and title 10 forces giving unity of command within the
military forces. The JTF-State can act as a subordinate C\2\
headquarters for NORTHCOM if required. The effectiveness of dual-hatted
command was proven in 2004 at the G8 Summit, Operation Winter Freeze as
well as the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. These were
landmark achievements. For the first time in our Nation's history, the
military attained unity of command for all forces operating in support
of a major event. In each case, from one Joint Force Headquarters, a
single National Guard officer commanded Guard units from multiple
states operating under title 32 authority, as well as Active component
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps title 10 forces in a joint,
intergovernmental, interagency environment.
training
I'd like to transition into training and the National Guard's
determination to take advantage of opportunities to share training and
planning expertise with civilian partners and the importance that these
efforts be institutionalized. The above-mentioned White House report
recommended that each Federal agency a homeland security professional
development program. We are pleased to say that we are already heading
in that direction. The National Guard's Joint Interagency Training
Center in West Virginia, serves as a model that demonstrates how joint
training capacity can be expanded and how the military and civilian
communities can train and work together. We are working with the Joint
Forces Command to institutionalize this Center within the Departments
process for joint education and training. This will allow us to
increase the overall effectiveness of the national effort through
standardized operational concepts, shared experiences, and enhanced
interoperability.
These four areas of concern--resourcing for personnel and
equipment, interoperability, command and control of all military
forces, and training--must be addressed as they are crucial to ensuring
an effective response for HLD and civil support. Identifying and
correcting these concerns will only improve the National Guard's
already high state of readiness in supporting HLD as training received
to support our other mission, overseas warfight, provides the vast
majority of preparation required for HLD.
The successful integration of civilian and military cultures and
capabilities has long been one of the strengths of the National Guard.
Our members live in both worlds. Our forces operate in both worlds. We
are proud to be able to bring these communities, cultures and
capabilities together and render to our fellow citizens essential help
when it is needed most.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, General Blum. We
appreciate your testimony.
All of your written statements will be made part of the
record, without objection, in addition to the summaries that
you've given us orally.
We'll proceed with a round of questions now. We're glad to
have Senator Thune join us, and I understand Senator Levin may
well join us. Of course, we're being televised. We don't know
who else is watching, but there's a lot of interest in what you
have to say, and let me start off with some questions.
First of all, I appreciate each of your efforts to help us
understand, a little bit better, about how all of our national
assets, whether they be designated civilian and under the
purview of the DHS, or military and under the purview of the
DOD, can be used to protect the American people.
Just a little bit of a background for you. I think I've
mentioned this to Secretary McHale. I also happen to serve as
the subcommittee chairman on the Immigration and Border
Security Subcommittee in the Judiciary Committee. Of course,
there's a lot of concern in America today about our border
security and just how we ought to deal with that. A lot of
people have a lot of different ideas. You've heard, like I
have, people have said, ``Well, there ought to be a role for
our military in border security.'' I appreciate the legal and
the policy reasons why our civilian agencies take the primary
law enforcement role, Posse Comitatus, for example, and
obviously the other obligations our men and women in uniform
have elsewhere around the world.
I guess it's really a tremendous compliment to our military
and to our civilian leadership that people hold you up as the
gold standard when it comes to professionalism and competence.
When they see that gold standard compared to other agencies of
the Federal Government, they usually find those other agencies
tend to pale somewhat in comparison. So, I guess it's a
backhanded compliment, but we need to also understand better
how those roles interact.
If I can just mention an example: certainly, as Secretary
McHale mentioned, in the DOD authorization of 2004 it indicated
and directed a role of the joint task forces in counterdrug
missions, but it also included counterterrorism missions.
Obviously one concern we have about our border is its--how it
can be exploited to--by terrorists who want to exploit the
porosity of our borders.
Another example I will mention to you, recently I was down
at the Corpus Christi Naval Air Station and looked at the
operation of the Customs and Border Patrol Air and Marine
Division down there, that operates the P-3s, the aircraft with
the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) type setup on
the top, that's designed to protect both our airspace and the
sea lanes from drug traffickers. Unfortunately, all of the P-3s
in Corpus Christi are now grounded, because they're 40-year-old
aircraft and they have serious maintenance problems, leaving
us, I think, in a very bad way.
So, as I'm trying to prepare the context for you, I want to
make sure that we're in a position to reassure the American
people that we are using all of the assets, both in personnel
and technology, and of every category, to keep them safe and to
make sure that those are working in a smooth, hopefully as
seamless a way as possible.
Perhaps it would be good to start with you, Secretary
McHale. Could you explain, in a summary fashion, how you
believe that the DOD, including NORTHCOM, are operating today,
in terms of its cooperation and communication with the DHS when
it comes to border security?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir, I can.
The domestic responsibilities of the DOD essentially fall
into two categories. As I indicated in my opening statement, we
have the warfighting responsibility to use military power to
defend the United States against a foreign threat, whether that
threat would be a nation-state or a transnational terrorist
group. Our primary emphasis has been on the need to identify,
interdict, and defeat any such attack upon the United States
that would involve a WMD.
If you look at the NORTHCOM mission statement, the first
half the mission statement addresses that warfighting
responsibility. Where we're not in support, we have the lead
for the warfighting defense of the United States.
If you look at the second half of the NORTHCOM mission
statement, it deals with civil support missions, including
missions of the type that you describe. Now, the most recent
and prominent, obviously, is the military response to Hurricane
Katrina. We were not in the lead. DHS was in the lead. FEMA was
the operating entity of DHS. The activities that we executed
with 72,000 men and women forward deployed were all in support
of FEMA, while FEMA and DHS retained the lead.
As I indicated, we average probably 90 to 100 civil support
missions each year. Last year, because of Katrina, we went well
beyond that. Among the civil support missions are the border
support missions to assist civilian law enforcement in
maintaining our border security. Again, we don't take the lead.
Border security is a law enforcement mission. But, under a
variety of authorities, including the statutory authority,
Senator, that you referenced, we can, and we do, assist the
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) in their paramount law
enforcement role to secure the border.
So, for instance, we do provide technical assistance, we
provide robust surveillance capabilities in counternarcotics
missions, and, in what is a new statutory mission, we are
permitted to provide counterterrorism, as well as
counternarcotics, support to CBP and other civilian law
enforcement agencies--not to take their place, but to better
enable those civilian law enforcement authorities to secure the
border, both in the context of counternarcotics and, more
recently, in the context of counterterrorism.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
General Inge, NORTHCOM, of course, is the command that has
responsibility for homeland defense. Could you tell us how many
dedicated forces that NORTHCOM has to its support mission for
the DHS?
General Inge. Thank you, Senator.
First of all, with regard to the DHS, we work very closely
with them, and we've had very close ties, very good engagement.
On a day-to-day basis, if there is not a mission assigned, we
have JTF North, which is planning headquarters, that would
coordinate efforts with the CBP, for example. When a mission is
requested, forces are then allocated to JTF North to accomplish
that mission. So, it depends on the day, and it depends on the
mission, and it depends on the support request, is the short
answer to your question.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. So, do I understand----
General Inge. There are no standing forces that are
dedicated specifically to doing border support unless there is
a mission request.
Senator Cornyn. All right.
As far as leveraging and sharing of technology, Secretary
McHale, the National Response Plan and the Department of
Defense Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states
that the DOD, as you mentioned, will facilitate and nurture
collaborate research, and ensure, as applicable, for the smooth
transition of appropriate technologies and capabilities to the
civilian sector. What DOD technologies and capabilities are
currently being leveraged by, or shared with, the DHS? If you
could provide us, if possible, the specific examples where the
sharing of technology or the transfer of technology or resident
DOD capability assist the DHS in their homeland security and
border defense mission, I would appreciate it.
Mr. McHale. Senator, if I may answer it a little bit more
broadly than perhaps the way you phrased it in the question,
I'll give you an example of some of the technologies which are
applicable to border security, but not exclusively to border
security.
We have a statutory duty, under the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2003, section 1401, to transfer dual-use
technologies from DOD to our civilian interagency partners,
most especially DHS. As some specific examples, there are areas
where we have developed technology to support us in overseas
warfighting, where that technology may have a domestic
application, depending upon the nature of the threat. As an
example, we've had the responsibility now for many decades to
be prepared to execute our military mission overseas in a WMD-
contaminated environment. So we have protective equipment, we
have WMD CBRNE sensor capabilities that have allowed us to
prepare for war in an overseas fight where the environment has
been contaminated by WMD. Unfortunately, but the reality is,
much of that technology could potentially have a domestic use
if we were to be attacked by terrorists utilizing WMD. So, we
share that information and technology with the DHS, so not only
the DOD, but first-responders and others, will have access to
personal protective equipment, sensor capabilities, and other
WMD-related technology to better enable the civilian mission.
A specific example of technology sharing was cited by
General Blum a couple of minutes ago, and that is, one of the
major challenges we have is that when first-responders,
emergency management personnel, including Federal Emergency
Management personnel, the National Guard, and Active-Duty
military forces, show up in the same area of responsibility, we
all bring different communications equipment. A police officer
from a city does not carry the same radio as an officer in the
United States military, even differentiating between the
National Guard and Active-Duty. We have to knit those
capabilities together.
General Blum made reference to the Customer Service Team
(CST) vans provided to the National Guard by the DOD, where
there's a patch capability. You can take a police officer's
radio, put it through a central switchboard that we have
designed, and it will be seamlessly connected to a title 10
radio that is very different in infrastructure, on a completely
different frequency, a wholly different design, yet these two
pieces of equipment, when patched through that central
switchboard contained within that CST van, will allow for
interoperability of communications.
In addition, in certain other areas, ground surveillance
capabilities, sensors that have been deployed along the border,
aerial observation platforms, Predators that we have made
available to DHS for border security, tunnel detection
capabilities, there are numerous areas that are leveraged by
technology where we have developed that technology for one
purpose, but make it available to DHS for domestic employment.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
I'm going to turn it over to Senator Reed. But let me just
note, and ask for confirmation by General Inge, with regard to
interoperable communications--I note, General Inge, that
NORTHCOM has provided a list of unfunded requirements that have
not been addressed in the budget submitted by the DOD. The top
two items include the need for, number one, interoperable
communications, for $10 million, and, number two, $5.6 million
for Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative. It's a
straightforward question, but obviously you don't have what you
need now in order to undertake those interoperable
communications, I take it.
General Inge. Hurricane Katrina taught us that
establishing, immediately after a disaster, interoperable
communications that would be commercial-backbone-like, is
critical to the success in an immediate response to the Nation,
and that capability is not in place today.
Senator Cornyn. I hope this subcommittee, and this
committee, can help you get what you need in order to get that
done. It seems like a no-brainer.
General Inge. Thank you, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me join the chairman in recognizing General
Rodriguez, the technical assessment group (TAG) of the Texas
National Guard. General Blum and all the TAGs have done an
extraordinary job, in terms of not only responding to domestic
crises, but deploying overseas in support of our operations.
I'm very proud of my Rhode Island National Guard. So, I thank
you, General Rodriguez, for your service.
Mr. Secretary and General Inge, during Hurricane Katrina
there were essentially two military chains of command. There
was a National Guard chain of command and there was a title 10
chain of command under General Honore. At any time, did the
White House ask for your advice about unity of command, a
different command structure, during the pendency of the crisis?
Mr. McHale. Senator, when you phrase the question, ``the
White House,'' that's pretty broad. I think I can answer your
question directly by saying that I did provide recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense, recommendations that he then
considered to inform him in any recommendations that he might
make to the President of the United States. I did have
discussions on that point with Secretary Rumsfeld.
Senator Reed. Was your recommendation, Mr. Secretary, a
unified command for all forces, or----
Let me step away from the history. Going forward, what we
know now, how will we approach the command structure, when you
essentially had two chains of command, which, I would assume,
violates the fundamental principle of unity of command?
Mr. McHale. It does violate the fundamental principle of
unity of command, it does reflect the Constitution of the
United States. We have a conflict between what you and I would
want to achieve in terms of unity of command for operational
purposes and the system of government, thank God, that we live
under, which is Federal in character, but assigns to the
President of the United States Federal C\2\ responsibilities,
and preserves, for the Governor, within the Governor's sphere
of responsibility, C\2\ over what historically was called the
State militia, today known as the National Guard. So, the
division in the command structure is a direct reflection of our
Federal system of government. Although there is the ability, by
statute, to achieve unity of command over both Active-Duty and
National Guard Forces, the invocation of the Insurrection Act
and the federalization of the National Guard are two steps
that, historically speaking, are seen as sobering decisions,
and not readily undertaken, unless there is clear reason to do
so.
So, with that as context, the Constitution sets up two
chains of command, so either we achieve, through very detailed
advanced planning, close coordination between the National
Guard and title 10 forces, recognizing that we don't have unity
of command, but that we can achieve unity of effort through
that close coordination in advance, not during, a crisis, or,
in the alternative, failing that kind of coordination, which
did work between General Honore and General Landreneau, the
title 10 commander and the National Guard TAG, if coordination
fails, then we do have the statutory option, the President has
the authority to federalize the Guard, move the Guard from
title 32 status to title 10, and have true, not only unity of
effort, but unity of command.
But I don't think--well, I'm sure--in the past 50 years,
since the days of the civil rights movement, no Governor has
been stripped, by statute, of that command authority over the
National Guard involuntarily. Only once or twice has it been
done, with the consent of the Governor; most recently, in 1992,
with the Los Angeles riots.
But, bottom line, it is a sobering decision to take that
command authority away from a Governor. In most cases, the
purpose is to achieve--the purpose should be to achieve unity
of effort, even in the absence of unity of command.
Senator Reed. Your comments are well taken, Mr. Secretary,
but I think what you've said is that we are working now much
more explicitly and consciously on the problems of unifying the
effort.
Mr. McHale. Yes.
Senator Reed. But, it has to be an ongoing basis.
Mr. McHale. Yes.
Senator Reed. It has to be part of our mindset, and also
what we exercise, I presume, that, as we----
Mr. McHale. Absolutely correct----
Senator Reed.--look at these----
Mr. McHale.--on all points. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Also, I would assume, given the magnitude of
Hurricane Katrina, and perhaps the magnitude of another natural
or, unfortunately, manmade crisis, that one of the first issues
will be assessing whether this unity effort is taking place,
and, if not, going to that very difficult judgment about
whether there has to be a decision by the Executive to unify
the command. Is that fair?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir, that's a completely accurate summary.
I think it's important that we keep it in the context that
I described earlier, and that is, for those of us who come out
of a military background, and who quickly recognize that having
dual command authority is not what is most operationally
efficient, that we understand why that is. It's the
Constitution of the United States. It's the recognized
authorities, both of the National Government and the State
governments, creating a dual chain of command. We should not
simply look at it from a military perspective and assume that
unity of effort requires unity of command. That, I think, would
violate some basic principles of federalism. We retain that
option, when required, but we should not lightly execute it.
When possible, we should preserve the command authorities
of a Governor, certainly command--respect the constitutional
authorities of the President of the United States. While
recognizing two distinct chains of command through close
coordination, deliberate staff planning, detailed anticipation
of the mission requirements, and rigorous exercises to test
that, we should preserve the two chains of command, while
insisting upon unity of effort through coordination.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Let me turn to a question that was alluded to, I think, in
your comments, Secretary McHale. It is situational awareness;
it was very poor. It was poor for the National Guard. It was
poor for NORTHCOM. That's the conclusion of the White House
report. Poor for practically all the participants, days into
the crisis. First, I don't think you will argue with that
premise, but, if you do, let me know. But I'd like to ask all
of you, what are you doing to improve the situational awareness
in another incident like Hurricane Katrina? Perhaps, General
Blum, you might start in terms of the National Guard.
General Blum. It's a bottom-up build, which is probably a
good way to do it. That's the way the National Response Plan is
built, anyway. So, the first responsibility for establishing
this situational awareness or this information feed so that
someone would know what is going on and then be able to
determine what needs to be done, based on what's being done and
what's unable to be done in the local area, is very important.
To take an event where you lose all of your existing normal
lines of communication--your television, radio, cell phones,
hardwired phones, fax machines, e-mail--all of those things,
electricity is gone. So, you have to--you have to--we have to
worst-case it. In the past, we did not. We did not, as much as
we should have. None of us.
So, now we are planning for catastrophic events. How do you
establish those critical communications in the early moments so
that you can gain the situation awareness, so you know what is
going on, so that you can tell others what is going on, so they
know what to anticipate to be ready to do next, because--so
they know what they don't have to do, because they're aware of
what is happening.
So we're setting up communications that are flyaway
packages, pre-positioned packages, and we've come to Congress
and submitted a requirement, and they have been very good, and
they've given the Army National Guard $700 million. I am
working with the United States Army for an accelerated
purchase. The hurricane season will be on us in 5 months. We
should start seeing hurricanes as early as June. They don't
always wait until the fall. So, we have to be ready. The United
States Army is doing an accelerated purchase for mostly
satellite communications that is not reliant on cell towers
being in place or any existing communications being in place.
We have those in much greater supply now than we did for
Hurricane Katrina, already. By this hurricane season, we'll be
much better prepared than we were last year. We will not be
where we need to be this year. It will take us some time, and
take us additional resources. I have to be honest. But we are
honestly and earnestly working toward that end that you
describe, and I think it's entirely appropriate to criticize
that, because that was a flaw in all of our planning, in all of
our response.
Senator Reed. General Inge, quickly--and my time is
receding quickly--but could you comment? Then, Secretary
McHale, the last word.
General Inge. Sure. A couple of things. True situational
awareness, needed to improve in this disaster. But, at the same
time, we probably had better situational awareness than we had
the right to expect, given our experience from times past. So,
it's a good and a bad story.
There is a lot of talk about situational awareness, title
10 versus State forces. I think we've worked on that. General
Blum and I have personally met and worked on that. That's a
matter of communication and coordination--they're the words he
used--and we have personal communication, and we agree with
that.
We've met with the TAGs of the hurricane States already at
NORTHCOM to make sure that our lines of communication are open,
our staffs' lines are open. I think that we'll be much better.
We have work to do. This is the first time we've ever put
up an air picture of the magnitude that we did for this
hurricane, I suspect in the history of the Nation. We have a
lot of work to do to get what, in a combat zone, would be
called intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
which we should rightly call here damage assessment, so that it
all flows in the downlinks in the right place. We're working
that very hard.
Control of 360 airplanes of different nature over a
disaster area, we're working that hard, to build that picture,
and are working with the adjutants general of the various
States so that, in a disaster, we can assist them with that,
while they are still in charge of the disaster.
Working the Navy piece, we had not worked as hard. Having
the Navy follow the storm, as is appropriate, to do beach
assessment immediately is a great deal.
But a piece we don't talk about very much is the logistics
piece and how you support FEMA in tracking logistics and it's
one of the technology pieces Senator Cornyn talked about. We
found that we routinely use our radio frequency tags in our
military business. Tracking our containers and just getting the
logistics package into the area of damage is no small task.
Day after day, you would hear staff officers stand up and
say, ``Sir, we shipped a million Meals Ready to Eat (MRE)
today.'' That's good information, I suppose. But the real
question is, ``How many did you need to ship, and where did
they go?'' So we're working all those kinds of issues very
aggressively as we move into this next season.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Secretary, if you have a comment?
Mr. McHale. Senator, the need to conduct wide-area
surveillance for damage assessment after a natural disaster
should have been a mission requirement that we recognized, but
it was not. So before the end of September, in our internal
preliminary lessons learned, we identified, and did not hide at
all, our recognition that the ability to have aerial assets in
place to conduct wide-area surveillance after either a
terrorist attack or a natural disaster is a preeminent
requirement. We did not anticipate, though--if we had read the
after-action reviews from Hurricane Andrew, in 1992, we might
have anticipated the reality that media reports inevitably,
after a disaster, tend to be inaccurate. So, unlike Hurricanes
Andrew and Katrina, for Hurricane Rita, that came along 4 or 5
weeks after Hurricane Katrina, we had a complete aerial
observation package in support of NORTHCOM. It included P-3s,
Predators, C-130s, high-altitude and space-based imagery, so
that if Hurricane Rita had produced catastrophic damage, we
would not have been reliant on media reports to scope and
assess that damage.
So, the first thing you need is--we don't call it,
domestically, an ISR package, as the General properly noted.
We're talking about wide-area surveillance for damage
assessment, and then the ability, through interoperable
communications, to disseminate what we collect to all of the
first-responders, emergency management personnel, military
authorities, who need to be aware of the damage so they can
begin responding to it. We didn't get it right for Hurricane
Andrew in 1992, we didn't get it right for Hurricane Katrina,
we did get it right for Hurricane Rita, and it's a lesson that
we have now learned very clearly.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Just a point with this
capability, you could have, for example, identified not just
the damage, but the fact that thousands of people were
collecting at the Superdome, because your photo analysts,
either space-based or jets up in the air, could have done the
same type of photo analysis they do in a tactical situation,
and said, ``You have lots of people accumulating.'' Is that--
all I need is a yes or no--what you're talking about when
exploiting this information?
Mr. McHale. What we're talking about, primarily, is
physical damage.
Senator Reed. Okay.
Mr. McHale. When you start talking about observing the
population with these assets, you get into an area of public
policy that is--I think, as you recognize----
Senator Reed. Let's defer that to next round, because I
will stop and----
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. I will recognize Senator Thune.
Excuse me. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
members of the panel, for your service. I appreciate the--just
listening to the line of questioning and the responses, clearly
there are lots of things that need to be improved upon, from
some of the responses in the past, and I appreciate the steps
that you've enumerated to make sure that we get it right in the
future.
I want to start with a question for General Blum, which has
to do with a piece of equipment that you all, the National
Guard, is receiving, the first 32 C-27s off the line. My
understanding is, those receiving units may have already been
selected. I have a two-pronged question. One is, when do you
estimate the NGB will make selections on units for the next
group to follow off the assembly line? What criteria will you
use in making that selection?
General Blum. Senator, let me back up if I can. To my
knowledge, the aircraft has not been selected. If you're
talking about the future cargo aircraft, or the light cargo
aircraft, that the Air Force and the Army are going to buy, and
we're going to put in the National Guard as a joint
intratheater airlift capability, it is my intent to put those
airplanes, when the DOD decides which one they're going to
buy--when they give that to the National Guard, I will then put
that capability out into as many States as I can, but they will
be distributed regionally as part of a package that supports
the Chem-Bio Response Force Packages, the Civil Support Teams,
the Quick Response Forces. They will be positioned based on
known weather patterns and also areas that we know are critical
and key in being able to move capabilities and logistics to
other affected areas.
That's a long answer. We've put out the first four or five
that are really so obvious where they need to go. The others
are under very careful consideration, in collaboration with
your adjutants general, your Governors, and the emergency
managers in the region, so that we do something that, when
they're not in the service of the Nation overseas as part of
the Air Expeditionary Force, they are superbly postured and
ready to support any Federal, or State and Federal combined
response, for a regional response, or even a national response.
So, I hope that gets to your question. If you want to be
more specific, I'll try to address it.
Senator Thune. I guess my question is, though, that the
first 32 of those units off the line--my understanding was that
the receiving units had already been selected. What you're
saying is that----
General Blum. The very first ones are, yes, sir.
Senator Thune. Okay. But--all right. So, then I guess what
I'm asking is, the next installation of that, the criteria that
you're going to use, which you've enumerated, is going to be
regional, and it's going to be based on some of the mission
requirements.
General Blum. Yes, sir. It will also be placed in a place
that has--do you understand the term ``bed down''?
Senator Thune. Right.
General Blum. It has the infrastructure there, so that the
airplane doesn't pass a bill to the Army or the Air Force for
military construction and the construction of a new airfield.
There are many, many airfields that are already in existence
that have superb infrastructure to support a C-130-like
airplane.
Senator Thune. Right.
General Blum. So, it would make sense that if that place is
near one of these regions we're talking about, they'd be a
strong candidate for where I would nominate them to receive
those aircraft.
Senator Thune. That was going to be a follow-up question,
is one of the things that you will look at among these
competing units, then, is the infrastructure capacity.
General Blum. Oh, absolutely. If they have the airspace,
they have the airfield, they have the hangars and the
maintenance, and it's already there, it would be foolish not to
take advantage of it, I think.
Senator Thune. One of the things I'd--with respect to the
National Guard--and 80 percent of the South Dakota National
Guard has mobilized in support of operations in the Middle
East--Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom--and I,
like all South Dakotans, are extremely proud of the
contributions that they have made to the war on terror, as well
as to homeland defense--one of the questions I have is--I'm
concerned, I think, like a lot of people are, that our National
Guard and Reserve will not be able to meet the demands of both
their title 32 and title 10 missions, due to some of the
operational stress on personnel and equipment. We're running a
lot of our equipment into the ground--the personnel, the
deployments--that have put tremendous stresses and strains on
the National Guard. How, in your view, can DOD maximize the use
of the National Guard and Reserve, without overusing them?
That's a general question, I understand.
General Blum. I think you do that by predictability. We've
worked that out with the Army and the Air Force. The members of
your National Guard know pretty well that, if they're in the
Air National Guard, that they're going to deploy for a
relatively short period of time, 2 to 3 months, about every 18
months. They accept that. The employers seem to accept that,
and the families accept it. Our retention rate shows that it is
well accepted by the three partners in the citizen soldier--the
employer, the family, and the servicemember. Our retention rate
is over 100 percent of our goal in the Air National Guard. It's
over 100 percent in the Army National Guard, but they rotate on
a different model, and that's about one deployment every 6
years. We have--we think--I firmly believe we can achieve that.
We're not there yet, but I think we can.
We hit an all-time highwater mark this time last year, with
12 brigades over in combat. This time--the same time this year,
we'll probably have four, four and a half. Then, when you add
Afghanistan, perhaps five. So, it's been a significant
reduction in the contribution that the Army National Guard--or
the demands on the Army National Guard overseas, as what they
have been over the last year--that was a conscious decision to
give the Army time to reset into modularity, so that they could
assume a heavier burden this year, and they are. So, we're very
conscious of what you're describing. I think we can do it.
The personnel piece, I'm very confident we can recruit,
retain, and keep our force. The equipment piece is where I need
help from this body.
Senator Thune. Right.
General Blum. We sent the very best of our equipment
overseas, as we should. We've been over there now for several
years. We've crossleveled our equipment. We were short of
equipment when the war started. You have to remember that. The
National Guard was under-resourced deliberately. It was a
strategic reserve. It has, for the last 6 years at least, been
an operational force overseas. It needs to be resourced as an
operational force back here at home. In the old--and we didn't
view the National Guard that way in the past, because they had
all the equipment that they needed as a strategic reserve
overseas, gave them adequate equipment to be ready here at
home. Now that we're an operational force overseas and that
equipment is moved to the war zone, which it should, we need to
address the shortages here.
Now, while this body will help provide the money for that,
and the authority to buy that new equipment, or acquire that
new equipment, we are leveraging the Emergency Assistance
Compacts (EMAC) amongst the States to move equipment to the
affected areas of this Nation while we're short on equipment,
so that we mitigate the--otherwise, if we didn't do that, the
problem would be that some States would be under-equipped to do
what they need to do. But through EMAC, we have, as Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma have shown--and, by the way, when all
of that was going on, and 80,000 troops were overseas, we were
still fighting blizzards in your northern neighbor, in North
Dakota. We had a blizzard going on while the hurricane was
coming on. We were clearing roads in North Dakota. We were
fighting floods in Vermont and New Hampshire at the same time.
So, Mother Nature doesn't throw this stuff at us one at a time.
But we can handle multiple near-simultaneous events, if we need
to. But we could handle them a lot better if we were better
equipped.
Senator Thune. That sounds exactly like what our TAG said
this week when he was in town. So, we understand that.
Certainly we want to do everything we can to address the needs
that you have, in terms of equipment and--understanding that--
the important role that the National Guard and those assets
have played in the war on terror, realizing that you--we ask
you to do a lot of things, and we have to make sure that you
have the resources you need to get it done.
Secretary McHale, a question having to do--some of what's
been touched on by Senator Cornyn, Senator Reed already--on the
homeland defense front, the illegal immigration issue, of
course, is a very hot issue on the border States. Admiral Loy,
who's Deputy Secretary at DHS, testified in front of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence that 44,000 other-than-
Mexicans came across the border last year. I guess what I'm
interested in knowing is, is the DOD working with DHS to
identify where those other-than-Mexicans are coming from? What
is the DOD doing, in terms of working with the DHS, to
implement the use of UAVs on the southern border? That's what I
hear is the technology that, as we look at immigration reform,
we may want to incorporate the UAVs that are policing the
border.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. We, in fact, are very active in
supporting CBP, a DHS subordinate element, in its
responsibilities along the southwest border. As I noted in my
opening statement, we've been engaged in counternarcotics
activity in support of civilian law enforcement since 1989. A
recent change in the law, that Chairman Cornyn cited earlier,
expanded the DOD role to include counterterrorism activity in
support of civilian law enforcement, as well as
counternarcotics activity. We've been doing a lot for a long
time to support civilian law enforcement in the execution of
their mission.
We have routinely provided aerial platforms, usually
helicopters, to provide surveillance of cross-border movement,
illegal movement, in order to inform ground-based CBP agents of
that movement so that appropriate detentions and arrests could
be made. I've flown one of those flights along the Texas border
with a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve helicopter unit where that
unit provided aerial surveillance in support of CBP on the
ground.
About 2 years ago, I think, I received a request for the
first use of a Predator, a DOD Predator, one that had not yet
been delivered to DOD, but was scheduled for delivery, to be
used in support of CBP, much like the helicopters, but using a
UAV, for surveillance along the southwest border. I think, for
about a 3-week period of time, based on our support for that
request for assistance, that Predator became the first of many
flights that have now been executed, and continue to be
executed, in support of CBP. My understanding is that DHS,
correctly, is in the process of standing up its own UAV
capability. But, in the interim, on a frequent, even daily,
basis, we, for instance, for training purposes, conduct UAV
flights in the southwest, training our own personnel to control
those flights, but we do share the information that we acquire
through that training with the CBP.
Lastly, I would not want to give the impression that it's
just aerial surveillance or UAV support that we provide. JTF
North, a subordinate NORTHCOM command, provides numerous other
forms of assistance on a regular basis--ground sensors,
engineering support, and other capabilities, to include the
sharing of intelligence and information to better identify the
nature of the threat.
The bottom line, there is absolutely no doubt that the
situation along the southwest border is extremely troubling,
probably getting worse, not better, in terms of criminality and
violence. There is no doubt that the requirement to address
that situation is primarily a civilian law enforcement
function, but there is also no doubt that, consistent with the
law, we are prepared to support--not replace, but support--
civilian law enforcement in the execution of that mission.
Senator Thune. Have you been able to identify where the
folks who are coming across the border, other than those who
are coming in that are Mexicans coming across the border where
those folks are coming from?
Mr. McHale. Yes. It's part of our strategy for homeland
defense that we have a defense in depth. In most domains, in
the air and on the sea, that means the forward deployment of
forces to interdict and defeat a threat before it enters the
United States. We don't forward deploy ground forces into
Canada or into Mexico. So, to achieve that defense in depth
requires the ability to obtain information in depth as to
threats that may be approaching the United States border.
In an unclassified setting, I can tell you that we receive
briefings--and I personally receive briefings--almost daily as
to the nature of that threat and any question of terrorist
activity that might be associated with it. We do try, to the
very best of our collection capability, to identify terrorist
threats approaching the United States border at a distance from
the United States border to separate illegal immigration from
what are perhaps related issues of terrorist infiltration.
Senator Thune. I see my time is expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you all very much.
Mr. McHale. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Thune, for those
important questions and the testimony we've heard.
We've all been told, during the course of hearings, that
the nature of illegal immigration across our border has
changed, and there's been some exchange about the spike in
people coming from countries other than Mexico, including
countries of special interest. It causes all of us a great
concern. Admiral Loy testified, as Senator Thune indicated.
But, pretty clearly, there seems to be a consensus that where
historically it may have been--organized crime may have been
involved in drug trafficking, that now they're engaged not only
in drug trafficking, but literally human smuggling, arms. It
doesn't take any stretch of the imagination to imagine that
they would transact in terrorist smuggling or in smuggling of
WMD. So, I think the emphasis on how we can cooperate and how
we can use all the assets of the Federal Government to protect
us against that threat are very, very important.
In that connection, I want to ask--starting with General
Inge--given the need for effective and synchronized interagency
coordination to respond to manmade or natural disasters, what
thought have you given to transitioning Joint Task Force North
into a Joint Interagency Task Force?
General Inge. Sir, that's been the subject of discussion
for, that I'm aware of, at least part of 3 years now. It's a
discussion more properly addressed, I believe, here in this
town than by the people of NORTHCOM. But we have been involved
in those discussions. It rests, as I understand it now, with
transitioning first to JTF North, with closer coordination with
the interagency--and we work very closely with the interagency,
and are very well tied in with them. If we continue on this
path, the next step would be to decide, when do you transition?
Then, who would be in charge? As you appreciate, JTF South
works air and sea domains, and therefore, is operational
control (OPCON) to Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), a military
organization. When you work the land domain internal to the
United States, you have different laws that would apply to the
organization.
So, short answer to your question, the discussions continue
in the interagency, and we are involved, and we are a
participant in the discussion. But I would assure you that
today, JTF North is very closely aligned, and very much
involved in, interagency coordination and incorporation as we
work the southwest border.
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate the fact that there's only so
much that you can do, or that NORTHCOM can do, or the DOD can
do, if it involves interagency cooperation and participation.
I, for one, intend to do everything within my power to
encourage all of the agencies that would make up an Interagency
Task Force to fully cooperate in the effort, because I think
there's a lot to be gained by that.
General Inge. I could tell you, certainly, Senator,
cooperation is better today--far better today than it was 18
months ago. That's the time I personally have been watching.
It's amazing how it's changed.
Senator Cornyn. General Inge, how is NORTHCOM coordinating
with SOUTHCOM? You mentioned JTF South, but how are you
coordinating across the board to ensure that there's no gaps
between commands?
General Inge. Sir, we are tied in with SOUTHCOM in multiple
ways. Most of their drug interdiction, we monitor--and,
frankly, from a little afar, because they do it in the southern
part of the region, and the focus of their emphasis is south of
our area of responsibility (AOR). But we have proper liaison
channels. We stay in communication with their Joint Interagency
Task Force (JIATF). As is appropriate, they will work missions
for us. We're in constant contact to make sure that a seam
doesn't develop between us. Likewise, as you look at the
islands to our south, we make sure that we have the right
connection and the right handoff between them, in case of mass
migrant problems.
Senator Cornyn. General Blum, training and exercising are
essential to preparedness.
General Blum. Yes, sir.
Senator Cornyn. We've talked a little bit about resources,
things that would allow interoperable communications. One of
the problems we saw during the Hurricane Katrina disaster was,
the Louisiana National Guard lost communications connectivity.
But what I want to focus on are other training and exercise
concerns that we can perhaps help you address, and help the DOD
address.
Currently, it's my understanding the DOD does not provide
funding for homeland security and homeland defense integration
training at the State and regional level. If that's true, what
can best be done to help improve overall joint response
nationally? Is programmed appropriated and routine DOD, DHS
training and exercising--is that part of the solution?
General Blum. Mr. Chairman, I think you've hit on something
very key. As I said--and Senator Reed said, what can you do
better? I think one of the things that we absolutely must do,
if we're going to get better, is to train and exercise. No good
team doesn't practice. Any good team practices very hard and
very realistically. That's why they're a good team. The problem
that I face isn't that there's no unwillingness to train or
practice; the problem is, there's no resource stream to
actually accomplish that. It's not by evil intent; it was just
never really a priority requirement in the past, and I think it
needs to be seriously addressed in the future.
If the DOD were provided funding for that, or if the
National Guard were provided funding for that, we could do that
very well at a local and State level, and a regional level, for
that matter. But I would like to see those exercises and
training tied in with the DOD so that it has the rigor and
overwatch that has produced the world-class teams in the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard that training
and exercises in our military model has produced.
I think that's one place where the military honestly could
be a force multiplier for the interagency and
intergovernmental. We know how to do that. If we were
adequately funded, or there was some mechanism to have some
cost sharing perhaps between DHS and DOD to do this, I think
the National Guard would be glad to be the lynchpin for the
connecting of those resources and the broker for putting that
together.
Having said that, I think there's a role to be played there
also by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, and
PACOM, who all have equities in this, as well, because some of
their--particularly NORTHCOM--mission set is largely focused on
the United States.
So anything they do, or we do, we're going to have to do
together anyhow, so, we may as well learn how to do that well,
early.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
If Congress saw fit to fund that sort of joint exercising
and training, Secretary McHale, you don't see any objections or
concerns, do you, from any other standpoint?
Mr. McHale. Within the constraints of the President's
budget, no. Our exercises have not been tough enough. Fifty to
60 times each year, there are presidentially-declared major
disasters. They are the type with which you and I are very
familiar. It's a hurricane of a recurring type, a tornado
through a region of the country, an earthquake that may be
damaging, or even significantly damaging, but not catastrophic
in its consequences. Fifty to 60 times a year, there are major
disasters. For most of those major disasters, civilian response
capabilities at all levels of government can normally address
the remediation requirement, and the role of the DOD is fairly
modest.
Hurricane Katrina, which in my judgment, was at the low end
of catastrophic events, taught us that we are not adequately
prepared for those kinds of terrorist attacks or natural
disasters that exceed in scope recurring major disasters and
become catastrophic in their consequences. Most of our
exercises in the past have dealt with major disasters, but not
truly catastrophic events of the type that are envisioned, for
instance, in the 15 planning scenarios that have been developed
by DHS.
So, Senator, I guess I would summarize by saying, we need
to plan not only for recurring major disasters, but for the
much more challenging environment of catastrophic events. Our
exercises should reflect catastrophic requirements and a more
deeply engaged DOD, where we have the organic capabilities to
provide a response that may not be found anywhere else in the
United States Government. Funding that kind of exercise program
is a good thing; again, within the constraints of the
President's budget.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
General Rodriguez, since you're here, I want to take
advantage of your presence, just ask you one question, if I
may. You might want to come up to the microphone, maybe over
here on General Inge's left.
The Texas National Guard played a very important role in
responding to both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I'd like to
give you an opportunity to share with the subcommittee any
lessons learned from the Texas National Guard's perspective,
that you'd like to highlight for the committee, that might help
us in our deliberations.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES R. RODRIGUEZ, ADJUTANT
GENERAL, TEXAS MILITARY FORCES
General Rodriguez. Yes. Thank you, Senator Cornyn, Senator
Reed.
Lessons learned from Katrina are primarily around two
areas. One is how we worked, in a title 32 status, alongside--
along parallel with the title 32 Active-Duty Forces, and that
it is possible--it's not ideal, but it is possible. As the
Secretary and the others here have said, unity of effort is the
primary concern, to include planning. There is no sense in
planning in a vacuum, either. We must plan both at the Federal
and at the State and at the local level. Everyone is tied
together when a disaster strikes.
The Texas National Guard adopted and tailored the adaptive
battle staff model that is favored by NORTHCOM for our own
Joint Force Headquarters. The Texas National Guard always
remained in a posture of assistance to civilian authorities.
But we focused exclusively on our customers--that is, the
disaster-impacted residents of the State who were represented
in the disaster zone by local elected officials, such as the
county judges and the city mayors and appointed State
authorities, like the disaster district chairman. In other
words, the control was very local. The Governor serves as a
moderator or a thermostat to make sure everything is in tune.
We pushed military and civilian hybrid capabilities forward
early. We pushed it strong, and we pushed it consistently. Our
focus was to deliver commodities, care, and calming presence
early, and to stay deployed forward as long as the Governor
deemed appropriate.
The most significant lesson we learned is that the National
Guard should continue to refine its mission. But clearly it is
the military choice of force for domestic disaster response,
because our armories are there, we live there, we're where the
disasters happen. What General Blum says is very true, that
when you call up the National Guard, you call up America.
Sir, you had mentioned something about the White House
report, the Townsend Report. There's a particular
recommendation there that really highlights the value of a
lesson learned. It's number 28. It's the one that mentions the
Joint Forces Headquarters State as a key facilitator and
infrastructure platform of Joint Incident Command, one that
ought to receive high priority implementation. That Joint Force
Headquarters is the place where military and civilian
coordination can be realized, where military coordination can
happen to support lead Federal and State civilian agencies, and
cross-communication can happen with greatest efficiency and
effectiveness. The Joint Force Headquarters worked for us
during our Hurricane Rita response. The Joint Force
Headquarters State ought to be fully supported at the national
level as a State or even a regional platform for fuller
integration with Federal/regional joint field offices. That is
to say, DHS.
I encourage recommendation number 28 be fast-tracked for
explicit establishment and missioning and legislation.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much for that testimony.
Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by associating myself with General Blum's
remarks about exercising. It's been said often, but I don't
think as well as or as emphatically as you did. We're spending
a lot of money on technology. We're doing lots of analysis.
We're doing lots of training. But until you blow the whistle
and say, ``Okay, here's the problem. Go out there and actually,
on the ground, do something,'' we really don't know what we
have. I agree with Secretary McHale's comments, too, that these
exercises have to be more rigorous, but my inclination is that
we could get a lot more bang for our buck if we put more money
into exercising every level of command. We've done that a
little bit in the Rhode Island National Guard, sort of on an ad
hoc basis, but we should be doing it every quarter, or at least
once a year, not just tabletop, but rolling--getting the wheels
on--moving on the ground and things like that.
Mr. Chairman, maybe we could think about trying to identify
those resources.
General Blum. Senator, you're spot on. I applaud Rhode
Island and other States that have taken money out of their
hide, or used State money, or some combinations of money to put
together to do the little bit of training and exercising
they've been able to do. We have an exercise schedule not too
far from here, near the Washington, DC, Armory here, coming up
at the end of the month. That's a modest exercise, but it costs
about $1 million. We've had to take that out of hide that we
don't have. But my good conscience won't allow me to stand up
organizations and then let them atrophy. If we're going to
train and certify them, they must be exercised if they're going
to be ready when you need them. Otherwise, unless they go right
into the crisis after graduation--and, even then, they're not
going to be terribly effective, because they haven't practiced
together. So you have to pull all of the parties together that
are really going to come to the dance, and let them practice,
so that when they are called upon in the middle of the night,
on short or no notice, they can respond the way the American
people expect them to.
Senator Reed. I think you're absolutely right. In fact,
I've been associated with the Army since 1967. It's gotten
better as it's done with more realistic evaluations, more
realistic in-the-field training. Not just the training, but
evaluations, the whole--probably technology--the terminology is
out of date, but the whole Radar Technology Improvement Program
(RTIP) process, the whole evaluation, down to individual
skills, from unit skills, is something that has moved us
forward. We have to do the same thing on the homeland security
side.
Mr. Secretary, I want to follow up the last comment you
made about the fact that now we have these air capabilities to
essentially photograph everything on the ground for a damage
assessment. Is there a legal issue about who can interpret
these photographs? Or where does the information go? For
example, my last point before I relinquished to Senator Thune
was, we had thousands of people trapped in the Superdome.
Presumably, if you had aerial coverage, taking photographs,
digitizing, and sending it down to photo interpreters, someone
would have noticed thousands of people congregating outside,
and perhaps assumed that, if they're outside, there are more
inside, and we could have moved quicker to relieve the
pressure. Can that be done now, or is there a legal obstacle to
interpreting these photos and getting information to the right
people?
Mr. McHale. There are certainly public policy questions,
important public policy questions, and, I believe, very likely,
related legal issues.
When I spoke earlier about the need for more timely and
accurate damage assessment, I was focused on the physical
consequences of a catastrophic event.
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. McHale. In the days after landfall of Hurricane Katrina
on August 29, we did not immediately appreciate the enormous
damage that had taken place along the Mississippi Gulf Coast,
because, by comparison to the coverage in New Orleans, the
coverage of the Mississippi Gulf Coast was modest. The focus
tended to be upon New Orleans, so we saw everything through
that region--everything in that region through the prism of a
New Orleans perspective. So we have recognized that, for wide-
area surveillance, not involving the observation--certainly not
the direct or intended observation of the movement of citizens,
either groups, crowds, or individuals, but, rather, to simply
see what's been blown away by the event, we have prepared, and
in fact, for Hurricane Rita, deployed, assets to gather that
wide-area surveillance.
Now, my instinct, Senator, is to say that obviously there
are profound issues of public policy when those aerial
platforms begin observing people, as opposed to damage. I know
that legally there are issues, legal issues, associated with
any observation of citizens by military platforms for purposes
of collecting information on those citizens for later criminal
prosecution. We can't do that. That violates Posse Comitatus.
I guess what I would say to you is, we are confident that
it's an appropriate military role to use those collection
assets for rapid, accurate damage assessment. We have not, and
in the absence of clear statutory authority, would not, take on
the responsibility of observing citizens, either groups or
individuals. Frankly, if you want to find out that somebody's
at the Superdome, the first-responders who are on the ground,
the military personnel who are on the ground observing events,
can provide a much more timely and accurate picture of what's
happening than something that we draw from an aviation asset.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, let me observe, and I think
you will agree, you already have a public policy problem,
because the photograph of the battle, the photograph of New
Orleans to assess the levee damage would reveal citizens.
Mr. McHale. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. So, we could be in the very interesting
position where we have graphic evidence of a need to rescue
Americans, yet no one has thought through how you legally get
that information to someone who can effect the rescue or the
relief.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. So, I would just urge you to--and I know you
have--study this quickly, address those public policy problems.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. If we need statutory relief, please send us
some recommendations so that we can make the judgment--and I
think you would urge that should be made--of what is the proper
policy.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. The public policy question really
involves the intent of that aerial imagery. So long as we
collect aerial imagery that is for the purpose of damage
assessment, the fact that individual citizens or groups of
citizens show up on that imagery is not a problem and we can
disseminate that information. If we begin focusing that aerial
imagery not on damage assessment, but on the movement of
citizens on the ground, then you get into issues related to
both the law and public policy if that imagery reveals----
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. McHale.--unintentionally----
Senator Reed. Yes.
Mr. McHale.--in the collection of the imagery, criminal
activity.
Senator Reed. I appreciate that, but the reality is, in one
of these crises, you will have multiple data about people,
about physical destruction about potential problems.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. We have to have a way, legally and
constitutionally, that we can get pertinent information to
people so that we can relieve citizens who are in distress. I
would be very interested in seeing a recommendation as to how
we do this.
General Inge, how is the intelligence-sharing between
NORTHCOM of the NCTC functioning today?
General Inge. Can I comment very briefly on the previous
discussion?
Senator Reed. Yes, you may, sir. Yes.
General Inge. Public law has not been an impediment to us
doing what we need to do. We are very careful that we don't put
ourselves in a position where we can be accused of spying on
our citizens. We are very sensitive to civil liberties.
But I wouldn't want us to leave here thinking technology is
the solution to this problem. It will only be a----
Senator Reed. Yes.
General Inge.--benefit to it, but it won't be the solution.
The boots on the ground of the guy reporting accurately what he
or she sees, and getting that report properly integrated to the
right people, is the long-term solution to situational
awareness.
The TAG of Mississippi personally rode down the coast of
the Gulf Coast the night the storm moved through. So, he knew
what was there. There weren't enough overhead assets, 3 days
later, that were going to help them very much.
Senator Reed. Right. Let me applaud both the Secretary's
and your concern with civil liberty. I want to reinforce that.
This is not a plea to disregard. This is actually a plea to
respect those. But I'm just looking ahead, I hope, practically,
to the point where you have the information, and you can't use
it, and people are suffering. Shame on us.
General Inge. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. We should have thought through this problem
and at least have some type of procedure to alleviate it.
Now your counterterrorism comment.
General Inge. Sir, I was new to homeland intelligence when
I came to this job 18 months ago, and everyone around the land
told me how bad intelligence cooperation was, and, if you
didn't believe that, you just had to listen to the news. I got
out there, and I found senior representatives from each of our
agencies in our headquarters in our morning meetings, sharing
appropriate information back and forth. We have good liaison
support with the agencies now, and good cooperation.
Is it as good as it needs to be? No, sir, it's not. But
it's improving on a daily basis. All of the senior heads of
those departments have been to us in the recent months to make
sure we're working to do what we need to do to meet the needs
of the people.
Senator Reed. Let me just give you a follow-up question.
General Inge. Go ahead.
Senator Reed. Do you receive actionable intelligence on a
regular basis? I mean, this is something where----
General Inge. We receive intelligence. We haven't had the
need, as a military, to action it.
Senator Reed. Right. Specifically, what could we do to
improve it? Are there specific steps that still have to be
taken that you could urge us to take?
General Inge. We, as the executives, are continuing to work
this problem, to the mutual benefit of the American people. I'm
not sure that there's immediate steps that need to be taken
here.
Senator Reed. It's just--keep the pressure on, keep moving
forward, never be satisfied.
General Inge. It's another piece of the interagency
coordination that we just have to continue every day to get
better at it because we're not as good as we need to be, but
we're better today than we were yesterday.
Senator Reed. Right. General Inge, Admiral Keating has
decided to combine NORAD and NORTHCOM Command Centers. I must
commend you for developing a new phrase for the Cheyenne
Mountain, ``The Warm Standby.''
General Inge. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. I sometimes feel like I'm warm standby. So,
I'm going to use that, with your permission.
Will this initiative change the mission and capability of
NORAD? Will functions at Cheyenne Mountain be reduced or
eliminated when relocated to Peterson Air Force Base?
General Inge. Sir, we will take the air warning and the
aerospace surveillance piece, move that piece of the Operations
Center into our, now NORAD/NORTHCOM Command Center, so the
commander will be able to go to one place, get a common
operating picture of all domains at one time.
Senator Reed. Has this been coordinated with General
Cartwright, at STRATCOM?
General Inge. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. What is the impact of moving the operation of
NORAD, as a binational command with Canadian involvement?
Essentially, what is the reaction of the Canadians, at this
point?
General Inge. We have coordinated with appropriate people
in Canada before we proceeded to do this. What the outcome will
be, and the precedent as we move forward, remains to be
determined, but the key leaders who needed to be coordinated
with, were coordinated with before we started, so it's not a
surprise to them.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
General Inge. Certainly here in the country, as well--in
our country.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Jack.
The discussion about taking pictures of people and--as part
of a damage assessment, and inadvertently picking up American
citizens, and the potential conflict in our laws, raises
another interesting question, and a related question.
Secretary McHale, we're all familiar with the debate about
the NSA and the Terrorist Surveillance Program that's going on.
One of the important functions of the NSA also relates to
cybersecurity. I'd like to know whether you have any concerns
regarding information assurance and Posse Comitatus. Are there
any changes in the law that--and you can either take this
question now or get back to us with a written response later
on--but I'd be interested to know, given the fact that
technology has certainly outstripped the 1978 law, Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, that Congress passed, that our
ability to both get information and also the defensive efforts
we need to undertake to protect our own information
infrastructure have certainly changed, and are changing perhaps
even as we speak, I'd like to know whether you have any
concerns with regard to legal limitations, like Posse Comitatus
may have, with regard to our ability to provide information
assurance.
Mr. McHale. Senator, when I took this position, I promised
the general counsel of the DOD that I wouldn't practice law
without a license. I am an attorney in private life from time
to time, but I'm not really prepared, nor would it be
appropriate for me, to address the legal questions today,
although we can certainly get back to you on that level of a
response to your question.
[The information referred to follows:]
The General Counsel of the Department of Defense (DOD) advises me
that, as described below, information assurance activities of the DOD
are not limited by the Posse Comitatus Act. The Posse Comitatus Act,
with certain exceptions, generally prohibits the use of any part of the
Army or the Air Force for civilian law enforcement purposes. DOD
defines information assurance as measures that protect and defend
information and information systems by ensuring their availability,
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation,
including the restoration of information systems by incorporating
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Accordingly, DOD's
information assurance focus is on protection and defense of its
information and information systems rather than on civilian law
enforcement. To the extent that DOD information assurance activities
may involve activities that appear to be civilian law enforcement,
these activities probably would be within the military purpose
exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. This judicially recognized
exception permits DOD participation in civilian law enforcement-like
activities if there is an independent military purpose for the
activities, in this case, the protection and defense of DOD information
and information systems.
Mr. McHale. Operationally, I have to tell you, I do have
those concerns. I think it would be irresponsible not to be
concerned about cybersecurity and mission assurance in the
context of adversaries who undoubtedly would attack us, in
terms of cyber-vulnerabilities, if given an opportunity to do
so.
Much like border security and some of the other issues that
we talked about earlier, it's important to emphasize that the
cybersecurity of the United States is not a DOD responsibility,
it's a responsibility that, by law, has been assigned primarily
to the DHS. We do have the responsibility within the DOD to
protect our own command-and-control capabilities and other
operational capabilities of DOD from a cyberattack. I do have
concerns, and that doesn't reflect an inadequacy, in terms of
what we're doing to protect those assets. It simply reflects
the reality that those assets almost certainly would come under
attack either prior to, or during, an overt combat operation
against the United States.
That said, what I'd like to do, perhaps at a classified
level, is get back to you, both with a more detailed answer, in
terms of cyber-defenses and vulnerabilities within DOD, how
that nests within the larger responsibility of DHS, and the
legal implications associated with that defense.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. That would be very
helpful. We'd appreciate that very much.
I just have two other relatively quick areas I want to
inquire.
I'm pleased that we've been joined by Senator Levin, the
ranking member of the committee.
First of all, let me ask General Blum. Since 2000,
Congress--and this committee taking the lead--has provided
approximately a half a billion dollars to establish and sustain
55 WMD Civil Support Teams and 17 CERFPs, or otherwise known
as, I guess, Chem-Bio Radiological Nuclear Enhanced Response
Force Package teams. What's the current status of these two
programs? Is there any need for any additional CERFP teams in
fiscal year 2007?
General Blum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
It was Congress that established the Civil Support Teams.
The ultimate goal is to have 55 of those, one in each State,
two in California, before the end of the program. At that
point, I think we will probably have more than sufficient
number of Civil Support Teams.
Are they perfectly configured? Are they perfectly equipped
now that we've had some experience and time? I'm not sure of
that. I think after we have them all fielded, trained, and we
get to test and exercise them, we may want to make some minor
modifications to their capabilities and composition of the
team. Having said that, there has not been 1 day--1 day--passed
in any month, in any year since 2000 that these teams have not
deployed. The calm and the psychological terror that they have
prevented by being able to show up in a shopping center or a
business district, and to assess immediately whether the white
powder was sugar or some other harmful substance, has been
incredibly important.
They have also responded in a capacity that--far greater
than anybody ever intended, with what Secretary McHale
described, and that's the ability to bridge the communications
normally that are brought to bear by the National Guard, Army,
and air communications with the civilian first-responders. So,
at the local level, at the very local level in the States and
the cities and the counties and municipalities, when these
teams come out, and the National Guard gets called out, and the
police and firefighters or emergency servicepeople are called
out, or hazardous materials teams come out, they work
magnificently well together, and they're well received. They
have also plugged in, on the incident command system, in a
magnificent manner. Even the most critical elements of civilian
emergency response welcomes their presence, are glad when they
come to the scene, and they're now, this is a success story.
But I don't think we need to expand the Civil Support Teams in
the country beyond 55 at this time.
I would like consideration given to some of the legislative
restrictions that are put on the Civil Support Teams. Since
Congress created them, they also put the law in there that
restricts their ability to go outside of the country. There are
scenarios and times and events that would be hugely beneficial
to NORTHCOM to be able to acquire these Civil Support Teams to
help our neighbors in Canada and Mexico, for example.
Certainly, I could envision other places around the globe where
the capabilities and the expertise of these Civil Support
Teams, now that we have sufficient number of them, would be
highly useful to the combatant commanders and our allies around
the world, and would also be very welcome in building new
partners overseas who are also worried about WMD and
counterterrorism and may want to build their own versions of
Civil Support Teams.
Now, the CERFPs, we started with 12, one in every FEMA
region, plus several extra, because I--you realize that--we
talked about earlier, the National Guard is deployed today
around the world, so it's likely that parts of those CERFPs
would be mobilized and deployed overseas. By having 12, we
would always have at least one for every FEMA region by having
that float. That has worked out very well, and I welcome the
fact that this body has asked us to expand it to five more.
Do I think we need more, beyond the 17? I'd rather feel the
17 and evaluate it and give you a more educated answer than to
just give you a swag today. Right now, I think we probably have
what we need, but I'd come back after an evaluation of the
program.
Mr. McHale. Senator, just as a footnote to the comment made
by General Blum. On the issue that he talked about--and that
is, cross-border movement of the CSTs to provide, for instance,
consequence management capabilities to Canada, if requested, or
conceivably to Mexico, if requested--for instance, we have the
Vancouver Olympics coming up in the not too distant future,
where it's foreseeable that it would benefit both Canada and
the United States to allow the CST to move cross-border--we are
preparing draft legislation that we will submit for your
consideration that would allow for the cross-border movement of
CSTs to deal with a WMD event that might take place, for
instance, north of our U.S./Canadian border.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
One final category of questions I have for Secretary
McHale, and this has to do with biometrics. I understand that
the DOD is collecting biometric information from individuals
detained in Iraq and from forensic investigations of improvised
explosive device (IED) attacks. Is the biometric data collected
in theater connected to, or shared with, our--your office or
with the DOJ, the Department of State, or the DHS? For example,
if a detainee was to escape from custody, would our current
system of screening people prevent him or her from entering the
United States using a forged name? If you could just address,
generally, what the DOD's policy is on the development,
integration, and use of biometrics technology across Federal
agencies.
Mr. McHale. Consistent with applicable law, we are
aggressively using biometrics for the purposes that you
describe, Senator. I would estimate that it was about a year
and a half ago, the DOD established uniform procedures for the
collection of biometric information and applied those uniform
standards to our forward-deployed combatant commands, so that,
with a very conscious intent, now executed, to collect
biometric data, let's say, in CENTCOM, the data collected is
transmitted to a co-located facility with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). I would note, as a footnote, when we stood
up that facility, we worked with the FBI and others, most
especially DHS--Secretary Ridge and I talked about this very
issue, in direct conversation--we transferred many, many--I'll
just keep the number general--but hundreds of thousands of
biometric datasets going back to the early 1990s to form the
base data for this system. So today when we add to that system
newly collected data acquired in overseas geographic combatant
commands, not only do we have access to it, we're co-located
with the FBI, and that information is shared with the entire
interagency, to include DHS.
Senator, if I may, it's an extraordinary success story.
Again, in an unclassified setting, what I can tell you is we
have had many instances when that biometric data has informed a
decision as to whether or not an individual in our custody will
be released. For instance, we have acquired biometric data from
threats overseas, and we have linked that data to specific
individuals, and, in specific cases, have kept them in custody,
under circumstances where, but for that biometric data, they
might have been released.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
allowing me to come to the hearing this morning as a Johnny-
come-lately and ask some questions. I appreciate your courtesy.
I appreciate the work of all three of you gentlemen.
First, there appears to be a widespread agreement that one
of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina is that there
needs to be better planning and training to improve
coordination between the National Guard and Active-Duty troops.
The White House report on Katrina called the current deployment
system, ``fragmented.''
The National Response Plan states the following, ``The
National Guard Forces employed under State Active-Duty or title
32 status''--and that's the status where we pay for the
operations of the State National Guard Forces--``that are
employed either under State Active-Duty or title 32 status are
providing support to the Governor of their State and are not
part of Federal military response efforts.''
Now, that really makes pretty sharp dichotomy between State
forces, National Guard, and Active Duty. It is too sharp a
dichotomy, in my judgment. I know we have to keep it,
constitutionally. I know, Secretary McHale, you have made
reference to that. But, in terms of coordination, it is too
sharp a dichotomy. I think NORTHCOM has to be hooked into what
the National Guard is doing, particularly since we have this
arrangement among the Governors where they call on each other
to supply National Guard.
So I guess the first question, General Inge, would go to
you, as to whether or not NORTHCOM, at least in Katrina, was
adequately linked into the utilization of National Guard
Forces. If so, what do we need to do to improve that
coordination?
General Inge. Sir, the answer to that question is, yes and
no. In the early days, we didn't feel that we had clear enough
picture on what was happening within the National Guard. I
don't believe that it was due to a lack of willingness to do
that, in any way. I don't mean to imply that. But as we moved
into the operation, we developed what reports needed to be
submitted at what time, as we saw the numbers were going to
pass 50,000 people wearing the uniform on the ground, and it
became much improved.
I would tell you that, as recently as last week General
Blum and I met with the J-3 of the Joint Staff to discuss this
issue, to satisfy ourselves that we now have the proper
procedures in place to share and pass information. Sitting in
our Operations Center at Colorado Springs today, the two chairs
on the end of the front row are National Guard guys that have
direct links back into Bureau Operating Center to make sure
that we have this problem solved.
I would also report to you that in preparation for the
coming hurricane season, we've already met and conferenced with
the adjutants general of the hurricane States, out at Colorado
Springs, at NORTHCOM, to discuss the need for awareness. You
would appreciate the spirit of cooperation and the positive
response that we had, both from us to them, and them to us, to
make sure that we've rectified this problem. I feel fairly
confident that we have.
Senator Levin. Okay. When the Federal Government pays for
the costs involved with National Guard deployment, sometimes
that comes after the fact. So, in this case, I believe--
Secretary McHale or General Blum may know--that the title 32
decision to reimburse the States for costs, came weeks
afterwards.
General Blum. No, it--well, I'll----
Senator Levin. Or days after?
Mr. McHale. Days.
General Blum. It was days. I'll tell you the day. It was
September 3.
Senator Levin. Was that, what, Friday?
General Blum. Yes, sir. But the----
Mr. McHale. No.
General Blum.--order was retroactive until August 29, which
is the day the hurricane made landfall.
Senator Levin. Right.
General Blum. So, the States bore the burden for calling up
the National Guard pre-landfall, but, as soon as the effects
made landfall, when we really saw we needed to flow large
number of forces in there, the Under Secretary of Defense----
Mr. McHale. Deputy Secretary.
General Blum.--Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary
England, actually authorized the retroactive payment of those
orders to the 29th. That decision was made probably as fast as
I've ever seen a decision made in the Pentagon, on September 3.
Senator Levin. Right.
General Inge. Sir, that was Wednesday or Thursday of the
week of the hurricane.
Senator Levin. It just reinforces the Federal role here.
What I'm really trying to say is that there's a major Federal
role, not just in terms of Active-Duty Forces, but in terms of
payment for the National Guard.
General Inge. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. My last question relates to the chain of
command. Do we have a Federal role through title 32
utilization, let's start with that. Should we have a single
chain of command? At what point should there be a single
military chain of command over both National Guard and Active-
Duty? Or, should there never be a single chain of command?
General?
General Blum. I would--from my point of view, I don't think
the answer is an absolute. I think--and I'm not trying to evade
the question--it depends on the situation. For instance, that
hurricane hit Florida; they had a single chain of command. That
hurricane also hit Alabama; they had a single chain of command.
That hurricane also hit Texas; and they maintained a single
chain of command. Mississippi insisted that they maintain a
single chain of command. Now, that doesn't mean that title 10
forces didn't assist all four of those other States. Now, I've
deliberately left Louisiana out of the discussion, because
that's what everybody focuses on. But you have to remember,
there were four other States affected, and, frankly,
destruction-wise, to a greater degree; damage-wise, to a
greater degree.
Senator Levin. Who was the commander of the title 10
forces?
General Blum. The commander of the title 10 forces is the
President of the United States and then whoever he designates
below him.
Senator Levin. Underneath the President, who is the
commander?
Mr. McHale. It goes from the President of the United States
to the Secretary of Defense, to the----
Senator Levin. Keep going.
Mr. McHale.--to the combatant commander.
Senator Levin. Who is----
Mr. McHale. Now----
Senator Levin. What is----
Mr. McHale. NORTHCOM.
Senator Levin. NORTHCOM, okay.
Mr. McHale. Admiral Keating.
Senator Levin. So, I want to just stop there at NORTHCOM.
Who's the commander of the National Guard Forces in Louisiana?
General Blum. The Commander in Chief, again, is the
Governor.
Senator Levin. Down to?
General Blum. Down to the adjutant general.
Senator Levin. The adjutant general.
General Blum. Then the operational force is the Joint Force
Headquarters commander that's subordinate to the Governor.
Senator Levin. Is there ever a single chain of command
between title 10 forces and the National Guard?
General Blum. We have done that, sir, four or five times.
Senator Levin. I know we did it during the riot situation.
General Blum. We've done it in the G8 Summit, we've done it
for the National Democratic Convention, we've done it for four
national special security events.
Senator Levin. Should we do it in an instance like Katrina?
Mr. McHale. No, sir, unless absolutely essential. If I can
revector slightly what you're heard so far, we have had dual-
hatted command in four circumstances. That's not really a
single chain of command. That preserves the authority of the
Governor, preserves the authority of the Secretary of Defense,
and their authority comes together in the person of one
individual, who is responsible to both in the exercise. That's
not really a single chain of command.
Senator Levin. Okay, let me go to dual-hatted. Let me shift
over. Should there be a dual-hatted person in Katrina
situations?
Mr. McHale. No, sir.
Senator Levin. Okay. Why not?
Mr. McHale. Dual-hat works when you have an absolutely
inseparable partnership between the President of the United
States and an individual Governor. If there is any daylight
between the two of them in a crisis environment, it leaves that
commander, who is responsible to both, in a very difficult
position.
In my judgment, dual-hatted command is an excellent
command-and-control approach in a noncrisis environment, like
the four circumstances that General Blum mentioned a moment
ago. But in a crisis, if you're going to have a difference--a
good-faith difference of opinion between the President and the
Chief Executive of the State, I think you're inviting a very
difficult circumstance to put a single officer in a position to
be responsible to both.
Can you achieve unity of command? The answer is yes. How do
you implement it? You implement it by federalizing the National
Guard. Is that, historically speaking, an extraordinary
decision? Yes. We did it in Los Angeles in 1992, because the
Governor asked us to do it. But we haven't done it
involuntarily, creating a single chain of command, stripping
the Governor of command authority, since the Civil Rights
Movement.
Senator Levin. I'm going to conclude, again, with my thanks
to the chair and ranking member here. There were really gaps in
coordination in Hurricane Katrina, in our military response. I
am going to just leave it at that.
I think it is important that you inform this committee as
to what you are working out to close those gaps. I think they
were obvious and they were unacceptable to everybody. There
were long delays. There were misunderstandings. The Governor
thought she had made a request that did not appear from the
Federal side to be a formal request. We have heard a lot of
testimony over in the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee. We have to work it out. I think from the
point of view of the Nation, we must have a very clear
coordination of a military response.
There's no excuse, as far as I am concerned, to have our
military down at or near a convention center and our Federal
officials not even knowing about it. We had NORTHCOM not
knowing what the National Guard were up to. It is just totally
unacceptable. I know efforts are underway to make sure that
never happens again. Just please keep this subcommittee and our
full committee informed, as well as the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee.
Thank you very much.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Levin.
The concerns that you express are ones that we, I know, all
share. We've heard some very practical solutions to those
problems already, in terms of interoperable communications, in
terms of joint training and exercising, making sure that those
budgets are funded so that that can occur, so that our military
can practice together, and so when a catastrophe arises, they
can respond more effectively than perhaps they've been able to
do in the past.
I, for one, have learned a lot from this hearing. I want to
express my gratitude to each of you for your testimony and your
participation. I know there will be some follow-up that we'll
want to undertake, and perhaps some additional briefings and
other questions, maybe even by members of the subcommittee.
We're going to leave the record open, so that if there are
any members of the subcommittee who want to ask question in
writing--we'll leave the record open, let's say, until next
Friday, a week from today--they can submit those in writing,
and if you'll respond--I don't know that there will be, but, if
there are, then I want to provide them an opportunity to do
that.
With that, I thank you for your time and your service, and
the hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington DC.
U.S. NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY AND THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IN NONPROLIFERATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
Cornyn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Cornyn, Collins, Reed,
E. Benjamin Nelson, and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearing clerk; and John H. Quirk V, security
clerk.
Majority staff member present: Lynn F. Rusten, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
minority counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston and Benjamin
L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Mackenzie M. Eaglen,
assistant to Senator Collins; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant
to Senator Cornyn; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
William Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant
to Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Cornyn. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities will come to order. Senator Reed, our ranking
member, will be arriving momentarily. We're pleased to have
Senator Collins here with us as well, as well as each of our
witnesses.
The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on U.S.
nonproliferation strategy and the roles and missions of the
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE)
in nonproliferation.
We welcome each of our witnesses: The Honorable Peter C. W.
Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy; General James E. Cartwright, USMC, Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM); and the Honorable Jerald S.
Paul, Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) of
the United States DOE. The Honorable Robert G. Joseph, Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
could not be with us today due to a conflict with his testimony
in the Foreign Relations Committee but he has submitted a very
helpful statement for the record, which I will insert after my
remarks.
The programs and missions for which each of you are
responsible are critically important to the national security
of the United States. In a major address on nonproliferation at
the National Defense University on February 11, 2004, President
Bush stated: ``The greatest threat before humanity today is the
possibility of a secret and sudden attack with chemical or
biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.'' He was
referring, of course, to the threat of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) getting into the hands of terrorists.
Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee just 1
month ago, Ambassador John Negroponte, the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), testified that terrorism is the preeminent
threat to the United States, and the key terrorist
organizations remain interested in acquiring chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear materials or weapons to
attack the United States, U.S. troops, and U.S. interests
worldwide. Each of you have significant responsibilities for
programs and missions that are aimed at reducing the
proliferation threat, and managing the consequences should such
weapons ever get into the wrong hands or even be used.
Assistant Secretary Flory, we look forward to your
testimony on the administration's nonproliferation policy and
strategy, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, DOD's
role in the Proliferation Security Initiative, and your
assessment of efforts underway in the DOD to consolidate and
integrate myriad Department activities into a unified
``combating WMD'' mission.
With respect to the CTR program, the subcommittee is
interested in your testimony on the progress of the chemical
weapons destruction facility at--I'm going to have a hard time
pronouncing that here--Shchuch'ye; the prospects for using CTR
funds to eliminate chemical weapons in Libya, and your vision
of the future of the CTR program.
General Cartwright, we look forward to your testimony on
your new responsibility for integrating the DOD's efforts to
combat WMD. We understand this is a work in progress. We look
forward to enhancing our understanding of what this mission
encompasses, how you plan to carry out your responsibilities in
this area, and what role the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA) will play. We'll be interested to hear what milestones
you have set to measure progress in integrating DOD's efforts
to combat WMD.
Deputy Administrator Paul, we look forward to your
testimony on the impressive and growing array of the DOE
nonproliferation programs. Second Line of Defense, Megaports,
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the elimination of
weapons grade plutonium production programs, to name just a
few, are making important contributions to U.S.
nonproliferation objectives.
One program that I have concerns about is the mixed-oxide
(MOX)/plutonium disposition program, which seems to have an
uncertain future on the Russian side, and has experienced
considerable cost growth and schedule delays on the U.S. side.
We look forward to a dialogue with you about the way forward in
this program.
In general the fiscal year 2007 DOD and DOE budget requests
demonstrate the administration's continuing commitment to
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. I strongly
share that commitment and believe that we must maintain and
strengthen our support for these vital nonproliferation
programs in the future. The subcommittee looks forward to your
testimony and I thank each of you for the service to our Nation
and your presence here today to provide testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Joseph follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert G. Joseph
u.s. strategy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction
I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide a written statement
to the subcommittee regarding the threat to U.S. national security from
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery
means, and the administration's strategy for combating that threat.
Almost immediately upon assuming office, President Bush emphasized
that WMD proliferation was the major security threat of the 21st
century, requiring a new, comprehensive strategy. In a speech at the
National Defense University on May 1, 2001, the President said:
. . . this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less
predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still
more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and
biological weapons. Some already have developed the ballistic
missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of
mass destruction at long distances and incredible speeds. A
number of these countries are spreading these technologies
around the world.
Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of
active nonproliferation, counterproliferation and defenses. We
must work together with other like-minded nations to deny
weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must
work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend
against the harm they can inflict. Together we must deter
anyone who would contemplate their use.
A year later, in his first National Security Strategy of the United
States and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,
the President expanded both on the requirements to meet today's threats
and on the tools we would marshal against them. The National Strategy
to Combat WMD is the first of its kind--a broad strategy uniting all
the elements of national power needed to counter the full spectrum of
WMD threats. Previous U.S. approaches had focused almost exclusively on
nonproliferation. The Bush administration has dramatically expanded
U.S. nonproliferation efforts to prevent acquisition of WMD, related
materials and delivery systems by rogue states or terrorists. At the
same time, the President recognized the reality that preventive efforts
will not always succeed. Therefore, the National Strategy to Combat WMD
put new, and necessary, emphasis on counterproliferation--to deter,
detect, defend against, and defeat WMD in the hands of our enemies.
Further, the National Strategy also focused on consequence management,
to reduce as much as possible the potentially horrific consequences of
WMD attacks at home or abroad.
The three pillars in the national strategy of counterproliferation,
nonproliferation, and consequence management do not stand alone, but
rather come together as seamless elements of a comprehensive approach.
Underlining that point, the National Strategy identified four
crosscutting enabling functions that are critical to combating WMD:
intelligence collection and analysis; research and development;
bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and targeted strategies against
hostile states and terrorists.
To succeed in our effort to combat WMD proliferation, we must apply
all elements of national power--diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law
enforcement, and military.
Diplomatic Tools
The Bush administration has given new vitality to the use of
diplomatic tools to prevent the proliferation of WMD. U.S. assistance
to other countries to reduce and prevent the proliferation of WMD and
delivery vehicles--through the Department of Defense's (DOD)
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the DOE's nuclear
nonproliferation programs, and the smaller but nonetheless important
Department of State (DOS) programs--has been at record funding levels.
The President has committed an average of $1 billion a year to these
critical efforts; we greatly welcome the consistent, strong support of
the subcommittee, the committee, the Senate, and the House of
Representatives, for these essential programs. Moreover, with the
proposal in 2002 for the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the President successfully
called on our foreign partners to commit their fair share to the effort
to meet what is a global responsibility. We continue to work closely
with the other G-8 members to realize fully the potential of this
critical commitment. Although much remains to be done, the Global
Partnership has already had important success in increasing non-U.S.
funding for securing and eliminating sensitive materials, technologies
and weapons.
While the bulk of U.S. nonproliferation assistance remains focused
on the states of the former Soviet Union, we have also expanded our
efforts to address proliferation threats more broadly. It is noteworthy
how these programs have evolved to meet today's threats, from an early
focus on denuclearizing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and on
reducing the former Soviet strategic arsenal, to an increasing
concentration on measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD and
related materials. Landmark DOE programs include the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative to reduce fissile and radioactive material
worldwide, and the Second Line of Defense and Megaports programs to
install radiation detection capability at major seaports, airports and
land crossings. While the statutes authorizing the CTR program give it
less flexibility than its DOE counterparts for work outside the former
Soviet states, DOD is taking full advantage of the flexibility it has
been given to eliminate chemical weapons in Albania.
The United States has also spearheaded the effort for the United
Nations Security Council to take on its responsibilities to maintain
peace and security against WMD threats. A major milestone was the
passage in April 2004 of United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1540. In adopting UNSCR 1540, the Security Council--for only
the second time since its founding--invoked its Chapter VII authorities
to require nations to act against a general, as opposed to a specific,
threat to international peace and security. In particular, UNSCR 1540
requires all states to prohibit WMD proliferation activities, such as
we witnessed with the A.Q. Khan network. It further requires that
states institute effective export controls, and enhance security for
nuclear materials on their territory. The United States stands ready to
assist other states in implementing UNSCR 1540; here too, DOE and DOD
nonproliferation assistance programs, as well as those of the DOS, are
key instruments for the administration's strategy to combat WMD.
The United States also has led the way to strengthen the
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) ability to detect nuclear
proliferation. We instituted a successful effort to increase the IAEA's
safeguards budget. We have strongly supported the IAEA Additional
Protocol, to strengthen the IAEA's ability to uncover clandestine
nuclear programs. The President submitted the U.S. Additional Protocol
to the Senate, which gave its advice and consent to ratification in
2004, and called for all other countries to adhere to it as well. The
President also successfully urged the creation of a new special
committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to examine ways to strengthen
the IAEA's safeguards and verification capabilities.
In addition to the President's proposals to strengthen the IAEA
institutionally, he challenged the international community to rectify
the greatest weakness in the nuclear nonproliferation system: the
ability of states to pursue nuclear weapons under the cover of peaceful
energy programs. The lesson of Iran and North Korea is clear: some
states will cynically manipulate the provisions of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty to acquire sensitive technologies to enable
them to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities--the very capabilities the
treaty is intended to deny.
To close this loophole, the President has proposed that uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities--the two primary paths
to acquiring fissile material for nuclear weapons--be limited to those
states that already operate full-scale, fully-functioning facilities.
In return, he called on the world's nuclear fuel suppliers to assure
supply, in a reliable and cost effective manner, to those states which
forego enrichment and reprocessing. We are working with other fuel
provider states and with the IAEA to put in place assurances that will
convince states with power reactors that their best economic interest
is not to invest in expensive, and proliferation risky, fuel cycle
capabilities. The DOE plays a critical part in developing these
Presidential initiatives and working with other nations to bring them
to fruition.
DOE's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which Secretary
Bodman announced last month, offers the promise for the longer term of
enhancing global access to nuclear energy while strengthening
nonproliferation. An important emphasis of the initiative is to provide
a basis for states to benefit from civil nuclear power while avoiding
the costs and challenges of enriching fresh fuel on the front end of
the fuel cycle and disposing of spent fuel on the back end. To that
end, GNEP envisions a cradle-to-grave fuel leasing regime under which
states that currently have the full fuel cycle would provide fresh fuel
for nuclear power plants in user nations. The spent fuel would then be
returned to a full fuel-cycle nation and would be recycled using a
process that does not result in separated plutonium. The DOS is working
closely with DOE to engage international partners to participate
actively in GNEP.
Defensive Measures
We refer to another set of tools as ``defensive measures.'' A key
requirement of counterproliferation is to protect ourselves from WMD-
armed adversaries. Combating WMD requires both offensive and defensive
capabilities, to deter, detect, defend against, and mitigate the
consequences of WMD and missile attacks. As the President stressed in
May 2001, we require new methods of deterrence against the
proliferation threats of today. A strong declaratory policy and
effective military forces are essential elements of our contemporary
deterrent posture, reinforced by effective intelligence, surveillance,
interdiction, and law enforcement. Because deterrence may not always
succeed, our military forces must be able to detect and destroy an
adversary's WMD before they are used, and to prevent WMD attack from
succeeding through robust active and passive defenses and mitigation
measures. All of those requirements place particular demands on the
DOD. Major milestones in implementing the administration's
comprehensive approach to combating WMD were marked in: January 2005,
when the Secretary of Defense designated STRATCOM as the lead combatant
command for this mission; in January 2006, when General Cartwright
announced the initial operating capability of the new STRATCOM Center
for Combating WMD in partnership with the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency; and in February 2006, when the DOD issued the first National
Military Strategy to Combat WMD.
Another critical defensive measure undertaken by the Bush
administration to combat weapons of mass destruction is the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which shows the close
interaction among--and the creative use of--diplomatic, military,
economic, law enforcement, and intelligence tools to combat
proliferation. Within the U.S. Government, the DOD, Intelligence
Community (IC), and the DOS all play essential roles in PSI. The
participating countries are applying laws already on the books in
innovative ways and cooperating as never before to interdict shipments,
to disrupt proliferation networks, and to hold accountable the front
companies that support them. PSI has now expanded to include support
from more than 70 countries, and continues to grow. It is not a treaty-
based approach, involving long, ponderous negotiations which yield
results only slowly, if at all. Instead, it is an active--and
proactive--partnership, to deter, disrupt, and prevent WMD
proliferation. It is working.
Economic and financial tools are also key elements of our defensive
measures. Adopting many of the means developed in the war against
terrorism, we are now working with our partners to cut off the
financial flows that fuel proliferation. UNSCR 1540 requires states to
take and enforce effective controls on funds and services related to
export and transshipment that would contribute to WMD programs.
Consistent with UNSCR 1540, in July 2005, G-8 leaders called for
enhanced efforts to combat proliferation through cooperation to
identify, track, and freeze financial transactions and assets
associated with proliferation-related activities.
President Bush augmented U.S. efforts in this area when he issued
in July 2005 a new Executive order, which authorizes the U.S.
Government to freeze assets and block transactions of entities and
persons, or their supporters, engaged in proliferation activities.
Currently 16 entities--11 from North Korea, 4 from Iran, and 1 from
Syria--have been designated under the Executive order, and we are
actively considering additional ones.
Our efforts to combat proliferation can also be aided by other
financial tools which are not specifically designed against WMD
proliferation. For example, in September, the Department of Treasury
(Treasury) applied authorities under the USA Patriot Act against an
Asian bank that provides financial services to North Korean illicit
activities, such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking. In designating
Banco Delta Asia as a ``primary money laundering concern'' under the
USA Patriot Act, Treasury acted to protect U.S. financial institutions
while warning the global community of the illicit financial threat
posed by the bank.
The Challenges Ahead
I would emphasize three proliferation challenges to illustrate the
path ahead.
The first is to end the North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons
programs. The President has made clear repeatedly that, while all
options remain on the table, our strong preference is to address these
threats through diplomacy.
In the Six-Party joint statement of September 2005, North Korea
committed to abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs. This was a notable development, but we still must agree on,
and implement, the detailed requirements of North Korean
denuclearization and its verification. That task will be difficult.
Indeed, North Korea's demand for a light water reactor immediately
after the joint statement was issued, and its more recent refusal to
return to negotiations until the United States rescinds what Pyongyang
calls ``economic sanctions,'' underscore the problems ahead. We have
made it clear that we are committed to pursuing successful Six-Party
negotiations, and we continue--with essential input from the DOD and
DOE--to develop our detailed concepts for the verified denuclearization
of North Korea. At the same time, we must and will continue our
defensive measures, and expand them as required, to ensure that we can
protect ourselves from the proliferation actions of the north, as well
as from its illicit activities such as money laundering or
counterfeiting.
In some ways, the challenge Iran poses to the nuclear
nonproliferation regime is even more daunting and complex than the
North Korean threat. We have now moved to a new phase, in which the
Security Council can add its considerable authority to the
international effort to counter Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. The
council will not supplant the IAEA effort, but reinforce it--for
example, by calling on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to take
steps the IAEA board has identified to restore confidence, and by
giving the IAEA new, needed authority to investigate all aspects of the
Iranian nuclear effort.
The Council should make clear to the Iranian regime that it will
face increasing isolation and pressure if it does not reverse course,
take the steps called for by the IAEA Board, and return promptly to
negotiations. We will continue to consult closely with the EU-3 and the
European Union, with Russia, China, and many other members of the
international community as this new diplomatic phase proceeds. Indeed,
Secretary Rice is meeting tomorrow in Berlin with her colleagues from
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China to discuss the
way forward.
Absent even more provocative actions by Iran, we envision a
graduated approach by the Security Council, interacting closely with
the IAEA. The Security Council can take progressively firmer action, to
the extent necessary, to induce Iran to come into complete compliance
with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and safeguards obligations,
suspend all its enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities, and
cooperate fully with the IAEA. We have been negotiating a statement by
the President of the Security Council that would send a clear message
to Iran that it must abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions. If Iran
defies the Security Council Presidential Statement, as it has the IAEA
Board of Governors resolutions, we will urge a Council resolution to
put increased pressure on Iran to comply. The resolution could be
grounded in chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, given the threat to
international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear program. In
issuing such a resolution, the Council could require Iran, within a
specified short period of time, to comply with all elements of the IAEA
Board resolutions, as well as with additional Council requirements such
as opening up to substantially increased IAEA investigative authority.
If Iran still does not comply, we will look to even firmer Council
action. Our aim is that Iran will be persuaded to reverse course by the
obvious resolve of the international community, shown first in the IAEA
Board of Governors and beginning this month in the Security Council.
The second challenge is to end proliferation trade by rogue states,
individuals and groups. As I described, we have made progress over the
last few years. We have moved from the creation of international export
control standards to their active enforcement--through enhanced
national legislation, PSI interdictions, international law enforcement
and financial cooperation. We have shut down the world's most dangerous
proliferation network. We are steadily reducing the opportunities
available to proliferators. But we must continue to expand and deepen
our efforts--using all available national and international authorities
and, where necessary, creating new ones--until the proliferation trade
has effectively ended.
The final challenge that I would mention is the need to prevent
terrorist acquisition and use of WMD, and especially of biological and
nuclear weapons. If terrorists acquire these weapons, they are likely
to employ them, with potentially catastrophic effects. The biggest
hurdle that a well-organized terrorist group with appropriate technical
expertise would have to overcome to make a crude nuclear device is to
gain access to sufficient quantities of fissile material. Although
terrorist use of other weapons is more likely, the consequences of a
terrorist nuclear attack would be so catastrophic that the danger
requires particular attention. On the biological weapons side, with
today's dual-use capabilities and access to particular, dangerous
pathogens--many of which exist in nature or could be relatively easily
obtained and cultured--the bioterror challenge presents a low-cost
means to prosecute a potentially high-impact attack.
Many of the tools we have in place to combat proliferation by rogue
states are relevant against WMD terrorism. A few examples are: reducing
the global stocks of fissile material and securing those which remain;
improved nuclear and biological detection capability; and the
interdiction of trafficking in nuclear weapons and biological weapons
components. A key difference, however, is one of scale. We cannot rest
as long as enough material for even one nuclear weapon remains
unsecured.
While many of the tools are the same, preventing WMD terrorism
requires different approaches from those we have followed against state
WMD programs or against conventional or non-WMD-related terrorism. For
example, intelligence collection and action against the proliferation
of WMD have traditionally focused on state-based programs, while anti-
terrorist intelligence has focused on individuals and groups.
Intelligence regarding the nexus of terrorism and WMD must cover the
full range of state and non-state threats and their interrelationships.
We are working hard to close any remaining gaps and to ensure that the
intelligence process supports our strategic approach to combating WMD
terrorism.
That strategic approach entails working with partner nations to
build a global layered defense to prevent, detect and respond to the
threat or use of WMD by terrorists. To prevent, we will undertake
national, multilateral, and global efforts to deny terrorists access to
the most dangerous materials. To protect, we will develop new tools and
capabilities with partner nations to detect the movement of WMD and to
disrupt linkages between WMD terrorists and their facilitators. Because
we can never be certain of our ability to prevent or protect against
all potential WMD terrorist attacks, we will cooperate with partners to
manage and mitigate the consequences of such attacks, and to improve
our capabilities to attribute their source. Thus, we will work to
harness, in an effective multinational way, all relevant collective
resources to establish more coordinated and effective capabilities to
prevent, protect against, and respond to the global threat of WMD
terrorism.
conclusion
The strategic approach to combat WMD proliferation which the
President first laid out almost 5 years ago continues to provide an
essential guide to action against this paramount threat. Our strategy,
supported by the new measures we have adopted to implement it, is
flexible and dynamic, suited to the changing nature of the
proliferation threat. Under the overall interagency leadership of the
National Security Council, the DOS, DOD, and DOE work closely together
at all levels--along with the Departments of Treasury, Commerce,
Homeland Security, and the IC--to ensure the full and coordinated
implementation of the President's strategy. While we have made
substantial progress in countering today's proliferation threats, we
cannot be satisfied. We must continue to heed the warning which the
President gave in 2002: ``History will judge harshly those who saw this
coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the
only path to peace and security is the path of action.''
Senator Cornyn. We'll go ahead and hear the opening
statements from each of the witnesses then we'll turn to a
round of questions and when Senator Reed arrives certainly give
him a chance to make any opening statement he would care to
make.
Mr. Flory, we'll be glad to hear from you first.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER FLORY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Mr. Flory. Chairman Cornyn, thank you. Senator Collins,
Senator Nelson. It's a honor to have the opportunity to testify
before the subcommittee today to describe the DOD's efforts to
combat the proliferation of WMD. I appreciate the opportunity
to summarize my prepared remarks which I request be included in
the record in full.
Senator Cornyn. Certainly, without objection. All written
statements will be made part of the record.
Mr. Flory. Thank you. My goal today is to share with you
many of the new approaches, new initiatives, the DOD is taking
to stop the proliferation of WMD, to preventing its use, and to
enable our warfighters to accomplish their missions in a WMD
environment, if necessary.
This is not a new mission, it's something we've been
focusing on particularly since the events of September 11 and
the promulgation of a national strategy on combating WMD in
2002. The challenge was summed up particularly well by
President Bush in his January 2004 State of the Union address,
when he said, ``America is committed to keeping the world's
most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous
regimes.'' I would add to that that under regimes we would also
include terrorist groups and others who might want to use WMD
against us.
There's a great deal that's happened since September 11,
since 2002, and even since January 2004. At the strategic level
as in the strategic level guidance preventing hostile states
and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD is one of the
four priorities for the DOD that were identified in the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that was issued by Secretary
Rumsfeld last month. I would add that it also supports and is
an element of the other priorities which include defeating
terrorists networks, defending the Homeland in depth, and
shaping the choices of states at strategic crossroads. So all
of these priority areas actually relate to and support each
other.
This is the first time that a QDR has devoted so much
attention to the threat of WMD. Also recently and at the
strategic level the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Pace, issued the first ever national military strategy
to combat WMD on February 13, 2006, last month. Our strategic
approach is to build on the so-called three pillars of
combating WMD, and these were identified in the 2002 national
strategy, and those are: nonproliferation,
counterproliferation, and consequence management. We use those
terms as follows:
Nonproliferation refers to actions to prevent the
proliferation of WMD by dissuading or impeding access to, or
distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and
expertise.
Counterproliferation refers to actions to defeat the threat
and/or the use of WMD against the United States, against our
Armed Forces, against our allies, or against our partners.
WMD consequence management refers to actions taken to
mitigate the effects of a WMD attack or event and to restore
essential operations and services at home or abroad.
The strategic framework and the more detailed functional
requirements that flow to it is the Department's vehicle for
dividing the broad combating WMD mission into eight specific
and definable military activities that we can address with
better focus in the budget, training, doctrine, and policy
processes.
In addition to a new strategic framework we have also
revised our organizational structure to better position us to
combat WMD. On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of Defense
designated STRATCOM, commanded by General Cartwright who is
here with me today, as the DOD's lead for synchronizing and
focusing combating WMD operational efforts in support of our
combatant commanders. In this new role, STRATCOM supports the
other combatant commanders as they execute combating WMD
operations and General Cartwright and his team, including Dr.
Jim Tegnelia, of the DTRA now are the advocates for developing
mission requirements and shepherding them through the budget
process. Those are mission requirements relating to combating
WMD.
The first two mission requirements to be addressed in this
manner are WMD elimination and interdiction, two areas where we
need to increase our capabilities substantially. Those are two
of the eight mission areas that were identified.
In addition, all DOD components were directed to realign
themselves to improve execution of the combating WMD mission.
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, for example, my own
office, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International
Security Policy, is a near-single point of contact for policy
support for the combating WMD mission, specifically covering
seven of the eight mission areas. We continue to refine our
organization within the Office of the Under Secretary for
Policy.
While we pursue these strategic and organizational changes
we continue to move ahead with day-to-day activities to combat
WMD. Many of these activities were initiated around the time of
the National Strategy to Combat WMD in 2002. Some actually were
started earlier and many are entirely new or certainly things
that were initiated in the last couple of years. The QDR groups
these activities into preventive and responsive dimensions.
With respect to the preventive end of things,
nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes have been
and remain integral elements of our strategy for combating WMD.
These include the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar
Arrangement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The DOD
brings significant policy and technical expertise to bear on
enforcement of these regimes including for a few examples
within my office, our Office of Negotiations Policy, and the
Defense Technology Security Administration. But while these
regimes are an important first line of defense, not all
countries are members of all regimes and many countries that
are members of regimes cheat. WMD programs in countries like
Iran and North Korea, for example, have highlighted the need
for additional measures. One of those in particular is
interdiction.
Interdiction is an essential component in our efforts to
counter the proliferation activities of both suppliers and
customers. Interdictions can raise the costs for proliferators,
they can shine a bright light on their activities, they can
also deter suppliers or potential suppliers from going into the
proliferation business in the first place.
President Bush launched the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) in May 2003 to help U.S. interdiction efforts
and to build the interdiction capacity of like-minded
governments around the world. PSI partners, and now there are
over 70 of them, define interdiction broadly to include
military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts
to impede and stop proliferation shipments. This can involve
sea, air, land, or what we call transmodal shipments, shipments
that go from sea to air or land, to sea or whatever. Again,
more than 70 countries have indicated support for the PSI and
we continue to discuss the initiative with other potential
supporters.
The DOD is responsible for leading the PSI Operational
Experts Group process which is the main focus for the
operational aspects of PSI. This is a group that brings
together experts in military, intelligence, law enforcement,
customs, and other fields and allows them to plan and conduct
exercises to share expertise, for example, on how different
country's legal regimes can be used to support
counterproliferation activities. To date, we've had 19 PSI
exercises with a number of countries involving a wide range of
operational assets including air, maritime, and ground assets,
and these have been hosted by a number of different PSI
countries.
Another DOD program that supports the preventive dimension
of combating WMD is the CTR program which Chairman Cornyn
mentioned earlier. The subcommittee is familiar with the
history and the details of CTR and we appreciate your support
in the past. My prepared statement addresses in detail the
CTR's record over the past year and some of the issues and
challenges we see in the year ahead.
For now I'd like to highlight one of the activities, one of
the CTR preventive activities in particular which is one in
which the administration needs Congress' help in the short-term
to help ensure success and I'm referring to the Nuclear
Security Cooperation Initiative announced by Presidents Bush
and Putin at the February 2005 G8 Summit in Bratislava. A key
element of this initiative is to accelerate U.S. security work
at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites to achieve completion
by 2008. That would be 4 years ahead of the originally planned
schedule. If we're successful in doing this and we certainly
intend to be successful we'll be able to say by 2008 that we
will have done all that we can to bring the security of
Russia's nuclear weapons up to credible standards. This will be
a significant achievement and we need your help to achieve this
goal. Acceleration of the original schedule to 2008 requires
additional funds for obligations during fiscal year 2006 and I
would respectfully urge subcommittee members to support the
administration's request for $44.5 million in fiscal year 2006
supplemental appropriations for this project.
Mr. Chairman, if I could just quickly also address two of
the specific issues you asked about in your statement, the
Shchuch'ye Project, and the question of using CTR funds to
Libya. The Shchuch'ye Project is a large project in which we've
invested a great deal of money to construct a chemical
demilitarization plant. We've had a delay in the project that
is going to set us back we think somewhat over a year. The one
subcontractor that entered a bid to carry out some of the work
inside the facilities of actually putting in some of the
equipment submitted a bid that is way too high and both the
U.S. Government and our main contractor on the contract agreed
that the bid was too high. We've gone back, we have put the
contract out for additional bids. We'll go through that
process, we'll see what we emerge with, and see if we can't get
a better offer on the table this time. I would emphasize for
the committee's purposes that this means there will be a delay
in the Shchuch'ye Project.
The other matter you raised was the question of Libya, what
CTR might do to contribute to the destruction of Libyan
chemical weapons. We had a team, I think it was a Department of
State (DOS) DTRA team with members from the DOS and our DTRA
that was in Libya in February. They have looked at the stocks
involved, they have looked at the logistical and other issues
involved, and we expect to get a report back from them with
some options sometime next month and I'm sure we'll have the
opportunity to discuss that further with the committee. That's
the status on the couple of additional items that you raised.
Mr. Chairman, turning now to the responsive dimension of
the combating WMD mission and what we have done to address the
challenges here, the autumn 2005 program/budget review
undertook a comprehensive look at combating WMD funding that
was carried on through the QDR. Beginning with the 2006 budget
submission, in fact, we added $2 billion to the previous $7.6
billion fiscal years 2006-2011 allocation for the Chemical
Biological Defense Program. This increase in the Chem-Bio
Defense Program funding represents a down payment towards
reprioritization of and within the combating WMD mission. This
process is not complete and we look forward to working with
STRATCOM and with the committee as we proceed with these
initiatives.
Another element of the responsive dimension is the
establishment of an Army headquarters tasked to provide
technically qualified chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) response forces to
support geographic combatant commanders. The 20th Army Support
Command has this job now which includes capabilities to quickly
and systematically locate, seize, secure, disable, and
safeguard an adversary's WMD program, including sites,
laboratories, materials, associated scientists, and other
personnel. The impetus for setting up this organization was the
work that was done prior to the Iraq war to set up forces to
deal with the WMD that we expected to find in Iraq. In fact,
many of the elements of the current group actually did serve as
part of the Iraq WMD effort.
Today this organization includes the Army's technical
escort battalions as well as an Army explosive ordinance
disposal (EOD) group. The headquarters of the 20th was
activated in 2004. The next step for this unit will be to make
the entire unit including the headquarters as deployable as its
many operational components. As it stands right now some of the
headquarters is civilian so they cannot be deployed in the same
way that the military components can be, but that's something
we're in the process of changing.
Another element of the responsive dimension is to
anticipate the continued evolution of WMD threats. As an
example of how we're doing this, we are reallocating $1.5
billion in Chem-Bio Defense Program funds to invest in broad-
spectrum countermeasures against advance bioterror threats.
Currently the approach has been somewhat shorthanded as the
``one drug, one bug'' approach whereby a particular vaccine or
a particular remedy only worked against one particular
pathogen. What we're trying to do now is develop broad-spectrum
countermeasures that work against an entire class of threats.
We're also expanding our work with potential partner
countries to improve response capabilities. In 2002, the DOD
helped create a Chem-Bio Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Defense
Battalion for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Elements of this fully operational battalion were available
just over a year later to support the 2004 Summer Olympics in
Athens. This battalion has received personnel and capability
support from 17 NATO nations to date. We continue to encourage
strengthening the battalion's capabilities to help drive member
nations to improve their own combating WMD capabilities as well
as to improve the collective capabilities of the unit. This
battalion will be a model for future collaboration as we expand
our counterproliferation discussions with other nations.
In addition, we continue to develop bilateral discussions
with international partners on counterproliferation issues
ranging from policy and operational support to detailed
technical cooperation. We have or we are establishing such
bilateral working groups with a number of countries in Europe,
the Middle East, and Asia that share our concern about and our
desire to prepare for the WMD threat.
I would just add as a general point here, one of the key
themes in the QDR is the idea of developing partnership
capacity and both the initiatives that I just mentioned as well
as a number of things that we are undertaking are designed to
support that goal. We can't do everything. We shouldn't have to
do everything, and in a number of cases arguably it's better if
somebody else does it. So the idea of developing capabilities
and developing capabilities of partner nations is something
that runs throughout our entire approach here.
Senator Cornyn. Secretary Flory, you are providing the
committee a lot of very good information but in the interest of
getting to the other witnesses if you wouldn't mind summing up
and then, of course, we'll come back with some questions and
answers.
Mr. Flory. Mr. Chairman, I can sum up very briefly and
simply say we understand at the DOD that combating the threat
of WMD in a complex and uncertain world while it continues to
surprise us and often in unpleasant manners, requires a new
approach. This approach is reflected in our strategic guidance,
in our realigned operational structure, and in the way we carry
out our day-to-day activities. Our commitment to success is
absolute. Failure is not an option. I look forward to having
the opportunity later to answer your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Flory follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Peter C.W. Flory
Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, members of the subcommittee, it is
an honor to have the opportunity to appear before you to describe the
Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to combat proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). My goal today is to share with you
many of the Department's new approaches to stopping the proliferation
of WMD, preventing its use, and enabling our warfighters to accomplish
their missions in a WMD environment if necessary.
Since December 2002, when the President set forth the National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Department has
taken a number of measures to enable us better to carry out this
mission. At the same time, while adapting at the strategic level, we
have been carrying out the day-to-day activities--some ongoing, some
new, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)--to implement
our policies in the face of the global WMD challenge.
strategic guidance
At the strategic level, preventing hostile states and non-state
actors from acquiring or using WMD is one of the four priorities for
the Department identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This
is the first time a QDR has devoted such attention to the threat of
WMD.
Also at the strategic level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on February 13, 2006, issued the first-ever National Military
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. This strategy builds on
the three-pillar structure of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD:
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. As
defined in the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, these pillars
are:
Nonproliferation: actions to prevent the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access
to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and
expertise.
Counterproliferation: actions to defeat the threat
and/or use of WMD against the United States, U.S. Armed Forces,
its allies, and partners.
WMD Consequence Management: actions taken to mitigate
the effects of WMD attack or event and restore essential
operations and services at home and abroad.
At the next level, the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD
identifies eight military mission areas that support the pillars in the
National Strategy: offensive operations, elimination operations,
interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, WMD
consequence management, security cooperation and partner activities,
and threat reduction cooperation. This new strategic framework is the
Department's vehicle for dividing the broad ``combating WMD'' mission
into specific, definable military activities that we can address with
better focus in the budget, training, doctrine, and policy processes.
organizing for the combating wmd mission
On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of Defense designated the United
States Strategic Command (STRATCOM)--commanded by General Cartwright,
here today--as the Department's lead for synchronizing and focusing
combating WMD operational efforts in support of our combatant
commanders. In this new role, STRATCOM supports other combatant
commanders as they execute combating WMD operations. General Cartwright
and his team now are designated to serve as advocates for developing
combating WMD mission requirements and shepherding them through the
budget process. STRATCOM's initial assignment is to focus on two of the
missions assigned by the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD:
elimination and interdiction.
Also, in the nature of organizational change, all DOD components
have been directed to realign themselves to improve execution of the
combating WMD mission. Within the organization of the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, for example, offices have been
realigned over the past 6 months to create in my office, the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, a
near-single point of contact for policy support of the combating WMD
mission. Within my office, in August 2005 the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy--already responsible for
interdiction and related WMD nonproliferation activities--was assigned
responsibility for the Offices of Counterproliferation Policy and
Cooperative Threat Reduction. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Forces Policy, also within my office, is responsible for active
defense and offensive operations. This organizational shift thus
brought policy responsibility for seven of the National Military
Strategy to Combat WMD's eight functional areas--offensive operations,
elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense,
passive defense, security cooperation and partner activities, and
threat reduction cooperation--under a single policy point of contact.
Organizing Policy's oversight of consequence management capabilities is
something we are still working on.
Our approach builds on the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction, and, more recently, the 2006 National Security
Strategy. Our goal was well summed up by President Bush in his January
20, 2004, State of the Union address, ``America is committed to keeping
the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most
dangerous regimes.'' To fulfill the President's commitment, the QDR
directs that ``national efforts to counter the threat posed by WMD must
incorporate both preventive and responsive dimensions.''
Again, while we are pursuing the strategic and organizational
changes I described above, we are already moving ahead on a day-to-day
basis in activities to combat WMD. Many of these activities were
initiated around the time the National Strategy to Combat WMD was
adopted. Some were started even earlier. Many are entirely new.
preventive dimension of combating wmd
The Toolkit for Preventive Activities
Nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes have been for
decades an integral element of our strategy for combating WMD. These
treaties and regimes include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement
and the Missile Technology Control Regime. DOD brings significant
policy and technical expertise to bear toward enforcement of these
regimes through the Office of Negotiations Policy and the Defense
Technology Security Administration.
Interdiction
While these regimes are a first line of defense, not all countries
are members of all regimes, and many countries that are members cheat.
WMD programs in countries like Iran and North Korea have highlighted
the need for additional measures such as interdiction. The December
2002 U.S. National Strategy to Combat WMD called for enhanced
interdiction to curtail proliferation of WMD. Interdiction is an
essential component in our efforts to counter the proliferation
activities of both suppliers and customers. Interdictions raise the
costs for proliferators, but also can deter some suppliers from even
getting in the business of prolferation.
Efforts to Improve Interdiction Capabilities
As part of this effort, DOD has taken steps to strengthen U.S.
military capabilities to support interdiction. For example:
Interdiction Simulation. In October 2005, the Naval
War College organized the first government-wide, classified
gaming exercise for all U.S. agencies involved in interdiction.
This simulation involved senior officials and a broad spectrum
of operational/technical experts. The goal was to improve our
ability to create and exploit interdiction opportunities by:
(1) developing new operational concepts; and (2) strengthening
relationships across the government.
Integration of U.S. Military Capabilities. In January
2005, STRATCOM was tasked with integrating DOD efforts to
combat WMD. Interdiction was identified as a top priority
(along with WMD elimination). In this new role, STRATCOM will
be able to: advocate development of capabilities supporting
WMD-related interdiction; develop operational concepts and
doctrine; synchronize intelligence; identify resource
requirements; and coordinate strategic planning. Military
departments and other combatant commands were tasked to support
STRATCOM's efforts.
Naval Assets. The U.S. Navy has improved shipboarding
and cargo assessment. In 2005, the Navy validated its new Visit
Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) team capability. VBSS teams are
assigned to every large deployed U.S. naval formation. The Navy
has also been testing a virtual, open-source database to
provide ship-boarding teams with visual cues (photographs and
descriptions of WMD-related materials) during examinations of
personnel, manifests, and cargo.
DOD Intelligence Organizations. The Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) established a new division for
interdiction support to DOD policymakers. This division is
integrating databases around the Intelligence Community for
tracking individuals, organizations and means of transport for
items of proliferation concern. In October 2005, the Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI) was directed to lead development of
cross-government, global maritime intelligence integration to
support national maritime security requirements to include
interdiction. The goal is strategic-to-tactical, time-sensitive
maritime intelligence for policymakers around the clock:
targeting support analysis, strategic indications and warning
analysis, and real time information sharing.
These are some specific examples of interdiction-related work
undertaken since 2002, and expansion of the relationships essential for
building capabilities.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
In addition to U.S. domestic efforts, we have worked closely with
other governments since President Bush launched the PSI in May 2003.
The PSI has been a forum for the United States and other countries to
collaborate on how we will work together to interdict WMD-related
shipments bound to and from states of concern, and to build national
capabilities so that like-minded nations collectively have a more
robust arsenal of WMD interdiction tools.
PSI partners define interdiction broadly to include military, law
enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts to impede and stop
proliferation-related shipments, and it can involve sea, air, land, or
trans-modal shipments. Today more than 70 countries have indicated
support for the PSI, and we continue to discuss the initiative with key
states where proliferators may operate.
PSI Builds National Capabilities
PSI partners are working together in the PSI operational experts
group (OEG) to improve their national interdiction capabilities. The
OEG is an expanding network of military, law enforcement, intelligence,
legal, and diplomatic experts. They develop new operational concepts
for interdiction, organize a program of interdiction exercises, share
information about national legal authorities, and pursue cooperation
with industry sectors that can be helpful to the interdiction mission.
Through these efforts, OEG participants raise the level of collective
and national interdiction capabilities. The November 2005 OEG meeting
was the first regionally focused OEG meeting and provided a venue for
all European PSI participants to develop national and regional
capabilities. The United States will host the next OEG meeting in April
2006, which for the first time will involve a South American
participant, Argentina.
DOD is responsible for leading the OEG process, the locus of
operational aspects of PSI. To date, 19 PSI exercises involving a wide
range of operational assets have been held. These have included air,
maritime, and ground assets and have been hosted by a range of
countries. Table-top games and simulations in particular have helped
participants work through interdiction scenarios, and have, in many
cases, improved the way participating governments organize to conduct
interdictions. We need to ensure DOD assigns the resources needed to
continue playing a leadership role in PSI operational activities and
working with our PSI partners.
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Mr. Chairman, the subcommittee is already familiar with the history
and details of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. CTR
supports another two of the mission areas identified by the National
Military Strategy to Combat WMD: threat reduction cooperation, and
security cooperation/partner activities. The program continues to help
eliminate WMD material and enhance security for WMD, particularly the
legacy WMD of the former Soviet Union. I would like to focus my
testimony on recent developments in CTR, as well as priorities for the
year ahead. A detailed explanation of the President's fiscal year 2007
budget request for the CTR program is appended to this statement.
The administration is requesting $372.1 million for CTR activities
in fiscal year 2007. The decrease from fiscal year 2006 ($409.2
million) results from decreasing requirements for the nerve agent
elimination project at Shchuch'ye, Russia. We expect CTR budget
requests to rise again in future years, as other projects replace
currently ongoing and completing projects.
Fiscal years 2005 and 2006-to-date saw continued progress for CTR.
This was the case both with respect to CTR's substantive mission, as
well as with respect to the revised business practices implemented
after problems arose several years ago. These new practices extended to
both policy and implementation. They included changes in personnel,
application of DOD acquisition processes, extensive reviews by the DOD
Inspector General and Government Accountability Office, conversion of
informal understandings to binding legal agreements, and establishment
of a formal ``executive review'' process, in which implementation and
policy experts review all aspects of major projects semi-annually with
their Russian counterparts.
In this timeframe, CTR continued its WMD infrastructure elimination
work in Russia, destroying 42 intercontinental missiles, and continued
work on the new mobile missile project that eliminates SS-24/25
missiles, as well as their rail- or road-mobile launchers. CTR also
continued work on the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at
Shchuch'ye. The Shchuch'ye facility will provide Russia a capability to
eliminate some 2.1 million artillery shells and rockets loaded with
nerve agent--one of Russia's most dangerous chemical agents weaponized
in the most proliferable form. At Shchuch'ye, both the Russian-built
and CTR-built main chemical weapons elimination buildings stand near
completion, ready to be outfitted internally with chemical handling and
neutralization equipment. Regrettably, the state-owned subcontractor we
had hoped would complete the CTR-funded main processing building
submitted an exorbitant bid for this work and has refused to budge. The
result may be up to a 14-month delay in completion of the facility, now
targeted for late 2008, with potential additional costs that cannot be
predicted with accuracy at this point. The U.S. commitment to
Shchuch'ye remains unchanged, and support from international partners
continues to be excellent.
Also in Russia, CTR has continued its assistance to improve the
security of nuclear warheads in storage. With the President's
Bratislava Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative, we are poised to
complete our security work at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites by
2008. This effort is an acceleration of work that was already underway
through CTR and a related DOE program, but was not programmed for
completion before 2011. What was achieved at Bratislava was Russian
agreement to supply information promptly on all warhead sites where
Moscow felt U.S. assistance would be necessary. Russia met that
commitment by providing detailed information in June 2005 that allowed
U.S. agencies and the Russian government to agree on an accelerated
schedule to upgrade security at select sites by 2008.
Let me be clear: the U.S. is not enhancing security of warheads
attached to operational nuclear delivery systems; rather, we are
supporting Russia in its responsibility to secure its extensive warhead
inventory across its vast and often remote array of storage facilities.
The U.S. will be able to say by 2008 that we have done all we can to
bring security of Russia's nuclear weapons up to credible standards.
That will be a significant achievement. We will need Congress to help
in this endeavor. Acceleration of the original schedule from a 2011
completion target to 2008 requires that additional funds be obligated
during fiscal year 2006. I urge subcommittee members to support the
administration's request for $44.5 million in fiscal year 2006
supplemental appropriations for this CTR project.
The past year has also seen success in implementation of CTR's
``Threat Agent Detection and Response'' (TADR) project. TADR is being
implemented in Central Asian and Caucasus states. It is a web-based
disease surveillance network that replaces the Soviet system of
maintaining libraries of dangerous pathogens in unsecured locations.
Under TADR, CTR consolidates these dangerous pathogen strains in a
Central Reference Laboratory which will have the ability to
characterize and securely store the sample. The U.S. receives samples
of each strain. The result is a capability to determine whether a
disease outbreak is naturally occurring or a potential bio-terror
event. TADR-supplied equipment and training already in place have been
used to identify Avian Influenza. In 2005, we signed agreements on TADR
assistance with Azerbaijan and with Ukraine. This complements
agreements already in place with Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.
The TADR project has been a key initiative for this administration and
we believe it helps meet a significant, unfilled requirement for the
U.S. to stay abreast of the global bio-terror threat.
During the past year, CTR also saw continued progress in its WMD
border security project, known as the WMD-Proliferation Prevention
Initiative (PPI). PPI was conceived at the outset of this
administration, and implemented after the September 11 attacks. This
initiative takes CTR in a fundamentally new direction. Previously, CTR
dealt with WMD at its source--a CTR mission that will be essential for
as long as governments identify stocks of WMD, delivery systems, and
related infrastructure and request U.S. help in eliminating them.
However, September 11 highlighted the need to look beyond ``WMD-in-
place'' and address the threat of ``WMD-on-the-move.'' PPI focuses on
willing countries that lack resources--in the case of PPI, the
resources to build detection/interdiction capabilities on their own.
PPI is now at work in Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. We recently
expanded activities in Ukraine, and signed key legal agreements with
Kazakhstan to allow us to begin PPI projects with that country. We are
focusing on Central Asian countries because of their proximity to
Russia in order to create a WMD ``safety net.'' We are not merely
supplying equipment through PPI, but are working with the combatant
commands to provide training, doctrine and tactics for that equipment.
We have appreciated the continued interest of Armed Services staff
in PPI and WMD border security. PPI's approach has prompted questions
about whether it should be viewed as traditional security assistance.
In our view, since PPI is linked specifically to WMD nonproliferation--
CTR's core goal as reflected in the original CTR legislation--it is
eligible for funding under CTR. We will continue to work with Congress
to ensure PPI continues to meet the legislation requirements. We
believe WMD border security is an important element of the CTR mission,
and will continue to provide opportunities to help other countries
improve their ability to secure their borders against the spread of
WMD.
One reason for congressional concern about CTR's WMD border
security work has been the sheer scope of U.S. international border
security activities, and the need to enhance coordination of these
border security programs. We can report that, as of January 2006, all
international border security assistance related to nuclear detection
activities is governed by guidelines promulgated and administered by
the NSC's Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee. These
guidelines will be expanded to include a process whereby all types of
U.S. international border security assistance, from proliferation
prevention to counternarcotics, will be synchronized and deconflicted
as well at the Washington level, as they are currently in the field.
Finally, I can report that in May 2005, DOD took the initiative to
extend the CTR program's legal framework with Russia--over 1 year ahead
of expiration. We took this step to avoid a disruption of CTR's
important work such as occurred 7 years ago, the last time the
framework required extension. We are pleased to report that Russia has
accepted U.S. terms for extension of this framework and we believe we
will be able to conclude negotiations well before the June 2006
deadline. This will allow CTR's important work to secure and eliminate
WMD and related infrastructure in Russia to continue uninterrupted.
responsive dimension of combating wmd
Day-to-Day Changes: Investing for the Future
Revising our strategies, restructuring our organizations, and
changing our daily activities will not have lasting impact without
adequate funding of corresponding capabilities, technologies and
mission areas. The autumn 2005 program/budget review undertook a
comprehensive review of combating WMD funding which was carried through
the QDR. Beginning with the fiscal year 2006 budget submission, we
added $2 billion to a $7.6 billion fiscal year 2006-2011 FYDP for the
Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP). We continue to seek
opportunities to realign resources for the combating WMD mission; and
two key priorities, under STRATCOM's leadership, will be military
requirements for the elimination and interdiction missions. The $2
billion increase in chem-bio defense program funding represents a down
payment toward reprioritization of the combating WMD mission. However,
this process is not complete and we look forward to working with
STRATCOM on improving definition of the requirements.
Day-to-Day Changes: Joint Task Force for Elimination
One of the earliest lessons learned from our military operations in
Iraq was that DOD needed a well organized, well trained force to be
able to quickly and systematically locate, seize, secure, disable and
safeguard an adversary's WMD program, including sites, laboratories,
materials, and associated scientists and other personnel.
The Army's 20th Support Command, located north of Baltimore at the
Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, was stood up as an Army
headquarters tasked to provide technically qualified Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives response
forces to support geographic combatant commanders. This unique
organization includes the Army's Technical Escort Battalions as well as
an Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group. While the 20th was not
established until after Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of its units
participated in the search for WMD in Iraq.
The 20th Headquarters was activated in 2004. However, while the
military units assigned to this headquarters are deployable, the
headquarters itself cannot deploy today since nearly two-thirds of the
staff is composed of government civilians or contractors. In the QDR
process, DOD leadership approved a proposal to assign 20th Support
Command the task of becoming a deployable headquarters that could
command and control these types of operations.
Establishing a joint task force for elimination is a key element of
the Department's vision, as articulated by the QDR, to deal with all
aspects of the threat posed by WMD.
Day-to-Day Changes: Biodefense Initiative
Another key conclusion of the QDR was that the Department should
focus on new defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued
evolution of WMD threats. In response, DOD has decided to reallocate
funding within the Chem-Bio Defense program to invest over $1.5 billion
over the next 5 years to develop broad-spectrum countermeasures against
advanced bio-terror threats. For example, rather than continuing the
traditional approach to developing countermeasures--which in effect
results in ``one drug, one bug''--DOD will conduct research to develop
drugs that could each counter many pathogens. For example, we are going
to conduct research to develop a single vaccine to counter all types of
viral hemorrhagic fevers (like Ebola and Marburg) as well as a single
vaccine for all ``intracellular'' pathogens, like the Plague.
While supporting our combating WMD effort, these initiatives also
benefit our forces who may well be ordered to deploy to places where
these fevers pose a risk. Having one drug that could counter many bugs
would improve military effectiveness by getting forces into the theater
more quickly.
Day-to-Day Changes: Building Partner Capacity
More than ever before, we need partners be to be prepared for
operations with us in a CBRN world. In 2002, the Department proposed
creation of a CBRN Defense Battalion for NATO. This U.S. concept was
endorsed by NATO defense ministers during the 2002 Prague Summit, and
elements of a fully operational CBRN Defense Battalion supported the
2004 Summer Olympics just over 1 year later. The battalion includes a
CBRN joint assessment team and mobile chemical, biological and
radiological laboratories; it has received personnel and capability
support from 17 NATO nations to date. The concept for the Battalion and
the way it was quickly institutionalized were unprecedented at NATO. We
continue to encourage strengthening of the Battalion's capabilities to
help drive member nations to improve their own combating WMD
capabilities. The Battalion will be a model for future collaboration as
we expand our counterproliferation discussions with other nations.
In addition, we continue to develop bilateral discussions with
international partners on counterproliferation issues ranging from
policy and operational support to detailed technical cooperation. We
have or are establishing such bilateral working groups with countries
from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia that share our desire to prepare
for defense against the WMD threat.
One goal of the bilateral working groups we establish is to ensure
that U.S. and potential coalition partners can execute combined
operations in a WMD environment. The challenge of interoperability is
significant even in a ``mere'' conventional warfighting environment.
However, a WMD situation raises many additional issues. For example, if
our combat or transport aircraft are returning from an area where WMD
has been employed, we need to know in advance what decontamination our
allies will require in order to ensure ready access to important way
stations and forward depots. Similar problems relate to the
decontamination of forces--including potentially wounded personnel--who
will require immediate evacuation and attention. We have launched
discussions with our NATO allies as well as several key potential
coalition partners on these and other issues we believe need to be
resolved for combined operations in a WMD environment.
Building partner capacity takes many forms and can include building
legal capacities. In 2005, Navy, Joint Staff, General Counsel, and
Office of the Secretary of Defense-Policy representatives completed 3
years of activity to expand legal authority against maritime
trafficking in WMD, and helped secure adoption of amendments to the
Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation establishing the first international criminal
standard against shipment of WMD as well as a comprehensive boarding
regime. Once the amendment enters into force after ratification by 12
member-states, we will have a new vehicle to prosecute violators and
press for greater vigilance against trafficking in WMD.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the DOD understands that combating the spread of WMD
in a complex and uncertain world requires a new approach. This new
approach is reflected in our new strategic guidance, realigned
organizational structure, and in changes in our day-to-day activities.
We view this as part of the Department's larger, long-term
transformation to better ensure U.S. security against future threats.
Our commitment to success in this endeavor is absolute. Failure is not
an option. Congress is an essential partner in this fight, and we look
forward to continuing our work together. Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. General Cartwright,
we'd be glad to hear your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES CARTWRIGHT, USMC, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think most
of it has been covered and I'll just hit on a couple of
questions that you brought up in your initial statement just to
make sure we have that as a starting point. The threat really
has been covered, the pillars, the national, and the military
strategies here.
In January 2005, STRATCOM was assigned the mission of
synchronizing and integrating all of the mission areas that
heretofore had been spread across the Department. So we see
ourselves in a position of advocating for the doctrine, the
organization, the material solutions, the tactics, techniques,
and procedures that will serve and benefit the regional
combatant commanders.
In August 2005, the DTRA was assigned as our lead combat
support agency and what they brought to the table for us was
the technical expertise. They are recognized within the DOD as
having the technical expertise and the relationships across the
government to allow us to effect this mission area in a way
that we need to do it.
In the January timeframe of this year, 2006, we stood up
the initial operating capability of what we call the Center for
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. STRATCOM is organized
with joint functional components but given that the DTRA is in
fact an agency rather than a military organization and has a
director as its head versus a commander, we chose to call this
a center to clearly identify the fact that it was led by a
civilian. We have assigned to that organization a flag officer
who gets up every day worrying about what it is that we need to
do to bring closer the military capabilities and the technical
expertise that DTRA brings to the table. So there is a core
element inside of DTRA at their headquarters in Fort Belvoir in
Virginia that is assigned to bring closer together that
technical expertise that resides there and the operational
planning and execution functions that we're going to have to
carry out in this mission area across all three pillars.
We also, as was discussed here in the opening statement,
have a joint task force (JTF) for elimination that we are
standing up with the 20th Support Group of the Army; a major
effort and a major capability need that we have to get going
and get going quickly. We're in the functional need assessment
phase of standing that organization up to make it deployable,
make it responsive to the combatant commanders. The objective
here is to give the regional combatant commanders the
capability all the way from what we call Phase Zero which is
the engagement activities within the theater through combat
operations and, if necessary, through the consequence
management of the clean-up of activities at the end of a
conflict. To have one coherent organization looking across all
those phases in support of the regional combatant commanders is
where we want to end up.
We intend to get there and get there as quickly as we can.
The next major milestone for us is at the end of this year to
have that component, that JTF for elimination, up and running
with a needs assessment and understanding of the requirements,
resources both in manpower and dollars that are going to be
necessary and the authorities for the organization to be
effective. I'll leave it at that and open to your questions,
Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: Thank you for this
opportunity to review U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) progress
during the past year and to present our plan for the future. I will
discuss the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) role in validating and
updating our transformational approach, and request your continued
support for specific actions necessary to ensure our strategic
capabilities are correctly postured to meet the challenges of today and
tomorrow. 2006 is a year of unprecedented change. Our ultimate goals
are driving the pace of change: building strategic advantage, ensuring
the security of the American people and strengthening the community of
free nations.
adapting to the new environment--transforming while we fight
One year ago, we spoke of global interdependence and its impact on
how we organize, plan, and operate. We emphasized developing strong
links between U.S. strategic objectives and regional operations, as our
adversaries were employing asymmetric means to strike well beyond the
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. We also spoke of STRATCOM's new
mission assignments and the steps we had undertaken to transform our
command into an agile 21st century organization capable of deterring
our adversaries and bringing the full range of global strike,
defensive, command and control (C\2\), and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to bear against them if
necessary. We outlined an enormous transformational effort that had to
be accomplished in the context of an ongoing global conflict with
active combat operations and without the luxury of an operational
pause.
Throughout the last year, the men and women of STRATCOM have
engaged in that global conflict, often employing means not visible
either to the average American or to our adversaries. They met this
day-to-day challenge with professionalism and commitment while they
were also restructuring our organization to focus our efforts, conserve
our resources, and streamline support to other combatant commanders
around the world. I come to you today gratified by the progress these
fine men and women have made and energized to complete the task before
us.
stratcom transformation vectors
The Department of Defense (DOD) budget you enacted for 2006 enabled
a string of organizational and operational successes along all of our
transformation vectors.
We changed the way we are organized and operate. We implemented,
and by the end of 2006, will refine the redistributed and functionally
aligned command structure described last year. This new structure is
already paying off in terms of decentralized operational employment and
increased operational speed. Our efforts resulted in:
A flattened, streamlined, and focused headquarters
staff charged with maintaining command and control of the
Nation's nuclear forces, providing strategic guidance and
advocacy for essential mission capabilities, and conducting
integrated and synchronized strategic-level planning necessary
for mission accomplishment in all mission areas.
Four interdependent Joint Functional Component
Commands: ISR; Network-Warfare; Integrated Missile Defense; and
Space and Global Strike. Day-to-day operational planning and
execution of specialized global capabilities now reside at the
component level, where commanders are able to maintain focus on
their primary mission and not be distracted by staff support
activities.
Integrated Information Operations (IO) support through
the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC). The JIOC is the
focal point for all operational and tactical IO planning
support to DOD users around the globe.
Improved security for DOD information systems through
the aggressive efforts of Joint Task Force--Global Network
Operations (JTF-GNO). JTF-GNO instituted stringent use controls
and trained system users to reduce vulnerabilities.
A collaborative, Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC), to deliver select DOD space capability to U.S.,
allied, and other national users. When fully operational, JSpOC
will provide the full range of DOD space capabilities.
A new STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction and a new Global Innovation and Strategy Center
that recently completed their formative processes, joining the
fight with specialized technical skills and solutions to unique
mission challenges.
By making this unique organizational transformation we also
strengthened our operational relationships with the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Defense
Information Systems Agency, and National Security Agency in order to
leverage the tremendous resources and capabilities resident in these
organizations. Now we effectively bridge many artificial barriers to
communications and information sharing, and bring enhanced combat power
to the regional combatant commanders.
We made progress in our drive toward a New Triad of capabilities
The New Triad is comprised of offensive and defensive capabilities
enabled by persistent global C\2\, intelligence, an agile planning
system, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The New Triad provides
improved flexibility in dealing with a wider range of contingencies,
while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons, in order to assure
our allies, dissuade competitors, and deter those who plan to harm us,
particularly with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Efforts to improve conventional global strike capability focused on
generating effects without being hindered by factors of time, distance,
basing rights, overflight considerations, or undue risk to American
service men and women. Recently the Department:
Bolstered the number of Joint Direct Attack Munitions
in the inventory, providing all weather, precision strike in a
smaller weapon footprint.
Fielded Tactical Tomahawk and the Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile, providing strike weapons that operate from
ranges outside enemy point defenses.
During the past year nonkinetic capabilities became an increasingly
important tool to deny our adversaries the opportunity to communicate
easily or to manipulate information in ways that further their efforts
to undermine stability around the world. We seek better nonkinetic
capabilities to improve our freedom of action at the lowest level of
conflict; to enhance deterrence; and support the sustained ability to
use our networks while denying the adversary a similar capability. In
this area we:
Expanded development of the applicable tactics,
techniques, and procedures to support use of information and
networks--cyberspace--as an environment for integrated
exploitation, offensive, and defensive operations.
Improved integration of nonkinetic effects into
operational planning, on a limited basis, in support of forces
involved in the global war on terrorism.
The President has committed the United States to sustaining a
credible nuclear deterrence capability with the lowest possible number
of nuclear weapons consistent with national security. STRATCOM's task
is to ensure our nuclear force remains ready to meet any contingency
while the nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable as we
prudently achieve the thresholds specified in the Moscow Treaty. To
this end we:
Sustained a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile in
cooperation with the national laboratories and the National
Nuclear Security Administration.
Took steps to improve the security and safety of the
deployed nuclear force.
Retired the last Peacekeeper Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) from service.
Reduced the number of operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads on the Minuteman III ICBM force.
Transferred the final ballistic missile submarine
scheduled for reconfiguration to carry conventionally armed
cruise missiles.
We continued pursuit of both active and passive defenses as a means
of deterring our adversaries by demonstrating our ability to deny their
attempts to coerce or harm the United States. During 2006 we will:
Conduct additional tests of a Standard Missile 3,
which is designed to engage mid- and short-range ballistic
missiles early in flight.
Conduct tests of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
missile, which is designed to engage mid- to short-range
ballistic missiles late in flight.
Increase the number of emplaced Ground Based
Interceptors in Alaska and California. Ground Based
Interceptors are designed to engage long-range ballistic
missiles in the midcourse of their flight. We plan on an
interceptor demonstration this spring and up to two more
interceptor tests by the end of 2006.
Refine our missile engagement tracking capability by
deploying sea-based and forward-based X-Band radars to
operational locations in the Pacific region, where, by the end
of 2006, they will join a global network of radars.
Upgrade the Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications System to extend situational awareness
capability to Pacific Command and European Command by the end
of 2006.
Promote expanded interagency support and participation
in the Proliferation Security Initiative to further global
efforts to combat the spread of WMD.
At the heart of the New Triad are the key enablers of command and
control, intelligence, and planning. Through these enablers, and our
broad array of space capability, we create the agility to respond to a
wide range of global challenges. During 2006 we will:
Evolve the renovated STRATCOM Global Operations Center
to enhance collaboration among all geographically distributed
STRATCOM elements--defining the first step toward a Global C\2\
capability for all New Triad forces.
Complete preparations for opening the first node in a
network of ground entry points designed to serve a nationally
distributed ground, air and sea network capable of providing
the diverse connectivity requirements of the New Triad and DOD
support to a broader national command capability using all
elements of national power.
Codify the output of the department-wide process
review designed to modify historically inefficient ISR force
apportionment practices to globally manage low-density, high-
demand ISR assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
reconnaissance aircraft.
Extrapolate the results of an exercise in which we
demonstrated the ability to achieve persistence through the
combination/integration of different ISR phenomenology, to
better fulfill combatant commander's intelligence requirements.
Capitalize on the longer dwell time of unmanned and
unattended sensors to produce greater persistence in global war
on terrorism operations.
Initiate a pilot program to determine essential global
strike command and control services with an explicit objective
of delivering a distributed, collaborative product. The pilot
program will take advantage of the Department's Data Strategy,
which calls for visible, accessible and understandable data,
and uses Services Oriented Architectures (SOA) to promote
flexibility and agility.
Initiate efforts to transition from a limited space
surveillance architecture to a more fully integrated
terrestrial and space-based approach to situational awareness.
a nation at war--continuing to transform
When I came before you last year, it was clear the pace of change
and nature of the threats and challenges to our Nation were growing
rapidly. It was also clear that Strategic Command's legacy systems and
organizational relationships were not suitable for meeting emerging
challenges the Nation now faces. Our intent, this year, was to address
nuclear issues in the QDR in order to rationalize them in the context
of our overall capabilities. It is against this backdrop that we
entered the dialog of the 2006 QDR.
STRATCOM presented new ideas and concepts, which were widely
debated during the course of review proceedings. We entered this review
believing the New Triad concept was sound in principle, but that the
pace of attaining the new construct was lagging the National need. With
this in mind we focused on four objectives:
Determine which elements of our considerable nuclear
force structure are essential to future stability and which
might be retired in favor of more redundant and credible
conventional or nonkinetic capabilities called for by the 2001
Nuclear Posture Review and 2005 Strategic Capabilities
Assessment.
Determine the next steps needed to fulfill our
commitment to an integrated missile defense capable of
defending the U.S., its deployed forces, friends, and allies.
Identify key enablers within the domains of ISR;
communications, space, and collaborative planning that could
rapidly improve our agility and responsiveness.
Identify structural barriers to effective integration
and synchronization of DOD efforts to combat WMD.
The QDR served to remind us of two very important factors: first,
that the United States is a nation engaged in a long war; and second,
that our enemies in this long war seek WMD and will likely attempt to
use them in their conflict with free people everywhere. Importantly,
the QDR validated the need to adjust the U.S. global military force
posture by moving away from a static defense in obsolete Cold War
garrisons. While the review described many areas in which we must shift
emphasis, we believe three are of particular importance to shaping our
command and its approach to the future:
From nation-state threats--to decentralized networked
threats from non-state enemies.
From ``one-size-fits-all'' deterrence--to tailored
deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer
competitors.
From a focus on kinetics--to a focus on effects.
We have taken the QDR's imperative for change as validation of our
desire to accelerate transformation in many areas. While we believe
progress has been made, more can be done in selected areas to improve
STRATCOM's posture and preparedness to respond to a wider range of
traditional, irregular, disruptive, or catastrophic challenges.
Beginning in 2007, we will take steps to:
Improve STRATCOM's nuclear deterrence posture. Key
initiatives include:
Reduce the number of deployed Minuteman III
ballistic missiles in order to provide assets to meet
essential flight test needs and ensure the viability of
the Minuteman force. This will better balance our
legacy nuclear capabilities while preserving our
ability to reconstitute additional forces in response
to strategic surprise.
Study the requirement for a Minuteman III
replacement. We believe this is an essential step
toward ensuring our future national security needs.
Study the requirement for nuclear-armed cruise
missiles and look at alternative methods of storing
these Cold War era weapons. We believe that this study
will provide valuable input in support of developing an
effective long term strategy to maintain the nuclear
stockpile.
Develop a wider range of conventional deterrent weapons
STRATCOM championed the need for a prompt, precise conventional
global strike capability, to bridge the gap between prompt nuclear
weapons and less timely, but precise, conventional weapons. Key
initiatives include:
Deploy an initial precision-guided conventional
Trident Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile capability within 2
years. The speed and range advantage of a conventional Trident
missile increases decision time and provides an alternative to
nuclear weapon use against fleeting, high value targets. The
conventional Trident missile would be particularly useful in
deterring or defeating those who seek to coerce or threaten the
U.S. with WMD.
Develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range
strike capability to be fielded by 2018.
Study alternative options for delivering prompt,
precise conventional warheads using advanced technologies such
as hypersonic vehicles from land, air, or the sea.
Develop nonkinetic capabilities to expand the range of effects we
can generate against certain targets. Without question we are on the
verge of a major technology shift to the Network Age. We see an
environment in which digital internet communication is more pervasive,
reliable, efficient, cheap, and rapid--even with the enormous increase
in volume, variety, and velocity of data. Key initiatives include:
Develop capabilities that promote the freedom of
action we enjoy in other mediums like, maritime and air.
Develop the doctrine, organization, training,
maintenance, logistics, personnel and facilities to defend our
Nation in this domain.
Enhance measures to improve information assurance and
network security.
Improve integrated defenses against short, intermediate, and
intercontinental range ballistic and cruise missiles, and develop
complementary capabilities to combat WMD. Key initiatives include:
Develop and mature integrated air and missile defenses
that deter attacks, demonstrating the ability to deny an
adversary's objectives.
Integrate defensive systems among our international
partners in ways that promote assurance against attack.
Expand the Army's 20th Support Command's capabilities,
to enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid
deployment in support of WMD elimination.
Improve and expand U.S. forces' capabilities to
locate, track and tag shipments of WMD.
Expand our advanced technical render safe capacity and
implement measures to increase associated speed of response.
Improve our nuclear infrastructure. STRATCOM recognizes the
importance of an efficient and more responsive nuclear weapons
infrastructure to the Department's strategy of tailored deterrence. We
believe this is the essential element needed to ensure our weapons are
safe, secure, and reliable, to ensure we can respond to both
technological and political surprise, and to reduce our current
stockpile of nuclear warheads.
In May 2005, the Nuclear Weapons Council commissioned an 18-month
study, to determine the feasibility of replacing some W76 warheads with
a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and to examine the potential for
using RRW in lieu of the W78 warhead. This U.S. Navy led study will
include Air Force and Interagency participants and should issue a final
report in November 2006. We believe this study will be a useful tool in
addressing some of the concerns raised by the Report of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, dated January 2006.
The key initiative is to:
Determine the feasibility of replacing existing
warheads with a RRW.
Develop a more coherent global command and control capability and a
network-enabled architecture that moves information to the user, rather
than moving the user to the information. The New Triad needs a robust,
resilient global C\2\ system that builds on our legacy nuclear C\2\
system and serves as the basis of a critical national-level capability
suitable for use in emergencies range from terrorist attacks to natural
disasters. Key initiatives include:
Transition the STRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command
Center, providing a survivable and enduring nuclear command and
control capability, to a new network of distributed ground-
based communications nodes; establishing a gateway to a robust
multi-functional global command and control capability.
Retire four National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC)
and upgrade the take charge and move out command and control
aircraft, to sustain a survivable airborne link to strategic
nuclear forces and broaden our ability to support full
functionality of the New Triad.
Transition intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
activities from a legacy approach, directed largely at monitoring
nation states in two theaters, to a true global enterprise tailored to
meet regional needs. Key initiatives include:
Implement a new global intelligence approach focused
on achieving persistent collection capabilities against legacy
and emerging threats, with our U.S. Government and allied
partners, and improved synergy with the Intelligence Community.
Increase investment in UAVs to provide greater dwell
capabilities in the effort to identify and track mobile targets
globally.
Improve space capabilities
The space mission area creates a decisive strategic advantage for
our national security, empowering critical economic as well as defense
related activities. Our dependence on space capabilities, coupled with
recent significant advances in space operations demonstrated by others,
establishes a true imperative to protect our space assets and our
freedom of action in space. STRATCOM understands the need to stay at
least one technology generation ahead of any foreign or commercial
space power. We must improve space situational awareness and
protection, and ensure unfettered, reliable, and secure access to
space. Key initiatives include:
Improve responsive space access, satellite operations,
and other space enabling capabilities such as the space
professional cadre.
Integrate air and space capabilities to deliver
combined effects.
Realign resources to sustain existing space
surveillance capabilities.
stratcom requests your support to meet the challenges we face
Over the next 5 years, we must fully transform while remaining
engaged in a conflict in which our enemies will use any and all means
to achieve their objectives. We believe a more aggressive
transformation schedule than envisioned 5 years ago is essential to
maintain the strategic advantage needed to deter or defeat those who
would do us harm. If we do not accelerate this transition, we will face
these adversaries, who attack through asymmetric means, with the blunt
weapons of last resort that won the Cold War. That alone will not
preserve our future national security. In particular we are requesting
your support in the following areas:
Prompt, Precision Conventional Global Strike
Tailored deterrence requires a more complete range of capabilities
to address the wide spectrum of challenges that confront us today.
While the Department employs expeditionary forces around the globe, it
is unlikely we will have forces in every place we need them at the
crucial moment when we have an opportunity to stop a WMD-armed threat
far from our shores. The United States has the capability to engage
with high quality conventional forces around the world, given days or
perhaps weeks to respond. But if our general-purpose forces are not in
a position to respond rapidly, the need to defeat attacks against the
United States may require STRATCOM to interdict fleeting targets at
global range. We have the delivery capability on alert today, but
configured only with nuclear weapons. This choice is not credible
against many of the extremist adversaries we will face.
We recommend proceeding with development of the responsive,
conventional global strike alternative offered by the Conventional
Trident Modification. The President's budget request includes funds for
the modification of a number of submarine based Trident Missiles to
deliver conventional warheads with precision over thousands of miles in
tens of minutes.
Global Command and Control (GC\2\)
We are now faced with the task of recapitalizing our aging, Nuclear
Command and Control (NC\2\) network, which is a matter of prime
importance. Capitalizing on advances in technology, we envision a
transition from the single-purpose, stove-piped NC\2\ network that
served us during the Cold War, to a multi-functional, distributed,
survivable, and expandable GC\2\ capability, leveraging the assets and
resources of the Global Information Grid and serving the needs of our
joint warfighters.
With your support for the President's budget request, we can
deliver a resilient air, land, and maritime GC\2\ capability that will
tie together all elements of New Triad power. Fully developed, the
GC\2\ will enable collaboration between and among DOD and other
government agencies and partners, providing the core of a National
Command Capability to meet the broadening array of potential challenges
we face as a nation. A true National Command Capability will only be
effective with federally mandated standards for data tagging to
facilitate enhanced information sharing.
RRW
Finally, if we are to break the cycle of maintaining and
refurbishing large numbers of Cold War-era nuclear warheads to guard
against uncertainty, we request your support to ensure a safe, secure,
reliable nuclear stockpile, and in the process transform the nuclear
weapons enterprise. Discussions over the past year within the executive
branch and Congress have increased understanding of the role for
nuclear weapons in our current environment, and the value of a
responsive defense infrastructure. STRATCOM supports the RRW as the key
to transforming our aging Cold War nuclear weapons stockpile. RRW will
enhance our long-term confidence in the stockpile and reduce the need
to retain high numbers of hedge weapons while exercising the people,
science, technology base, and facilities required for sustaining the
nuclear weapons enterprise.
Maintaining the current stockpile of Cold War era weapons is a
challenge. If directed, we believe the time is right; the risk is
manageable; and the opportunity is at hand to choose weapons that will
best serve our future and allow us to further reduce our overall
stockpile size, in order to transition to and maintain a smaller but
safer, more secure, and more reliable nuclear weapon arsenal.
stratcom transformational vectors building strategic advantage
STRATCOM plays an important role in leading national efforts to
send an unambiguous message to our adversaries and friends alike--we
will do whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to ensure the
forces of freedom possess a lasting strategic advantage against those
who would deny citizens of America and the world the security to govern
their own future. We will continue to be aggressive and resourceful in
offering our best advice in the pursuit of capabilities needed to meet
our National security requirements. With your help we can assure our
allies, dissuade unhealthy competition, deter coercive or damaging
acts, and above all else, defend our citizens and defeat our enemies.
Thank your for your continued support.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Mr. Paul.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERALD S. PAUL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Paul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson. Thank
you for creating this opportunity to raise the level of
attention and for your leadership on these paramount issues
associated with nuclear WMD. It is indeed a pleasure to be here
today to discuss nonproliferation activities of the DOE's NNSA.
Acquisition of nuclear weapons, WMD capabilities,
technologies, and expertise by rogue states or terrorists pose
the greatest threat to our national security as the chairman
eloquently pointed out. The pursuit of these capabilities by
terrorists and states of concern underscores the importance of
our threat reduction, detection, and interdiction programs.
The mission for the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, within NNSA, is to detect, prevent, and
reverse the proliferation of WMD.
Our programs are structured to support multiple layers of
defense against nuclear terrorism and state-sponsored nuclear
proliferation. We work with more than 70 countries to secure
dangerous nuclear and radiological materials, and to dispose of
surplus weapons-usable material.
We also work closely with multinational and multilateral
institutions, including the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) at the United Nations in our offices in Vienna and with
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as well, to strengthen
international nuclear safeguards regimes and to improve the
nuclear export control regulatory infrastructure in other
countries. This multi-layered approach is intended to identify
and address potential vulnerabilities within the international
nonproliferation regime and to limit terrorists' access to
deadly weapons and material.
Since September 11, 2001, the Office of the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation within the NNSA has accelerated and expanded
its implementation of a six-pronged defense-in-depth strategy
to deny terrorists and states of concern the materials, the
technology, and the expertise needed to develop nuclear and
radiological weapons. Our programs fall into those six broad
categories.
The first element of that strategy is to account for and
secure nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union.
To date, we've secured over 80 percent of the sites where these
materials are stored and we are on course to finish all of our
security upgrades by 2008, a full 2 years ahead of schedule.
The second prong is to detect and prevent the movement or
trafficking of weapons-usable technologies and nuclear
materials. We have installed radiation detection equipment at
more than 50 border crossings in Russia and the former Soviet
Union and European countries. The Megaports Initiative is
currently operational in Greece, the Bahamas, Sri Lanka, Spain,
and the Netherlands, and is at various stages of implementation
in nine other countries and there are many more on the list
that we are driving towards implementing.
The third prong is to stop the production of new fissile
material in Russia. We are working with Russia to expedite the
closure of its remaining three plutonium production reactors in
the formerly closed cities of Seversk and Zheleznegorsk.
Fourth, to eliminate existing weapons-usable material in
Russia and former Soviet states. Through our Megatons to
Megawatts program, more than 260 metric tons of Russian highly
enriched uranium, that is bomb-grade uranium, from dismantled
weapons have been down-blended to low-enriched uranium that is
non-bomb grade uranium to non-weapons grade material for use in
commercial nuclear power reactors. As we speak, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Nelson, 10 percent of all electricity consumed by
Americans in this country comes from low-enriched uranium that
formerly was a part of high-enriched uranium for Soviet nuclear
weapons. This program ultimately will be responsible for
disposing of approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads worth of
material and we're a little more than halfway through that now.
We are also working with the Russian Federation to eliminate 34
metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium in each country, enough
for over 17,000 nuclear weapons. This in part is the MOX
program the chairman mentioned and I look forward to taking
some questions on both the Russian and the domestic progress on
MOX.
The fifth prong is to eliminate or consolidate the
remaining weapons-useable nuclear and radiological materials
that exists throughout the remainder of the world. Our Global
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) formed 2 years ago has
converted 43 research reactors to use low-enriched uranium and
plans to convert all 106 targeted research reactors by 2014.
The GTRI has repatriated 145 kilograms of Russian-origin
highly-enriched uranium from Russian-supplied research reactors
and approximately 1,200 kilograms of U.S.-origin highly-
enriched uranium in spent fuel assemblies from U.S.-supplied
research reactors. The U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction
program has recovered more than 12,000 radioactive radiological
sources in the United States and the International Radiological
Threat Reduction program has completed security upgrades at 373
sites to date.
Our sixth prong is to support our U.S. diplomatic
initiatives. The DOE and the NNSA through our national
laboratories are playing a vital role in our Nation's broader
effort to challenge proliferation in Iran, to prepare the
groundwork for verifying any North Korean nuclear declaration
in the context of the Six-Party Talks, to promote universal
implementation of anti-proliferation measures outlined in the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, to update the
Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and strengthen international
safeguards and, of course, to assist Libya in the dismantlement
of its former WMD program.
We also perform critical research and development. We
manage a vigorous nonproliferation research and development
(R&D) program and it is the technical base that provides our
policy programs and operational agencies, including the DOD,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Intelligence
Community (IC), with the innovative systems and technologies to
meet their nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
counterterrorism mission responsibilities.
A brief word on Bratislava. Many of these programs have
new, accelerated completion dates as a result of the Joint
Statement at the G8 Summit at Bratislava to which the General
and Secretary Flory referred. We have made great progress
because of this momentum that has been given to us by this
joint statement between President Bush and President Putin
who've established a bilateral Senior Interagency Working Group
co-chaired by U.S. Secretary of Energy Bodman and the Russian
Federal Atomic Energy Agency Director, Sergei Kiriyenko.
Together, they oversee enhanced nuclear security cooperation in
six areas: Emergency Response, Best Practices, Security
Culture, Research Reactors, Material Protection, and Control
and Accounting.
While the NNSA has been working with our Russian
counterparts in many of these areas for several years, the
Bratislava initiative truly did elevate our dialogue to a
national level and has moved the operation to one of a shared
partnership. One example would by our cooperation on physical
protection of sensitive nuclear sites in Russia that has been
accelerated and will allow us to complete those by the end of
2008.
I also want to make a brief comment while we're talking
about nonproliferation, the importance of energy, nuclear
energy and nuclear nonproliferation. Last month the President
announced the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). GNEP is
a comprehensive strategy to supply the projected doubling of
the world's demand for nuclear energy in the next 4 decades, to
do this by using the science of the atom to provide clean, safe
nuclear energy for decades to come in a way that reduces air
emissions, advances nonproliferation goals, helps to resolve
nuclear waste disposal issues, and develops advanced safeguards
and technologies. It is through GNEP that we can create a new
model of nonproliferation both globally and domestically.
Under the administration's proposal, countries with secure,
advanced nuclear fuel cycle capabilities would offer
commercially competitive and reliable access to nuclear fuel
services to those countries who agree to forego the development
of indigenous fuel cycle enrichment and reprocessing
technologies.
On the budget, let me just say that although we thank
Congress very much for helping us elevate the level of
attention to nonproliferation issues, we ask for your continued
support. This administration has more than doubled the funding
for nuclear nonproliferation since its first budget in 2001.
The request this year of almost $2 billion supports the NNSA
nonproliferation programs that represents almost a 7-percent
increase over the budget for comparable 2006 activities in a
budget constrained environment.
I have submitted a more detailed budget justification and
statistical appendix for the record and I'd like to take just a
quick moment to run through a couple of those key items. For
the activities that fall under the Bratislava Initiative, our
budget request will support the completion of upgrades of nine
additional 12th Main Directorate sites by the end of 2008,
acceleration of the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return
program, and continued development and execution of specialized
emergency management training for monitoring and assessing
nuclear and radiological events.
High among our priorities, it will also help us increase
the sustainability activities to support transfer of the
material protection and control and accounting activities to
Russia by 2013. In other words, it's one thing to go in and
secure a facility, you have to also then train the host country
to maintain the capability and operate that equipment, the
sustainability function that we continue to try to transfer to
the Russians.
The request also fulfills DOE's commitment to roughly $675
million to the G8's global partnership against the spread of
WMD and this is a program, of course, that Senator Domenici
highlighted very eloquently yesterday during the hearing that
Senator Collins attended. It will also support the Six-Party
Talks with North Korea and the scientist engagement in Russia,
the former Soviet Union, Libya, and Iraq.
In conclusion, just again I want to thank you for this
opportunity to speak about some of the programs that we are
engaged in. Congress has been so supportive and we ask for your
continued support and certainly look forward to an opportunity
to answer some of your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Paul follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Jerald S. Paul
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and members of the subcommittee, it is
a pleasure to be here today to discuss the nonproliferation activities
of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).
Acquisition of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capabilities, technologies, and expertise by rogue states or terrorists
pose the greatest threat to our national security. The pursuit of these
capabilities by terrorists and states of concern underscores the
importance of our threat reduction, detection, and interdiction
programs.
I would like to begin by briefly outlining our NNSA's
nonproliferation strategy and will highlight a few examples of where
our programs, working with other agencies, fit into the context of
broader U.S. Government efforts to stem the proliferation of WMD. Next,
I will outline a few recent and new initiatives that the NNSA,
particularly the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), is
supporting. Finally, I will discuss how the President's budget request
supports these important missions. Before I begin, I would like to take
a moment to note that it has been, and continues to be, a privilege and
honor to work with the talented and dedicated individuals at the NNSA.
These are folks charged with the single most important national
security mission in the Department--keeping the world's most dangerous
materials out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people--and
they continue to meet that goal day in and day out.
The mission of the Office of DNN, within the NNSA, is to detect,
prevent, and reverse the proliferation of WMD.
Our programs are structured to support multiple layers of defense
against nuclear terrorism and state-sponsored nuclear proliferation. We
work with more than 70 countries to secure dangerous nuclear and
radiological materials, and to dispose of surplus weapons-usable
material. We also work closely with multilateral institutions,
including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, to strengthen the international nuclear safeguards
regime and to improve the nuclear export control regulatory
infrastructure in other countries. This multi-layered approach is
intended to identify and address potential vulnerabilities within the
international nonproliferation regime, to limit terrorists' access to
deadly weapons and material.
Since September 11, the DNN within NNSA has accelerated and
expanded its implementation of a six-pronged defense-in-depth strategy
to deny terrorists and states of concern the materials, technology, and
expertise needed to develop nuclear and radiological weapons. Our
programs fall into six broad categories:
First: To account for and secure nuclear material in Russia and the
former Soviet Union.
In cooperation with the Russian Federation our Office of Material
Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) works to upgrade security at
Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) weapons complex and at
sites that store and process weapons-usable materials in Russia.
Working with the Russian Ministry of Defense, we also cooperate to
secure nuclear weapons at Russian Navy and Strategic Rocket Forces
sites and consolidate weapons-usable material into fewer, more secure
locations.
To date, we have secured over 80 percent of the sites
where these materials are stored and we are on course to finish
all of our security upgrades by 2008--a full 2 years ahead of
the schedule.
With over 95 percent of the warhead and nuclear fuels
sites completed, we will finish our work to secure Russian Navy
warhead and nuclear fuel sites in 2006. We are moving rapidly
to identify and secure all remaining 12th Main Directorate and
Strategic Rocket Forces warhead sites on an accelerated
schedule by the end of 2008.
Second: To detect and prevent the movement or trafficking of weapons-
usable technologies and nuclear materials.
Through our Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program, which includes
the Megaports Initiative, and International Nonproliferation Export
Control programs, we are working with other countries to install
radiation detection equipment at key transit choke points throughout
the world--such as sea ports, airports, and land border crossings--to
enhance the capabilities of our international partners to detect
movement of nuclear and radiological materials, and improve
international export controls. These programs complement and build upon
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs, such as the Container
Security Initiative (CSI), and form an important layer in DHS's
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's ``Global Architecture.'' In
addition, our work goes hand-in-glove with the State Department's (DOS)
Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) initiative. With our CSI
partners at DHS's Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, we are
working to install radiation portal monitors at the foreign ports where
CSI is present or will soon be operational.
Through 2005, we have installed radiation detection
equipment at more than 50 border crossings (rail crossings,
vehicle crossings, small seaports) in Russia and other Former
Soviet Union (FSU) and European countries. Additionally, we
maintain radiation detection equipment at approximately 60
locations originally equipped by the DOS and other agencies.
The Megaports Initiative is currently operational in
Greece, the Bahamas, Sri Lanka, Spain, and the Netherlands.
NNSA is at various stages of implementation in nine other
countries: Belgium, China, United Arab Emerates (UAE),
Honduras, Israel, Oman, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand.
Our International Nonproliferation Export Control
Program assists foreign governments to implement effective
export controls, including training to identify and block
transfers of proliferation-sensitive trade. This program is
operating in over 40 countries, including nodal transshipment
states in regions of concern and emerging suppliers.
We are also placing an increasing emphasis on
interdiction, including assessments of foreign WMD technology
procurements and support for the administration's Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI).
In addition to this important work, we are securing weapons
expertise through joint collaboration and alternate infrastructure
development. Through the Department's Global Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program we are engaging former weapons
experts in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons institutes in
Russia, FSU, Libya, and Iraq. We often say that the proliferation
threat has three elements--technology, materials, and expertise. This
program addresses the third element. By redirecting weapons scientists
to peaceful, commercially viable, activities, we reduce the likelihood
that these individuals will want to work with proliferators--and reduce
the likelihood that a rogue state or terrorist organization will be
able to recruit them.
Another benefit of the GIPP program is the new sources of
technology that it provides to the U.S. industry. The program is
structured to include participation of U.S. companies, which match the
Department's project funds with their own resources to bring projects
to the market and gain intellectual property rights. Among the GIPP
program's commercial successes are advanced medical equipment,
specialized metallurgy, improved fossil fuel exploration, and filters
that have been used in manned space exploration.
Third: To stop the production of new fissile material in Russia.
In 1997, the U.S. and Russia signed the Plutonium Production
Reactor Agreement (PPRA) requiring the cessation of weapons-grade
plutonium production for use in nuclear weapons. Under PPRA, we monitor
the permanent shut-down of Russia's plutonium production reactors and
the more than 10 metric tons of plutonium oxide to ensure the reactors
and materials are no longer available for use in weapons production.
We are also working with Russia to expedite closure of the
remaining three plutonium production reactors. In March 2003, the DOE
and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (Rosatom)
signed an agreement to carry out the objectives of PPRA, which
committed DOE, subject to available funds, to assist in providing
fossil fuel plants to replace the energy now provided by the reactors.
We have made significant progress on this project in
the last year. We have already begun construction work at the
first site, Seversk, and will start construction at the second
site, Zheleznogorsk, this spring.
At both sites, we agreed to ``quid pro quo''
milestones that tie progress in fossil fuel plant construction
to progress toward permanent reactor shutdown and are making
satisfactory progress in meeting milestones.
Fourth: To eliminate existing weapons-usable material in Russia and
former Soviet States.
To date more than 260 metric tons of Russian highly-enriched
uranium (HEU) from dismantled weapons have been down-blended to low-
enriched, non-weapons grade material for use in commercial power
reactors pursuant the HEU agreement or what is often called the
``Megatons to Megawatts'' program. Altogether, by 2013, 500 metric tons
of Russia's HEU will be converted and used to support civilian nuclear
power here in the United States at little or no cost to the American
taxpayer. This down-blended material accounts for 10 percent of U.S.
electricity production. In other words, 1 in every 10 light bulbs in
America is powered by material that was once contained in a Soviet
nuclear warhead.
Additionally, through our plutonium disposition programs, we are
working with the Russian Federation to eliminate 34 metric tons of
weapons-grade plutonium in each country, enough for over 17,000 nuclear
weapons.
Fifth: To eliminate or consolidate the remaining weapons-useable
nuclear and radiological materials that exists throughout the
remainder of the world.
In May 2004, DOE launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative
(GTRI) to identify, secure, recover, and/or facilitate the disposition
of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world that
pose a threat to the Unites States and to the international community.
GTRI works to convert research reactors worldwide from the use of
HEU nuclear fuels to low-enriched uranium (LEU). GTRI repatriates the
U.S. and Russian-supplied HEU nuclear fuels from these reactors to
their country of origin, as well as addresses the ``gap'' material
(i.e. material of concern that is not currently being addressed under
existing programs) for final disposition, and performs research reactor
physical security upgrades. GTRI also maintains a rapid response
capability to address denuclearization. This capability was put to use
during the material and source removal efforts in Libya and Iraq.
GTRI also addresses the threat of a radiological dispersal device
or ``dirty bomb'' by identifying and recovering excess and abandoned
radiological sources domestically and securing vulnerable radiological
materials abroad.
GTRI has converted 43 research reactors to the use of
LEU and plans to convert all 106 targeted research reactors by
2014.
GTRI has repatriated 145 kilograms of Russian-origin
HEU from Russian-supplied research reactors and approximately
1,200 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU in spent fuel assemblies
from U.S.-supplied research reactors.
The U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program has
recovered more than 12,000 radioactive sources in the U.S. and
the International Radiological Threat Reduction program has
completed security upgrades at 373 sites.
Sixth: Support U.S. diplomatic initiatives.
In his speech before the National Defense University 2 years ago,
President Bush laid out an ambitious program of work to close gaps in
the existing system of nonproliferation controls. DOE/NNSA and our
national laboratories are playing a vital part in our Nation's broader
effort to challenge proliferation in Iran; to prepare the groundwork
for verifying any North Korean nuclear declaration in the context of
the Six-Party Talks; to promote universal implementation of anti-
proliferation measures outlined in United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540; to update Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and
strengthen international safeguards; and to assist Libya eliminate its
WMD programs.
Underpinning each of these policy initiatives, we maintain a
vigorous Nonproliferation Research and Development (R&D) Program. This
program conducts applied research, development, testing, and evaluation
to produce technologies that lead to prototype demonstrations and
resultant detection systems. This, in turn, strengthens the U.S.
response to current and projected threats to national security
worldwide posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the diversion of special nuclear material. The R&D program is the
technical base that provides our policy programs and operational
agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), the DHS, and the
Intelligence Community (IC), with innovative systems and technologies
to meet their nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
counterterrorism mission responsibilities. NNSA invests in strategic
and often high-risk technical solutions to detect the proliferation of
WMD.
Many of these programs have new, accelerated completion dates as a
result of the Joint Statement on Nuclear Security by Presidents Bush
and Putin following their meeting in Bratislava, Slovak Republic, in
February 2005.
The Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative called for the
establishment of a bilateral Senior Interagency Working Group, co-
chaired by U.S. Secretary of Energy Bodman and Rosatom Director
Kiriyenko. Together, they oversee enhanced nuclear security cooperation
in five areas: Emergency Response; Best Practices; Security Culture;
Research Reactors; and Material Protection, Control and Accounting.
While the NNSA has been working with our Russian counterparts in
many of these areas for several years, the Bratislava initiative
elevated our dialogue to a national level and has moved our cooperation
to one of a shared partnership. As a direct result of the Bratislava
Initiative, our cooperation on the physical protection of sensitive
nuclear sites in Russia was accelerated and will be completed by the
end of 2008. We continue to work with the Russian Government to ensure
that they provide resources needed to sustain these upgrades and
promote a strong nuclear security culture and employ best practices in
handling nuclear materials.
It seems natural after summarizing such a successful Presidential
initiative to discuss the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). In
February, the administration announced GNEP, as part of President
Bush's Advanced Energy Initiative. GNEP is a comprehensive strategy to
enable an expansion of nuclear power in the U.S. and around the world,
to promote nuclear nonproliferation goals; and to help resolve nuclear
waste disposal issues. Fundamental to GNEP is a new approach to fuel
cycle technology. Under this proposed new approach, countries with
secure, advanced nuclear fuel cycle capabilities would offer
commercially competitive and reliable access to nuclear fuel services--
fresh fuel and recovery of used fuel--to other countries in exchange
for their commitment to forgo the development of enrichment and
recycling technology.
Over the next year, we will work with other elements of the
Department to establish GNEP, paying special attention to developing
advanced safeguards and developing the parameters for international
cooperation. I believe that GNEP takes us closer to expanding access to
the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology while preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons through tangible actions that will
benefit directly those who join us in this partnership. GNEP will offer
us the opportunity to take the international lead in making
nonproliferation an integral part of our global nuclear safety and
security culture.
budget
The administration's request of $1.73 billion to support NNSA
activities addressing the global WMD proliferation threat represents
almost a 7-percent increase over the budget for 2006 activities.
The administration's fiscal year 2007 Fissile Material Disposition
budget request is $638 million, an increase of $169 million over fiscal
year 2006. This increase reflects the progress in implementing the
plutonium disposition program in the past year. Of this amount, $551
million will be allocated for disposing of surplus U.S. and Russian
plutonium and $87 million is requested for the disposition of surplus
U.S. highly-enriched uranium. The plutonium disposition program, the
Department's largest nonproliferation program, plans to dispose of 68
metric tons of surplus Russian and U.S. weapons-grade plutonium (34
metric tons from each country) by fabricating it into mixed oxide (MOX)
fuel for use in nuclear power-generating reactors. The United States
and Russia completed negotiations of a liability protocol for the
program, and senior Russian Government officials have assured the
United States that the Russian Government has no issues with this
protocol and that it will be signed in the near future. DOE has also
been working to validate the U.S. MOX project cost and schedule
baseline as part of our project management process, and we will have a
validated baseline in place before construction begins. DOE received
authorization to begin construction of the MOX facility from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, began site preparation work for the MOX
facility at the Savannah River Site, and implemented a number of
improvements to strengthen the management of the MOX project. Current
plans call for construction of the U.S. MOX facility to start in 2006,
with operations to start in 2015. The administration's budget request
is essential for continuing this work in fiscal year 2007, which will
be a peak construction year. Now that the matter of liability
protections for the plutonium disposition program has been resolved,
pending signature of the liability protocol, high-level U.S.-Russian
discussions are taking place to discuss technical and financial details
for the Russian program.
The administration's fiscal year 2007 budget request of $107
million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is a 10-
percent increase over fiscal year 2006 and supports the ambitious
completion dates and objectives set by the program. GTRI will identify,
secure, recover, and/or facilitate the disposition of the vulnerable
nuclear and radiological materials worldwide that pose a threat to the
United States and the international community. Since the creation of
GTRI, we have enjoyed a number of successes. Under our radiological
threat reduction program, we secured more than 370 sites around the
world. As a result of the Bush-Putin Bratislava joint statement on
enhanced nuclear security cooperation, we have established a
prioritized schedule for the repatriation of U.S.-origin and Russian-
origin research reactor nuclear fuel located in third countries. As
part of our nuclear materials threat reduction efforts under GTRI,
three successful shipments were completed in fiscal year 2005 to
repatriate Russian-origin HEU fresh fuel from the Czech Republic (two
shipments) and Latvia.
In accordance with the President's Bratislava commitment, we are
also working with the Russian Federation to repatriate Russian-origin
spent fuel. We have also conducted several successful shipments to
repatriate U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel from Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Greece, and Austria. Three research reactors in the
Netherlands, Libya, and the Czech Republic have converted from the use
of HEU to the use of LEU fuel so far in fiscal year 2006.
The International Material Protection and Cooperation fiscal year
2007 budget request of $413 million reflects the completion of MPC&A
security upgrades in 2008 and the acceleration of Second Line of
Defense (SLD) activities in the Caucasus region. This request would
fully fund both Bratislava and SLD requirements for 2007. For more than
a decade, the United States has worked cooperatively with the Russian
Federation and other former Soviet republics to secure nuclear weapons
and weapons material that may be at risk of theft or diversion. As part
of the Bush-Putin Bratislava joint statement, we agreed to accelerate
security upgrades at Russian sites holding weapons-usable materials and
warheads. The Bratislava joint statement also provided for a
comprehensive joint action plan for cooperation on security upgrades of
Russian nuclear facilities at Rosatom and Ministry of Defense sites. In
addition, this statement called for enhanced cooperation in the areas
of nuclear regulatory development, sustainability, secure
transportation, MPC&A expertise training, and protective force
equipment. A number of major milestones for this cooperative program
are on the horizon, and the fiscal year 2007 budget ensures that
sufficient funding will be available to meet these milestones. Security
upgrades for Russian Rosatom facilities will be completed by the end of
2008--2 years ahead of schedule. By the end of 2008 we will also
complete cooperative upgrades at the nuclear warhead storage sites of
the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and the Russian Ministry of Defense
sites. By the end of fiscal year 2007, we will have provided security
upgrades at more than 80 percent of all the nuclear sites in Russia at
which we now plan cooperative work. In addition to the accomplishments
reached thus far under Bratislava, we have also completed physical
security upgrades at three priority sites housing dangerous materials
in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.
The administration's budget request will enable us to expand and
accelerate the deployment of radiation detection systems at key transit
points within Russia and accelerate installation of such equipment in
five other priority countries to prevent attempts to smuggle nuclear or
radiological materials across land borders. Through our Megaports
Initiative, we plan to deploy radiation detection capabilities at three
additional major seaports in fiscal year 2007, thereby increasing the
number of completed ports to 13.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $207 million for the
Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) is an
increase of 18 percent from fiscal year 2006. The EWGPP program is
working to establish the fossil fuel plants to allow for the complete
and permanent shutdown of the three remaining weapons grade plutonium
production reactors in Russia at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Every week,
these reactors currently produce enough fissile material for several
nuclear weapons. The overall EWGPP plan is to replace the heat and
electricity these reactors currently supply to the closed cities with
energy generated by fossil fuel plants by December 2008 in Seversk and
December 2010 in Zheleznogorsk. The reactors are to be shut down
immediately when the fossil fuel plants are completed and will be
monitored under PPRA to confirm that they are not restarted. The first
validated estimate of total EWGPP program cost--$1.2 billion--was
determined in January 2004. After extensive negotiations with Russia,
we achieved $200 million in cost savings. Also, under the authority to
accept international funding as provided in the Ronald W. Reagan
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, we have
received pledges of $30 million from six Global Partnership
participants. Construction of the fossil fuel plant at Seversk started
in late 2004, and the start of construction of the fossil fuel plant at
Zheleznogorsk was recently approved.
The fiscal year 2007 budget requests $269 million for
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development. This effort
includes a number of programs that make unique contributions to
national security by researching the technological advancements
necessary to detect proliferation activity worldwide and to detect and
prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear materials.
The Proliferation Detection program advances basic and applied
technologies for the nonproliferation community with benefit to both
national counterproliferation missions and national counterterrorism
missions. Specifically, this program develops the tools, technologies,
techniques, and expertise for the identification, location, and
analysis of the facilities, materials, and processes of undeclared and
proliferant WMD programs. The Proliferation Detection program conducts
fundamental research in fields such as radiation detection and advanced
infrared and radar imaging, providing support to the DHS, the DOD, and
the IIC. The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring program builds the Nation's
operational sensors that monitor the entire planet from space to detect
and report surface, atmospheric, or space nuclear detonations, with
sensors carried on every Global Positioning System and ballistic
missile early warning satellite. This program also produces and updates
the regional geophysical datasets enabling operation of the Nation's
ground-based seismic monitoring networks to detect and report
underground detonations. The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring program has
long supported the DOD and the DOS to conduct their missions.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request for Nonproliferation and
International Security is $127 million. This figure reflects a budget
structure change, rather than a significant funding increase,
realigning the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and HEU
Transparency programs to this Government Performance and Results Act
unit. Through this program, the Department provides technical and
policy expertise in support of U.S. efforts to strengthen international
nonproliferation institutions and arrangements, fosters implementation
of nonproliferation requirements through engagement with foreign
partners, and helps develop the mechanisms necessary for transparent
and verifiable nuclear reductions worldwide. This budget request
addresses our need to tackle key policy challenges including efforts to
strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, attempt to block and reverse
proliferation in Iran and North Korea, augment U.S. cooperation with
China, India, and Russia, and plan to build-up the nonproliferation
component of the GNEP.
conclusion
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs are an important
investment for this Nation, and are achieving great results. Our budget
request will support continuing our progress on reducing the threat
posed by the proliferation of nuclear and radiological weapons,
expertise, and related technologies. Above all, it will meet the
national security needs of the United States of America in the 21st
century.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. A statistical appendix
follows that contains the budget figures supporting our request for the
DNN. I would be pleased to answer any questions on the justification
for the requested budget.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. We'll now proceed to a
round of questions and each of you have provided extensive
opening statements which rather than interrupt and truncate I
thought were very helpful in laying out the overall groundwork
that is necessary to understanding our nonproliferation,
counterproliferation, and counterterrorism efforts. But I would
like to just ask, maybe start with Secretary Flory, I
understand General Cartwright's mission within the DOD when it
comes to synchronizing and integrating the Department's efforts
on counterproliferation but I'd like to get your comment on who
is responsible government-wide across agencies for coordinating
and integrating our efforts when it comes to
counterproliferation and nonproliferation? My understanding is
the ultimate responsibility stops at the National Security
Council (NSC) and then obviously the President but I'd like for
you to give us some sense of your confidence level that things
are going well, that we are filling the gaps and anticipating
departmental differences in our approach so that we can have
some understanding about how we're handling these important
missions government-wide.
Mr. Flory. Senator, you're right, we focus primarily on
what we do within the DOD, how we organize internally. The
focal point, as you say, ultimately the responsibility is with
the President and the President has the NSC and the NSC's
staff. The focal point for most of our efforts is the Director
for Proliferation Strategy (PROSTRAT) office in the NSC staff
where there's a senior director who is the person who pulls
together the different departments on many of these issues. I
think you see an evolution on a lot of fronts since the
administration took office, particularly since September 11,
that have been manifested in the first strategy for combating
WMD in 2002 and the succession of additional documents that I
cited to you earlier, most recently, the most recent National
Security Strategy. I would say that I think we have made a lot
of progress in organizing for a new type of threat, a threat
that in many ways is more diffuse and more complex than
certainly the Cold War threat and even arguably than the way we
perceive the threats in the 1990s. I think that the nature of
the threat is such that one would never want to say one was
totally confident because of the uncertainties involved because
of the effort of proliferators, both countries that want to
sell things and countries that want to get a hold of things,
the extraordinary denial and deception measures that they use,
the large amounts of money that they spend in doing the things
they're trying to do. This remains a very hard target and a
very complex target and this is one of the reasons that in the
QDR and many of our other documents we emphasize the theme of
uncertainty. We've been surprised before, we were surprised at
the time of the first Iraq war at the extent to which the Iraqi
nuclear problem had advanced, as well as later on as we found
the extent of biological and chemical weapons that Saddam
Hussein at that point had managed to amass. We were surprised
when we went into Iraq in 2003 because we expected to find
weapons there. We were focused for a number of years on Libya's
chemical weapons program, then the nuclear program there came
to our attention. That was an unpleasant surprise.
So the basic point I would say is that yes we've made a
great deal of progress in the way we have organized and in the
guidance we've developed to deal with this threat. On the other
hand, this is a very adaptive threat, it's a threat where
people are watching what we're doing and trying to find ways to
get around what we're doing. I would ask my colleagues, they
might want to add on that. I know General Cartwright sees this
on a day-to-day basis as well as Mr. Paul.
Senator Cornyn. Let me put another little fine point on the
question and then I'd ask General Cartwright and Mr. Paul to
comment, but it seems to me that all of the wonderful work
that's occurring and that each of you and the people working
with you are doing to reduce the threat from proliferation of
weapons and to prepare ourselves to counter proliferation of
weapons can essentially be defeated if an A.Q. Khan or somebody
like him sees that nuclear materials get in the hands of people
that shouldn't have them. I just want to make sure and give you
an opportunity to express yourselves on whether you believe
that we are prioritizing measures appropriately and whether you
believe that we are doing, since resources are not limitless,
that we are putting our money and our resources and our
personnel on the issues in a priority way that are most likely
to cause us harm.
General Cartwright.
General Cartwright. Mr. Chairman, I think that's a good
question that gets really at the heart of the issue. For
STRATCOM, as we start to enter into this mission area, the
objective is not to invent a whole new organizational construct
to go out and buy all new equipment, et cetera, but to leverage
what is there, understand where the gaps in our capability are,
and how they can be quickly filled. A key part of this mission
area is our interfaces with our interagency partners, as well
as our allies, and so where we can we're taking advantage of
those existing relationships.
Clearly between DOE, STRATCOM, NNSA, a long heritage of
sharing on the technical side and being able to leverage our
technical capabilities in the nuclear world, et cetera. We're
trying to leverage off of those capabilities. Within the
STRATCOM's portfolio are the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance skills that will be so critical to doing some of
the things that you alluded to in trying to find these weapons,
fix them, and then if necessary go out and take them, destroy
them, whatever is necessary. Those skills are within the
portfolio.
What we're trying to understand now as we stand this
organization up is how well will they scale up to the size; how
quickly will they be able to respond to an ever-changing
adversary; do we have the right organizational constructs; do
we have the right relationships set up to be efficient at doing
that and not to react to the adversary but to get in front of
the adversary; to basically be determinant of where they're
going rather than the other way around. I'll tell you that this
is a work in progress. I'll tell you that the organizations are
coming together. Issues of turf are not really getting in the
way, and at the agency level, without stepping on checks and
balances, we're creating relationships that are inside the
decision cycles of the adversary which to me is the key
attribute. We can have wonderful studies and decisions, but if
they occur and they're not actionable because they occur after
the adversary's already acted, it's of no value.
So to us it's critical to make sure that whatever we set in
place has to be able to make the adversary react to you, get in
front of their decision cycles, and change the calculus in
their minds. So to me that will be the litmus test of how well
these organizations actually perform.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. Mr. Paul, do you have a brief
response?
Mr. Paul. Briefly, Mr. Chairman, it's an excellent
question. Nothing binds men together more than a common
challenge and just as nuclear proliferation and the threat of
nuclear terrorism has bound members together in Congress in a
bipartisan way to provide extraordinary attention, support, and
resources for this, so too within the interagency, it binds us
together. The working relationships are really fantastic.
I'm not going to tell you that there aren't difficulties
with the interagencies at times. There's supposed to be a
certain amount of tension, which is healthy, but in this arena
when we're focused on keeping people with evil in their hearts
who would harm innocent people from doing so on American soil,
that tends to bind us together and our organizations, Mr.
Flory, General Cartwright, Under Secretary Joseph, DHS, and
NNSA, I think work very well in this regard. Is there progress
to be made? Absolutely. Every day we worry about whether we
have the right construct, for example, the right organization
in order to get our work done. But there is strong agreement on
the need to develop the right technology, to deploy that
technology, to ensure that we have the management structure and
the focus and the attention on getting this job done because
it's so important.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Mr. Flory. Senator, if I could just add one small point.
General Cartwright made the point very well about resources. In
the DOD, we already get from Congress and the American people a
substantial budget and we use it to cover our needs and we
allocate in what we think is an intelligent way. One of the
ways in which we can improve our capability is in some cases
using a relatively small amount of money differently. For
example, in terms of interdiction, the Navy is, and this is one
of the items, one of the eight mission areas that General
Cartwright is tackling as a priority, the Navy has done a good
job of using relatively small amounts of money to increase its
organic interdiction capabilities on ships deployed. The
approach earlier was more an approach that the idea that you
had to have some specialized operators to come in and do an
interdiction. In most cases you actually don't, so what the
Navy has done without spending a whole lot more money is to
develop more deployed organic capabilities that can carry out
interdiction.
So it's not just a question of resources, it's a question
of using the resources we have intelligently and in ways that
give us that extra bit of leverage.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for your consideration this morning, with my schedule
particularly. I have an opening statement which I'd like to put
in the record and at this time and will yield to Senator Nelson
who has been attentive throughout the hearing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Reed follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jack Reed
Good morning. I would like to join Senator Cornyn in welcoming our
witnesses this morning. This is an important hearing and I am glad we
have an opportunity to discuss these issues this year.
First I want to express my appreciation and admiration for the
people at the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security
Administration, the Department of Defense, and in the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), and their contractors who are on the ground in
various parts of the world implementing these important
nonproliferation programs. The working conditions are difficult, and
many of the folks spend a good deal of time away from home.
Complicating the work in some instances is pervasive corruption and
criminal activity, which adds an additional level of complexity to the
mission.
Having said that I am concerned, however, that the administration
is not giving the high priority to the programs and providing adequate
funding to these programs that they have acknowledged is needed. For
example, the 9/11 Commission found that countering the threat of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) should be a top priority of the
United States and recommended that the United States put forth maximum
effort to secure WMD. Nevertheless, in the December 2005 report card
issued by the 9/11 Commission, the administration got a grade of ``D''
in its efforts to implement this recommendation. The 9/11 Commission
concluded that at the current rate it would take 14 years to secure all
of the nuclear materials just in the former Soviet Union and that is
unacceptable. I agree.
Today, I hope we can discuss what can be done to accelerate these
programs, address all of the very real threats to the United States and
to friends and allies, and to raise that grade from a D to an A.
In addition, there are a number of programmatic issues that we need
to discuss today including the Mixed Oxide Fuel program, border
security and control issues, and the destruction of Russian chemical
weapons.
Finally, General Cartwright, I look forward to a good discussion of
the Strategic Command's new mission to combat WMD, your goals for the
mission, and the role of the DTRA as the Joint Functional Component
Command designated to operationally plan and execute the new mission.
Thank you, Senator Cornyn, and again thank our witnesses for
appearing here today.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. I
appreciate the courtesy.
General Cartwright, you mentioned in your written testimony
that STRATCOM has developed a Center for Combating WMD and that
there are going to be former Soviet scientists and others who
have expertise in this area and they want to turn over their
knowledge on access to weapons-grade plutonium and other very
valuable information. Can you give us maybe some specifics as
to how this would work?
General Cartwright. The Center for Combating WMD had its
initial operating capability declaration on the 1st of January
this year. It is housed inside of the DTRA at Fort Belvoir. Dr.
Jim Tegnelia who's here with me today is the lead of that
agency. We have several programs that are of record and are in
execution to try to help to both retrain people and take these
skills and make them usable in other disciplines, use these
skills in a way that's synergistic with our aims in things
like, not necessarily just for the Russians, but the PSIs and
other types of activities.
We also have another activity in Omaha with STRATCOM that
seeks to create partnerships in the civil sector and reach out
through to try to find ways to address many of these problems,
particularly as we start to get to the harder problems in the
future, biological agents and chemical agents. To find ways to
address these problems that are probably non-standard, and to
take advantage of all of the expertise that lives in the
academic world, not only in the United States but abroad, and
in the business world. From that agency, coupled with this
Center for Combating WMD, we hope to see some synergy develop
starting to change the mind-set and offer a path forward that
is positive in nature versus the one that we're on which, in
many cases, just continues to build the next generation of an
agent whether it be nuclear, biological, or radiological.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Secretary Flory and Mr.
Paul, when I hear words like uncertainty and surprise, those
are words that are not comforting but after all the effort is
made and with an expectation of success in 2008, how certain,
on a scale of 1 to 100, will we be that we've identified all
the nuclear material, secured it, and have kept it out of the
hands of those who would misuse it?
Mr. Paul. Senator, one thing we are certain of to a 100-
percent degree is that the threat is real and that those
persons with evil in their hearts will continue to try and it's
our job to make sure that they fail every day, all day. It's
our job to ensure that our certainty about whether we're doing
everything possible is at its peak as well. I can't give you an
exact number. What I can tell you is that we have in the NNSA
37,000 committed Federal, military, and civilian patriots who
work every single day, 15-hour days, trying to make sure that
this threat doesn't ultimately succeed on our soil. I have a
high degree of certainty that the American people are safe and
can be confident in knowing that we are doing absolutely all
that we can do every single day.
Senator Ben Nelson. What if we were to relate it to just
the former Soviet Union and the Russian stockpiles? Is there a
possibility of identifying some degree of certainty there?
Mr. Paul. We have historically recognized that that is an
area globally of greatest threat. That's where the material is.
The fall of the Soviet Union security, we found out that
security to them quite frankly had been a ring of soldiers,
many of whom who simply went home shortly after, and there was
very little physical protection. All the material protection
and control and accounting systems that exist there today are
U.S. origin that we put there and that we manage every single
day and we are very close to wrapping up that work.
In the former Soviet Union, for example, we've completed 41
of 51 material sites. That's 80 percent where we've completed
all of those upgrades, 47 of the 73 warhead sites at 64 percent
and we will have all of those completely secured by the end of
2008. We risk base those, we prioritize them in order to
increase our certainty, if you will. We're making great
progress. Congress has been very supportive. It takes time
though. Access is one issue and, of course, it's obvious that
these are facilities that exist in a country that has to
cooperate with us in order to let us get in there and do our
work. Once we get access we have high degree of certainty that
by leveraging the extraordinary technology of our laboratory,
Sandia National Lab, Los Alamos Lab, Livermore Lab, and so many
others that we can do the job, do it quickly, and do it well.
Senator Ben Nelson. When we identify those 50-plus sites,
have we been able to do any kind of an accounting or inventory
based on what was expected to be there versus what we found?
Mr. Paul. Yes, there were predictions about how much
material would be in those sites. Of course, they were merely
predictions and as time went by as we got better and better
intelligence, as we were able to put our technical experts
inside with access, we learned that those predictions weren't
always accurate and each time we get a new piece of
intelligence, a new piece of data, we feed that into the
calculus in making that risk based determination of what
equipment to put in, where, and at what time. But certainly it
is a work in progress truing up our decade and a half old
predictions.
Senator Ben Nelson. The final question is, is it reasonable
to expect that not everything was there that had originally
been there? In other words, are there missing items that we're
aware are missing as opposed--what do we know that we know
versus what we don't know?
Mr. Paul. I think the question and the point is that you
never know what you don't know. We do take that point. That is
something that we build into our----
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand, but what I'm trying to
say is, do we have any information that would indicate that we
expected something to be there that isn't there?
Mr. Paul. No.
Senator Ben Nelson. Or wasn't there with some degree of
reliability a concern that there is something missing, putting
it that way?
Mr. Paul. No.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Thank you,
General.
General Cartwright. I would just add though, you don't want
a false positive here.
Senator Ben Nelson. That's what I'm trying to get to.
General Cartwright. That ought to keep us awake at night.
We can't assume that we do, in fact, have full accounting of
what exists today and certainly the way technology is moving,
building fissile material is a relatively complicated process.
But as we move to the future and worry about the next
generation of WMD may it be biological or some other, those
production requirements are not the same and can easily be
disguised and we should worry about what we don't know.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Cartwright, with you worrying
about it at night I think I'll sleep better at night. Thank
you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony today and let me follow up with a
question regarding Senator Nelson's topic and that is, we know
very little about the tactical nuclear weapons that the Soviet
Union had and now they are in the hands of Russia. Last year we
proposed an amendment on the committee to try to get a better
handle on that. Can you give us, Secretary Flory, a notion of
what we're doing to initiate discussions and really try to
determine the status of their tactical nuclear weapons and what
we can do to put them into controlled circumstances?
Mr. Flory. Senator Reed, as you point out, the status of
those tactical weapons has been a concern from the beginning. I
don't want to say we have a handle, but we have processes in
place to deal with the strategic and as we mentioned
specifically accelerating the improvements in the security on
the stored, nondeployed weapons. I would have to get back to
you specifically with respect to any discussions. Secretary
Paul may have something that he can add to that but if I could
get back to you on the record.
Senator Reed. Surely.
Secretary Paul?
Mr. Paul. Together we will.
[The information referred to follows:]
We continue to engage with the Russians on the issue of securing
both their strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, although the
Russians have provided little data on the operational status of their
tactical nuclear weapons. Neither the Department of Defense nor the
Department of Energy has every differentiated between strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons in our efforts to upgrade security at storage
sites in the Russian Federation. We expect to complete our security
upgrade work at all storage sites where assistance has been requested
by the end of calendar year 2008, at which time the vast majority of
all of Russia's nondeployed nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical,
will have been secured with U.S. assistance.
Senator Reed. Okay. One of the obvious things, and you
might want to comment, General Cartwright, is that some of
these weapons are rather mobile and small and ideal, if you had
a shopping list as a terrorist, they would be on that shopping
list and we have to be concerned about that, absolutely
concerned.
Let me raise another issue with Secretary Flory and
Secretary Paul and that is the 9/11 Commission evaluated many
of our national security efforts and this Commission is one of
the most respected voices today on a bipartisan basis, and they
gave the administration a D with respect to securing
radiological and nuclear materials in the Soviet Union. I
presume, correct me if I'm wrong, that this is agreed by all to
be a high national security priority in the United States.
Essentially what they've done is challenge the
administration and Congress to speed up these efforts and be
more proactive and more effective. What's the reasonable time-
line? The 9/11 Commission said it would take us 14 years at the
current rate to secure these materials. I note that DOE and
NNSA are talking about securing all materials by 2013. There
seems to be a gap first of all in the perception of what the
process is, how fast it's going, but the bottom line here is
what do we have to do to accelerate the securing of these
materials?
Secretary Flory and Secretary Paul?
Mr. Flory. I would like to make one point, one of the
things we're trying to do to secure in particular the so-called
stored warhead is the Bratislava Initiative announced by
President Bush and President Putin and, in fact, we have a
supplemental request before Congress now for $44 million. That
will certainly help because that's one area where we recognize
that there was a need to move faster on that. We worked with
the Russians because frankly it wasn't easy to get the level of
transparency and understanding and agreement on that side to
let us know the things we needed to know in order to help them
to solve this problem. I think that brings us to an important
point here. The Russians continue to have the primary
responsibility here and it's something we need to keep as part
of the context. We can do with them what they are willing to do
with us and they've been over time willing to do more things
but the fact of the matter at the end of the day is that they
are ultimately responsible.
Senator Reed. Secretary Paul.
Mr. Paul. It's an excellent question. As I said on the
MPC&A upgrades we firmly believe that we will have this
complete 100 percent by the end of 2008, a full 2 years ahead
of schedule. What has given us a lot of momentum is Bratislava
and President Bush and President Putin coming together and
making that clear joint statement. But what's also given us a
lot of momentum is the broad bipartisan support from Congress
and the funding. As we talked about before, this administration
has doubled the amount of funding that goes to nonproliferation
and addressing this threat. We continue to make progress. We
don't slow down. We look for ways to accelerate as much as we
can. We have accelerated a lot. We've gotten more and more
access into the Russian facilities but it's not just Russia.
It's outside the Soviet Union states and that's really the next
chapter in what we've been working on now for several years is
broadening it throughout Europe, reducing the enrichment of
those research reactors, the 106 remaining research reactors,
and down-blending, putting in security measures at those
reactors, repatriating Russian origin spent nuclear fuel and
fresh nuclear fuel, all of which is high enriched uranium, and
repatriating the fuel that had as its origin American U.S. fuel
origin.
We continue to look for ways to accelerate that. I take
your point. We'll continue to do that.
Senator Reed. Let me add a quick followup question.
Secretary Flory points out that there's a supplemental request
which we think is very important which we have to recognize. Do
you have sufficient funds, Secretary Paul, to meet this 2013
goal of securing these materials or do you need incremental
funds going forward and we should, either through supplementals
or enhanced budget authority now, give you these additional
resources?
Mr. Paul. The President's 2007 request provides for, as
requested, provides for the adequate funds to meet these----
Senator Reed. The 2013?
Mr. Paul. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, Mr.
Paul, this is a matter of great concern to us especially in
light of Linton Brooks' comments in a recent USA Today article
saying that one-third of the world's 130 civil nuclear research
reactors lack security upgrades needed to prevent terrorists
from stealing material that would enable them to make a nuclear
device, including even an atomic bomb. We just need to know as
precisely as you and others can lay out how to make good on the
priority that the President expressed during the 2004 election
and which many people agree with: that preventing rogue states
and terrorists from acquiring the materials necessary for
nuclear weapons has to be our top priority. Why aren't these
reactors secure? Are people refusing our assistance, are we not
offering our assistance, is there no international mechanism
capable of coming in and trying to help secure these reactors?
Mr. Paul. First of all, to correct one part, I think the
article could be read--could be interpreted the way that you
have stated. It's not--would not be completely accurate.
Administrator Brooks did not say that there were all these
reactors that weren't without security upgrades. Through our
GTRI and Nonproliferation Organization we have a very effective
program for providing the security at those reactors, both
through this administration and the previous administration who
placed attention on this as well. We originally identified 173
research reactors throughout the world that had highly-enriched
uranium in them. We started working down that list as to those
who already had security upgrades with countries such as France
and Canada who take care of their own security and what we came
up with was a list of about 103 that needed additional security
upgrades and down-blending from highly-enriched uranium to low
enriched uranium. We have performed those upgrades at a total
of 76 sites. Of the remaining 27 research reactors upgrading,
there's currently upgrading of 6 reactors we're working on: 2
in Chili, 1 in Mexico, Russia, Vietnam, and Peru, and of the
remaining 21 we have identified 4 new sites where security is
not adequate but we are working on access. This requires
cooperation and it's this subcommittee and the full committee
that have helped us in highlighting the focus and attention on
that and that helps us get some access. But it's hard to get
into some of these sites. I can assure you that we are on top
of these sites, we have made security upgrades in most of them.
We have a program in place to down-blend the uranium in them
and as to the small number of sites that we believe need
security upgrades and that we don't have access to, we are
working very hard to get that access through the international
regime and through other contacts and through the IAEA. Thank
you for the question.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate the update on that and
obviously as you said this subcommittee and then the full
committee are very concerned and focused on this so any
additional authority, any additional resources, I hope that you
will let us know. Obviously, that has to remain one of our top
priorities.
Mr. Paul. By the way, on the small list of other sites
where we don't have access we could provide you in a different
setting some information on those.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much. Mr. Paul, I want to
follow up on some questions that I asked Secretary Bodman back
in February when he testified before the full committee and we
had a chance to discuss the GNEP. During that hearing, the
Secretary said he would get back to me with answers to some of
my questions. I haven't yet heard back so I'll ask the similar
questions to you and I hope that I will hear back from one or
both of you.
Now, I believe that GNEP is a well-intentioned proposal to
help meet the energy needs of our country and our allies and be
part of a comprehensive strategy to reduce our dependence on
foreign oil but I have some serious concerns about the program
which would create a global system of nuclear reactors and U.S.
reprocessing plants over the course of decades that could cost
tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars. I am concerned
about independent research that contradicts the
administration's underlying claims that provide the rationale
for GNEP. I have two questions: First, studies by the National
Academy of Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), and even the DOE itself, have pointed out worrisome
risks with the program.
First, we know reprocessing spent fuel creates plutonium
which can be used not only in civil nuclear energy reactors as
laid out in the plan but also to make nuclear weapons. The U.S.
has consistently opposed reprocessing, even for allies such as
France, and while we focus on how to deal with Iran's quest to
develop nuclear weapons and what to do about a nuclear armed
North Korea, a country which does use plutonium in its nuclear
weapons, I would ask, first, how do you respond to the
questions and the risks laid out by the independent analysts
and do you see a contradiction between GNEP and our global
nonproliferation goals?
Mr. Paul. Not only is there not a contradiction, the two
are absolutely critical for the success of each. It is certain
that the world will supply the more than doubling of the demand
for nuclear power globally over the next 4 decades through the
use of the science of the atom. The rest of the world has
concluded that it's no longer a decision for America to make,
quite frankly. The rest of the world in order to do this will
continue to make use of the nuclear fuel cycle and will
continue to recycle fuel. We no longer in America have a
decision on whether that will occur. What the GNEP does do,
however, is provide a narrow window of opportunity where
through leadership America can guide it in a way that improves
our nonproliferation regime globally and improves the
proliferation resistance of those fuel cycle processes
themselves. It is through our research and development and
technology and support that we've been able to provide some
enhancements to the current purex processes that is the current
methodology whereby the fuel cycle states reprocess fuel now.
GNEP proposes a form of recycling that gives enhanced
proliferation protections, does not separate plutonium. Current
recycling separates plutonium into a pure stream. What GNEP is
proposing is a different model whereby plutonium is not
separated into a pure stream. It continues to have these other
actinides and lanthanides connected to it. On a global setting,
as I said, the rest of the world has come to the conclusion
that nuclear power will be an important part of providing
energy supply not just to America and to the allies but also to
those countries who aren't our allies, who want the peaceful
use of the atom.
GNEP is an opportunity to allow the peaceful use of the
atom, the use of nuclear energy for energy purposes, but do it
in a way so that you bring together a partnership of countries
whereby those who don't have a fuel cycle can access the energy
without accessing the capability that can be converted into a
military threat. That is a notion that is as old as President
Eisenhower's speech in 1953 before the U.N. Assembly. We have
made some progress on it, GNEP puts together all of these
pieces and we've been very encouraged by the support that we're
getting from the global community, not only from the potential
supplier states, Russia, China, Japan, France, U.K., and the
IAEA Director El Baradei, but also from potential recipient
states, those states who might say that if we had a mechanism
to access nuclear energy without developing a recycling
capability in-house, we might go in that direction, let's sit
down and talk. It's very encouraging.
Senator Clinton. Could I just have a followup on that
because as I understand the critique from various
nonproliferation experts, including the MIT study that I
mentioned earlier, the so-called proliferation resistant
reprocessing system that GNEP claims it would promote is
proliferation resistant only in comparison to other methods of
reprocessing, not as compared to the original spent fuel. The
spent fuel itself is actually far more proliferation resistant
than GNEP reprocessed plutonium because it's too radioactive to
be handled safely by terrorists. So, in other words, the
experts claim that the GNEP program would actually make it
easier for terrorists to steal dangerous material to use in an
attack. We're about to embark on an undertaking that could very
well cost hundreds of billions of dollars and I'm well aware of
the desire on the part of many countries and including the
administration here at home to promote nuclear civilian use for
energy purposes. But I'm just worried about the trade-offs
here. If we spent hundreds of billions of dollars refining coal
gasification we would provide clean coal without providing
spent plutonium as a potential terrorist attack. So how do you
make that trade-off?
Mr. Paul. Fair question. First of all, the purpose of these
other countries in accessing the science of the atom to provide
energy is not to develop or promote nuclear power. It's to have
electricity for hospitals and for first responders and for
schools.
Senator Clinton. It's nuclear power to fuel electricity.
Mr. Paul. It's to have electricity and to find a way to
provide that electricity in the cleanest, safest way, and they
have come to nuclear power as the one zero emissions method for
doing that. Now the question is, can America provide the
leadership to help that new partnership be crafted globally so
that it is more proliferation resistant? Now, I think we share
common concerns and goals, maybe not--we may not share all the
same conclusions as to the ``proliferation resistance'' of one
chemical process as opposed to another based upon a spent fuel
standard. First of all, that process that you're talking about
already exists. It's what all of those countries are currently
using, so to go back and say well let's compare it to not doing
recycling at all, quite frankly we don't have that opportunity
anymore. The rest of the world is going to recycle--is
recycling fuel and will continue to recycle spent fuel.
The question is, can we come up with a way that's even
better? Can we be a player by asserting leadership? We think
that we can. The global partners that we've spoken to also
think that through this partnership we can show leadership to
provide a more proliferation resistant process.
Some of the studies that you're referring to or some of the
comments have as their predicate certain assumptions that do
not necessarily apply. You can design a recycle process
thorough uranium extraction (UREX) to have whatever radiation
level protection that you want, if that's the sole way that
you're going to define proliferation resistance. But
proliferation and nonproliferation are something that is far
greater than a mere radiation dose level at hundred rad or rem
per hour or 80-100 spent fuel standard. You can have UREX that
is at that standard if that's your goal but the safeguards
technologies that America has developed and helped these other
countries to deploy even on their plutonium extraction (PUREX)
processes has moved far beyond these earlier standards. We have
the opportunity to shift them to a more proliferation resistant
process that does not separate out plutonium and that provides
safeguards and securities, verification technologies, and mass
accounting that is available with this process that is not
available with others. Remember that when you keep the
plutonium entrained with other isotopes, the lanthanides and
the other transuranics, you have signals, signatures,
additional tools that a nuclear engineer can use to ensure that
there is not diversion, and tools that I do not have available
to me with PUREX.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Clinton, you raised some
very serious concerns and certainly most Members of Congress
aren't nuclear physicists and we need the best information we
can possibly get when determining what the policy of this
government should be in so many of these areas. So we'd
encourage you to continue to supply us with that best thinking
and the best science that is out there so we can answer some of
these questions at least as satisfactorily as humanly possible.
Mr. Paul, the Fissile Material Disposition Program under
which the United States and Russia committed to dispose of 34
metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium is, of course,
laudable in intent, but it's been plagued by numerous problems.
There's been a 2-year delay in the program due to an inability
to agree on liability for U.S. contractors and now there's an
agreement but it awaits Russian signatures and ratification by
the Duma.
The impasse over liability caused the United States to
postpone construction of the U.S. MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility
in South Carolina in order to maintain parallelism between the
Russian and U.S. programs, in 2005, the DOE Inspector General
report criticized the management of the U.S. program and
assessed that the cost of the U.S. MOX Facility will be $3.5
billion, $2.5 billion more than the original DOE estimate in
2002. The fiscal year 2007 budget request for the program is
$638 million, nearly one-third of the total DOE
nonproliferation request for that year, and now it appears that
the Russians are no longer committed to the program as
originally conceived. Would you give us your view of the status
of that program and where you believe the future leads?
Mr. Paul. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The plutonium disposition
model, the goal of disposing of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade
plutonium, both from Russia and 34 metric tons from the surplus
material stockpile of the United States is a goal that is
shared by both this administration, and the previous
administration, and the previous administration put in place
the Plutonium Disposition Agreement in 2000 with the Russians
for the disposition on the Russian side and the U.S. side. On
the U.S. side, is our MOX program. That is the MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility and Pit Disassembly Conversion Facility to
take that plutonium from our stockpile, convert it into MOX
fuel that can then be irradiated in the light water reactors,
power reactors that produce electricity for us.
On the Russian side, the Russians have never particularly
supported the notion of consuming that plutonium in light water
reactors. Their preferred method is through fast reactors and
it is true that we have not made as much progress on the
Russian side. They started site preparation 2 years ago on
their MOX Facility, as we started site preparation this past
fall on ours.
The challenges, the difficulties with this are: one, again,
the Russians would prefer to go in the fast reactor direction;
and two, the liability dispute, the question about what
liability protection would apply with U.S. workers in the
Soviet Union, significantly delayed the progress on both sides,
had a significant impact on the project costs. As you delay a
project, a multibillion dollar project, the long lead
procurement costs increase more and more and more. There has
been uncertainty because of those delays that has to some
extent affected appropriations and it has resulted in logical
questions that would be asked from the legislative branch.
Senator Cornyn. Let me ask you this, Mr. Paul. Do you
believe that Russia is still committed to disposing of excess
plutonium through the MOX program and if not what are the costs
and benefits and risks to the United States going down another
disposition path?
Mr. Paul. As confirmed by recent communications between the
Director of Rosatom, Sergei Kiriyenko, and Secretary Bodman,
they are still committed to the disposition of the 34 metric
tons although their preference is not for light water reactors,
their preference is for the fast reactors. What they have said
is pretty consistent with what they said from the beginning,
which is that unless the international community provides all
the money to do it--they're saying that they are supportive of
doing it if the international community provides all of the
money to use light water reactors.
If, instead of using light water reactors, they can use
their BN600 and move towards an upgrade of that, a BN800, a
fast reactor model, then they are saying that they would put in
a significant amount of the money themselves. So we are
currently considering some discussions with them to figure out
what would it take to get them to dispose of their plutonium in
parallel with our disposition of plutonium pursuant to the
commitment that this administration and the previous
administration have made to developing the MOX program, this
MOX facility now in South Carolina. Senator Graham has been a
strong leader on these issues both as to the facility itself
but also as to the importance of reducing the plutonium
footprint worldwide.
Senator Cornyn. If we were to delink the U.S. and Russian
plutonium disposition programs, what would be the likely impact
on the Russian program and on the U.S. program?
Mr. Paul. I think it could have a significant impact on the
extent to which the international community would be willing to
contribute to the Russian program. Now the DOS has advised they
think the probability is lower and lower that the international
community is going to support this with funding at a greater
and greater level. That's a lot of qualifiers. There's still an
opportunity here for the international community to provide
significant support. I think if you delink it right now, you
would probably send a strong message to those contributors that
causes them to be even less receptive.
Senator Cornyn. If Russia decides to head down a different
path, should the U.S. disposition program be considered a
nonproliferation program or simply a program of disposing of
excess U.S. material that should be considered in a wider
context of DOE nuclear material disposition and cleanup?
Mr. Paul. We think both. This administration and the
previous administration both thought that it was important to
not only reduce, condense, consolidate the amount of fissile
material in this country and its locations and also for the
worldwide nonproliferation effort to reduce the threat of
people getting their hands on that material that can be used to
make a nuclear device. For both of those reasons, we continue
to be committed to disposing of that material.
Senator Cornyn. Secretary Flory, 2 years ago Libya declared
its intention to renounce all WMD programs and made a full
declaration of its considerable chemical weapons stockpile as a
first step forward to elimination. The United States has
offered to help Libya in that connection and I understand the
administration is currently considering which agency of the
U.S. Government will be charged with carrying out that
assistance. It would seem that the CTR program is the most
logical candidate. CTR is aimed at eliminating WMD threats.
Congress has provided authority to use CTR funds for activities
outside of the former Soviet Union with the specific example of
Libya in mind. CTR has the experience and expertise to
undertake this activity based upon its experience in Russia and
now in Albania. Do you support the use of CTR funds for
chemical weapons elimination in Libya and what factors are the
administration considering as it weighs its decision? Then let
me ask you when you're answering those questions to answer one
more. What is the estimated cost and timeline for carrying out
the chemical weapons elimination program in Libya? So do you
support the use of CTR funds, what factors are the
administration considering as it weighs its decision, and
what's the estimated cost and timeline?
Mr. Flory. Senator, there was a team, a joint team, I think
it was the DOS and DTRA team that was there in February at the
site. They looked at the site and the surrounding area. It's a
pretty remote site. I think it's about 600 kilometers away from
Tripoli. The team that went there is supposed to present
options sometime next month so given where we are in the month,
pretty soon I'll be in a better position to get back to you
after that. I think some of the factors that we would look at
and I think these would be incorporated in the options that are
presented are what are the conditions of the munitions, what
are the proliferation risks we believe they pose, what are the
technical aspects? For example, one part of the problem I think
is going to be transportation. Where these things are now does
not have any water and chemical demilitarization is a very
water intensive process. So there are a number of issues to be
looked at in terms of the threat, in terms of the technical
aspects of how we do it, and once we've had a chance to look at
the options that are presented, we will get back to Congress
I'm sure.
[The information referred to follows:]
I support the current United States position that we are committed
in principle to provide United States assistance to destroy Libya's
chemical weapons stockpile contingent upon Libya remaining responsible
for destruction, United States ability to identify appropriate funding,
and United States and Libya conclusion of implementing agreements, to
include agreement on division of responsibility.
Factors affecting the Department's decision to use Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) funds include the proliferation risk we believe
the Libyan stockpiles poses, the threat reduction and proliferation
reduction value of eliminating Libyan chemical weapons relative to
other CTR WMD elimination and proliferation prevention programs, the
condition of the munitions, the technical and logistical aspects of the
work, the availability of CTR funding, potential destruction timelines,
and overall expected costs.
The Department's CTR fiscal year 2006 and requested fiscal year
2007 funds are committed to other programs assigned high priority by
the administration. Use of these funds for assistance to Libya would
come at the cost of significantly reduced efforts in these programs.
Department of Defense's (DOD) cost and schedule estimate to
destroy/neutralize the Libyan chemical agent and precursor materials is
$142 million and 43 months. With risk and inflation factors removed,
the estimated cost is $75 million. The DOD schedule does not include
the time required to staff and obtain a presidential determination to
comply with the legislative restriction on performing CTR work outside
the states of the former Soviet Union, nor the time required to
negotiate and conclude with the Government of Libya the legal
architecture to ensure exemptions from taxes/customs and liability
protections for United States Government and contractor personnel.
Proceeding without this architecture in place could undermine the
protections and exemptions negotiated with other countries where CTR
work is performed.
Mr. Flory. The question is, there's DOS nonproliferation
money that's available. There's also the CTR money and that's I
think the choice you referred to upfront. If we could get back
to you when we know a little bit more about the scope of the
problem, we'd be pleased to do so.
In terms of the cost, because of some of the factors I just
described, including the distances involved, the lack of water,
the weather--I understand that it's 140 degrees during the day
for most months of the year there--it's going to be fairly
expensive. I haven't seen any figures we have a high degree of
confidence in. I do think there's a good chance it will be over
a $100 million and in that case we have to consider what are
the opportunity costs of doing that particular bit of work
compared to other work CTR or any other program is doing in the
former Soviet Union in Central Asia or any of the other places
we're working. But we'll be able to talk more with more
definition when we have a report back from the team.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. We look forward to you getting
back with us on that. Here again, I guess you raised in your
answer the point that I was inquiring about initially, and
given not limitless resources, how do we prioritize and focus
and as you say the opportunity costs of participating or
funding one program at perhaps the expense of others? That
continues to be a concern and I know you're working hard on
that but that certainly is a concern I have and one that I want
to continue to stay in touch with you on.
General Cartwright, let me just ask you quickly, you noted
that STRATCOM's focused on improving DOD capacity and
increasing resources for WMD elimination and mitigation
efforts, but I want to make sure that you have all the
capabilities in terms of authorization for the Department to
carry out your mission and where in future years do you see
your budget requests going in terms of fulfilling that mission?
General Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My sense is
that we have the resources and the authorities that we need to
move forward on this mission and move forward aggressively. If
there is a point in the future that I would use a crystal ball
to say where do I think maybe things are going to change, the
area that probably is most vexing right now technically is
standoff detection, knowing what's coming to your border and
being able to detect that in a technical sense with a degree of
fidelity that you're not chasing false alarms on a regular
basis and that you can have a level of monitoring that is
global to understand what's going on in a global sense in these
different processes.
The technical solutions right now tend to be point
solutions. We can tell what's in this room but 100 miles away
we don't have a good capability of forecasting it's movement. I
think that's an area that we will come back to you as we better
understand the technical challenge and where we ought to apply
our dollars and cents to go after that challenge.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, General Cartwright. I guess in
light of recent events, we need to not only make sure we have
the detection capability but perhaps good identification.
General Cartwright. Identification.
Senator Cornyn. So we know people are indeed authorized to
transport radioactive materials, for example.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
follow up that line of questioning, General Cartwright, with
respect to the combating WMD mission. You responded to Senator
Nelson that the DTRA is the component commander. Could you
elaborate? Do they report to you directly and do they retain
planning, budgeting, and command control responsibilities? How
does it work?
General Cartwright. Sir, they are by designation a combat
support agency within the DOD which creates a relationship
between the chairman and the organization. They have a charter
and a set of missions. All of those missions are not
necessarily associated with the mission of combating WMD so in
the DOD we have set up an arrangement that we've used for a lot
of years where we take the director, in this case, and give him
what we call dualhatting.
In other words, he has two responsibilities. In the sense
of the combating WMD, he operates as a component for STRATCOM
to provide those services to all of the regional combatant
commanders as they need them. He turns to me when there is
competition for resources as the first level of let's see how
we should prioritize resources and then also to advocate for
additional resources where it's appropriate. So that tends to
be the relationship.
Inside the organization what we've tried to do is insert an
element of military planning capability that was not there
before to bring closer the skill set that's already resident in
the DTRA and the skills necessary to service the regional
combatant commanders in a timely fashion. So there's a good
articulation and we don't have a separation. Oftentimes, your
ability to ask the right question is the key in crisis to know
what's out there to help you. By bringing the planning skills
into the organization, we get closer and draw that relationship
closer and that's at the heart of what we're trying to get
accomplished.
Senator Reed. But you're still--it's a work in progress?
General Cartwright. It is, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. You're also--on a day-to-day basis they're
responding about synchronization, the chairman and yourself,
and you're trying to get that more synchronized, is that fair?
General Cartwright. That's fair. In the synchronization or
the integration of the process, a lot of what we're trying to
do by bringing them into the STRATCOM portfolio, so to speak,
is to avail them of a very direct and close relationship with
things like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. So
that again, the partnership is much tighter, to the extent that
it's appropriate, the information operations that we're
responsible for missile defense operations so that you get a
more holistic look at choices and as customers, so to speak.
The regional combatant commanders come in the door and they can
expect not only a direct answer to maybe the wrong question,
but the opportunity to find the right question and the right
set of answers.
Senator Reed. What's STRATCOM's role in the PSI?
General Cartwright. We work closely, through DTRA and
through the operational forces, and, again, this is why the
planners are so critical, along with the lead agency, the DOS
to one, set the environment and, two, to provide when necessary
the operational planning and execution skills that are
necessary for a particular action.
Senator Reed. Have you exercised this function yet?
General Cartwright. We have in the planning and we have in
the seminars and the objective setting and the training
activities that go on broadly across the world.
Senator Reed. But do you have a--what's the next step in
exercising?
General Cartwright. The next step is a set of exercises
that are international in scope led by the DOS that extend
through this summer and into next year. We are a key
participant in providing support to those and interfacing with
not only DOS but with the other governments and their military
organizations to ensure services, for instance, we talked about
a Navy capability to ensure that that matches up so that if we
arrive at a juncture where we are trying to interdict
something, that we have all of the right rules, we know how to
operate together, we know who's to talk to who, and all of that
gets laid out. That's the part of the exercise and planning
activity that we're trying to bring.
Senator Reed. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the QDR
has been given similar responsibilities, at least closely
allied. Can you talk about your link-up with SOCOM,
particularly going forward?
General Cartwright. Sure. There is a very tight
relationship between SOCOM and STRATCOM, particularly in the
areas of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In
the area of combating WMD, the teams that we put together that
have been called render safe but have the skills of the
explosive ordinance disposal people, the skills that are
brought to the table by the DTRA, bringing those together in a
way that we can deploy them in a timeline that's appropriate
that we can figure out what the size and availability of them,
how many of these teams do we need, how robust do they have to
be. All of those things seem to be growing over time. Where do
we want to take these teams? Those are the types of things that
General Brown and I work on a regular basis. Our staffs are
linked both virtually and physically and we come together at
the DTRA in that planning cell and in the technical expertise
that Dr. Tegnelia and his organization bring. So it is a very
close relationship.
I will tell you that SOCOM is probably more focused on the
execution side of this activity. We're trying to prepare the
battle space, make sure that they have the tools necessary, as
we do for each regional combatant commander.
Senator Reed. Can you comment briefly on the mission of the
Global Innovation and Strategy Center?
General Cartwright. I talked a little bit about that with
Senator Nelson's question, but the idea here is that there
emerge questions for which we often don't have answers. In
order to get the answers and get inside the decision cycles of
an adversary who would operate with some limited knowledge or
work in our seams, we have established an opportunity to reach
out to the commercial sector, both U.S. and abroad, and to the
academic sector. The idea here is if I have a problem I grab
the smartest and brightest people in the world, get them into,
my phrase, a hot, sweaty pile, and not let them out until we
have a potential answer. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. That's good enough. [Laughter].
We don't want to go any further with that.
General Cartwright, in your testimony, you describe one of
your key initiatives as improve and expand U.S. Forces
capabilities to locate, track, and tag shipments of WMD. Could
you provide some amplification there about what you're doing
and do you need additional resources to do this?
General Cartwright. This is another very close partnership
with SOCOM because they work in this area and have worked in
this area for a lot of years. The acknowledgment here is that
the finding and fixing part of this cycle is probably broader
than just radiological activities. In a find and fix activity
you must tag it so that you know where it is and you can keep
track of it. We must expand this effort to other vexing
problems like mobile threats that we have, missiles, et cetera,
and so the intent here is to broaden the activity not to
diminish or dilute what SOCOM is trying to accomplish. Start to
broaden it out and make it available to the other regional
combatant commanders for a broader set of targets.
Senator Reed. Just a final point and maybe just a very
quick response, it seems to me that this function is intimately
involved with the national intelligence capability. What's your
general satisfaction level with the integration, with the new
regime of intelligence in the United States?
General Cartwright. I will tell you that what we are trying
to do on the DOD side is focus, through STRATCOM, to the DNI
and his organization a single portal, so to speak, where the
needs are coming from one voice and one place that are
aggregated from all the regions. Not to cut anybody out but to
get them correlated and collated in a way that the IC can
respond. That is starting to create synergies that we were
unable to realize before because once we understand the problem
and we can work at it together, many of these threats that we
deal with today and we anticipate we'll deal with in the future
operate in the seams of authorities. So by having that single
portal and being able to get it very tight and very close--and
essentially we will open a center here in the next month at
Bolling Air Force Base in the DIA spaces that bring the DNI's
capabilities along with the DOD's capabilities, at least to a
common floor for operations so that we can see each other's
problems, look at the opportunities to solve them in a way that
creates synergy rather than the old constructive need to know.
If you don't know the right question to ask, you don't
necessarily get what you need.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow
up on the line of questioning first by the Chairman and then by
Senator Reed.
Mr. Paul, with respect to the cost of the U.S./Russian
disposal program, what is the approximate cost? What are we
talking about when you say that the Russians won't do it the
way that we would prefer unless they're paid for it and the
international community may not want to bear the cost? What are
we talking about in terms of dollars?
Mr. Paul. For the Russian program?
Senator Clinton. Right.
Mr. Paul. Or the Russian side? I'm hesitant to quote an
exact price from their recent validated baseline. I'm thinking
$2.7 billion is what they're saying.
Senator Clinton. So we're talking about $2.7 billion?
Mr. Paul. I believe so.
Senator Clinton. Where is the source of that money if it
comes internationally? Who contributes to that $2.7 billion?
Mr. Paul. I believe that France has made a pledge of a few
hundred million dollars. I don't know the exact number.
It's a couple million dollars because the MOX technology is
of French origin. I shouldn't say that's why but there is a
connection there. They actually have that technology. So the
French have made a commitment if the fuel were MOX. There are a
few others who have not made firm commitments, I believe, but
have said that if the project goes forward they would be
interested in making contributions. I don't know exactly how
much money has been firmly committed by the international
community. It's something that I will get you.
It turns out I do know how much. [Laughter].
Senator Clinton. Thank goodness for those people who sit
behind us.
Mr. Paul. It turns out I'm told that we have pledges
totaling $844 million.
Senator Clinton. Will this be an issue for the President to
raise at the G8?
Mr. Paul. I think that it is. It's something that we've
discussed anyway about having that be mentioned and
nonproliferation cooperation is something that the President
has mentioned in the international fora in the past. I think
this is an issue that the Russians--I don't know about MOX
specifically but nonproliferation efforts is something that I
believe that Russia as chair will raise as well.
Senator Clinton. We might want to emphasize that, Mr.
Chairman, because I think your questions really go to the heart
of whether the single biggest threat, the one that we were most
interested in trying to address over the last several years,
will be addressed and finalized at some point. So maybe we
could follow up on that.
Mr. Paul. I appreciate that thought too, on the G8 Summit.
I will follow up with that. I'll also get you a breakdown of
the $844 million to tell you which countries have made those
pledges.
[The information referred to follows:]
As a part of the Group of Eight, the Global Partnership against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction is a significant
force to enhance international security and safety. The G-8 has
committed to raise up to $20 billion through 2012 to support Global
Partnership projects primarily in Russia, such as the plutonium
disposition project. As of now, international donations to the
plutonium disposition are as follows:
[In millions of dollars]
United States............................. $400
United Kingdom............................ 133.6 (70,000,000 British
pounds)
Canada.................................... 57.4 (65,000,000 Canadian
dollars)
Japan..................................... 100
Italy..................................... 102 (80,000,000 Euro)
France.................................... 76.5 (60,000,000 Euro)
-----------------------------
Total................................... $869.5
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that, Mr. Paul. Let me follow
up on the line of questioning by Senator Reed. When the panel
describes the various entities that are now part of our threat
reduction nonproliferation strategy it really does sound like
alphabet soup. It sounds like there are lots and lots of cooks
in the kitchen and when everybody's in charge, nobody's in
charge. I'm concerned about duplication, I'm concerned about
gaps, and I think it would be useful to get a matrix that
actually lays out who is responsible for what, how they
interact, what shared lines of command there may or may not be.
I very much appreciate the work that everyone is doing on this
but, for example, Mr. Paul, not to pick on you, but the DOE's
Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program is
incredibly important to ensure that WMD experts from various
countries are redirected to peaceful jobs, don't end up in
Iran, or you name it at this point.
However, I'm also aware there's a DOS program that is
focused on the similar objectives. Are these programs
duplicative? Are they complementary? What mechanism is in place
to ensure proper coordination? This is just a tiny example of
what I see as a very broadly dispersed responsibility on the
biggest threat we face.
Mr. Paul. It's a good question and a good point. They are
complementary but if you weren't on top of them day-in and day-
out and making sure that you have good coordination and
communication, they could stumble over themselves. The programs
for proliferation prevention and the complementary DOS program,
something that this administration and the previous
administration both supported, and has been very successful,
but there is the potential for them to stumble over each other.
That hasn't happened. We've worked very well together using the
DOS's centers, if you will, for collecting the technical
capabilities and our piece which is more deploying it into the
nuclear weapons facilities. We reach out and we look for
scientists, whether it be Russian scientists, former Soviet
Union scientists, Libyan or Iraqi scientists, and we go out and
try to link them up with peaceful uses, as I know you're
familiar with this program. The DOS maintains a clearing house
of that but quite frankly you are making a very good point that
if you didn't communicate, if we didn't have such a good
relationship between our program and theirs, it could be
difficult to manage.
Senator Clinton. I really appreciate that and as I say
maybe, Mr. Chairman, our staffs could work with our witnesses
and others to put forth that kind of matrix because everyone
gives lip service to the fact that this is the most dangerous
threat we face and there are lots of those cooks in the kitchen
and I just want to know who the chef is and who the point
person is. It's in DOD, it's in DOS, it's in DOE, so it would
be helpful at least to me if we could try to sort that out.
My final question that really would go to each of you which
is to add a layer of further complexity on this, we do have the
IAEA, which is responsible for promoting peaceful uses of
nuclear technology and then ensuring insofar as possible that
those technologies are not used to develop nuclear weapons and
it does so largely in its role as a watchdog. Increasingly, the
IAEA is playing a major international role. It frankly has
credibility that sometimes we and our allies lack. It has
access as it now does for example to Iranian nuclear sites that
we could only dream of. I worry that we're not doing enough to
bolster and support the IAEA and there developed a kind of
antagonistic relationship for all the reasons we know. So let
me ask each of you, starting with Secretary Flory, is there
more we could do to help bolster the IAEA by, for example,
sending more U.S. personnel to Vienna, Austria, or helping to
provide technology or working better to coordinate with them?
Because I think increasingly we're going to need an agency
like that given what is, I think, the appropriate warning or
caution that Mr. Paul gave that we're on a fast march toward
nuclear proliferation and I wish we could do more to reign it
in. I think there are some things we could do. It may or may
not be inevitable but the fact is, it's happening. So what do
we do to really bolster the IAEA as a necessary component of
our efforts to try to watch that and prevent insofar as
possible?
Mr. Flory. Senator, you raise a very good point. The IAEA
plays an extremely important role and after decades when it was
there and frankly didn't get a lot of attention because things
were moving along, it first came into world view after the
first Iraq war when it was learned how much Iraq had been able
to accomplish under IAEA scrutiny and that led to the
development of stronger safeguards by the IAEA and most
recently in the case of Iran. In terms of resources and things
like that, I think--I don't know if I'm allowed to do this but
if I can take your question for the record vicariously on
behalf of Bob Joseph who was unable to be here----[Laughter].
[The information referred to follows:]
The United States has long been at the forefront of efforts to
strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) ability to
deter, detect, and respond to nuclear proliferation. When the IAEA
safeguards system was being developed, we provided much of the
technology to verify and monitor nuclear material and facilities. After
the first Gulf War revealed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear
activities, we supported the successful development of the additional
protocol, to strengthen the ability of the IAEA to detect undeclared
nuclear activities and change safeguards from a culture of accountants
to one of detectives. When the IAEA budget was stretched thin by the
added demands of strengthened safeguards, we stepped in to fill the gap
in safeguards through our annual voluntary contribution--the largest by
far by any member state--and by persuading IAEA member states in 2003
to support an increase in the safeguards budget.
President Bush submitted the IAEA Additional Protocol to the Senate
for advice and consent to ratification in 2002, and welcomed the
Senate's approval in 2004. The President also called for universal
adoption of the Additional Protocol and the creation of a new special
committee of the IAEA Board to examine ways to strengthen the agency's
safeguards and verification capabilities. Working closely with the IAEA
Director General, we are pleased that the new special committee began
its important work late last year.
The United States has also worked with others on the IAEA Board to
reinforce the essential role of the U.N. Security Council in addressing
noncompliance with safeguards obligations, as that role was embedded in
the IAEA Statute almost 50 years ago. In September 2005, the IAEA Board
of Governors found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards
obligations, a formal finding that requires a report to the Security
Council. The Board also found that Iran's nuclear activities raise
questions concerning international peace and security that are within
the competence of the U.N. Security Council. In February 2006, the
Board reported the Iranian case to the Security Council, and the
Council added its authority to the IAEA's calls on Iran through a
Presidential statement in late March. Thus, as the U.S. strongly
advocated, the Security Council has not supplanted the IAEA effort, but
instead reinforces it.
One clear lesson from the Iran case is that some states will skirt
their obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), or cynically
manipulate the provisions of the NPT to justify the acquisition of
sensitive technologies that enable them to pursue nuclear weapons
capabilities. These are the very capabilities the Treaty is intended to
deny. To close this loophole, the President has proposed measures to
halt the further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation
capabilities beyond those states that already operate full-scale, fully
functioning facilities. These sensitive fuel cycle capabilities are--
the two primary paths to acquiring fissile material for nuclear
weapons. In return, he called on the world's nuclear fuel suppliers to
ensure that states that forego enrichment and reprocessing have
reliable access at a reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors. We
are working with other fuel provider states and with the IAEA to put in
place reliable fuel service arrangements that will convince states with
power reactors that their best economic interest is not to invest in
expensive, and proliferation risky, fuel cycle capabilities.
The IAEA relies on its member states to meet its needs for
expertise and for developing and applying technology to meet safeguards
needs and challenges. The U.S. Support Program is by far the largest
and most comprehensive of the 18 Member State Support Programs. Over
the years we have provided most of the basic technology for measuring
nuclear materials and monitoring for possible diversion of those
materials from peaceful nuclear activities. We provided experts who
helped develop the system and structure of IAEA safeguards. When the
IAEA needs novel or unique capabilities to respond to challenges in
particular countries, such as Iran or North Korea, the United States
has always stood ready to respond. Currently, we are sponsoring 12
full-time experts and 35 interns, junior professionals and part-time
consultants, and working on 80 other projects in collaboration with the
IAEA Safeguards Department. We are committed further enhancing IAEA
safeguards in the context of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, in
order to facilitate the growth of nuclear energy to meet the world's
growing energy needs.
Mr. Flory. I'm sure he'll appreciate my doing this, but DOS
is the lead and we'll obviously be happy to contribute to
answering that question in any way we can. But since it's a
diplomatic mission they probably are the best people to pull
together an answer on that.
I think what is tremendously important is that, and this is
again something where the DOS is in the lead for us, is that
the matter of Iran be handled successfully. The IAEA has
grappled with this under the leadership for much of that time
of a particular group of members but as you've mentioned it's
focused attention on the IAEA and I think it's important for
the overall, for the internationally established safeguard
network, that the international system that we're working with
be able to solve this problem.
Senator Clinton. General, do you have anything to add to
that?
General Cartwright. I would just say that there are
certainly things that we can do in partnership. The obvious
ones are training, standards, technical experts, and making
sure that we're on a common sheet of music, so to speak, in
advocating for those standards and once they're accepted, then
advocating globally for them. Those are critical pieces. There
are also pieces that we probably ought to sit down in another
session and talk a little bit about what we could do to assist
them in setting the conditions for their ability to do their
job.
Senator Clinton. That would be very helpful. I'm sure that
you've given thought to that and it might be something that we
could look at.
Mr. Paul. That's actually something that the President's
focused on quite a bit, increasing the funding for the IAEA,
continuing to provide the technical basis and supports that the
IAEA and Director El Baradei needs. Every one of the more than
200 nuclear weapons inspectors at the IAEA were trained at Los
Alamos National Laboratory here in America here within the
NNSA. We're very proud to continue to fund that training. They
come here to learn how to do what they do to keep the world
safe.
We led the way to strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect
nuclear proliferation. We instituted a successful effort to
increase the safeguards budget. The United States of America is
the single largest contributor to the budget of the IAEA. In
fact, we are even a larger contributor by percentage basis to
the IAEA than we are to the U.N. There's 128 members of the
IAEA. We provide one-quarter of all the funding. We also
provide a lot, on a rotational basis, of our technical experts
from our national laboratories and with Ambassador Greg
Schulte, our recently sworn-in ambassador to the U.N. mission
there, along with our office, our DOE office there, we have
engaged in an effort to increase the number of U.S. origin
persons and experts that go to the IAEA and work internally.
It's something that I've spoken personally with Director El
Baradei about.
I have one deputy director general on his board who is
American, who's actually the Deputy Director General for
Management for the IAEA and I am in a process right now of
increasing the number of technical experts that we send over
there. These are excellent points and they're things that we
are working on on a day-to-day basis. I think that it's a good
testament to the leadership of the President and the leadership
of Director El Baradei. We've made some progress but we can do
more.
Senator Clinton. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Clinton. I, too, think
it would be interesting to see that wire diagram.
Senator Clinton. Yes.
Senator Cornyn. May be instructive for all of us.
Mr. Paul, the Megaports program is a DOE nonproliferation
program to install nuclear detection equipment at major
international seaports. Last Friday, March 24, a couple of
newspapers ran articles alleging that through the Megaports
Program the United States was contracting with foreign
companies to scan cargo for nuclear materials. Could you please
explain to us what the Megaports Program is and how it operates
at international seaports? If you would also tell us what would
be the role of private contractors in the Philippines, the
Bahamas, and other countries where the Megaports Program is
being conducted?
Finally, who will actually operate the radiation detection
equipment and how confident can we be that it will not be
tampered with?
Mr. Paul. We can be very confident that the equipment and
the material, the data stream that we get from it, and the
analysis of it will not be tampered with.
Let me tell you a little bit about the Megaports Program.
This is a fantastic program. It's an opportunity for us to have
an additional layer of defense and protection in order to
detect the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological
material through some of the major ports with the most
throughput outside the United States, ports through which cargo
would travel before it ultimately comes to a U.S. port.
We are currently up and running with our radiation detector
equipment that we deploy in four ports. We have 10 this year
that we have in construction mode and we have another 35, 40
that we're in negotiations with right now. It's a program that
works very much in tandem with the DHS Container Security
Initiative (CSI). CSI has U.S. Federal customs agents onsite at
foreign ports who through profiles review manifests of cargo to
identify containers, for example, that should have further
review, inspection, and detector inspections. What we do is we
put equipment in these foreign ports. We train the operators.
These are foreign port Federal Government operators.
So, for example, we go into the Port of Bahamas and we
train their customs officials, because it's their port to
operate and analyze the data that comes from a radiation
detector, a gamma ray detector, and a neutron detector, which
is in that port. If a cargo container were to come through that
portal and an alarm were to sound that data goes to a central
alarm station that is manned by a government official. It is a
customs official from the host government because these are in
foreign government's ports. I think what was stated in a
newspaper was not exactly correct.
Senator Cornyn. That would surprise me.
Mr. Paul. Yes, I know. To set the record straight, in the
Bahamas and in all other Megaports ports and in all future
Megaports ports the equipment and the data collection is
operated by a Federal Government agent from the host country.
Now, obviously, we have to work out agreements with the port on
the logistics and how the ports themselves are operated so
that, for example, if a terminal is owned by a private company,
we can't change the fact that a private company operates it,
but our radiation detection equipment in there is not operated
by that private company, is not touched by that private
company, it cannot be tampered with by that private company. If
it is tampered with, we get an immediate alarm, a signal. If
it's defeated so that there is a break in the signal, we get an
immediate alarm. We also have technologies that allow us to be
very vigilant in this setting, I'll say that.
Senator Cornyn. I would note that we just got word that
there is a 15-minute vote on the floor, so we're going to be
wrapping up here rather quickly. What is the role that U.S.
Government personnel play at those foreign ports?
Mr. Paul. In most of those foreign ports, the CSI program
is already in place where there is a U.S. Federal customs
official reviewing manifests. We typically go into a port with
Megaports and add the detector capability at a port where there
is already CSI and therefore already a U.S. Federal customs
official. In those instances, which is most of them, if a
Megaports alarm were to sound and a government official from
the foreign port got that alarm, it is common that that person
would contact his counterpart, the U.S. Federal customs
official there, but it's not a requirement. In the absence of a
U.S. Federal customs official there, they go straight to the
embassy and then the embassy calls me or calls our office. But
under no circumstances is a private company in control of that
data nor can they tamper with it.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. Mr. Flory, my last question and
then I'll turn it over to Senator Reed, has to do with the CTR
program and notwithstanding the success that that program has
enjoyed, we see the CTR budget declining this year and it looks
like CTR budgets will either remain flat or even decline
further over the 5-year defense plan. It strikes me as odd
because we also have a request for a $44.5 million supplemental
for the CTR program to fund accelerated security improvements
at Russian warhead sites agreed to by President Bush and
President Putin at the Bratislava Summit, as has already been
testified to.
Could you explain that and in particular there's been some
discussion as I know you know about the use of supplementals to
fund ongoing operations of the DOD, and why a supplemental is
the appropriate way to go here as opposed to putting it in the
baseline of the DOD budget?
Mr. Flory. Mr. Chairman, in terms of the supplemental
request, I don't know precisely the answers to why that request
came in as a supplemental. I suspect that it had to do with,
and this is a problem we have in many cases, where the budget
cycle is such a long drawn out process that sometimes things
have changed and requirements have changed over time. We do
need the money to spend now in fiscal year 2006. That's what's
driving--and the fact that it's part of a program that is
specifically designed to accelerate a preexisting program that
was supposed to take until 2012 and is now supposed to take
until 2008. With respect to this year's budget specifically,
you're right, last year was I think about $409 million and this
year we go down to $372 million. That reflected actually the
program expectations at the time and in particular the fact
that the assumptions driving the budget at the time the budget
was put together assumed that there was going to be a drop-off
in funding for Shchuch'ye.
Now, as I told you earlier, we have a delay in the
Shchuch'ye project. We do not assume that that delay is going
to transform into an additional financial requirement. Right
now we only know that it's going to take more time. If it were
to turn out that more funding were required, we'd have to come
back, but it's a function of the budget having been developed
about a year ago and some of the problems only becoming
manifest now.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. I just want to quickly follow up. You've
mentioned Shchuch'ye but I have a series of specific questions
about the delay, about the potential budget authorities that
might be necessary in the future, and when live agent
production will be--destruction I should say, not production,
destruction--we're destroying we're not producing.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
testimony. As you can see, there's a lot of interest in what
you do and in our country's security when it comes to
proliferation, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation and
counterterrorism efforts and we very much appreciate your
service to our Nation and your willingness to take on this
challenge. We want to be supportive of those efforts. We want
to know what resources and authority that you need in order to
do your job even better.
The hearing will now conclude but we'll leave the record
open for 48 hours in case there are other members of the
committee who'd like to submit additional requests for
information. Thank you very much. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
fissile material disposition program
1. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, the fissile material disposition
program, under which the United States and Russia committed to dispose
of 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, is laudable in
intent, but has been plagued by numerous problems: There was a 2-year
delay in the program due to an inability to agree on liability issues
for U.S. contractors. Though an agreement has now been reached, it
still awaits Russian signature and ratification by the Russian Duma.
The impasse over liability caused the United States to postpone
construction of the U.S. Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility in
South Carolina in order to maintain parallelism in the program. A
December 2005 Department of Energy (DOE) Inspector General (IG) report
criticized the management of the U.S. program and assessed that the
cost of the U.S. MOX facility will be $3.5 billion-$2.5 billion more
than the original DOE estimate in 2002.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request for the MOX program is $638.0
million--nearly one-third of the total DOE nonproliferation request for
fiscal year 2007. Now it appears that the Russians are no longer
committed to the program as originally conceived.
Why hasn't Russia signed the liability agreement it reached with
the United States last year?
Mr. Paul. The United States and Russia successfully completed
negotiations of a protocol covering liability protection for the
plutonium disposition program in July 2005. The protocol is currently
under final review within the Russian Government and is expected to be
signed in the near future. We have been reassured by officials from the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Atomic Energy
Agency that there are no substantive problems with the agreed language,
but rather it is a question of the protocol undergoing a complete
interagency review that has been moving more slowly than expected.
While we are disappointed with the delay in signing, we continue to
believe that the protocol will be signed.
2. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, since Russia has indicated this
agreement must be ratified by the Russian Duma, are there risks in
spending additional U.S. taxpayer dollars on the Russian program before
the Duma has approved the liability agreement?
Mr. Paul. I believe the risks are minimal. Russian officials have
assured us that once the liability protocol is signed, the two sides
can work together to seek interim arrangements to enable the terms of
the protocol to be applied provisionally.
3. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, do you believe Russia is still
committed to disposing of excess plutonium through the MOX program? If
not, what are the costs, benefits, and risks to the U.S. of going down
another disposition path with Russia?
Mr. Paul. Yes, I believe Russia remains committed to disposing of
34 metric tons of its surplus weapon-grade plutonium. Recent high-level
meetings with officials from the Russian Atomic Energy Agency indicate
that Russia would proceed with the disposition program using primarily
light water reactors were full funding available from the international
community. At the same time, Russian officials have expressed their
desire to explore the use of fast reactors for their disposition
effort, which is consistent with the 2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement as well as Russia's future energy
policy. We are now actively engaged with Russia on exploring ways to
shift the program in a direction that will garner Russian commitment,
political as well as financial. The absence of such a commitment has
been a major factor accounting for the delays in their cooperation.
4. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, do you believe the U.S. and Russian
programs should continue to be linked? Should they still proceed at a
parallel pace?
Mr. Paul. The United States and Russia remain committed to
proceeding with plutonium disposition in parallel, to the extent
practicable, as called for in the 2000 agreement. However, vastly
different political and regulatory infrastructures make meeting
milestones for U.S. and Russian plutonium disposition facilities at the
same time difficult. The Department is ready to start construction of
the U.S. MOX facility in 2006, even though the Russian program has
lagged behind. However, the Russian Government has recently signaled
its intent to begin early disposition of limited quantities of weapon-
grade plutonium in its existing fast reactor well before the United
States could begin disposition of its plutonium. Moreover, the United
States and Russia are exploring the use of other advanced reactors for
disposing of the balance of the 34 metric tons of Russian plutonium.
5. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, if we were to delink the U.S. and
Russian plutonium disposition programs, what would be the likely impact
on the Russian program and on the U.S. program?
Mr. Paul. The 2000 Agreement commits the United States and Russia
to dispose of 34 metric tons each of surplus weapon-grade plutonium in
parallel to the extent practicable. While the U.S. is prepared to
proceed with construction of its MOX facility, Russia is still
considering various disposal options to meet its commitment.
Consequently, the U.S. has concluded it's no longer practicable to link
construction and operation of its MOX facility to the achievement of
similar milestones for a MOX facility by Russia. The U.S. believes its
approach will enable both countries to achieve commitments under the
2000 Agreement in a timely and cost-effective manner.
6. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, in that case, should the U.S.
disposition program still be considered a nonproliferation program? Or
is it then simply a program for disposing of excess U.S. material that
should be considered in the wider context of DOE nuclear material
disposition and cleanup?
Mr. Paul. Yes, the U.S. program is still a critical
nonproliferation effort because it will yield important
nonproliferation benefits by eliminating weapons usable nuclear
material and demonstrating its leadership in nonproliferation to the
rest of the world.
7. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, does DOE have a plan to present to
Congress a clear path forward for both the Russian and the U.S.
programs before we put any more funds into the program?
Mr. Paul. A detailed cost estimate and schedule baseline for the
construction of the U.S. MOX facility is currently being developed and
will be validated before construction begins as part of the DOE's
Critical Decision process. The Department will submit to Congress a
report on the cost and schedule baseline for MOX facility by December
2006. As for the Russian program, the two sides are working together to
explore other disposition alternatives based on the use of advanced
reactors for plutonium disposition. In this regard, Russian officials
have signaled their intent to begin early disposition of limited
quantities of weapon-grade plutonium in its existing fast reactor well
before the United States could begin disposition of its plutonium.
Moreover, the United States and Russia are exploring the use of other
advanced reactors for disposing of the balance of the 34 metric tons of
Russian plutonium. Joint U.S.-Russian technical working groups are
being established to discuss early Russian disposition, with the first
meeting planned for May 10-12, 2006. At this time, we cannot predict
how long the preparations will take.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
megaports and the second line of defense program and other border
security initiatives
8. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory and Mr. Paul, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) plans
to establish a global architecture for international border security.
How will this be coordinated with the Department of State (DOS), which
has the lead responsibility in coordinating efforts of the DOE and
Department of Defense (DOD) to prevent nuclear smuggling overseas?
Mr. Flory. I would refer you to DHS's DNDO and the DOS for an
understanding of the coordination mechanisms between the two
organizations regarding DNDO's global architecture.
Mr. Paul. The DNDO's responsibility to develop the global
architecture for radiation detection does not obviate the need for the
DOS's coordination role. In coordination with the DOE, DOD, and DOS,
the DNDO is focused on developing the overarching multi-layered
strategy for protection of the U.S. from an act of nuclear terrorism
(i.e., the Global Architecture), developing more advanced detection
equipment, and examining methods to facilitate U.S. receipt of
information on potential nuclear threats in near real-time. The DOE
continues to have the responsibility for the international deployment
of radiation detection systems and will continue to consult with DOS on
its international cooperation programs. DOE is a participant in the
Nuclear Trafficking Response Group, which is chaired by DOS and is
responsible for facilitating the coordination of the U.S. Government
response to all international origin nuclear detection alarms.
9. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory and Mr. Paul, how does the global
architecture apply to DOE and DOD programs?
Mr. Flory. DOD policy and program personnel who work on the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program's Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) have been
coordinating closely with DNDO in the development of DNDO's
international radiation and nuclear detection capabilities data base--
one component of its global nuclear detection architecture.
DOD's CTR policy office has provided to DNDO specific information
on the deployment of radiation detection equipment that has been
provided through its WMD-PPI program, as well as general WMD-PPI
program background information.
DOD is placing provisions in its WMD-PPI agreements with CTR
program recipient states that require reporting, through the U.S.
Embassy, when any WMD-related material is detected through the use of
U.S. Government-provided equipment. These reports are sent back to the
State Department, which shares them with DNDO.
As its WMD-PPI projects mature, CTR Policy will continue to provide
project information that is relevant to DNDO's mission.
I would refer you to DOE for an understanding of how DNDO's global
architecture applies to its programs.
Mr. Paul. As the primary agency responsible for international
deployment of radiation detection equipment, we work closely with DNDO
to shape the global nuclear detection architecture. The National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) routinely exchanges programmatic
and technical information with DNDO to determine how the efforts of the
Second Line of Defense program can enhance the external layer of the
Global Architecture.
10. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory and Mr. Paul, in a report
released Monday, March 27, 2006, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) recommends that the National Security Advisory, acting through
the National Security Council staff, issue a plan ``guiding the
implementation and coordination of threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs addressing border security.'' How does the
DHS global architecture fit within this recommendation?
Mr. Flory. I would refer you to DHS and the National Security
Council regarding this recommendation.
Mr. Paul. The DHS's DNDO efforts to establish this global
architecture are focused on baselining the current detection
capabilities both domestically and internationally and identifying the
``gaps'' where the establishment of detection or interdiction
capabilities is required. According to the terms of National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD)/HSPD that created this office, the DOE,
DOS, and DOD remain responsible for the policy and implementation of
their respective international border security programs. As such, the
National Security Advisor retains the authority to guide the
implementation and coordination of such programs.
11. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, could you briefly describe the DOE
Megaports program and explain how it is coordinated with the DHS's
Container Security Initiative?
Mr. Paul. The Megaports Initiative is a bilateral international
nonproliferation program under which DOE/NNSA cooperates with its
foreign partners to enhance host nation capability to deter and detect
illicit trafficking in special nuclear and other radioactive materials
in the international maritime trading system. Under the Megaports
program DOE/NNSA provides radiation detection systems, training in use
of the systems, and technical and sustainability support to appropriate
host nation law enforcement officials. Once installation, training, and
system evaluation is complete, ownership of the equipment and
responsibility for its operation transfers to the host government. The
host government is obligated to provide all data associated with
detections or seizures made as a result of the use of DOE/NNSA supplied
equipment to the U.S. Government.
DOE/NNSA and DHS/Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) have built a
strong, effective relationship and closely coordinate on the planning
and implementation of the Megaports Initiative and the Container
Security Initiative (CSI). The Megaports Initiative enhances CSI
targeting and scanning activities at foreign seaports by providing an
additional scanning tool to detect nuclear and other radioactive
materials in cargo containers prior to being loaded on vessels bound
for the United States. The broad extent of coordination between CSI and
the Megaports Initiative is evident in the number of joint outreach
missions and port assessments we have undertaken, the joint agreements
we have already signed with host governments, and our efforts to
identify additional opportunities to jointly implement both programs.
Finally, for the ports where CSI personnel are present, NNSA is
developing procedures with our host country counterparts whereby CSI is
notified of alarms on containers bound for the United States.
12. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, some have suggested that these two
programs be combined into the DHS. What are your views on this idea?
Would you recommend for or against this proposal?
Mr. Paul. For a number of compelling reasons, I believe that it is
imperative that the Megaports Initiative remains within NNSA. The
Megaports Initiative is a key component of our larger strategy to
prevent the diversion of nuclear weapons and material. As an extension
of our efforts to enhance the security of Russia's nuclear complex, the
deployment of radiation detection monitors at land borders, airports,
and seaports under the Second Line of Defense program, which includes
the Megaports Initiative, provides another opportunity to prevent
terrorist organizations access to nuclear or other radiological
material. The NSPD that established the DNDO clearly acknowledged DOE/
NNSA's role as the primary source of expertise in dealing with issues
related to special nuclear and other radioactive materials. Leaving the
Megaports Initiative within NNSA will allow us to continue to leverage
this expertise and build upon our solid record of successfully managing
international nuclear nonproliferation programs.
To ensure a cohesive international port security program, NNSA and
DHS's CBP bureau have established a strong, effective partnership that
allows us to leverage the unique strengths of both of our agencies.
Although we are working towards the common goal of preventing WMD from
entering our country, the Megaports Initiative's mission is broader in
that we are focused on detecting efforts to smuggle nuclear material,
regardless of the destination. Because CSI is focused on screening U.S.
bound containers, merging the two programs could result in lost
opportunities to seize smuggled material or weapons.
Moreover, NNSA has the contractual infrastructure in place and the
radiation detection monitors on hand to support deployments into fiscal
year 2008. We are gaining significant momentum in expanding the
Megaports program with the completion of eight new agreements in 2005
and up to six more agreements in 2006. Transferring the program could
delay further expansion indefinitely as it will require DHS to begin
anew the building of the expertise and the complex contract/procurement
processes necessary for this type of specialized work.
13. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, while we are on the subject of
megaports, the GAO report expressed concern about DOE's ability to
implement its goal of having equipment at 70 ports in 35 countries. By
this spring DOE will have equipment operating at six ports. The fiscal
year 2007 budget request for megaports is $40 million down from $73
million in fiscal year 2006. How do you get from 6 to 70 ports in any
useful period of time with a 40-percent decrease in the budget?
Mr. Paul. For fiscal year 2006, we identified opportunities to
accelerate implementation of the Megaports Initiative and, accordingly,
sought additional funding for more ports. We did not initially
anticipate opportunities to sign as many agreements in 2006 when we
were formulating the fiscal year 2007 budget request. Since we had
recently completed agreements with countries of high priority to the
Core program we instead requested additional funds to support
acceleration of the Core program for fiscal year 2007. To expedite the
expansion of the Megaports program, DOE/NNSA is also pursuing cost-
sharing arrangements with prospective and current Megaports partners to
cover additional ports in each country. Finally, we are exploring
arrangements in which we would partner with the private sector port
terminal operators to increase the number of international port
terminals with radiation scanning capability.
14. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, does Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) play a role in the planning to prevent global nuclear
smuggling?
General Cartwright. Yes. STRATCOM is an integral part of the DOD's
contribution to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In
accordance with Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directives, STRATCOM is
identifying and assessing required capabilities, advocating for
research and development, coordinating military intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, and providing subject matter experts
to international PSI meetings and activities. In conjunction with the
Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, STRATCOM
personnel are participating actively in the PSI exercise program as
players, observers, and/or controllers.
15. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, what is STRATCOM's
relationship with the DHS DNDO?
General Cartwright. No formal relationship exists. However,
STRATCOM headquarters personnel and the command's component for
combating WMD work closely with the DHS on issues related to nuclear
detection. The STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction (SCC-WMD) and Headquarters J8 directorate continue to
develop a relationship with the DNDO, working to establish and
formalize maritime architectures and information sharing. The National
Military Command Center and the SCC-WMD are part of the Maritime
Operational Threat Response notification system of United States
Government departments and agencies to support DNDO's Interagency
Nuclear Detection Alarm Adjudication Procedures. The SCC-WMD is also
communicating at the working level to establish better links with the
DNDO Operation Center, providing DNDO DOD subject matter expertise to
further enhance timely/effective agency coordination.
corruption
16. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, General Cartwright, and Mr.
Paul, corruption and criminal activity are complicated and pervasive in
many areas of the world where there is a threat of nuclear smuggling.
The mechanisms for the corruption and criminal activity are equally
complicated and are often longstanding arrangements. What can the
United States realistically do to minimize the effect of corruption and
criminal activity on the efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling?
Mr. Flory. In a country as large as the Russian Federation, with a
well-established criminal element, underpaid military and civil
servants, and widely dispersed storage locations far from central
control, there is always a threat that local corruption could lead to
proliferation. The U.S. response to this concern has been to provide
equipment and training that makes it more difficult for either corrupt
officials or criminals to obtain nuclear weapons. As a result of the
joint statement by Presidents Bush and Putin, the DOD and DOE will
complete security upgrades in 2008 to all nuclear weapons storage sites
for which the Russian Federation has requested assistance. An automated
inventory control and management system is now operational, allowing
the Russian Ministry of Defense real-time inventories of its nuclear
weapons. In addition, DOD has helped to set up and institutionalize
within the Ministry of Defense directorate responsible for nuclear
weapons security a personnel reliability program which is intended to
protect against any threat from corrupt insiders. Together, these joint
efforts improve control of the weapons by their lawful custodians, deny
unauthorized access to weapons, and limit the ability of even a corrupt
insider to divert any weapon.
The CTR WMD PPI addresses the potential vulnerability of non-
Russian FSU states' borders to smuggling of WMD and related components.
The program complements the CTR program's traditional focus,
elimination of WMD at its sources, by addressing WMD ``on the move.''
Projects help develop comprehensive detection and interdiction
capabilities at key ports of entry and along borders to diminish
criminal cross-border smuggling activities. These projects help develop
concepts of operation and include training to international standards.
Data base upgrades and communications to headquarters help provide
visibility into operations at outlying locations. These efforts help to
professionalize the officers of the border services. Of particular
note, the PPI Portal Monitoring Project in Uzbekistan will incorporate
an Employee Dependability Program that will assist the Uzbekistan
customs and border guard leadership in codifying and enforcing
standards of dependability, conduct and behavior commensurate with
responsibilities of those operating, maintaining and/or supervising
radiation portal monitors.
General Cartwright. The United States should continue to
participate in and advocate for endorsement of and participation in the
PSI. The PSI relies upon a supportive global network of partner
nations, which share intelligence and conduct unilateral or joint
operations in order to limit proliferation activities, including those
resulting from criminal or corrupt activities. A multilateral approach
to this problem is critical for success, and the United States aids
other nations, particularly in regions of concern in minimizing the
effect of corruption and criminal activity by fully supporting the PSI,
and recruiting other nations to join in this effort.
Mr. Paul. The NNSA has been working for years to understand and
address the effects of corruption and criminal activity on cooperative
security programs. First, NNSA strives to maintain an up-to-date, in
depth understanding of a range of corruption issues in regions of
concern. This involves NNSA commissioned studies by experts at the
Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at the American University,
Rand Corp, et cetera, and continual review of related foreign press and
intelligence. This analysis includes corruption at various levels,
including official corruption within governments, and links between
corrupt officials and criminal networks with varying degrees of
sophistication. Second, NNSA works to incorporate realistic assumptions
about corruption into decisions related to cooperative security and
anti-smuggling projects. For example, corruption factors into
prioritization models used to rank prospective ports for inclusion in
the Megaports program. NNSA also designs security systems to make
official corruption more difficult. Measures such as video surveillance
at key locations in nuclear facilities or border crossings can provide
a viable deterrent. Finally, NNSA is working to increase awareness of
corruption and the tools to address it by including the subject in
training programs.
Despite these efforts, NNSA recognizes that crime and corruption
present a real and lasting challenge to anti-smuggling programs. In
addition to measures described above, NNSA relies heavily on redundancy
to combat this threat. Redundant layers of security at facilities,
regional borders, and in the global shipping system, provide the best
defense against nuclear smuggling networks.
mox fuel program
17. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, the United States and Russia agreed to
each get rid of 34 metric tons of excess weapons grade plutonium.
Without going into the whole history of the MOX fuel program, and the
joint agreement to convert excess weapons grade plutonium into MOX fuel
for nuclear power reactors, I am concerned about several aspects of the
program:
1. The ability of the U.S. and Russian program to move in
parallel as agreed;
2. That the Russian Duma will never ratify the liability
agreement;
3. That Russia probably is no longer willing to convert the
plutonium to MOX fuel; and
4. That the U.S. is rushing to build a multibillion dollar
facility to convert plutonium into MOX fuel without a good
understanding of how Russia will meet its commitment to get rid
of 34 tons of excess weapons grade plutonium and without any
understanding of parallelism.
Could you address each of these issues.
Mr. Paul. The Russian Government has repeatedly stated that it
remains committed to the 2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement, and we expect the Russian Government to fulfill
its nonproliferation obligations. The United States and Russia remain
committed to proceeding with plutonium disposition in parallel to the
extent practicable, as called for in the 2000 agreement. We have been
reassured by officials from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Russian Atomic Energy Agency that there are no substantive problems
with the agreed upon language in the liability protocol, but rather it
is a question of the protocol undergoing a complete interagency review
that has been moving more slowly than expected. We continue to believe
that the protocol will be signed. Russian officials have assured us
that once the liability protocol is signed, the two sides can work
together to seek interim arrangements to enable the terms of the
protocol to be applied provisionally. The Russian Government recently
demonstrated its commitment to plutonium disposition by signaling its
intent to begin early disposition of limited quantities of plutonium in
its existing fast reactor well before the United States could begin
disposition of its plutonium. Moreover, the United States and Russia
are exploring the use of other advanced reactors for disposing of the
balance of the 34 metric tons of Russian plutonium. As a result, we are
moving forward with the U.S. plutonium disposition program and plan to
begin construction of the U.S. MOX facility at the Savannah River Site
later this year. Further delay in construction would increase the cost
for the facility, threaten our ability to meet our commitments to South
Carolina as set forth in existing law and significantly increase the
likelihood the Department would have to pay penalties and take other
actions under 50 U.S.C. 2566.
18. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, currently, the U.S. plutonium is safe
and secure at the Savannah River Site. I understand there is a desire
to ensure that the plutonium stored indefinitely at Savannah River but
we need to make sure that we have the right budget priorities before we
spend $2 to $3 billion to make MOX fuel. Is there an alternative and
higher priority use for these funds in DOE?
Mr. Paul. No. The administration's fiscal year 2007 request
reflects the operational priorities of the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation. We have developed comprehensive metrics and a
prioritization model that identifies the highest threats, considers our
ability to address those threats over time, and, thus, allows us to
align our priorities over the fiscal years accordingly. Both the
previous administration and this administration have stated a
commitment to dispose of access plutonium through conversion to MOX
fuel for use in commercial reactors. The administration's fiscal year
2007 budget request continues to demonstrate that commitment.
19. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, I should also note that the DOE IG's
office recently reviewed the MOX fuel facility and the construction
cost estimates. The estimate in 2002 was that the facility would cost
about $1 billion. $950 million has already been appropriated for the
facility. The IG report indicated that the construction cost has more
than doubled to between $2 and $3 billion. DOE wants to begin
construction the end of this year. Is it time to rethink the plutonium
disposition program?
Mr. Paul. Although I understand your frustration with the findings
in the Department's IG report on the U.S. MOX facility, I do not
believe that it is time to rethink the plutonium disposition program.
While it is true that project costs have risen, comparing the current
MOX cost estimate to that which appeared in 2002 is misleading and
overstates the cost difference. For example, costs appearing in the
2002 report are in 2001 dollars whereas the current estimate: 1) is in
future year dollars; 2) reflects sunk costs incurred to date; and 3)
reflects a 2\1/2\ year delay caused by the liability impasse with
Russia. In addition, it must be recognized that the cost increase
results, in large part, from circumstances that cannot be fairly
attributed to project management. Notwithstanding, the Department has
already identified and taken action to address each of the
recommendations in the report. These include incorporating performance
incentives in future contract negotiations, improving monthly project
reports from the contractor, controlling contractor spending, and
reviewing contractor performance. Now that the planned date for the
start of construction of the MOX facility has been set, the project
cost and schedule baseline is currently undergoing an independent
review and validation prior to the start of construction. This will
enable us to track project performance against the baseline and
minimize the possibility of future cost overruns. Plans are also
underway to hire a qualified MOX Federal Project Director and to
streamline the organizational structure of the project.
bratislava commitment
20. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory and Mr. Paul, at the Bratislava
summit, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to a joint effort to improve
security at 15 key Russian nuclear weapons storage sites by 2008. To
meet this goal DOE and DOD have divided responsibility for the sites
between them and must begin work in 2006. DOE received additional money
in its fiscal year 2006 budget to begin its work in 2006, and DOD has
requested $46 million in the fiscal year 2006 supplemental, now
awaiting congressional action, to begin work in 2006. With the
supplemental does each agency have enough money to do the work needed
in 2006 to make the 2008 goal?
Mr. Flory. If the requested supplemental funds are appropriated as
CTR funds (as opposed to operations and maintenance funds), DOD will
have, along with its fiscal year 2007 request, sufficient funds to
complete the security upgrades at the 8 nuclear weapons sites assigned
to DOD for upgrading (of the total 15 sites).
By the end of 2006, DOD also will have completed upgrades at nine
other storage sites and three rail transfer sites, while continuing to
upgrade security at four other sites begun in 2005. The sites being
upgraded are storage facilities for strategic and nonstrategic nuclear
weapons.
Mr. Paul. Given the supplemental funding received by the DOE to
meet its Bratislava commitment, DOE has enough funding to meet the 2008
goal of completing its portion of the work at the 15 key Russian
nuclear weapons storage site by 2008.
21. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory and Mr. Paul, is the work of DOE
and DOD coordinated? Previously GAO has been critical of the two
agencies for using different approaches for securing materials. Will
both agencies be using similar approaches to secure the materials?
Mr. Flory. DOD coordinates closely with DOE and the interagency to
ensure that a common approach is being used to upgrade security for
nuclear weapons in the custody of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Mr. Paul. Yes, both DOE and DOD have been coordinating on their
approaches to work at these sites and have developed preliminary
designs to enhance security at similar sites. Meetings between either
party and their MOD counterparts are usually attended by a
representative from the other agency to ensure continuity of approach.
stratcom
22. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) appears to give the Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
additional responsibility for the render safe role. The DOE and its
national labs provide technical support for the nuclear render safe
mission. What is STRATCOM's role in the mission to render safe stolen
or other WMD, including nuclear devices and do you plan to change these
relationships in any way?
General Cartwright. STRATCOM is currently in the process of
validating the render safe roadmap set forth in the QDR. We believe
that the current SOCOM/STRATCOM/DOE relationship is fundamentally
sound.
23. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, is the new render safe focus
on large scale operations to identify and destroy large stockpiles of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials along the lines
that the Bush administration thought were in Iraq before March 2003?
General Cartwright. No, render safe focuses on the disarming of
weapons once the target has been temporarily secured. The Joint Task
Force-Elimination will focus on large-scale elimination of WMD
capabilities.
24. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, in your prepared testimony,
you identify one of your key initiatives as ``Improve and expand U.S.
forces' capabilities to locate, track, and tag shipments of WMD.''
Could you provide some additional explanation as what you plan to do
under this key initiative?
General Cartwright. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directive
on the ``PSI Activity Program,'' delineates specific STRATCOM tasks and
responsibilities. These include ``identify and assess required U.S.
military WMD interdiction capabilities . . .'' and ``advocate, support
and monitor research and development associated with U.S. military WMD
interdiction capabilities . . .'' In conjunction with interagency and
international PSI partners, these STRATCOM efforts will result in an
improved ability for U.S. forces to locate, track, and tag shipments of
WMD.
russian chemical weapons destruction facility--cooperative threat
reduction program
25. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, there have been several delays
in the construction of the Russian chemical weapons destruction project
at Shchuch'ye. The reasons for the delays have varied from
subcontractor bankruptcies to a reorganization of the Russian
government. The current schedule calls for first agent destruction/
initial live agent operations at the end of 2008 and transfer to Russia
in July 2009 for full operation. What is the estimated total project
cost of the facility?
Mr. Flory. DOD expects to complete the work within the current
budgeted funds of $1,039.2 million. However, as a result of delays in
completing the construction of the project's primary destruction
building, final project costs cannot be projected with certainty. We
will revise our schedule and know whether we can complete the project
within our budget once the proposal is awarded. If there is a
shortfall, DOD may in the future have to chose between either
requesting additional funds or consulting with other partners to share
the cost.
26. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, will the live agent startup date
be met? If startup will not occur by the end of 2008, when will it
occur?
Mr. Flory. Live agent startup is currently scheduled for May 2008.
Given the delay in awarding the contract to complete the main chemical
weapons destruction building at Shchuch'ye, startup may be delayed by
approximately a year to mid-2009.
27. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, how long after live agent
destruction begins will the operational handoff to Russia begin?
Mr. Flory. The United States and Russia have agreed to transfer
custody of the Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF)
as soon as we have verified initial operational capability and design
capacity. This verification involves the destruction of a limited
number of live agent chemical munitions during a 10-day period.
Operation of the CWDF to destroy the nerve agent stockpile is solely
the responsibility of the Russian Federation.
28. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, will the United States continue
to fund its commitment to complete the project including the design and
construction of the facility; equipment acquisition and installation;
systems integration; training; and facility startup?
Mr. Flory. Yes, we intend to complete the project including the
design and construction of the facility; equipment acquisition and
installation; systems integration; training; and facility startup.
29. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, the CTR fiscal year 2007 budget
includes $42.7 million for chemical weapons in Russia. How much is for
Shchuch'ye?
Mr. Flory. The entire fiscal year 2007 budget of $42.7 million for
chemical weapons destruction in Russia is for the Shchuch'ye CWDF.
30. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, will funding be requested for
Shchuch'ye after fiscal year 2007?
Mr. Flory. DOD expects to complete the work within the current
budgeted funds of $1,039.2 million. However, as a result of the
collapse of negotiations previously described and the attendant delay,
final project costs cannot be projected with certainty. We will revise
our schedule and know whether we can complete the project within our
budget once the new proposal is awarded. If there is a shortfall, DOD
may in the future have to chose between either requesting additional
funds or consulting with other partners to share the cost.
31. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, will the CTR program fund the
training and live agent startup?
Mr. Flory. Yes, we intend to provide training and verification of
initial live agent operational capability.
caspian sea maritime proliferation prevention program in azerbaijan and
kazakhstan
32. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, the funding for the Caspian Sea
Maritime Proliferation Prevention Programs in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
goes up substantially, from $7 million to $19 million. What is driving
this increase, what is the program buying, and can this increase be
executed?
Mr. Flory. The increase is driven by the beginning of project work
in Kazakhstan at the same time we are continuing work in Azerbaijan.
The Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention Projects in
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan support the development of a comprehensive
capability for maritime surveillance and WMD detection and interdiction
on the Caspian Sea borders. The project in Azerbaijan will build on
previous assistance that established an interim command and control
center; provided vessel maintenance assistance; enhanced detection
capabilities by developing guides, handbooks, and procedures; and
provided maintenance and logistics system enhancements and training.
This year, assistance includes repair and upgrades of patrol and
support craft; completion of the Astana Boat Basin in southern
Azerbaijan; revision of the detection and interdiction concept of
operations; and enhancement of a coastal surveillance system, including
24/7 radar operations. We anticipate a formal notification from the
Government of Azerbaijan that the Azerbaijan Navy will play a
supporting role to the Coast Guard in prosecuting its WMD detection and
interdiction mission, and identification of the site for permanent
command and control center. This will permit construction of the new
center.
Fiscal year 2006 marks the beginning of the Caspian Sea Maritime
Proliferation Prevention project with Kazakhstan. DOD teams twice have
visited Kazakhstan to help determine the project's requirements. Teams
have met with officials from the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense,
Maritime Border Guard, and Navy, and have visited operating bases, a
maritime operations center, and a joint Navy-Maritime Border Guard
training center on the Caspian Sea. While the assessments--including a
concept of operations evaluation--are still ongoing, some fiscal year
2006 funds will procure WMD detection equipment and training, boarding
officer training, and enhancements of maintenance facilities and
technical surveillance posts.
This increase will be executed to improve WMD detection and
interdiction on the Caspian Sea borders.
33. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, is the Caspian Sea program
coordinated with STRATCOM's combating WMD mission?
General Cartwright. Yes, when the DOD draft Concept Plan is
approved, the Caspian Sea program will be linked through the respective
regional combatant commander's combating WMD campaign plans.
34. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, how does the CTR program
support your mission?
General Cartwright. The CTR supports our mission through the dual
aims of safeguarding and eliminating nuclear and other weapons in the
former Soviet Union and to prevent the proliferation of WMD through the
PPI. Every weapon secured or destroyed through the CTR program is one
less weapon that the adversary may acquire and use against the United
States.
35. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, does this effort support the
PSI?
General Cartwright. The CTR supports the overall PSI program. When
weapons are destroyed, secured, or otherwise interdicted, the
proliferators are forced to expend more resources to obtain
replacements.
nuclear detection sensor on global positioning systems satellites
36. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Mr. Paul, I understand
that there is an issue as to whether the Global Positioning System
(GPS) III and possibly some of the GPS IIF satellites will include as a
payload the nuclear detection (NUDET) sensor package. The DOE/NNSA
develops and builds the NUDET sensor package and the Air Force is
responsible for integration. The sensor detects nuclear weapon
detonations. Inclusion of this sensor on GPS has always been a high
priority for STRATCOM. What is the issue and will the NUDET sensor be
on all future GPS satellites including all GPS III satellites?
General Cartwright. Historically, power management on older GPS
satellites has been the issue. Weight and power management are future
GPS III considerations. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center
(SMC) are currently integrating NUDET sensors onto the follow-on GPS
IIF satellites, and plan to host nuclear detonation detection sensors
on the next generation GPS III satellites. STRATCOM is agnostic as to
the platform this sensor will be placed upon, so long as the capability
exists in a timely manner.
Mr. Paul. NUDET sensor packages are on all current GPS satellites
including the on-orbit GPS Block IIA & IIR satellites and the GPS Block
IIF satellites that are in production. It has become a practice to turn
off the NUDET sensors on older satellites that have lived beyond their
design life, after the solar panels can no longer produce enough power
to supply both the NUDET sensors and the navigation payload thus
enabling continued use of the satellite in support of navigation
requirements. This results in occasional reductions in the NUDET sensor
coverage until new satellites replace these older GPS satellites. The
next generation of GPS satellites (GPS Block III) are expected to have
tighter constraints on the power and weight available to support the
NUDET sensor package. NNSA is working to develop technology to reduce
the size, weight, and power of future NUDET sensors while still meeting
all the NUDET mission requirements. Concurrently, NNSA is working with
STRATCOM, other elements of the DOD, and other NUDET sensor customers
to review the detection requirements as well as alternative sensor
technology and system approaches for meeting the requirements. The
base-line strategy for satisfying NUDET detection requirements is to
place NUDET sensor packages on all GPS Block IIF and GPS Block III
satellites.
research and development
37. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, the DOE/NNSA's research and development
program funds the Nation's basic research program for nuclear
detection, proliferation, and monitoring, as well as other activities.
I am concerned that the funding for this program is not adequate to
meet all of the research missions. What work is being deferred based on
the fiscal year 2007 budget request?
Mr. Paul. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request supports
the research mission of the Proliferation Detection Program. Future
funding increases could be used to accelerate the development of
systems that can remotely detect and identify clandestine proliferation
activities and the transition of these systems to operational detection
of uranium-235 enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
global nuclear energy partnership
38. Senator Clinton. Mr. Paul, in its fiscal year 2007 budget
request, the DOE asked for $250 million for the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership (GNEP). Based on DOE estimates, the fiscal year 2008 and
fiscal year 2009 costs would total $1.55 billion. Funding would
continue to increase, totaling $13 billion for the 10-year
demonstration phase of the program. Note that these costs are merely
for the demonstration phase. A 1996 National Academy of Sciences study
concluded that reprocessing and transmutation of existing fuel from
U.S. reactors could cost upwards of $100 billion, but does not address
the cost to implement the program globally.
As this is envisioned as a program with worldwide reach that could
cost such a large amount to taxpayers, I would appreciate your
assistance in understanding how GNEP would compliment the global
nonproliferation regime and the administration's nonproliferation
priorities.
What nonproliferation benchmarks will the administration require
that nations meet in order to take part in GNEP?
Mr. Paul. GNEP proposes to increase global access to nuclear energy
while promoting our nonproliferation objectives. GNEP seeks to
demonstrate the nuclear technology systems that would make this
possible over the next 2 decades while avoiding the costs of additional
geologic repositories in the United States that would otherwise be
required. Sustained operation of GNEP will ultimately be on a
commercial basis, with supplier states leveraging their investments in
the fuel cycle as a way for other partner states to benefit from
nuclear energy while forgoing enrichment and reprocessing.
We envision that states that participate in GNEP must adhere to
essential nonproliferation commitments, for example, implementing the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) additional protocol,
complying with IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocol obligations,
maintaining the latest international standards for physical protection
of nuclear material. States that participate as recipients in the GNEP
fuel leasing regime would also be expected to voluntarily refrain from
developing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities as part of this
arrangement. Beyond these essential conditions, we would want GNEP
partners to subscribe to the general nonproliferation principles or
goals that shape the GNEP vision, including committing to the building
of advanced safeguards into new recycling and reactor technologies to
ensure they are used for exclusively civil purposes, reducing stocks of
separated plutonium and eventually bringing these stocks into
equilibrium, creating a sensible timescale for fuel cycle states to
move from PUREX to recycling technologies that do not result in
separated plutonium, building proliferation resistance into new small
reactor designs that can be safely deployed in the developing world,
and creating a regime in which suppliers of fresh fuel can take back
spent fuel for recycle or identify an approved path forward for spent
fuel that will meet nonproliferation concerns.
39. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, will nations have to have ratified the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? The Additional Protocol?
Mr. Paul. The specific details of the framework for various
international transactions under GNEP are still being developed.
However, the Department anticipates that all activities that the United
States will pursue with foreign partners will be in conformity of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and with Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.
As the United States develops its technology roadmap and identifies its
potential partners, it will seek to strengthen the overall
nonproliferation regime, including compliance with the objectives the
NPT and the overall IAEA safeguards regime. Furthermore, as the
Additional Protocol becomes widely accepted and ratified the Department
anticipates that it will become part of the baseline requirements for
nuclear cooperation within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and thus become
a standard element for all nuclear transactions with foreign partners
including transactions under GNEP.
40. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, in order to implement the GNEP program
internationally, will there have to be changes to the Nuclear Suppliers
Group Guidelines?
Mr. Paul. No, the NSG Guidelines will not have to be amended to
implement GNEP. The Guidelines have been developed over the past 30
years to allow for the promotion of the nuclear fuel-cycle with
stringent nonproliferation standards.
41. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, IAEA Director General El Baradei has
proposed that the IAEA manage a fuel bank to act as supplier of last
resort to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel so that states do not
need to produce their own fissile material. What is the
administration's position on the IAEA proposal, and how would it affect
the GNEP?
Mr. Paul. One of the key goals of the GNEP is to establish a fuel
cycle services program that would allow developing nations to acquire
and use nuclear energy economically while minimizing the risk of
nuclear proliferation. The United States is working with supplier
states and the IAEA to establish a fuel supply mechanism that could be
used by states that forego enrichment and reprocessing in the event of
a fuel supply disruption. The IAEA would play a central role as
facilitator between supplier and recipient to resolve such problems.
As an additional step to support this mechanism, the DOE is setting
aside up to 17 MT HEU--from a stock that was previously declared in
excess of national security needs--to be down-blended under IAEA
verification and prepared for use as fuel in civilian reactors. This
material will be the first contribution to a nuclear fuel reserve, and
we will consider placing additional uranium in this reserve. We
encourage other nations to join us in this initiative.
[Whereupon at 11:47 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN COMBATING TERRORISM
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:36 a.m., in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
Cornyn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Cornyn, Warner, and
Reed.
Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk; and John H. Quirk V, security
clerk.
Majority staff member present: Sandra E. Luff, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; and Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member.
Staff assistant present: Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistant present: Russell J. Thomasson,
assistant to Senator Cornyn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Cornyn. The subcommittee reconvenes in open session
to receive further testimony on the Department of Defense's
(DOD) role in combating terrorism.
For the record, we just concluded a closed session and are
now reconvening in open session.
Secretary O'Connell, during the closed session, you did not
provide an opening statement, although we have heard a number
of answers to a variety of questions. If you have anything you
would like to add by way of an opening statement in this open
session, we would be glad to give you that opportunity now.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS W. O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I will be very brief.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the status of our
Nation's superb Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the
increasing ability of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
to respond to current and emerging transnational terrorist
threats, as well as evolving asymmetrical threats. I have an
extended statement for the record.
Sir, the recently published 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) accurately states that we are in a long war and it is
irregular in nature. This long war is characterized by
dispersed, global terrorist networks with radical aims that
directly and indirectly threaten the United States and our way
of life. The nature of this long war requires the U.S. Armed
Forces to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches to
ultimately prevail in this struggle. The report further
emphasizes the important and necessary changes needed to
prepare SOF and other forces to respond to wide asymmetric
challenges. The result of this emphasis is a significantly
expanded SOF program that will qualitatively increase not only
SOCOM's capabilities but also its capacities to confront and
prevail against a global terrorist network.
I would like to commend my colleague, Vice Admiral Eric
Olson, for his work on behalf of SOCOM in the QDR. I think the
results reflect a great deal of effort on the part of he and
his team.
The fiscal year 2007 President's budget submission for
SOCOM is $5.2 billion, excluding military pay. That is an
increase of 27 percent over the fiscal year 2006 submission.
This increase is essential to support the DOD's QDR decision to
increase SOF capability and capacity to conduct low-visibility,
persistent presence missions and a global unconventional
warfare campaign.
The budget submission continues to strengthen the command,
reflecting QDR guidance to increase SOCOM's military capability
and capacity. It will enable SOCOM to add over 1,300 personnel
to specifically find, fix, and finish terrorist networks;
maintain sustained operations in areas where terrorist networks
are operating; continue the investment in critical fixed-wing,
rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft that provide SOF with the
mobility necessary to deploy and execute their missions
quickly; invest in additional Active and Reserve component
civil affairs and psychological operations force structure; and
support the newly created Marine Corps Special Operations
Command (MARSOC) providing SOCOM greater flexibility and
capability to fight terrorism.
I would certainly like to thank this committee and Congress
as a whole for their support of our Nation's SOF. Your
continued interest and support of the President's budget is
essential in sustaining this critical SOCOM effort.
I welcome your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas W. O'Connell
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify about the status of our Nation's
superb Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the increasing ability of
the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to respond to
current and emerging transnational terrorist threats as well as
evolving asymmetrical threats.
The recently published 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report
accurately states that we are in a long war that is irregular in
nature. This long war is characterized by dispersed, global terrorist
networks with radical political aims that directly and indirectly
threaten the United States and our way of life. The nature of this long
war requires the U.S. Armed Forces to adopt unconventional and indirect
approaches to ultimately prevail in this historic struggle. The report
further emphasizes the important and necessary changes needed to
prepare SOF and other forces to respond to wide asymmetric challenges.
The result of this emphasis is a significantly expanded SOF program
that will qualitatively increase not only SOCOM's capabilities but also
its capacities to confront and prevail against the global terrorist
network threat.
Title 10, section 138 requires my position to provide civilian
oversight of special operations activities of the Department of Defense
(DOD). I am responsible for ensuring that our SOF are appropriately
tasked and employed, and that senior policymakers, to include our
interagency partners, understand SOF capabilities as well as their
limitations. Not only am I an advocate of the SOCOM and SOF, I am also
dedicated to ensuring our elements continue to be the best trained,
best equipped, most flexible, and effective fighting force available to
our country. I consult closely with General Brown on a wide range of
policy issues and participate in the SOCOM Board of Director's
meetings, the Command's executive resource body. This effort produces a
SOF program and budget that stress force readiness and sustainability,
and provides sufficient force structure to meet the demands of the
geographic combatant commanders and General Brown in his role as the
supported commander in the global war on terrorism.
I'd like to recognize the superb effort of General Brown's Deputy
Commander, Vice Admiral Eric Olson, for his SOCOM team's work on the
QDR. SOCOM was well prepared to present an objective blueprint for SOF
growth and posture. They put a combatant commander's fingerprints on
the QDR process, which I believe improved the result. A key component
of that strategy has been the unwavering support of members of this
committee, the full House and Senate in delivering the necessary
support, congressional oversight, and critical review for SOF programs
and initiatives. We've had successes and, yes, some setbacks with our
programs, but I believe we've taken a prudent course in building both
capability and capacity for the long war. The fiscal year 2007
President's budget submission for SOCOM is $5.2 billion (excluding
military pay), an increase of 27 percent over the fiscal year 2006
submission. This fiscal year 2007 increase is essential to support the
Department's QDR decision to increase SOF capability and capacity to
conduct low-visibility, persistent presence missions and a global
unconventional warfare campaign.
The fiscal year 2007 President's budget submission continues to
strengthen the command, reflecting QDR guidance to increase SOCOM's
military capability and capacity. It will enable SOCOM to: 1) add over
1,300 personnel to find, fix, and finish terrorist networks; 2)
maintain sustained operations in areas where terrorist networks are
operating; 3) continue the investment in critical fixed-wing, rotary-
wing, and unmanned aircraft that provide SOF with the mobility
necessary to deploy and to execute their missions quickly; 4) invest in
additional Active and Reserve component civil affairs and Psychological
Operations (PSYOPs) force structure; and 5) support the newly created
Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC), providing SOCOM
greater flexibility and capability to fight terrorism.
I would like to thank this committee and Congress for your support
of this Nation's SOFs. Your continued interest and support of the
fiscal year 2007 President's budget submission will be essential to
sustain this critical funding for SOCOM.
We are faced by interacting networks--sometimes structured--of
radical extremists who inflict terror with minimal concern for their
innocent victims. These networks will migrate to places where they can
survive, operate, and grow. Our challenge is to develop counter-
networks to monitor, isolate, disrupt, and destroy hostile elements.
SOCOM has started this process. While some of SOCOM's operations are
visible, there has been a substantial investment in low-visibility and
clandestine activities. Our Army Special Forces, Army Special
Operations Aviation Forces, Army Rangers, Navy SEALs and Special Boat
Units, Army Civil Affairs, Army Psychological Operations units, Air
Force Special Operations crews and staffs, Combat Controllers and
Weather Teams, have served U.S. Central Command requirements very well
from their counter-insurgency and foreign internal defense roles in
Afghanistan and Iraq to their work in the Horn of Africa. Most
importantly, SOCOM Forces operate in the only environment that can lead
to success: Joint, Interagency, Combined, and Coalition.
SOCOM is also increasing its capacity to conduct operations against
the threat:
The recently activated MARSOC with its organic
operational and foreign training units provides SOCOM
additional depth and operational flexibility in irregular
warfare.
A programmed one-third increase in Active-Duty Special
Forces battalions will improve SOCOM's rotation base.
Similarly, there is a programmed one-third increase in Civil
Affairs and PSYOPs units, both Active and Reserve component.
These force level increases allow additional time between
deployments to refit and reconstitute units that will improve
their readiness posture. Coupling this force level increase and
a flexible basing and rotation strategy will meet the demands
of the Secretary of Defense and the President as well as the
Nation as the unknown unfolds.
My position in the Pentagon also gives me a unique perspective on a
number of initiatives to expand the authorities that govern SOCOM and
geographic combatant commander's operations. These initiatives are
slowly but surely moving together to match national and military
strategies.
On the stability operations front, we've seen advances
in authorities that will allow greater efforts in train and
equip missions, peacekeeping initiatives, and capacity building
while partnering with Department of State. Section 1206 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 permits
the Secretary of Defense, at the direction of the President, to
conduct or support programs to build foreign military capacity
counterterrorism or stability operations. The Joint Staff and
combatant commands are actively identifying opportunities to
enable partner nations to seize opportunities and counter
unexpected threats through assistance under this authority. We
are working with the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and
our colleagues at the Department of State to plan potential
assistance under this authority and, once directed by the
President, to efficiently and effectively implement designated
assistance programs. I want to stress that we fully expect this
type of authority will be extremely helpful in meeting the
needs of our combatant commanders for more flexibility in
working with international partners against today's
unpredictable threats.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006 also established a DOD security and stabilization
assistance authority, section 1207, which authorizes DOD
support to the Department of State for civilian deployments and
programs in countries falling into or emerging from conflict.
The DOD is working closely with the Department of State's
Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction to determine
the most effective means of using this transfer authority to
deploy civilian experts and facilitate the provision of
reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance. We need
substantial congressional support for the President's fiscal
year 2007 request that will support efforts to build civilian
capabilities for tasks like stabilization and reconstruction.
Although requests for the Department of State and other
agencies are outside the responsibility of this committee, I
want to stress to the committee that civilian capabilities will
be critical to the Nation's long-term success against terrorism
and could reduce the stress on U.S. forces by precluding the
need for certain deployments.
Our Counternarcotics (CN) portfolio provides very
robust longstanding train and equip authorities and resources
that permit maximum flexibility for combatant commanders as
they develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to combat
smugglers, pirates, narcoterrorists, money launderers,
proliferators, and other networks. Our foreign CN training
efforts are proving a valuable adjunct to our counterterrorism
efforts and provide U.S. access to countries for
counternarcotics activities whose governments may not allow
U.S. in for other reasons. Our close partners from the British
SOFs now assist a key Afghan CN element that has been highly
successful in seizures over the last year.
The authority provided by Congress last year in
section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 is being used
effectively by the command to train, pay, equip foreign
indigenous forces, and build indigenous capabilities essential
to developing counterterrorism networks. As we exercise this
authority on the ground, we are getting smarter at how best to
employ this very unique tool.
SOCOM was granted relief from title 5 Personal Service
Contract prohibitions. This allows DOD to authorize personal
services contracts for the purpose of hiring SOF expertise and
recruiting long-term sources and assets in support of the
global war on terror. The additional authority allows flexible
response to emerging situations and the ability to tap into
previously unexploited resources.
As SOCOM undergoes stressful periods of change during this long
war, there will remain one constant: the importance of our human
capital investment in the special operator. In terms of missions
performed and in the qualities of the individuals who undertake those
missions, the special operator is truly unique and requires a different
type of mindset on our end in terms of planning and support. Our
starting point has always been and must continue to be what we call the
``SOF Truths,'' which are essentially statements of the fundamentals:
``Quality is better than quantity. SOFs cannot be mass produced.
Competent SOFs cannot be created after a crisis occurs. Humans are more
important than hardware.'' I pay special tribute to the superb
officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians of the command who
live and enforce these truths every day.
These truths have been reaffirmed by the awe-inspiring performance
of our SOFs in Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, the Philippines, and many
other countries around the world. I hope one day we may be able to
fully reveal their story. They could not meet their mission
requirements without the superb support of the Secretary of Defense,
the department staff, the Joint Staff, and the military departments.
It is also with the support of Congress that SOCOM has moved so far
and will continue to do so.
I would like to conclude by highlighting the implications the
posture, programming and policy for SOF in the war on terrorism have
for all aspects of our Nation's defense. Our Special Operators have
often been the innovators for the larger military, and the SOF mindset
has been the incubator of innovation. That is especially true today.
With the shift from SOF being postured for reactive, regional
contingencies to being a global, proactive, and preemptive force, we
are witnessing a key evolution in how we must conduct our security
affairs in the future and address those ``safe havens,'' and build
capacity to deal with those who would harm our country.
Finally, a personal note--repeated from last year. Whenever
possible, I attend funerals of SOF personnel at Arlington National
Cemetery. It is indeed a high honor to represent the DOD. When I look
into the eyes of widows, children, parents, and other relatives of our
fallen heroes, I understand that there is no ``quit'' in their
demeanor. We must honor their service and sacrifice. They are an
inspiration to all who witness their courage and spirit. Your support
is critical to the success of our SOFs. I thank you for your careful
scrutiny of our program and budget. Together, we can continue to help
move our SOFs into a position of prominence that will continue to press
the fight against America's enemies.
Thank you for your continued support. I welcome your questions.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Secretary O'Connell.
I will also note that because of the very helpful testimony
we received during the closed session, we are going to be a
little cramped for time this morning on our open session. We
will have to adjourn no later than noon, but that does not mean
our inquiry into these subjects will end. We will continue to
be in discussion with you about them, and we will have follow-
on hearings on many of the matters that we are discussing today
in public session. So there will be no shortage of public
discussion and debate about these important issues.
Senator Warner. Could I make just one comment?
Senator Cornyn. Certainly.
Senator Warner. I, in closed session, mentioned that
General Brown has served in his capacity very well, and the
Secretary indicates that the Secretary of Defense recently
asked that he extend. I think that is a very commendable
recommendation by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and there
certainly is no consideration of this committee at this time
for any replacement. I do hope he accepts that post, and we are
fortunate as a Nation to have him continue in office. So give
him my warmest regards. I have the highest personal regard for
him and his professional abilities.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Chairman Warner.
I am going to make my opening statement for the closed
session part of the record and now recognize Senator Reed.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Cornyn
The subcommittee reconvenes in open session to receive testimony on
Department of Defense's role in combating terrorism. We welcome our
distinguished witnesses and commend each of you for the leadership you
provide:
The Honorable Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict;
Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM);
Vice Admiral (Retired) John Scott Redd, Director, National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); and
Jeffrey N. Rapp, Director, Joint Intelligence Task Force-
Combating Terrorism, Defense Intelligence Agency.
We also thank you for a very thorough, analytical, overview of the
transnational terrorist threats that face our Nation, our interests,
and our allies.
Key lessons of September 11, 2001, highlighted the need for our
Nation's intelligence agencies to work together as a single unified
enterprise--and also caused us to review the manner in which our
forces--specifically, our Special Operations Forces (SOF) are
organized, trained, and equipped.
Although much progress has been made in the long war against
terrorism--and I want to recognize the instrumental role our witnesses
contributed to the success we have achieved--we also recognize that
terrorist organizations, as well as the growing threat from global
jihadist networks, continue to pose a significant threat to our
national security.
Moreover, this very sentiment was highlighted by the Director of
National Intelligence, Ambassador Negroponte, on February 28, 2006,
when he testified before the full committee. He stated:
``Let me begin with a straightforward statement of
preoccupation--terrorism is the preeminent threat to our
citizens, to our Homeland, to our interests, and to our
friends.''
Each of our witnesses represent organizations that are at the very
heart of this issue. We recognize the hard work and dedication required
of your organizations to respond to these threats, as well as the
tremendous sacrifices made by service members, your civilian workforce,
and their family members--we owe each of them a debt of gratitude.
I also believe the recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) clearly establish a roadmap for the expansion of our SOF
to address this threat--and I commend the Department for their efforts.
Gentlemen, we welcome your insights on developments in your
respective organizations, as well as your own personal assessments of
the fiscal year 2007 defense budget request as it relates to the
Department's ability to prosecute the global war on terror.
Secretary O'Connell, we look forward to your testimony regarding:
Your oversight role of SOCOM, specifically in light of the
expansion addressed in the QDR--what challenges, if any, does
the expansion mean to your office?;
What authorities, if any, does your office need to ensure
for the effective oversight of SOCOM acquisition programs, as a
result of this expansion; and,
An update on your efforts to ensure effective interagency
coordination for SOCOM's Military Liaison Elements (MLEs), as
well as your overall assessment of the program.
Vice Admiral Olson, the subcommittee looks forward to hearing your
assessment on:
The progress made in establishing the capability to conduct
military operations as a supported command;
A current status of SOCOM's major acquisition programs,
including the Advanced Seal Delivery System;
Manpower challenges and actions taken to address your
increased operating tempo; and,
The current state of your MLEs, and the steps you have taken
to coordinate and synchronize those elements with the Chiefs of
Mission and related officials within the interagency.
Vice Admiral Redd, as you are aware, based on the recommendation of
the 9/11 Commission, the NCTC was codified by Congress in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Since your organization has had approximately 2 years to mature, we
seek your insight regarding the progress made by the NCTC to:
Serve as the primary organization within the U.S. Government
for analysis and integration of all terrorism intelligence;
and,
Your assessment of NCTC's ability to conduct strategic
operational planning for counterterrorism activities
integrating all instruments of U.S. national power.
Mr. Rapp, we also look forward to your insight on:
The Department's, and specifically the Defense Intelligence
Agency's, access to all available terrorist threat information;
and,
Any additional funding or authorities you require to execute
your mission.
Our witnesses today represent the quiet professionals--whether
assigned to the SOCOM or the Intelligence Community--that are on point
for our Nation in the fight against terrorism and tirelessly work to
defend our Homeland from the threats of the 21st century.
We applaud and honor their service and we thank our witnesses for
their service and for appearing before the subcommittee today.
Senator Cornyn. Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your participation today and your service to the
Nation.
The purpose of this hearing is to receive an update on the
DOD's efforts to combat terrorism from the officials
responsible for developing and implementing the policy for the
military's global war on terrorism, from the intelligence
analysts and disseminators, and from the operators. Each of
these cadres of professionals is equally critical to the
military mission.
This committee established a SOCOM and the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict (SOLIC). The SOLIC Assistant Secretary is
charged with management oversight of SOCOM, as well as for
combating terrorism, stability operations, and counterdrug
policy.
In February, the press reported that Secretary Rumsfeld may
be considering proposals to move various functions out of SOLIC
or even asking Congress to eliminate it entirely. I hope that
if this is the case, Secretary O'Connell can tell us about
these proposals today. I must apologize because I will have to
leave. So, Mr. Secretary, if you want to comment on that, that
will be your option.
In addition, retired General Wayne Downing recently
completed a review of SOCOM's role in coordinating and
executing the war on terrorism. The chairman and ranking member
of the full committee have asked for a copy of that review, and
I hope that Secretary O'Connell can ensure this subcommittee
that he will work to get it for us. The findings of the report
will inform the work of the committee. Again, I think this is
an eminently reasonable request that Chairman Warner and
Senator Levin have made, and I believe we should have the
report. I know it is classified, and obviously, we would accept
it on those terms.
[The information referred to follows:]
[The committee staff received a closed briefing on June 27, 2006,
regarding the report by General Wayne Downing.]
Senator Reed. I am concerned about reorganization proposals
coming at a time when the civilian policy leaders need to work
closely with SOCOM to ensure the progress in the war on
terrorism and to oversee SOCOM's operations, budget, and
acquisition programs. The President has asked this committee to
authorize a $9 billion increase in SOCOM's budget over the next
5 years and almost a 30-percent increase over last year. This
growth will have to be wisely managed by the command and the
civilian leadership in the Pentagon.
SOCOM has important acquisition needs and unique
acquisition authorities. Yet, the SOLIC office does not have a
senior acquisition executive in the Pentagon, as the other
Services do, to advocate for SOCOM's requirements and to help
the command manage large programs, such as the troubled
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS).
In addition, special operators have new missions, including
clandestine ones, that require interagency coordination to
ensure that they strengthen U.S. national objectives in
fighting terrorism, something that SOLIC must be actively
overseeing and keeping this committee informed about.
Again, I hope that in the course of the rest of this
hearing or in written responses, that we can get some
clarification on the issues I have just mentioned.
In addition, I have written questions, which are as a
result not only of this hearing but my visit a few weeks ago
down to SOCOM headquarters with General Brown and Admiral
Olson. I would forward them for response in a timely fashion.
Thank you so much again for your service to the Nation and
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Reed, for that opening
statement.
Admiral Olson, we have talked about SOCOM's
responsibilities around the world. We know that those
responsibilities are increasing, and accordingly, the budget
request for 2007 is about $8 billion, including over $2 billion
for military personnel costs, a 27-percent increase in your
budget over last year.
I would like to ask you to comment on a few questions.
First of all, does this meet all of your operational
requirements? Second, can you absorb that sort of big increase
in your budget in a way that is efficient and effective to meet
those operational requirements, and have you been able to
replace all equipment, particularly helicopters damaged and
destroyed in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
to respond to that.
As I said in the closed session, I was the primary
representative of SOCOM in the QDR process. We did that by
receiving and evaluating requirements submitted to us by our
component headquarters and then machining those into a single
requirements input into the QDR. That was mostly answered.
We went into the process knowing what we could absorb and
requesting no more than that. So we are well postured to absorb
the growth that has been programmed for us in both platforms
and people.
As an example, pre-September 11, 2001, our Special Forces
Training Command was able to turn out about 250 special forces
operators per year on the Army side; the Green Berets. Last
year, they graduated 791. Our previous investment in
infrastructure growth is now permitting us to absorb the
additional resources that we have programmed through the QDR
process.
Does it answer all of our needs? It does not. It answers
our most immediate needs. It certainly answers our foreseeable
personnel needs. We will be growing one battalion per special
forces group, one company per ranger battalion, the equivalent
of two new SEAL teams, and Air Force special operators at the
rate that we can produce and absorb them. So we certainly will
not be asking for increased force structure growth anytime soon
except for what it takes to implement the growth that we have
been granted so far in the process.
Again, we will have additional requirements for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms,
with a reminder that those are not only airborne platforms, but
they are also ground and maritime sensors that are associated
with ISR in which we have capability gaps.
Sir, I did not address your question about
recapitalization.
We have been able to sustain our fleet without full
recapitalization of it. We fly some old aircraft. We do not
have full programs to replace each of those. We have been able
to replace engines and wings and repair our fleet to keep it
flying. We are programmed in the future for the V-22 that we
would like to receive at an accelerated rate. We have long-
range programs for next-generation platforms, and we have been
granted relief with replacement of combat losses along the way,
but we have not done a full recapitalization of our fleet
within the current program.
Senator Cornyn. I for one--and I think I probably speak for
many Members of Congress--am more than happy to appropriate all
funds necessary for our military to do the job that we have
asked you to do. The challenge is, is that money appropriated
and used effectively to acquire and develop systems that are
important to our national defense and protecting our national
interests?
That brings me, as you might imagine, to the ASDS. I would
like to ask Secretary O'Connell and Admiral Olson to both
comment on these questions.
The ASDS program has been plagued with problems from its
inception and was approved for a restructure by this committee
in November 2005. As a part of that restructure, an ASDS
reliability action panel was formed to answer reliability
questions.
The questions are these: What is the status of the ASDS
reliability action panel report? What is the current status of
the program? When can we expect to receive the report, as
directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006 regarding this program, which actually, I believe,
provided that it was due on March 1?
Secretary O'Connell.
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I know that the ASDS program management
office requested an extension through the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(AT&L). We are aware of what the report must entail, to include
the Secretary's certification that he has revalidated the
requirement and conclusions of the QDR, the number of eventual
platforms that would be required, updated cost estimate, a time
line for addressing the technological challenges. This must be
coordinated with both the Navy Department and AT&L.
I would defer to Admiral Olson in terms of the status of
the reexamination panel, I believe you called it.
Admiral Olson. Sir, beyond the extension request for the
report, I do not know today's status of the ASDS reliability
action report. I will take that question for the record, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) Reliability Action Panel
report was completed on March 14, 2006. The current status of the
program is we are executing the ASDS program restructure as briefed to
U.S. Southern Command congressional account holders in November 2005.
The program restructure consists of two fundamental parts: an
improvement program to increase reliability and address obsolescence;
and a concept study to assess hybrid combatant submersible designs for
follow-on vehicles.
Senator Cornyn. Secretary O'Connell, given the increase in
SOCOM's budget and the need to ensure that its acquisition
needs are represented at board meetings of the service
acquisition managers, would you support creating a senior
civilian position within your office for acquisition
management, one that would complement the position in the
command?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I have given this much thought in the
last couple of months, after some of your committee staffers
raised it. I think it would be a prudent move. If nothing more,
it gives me someone who might be very well-connected in the
community, can look at acquisition programs, and at least give
me a comfort level in terms of are we going the right way, do
we need to be more aggressive, or are there things like the
ASDS that we need to curtail and reexamine significantly. I
think it would be a help.
I currently have a senior civilian, but not a deputy
assistant secretary for resources and technology, Tim Morgan.
He has 16 years of budget oversight and programming experience,
and he is very capable. However, I do not really have an
independent acquisition expert on my staff who would report
directly to me and work with AT&L and others on SOCOM programs.
So I would be in favor of that.
Senator Cornyn. From my limited experience in a previous
life, I know that technology issues--in addition to things like
the ASDS where you have sort of a moving target, in terms of
requirements, have a tendency to vastly increase the costs of
Government acquisitions.
I am also concerned, Admiral Redd, about technology uses
within the Government and how we are adapting those technology
needs to particularly our intelligence gathering and sharing
requirements. As I recall, when I was out at the Technology
Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC), the predecessor of the
organization you head, they had--I cannot remember if it was
four or five Central Processing Units (CPU)--maybe less, maybe
three CPUs--strapped together. I think there was a toggle
switch that allowed you to search each one of them, but there
was not any interconnectivity between those. Could you tell me,
is that still the situation or has it improved?
Admiral Redd. Depending on whether you are selling the
systems or using them, it has gotten better or worse. I have
nine CPUs by my desk right now.
Senator Cornyn. Nine of them?
Admiral Redd. Nine of them, yes, sir. It is all good news
in the sense that we now have additional things. For example,
we have classified circuits with several of our allies right
now, the United Kingdom and Australia. We are working on
turning that around.
The problem again, as I mentioned in closed session, is we
have, in a sense, an elegant but simple solution, but we have
to use a lot of brute force just to get the information in, and
that means having all these networks.
We are starting to turn that around in a couple of ways. We
will, at one point, God willing, get to the point where we have
one network, which everybody uses and with all the appropriate
security. We are a long ways from being there yet. Ten percent
of that or 20 percent of that is technology; 80 percent is
still in the policy. So that is getting there.
We are doing some things which are important, however. In
fact, my Chief of Staff is right now the guinea pig. One of the
problems is when you have e-mails coming in from nine different
systems and you have to go through and punch up and log in on
each one of those in order. It takes a half a day just to do
that. We have a single screen pilot project right now so when
your e-mails come in on different systems, they all show up on
the same screen. We are trying that out. So that will help
substantially. Little things like that will help.
We are also doing things in a deeper sense and working on
things. We have the ability right now as I mentioned, through
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) online to access
right now about 5 million pieces of finished intelligence on a
Web site, which any organization can come into and use. About
5,000 people are cleared for that.
The next steps we are looking at, though, are how do you go
through large amounts of data and how do you search not only
one at a time on each of those networks' databases, but how do
you do a consolidated database of all of them at the same time?
So we are looking at how to use technology not only in the
connectivity side, if you will, which is extremely important,
but also in that basic research, if you will. So a lot of
things are going on there. As we mentioned, the challenges on
the collection side also continue, but our goal is to use
technology wherever we can, obviously, to move things along. As
I mentioned in closed session, I think we have made an awful
lot of good progress.
Senator Cornyn. Some of the agencies of the Federal
Government's experience with technology challenges have not
been good, and I keep thinking about the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) in particular and a lot of taxpayer dollars
basically down the drain in attempts to try to bring the FBI
into the technology age.
Changing the issue just slightly, though, obviously there
are a lot of our enemies and others who would like to have
access to that information. Could you give me some confidence
in the level of our information security efforts with regard to
NCTC?
Admiral Redd. I think in terms of NCTC, it is extremely
good. You have established us as the one place in the
Government where all information comes in. Everybody out there,
just on the personnel side, is polygraphed, and has very high
security standards. We basically are a tenant of the Central
Intelligence Agency and so we respond to all of their security
requirements. I think we do a very good job in terms of that.
You can always do better.
I am not the expert on our cryptography or how well we are
in terms of cybersecurity, but I can tell you it is extremely
high by the very nature of the fact that we bring all that
information together and we have some very strict rules.
Again, the blessing is having that information all in one
place. The curse is you have to make sure that it stays there
except when it is properly sent out. I would say that we do a
pretty good job on that, a very good job on that.
Senator Cornyn. Working at the Office of Management and
Budget and also some of the committees that have looked at
information security across the Federal Government, it causes
me some concern and not specifically with your agency because I
cannot recall right now how some of the various agencies have
ranked. But overall, the Federal Government does not rank well
when it comes to information security, and that is a huge
concern.
Given the late hour, let me make this the last question,
and I will direct it to Admiral Olson. As I indicated, we
appreciate your generous time, granting us the last couple of
hours for questions. We spent most of our time in closed
session. We have additional matters we want to discuss with you
and your staff going forward.
Admiral Olson, elements of special forces have been present
in Afghanistan since 2001, and given the longevity of that
continued presence, I would like to get your comment on the
following. What is the current SOCOM level of effort in
Afghanistan, and do you see a significant change in the
presence of SOF there in the next 6 to 12 months as the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) expands its
operations in Afghanistan? What will the command relationship
be between SOF that remain in Afghanistan and the ISAF?
Admiral Olson. Senator, thank you.
We have just had some relief of SOF in Iraq in particular.
We drew 15 Special Forces A-Teams out as the training mission
came to an end.
I do not foresee significant change in the SOF presence in
either Afghanistan or Iraq in the coming months.
I believe that ISAF's presence is important. It will expand
capability and capacity across Afghanistan, but the SOF's A-
Teams that are in remote sites and working with the Afghan
National Army will continue to do that with a nationwide
presence in Afghanistan after ISAF's arrival.
The SOF in the regions where the ISAF is will come under
staff control, but will also be responsive to SOCOM
requirements. I will take that question particularly for the
record and provide you with a more detailed wiring diagram of
the command relationships. The bottom line is that ISAF by
itself will augment, but not relieve special operations
presence in Afghanistan.
[The information referred to follows:]
The decision of exactly what the overall command relationships will
be in Afghanistan when the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) takes over is not yet final. However, of the two possible
courses of action, Special Operations Force's (SOF) command
relationships will remain the same. The Combined Joint Special
Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) is going to be a supporting command to
the ISAF (the supported command). CJSOTF will remain under tactical
control of Combined Joint Task Force-76. The U.S. Central Command
Forward Special Operations Command will retain operational control. The
bottom line is that U.S. SOF will fall under U.S. commanders while
working for ISAF.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you Admiral Olson, Admiral Redd, Mr.
Rapp, and Secretary O'Connell for your testimony today.
We will leave the record open for 2 days so that members
who could not attend the hearing can submit their questions for
the record.
Thank you very much for your presence here today and your
response to our questions, and again, on behalf of all of us,
for your service to our Nation. Thank you. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]