    [Senate Hearing 109-827]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                    S. Hrg. 109-827, Pt. 5

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2766

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                   ----------

                          MARCH 10, 29; APRIL 5, 2006

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                2007--Part 5  EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                                      S. Hrg. 109-827 Pt. 5

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2766

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                   __________

                          MARCH 10, 29; APRIL 5, 2006

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
    Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov  Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
    Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001

                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            BILL NELSON, Florida
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota

                        Charles S. Abell, Staff Director

                 Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

                                     ______

               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

                          JOHN CORNYN, Texas, Chairman

    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  JACK REED, Rhode Island
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            BILL NELSON, Florida
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    E. BENAJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York

                                      (ii)
    ?

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
           Roles and Missions of the Department of Defense Regarding
                HomelandDefense and Support to Civil Authorities
                                 march 10, 2006

                                                                       Page
    McHale, Hon. Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
      Defense........................................................     4
    Inge, LTG Joseph R., USA, Deputy Commander, United States
      NorthernCommand................................................    13
    Blum, LTG H. Steven, USA, Chief, National Guard Bureau...........    17
    Rodriguez, Major General Charles R., Adjutant General, Texas
      MilitaryForces.................................................    41

         U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy and the Roles and Missions of
     Departmentof Defense and the Department of Energy in Nonproliferation
                                 march 29, 2006

    Flory, Hon. Peter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      International SecurityPolicy...................................    62
    Cartwright, Gen. James, USMC, Commander, United States Strategic
      Command........................................................    75
    Paul, Hon. Jerald S., Principal Deputy Administrator of National
      NuclearSecurity Administration, Department of Energy...........    82

              Department of Defense's Role in Combating Terrorism
                                 april 5, 2006

    O'Connell, Hon. Thomas W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      Special Operationsand Low-Intensity Conflict...................   132

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

                                  ----------

                             FRIDAY, MARCH 10, 2006

                               U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
                                      and Capabilities,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

      ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGARDING HOMELAND
                    DEFENSE AND SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
    Cornyn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Cornyn, Thune, and
    Reed.
        Also present: Senator Levin.
        Committee staff member present: John H. Quirk V, security
    clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Sandra E. Luff,
    professional staff member; Elaine A. McCusker, professional
    staff member; David M. Morriss, counsel; Lynn F. Rusten,
    professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, general
    counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
    member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
    Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston and Benjamin
    L. Rubin.
        Committee members' assistants present: Russell J.
    Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory,
    assistant to Senator Thune; Elizabeth King, assistant to
    Senator Reed, and William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
    Nelson.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Cornyn. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to
    order. The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) role in homeland defense and
    support to civil authorities.
        We welcome our distinguished witnesses today, including the
    Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Homeland Defense; Lieutenant General Joseph R. Inge, Deputy
    Commander of Northern Command (NORTHCOM); and Lieutenant
    General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB).
        I'd also like to recognize someone from my home State,
    Major General Charles Rodriguez, who's attending the hearing
    today. General Rodriguez is the adjutant general for the State
    of Texas, and has done a superb job. I saw him in action during
    the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and we're grateful
    to have his service, not only to our State, but our Nation.
        I commend each of our witnesses for the leadership you
    provide. I've had a chance to review your written statements,
    and they're all outstanding and quite comprehensive. We will,
    of course, invite you to make an opening statement, and then
    we'll have some questions.
        I also hope that you will convey to the fine men and women
    under your charge, both military and civilian, the Nation's
    gratitude for their selfless service and commitment to our
    Nation's defense. We recognize that we must view homeland
    defense, in a post-September 11, 2001, environment, in a--
    perhaps even in a different way. Moreover, recent events along
    the U.S./Mexican border, coupled with the discovery of the Otay
    Mesa Tunnel, highlight the need for our continued vigilance and
    the close cooperation between the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) and the DOD in protecting our Nation's borders
    and keeping us safe.
        As public servants, our most solemn obligation is to
    protect the American people. Simply stated, the security of the
    United States and defense of the Homeland is job number one.
    While our forward-deployed forces are our first line of defense
    in the global war on terrorism, the readiness of our Armed
    Forces to defend the Homeland and to assist civilian
    authorities in identifying threats, gathering and analyzing
    intelligence, preventing or responding to an attack or other
    national emergencies are of paramount importance to the
    subcommittee. We welcome your insights on developments in your
    respective organizations, as well as your personal assessments
    of the fiscal year 2007 defense budget request.
        Lieutenant General Inge and Lieutenant General Blum, the
    subcommittee also looks forward to hearing your assessment with
    regard to how you integrate the total force into the execution
    of your mission. We're specifically interested in how you
    coordinate and synchronize the elements of your mission that
    are in support of the DHS. We're also interested in your views
    regarding the establishment of unity of effort, as well as
    unity of command when the Active-Duty, Reserve component, and
    the National Guard Forces are employed in response to a
    catastrophic national disaster, pandemic, or attack on the
    Homeland.
        Secretary McHale and Lieutenant General Inge, we seek your
    comments and insight on the recommendations outlined in the
    Federal response to Hurricane Katrina lessons learned. We're
    particularly interested in the recommendations that outlines
    that the DOD should lead the Federal response, in extraordinary
    circumstances. Under what circumstances would you like to see
    the DOD take such a role?
        In addition, the subcommittee seeks your assessment
    regarding the steps being taken to identify gaps, as well as
    redundancies, between Federal agencies that share a role in
    homeland security and homeland defense. Of particular interest
    is how your organizations synchronize your support to the DHS
    with regard to the land, air, and maritime defense of our
    borders, and how resident DOD technology and capabilities are
    being leveraged and shared with the DHS in their execution of
    the border defense mission.
        The subcommittee is also interested in any authorities that
    you believe should be reexamined in light of the recently
    published Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), as well as the
    Federal response to Hurricane Katrina lessons learned.
        Again, we welcome each of our witnesses this morning. We
    certainly want to convey to you our appreciation for your
    service to our great Nation and the seriousness of the
    responsibilities with which you have been charged. We stand
    ready to assist you, in any way that is within our power, in
    the discharge of those very important duties in defense of our
    Nation.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me join you in welcoming the members of the panel.
    Secretary McHale, General Inge, and General Blum, thank you for
    the service to the Nation.
        I'm particularly glad to see Secretary McHale here, after
    serving with the Secretary in the House of Representatives, and
    I know his commitment to the men and women of the Armed Forces,
    particularly the Marine Corps. So, thanks for that, Paul.
        We extend our thanks, obviously, to all of you, and to the
    valiant men and women that you lead. Thank you so much.
        This is the first hearing of the subcommittee, and the
    first Armed Services hearing since the Hurricane Katrina
    disaster to explore DOD's role in support of Federal
    authorities during a natural or manmade disaster. The DOD,
    NORTHCOM, and especially the National Guard played a tremendous
    and pivotal role in helping the victims of the disaster in
    Louisiana and along the Gulf Coast. Indeed, there was a stark
    contrast between the military's response and the response of
    the DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
    Nevertheless, I believe that DOD's ability to support civil
    authorities can be improved, and I think most, if not all, the
    witnesses have indicated such in comments before other
    audiences, other hearings before Congress.
        The White House view of the lessons learned from the
    response to Hurricane Katrina stated ``Limitations under
    Federal law and DOD policy caused the Active-Duty military to
    be dependent on requests for assistance. These limitations
    result in slowed application of DOD resources during the
    initial response. Further Active-Duty military and National
    Guard operations were not coordinated, and serve two different
    bosses--one, the President, and the other, the Governor.'' This
    review makes 11 recommendations, and I hope to hear from the
    witnesses today on the conclusion of this review and on the
    recommendations.
        I also hope to hear more about the DOD's homeland defense
    efforts, including developments relating to North American
    Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and our cooperation with
    Canada, air and maritime security, how the interface between
    NORTHCOM and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is
    functioning, and DOD's ability to prevent, respond, and manage
    the aftermath of a terrorist attack or other catastrophic
    event.
        The public's confidence, frankly, has been shaken by the
    Federal response to Hurricane Katrina, particularly since the
    administration has asserted, since September 11, 2001, that
    we've been improving our emergency capacity. I'm not
    convinced--and more importantly I don't think the American
    public is convinced--that we are fully prepared to respond to a
    terrorist event if it were to happen today or tomorrow or the
    next several days or months ahead. I'd like your views on this
    subject, what we've learned with respect to Hurricane Katrina
    and how well we're ready to respond to a catastrophic event, if
    it occurs in the United States.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Reed. I appreciate the
    way that our staffs and you and I are able to work together to
    discharge our responsibilities. It's a pleasure working with
    you.
        We'd like now to hear from our witnesses, starting with
    Assistant Secretary McHale, and then General Inge, and then
    General Blum. If you would keep your comments to within 10
    minutes or so, we want to give you plenty of time to say what
    you want to say, and then we have a lot of questions we want to
    ask.
        So, Secretary McHale, we'll turn to you first.

     STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL McHALE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                          FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE

        Mr. McHale. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, it is a pleasure to be back
    in your company again--distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to describe DOD's
    role in protecting the United States from foreign attack and in
    responding to the consequences of attacks and natural
    disasters.
        Mr. Chairman, you indicated, accurately, that my formal
    statement has been submitted for the record. If I may, I'll
    simply proceed to a very brief summary of that testimony.
        Senator Cornyn. Very well.
        Mr. McHale. The 2005 National Defense Strategy designates
    securing the United States from direct attack as DOD's first
    objective. DOD gives top priority to dissuading, deterring, and
    defeating those who would seek to harm the United States, with
    a paramount emphasis upon enemies potentially armed with
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
        Protecting the United States Homeland requires a global,
    active, and layered defense strategy. There is no home game,
    there is no away game. We are engaged in a global conflict. In
    that global conflict, the defense of the U.S. Homeland is the
    preeminent duty.
        It is the primary mission of the DHS to prevent terrorist
    attacks within the United States, including stopping terrorists
    form crossing our borders, coming through our ports, or
    hijacking aircraft inside or outside of the United States.
    Similarly, the Attorney General leads our Nation's law
    enforcement effort to detect, prevent, and investigate
    terrorist activity within the United States. DOD's
    responsibility is to employ our warfighting capabilities,
    subject to constitutional and statutory authority, in a
    military defense of U.S. lives, property, and individual
    freedom.
        DOD has primary responsibility for defending U.S. airspace
    and protecting the Nation's air approaches. Since the terrorist
    attacks of September 11, 2001, more than 41,000 fighter, aerial
    refueling, and airborne early-warning sorties have been flown,
    while more than 2,000 air patrols have responded to actual
    incidents and suspicious flight operations.
        We have fighters positioned throughout the United States
    and Canada capable of defending major population centers and
    high-value infrastructure within minutes. Within the National
    Capital Region (NCR), where we are located today, the DOD
    conducts irregular air patrols, maintains a dedicated 24/7
    fighter capability based at Andrews Air Force Base, and has a
    dedicated ground missile defense system to provide around-the-
    clock coverage of the NCR. In addition, last year, DOD provided
    a sophisticated visual warning system to warn wayward pilots.
        In the maritime domain, including the international waters,
    the maritime approaches to the United States, our territorial
    seas, and other U.S. navigable waters, we have a defense and a
    highly effective partnership executed by the United States Navy
    and the United States Coast Guard. The U.S. Navy defends the
    sea approaches to the United States and works with the Coast
    Guard to patrol international waters and our territorial seas.
        In December 2004, DOD and DHS signed a memorandum of
    agreement (MOA) that incorporated the U.S. Coast Guard in
    support of DOD maritime homeland defense operations. A similar
    MOA that would include DOD in support of the Coast Guard
    maritime homeland security operations is currently awaiting
    final approval.
        As noted earlier, it is the primary mission of DHS to
    prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. In
    addition, the Attorney General leads our Nation's law
    enforcement effort to detect, prevent, and investigate
    terrorist activity, again, within the United States.
    Accordingly, DOD does not have the assigned responsibility to
    stop terrorists from coming across our borders, to stop
    terrorists from coming through U.S. ports, or to stop
    terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside of the
    United States. These responsibilities belong to DHS. Nor does
    DOD have the authority to seek out and arrest terrorists in the
    United States. These responsibilities belong to the Department
    of Justice (DOJ).
        DOD does have a role in providing support to civil
    authorities, when appropriate and permitted by law. For
    instance, DOD Active and Reserve component forces, and the
    National Guard, have provided a wide variety of
    counternarcotics missions along the southwest border of the
    United States since 1989. Congress recognized the possible
    interplay between drug trafficking and terrorism, and included,
    in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2004, a provision
    that addressed the authority of the Secretary of Defense to
    expand the mission of DOD joint task forces from
    counternarcotics to include counterterrorism activities.
        Again, as noted earlier, at the direction of the President
    or the Secretary of Defense, the DOD provides military support
    to civil authorities as part of a comprehensive national
    response to prevent and protect against terrorist incidents or
    to recover from an attack or natural disaster.
        In 2003, DOD acted on 75 requests for assistance (RFA) from
    more than 20 civilian agencies. In 2004, DOD acted on 99 RFAs
    from domestic civilian agencies, as noted by Senator Reed just
    a few moments ago.
        DOD's deployment in response to the catastrophic effects of
    Hurricane Katrina was the largest, fastest civil support
    mission in the history of the United States. Between August 29
    and September 10, 2005, more than 72,000 Federal military and
    National Guard personnel were deployed in response to Hurricane
    Katrina, more than twice the previous record deployment in
    response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992.
        During the response to Hurricane Katrina, DOD acted on more
    than 90 hurricane-related RFAs from civil authorities. Many of
    these requests were approved orally by the Secretary of
    Defense. I would note, parenthetically, including one RFA
    approved orally and quickly that had an estimated cost of $1
    billion. These RFAs were in execution when the paperwork caught
    up, several days later. DOD felt a sense of urgency, and acted
    upon it.
        In addition to Hurricane Katrina, DOD acted on more than
    140 requests for assistance in 2005, including responses to
    Hurricanes Dennis, Ophelia, and Rita.
        In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, again, as noted by
    Senator Reed, President Bush ordered a comprehensive review of
    the Federal response. The White House recommendations correlate
    well with our internal DOD lessons-learned effort. We have
    already begun to implement improvements.
        For example, DOD is developing pre-scripted requests for
    assistance that would speed the response to a catastrophic
    event. We are completing a contingency plan defining NORTHCOM's
    role in providing support to DHS during domestic contingencies.
    We are developing a framework to provide initial damage
    reconnaissance. I would note, that was one of our areas of
    deficiency during Hurricane Katrina. Battle damage assessment,
    as we would perform it overseas, or an assessment of the damage
    associated with a natural event here in the United States, was
    not as successful as it should have been, because we relied too
    heavily on what turned out to be inaccurate media reports.
    That's not a criticism of the media. It's simply a strong
    motivation, a requirement, for the DOD to develop independent
    capabilities for rapid, accurate damage assessments following
    either terrorist attacks or naturally occurring catastrophic
    disasters within the United States.
        We are also participating in the interagency revision of
    the National Search and Rescue Plan.
        In conclusion, we recognize that the defense of the United
    States Homeland, our people, property, and freedom, is DOD's
    most fundamental duty. Men and women in military uniform,
    Active, Reserve, and National Guard, will continue to meet that
    obligation with passion, professionalism, and a resolute sense
    of purpose.
        Mr. Chairman, I'll look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McHale follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by Hon. Paul McHale

                                  introduction

        Chairman Cornyn, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to address you today on the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) important role in protecting the United
    States from enemy attacks and responding to the consequences of attacks
    and natural disasters.
        As noted in the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
    the United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war. Since
    the attacks of September 11, 2001, our Nation has fought a global war
    against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice,
    and who want to destroy our free way of life. Our enemies seek weapons
    of mass destruction (WMD) and, if they are successful, will likely
    attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere.
        As we wage this long war, we must also be prepared for other
    threats. Hostile states could attack the United States using WMD
    delivered by missiles or by means such as commercial shipping or
    general aviation. They could attack surreptitiously through surrogates,
    and, of course, there is also the danger that the WMD capabilities of
    some states could fall into the hands of, or be given to, terrorists
    who could use them to attack the United States.
        In addition to their duties overseas, U.S. forces have taken on
    greater roles at home since this long war began. Immediately following
    the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, U.S. forces were called upon
    to assist in securing the Homeland. Working alongside other Federal
    agencies, DOD answered the call. At the President's direction, Active
    and Reserve Forces: conducted combat air patrols over major cities to
    prevent follow-on attacks; reinforced the Nation's land borders;
    guarded shipping lanes; protected harbors; secured critical
    infrastructure; and guarded airports and other transportation hubs
    temporarily until the establishment of the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA). Specialized anti-terrorism and chemical and
    biological incident response forces also deployed to Washington, DC, in
    the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks.
        Whether at home or abroad, defending our Nation, fighting our wars,
    or responding to disasters, the men and women of our military--Active,
    Guard, and Reserve--have proven that they are dedicated, adaptable, and
    ready to answer the call to duty.

                          protecting the united states

        The 2005 National Defense Strategy designates securing the United
    States from direct attack as our first objective. DOD gives top
    priority to dissuading, deterring, and defeating those who seek to harm
    the United States directly, with a paramount emphasis upon enemies
    potentially armed with WMD. Protecting the U.S. Homeland requires a
    global, active, and layered defense strategy. There is no ``home
    game.'' There is no ``away game.'' There is only one game. We are
    engaged in a global conflict. In that global conflict, the defense of
    the U.S. Homeland is the preeminent duty. Therefore, Homeland Defense
    must be seen as an integral part of a global, active, layered defense--
    a defense in depth that has as its single goal to secure the United
    States and its citizens from attack. In addition to the National
    Defense Strategy, last year we also completed DOD's first Strategy for
    Homeland Defense and Civil Support. By articulating strategic goals and
    objectives, we add coherence and direction to relevant activities
    across the DOD that include: deterring and preventing attacks;
    protecting critical defense and designated civilian infrastructure;
    providing situational understanding; and preparing for and responding
    to incidents.
        To secure our freedom and safeguard the American way of life we
    cannot depend on passive or reactive defenses. A purely passive defense
    would be subject to enemy reconnaissance and inevitable defeat. By
    contrast, an active, layered defense relies on early warning of an
    emerging threat in order to quickly deploy and execute a decisive
    response. An active defense is a powerful deterrent, dissuading enemies
    and denying them the operational initiative.
        U.S. forces are prepared to: intercept and defeat threats against
    U.S. territory, within U.S. territorial waters and airspace, and at a
    distance from the Homeland; protect against and mitigate the
    consequences of any attack; and/or conduct military operations in
    response to any attack.
        Here at home, it is the primary mission of the DHS to prevent
    terrorist attacks within the United States, including stopping
    terrorists from coming across our borders, coming through our ports, or
    hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States. The Attorney
    General leads our Nation's law enforcement effort to detect, prevent,
    and investigate terrorist activity within the United States. DOD's
    responsibility is to employ our warfighting capabilities, subject to
    constitutional and statutory authority, in a military defense of U.S.
    lives, property, and individual freedom.

                dod's homeland defense and civil support posture

        All U.S. military commands throughout the world have a role to play
    in the active defense-in-depth of the United States. Three military
    commands--U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the North American
    Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)--
    are directly involved in the defense of the U.S. Homeland.
    Additionally, the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is the lead
    combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing military efforts
    to combat WMD, including ensuring the force structure and necessary
    resources are in place to help all combatant commands defeat WMD.
        To meet emerging threats, DOD is postured to deter, defend against,
    and defeat threats to the United States in the air, maritime, and land
    domains.
    Air Defense
        In the air domain, DOD has primary responsibility for defending
    U.S. airspace and protecting the Nation's air approaches. The air
    domain is guarded, patrolled, and monitored by the bi-national U.S.-
    Canada NORAD. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, more
    than 42,000 fighter, aerial refueling, and airborne early warning
    sorties have been flown, while more than 2,000 air patrols have
    responded to actual incidents and suspicious flight operations. We also
    have air defense alert fighters positioned throughout the United States
    and Canada that are capable of reaching major population centers and
    high-value infrastructure within minutes. The number of alert fighters
    can be increased or decreased according to emerging threat levels.
        We continually adjust our posture in order to protect the National
    Capitol Region (NCR), the seat of the U.S. Government. The DOD conducts
    irregular air patrols,, maintains a dedicated 24-hours-a-day/7-days-a-
    week alert fighter response based at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland,
    and has a dedicated ground missile defense system located to provide
    around-the-clock coverage for the NCR. In addition, last year, DOD
    provided the Visual Warning System (VWS) to warn wayward pilots to
    contact the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic
    controllers immediately and to depart from restricted airspace. We also
    detailed DOD liaison officers to serve at the TSA-hosted NCR
    Coordination Center (NCRCC) on a full-time basis and provided key
    interagency operations centers and the NCRCC access to DOD's classified
    conferencing capability, which is used for DOD coordination and
    decision making during the response to hostile domestic air threats.
        In addition, DOD has begun deploying missile interceptors at Fort
    Greeley, Alaska, to protect the U.S. Homeland from ballistic missile
    attack even as system development, testing, and fielding continue.
    Maritime Domain
        The maritime domain--including international waters, the maritime
    approaches to the United States, our territorial seas, and other U.S.
    navigable waters--is guarded by a highly effective partnership between
    the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Navy defends the sea
    approaches to the United States and works with the U.S. Coast Guard to
    patrol international waters and our territorial seas.
        In December 2004, DOD and DHS signed a memorandum of agreement that
    incorporated the U.S. Coast Guard in support of DOD maritime homeland
    defense operations. This memorandum of agreement established a joint
    command, control, and coordination structure using existing DOD and
    U.S. Coast Guard operations centers. A similar memorandum of agreement
    that would include DOD in support of U.S. Coast Guard maritime homeland
    security operations is currently awaiting final approval. This close
    coordination is essential to our ability to interdict terrorists and
    others attempting to enter the United States, possibly with WMD
    materiel and components, via the maritime domain.
        This year, the Secretary of Defense approved a new NORTHCOM
    Maritime Homeland Defense Execute Order, which provides readily
    accessible forces, procedures, coordination requirements, and rules of
    engagement to counter all threats to the U.S. Homeland, including WMD
    proliferation.
        Additionally, in multiple theaters in the global war on terror,
    forward-deployed U.S. Navy assets work with other agencies to identify,
    track, and intercept threats before they threaten the United States.
    Land Domain
        It is the primary mission of DHS to prevent terrorist attacks
    within the United States. The Attorney General leads our Nation's law
    enforcement efforts to detect, prevent, and investigate terrorist
    activity within the United States. Accordingly, DOD does not have the
    assigned responsibility to stop terrorists coming across our borders,
    to stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports, or to stop
    terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States
    (these responsibilities belong to DHS). Nor does DOD have the authority
    to seek out and arrest terrorists in the United States (these
    responsibilities belong to DOJ). DOD does have a role in providing
    support to civil authorities, when appropriate and as permitted by law.
    DOD has deployed numerous assets both to defend the U.S. Homeland and
    to assist civil authorities:

             Quick Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces,
            highly trained U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps units, are
            postured to respond to a wide range of potential threats to the
            U.S. Homeland, including critical infrastructure protection.
             The U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident
            Response Force (CBIRF), headquartered at Indian Head, Maryland,
            can deploy to assist local, State, or Federal agencies and
            military commanders in consequence management operations by
            providing: capabilities for detection and identification;
            casualty search, rescue, and personnel decontamination; and
            emergency medical care and stabilization of contaminated
            personnel. CBIRF was instrumental in responding to the
            discovery of ricin in the Dirksen Senate Office Building in
            February 2004.
             Joint Task Force Civil Support, headquartered in Fort
            Monroe, Virginia; Joint Task Force Consequence Management East,
            headquartered at Fort Gillem, Georgia; and Joint Task Force
            Consequence Management West, headquartered at Fort Sam Houston,
            Texas, can provide consequence management support to civil
            authorities in the case of WMD attacks.
             Joint Force Headquarters NCR, based at Fort McNair in
            Washington, DC, is responsible for land homeland defense, civil
            support, and consequence management in the NCR.
             Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), headquartered at Fort
            Bliss, Texas, supports counterdrug, counterterrorism, and other
            operations to countertransnational threats.
             Joint Task Force Alaska, based at Elmendorf Air Force
            Base, Alaska, is responsible for land homeland defense and
            civil support operations in Alaska, and Joint Task Force
            Homeland Defense, based at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, has these
            responsibilities in Hawaii and U.S. territories, possessions,
            and protectorates in the Pacific.
            dod's role in the security of the united states borders
        In accordance with section 202 of title 6, U.S. Code, DHS is
    responsible for ``[s]ecuring the borders, territorial waters, ports,
    terminals, waterways, and air, land, and sea transportation systems of
    the United States'' and ``[p]reventing the entry of terrorists and the
    instruments of terrorism into the United States.'' DOD's role in the
    execution of this responsibility, as noted earlier, is to provide
    support to DHS, when requested, appropriate, lawful, and approved by
    the President or the Secretary of Defense.
        DOD Active and Reserve component forces and the National Guard have
    conducted a wide variety of counternarcotics missions along the
    southwest border of the United States since 1989. That support to
    civilian law enforcement has included activities such as surface and
    aerial reconnaissance; minor construction; establishing tactical
    observation posts, training, intelligence analysis, linguist support,
    and transportation; and conducting training exercises along the border
    to provide terrain denial. DOD also supports requests from DOJ, DHS,
    and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Task Force
    Headquarters for unique military assistance, such as reconnaissance
    (ground-based, aviation-based, and maritime), logistics,
    transportation, engineer support along the southwest border, as well as
    intelligence programs and training.
        Since September 11, 2001, policy and operational changes in DOD
    have improved the alignment of resources and efforts where there is a
    potential relationship between terrorism and narcotics trafficking.
    Congress recognized the possible interplay between drug trafficking and
    terrorism and included in the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2004 a provision that addressed the authority of the
    Secretary of Defense to expand the mission of DOD joint task forces
    from counternarcotics to include counterterrorism activities.
        Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD has also
    engaged in a number of activities to assist civil authorities in
    improving the security of our borders:

             March-August 2002. DOD mobilized some 1,600 National
            Guard personnel along the northern and southern borders to
            support the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and
            Naturalization Service (INS), and the Border Patrol, in their
            heightened post-September 11 security posture.
             October-November 2003. A Predator B Unmanned Aerial
            Vehicle (UAV), scheduled for future delivery to DOD, operated
            in support of DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
            Operation Safeguard, a humanitarian/law enforcement effort to
            protect lives of illegal aliens and enforce immigration law
            during crossings along the southwest border into the United
            States. Operation Safeguard provided an opportunity for DOD to
            demonstrate UAV capabilities to border authorities. Operation
            Safeguard also served to highlight the policy, legal, and
            infrastructure issues that must be examined in tandem with
            technology development. These include challenges associated
            with the use of UAVs in controlled domestic airspace as well as
            the extensive infrastructure (e.g., communications,
            exploitation tools, imagery analysts) required to process and
            exploit information collected by UAVs.
             June-September 2004. DOD UAVs operated in support of
            the Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI), which sought to
            detect illegal entry and smuggling/drug activity along the
            Arizona-Mexico border, and to aid in the rescue of lost or
            injured persons.
             November 2004-January 2005.

                     JTF-N supported the U.S. Customs and Border
                    Protection (CBP) Operation Winter Freeze, an operation
                    to interdict suspected transnational threats along the
                    U.S.-Canadian border in the Swanton and Buffalo sectors
                    (New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York). The military
                    provided aerial reconnaissance and interdiction sorties
                    and augmented two Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
                    Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) detection
                    checkpoints.
                     Army Hunter UAVs flew sorties to detect
                    illegal entry/drug activity along the Arizona--Mexico
                    border in support of the ABCI.

             June 2005. DOD supported a DHS bi-national interagency
            exercise, ``Operation San Juan,'' involving CBP and Royal
            Canadian Mounted Police activities along the northwest border
            in Washington State. DOD provided surveillance radars, ground
            sensors, and military personnel to operate them.
             September 2005. DOD supported DHS CBP by providing
            flight operations support at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to UAV
            operations supporting counterterrorism border enforcement
            efforts.
             October-November 2005. JTF-N supported DHS CBP's
            efforts to interdict transnational threats in the El Paso
            Sector by conducting multi-sensor operations (ground-based
            forward-looking infrared, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles,
            ground sensors, ground surveillance radars) in Hidalgo, Grant,
            Luna, and Dona Ana counties of New Mexico.

                      defense support of civil authorities

        At the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense, the DOD
    supports civil authorities--as appropriate and consistent with the law
    and the imperative to sustain military readiness--for designated
    activities and as part of a comprehensive national response to prevent
    and protect against terrorist incidents or to recover from an attack or
    a disaster.
        DOD has significant resources that may be available to support
    civil authorities. In Incidents of National Significance, DOD's support
    is provided consistent with the National Response Plan (NRP), which was
    published in December 2004. The Secretary of Defense retains command of
    military forces providing defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)--
    sometimes referred to as ``civil support''--as with all other military
    operations. In accordance with the NRP, when requested, and upon
    approval of the Secretary of Defense, DOD provides DSCA during domestic
    incidents. Accordingly, DOD is considered a support agency for all of
    the NRP's emergency support functions.
        There are three primary mechanisms by which DOD takes part in a
    Federal response to a domestic incident. Federal assistance, including
    assistance from DOD, can be provided: (1) at the direction of the
    President; (2) at the request of another Federal agency under the
    Economy Act, or (3) in response to a request from DHS's Federal
    Emergency Management Agency under the Stafford Act. The second and
    third mechanisms require a request for assistance and approval of the
    Secretary of Defense.
        DOD resources employed in support of domestic civil authorities are
    under the command and control of Commander, NORTHCOM, for responses in
    the Continental United States, Alaska, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
    U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia; or Commander, PACOM,
    for Hawaii and U.S. territories, possessions, and protectorates in the
    Pacific region.
        DOD has continued its long tradition of DSCA while maintaining its
    primary mission of fighting and winning the Nation's wars. In 2003, DOD
    acted on 75 RFAs from more than 20 civilian agencies. In 2004, DOD
    acted on 99 RFAs from domestic civilian agencies. DOD's response to the
    catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina was the largest and most
    rapid military deployment within the United States since the Civil War.
    More than 72,000 Federal military and National Guard personnel were
    deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina--more than twice the number
    that deployed in response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (more than
    29,000). These forces were directly employed in saving lives through
    extensive search and rescue, evacuation, and medical assistance. Other
    military capabilities employed during the response included 23 ships,
    68 fixed-wing aircraft, 293 helicopters, amphibious landing craft,
    space-based imagery, night vision capabilities, port and waterway
    surveillance, mortuary teams, and large-scale construction support
    provided through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Navy
    Seabees. Additionally, nine DOD installations served as logistical
    staging areas for the delivery of supplies and as sites for Federal
    Medical Shelters. Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, was designated
    as the central collection point for foreign relief donations. During
    the response to Hurricane Katrina, DOD acted on more than 90 hurricane-
    related RFAs from civil authorities requiring a broad range of military
    capabilities. Some of these requests were approved orally by the
    Secretary of Defense or the acting Deputy Secretary of Defense, and
    were in execution when the approval paperwork caught up later. DOD felt
    a sense of urgency and acted upon it, as provided for within the NRP.
    In addition to Hurricane Katrina, DOD acted on more than 140 requests
    for assistance in 2005, including responses to Hurricanes Dennis,
    Ophelia, and Rita, and the provision of UAV support to DHS border
    security activities.

                                the total force

        The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which was
    published 2 months prior to Hurricane Katrina, reflects a Total Force
    approach to homeland defense and domestic civil support missions,
    incorporating the capabilities of trained and equipped Active-Duty,
    National Guard, and Reserve Forces. This approach preserves the
    historic Federal relationship between the various levels of government
    while, at the same time, recognizing the unique capabilities of the
    Total Force to respond immediately to American citizens who are
    desperately in need. The Total Force--Active, Reserve, and National
    Guard--is even now engaged in activities at home and abroad that
    promote the security and interests of our Nation. The National Guard,
    in particular, provides unique capabilities in every U.S. State and
    Territory. The modern-day National Guard effectively operates as an
    operational force for military missions at home and abroad and can
    answer no-notice calls by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or
    the Governors to respond to natural or man-made catastrophic incidents
    here at home.
        The DOD planned for and employed a balance of Active, Reserve, and
    National Guard capabilities in responding to Hurricane Katrina. In
    contrast to Hurricane Andrew (1992), in which National Guard Forces
    constituted 24 percent of the military response, National Guard Forces
    represented more than 70 percent of the military force for Hurricane
    Katrina. Even while 75,000 National Guard members were deployed
    overseas, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Blum and the
    various state Adjutants General, the National Guard amassed more than
    30,000 personnel in 96 hours in response to Hurricane Katrina. At the
    height of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, the National Guard deployed
    a total of 50,000 military personnel. National Guard personnel from
    every State, Territory, and the District of Columbia were involved in
    Hurricane Katrina response operations. Further, National Guard Weapons
    of Mass Destruction--Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) from 14 States
    deployed to provide state-of-the-art communications capabilities to
    local authorities and assistance and advice on identifying and handling
    hazardous materials from damaged infrastructure.
        The National Guard provides important capabilities to NORTHCOM and
    PACOM, including situational awareness capabilities, intelligence and
    information feeds, chemical-biological weapons of mass destruction
    response force packages, and forward-deployed command and control
    apparatuses and joint logistics bases, as needed.
        In the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized
    the Secretary of Defense to provide funds to the Governor of a State
    for the use of the National Guard in a title 32 status (State control/
    Federal funding) for approved homeland defense activities. This new
    authority recognizes both the truly global nature of the current war
    and the special capabilities and contributions of the National Guard--a
    force located in every State and Territory, very familiar with the
    local geography, officials, and population, and well versed in working
    with other U.S. agencies. Under this authority, National Guard Forces
    will be engaged directly in the defense of the U.S. Homeland in a
    manner not seen since the early days of our country.

                       hurricane katrina lessons learned

        Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent sustained flooding of New
    Orleans exposed significant flaws in our national preparedness for
    catastrophic events and our Nation's capacity to respond to them.
    Emergency plans at all levels of government were put to the test and
    came up short. As a result, President Bush, in his September 15, 2005,
    address to the Nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans, made it clear
    that the Federal Government will make the necessary changes to be
    ``better prepared for any challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that
    could threaten our people.''
        President Bush subsequently ordered a comprehensive review of the
    Federal response to Hurricane Katrina--this review resulted in the
    publication of ``The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
    Learned.'' Regarding DOD, the review states:

              The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that
            the Department of Defense (DOD) has the capability to play a
            critical role in the Nation's response to catastrophic events.
            During the Katrina response, DOD--both National Guard and
            Active-Duty Forces--demonstrated that along with the Coast
            Guard it was one of the only Federal departments that possessed
            real operational capabilities to translate Presidential
            decisions into prompt, effective action on the ground. In
            addition to possessing operational personnel in large numbers
            that have been trained and equipped for their missions, DOD
            brought robust communications infrastructure, logistics, and
            planning capabilities. Since DOD, first and foremost, has its
            critical overseas mission, the solution to improving the
            Federal response to future catastrophes cannot simply be ``let
            the Department of Defense do it.'' Yet DOD capabilities must be
            better identified and integrated into the Nation's response
            plans.

        The White House recommendations correlate well with our internal
    lessons learned effort. We have already begun to implement improvements
    with an urgent focus on the operational challenges associated with this
    year's upcoming hurricane season. For example, DOD is:

             Developing pre-scripted requests for assistance that
            would speed the response to a catastrophic event;
             Completing a contingency plan defining NORTHCOM's role
            in planning and executing support to DHS during domestic
            contingencies;
             Reviewing its Immediate Response Authority with a view
            to making appropriate changes if necessary;
             Providing a strategic planner as a detailee to the
            DHS's Policy Directorate and reviewing DOD personnel support to
            DHS in terms of both numbers and expertise to identify
            appropriate adjustments;
             Developing a framework to provide initial damage
            reconnaissance, including those capabilities provided by the
            National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National
            Security Agency (NSA), as part of a STRATCOM civil support
            plan;
             Proposing legislation that would allow more effective
            and rapid mobilization of applicable Reserve units to conduct
            all-hazards civil support missions in response to disasters;
             Participating in the interagency revision of the
            National Search and Rescue Plan, including disaster response
            operations and address air traffic control and coordination;
            and
             Pursuing better integration of Federal military force
            and State National Guard during planning and exercises. In the
            future, integrated planning can be enhanced by anticipating
            incidents and their operational requirements, as well as by
            training and exercising for the 15 National Planning Scenarios
            developed by DHS. NORTHCOM is developing detailed operational
            plans for all foreseeable mission requests. Additionally,
            beginning in February 2006, NORTHCOM will participate in DHS's
            effort to review emergency plans in all 54 States and
            Territories. We will integrate the lessons learned from the
            response to Hurricane Katrina into future exercises to minimize
            or mitigate military command and control difficulties during
            responses to future disasters. Finally, when justified by the
            disabling impact of a catastrophic incident upon State and
            local authorities and the need to act swiftly to save lives,
            the President has the necessary authorities to Federalize
            National Guard Forces and establish ``unity of effort'' by
            establishing a unity of command, placing all military forces--
            Active, Reserve, and National Guard--in title 10 status.

                                   conclusion

        As stated in the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support,
    the United States faces ruthless enemies who seek to break our will by
    exploiting America's fundamental freedoms. Our adversaries are eager to
    employ violence against Americans at home. In this environment, DOD's
    paramount goal will continue to be the defense of the U.S. Homeland
    from direct attack.
        A new kind of enemy requires a new concept for defending the U.S.
    Homeland. The terrorist enemy now considers the U.S. Homeland a
    preeminent part of the global theater of combat, and so must we. We
    cannot depend on passive or reactive defenses but must seize the
    initiative from adversaries.
        The active, layered defense articulated in the Strategy for
    Homeland Defense and Civil Support seamlessly integrates U.S.
    capabilities in the forward regions of the world, the global commons,
    the geographic approaches to the U.S. territory, and within the United
    States. Whether in a leading, supporting, or enabling role, the DOD,
    guided by this Strategy and consistent with U.S. law, will work with a
    sense of urgency to protect the U.S. Homeland and the American people.
        Defending the U.S. Homeland--our people, property, and freedom--is
    our most fundamental duty. Failure is not an option.

        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, Secretary McHale.
        General Inge, we'd be pleased to hear from you.

    STATEMENT OF LTG JOSEPH R. INGE, USA, DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

        General Inge. Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, distinguished
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    report on NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil support
    operations.
        As we enter our fourth year at NORTHCOM, we are mission
    capable, and we are responding to the needs of the Nation. Our
    primary focus is on homeland defense, deterring, preventing,
    and defeating attacks. We also stand ready to assist primary
    agencies in responding quickly to manmade and natural
    disasters, as directed.
        When we became NORTHCOM some 4 years ago, we inherited a
    family of plans from various organizations across the land. In
    conjunction with taskings from the Joint Strategic Capabilities
    Plan, we have built those plans into a family of plans. We now
    have some 12 plans that are either complete or very near
    complete. These plans are the foundation of our ability to
    deter, prevent, and defeat threats to our Nation, and to assist
    civil authorities when called upon by the President or the
    Secretary of Defense.
        To refine these plans and to hone our ability to accomplish
    our missions, we conduct frequent and demanding exercises. Our
    exercises scenarios have simulated a wide range of homeland
    defense and civil support challenges. These challenges have
    been exercised in the air, the land, the sea, both natural and
    manmade.
        To date, over 150 Federal, State, local, and
    multifunctional nongovernmental organizations (NGO) have
    participated in our exercises. After each of these, we conduct
    a comprehensive review to identify lessons learned. We adjust
    our operations and our plans, in accordance with these lessons
    learned, to improve our ability to protect Americans and supply
    primary agencies in times of crisis. I would also add that we
    adjust a similar rigorous after-action review process after
    each event, in terms of a real operation.
        Day-to-day, we sustain continuous situational awareness and
    readiness to defend the United States against a range of
    threats in all domains. Our operations center is up and running
    24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. It is manned by
    a team of qualified and competent professionals interfaced with
    other agencies within Government, and, particularly, I would
    add, with the National Guard. We are networked with our
    subordinate commands and stand ready to respond immediately in
    time of crisis.
        NORTHCOM has four subordinate headquarters, that I believe
    you are aware. Briefly, Joint Forces National Capital Region,
    located here, at Fort McNair, is responsible for land-based
    homeland defense, civil support, and incident management within
    the NCR. Joint Task Force Civil Support is located in Fort
    Monroe, Virginia, and command and control's DOD forces that
    respond to catastrophic chemical, biological, radiological,
    nuclear, and high-yield explosive events. Joint Task Force
    Alaska, located at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska, is under
    PACOM for normal operations. If Alaska-based forces are needed
    for homeland defense or civil support operations, NORTHCOM will
    command and control the forces through Joint Task Force Alaska.
    Joint Task Force North, located at Fort Bliss, Texas, supports
    law enforcement agencies in counterdrug, counterterrorism, and
    border patrol operations along the northern and southwest U.S.
    borders.
        In addition, the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have
    established dedicated service components for NORTHCOM. These
    commands are 5th United States Army, located at Fort Sam
    Houston, Texas; 1st Air Force, Air Force North, located at
    Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida; Marine Forces North, located
    in New Orleans, Louisiana; and the Commanders of Fleet Forces
    Command located in Norfolk, Virginia, is designated as the
    Navy's supporting command to NORTHCOM.
        In the area of civil support, DOD has a long history of
    supporting civil authorities, providing specialized skills and
    assets that can rapidly stabilize and improve situations in the
    wake of catastrophic events. All DOD support is provided at the
    direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense and in
    accordance with the National Response Plan and applicable laws.
        In the past year, we have supported the President's State
    of the Union Address, the United Nations 60th General Assembly,
    National Interagency Fire Center, combating wildfires in
    Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, and many other States in the
    western United States. We have supported Customs and Border
    Protection--just to name a few.
        In 2005, we supported the DHS in four hurricanes, including
    the unprecedented response to Hurricane Katrina. We continue to
    support law enforcement in combating illegal drugs and other
    transnational threats. Federal laws and policies allow us to
    assist law enforcement agencies in conducting their mission and
    securing our borders. All DOD involvement in border security
    operations is solely in support of civilian law enforcement
    agencies.
        We actively coordinate with other agencies, including the
    DHS and the National Guard, to develop stronger working
    relationships with State, regional, local, and international
    partners. We will never operate alone. We know this. In
    everything we do--planning, exercising, conducting realworld
    operations--we continue to improve our ability to support civil
    authorities in responding to disasters, while never losing
    focus of our primary mission, which is defending our Homeland.
    Our enemies should make no mistake about our resolve or our
    capabilities.
        We thank the members of this committee for their steadfast
    support to our men and women in uniform, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Inge follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by LTG Joseph R. Inge, USA

        Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, and members of the subcommittee:
    Thank you for this opportunity to discuss homeland defense and civil
    support operations.
        U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is responsible for homeland
    defense, sustaining continuous situational awareness and readiness to
    protect the United States against a range of symmetric and asymmetric
    threats in all domains. Day-to-day, we are focused on deterring,
    preventing and defeating attacks against our Homeland. We also stand
    ready to assist primary agencies in responding quickly to manmade and
    natural disasters, when directed by the President or Secretary of
    Defense. To better serve Americans in their time of need, we are
    actively coordinating with other Federal agencies and developing
    stronger working relationships with State and local partners.
        NORTHCOM conducts maritime operations to deter terrorist operations
    and prevent attacks against the United States and its allies. During
    the past year, we analyzed and disseminated to government leaders
    information on the global maritime environment to facilitate
    situational awareness and decision making. NORTHCOM pursued and
    effectively garnered national and international support and
    strengthened partnerships to deter and disrupt terrorist activity. We
    also monitored threats of interest in the global maritime environment.
        For land domain operations, NORTHCOM postures and positions forces
    to deter and prevent attacks. Quick and rapid response forces and
    consequence management forces are maintained at appropriate alert
    levels to meet potential threats. During the 2004 national election
    period, we provided assistance for border security, conducted airport
    vulnerability assessments, and deployed forces trained for radiological
    detection at the request of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    and the direction of the Department of Defense (DOD).
        our Homeland is protected from air threats primarily by the North
    American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORTHCOM and NORAD work
    closely together in defending our Nation's airspace. Across the United
    States and Canada, armed fighters are on alert and flying irregular air
    patrols to identify and intercept suspect aircraft. Since September 11,
    2001, as part of Operation Noble Eagle, NORAD has flown more than
    42,000 accident-free sorties and scrambled or diverted fighters more
    than 2,000 times in response to potential asymmetric threats. In
    addition, NORAD remains postured to defend against strategic airborne
    threats to the United States and Canada. NORTHCOM is responsible for
    air operations within our area of responsibility such as evacuation and
    movement of people and high-value cargo via military airlift. In
    addition, NORTHCOM has the capability to use NORAD air defense alert
    aircraft to conduct unilateral operations as required and directed.
        The DOD has a long history of supporting civil authorities with
    specialized skills and assets that can rapidly stabilize and improve
    the situation in the wake of catastrophic events. All requested DOD
    support is provided at the direction of the President or Secretary of
    Defense and in accordance with the National Response Plan and
    applicable laws, including the Stafford Act and the Economy Act.
        NORTHCOM provides defense support of civil authorities primarily
    through our subordinate commands Joint Task Force Civil Support at Fort
    Monroe, Virginia; Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region at
    Fort McNair, Washington DC; Joint Task Force Alaska at Elmendorf Air
    Force Base, Alaska and Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) at Fort Bliss,
    Texas. In addition, the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps have
    established dedicated Service Components for NORTHCOM. These commands
    include: Army North located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Air Force North
    located at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, and Marine Forces North
    located in New Orleans, Louisiana. The Commander Fleet Forces Command,
    located at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, is designated as the Navy's
    Supporting Commander to NORTHCOM.
        The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigns the Secretary of Homeland
    Security the responsibility for security of our Nation's borders.
    NORTHCOM's role in the border security mission is to provide support to
    civil authorities, principally the DHS. We provide such support under
    chapter 18 of title 10. When Customs and Border Protection requests the
    military's support, the Office of the Secretary of Defense evaluates
    their request, and as directed, NORTHCOM provides the necessary
    support. NORTHCOM's involvement in border security operations is always
    in support of civilian law enforcement agencies. Coordinated by JTF-N,
    our force providers continue to support law enforcement agencies in the
    war against illegal drugs and other transnational threats through the
    application of emerging DOD-unique technologies. This includes
    intelligence and operational support missions. Intelligence support
    includes employing military intelligence analysts to develop
    operational intelligence products that we can share with our
    interagency partners for their use in early cuing, warning, and
    interdiction operations. Operational support includes detection
    missions using a variety of sensors that are unique to the DOD in order
    to improve a supported law enforcement agency's ability to detect,
    monitor and interdict transnational threats. Construction of roads,
    bridges and fences, as well as installing area lighting to improve the
    ability of law enforcement officers to move, identify and respond to
    threats crossing the border are also a part of this mission category.
        In addition to assisting the law enforcement agencies that request
    such support, JTF-North's intelligence and operational support missions
    provide military training opportunities for the title 10 and National
    Guard Forces that conduct them. JTF-North recruits units to volunteer
    for these missions by soliciting forces from all Services, both Active
    and Reserve components. Through JTF-N, NORTHCOM employed unmanned
    aerial systems along the southwest border in support of U.S. Customs
    and Border Protection. While obtaining unmanned aerial system training,
    these flights greatly assisted in the detection and apprehension of
    those engaged in illegal drug trafficking in New Mexico and Arizona.
        During 2005, NORTHCOM supported DHS in responding to four
    hurricanes. For Hurricane Katrina, we established Joint Task Force
    Katrina to oversee title 10 operations for the most complex civil
    support mission in the history of the U.S. military. DOD provided
    Defense Coordinating Officers and Elements, DOD bases for mobilization
    centers, airlift, ground transportation assets, aerial damage
    assessment, satellite communications, airborne and waterborne search
    and rescue, subsistence, water purification, mosquito abatement and
    medical support. We are actively involved in efforts to compile lessons
    learned and incorporate them into future operations. One very important
    lesson we learned pertains to unity of effort and unity of command.
    NORTHCOM was in charge of 22,500 Active-Duty Forces. Additionally,
    there were 50,000 National Guardsmen in state status (title 32 and
    state Active-Duty). Commanding and directing 22,500 Active-Duty Forces
    and coordinating with the National Guard the efforts of over 50,000
    state status National Guard troops presented challenges. We embrace the
    fact that the National Guard will play a pivotal role in disasters.
    However, the Nation should have the capability to effect unity of
    effort among Active-Duty Forces and state status National Guard Forces
    when assembling and directing a large-scale, multi-state and
    international response to a catastrophic event. We are prepared to
    respond as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.
        Another lesson learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina
    relates to communications. We need immediate, reliable communications
    that are survivable, flexible and interoperable with our civilian
    partners. These communications must be mobile, secure and both voice
    and data capable.
        As we act to support civil authorities in responding to natural
    disasters, we never lose focus on our primary mission of homeland
    defense. We thank the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee
    for their unwavering support of NORAD and NORTHCOM. We are grateful for
    all that you have done to ensure our men and women in uniform have the
    tools they need to keep our Nation and the American people safe and
    free. Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.

        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, General Inge.
        General Blum, we would be glad to hear from you.

      STATEMENT OF LTG H. STEVEN BLUM, USA, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD
                                 BUREAU

        General Blum. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, and distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, thanks for the opportunity to appear here
    today and talk about your National Guard and its role in
    homeland defense in support of homeland security, as well as
    the great job we do overseas when we're called into Federal
    service.
        The Army and the Air National Guard this past year have had
    a very historic year. We had more people overseas than at any
    other time since World War II. We made up over 50 percent of
    the Army's combat formations in Iraq. We're training the Afghan
    national army, keeping the peace in the Sinai, maintaining the
    peace in the Balkans, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and sending citizen
    airmen and soldiers to 40 other nations in the global war on
    terrorism. At the same time, we had our busiest year ever in
    terms of military response to natural disasters.
        Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma were not the only
    things the National Guard did last year. We were called out for
    several hundred local- and State-level emergencies brought on
    by either industrial accidents, civil unrest, critical
    infrastructure protection, or the effects--the weather patterns
    that affected the States of our great Nation.
        We are leveraging existing combat capabilities and
    technologies that we use to fight the war. We are a full-
    spectrum force, and we apply those same skill sets, experience,
    knowledge, and technologies here at home when we're called out
    either by the Governors or the President to execute our duties.
        Your National Guard has 10 essential core elements that we
    feel are necessary to be able to do homeland defense or
    homeland readiness indicators, as we call them. They fall into
    the categories of aviation, engineering, civil support teams,
    security forces, medical, transportation, maintenance,
    logistics, and, of course, what we used to call command and
    control (C2), or we do call command and control everywhere else
    in the world, but here at home, I think C2 takes a different
    definition. It's not really C2 we're talking about. We're
    talking about communications and coordination. So, we have a
    Joint Force Headquarters in every single State and Territory
    that is superbly able to do that, not only with military forces
    of all the Services, but with the interagency and the
    intergovernmental response that was required for the State or
    the region or the Nation.
        Last, and not least--in fact, almost most important--are
    communications. We are leveraging all of these capabilities,
    and have established certain protocols, organizations, and
    capabilities as gap fillers. They are not to take the place of
    existing title 10 organizations, they are to fill the gap, the
    capabilities gap, that exists in the early hours of an incident
    while we are discovering what we are facing and when the
    American people expect their first military responders to
    probably be their local National Guard units.
        So, what we have done is, we've set up a Joint Force
    Headquarters in every State and Territory. We've set up a Joint
    Operations Center that has 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week, 365-day
    operational coverage, so that we can basically provide a shared
    awareness with all of those interagency, intergovernmental
    partners, and military partners, on the Active-Duty side,
    such--particularly noteworthy is NORTHCOM--so that we have a
    shared awareness of what's going on and a better idea of how
    we're going to work together to solve the problem.
        We have, of course, the Civil Support Teams that Congress
    has authorized. They are moving out, and have proven their
    worth. We sent--I think it was 17, total, responded to
    Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. What they brought, that
    communications van that is embedded in that Civil Support Team,
    proved to be invaluable, because it was one of the few systems
    that would connect the DOD communications technology with the
    civilian first-response community's technologies and
    communications capabilities.
        In addition, we have stood up what we call CERFPs, which
    are Chem-Bio Response Force Packages. We have 12 of those. Now,
    with Congress's assistance and direction, we will stand five
    more up, so we'll have a total of 17. They are arrayed all over
    the United States, so that no region of the United States is
    left uncovered.
        We have something called a Joint Continental United States
    Communications Support Environment, which is a lot of words
    that actually mean we take all of the existing technologies in
    the Air Force and the Army that are resident in the National
    Guard, and we optimize them so that they can be most useful in
    feeding situational awareness in a common relative operating
    picture to NORTHCOM and PACOM in Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam, and
    that we're able to pass information in a secure method or a
    nonsecure method, to include video teleconferencing (VTC), so
    that everybody really knows what actually is occurring and what
    needs to be done in any catastrophe.
        I think what I'll do, in the interest of time, is shorten
    my statement and give you more time for questions, and close in
    saying that the successful integration of the interagency and
    intergovernmental, and the civilian and the military
    organizations, are absolutely essential in any disaster that
    ever befalls this Nation. The National Guard has a 368-year
    history of being able to do that quite well. We have a great
    deal of pride in how well we respond, but we recognize we could
    do better.
        Senator Reed is exactly right, no military organization is
    ever satisfied with its performance. There are several areas we
    could improve. They are listed in my report. But mostly they
    revolve around resourcing, equipment, training and exercising,
    and planning so that we can be better prepared next time than
    we even were the last time.
        Thank you very much for the opportunity. I await your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Blum follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by LTG H. Steven Blum, USA

        Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the
    National Guard's role in homeland defense. In addition to the overseas
    fight, you can rest assured, the National Guard stands ready to protect
    the Homeland and provide military assets to assist civilian authorities
    at the request of the Governors or the President, through a rapid,
    integrated response across the Nation. Geographical distribution,
    community integration, and other traditional strengths make the
    National Guard an effective and cost efficient force for many homeland
    defense (HLD) and civil support requirements at both the State and
    Federal levels. In preparing for these missions, the National Guard has
    examined the emerging threats and searched for capability gaps we must
    overcome to be successful. I want to stress meeting these needs does
    not demand a dedicated HLD force structure, rather, they can be
    addressed through enhanced capabilities for existing warfighting force
    structure.
        The National Guard is a balanced force which operates across the
    full spectrum of military engagement from close order combat to
    military support to civil authorities. Training and preparation for the
    overseas warfighting mission provides National Guard Forces with the
    vast majority of the preparation required for HLD and civil support.
    These requirements do not focus solely on material solutions; they also
    identify needed cultural changes--specifically regarding coordination
    and unity of effort across multiple agencies and intergovernmental
    seams. The emphasis of our homeland defense mission is on prevention,
    pre-event deterrence, and responding within hours after a major
    incident.
        As I'll discuss in a moment, the National Guard's response to
    homeland defense since September 11, and more recently during Hurricane
    Katrina has been tremendous. Still, there is room for improvement.
    Capability and synchronization gaps between local first responders and
    follow-on State and Federal forces exist and must be addressed to
    ensure a fully secure America. In June 2005, the Department of Defense
    (DOD) published the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
    followed shortly in August by Joint Publication 3-26 Homeland Security.
    This document emphasizes the need to ``Lead, Support, and Enable'' by
    executing missions to prevent and repel attacks; working with civil
    authorities as part of a national response to attack or disaster; and
    sharing expertise with domestic as well as our international partners.
    This broad homeland security direction on Homeland Defense and Civil
    Support (HLD/CS) focuses reliance upon National Guard capabilities
    within an active, layered defense strategy for the United States.
        HLD is mission one for the National Guard. Governors count on the
    National Guard to be the first military responder and call on Guard
    assets at their disposal within the first hours of an event, which
    makes resourcing critical. The National Guard must be able to support
    the Governors' requirements on an immediate basis, and respond with the
    right capabilities, to the right location, at the right time. The
    States have indicated to the National Guard Bureau that there are
    certain capabilities they feel they need to meet emergencies. At the
    National Guard Bureau we express these in the following list of 10
    essential capabilities each State, Territory, and the District of
    Columbia must maintain at all times: (1) Aviation, (2) Engineering, (3)
    Civil Support Teams, (4) Security, (5) Medical, (6) Transportation, (7)
    Maintenance, (8) Logistics, (9) Joint Force Headquarters, and (10)
    Communications.
        We are seeking to further leverage the capacity currently existing
    in these 10 essential capabilities to address identified gaps through
    the development of the following initiatives and concepts.

              (1) Joint Force Headquarters-State (JFHQ-State). JFHQ-State
            is a joint command and control entity in each State and
            Territory. It is integrated into national consequence
            management and contingency planning structures. JFHQs provide
            situational updates (common operating picture) information to
            national level headquarters before and during any contingency
            operation and Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward Movements,
            and Integration for all inbound military forces. Federal law
            provides a mechanism whereby a National Guard officer can
            command Federal troops. Such a commander at the head of a Joint
            Task Force-State (JTF-State) can assume tactical control of all
            military units--State National Guard, other National Guard
            Forces, Active component and Reserves. JTF-State commander can
            be a dual-hatted commander of both title 32 and title 10 forces
            as demonstrated in the 2004 G8 Summit, Democratic and
            Republican National Conventions.
              (2) Joint Force Headquarters Joint Operations Centers (JFHQ
            JOC). The JOC is a network composed of the National Guard
            Bureau JOC and a JOC in the 54 States and Territories. JFHQ JOC
            serves as the primary entity for coordinating, facilitating,
            and synchronizing efforts in support of their states,
            information requirements of National Guard Bureau and customers
            at the Federal level during natural disasters, National Special
            Security Events (NSSE), exercises and domestic activities. Each
            JFHQ JOC has redundant connectivity: DOD architecture of NIPR
            and SPIR; a High Frequency (HF) network with classified and
            unclassified voice and data information; and commercial
            systems.
              (3) National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological/
            Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response
            Force Package (NG CERFP). The National Guard developed and
            fielded 12 NG CERFP teams to provide a regional capability to
            respond to incidents involving chemical, biological,
            radiological or high explosive threats. Each team is designed
            to rapidly (less than 96 hours) provide the capability to
            locate and extract victims from a CBRNE incident site and
            perform mass patient/casualty decontamination and medical
            triage and stabilization. The CERFP augments the capabilities
            of the Civil Support Teams (CST). The incremental training and
            equipment for this capability is specialized, compatible with
            the first responders, and interoperable with the incident
            command system. Congress provided direction and, for fiscal
            year 2006, funding to establish an additional 5 teams bringing
            the total to 17.
              (4) Critical Infrastructure Program-Mission Assurance
            Assessments (CIP-MAA). National Guard CIP-MAA teams--formerly
            referred to as Full-Spectrum Vulnerability Assessment teams--
            execute the pre-planning needed to educate the civilian
            agencies on basic force protection and emergency response.
            Additionally, these teams are building relationships with first
            responders, owners of critical infrastructure and National
            Guard planners in the States and Territories. CIP-MAA teams
            deploy traditional National Guard Forces in a timely fashion to
            assist in protection of the Nation's critical infrastructure,
            including vital elements of the Defense Industrial Base.
            Currently, 6 ``pilot'' teams staffed by 14 specially trained
            National Guard personnel conduct vulnerability assessments.
              (5) National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF). Being based in so
            many communities, the National Guard has proven time and again
            that it can muster forces and be on the scene of an incident
            within hours. Each of the 54 States and Territories is
            currently training a battalion size reaction force that can
            respond anywhere in the state with an initial 75 to 125 person
            element within a minimum of 4 to 8 hours. So, generally, we can
            get a company of troops on the ground within hours and a
            battalion in place overnight. These reaction forces provided
            crucial support to law enforcement in the response to Hurricane
            Katrina. The NGRF is task-organized from existing units and can
            provide Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), site
            security, and security and support during CBRNE contingency
            operations.
              (6) Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment (JCCSE).
            The National Guard has successfully established a JCCSE
            nationwide. Each JFHQ established Homeland Security Information
            Network (HSIN) linkages. The HSIN is an unsecured collection of
            Department of Homeland Security systems designed to facilitate
            information sharing and collaboration. Additionally, each Joint
            Force Joint Operation Center (JF JOC) has secure/non-secure
            real-time operational network linkages in addition to secure
            video teleconference capabilities. This is critical to
            providing real time operational connectivity as well as a
            common operating picture to local, State, and Federal agencies.
              (7) Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-
            CSTs). Include 22 Army and Air National Guard-Active Guard
            Reserve (AGR) personnel organized, trained, and equipped to
            enter contaminated areas and identify contaminants within a
            short period of time. They have extensive reach-back
            communications capability to facilitate off-site evaluation and
            support from various laboratories. They are equipped with
            mobile laboratories capable of providing identification of
            chemical or biological materials. To date, the National Guard
            has fielded 36 CSTs and will have 55 teams by fiscal year 2007.
              (8) Aviation Security and Support (S&S) Battalions. As part
            of the Army's overall aviation transformation, the Army
            National Guard has been able to convert and grow some valuable
            dual-purpose aviation structure that will be readily available
            and responsive to homeland security/defense needs, in addition
            to their normal Army operational mission. The ARNG officially
            activated 6of these 24-aircraft S&S Battalions on October 1,
            2005, and placed them in readily responsive locations across 44
            States.

        We are, once again, on point to test many of these measures as we
    are fast approaching another hurricane season. In this post-Katrina era
    we find that the best preparation for the next potential disaster is
    history.
        With that said, I am particularly proud of the timeliness and
    magnitude of the National Guard's efforts in advance of Hurricane
    Katrina and our response in its immediate aftermath. National Guard
    Forces were in the water and on the streets of New Orleans rescuing
    people within 4 hours of Katrina's passing. Over 50,000 National Guard
    personnel hailing from every State and Territory responded to calls for
    support of the affected region.
        This response was phenomenal; however, it is the ``lessons
    learned'' from Katrina that require--in fact, demand--our immediate
    attention. Through conversations with troops on the ground, commanders,
    Senate and House hearings, and most recently the White House's February
    report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,
    released by Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland
    Security and Counterterrorism, the National Guard has three major issue
    areas that need to be addressed--resourcing, interoperability, command
    and control of all military forces, and training.

                                   resourcing

        Even prior to September 11, the National Guard did not have all of
    the equipment it is required to have. The pace of combat has placed
    even further challenges on us. In order to ensure that deploying units
    are fully equipped and ready to support operations anywhere in the
    world, we have transferred over 101,000 items of equipment in support
    of these missions. This situation has presented the National Guard with
    challenges in keeping our inventories here at home fully supplied with
    critical items such as trucks, radios, and heavy engineering equipment.
    With the help of Congress and the President, we have made an excellent
    start in filling these equipment gaps, and the President's budget will
    allow the National Guard to continue on the road to recovery. Over the
    fiscal years 2006-2011 timeframe, the administration plans to invest
    $19.2 billion and $4.4 billion in the Army and Air National Guard,
    respectively, demonstrating an unwavering commitment to providing the
    resources necessary to protect our Homeland.
        We are also addressing this through force structure rebalancing and
    the use the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) as an
    essential force multiplier. This agreement among the States enhances a
    Governor's response capabilities by providing access to regional forces
    and equipment. Without question, EMAC enabled the National Guard to
    overcome many of the equipment/resource obstacles faced during
    Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The National Guard Bureau Joint Operations
    Center (NGB JOC) served as the coordination point for the various EMAC
    requests before sending the requests out to the states and territories.
    We provided needed advice and assistance to Governors in identifying,
    selecting, requesting and deploying Guard forces needed in the affected
    states.
        Maintaining essential capabilities across the National Guard, amid
    ongoing overseas operations, Active component/Reserve component
    rebalance, modularity conversions, and National Strategy adjustments is
    an evolving task. Nevertheless, the National Guard Bureau attempts to
    synchronize all of these activities to ensure at least 50 percent of a
    given State's National Guard is always available for State missions,
    and HLD operations.

                                interoperability

        The recently released White House report, The Federal Response to
    Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned spoke to the need for
    interoperability. It said, ``lack of interoperable communications was
    apparent at the tactical level, resulting from the fact that emergency
    responders, National Guard, and Active-Duty military use different
    equipment.'' As for the National Guard Forces, the first 48 hours after
    the hurricane made landfall saw the Guard literally using boats and
    helicopters to communicate. Our specialized command, control,
    cummunications, and computers packages, though limited in number, were
    able to bridge the frequency gap between military and civilian
    personnel in many locations. An in-depth look at interoperability is
    ongoing and there is a ``sense of urgency'' inside the Army and the DOD
    about meeting the National Guard's equipment needs.

                              command and control

        The infusion of the Active-Duty Forces into the Hurricane Katrina
    response effort presented some challenges at the operational level.
    There were some gaps in communication, coordination and integration
    into ongoing National Guard and emergency response operations already
    underway by the affected States. The situation was occasionally
    exacerbated by incompatible communication systems, lack of familiarity
    with the local area, and lack of involvement in the pre-hurricane
    planning.
        The efficacy of the creation of the Joint Forces Headquarters-State
    was proven in the National Guard portion of the response as both of the
    affected states were able to integrate forces from 53 other States and
    Territories and the District of Columbia. Further, the Joint Forces
    Headquarters-State could have provided reception, staging, and onward
    integration for the Federal forces deployed by NORTHCOM to support the
    civil authorities in the affected States.
        In addition to the benefits of JFHQ-State I've already discussed, a
    Joint Task Force-State (JTF-State) can, with State-Federal concurrence,
    assume tactical control of all military units ordered to respond to a
    contingency operation or disaster. This includes all State National
    Guard, other National Guard Forces, Active component as well as
    Reserves. The JTF-State commander can be a dual-hatted commander of
    both title 32 and title 10 forces giving unity of command within the
    military forces. The JTF-State can act as a subordinate C\2\
    headquarters for NORTHCOM if required. The effectiveness of dual-hatted
    command was proven in 2004 at the G8 Summit, Operation Winter Freeze as
    well as the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. These were
    landmark achievements. For the first time in our Nation's history, the
    military attained unity of command for all forces operating in support
    of a major event. In each case, from one Joint Force Headquarters, a
    single National Guard officer commanded Guard units from multiple
    states operating under title 32 authority, as well as Active component
    Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps title 10 forces in a joint,
    intergovernmental, interagency environment.

                                    training

        I'd like to transition into training and the National Guard's
    determination to take advantage of opportunities to share training and
    planning expertise with civilian partners and the importance that these
    efforts be institutionalized. The above-mentioned White House report
    recommended that each Federal agency a homeland security professional
    development program. We are pleased to say that we are already heading
    in that direction. The National Guard's Joint Interagency Training
    Center in West Virginia, serves as a model that demonstrates how joint
    training capacity can be expanded and how the military and civilian
    communities can train and work together. We are working with the Joint
    Forces Command to institutionalize this Center within the Departments
    process for joint education and training. This will allow us to
    increase the overall effectiveness of the national effort through
    standardized operational concepts, shared experiences, and enhanced
    interoperability.
        These four areas of concern--resourcing for personnel and
    equipment, interoperability, command and control of all military
    forces, and training--must be addressed as they are crucial to ensuring
    an effective response for HLD and civil support. Identifying and
    correcting these concerns will only improve the National Guard's
    already high state of readiness in supporting HLD as training received
    to support our other mission, overseas warfight, provides the vast
    majority of preparation required for HLD.
        The successful integration of civilian and military cultures and
    capabilities has long been one of the strengths of the National Guard.
    Our members live in both worlds. Our forces operate in both worlds. We
    are proud to be able to bring these communities, cultures and
    capabilities together and render to our fellow citizens essential help
    when it is needed most.

        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, General Blum. We
    appreciate your testimony.
        All of your written statements will be made part of the
    record, without objection, in addition to the summaries that
    you've given us orally.
        We'll proceed with a round of questions now. We're glad to
    have Senator Thune join us, and I understand Senator Levin may
    well join us. Of course, we're being televised. We don't know
    who else is watching, but there's a lot of interest in what you
    have to say, and let me start off with some questions.
        First of all, I appreciate each of your efforts to help us
    understand, a little bit better, about how all of our national
    assets, whether they be designated civilian and under the
    purview of the DHS, or military and under the purview of the
    DOD, can be used to protect the American people.
        Just a little bit of a background for you. I think I've
    mentioned this to Secretary McHale. I also happen to serve as
    the subcommittee chairman on the Immigration and Border
    Security Subcommittee in the Judiciary Committee. Of course,
    there's a lot of concern in America today about our border
    security and just how we ought to deal with that. A lot of
    people have a lot of different ideas. You've heard, like I
    have, people have said, ``Well, there ought to be a role for
    our military in border security.'' I appreciate the legal and
    the policy reasons why our civilian agencies take the primary
    law enforcement role, Posse Comitatus, for example, and
    obviously the other obligations our men and women in uniform
    have elsewhere around the world.
        I guess it's really a tremendous compliment to our military
    and to our civilian leadership that people hold you up as the
    gold standard when it comes to professionalism and competence.
    When they see that gold standard compared to other agencies of
    the Federal Government, they usually find those other agencies
    tend to pale somewhat in comparison. So, I guess it's a
    backhanded compliment, but we need to also understand better
    how those roles interact.
        If I can just mention an example: certainly, as Secretary
    McHale mentioned, in the DOD authorization of 2004 it indicated
    and directed a role of the joint task forces in counterdrug
    missions, but it also included counterterrorism missions.
    Obviously one concern we have about our border is its--how it
    can be exploited to--by terrorists who want to exploit the
    porosity of our borders.
        Another example I will mention to you, recently I was down
    at the Corpus Christi Naval Air Station and looked at the
    operation of the Customs and Border Patrol Air and Marine
    Division down there, that operates the P-3s, the aircraft with
    the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) type setup on
    the top, that's designed to protect both our airspace and the
    sea lanes from drug traffickers. Unfortunately, all of the P-3s
    in Corpus Christi are now grounded, because they're 40-year-old
    aircraft and they have serious maintenance problems, leaving
    us, I think, in a very bad way.
        So, as I'm trying to prepare the context for you, I want to
    make sure that we're in a position to reassure the American
    people that we are using all of the assets, both in personnel
    and technology, and of every category, to keep them safe and to
    make sure that those are working in a smooth, hopefully as
    seamless a way as possible.
        Perhaps it would be good to start with you, Secretary
    McHale. Could you explain, in a summary fashion, how you
    believe that the DOD, including NORTHCOM, are operating today,
    in terms of its cooperation and communication with the DHS when
    it comes to border security?
        Mr. McHale. Yes, sir, I can.
        The domestic responsibilities of the DOD essentially fall
    into two categories. As I indicated in my opening statement, we
    have the warfighting responsibility to use military power to
    defend the United States against a foreign threat, whether that
    threat would be a nation-state or a transnational terrorist
    group. Our primary emphasis has been on the need to identify,
    interdict, and defeat any such attack upon the United States
    that would involve a WMD.
        If you look at the NORTHCOM mission statement, the first
    half the mission statement addresses that warfighting
    responsibility. Where we're not in support, we have the lead
    for the warfighting defense of the United States.
        If you look at the second half of the NORTHCOM mission
    statement, it deals with civil support missions, including
    missions of the type that you describe. Now, the most recent
    and prominent, obviously, is the military response to Hurricane
    Katrina. We were not in the lead. DHS was in the lead. FEMA was
    the operating entity of DHS. The activities that we executed
    with 72,000 men and women forward deployed were all in support
    of FEMA, while FEMA and DHS retained the lead.
        As I indicated, we average probably 90 to 100 civil support
    missions each year. Last year, because of Katrina, we went well
    beyond that. Among the civil support missions are the border
    support missions to assist civilian law enforcement in
    maintaining our border security. Again, we don't take the lead.
    Border security is a law enforcement mission. But, under a
    variety of authorities, including the statutory authority,
    Senator, that you referenced, we can, and we do, assist the
    Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) in their paramount law
    enforcement role to secure the border.
        So, for instance, we do provide technical assistance, we
    provide robust surveillance capabilities in counternarcotics
    missions, and, in what is a new statutory mission, we are
    permitted to provide counterterrorism, as well as
    counternarcotics, support to CBP and other civilian law
    enforcement agencies--not to take their place, but to better
    enable those civilian law enforcement authorities to secure the
    border, both in the context of counternarcotics and, more
    recently, in the context of counterterrorism.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
        General Inge, NORTHCOM, of course, is the command that has
    responsibility for homeland defense. Could you tell us how many
    dedicated forces that NORTHCOM has to its support mission for
    the DHS?
        General Inge. Thank you, Senator.
        First of all, with regard to the DHS, we work very closely
    with them, and we've had very close ties, very good engagement.
    On a day-to-day basis, if there is not a mission assigned, we
    have JTF North, which is planning headquarters, that would
    coordinate efforts with the CBP, for example. When a mission is
    requested, forces are then allocated to JTF North to accomplish
    that mission. So, it depends on the day, and it depends on the
    mission, and it depends on the support request, is the short
    answer to your question.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you. So, do I understand----
        General Inge. There are no standing forces that are
    dedicated specifically to doing border support unless there is
    a mission request.
        Senator Cornyn. All right.
        As far as leveraging and sharing of technology, Secretary
    McHale, the National Response Plan and the Department of
    Defense Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states
    that the DOD, as you mentioned, will facilitate and nurture
    collaborate research, and ensure, as applicable, for the smooth
    transition of appropriate technologies and capabilities to the
    civilian sector. What DOD technologies and capabilities are
    currently being leveraged by, or shared with, the DHS? If you
    could provide us, if possible, the specific examples where the
    sharing of technology or the transfer of technology or resident
    DOD capability assist the DHS in their homeland security and
    border defense mission, I would appreciate it.
        Mr. McHale. Senator, if I may answer it a little bit more
    broadly than perhaps the way you phrased it in the question,
    I'll give you an example of some of the technologies which are
    applicable to border security, but not exclusively to border
    security.
        We have a statutory duty, under the National Defense
    Authorization Act of 2003, section 1401, to transfer dual-use
    technologies from DOD to our civilian interagency partners,
    most especially DHS. As some specific examples, there are areas
    where we have developed technology to support us in overseas
    warfighting, where that technology may have a domestic
    application, depending upon the nature of the threat. As an
    example, we've had the responsibility now for many decades to
    be prepared to execute our military mission overseas in a WMD-
    contaminated environment. So we have protective equipment, we
    have WMD CBRNE sensor capabilities that have allowed us to
    prepare for war in an overseas fight where the environment has
    been contaminated by WMD. Unfortunately, but the reality is,
    much of that technology could potentially have a domestic use
    if we were to be attacked by terrorists utilizing WMD. So, we
    share that information and technology with the DHS, so not only
    the DOD, but first-responders and others, will have access to
    personal protective equipment, sensor capabilities, and other
    WMD-related technology to better enable the civilian mission.
        A specific example of technology sharing was cited by
    General Blum a couple of minutes ago, and that is, one of the
    major challenges we have is that when first-responders,
    emergency management personnel, including Federal Emergency
    Management personnel, the National Guard, and Active-Duty
    military forces, show up in the same area of responsibility, we
    all bring different communications equipment. A police officer
    from a city does not carry the same radio as an officer in the
    United States military, even differentiating between the
    National Guard and Active-Duty. We have to knit those
    capabilities together.
        General Blum made reference to the Customer Service Team
    (CST) vans provided to the National Guard by the DOD, where
    there's a patch capability. You can take a police officer's
    radio, put it through a central switchboard that we have
    designed, and it will be seamlessly connected to a title 10
    radio that is very different in infrastructure, on a completely
    different frequency, a wholly different design, yet these two
    pieces of equipment, when patched through that central
    switchboard contained within that CST van, will allow for
    interoperability of communications.
        In addition, in certain other areas, ground surveillance
    capabilities, sensors that have been deployed along the border,
    aerial observation platforms, Predators that we have made
    available to DHS for border security, tunnel detection
    capabilities, there are numerous areas that are leveraged by
    technology where we have developed that technology for one
    purpose, but make it available to DHS for domestic employment.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
        I'm going to turn it over to Senator Reed. But let me just
    note, and ask for confirmation by General Inge, with regard to
    interoperable communications--I note, General Inge, that
    NORTHCOM has provided a list of unfunded requirements that have
    not been addressed in the budget submitted by the DOD. The top
    two items include the need for, number one, interoperable
    communications, for $10 million, and, number two, $5.6 million
    for Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative. It's a
    straightforward question, but obviously you don't have what you
    need now in order to undertake those interoperable
    communications, I take it.
        General Inge. Hurricane Katrina taught us that
    establishing, immediately after a disaster, interoperable
    communications that would be commercial-backbone-like, is
    critical to the success in an immediate response to the Nation,
    and that capability is not in place today.
        Senator Cornyn. I hope this subcommittee, and this
    committee, can help you get what you need in order to get that
    done. It seems like a no-brainer.
        General Inge. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, let me join the chairman in recognizing General
    Rodriguez, the technical assessment group (TAG) of the Texas
    National Guard. General Blum and all the TAGs have done an
    extraordinary job, in terms of not only responding to domestic
    crises, but deploying overseas in support of our operations.
    I'm very proud of my Rhode Island National Guard. So, I thank
    you, General Rodriguez, for your service.
        Mr. Secretary and General Inge, during Hurricane Katrina
    there were essentially two military chains of command. There
    was a National Guard chain of command and there was a title 10
    chain of command under General Honore. At any time, did the
    White House ask for your advice about unity of command, a
    different command structure, during the pendency of the crisis?
        Mr. McHale. Senator, when you phrase the question, ``the
    White House,'' that's pretty broad. I think I can answer your
    question directly by saying that I did provide recommendations
    to the Secretary of Defense, recommendations that he then
    considered to inform him in any recommendations that he might
    make to the President of the United States. I did have
    discussions on that point with Secretary Rumsfeld.
        Senator Reed. Was your recommendation, Mr. Secretary, a
    unified command for all forces, or----
        Let me step away from the history. Going forward, what we
    know now, how will we approach the command structure, when you
    essentially had two chains of command, which, I would assume,
    violates the fundamental principle of unity of command?
        Mr. McHale. It does violate the fundamental principle of
    unity of command, it does reflect the Constitution of the
    United States. We have a conflict between what you and I would
    want to achieve in terms of unity of command for operational
    purposes and the system of government, thank God, that we live
    under, which is Federal in character, but assigns to the
    President of the United States Federal C\2\ responsibilities,
    and preserves, for the Governor, within the Governor's sphere
    of responsibility, C\2\ over what historically was called the
    State militia, today known as the National Guard. So, the
    division in the command structure is a direct reflection of our
    Federal system of government. Although there is the ability, by
    statute, to achieve unity of command over both Active-Duty and
    National Guard Forces, the invocation of the Insurrection Act
    and the federalization of the National Guard are two steps
    that, historically speaking, are seen as sobering decisions,
    and not readily undertaken, unless there is clear reason to do
    so.
        So, with that as context, the Constitution sets up two
    chains of command, so either we achieve, through very detailed
    advanced planning, close coordination between the National
    Guard and title 10 forces, recognizing that we don't have unity
    of command, but that we can achieve unity of effort through
    that close coordination in advance, not during, a crisis, or,
    in the alternative, failing that kind of coordination, which
    did work between General Honore and General Landreneau, the
    title 10 commander and the National Guard TAG, if coordination
    fails, then we do have the statutory option, the President has
    the authority to federalize the Guard, move the Guard from
    title 32 status to title 10, and have true, not only unity of
    effort, but unity of command.
        But I don't think--well, I'm sure--in the past 50 years,
    since the days of the civil rights movement, no Governor has
    been stripped, by statute, of that command authority over the
    National Guard involuntarily. Only once or twice has it been
    done, with the consent of the Governor; most recently, in 1992,
    with the Los Angeles riots.
        But, bottom line, it is a sobering decision to take that
    command authority away from a Governor. In most cases, the
    purpose is to achieve--the purpose should be to achieve unity
    of effort, even in the absence of unity of command.
        Senator Reed. Your comments are well taken, Mr. Secretary,
    but I think what you've said is that we are working now much
    more explicitly and consciously on the problems of unifying the
    effort.
        Mr. McHale. Yes.
        Senator Reed. But, it has to be an ongoing basis.
        Mr. McHale. Yes.
        Senator Reed. It has to be part of our mindset, and also
    what we exercise, I presume, that, as we----
        Mr. McHale. Absolutely correct----
        Senator Reed.--look at these----
        Mr. McHale.--on all points. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Also, I would assume, given the magnitude of
    Hurricane Katrina, and perhaps the magnitude of another natural
    or, unfortunately, manmade crisis, that one of the first issues
    will be assessing whether this unity effort is taking place,
    and, if not, going to that very difficult judgment about
    whether there has to be a decision by the Executive to unify
    the command. Is that fair?
        Mr. McHale. Yes, sir, that's a completely accurate summary.
        I think it's important that we keep it in the context that
    I described earlier, and that is, for those of us who come out
    of a military background, and who quickly recognize that having
    dual command authority is not what is most operationally
    efficient, that we understand why that is. It's the
    Constitution of the United States. It's the recognized
    authorities, both of the National Government and the State
    governments, creating a dual chain of command. We should not
    simply look at it from a military perspective and assume that
    unity of effort requires unity of command. That, I think, would
    violate some basic principles of federalism. We retain that
    option, when required, but we should not lightly execute it.
        When possible, we should preserve the command authorities
    of a Governor, certainly command--respect the constitutional
    authorities of the President of the United States. While
    recognizing two distinct chains of command through close
    coordination, deliberate staff planning, detailed anticipation
    of the mission requirements, and rigorous exercises to test
    that, we should preserve the two chains of command, while
    insisting upon unity of effort through coordination.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Let me turn to a question that was alluded to, I think, in
    your comments, Secretary McHale. It is situational awareness;
    it was very poor. It was poor for the National Guard. It was
    poor for NORTHCOM. That's the conclusion of the White House
    report. Poor for practically all the participants, days into
    the crisis. First, I don't think you will argue with that
    premise, but, if you do, let me know. But I'd like to ask all
    of you, what are you doing to improve the situational awareness
    in another incident like Hurricane Katrina? Perhaps, General
    Blum, you might start in terms of the National Guard.
        General Blum. It's a bottom-up build, which is probably a
    good way to do it. That's the way the National Response Plan is
    built, anyway. So, the first responsibility for establishing
    this situational awareness or this information feed so that
    someone would know what is going on and then be able to
    determine what needs to be done, based on what's being done and
    what's unable to be done in the local area, is very important.
    To take an event where you lose all of your existing normal
    lines of communication--your television, radio, cell phones,
    hardwired phones, fax machines, e-mail--all of those things,
    electricity is gone. So, you have to--you have to--we have to
    worst-case it. In the past, we did not. We did not, as much as
    we should have. None of us.
        So, now we are planning for catastrophic events. How do you
    establish those critical communications in the early moments so
    that you can gain the situation awareness, so you know what is
    going on, so that you can tell others what is going on, so they
    know what to anticipate to be ready to do next, because--so
    they know what they don't have to do, because they're aware of
    what is happening.
        So we're setting up communications that are flyaway
    packages, pre-positioned packages, and we've come to Congress
    and submitted a requirement, and they have been very good, and
    they've given the Army National Guard $700 million. I am
    working with the United States Army for an accelerated
    purchase. The hurricane season will be on us in 5 months. We
    should start seeing hurricanes as early as June. They don't
    always wait until the fall. So, we have to be ready. The United
    States Army is doing an accelerated purchase for mostly
    satellite communications that is not reliant on cell towers
    being in place or any existing communications being in place.
    We have those in much greater supply now than we did for
    Hurricane Katrina, already. By this hurricane season, we'll be
    much better prepared than we were last year. We will not be
    where we need to be this year. It will take us some time, and
    take us additional resources. I have to be honest. But we are
    honestly and earnestly working toward that end that you
    describe, and I think it's entirely appropriate to criticize
    that, because that was a flaw in all of our planning, in all of
    our response.
        Senator Reed. General Inge, quickly--and my time is
    receding quickly--but could you comment? Then, Secretary
    McHale, the last word.
        General Inge. Sure. A couple of things. True situational
    awareness, needed to improve in this disaster. But, at the same
    time, we probably had better situational awareness than we had
    the right to expect, given our experience from times past. So,
    it's a good and a bad story.
        There is a lot of talk about situational awareness, title
    10 versus State forces. I think we've worked on that. General
    Blum and I have personally met and worked on that. That's a
    matter of communication and coordination--they're the words he
    used--and we have personal communication, and we agree with
    that.
        We've met with the TAGs of the hurricane States already at
    NORTHCOM to make sure that our lines of communication are open,
    our staffs' lines are open. I think that we'll be much better.
        We have work to do. This is the first time we've ever put
    up an air picture of the magnitude that we did for this
    hurricane, I suspect in the history of the Nation. We have a
    lot of work to do to get what, in a combat zone, would be
    called intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
    which we should rightly call here damage assessment, so that it
    all flows in the downlinks in the right place. We're working
    that very hard.
        Control of 360 airplanes of different nature over a
    disaster area, we're working that hard, to build that picture,
    and are working with the adjutants general of the various
    States so that, in a disaster, we can assist them with that,
    while they are still in charge of the disaster.
        Working the Navy piece, we had not worked as hard. Having
    the Navy follow the storm, as is appropriate, to do beach
    assessment immediately is a great deal.
        But a piece we don't talk about very much is the logistics
    piece and how you support FEMA in tracking logistics and it's
    one of the technology pieces Senator Cornyn talked about. We
    found that we routinely use our radio frequency tags in our
    military business. Tracking our containers and just getting the
    logistics package into the area of damage is no small task.
        Day after day, you would hear staff officers stand up and
    say, ``Sir, we shipped a million Meals Ready to Eat (MRE)
    today.'' That's good information, I suppose. But the real
    question is, ``How many did you need to ship, and where did
    they go?'' So we're working all those kinds of issues very
    aggressively as we move into this next season.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        Secretary, if you have a comment?
        Mr. McHale. Senator, the need to conduct wide-area
    surveillance for damage assessment after a natural disaster
    should have been a mission requirement that we recognized, but
    it was not. So before the end of September, in our internal
    preliminary lessons learned, we identified, and did not hide at
    all, our recognition that the ability to have aerial assets in
    place to conduct wide-area surveillance after either a
    terrorist attack or a natural disaster is a preeminent
    requirement. We did not anticipate, though--if we had read the
    after-action reviews from Hurricane Andrew, in 1992, we might
    have anticipated the reality that media reports inevitably,
    after a disaster, tend to be inaccurate. So, unlike Hurricanes
    Andrew and Katrina, for Hurricane Rita, that came along 4 or 5
    weeks after Hurricane Katrina, we had a complete aerial
    observation package in support of NORTHCOM. It included P-3s,
    Predators, C-130s, high-altitude and space-based imagery, so
    that if Hurricane Rita had produced catastrophic damage, we
    would not have been reliant on media reports to scope and
    assess that damage.
        So, the first thing you need is--we don't call it,
    domestically, an ISR package, as the General properly noted.
    We're talking about wide-area surveillance for damage
    assessment, and then the ability, through interoperable
    communications, to disseminate what we collect to all of the
    first-responders, emergency management personnel, military
    authorities, who need to be aware of the damage so they can
    begin responding to it. We didn't get it right for Hurricane
    Andrew in 1992, we didn't get it right for Hurricane Katrina,
    we did get it right for Hurricane Rita, and it's a lesson that
    we have now learned very clearly.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Just a point with this
    capability, you could have, for example, identified not just
    the damage, but the fact that thousands of people were
    collecting at the Superdome, because your photo analysts,
    either space-based or jets up in the air, could have done the
    same type of photo analysis they do in a tactical situation,
    and said, ``You have lots of people accumulating.'' Is that--
    all I need is a yes or no--what you're talking about when
    exploiting this information?
        Mr. McHale. What we're talking about, primarily, is
    physical damage.
        Senator Reed. Okay.
        Mr. McHale. When you start talking about observing the
    population with these assets, you get into an area of public
    policy that is--I think, as you recognize----
        Senator Reed. Let's defer that to next round, because I
    will stop and----
        Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. I will recognize Senator Thune.
        Excuse me. Thank you.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Thune.
        Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    members of the panel, for your service. I appreciate the--just
    listening to the line of questioning and the responses, clearly
    there are lots of things that need to be improved upon, from
    some of the responses in the past, and I appreciate the steps
    that you've enumerated to make sure that we get it right in the
    future.
        I want to start with a question for General Blum, which has
    to do with a piece of equipment that you all, the National
    Guard, is receiving, the first 32 C-27s off the line. My
    understanding is, those receiving units may have already been
    selected. I have a two-pronged question. One is, when do you
    estimate the NGB will make selections on units for the next
    group to follow off the assembly line? What criteria will you
    use in making that selection?
        General Blum. Senator, let me back up if I can. To my
    knowledge, the aircraft has not been selected. If you're
    talking about the future cargo aircraft, or the light cargo
    aircraft, that the Air Force and the Army are going to buy, and
    we're going to put in the National Guard as a joint
    intratheater airlift capability, it is my intent to put those
    airplanes, when the DOD decides which one they're going to
    buy--when they give that to the National Guard, I will then put
    that capability out into as many States as I can, but they will
    be distributed regionally as part of a package that supports
    the Chem-Bio Response Force Packages, the Civil Support Teams,
    the Quick Response Forces. They will be positioned based on
    known weather patterns and also areas that we know are critical
    and key in being able to move capabilities and logistics to
    other affected areas.
        That's a long answer. We've put out the first four or five
    that are really so obvious where they need to go. The others
    are under very careful consideration, in collaboration with
    your adjutants general, your Governors, and the emergency
    managers in the region, so that we do something that, when
    they're not in the service of the Nation overseas as part of
    the Air Expeditionary Force, they are superbly postured and
    ready to support any Federal, or State and Federal combined
    response, for a regional response, or even a national response.
        So, I hope that gets to your question. If you want to be
    more specific, I'll try to address it.
        Senator Thune. I guess my question is, though, that the
    first 32 of those units off the line--my understanding was that
    the receiving units had already been selected. What you're
    saying is that----
        General Blum. The very first ones are, yes, sir.
        Senator Thune. Okay. But--all right. So, then I guess what
    I'm asking is, the next installation of that, the criteria that
    you're going to use, which you've enumerated, is going to be
    regional, and it's going to be based on some of the mission
    requirements.
        General Blum. Yes, sir. It will also be placed in a place
    that has--do you understand the term ``bed down''?
        Senator Thune. Right.
        General Blum. It has the infrastructure there, so that the
    airplane doesn't pass a bill to the Army or the Air Force for
    military construction and the construction of a new airfield.
    There are many, many airfields that are already in existence
    that have superb infrastructure to support a C-130-like
    airplane.
        Senator Thune. Right.
        General Blum. So, it would make sense that if that place is
    near one of these regions we're talking about, they'd be a
    strong candidate for where I would nominate them to receive
    those aircraft.
        Senator Thune. That was going to be a follow-up question,
    is one of the things that you will look at among these
    competing units, then, is the infrastructure capacity.
        General Blum. Oh, absolutely. If they have the airspace,
    they have the airfield, they have the hangars and the
    maintenance, and it's already there, it would be foolish not to
    take advantage of it, I think.
        Senator Thune. One of the things I'd--with respect to the
    National Guard--and 80 percent of the South Dakota National
    Guard has mobilized in support of operations in the Middle
    East--Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom--and I,
    like all South Dakotans, are extremely proud of the
    contributions that they have made to the war on terror, as well
    as to homeland defense--one of the questions I have is--I'm
    concerned, I think, like a lot of people are, that our National
    Guard and Reserve will not be able to meet the demands of both
    their title 32 and title 10 missions, due to some of the
    operational stress on personnel and equipment. We're running a
    lot of our equipment into the ground--the personnel, the
    deployments--that have put tremendous stresses and strains on
    the National Guard. How, in your view, can DOD maximize the use
    of the National Guard and Reserve, without overusing them?
    That's a general question, I understand.
        General Blum. I think you do that by predictability. We've
    worked that out with the Army and the Air Force. The members of
    your National Guard know pretty well that, if they're in the
    Air National Guard, that they're going to deploy for a
    relatively short period of time, 2 to 3 months, about every 18
    months. They accept that. The employers seem to accept that,
    and the families accept it. Our retention rate shows that it is
    well accepted by the three partners in the citizen soldier--the
    employer, the family, and the servicemember. Our retention rate
    is over 100 percent of our goal in the Air National Guard. It's
    over 100 percent in the Army National Guard, but they rotate on
    a different model, and that's about one deployment every 6
    years. We have--we think--I firmly believe we can achieve that.
    We're not there yet, but I think we can.
        We hit an all-time highwater mark this time last year, with
    12 brigades over in combat. This time--the same time this year,
    we'll probably have four, four and a half. Then, when you add
    Afghanistan, perhaps five. So, it's been a significant
    reduction in the contribution that the Army National Guard--or
    the demands on the Army National Guard overseas, as what they
    have been over the last year--that was a conscious decision to
    give the Army time to reset into modularity, so that they could
    assume a heavier burden this year, and they are. So, we're very
    conscious of what you're describing. I think we can do it.
        The personnel piece, I'm very confident we can recruit,
    retain, and keep our force. The equipment piece is where I need
    help from this body.
        Senator Thune. Right.
        General Blum. We sent the very best of our equipment
    overseas, as we should. We've been over there now for several
    years. We've crossleveled our equipment. We were short of
    equipment when the war started. You have to remember that. The
    National Guard was under-resourced deliberately. It was a
    strategic reserve. It has, for the last 6 years at least, been
    an operational force overseas. It needs to be resourced as an
    operational force back here at home. In the old--and we didn't
    view the National Guard that way in the past, because they had
    all the equipment that they needed as a strategic reserve
    overseas, gave them adequate equipment to be ready here at
    home. Now that we're an operational force overseas and that
    equipment is moved to the war zone, which it should, we need to
    address the shortages here.
        Now, while this body will help provide the money for that,
    and the authority to buy that new equipment, or acquire that
    new equipment, we are leveraging the Emergency Assistance
    Compacts (EMAC) amongst the States to move equipment to the
    affected areas of this Nation while we're short on equipment,
    so that we mitigate the--otherwise, if we didn't do that, the
    problem would be that some States would be under-equipped to do
    what they need to do. But through EMAC, we have, as Hurricanes
    Katrina, Rita, and Wilma have shown--and, by the way, when all
    of that was going on, and 80,000 troops were overseas, we were
    still fighting blizzards in your northern neighbor, in North
    Dakota. We had a blizzard going on while the hurricane was
    coming on. We were clearing roads in North Dakota. We were
    fighting floods in Vermont and New Hampshire at the same time.
    So, Mother Nature doesn't throw this stuff at us one at a time.
    But we can handle multiple near-simultaneous events, if we need
    to. But we could handle them a lot better if we were better
    equipped.
        Senator Thune. That sounds exactly like what our TAG said
    this week when he was in town. So, we understand that.
    Certainly we want to do everything we can to address the needs
    that you have, in terms of equipment and--understanding that--
    the important role that the National Guard and those assets
    have played in the war on terror, realizing that you--we ask
    you to do a lot of things, and we have to make sure that you
    have the resources you need to get it done.
        Secretary McHale, a question having to do--some of what's
    been touched on by Senator Cornyn, Senator Reed already--on the
    homeland defense front, the illegal immigration issue, of
    course, is a very hot issue on the border States. Admiral Loy,
    who's Deputy Secretary at DHS, testified in front of the Senate
    Select Committee on Intelligence that 44,000 other-than-
    Mexicans came across the border last year. I guess what I'm
    interested in knowing is, is the DOD working with DHS to
    identify where those other-than-Mexicans are coming from? What
    is the DOD doing, in terms of working with the DHS, to
    implement the use of UAVs on the southern border? That's what I
    hear is the technology that, as we look at immigration reform,
    we may want to incorporate the UAVs that are policing the
    border.
        Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. We, in fact, are very active in
    supporting CBP, a DHS subordinate element, in its
    responsibilities along the southwest border. As I noted in my
    opening statement, we've been engaged in counternarcotics
    activity in support of civilian law enforcement since 1989. A
    recent change in the law, that Chairman Cornyn cited earlier,
    expanded the DOD role to include counterterrorism activity in
    support of civilian law enforcement, as well as
    counternarcotics activity. We've been doing a lot for a long
    time to support civilian law enforcement in the execution of
    their mission.
        We have routinely provided aerial platforms, usually
    helicopters, to provide surveillance of cross-border movement,
    illegal movement, in order to inform ground-based CBP agents of
    that movement so that appropriate detentions and arrests could
    be made. I've flown one of those flights along the Texas border
    with a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve helicopter unit where that
    unit provided aerial surveillance in support of CBP on the
    ground.
        About 2 years ago, I think, I received a request for the
    first use of a Predator, a DOD Predator, one that had not yet
    been delivered to DOD, but was scheduled for delivery, to be
    used in support of CBP, much like the helicopters, but using a
    UAV, for surveillance along the southwest border. I think, for
    about a 3-week period of time, based on our support for that
    request for assistance, that Predator became the first of many
    flights that have now been executed, and continue to be
    executed, in support of CBP. My understanding is that DHS,
    correctly, is in the process of standing up its own UAV
    capability. But, in the interim, on a frequent, even daily,
    basis, we, for instance, for training purposes, conduct UAV
    flights in the southwest, training our own personnel to control
    those flights, but we do share the information that we acquire
    through that training with the CBP.
        Lastly, I would not want to give the impression that it's
    just aerial surveillance or UAV support that we provide. JTF
    North, a subordinate NORTHCOM command, provides numerous other
    forms of assistance on a regular basis--ground sensors,
    engineering support, and other capabilities, to include the
    sharing of intelligence and information to better identify the
    nature of the threat.
        The bottom line, there is absolutely no doubt that the
    situation along the southwest border is extremely troubling,
    probably getting worse, not better, in terms of criminality and
    violence. There is no doubt that the requirement to address
    that situation is primarily a civilian law enforcement
    function, but there is also no doubt that, consistent with the
    law, we are prepared to support--not replace, but support--
    civilian law enforcement in the execution of that mission.
        Senator Thune. Have you been able to identify where the
    folks who are coming across the border, other than those who
    are coming in that are Mexicans coming across the border where
    those folks are coming from?
        Mr. McHale. Yes. It's part of our strategy for homeland
    defense that we have a defense in depth. In most domains, in
    the air and on the sea, that means the forward deployment of
    forces to interdict and defeat a threat before it enters the
    United States. We don't forward deploy ground forces into
    Canada or into Mexico. So, to achieve that defense in depth
    requires the ability to obtain information in depth as to
    threats that may be approaching the United States border.
        In an unclassified setting, I can tell you that we receive
    briefings--and I personally receive briefings--almost daily as
    to the nature of that threat and any question of terrorist
    activity that might be associated with it. We do try, to the
    very best of our collection capability, to identify terrorist
    threats approaching the United States border at a distance from
    the United States border to separate illegal immigration from
    what are perhaps related issues of terrorist infiltration.
        Senator Thune. I see my time is expired. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman. Thank you all very much.
        Mr. McHale. Thank you.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Thune, for those
    important questions and the testimony we've heard.
        We've all been told, during the course of hearings, that
    the nature of illegal immigration across our border has
    changed, and there's been some exchange about the spike in
    people coming from countries other than Mexico, including
    countries of special interest. It causes all of us a great
    concern. Admiral Loy testified, as Senator Thune indicated.
    But, pretty clearly, there seems to be a consensus that where
    historically it may have been--organized crime may have been
    involved in drug trafficking, that now they're engaged not only
    in drug trafficking, but literally human smuggling, arms. It
    doesn't take any stretch of the imagination to imagine that
    they would transact in terrorist smuggling or in smuggling of
    WMD. So, I think the emphasis on how we can cooperate and how
    we can use all the assets of the Federal Government to protect
    us against that threat are very, very important.
        In that connection, I want to ask--starting with General
    Inge--given the need for effective and synchronized interagency
    coordination to respond to manmade or natural disasters, what
    thought have you given to transitioning Joint Task Force North
    into a Joint Interagency Task Force?
        General Inge. Sir, that's been the subject of discussion
    for, that I'm aware of, at least part of 3 years now. It's a
    discussion more properly addressed, I believe, here in this
    town than by the people of NORTHCOM. But we have been involved
    in those discussions. It rests, as I understand it now, with
    transitioning first to JTF North, with closer coordination with
    the interagency--and we work very closely with the interagency,
    and are very well tied in with them. If we continue on this
    path, the next step would be to decide, when do you transition?
    Then, who would be in charge? As you appreciate, JTF South
    works air and sea domains, and therefore, is operational
    control (OPCON) to Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), a military
    organization. When you work the land domain internal to the
    United States, you have different laws that would apply to the
    organization.
        So, short answer to your question, the discussions continue
    in the interagency, and we are involved, and we are a
    participant in the discussion. But I would assure you that
    today, JTF North is very closely aligned, and very much
    involved in, interagency coordination and incorporation as we
    work the southwest border.
        Senator Cornyn. I appreciate the fact that there's only so
    much that you can do, or that NORTHCOM can do, or the DOD can
    do, if it involves interagency cooperation and participation.
    I, for one, intend to do everything within my power to
    encourage all of the agencies that would make up an Interagency
    Task Force to fully cooperate in the effort, because I think
    there's a lot to be gained by that.
        General Inge. I could tell you, certainly, Senator,
    cooperation is better today--far better today than it was 18
    months ago. That's the time I personally have been watching.
    It's amazing how it's changed.
        Senator Cornyn. General Inge, how is NORTHCOM coordinating
    with SOUTHCOM? You mentioned JTF South, but how are you
    coordinating across the board to ensure that there's no gaps
    between commands?
        General Inge. Sir, we are tied in with SOUTHCOM in multiple
    ways. Most of their drug interdiction, we monitor--and,
    frankly, from a little afar, because they do it in the southern
    part of the region, and the focus of their emphasis is south of
    our area of responsibility (AOR). But we have proper liaison
    channels. We stay in communication with their Joint Interagency
    Task Force (JIATF). As is appropriate, they will work missions
    for us. We're in constant contact to make sure that a seam
    doesn't develop between us. Likewise, as you look at the
    islands to our south, we make sure that we have the right
    connection and the right handoff between them, in case of mass
    migrant problems.
        Senator Cornyn. General Blum, training and exercising are
    essential to preparedness.
        General Blum. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. We've talked a little bit about resources,
    things that would allow interoperable communications. One of
    the problems we saw during the Hurricane Katrina disaster was,
    the Louisiana National Guard lost communications connectivity.
    But what I want to focus on are other training and exercise
    concerns that we can perhaps help you address, and help the DOD
    address.
        Currently, it's my understanding the DOD does not provide
    funding for homeland security and homeland defense integration
    training at the State and regional level. If that's true, what
    can best be done to help improve overall joint response
    nationally? Is programmed appropriated and routine DOD, DHS
    training and exercising--is that part of the solution?
        General Blum. Mr. Chairman, I think you've hit on something
    very key. As I said--and Senator Reed said, what can you do
    better? I think one of the things that we absolutely must do,
    if we're going to get better, is to train and exercise. No good
    team doesn't practice. Any good team practices very hard and
    very realistically. That's why they're a good team. The problem
    that I face isn't that there's no unwillingness to train or
    practice; the problem is, there's no resource stream to
    actually accomplish that. It's not by evil intent; it was just
    never really a priority requirement in the past, and I think it
    needs to be seriously addressed in the future.
        If the DOD were provided funding for that, or if the
    National Guard were provided funding for that, we could do that
    very well at a local and State level, and a regional level, for
    that matter. But I would like to see those exercises and
    training tied in with the DOD so that it has the rigor and
    overwatch that has produced the world-class teams in the Army,
    Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard that training
    and exercises in our military model has produced.
        I think that's one place where the military honestly could
    be a force multiplier for the interagency and
    intergovernmental. We know how to do that. If we were
    adequately funded, or there was some mechanism to have some
    cost sharing perhaps between DHS and DOD to do this, I think
    the National Guard would be glad to be the lynchpin for the
    connecting of those resources and the broker for putting that
    together.
        Having said that, I think there's a role to be played there
    also by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, and
    PACOM, who all have equities in this, as well, because some of
    their--particularly NORTHCOM--mission set is largely focused on
    the United States.
        So anything they do, or we do, we're going to have to do
    together anyhow, so, we may as well learn how to do that well,
    early.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
        If Congress saw fit to fund that sort of joint exercising
    and training, Secretary McHale, you don't see any objections or
    concerns, do you, from any other standpoint?
        Mr. McHale. Within the constraints of the President's
    budget, no. Our exercises have not been tough enough. Fifty to
    60 times each year, there are presidentially-declared major
    disasters. They are the type with which you and I are very
    familiar. It's a hurricane of a recurring type, a tornado
    through a region of the country, an earthquake that may be
    damaging, or even significantly damaging, but not catastrophic
    in its consequences. Fifty to 60 times a year, there are major
    disasters. For most of those major disasters, civilian response
    capabilities at all levels of government can normally address
    the remediation requirement, and the role of the DOD is fairly
    modest.
        Hurricane Katrina, which in my judgment, was at the low end
    of catastrophic events, taught us that we are not adequately
    prepared for those kinds of terrorist attacks or natural
    disasters that exceed in scope recurring major disasters and
    become catastrophic in their consequences. Most of our
    exercises in the past have dealt with major disasters, but not
    truly catastrophic events of the type that are envisioned, for
    instance, in the 15 planning scenarios that have been developed
    by DHS.
        So, Senator, I guess I would summarize by saying, we need
    to plan not only for recurring major disasters, but for the
    much more challenging environment of catastrophic events. Our
    exercises should reflect catastrophic requirements and a more
    deeply engaged DOD, where we have the organic capabilities to
    provide a response that may not be found anywhere else in the
    United States Government. Funding that kind of exercise program
    is a good thing; again, within the constraints of the
    President's budget.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
        General Rodriguez, since you're here, I want to take
    advantage of your presence, just ask you one question, if I
    may. You might want to come up to the microphone, maybe over
    here on General Inge's left.
        The Texas National Guard played a very important role in
    responding to both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I'd like to
    give you an opportunity to share with the subcommittee any
    lessons learned from the Texas National Guard's perspective,
    that you'd like to highlight for the committee, that might help
    us in our deliberations.

       STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES R. RODRIGUEZ, ADJUTANT
                     GENERAL, TEXAS MILITARY FORCES

        General Rodriguez. Yes. Thank you, Senator Cornyn, Senator
    Reed.
        Lessons learned from Katrina are primarily around two
    areas. One is how we worked, in a title 32 status, alongside--
    along parallel with the title 32 Active-Duty Forces, and that
    it is possible--it's not ideal, but it is possible. As the
    Secretary and the others here have said, unity of effort is the
    primary concern, to include planning. There is no sense in
    planning in a vacuum, either. We must plan both at the Federal
    and at the State and at the local level. Everyone is tied
    together when a disaster strikes.
        The Texas National Guard adopted and tailored the adaptive
    battle staff model that is favored by NORTHCOM for our own
    Joint Force Headquarters. The Texas National Guard always
    remained in a posture of assistance to civilian authorities.
    But we focused exclusively on our customers--that is, the
    disaster-impacted residents of the State who were represented
    in the disaster zone by local elected officials, such as the
    county judges and the city mayors and appointed State
    authorities, like the disaster district chairman. In other
    words, the control was very local. The Governor serves as a
    moderator or a thermostat to make sure everything is in tune.
        We pushed military and civilian hybrid capabilities forward
    early. We pushed it strong, and we pushed it consistently. Our
    focus was to deliver commodities, care, and calming presence
    early, and to stay deployed forward as long as the Governor
    deemed appropriate.
        The most significant lesson we learned is that the National
    Guard should continue to refine its mission. But clearly it is
    the military choice of force for domestic disaster response,
    because our armories are there, we live there, we're where the
    disasters happen. What General Blum says is very true, that
    when you call up the National Guard, you call up America.
        Sir, you had mentioned something about the White House
    report, the Townsend Report. There's a particular
    recommendation there that really highlights the value of a
    lesson learned. It's number 28. It's the one that mentions the
    Joint Forces Headquarters State as a key facilitator and
    infrastructure platform of Joint Incident Command, one that
    ought to receive high priority implementation. That Joint Force
    Headquarters is the place where military and civilian
    coordination can be realized, where military coordination can
    happen to support lead Federal and State civilian agencies, and
    cross-communication can happen with greatest efficiency and
    effectiveness. The Joint Force Headquarters worked for us
    during our Hurricane Rita response. The Joint Force
    Headquarters State ought to be fully supported at the national
    level as a State or even a regional platform for fuller
    integration with Federal/regional joint field offices. That is
    to say, DHS.
        I encourage recommendation number 28 be fast-tracked for
    explicit establishment and missioning and legislation.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much for that testimony.
    Thank you.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me begin by associating myself with General Blum's
    remarks about exercising. It's been said often, but I don't
    think as well as or as emphatically as you did. We're spending
    a lot of money on technology. We're doing lots of analysis.
    We're doing lots of training. But until you blow the whistle
    and say, ``Okay, here's the problem. Go out there and actually,
    on the ground, do something,'' we really don't know what we
    have. I agree with Secretary McHale's comments, too, that these
    exercises have to be more rigorous, but my inclination is that
    we could get a lot more bang for our buck if we put more money
    into exercising every level of command. We've done that a
    little bit in the Rhode Island National Guard, sort of on an ad
    hoc basis, but we should be doing it every quarter, or at least
    once a year, not just tabletop, but rolling--getting the wheels
    on--moving on the ground and things like that.
        Mr. Chairman, maybe we could think about trying to identify
    those resources.
        General Blum. Senator, you're spot on. I applaud Rhode
    Island and other States that have taken money out of their
    hide, or used State money, or some combinations of money to put
    together to do the little bit of training and exercising
    they've been able to do. We have an exercise schedule not too
    far from here, near the Washington, DC, Armory here, coming up
    at the end of the month. That's a modest exercise, but it costs
    about $1 million. We've had to take that out of hide that we
    don't have. But my good conscience won't allow me to stand up
    organizations and then let them atrophy. If we're going to
    train and certify them, they must be exercised if they're going
    to be ready when you need them. Otherwise, unless they go right
    into the crisis after graduation--and, even then, they're not
    going to be terribly effective, because they haven't practiced
    together. So you have to pull all of the parties together that
    are really going to come to the dance, and let them practice,
    so that when they are called upon in the middle of the night,
    on short or no notice, they can respond the way the American
    people expect them to.
        Senator Reed. I think you're absolutely right. In fact,
    I've been associated with the Army since 1967. It's gotten
    better as it's done with more realistic evaluations, more
    realistic in-the-field training. Not just the training, but
    evaluations, the whole--probably technology--the terminology is
    out of date, but the whole Radar Technology Improvement Program
    (RTIP) process, the whole evaluation, down to individual
    skills, from unit skills, is something that has moved us
    forward. We have to do the same thing on the homeland security
    side.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to follow up the last comment you
    made about the fact that now we have these air capabilities to
    essentially photograph everything on the ground for a damage
    assessment. Is there a legal issue about who can interpret
    these photographs? Or where does the information go? For
    example, my last point before I relinquished to Senator Thune
    was, we had thousands of people trapped in the Superdome.
    Presumably, if you had aerial coverage, taking photographs,
    digitizing, and sending it down to photo interpreters, someone
    would have noticed thousands of people congregating outside,
    and perhaps assumed that, if they're outside, there are more
    inside, and we could have moved quicker to relieve the
    pressure. Can that be done now, or is there a legal obstacle to
    interpreting these photos and getting information to the right
    people?
        Mr. McHale. There are certainly public policy questions,
    important public policy questions, and, I believe, very likely,
    related legal issues.
        When I spoke earlier about the need for more timely and
    accurate damage assessment, I was focused on the physical
    consequences of a catastrophic event.
        Senator Reed. Right.
        Mr. McHale. In the days after landfall of Hurricane Katrina
    on August 29, we did not immediately appreciate the enormous
    damage that had taken place along the Mississippi Gulf Coast,
    because, by comparison to the coverage in New Orleans, the
    coverage of the Mississippi Gulf Coast was modest. The focus
    tended to be upon New Orleans, so we saw everything through
    that region--everything in that region through the prism of a
    New Orleans perspective. So we have recognized that, for wide-
    area surveillance, not involving the observation--certainly not
    the direct or intended observation of the movement of citizens,
    either groups, crowds, or individuals, but, rather, to simply
    see what's been blown away by the event, we have prepared, and
    in fact, for Hurricane Rita, deployed, assets to gather that
    wide-area surveillance.
        Now, my instinct, Senator, is to say that obviously there
    are profound issues of public policy when those aerial
    platforms begin observing people, as opposed to damage. I know
    that legally there are issues, legal issues, associated with
    any observation of citizens by military platforms for purposes
    of collecting information on those citizens for later criminal
    prosecution. We can't do that. That violates Posse Comitatus.
        I guess what I would say to you is, we are confident that
    it's an appropriate military role to use those collection
    assets for rapid, accurate damage assessment. We have not, and
    in the absence of clear statutory authority, would not, take on
    the responsibility of observing citizens, either groups or
    individuals. Frankly, if you want to find out that somebody's
    at the Superdome, the first-responders who are on the ground,
    the military personnel who are on the ground observing events,
    can provide a much more timely and accurate picture of what's
    happening than something that we draw from an aviation asset.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, let me observe, and I think
    you will agree, you already have a public policy problem,
    because the photograph of the battle, the photograph of New
    Orleans to assess the levee damage would reveal citizens.
        Mr. McHale. Oh, yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. So, we could be in the very interesting
    position where we have graphic evidence of a need to rescue
    Americans, yet no one has thought through how you legally get
    that information to someone who can effect the rescue or the
    relief.
        Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. So, I would just urge you to--and I know you
    have--study this quickly, address those public policy problems.
        Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. If we need statutory relief, please send us
    some recommendations so that we can make the judgment--and I
    think you would urge that should be made--of what is the proper
    policy.
        Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. The public policy question really
    involves the intent of that aerial imagery. So long as we
    collect aerial imagery that is for the purpose of damage
    assessment, the fact that individual citizens or groups of
    citizens show up on that imagery is not a problem and we can
    disseminate that information. If we begin focusing that aerial
    imagery not on damage assessment, but on the movement of
    citizens on the ground, then you get into issues related to
    both the law and public policy if that imagery reveals----
        Senator Reed. Right.
        Mr. McHale.--unintentionally----
        Senator Reed. Yes.
        Mr. McHale.--in the collection of the imagery, criminal
    activity.
        Senator Reed. I appreciate that, but the reality is, in one
    of these crises, you will have multiple data about people,
    about physical destruction about potential problems.
        Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. We have to have a way, legally and
    constitutionally, that we can get pertinent information to
    people so that we can relieve citizens who are in distress. I
    would be very interested in seeing a recommendation as to how
    we do this.
        General Inge, how is the intelligence-sharing between
    NORTHCOM of the NCTC functioning today?
        General Inge. Can I comment very briefly on the previous
    discussion?
        Senator Reed. Yes, you may, sir. Yes.
        General Inge. Public law has not been an impediment to us
    doing what we need to do. We are very careful that we don't put
    ourselves in a position where we can be accused of spying on
    our citizens. We are very sensitive to civil liberties.
        But I wouldn't want us to leave here thinking technology is
    the solution to this problem. It will only be a----
        Senator Reed. Yes.
        General Inge.--benefit to it, but it won't be the solution.
    The boots on the ground of the guy reporting accurately what he
    or she sees, and getting that report properly integrated to the
    right people, is the long-term solution to situational
    awareness.
        The TAG of Mississippi personally rode down the coast of
    the Gulf Coast the night the storm moved through. So, he knew
    what was there. There weren't enough overhead assets, 3 days
    later, that were going to help them very much.
        Senator Reed. Right. Let me applaud both the Secretary's
    and your concern with civil liberty. I want to reinforce that.
    This is not a plea to disregard. This is actually a plea to
    respect those. But I'm just looking ahead, I hope, practically,
    to the point where you have the information, and you can't use
    it, and people are suffering. Shame on us.
        General Inge. Absolutely.
        Senator Reed. We should have thought through this problem
    and at least have some type of procedure to alleviate it.
        Now your counterterrorism comment.
        General Inge. Sir, I was new to homeland intelligence when
    I came to this job 18 months ago, and everyone around the land
    told me how bad intelligence cooperation was, and, if you
    didn't believe that, you just had to listen to the news. I got
    out there, and I found senior representatives from each of our
    agencies in our headquarters in our morning meetings, sharing
    appropriate information back and forth. We have good liaison
    support with the agencies now, and good cooperation.
        Is it as good as it needs to be? No, sir, it's not. But
    it's improving on a daily basis. All of the senior heads of
    those departments have been to us in the recent months to make
    sure we're working to do what we need to do to meet the needs
    of the people.
        Senator Reed. Let me just give you a follow-up question.
        General Inge. Go ahead.
        Senator Reed. Do you receive actionable intelligence on a
    regular basis? I mean, this is something where----
        General Inge. We receive intelligence. We haven't had the
    need, as a military, to action it.
        Senator Reed. Right. Specifically, what could we do to
    improve it? Are there specific steps that still have to be
    taken that you could urge us to take?
        General Inge. We, as the executives, are continuing to work
    this problem, to the mutual benefit of the American people. I'm
    not sure that there's immediate steps that need to be taken
    here.
        Senator Reed. It's just--keep the pressure on, keep moving
    forward, never be satisfied.
        General Inge. It's another piece of the interagency
    coordination that we just have to continue every day to get
    better at it because we're not as good as we need to be, but
    we're better today than we were yesterday.
        Senator Reed. Right. General Inge, Admiral Keating has
    decided to combine NORAD and NORTHCOM Command Centers. I must
    commend you for developing a new phrase for the Cheyenne
    Mountain, ``The Warm Standby.''
        General Inge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. I sometimes feel like I'm warm standby. So,
    I'm going to use that, with your permission.
        Will this initiative change the mission and capability of
    NORAD? Will functions at Cheyenne Mountain be reduced or
    eliminated when relocated to Peterson Air Force Base?
        General Inge. Sir, we will take the air warning and the
    aerospace surveillance piece, move that piece of the Operations
    Center into our, now NORAD/NORTHCOM Command Center, so the
    commander will be able to go to one place, get a common
    operating picture of all domains at one time.
        Senator Reed. Has this been coordinated with General
    Cartwright, at STRATCOM?
        General Inge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. What is the impact of moving the operation of
    NORAD, as a binational command with Canadian involvement?
    Essentially, what is the reaction of the Canadians, at this
    point?
        General Inge. We have coordinated with appropriate people
    in Canada before we proceeded to do this. What the outcome will
    be, and the precedent as we move forward, remains to be
    determined, but the key leaders who needed to be coordinated
    with, were coordinated with before we started, so it's not a
    surprise to them.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        General Inge. Certainly here in the country, as well--in
    our country.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Jack.
        The discussion about taking pictures of people and--as part
    of a damage assessment, and inadvertently picking up American
    citizens, and the potential conflict in our laws, raises
    another interesting question, and a related question.
        Secretary McHale, we're all familiar with the debate about
    the NSA and the Terrorist Surveillance Program that's going on.
    One of the important functions of the NSA also relates to
    cybersecurity. I'd like to know whether you have any concerns
    regarding information assurance and Posse Comitatus. Are there
    any changes in the law that--and you can either take this
    question now or get back to us with a written response later
    on--but I'd be interested to know, given the fact that
    technology has certainly outstripped the 1978 law, Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Act, that Congress passed, that our
    ability to both get information and also the defensive efforts
    we need to undertake to protect our own information
    infrastructure have certainly changed, and are changing perhaps
    even as we speak, I'd like to know whether you have any
    concerns with regard to legal limitations, like Posse Comitatus
    may have, with regard to our ability to provide information
    assurance.
        Mr. McHale. Senator, when I took this position, I promised
    the general counsel of the DOD that I wouldn't practice law
    without a license. I am an attorney in private life from time
    to time, but I'm not really prepared, nor would it be
    appropriate for me, to address the legal questions today,
    although we can certainly get back to you on that level of a
    response to your question.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The General Counsel of the Department of Defense (DOD) advises me
    that, as described below, information assurance activities of the DOD
    are not limited by the Posse Comitatus Act. The Posse Comitatus Act,
    with certain exceptions, generally prohibits the use of any part of the
    Army or the Air Force for civilian law enforcement purposes. DOD
    defines information assurance as measures that protect and defend
    information and information systems by ensuring their availability,
    integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation,
    including the restoration of information systems by incorporating
    protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Accordingly, DOD's
    information assurance focus is on protection and defense of its
    information and information systems rather than on civilian law
    enforcement. To the extent that DOD information assurance activities
    may involve activities that appear to be civilian law enforcement,
    these activities probably would be within the military purpose
    exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. This judicially recognized
    exception permits DOD participation in civilian law enforcement-like
    activities if there is an independent military purpose for the
    activities, in this case, the protection and defense of DOD information
    and information systems.

        Mr. McHale. Operationally, I have to tell you, I do have
    those concerns. I think it would be irresponsible not to be
    concerned about cybersecurity and mission assurance in the
    context of adversaries who undoubtedly would attack us, in
    terms of cyber-vulnerabilities, if given an opportunity to do
    so.
        Much like border security and some of the other issues that
    we talked about earlier, it's important to emphasize that the
    cybersecurity of the United States is not a DOD responsibility,
    it's a responsibility that, by law, has been assigned primarily
    to the DHS. We do have the responsibility within the DOD to
    protect our own command-and-control capabilities and other
    operational capabilities of DOD from a cyberattack. I do have
    concerns, and that doesn't reflect an inadequacy, in terms of
    what we're doing to protect those assets. It simply reflects
    the reality that those assets almost certainly would come under
    attack either prior to, or during, an overt combat operation
    against the United States.
        That said, what I'd like to do, perhaps at a classified
    level, is get back to you, both with a more detailed answer, in
    terms of cyber-defenses and vulnerabilities within DOD, how
    that nests within the larger responsibility of DHS, and the
    legal implications associated with that defense.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. That would be very
    helpful. We'd appreciate that very much.
        I just have two other relatively quick areas I want to
    inquire.
        I'm pleased that we've been joined by Senator Levin, the
    ranking member of the committee.
        First of all, let me ask General Blum. Since 2000,
    Congress--and this committee taking the lead--has provided
    approximately a half a billion dollars to establish and sustain
    55 WMD Civil Support Teams and 17 CERFPs, or otherwise known
    as, I guess, Chem-Bio Radiological Nuclear Enhanced Response
    Force Package teams. What's the current status of these two
    programs? Is there any need for any additional CERFP teams in
    fiscal year 2007?
        General Blum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
        It was Congress that established the Civil Support Teams.
    The ultimate goal is to have 55 of those, one in each State,
    two in California, before the end of the program. At that
    point, I think we will probably have more than sufficient
    number of Civil Support Teams.
        Are they perfectly configured? Are they perfectly equipped
    now that we've had some experience and time? I'm not sure of
    that. I think after we have them all fielded, trained, and we
    get to test and exercise them, we may want to make some minor
    modifications to their capabilities and composition of the
    team. Having said that, there has not been 1 day--1 day--passed
    in any month, in any year since 2000 that these teams have not
    deployed. The calm and the psychological terror that they have
    prevented by being able to show up in a shopping center or a
    business district, and to assess immediately whether the white
    powder was sugar or some other harmful substance, has been
    incredibly important.
        They have also responded in a capacity that--far greater
    than anybody ever intended, with what Secretary McHale
    described, and that's the ability to bridge the communications
    normally that are brought to bear by the National Guard, Army,
    and air communications with the civilian first-responders. So,
    at the local level, at the very local level in the States and
    the cities and the counties and municipalities, when these
    teams come out, and the National Guard gets called out, and the
    police and firefighters or emergency servicepeople are called
    out, or hazardous materials teams come out, they work
    magnificently well together, and they're well received. They
    have also plugged in, on the incident command system, in a
    magnificent manner. Even the most critical elements of civilian
    emergency response welcomes their presence, are glad when they
    come to the scene, and they're now, this is a success story.
    But I don't think we need to expand the Civil Support Teams in
    the country beyond 55 at this time.
        I would like consideration given to some of the legislative
    restrictions that are put on the Civil Support Teams. Since
    Congress created them, they also put the law in there that
    restricts their ability to go outside of the country. There are
    scenarios and times and events that would be hugely beneficial
    to NORTHCOM to be able to acquire these Civil Support Teams to
    help our neighbors in Canada and Mexico, for example.
    Certainly, I could envision other places around the globe where
    the capabilities and the expertise of these Civil Support
    Teams, now that we have sufficient number of them, would be
    highly useful to the combatant commanders and our allies around
    the world, and would also be very welcome in building new
    partners overseas who are also worried about WMD and
    counterterrorism and may want to build their own versions of
    Civil Support Teams.
        Now, the CERFPs, we started with 12, one in every FEMA
    region, plus several extra, because I--you realize that--we
    talked about earlier, the National Guard is deployed today
    around the world, so it's likely that parts of those CERFPs
    would be mobilized and deployed overseas. By having 12, we
    would always have at least one for every FEMA region by having
    that float. That has worked out very well, and I welcome the
    fact that this body has asked us to expand it to five more.
        Do I think we need more, beyond the 17? I'd rather feel the
    17 and evaluate it and give you a more educated answer than to
    just give you a swag today. Right now, I think we probably have
    what we need, but I'd come back after an evaluation of the
    program.
        Mr. McHale. Senator, just as a footnote to the comment made
    by General Blum. On the issue that he talked about--and that
    is, cross-border movement of the CSTs to provide, for instance,
    consequence management capabilities to Canada, if requested, or
    conceivably to Mexico, if requested--for instance, we have the
    Vancouver Olympics coming up in the not too distant future,
    where it's foreseeable that it would benefit both Canada and
    the United States to allow the CST to move cross-border--we are
    preparing draft legislation that we will submit for your
    consideration that would allow for the cross-border movement of
    CSTs to deal with a WMD event that might take place, for
    instance, north of our U.S./Canadian border.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
        One final category of questions I have for Secretary
    McHale, and this has to do with biometrics. I understand that
    the DOD is collecting biometric information from individuals
    detained in Iraq and from forensic investigations of improvised
    explosive device (IED) attacks. Is the biometric data collected
    in theater connected to, or shared with, our--your office or
    with the DOJ, the Department of State, or the DHS? For example,
    if a detainee was to escape from custody, would our current
    system of screening people prevent him or her from entering the
    United States using a forged name? If you could just address,
    generally, what the DOD's policy is on the development,
    integration, and use of biometrics technology across Federal
    agencies.
        Mr. McHale. Consistent with applicable law, we are
    aggressively using biometrics for the purposes that you
    describe, Senator. I would estimate that it was about a year
    and a half ago, the DOD established uniform procedures for the
    collection of biometric information and applied those uniform
    standards to our forward-deployed combatant commands, so that,
    with a very conscious intent, now executed, to collect
    biometric data, let's say, in CENTCOM, the data collected is
    transmitted to a co-located facility with the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI). I would note, as a footnote, when we stood
    up that facility, we worked with the FBI and others, most
    especially DHS--Secretary Ridge and I talked about this very
    issue, in direct conversation--we transferred many, many--I'll
    just keep the number general--but hundreds of thousands of
    biometric datasets going back to the early 1990s to form the
    base data for this system. So today when we add to that system
    newly collected data acquired in overseas geographic combatant
    commands, not only do we have access to it, we're co-located
    with the FBI, and that information is shared with the entire
    interagency, to include DHS.
        Senator, if I may, it's an extraordinary success story.
    Again, in an unclassified setting, what I can tell you is we
    have had many instances when that biometric data has informed a
    decision as to whether or not an individual in our custody will
    be released. For instance, we have acquired biometric data from
    threats overseas, and we have linked that data to specific
    individuals, and, in specific cases, have kept them in custody,
    under circumstances where, but for that biometric data, they
    might have been released.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
    allowing me to come to the hearing this morning as a Johnny-
    come-lately and ask some questions. I appreciate your courtesy.
        I appreciate the work of all three of you gentlemen.
        First, there appears to be a widespread agreement that one
    of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina is that there
    needs to be better planning and training to improve
    coordination between the National Guard and Active-Duty troops.
    The White House report on Katrina called the current deployment
    system, ``fragmented.''
        The National Response Plan states the following, ``The
    National Guard Forces employed under State Active-Duty or title
    32 status''--and that's the status where we pay for the
    operations of the State National Guard Forces--``that are
    employed either under State Active-Duty or title 32 status are
    providing support to the Governor of their State and are not
    part of Federal military response efforts.''
        Now, that really makes pretty sharp dichotomy between State
    forces, National Guard, and Active Duty. It is too sharp a
    dichotomy, in my judgment. I know we have to keep it,
    constitutionally. I know, Secretary McHale, you have made
    reference to that. But, in terms of coordination, it is too
    sharp a dichotomy. I think NORTHCOM has to be hooked into what
    the National Guard is doing, particularly since we have this
    arrangement among the Governors where they call on each other
    to supply National Guard.
        So I guess the first question, General Inge, would go to
    you, as to whether or not NORTHCOM, at least in Katrina, was
    adequately linked into the utilization of National Guard
    Forces. If so, what do we need to do to improve that
    coordination?
        General Inge. Sir, the answer to that question is, yes and
    no. In the early days, we didn't feel that we had clear enough
    picture on what was happening within the National Guard. I
    don't believe that it was due to a lack of willingness to do
    that, in any way. I don't mean to imply that. But as we moved
    into the operation, we developed what reports needed to be
    submitted at what time, as we saw the numbers were going to
    pass 50,000 people wearing the uniform on the ground, and it
    became much improved.
        I would tell you that, as recently as last week General
    Blum and I met with the J-3 of the Joint Staff to discuss this
    issue, to satisfy ourselves that we now have the proper
    procedures in place to share and pass information. Sitting in
    our Operations Center at Colorado Springs today, the two chairs
    on the end of the front row are National Guard guys that have
    direct links back into Bureau Operating Center to make sure
    that we have this problem solved.
        I would also report to you that in preparation for the
    coming hurricane season, we've already met and conferenced with
    the adjutants general of the hurricane States, out at Colorado
    Springs, at NORTHCOM, to discuss the need for awareness. You
    would appreciate the spirit of cooperation and the positive
    response that we had, both from us to them, and them to us, to
    make sure that we've rectified this problem. I feel fairly
    confident that we have.
        Senator Levin. Okay. When the Federal Government pays for
    the costs involved with National Guard deployment, sometimes
    that comes after the fact. So, in this case, I believe--
    Secretary McHale or General Blum may know--that the title 32
    decision to reimburse the States for costs, came weeks
    afterwards.
        General Blum. No, it--well, I'll----
        Senator Levin. Or days after?
        Mr. McHale. Days.
        General Blum. It was days. I'll tell you the day. It was
    September 3.
        Senator Levin. Was that, what, Friday?
        General Blum. Yes, sir. But the----
        Mr. McHale. No.
        General Blum.--order was retroactive until August 29, which
    is the day the hurricane made landfall.
        Senator Levin. Right.
        General Blum. So, the States bore the burden for calling up
    the National Guard pre-landfall, but, as soon as the effects
    made landfall, when we really saw we needed to flow large
    number of forces in there, the Under Secretary of Defense----
        Mr. McHale. Deputy Secretary.
        General Blum.--Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary
    England, actually authorized the retroactive payment of those
    orders to the 29th. That decision was made probably as fast as
    I've ever seen a decision made in the Pentagon, on September 3.
        Senator Levin. Right.
        General Inge. Sir, that was Wednesday or Thursday of the
    week of the hurricane.
        Senator Levin. It just reinforces the Federal role here.
    What I'm really trying to say is that there's a major Federal
    role, not just in terms of Active-Duty Forces, but in terms of
    payment for the National Guard.
        General Inge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. My last question relates to the chain of
    command. Do we have a Federal role through title 32
    utilization, let's start with that. Should we have a single
    chain of command? At what point should there be a single
    military chain of command over both National Guard and Active-
    Duty? Or, should there never be a single chain of command?
        General?
        General Blum. I would--from my point of view, I don't think
    the answer is an absolute. I think--and I'm not trying to evade
    the question--it depends on the situation. For instance, that
    hurricane hit Florida; they had a single chain of command. That
    hurricane also hit Alabama; they had a single chain of command.
    That hurricane also hit Texas; and they maintained a single
    chain of command. Mississippi insisted that they maintain a
    single chain of command. Now, that doesn't mean that title 10
    forces didn't assist all four of those other States. Now, I've
    deliberately left Louisiana out of the discussion, because
    that's what everybody focuses on. But you have to remember,
    there were four other States affected, and, frankly,
    destruction-wise, to a greater degree; damage-wise, to a
    greater degree.
        Senator Levin. Who was the commander of the title 10
    forces?
        General Blum. The commander of the title 10 forces is the
    President of the United States and then whoever he designates
    below him.
        Senator Levin. Underneath the President, who is the
    commander?
        Mr. McHale. It goes from the President of the United States
    to the Secretary of Defense, to the----
        Senator Levin. Keep going.
        Mr. McHale.--to the combatant commander.
        Senator Levin. Who is----
        Mr. McHale. Now----
        Senator Levin. What is----
        Mr. McHale. NORTHCOM.
        Senator Levin. NORTHCOM, okay.
        Mr. McHale. Admiral Keating.
        Senator Levin. So, I want to just stop there at NORTHCOM.
    Who's the commander of the National Guard Forces in Louisiana?
        General Blum. The Commander in Chief, again, is the
    Governor.
        Senator Levin. Down to?
        General Blum. Down to the adjutant general.
        Senator Levin. The adjutant general.
        General Blum. Then the operational force is the Joint Force
    Headquarters commander that's subordinate to the Governor.
        Senator Levin. Is there ever a single chain of command
    between title 10 forces and the National Guard?
        General Blum. We have done that, sir, four or five times.
        Senator Levin. I know we did it during the riot situation.
        General Blum. We've done it in the G8 Summit, we've done it
    for the National Democratic Convention, we've done it for four
    national special security events.
        Senator Levin. Should we do it in an instance like Katrina?
        Mr. McHale. No, sir, unless absolutely essential. If I can
    revector slightly what you're heard so far, we have had dual-
    hatted command in four circumstances. That's not really a
    single chain of command. That preserves the authority of the
    Governor, preserves the authority of the Secretary of Defense,
    and their authority comes together in the person of one
    individual, who is responsible to both in the exercise. That's
    not really a single chain of command.
        Senator Levin. Okay, let me go to dual-hatted. Let me shift
    over. Should there be a dual-hatted person in Katrina
    situations?
        Mr. McHale. No, sir.
        Senator Levin. Okay. Why not?
        Mr. McHale. Dual-hat works when you have an absolutely
    inseparable partnership between the President of the United
    States and an individual Governor. If there is any daylight
    between the two of them in a crisis environment, it leaves that
    commander, who is responsible to both, in a very difficult
    position.
        In my judgment, dual-hatted command is an excellent
    command-and-control approach in a noncrisis environment, like
    the four circumstances that General Blum mentioned a moment
    ago. But in a crisis, if you're going to have a difference--a
    good-faith difference of opinion between the President and the
    Chief Executive of the State, I think you're inviting a very
    difficult circumstance to put a single officer in a position to
    be responsible to both.
        Can you achieve unity of command? The answer is yes. How do
    you implement it? You implement it by federalizing the National
    Guard. Is that, historically speaking, an extraordinary
    decision? Yes. We did it in Los Angeles in 1992, because the
    Governor asked us to do it. But we haven't done it
    involuntarily, creating a single chain of command, stripping
    the Governor of command authority, since the Civil Rights
    Movement.
        Senator Levin. I'm going to conclude, again, with my thanks
    to the chair and ranking member here. There were really gaps in
    coordination in Hurricane Katrina, in our military response. I
    am going to just leave it at that.
        I think it is important that you inform this committee as
    to what you are working out to close those gaps. I think they
    were obvious and they were unacceptable to everybody. There
    were long delays. There were misunderstandings. The Governor
    thought she had made a request that did not appear from the
    Federal side to be a formal request. We have heard a lot of
    testimony over in the Homeland Security and Governmental
    Affairs Committee. We have to work it out. I think from the
    point of view of the Nation, we must have a very clear
    coordination of a military response.
        There's no excuse, as far as I am concerned, to have our
    military down at or near a convention center and our Federal
    officials not even knowing about it. We had NORTHCOM not
    knowing what the National Guard were up to. It is just totally
    unacceptable. I know efforts are underway to make sure that
    never happens again. Just please keep this subcommittee and our
    full committee informed, as well as the Homeland Security and
    Governmental Affairs Committee.
        Thank you very much.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Levin.
        The concerns that you express are ones that we, I know, all
    share. We've heard some very practical solutions to those
    problems already, in terms of interoperable communications, in
    terms of joint training and exercising, making sure that those
    budgets are funded so that that can occur, so that our military
    can practice together, and so when a catastrophe arises, they
    can respond more effectively than perhaps they've been able to
    do in the past.
        I, for one, have learned a lot from this hearing. I want to
    express my gratitude to each of you for your testimony and your
    participation. I know there will be some follow-up that we'll
    want to undertake, and perhaps some additional briefings and
    other questions, maybe even by members of the subcommittee.
        We're going to leave the record open, so that if there are
    any members of the subcommittee who want to ask question in
    writing--we'll leave the record open, let's say, until next
    Friday, a week from today--they can submit those in writing,
    and if you'll respond--I don't know that there will be, but, if
    there are, then I want to provide them an opportunity to do
    that.
        With that, I thank you for your time and your service, and
    the hearing is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 2006

                               U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
                                      and Capabilities,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                         Washington DC.

    U.S. NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY AND THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF DEPARTMENT
          OF DEFENSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IN NONPROLIFERATION

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
    Cornyn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Cornyn, Collins, Reed,
    E. Benjamin Nelson, and Clinton.
        Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
    nominations and hearing clerk; and John H. Quirk V, security
    clerk.
        Majority staff member present: Lynn F. Rusten, professional
    staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    minority counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
    member.
        Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston and Benjamin
    L. Rubin.
        Committee members' assistants present: Mackenzie M. Eaglen,
    assistant to Senator Collins; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant
    to Senator Cornyn; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
    William Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce,
    assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant
    to Senator Clinton.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Cornyn. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities will come to order. Senator Reed, our ranking
    member, will be arriving momentarily. We're pleased to have
    Senator Collins here with us as well, as well as each of our
    witnesses.
        The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on U.S.
    nonproliferation strategy and the roles and missions of the
    Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE)
    in nonproliferation.
        We welcome each of our witnesses: The Honorable Peter C. W.
    Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
    Security Policy; General James E. Cartwright, USMC, Commander,
    U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM); and the Honorable Jerald S.
    Paul, Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) of
    the United States DOE. The Honorable Robert G. Joseph, Under
    Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
    could not be with us today due to a conflict with his testimony
    in the Foreign Relations Committee but he has submitted a very
    helpful statement for the record, which I will insert after my
    remarks.
        The programs and missions for which each of you are
    responsible are critically important to the national security
    of the United States. In a major address on nonproliferation at
    the National Defense University on February 11, 2004, President
    Bush stated: ``The greatest threat before humanity today is the
    possibility of a secret and sudden attack with chemical or
    biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.'' He was
    referring, of course, to the threat of weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) getting into the hands of terrorists.
        Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee just 1
    month ago, Ambassador John Negroponte, the Director of National
    Intelligence (DNI), testified that terrorism is the preeminent
    threat to the United States, and the key terrorist
    organizations remain interested in acquiring chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear materials or weapons to
    attack the United States, U.S. troops, and U.S. interests
    worldwide. Each of you have significant responsibilities for
    programs and missions that are aimed at reducing the
    proliferation threat, and managing the consequences should such
    weapons ever get into the wrong hands or even be used.
        Assistant Secretary Flory, we look forward to your
    testimony on the administration's nonproliferation policy and
    strategy, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, DOD's
    role in the Proliferation Security Initiative, and your
    assessment of efforts underway in the DOD to consolidate and
    integrate myriad Department activities into a unified
    ``combating WMD'' mission.
        With respect to the CTR program, the subcommittee is
    interested in your testimony on the progress of the chemical
    weapons destruction facility at--I'm going to have a hard time
    pronouncing that here--Shchuch'ye; the prospects for using CTR
    funds to eliminate chemical weapons in Libya, and your vision
    of the future of the CTR program.
        General Cartwright, we look forward to your testimony on
    your new responsibility for integrating the DOD's efforts to
    combat WMD. We understand this is a work in progress. We look
    forward to enhancing our understanding of what this mission
    encompasses, how you plan to carry out your responsibilities in
    this area, and what role the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    (DTRA) will play. We'll be interested to hear what milestones
    you have set to measure progress in integrating DOD's efforts
    to combat WMD.
        Deputy Administrator Paul, we look forward to your
    testimony on the impressive and growing array of the DOE
    nonproliferation programs. Second Line of Defense, Megaports,
    the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the elimination of
    weapons grade plutonium production programs, to name just a
    few, are making important contributions to U.S.
    nonproliferation objectives.
        One program that I have concerns about is the mixed-oxide
    (MOX)/plutonium disposition program, which seems to have an
    uncertain future on the Russian side, and has experienced
    considerable cost growth and schedule delays on the U.S. side.
    We look forward to a dialogue with you about the way forward in
    this program.
        In general the fiscal year 2007 DOD and DOE budget requests
    demonstrate the administration's continuing commitment to
    threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. I strongly
    share that commitment and believe that we must maintain and
    strengthen our support for these vital nonproliferation
    programs in the future. The subcommittee looks forward to your
    testimony and I thank each of you for the service to our Nation
    and your presence here today to provide testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Joseph follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert G. Joseph

         u.s. strategy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass
                                  destruction

        I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide a written statement
    to the subcommittee regarding the threat to U.S. national security from
    the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery
    means, and the administration's strategy for combating that threat.
        Almost immediately upon assuming office, President Bush emphasized
    that WMD proliferation was the major security threat of the 21st
    century, requiring a new, comprehensive strategy. In a speech at the
    National Defense University on May 1, 2001, the President said:

              . . . this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less
            predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still
            more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and
            biological weapons. Some already have developed the ballistic
            missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of
            mass destruction at long distances and incredible speeds. A
            number of these countries are spreading these technologies
            around the world.
              Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of
            active nonproliferation, counterproliferation and defenses. We
            must work together with other like-minded nations to deny
            weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must
            work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend
            against the harm they can inflict. Together we must deter
            anyone who would contemplate their use.

        A year later, in his first National Security Strategy of the United
    States and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,
    the President expanded both on the requirements to meet today's threats
    and on the tools we would marshal against them. The National Strategy
    to Combat WMD is the first of its kind--a broad strategy uniting all
    the elements of national power needed to counter the full spectrum of
    WMD threats. Previous U.S. approaches had focused almost exclusively on
    nonproliferation. The Bush administration has dramatically expanded
    U.S. nonproliferation efforts to prevent acquisition of WMD, related
    materials and delivery systems by rogue states or terrorists. At the
    same time, the President recognized the reality that preventive efforts
    will not always succeed. Therefore, the National Strategy to Combat WMD
    put new, and necessary, emphasis on counterproliferation--to deter,
    detect, defend against, and defeat WMD in the hands of our enemies.
    Further, the National Strategy also focused on consequence management,
    to reduce as much as possible the potentially horrific consequences of
    WMD attacks at home or abroad.
        The three pillars in the national strategy of counterproliferation,
    nonproliferation, and consequence management do not stand alone, but
    rather come together as seamless elements of a comprehensive approach.
    Underlining that point, the National Strategy identified four
    crosscutting enabling functions that are critical to combating WMD:
    intelligence collection and analysis; research and development;
    bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and targeted strategies against
    hostile states and terrorists.
        To succeed in our effort to combat WMD proliferation, we must apply
    all elements of national power--diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law
    enforcement, and military.
    Diplomatic Tools
        The Bush administration has given new vitality to the use of
    diplomatic tools to prevent the proliferation of WMD. U.S. assistance
    to other countries to reduce and prevent the proliferation of WMD and
    delivery vehicles--through the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the DOE's nuclear
    nonproliferation programs, and the smaller but nonetheless important
    Department of State (DOS) programs--has been at record funding levels.
    The President has committed an average of $1 billion a year to these
    critical efforts; we greatly welcome the consistent, strong support of
    the subcommittee, the committee, the Senate, and the House of
    Representatives, for these essential programs. Moreover, with the
    proposal in 2002 for the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of
    Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the President successfully
    called on our foreign partners to commit their fair share to the effort
    to meet what is a global responsibility. We continue to work closely
    with the other G-8 members to realize fully the potential of this
    critical commitment. Although much remains to be done, the Global
    Partnership has already had important success in increasing non-U.S.
    funding for securing and eliminating sensitive materials, technologies
    and weapons.
        While the bulk of U.S. nonproliferation assistance remains focused
    on the states of the former Soviet Union, we have also expanded our
    efforts to address proliferation threats more broadly. It is noteworthy
    how these programs have evolved to meet today's threats, from an early
    focus on denuclearizing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and on
    reducing the former Soviet strategic arsenal, to an increasing
    concentration on measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD and
    related materials. Landmark DOE programs include the Global Threat
    Reduction Initiative to reduce fissile and radioactive material
    worldwide, and the Second Line of Defense and Megaports programs to
    install radiation detection capability at major seaports, airports and
    land crossings. While the statutes authorizing the CTR program give it
    less flexibility than its DOE counterparts for work outside the former
    Soviet states, DOD is taking full advantage of the flexibility it has
    been given to eliminate chemical weapons in Albania.
        The United States has also spearheaded the effort for the United
    Nations Security Council to take on its responsibilities to maintain
    peace and security against WMD threats. A major milestone was the
    passage in April 2004 of United Nations Security Council Resolution
    (UNSCR) 1540. In adopting UNSCR 1540, the Security Council--for only
    the second time since its founding--invoked its Chapter VII authorities
    to require nations to act against a general, as opposed to a specific,
    threat to international peace and security. In particular, UNSCR 1540
    requires all states to prohibit WMD proliferation activities, such as
    we witnessed with the A.Q. Khan network. It further requires that
    states institute effective export controls, and enhance security for
    nuclear materials on their territory. The United States stands ready to
    assist other states in implementing UNSCR 1540; here too, DOE and DOD
    nonproliferation assistance programs, as well as those of the DOS, are
    key instruments for the administration's strategy to combat WMD.
        The United States also has led the way to strengthen the
    International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) ability to detect nuclear
    proliferation. We instituted a successful effort to increase the IAEA's
    safeguards budget. We have strongly supported the IAEA Additional
    Protocol, to strengthen the IAEA's ability to uncover clandestine
    nuclear programs. The President submitted the U.S. Additional Protocol
    to the Senate, which gave its advice and consent to ratification in
    2004, and called for all other countries to adhere to it as well. The
    President also successfully urged the creation of a new special
    committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to examine ways to strengthen
    the IAEA's safeguards and verification capabilities.
        In addition to the President's proposals to strengthen the IAEA
    institutionally, he challenged the international community to rectify
    the greatest weakness in the nuclear nonproliferation system: the
    ability of states to pursue nuclear weapons under the cover of peaceful
    energy programs. The lesson of Iran and North Korea is clear: some
    states will cynically manipulate the provisions of the Nuclear
    Nonproliferation Treaty to acquire sensitive technologies to enable
    them to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities--the very capabilities the
    treaty is intended to deny.
        To close this loophole, the President has proposed that uranium
    enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities--the two primary paths
    to acquiring fissile material for nuclear weapons--be limited to those
    states that already operate full-scale, fully-functioning facilities.
    In return, he called on the world's nuclear fuel suppliers to assure
    supply, in a reliable and cost effective manner, to those states which
    forego enrichment and reprocessing. We are working with other fuel
    provider states and with the IAEA to put in place assurances that will
    convince states with power reactors that their best economic interest
    is not to invest in expensive, and proliferation risky, fuel cycle
    capabilities. The DOE plays a critical part in developing these
    Presidential initiatives and working with other nations to bring them
    to fruition.
        DOE's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which Secretary
    Bodman announced last month, offers the promise for the longer term of
    enhancing global access to nuclear energy while strengthening
    nonproliferation. An important emphasis of the initiative is to provide
    a basis for states to benefit from civil nuclear power while avoiding
    the costs and challenges of enriching fresh fuel on the front end of
    the fuel cycle and disposing of spent fuel on the back end. To that
    end, GNEP envisions a cradle-to-grave fuel leasing regime under which
    states that currently have the full fuel cycle would provide fresh fuel
    for nuclear power plants in user nations. The spent fuel would then be
    returned to a full fuel-cycle nation and would be recycled using a
    process that does not result in separated plutonium. The DOS is working
    closely with DOE to engage international partners to participate
    actively in GNEP.
    Defensive Measures
        We refer to another set of tools as ``defensive measures.'' A key
    requirement of counterproliferation is to protect ourselves from WMD-
    armed adversaries. Combating WMD requires both offensive and defensive
    capabilities, to deter, detect, defend against, and mitigate the
    consequences of WMD and missile attacks. As the President stressed in
    May 2001, we require new methods of deterrence against the
    proliferation threats of today. A strong declaratory policy and
    effective military forces are essential elements of our contemporary
    deterrent posture, reinforced by effective intelligence, surveillance,
    interdiction, and law enforcement. Because deterrence may not always
    succeed, our military forces must be able to detect and destroy an
    adversary's WMD before they are used, and to prevent WMD attack from
    succeeding through robust active and passive defenses and mitigation
    measures. All of those requirements place particular demands on the
    DOD. Major milestones in implementing the administration's
    comprehensive approach to combating WMD were marked in: January 2005,
    when the Secretary of Defense designated STRATCOM as the lead combatant
    command for this mission; in January 2006, when General Cartwright
    announced the initial operating capability of the new STRATCOM Center
    for Combating WMD in partnership with the Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency; and in February 2006, when the DOD issued the first National
    Military Strategy to Combat WMD.
        Another critical defensive measure undertaken by the Bush
    administration to combat weapons of mass destruction is the
    Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which shows the close
    interaction among--and the creative use of--diplomatic, military,
    economic, law enforcement, and intelligence tools to combat
    proliferation. Within the U.S. Government, the DOD, Intelligence
    Community (IC), and the DOS all play essential roles in PSI. The
    participating countries are applying laws already on the books in
    innovative ways and cooperating as never before to interdict shipments,
    to disrupt proliferation networks, and to hold accountable the front
    companies that support them. PSI has now expanded to include support
    from more than 70 countries, and continues to grow. It is not a treaty-
    based approach, involving long, ponderous negotiations which yield
    results only slowly, if at all. Instead, it is an active--and
    proactive--partnership, to deter, disrupt, and prevent WMD
    proliferation. It is working.
        Economic and financial tools are also key elements of our defensive
    measures. Adopting many of the means developed in the war against
    terrorism, we are now working with our partners to cut off the
    financial flows that fuel proliferation. UNSCR 1540 requires states to
    take and enforce effective controls on funds and services related to
    export and transshipment that would contribute to WMD programs.
    Consistent with UNSCR 1540, in July 2005, G-8 leaders called for
    enhanced efforts to combat proliferation through cooperation to
    identify, track, and freeze financial transactions and assets
    associated with proliferation-related activities.
        President Bush augmented U.S. efforts in this area when he issued
    in July 2005 a new Executive order, which authorizes the U.S.
    Government to freeze assets and block transactions of entities and
    persons, or their supporters, engaged in proliferation activities.
    Currently 16 entities--11 from North Korea, 4 from Iran, and 1 from
    Syria--have been designated under the Executive order, and we are
    actively considering additional ones.
        Our efforts to combat proliferation can also be aided by other
    financial tools which are not specifically designed against WMD
    proliferation. For example, in September, the Department of Treasury
    (Treasury) applied authorities under the USA Patriot Act against an
    Asian bank that provides financial services to North Korean illicit
    activities, such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking. In designating
    Banco Delta Asia as a ``primary money laundering concern'' under the
    USA Patriot Act, Treasury acted to protect U.S. financial institutions
    while warning the global community of the illicit financial threat
    posed by the bank.
    The Challenges Ahead
        I would emphasize three proliferation challenges to illustrate the
    path ahead.
        The first is to end the North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons
    programs. The President has made clear repeatedly that, while all
    options remain on the table, our strong preference is to address these
    threats through diplomacy.
        In the Six-Party joint statement of September 2005, North Korea
    committed to abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
    programs. This was a notable development, but we still must agree on,
    and implement, the detailed requirements of North Korean
    denuclearization and its verification. That task will be difficult.
    Indeed, North Korea's demand for a light water reactor immediately
    after the joint statement was issued, and its more recent refusal to
    return to negotiations until the United States rescinds what Pyongyang
    calls ``economic sanctions,'' underscore the problems ahead. We have
    made it clear that we are committed to pursuing successful Six-Party
    negotiations, and we continue--with essential input from the DOD and
    DOE--to develop our detailed concepts for the verified denuclearization
    of North Korea. At the same time, we must and will continue our
    defensive measures, and expand them as required, to ensure that we can
    protect ourselves from the proliferation actions of the north, as well
    as from its illicit activities such as money laundering or
    counterfeiting.
        In some ways, the challenge Iran poses to the nuclear
    nonproliferation regime is even more daunting and complex than the
    North Korean threat. We have now moved to a new phase, in which the
    Security Council can add its considerable authority to the
    international effort to counter Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. The
    council will not supplant the IAEA effort, but reinforce it--for
    example, by calling on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to take
    steps the IAEA board has identified to restore confidence, and by
    giving the IAEA new, needed authority to investigate all aspects of the
    Iranian nuclear effort.
        The Council should make clear to the Iranian regime that it will
    face increasing isolation and pressure if it does not reverse course,
    take the steps called for by the IAEA Board, and return promptly to
    negotiations. We will continue to consult closely with the EU-3 and the
    European Union, with Russia, China, and many other members of the
    international community as this new diplomatic phase proceeds. Indeed,
    Secretary Rice is meeting tomorrow in Berlin with her colleagues from
    the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China to discuss the
    way forward.
        Absent even more provocative actions by Iran, we envision a
    graduated approach by the Security Council, interacting closely with
    the IAEA. The Security Council can take progressively firmer action, to
    the extent necessary, to induce Iran to come into complete compliance
    with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and safeguards obligations,
    suspend all its enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities, and
    cooperate fully with the IAEA. We have been negotiating a statement by
    the President of the Security Council that would send a clear message
    to Iran that it must abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions. If Iran
    defies the Security Council Presidential Statement, as it has the IAEA
    Board of Governors resolutions, we will urge a Council resolution to
    put increased pressure on Iran to comply. The resolution could be
    grounded in chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, given the threat to
    international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear program. In
    issuing such a resolution, the Council could require Iran, within a
    specified short period of time, to comply with all elements of the IAEA
    Board resolutions, as well as with additional Council requirements such
    as opening up to substantially increased IAEA investigative authority.
    If Iran still does not comply, we will look to even firmer Council
    action. Our aim is that Iran will be persuaded to reverse course by the
    obvious resolve of the international community, shown first in the IAEA
    Board of Governors and beginning this month in the Security Council.
        The second challenge is to end proliferation trade by rogue states,
    individuals and groups. As I described, we have made progress over the
    last few years. We have moved from the creation of international export
    control standards to their active enforcement--through enhanced
    national legislation, PSI interdictions, international law enforcement
    and financial cooperation. We have shut down the world's most dangerous
    proliferation network. We are steadily reducing the opportunities
    available to proliferators. But we must continue to expand and deepen
    our efforts--using all available national and international authorities
    and, where necessary, creating new ones--until the proliferation trade
    has effectively ended.
        The final challenge that I would mention is the need to prevent
    terrorist acquisition and use of WMD, and especially of biological and
    nuclear weapons. If terrorists acquire these weapons, they are likely
    to employ them, with potentially catastrophic effects. The biggest
    hurdle that a well-organized terrorist group with appropriate technical
    expertise would have to overcome to make a crude nuclear device is to
    gain access to sufficient quantities of fissile material. Although
    terrorist use of other weapons is more likely, the consequences of a
    terrorist nuclear attack would be so catastrophic that the danger
    requires particular attention. On the biological weapons side, with
    today's dual-use capabilities and access to particular, dangerous
    pathogens--many of which exist in nature or could be relatively easily
    obtained and cultured--the bioterror challenge presents a low-cost
    means to prosecute a potentially high-impact attack.
        Many of the tools we have in place to combat proliferation by rogue
    states are relevant against WMD terrorism. A few examples are: reducing
    the global stocks of fissile material and securing those which remain;
    improved nuclear and biological detection capability; and the
    interdiction of trafficking in nuclear weapons and biological weapons
    components. A key difference, however, is one of scale. We cannot rest
    as long as enough material for even one nuclear weapon remains
    unsecured.
        While many of the tools are the same, preventing WMD terrorism
    requires different approaches from those we have followed against state
    WMD programs or against conventional or non-WMD-related terrorism. For
    example, intelligence collection and action against the proliferation
    of WMD have traditionally focused on state-based programs, while anti-
    terrorist intelligence has focused on individuals and groups.
    Intelligence regarding the nexus of terrorism and WMD must cover the
    full range of state and non-state threats and their interrelationships.
    We are working hard to close any remaining gaps and to ensure that the
    intelligence process supports our strategic approach to combating WMD
    terrorism.
        That strategic approach entails working with partner nations to
    build a global layered defense to prevent, detect and respond to the
    threat or use of WMD by terrorists. To prevent, we will undertake
    national, multilateral, and global efforts to deny terrorists access to
    the most dangerous materials. To protect, we will develop new tools and
    capabilities with partner nations to detect the movement of WMD and to
    disrupt linkages between WMD terrorists and their facilitators. Because
    we can never be certain of our ability to prevent or protect against
    all potential WMD terrorist attacks, we will cooperate with partners to
    manage and mitigate the consequences of such attacks, and to improve
    our capabilities to attribute their source. Thus, we will work to
    harness, in an effective multinational way, all relevant collective
    resources to establish more coordinated and effective capabilities to
    prevent, protect against, and respond to the global threat of WMD
    terrorism.

                                   conclusion

        The strategic approach to combat WMD proliferation which the
    President first laid out almost 5 years ago continues to provide an
    essential guide to action against this paramount threat. Our strategy,
    supported by the new measures we have adopted to implement it, is
    flexible and dynamic, suited to the changing nature of the
    proliferation threat. Under the overall interagency leadership of the
    National Security Council, the DOS, DOD, and DOE work closely together
    at all levels--along with the Departments of Treasury, Commerce,
    Homeland Security, and the IC--to ensure the full and coordinated
    implementation of the President's strategy. While we have made
    substantial progress in countering today's proliferation threats, we
    cannot be satisfied. We must continue to heed the warning which the
    President gave in 2002: ``History will judge harshly those who saw this
    coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the
    only path to peace and security is the path of action.''

        Senator Cornyn. We'll go ahead and hear the opening
    statements from each of the witnesses then we'll turn to a
    round of questions and when Senator Reed arrives certainly give
    him a chance to make any opening statement he would care to
    make.
        Mr. Flory, we'll be glad to hear from you first.

     STATEMENT OF HON. PETER FLORY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                   FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

        Mr. Flory. Chairman Cornyn, thank you. Senator Collins,
    Senator Nelson. It's a honor to have the opportunity to testify
    before the subcommittee today to describe the DOD's efforts to
    combat the proliferation of WMD. I appreciate the opportunity
    to summarize my prepared remarks which I request be included in
    the record in full.
        Senator Cornyn. Certainly, without objection. All written
    statements will be made part of the record.
        Mr. Flory. Thank you. My goal today is to share with you
    many of the new approaches, new initiatives, the DOD is taking
    to stop the proliferation of WMD, to preventing its use, and to
    enable our warfighters to accomplish their missions in a WMD
    environment, if necessary.
        This is not a new mission, it's something we've been
    focusing on particularly since the events of September 11 and
    the promulgation of a national strategy on combating WMD in
    2002. The challenge was summed up particularly well by
    President Bush in his January 2004 State of the Union address,
    when he said, ``America is committed to keeping the world's
    most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous
    regimes.'' I would add to that that under regimes we would also
    include terrorist groups and others who might want to use WMD
    against us.
        There's a great deal that's happened since September 11,
    since 2002, and even since January 2004. At the strategic level
    as in the strategic level guidance preventing hostile states
    and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD is one of the
    four priorities for the DOD that were identified in the
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that was issued by Secretary
    Rumsfeld last month. I would add that it also supports and is
    an element of the other priorities which include defeating
    terrorists networks, defending the Homeland in depth, and
    shaping the choices of states at strategic crossroads. So all
    of these priority areas actually relate to and support each
    other.
        This is the first time that a QDR has devoted so much
    attention to the threat of WMD. Also recently and at the
    strategic level the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    General Pace, issued the first ever national military strategy
    to combat WMD on February 13, 2006, last month. Our strategic
    approach is to build on the so-called three pillars of
    combating WMD, and these were identified in the 2002 national
    strategy, and those are: nonproliferation,
    counterproliferation, and consequence management. We use those
    terms as follows:
        Nonproliferation refers to actions to prevent the
    proliferation of WMD by dissuading or impeding access to, or
    distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and
    expertise.
        Counterproliferation refers to actions to defeat the threat
    and/or the use of WMD against the United States, against our
    Armed Forces, against our allies, or against our partners.
        WMD consequence management refers to actions taken to
    mitigate the effects of a WMD attack or event and to restore
    essential operations and services at home or abroad.
        The strategic framework and the more detailed functional
    requirements that flow to it is the Department's vehicle for
    dividing the broad combating WMD mission into eight specific
    and definable military activities that we can address with
    better focus in the budget, training, doctrine, and policy
    processes.
        In addition to a new strategic framework we have also
    revised our organizational structure to better position us to
    combat WMD. On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of Defense
    designated STRATCOM, commanded by General Cartwright who is
    here with me today, as the DOD's lead for synchronizing and
    focusing combating WMD operational efforts in support of our
    combatant commanders. In this new role, STRATCOM supports the
    other combatant commanders as they execute combating WMD
    operations and General Cartwright and his team, including Dr.
    Jim Tegnelia, of the DTRA now are the advocates for developing
    mission requirements and shepherding them through the budget
    process. Those are mission requirements relating to combating
    WMD.
        The first two mission requirements to be addressed in this
    manner are WMD elimination and interdiction, two areas where we
    need to increase our capabilities substantially. Those are two
    of the eight mission areas that were identified.
        In addition, all DOD components were directed to realign
    themselves to improve execution of the combating WMD mission.
    Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, for example, my own
    office, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International
    Security Policy, is a near-single point of contact for policy
    support for the combating WMD mission, specifically covering
    seven of the eight mission areas. We continue to refine our
    organization within the Office of the Under Secretary for
    Policy.
        While we pursue these strategic and organizational changes
    we continue to move ahead with day-to-day activities to combat
    WMD. Many of these activities were initiated around the time of
    the National Strategy to Combat WMD in 2002. Some actually were
    started earlier and many are entirely new or certainly things
    that were initiated in the last couple of years. The QDR groups
    these activities into preventive and responsive dimensions.
        With respect to the preventive end of things,
    nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes have been
    and remain integral elements of our strategy for combating WMD.
    These include the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical
    Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the
    Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar
    Arrangement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The DOD
    brings significant policy and technical expertise to bear on
    enforcement of these regimes including for a few examples
    within my office, our Office of Negotiations Policy, and the
    Defense Technology Security Administration. But while these
    regimes are an important first line of defense, not all
    countries are members of all regimes and many countries that
    are members of regimes cheat. WMD programs in countries like
    Iran and North Korea, for example, have highlighted the need
    for additional measures. One of those in particular is
    interdiction.
        Interdiction is an essential component in our efforts to
    counter the proliferation activities of both suppliers and
    customers. Interdictions can raise the costs for proliferators,
    they can shine a bright light on their activities, they can
    also deter suppliers or potential suppliers from going into the
    proliferation business in the first place.
        President Bush launched the Proliferation Security
    Initiative (PSI) in May 2003 to help U.S. interdiction efforts
    and to build the interdiction capacity of like-minded
    governments around the world. PSI partners, and now there are
    over 70 of them, define interdiction broadly to include
    military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts
    to impede and stop proliferation shipments. This can involve
    sea, air, land, or what we call transmodal shipments, shipments
    that go from sea to air or land, to sea or whatever. Again,
    more than 70 countries have indicated support for the PSI and
    we continue to discuss the initiative with other potential
    supporters.
        The DOD is responsible for leading the PSI Operational
    Experts Group process which is the main focus for the
    operational aspects of PSI. This is a group that brings
    together experts in military, intelligence, law enforcement,
    customs, and other fields and allows them to plan and conduct
    exercises to share expertise, for example, on how different
    country's legal regimes can be used to support
    counterproliferation activities. To date, we've had 19 PSI
    exercises with a number of countries involving a wide range of
    operational assets including air, maritime, and ground assets,
    and these have been hosted by a number of different PSI
    countries.
        Another DOD program that supports the preventive dimension
    of combating WMD is the CTR program which Chairman Cornyn
    mentioned earlier. The subcommittee is familiar with the
    history and the details of CTR and we appreciate your support
    in the past. My prepared statement addresses in detail the
    CTR's record over the past year and some of the issues and
    challenges we see in the year ahead.
        For now I'd like to highlight one of the activities, one of
    the CTR preventive activities in particular which is one in
    which the administration needs Congress' help in the short-term
    to help ensure success and I'm referring to the Nuclear
    Security Cooperation Initiative announced by Presidents Bush
    and Putin at the February 2005 G8 Summit in Bratislava. A key
    element of this initiative is to accelerate U.S. security work
    at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites to achieve completion
    by 2008. That would be 4 years ahead of the originally planned
    schedule. If we're successful in doing this and we certainly
    intend to be successful we'll be able to say by 2008 that we
    will have done all that we can to bring the security of
    Russia's nuclear weapons up to credible standards. This will be
    a significant achievement and we need your help to achieve this
    goal. Acceleration of the original schedule to 2008 requires
    additional funds for obligations during fiscal year 2006 and I
    would respectfully urge subcommittee members to support the
    administration's request for $44.5 million in fiscal year 2006
    supplemental appropriations for this project.
        Mr. Chairman, if I could just quickly also address two of
    the specific issues you asked about in your statement, the
    Shchuch'ye Project, and the question of using CTR funds to
    Libya. The Shchuch'ye Project is a large project in which we've
    invested a great deal of money to construct a chemical
    demilitarization plant. We've had a delay in the project that
    is going to set us back we think somewhat over a year. The one
    subcontractor that entered a bid to carry out some of the work
    inside the facilities of actually putting in some of the
    equipment submitted a bid that is way too high and both the
    U.S. Government and our main contractor on the contract agreed
    that the bid was too high. We've gone back, we have put the
    contract out for additional bids. We'll go through that
    process, we'll see what we emerge with, and see if we can't get
    a better offer on the table this time. I would emphasize for
    the committee's purposes that this means there will be a delay
    in the Shchuch'ye Project.
        The other matter you raised was the question of Libya, what
    CTR might do to contribute to the destruction of Libyan
    chemical weapons. We had a team, I think it was a Department of
    State (DOS) DTRA team with members from the DOS and our DTRA
    that was in Libya in February. They have looked at the stocks
    involved, they have looked at the logistical and other issues
    involved, and we expect to get a report back from them with
    some options sometime next month and I'm sure we'll have the
    opportunity to discuss that further with the committee. That's
    the status on the couple of additional items that you raised.
        Mr. Chairman, turning now to the responsive dimension of
    the combating WMD mission and what we have done to address the
    challenges here, the autumn 2005 program/budget review
    undertook a comprehensive look at combating WMD funding that
    was carried on through the QDR. Beginning with the 2006 budget
    submission, in fact, we added $2 billion to the previous $7.6
    billion fiscal years 2006-2011 allocation for the Chemical
    Biological Defense Program. This increase in the Chem-Bio
    Defense Program funding represents a down payment towards
    reprioritization of and within the combating WMD mission. This
    process is not complete and we look forward to working with
    STRATCOM and with the committee as we proceed with these
    initiatives.
        Another element of the responsive dimension is the
    establishment of an Army headquarters tasked to provide
    technically qualified chemical, biological, radiological,
    nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) response forces to
    support geographic combatant commanders. The 20th Army Support
    Command has this job now which includes capabilities to quickly
    and systematically locate, seize, secure, disable, and
    safeguard an adversary's WMD program, including sites,
    laboratories, materials, associated scientists, and other
    personnel. The impetus for setting up this organization was the
    work that was done prior to the Iraq war to set up forces to
    deal with the WMD that we expected to find in Iraq. In fact,
    many of the elements of the current group actually did serve as
    part of the Iraq WMD effort.
        Today this organization includes the Army's technical
    escort battalions as well as an Army explosive ordinance
    disposal (EOD) group. The headquarters of the 20th was
    activated in 2004. The next step for this unit will be to make
    the entire unit including the headquarters as deployable as its
    many operational components. As it stands right now some of the
    headquarters is civilian so they cannot be deployed in the same
    way that the military components can be, but that's something
    we're in the process of changing.
        Another element of the responsive dimension is to
    anticipate the continued evolution of WMD threats. As an
    example of how we're doing this, we are reallocating $1.5
    billion in Chem-Bio Defense Program funds to invest in broad-
    spectrum countermeasures against advance bioterror threats.
    Currently the approach has been somewhat shorthanded as the
    ``one drug, one bug'' approach whereby a particular vaccine or
    a particular remedy only worked against one particular
    pathogen. What we're trying to do now is develop broad-spectrum
    countermeasures that work against an entire class of threats.
        We're also expanding our work with potential partner
    countries to improve response capabilities. In 2002, the DOD
    helped create a Chem-Bio Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Defense
    Battalion for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
    Elements of this fully operational battalion were available
    just over a year later to support the 2004 Summer Olympics in
    Athens. This battalion has received personnel and capability
    support from 17 NATO nations to date. We continue to encourage
    strengthening the battalion's capabilities to help drive member
    nations to improve their own combating WMD capabilities as well
    as to improve the collective capabilities of the unit. This
    battalion will be a model for future collaboration as we expand
    our counterproliferation discussions with other nations.
        In addition, we continue to develop bilateral discussions
    with international partners on counterproliferation issues
    ranging from policy and operational support to detailed
    technical cooperation. We have or we are establishing such
    bilateral working groups with a number of countries in Europe,
    the Middle East, and Asia that share our concern about and our
    desire to prepare for the WMD threat.
        I would just add as a general point here, one of the key
    themes in the QDR is the idea of developing partnership
    capacity and both the initiatives that I just mentioned as well
    as a number of things that we are undertaking are designed to
    support that goal. We can't do everything. We shouldn't have to
    do everything, and in a number of cases arguably it's better if
    somebody else does it. So the idea of developing capabilities
    and developing capabilities of partner nations is something
    that runs throughout our entire approach here.
        Senator Cornyn. Secretary Flory, you are providing the
    committee a lot of very good information but in the interest of
    getting to the other witnesses if you wouldn't mind summing up
    and then, of course, we'll come back with some questions and
    answers.
        Mr. Flory. Mr. Chairman, I can sum up very briefly and
    simply say we understand at the DOD that combating the threat
    of WMD in a complex and uncertain world while it continues to
    surprise us and often in unpleasant manners, requires a new
    approach. This approach is reflected in our strategic guidance,
    in our realigned operational structure, and in the way we carry
    out our day-to-day activities. Our commitment to success is
    absolute. Failure is not an option. I look forward to having
    the opportunity later to answer your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Flory follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Peter C.W. Flory
        Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, members of the subcommittee, it is
    an honor to have the opportunity to appear before you to describe the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to combat proliferation of
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD). My goal today is to share with you
    many of the Department's new approaches to stopping the proliferation
    of WMD, preventing its use, and enabling our warfighters to accomplish
    their missions in a WMD environment if necessary.
        Since December 2002, when the President set forth the National
    Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Department has
    taken a number of measures to enable us better to carry out this
    mission. At the same time, while adapting at the strategic level, we
    have been carrying out the day-to-day activities--some ongoing, some
    new, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)--to implement
    our policies in the face of the global WMD challenge.

                               strategic guidance

        At the strategic level, preventing hostile states and non-state
    actors from acquiring or using WMD is one of the four priorities for
    the Department identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This
    is the first time a QDR has devoted such attention to the threat of
    WMD.
        Also at the strategic level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff on February 13, 2006, issued the first-ever National Military
    Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. This strategy builds on
    the three-pillar structure of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD:
    nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. As
    defined in the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, these pillars
    are:

             Nonproliferation: actions to prevent the proliferation
            of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access
            to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and
            expertise.
             Counterproliferation: actions to defeat the threat
            and/or use of WMD against the United States, U.S. Armed Forces,
            its allies, and partners.
             WMD Consequence Management: actions taken to mitigate
            the effects of WMD attack or event and restore essential
            operations and services at home and abroad.

        At the next level, the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD
    identifies eight military mission areas that support the pillars in the
    National Strategy: offensive operations, elimination operations,
    interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, WMD
    consequence management, security cooperation and partner activities,
    and threat reduction cooperation. This new strategic framework is the
    Department's vehicle for dividing the broad ``combating WMD'' mission
    into specific, definable military activities that we can address with
    better focus in the budget, training, doctrine, and policy processes.

                    organizing for the combating wmd mission

        On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of Defense designated the United
    States Strategic Command (STRATCOM)--commanded by General Cartwright,
    here today--as the Department's lead for synchronizing and focusing
    combating WMD operational efforts in support of our combatant
    commanders. In this new role, STRATCOM supports other combatant
    commanders as they execute combating WMD operations. General Cartwright
    and his team now are designated to serve as advocates for developing
    combating WMD mission requirements and shepherding them through the
    budget process. STRATCOM's initial assignment is to focus on two of the
    missions assigned by the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD:
    elimination and interdiction.
        Also, in the nature of organizational change, all DOD components
    have been directed to realign themselves to improve execution of the
    combating WMD mission. Within the organization of the Office of the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, for example, offices have been
    realigned over the past 6 months to create in my office, the Office of
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, a
    near-single point of contact for policy support of the combating WMD
    mission. Within my office, in August 2005 the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy--already responsible for
    interdiction and related WMD nonproliferation activities--was assigned
    responsibility for the Offices of Counterproliferation Policy and
    Cooperative Threat Reduction. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Forces Policy, also within my office, is responsible for active
    defense and offensive operations. This organizational shift thus
    brought policy responsibility for seven of the National Military
    Strategy to Combat WMD's eight functional areas--offensive operations,
    elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense,
    passive defense, security cooperation and partner activities, and
    threat reduction cooperation--under a single policy point of contact.
    Organizing Policy's oversight of consequence management capabilities is
    something we are still working on.
        Our approach builds on the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons
    of Mass Destruction, and, more recently, the 2006 National Security
    Strategy. Our goal was well summed up by President Bush in his January
    20, 2004, State of the Union address, ``America is committed to keeping
    the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most
    dangerous regimes.'' To fulfill the President's commitment, the QDR
    directs that ``national efforts to counter the threat posed by WMD must
    incorporate both preventive and responsive dimensions.''
        Again, while we are pursuing the strategic and organizational
    changes I described above, we are already moving ahead on a day-to-day
    basis in activities to combat WMD. Many of these activities were
    initiated around the time the National Strategy to Combat WMD was
    adopted. Some were started even earlier. Many are entirely new.

                     preventive dimension of combating wmd

    The Toolkit for Preventive Activities
        Nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes have been for
    decades an integral element of our strategy for combating WMD. These
    treaties and regimes include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the
    Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the
    Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement
    and the Missile Technology Control Regime. DOD brings significant
    policy and technical expertise to bear toward enforcement of these
    regimes through the Office of Negotiations Policy and the Defense
    Technology Security Administration.
    Interdiction
        While these regimes are a first line of defense, not all countries
    are members of all regimes, and many countries that are members cheat.
    WMD programs in countries like Iran and North Korea have highlighted
    the need for additional measures such as interdiction. The December
    2002 U.S. National Strategy to Combat WMD called for enhanced
    interdiction to curtail proliferation of WMD. Interdiction is an
    essential component in our efforts to counter the proliferation
    activities of both suppliers and customers. Interdictions raise the
    costs for proliferators, but also can deter some suppliers from even
    getting in the business of prolferation.
    Efforts to Improve Interdiction Capabilities
        As part of this effort, DOD has taken steps to strengthen U.S.
    military capabilities to support interdiction. For example:

             Interdiction Simulation. In October 2005, the Naval
            War College organized the first government-wide, classified
            gaming exercise for all U.S. agencies involved in interdiction.
            This simulation involved senior officials and a broad spectrum
            of operational/technical experts. The goal was to improve our
            ability to create and exploit interdiction opportunities by:
            (1) developing new operational concepts; and (2) strengthening
            relationships across the government.
             Integration of U.S. Military Capabilities. In January
            2005, STRATCOM was tasked with integrating DOD efforts to
            combat WMD. Interdiction was identified as a top priority
            (along with WMD elimination). In this new role, STRATCOM will
            be able to: advocate development of capabilities supporting
            WMD-related interdiction; develop operational concepts and
            doctrine; synchronize intelligence; identify resource
            requirements; and coordinate strategic planning. Military
            departments and other combatant commands were tasked to support
            STRATCOM's efforts.
             Naval Assets. The U.S. Navy has improved shipboarding
            and cargo assessment. In 2005, the Navy validated its new Visit
            Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) team capability. VBSS teams are
            assigned to every large deployed U.S. naval formation. The Navy
            has also been testing a virtual, open-source database to
            provide ship-boarding teams with visual cues (photographs and
            descriptions of WMD-related materials) during examinations of
            personnel, manifests, and cargo.
             DOD Intelligence Organizations. The Defense
            Intelligence Agency (DIA) established a new division for
            interdiction support to DOD policymakers. This division is
            integrating databases around the Intelligence Community for
            tracking individuals, organizations and means of transport for
            items of proliferation concern. In October 2005, the Office of
            Naval Intelligence (ONI) was directed to lead development of
            cross-government, global maritime intelligence integration to
            support national maritime security requirements to include
            interdiction. The goal is strategic-to-tactical, time-sensitive
            maritime intelligence for policymakers around the clock:
            targeting support analysis, strategic indications and warning
            analysis, and real time information sharing.

        These are some specific examples of interdiction-related work
    undertaken since 2002, and expansion of the relationships essential for
    building capabilities.
    The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
        In addition to U.S. domestic efforts, we have worked closely with
    other governments since President Bush launched the PSI in May 2003.
    The PSI has been a forum for the United States and other countries to
    collaborate on how we will work together to interdict WMD-related
    shipments bound to and from states of concern, and to build national
    capabilities so that like-minded nations collectively have a more
    robust arsenal of WMD interdiction tools.
        PSI partners define interdiction broadly to include military, law
    enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts to impede and stop
    proliferation-related shipments, and it can involve sea, air, land, or
    trans-modal shipments. Today more than 70 countries have indicated
    support for the PSI, and we continue to discuss the initiative with key
    states where proliferators may operate.
    PSI Builds National Capabilities
        PSI partners are working together in the PSI operational experts
    group (OEG) to improve their national interdiction capabilities. The
    OEG is an expanding network of military, law enforcement, intelligence,
    legal, and diplomatic experts. They develop new operational concepts
    for interdiction, organize a program of interdiction exercises, share
    information about national legal authorities, and pursue cooperation
    with industry sectors that can be helpful to the interdiction mission.
    Through these efforts, OEG participants raise the level of collective
    and national interdiction capabilities. The November 2005 OEG meeting
    was the first regionally focused OEG meeting and provided a venue for
    all European PSI participants to develop national and regional
    capabilities. The United States will host the next OEG meeting in April
    2006, which for the first time will involve a South American
    participant, Argentina.
        DOD is responsible for leading the OEG process, the locus of
    operational aspects of PSI. To date, 19 PSI exercises involving a wide
    range of operational assets have been held. These have included air,
    maritime, and ground assets and have been hosted by a range of
    countries. Table-top games and simulations in particular have helped
    participants work through interdiction scenarios, and have, in many
    cases, improved the way participating governments organize to conduct
    interdictions. We need to ensure DOD assigns the resources needed to
    continue playing a leadership role in PSI operational activities and
    working with our PSI partners.
    Cooperative Threat Reduction
        Mr. Chairman, the subcommittee is already familiar with the history
    and details of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. CTR
    supports another two of the mission areas identified by the National
    Military Strategy to Combat WMD: threat reduction cooperation, and
    security cooperation/partner activities. The program continues to help
    eliminate WMD material and enhance security for WMD, particularly the
    legacy WMD of the former Soviet Union. I would like to focus my
    testimony on recent developments in CTR, as well as priorities for the
    year ahead. A detailed explanation of the President's fiscal year 2007
    budget request for the CTR program is appended to this statement.
        The administration is requesting $372.1 million for CTR activities
    in fiscal year 2007. The decrease from fiscal year 2006 ($409.2
    million) results from decreasing requirements for the nerve agent
    elimination project at Shchuch'ye, Russia. We expect CTR budget
    requests to rise again in future years, as other projects replace
    currently ongoing and completing projects.
        Fiscal years 2005 and 2006-to-date saw continued progress for CTR.
    This was the case both with respect to CTR's substantive mission, as
    well as with respect to the revised business practices implemented
    after problems arose several years ago. These new practices extended to
    both policy and implementation. They included changes in personnel,
    application of DOD acquisition processes, extensive reviews by the DOD
    Inspector General and Government Accountability Office, conversion of
    informal understandings to binding legal agreements, and establishment
    of a formal ``executive review'' process, in which implementation and
    policy experts review all aspects of major projects semi-annually with
    their Russian counterparts.
        In this timeframe, CTR continued its WMD infrastructure elimination
    work in Russia, destroying 42 intercontinental missiles, and continued
    work on the new mobile missile project that eliminates SS-24/25
    missiles, as well as their rail- or road-mobile launchers. CTR also
    continued work on the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at
    Shchuch'ye. The Shchuch'ye facility will provide Russia a capability to
    eliminate some 2.1 million artillery shells and rockets loaded with
    nerve agent--one of Russia's most dangerous chemical agents weaponized
    in the most proliferable form. At Shchuch'ye, both the Russian-built
    and CTR-built main chemical weapons elimination buildings stand near
    completion, ready to be outfitted internally with chemical handling and
    neutralization equipment. Regrettably, the state-owned subcontractor we
    had hoped would complete the CTR-funded main processing building
    submitted an exorbitant bid for this work and has refused to budge. The
    result may be up to a 14-month delay in completion of the facility, now
    targeted for late 2008, with potential additional costs that cannot be
    predicted with accuracy at this point. The U.S. commitment to
    Shchuch'ye remains unchanged, and support from international partners
    continues to be excellent.
        Also in Russia, CTR has continued its assistance to improve the
    security of nuclear warheads in storage. With the President's
    Bratislava Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative, we are poised to
    complete our security work at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites by
    2008. This effort is an acceleration of work that was already underway
    through CTR and a related DOE program, but was not programmed for
    completion before 2011. What was achieved at Bratislava was Russian
    agreement to supply information promptly on all warhead sites where
    Moscow felt U.S. assistance would be necessary. Russia met that
    commitment by providing detailed information in June 2005 that allowed
    U.S. agencies and the Russian government to agree on an accelerated
    schedule to upgrade security at select sites by 2008.
        Let me be clear: the U.S. is not enhancing security of warheads
    attached to operational nuclear delivery systems; rather, we are
    supporting Russia in its responsibility to secure its extensive warhead
    inventory across its vast and often remote array of storage facilities.
    The U.S. will be able to say by 2008 that we have done all we can to
    bring security of Russia's nuclear weapons up to credible standards.
    That will be a significant achievement. We will need Congress to help
    in this endeavor. Acceleration of the original schedule from a 2011
    completion target to 2008 requires that additional funds be obligated
    during fiscal year 2006. I urge subcommittee members to support the
    administration's request for $44.5 million in fiscal year 2006
    supplemental appropriations for this CTR project.
        The past year has also seen success in implementation of CTR's
    ``Threat Agent Detection and Response'' (TADR) project. TADR is being
    implemented in Central Asian and Caucasus states. It is a web-based
    disease surveillance network that replaces the Soviet system of
    maintaining libraries of dangerous pathogens in unsecured locations.
    Under TADR, CTR consolidates these dangerous pathogen strains in a
    Central Reference Laboratory which will have the ability to
    characterize and securely store the sample. The U.S. receives samples
    of each strain. The result is a capability to determine whether a
    disease outbreak is naturally occurring or a potential bio-terror
    event. TADR-supplied equipment and training already in place have been
    used to identify Avian Influenza. In 2005, we signed agreements on TADR
    assistance with Azerbaijan and with Ukraine. This complements
    agreements already in place with Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.
    The TADR project has been a key initiative for this administration and
    we believe it helps meet a significant, unfilled requirement for the
    U.S. to stay abreast of the global bio-terror threat.
        During the past year, CTR also saw continued progress in its WMD
    border security project, known as the WMD-Proliferation Prevention
    Initiative (PPI). PPI was conceived at the outset of this
    administration, and implemented after the September 11 attacks. This
    initiative takes CTR in a fundamentally new direction. Previously, CTR
    dealt with WMD at its source--a CTR mission that will be essential for
    as long as governments identify stocks of WMD, delivery systems, and
    related infrastructure and request U.S. help in eliminating them.
        However, September 11 highlighted the need to look beyond ``WMD-in-
    place'' and address the threat of ``WMD-on-the-move.'' PPI focuses on
    willing countries that lack resources--in the case of PPI, the
    resources to build detection/interdiction capabilities on their own.
    PPI is now at work in Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. We recently
    expanded activities in Ukraine, and signed key legal agreements with
    Kazakhstan to allow us to begin PPI projects with that country. We are
    focusing on Central Asian countries because of their proximity to
    Russia in order to create a WMD ``safety net.'' We are not merely
    supplying equipment through PPI, but are working with the combatant
    commands to provide training, doctrine and tactics for that equipment.
        We have appreciated the continued interest of Armed Services staff
    in PPI and WMD border security. PPI's approach has prompted questions
    about whether it should be viewed as traditional security assistance.
    In our view, since PPI is linked specifically to WMD nonproliferation--
    CTR's core goal as reflected in the original CTR legislation--it is
    eligible for funding under CTR. We will continue to work with Congress
    to ensure PPI continues to meet the legislation requirements. We
    believe WMD border security is an important element of the CTR mission,
    and will continue to provide opportunities to help other countries
    improve their ability to secure their borders against the spread of
    WMD.
        One reason for congressional concern about CTR's WMD border
    security work has been the sheer scope of U.S. international border
    security activities, and the need to enhance coordination of these
    border security programs. We can report that, as of January 2006, all
    international border security assistance related to nuclear detection
    activities is governed by guidelines promulgated and administered by
    the NSC's Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee. These
    guidelines will be expanded to include a process whereby all types of
    U.S. international border security assistance, from proliferation
    prevention to counternarcotics, will be synchronized and deconflicted
    as well at the Washington level, as they are currently in the field.
        Finally, I can report that in May 2005, DOD took the initiative to
    extend the CTR program's legal framework with Russia--over 1 year ahead
    of expiration. We took this step to avoid a disruption of CTR's
    important work such as occurred 7 years ago, the last time the
    framework required extension. We are pleased to report that Russia has
    accepted U.S. terms for extension of this framework and we believe we
    will be able to conclude negotiations well before the June 2006
    deadline. This will allow CTR's important work to secure and eliminate
    WMD and related infrastructure in Russia to continue uninterrupted.

                     responsive dimension of combating wmd

    Day-to-Day Changes: Investing for the Future
        Revising our strategies, restructuring our organizations, and
    changing our daily activities will not have lasting impact without
    adequate funding of corresponding capabilities, technologies and
    mission areas. The autumn 2005 program/budget review undertook a
    comprehensive review of combating WMD funding which was carried through
    the QDR. Beginning with the fiscal year 2006 budget submission, we
    added $2 billion to a $7.6 billion fiscal year 2006-2011 FYDP for the
    Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP). We continue to seek
    opportunities to realign resources for the combating WMD mission; and
    two key priorities, under STRATCOM's leadership, will be military
    requirements for the elimination and interdiction missions. The $2
    billion increase in chem-bio defense program funding represents a down
    payment toward reprioritization of the combating WMD mission. However,
    this process is not complete and we look forward to working with
    STRATCOM on improving definition of the requirements.
    Day-to-Day Changes: Joint Task Force for Elimination
        One of the earliest lessons learned from our military operations in
    Iraq was that DOD needed a well organized, well trained force to be
    able to quickly and systematically locate, seize, secure, disable and
    safeguard an adversary's WMD program, including sites, laboratories,
    materials, and associated scientists and other personnel.
        The Army's 20th Support Command, located north of Baltimore at the
    Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, was stood up as an Army
    headquarters tasked to provide technically qualified Chemical,
    Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives response
    forces to support geographic combatant commanders. This unique
    organization includes the Army's Technical Escort Battalions as well as
    an Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group. While the 20th was not
    established until after Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of its units
    participated in the search for WMD in Iraq.
        The 20th Headquarters was activated in 2004. However, while the
    military units assigned to this headquarters are deployable, the
    headquarters itself cannot deploy today since nearly two-thirds of the
    staff is composed of government civilians or contractors. In the QDR
    process, DOD leadership approved a proposal to assign 20th Support
    Command the task of becoming a deployable headquarters that could
    command and control these types of operations.
        Establishing a joint task force for elimination is a key element of
    the Department's vision, as articulated by the QDR, to deal with all
    aspects of the threat posed by WMD.
    Day-to-Day Changes: Biodefense Initiative
        Another key conclusion of the QDR was that the Department should
    focus on new defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued
    evolution of WMD threats. In response, DOD has decided to reallocate
    funding within the Chem-Bio Defense program to invest over $1.5 billion
    over the next 5 years to develop broad-spectrum countermeasures against
    advanced bio-terror threats. For example, rather than continuing the
    traditional approach to developing countermeasures--which in effect
    results in ``one drug, one bug''--DOD will conduct research to develop
    drugs that could each counter many pathogens. For example, we are going
    to conduct research to develop a single vaccine to counter all types of
    viral hemorrhagic fevers (like Ebola and Marburg) as well as a single
    vaccine for all ``intracellular'' pathogens, like the Plague.
        While supporting our combating WMD effort, these initiatives also
    benefit our forces who may well be ordered to deploy to places where
    these fevers pose a risk. Having one drug that could counter many bugs
    would improve military effectiveness by getting forces into the theater
    more quickly.
    Day-to-Day Changes: Building Partner Capacity
        More than ever before, we need partners be to be prepared for
    operations with us in a CBRN world. In 2002, the Department proposed
    creation of a CBRN Defense Battalion for NATO. This U.S. concept was
    endorsed by NATO defense ministers during the 2002 Prague Summit, and
    elements of a fully operational CBRN Defense Battalion supported the
    2004 Summer Olympics just over 1 year later. The battalion includes a
    CBRN joint assessment team and mobile chemical, biological and
    radiological laboratories; it has received personnel and capability
    support from 17 NATO nations to date. The concept for the Battalion and
    the way it was quickly institutionalized were unprecedented at NATO. We
    continue to encourage strengthening of the Battalion's capabilities to
    help drive member nations to improve their own combating WMD
    capabilities. The Battalion will be a model for future collaboration as
    we expand our counterproliferation discussions with other nations.
        In addition, we continue to develop bilateral discussions with
    international partners on counterproliferation issues ranging from
    policy and operational support to detailed technical cooperation. We
    have or are establishing such bilateral working groups with countries
    from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia that share our desire to prepare
    for defense against the WMD threat.
        One goal of the bilateral working groups we establish is to ensure
    that U.S. and potential coalition partners can execute combined
    operations in a WMD environment. The challenge of interoperability is
    significant even in a ``mere'' conventional warfighting environment.
    However, a WMD situation raises many additional issues. For example, if
    our combat or transport aircraft are returning from an area where WMD
    has been employed, we need to know in advance what decontamination our
    allies will require in order to ensure ready access to important way
    stations and forward depots. Similar problems relate to the
    decontamination of forces--including potentially wounded personnel--who
    will require immediate evacuation and attention. We have launched
    discussions with our NATO allies as well as several key potential
    coalition partners on these and other issues we believe need to be
    resolved for combined operations in a WMD environment.
        Building partner capacity takes many forms and can include building
    legal capacities. In 2005, Navy, Joint Staff, General Counsel, and
    Office of the Secretary of Defense-Policy representatives completed 3
    years of activity to expand legal authority against maritime
    trafficking in WMD, and helped secure adoption of amendments to the
    Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Against the Safety of
    Maritime Navigation establishing the first international criminal
    standard against shipment of WMD as well as a comprehensive boarding
    regime. Once the amendment enters into force after ratification by 12
    member-states, we will have a new vehicle to prosecute violators and
    press for greater vigilance against trafficking in WMD.

                                   conclusion

        Mr. Chairman, the DOD understands that combating the spread of WMD
    in a complex and uncertain world requires a new approach. This new
    approach is reflected in our new strategic guidance, realigned
    organizational structure, and in changes in our day-to-day activities.
    We view this as part of the Department's larger, long-term
    transformation to better ensure U.S. security against future threats.
    Our commitment to success in this endeavor is absolute. Failure is not
    an option. Congress is an essential partner in this fight, and we look
    forward to continuing our work together. Thank you again for the
    opportunity to testify.

        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. General Cartwright,
    we'd be glad to hear your opening statement.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES CARTWRIGHT, USMC, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think most
    of it has been covered and I'll just hit on a couple of
    questions that you brought up in your initial statement just to
    make sure we have that as a starting point. The threat really
    has been covered, the pillars, the national, and the military
    strategies here.
        In January 2005, STRATCOM was assigned the mission of
    synchronizing and integrating all of the mission areas that
    heretofore had been spread across the Department. So we see
    ourselves in a position of advocating for the doctrine, the
    organization, the material solutions, the tactics, techniques,
    and procedures that will serve and benefit the regional
    combatant commanders.
        In August 2005, the DTRA was assigned as our lead combat
    support agency and what they brought to the table for us was
    the technical expertise. They are recognized within the DOD as
    having the technical expertise and the relationships across the
    government to allow us to effect this mission area in a way
    that we need to do it.
        In the January timeframe of this year, 2006, we stood up
    the initial operating capability of what we call the Center for
    Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. STRATCOM is organized
    with joint functional components but given that the DTRA is in
    fact an agency rather than a military organization and has a
    director as its head versus a commander, we chose to call this
    a center to clearly identify the fact that it was led by a
    civilian. We have assigned to that organization a flag officer
    who gets up every day worrying about what it is that we need to
    do to bring closer the military capabilities and the technical
    expertise that DTRA brings to the table. So there is a core
    element inside of DTRA at their headquarters in Fort Belvoir in
    Virginia that is assigned to bring closer together that
    technical expertise that resides there and the operational
    planning and execution functions that we're going to have to
    carry out in this mission area across all three pillars.
        We also, as was discussed here in the opening statement,
    have a joint task force (JTF) for elimination that we are
    standing up with the 20th Support Group of the Army; a major
    effort and a major capability need that we have to get going
    and get going quickly. We're in the functional need assessment
    phase of standing that organization up to make it deployable,
    make it responsive to the combatant commanders. The objective
    here is to give the regional combatant commanders the
    capability all the way from what we call Phase Zero which is
    the engagement activities within the theater through combat
    operations and, if necessary, through the consequence
    management of the clean-up of activities at the end of a
    conflict. To have one coherent organization looking across all
    those phases in support of the regional combatant commanders is
    where we want to end up.
        We intend to get there and get there as quickly as we can.
    The next major milestone for us is at the end of this year to
    have that component, that JTF for elimination, up and running
    with a needs assessment and understanding of the requirements,
    resources both in manpower and dollars that are going to be
    necessary and the authorities for the organization to be
    effective. I'll leave it at that and open to your questions,
    Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: Thank you for this
    opportunity to review U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) progress
    during the past year and to present our plan for the future. I will
    discuss the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) role in validating and
    updating our transformational approach, and request your continued
    support for specific actions necessary to ensure our strategic
    capabilities are correctly postured to meet the challenges of today and
    tomorrow. 2006 is a year of unprecedented change. Our ultimate goals
    are driving the pace of change: building strategic advantage, ensuring
    the security of the American people and strengthening the community of
    free nations.

          adapting to the new environment--transforming while we fight

        One year ago, we spoke of global interdependence and its impact on
    how we organize, plan, and operate. We emphasized developing strong
    links between U.S. strategic objectives and regional operations, as our
    adversaries were employing asymmetric means to strike well beyond the
    battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. We also spoke of STRATCOM's new
    mission assignments and the steps we had undertaken to transform our
    command into an agile 21st century organization capable of deterring
    our adversaries and bringing the full range of global strike,
    defensive, command and control (C\2\), and intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to bear against them if
    necessary. We outlined an enormous transformational effort that had to
    be accomplished in the context of an ongoing global conflict with
    active combat operations and without the luxury of an operational
    pause.
        Throughout the last year, the men and women of STRATCOM have
    engaged in that global conflict, often employing means not visible
    either to the average American or to our adversaries. They met this
    day-to-day challenge with professionalism and commitment while they
    were also restructuring our organization to focus our efforts, conserve
    our resources, and streamline support to other combatant commanders
    around the world. I come to you today gratified by the progress these
    fine men and women have made and energized to complete the task before
    us.

                        stratcom transformation vectors

        The Department of Defense (DOD) budget you enacted for 2006 enabled
    a string of organizational and operational successes along all of our
    transformation vectors.
        We changed the way we are organized and operate. We implemented,
    and by the end of 2006, will refine the redistributed and functionally
    aligned command structure described last year. This new structure is
    already paying off in terms of decentralized operational employment and
    increased operational speed. Our efforts resulted in:

             A flattened, streamlined, and focused headquarters
            staff charged with maintaining command and control of the
            Nation's nuclear forces, providing strategic guidance and
            advocacy for essential mission capabilities, and conducting
            integrated and synchronized strategic-level planning necessary
            for mission accomplishment in all mission areas.
             Four interdependent Joint Functional Component
            Commands: ISR; Network-Warfare; Integrated Missile Defense; and
            Space and Global Strike. Day-to-day operational planning and
            execution of specialized global capabilities now reside at the
            component level, where commanders are able to maintain focus on
            their primary mission and not be distracted by staff support
            activities.
             Integrated Information Operations (IO) support through
            the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC). The JIOC is the
            focal point for all operational and tactical IO planning
            support to DOD users around the globe.
             Improved security for DOD information systems through
            the aggressive efforts of Joint Task Force--Global Network
            Operations (JTF-GNO). JTF-GNO instituted stringent use controls
            and trained system users to reduce vulnerabilities.
             A collaborative, Joint Space Operations Center
            (JSpOC), to deliver select DOD space capability to U.S.,
            allied, and other national users. When fully operational, JSpOC
            will provide the full range of DOD space capabilities.
             A new STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
            Destruction and a new Global Innovation and Strategy Center
            that recently completed their formative processes, joining the
            fight with specialized technical skills and solutions to unique
            mission challenges.

        By making this unique organizational transformation we also
    strengthened our operational relationships with the Defense
    Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Defense
    Information Systems Agency, and National Security Agency in order to
    leverage the tremendous resources and capabilities resident in these
    organizations. Now we effectively bridge many artificial barriers to
    communications and information sharing, and bring enhanced combat power
    to the regional combatant commanders.
    We made progress in our drive toward a New Triad of capabilities
        The New Triad is comprised of offensive and defensive capabilities
    enabled by persistent global C\2\, intelligence, an agile planning
    system, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The New Triad provides
    improved flexibility in dealing with a wider range of contingencies,
    while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons, in order to assure
    our allies, dissuade competitors, and deter those who plan to harm us,
    particularly with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
        Efforts to improve conventional global strike capability focused on
    generating effects without being hindered by factors of time, distance,
    basing rights, overflight considerations, or undue risk to American
    service men and women. Recently the Department:

             Bolstered the number of Joint Direct Attack Munitions
            in the inventory, providing all weather, precision strike in a
            smaller weapon footprint.
             Fielded Tactical Tomahawk and the Joint Air-to-Surface
            Standoff Missile, providing strike weapons that operate from
            ranges outside enemy point defenses.

        During the past year nonkinetic capabilities became an increasingly
    important tool to deny our adversaries the opportunity to communicate
    easily or to manipulate information in ways that further their efforts
    to undermine stability around the world. We seek better nonkinetic
    capabilities to improve our freedom of action at the lowest level of
    conflict; to enhance deterrence; and support the sustained ability to
    use our networks while denying the adversary a similar capability. In
    this area we:

             Expanded development of the applicable tactics,
            techniques, and procedures to support use of information and
            networks--cyberspace--as an environment for integrated
            exploitation, offensive, and defensive operations.
             Improved integration of nonkinetic effects into
            operational planning, on a limited basis, in support of forces
            involved in the global war on terrorism.

        The President has committed the United States to sustaining a
    credible nuclear deterrence capability with the lowest possible number
    of nuclear weapons consistent with national security. STRATCOM's task
    is to ensure our nuclear force remains ready to meet any contingency
    while the nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable as we
    prudently achieve the thresholds specified in the Moscow Treaty. To
    this end we:

             Sustained a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile in
            cooperation with the national laboratories and the National
            Nuclear Security Administration.
             Took steps to improve the security and safety of the
            deployed nuclear force.
             Retired the last Peacekeeper Intercontinental
            Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) from service.
             Reduced the number of operationally deployed strategic
            nuclear warheads on the Minuteman III ICBM force.
             Transferred the final ballistic missile submarine
            scheduled for reconfiguration to carry conventionally armed
            cruise missiles.

        We continued pursuit of both active and passive defenses as a means
    of deterring our adversaries by demonstrating our ability to deny their
    attempts to coerce or harm the United States. During 2006 we will:

             Conduct additional tests of a Standard Missile 3,
            which is designed to engage mid- and short-range ballistic
            missiles early in flight.
             Conduct tests of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
            missile, which is designed to engage mid- to short-range
            ballistic missiles late in flight.
             Increase the number of emplaced Ground Based
            Interceptors in Alaska and California. Ground Based
            Interceptors are designed to engage long-range ballistic
            missiles in the midcourse of their flight. We plan on an
            interceptor demonstration this spring and up to two more
            interceptor tests by the end of 2006.
             Refine our missile engagement tracking capability by
            deploying sea-based and forward-based X-Band radars to
            operational locations in the Pacific region, where, by the end
            of 2006, they will join a global network of radars.
             Upgrade the Command, Control, Battle Management, and
            Communications System to extend situational awareness
            capability to Pacific Command and European Command by the end
            of 2006.
             Promote expanded interagency support and participation
            in the Proliferation Security Initiative to further global
            efforts to combat the spread of WMD.

        At the heart of the New Triad are the key enablers of command and
    control, intelligence, and planning. Through these enablers, and our
    broad array of space capability, we create the agility to respond to a
    wide range of global challenges. During 2006 we will:

             Evolve the renovated STRATCOM Global Operations Center
            to enhance collaboration among all geographically distributed
            STRATCOM elements--defining the first step toward a Global C\2\
            capability for all New Triad forces.
             Complete preparations for opening the first node in a
            network of ground entry points designed to serve a nationally
            distributed ground, air and sea network capable of providing
            the diverse connectivity requirements of the New Triad and DOD
            support to a broader national command capability using all
            elements of national power.
             Codify the output of the department-wide process
            review designed to modify historically inefficient ISR force
            apportionment practices to globally manage low-density, high-
            demand ISR assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
            reconnaissance aircraft.
             Extrapolate the results of an exercise in which we
            demonstrated the ability to achieve persistence through the
            combination/integration of different ISR phenomenology, to
            better fulfill combatant commander's intelligence requirements.
             Capitalize on the longer dwell time of unmanned and
            unattended sensors to produce greater persistence in global war
            on terrorism operations.
             Initiate a pilot program to determine essential global
            strike command and control services with an explicit objective
            of delivering a distributed, collaborative product. The pilot
            program will take advantage of the Department's Data Strategy,
            which calls for visible, accessible and understandable data,
            and uses Services Oriented Architectures (SOA) to promote
            flexibility and agility.
             Initiate efforts to transition from a limited space
            surveillance architecture to a more fully integrated
            terrestrial and space-based approach to situational awareness.

                    a nation at war--continuing to transform

        When I came before you last year, it was clear the pace of change
    and nature of the threats and challenges to our Nation were growing
    rapidly. It was also clear that Strategic Command's legacy systems and
    organizational relationships were not suitable for meeting emerging
    challenges the Nation now faces. Our intent, this year, was to address
    nuclear issues in the QDR in order to rationalize them in the context
    of our overall capabilities. It is against this backdrop that we
    entered the dialog of the 2006 QDR.
        STRATCOM presented new ideas and concepts, which were widely
    debated during the course of review proceedings. We entered this review
    believing the New Triad concept was sound in principle, but that the
    pace of attaining the new construct was lagging the National need. With
    this in mind we focused on four objectives:

             Determine which elements of our considerable nuclear
            force structure are essential to future stability and which
            might be retired in favor of more redundant and credible
            conventional or nonkinetic capabilities called for by the 2001
            Nuclear Posture Review and 2005 Strategic Capabilities
            Assessment.
             Determine the next steps needed to fulfill our
            commitment to an integrated missile defense capable of
            defending the U.S., its deployed forces, friends, and allies.
             Identify key enablers within the domains of ISR;
            communications, space, and collaborative planning that could
            rapidly improve our agility and responsiveness.
             Identify structural barriers to effective integration
            and synchronization of DOD efforts to combat WMD.

        The QDR served to remind us of two very important factors: first,
    that the United States is a nation engaged in a long war; and second,
    that our enemies in this long war seek WMD and will likely attempt to
    use them in their conflict with free people everywhere. Importantly,
    the QDR validated the need to adjust the U.S. global military force
    posture by moving away from a static defense in obsolete Cold War
    garrisons. While the review described many areas in which we must shift
    emphasis, we believe three are of particular importance to shaping our
    command and its approach to the future:

             From nation-state threats--to decentralized networked
            threats from non-state enemies.
             From ``one-size-fits-all'' deterrence--to tailored
            deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer
            competitors.
             From a focus on kinetics--to a focus on effects.

        We have taken the QDR's imperative for change as validation of our
    desire to accelerate transformation in many areas. While we believe
    progress has been made, more can be done in selected areas to improve
    STRATCOM's posture and preparedness to respond to a wider range of
    traditional, irregular, disruptive, or catastrophic challenges.
    Beginning in 2007, we will take steps to:

              Improve STRATCOM's nuclear deterrence posture. Key
            initiatives include:

                     Reduce the number of deployed Minuteman III
                    ballistic missiles in order to provide assets to meet
                    essential flight test needs and ensure the viability of
                    the Minuteman force. This will better balance our
                    legacy nuclear capabilities while preserving our
                    ability to reconstitute additional forces in response
                    to strategic surprise.
                     Study the requirement for a Minuteman III
                    replacement. We believe this is an essential step
                    toward ensuring our future national security needs.
                     Study the requirement for nuclear-armed cruise
                    missiles and look at alternative methods of storing
                    these Cold War era weapons. We believe that this study
                    will provide valuable input in support of developing an
                    effective long term strategy to maintain the nuclear
                    stockpile.
    Develop a wider range of conventional deterrent weapons
        STRATCOM championed the need for a prompt, precise conventional
    global strike capability, to bridge the gap between prompt nuclear
    weapons and less timely, but precise, conventional weapons. Key
    initiatives include:

             Deploy an initial precision-guided conventional
            Trident Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile capability within 2
            years. The speed and range advantage of a conventional Trident
            missile increases decision time and provides an alternative to
            nuclear weapon use against fleeting, high value targets. The
            conventional Trident missile would be particularly useful in
            deterring or defeating those who seek to coerce or threaten the
            U.S. with WMD.
             Develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range
            strike capability to be fielded by 2018.
             Study alternative options for delivering prompt,
            precise conventional warheads using advanced technologies such
            as hypersonic vehicles from land, air, or the sea.

        Develop nonkinetic capabilities to expand the range of effects we
    can generate against certain targets. Without question we are on the
    verge of a major technology shift to the Network Age. We see an
    environment in which digital internet communication is more pervasive,
    reliable, efficient, cheap, and rapid--even with the enormous increase
    in volume, variety, and velocity of data. Key initiatives include:

             Develop capabilities that promote the freedom of
            action we enjoy in other mediums like, maritime and air.

             Develop the doctrine, organization, training,
            maintenance, logistics, personnel and facilities to defend our
            Nation in this domain.
             Enhance measures to improve information assurance and
            network security.

        Improve integrated defenses against short, intermediate, and
    intercontinental range ballistic and cruise missiles, and develop
    complementary capabilities to combat WMD. Key initiatives include:

             Develop and mature integrated air and missile defenses
            that deter attacks, demonstrating the ability to deny an
            adversary's objectives.
             Integrate defensive systems among our international
            partners in ways that promote assurance against attack.
             Expand the Army's 20th Support Command's capabilities,
            to enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid
            deployment in support of WMD elimination.
             Improve and expand U.S. forces' capabilities to
            locate, track and tag shipments of WMD.
             Expand our advanced technical render safe capacity and
            implement measures to increase associated speed of response.

        Improve our nuclear infrastructure. STRATCOM recognizes the
    importance of an efficient and more responsive nuclear weapons
    infrastructure to the Department's strategy of tailored deterrence. We
    believe this is the essential element needed to ensure our weapons are
    safe, secure, and reliable, to ensure we can respond to both
    technological and political surprise, and to reduce our current
    stockpile of nuclear warheads.
        In May 2005, the Nuclear Weapons Council commissioned an 18-month
    study, to determine the feasibility of replacing some W76 warheads with
    a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and to examine the potential for
    using RRW in lieu of the W78 warhead. This U.S. Navy led study will
    include Air Force and Interagency participants and should issue a final
    report in November 2006. We believe this study will be a useful tool in
    addressing some of the concerns raised by the Report of the Defense
    Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, dated January 2006.
    The key initiative is to:

             Determine the feasibility of replacing existing
            warheads with a RRW.

        Develop a more coherent global command and control capability and a
    network-enabled architecture that moves information to the user, rather
    than moving the user to the information. The New Triad needs a robust,
    resilient global C\2\ system that builds on our legacy nuclear C\2\
    system and serves as the basis of a critical national-level capability
    suitable for use in emergencies range from terrorist attacks to natural
    disasters. Key initiatives include:

             Transition the STRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command
            Center, providing a survivable and enduring nuclear command and
            control capability, to a new network of distributed ground-
            based communications nodes; establishing a gateway to a robust
            multi-functional global command and control capability.
             Retire four National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC)
            and upgrade the take charge and move out command and control
            aircraft, to sustain a survivable airborne link to strategic
            nuclear forces and broaden our ability to support full
            functionality of the New Triad.

        Transition intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    activities from a legacy approach, directed largely at monitoring
    nation states in two theaters, to a true global enterprise tailored to
    meet regional needs. Key initiatives include:

             Implement a new global intelligence approach focused
            on achieving persistent collection capabilities against legacy
            and emerging threats, with our U.S. Government and allied
            partners, and improved synergy with the Intelligence Community.
             Increase investment in UAVs to provide greater dwell
            capabilities in the effort to identify and track mobile targets
            globally.

    Improve space capabilities
        The space mission area creates a decisive strategic advantage for
    our national security, empowering critical economic as well as defense
    related activities. Our dependence on space capabilities, coupled with
    recent significant advances in space operations demonstrated by others,
    establishes a true imperative to protect our space assets and our
    freedom of action in space. STRATCOM understands the need to stay at
    least one technology generation ahead of any foreign or commercial
    space power. We must improve space situational awareness and
    protection, and ensure unfettered, reliable, and secure access to
    space. Key initiatives include:

             Improve responsive space access, satellite operations,
            and other space enabling capabilities such as the space
            professional cadre.
             Integrate air and space capabilities to deliver
            combined effects.
             Realign resources to sustain existing space
            surveillance capabilities.
         stratcom requests your support to meet the challenges we face
        Over the next 5 years, we must fully transform while remaining
    engaged in a conflict in which our enemies will use any and all means
    to achieve their objectives. We believe a more aggressive
    transformation schedule than envisioned 5 years ago is essential to
    maintain the strategic advantage needed to deter or defeat those who
    would do us harm. If we do not accelerate this transition, we will face
    these adversaries, who attack through asymmetric means, with the blunt
    weapons of last resort that won the Cold War. That alone will not
    preserve our future national security. In particular we are requesting
    your support in the following areas:
    Prompt, Precision Conventional Global Strike
        Tailored deterrence requires a more complete range of capabilities
    to address the wide spectrum of challenges that confront us today.
    While the Department employs expeditionary forces around the globe, it
    is unlikely we will have forces in every place we need them at the
    crucial moment when we have an opportunity to stop a WMD-armed threat
    far from our shores. The United States has the capability to engage
    with high quality conventional forces around the world, given days or
    perhaps weeks to respond. But if our general-purpose forces are not in
    a position to respond rapidly, the need to defeat attacks against the
    United States may require STRATCOM to interdict fleeting targets at
    global range. We have the delivery capability on alert today, but
    configured only with nuclear weapons. This choice is not credible
    against many of the extremist adversaries we will face.
        We recommend proceeding with development of the responsive,
    conventional global strike alternative offered by the Conventional
    Trident Modification. The President's budget request includes funds for
    the modification of a number of submarine based Trident Missiles to
    deliver conventional warheads with precision over thousands of miles in
    tens of minutes.
    Global Command and Control (GC\2\)
        We are now faced with the task of recapitalizing our aging, Nuclear
    Command and Control (NC\2\) network, which is a matter of prime
    importance. Capitalizing on advances in technology, we envision a
    transition from the single-purpose, stove-piped NC\2\ network that
    served us during the Cold War, to a multi-functional, distributed,
    survivable, and expandable GC\2\ capability, leveraging the assets and
    resources of the Global Information Grid and serving the needs of our
    joint warfighters.
        With your support for the President's budget request, we can
    deliver a resilient air, land, and maritime GC\2\ capability that will
    tie together all elements of New Triad power. Fully developed, the
    GC\2\ will enable collaboration between and among DOD and other
    government agencies and partners, providing the core of a National
    Command Capability to meet the broadening array of potential challenges
    we face as a nation. A true National Command Capability will only be
    effective with federally mandated standards for data tagging to
    facilitate enhanced information sharing.
    RRW
        Finally, if we are to break the cycle of maintaining and
    refurbishing large numbers of Cold War-era nuclear warheads to guard
    against uncertainty, we request your support to ensure a safe, secure,
    reliable nuclear stockpile, and in the process transform the nuclear
    weapons enterprise. Discussions over the past year within the executive
    branch and Congress have increased understanding of the role for
    nuclear weapons in our current environment, and the value of a
    responsive defense infrastructure. STRATCOM supports the RRW as the key
    to transforming our aging Cold War nuclear weapons stockpile. RRW will
    enhance our long-term confidence in the stockpile and reduce the need
    to retain high numbers of hedge weapons while exercising the people,
    science, technology base, and facilities required for sustaining the
    nuclear weapons enterprise.
        Maintaining the current stockpile of Cold War era weapons is a
    challenge. If directed, we believe the time is right; the risk is
    manageable; and the opportunity is at hand to choose weapons that will
    best serve our future and allow us to further reduce our overall
    stockpile size, in order to transition to and maintain a smaller but
    safer, more secure, and more reliable nuclear weapon arsenal.
         stratcom transformational vectors building strategic advantage
        STRATCOM plays an important role in leading national efforts to
    send an unambiguous message to our adversaries and friends alike--we
    will do whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to ensure the
    forces of freedom possess a lasting strategic advantage against those
    who would deny citizens of America and the world the security to govern
    their own future. We will continue to be aggressive and resourceful in
    offering our best advice in the pursuit of capabilities needed to meet
    our National security requirements. With your help we can assure our
    allies, dissuade unhealthy competition, deter coercive or damaging
    acts, and above all else, defend our citizens and defeat our enemies.
    Thank your for your continued support.

        Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
        Mr. Paul.

          STATEMENT OF HON. JERALD S. PAUL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
      ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Paul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson. Thank
    you for creating this opportunity to raise the level of
    attention and for your leadership on these paramount issues
    associated with nuclear WMD. It is indeed a pleasure to be here
    today to discuss nonproliferation activities of the DOE's NNSA.
        Acquisition of nuclear weapons, WMD capabilities,
    technologies, and expertise by rogue states or terrorists pose
    the greatest threat to our national security as the chairman
    eloquently pointed out. The pursuit of these capabilities by
    terrorists and states of concern underscores the importance of
    our threat reduction, detection, and interdiction programs.
        The mission for the Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation, within NNSA, is to detect, prevent, and
    reverse the proliferation of WMD.
        Our programs are structured to support multiple layers of
    defense against nuclear terrorism and state-sponsored nuclear
    proliferation. We work with more than 70 countries to secure
    dangerous nuclear and radiological materials, and to dispose of
    surplus weapons-usable material.
        We also work closely with multinational and multilateral
    institutions, including the International Atomic Energy Agency
    (IAEA) at the United Nations in our offices in Vienna and with
    the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as well, to strengthen
    international nuclear safeguards regimes and to improve the
    nuclear export control regulatory infrastructure in other
    countries. This multi-layered approach is intended to identify
    and address potential vulnerabilities within the international
    nonproliferation regime and to limit terrorists' access to
    deadly weapons and material.
        Since September 11, 2001, the Office of the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation within the NNSA has accelerated and expanded
    its implementation of a six-pronged defense-in-depth strategy
    to deny terrorists and states of concern the materials, the
    technology, and the expertise needed to develop nuclear and
    radiological weapons. Our programs fall into those six broad
    categories.
        The first element of that strategy is to account for and
    secure nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union.
    To date, we've secured over 80 percent of the sites where these
    materials are stored and we are on course to finish all of our
    security upgrades by 2008, a full 2 years ahead of schedule.
        The second prong is to detect and prevent the movement or
    trafficking of weapons-usable technologies and nuclear
    materials. We have installed radiation detection equipment at
    more than 50 border crossings in Russia and the former Soviet
    Union and European countries. The Megaports Initiative is
    currently operational in Greece, the Bahamas, Sri Lanka, Spain,
    and the Netherlands, and is at various stages of implementation
    in nine other countries and there are many more on the list
    that we are driving towards implementing.
        The third prong is to stop the production of new fissile
    material in Russia. We are working with Russia to expedite the
    closure of its remaining three plutonium production reactors in
    the formerly closed cities of Seversk and Zheleznegorsk.
        Fourth, to eliminate existing weapons-usable material in
    Russia and former Soviet states. Through our Megatons to
    Megawatts program, more than 260 metric tons of Russian highly
    enriched uranium, that is bomb-grade uranium, from dismantled
    weapons have been down-blended to low-enriched uranium that is
    non-bomb grade uranium to non-weapons grade material for use in
    commercial nuclear power reactors. As we speak, Mr. Chairman,
    Senator Nelson, 10 percent of all electricity consumed by
    Americans in this country comes from low-enriched uranium that
    formerly was a part of high-enriched uranium for Soviet nuclear
    weapons. This program ultimately will be responsible for
    disposing of approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads worth of
    material and we're a little more than halfway through that now.
    We are also working with the Russian Federation to eliminate 34
    metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium in each country, enough
    for over 17,000 nuclear weapons. This in part is the MOX
    program the chairman mentioned and I look forward to taking
    some questions on both the Russian and the domestic progress on
    MOX.
        The fifth prong is to eliminate or consolidate the
    remaining weapons-useable nuclear and radiological materials
    that exists throughout the remainder of the world. Our Global
    Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) formed 2 years ago has
    converted 43 research reactors to use low-enriched uranium and
    plans to convert all 106 targeted research reactors by 2014.
    The GTRI has repatriated 145 kilograms of Russian-origin
    highly-enriched uranium from Russian-supplied research reactors
    and approximately 1,200 kilograms of U.S.-origin highly-
    enriched uranium in spent fuel assemblies from U.S.-supplied
    research reactors. The U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction
    program has recovered more than 12,000 radioactive radiological
    sources in the United States and the International Radiological
    Threat Reduction program has completed security upgrades at 373
    sites to date.
        Our sixth prong is to support our U.S. diplomatic
    initiatives. The DOE and the NNSA through our national
    laboratories are playing a vital role in our Nation's broader
    effort to challenge proliferation in Iran, to prepare the
    groundwork for verifying any North Korean nuclear declaration
    in the context of the Six-Party Talks, to promote universal
    implementation of anti-proliferation measures outlined in the
    United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, to update the
    Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and strengthen international
    safeguards and, of course, to assist Libya in the dismantlement
    of its former WMD program.
        We also perform critical research and development. We
    manage a vigorous nonproliferation research and development
    (R&D) program and it is the technical base that provides our
    policy programs and operational agencies, including the DOD,
    the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Intelligence
    Community (IC), with the innovative systems and technologies to
    meet their nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
    counterterrorism mission responsibilities.
        A brief word on Bratislava. Many of these programs have
    new, accelerated completion dates as a result of the Joint
    Statement at the G8 Summit at Bratislava to which the General
    and Secretary Flory referred. We have made great progress
    because of this momentum that has been given to us by this
    joint statement between President Bush and President Putin
    who've established a bilateral Senior Interagency Working Group
    co-chaired by U.S. Secretary of Energy Bodman and the Russian
    Federal Atomic Energy Agency Director, Sergei Kiriyenko.
    Together, they oversee enhanced nuclear security cooperation in
    six areas: Emergency Response, Best Practices, Security
    Culture, Research Reactors, Material Protection, and Control
    and Accounting.
        While the NNSA has been working with our Russian
    counterparts in many of these areas for several years, the
    Bratislava initiative truly did elevate our dialogue to a
    national level and has moved the operation to one of a shared
    partnership. One example would by our cooperation on physical
    protection of sensitive nuclear sites in Russia that has been
    accelerated and will allow us to complete those by the end of
    2008.
        I also want to make a brief comment while we're talking
    about nonproliferation, the importance of energy, nuclear
    energy and nuclear nonproliferation. Last month the President
    announced the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). GNEP is
    a comprehensive strategy to supply the projected doubling of
    the world's demand for nuclear energy in the next 4 decades, to
    do this by using the science of the atom to provide clean, safe
    nuclear energy for decades to come in a way that reduces air
    emissions, advances nonproliferation goals, helps to resolve
    nuclear waste disposal issues, and develops advanced safeguards
    and technologies. It is through GNEP that we can create a new
    model of nonproliferation both globally and domestically.
        Under the administration's proposal, countries with secure,
    advanced nuclear fuel cycle capabilities would offer
    commercially competitive and reliable access to nuclear fuel
    services to those countries who agree to forego the development
    of indigenous fuel cycle enrichment and reprocessing
    technologies.
        On the budget, let me just say that although we thank
    Congress very much for helping us elevate the level of
    attention to nonproliferation issues, we ask for your continued
    support. This administration has more than doubled the funding
    for nuclear nonproliferation since its first budget in 2001.
    The request this year of almost $2 billion supports the NNSA
    nonproliferation programs that represents almost a 7-percent
    increase over the budget for comparable 2006 activities in a
    budget constrained environment.
        I have submitted a more detailed budget justification and
    statistical appendix for the record and I'd like to take just a
    quick moment to run through a couple of those key items. For
    the activities that fall under the Bratislava Initiative, our
    budget request will support the completion of upgrades of nine
    additional 12th Main Directorate sites by the end of 2008,
    acceleration of the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return
    program, and continued development and execution of specialized
    emergency management training for monitoring and assessing
    nuclear and radiological events.
        High among our priorities, it will also help us increase
    the sustainability activities to support transfer of the
    material protection and control and accounting activities to
    Russia by 2013. In other words, it's one thing to go in and
    secure a facility, you have to also then train the host country
    to maintain the capability and operate that equipment, the
    sustainability function that we continue to try to transfer to
    the Russians.
        The request also fulfills DOE's commitment to roughly $675
    million to the G8's global partnership against the spread of
    WMD and this is a program, of course, that Senator Domenici
    highlighted very eloquently yesterday during the hearing that
    Senator Collins attended. It will also support the Six-Party
    Talks with North Korea and the scientist engagement in Russia,
    the former Soviet Union, Libya, and Iraq.
        In conclusion, just again I want to thank you for this
    opportunity to speak about some of the programs that we are
    engaged in. Congress has been so supportive and we ask for your
    continued support and certainly look forward to an opportunity
    to answer some of your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Paul follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Jerald S. Paul

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and members of the subcommittee, it is
    a pleasure to be here today to discuss the nonproliferation activities
    of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA).
        Acquisition of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    capabilities, technologies, and expertise by rogue states or terrorists
    pose the greatest threat to our national security. The pursuit of these
    capabilities by terrorists and states of concern underscores the
    importance of our threat reduction, detection, and interdiction
    programs.
        I would like to begin by briefly outlining our NNSA's
    nonproliferation strategy and will highlight a few examples of where
    our programs, working with other agencies, fit into the context of
    broader U.S. Government efforts to stem the proliferation of WMD. Next,
    I will outline a few recent and new initiatives that the NNSA,
    particularly the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), is
    supporting. Finally, I will discuss how the President's budget request
    supports these important missions. Before I begin, I would like to take
    a moment to note that it has been, and continues to be, a privilege and
    honor to work with the talented and dedicated individuals at the NNSA.
    These are folks charged with the single most important national
    security mission in the Department--keeping the world's most dangerous
    materials out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people--and
    they continue to meet that goal day in and day out.
        The mission of the Office of DNN, within the NNSA, is to detect,
    prevent, and reverse the proliferation of WMD.
        Our programs are structured to support multiple layers of defense
    against nuclear terrorism and state-sponsored nuclear proliferation. We
    work with more than 70 countries to secure dangerous nuclear and
    radiological materials, and to dispose of surplus weapons-usable
    material. We also work closely with multilateral institutions,
    including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear
    Suppliers Group, to strengthen the international nuclear safeguards
    regime and to improve the nuclear export control regulatory
    infrastructure in other countries. This multi-layered approach is
    intended to identify and address potential vulnerabilities within the
    international nonproliferation regime, to limit terrorists' access to
    deadly weapons and material.
        Since September 11, the DNN within NNSA has accelerated and
    expanded its implementation of a six-pronged defense-in-depth strategy
    to deny terrorists and states of concern the materials, technology, and
    expertise needed to develop nuclear and radiological weapons. Our
    programs fall into six broad categories:
    First: To account for and secure nuclear material in Russia and the
            former Soviet Union.
        In cooperation with the Russian Federation our Office of Material
    Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) works to upgrade security at
    Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) weapons complex and at
    sites that store and process weapons-usable materials in Russia.
    Working with the Russian Ministry of Defense, we also cooperate to
    secure nuclear weapons at Russian Navy and Strategic Rocket Forces
    sites and consolidate weapons-usable material into fewer, more secure
    locations.

             To date, we have secured over 80 percent of the sites
            where these materials are stored and we are on course to finish
            all of our security upgrades by 2008--a full 2 years ahead of
            the schedule.
             With over 95 percent of the warhead and nuclear fuels
            sites completed, we will finish our work to secure Russian Navy
            warhead and nuclear fuel sites in 2006. We are moving rapidly
            to identify and secure all remaining 12th Main Directorate and
            Strategic Rocket Forces warhead sites on an accelerated
            schedule by the end of 2008.
    Second: To detect and prevent the movement or trafficking of weapons-
            usable technologies and nuclear materials.
        Through our Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program, which includes
    the Megaports Initiative, and International Nonproliferation Export
    Control programs, we are working with other countries to install
    radiation detection equipment at key transit choke points throughout
    the world--such as sea ports, airports, and land border crossings--to
    enhance the capabilities of our international partners to detect
    movement of nuclear and radiological materials, and improve
    international export controls. These programs complement and build upon
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs, such as the Container
    Security Initiative (CSI), and form an important layer in DHS's
    Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's ``Global Architecture.'' In
    addition, our work goes hand-in-glove with the State Department's (DOS)
    Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) initiative. With our CSI
    partners at DHS's Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, we are
    working to install radiation portal monitors at the foreign ports where
    CSI is present or will soon be operational.

             Through 2005, we have installed radiation detection
            equipment at more than 50 border crossings (rail crossings,
            vehicle crossings, small seaports) in Russia and other Former
            Soviet Union (FSU) and European countries. Additionally, we
            maintain radiation detection equipment at approximately 60
            locations originally equipped by the DOS and other agencies.
             The Megaports Initiative is currently operational in
            Greece, the Bahamas, Sri Lanka, Spain, and the Netherlands.
            NNSA is at various stages of implementation in nine other
            countries: Belgium, China, United Arab Emerates (UAE),
            Honduras, Israel, Oman, the Philippines, Singapore, and
            Thailand.
             Our International Nonproliferation Export Control
            Program assists foreign governments to implement effective
            export controls, including training to identify and block
            transfers of proliferation-sensitive trade. This program is
            operating in over 40 countries, including nodal transshipment
            states in regions of concern and emerging suppliers.
             We are also placing an increasing emphasis on
            interdiction, including assessments of foreign WMD technology
            procurements and support for the administration's Proliferation
            Security Initiative (PSI).

        In addition to this important work, we are securing weapons
    expertise through joint collaboration and alternate infrastructure
    development. Through the Department's Global Initiatives for
    Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program we are engaging former weapons
    experts in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons institutes in
    Russia, FSU, Libya, and Iraq. We often say that the proliferation
    threat has three elements--technology, materials, and expertise. This
    program addresses the third element. By redirecting weapons scientists
    to peaceful, commercially viable, activities, we reduce the likelihood
    that these individuals will want to work with proliferators--and reduce
    the likelihood that a rogue state or terrorist organization will be
    able to recruit them.
        Another benefit of the GIPP program is the new sources of
    technology that it provides to the U.S. industry. The program is
    structured to include participation of U.S. companies, which match the
    Department's project funds with their own resources to bring projects
    to the market and gain intellectual property rights. Among the GIPP
    program's commercial successes are advanced medical equipment,
    specialized metallurgy, improved fossil fuel exploration, and filters
    that have been used in manned space exploration.
    Third: To stop the production of new fissile material in Russia.
        In 1997, the U.S. and Russia signed the Plutonium Production
    Reactor Agreement (PPRA) requiring the cessation of weapons-grade
    plutonium production for use in nuclear weapons. Under PPRA, we monitor
    the permanent shut-down of Russia's plutonium production reactors and
    the more than 10 metric tons of plutonium oxide to ensure the reactors
    and materials are no longer available for use in weapons production.
        We are also working with Russia to expedite closure of the
    remaining three plutonium production reactors. In March 2003, the DOE
    and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (Rosatom)
    signed an agreement to carry out the objectives of PPRA, which
    committed DOE, subject to available funds, to assist in providing
    fossil fuel plants to replace the energy now provided by the reactors.

             We have made significant progress on this project in
            the last year. We have already begun construction work at the
            first site, Seversk, and will start construction at the second
            site, Zheleznogorsk, this spring.
             At both sites, we agreed to ``quid pro quo''
            milestones that tie progress in fossil fuel plant construction
            to progress toward permanent reactor shutdown and are making
            satisfactory progress in meeting milestones.
    Fourth: To eliminate existing weapons-usable material in Russia and
            former Soviet States.
        To date more than 260 metric tons of Russian highly-enriched
    uranium (HEU) from dismantled weapons have been down-blended to low-
    enriched, non-weapons grade material for use in commercial power
    reactors pursuant the HEU agreement or what is often called the
    ``Megatons to Megawatts'' program. Altogether, by 2013, 500 metric tons
    of Russia's HEU will be converted and used to support civilian nuclear
    power here in the United States at little or no cost to the American
    taxpayer. This down-blended material accounts for 10 percent of U.S.
    electricity production. In other words, 1 in every 10 light bulbs in
    America is powered by material that was once contained in a Soviet
    nuclear warhead.
        Additionally, through our plutonium disposition programs, we are
    working with the Russian Federation to eliminate 34 metric tons of
    weapons-grade plutonium in each country, enough for over 17,000 nuclear
    weapons.
    Fifth: To eliminate or consolidate the remaining weapons-useable
            nuclear and radiological materials that exists throughout the
            remainder of the world.
        In May 2004, DOE launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative
    (GTRI) to identify, secure, recover, and/or facilitate the disposition
    of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world that
    pose a threat to the Unites States and to the international community.
        GTRI works to convert research reactors worldwide from the use of
    HEU nuclear fuels to low-enriched uranium (LEU). GTRI repatriates the
    U.S. and Russian-supplied HEU nuclear fuels from these reactors to
    their country of origin, as well as addresses the ``gap'' material
    (i.e. material of concern that is not currently being addressed under
    existing programs) for final disposition, and performs research reactor
    physical security upgrades. GTRI also maintains a rapid response
    capability to address denuclearization. This capability was put to use
    during the material and source removal efforts in Libya and Iraq.
        GTRI also addresses the threat of a radiological dispersal device
    or ``dirty bomb'' by identifying and recovering excess and abandoned
    radiological sources domestically and securing vulnerable radiological
    materials abroad.

             GTRI has converted 43 research reactors to the use of
            LEU and plans to convert all 106 targeted research reactors by
            2014.
             GTRI has repatriated 145 kilograms of Russian-origin
            HEU from Russian-supplied research reactors and approximately
            1,200 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU in spent fuel assemblies
            from U.S.-supplied research reactors.
             The U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program has
            recovered more than 12,000 radioactive sources in the U.S. and
            the International Radiological Threat Reduction program has
            completed security upgrades at 373 sites.
    Sixth: Support U.S. diplomatic initiatives.
        In his speech before the National Defense University 2 years ago,
    President Bush laid out an ambitious program of work to close gaps in
    the existing system of nonproliferation controls. DOE/NNSA and our
    national laboratories are playing a vital part in our Nation's broader
    effort to challenge proliferation in Iran; to prepare the groundwork
    for verifying any North Korean nuclear declaration in the context of
    the Six-Party Talks; to promote universal implementation of anti-
    proliferation measures outlined in United Nations Security Council
    Resolution 1540; to update Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and
    strengthen international safeguards; and to assist Libya eliminate its
    WMD programs.
        Underpinning each of these policy initiatives, we maintain a
    vigorous Nonproliferation Research and Development (R&D) Program. This
    program conducts applied research, development, testing, and evaluation
    to produce technologies that lead to prototype demonstrations and
    resultant detection systems. This, in turn, strengthens the U.S.
    response to current and projected threats to national security
    worldwide posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
    the diversion of special nuclear material. The R&D program is the
    technical base that provides our policy programs and operational
    agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), the DHS, and the
    Intelligence Community (IC), with innovative systems and technologies
    to meet their nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
    counterterrorism mission responsibilities. NNSA invests in strategic
    and often high-risk technical solutions to detect the proliferation of
    WMD.
        Many of these programs have new, accelerated completion dates as a
    result of the Joint Statement on Nuclear Security by Presidents Bush
    and Putin following their meeting in Bratislava, Slovak Republic, in
    February 2005.
        The Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative called for the
    establishment of a bilateral Senior Interagency Working Group, co-
    chaired by U.S. Secretary of Energy Bodman and Rosatom Director
    Kiriyenko. Together, they oversee enhanced nuclear security cooperation
    in five areas: Emergency Response; Best Practices; Security Culture;
    Research Reactors; and Material Protection, Control and Accounting.
        While the NNSA has been working with our Russian counterparts in
    many of these areas for several years, the Bratislava initiative
    elevated our dialogue to a national level and has moved our cooperation
    to one of a shared partnership. As a direct result of the Bratislava
    Initiative, our cooperation on the physical protection of sensitive
    nuclear sites in Russia was accelerated and will be completed by the
    end of 2008. We continue to work with the Russian Government to ensure
    that they provide resources needed to sustain these upgrades and
    promote a strong nuclear security culture and employ best practices in
    handling nuclear materials.
        It seems natural after summarizing such a successful Presidential
    initiative to discuss the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). In
    February, the administration announced GNEP, as part of President
    Bush's Advanced Energy Initiative. GNEP is a comprehensive strategy to
    enable an expansion of nuclear power in the U.S. and around the world,
    to promote nuclear nonproliferation goals; and to help resolve nuclear
    waste disposal issues. Fundamental to GNEP is a new approach to fuel
    cycle technology. Under this proposed new approach, countries with
    secure, advanced nuclear fuel cycle capabilities would offer
    commercially competitive and reliable access to nuclear fuel services--
    fresh fuel and recovery of used fuel--to other countries in exchange
    for their commitment to forgo the development of enrichment and
    recycling technology.
        Over the next year, we will work with other elements of the
    Department to establish GNEP, paying special attention to developing
    advanced safeguards and developing the parameters for international
    cooperation. I believe that GNEP takes us closer to expanding access to
    the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology while preventing the
    proliferation of nuclear weapons through tangible actions that will
    benefit directly those who join us in this partnership. GNEP will offer
    us the opportunity to take the international lead in making
    nonproliferation an integral part of our global nuclear safety and
    security culture.

                                     budget

        The administration's request of $1.73 billion to support NNSA
    activities addressing the global WMD proliferation threat represents
    almost a 7-percent increase over the budget for 2006 activities.
        The administration's fiscal year 2007 Fissile Material Disposition
    budget request is $638 million, an increase of $169 million over fiscal
    year 2006. This increase reflects the progress in implementing the
    plutonium disposition program in the past year. Of this amount, $551
    million will be allocated for disposing of surplus U.S. and Russian
    plutonium and $87 million is requested for the disposition of surplus
    U.S. highly-enriched uranium. The plutonium disposition program, the
    Department's largest nonproliferation program, plans to dispose of 68
    metric tons of surplus Russian and U.S. weapons-grade plutonium (34
    metric tons from each country) by fabricating it into mixed oxide (MOX)
    fuel for use in nuclear power-generating reactors. The United States
    and Russia completed negotiations of a liability protocol for the
    program, and senior Russian Government officials have assured the
    United States that the Russian Government has no issues with this
    protocol and that it will be signed in the near future. DOE has also
    been working to validate the U.S. MOX project cost and schedule
    baseline as part of our project management process, and we will have a
    validated baseline in place before construction begins. DOE received
    authorization to begin construction of the MOX facility from the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, began site preparation work for the MOX
    facility at the Savannah River Site, and implemented a number of
    improvements to strengthen the management of the MOX project. Current
    plans call for construction of the U.S. MOX facility to start in 2006,
    with operations to start in 2015. The administration's budget request
    is essential for continuing this work in fiscal year 2007, which will
    be a peak construction year. Now that the matter of liability
    protections for the plutonium disposition program has been resolved,
    pending signature of the liability protocol, high-level U.S.-Russian
    discussions are taking place to discuss technical and financial details
    for the Russian program.
        The administration's fiscal year 2007 budget request of $107
    million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is a 10-
    percent increase over fiscal year 2006 and supports the ambitious
    completion dates and objectives set by the program. GTRI will identify,
    secure, recover, and/or facilitate the disposition of the vulnerable
    nuclear and radiological materials worldwide that pose a threat to the
    United States and the international community. Since the creation of
    GTRI, we have enjoyed a number of successes. Under our radiological
    threat reduction program, we secured more than 370 sites around the
    world. As a result of the Bush-Putin Bratislava joint statement on
    enhanced nuclear security cooperation, we have established a
    prioritized schedule for the repatriation of U.S.-origin and Russian-
    origin research reactor nuclear fuel located in third countries. As
    part of our nuclear materials threat reduction efforts under GTRI,
    three successful shipments were completed in fiscal year 2005 to
    repatriate Russian-origin HEU fresh fuel from the Czech Republic (two
    shipments) and Latvia.
        In accordance with the President's Bratislava commitment, we are
    also working with the Russian Federation to repatriate Russian-origin
    spent fuel. We have also conducted several successful shipments to
    repatriate U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel from Japan, the Netherlands,
    Sweden, Greece, and Austria. Three research reactors in the
    Netherlands, Libya, and the Czech Republic have converted from the use
    of HEU to the use of LEU fuel so far in fiscal year 2006.
        The International Material Protection and Cooperation fiscal year
    2007 budget request of $413 million reflects the completion of MPC&A
    security upgrades in 2008 and the acceleration of Second Line of
    Defense (SLD) activities in the Caucasus region. This request would
    fully fund both Bratislava and SLD requirements for 2007. For more than
    a decade, the United States has worked cooperatively with the Russian
    Federation and other former Soviet republics to secure nuclear weapons
    and weapons material that may be at risk of theft or diversion. As part
    of the Bush-Putin Bratislava joint statement, we agreed to accelerate
    security upgrades at Russian sites holding weapons-usable materials and
    warheads. The Bratislava joint statement also provided for a
    comprehensive joint action plan for cooperation on security upgrades of
    Russian nuclear facilities at Rosatom and Ministry of Defense sites. In
    addition, this statement called for enhanced cooperation in the areas
    of nuclear regulatory development, sustainability, secure
    transportation, MPC&A expertise training, and protective force
    equipment. A number of major milestones for this cooperative program
    are on the horizon, and the fiscal year 2007 budget ensures that
    sufficient funding will be available to meet these milestones. Security
    upgrades for Russian Rosatom facilities will be completed by the end of
    2008--2 years ahead of schedule. By the end of 2008 we will also
    complete cooperative upgrades at the nuclear warhead storage sites of
    the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and the Russian Ministry of Defense
    sites. By the end of fiscal year 2007, we will have provided security
    upgrades at more than 80 percent of all the nuclear sites in Russia at
    which we now plan cooperative work. In addition to the accomplishments
    reached thus far under Bratislava, we have also completed physical
    security upgrades at three priority sites housing dangerous materials
    in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.
        The administration's budget request will enable us to expand and
    accelerate the deployment of radiation detection systems at key transit
    points within Russia and accelerate installation of such equipment in
    five other priority countries to prevent attempts to smuggle nuclear or
    radiological materials across land borders. Through our Megaports
    Initiative, we plan to deploy radiation detection capabilities at three
    additional major seaports in fiscal year 2007, thereby increasing the
    number of completed ports to 13.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $207 million for the
    Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) is an
    increase of 18 percent from fiscal year 2006. The EWGPP program is
    working to establish the fossil fuel plants to allow for the complete
    and permanent shutdown of the three remaining weapons grade plutonium
    production reactors in Russia at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Every week,
    these reactors currently produce enough fissile material for several
    nuclear weapons. The overall EWGPP plan is to replace the heat and
    electricity these reactors currently supply to the closed cities with
    energy generated by fossil fuel plants by December 2008 in Seversk and
    December 2010 in Zheleznogorsk. The reactors are to be shut down
    immediately when the fossil fuel plants are completed and will be
    monitored under PPRA to confirm that they are not restarted. The first
    validated estimate of total EWGPP program cost--$1.2 billion--was
    determined in January 2004. After extensive negotiations with Russia,
    we achieved $200 million in cost savings. Also, under the authority to
    accept international funding as provided in the Ronald W. Reagan
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, we have
    received pledges of $30 million from six Global Partnership
    participants. Construction of the fossil fuel plant at Seversk started
    in late 2004, and the start of construction of the fossil fuel plant at
    Zheleznogorsk was recently approved.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget requests $269 million for
    Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development. This effort
    includes a number of programs that make unique contributions to
    national security by researching the technological advancements
    necessary to detect proliferation activity worldwide and to detect and
    prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear materials.
        The Proliferation Detection program advances basic and applied
    technologies for the nonproliferation community with benefit to both
    national counterproliferation missions and national counterterrorism
    missions. Specifically, this program develops the tools, technologies,
    techniques, and expertise for the identification, location, and
    analysis of the facilities, materials, and processes of undeclared and
    proliferant WMD programs. The Proliferation Detection program conducts
    fundamental research in fields such as radiation detection and advanced
    infrared and radar imaging, providing support to the DHS, the DOD, and
    the IIC. The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring program builds the Nation's
    operational sensors that monitor the entire planet from space to detect
    and report surface, atmospheric, or space nuclear detonations, with
    sensors carried on every Global Positioning System and ballistic
    missile early warning satellite. This program also produces and updates
    the regional geophysical datasets enabling operation of the Nation's
    ground-based seismic monitoring networks to detect and report
    underground detonations. The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring program has
    long supported the DOD and the DOS to conduct their missions.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget request for Nonproliferation and
    International Security is $127 million. This figure reflects a budget
    structure change, rather than a significant funding increase,
    realigning the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and HEU
    Transparency programs to this Government Performance and Results Act
    unit. Through this program, the Department provides technical and
    policy expertise in support of U.S. efforts to strengthen international
    nonproliferation institutions and arrangements, fosters implementation
    of nonproliferation requirements through engagement with foreign
    partners, and helps develop the mechanisms necessary for transparent
    and verifiable nuclear reductions worldwide. This budget request
    addresses our need to tackle key policy challenges including efforts to
    strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, attempt to block and reverse
    proliferation in Iran and North Korea, augment U.S. cooperation with
    China, India, and Russia, and plan to build-up the nonproliferation
    component of the GNEP.

                                   conclusion

        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs are an important
    investment for this Nation, and are achieving great results. Our budget
    request will support continuing our progress on reducing the threat
    posed by the proliferation of nuclear and radiological weapons,
    expertise, and related technologies. Above all, it will meet the
    national security needs of the United States of America in the 21st
    century.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. A statistical appendix
    follows that contains the budget figures supporting our request for the
    DNN. I would be pleased to answer any questions on the justification
    for the requested budget.

        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. We'll now proceed to a
    round of questions and each of you have provided extensive
    opening statements which rather than interrupt and truncate I
    thought were very helpful in laying out the overall groundwork
    that is necessary to understanding our nonproliferation,
    counterproliferation, and counterterrorism efforts. But I would
    like to just ask, maybe start with Secretary Flory, I
    understand General Cartwright's mission within the DOD when it
    comes to synchronizing and integrating the Department's efforts
    on counterproliferation but I'd like to get your comment on who
    is responsible government-wide across agencies for coordinating
    and integrating our efforts when it comes to
    counterproliferation and nonproliferation? My understanding is
    the ultimate responsibility stops at the National Security
    Council (NSC) and then obviously the President but I'd like for
    you to give us some sense of your confidence level that things
    are going well, that we are filling the gaps and anticipating
    departmental differences in our approach so that we can have
    some understanding about how we're handling these important
    missions government-wide.
        Mr. Flory. Senator, you're right, we focus primarily on
    what we do within the DOD, how we organize internally. The
    focal point, as you say, ultimately the responsibility is with
    the President and the President has the NSC and the NSC's
    staff. The focal point for most of our efforts is the Director
    for Proliferation Strategy (PROSTRAT) office in the NSC staff
    where there's a senior director who is the person who pulls
    together the different departments on many of these issues. I
    think you see an evolution on a lot of fronts since the
    administration took office, particularly since September 11,
    that have been manifested in the first strategy for combating
    WMD in 2002 and the succession of additional documents that I
    cited to you earlier, most recently, the most recent National
    Security Strategy. I would say that I think we have made a lot
    of progress in organizing for a new type of threat, a threat
    that in many ways is more diffuse and more complex than
    certainly the Cold War threat and even arguably than the way we
    perceive the threats in the 1990s. I think that the nature of
    the threat is such that one would never want to say one was
    totally confident because of the uncertainties involved because
    of the effort of proliferators, both countries that want to
    sell things and countries that want to get a hold of things,
    the extraordinary denial and deception measures that they use,
    the large amounts of money that they spend in doing the things
    they're trying to do. This remains a very hard target and a
    very complex target and this is one of the reasons that in the
    QDR and many of our other documents we emphasize the theme of
    uncertainty. We've been surprised before, we were surprised at
    the time of the first Iraq war at the extent to which the Iraqi
    nuclear problem had advanced, as well as later on as we found
    the extent of biological and chemical weapons that Saddam
    Hussein at that point had managed to amass. We were surprised
    when we went into Iraq in 2003 because we expected to find
    weapons there. We were focused for a number of years on Libya's
    chemical weapons program, then the nuclear program there came
    to our attention. That was an unpleasant surprise.
        So the basic point I would say is that yes we've made a
    great deal of progress in the way we have organized and in the
    guidance we've developed to deal with this threat. On the other
    hand, this is a very adaptive threat, it's a threat where
    people are watching what we're doing and trying to find ways to
    get around what we're doing. I would ask my colleagues, they
    might want to add on that. I know General Cartwright sees this
    on a day-to-day basis as well as Mr. Paul.
        Senator Cornyn. Let me put another little fine point on the
    question and then I'd ask General Cartwright and Mr. Paul to
    comment, but it seems to me that all of the wonderful work
    that's occurring and that each of you and the people working
    with you are doing to reduce the threat from proliferation of
    weapons and to prepare ourselves to counter proliferation of
    weapons can essentially be defeated if an A.Q. Khan or somebody
    like him sees that nuclear materials get in the hands of people
    that shouldn't have them. I just want to make sure and give you
    an opportunity to express yourselves on whether you believe
    that we are prioritizing measures appropriately and whether you
    believe that we are doing, since resources are not limitless,
    that we are putting our money and our resources and our
    personnel on the issues in a priority way that are most likely
    to cause us harm.
        General Cartwright.
        General Cartwright. Mr. Chairman, I think that's a good
    question that gets really at the heart of the issue. For
    STRATCOM, as we start to enter into this mission area, the
    objective is not to invent a whole new organizational construct
    to go out and buy all new equipment, et cetera, but to leverage
    what is there, understand where the gaps in our capability are,
    and how they can be quickly filled. A key part of this mission
    area is our interfaces with our interagency partners, as well
    as our allies, and so where we can we're taking advantage of
    those existing relationships.
        Clearly between DOE, STRATCOM, NNSA, a long heritage of
    sharing on the technical side and being able to leverage our
    technical capabilities in the nuclear world, et cetera. We're
    trying to leverage off of those capabilities. Within the
    STRATCOM's portfolio are the intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance skills that will be so critical to doing some of
    the things that you alluded to in trying to find these weapons,
    fix them, and then if necessary go out and take them, destroy
    them, whatever is necessary. Those skills are within the
    portfolio.
        What we're trying to understand now as we stand this
    organization up is how well will they scale up to the size; how
    quickly will they be able to respond to an ever-changing
    adversary; do we have the right organizational constructs; do
    we have the right relationships set up to be efficient at doing
    that and not to react to the adversary but to get in front of
    the adversary; to basically be determinant of where they're
    going rather than the other way around. I'll tell you that this
    is a work in progress. I'll tell you that the organizations are
    coming together. Issues of turf are not really getting in the
    way, and at the agency level, without stepping on checks and
    balances, we're creating relationships that are inside the
    decision cycles of the adversary which to me is the key
    attribute. We can have wonderful studies and decisions, but if
    they occur and they're not actionable because they occur after
    the adversary's already acted, it's of no value.
        So to us it's critical to make sure that whatever we set in
    place has to be able to make the adversary react to you, get in
    front of their decision cycles, and change the calculus in
    their minds. So to me that will be the litmus test of how well
    these organizations actually perform.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you. Mr. Paul, do you have a brief
    response?
        Mr. Paul. Briefly, Mr. Chairman, it's an excellent
    question. Nothing binds men together more than a common
    challenge and just as nuclear proliferation and the threat of
    nuclear terrorism has bound members together in Congress in a
    bipartisan way to provide extraordinary attention, support, and
    resources for this, so too within the interagency, it binds us
    together. The working relationships are really fantastic.
        I'm not going to tell you that there aren't difficulties
    with the interagencies at times. There's supposed to be a
    certain amount of tension, which is healthy, but in this arena
    when we're focused on keeping people with evil in their hearts
    who would harm innocent people from doing so on American soil,
    that tends to bind us together and our organizations, Mr.
    Flory, General Cartwright, Under Secretary Joseph, DHS, and
    NNSA, I think work very well in this regard. Is there progress
    to be made? Absolutely. Every day we worry about whether we
    have the right construct, for example, the right organization
    in order to get our work done. But there is strong agreement on
    the need to develop the right technology, to deploy that
    technology, to ensure that we have the management structure and
    the focus and the attention on getting this job done because
    it's so important.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Flory. Senator, if I could just add one small point.
    General Cartwright made the point very well about resources. In
    the DOD, we already get from Congress and the American people a
    substantial budget and we use it to cover our needs and we
    allocate in what we think is an intelligent way. One of the
    ways in which we can improve our capability is in some cases
    using a relatively small amount of money differently. For
    example, in terms of interdiction, the Navy is, and this is one
    of the items, one of the eight mission areas that General
    Cartwright is tackling as a priority, the Navy has done a good
    job of using relatively small amounts of money to increase its
    organic interdiction capabilities on ships deployed. The
    approach earlier was more an approach that the idea that you
    had to have some specialized operators to come in and do an
    interdiction. In most cases you actually don't, so what the
    Navy has done without spending a whole lot more money is to
    develop more deployed organic capabilities that can carry out
    interdiction.
        So it's not just a question of resources, it's a question
    of using the resources we have intelligently and in ways that
    give us that extra bit of leverage.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
    for your consideration this morning, with my schedule
    particularly. I have an opening statement which I'd like to put
    in the record and at this time and will yield to Senator Nelson
    who has been attentive throughout the hearing.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Reed follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Senator Jack Reed

        Good morning. I would like to join Senator Cornyn in welcoming our
    witnesses this morning. This is an important hearing and I am glad we
    have an opportunity to discuss these issues this year.
        First I want to express my appreciation and admiration for the
    people at the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security
    Administration, the Department of Defense, and in the Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency (DTRA), and their contractors who are on the ground in
    various parts of the world implementing these important
    nonproliferation programs. The working conditions are difficult, and
    many of the folks spend a good deal of time away from home.
    Complicating the work in some instances is pervasive corruption and
    criminal activity, which adds an additional level of complexity to the
    mission.
        Having said that I am concerned, however, that the administration
    is not giving the high priority to the programs and providing adequate
    funding to these programs that they have acknowledged is needed. For
    example, the 9/11 Commission found that countering the threat of
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD) should be a top priority of the
    United States and recommended that the United States put forth maximum
    effort to secure WMD. Nevertheless, in the December 2005 report card
    issued by the 9/11 Commission, the administration got a grade of ``D''
    in its efforts to implement this recommendation. The 9/11 Commission
    concluded that at the current rate it would take 14 years to secure all
    of the nuclear materials just in the former Soviet Union and that is
    unacceptable. I agree.
        Today, I hope we can discuss what can be done to accelerate these
    programs, address all of the very real threats to the United States and
    to friends and allies, and to raise that grade from a D to an A.
        In addition, there are a number of programmatic issues that we need
    to discuss today including the Mixed Oxide Fuel program, border
    security and control issues, and the destruction of Russian chemical
    weapons.
        Finally, General Cartwright, I look forward to a good discussion of
    the Strategic Command's new mission to combat WMD, your goals for the
    mission, and the role of the DTRA as the Joint Functional Component
    Command designated to operationally plan and execute the new mission.
        Thank you, Senator Cornyn, and again thank our witnesses for
    appearing here today.

        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. I
    appreciate the courtesy.
        General Cartwright, you mentioned in your written testimony
    that STRATCOM has developed a Center for Combating WMD and that
    there are going to be former Soviet scientists and others who
    have expertise in this area and they want to turn over their
    knowledge on access to weapons-grade plutonium and other very
    valuable information. Can you give us maybe some specifics as
    to how this would work?
        General Cartwright. The Center for Combating WMD had its
    initial operating capability declaration on the 1st of January
    this year. It is housed inside of the DTRA at Fort Belvoir. Dr.
    Jim Tegnelia who's here with me today is the lead of that
    agency. We have several programs that are of record and are in
    execution to try to help to both retrain people and take these
    skills and make them usable in other disciplines, use these
    skills in a way that's synergistic with our aims in things
    like, not necessarily just for the Russians, but the PSIs and
    other types of activities.
        We also have another activity in Omaha with STRATCOM that
    seeks to create partnerships in the civil sector and reach out
    through to try to find ways to address many of these problems,
    particularly as we start to get to the harder problems in the
    future, biological agents and chemical agents. To find ways to
    address these problems that are probably non-standard, and to
    take advantage of all of the expertise that lives in the
    academic world, not only in the United States but abroad, and
    in the business world. From that agency, coupled with this
    Center for Combating WMD, we hope to see some synergy develop
    starting to change the mind-set and offer a path forward that
    is positive in nature versus the one that we're on which, in
    many cases, just continues to build the next generation of an
    agent whether it be nuclear, biological, or radiological.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Secretary Flory and Mr.
    Paul, when I hear words like uncertainty and surprise, those
    are words that are not comforting but after all the effort is
    made and with an expectation of success in 2008, how certain,
    on a scale of 1 to 100, will we be that we've identified all
    the nuclear material, secured it, and have kept it out of the
    hands of those who would misuse it?
        Mr. Paul. Senator, one thing we are certain of to a 100-
    percent degree is that the threat is real and that those
    persons with evil in their hearts will continue to try and it's
    our job to make sure that they fail every day, all day. It's
    our job to ensure that our certainty about whether we're doing
    everything possible is at its peak as well. I can't give you an
    exact number. What I can tell you is that we have in the NNSA
    37,000 committed Federal, military, and civilian patriots who
    work every single day, 15-hour days, trying to make sure that
    this threat doesn't ultimately succeed on our soil. I have a
    high degree of certainty that the American people are safe and
    can be confident in knowing that we are doing absolutely all
    that we can do every single day.
        Senator Ben Nelson. What if we were to relate it to just
    the former Soviet Union and the Russian stockpiles? Is there a
    possibility of identifying some degree of certainty there?
        Mr. Paul. We have historically recognized that that is an
    area globally of greatest threat. That's where the material is.
    The fall of the Soviet Union security, we found out that
    security to them quite frankly had been a ring of soldiers,
    many of whom who simply went home shortly after, and there was
    very little physical protection. All the material protection
    and control and accounting systems that exist there today are
    U.S. origin that we put there and that we manage every single
    day and we are very close to wrapping up that work.
        In the former Soviet Union, for example, we've completed 41
    of 51 material sites. That's 80 percent where we've completed
    all of those upgrades, 47 of the 73 warhead sites at 64 percent
    and we will have all of those completely secured by the end of
    2008. We risk base those, we prioritize them in order to
    increase our certainty, if you will. We're making great
    progress. Congress has been very supportive. It takes time
    though. Access is one issue and, of course, it's obvious that
    these are facilities that exist in a country that has to
    cooperate with us in order to let us get in there and do our
    work. Once we get access we have high degree of certainty that
    by leveraging the extraordinary technology of our laboratory,
    Sandia National Lab, Los Alamos Lab, Livermore Lab, and so many
    others that we can do the job, do it quickly, and do it well.
        Senator Ben Nelson. When we identify those 50-plus sites,
    have we been able to do any kind of an accounting or inventory
    based on what was expected to be there versus what we found?
        Mr. Paul. Yes, there were predictions about how much
    material would be in those sites. Of course, they were merely
    predictions and as time went by as we got better and better
    intelligence, as we were able to put our technical experts
    inside with access, we learned that those predictions weren't
    always accurate and each time we get a new piece of
    intelligence, a new piece of data, we feed that into the
    calculus in making that risk based determination of what
    equipment to put in, where, and at what time. But certainly it
    is a work in progress truing up our decade and a half old
    predictions.
        Senator Ben Nelson. The final question is, is it reasonable
    to expect that not everything was there that had originally
    been there? In other words, are there missing items that we're
    aware are missing as opposed--what do we know that we know
    versus what we don't know?
        Mr. Paul. I think the question and the point is that you
    never know what you don't know. We do take that point. That is
    something that we build into our----
        Senator Ben Nelson. I understand, but what I'm trying to
    say is, do we have any information that would indicate that we
    expected something to be there that isn't there?
        Mr. Paul. No.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Or wasn't there with some degree of
    reliability a concern that there is something missing, putting
    it that way?
        Mr. Paul. No.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Thank you,
    General.
        General Cartwright. I would just add though, you don't want
    a false positive here.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That's what I'm trying to get to.
        General Cartwright. That ought to keep us awake at night.
    We can't assume that we do, in fact, have full accounting of
    what exists today and certainly the way technology is moving,
    building fissile material is a relatively complicated process.
    But as we move to the future and worry about the next
    generation of WMD may it be biological or some other, those
    production requirements are not the same and can easily be
    disguised and we should worry about what we don't know.
        Senator Ben Nelson. General Cartwright, with you worrying
    about it at night I think I'll sleep better at night. Thank
    you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen, for your testimony today and let me follow up with a
    question regarding Senator Nelson's topic and that is, we know
    very little about the tactical nuclear weapons that the Soviet
    Union had and now they are in the hands of Russia. Last year we
    proposed an amendment on the committee to try to get a better
    handle on that. Can you give us, Secretary Flory, a notion of
    what we're doing to initiate discussions and really try to
    determine the status of their tactical nuclear weapons and what
    we can do to put them into controlled circumstances?
        Mr. Flory. Senator Reed, as you point out, the status of
    those tactical weapons has been a concern from the beginning. I
    don't want to say we have a handle, but we have processes in
    place to deal with the strategic and as we mentioned
    specifically accelerating the improvements in the security on
    the stored, nondeployed weapons. I would have to get back to
    you specifically with respect to any discussions. Secretary
    Paul may have something that he can add to that but if I could
    get back to you on the record.
        Senator Reed. Surely.
        Secretary Paul?
        Mr. Paul. Together we will.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        We continue to engage with the Russians on the issue of securing
    both their strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, although the
    Russians have provided little data on the operational status of their
    tactical nuclear weapons. Neither the Department of Defense nor the
    Department of Energy has every differentiated between strategic and
    tactical nuclear weapons in our efforts to upgrade security at storage
    sites in the Russian Federation. We expect to complete our security
    upgrade work at all storage sites where assistance has been requested
    by the end of calendar year 2008, at which time the vast majority of
    all of Russia's nondeployed nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical,
    will have been secured with U.S. assistance.

        Senator Reed. Okay. One of the obvious things, and you
    might want to comment, General Cartwright, is that some of
    these weapons are rather mobile and small and ideal, if you had
    a shopping list as a terrorist, they would be on that shopping
    list and we have to be concerned about that, absolutely
    concerned.
        Let me raise another issue with Secretary Flory and
    Secretary Paul and that is the 9/11 Commission evaluated many
    of our national security efforts and this Commission is one of
    the most respected voices today on a bipartisan basis, and they
    gave the administration a D with respect to securing
    radiological and nuclear materials in the Soviet Union. I
    presume, correct me if I'm wrong, that this is agreed by all to
    be a high national security priority in the United States.
        Essentially what they've done is challenge the
    administration and Congress to speed up these efforts and be
    more proactive and more effective. What's the reasonable time-
    line? The 9/11 Commission said it would take us 14 years at the
    current rate to secure these materials. I note that DOE and
    NNSA are talking about securing all materials by 2013. There
    seems to be a gap first of all in the perception of what the
    process is, how fast it's going, but the bottom line here is
    what do we have to do to accelerate the securing of these
    materials?
        Secretary Flory and Secretary Paul?
        Mr. Flory. I would like to make one point, one of the
    things we're trying to do to secure in particular the so-called
    stored warhead is the Bratislava Initiative announced by
    President Bush and President Putin and, in fact, we have a
    supplemental request before Congress now for $44 million. That
    will certainly help because that's one area where we recognize
    that there was a need to move faster on that. We worked with
    the Russians because frankly it wasn't easy to get the level of
    transparency and understanding and agreement on that side to
    let us know the things we needed to know in order to help them
    to solve this problem. I think that brings us to an important
    point here. The Russians continue to have the primary
    responsibility here and it's something we need to keep as part
    of the context. We can do with them what they are willing to do
    with us and they've been over time willing to do more things
    but the fact of the matter at the end of the day is that they
    are ultimately responsible.
        Senator Reed. Secretary Paul.
        Mr. Paul. It's an excellent question. As I said on the
    MPC&A upgrades we firmly believe that we will have this
    complete 100 percent by the end of 2008, a full 2 years ahead
    of schedule. What has given us a lot of momentum is Bratislava
    and President Bush and President Putin coming together and
    making that clear joint statement. But what's also given us a
    lot of momentum is the broad bipartisan support from Congress
    and the funding. As we talked about before, this administration
    has doubled the amount of funding that goes to nonproliferation
    and addressing this threat. We continue to make progress. We
    don't slow down. We look for ways to accelerate as much as we
    can. We have accelerated a lot. We've gotten more and more
    access into the Russian facilities but it's not just Russia.
    It's outside the Soviet Union states and that's really the next
    chapter in what we've been working on now for several years is
    broadening it throughout Europe, reducing the enrichment of
    those research reactors, the 106 remaining research reactors,
    and down-blending, putting in security measures at those
    reactors, repatriating Russian origin spent nuclear fuel and
    fresh nuclear fuel, all of which is high enriched uranium, and
    repatriating the fuel that had as its origin American U.S. fuel
    origin.
        We continue to look for ways to accelerate that. I take
    your point. We'll continue to do that.
        Senator Reed. Let me add a quick followup question.
    Secretary Flory points out that there's a supplemental request
    which we think is very important which we have to recognize. Do
    you have sufficient funds, Secretary Paul, to meet this 2013
    goal of securing these materials or do you need incremental
    funds going forward and we should, either through supplementals
    or enhanced budget authority now, give you these additional
    resources?
        Mr. Paul. The President's 2007 request provides for, as
    requested, provides for the adequate funds to meet these----
        Senator Reed. The 2013?
        Mr. Paul. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cornyn. Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, Mr.
    Paul, this is a matter of great concern to us especially in
    light of Linton Brooks' comments in a recent USA Today article
    saying that one-third of the world's 130 civil nuclear research
    reactors lack security upgrades needed to prevent terrorists
    from stealing material that would enable them to make a nuclear
    device, including even an atomic bomb. We just need to know as
    precisely as you and others can lay out how to make good on the
    priority that the President expressed during the 2004 election
    and which many people agree with: that preventing rogue states
    and terrorists from acquiring the materials necessary for
    nuclear weapons has to be our top priority. Why aren't these
    reactors secure? Are people refusing our assistance, are we not
    offering our assistance, is there no international mechanism
    capable of coming in and trying to help secure these reactors?
        Mr. Paul. First of all, to correct one part, I think the
    article could be read--could be interpreted the way that you
    have stated. It's not--would not be completely accurate.
    Administrator Brooks did not say that there were all these
    reactors that weren't without security upgrades. Through our
    GTRI and Nonproliferation Organization we have a very effective
    program for providing the security at those reactors, both
    through this administration and the previous administration who
    placed attention on this as well. We originally identified 173
    research reactors throughout the world that had highly-enriched
    uranium in them. We started working down that list as to those
    who already had security upgrades with countries such as France
    and Canada who take care of their own security and what we came
    up with was a list of about 103 that needed additional security
    upgrades and down-blending from highly-enriched uranium to low
    enriched uranium. We have performed those upgrades at a total
    of 76 sites. Of the remaining 27 research reactors upgrading,
    there's currently upgrading of 6 reactors we're working on: 2
    in Chili, 1 in Mexico, Russia, Vietnam, and Peru, and of the
    remaining 21 we have identified 4 new sites where security is
    not adequate but we are working on access. This requires
    cooperation and it's this subcommittee and the full committee
    that have helped us in highlighting the focus and attention on
    that and that helps us get some access. But it's hard to get
    into some of these sites. I can assure you that we are on top
    of these sites, we have made security upgrades in most of them.
    We have a program in place to down-blend the uranium in them
    and as to the small number of sites that we believe need
    security upgrades and that we don't have access to, we are
    working very hard to get that access through the international
    regime and through other contacts and through the IAEA. Thank
    you for the question.
        Senator Clinton. I appreciate the update on that and
    obviously as you said this subcommittee and then the full
    committee are very concerned and focused on this so any
    additional authority, any additional resources, I hope that you
    will let us know. Obviously, that has to remain one of our top
    priorities.
        Mr. Paul. By the way, on the small list of other sites
    where we don't have access we could provide you in a different
    setting some information on those.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much. Mr. Paul, I want to
    follow up on some questions that I asked Secretary Bodman back
    in February when he testified before the full committee and we
    had a chance to discuss the GNEP. During that hearing, the
    Secretary said he would get back to me with answers to some of
    my questions. I haven't yet heard back so I'll ask the similar
    questions to you and I hope that I will hear back from one or
    both of you.
        Now, I believe that GNEP is a well-intentioned proposal to
    help meet the energy needs of our country and our allies and be
    part of a comprehensive strategy to reduce our dependence on
    foreign oil but I have some serious concerns about the program
    which would create a global system of nuclear reactors and U.S.
    reprocessing plants over the course of decades that could cost
    tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars. I am concerned
    about independent research that contradicts the
    administration's underlying claims that provide the rationale
    for GNEP. I have two questions: First, studies by the National
    Academy of Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    (MIT), and even the DOE itself, have pointed out worrisome
    risks with the program.
        First, we know reprocessing spent fuel creates plutonium
    which can be used not only in civil nuclear energy reactors as
    laid out in the plan but also to make nuclear weapons. The U.S.
    has consistently opposed reprocessing, even for allies such as
    France, and while we focus on how to deal with Iran's quest to
    develop nuclear weapons and what to do about a nuclear armed
    North Korea, a country which does use plutonium in its nuclear
    weapons, I would ask, first, how do you respond to the
    questions and the risks laid out by the independent analysts
    and do you see a contradiction between GNEP and our global
    nonproliferation goals?
        Mr. Paul. Not only is there not a contradiction, the two
    are absolutely critical for the success of each. It is certain
    that the world will supply the more than doubling of the demand
    for nuclear power globally over the next 4 decades through the
    use of the science of the atom. The rest of the world has
    concluded that it's no longer a decision for America to make,
    quite frankly. The rest of the world in order to do this will
    continue to make use of the nuclear fuel cycle and will
    continue to recycle fuel. We no longer in America have a
    decision on whether that will occur. What the GNEP does do,
    however, is provide a narrow window of opportunity where
    through leadership America can guide it in a way that improves
    our nonproliferation regime globally and improves the
    proliferation resistance of those fuel cycle processes
    themselves. It is through our research and development and
    technology and support that we've been able to provide some
    enhancements to the current purex processes that is the current
    methodology whereby the fuel cycle states reprocess fuel now.
    GNEP proposes a form of recycling that gives enhanced
    proliferation protections, does not separate plutonium. Current
    recycling separates plutonium into a pure stream. What GNEP is
    proposing is a different model whereby plutonium is not
    separated into a pure stream. It continues to have these other
    actinides and lanthanides connected to it. On a global setting,
    as I said, the rest of the world has come to the conclusion
    that nuclear power will be an important part of providing
    energy supply not just to America and to the allies but also to
    those countries who aren't our allies, who want the peaceful
    use of the atom.
        GNEP is an opportunity to allow the peaceful use of the
    atom, the use of nuclear energy for energy purposes, but do it
    in a way so that you bring together a partnership of countries
    whereby those who don't have a fuel cycle can access the energy
    without accessing the capability that can be converted into a
    military threat. That is a notion that is as old as President
    Eisenhower's speech in 1953 before the U.N. Assembly. We have
    made some progress on it, GNEP puts together all of these
    pieces and we've been very encouraged by the support that we're
    getting from the global community, not only from the potential
    supplier states, Russia, China, Japan, France, U.K., and the
    IAEA Director El Baradei, but also from potential recipient
    states, those states who might say that if we had a mechanism
    to access nuclear energy without developing a recycling
    capability in-house, we might go in that direction, let's sit
    down and talk. It's very encouraging.
        Senator Clinton. Could I just have a followup on that
    because as I understand the critique from various
    nonproliferation experts, including the MIT study that I
    mentioned earlier, the so-called proliferation resistant
    reprocessing system that GNEP claims it would promote is
    proliferation resistant only in comparison to other methods of
    reprocessing, not as compared to the original spent fuel. The
    spent fuel itself is actually far more proliferation resistant
    than GNEP reprocessed plutonium because it's too radioactive to
    be handled safely by terrorists. So, in other words, the
    experts claim that the GNEP program would actually make it
    easier for terrorists to steal dangerous material to use in an
    attack. We're about to embark on an undertaking that could very
    well cost hundreds of billions of dollars and I'm well aware of
    the desire on the part of many countries and including the
    administration here at home to promote nuclear civilian use for
    energy purposes. But I'm just worried about the trade-offs
    here. If we spent hundreds of billions of dollars refining coal
    gasification we would provide clean coal without providing
    spent plutonium as a potential terrorist attack. So how do you
    make that trade-off?
        Mr. Paul. Fair question. First of all, the purpose of these
    other countries in accessing the science of the atom to provide
    energy is not to develop or promote nuclear power. It's to have
    electricity for hospitals and for first responders and for
    schools.
        Senator Clinton. It's nuclear power to fuel electricity.
        Mr. Paul. It's to have electricity and to find a way to
    provide that electricity in the cleanest, safest way, and they
    have come to nuclear power as the one zero emissions method for
    doing that. Now the question is, can America provide the
    leadership to help that new partnership be crafted globally so
    that it is more proliferation resistant? Now, I think we share
    common concerns and goals, maybe not--we may not share all the
    same conclusions as to the ``proliferation resistance'' of one
    chemical process as opposed to another based upon a spent fuel
    standard. First of all, that process that you're talking about
    already exists. It's what all of those countries are currently
    using, so to go back and say well let's compare it to not doing
    recycling at all, quite frankly we don't have that opportunity
    anymore. The rest of the world is going to recycle--is
    recycling fuel and will continue to recycle spent fuel.
        The question is, can we come up with a way that's even
    better? Can we be a player by asserting leadership? We think
    that we can. The global partners that we've spoken to also
    think that through this partnership we can show leadership to
    provide a more proliferation resistant process.
        Some of the studies that you're referring to or some of the
    comments have as their predicate certain assumptions that do
    not necessarily apply. You can design a recycle process
    thorough uranium extraction (UREX) to have whatever radiation
    level protection that you want, if that's the sole way that
    you're going to define proliferation resistance. But
    proliferation and nonproliferation are something that is far
    greater than a mere radiation dose level at hundred rad or rem
    per hour or 80-100 spent fuel standard. You can have UREX that
    is at that standard if that's your goal but the safeguards
    technologies that America has developed and helped these other
    countries to deploy even on their plutonium extraction (PUREX)
    processes has moved far beyond these earlier standards. We have
    the opportunity to shift them to a more proliferation resistant
    process that does not separate out plutonium and that provides
    safeguards and securities, verification technologies, and mass
    accounting that is available with this process that is not
    available with others. Remember that when you keep the
    plutonium entrained with other isotopes, the lanthanides and
    the other transuranics, you have signals, signatures,
    additional tools that a nuclear engineer can use to ensure that
    there is not diversion, and tools that I do not have available
    to me with PUREX.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Clinton, you raised some
    very serious concerns and certainly most Members of Congress
    aren't nuclear physicists and we need the best information we
    can possibly get when determining what the policy of this
    government should be in so many of these areas. So we'd
    encourage you to continue to supply us with that best thinking
    and the best science that is out there so we can answer some of
    these questions at least as satisfactorily as humanly possible.
        Mr. Paul, the Fissile Material Disposition Program under
    which the United States and Russia committed to dispose of 34
    metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium is, of course,
    laudable in intent, but it's been plagued by numerous problems.
    There's been a 2-year delay in the program due to an inability
    to agree on liability for U.S. contractors and now there's an
    agreement but it awaits Russian signatures and ratification by
    the Duma.
        The impasse over liability caused the United States to
    postpone construction of the U.S. MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility
    in South Carolina in order to maintain parallelism between the
    Russian and U.S. programs, in 2005, the DOE Inspector General
    report criticized the management of the U.S. program and
    assessed that the cost of the U.S. MOX Facility will be $3.5
    billion, $2.5 billion more than the original DOE estimate in
    2002. The fiscal year 2007 budget request for the program is
    $638 million, nearly one-third of the total DOE
    nonproliferation request for that year, and now it appears that
    the Russians are no longer committed to the program as
    originally conceived. Would you give us your view of the status
    of that program and where you believe the future leads?
        Mr. Paul. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The plutonium disposition
    model, the goal of disposing of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade
    plutonium, both from Russia and 34 metric tons from the surplus
    material stockpile of the United States is a goal that is
    shared by both this administration, and the previous
    administration, and the previous administration put in place
    the Plutonium Disposition Agreement in 2000 with the Russians
    for the disposition on the Russian side and the U.S. side. On
    the U.S. side, is our MOX program. That is the MOX Fuel
    Fabrication Facility and Pit Disassembly Conversion Facility to
    take that plutonium from our stockpile, convert it into MOX
    fuel that can then be irradiated in the light water reactors,
    power reactors that produce electricity for us.
        On the Russian side, the Russians have never particularly
    supported the notion of consuming that plutonium in light water
    reactors. Their preferred method is through fast reactors and
    it is true that we have not made as much progress on the
    Russian side. They started site preparation 2 years ago on
    their MOX Facility, as we started site preparation this past
    fall on ours.
        The challenges, the difficulties with this are: one, again,
    the Russians would prefer to go in the fast reactor direction;
    and two, the liability dispute, the question about what
    liability protection would apply with U.S. workers in the
    Soviet Union, significantly delayed the progress on both sides,
    had a significant impact on the project costs. As you delay a
    project, a multibillion dollar project, the long lead
    procurement costs increase more and more and more. There has
    been uncertainty because of those delays that has to some
    extent affected appropriations and it has resulted in logical
    questions that would be asked from the legislative branch.
        Senator Cornyn. Let me ask you this, Mr. Paul. Do you
    believe that Russia is still committed to disposing of excess
    plutonium through the MOX program and if not what are the costs
    and benefits and risks to the United States going down another
    disposition path?
        Mr. Paul. As confirmed by recent communications between the
    Director of Rosatom, Sergei Kiriyenko, and Secretary Bodman,
    they are still committed to the disposition of the 34 metric
    tons although their preference is not for light water reactors,
    their preference is for the fast reactors. What they have said
    is pretty consistent with what they said from the beginning,
    which is that unless the international community provides all
    the money to do it--they're saying that they are supportive of
    doing it if the international community provides all of the
    money to use light water reactors.
        If, instead of using light water reactors, they can use
    their BN600 and move towards an upgrade of that, a BN800, a
    fast reactor model, then they are saying that they would put in
    a significant amount of the money themselves. So we are
    currently considering some discussions with them to figure out
    what would it take to get them to dispose of their plutonium in
    parallel with our disposition of plutonium pursuant to the
    commitment that this administration and the previous
    administration have made to developing the MOX program, this
    MOX facility now in South Carolina. Senator Graham has been a
    strong leader on these issues both as to the facility itself
    but also as to the importance of reducing the plutonium
    footprint worldwide.
        Senator Cornyn. If we were to delink the U.S. and Russian
    plutonium disposition programs, what would be the likely impact
    on the Russian program and on the U.S. program?
        Mr. Paul. I think it could have a significant impact on the
    extent to which the international community would be willing to
    contribute to the Russian program. Now the DOS has advised they
    think the probability is lower and lower that the international
    community is going to support this with funding at a greater
    and greater level. That's a lot of qualifiers. There's still an
    opportunity here for the international community to provide
    significant support. I think if you delink it right now, you
    would probably send a strong message to those contributors that
    causes them to be even less receptive.
        Senator Cornyn. If Russia decides to head down a different
    path, should the U.S. disposition program be considered a
    nonproliferation program or simply a program of disposing of
    excess U.S. material that should be considered in a wider
    context of DOE nuclear material disposition and cleanup?
        Mr. Paul. We think both. This administration and the
    previous administration both thought that it was important to
    not only reduce, condense, consolidate the amount of fissile
    material in this country and its locations and also for the
    worldwide nonproliferation effort to reduce the threat of
    people getting their hands on that material that can be used to
    make a nuclear device. For both of those reasons, we continue
    to be committed to disposing of that material.
        Senator Cornyn. Secretary Flory, 2 years ago Libya declared
    its intention to renounce all WMD programs and made a full
    declaration of its considerable chemical weapons stockpile as a
    first step forward to elimination. The United States has
    offered to help Libya in that connection and I understand the
    administration is currently considering which agency of the
    U.S. Government will be charged with carrying out that
    assistance. It would seem that the CTR program is the most
    logical candidate. CTR is aimed at eliminating WMD threats.
    Congress has provided authority to use CTR funds for activities
    outside of the former Soviet Union with the specific example of
    Libya in mind. CTR has the experience and expertise to
    undertake this activity based upon its experience in Russia and
    now in Albania. Do you support the use of CTR funds for
    chemical weapons elimination in Libya and what factors are the
    administration considering as it weighs its decision? Then let
    me ask you when you're answering those questions to answer one
    more. What is the estimated cost and timeline for carrying out
    the chemical weapons elimination program in Libya? So do you
    support the use of CTR funds, what factors are the
    administration considering as it weighs its decision, and
    what's the estimated cost and timeline?
        Mr. Flory. Senator, there was a team, a joint team, I think
    it was the DOS and DTRA team that was there in February at the
    site. They looked at the site and the surrounding area. It's a
    pretty remote site. I think it's about 600 kilometers away from
    Tripoli. The team that went there is supposed to present
    options sometime next month so given where we are in the month,
    pretty soon I'll be in a better position to get back to you
    after that. I think some of the factors that we would look at
    and I think these would be incorporated in the options that are
    presented are what are the conditions of the munitions, what
    are the proliferation risks we believe they pose, what are the
    technical aspects? For example, one part of the problem I think
    is going to be transportation. Where these things are now does
    not have any water and chemical demilitarization is a very
    water intensive process. So there are a number of issues to be
    looked at in terms of the threat, in terms of the technical
    aspects of how we do it, and once we've had a chance to look at
    the options that are presented, we will get back to Congress
    I'm sure.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I support the current United States position that we are committed
    in principle to provide United States assistance to destroy Libya's
    chemical weapons stockpile contingent upon Libya remaining responsible
    for destruction, United States ability to identify appropriate funding,
    and United States and Libya conclusion of implementing agreements, to
    include agreement on division of responsibility.
        Factors affecting the Department's decision to use Cooperative
    Threat Reduction (CTR) funds include the proliferation risk we believe
    the Libyan stockpiles poses, the threat reduction and proliferation
    reduction value of eliminating Libyan chemical weapons relative to
    other CTR WMD elimination and proliferation prevention programs, the
    condition of the munitions, the technical and logistical aspects of the
    work, the availability of CTR funding, potential destruction timelines,
    and overall expected costs.
        The Department's CTR fiscal year 2006 and requested fiscal year
    2007 funds are committed to other programs assigned high priority by
    the administration. Use of these funds for assistance to Libya would
    come at the cost of significantly reduced efforts in these programs.
        Department of Defense's (DOD) cost and schedule estimate to
    destroy/neutralize the Libyan chemical agent and precursor materials is
    $142 million and 43 months. With risk and inflation factors removed,
    the estimated cost is $75 million. The DOD schedule does not include
    the time required to staff and obtain a presidential determination to
    comply with the legislative restriction on performing CTR work outside
    the states of the former Soviet Union, nor the time required to
    negotiate and conclude with the Government of Libya the legal
    architecture to ensure exemptions from taxes/customs and liability
    protections for United States Government and contractor personnel.
    Proceeding without this architecture in place could undermine the
    protections and exemptions negotiated with other countries where CTR
    work is performed.

        Mr. Flory. The question is, there's DOS nonproliferation
    money that's available. There's also the CTR money and that's I
    think the choice you referred to upfront. If we could get back
    to you when we know a little bit more about the scope of the
    problem, we'd be pleased to do so.
        In terms of the cost, because of some of the factors I just
    described, including the distances involved, the lack of water,
    the weather--I understand that it's 140 degrees during the day
    for most months of the year there--it's going to be fairly
    expensive. I haven't seen any figures we have a high degree of
    confidence in. I do think there's a good chance it will be over
    a $100 million and in that case we have to consider what are
    the opportunity costs of doing that particular bit of work
    compared to other work CTR or any other program is doing in the
    former Soviet Union in Central Asia or any of the other places
    we're working. But we'll be able to talk more with more
    definition when we have a report back from the team.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you. We look forward to you getting
    back with us on that. Here again, I guess you raised in your
    answer the point that I was inquiring about initially, and
    given not limitless resources, how do we prioritize and focus
    and as you say the opportunity costs of participating or
    funding one program at perhaps the expense of others? That
    continues to be a concern and I know you're working hard on
    that but that certainly is a concern I have and one that I want
    to continue to stay in touch with you on.
        General Cartwright, let me just ask you quickly, you noted
    that STRATCOM's focused on improving DOD capacity and
    increasing resources for WMD elimination and mitigation
    efforts, but I want to make sure that you have all the
    capabilities in terms of authorization for the Department to
    carry out your mission and where in future years do you see
    your budget requests going in terms of fulfilling that mission?
        General Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My sense is
    that we have the resources and the authorities that we need to
    move forward on this mission and move forward aggressively. If
    there is a point in the future that I would use a crystal ball
    to say where do I think maybe things are going to change, the
    area that probably is most vexing right now technically is
    standoff detection, knowing what's coming to your border and
    being able to detect that in a technical sense with a degree of
    fidelity that you're not chasing false alarms on a regular
    basis and that you can have a level of monitoring that is
    global to understand what's going on in a global sense in these
    different processes.
        The technical solutions right now tend to be point
    solutions. We can tell what's in this room but 100 miles away
    we don't have a good capability of forecasting it's movement. I
    think that's an area that we will come back to you as we better
    understand the technical challenge and where we ought to apply
    our dollars and cents to go after that challenge.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, General Cartwright. I guess in
    light of recent events, we need to not only make sure we have
    the detection capability but perhaps good identification.
        General Cartwright. Identification.
        Senator Cornyn. So we know people are indeed authorized to
    transport radioactive materials, for example.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
    follow up that line of questioning, General Cartwright, with
    respect to the combating WMD mission. You responded to Senator
    Nelson that the DTRA is the component commander. Could you
    elaborate? Do they report to you directly and do they retain
    planning, budgeting, and command control responsibilities? How
    does it work?
        General Cartwright. Sir, they are by designation a combat
    support agency within the DOD which creates a relationship
    between the chairman and the organization. They have a charter
    and a set of missions. All of those missions are not
    necessarily associated with the mission of combating WMD so in
    the DOD we have set up an arrangement that we've used for a lot
    of years where we take the director, in this case, and give him
    what we call dualhatting.
        In other words, he has two responsibilities. In the sense
    of the combating WMD, he operates as a component for STRATCOM
    to provide those services to all of the regional combatant
    commanders as they need them. He turns to me when there is
    competition for resources as the first level of let's see how
    we should prioritize resources and then also to advocate for
    additional resources where it's appropriate. So that tends to
    be the relationship.
        Inside the organization what we've tried to do is insert an
    element of military planning capability that was not there
    before to bring closer the skill set that's already resident in
    the DTRA and the skills necessary to service the regional
    combatant commanders in a timely fashion. So there's a good
    articulation and we don't have a separation. Oftentimes, your
    ability to ask the right question is the key in crisis to know
    what's out there to help you. By bringing the planning skills
    into the organization, we get closer and draw that relationship
    closer and that's at the heart of what we're trying to get
    accomplished.
        Senator Reed. But you're still--it's a work in progress?
        General Cartwright. It is, yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. You're also--on a day-to-day basis they're
    responding about synchronization, the chairman and yourself,
    and you're trying to get that more synchronized, is that fair?
        General Cartwright. That's fair. In the synchronization or
    the integration of the process, a lot of what we're trying to
    do by bringing them into the STRATCOM portfolio, so to speak,
    is to avail them of a very direct and close relationship with
    things like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. So
    that again, the partnership is much tighter, to the extent that
    it's appropriate, the information operations that we're
    responsible for missile defense operations so that you get a
    more holistic look at choices and as customers, so to speak.
    The regional combatant commanders come in the door and they can
    expect not only a direct answer to maybe the wrong question,
    but the opportunity to find the right question and the right
    set of answers.
        Senator Reed. What's STRATCOM's role in the PSI?
        General Cartwright. We work closely, through DTRA and
    through the operational forces, and, again, this is why the
    planners are so critical, along with the lead agency, the DOS
    to one, set the environment and, two, to provide when necessary
    the operational planning and execution skills that are
    necessary for a particular action.
        Senator Reed. Have you exercised this function yet?
        General Cartwright. We have in the planning and we have in
    the seminars and the objective setting and the training
    activities that go on broadly across the world.
        Senator Reed. But do you have a--what's the next step in
    exercising?
        General Cartwright. The next step is a set of exercises
    that are international in scope led by the DOS that extend
    through this summer and into next year. We are a key
    participant in providing support to those and interfacing with
    not only DOS but with the other governments and their military
    organizations to ensure services, for instance, we talked about
    a Navy capability to ensure that that matches up so that if we
    arrive at a juncture where we are trying to interdict
    something, that we have all of the right rules, we know how to
    operate together, we know who's to talk to who, and all of that
    gets laid out. That's the part of the exercise and planning
    activity that we're trying to bring.
        Senator Reed. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the QDR
    has been given similar responsibilities, at least closely
    allied. Can you talk about your link-up with SOCOM,
    particularly going forward?
        General Cartwright. Sure. There is a very tight
    relationship between SOCOM and STRATCOM, particularly in the
    areas of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In
    the area of combating WMD, the teams that we put together that
    have been called render safe but have the skills of the
    explosive ordinance disposal people, the skills that are
    brought to the table by the DTRA, bringing those together in a
    way that we can deploy them in a timeline that's appropriate
    that we can figure out what the size and availability of them,
    how many of these teams do we need, how robust do they have to
    be. All of those things seem to be growing over time. Where do
    we want to take these teams? Those are the types of things that
    General Brown and I work on a regular basis. Our staffs are
    linked both virtually and physically and we come together at
    the DTRA in that planning cell and in the technical expertise
    that Dr. Tegnelia and his organization bring. So it is a very
    close relationship.
        I will tell you that SOCOM is probably more focused on the
    execution side of this activity. We're trying to prepare the
    battle space, make sure that they have the tools necessary, as
    we do for each regional combatant commander.
        Senator Reed. Can you comment briefly on the mission of the
    Global Innovation and Strategy Center?
        General Cartwright. I talked a little bit about that with
    Senator Nelson's question, but the idea here is that there
    emerge questions for which we often don't have answers. In
    order to get the answers and get inside the decision cycles of
    an adversary who would operate with some limited knowledge or
    work in our seams, we have established an opportunity to reach
    out to the commercial sector, both U.S. and abroad, and to the
    academic sector. The idea here is if I have a problem I grab
    the smartest and brightest people in the world, get them into,
    my phrase, a hot, sweaty pile, and not let them out until we
    have a potential answer. [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. That's good enough. [Laughter].
        We don't want to go any further with that.
        General Cartwright, in your testimony, you describe one of
    your key initiatives as improve and expand U.S. Forces
    capabilities to locate, track, and tag shipments of WMD. Could
    you provide some amplification there about what you're doing
    and do you need additional resources to do this?
        General Cartwright. This is another very close partnership
    with SOCOM because they work in this area and have worked in
    this area for a lot of years. The acknowledgment here is that
    the finding and fixing part of this cycle is probably broader
    than just radiological activities. In a find and fix activity
    you must tag it so that you know where it is and you can keep
    track of it. We must expand this effort to other vexing
    problems like mobile threats that we have, missiles, et cetera,
    and so the intent here is to broaden the activity not to
    diminish or dilute what SOCOM is trying to accomplish. Start to
    broaden it out and make it available to the other regional
    combatant commanders for a broader set of targets.
        Senator Reed. Just a final point and maybe just a very
    quick response, it seems to me that this function is intimately
    involved with the national intelligence capability. What's your
    general satisfaction level with the integration, with the new
    regime of intelligence in the United States?
        General Cartwright. I will tell you that what we are trying
    to do on the DOD side is focus, through STRATCOM, to the DNI
    and his organization a single portal, so to speak, where the
    needs are coming from one voice and one place that are
    aggregated from all the regions. Not to cut anybody out but to
    get them correlated and collated in a way that the IC can
    respond. That is starting to create synergies that we were
    unable to realize before because once we understand the problem
    and we can work at it together, many of these threats that we
    deal with today and we anticipate we'll deal with in the future
    operate in the seams of authorities. So by having that single
    portal and being able to get it very tight and very close--and
    essentially we will open a center here in the next month at
    Bolling Air Force Base in the DIA spaces that bring the DNI's
    capabilities along with the DOD's capabilities, at least to a
    common floor for operations so that we can see each other's
    problems, look at the opportunities to solve them in a way that
    creates synergy rather than the old constructive need to know.
    If you don't know the right question to ask, you don't
    necessarily get what you need.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cornyn. Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow
    up on the line of questioning first by the Chairman and then by
    Senator Reed.
        Mr. Paul, with respect to the cost of the U.S./Russian
    disposal program, what is the approximate cost? What are we
    talking about when you say that the Russians won't do it the
    way that we would prefer unless they're paid for it and the
    international community may not want to bear the cost? What are
    we talking about in terms of dollars?
        Mr. Paul. For the Russian program?
        Senator Clinton. Right.
        Mr. Paul. Or the Russian side? I'm hesitant to quote an
    exact price from their recent validated baseline. I'm thinking
    $2.7 billion is what they're saying.
        Senator Clinton. So we're talking about $2.7 billion?
        Mr. Paul. I believe so.
        Senator Clinton. Where is the source of that money if it
    comes internationally? Who contributes to that $2.7 billion?
        Mr. Paul. I believe that France has made a pledge of a few
    hundred million dollars. I don't know the exact number.
        It's a couple million dollars because the MOX technology is
    of French origin. I shouldn't say that's why but there is a
    connection there. They actually have that technology. So the
    French have made a commitment if the fuel were MOX. There are a
    few others who have not made firm commitments, I believe, but
    have said that if the project goes forward they would be
    interested in making contributions. I don't know exactly how
    much money has been firmly committed by the international
    community. It's something that I will get you.
        It turns out I do know how much. [Laughter].
        Senator Clinton. Thank goodness for those people who sit
    behind us.
        Mr. Paul. It turns out I'm told that we have pledges
    totaling $844 million.
        Senator Clinton. Will this be an issue for the President to
    raise at the G8?
        Mr. Paul. I think that it is. It's something that we've
    discussed anyway about having that be mentioned and
    nonproliferation cooperation is something that the President
    has mentioned in the international fora in the past. I think
    this is an issue that the Russians--I don't know about MOX
    specifically but nonproliferation efforts is something that I
    believe that Russia as chair will raise as well.
        Senator Clinton. We might want to emphasize that, Mr.
    Chairman, because I think your questions really go to the heart
    of whether the single biggest threat, the one that we were most
    interested in trying to address over the last several years,
    will be addressed and finalized at some point. So maybe we
    could follow up on that.
        Mr. Paul. I appreciate that thought too, on the G8 Summit.
    I will follow up with that. I'll also get you a breakdown of
    the $844 million to tell you which countries have made those
    pledges.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        As a part of the Group of Eight, the Global Partnership against the
    Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction is a significant
    force to enhance international security and safety. The G-8 has
    committed to raise up to $20 billion through 2012 to support Global
    Partnership projects primarily in Russia, such as the plutonium
    disposition project. As of now, international donations to the
    plutonium disposition are as follows:

                            [In millions of dollars]
    United States.............................  $400
    United Kingdom............................   133.6 (70,000,000 British
                                                 pounds)
    Canada....................................   57.4 (65,000,000 Canadian
                                                 dollars)
    Japan.....................................   100
    Italy.....................................   102 (80,000,000 Euro)
    France....................................   76.5 (60,000,000 Euro)
                                               -----------------------------
      Total...................................  $869.5

        Senator Clinton. I appreciate that, Mr. Paul. Let me follow
    up on the line of questioning by Senator Reed. When the panel
    describes the various entities that are now part of our threat
    reduction nonproliferation strategy it really does sound like
    alphabet soup. It sounds like there are lots and lots of cooks
    in the kitchen and when everybody's in charge, nobody's in
    charge. I'm concerned about duplication, I'm concerned about
    gaps, and I think it would be useful to get a matrix that
    actually lays out who is responsible for what, how they
    interact, what shared lines of command there may or may not be.
    I very much appreciate the work that everyone is doing on this
    but, for example, Mr. Paul, not to pick on you, but the DOE's
    Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program is
    incredibly important to ensure that WMD experts from various
    countries are redirected to peaceful jobs, don't end up in
    Iran, or you name it at this point.
        However, I'm also aware there's a DOS program that is
    focused on the similar objectives. Are these programs
    duplicative? Are they complementary? What mechanism is in place
    to ensure proper coordination? This is just a tiny example of
    what I see as a very broadly dispersed responsibility on the
    biggest threat we face.
        Mr. Paul. It's a good question and a good point. They are
    complementary but if you weren't on top of them day-in and day-
    out and making sure that you have good coordination and
    communication, they could stumble over themselves. The programs
    for proliferation prevention and the complementary DOS program,
    something that this administration and the previous
    administration both supported, and has been very successful,
    but there is the potential for them to stumble over each other.
    That hasn't happened. We've worked very well together using the
    DOS's centers, if you will, for collecting the technical
    capabilities and our piece which is more deploying it into the
    nuclear weapons facilities. We reach out and we look for
    scientists, whether it be Russian scientists, former Soviet
    Union scientists, Libyan or Iraqi scientists, and we go out and
    try to link them up with peaceful uses, as I know you're
    familiar with this program. The DOS maintains a clearing house
    of that but quite frankly you are making a very good point that
    if you didn't communicate, if we didn't have such a good
    relationship between our program and theirs, it could be
    difficult to manage.
        Senator Clinton. I really appreciate that and as I say
    maybe, Mr. Chairman, our staffs could work with our witnesses
    and others to put forth that kind of matrix because everyone
    gives lip service to the fact that this is the most dangerous
    threat we face and there are lots of those cooks in the kitchen
    and I just want to know who the chef is and who the point
    person is. It's in DOD, it's in DOS, it's in DOE, so it would
    be helpful at least to me if we could try to sort that out.
        My final question that really would go to each of you which
    is to add a layer of further complexity on this, we do have the
    IAEA, which is responsible for promoting peaceful uses of
    nuclear technology and then ensuring insofar as possible that
    those technologies are not used to develop nuclear weapons and
    it does so largely in its role as a watchdog. Increasingly, the
    IAEA is playing a major international role. It frankly has
    credibility that sometimes we and our allies lack. It has
    access as it now does for example to Iranian nuclear sites that
    we could only dream of. I worry that we're not doing enough to
    bolster and support the IAEA and there developed a kind of
    antagonistic relationship for all the reasons we know. So let
    me ask each of you, starting with Secretary Flory, is there
    more we could do to help bolster the IAEA by, for example,
    sending more U.S. personnel to Vienna, Austria, or helping to
    provide technology or working better to coordinate with them?
        Because I think increasingly we're going to need an agency
    like that given what is, I think, the appropriate warning or
    caution that Mr. Paul gave that we're on a fast march toward
    nuclear proliferation and I wish we could do more to reign it
    in. I think there are some things we could do. It may or may
    not be inevitable but the fact is, it's happening. So what do
    we do to really bolster the IAEA as a necessary component of
    our efforts to try to watch that and prevent insofar as
    possible?
        Mr. Flory. Senator, you raise a very good point. The IAEA
    plays an extremely important role and after decades when it was
    there and frankly didn't get a lot of attention because things
    were moving along, it first came into world view after the
    first Iraq war when it was learned how much Iraq had been able
    to accomplish under IAEA scrutiny and that led to the
    development of stronger safeguards by the IAEA and most
    recently in the case of Iran. In terms of resources and things
    like that, I think--I don't know if I'm allowed to do this but
    if I can take your question for the record vicariously on
    behalf of Bob Joseph who was unable to be here----[Laughter].
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The United States has long been at the forefront of efforts to
    strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) ability to
    deter, detect, and respond to nuclear proliferation. When the IAEA
    safeguards system was being developed, we provided much of the
    technology to verify and monitor nuclear material and facilities. After
    the first Gulf War revealed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear
    activities, we supported the successful development of the additional
    protocol, to strengthen the ability of the IAEA to detect undeclared
    nuclear activities and change safeguards from a culture of accountants
    to one of detectives. When the IAEA budget was stretched thin by the
    added demands of strengthened safeguards, we stepped in to fill the gap
    in safeguards through our annual voluntary contribution--the largest by
    far by any member state--and by persuading IAEA member states in 2003
    to support an increase in the safeguards budget.
        President Bush submitted the IAEA Additional Protocol to the Senate
    for advice and consent to ratification in 2002, and welcomed the
    Senate's approval in 2004. The President also called for universal
    adoption of the Additional Protocol and the creation of a new special
    committee of the IAEA Board to examine ways to strengthen the agency's
    safeguards and verification capabilities. Working closely with the IAEA
    Director General, we are pleased that the new special committee began
    its important work late last year.
        The United States has also worked with others on the IAEA Board to
    reinforce the essential role of the U.N. Security Council in addressing
    noncompliance with safeguards obligations, as that role was embedded in
    the IAEA Statute almost 50 years ago. In September 2005, the IAEA Board
    of Governors found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards
    obligations, a formal finding that requires a report to the Security
    Council. The Board also found that Iran's nuclear activities raise
    questions concerning international peace and security that are within
    the competence of the U.N. Security Council. In February 2006, the
    Board reported the Iranian case to the Security Council, and the
    Council added its authority to the IAEA's calls on Iran through a
    Presidential statement in late March. Thus, as the U.S. strongly
    advocated, the Security Council has not supplanted the IAEA effort, but
    instead reinforces it.
        One clear lesson from the Iran case is that some states will skirt
    their obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), or cynically
    manipulate the provisions of the NPT to justify the acquisition of
    sensitive technologies that enable them to pursue nuclear weapons
    capabilities. These are the very capabilities the Treaty is intended to
    deny. To close this loophole, the President has proposed measures to
    halt the further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation
    capabilities beyond those states that already operate full-scale, fully
    functioning facilities. These sensitive fuel cycle capabilities are--
    the two primary paths to acquiring fissile material for nuclear
    weapons. In return, he called on the world's nuclear fuel suppliers to
    ensure that states that forego enrichment and reprocessing have
    reliable access at a reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors. We
    are working with other fuel provider states and with the IAEA to put in
    place reliable fuel service arrangements that will convince states with
    power reactors that their best economic interest is not to invest in
    expensive, and proliferation risky, fuel cycle capabilities.
        The IAEA relies on its member states to meet its needs for
    expertise and for developing and applying technology to meet safeguards
    needs and challenges. The U.S. Support Program is by far the largest
    and most comprehensive of the 18 Member State Support Programs. Over
    the years we have provided most of the basic technology for measuring
    nuclear materials and monitoring for possible diversion of those
    materials from peaceful nuclear activities. We provided experts who
    helped develop the system and structure of IAEA safeguards. When the
    IAEA needs novel or unique capabilities to respond to challenges in
    particular countries, such as Iran or North Korea, the United States
    has always stood ready to respond. Currently, we are sponsoring 12
    full-time experts and 35 interns, junior professionals and part-time
    consultants, and working on 80 other projects in collaboration with the
    IAEA Safeguards Department. We are committed further enhancing IAEA
    safeguards in the context of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, in
    order to facilitate the growth of nuclear energy to meet the world's
    growing energy needs.

        Mr. Flory. I'm sure he'll appreciate my doing this, but DOS
    is the lead and we'll obviously be happy to contribute to
    answering that question in any way we can. But since it's a
    diplomatic mission they probably are the best people to pull
    together an answer on that.
        I think what is tremendously important is that, and this is
    again something where the DOS is in the lead for us, is that
    the matter of Iran be handled successfully. The IAEA has
    grappled with this under the leadership for much of that time
    of a particular group of members but as you've mentioned it's
    focused attention on the IAEA and I think it's important for
    the overall, for the internationally established safeguard
    network, that the international system that we're working with
    be able to solve this problem.
        Senator Clinton. General, do you have anything to add to
    that?
        General Cartwright. I would just say that there are
    certainly things that we can do in partnership. The obvious
    ones are training, standards, technical experts, and making
    sure that we're on a common sheet of music, so to speak, in
    advocating for those standards and once they're accepted, then
    advocating globally for them. Those are critical pieces. There
    are also pieces that we probably ought to sit down in another
    session and talk a little bit about what we could do to assist
    them in setting the conditions for their ability to do their
    job.
        Senator Clinton. That would be very helpful. I'm sure that
    you've given thought to that and it might be something that we
    could look at.
        Mr. Paul. That's actually something that the President's
    focused on quite a bit, increasing the funding for the IAEA,
    continuing to provide the technical basis and supports that the
    IAEA and Director El Baradei needs. Every one of the more than
    200 nuclear weapons inspectors at the IAEA were trained at Los
    Alamos National Laboratory here in America here within the
    NNSA. We're very proud to continue to fund that training. They
    come here to learn how to do what they do to keep the world
    safe.
        We led the way to strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect
    nuclear proliferation. We instituted a successful effort to
    increase the safeguards budget. The United States of America is
    the single largest contributor to the budget of the IAEA. In
    fact, we are even a larger contributor by percentage basis to
    the IAEA than we are to the U.N. There's 128 members of the
    IAEA. We provide one-quarter of all the funding. We also
    provide a lot, on a rotational basis, of our technical experts
    from our national laboratories and with Ambassador Greg
    Schulte, our recently sworn-in ambassador to the U.N. mission
    there, along with our office, our DOE office there, we have
    engaged in an effort to increase the number of U.S. origin
    persons and experts that go to the IAEA and work internally.
    It's something that I've spoken personally with Director El
    Baradei about.
        I have one deputy director general on his board who is
    American, who's actually the Deputy Director General for
    Management for the IAEA and I am in a process right now of
    increasing the number of technical experts that we send over
    there. These are excellent points and they're things that we
    are working on on a day-to-day basis. I think that it's a good
    testament to the leadership of the President and the leadership
    of Director El Baradei. We've made some progress but we can do
    more.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Clinton. I, too, think
    it would be interesting to see that wire diagram.
        Senator Clinton. Yes.
        Senator Cornyn. May be instructive for all of us.
        Mr. Paul, the Megaports program is a DOE nonproliferation
    program to install nuclear detection equipment at major
    international seaports. Last Friday, March 24, a couple of
    newspapers ran articles alleging that through the Megaports
    Program the United States was contracting with foreign
    companies to scan cargo for nuclear materials. Could you please
    explain to us what the Megaports Program is and how it operates
    at international seaports? If you would also tell us what would
    be the role of private contractors in the Philippines, the
    Bahamas, and other countries where the Megaports Program is
    being conducted?
        Finally, who will actually operate the radiation detection
    equipment and how confident can we be that it will not be
    tampered with?
        Mr. Paul. We can be very confident that the equipment and
    the material, the data stream that we get from it, and the
    analysis of it will not be tampered with.
        Let me tell you a little bit about the Megaports Program.
    This is a fantastic program. It's an opportunity for us to have
    an additional layer of defense and protection in order to
    detect the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological
    material through some of the major ports with the most
    throughput outside the United States, ports through which cargo
    would travel before it ultimately comes to a U.S. port.
        We are currently up and running with our radiation detector
    equipment that we deploy in four ports. We have 10 this year
    that we have in construction mode and we have another 35, 40
    that we're in negotiations with right now. It's a program that
    works very much in tandem with the DHS Container Security
    Initiative (CSI). CSI has U.S. Federal customs agents onsite at
    foreign ports who through profiles review manifests of cargo to
    identify containers, for example, that should have further
    review, inspection, and detector inspections. What we do is we
    put equipment in these foreign ports. We train the operators.
    These are foreign port Federal Government operators.
        So, for example, we go into the Port of Bahamas and we
    train their customs officials, because it's their port to
    operate and analyze the data that comes from a radiation
    detector, a gamma ray detector, and a neutron detector, which
    is in that port. If a cargo container were to come through that
    portal and an alarm were to sound that data goes to a central
    alarm station that is manned by a government official. It is a
    customs official from the host government because these are in
    foreign government's ports. I think what was stated in a
    newspaper was not exactly correct.
        Senator Cornyn. That would surprise me.
        Mr. Paul. Yes, I know. To set the record straight, in the
    Bahamas and in all other Megaports ports and in all future
    Megaports ports the equipment and the data collection is
    operated by a Federal Government agent from the host country.
    Now, obviously, we have to work out agreements with the port on
    the logistics and how the ports themselves are operated so
    that, for example, if a terminal is owned by a private company,
    we can't change the fact that a private company operates it,
    but our radiation detection equipment in there is not operated
    by that private company, is not touched by that private
    company, it cannot be tampered with by that private company. If
    it is tampered with, we get an immediate alarm, a signal. If
    it's defeated so that there is a break in the signal, we get an
    immediate alarm. We also have technologies that allow us to be
    very vigilant in this setting, I'll say that.
        Senator Cornyn. I would note that we just got word that
    there is a 15-minute vote on the floor, so we're going to be
    wrapping up here rather quickly. What is the role that U.S.
    Government personnel play at those foreign ports?
        Mr. Paul. In most of those foreign ports, the CSI program
    is already in place where there is a U.S. Federal customs
    official reviewing manifests. We typically go into a port with
    Megaports and add the detector capability at a port where there
    is already CSI and therefore already a U.S. Federal customs
    official. In those instances, which is most of them, if a
    Megaports alarm were to sound and a government official from
    the foreign port got that alarm, it is common that that person
    would contact his counterpart, the U.S. Federal customs
    official there, but it's not a requirement. In the absence of a
    U.S. Federal customs official there, they go straight to the
    embassy and then the embassy calls me or calls our office. But
    under no circumstances is a private company in control of that
    data nor can they tamper with it.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you. Mr. Flory, my last question and
    then I'll turn it over to Senator Reed, has to do with the CTR
    program and notwithstanding the success that that program has
    enjoyed, we see the CTR budget declining this year and it looks
    like CTR budgets will either remain flat or even decline
    further over the 5-year defense plan. It strikes me as odd
    because we also have a request for a $44.5 million supplemental
    for the CTR program to fund accelerated security improvements
    at Russian warhead sites agreed to by President Bush and
    President Putin at the Bratislava Summit, as has already been
    testified to.
        Could you explain that and in particular there's been some
    discussion as I know you know about the use of supplementals to
    fund ongoing operations of the DOD, and why a supplemental is
    the appropriate way to go here as opposed to putting it in the
    baseline of the DOD budget?
        Mr. Flory. Mr. Chairman, in terms of the supplemental
    request, I don't know precisely the answers to why that request
    came in as a supplemental. I suspect that it had to do with,
    and this is a problem we have in many cases, where the budget
    cycle is such a long drawn out process that sometimes things
    have changed and requirements have changed over time. We do
    need the money to spend now in fiscal year 2006. That's what's
    driving--and the fact that it's part of a program that is
    specifically designed to accelerate a preexisting program that
    was supposed to take until 2012 and is now supposed to take
    until 2008. With respect to this year's budget specifically,
    you're right, last year was I think about $409 million and this
    year we go down to $372 million. That reflected actually the
    program expectations at the time and in particular the fact
    that the assumptions driving the budget at the time the budget
    was put together assumed that there was going to be a drop-off
    in funding for Shchuch'ye.
        Now, as I told you earlier, we have a delay in the
    Shchuch'ye project. We do not assume that that delay is going
    to transform into an additional financial requirement. Right
    now we only know that it's going to take more time. If it were
    to turn out that more funding were required, we'd have to come
    back, but it's a function of the budget having been developed
    about a year ago and some of the problems only becoming
    manifest now.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. I just want to quickly follow up. You've
    mentioned Shchuch'ye but I have a series of specific questions
    about the delay, about the potential budget authorities that
    might be necessary in the future, and when live agent
    production will be--destruction I should say, not production,
    destruction--we're destroying we're not producing.
        Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cornyn. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
    testimony. As you can see, there's a lot of interest in what
    you do and in our country's security when it comes to
    proliferation, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation and
    counterterrorism efforts and we very much appreciate your
    service to our Nation and your willingness to take on this
    challenge. We want to be supportive of those efforts. We want
    to know what resources and authority that you need in order to
    do your job even better.
        The hearing will now conclude but we'll leave the record
    open for 48 hours in case there are other members of the
    committee who'd like to submit additional requests for
    information. Thank you very much. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

                      fissile material disposition program

        1. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, the fissile material disposition
    program, under which the United States and Russia committed to dispose
    of 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, is laudable in
    intent, but has been plagued by numerous problems: There was a 2-year
    delay in the program due to an inability to agree on liability issues
    for U.S. contractors. Though an agreement has now been reached, it
    still awaits Russian signature and ratification by the Russian Duma.
    The impasse over liability caused the United States to postpone
    construction of the U.S. Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility in
    South Carolina in order to maintain parallelism in the program. A
    December 2005 Department of Energy (DOE) Inspector General (IG) report
    criticized the management of the U.S. program and assessed that the
    cost of the U.S. MOX facility will be $3.5 billion-$2.5 billion more
    than the original DOE estimate in 2002.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget request for the MOX program is $638.0
    million--nearly one-third of the total DOE nonproliferation request for
    fiscal year 2007. Now it appears that the Russians are no longer
    committed to the program as originally conceived.
        Why hasn't Russia signed the liability agreement it reached with
    the United States last year?
        Mr. Paul. The United States and Russia successfully completed
    negotiations of a protocol covering liability protection for the
    plutonium disposition program in July 2005. The protocol is currently
    under final review within the Russian Government and is expected to be
    signed in the near future. We have been reassured by officials from the
    Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Atomic Energy
    Agency that there are no substantive problems with the agreed language,
    but rather it is a question of the protocol undergoing a complete
    interagency review that has been moving more slowly than expected.
    While we are disappointed with the delay in signing, we continue to
    believe that the protocol will be signed.

        2. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, since Russia has indicated this
    agreement must be ratified by the Russian Duma, are there risks in
    spending additional U.S. taxpayer dollars on the Russian program before
    the Duma has approved the liability agreement?
        Mr. Paul. I believe the risks are minimal. Russian officials have
    assured us that once the liability protocol is signed, the two sides
    can work together to seek interim arrangements to enable the terms of
    the protocol to be applied provisionally.

        3. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, do you believe Russia is still
    committed to disposing of excess plutonium through the MOX program? If
    not, what are the costs, benefits, and risks to the U.S. of going down
    another disposition path with Russia?
        Mr. Paul. Yes, I believe Russia remains committed to disposing of
    34 metric tons of its surplus weapon-grade plutonium. Recent high-level
    meetings with officials from the Russian Atomic Energy Agency indicate
    that Russia would proceed with the disposition program using primarily
    light water reactors were full funding available from the international
    community. At the same time, Russian officials have expressed their
    desire to explore the use of fast reactors for their disposition
    effort, which is consistent with the 2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium
    Management and Disposition Agreement as well as Russia's future energy
    policy. We are now actively engaged with Russia on exploring ways to
    shift the program in a direction that will garner Russian commitment,
    political as well as financial. The absence of such a commitment has
    been a major factor accounting for the delays in their cooperation.

        4. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, do you believe the U.S. and Russian
    programs should continue to be linked? Should they still proceed at a
    parallel pace?
        Mr. Paul. The United States and Russia remain committed to
    proceeding with plutonium disposition in parallel, to the extent
    practicable, as called for in the 2000 agreement. However, vastly
    different political and regulatory infrastructures make meeting
    milestones for U.S. and Russian plutonium disposition facilities at the
    same time difficult. The Department is ready to start construction of
    the U.S. MOX facility in 2006, even though the Russian program has
    lagged behind. However, the Russian Government has recently signaled
    its intent to begin early disposition of limited quantities of weapon-
    grade plutonium in its existing fast reactor well before the United
    States could begin disposition of its plutonium. Moreover, the United
    States and Russia are exploring the use of other advanced reactors for
    disposing of the balance of the 34 metric tons of Russian plutonium.

        5. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, if we were to delink the U.S. and
    Russian plutonium disposition programs, what would be the likely impact
    on the Russian program and on the U.S. program?
        Mr. Paul. The 2000 Agreement commits the United States and Russia
    to dispose of 34 metric tons each of surplus weapon-grade plutonium in
    parallel to the extent practicable. While the U.S. is prepared to
    proceed with construction of its MOX facility, Russia is still
    considering various disposal options to meet its commitment.
    Consequently, the U.S. has concluded it's no longer practicable to link
    construction and operation of its MOX facility to the achievement of
    similar milestones for a MOX facility by Russia. The U.S. believes its
    approach will enable both countries to achieve commitments under the
    2000 Agreement in a timely and cost-effective manner.

        6. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, in that case, should the U.S.
    disposition program still be considered a nonproliferation program? Or
    is it then simply a program for disposing of excess U.S. material that
    should be considered in the wider context of DOE nuclear material
    disposition and cleanup?
        Mr. Paul. Yes, the U.S. program is still a critical
    nonproliferation effort because it will yield important
    nonproliferation benefits by eliminating weapons usable nuclear
    material and demonstrating its leadership in nonproliferation to the
    rest of the world.

        7. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Paul, does DOE have a plan to present to
    Congress a clear path forward for both the Russian and the U.S.
    programs before we put any more funds into the program?
        Mr. Paul. A detailed cost estimate and schedule baseline for the
    construction of the U.S. MOX facility is currently being developed and
    will be validated before construction begins as part of the DOE's
    Critical Decision process. The Department will submit to Congress a
    report on the cost and schedule baseline for MOX facility by December
    2006. As for the Russian program, the two sides are working together to
    explore other disposition alternatives based on the use of advanced
    reactors for plutonium disposition. In this regard, Russian officials
    have signaled their intent to begin early disposition of limited
    quantities of weapon-grade plutonium in its existing fast reactor well
    before the United States could begin disposition of its plutonium.
    Moreover, the United States and Russia are exploring the use of other
    advanced reactors for disposing of the balance of the 34 metric tons of
    Russian plutonium. Joint U.S.-Russian technical working groups are
    being established to discuss early Russian disposition, with the first
    meeting planned for May 10-12, 2006. At this time, we cannot predict
    how long the preparations will take.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

       megaports and the second line of defense program and other border
                              security initiatives

        8. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory and Mr. Paul, the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) plans
    to establish a global architecture for international border security.
    How will this be coordinated with the Department of State (DOS), which
    has the lead responsibility in coordinating efforts of the DOE and
    Department of Defense (DOD) to prevent nuclear smuggling overseas?
        Mr. Flory. I would refer you to DHS's DNDO and the DOS for an
    understanding of the coordination mechanisms between the two
    organizations regarding DNDO's global architecture.
        Mr. Paul. The DNDO's responsibility to develop the global
    architecture for radiation detection does not obviate the need for the
    DOS's coordination role. In coordination with the DOE, DOD, and DOS,
    the DNDO is focused on developing the overarching multi-layered
    strategy for protection of the U.S. from an act of nuclear terrorism
    (i.e., the Global Architecture), developing more advanced detection
    equipment, and examining methods to facilitate U.S. receipt of
    information on potential nuclear threats in near real-time. The DOE
    continues to have the responsibility for the international deployment
    of radiation detection systems and will continue to consult with DOS on
    its international cooperation programs. DOE is a participant in the
    Nuclear Trafficking Response Group, which is chaired by DOS and is
    responsible for facilitating the coordination of the U.S. Government
    response to all international origin nuclear detection alarms.

        9. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory and Mr. Paul, how does the global
    architecture apply to DOE and DOD programs?
        Mr. Flory. DOD policy and program personnel who work on the
    Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program's Weapons of Mass
    Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) have been
    coordinating closely with DNDO in the development of DNDO's
    international radiation and nuclear detection capabilities data base--
    one component of its global nuclear detection architecture.
        DOD's CTR policy office has provided to DNDO specific information
    on the deployment of radiation detection equipment that has been
    provided through its WMD-PPI program, as well as general WMD-PPI
    program background information.
        DOD is placing provisions in its WMD-PPI agreements with CTR
    program recipient states that require reporting, through the U.S.
    Embassy, when any WMD-related material is detected through the use of
    U.S. Government-provided equipment. These reports are sent back to the
    State Department, which shares them with DNDO.
        As its WMD-PPI projects mature, CTR Policy will continue to provide
    project information that is relevant to DNDO's mission.
        I would refer you to DOE for an understanding of how DNDO's global
    architecture applies to its programs.
        Mr. Paul. As the primary agency responsible for international
    deployment of radiation detection equipment, we work closely with DNDO
    to shape the global nuclear detection architecture. The National
    Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) routinely exchanges programmatic
    and technical information with DNDO to determine how the efforts of the
    Second Line of Defense program can enhance the external layer of the
    Global Architecture.

        10. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory and Mr. Paul, in a report
    released Monday, March 27, 2006, the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) recommends that the National Security Advisory, acting through
    the National Security Council staff, issue a plan ``guiding the
    implementation and coordination of threat reduction and
    nonproliferation programs addressing border security.'' How does the
    DHS global architecture fit within this recommendation?
        Mr. Flory. I would refer you to DHS and the National Security
    Council regarding this recommendation.
        Mr. Paul. The DHS's DNDO efforts to establish this global
    architecture are focused on baselining the current detection
    capabilities both domestically and internationally and identifying the
    ``gaps'' where the establishment of detection or interdiction
    capabilities is required. According to the terms of National Security
    Presidential Directive (NSPD)/HSPD that created this office, the DOE,
    DOS, and DOD remain responsible for the policy and implementation of
    their respective international border security programs. As such, the
    National Security Advisor retains the authority to guide the
    implementation and coordination of such programs.

        11. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, could you briefly describe the DOE
    Megaports program and explain how it is coordinated with the DHS's
    Container Security Initiative?
        Mr. Paul. The Megaports Initiative is a bilateral international
    nonproliferation program under which DOE/NNSA cooperates with its
    foreign partners to enhance host nation capability to deter and detect
    illicit trafficking in special nuclear and other radioactive materials
    in the international maritime trading system. Under the Megaports
    program DOE/NNSA provides radiation detection systems, training in use
    of the systems, and technical and sustainability support to appropriate
    host nation law enforcement officials. Once installation, training, and
    system evaluation is complete, ownership of the equipment and
    responsibility for its operation transfers to the host government. The
    host government is obligated to provide all data associated with
    detections or seizures made as a result of the use of DOE/NNSA supplied
    equipment to the U.S. Government.
        DOE/NNSA and DHS/Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) have built a
    strong, effective relationship and closely coordinate on the planning
    and implementation of the Megaports Initiative and the Container
    Security Initiative (CSI). The Megaports Initiative enhances CSI
    targeting and scanning activities at foreign seaports by providing an
    additional scanning tool to detect nuclear and other radioactive
    materials in cargo containers prior to being loaded on vessels bound
    for the United States. The broad extent of coordination between CSI and
    the Megaports Initiative is evident in the number of joint outreach
    missions and port assessments we have undertaken, the joint agreements
    we have already signed with host governments, and our efforts to
    identify additional opportunities to jointly implement both programs.
    Finally, for the ports where CSI personnel are present, NNSA is
    developing procedures with our host country counterparts whereby CSI is
    notified of alarms on containers bound for the United States.

        12. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, some have suggested that these two
    programs be combined into the DHS. What are your views on this idea?
    Would you recommend for or against this proposal?
        Mr. Paul. For a number of compelling reasons, I believe that it is
    imperative that the Megaports Initiative remains within NNSA. The
    Megaports Initiative is a key component of our larger strategy to
    prevent the diversion of nuclear weapons and material. As an extension
    of our efforts to enhance the security of Russia's nuclear complex, the
    deployment of radiation detection monitors at land borders, airports,
    and seaports under the Second Line of Defense program, which includes
    the Megaports Initiative, provides another opportunity to prevent
    terrorist organizations access to nuclear or other radiological
    material. The NSPD that established the DNDO clearly acknowledged DOE/
    NNSA's role as the primary source of expertise in dealing with issues
    related to special nuclear and other radioactive materials. Leaving the
    Megaports Initiative within NNSA will allow us to continue to leverage
    this expertise and build upon our solid record of successfully managing
    international nuclear nonproliferation programs.
        To ensure a cohesive international port security program, NNSA and
    DHS's CBP bureau have established a strong, effective partnership that
    allows us to leverage the unique strengths of both of our agencies.
    Although we are working towards the common goal of preventing WMD from
    entering our country, the Megaports Initiative's mission is broader in
    that we are focused on detecting efforts to smuggle nuclear material,
    regardless of the destination. Because CSI is focused on screening U.S.
    bound containers, merging the two programs could result in lost
    opportunities to seize smuggled material or weapons.
        Moreover, NNSA has the contractual infrastructure in place and the
    radiation detection monitors on hand to support deployments into fiscal
    year 2008. We are gaining significant momentum in expanding the
    Megaports program with the completion of eight new agreements in 2005
    and up to six more agreements in 2006. Transferring the program could
    delay further expansion indefinitely as it will require DHS to begin
    anew the building of the expertise and the complex contract/procurement
    processes necessary for this type of specialized work.

        13. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, while we are on the subject of
    megaports, the GAO report expressed concern about DOE's ability to
    implement its goal of having equipment at 70 ports in 35 countries. By
    this spring DOE will have equipment operating at six ports. The fiscal
    year 2007 budget request for megaports is $40 million down from $73
    million in fiscal year 2006. How do you get from 6 to 70 ports in any
    useful period of time with a 40-percent decrease in the budget?
        Mr. Paul. For fiscal year 2006, we identified opportunities to
    accelerate implementation of the Megaports Initiative and, accordingly,
    sought additional funding for more ports. We did not initially
    anticipate opportunities to sign as many agreements in 2006 when we
    were formulating the fiscal year 2007 budget request. Since we had
    recently completed agreements with countries of high priority to the
    Core program we instead requested additional funds to support
    acceleration of the Core program for fiscal year 2007. To expedite the
    expansion of the Megaports program, DOE/NNSA is also pursuing cost-
    sharing arrangements with prospective and current Megaports partners to
    cover additional ports in each country. Finally, we are exploring
    arrangements in which we would partner with the private sector port
    terminal operators to increase the number of international port
    terminals with radiation scanning capability.

        14. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, does Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM) play a role in the planning to prevent global nuclear
    smuggling?
        General Cartwright. Yes. STRATCOM is an integral part of the DOD's
    contribution to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In
    accordance with Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directives, STRATCOM is
    identifying and assessing required capabilities, advocating for
    research and development, coordinating military intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance, and providing subject matter experts
    to international PSI meetings and activities. In conjunction with the
    Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, STRATCOM
    personnel are participating actively in the PSI exercise program as
    players, observers, and/or controllers.

        15. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, what is STRATCOM's
    relationship with the DHS DNDO?
        General Cartwright. No formal relationship exists. However,
    STRATCOM headquarters personnel and the command's component for
    combating WMD work closely with the DHS on issues related to nuclear
    detection. The STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
    Destruction (SCC-WMD) and Headquarters J8 directorate continue to
    develop a relationship with the DNDO, working to establish and
    formalize maritime architectures and information sharing. The National
    Military Command Center and the SCC-WMD are part of the Maritime
    Operational Threat Response notification system of United States
    Government departments and agencies to support DNDO's Interagency
    Nuclear Detection Alarm Adjudication Procedures. The SCC-WMD is also
    communicating at the working level to establish better links with the
    DNDO Operation Center, providing DNDO DOD subject matter expertise to
    further enhance timely/effective agency coordination.

                                   corruption

        16. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, General Cartwright, and Mr.
    Paul, corruption and criminal activity are complicated and pervasive in
    many areas of the world where there is a threat of nuclear smuggling.
    The mechanisms for the corruption and criminal activity are equally
    complicated and are often longstanding arrangements. What can the
    United States realistically do to minimize the effect of corruption and
    criminal activity on the efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling?
        Mr. Flory. In a country as large as the Russian Federation, with a
    well-established criminal element, underpaid military and civil
    servants, and widely dispersed storage locations far from central
    control, there is always a threat that local corruption could lead to
    proliferation. The U.S. response to this concern has been to provide
    equipment and training that makes it more difficult for either corrupt
    officials or criminals to obtain nuclear weapons. As a result of the
    joint statement by Presidents Bush and Putin, the DOD and DOE will
    complete security upgrades in 2008 to all nuclear weapons storage sites
    for which the Russian Federation has requested assistance. An automated
    inventory control and management system is now operational, allowing
    the Russian Ministry of Defense real-time inventories of its nuclear
    weapons. In addition, DOD has helped to set up and institutionalize
    within the Ministry of Defense directorate responsible for nuclear
    weapons security a personnel reliability program which is intended to
    protect against any threat from corrupt insiders. Together, these joint
    efforts improve control of the weapons by their lawful custodians, deny
    unauthorized access to weapons, and limit the ability of even a corrupt
    insider to divert any weapon.
        The CTR WMD PPI addresses the potential vulnerability of non-
    Russian FSU states' borders to smuggling of WMD and related components.
    The program complements the CTR program's traditional focus,
    elimination of WMD at its sources, by addressing WMD ``on the move.''
    Projects help develop comprehensive detection and interdiction
    capabilities at key ports of entry and along borders to diminish
    criminal cross-border smuggling activities. These projects help develop
    concepts of operation and include training to international standards.
    Data base upgrades and communications to headquarters help provide
    visibility into operations at outlying locations. These efforts help to
    professionalize the officers of the border services. Of particular
    note, the PPI Portal Monitoring Project in Uzbekistan will incorporate
    an Employee Dependability Program that will assist the Uzbekistan
    customs and border guard leadership in codifying and enforcing
    standards of dependability, conduct and behavior commensurate with
    responsibilities of those operating, maintaining and/or supervising
    radiation portal monitors.
        General Cartwright. The United States should continue to
    participate in and advocate for endorsement of and participation in the
    PSI. The PSI relies upon a supportive global network of partner
    nations, which share intelligence and conduct unilateral or joint
    operations in order to limit proliferation activities, including those
    resulting from criminal or corrupt activities. A multilateral approach
    to this problem is critical for success, and the United States aids
    other nations, particularly in regions of concern in minimizing the
    effect of corruption and criminal activity by fully supporting the PSI,
    and recruiting other nations to join in this effort.
        Mr. Paul. The NNSA has been working for years to understand and
    address the effects of corruption and criminal activity on cooperative
    security programs. First, NNSA strives to maintain an up-to-date, in
    depth understanding of a range of corruption issues in regions of
    concern. This involves NNSA commissioned studies by experts at the
    Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at the American University,
    Rand Corp, et cetera, and continual review of related foreign press and
    intelligence. This analysis includes corruption at various levels,
    including official corruption within governments, and links between
    corrupt officials and criminal networks with varying degrees of
    sophistication. Second, NNSA works to incorporate realistic assumptions
    about corruption into decisions related to cooperative security and
    anti-smuggling projects. For example, corruption factors into
    prioritization models used to rank prospective ports for inclusion in
    the Megaports program. NNSA also designs security systems to make
    official corruption more difficult. Measures such as video surveillance
    at key locations in nuclear facilities or border crossings can provide
    a viable deterrent. Finally, NNSA is working to increase awareness of
    corruption and the tools to address it by including the subject in
    training programs.
        Despite these efforts, NNSA recognizes that crime and corruption
    present a real and lasting challenge to anti-smuggling programs. In
    addition to measures described above, NNSA relies heavily on redundancy
    to combat this threat. Redundant layers of security at facilities,
    regional borders, and in the global shipping system, provide the best
    defense against nuclear smuggling networks.

                                mox fuel program

        17. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, the United States and Russia agreed to
    each get rid of 34 metric tons of excess weapons grade plutonium.
    Without going into the whole history of the MOX fuel program, and the
    joint agreement to convert excess weapons grade plutonium into MOX fuel
    for nuclear power reactors, I am concerned about several aspects of the
    program:

              1. The ability of the U.S. and Russian program to move in
            parallel as agreed;
              2. That the Russian Duma will never ratify the liability
            agreement;
              3. That Russia probably is no longer willing to convert the
            plutonium to MOX fuel; and
              4. That the U.S. is rushing to build a multibillion dollar
            facility to convert plutonium into MOX fuel without a good
            understanding of how Russia will meet its commitment to get rid
            of 34 tons of excess weapons grade plutonium and without any
            understanding of parallelism.

        Could you address each of these issues.
        Mr. Paul. The Russian Government has repeatedly stated that it
    remains committed to the 2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and
    Disposition Agreement, and we expect the Russian Government to fulfill
    its nonproliferation obligations. The United States and Russia remain
    committed to proceeding with plutonium disposition in parallel to the
    extent practicable, as called for in the 2000 agreement. We have been
    reassured by officials from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
    the Russian Atomic Energy Agency that there are no substantive problems
    with the agreed upon language in the liability protocol, but rather it
    is a question of the protocol undergoing a complete interagency review
    that has been moving more slowly than expected. We continue to believe
    that the protocol will be signed. Russian officials have assured us
    that once the liability protocol is signed, the two sides can work
    together to seek interim arrangements to enable the terms of the
    protocol to be applied provisionally. The Russian Government recently
    demonstrated its commitment to plutonium disposition by signaling its
    intent to begin early disposition of limited quantities of plutonium in
    its existing fast reactor well before the United States could begin
    disposition of its plutonium. Moreover, the United States and Russia
    are exploring the use of other advanced reactors for disposing of the
    balance of the 34 metric tons of Russian plutonium. As a result, we are
    moving forward with the U.S. plutonium disposition program and plan to
    begin construction of the U.S. MOX facility at the Savannah River Site
    later this year. Further delay in construction would increase the cost
    for the facility, threaten our ability to meet our commitments to South
    Carolina as set forth in existing law and significantly increase the
    likelihood the Department would have to pay penalties and take other
    actions under 50 U.S.C. 2566.

        18. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, currently, the U.S. plutonium is safe
    and secure at the Savannah River Site. I understand there is a desire
    to ensure that the plutonium stored indefinitely at Savannah River but
    we need to make sure that we have the right budget priorities before we
    spend $2 to $3 billion to make MOX fuel. Is there an alternative and
    higher priority use for these funds in DOE?
        Mr. Paul. No. The administration's fiscal year 2007 request
    reflects the operational priorities of the Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation. We have developed comprehensive metrics and a
    prioritization model that identifies the highest threats, considers our
    ability to address those threats over time, and, thus, allows us to
    align our priorities over the fiscal years accordingly. Both the
    previous administration and this administration have stated a
    commitment to dispose of access plutonium through conversion to MOX
    fuel for use in commercial reactors. The administration's fiscal year
    2007 budget request continues to demonstrate that commitment.

        19. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, I should also note that the DOE IG's
    office recently reviewed the MOX fuel facility and the construction
    cost estimates. The estimate in 2002 was that the facility would cost
    about $1 billion. $950 million has already been appropriated for the
    facility. The IG report indicated that the construction cost has more
    than doubled to between $2 and $3 billion. DOE wants to begin
    construction the end of this year. Is it time to rethink the plutonium
    disposition program?
        Mr. Paul. Although I understand your frustration with the findings
    in the Department's IG report on the U.S. MOX facility, I do not
    believe that it is time to rethink the plutonium disposition program.
    While it is true that project costs have risen, comparing the current
    MOX cost estimate to that which appeared in 2002 is misleading and
    overstates the cost difference. For example, costs appearing in the
    2002 report are in 2001 dollars whereas the current estimate: 1) is in
    future year dollars; 2) reflects sunk costs incurred to date; and 3)
    reflects a 2\1/2\ year delay caused by the liability impasse with
    Russia. In addition, it must be recognized that the cost increase
    results, in large part, from circumstances that cannot be fairly
    attributed to project management. Notwithstanding, the Department has
    already identified and taken action to address each of the
    recommendations in the report. These include incorporating performance
    incentives in future contract negotiations, improving monthly project
    reports from the contractor, controlling contractor spending, and
    reviewing contractor performance. Now that the planned date for the
    start of construction of the MOX facility has been set, the project
    cost and schedule baseline is currently undergoing an independent
    review and validation prior to the start of construction. This will
    enable us to track project performance against the baseline and
    minimize the possibility of future cost overruns. Plans are also
    underway to hire a qualified MOX Federal Project Director and to
    streamline the organizational structure of the project.

                             bratislava commitment

        20. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory and Mr. Paul, at the Bratislava
    summit, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to a joint effort to improve
    security at 15 key Russian nuclear weapons storage sites by 2008. To
    meet this goal DOE and DOD have divided responsibility for the sites
    between them and must begin work in 2006. DOE received additional money
    in its fiscal year 2006 budget to begin its work in 2006, and DOD has
    requested $46 million in the fiscal year 2006 supplemental, now
    awaiting congressional action, to begin work in 2006. With the
    supplemental does each agency have enough money to do the work needed
    in 2006 to make the 2008 goal?
        Mr. Flory. If the requested supplemental funds are appropriated as
    CTR funds (as opposed to operations and maintenance funds), DOD will
    have, along with its fiscal year 2007 request, sufficient funds to
    complete the security upgrades at the 8 nuclear weapons sites assigned
    to DOD for upgrading (of the total 15 sites).
        By the end of 2006, DOD also will have completed upgrades at nine
    other storage sites and three rail transfer sites, while continuing to
    upgrade security at four other sites begun in 2005. The sites being
    upgraded are storage facilities for strategic and nonstrategic nuclear
    weapons.
        Mr. Paul. Given the supplemental funding received by the DOE to
    meet its Bratislava commitment, DOE has enough funding to meet the 2008
    goal of completing its portion of the work at the 15 key Russian
    nuclear weapons storage site by 2008.

        21. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory and Mr. Paul, is the work of DOE
    and DOD coordinated? Previously GAO has been critical of the two
    agencies for using different approaches for securing materials. Will
    both agencies be using similar approaches to secure the materials?
        Mr. Flory. DOD coordinates closely with DOE and the interagency to
    ensure that a common approach is being used to upgrade security for
    nuclear weapons in the custody of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
        Mr. Paul. Yes, both DOE and DOD have been coordinating on their
    approaches to work at these sites and have developed preliminary
    designs to enhance security at similar sites. Meetings between either
    party and their MOD counterparts are usually attended by a
    representative from the other agency to ensure continuity of approach.

                                    stratcom

        22. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, the Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR) appears to give the Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
    additional responsibility for the render safe role. The DOE and its
    national labs provide technical support for the nuclear render safe
    mission. What is STRATCOM's role in the mission to render safe stolen
    or other WMD, including nuclear devices and do you plan to change these
    relationships in any way?
        General Cartwright. STRATCOM is currently in the process of
    validating the render safe roadmap set forth in the QDR. We believe
    that the current SOCOM/STRATCOM/DOE relationship is fundamentally
    sound.

        23. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, is the new render safe focus
    on large scale operations to identify and destroy large stockpiles of
    nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials along the lines
    that the Bush administration thought were in Iraq before March 2003?
        General Cartwright. No, render safe focuses on the disarming of
    weapons once the target has been temporarily secured. The Joint Task
    Force-Elimination will focus on large-scale elimination of WMD
    capabilities.

        24. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, in your prepared testimony,
    you identify one of your key initiatives as ``Improve and expand U.S.
    forces' capabilities to locate, track, and tag shipments of WMD.''
    Could you provide some additional explanation as what you plan to do
    under this key initiative?
        General Cartwright. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directive
    on the ``PSI Activity Program,'' delineates specific STRATCOM tasks and
    responsibilities. These include ``identify and assess required U.S.
    military WMD interdiction capabilities . . .'' and ``advocate, support
    and monitor research and development associated with U.S. military WMD
    interdiction capabilities . . .'' In conjunction with interagency and
    international PSI partners, these STRATCOM efforts will result in an
    improved ability for U.S. forces to locate, track, and tag shipments of
    WMD.

       russian chemical weapons destruction facility--cooperative threat
                               reduction program

        25. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, there have been several delays
    in the construction of the Russian chemical weapons destruction project
    at Shchuch'ye. The reasons for the delays have varied from
    subcontractor bankruptcies to a reorganization of the Russian
    government. The current schedule calls for first agent destruction/
    initial live agent operations at the end of 2008 and transfer to Russia
    in July 2009 for full operation. What is the estimated total project
    cost of the facility?
        Mr. Flory. DOD expects to complete the work within the current
    budgeted funds of $1,039.2 million. However, as a result of delays in
    completing the construction of the project's primary destruction
    building, final project costs cannot be projected with certainty. We
    will revise our schedule and know whether we can complete the project
    within our budget once the proposal is awarded. If there is a
    shortfall, DOD may in the future have to chose between either
    requesting additional funds or consulting with other partners to share
    the cost.

        26. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, will the live agent startup date
    be met? If startup will not occur by the end of 2008, when will it
    occur?
        Mr. Flory. Live agent startup is currently scheduled for May 2008.
    Given the delay in awarding the contract to complete the main chemical
    weapons destruction building at Shchuch'ye, startup may be delayed by
    approximately a year to mid-2009.

        27. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, how long after live agent
    destruction begins will the operational handoff to Russia begin?
        Mr. Flory. The United States and Russia have agreed to transfer
    custody of the Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF)
    as soon as we have verified initial operational capability and design
    capacity. This verification involves the destruction of a limited
    number of live agent chemical munitions during a 10-day period.
    Operation of the CWDF to destroy the nerve agent stockpile is solely
    the responsibility of the Russian Federation.

        28. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, will the United States continue
    to fund its commitment to complete the project including the design and
    construction of the facility; equipment acquisition and installation;
    systems integration; training; and facility startup?
        Mr. Flory. Yes, we intend to complete the project including the
    design and construction of the facility; equipment acquisition and
    installation; systems integration; training; and facility startup.

        29. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, the CTR fiscal year 2007 budget
    includes $42.7 million for chemical weapons in Russia. How much is for
    Shchuch'ye?
        Mr. Flory. The entire fiscal year 2007 budget of $42.7 million for
    chemical weapons destruction in Russia is for the Shchuch'ye CWDF.

        30. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, will funding be requested for
    Shchuch'ye after fiscal year 2007?
        Mr. Flory. DOD expects to complete the work within the current
    budgeted funds of $1,039.2 million. However, as a result of the
    collapse of negotiations previously described and the attendant delay,
    final project costs cannot be projected with certainty. We will revise
    our schedule and know whether we can complete the project within our
    budget once the new proposal is awarded. If there is a shortfall, DOD
    may in the future have to chose between either requesting additional
    funds or consulting with other partners to share the cost.

        31. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, will the CTR program fund the
    training and live agent startup?
        Mr. Flory. Yes, we intend to provide training and verification of
    initial live agent operational capability.

    caspian sea maritime proliferation prevention program in azerbaijan and
                                   kazakhstan

        32. Senator Reed. Secretary Flory, the funding for the Caspian Sea
    Maritime Proliferation Prevention Programs in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
    goes up substantially, from $7 million to $19 million. What is driving
    this increase, what is the program buying, and can this increase be
    executed?
        Mr. Flory. The increase is driven by the beginning of project work
    in Kazakhstan at the same time we are continuing work in Azerbaijan.
    The Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention Projects in
    Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan support the development of a comprehensive
    capability for maritime surveillance and WMD detection and interdiction
    on the Caspian Sea borders. The project in Azerbaijan will build on
    previous assistance that established an interim command and control
    center; provided vessel maintenance assistance; enhanced detection
    capabilities by developing guides, handbooks, and procedures; and
    provided maintenance and logistics system enhancements and training.
    This year, assistance includes repair and upgrades of patrol and
    support craft; completion of the Astana Boat Basin in southern
    Azerbaijan; revision of the detection and interdiction concept of
    operations; and enhancement of a coastal surveillance system, including
    24/7 radar operations. We anticipate a formal notification from the
    Government of Azerbaijan that the Azerbaijan Navy will play a
    supporting role to the Coast Guard in prosecuting its WMD detection and
    interdiction mission, and identification of the site for permanent
    command and control center. This will permit construction of the new
    center.
        Fiscal year 2006 marks the beginning of the Caspian Sea Maritime
    Proliferation Prevention project with Kazakhstan. DOD teams twice have
    visited Kazakhstan to help determine the project's requirements. Teams
    have met with officials from the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense,
    Maritime Border Guard, and Navy, and have visited operating bases, a
    maritime operations center, and a joint Navy-Maritime Border Guard
    training center on the Caspian Sea. While the assessments--including a
    concept of operations evaluation--are still ongoing, some fiscal year
    2006 funds will procure WMD detection equipment and training, boarding
    officer training, and enhancements of maintenance facilities and
    technical surveillance posts.
        This increase will be executed to improve WMD detection and
    interdiction on the Caspian Sea borders.

        33. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, is the Caspian Sea program
    coordinated with STRATCOM's combating WMD mission?
        General Cartwright. Yes, when the DOD draft Concept Plan is
    approved, the Caspian Sea program will be linked through the respective
    regional combatant commander's combating WMD campaign plans.

        34. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, how does the CTR program
    support your mission?
        General Cartwright. The CTR supports our mission through the dual
    aims of safeguarding and eliminating nuclear and other weapons in the
    former Soviet Union and to prevent the proliferation of WMD through the
    PPI. Every weapon secured or destroyed through the CTR program is one
    less weapon that the adversary may acquire and use against the United
    States.

        35. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, does this effort support the
    PSI?
        General Cartwright. The CTR supports the overall PSI program. When
    weapons are destroyed, secured, or otherwise interdicted, the
    proliferators are forced to expend more resources to obtain
    replacements.

       nuclear detection sensor on global positioning systems satellites

        36. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Mr. Paul, I understand
    that there is an issue as to whether the Global Positioning System
    (GPS) III and possibly some of the GPS IIF satellites will include as a
    payload the nuclear detection (NUDET) sensor package. The DOE/NNSA
    develops and builds the NUDET sensor package and the Air Force is
    responsible for integration. The sensor detects nuclear weapon
    detonations. Inclusion of this sensor on GPS has always been a high
    priority for STRATCOM. What is the issue and will the NUDET sensor be
    on all future GPS satellites including all GPS III satellites?
        General Cartwright. Historically, power management on older GPS
    satellites has been the issue. Weight and power management are future
    GPS III considerations. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center
    (SMC) are currently integrating NUDET sensors onto the follow-on GPS
    IIF satellites, and plan to host nuclear detonation detection sensors
    on the next generation GPS III satellites. STRATCOM is agnostic as to
    the platform this sensor will be placed upon, so long as the capability
    exists in a timely manner.
        Mr. Paul. NUDET sensor packages are on all current GPS satellites
    including the on-orbit GPS Block IIA & IIR satellites and the GPS Block
    IIF satellites that are in production. It has become a practice to turn
    off the NUDET sensors on older satellites that have lived beyond their
    design life, after the solar panels can no longer produce enough power
    to supply both the NUDET sensors and the navigation payload thus
    enabling continued use of the satellite in support of navigation
    requirements. This results in occasional reductions in the NUDET sensor
    coverage until new satellites replace these older GPS satellites. The
    next generation of GPS satellites (GPS Block III) are expected to have
    tighter constraints on the power and weight available to support the
    NUDET sensor package. NNSA is working to develop technology to reduce
    the size, weight, and power of future NUDET sensors while still meeting
    all the NUDET mission requirements. Concurrently, NNSA is working with
    STRATCOM, other elements of the DOD, and other NUDET sensor customers
    to review the detection requirements as well as alternative sensor
    technology and system approaches for meeting the requirements. The
    base-line strategy for satisfying NUDET detection requirements is to
    place NUDET sensor packages on all GPS Block IIF and GPS Block III
    satellites.

                            research and development

        37. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, the DOE/NNSA's research and development
    program funds the Nation's basic research program for nuclear
    detection, proliferation, and monitoring, as well as other activities.
    I am concerned that the funding for this program is not adequate to
    meet all of the research missions. What work is being deferred based on
    the fiscal year 2007 budget request?
        Mr. Paul. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request supports
    the research mission of the Proliferation Detection Program. Future
    funding increases could be used to accelerate the development of
    systems that can remotely detect and identify clandestine proliferation
    activities and the transition of these systems to operational detection
    of uranium-235 enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

                       global nuclear energy partnership

        38. Senator Clinton. Mr. Paul, in its fiscal year 2007 budget
    request, the DOE asked for $250 million for the Global Nuclear Energy
    Partnership (GNEP). Based on DOE estimates, the fiscal year 2008 and
    fiscal year 2009 costs would total $1.55 billion. Funding would
    continue to increase, totaling $13 billion for the 10-year
    demonstration phase of the program. Note that these costs are merely
    for the demonstration phase. A 1996 National Academy of Sciences study
    concluded that reprocessing and transmutation of existing fuel from
    U.S. reactors could cost upwards of $100 billion, but does not address
    the cost to implement the program globally.
        As this is envisioned as a program with worldwide reach that could
    cost such a large amount to taxpayers, I would appreciate your
    assistance in understanding how GNEP would compliment the global
    nonproliferation regime and the administration's nonproliferation
    priorities.
        What nonproliferation benchmarks will the administration require
    that nations meet in order to take part in GNEP?
        Mr. Paul. GNEP proposes to increase global access to nuclear energy
    while promoting our nonproliferation objectives. GNEP seeks to
    demonstrate the nuclear technology systems that would make this
    possible over the next 2 decades while avoiding the costs of additional
    geologic repositories in the United States that would otherwise be
    required. Sustained operation of GNEP will ultimately be on a
    commercial basis, with supplier states leveraging their investments in
    the fuel cycle as a way for other partner states to benefit from
    nuclear energy while forgoing enrichment and reprocessing.
        We envision that states that participate in GNEP must adhere to
    essential nonproliferation commitments, for example, implementing the
    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) additional protocol,
    complying with IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocol obligations,
    maintaining the latest international standards for physical protection
    of nuclear material. States that participate as recipients in the GNEP
    fuel leasing regime would also be expected to voluntarily refrain from
    developing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities as part of this
    arrangement. Beyond these essential conditions, we would want GNEP
    partners to subscribe to the general nonproliferation principles or
    goals that shape the GNEP vision, including committing to the building
    of advanced safeguards into new recycling and reactor technologies to
    ensure they are used for exclusively civil purposes, reducing stocks of
    separated plutonium and eventually bringing these stocks into
    equilibrium, creating a sensible timescale for fuel cycle states to
    move from PUREX to recycling technologies that do not result in
    separated plutonium, building proliferation resistance into new small
    reactor designs that can be safely deployed in the developing world,
    and creating a regime in which suppliers of fresh fuel can take back
    spent fuel for recycle or identify an approved path forward for spent
    fuel that will meet nonproliferation concerns.

        39. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, will nations have to have ratified the
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? The Additional Protocol?
        Mr. Paul. The specific details of the framework for various
    international transactions under GNEP are still being developed.
    However, the Department anticipates that all activities that the United
    States will pursue with foreign partners will be in conformity of the
    Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and with Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.
    As the United States develops its technology roadmap and identifies its
    potential partners, it will seek to strengthen the overall
    nonproliferation regime, including compliance with the objectives the
    NPT and the overall IAEA safeguards regime. Furthermore, as the
    Additional Protocol becomes widely accepted and ratified the Department
    anticipates that it will become part of the baseline requirements for
    nuclear cooperation within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and thus become
    a standard element for all nuclear transactions with foreign partners
    including transactions under GNEP.

        40. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, in order to implement the GNEP program
    internationally, will there have to be changes to the Nuclear Suppliers
    Group Guidelines?
        Mr. Paul. No, the NSG Guidelines will not have to be amended to
    implement GNEP. The Guidelines have been developed over the past 30
    years to allow for the promotion of the nuclear fuel-cycle with
    stringent nonproliferation standards.

        41. Senator Reed. Mr. Paul, IAEA Director General El Baradei has
    proposed that the IAEA manage a fuel bank to act as supplier of last
    resort to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel so that states do not
    need to produce their own fissile material. What is the
    administration's position on the IAEA proposal, and how would it affect
    the GNEP?
        Mr. Paul. One of the key goals of the GNEP is to establish a fuel
    cycle services program that would allow developing nations to acquire
    and use nuclear energy economically while minimizing the risk of
    nuclear proliferation. The United States is working with supplier
    states and the IAEA to establish a fuel supply mechanism that could be
    used by states that forego enrichment and reprocessing in the event of
    a fuel supply disruption. The IAEA would play a central role as
    facilitator between supplier and recipient to resolve such problems.
        As an additional step to support this mechanism, the DOE is setting
    aside up to 17 MT HEU--from a stock that was previously declared in
    excess of national security needs--to be down-blended under IAEA
    verification and prepared for use as fuel in civilian reactors. This
    material will be the first contribution to a nuclear fuel reserve, and
    we will consider placing additional uranium in this reserve. We
    encourage other nations to join us in this initiative.

        [Whereupon at 11:47 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2007

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006

                               U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
                                      and Capabilities,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN COMBATING TERRORISM

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:36 a.m., in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
    Cornyn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Cornyn, Warner, and
    Reed.
        Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
    nominations and hearings clerk; and John H. Quirk V, security
    clerk.
        Majority staff member present: Sandra E. Luff, professional
    staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
    professional staff member; and Richard W. Fieldhouse,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistant present: Jessica L. Kingston.
        Committee members' assistant present: Russell J. Thomasson,
    assistant to Senator Cornyn.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Cornyn. The subcommittee reconvenes in open session
    to receive further testimony on the Department of Defense's
    (DOD) role in combating terrorism.
        For the record, we just concluded a closed session and are
    now reconvening in open session.
        Secretary O'Connell, during the closed session, you did not
    provide an opening statement, although we have heard a number
    of answers to a variety of questions. If you have anything you
    would like to add by way of an opening statement in this open
    session, we would be glad to give you that opportunity now.

     STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS W. O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
       DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

        Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I will be very brief.
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
    I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the status of our
    Nation's superb Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the
    increasing ability of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
    to respond to current and emerging transnational terrorist
    threats, as well as evolving asymmetrical threats. I have an
    extended statement for the record.
        Sir, the recently published 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
    (QDR) accurately states that we are in a long war and it is
    irregular in nature. This long war is characterized by
    dispersed, global terrorist networks with radical aims that
    directly and indirectly threaten the United States and our way
    of life. The nature of this long war requires the U.S. Armed
    Forces to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches to
    ultimately prevail in this struggle. The report further
    emphasizes the important and necessary changes needed to
    prepare SOF and other forces to respond to wide asymmetric
    challenges. The result of this emphasis is a significantly
    expanded SOF program that will qualitatively increase not only
    SOCOM's capabilities but also its capacities to confront and
    prevail against a global terrorist network.
        I would like to commend my colleague, Vice Admiral Eric
    Olson, for his work on behalf of SOCOM in the QDR. I think the
    results reflect a great deal of effort on the part of he and
    his team.
        The fiscal year 2007 President's budget submission for
    SOCOM is $5.2 billion, excluding military pay. That is an
    increase of 27 percent over the fiscal year 2006 submission.
    This increase is essential to support the DOD's QDR decision to
    increase SOF capability and capacity to conduct low-visibility,
    persistent presence missions and a global unconventional
    warfare campaign.
        The budget submission continues to strengthen the command,
    reflecting QDR guidance to increase SOCOM's military capability
    and capacity. It will enable SOCOM to add over 1,300 personnel
    to specifically find, fix, and finish terrorist networks;
    maintain sustained operations in areas where terrorist networks
    are operating; continue the investment in critical fixed-wing,
    rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft that provide SOF with the
    mobility necessary to deploy and execute their missions
    quickly; invest in additional Active and Reserve component
    civil affairs and psychological operations force structure; and
    support the newly created Marine Corps Special Operations
    Command (MARSOC) providing SOCOM greater flexibility and
    capability to fight terrorism.
        I would certainly like to thank this committee and Congress
    as a whole for their support of our Nation's SOF. Your
    continued interest and support of the President's budget is
    essential in sustaining this critical SOCOM effort.
        I welcome your questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas W. O'Connell

        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
    you for the opportunity to testify about the status of our Nation's
    superb Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the increasing ability of
    the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to respond to
    current and emerging transnational terrorist threats as well as
    evolving asymmetrical threats.
        The recently published 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report
    accurately states that we are in a long war that is irregular in
    nature. This long war is characterized by dispersed, global terrorist
    networks with radical political aims that directly and indirectly
    threaten the United States and our way of life. The nature of this long
    war requires the U.S. Armed Forces to adopt unconventional and indirect
    approaches to ultimately prevail in this historic struggle. The report
    further emphasizes the important and necessary changes needed to
    prepare SOF and other forces to respond to wide asymmetric challenges.
    The result of this emphasis is a significantly expanded SOF program
    that will qualitatively increase not only SOCOM's capabilities but also
    its capacities to confront and prevail against the global terrorist
    network threat.
        Title 10, section 138 requires my position to provide civilian
    oversight of special operations activities of the Department of Defense
    (DOD). I am responsible for ensuring that our SOF are appropriately
    tasked and employed, and that senior policymakers, to include our
    interagency partners, understand SOF capabilities as well as their
    limitations. Not only am I an advocate of the SOCOM and SOF, I am also
    dedicated to ensuring our elements continue to be the best trained,
    best equipped, most flexible, and effective fighting force available to
    our country. I consult closely with General Brown on a wide range of
    policy issues and participate in the SOCOM Board of Director's
    meetings, the Command's executive resource body. This effort produces a
    SOF program and budget that stress force readiness and sustainability,
    and provides sufficient force structure to meet the demands of the
    geographic combatant commanders and General Brown in his role as the
    supported commander in the global war on terrorism.
        I'd like to recognize the superb effort of General Brown's Deputy
    Commander, Vice Admiral Eric Olson, for his SOCOM team's work on the
    QDR. SOCOM was well prepared to present an objective blueprint for SOF
    growth and posture. They put a combatant commander's fingerprints on
    the QDR process, which I believe improved the result. A key component
    of that strategy has been the unwavering support of members of this
    committee, the full House and Senate in delivering the necessary
    support, congressional oversight, and critical review for SOF programs
    and initiatives. We've had successes and, yes, some setbacks with our
    programs, but I believe we've taken a prudent course in building both
    capability and capacity for the long war. The fiscal year 2007
    President's budget submission for SOCOM is $5.2 billion (excluding
    military pay), an increase of 27 percent over the fiscal year 2006
    submission. This fiscal year 2007 increase is essential to support the
    Department's QDR decision to increase SOF capability and capacity to
    conduct low-visibility, persistent presence missions and a global
    unconventional warfare campaign.
        The fiscal year 2007 President's budget submission continues to
    strengthen the command, reflecting QDR guidance to increase SOCOM's
    military capability and capacity. It will enable SOCOM to: 1) add over
    1,300 personnel to find, fix, and finish terrorist networks; 2)
    maintain sustained operations in areas where terrorist networks are
    operating; 3) continue the investment in critical fixed-wing, rotary-
    wing, and unmanned aircraft that provide SOF with the mobility
    necessary to deploy and to execute their missions quickly; 4) invest in
    additional Active and Reserve component civil affairs and Psychological
    Operations (PSYOPs) force structure; and 5) support the newly created
    Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC), providing SOCOM
    greater flexibility and capability to fight terrorism.
        I would like to thank this committee and Congress for your support
    of this Nation's SOFs. Your continued interest and support of the
    fiscal year 2007 President's budget submission will be essential to
    sustain this critical funding for SOCOM.
        We are faced by interacting networks--sometimes structured--of
    radical extremists who inflict terror with minimal concern for their
    innocent victims. These networks will migrate to places where they can
    survive, operate, and grow. Our challenge is to develop counter-
    networks to monitor, isolate, disrupt, and destroy hostile elements.
    SOCOM has started this process. While some of SOCOM's operations are
    visible, there has been a substantial investment in low-visibility and
    clandestine activities. Our Army Special Forces, Army Special
    Operations Aviation Forces, Army Rangers, Navy SEALs and Special Boat
    Units, Army Civil Affairs, Army Psychological Operations units, Air
    Force Special Operations crews and staffs, Combat Controllers and
    Weather Teams, have served U.S. Central Command requirements very well
    from their counter-insurgency and foreign internal defense roles in
    Afghanistan and Iraq to their work in the Horn of Africa. Most
    importantly, SOCOM Forces operate in the only environment that can lead
    to success: Joint, Interagency, Combined, and Coalition.
        SOCOM is also increasing its capacity to conduct operations against
    the threat:

             The recently activated MARSOC with its organic
            operational and foreign training units provides SOCOM
            additional depth and operational flexibility in irregular
            warfare.
             A programmed one-third increase in Active-Duty Special
            Forces battalions will improve SOCOM's rotation base.
            Similarly, there is a programmed one-third increase in Civil
            Affairs and PSYOPs units, both Active and Reserve component.
            These force level increases allow additional time between
            deployments to refit and reconstitute units that will improve
            their readiness posture. Coupling this force level increase and
            a flexible basing and rotation strategy will meet the demands
            of the Secretary of Defense and the President as well as the
            Nation as the unknown unfolds.

        My position in the Pentagon also gives me a unique perspective on a
    number of initiatives to expand the authorities that govern SOCOM and
    geographic combatant commander's operations. These initiatives are
    slowly but surely moving together to match national and military
    strategies.

             On the stability operations front, we've seen advances
            in authorities that will allow greater efforts in train and
            equip missions, peacekeeping initiatives, and capacity building
            while partnering with Department of State. Section 1206 of the
            National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 permits
            the Secretary of Defense, at the direction of the President, to
            conduct or support programs to build foreign military capacity
            counterterrorism or stability operations. The Joint Staff and
            combatant commands are actively identifying opportunities to
            enable partner nations to seize opportunities and counter
            unexpected threats through assistance under this authority. We
            are working with the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and
            our colleagues at the Department of State to plan potential
            assistance under this authority and, once directed by the
            President, to efficiently and effectively implement designated
            assistance programs. I want to stress that we fully expect this
            type of authority will be extremely helpful in meeting the
            needs of our combatant commanders for more flexibility in
            working with international partners against today's
            unpredictable threats.
             The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
            2006 also established a DOD security and stabilization
            assistance authority, section 1207, which authorizes DOD
            support to the Department of State for civilian deployments and
            programs in countries falling into or emerging from conflict.
            The DOD is working closely with the Department of State's
            Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction to determine
            the most effective means of using this transfer authority to
            deploy civilian experts and facilitate the provision of
            reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance. We need
            substantial congressional support for the President's fiscal
            year 2007 request that will support efforts to build civilian
            capabilities for tasks like stabilization and reconstruction.
            Although requests for the Department of State and other
            agencies are outside the responsibility of this committee, I
            want to stress to the committee that civilian capabilities will
            be critical to the Nation's long-term success against terrorism
            and could reduce the stress on U.S. forces by precluding the
            need for certain deployments.
             Our Counternarcotics (CN) portfolio provides very
            robust longstanding train and equip authorities and resources
            that permit maximum flexibility for combatant commanders as
            they develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to combat
            smugglers, pirates, narcoterrorists, money launderers,
            proliferators, and other networks. Our foreign CN training
            efforts are proving a valuable adjunct to our counterterrorism
            efforts and provide U.S. access to countries for
            counternarcotics activities whose governments may not allow
            U.S. in for other reasons. Our close partners from the British
            SOFs now assist a key Afghan CN element that has been highly
            successful in seizures over the last year.
             The authority provided by Congress last year in
            section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
            Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 is being used
            effectively by the command to train, pay, equip foreign
            indigenous forces, and build indigenous capabilities essential
            to developing counterterrorism networks. As we exercise this
            authority on the ground, we are getting smarter at how best to
            employ this very unique tool.
             SOCOM was granted relief from title 5 Personal Service
            Contract prohibitions. This allows DOD to authorize personal
            services contracts for the purpose of hiring SOF expertise and
            recruiting long-term sources and assets in support of the
            global war on terror. The additional authority allows flexible
            response to emerging situations and the ability to tap into
            previously unexploited resources.

        As SOCOM undergoes stressful periods of change during this long
    war, there will remain one constant: the importance of our human
    capital investment in the special operator. In terms of missions
    performed and in the qualities of the individuals who undertake those
    missions, the special operator is truly unique and requires a different
    type of mindset on our end in terms of planning and support. Our
    starting point has always been and must continue to be what we call the
    ``SOF Truths,'' which are essentially statements of the fundamentals:
    ``Quality is better than quantity. SOFs cannot be mass produced.
    Competent SOFs cannot be created after a crisis occurs. Humans are more
    important than hardware.'' I pay special tribute to the superb
    officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians of the command who
    live and enforce these truths every day.
        These truths have been reaffirmed by the awe-inspiring performance
    of our SOFs in Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, the Philippines, and many
    other countries around the world. I hope one day we may be able to
    fully reveal their story. They could not meet their mission
    requirements without the superb support of the Secretary of Defense,
    the department staff, the Joint Staff, and the military departments.
        It is also with the support of Congress that SOCOM has moved so far
    and will continue to do so.
        I would like to conclude by highlighting the implications the
    posture, programming and policy for SOF in the war on terrorism have
    for all aspects of our Nation's defense. Our Special Operators have
    often been the innovators for the larger military, and the SOF mindset
    has been the incubator of innovation. That is especially true today.
    With the shift from SOF being postured for reactive, regional
    contingencies to being a global, proactive, and preemptive force, we
    are witnessing a key evolution in how we must conduct our security
    affairs in the future and address those ``safe havens,'' and build
    capacity to deal with those who would harm our country.
        Finally, a personal note--repeated from last year. Whenever
    possible, I attend funerals of SOF personnel at Arlington National
    Cemetery. It is indeed a high honor to represent the DOD. When I look
    into the eyes of widows, children, parents, and other relatives of our
    fallen heroes, I understand that there is no ``quit'' in their
    demeanor. We must honor their service and sacrifice. They are an
    inspiration to all who witness their courage and spirit. Your support
    is critical to the success of our SOFs. I thank you for your careful
    scrutiny of our program and budget. Together, we can continue to help
    move our SOFs into a position of prominence that will continue to press
    the fight against America's enemies.
        Thank you for your continued support. I welcome your questions.

        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Secretary O'Connell.
        I will also note that because of the very helpful testimony
    we received during the closed session, we are going to be a
    little cramped for time this morning on our open session. We
    will have to adjourn no later than noon, but that does not mean
    our inquiry into these subjects will end. We will continue to
    be in discussion with you about them, and we will have follow-
    on hearings on many of the matters that we are discussing today
    in public session. So there will be no shortage of public
    discussion and debate about these important issues.
        Senator Warner. Could I make just one comment?
        Senator Cornyn. Certainly.
        Senator Warner. I, in closed session, mentioned that
    General Brown has served in his capacity very well, and the
    Secretary indicates that the Secretary of Defense recently
    asked that he extend. I think that is a very commendable
    recommendation by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and there
    certainly is no consideration of this committee at this time
    for any replacement. I do hope he accepts that post, and we are
    fortunate as a Nation to have him continue in office. So give
    him my warmest regards. I have the highest personal regard for
    him and his professional abilities.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Chairman Warner.
        I am going to make my opening statement for the closed
    session part of the record and now recognize Senator Reed.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Cornyn
        The subcommittee reconvenes in open session to receive testimony on
    Department of Defense's role in combating terrorism. We welcome our
    distinguished witnesses and commend each of you for the leadership you
    provide:

             The Honorable Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of
            Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict;
             Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
            Operations Command (SOCOM);
             Vice Admiral (Retired) John Scott Redd, Director, National
            Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); and
             Jeffrey N. Rapp, Director, Joint Intelligence Task Force-
            Combating Terrorism, Defense Intelligence Agency.

        We also thank you for a very thorough, analytical, overview of the
    transnational terrorist threats that face our Nation, our interests,
    and our allies.
        Key lessons of September 11, 2001, highlighted the need for our
    Nation's intelligence agencies to work together as a single unified
    enterprise--and also caused us to review the manner in which our
    forces--specifically, our Special Operations Forces (SOF) are
    organized, trained, and equipped.
         Although much progress has been made in the long war against
    terrorism--and I want to recognize the instrumental role our witnesses
    contributed to the success we have achieved--we also recognize that
    terrorist organizations, as well as the growing threat from global
    jihadist networks, continue to pose a significant threat to our
    national security.
        Moreover, this very sentiment was highlighted by the Director of
    National Intelligence, Ambassador Negroponte, on February 28, 2006,
    when he testified before the full committee. He stated:

              ``Let me begin with a straightforward statement of
            preoccupation--terrorism is the preeminent threat to our
            citizens, to our Homeland, to our interests, and to our
            friends.''

        Each of our witnesses represent organizations that are at the very
    heart of this issue. We recognize the hard work and dedication required
    of your organizations to respond to these threats, as well as the
    tremendous sacrifices made by service members, your civilian workforce,
    and their family members--we owe each of them a debt of gratitude.
        I also believe the recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR) clearly establish a roadmap for the expansion of our SOF
    to address this threat--and I commend the Department for their efforts.
        Gentlemen, we welcome your insights on developments in your
    respective organizations, as well as your own personal assessments of
    the fiscal year 2007 defense budget request as it relates to the
    Department's ability to prosecute the global war on terror.
        Secretary O'Connell, we look forward to your testimony regarding:

              Your oversight role of SOCOM, specifically in light of the
            expansion addressed in the QDR--what challenges, if any, does
            the expansion mean to your office?;
              What authorities, if any, does your office need to ensure
            for the effective oversight of SOCOM acquisition programs, as a
            result of this expansion; and,
              An update on your efforts to ensure effective interagency
            coordination for SOCOM's Military Liaison Elements (MLEs), as
            well as your overall assessment of the program.

        Vice Admiral Olson, the subcommittee looks forward to hearing your
    assessment on:

              The progress made in establishing the capability to conduct
            military operations as a supported command;
              A current status of SOCOM's major acquisition programs,
            including the Advanced Seal Delivery System;
              Manpower challenges and actions taken to address your
            increased operating tempo; and,
              The current state of your MLEs, and the steps you have taken
            to coordinate and synchronize those elements with the Chiefs of
            Mission and related officials within the interagency.

        Vice Admiral Redd, as you are aware, based on the recommendation of
    the 9/11 Commission, the NCTC was codified by Congress in the
    Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
        Since your organization has had approximately 2 years to mature, we
    seek your insight regarding the progress made by the NCTC to:

              Serve as the primary organization within the U.S. Government
            for analysis and integration of all terrorism intelligence;
            and,
              Your assessment of NCTC's ability to conduct strategic
            operational planning for counterterrorism activities
            integrating all instruments of U.S. national power.

        Mr. Rapp, we also look forward to your insight on:

              The Department's, and specifically the Defense Intelligence
            Agency's, access to all available terrorist threat information;
            and,
              Any additional funding or authorities you require to execute
            your mission.

        Our witnesses today represent the quiet professionals--whether
    assigned to the SOCOM or the Intelligence Community--that are on point
    for our Nation in the fight against terrorism and tirelessly work to
    defend our Homeland from the threats of the 21st century.
        We applaud and honor their service and we thank our witnesses for
    their service and for appearing before the subcommittee today.

        Senator Cornyn. Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen, for your participation today and your service to the
    Nation.
        The purpose of this hearing is to receive an update on the
    DOD's efforts to combat terrorism from the officials
    responsible for developing and implementing the policy for the
    military's global war on terrorism, from the intelligence
    analysts and disseminators, and from the operators. Each of
    these cadres of professionals is equally critical to the
    military mission.
        This committee established a SOCOM and the Office of the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
    Intensity Conflict (SOLIC). The SOLIC Assistant Secretary is
    charged with management oversight of SOCOM, as well as for
    combating terrorism, stability operations, and counterdrug
    policy.
        In February, the press reported that Secretary Rumsfeld may
    be considering proposals to move various functions out of SOLIC
    or even asking Congress to eliminate it entirely. I hope that
    if this is the case, Secretary O'Connell can tell us about
    these proposals today. I must apologize because I will have to
    leave. So, Mr. Secretary, if you want to comment on that, that
    will be your option.
        In addition, retired General Wayne Downing recently
    completed a review of SOCOM's role in coordinating and
    executing the war on terrorism. The chairman and ranking member
    of the full committee have asked for a copy of that review, and
    I hope that Secretary O'Connell can ensure this subcommittee
    that he will work to get it for us. The findings of the report
    will inform the work of the committee. Again, I think this is
    an eminently reasonable request that Chairman Warner and
    Senator Levin have made, and I believe we should have the
    report. I know it is classified, and obviously, we would accept
    it on those terms.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [The committee staff received a closed briefing on June 27, 2006,
    regarding the report by General Wayne Downing.]

        Senator Reed. I am concerned about reorganization proposals
    coming at a time when the civilian policy leaders need to work
    closely with SOCOM to ensure the progress in the war on
    terrorism and to oversee SOCOM's operations, budget, and
    acquisition programs. The President has asked this committee to
    authorize a $9 billion increase in SOCOM's budget over the next
    5 years and almost a 30-percent increase over last year. This
    growth will have to be wisely managed by the command and the
    civilian leadership in the Pentagon.
        SOCOM has important acquisition needs and unique
    acquisition authorities. Yet, the SOLIC office does not have a
    senior acquisition executive in the Pentagon, as the other
    Services do, to advocate for SOCOM's requirements and to help
    the command manage large programs, such as the troubled
    Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS).
        In addition, special operators have new missions, including
    clandestine ones, that require interagency coordination to
    ensure that they strengthen U.S. national objectives in
    fighting terrorism, something that SOLIC must be actively
    overseeing and keeping this committee informed about.
        Again, I hope that in the course of the rest of this
    hearing or in written responses, that we can get some
    clarification on the issues I have just mentioned.
        In addition, I have written questions, which are as a
    result not only of this hearing but my visit a few weeks ago
    down to SOCOM headquarters with General Brown and Admiral
    Olson. I would forward them for response in a timely fashion.
        Thank you so much again for your service to the Nation and
    thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Reed, for that opening
    statement.
        Admiral Olson, we have talked about SOCOM's
    responsibilities around the world. We know that those
    responsibilities are increasing, and accordingly, the budget
    request for 2007 is about $8 billion, including over $2 billion
    for military personnel costs, a 27-percent increase in your
    budget over last year.
        I would like to ask you to comment on a few questions.
    First of all, does this meet all of your operational
    requirements? Second, can you absorb that sort of big increase
    in your budget in a way that is efficient and effective to meet
    those operational requirements, and have you been able to
    replace all equipment, particularly helicopters damaged and
    destroyed in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
    to respond to that.
        As I said in the closed session, I was the primary
    representative of SOCOM in the QDR process. We did that by
    receiving and evaluating requirements submitted to us by our
    component headquarters and then machining those into a single
    requirements input into the QDR. That was mostly answered.
        We went into the process knowing what we could absorb and
    requesting no more than that. So we are well postured to absorb
    the growth that has been programmed for us in both platforms
    and people.
        As an example, pre-September 11, 2001, our Special Forces
    Training Command was able to turn out about 250 special forces
    operators per year on the Army side; the Green Berets. Last
    year, they graduated 791. Our previous investment in
    infrastructure growth is now permitting us to absorb the
    additional resources that we have programmed through the QDR
    process.
        Does it answer all of our needs? It does not. It answers
    our most immediate needs. It certainly answers our foreseeable
    personnel needs. We will be growing one battalion per special
    forces group, one company per ranger battalion, the equivalent
    of two new SEAL teams, and Air Force special operators at the
    rate that we can produce and absorb them. So we certainly will
    not be asking for increased force structure growth anytime soon
    except for what it takes to implement the growth that we have
    been granted so far in the process.
        Again, we will have additional requirements for
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms,
    with a reminder that those are not only airborne platforms, but
    they are also ground and maritime sensors that are associated
    with ISR in which we have capability gaps.
        Sir, I did not address your question about
    recapitalization.
        We have been able to sustain our fleet without full
    recapitalization of it. We fly some old aircraft. We do not
    have full programs to replace each of those. We have been able
    to replace engines and wings and repair our fleet to keep it
    flying. We are programmed in the future for the V-22 that we
    would like to receive at an accelerated rate. We have long-
    range programs for next-generation platforms, and we have been
    granted relief with replacement of combat losses along the way,
    but we have not done a full recapitalization of our fleet
    within the current program.
        Senator Cornyn. I for one--and I think I probably speak for
    many Members of Congress--am more than happy to appropriate all
    funds necessary for our military to do the job that we have
    asked you to do. The challenge is, is that money appropriated
    and used effectively to acquire and develop systems that are
    important to our national defense and protecting our national
    interests?
        That brings me, as you might imagine, to the ASDS. I would
    like to ask Secretary O'Connell and Admiral Olson to both
    comment on these questions.
        The ASDS program has been plagued with problems from its
    inception and was approved for a restructure by this committee
    in November 2005. As a part of that restructure, an ASDS
    reliability action panel was formed to answer reliability
    questions.
        The questions are these: What is the status of the ASDS
    reliability action panel report? What is the current status of
    the program? When can we expect to receive the report, as
    directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2006 regarding this program, which actually, I believe,
    provided that it was due on March 1?
        Secretary O'Connell.
        Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I know that the ASDS program management
    office requested an extension through the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    (AT&L). We are aware of what the report must entail, to include
    the Secretary's certification that he has revalidated the
    requirement and conclusions of the QDR, the number of eventual
    platforms that would be required, updated cost estimate, a time
    line for addressing the technological challenges. This must be
    coordinated with both the Navy Department and AT&L.
        I would defer to Admiral Olson in terms of the status of
    the reexamination panel, I believe you called it.
        Admiral Olson. Sir, beyond the extension request for the
    report, I do not know today's status of the ASDS reliability
    action report. I will take that question for the record, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) Reliability Action Panel
    report was completed on March 14, 2006. The current status of the
    program is we are executing the ASDS program restructure as briefed to
    U.S. Southern Command congressional account holders in November 2005.
    The program restructure consists of two fundamental parts: an
    improvement program to increase reliability and address obsolescence;
    and a concept study to assess hybrid combatant submersible designs for
    follow-on vehicles.

        Senator Cornyn. Secretary O'Connell, given the increase in
    SOCOM's budget and the need to ensure that its acquisition
    needs are represented at board meetings of the service
    acquisition managers, would you support creating a senior
    civilian position within your office for acquisition
    management, one that would complement the position in the
    command?
        Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I have given this much thought in the
    last couple of months, after some of your committee staffers
    raised it. I think it would be a prudent move. If nothing more,
    it gives me someone who might be very well-connected in the
    community, can look at acquisition programs, and at least give
    me a comfort level in terms of are we going the right way, do
    we need to be more aggressive, or are there things like the
    ASDS that we need to curtail and reexamine significantly. I
    think it would be a help.
        I currently have a senior civilian, but not a deputy
    assistant secretary for resources and technology, Tim Morgan.
    He has 16 years of budget oversight and programming experience,
    and he is very capable. However, I do not really have an
    independent acquisition expert on my staff who would report
    directly to me and work with AT&L and others on SOCOM programs.
    So I would be in favor of that.
        Senator Cornyn. From my limited experience in a previous
    life, I know that technology issues--in addition to things like
    the ASDS where you have sort of a moving target, in terms of
    requirements, have a tendency to vastly increase the costs of
    Government acquisitions.
        I am also concerned, Admiral Redd, about technology uses
    within the Government and how we are adapting those technology
    needs to particularly our intelligence gathering and sharing
    requirements. As I recall, when I was out at the Technology
    Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC), the predecessor of the
    organization you head, they had--I cannot remember if it was
    four or five Central Processing Units (CPU)--maybe less, maybe
    three CPUs--strapped together. I think there was a toggle
    switch that allowed you to search each one of them, but there
    was not any interconnectivity between those. Could you tell me,
    is that still the situation or has it improved?
        Admiral Redd. Depending on whether you are selling the
    systems or using them, it has gotten better or worse. I have
    nine CPUs by my desk right now.
        Senator Cornyn. Nine of them?
        Admiral Redd. Nine of them, yes, sir. It is all good news
    in the sense that we now have additional things. For example,
    we have classified circuits with several of our allies right
    now, the United Kingdom and Australia. We are working on
    turning that around.
        The problem again, as I mentioned in closed session, is we
    have, in a sense, an elegant but simple solution, but we have
    to use a lot of brute force just to get the information in, and
    that means having all these networks.
        We are starting to turn that around in a couple of ways. We
    will, at one point, God willing, get to the point where we have
    one network, which everybody uses and with all the appropriate
    security. We are a long ways from being there yet. Ten percent
    of that or 20 percent of that is technology; 80 percent is
    still in the policy. So that is getting there.
        We are doing some things which are important, however. In
    fact, my Chief of Staff is right now the guinea pig. One of the
    problems is when you have e-mails coming in from nine different
    systems and you have to go through and punch up and log in on
    each one of those in order. It takes a half a day just to do
    that. We have a single screen pilot project right now so when
    your e-mails come in on different systems, they all show up on
    the same screen. We are trying that out. So that will help
    substantially. Little things like that will help.
        We are also doing things in a deeper sense and working on
    things. We have the ability right now as I mentioned, through
    the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) online to access
    right now about 5 million pieces of finished intelligence on a
    Web site, which any organization can come into and use. About
    5,000 people are cleared for that.
        The next steps we are looking at, though, are how do you go
    through large amounts of data and how do you search not only
    one at a time on each of those networks' databases, but how do
    you do a consolidated database of all of them at the same time?
        So we are looking at how to use technology not only in the
    connectivity side, if you will, which is extremely important,
    but also in that basic research, if you will. So a lot of
    things are going on there. As we mentioned, the challenges on
    the collection side also continue, but our goal is to use
    technology wherever we can, obviously, to move things along. As
    I mentioned in closed session, I think we have made an awful
    lot of good progress.
        Senator Cornyn. Some of the agencies of the Federal
    Government's experience with technology challenges have not
    been good, and I keep thinking about the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI) in particular and a lot of taxpayer dollars
    basically down the drain in attempts to try to bring the FBI
    into the technology age.
        Changing the issue just slightly, though, obviously there
    are a lot of our enemies and others who would like to have
    access to that information. Could you give me some confidence
    in the level of our information security efforts with regard to
    NCTC?
        Admiral Redd. I think in terms of NCTC, it is extremely
    good. You have established us as the one place in the
    Government where all information comes in. Everybody out there,
    just on the personnel side, is polygraphed, and has very high
    security standards. We basically are a tenant of the Central
    Intelligence Agency and so we respond to all of their security
    requirements. I think we do a very good job in terms of that.
    You can always do better.
        I am not the expert on our cryptography or how well we are
    in terms of cybersecurity, but I can tell you it is extremely
    high by the very nature of the fact that we bring all that
    information together and we have some very strict rules.
        Again, the blessing is having that information all in one
    place. The curse is you have to make sure that it stays there
    except when it is properly sent out. I would say that we do a
    pretty good job on that, a very good job on that.
        Senator Cornyn. Working at the Office of Management and
    Budget and also some of the committees that have looked at
    information security across the Federal Government, it causes
    me some concern and not specifically with your agency because I
    cannot recall right now how some of the various agencies have
    ranked. But overall, the Federal Government does not rank well
    when it comes to information security, and that is a huge
    concern.
        Given the late hour, let me make this the last question,
    and I will direct it to Admiral Olson. As I indicated, we
    appreciate your generous time, granting us the last couple of
    hours for questions. We spent most of our time in closed
    session. We have additional matters we want to discuss with you
    and your staff going forward.
        Admiral Olson, elements of special forces have been present
    in Afghanistan since 2001, and given the longevity of that
    continued presence, I would like to get your comment on the
    following. What is the current SOCOM level of effort in
    Afghanistan, and do you see a significant change in the
    presence of SOF there in the next 6 to 12 months as the
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) expands its
    operations in Afghanistan? What will the command relationship
    be between SOF that remain in Afghanistan and the ISAF?
        Admiral Olson. Senator, thank you.
        We have just had some relief of SOF in Iraq in particular.
    We drew 15 Special Forces A-Teams out as the training mission
    came to an end.
        I do not foresee significant change in the SOF presence in
    either Afghanistan or Iraq in the coming months.
        I believe that ISAF's presence is important. It will expand
    capability and capacity across Afghanistan, but the SOF's A-
    Teams that are in remote sites and working with the Afghan
    National Army will continue to do that with a nationwide
    presence in Afghanistan after ISAF's arrival.
        The SOF in the regions where the ISAF is will come under
    staff control, but will also be responsive to SOCOM
    requirements. I will take that question particularly for the
    record and provide you with a more detailed wiring diagram of
    the command relationships. The bottom line is that ISAF by
    itself will augment, but not relieve special operations
    presence in Afghanistan.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The decision of exactly what the overall command relationships will
    be in Afghanistan when the International Security Assistance Force
    (ISAF) takes over is not yet final. However, of the two possible
    courses of action, Special Operations Force's (SOF) command
    relationships will remain the same. The Combined Joint Special
    Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) is going to be a supporting command to
    the ISAF (the supported command). CJSOTF will remain under tactical
    control of Combined Joint Task Force-76. The U.S. Central Command
    Forward Special Operations Command will retain operational control. The
    bottom line is that U.S. SOF will fall under U.S. commanders while
    working for ISAF.

        Senator Cornyn. Thank you Admiral Olson, Admiral Redd, Mr.
    Rapp, and Secretary O'Connell for your testimony today.
        We will leave the record open for 2 days so that members
    who could not attend the hearing can submit their questions for
    the record.
        Thank you very much for your presence here today and your
    response to our questions, and again, on behalf of all of us,
    for your service to our Nation. Thank you. We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]