[Senate Hearing 109-827]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-827, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2766
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 2
SEAPOWER
__________
MARCH 29; APRIL 4, 6, 2006
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
30-348 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Charles S. Abell, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Seapower
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JACK REED, Rhode Island
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Navy/Marine Corps Force Structure and Future Capabilities
march 29, 2006
Page
Crenshaw, VADM Lewis W., Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments........ 4
Gardner, Lt. Gen. Emerson N., Jr., USMC, Deputy Commandant of the
Marine Corps for Programs and Resources........................ 11
Mattis, Lt. Gen. James N., USMC, Deputy Commandant of the Marine
Corps for Combat Development and Integration................... 23
Posture of the U.S. Transportation Command
april 4, 2006
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command........................................................ 59
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, Commander, Air Mobility Command.... 74
Navy Shipbuilding
april 6, 2006
Etter, Dr. Delores M., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition......................... 99
Edwards, RADM Mark J., USN, Director of Warfare Integration, N8F,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations........................ 112
Bloor, Damien, Principal Consultant, First Marine International
Limited, United Kingdom........................................ 136
Schank, John F., RAND Corporation................................ 138
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington DC.
NAVY/MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURE AND FUTURE CAPABILITIES
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:35 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Talent (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Talent, Kennedy, and
Reed.
Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.,
professional staff member; and Sean G. Stackley, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; and Creighton Greene, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Micah H. Harris and Benjamin L.
Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Lindsey R. Neas,
assistant to Senator Talent; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to
Senator Kennedy; and Neil Campbell, assistant to Senator Reed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. TALENT, CHAIRMAN
Senator Talent. Welcome to everybody. The subcommittee
meets today to receive testimony on the Navy and Marine Corps
force structure and future capabilities in review of the
National Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2007. We
are pleased to have with us today Lieutenant General Emerson
Gardner, who is the Deputy Commandant for Programs and
Resources; Lieutenant General James Mattis, the Deputy
Commandant for Combat Development and Integration; Vice Admiral
Lewis Crenshaw, who is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Resources, Requirements, and Assessments; and Rear Admiral Mark
Edwards, who is the Director for Warfare Integration. Welcome,
gentlemen. Thank you for taking the time to be with us today.
More importantly, thank you for your outstanding leadership and
service to the country at a very crucial time.
These are challenging times as our Nation fights the global
war on terror. The men and women under your leadership have
distinguished themselves by their dedication to duty and their
personal sacrifice. It's a privilege for me to say how deeply
proud we are of our sailors and marines at their posts all over
the world. It is not possible to express the full depth of our
gratitude for their service and their families' sacrifice, and
we just jointly hope you will take that back to them when you
speak with them.
The purpose of today's hearing is to discuss the Navy and
Marine Corps capabilities and force structure planned in this
year's and future years' budgets. Our first priority must be to
meet the demands current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are
placing on our forces. At the same time, we cannot lose sight
of the fact that half of our fleet is underway on any given
day, performing peacekeeping and humanitarian operations around
the world and providing a level of security made possible only
through global presence. As we size and shape the future force,
we must retain our ability to sustain the current operations
tempo while adding to our current capabilities in order to meet
emerging threats to our national security.
The subcommittee is interested in your current direction
regarding fleet operating concepts, your assessment of new
capabilities, and your insights regarding the risks and
challenges you must closely manage in developing the
capabilities of the future fleet. In particular, we're
interested in understanding the capabilities currently
envisioned for Seapower 21 and your efforts to employ these
capabilities through the Fleet Response Plan. We look for an
update on both the Marine Corps lift requirements and the
seabase concept. We're interested in your performance
assessment of the MV-22 Osprey and the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle programs as they approach full rate production. As
well, we look for an update on the requirements for key
programs at critical stages in their developments such as
DD(X), the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the Multi-mission
Maritime Aircraft, and the Heavy-Lift Helicopter.
Of particular interest, 1 year ago, this subcommittee
expressed heightened concern with a course the fleet was on--in
fact, is on regarding the steady decline in ship numbers and
the associated implications regarding the capability that comes
with numbers. The ability to maintain forward presence, the
ability to respond in time of crisis, the stress placed on
operating forces, their hardware, and the decline in our
strategic industrial base. With today's Navy at its smallest
size in decades, 281 ships, we concur with the Chief of Naval
Operation's (CNO) conclusion that it is as small as it can get,
and we are encouraged by his response to our concerns. The 313-
ship Navy described in the report to Congress on the future
naval force promises to turn around trends of the past 15 years
and defines a clear requirements baseline for planning,
budgeting, and execution by the Navy and the industrial base.
The CNO has been careful to describe his plan as a balanced
solution addressing the competing elements of warfighting
requirements, affordability, and the preservation of critical
industrial base capabilities, and we support this approach.
However, it's important that we understand the underlying
assumptions, the things that have to occur in order to support
the Navy's analysis. Additionally, and perhaps most
importantly, when we discuss the plan in the context of mission
performance, we need to arrive at a common understanding of the
risks that are inherent to the plan and prudent action that
would help further mitigate those risks.
Again, gentlemen, thank you for joining us today. We're all
looking forward to your testimony, and I'm happy to recognize
Senator Kennedy for such remarks as he may wish to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank our panel for being here. I want to mention to our
friends in the Marines just a program that Matthew Caulfield
has worked up; we call it Helmets to Hardhats. We know that
those are returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, and many of
those have been out to sea. They have three times the
unemployment, and this is a very creative program that they're
working with the building trades. I've seen it. More than 180
service men and women that served in Iraq and in Afghanistan
are involved in the program. Two hundred and fifty are on deck
to come into it. So, it is interesting.
Not only do we have an example of people that are at the
cutting edge in terms of wearing the uniform of the country,
but also strongly committed to trying to make sure that we're
going to meet our responsibilities to these young people
afterwards. I just wanted to mention and commend that.
The buzzer has buzzed, Mr. Chairman. I'm just going to
mention the areas that I would like to see if we can't have
some of the questions answered. This is on the uparmoring of
the Humvees and the adequacy of the funding for those programs
and what will be the impact if the funding is not forthcoming
in 2006 for 2007.
I'm interested in fire support systems and the DD(X) land
attack destroyer. We have a change in the number of ships. We
intend to buy only seven ships rather than the larger number of
DD(X). There's a difference in the number of rounds being
fired--the fire support requirements. What's the reaction of
the marines on this? How are they going to compensate for it?
We haven't seen it a great deal in terms of additional tactical
air.
The seabasing, interested in the costs of that program.
Perhaps we'll get a chance to talk a little later about how
this is going to work in rough weather, how that is going to
take place. Also, we ought to find out in that--since some of
these requirements we want to find out what the needs and the
cost would be.
Also, I've been interested--I think, as our Navy and
Marines know in terms of the mine warfare capability, the
problems we have, I understand, in remote mine hunting systems,
we have ships that are involved in that, but they're slow in
getting to the places where they're supposed to get. How are we
balancing on this? We have been interested in this issue for
some period of time, and we want to try and make sure that
we're doing all that we should.
So, these are areas that we would be interested in. I also
know we had the P-3 replacements, and I'd be interested in
getting into where we thought we were going with those issues.
There are a couple of others, but I know the bell has rung on
this. These are the primary areas that I hoped that we would be
able to get to with the panel, and if we're having a series of
votes, as I guess we are, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. I thank the Senator for his comments. Why
don't we see if Admiral Crenshaw, if you couldn't give us your
statement before we have to go vote because we have two in a
row, so at least we can get at the end of the first one and
then pick the second one up and then come right back.
STATEMENT OF VADM LEWIS W. CRENSHAW, JR., USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR RESOURCES, REQUIREMENTS, AND ASSESSMENTS
Admiral Crenshaw. Mr. Chairman, Senator, and distinguished
members, it's a privilege for me as the Navy's lead Resource,
Requirements, and Assessments Officer to appear before you
today to discuss the Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and
force structures recently submitted in the President's budget.
I'm joined by Admiral Mark Edwards to my right and of course,
my colleagues, General Jim Mattis and General Emerson Gardner.
We have provided written statements, and ask that you make
those a part of the record. I am excited about this budget
because it is the basis from which we implement the findings
completed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which
includes fundings for the first eight maritime preposition
future ships and implements some new and emerging mission sets
such as riverine warfare, the Naval Expeditionary Combat
Command, and maritime domain awareness.
Additionally, this budget implements the CNO's priorities
of sustaining combat readiness, developing 21st century
leaders, and finally, building a fleet for the future, upon
which this hearing is focused.
Over the last year, we have employed a capabilities-based
approach to calculate the size and composition of the future
force required to meet the expected joint force demands. The
analysis concluded that a fleet of about 313 ships is the force
that's necessary to meet these demands with acceptable risk.
This budget is a stepping stone to realizing that fleet.
As the 30-year shipbuilding plan evolves over the next
year, it will produce an investment plan that is both
executable and affordable based on balancing several factors:
the naval force operational capabilities, risk, and the ability
of the shipbuilding industrial base to execute the plan.
Implementing this plan will be a challenge, but I believe it is
achievable. It's essential that we control the cost of the
ships that we build in order to maintain stability. To do this,
we have instituted a series of boards at the highest levels of
Navy leadership to come to grips with the steps necessary to
control these costs. Rightsizing capabilities and adhering to
cost and production schedules and common hull forms, common
electronics, and open architecture software are all things that
allow us to control costs. Determining the right size of the
force has not stopped at the 313 ships. Right now, we're
conducting a detailed review of naval aviation just as we did
with shipbuilding.
Additionally, we continue to bring the Navy's longstanding
tradition as a seabased force to the 21st century as a joint
concept. The ongoing seabasing joint integration capability
assessment being led by the Joint Staff and our own
complementary Navy and Marine Corps seabasing capability study,
both expected to be completed later this year, will be two of
the stars that we steer by as we bring this seabasing concept
into the 21st century and the joint arena. These studies
combined with the 313-ship plan and balanced between fiscal
reality and measured risk will form the roadmap for the future
naval force. We believe it is a capable force, and the
requirements are stable and affordable.
I look forward to the future, your continued strong
support, and thank you for your remarks today, and thank you
for your consideration, and we're ready to answer questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Crenshaw and
Admiral Edwards follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by VADM Lewis W. Crenshaw, Jr., USN, and RADM
Mark J. Edwards, USN
introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Seapower
Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and force structure
requirements outlined in the 2007 President's budget.
Current Operations
We are a Nation at war. Today your Navy is postured worldwide,
fighting the war on terror, deterring aggression by would-be foes,
preserving freedom of the seas, and promoting peace and security. While
numbers vary with daily operations, as of 20 March 2006, 129 ships are
underway (46 percent) of which 92 (33 percent) are forward deployed.
Navy has 5,244 Reserves currently mobilized.
There are over 10,000 sailors serving ashore throughout the Central
Command area of responsibility including more than 3,800 in Iraq, and
an additional 2,600 in Kuwait, that includes SEALs, Seabees, military
policemen, explosive ordnance disposal, medical, intelligence, and
civil affairs support personnel. Navy carrier and expeditionary strike
groups continue to deploy in support of the global war on terrorism and
conduct combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions such as tsunami relief
and Pakistani earthquake.
At the same time, our Nation took advantage of the immediate access
provided by naval forces to bring time-critical assistance to Hurricane
Katrina and Rita victims in the Gulf Coast States. Twenty-three ships
provided command and control, evacuation, and humanitarian support to
military and civilian personnel in affected regions. Additionally, 104
Naval aircraft flew 1,103 sorties in support of search and rescue and
other humanitarian assistance missions. These efforts resulted in the
safe evacuation of 8,518 personnel and the rescue of an additional
1,582 people isolated by the disasters. In the weeks that followed,
naval relief efforts provided a total of approximately 2.5 million
pounds of food and water to people most severely affected by the
disaster.
Sailors
The men and women of the United States Navy--Active, Reserve, and
civilian, are the lifeblood and heart of the Service. They are the
best, most talented, and capable team of professionals the Nation has
ever assembled. Navy Active strength totals 356,258 and Reserves have
72,022 total. Our sailors believe in what they are doing and they are
performing superbly in very challenging circumstances. From Iraq and
Afghanistan to our humanitarian relief efforts, I am very proud of what
they are doing to win the war and support our Nation and friends in
time of need. They are smarter and better trained than at any time in
our history. Your continued and generous support of our sailors has
provided a force second to none in the world.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request maximizes our Nation's return
on its investment by positioning us to meet today's challenges--from
peacekeeping/stability operations to global war on terrorism operations
and small-scale contingencies--and by transforming the force for future
challenges.
Future Navy Force Structure
The Navy of the future must be capabilities-based and threat-
oriented. The United States needs an agile, adaptable, persistent,
lethal, surge-ready force. The Navy must seek to identify the proper
strategic balance of capabilities to ensure we have the agility, speed,
flexibility, and lethality to respond to any threat from any adversary,
whether that threat is conventional or asymmetric in nature. Through
agility and persistence, our Navy and Marine Corps team must be poised
to fight irregular warfare against a ``thinking enemy,'' able to act
immediately against a fleeting target. The challenge is to
simultaneously ``set the conditions'' for a major combat operation
(MCO) while continuing to fight the global war on terrorism, with the
understanding that the capabilities required for the global war on
terrorism cannot necessarily be assumed to be a lesser-included case of
an MCO. Our force must be the right mix of capabilities that balances
persistence and agility with power and speed in order to fight the
global war on terrorism while being prepared to win an MCO. To do so,
it must be properly postured in terms of greater operational
availability from platforms that are much more capable as a
distributed, networked force. While the fabric of our fighting force
will still be the power and speed needed to seize the initiative and
swiftly defeat any regional threat, FORCEnet's pervasive awareness via
command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) will enable us to achieve essential
effects with less mass. Because of its access from the sea, the Navy
and Marine Corps are focusing significant effort and analysis in
support of joint combat power projection by leveraging the maneuver
space of the oceans through Seabasing.
Seabasing--A National Capability
The Naval Power 21 vision defines the capabilities that the 21st
century Navy and Marine Corps team will deliver. Our overarching
transformational operating concept is Seabasing; a national capability,
for projecting and sustaining naval power and joint forces that assures
joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign,
distributed, and networked forces operating globally from the sea.
Seabasing unifies our capabilities for projecting offensive power,
defensive power, command and control, mobility, and sustainment around
the world. It will enable commanders to generate high tempo operational
maneuver by making use of the sea as a means of gaining and maintaining
advantage.
Seabasing represents a complex capability, a system-of-systems able
to move at will. Seabasing, enabled by joint integrated and operational
concepts, is the employment of ships and vessels with organic strike
fires (including naval surface fires support to the Marine Corps) and
defensive shields of sensors and weapons, strike and transport
aircraft, communications, and logistics. We will use the sea as
maneuver space to create uncertainty for adversaries and protect the
joint force while receiving, staging, and integrating scalable forces,
at sea, that are capable of a broad range of missions. Its inherent
freedom of movement, appropriate scalability, and sustainable
persistent power provides full spectrum capabilities, from support of
theater engagement strategies, to rapid response to natural or man made
disasters, to military combat operations from raids, to swift defeat of
enemies, to scale of major combat and decisive operations. The seabased
Navy will be distributed, netted, immediately employable, and rapidly
deployable, greatly increasing its operational availability through
innovative concepts such as, the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) and Sea
Swap. At the same time, innovative transformational platforms under
development such as MPF(F), LHA(R), and High-Speed Connectors, will be
instrumental to the seabase.
The FRP is the maintenance, training, and operational framework
through which the Navy meets global combatant commander demand signals
for traditional (e.g., global war on terrorism, major combat
operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, shaping and
stability operations, counter piracy, etc.) and emerging mission sets
(e.g., riverine warfare, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, medical
outreach). The FRP is mission-driven, capabilities-based, and provides
the right readiness at the right time (within fiscal constraints). It
enables responsive and dependable forward presence. With the FRP we can
deploy a more agile, flexible, and scalable naval force capable of
surging quickly to deal with unexpected threats, humanitarian
disasters, and contingency operations. Sea Swap is an initiative
designed to keep a single hull continuously deployed in a given
theater, replacing the entire crew at 6-month intervals. The primary
objective is to effectively and efficiently increase forward naval
presence without increasing operating cost.
The Navy's Naval Surface Fires Support (NSFS) program was initiated
as part of a larger strategy to meet U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) stated
requirements for expeditionary maneuver warfare. However, NSFS will
support all joint maneuver forces ashore at extended ranges and will
provide responsive and persistent fire support for all other
operations. The NSFS program will continue to be relatively affordable
since fewer rounds will be required to achieve the desired effects on
most targets due to greatly enhanced accuracy, precision, and
lethality. Current program needs to meet NSFS requirements for the near
term are being met by the MK 45 Mod 4 5/62 gun, Naval Fires Control
System, Extended Range Munitions, and a Supporting Arms Coordination
Center (Automated) (SACC(A)). Mid-term requirements will be met by
DD(X) and associated NSFS programs, 155-mm Advanced Gun System, and
Long Range Land Attack Projectile. Finally, the long term requirements
may be met by Electromagnetic Rail Gun System and Multi-Purpose
Loitering Missile. The programs of record that we have today in our
NSFS plan will be able to provide persistent fire support at longer
ranges with better accuracy than the battleships were ever able to
provide.
Seapower 21
We developed the Sea Power 21 vision in support of our National
Military Strategy. The objective of Sea Power 21 is to ensure this
Nation possesses credible combat capability on scene to promote
regional stability, to deter aggression throughout the world, to assure
the access of joint forces and to fight and win should deterrence fail.
Sea Power 21 guides the Navy's transformation from a threat--based
platform centric structure to a capabilities-based, fully integrated
force. The pillars of Sea Power 21--Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and
Seabasing--are integrated by FORCEnet. Sea Power 21 is structured by
four pillars:
Sea Strike is the projection of precise and persistent
offensive power. It leverages persistence, precision, stealth,
and new force packaging concepts to increase operational tempo
and reach. It includes strikes by air, missiles, and long-range
gunfires.
Sea Shield is the projection of layered defensive power. It
seeks maritime superiority to assure access, and to project
defense overland. seabasing is the projection of operational
independence. It provides the Joint Force Commander the ability
to exploit expeditionary maneuver warfare, and the capability
to retain command and control and logistics at mobile, secure
locations at sea.
FORCEnet is the means by which the power of sensors,
networks, weapons, warriors, and platforms are harnessed in a
networked combat force.
This networked force will provide the strategic agility and
persistence necessary to prevail in the continuing global war on
terrorism, as well as the speed and overwhelming power to seize the
initiative and swiftly defeat any regional peer competitor in MCO.
Extending FORCEnet to our allies and partners in the form of
multinational information sharing networks will represent an
unprecedented level of interoperability for both global war on
terrorism and MCO. The immeasurable advantage of this effort is the
effective association of a ``1,000-ship Navy'' built from our own core
capabilities combined with the coordinated efforts of our allies and
partners in today's challenging global environment.
Fiscal Year 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 06)
The fiscal and temporal realities associated with the design and
development of modern, sophisticated weapons systems requires a
significantly different approach to procurement and operation of our
forces and resources. It is this dynamic that is propelling the Navy
forward in the transformational arena. As recognized in the Quadrennial
Defense Review, the size and capabilities of our force are driven by
the challenges we will face. The capacity of the force is determined by
its global posture in peacetime and the requirement to respond from
this posture, as well as to surge, in crisis. In the case of our Navy,
it is based upon the need for a ubiquitous but carefully tailored
maritime presence that can provide the President and our allies with
strategic options in support of dynamic security requirements. QDR 06
developed guidance to achieve the national defense and national
military strategies and shaping the future force to improve
capabilities and expand capacity to address four priorities:
Defeat Terrorist Extremists
Defending the Homeland in Depth
Shaping the Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads
Preventing Hostile State and Non-state Actors from Acquiring
or Using Weapons of Mass Destruction
QDR 06 sets a 20-year course for the Department of Defense and
provides an opportunity to continue to reshape the U.S. Armed Forces to
meet current and emerging security responsibilities. The QDR 06
construct places new emphasis on the unique operational demands
associated with homeland defense and the global war on terrorism,
shifts focus from optimizing for conflicts in two particular regions to
building a portfolio of capabilities with global reach and serves as a
bridge from today's threat-based force to a future capabilities-based
transformational force.
Force Structure
Force structure requirements were developed and validated through
detailed joint campaign and mission level analysis, optimized through
innovative sourcing initiatives (FRP, Sea Swap, forward posturing) that
increase platform operational availability, and balanced with
shipbuilding industrial base requirements. This force structure was
developed using a capabilities-based approach measured against the
anticipated threats for the fiscal year 2020 timeframe.
The future Navy will remain seabased, with global speed and
persistence provided by forward deployed forces, supplemented by
rapidly deployable forces through the FRP. To maximize return on
investment, the Navy that fights the global war on terrorism and
executes maritime security operations will be complementary to the Navy
required to fight and win in any MCO. This capabilities-based, threat-
oriented Navy can be disaggregated and distributed world wide to
support combatant commander global war on terrorism demands. The
resulting distributed and netted force, working in conjunction with our
joint and maritime partners, will provide both actionable intelligence
through persistent, maritime domain awareness, and the ability to take
action where and when a threat is identified. The same force can be
rapidly aggregated to provide the strength needed to defeat any
potential adversary in an MCO. The warships represented by this
shipbuilding plan, along with the naval aircraft programmed in fiscal
year 2007 President's budget, will sustain operations in forward areas
longer, be able to respond more quickly to emerging contingencies, and
generate more sorties and simultaneous attacks against greater numbers
of multiple targets and with greater effect than our current fleet.
Employing a capabilities-based approach to calculate the size and
composition of the future force required to meet expected joint force
demands in peace and in the most stressing construct of the Defense
Planning Guidance, along with detailed assessments of risk associated
with affordability and instabilities in the industrial base, the
analysis concluded that a fleet of about 313 ships is the minimum force
necessary to meet all the demands, and to pace the most advanced
technological challengers well into the future, with an acceptable
level of risk.
Our force structure strategy is balanced between new construction
and modernization for ships, and recapitalization and sustainment for
aircraft. It is critical to our strategy for us to have vigorous
modernization and sustainment programs to achieve the expected service
life of our ships and aircraft in the face of rapidly escalating global
threats using advanced technologies. Modernization and sustainment gets
the most out of our capital investments.
During the last year, the Chief of Naval Operations established a
focused effort to clearly define naval force structure requirements.
The Navy recently submitted to Congress its 2007 Annual Long Range Plan
for Construction of Naval Vessels. This plan begins our movement toward
a more balanced force that meets the future national security
requirements outlined in QDR 06 with acceptable risk and is designed to
replenish the fleet, while stabilizing workload and funding
requirements. As this 30 year shipbuilding plan evolves over the next
year, it will produce an investment plan that is both executable and
affordable based on balancing several factors: naval force operational
capability; risk; and, the ability of the shipbuilding industrial base
to execute the plan. This year the Chief of Naval Operations continues
to define naval force structure requirements with a detailed review of
naval aviation, in the same manner as the shipbuilding force structure
requirements were established. This effort will define a naval aviation
force structure which will meet the requirements outlined in QDR 06
with acceptable risk, is balanced with the 313 ship-plan, and
stabilizes the industrial base.
Shipbuilding (30-Year Naval Force Size)
The 30-year shipbuilding plan and the resulting ship inventory, as
outlined in the fiscal year 2007 Annual Long-Range Plan for
Construction of Naval Vessels, represent the baseline as reflected in
the 2007 President's Budget submission. There will be subsequent
studies and analysis that will continue to balance affordability with
capability and industrial base capacity. As part of the program
objective memorandum development process, the Navy will be exploring
alternative approaches to attaining the future force structure and ship
mix while retaining the necessary capabilities for joint force
operations. Overall, this plan reflects the Navy's commitment to
stabilize the demand signal to the industrial base while still
achieving the appropriate balance of affordability and capability in
all ship classes. Also, although there is risk with this plan, and not
a lot of excess capacity to accommodate the unforeseen, we believe the
risk is both moderate and manageable. Areas of special interest
include:
Carriers
Eleven aircraft carriers and their associated air wings are
sufficient to ensure our ability to provide coverage in any foreseeable
contingency and do so with meaningful, persistent combat power. While
the Navy requirement for carriers remains a minimum of 11 operational
vessels, past delays in beginning the nuclear powered aircraft carrier
(CVN)-21 program will result in the Navy having only 10 operational
carriers in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014. This anomaly will
require operational management of the remaining carrier fleet to
mitigate the impact of this shortfall in carrier force level.
Attack Submarines
Despite the fact that the total SSN numbers drop below 48 between
2020 and 2033, our fast attack submarines will provide the necessary
presence throughout their respective areas of operation and will be
sufficient to sustain the minimum required deployed presence needed for
major combat operations. Navy is pursuing a number of cost reduction
initiatives intended to lower SSN 774 acquisition costs to $2.0 billion
(fiscal year 2005 dollars) at a stable build rate of two-per-year
commencing with fiscal year 2012 as cited in QDR 06.
Expeditionary
Our expeditionary capability provides the joint forcible entry
capacity necessary to support the seabase as a lodgment point for joint
operations but represents an acceptable decrease in Marine
expeditionary brigade lift capacity. Myriad tactical, surveillance and
reconnaissance, heavy lift, and support aircraft, as well as a variety
of support ships, provide the Navy with sufficient capacity in each
mission area.
A stable shipbuilding industry is essential to sustain minimum
employment levels and retain critical skills to meet our requirements
for an affordable and capable force structure. We must align the
industrial base for long-term force development through advanced
procurement and incentivized cost savings. We must build ships more
efficiently, cost effectively, and quickly. To do this, we are
committed to help provide stability in the shipbuilding plan and
rigorously control requirements. Costs and production schedules must be
kept within contractual limits. Industry must be viewed as a trusted
partner while we provide a stable baseline upon which to plan.
The Navy continues to analyze operational requirements, ship
designs and costs, acquisition plans and tools, and industrial base
capacity to further improve its shipbuilding plan. Full funding and
support for execution of this plan is crucial to transforming the U.S.
Navy to a force tuned to the 21st century and its evolving
requirements.
2007 President's Budget Shipbuilding Programs
There has been considerable activity within shipbuilding over the
last year. Currently, there are 37 naval ships under construction in
the United States: 1 CVN, 13 DDGs, 1 LHD, 4 LPDs, 9 T-AKEs , 2 Littoral
Combat Ships (LCS) and 7 Virginia class submarines. Three additional
LPDs have ongoing contract negotiations. In 2005 the Department
delivered the lead ship for our newest class of amphibious transport
dock ships, U.S.S. San Antonio, (LPD 17), initiating a new era of
amphibious assault capabilities that are aligned to the littoral
regions. In January 2006, the Navy commissioned LPD 17. The Navy also
commissioned three DDGs in calendar year 2005. We laid the keel for the
eighth ship of the LHD class and the second Lewis & Clark Auxiliary Dry
Cargo & Ammunition ship (T-AKE), launched the lead ship T-AKE and
commenced construction of the seventh Virginia class submarine. The
Navy completed the engineered refueling overhaul (ERO) and conversion
of the U.S.S. Ohio (SSGN 726), the first SSGN, and redelivered the
submarine to the fleet in December 2005. In March 2005, we also
completed the refueling complex overhaul (RCOH) of CVN 69.
Fiscal year 2007 will see the Navy's previous research and
development efforts begin to bear fruit. The first increment of
procurement of the two lead-DD(X) destroyers has been requested.
Follow-on LCSs are programmed that will accelerate the Navy's
capability to defeat anti-access threats close to shore. Transformation
is most apparent in fiscal year 2007 where new construction increases
to seven ships from the four in the President's fiscal year 2006 budget
request. The total number of new ships procured over the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) is 51, averaging 10 ships per year including
DD(X), CG(X), LCS, T-AKE, Virginia class SSN, CVN 21, MPF(F), LPD 17,
Joint High Speed Vessel, and LHA(R). Our fiscal year 2007 budget
request calls for construction of seven ships: two DD(X) destroyers,
one Virginia class submarine, one Lewis & Clark (T-AKE) class Auxiliary
Dry Cargo & Ammunition ship, the LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship, and two
LCS. In addition, we have requested funding for advance procurement of
the 10th and 11th Virginia class submarines, advance procurement of
long lead material for the 9th San Antonio class Amphibious Transport
Dock ship, advance procurement for CVN 21 construction, the second
increment of CVN 70 RCOH funding, advance procurement for CVN 71 RCOH,
ERO of an SSBN, funding for Ticonderoga class cruiser and Arleigh Burke
class destroyer modernization, and the service life extension for six
Landing Craft Air Cushion vessels.
2007 President's Budget Naval Aviation Programs
The fiscal year 2007 President's budget procurement plan stresses
recapitalization and achieves significant advances in critical
warfighting capability while continuing the transition from a
``platform-centric'' approach. Fiscal year 2007 President's budget
improved critical warfighting capability while lowering operation and
support cost. Fiscal year 2007 President's budget lays out $63.0
billion in aircraft procurement, Navy 1-4 for the procurement of 1,135
aircraft in the FYDP (fiscal years 2007-2011). There is $8.0 billion
for 165 aircraft in fiscal year 2007.
The fiscal year 2007 President's budget produces financial
efficiencies through tactical air integration, Active-Reserve
integration, and Helo ConOps. These programs along with the pursuit of
multi-year procurement contracts for MH-60S, MH-60R, and MV-22 will
continue to produce efficiencies that aid in divestment from legacy
airframes and consolidation of facilities.
Fiscal year 2007 will see the procurement of 109 Department of the
Navy (DON) Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft in the FYDP. Marine
Corps initial operating capability (IOC) remains fiscal year 2012 while
Air Force and Navy IOCs remain fiscal year 2013. In fiscal year 2007
the F/A-18E/F program will be in its third year of procuring 210
aircraft through a multi-year procurement buy, and remains on cost and
ahead of schedule. The Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) program
will procure the first P-8A in fiscal year 2010 with an eye towards
transitioning the MPRA community between fiscal years 2013 and 2019.
The procurement strategy for UH-1Y aircraft is now new-build aircraft
versus remanufacture. This eliminates the need to remove aircraft from
Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom for remanufacture.
USMC Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR/CH-53K) program is fully funded for
fiscal year 2015 IOC.
Fiscal year 2007 President's budget plans for $24.7 billion FYDP
with $6.3 billion in fiscal year 2007 for naval aviation research and
development. These funds ensure future naval aviation transformation
and recapitalization. Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned
Aircraft System (UAS) is funded for technical risk reduction activities
and milestone B documentation preparation through fiscal year 2007; IOC
is planned for fiscal year 2013. E-2D is currently in system design and
development with milestone C in fiscal year 2009 and IOC in fiscal year
2011. Fire Scout is currently in engineering and manufacturing
development (EMD). Fiscal year 2007 President's budget implements and
funds a strategy that retires Navy EA-6Bs and replaces them with EA-
18G.
Future Maritime Patrol
The aging P-3C fleet continues to provide critical broad area
maritime and littoral anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface
warfare, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). P-8A
MMA will provide P-3 replacement, but P-3C sustainment measures are
needed until MMA reaches full operational capability (FOC) in fiscal
year 2019. The 2007 President's budget funds P-3C airframe sustainment
measures which include inspections and pre-emptive repair or
replacement of critical structural components to extend aircraft
service life. The sustainment program will sustain the P-3 until MMA
FOC. MMA achieved milestone B in May 2004 and entered system
development and demonstration (SDD) in June 2004. Boeing was awarded a
$3.9 billion contract to design the aircraft, integrate subsystems, and
build up to seven test aircraft. System requirements review, system
functional review, and preliminary design review have been completed,
and MMA has entered the detailed design phase. Milestone C is planned
for fiscal year 2010 and IOC in fiscal year 2013. The MMA program has
executed on time and on budget.
Unmanned Aircraft System
The DON is developing, acquiring, and fielding UAS technologies as
a key transformational initiative supporting knowledge and information
superiority, persistent surveillance, and time sensitive operations.
Investments are being made in future UAS capabilities while maintaining
current war supporting capabilities such as Marine Corps' legacy
Pioneer UAS. ISR capabilities addressing improved battlespace
management, situational awareness, and persistence are the primary
development focus to support the warfighter. The Vertical Takeoff and
Landing UAV (VTUAV) system-Fire Scout is in test and development and
will reach IOC in fiscal year 2008, providing support for core LCS
mission areas. Two Global Hawk maritime demonstrators will be delivered
in 2006 and will support fleet experiments and concept of operations
development for the BAMS UAS to be fielded in fiscal year 2013. Dragon
Eye, a lightweight, manportable, modular system designed to give the
small unit leader a reconnaissance and surveillance capability to see
over the next hill or building has been fielded in the Marine Corps.
Finally, the Navy is supporting an unmanned combat aircraft system
program to develop a carrier based UAS system that provides ISR and
operates in the same battlespace as carrier strike aircraft.
Interoperability continues to be a key element in the development of
our UASs. The Tactical Control System (TCS) is a standards-based,
interoperable, open system architecture solution that includes
implementation of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4586. TCS and NATO STANAG 4586
represent the foundation for our UAV interoperability. In addition,
applicable DON UAS will comply with Congressional direction regarding
use of Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL). The VTUAV system will IOC with
TCDL, and the Pioneer program is funded to retrofit to meet this
requirement.
Army announced Lockheed-Martin ACS contract termination 12 January
2006. The fiscal year 2007 President's budget sustains EP-3 until a
replacement capability is fielded. Army and Navy, in coordination with
Air Force, are co-leading an Office of the Secretary of Defense-
directed ISR gap analysis study.
summary
Our mission remains bringing the fight to our enemies. The
increasing dependence of our world on the seas, coupled with growing
uncertainty of other nations' ability or desire to ensure access in a
future conflict, will continue to drive the need for Naval forces and
the capability to project decisive joint power by access through the
seas. The increased emphasis on the littorals and the global nature of
the terrorist threat will demand the ability to strike where and when
required, with the maritime domain serving as the key enabler for U.S.
military forces.
Accordingly, we will execute the global war on terrorism while
transforming for the future fight. We will continue to refine our
operational concepts and appropriate technology investments to deliver
the kind of dominant military power from the sea envisioned in Sea
Power 21. We will continue to pursue the operational concepts for
seabasing persistent combat power, even as we invest in technology and
systems to enable naval vessels to deliver decisive combat power in
every tactical and operational dimension. We look forward to a future
that continues the strong partnership with Congress that has brought
the Navy many successes today. We thank you for your consideration.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Admiral. We probably have a
couple of minutes left, and I think I won't cut it too fine.
Senator, I think we'll adjourn the hearing, go over and vote,
and then come on back. We want to welcome the students who are
with us today. If you can stick around until the questions,
that's when the fun really starts. So, I'll recess the hearing,
and then we'll go over and vote. [Recess.]
All right, thank you for your patience. We have another
vote coming up in a few minutes, and Senator Kennedy agreed I
would come back and continue with the statements, and he will
try to come back. He has a conference committee he has to
attend, but if he can't, and to the extent I don't cover his
questions, we will just submit his for the record. Thank you,
Admiral Crenshaw, for your testimony. General Gardner, I have
you next on the list. We appreciate your being here.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. EMERSON N. GARDNER, JR., USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES
General Gardner. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you today. As the Marine Corps'
Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, I am responsible
for creating a budget request that provides necessary funding
to develop our future capability needs. Our fiscal year 2007
budget request enables your Marine Corps to respond to current
national demands even as we aggressively transform our forces
to prepare for the uncertainties of the future.
However, our baseline modernization and transformation
accounts cannot bear the unfunded costs associated with
sustaining the global war on terror, which is why the
administration is requesting funds in the fiscal year 2006
supplemental to fund our cost of war operations and to address
our need to reset our forces. Our fiscal year 2007 budget and
our fiscal year 2006 supplemental request work together to
sustain readiness while providing opportunity for investment
and resetting continued modernization of the Corps. On behalf
of all the marines, I thank the committee for your continued
support and look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Gardner and
General Mattis follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Emerson N. Gardner, USMC, and Lt.
Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC
Chairman Talent, Senator Kennedy, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss Marine Corps maritime and aviation requirements. Your Marine
Corps is entering the fifth year of what has been aptly termed The Long
War and because of the support received from Congress, Marines continue
to demonstrate that they are an expeditionary force in readiness--Most
Ready When the Nation is Least Ready. Scalable, flexible, and adaptable
for peacetime crises and always innovative for future challenges, your
Corps' number one priority is fighting and winning battles.
On behalf of all marines, we thank the committee for your continued
support and commitment to the readiness of your Marine Corps.
creating stability in an unstable world
We remain the Nation's premier expeditionary combat force-in-
readiness. We are primarily a naval force whose strength is our ability
to access denied areas from great distances. We project Marine forces
from land or seabases for operations as part of a joint or combined
force. We provide defense of the homeland by operating from forward
deployed locations throughout the world. We sustain our deployed forces
for extended periods of time.
We fight across the spectrum of conflict. However, we believe that
our future will be characterized by irregular wars. The enemy we are
fighting today is different than those in our recent past. He is a
transnational actor with no allegiance to sovereign nations or respect
for conventional rules of war. To address this threat, we focus on
warfighting excellence in everything we do. A guiding principle of our
Corps is that we fight as combined-arms teams, seamlessly integrating
our ground, aviation, and logistics forces adapted to the complexities
of irregular war. We exploit the speed, flexibility, and agility
inherent in our combined-arms approach to defeat irregular,
traditional, and emerging threats to our Nation's security.
Every marine is a rifleman and a warrior--our link to the past and
a highly relevant key to the future. We train and educate our marines
to think independently and act maturely and aggressively, with speed
and initiative, and to exploit the advantages of cultural
understanding. We thrive in the chaotic and unpredictable environments
in which our forces are employed. We are committed to providing
relevant, sustainable, and sturdy forces to the joint task force
commanders. Marines are intensely devoted to each other and the defense
of our Nation.
quadrennial defense review (qdr)
The 2006 QDR report highlights that seabasing and flexible options
for expeditionary maneuver are not only relevant; they are critical to
our strategic goals. The QDR defines achieving global freedom of action
as one of the four key objectives in the National Defense Strategy. To
increase our Nation's freedom of action, we need to focus on the
following four areas: operational readiness, global reach, building
partnership capacity, and strengthening alliances. Seabasing plays a
significant role in all four of these areas, but makes its greatest
contributions in enhancing global reach. The QDR specifically calls for
more flexible basing and indirect operational approaches. With its
characterization of today's security environment as an era of
uncertainty and surprise, marked by a shift from static defense and
garrison forces to mobile expeditionary operations, the QDR suggests
more emphasis be placed on agility of response rather than speed of
response. It seeks tailored deterrence by shifting from responding
after a crisis starts (reactive) to preventive action so that problems
do not become crises (proactive). This requires an agile and integrated
joint force that is more rapidly deployable and more capable against a
wider range of threats. Lastly, the QDR highlights the need to develop
the capability ``to deploy rapidly, assemble, command, project,
reconstitute, and re-employ joint combat power from all domains to
facilitate assured access.'' If we as a Nation desire to assure we can
gain access at a time and place of our choosing, it is imperative that
we continue to invest in and further advance our Nation's seabasing
capabilities to achieve global freedom of action. There is no better
way to reassure our friends around the world while confronting our
enemies with a compelling threat.
seabasing--a national capability
America's ability to use international seas and waterways, as both
maneuver space and an operating base unconstrained by foreign veto,
allows our naval forces to project combat power into the littoral
regions. The littorals contain more than half the world's population
and more than 75 percent of its major urban areas. Highly mobile and
ready for combat, our forward-deployed expeditionary forces are
critical instruments of U.S. diplomacy and central components of joint
military force packages designed to quickly contain a crisis or defeat
an emerging threat. The Navy and Marine Corps team can project
unmatched amphibious forcible-entry capabilities and provide a
persistent combat capability from a mobile seabase, thus reducing the
U.S. logistical ``footprint'' ashore. By exploiting our Nation's
premier asymmetric advantage--command of the sea--the Navy and Marine
Corps can loiter over the horizon and project, protect, and sustain
integrated joint warfighting capabilities, provide muscular yet agile
support for the Commander in Chief's diplomatic efforts, and ensure
operational independence for combatant commanders across the full
spectrum of warfare.
Today and tomorrow, a most visible element of assurance to allies
and deterrence to foes will be naval forward presence, including
capabilities of Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable)
(MEU(SOC)) embarked, protected, and sustained by Expeditionary Strike
Group (ESG) ships. These units provide the combatant commanders with
forward-deployed adaptive units that can conduct a variety of quick
reaction, seabased, crisis-response options against traditional
challenges or against irregular foes. To appreciate our Nation's
ability to maintain global presence, we only need to reflect back 23
years. From Beirut to Biloxi, our Nation has responded with amphibious
forces to 76 global events ranging from humanitarian relief to combat
operations, each of which provides an excellent example of our current
capabilities.
The current force-sizing construct requires the capability to
respond to two swiftly defeat the efforts (SDTE)--each of which
requiring a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) size force. One of these
crises may become a decisively defeat campaign, bringing our most
powerful force to bear, the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), for
highly-capable, lethal, mobile, and sustained operations. This requires
30 operational available amphibious warships (10 of which must be large
deck amphibious ships capable of supporting the aviation combat element
of the assault echelon).
The future Seabasing effort will allow more efficiency in the
generation of our expeditionary brigades, enabling the forces to flow
directly from home bases to the forward, on-scene, Seabasing ships,
while leveraging the Sea Shield force protection for off-shore, less
vulnerable operating bases. As a crisis builds, one to two forward
deployed MEUs serve as the ``leading edge'' of the MEB, conducting
advanced force and limited objective, initial entry/response efforts,
while the remainder of the strike power of the MEB is assembled on
scene as part of the Maritime Preposition Force (Future) (MPF(F))
Seabasing echelon. As ``proof of concept,'' our Nation's strength and
capability to operate in an anti-access environment was tested during
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The war against the Taliban and al
Qaeda in Afghanistan provided a harsh dose of reality for those who
assumed traditional threats and the availability of friendly,
convenient land bases to project airpower and land forces.
In the early phases of OEF, two forward-deployed MEUs and
associated amphibious shipping formed Task Force 58 and projected the
first major U.S. ``conventional'' combat units into Afghanistan--more
than 350 miles from its seabase of amphibious shipping. Yet, their
operations were far from traditional or conventional in tone. We
believe recent experiences, such as Turkey's prohibition of passage for
the 4th Infantry Division to open a northern front in the early stages
of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), are compelling insights for how
operations must be conducted in the future. When negotiating for the
4th Infantry Division to transit Turkey, the U.S. offered to pay a
multi-billion dollar option for a one time passage when this funding
could have been applied to our Nation's future warfighting investments
such as MPF(F). In the globalized world and information age, ``all
politics are local'' remains a constant theme but now has strategic
implications. Our naval forces, operations off-shore, are more relevant
now than ever before, when even friendly nations may deny U.S. forces
land basing and transit due to their own sovereign interests.
distributed operations
The attributes of sea power are extremely useful to the combatant
commanders. However, this operational capability must also be matched
by increased tactical capabilities that enhance the effectiveness of
our ``boots on ground'' to enable operational maneuver and to create
stability, especially in irregular and counterinsurgency operations
where decisive combat has shifted to ground combat against irregular
forces. After a quarter century of unwavering commitment to our
maneuver warfare philosophy, marines are harvesting a generation of
junior officers and noncommissioned officers who are better prepared to
assume much greater authority and responsibility than traditionally
expected at the small-unit level. As an additive tactic and
complementary capability to our Seabasing concept, distributed
operations describes an operating approach that will create an
advantage over an adversary through the deliberate use of wider
dispersion and coordinated, interdependent, tactical actions enabled by
enhanced communications, increased access to joint fire support, as
well as by enhanced combat capabilities at the small-unit level. The
essence of this concept lies in enhanced small units gained through
taking advantage of our high quality, combat experienced marines and
the incorporation of emerging technologies which will support them.
Once implemented, a networked Marine Air-Ground Task Force
operating in a distributed operations manner will disperse, mass, and
disperse again to exploit opportunities the enemy offers. The
integration of new doctrine, force structure, training, equipment,
personnel policies, and leader development initiatives will afford our
tactical and operational commanders a significantly enhanced weapon in
the increasingly sophisticated global war on terror.
marine corps maritime lift and naval surface fires requirements
In order to support Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO), the
Marine Corps shipbuilding requirement is two amphibious MEB Assault
Echelons (AE) plus two (MPF(F)) MEBs (or equivalent as indicated
below).
30 operationally available amphibious ships, of which 10
must be operationally available big-deck aviation-capable ships
to support two MEB AE.
Note: operationally available--minimum amount of
ships required to conduct the mission. Planning factors
will account for ship maintenance cycles.
Minimum of 9 LPD-17s within the LPD program to
mitigate risk incurred by limiting each MEB AE to 15
amphibious ships.
Both discrete and volumetric analyses have
been conducted to load the ``2015 MEB AE'' on
amphibious ships. Seventeen ships (five LHD,
five LPD-17, five LSD-41, two LSD-49) are
required, however, the Marine Corps has
accepted risk with a 7-percent reduction in MEB
equipment by self limiting to 15 ships per MEB
AE.
Limiting the LPD-17 production line to nine
ships places the Marine Corps at grave/
significant risk by further decrementing the
MEB equipment for the assault echelon.
2 MPF(F) MEB squadrons or one MPF(F) squadron plus two
legacy Maritime Pre-position Ship (MPS) squadrons.
MPF(F) squadron will consist of 14 ships with two
types using proven amphibious hull designs: 1 LHD, 2
LHA(R), 3 T-AKE, 3 large, medium speed, roll-on/roll-
off (LMSR), 3 Mobile Landing Platform ships, and 2
legacy ``dense-pack'' maritime prepositioning ships.
We are not ready to commit MPF(F) to forcible entry
in the assault echelon without further experimentation
in the following areas:
Civilians (merchant marines) manning MPF(F)
and associated legal implications.
Survivability, preposition loading, and
continued on-load/off-load experiments, etc.
Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) that meets the Marine
Corps requirement of ``24/7,'' all weather, long range naval
surface fires in support of amphibious operations from the sea
with continuous striking power and volume of fires out to a
range of 63 nautical miles (threshold) to 110 nautical miles
(objective) from ships at sea.
LHA/LHD recapitalization plan.
Recapitalization plan for LSD line to bridge from last LPD
to first LSD replacement (must account for LHA(R) design of not
having a well deck).
We have lost a total of 27 aircraft in support of OIF/OEF/
Horn of Africa (HOA) operations. Until last fall (28 Sep 05--
MV-22 full rate production decision), we have not had a ``hot''
manufacturing line from which to replace these losses because
we are in the midst of recapitalizing our legacy fleet.
With only one active production line for our existing
rotary-wing aircraft, addressing near-term inventory shortfalls
for this generational war requires revisiting the production
ramp-up rates for the procurement of the MV-22, KC-130J
(procure multi-year), H1Y/Z aircraft and staying on track with
the development of the CH53K.
F-35B (JSF)--preserve Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
date of fiscal year 2012 in order to replace legacy aircraft
operating beyond the Expected Service Life (ESL).
fiscal year 2007 and future years defense programs--modernization and
transformation
While we continue to focus our efforts on sustaining the current
requirements for global war on terror, we must not sacrifice our
modernization and transformation initiatives in the process. Our
modernization and transformation accounts can no longer bear the
unfunded costs associated with sustaining the global war on terror,
which is why the administration is requesting funds in the fiscal year
2006 supplemental to continue addressing the resetting of our forces.
Our modernization and transformation initiatives must plan for the
procurement of replacement equipment that will enable our Corps to be
ready for future conflicts and contingencies.
The readiness of our Corps remains dependent on our ability to
continue to attract and enlist young men and women dedicated to the
preservation of freedom and to service to our great Nation. We will
continue to inspire, train, and equip them for success. Our fiscal year
2007 budget and our fiscal year 2006 supplemental request work together
to address our essential operational and maintenance requirements to
sustain our readiness, while providing opportunity for investment in
the resetting and continued modernization of our Corps. We will
dedicate these resources to the destruction of our enemies and
stability for our friends and thank you for this support. Your
unwavering support is deeply appreciated.
specific responses to the subcommittee's request for information
For the purpose of this statement, we have emphasized Marine Corps
maritime lift, naval surface fires support, and aviation requirements.
Additionally, we have provided Enclosure (1) for the responses to the
subcommittee's specific request for information.
conclusion
Your marines are fully dedicated to serving and protecting this
Nation. Their bravery, sacrifice, and commitment to warfighting
excellence are well known to you. We recognize we have an essential
mission, and that we have the solid backing of the American people. The
Marine Corps fully understands that our greatest contribution to the
Nation is our high-level of readiness across the spectrum of conflict.
We see Seabasing as a national capability that regional combatant
commanders can immediately apply to emerging threats transcending all
levels of warfare. No longer will we need to rely on critical airfields
and seaports in the initial phases of conflict. On behalf of all
marines, we thank the committee for your continued support that has
made us more effective in the fight, saved lives, and will allow us to
protect this great Nation in an uncertain future.
Senator Talent. That was expeditious. Thank you. You'll
never, however, be able to serve in the Senate if you can't
talk longer than that. [Laughter].
General Mattis, would you care to go next, please?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, General Gardner's and my
written statement has been submitted, and I ask that it be
accepted for the record. The Marine Corps is heavily committed
to this war having taken over 6,000 killed and wounded in
action since 2001. While we remain fully engaged in this fight,
we're also adapting and modernizing for future fights in this
long war. From adaptive concepts to innovative training and the
incorporation of focused technologies, we're transforming our
Corps even while maintaining near-term readiness from seabasing
to distributed operations. We're posturing the Corps for its
role from forcible entry to irregular warfare against an
elusive foe.
Thanks to our extremely hard-working recruiters and your
support, we continue to enlist high-quality young men and women
into our ranks, and we are retaining our combat veterans at
extremely high levels. With your continued support, we will
ensure our marines remain an elite force fully prepared for
tomorrow's challenges.
Programs such as the MV-22 tiltrotor, the fighting
amphibious ships of the LPD-17 class, the expeditionary
fighting vehicles, the KC-130J, CH-53K, and others form the
composite of capabilities that carry our troops against the
enemy. Alongside our shipmates in the Navy, we marines are
confident of our future capabilities. With 30 operationally-
available amphibious ships, 10 of which need to be large-deck
amphibs, the advent of the Maritime Prepositioning Force of the
future squadrons and associated programs, we will be prepared
for the next fight. I thank you for your strong support over
this last year and look forward to your questions, sir.
Senator Talent. Thank you.
Admiral Edwards.
Admiral Edwards. Sir, as the Director of Warfare
Integration, I work for Admiral Crenshaw, and his statement is
one and the same as mine.
Senator Talent. Tremendous. I appreciate your comments and
your summing them up. I guess I will go right to my questions.
Admiral Crenshaw and Admiral Edwards, the Navy's report to
Congress, which outlined the plan for a 313-ship Navy,
emphasizes the importance--really the critical nature of budget
stability and concludes that we're going to need at least $13.5
billion per year in the shipbuilding and conversion, Navy (SCN)
accounts, at least on an average in order to be able to sustain
that number of ships. Now, I completely agree about the
criticality of budget stability. I hope we can do it for $13.5
billion. But that is an ambitious figure. You know that the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated we're going to
need more than that. We're at $8.7 billion now, which means
just to get to the $13.5 billion figure, we need an almost $5
billion increase in the SCN account. What are the Navy's
designs or plans for fencing the necessary funding in the
future? Where are you going to get it from?
Admiral Crenshaw. Senator, that is a great question. People
ask me that all the time in and out of the Navy.
Senator Talent. To the extent that you can't give
specifics, how confident are you that you can get it, and what,
at least, is your general thinking about where you're going to
go for it?
Admiral Crenshaw. Yes, sir. I think to kind of simplify the
things, our basic strategy here is based on number one, as you
mentioned, being specific about the requirement, which is about
the 313 number that Admiral Mullen has produced and then being
constant on our demand on that requirement. In other words, not
changing the numbers around. One of the things that causes
ships to cost more money, quite frankly, is when we move them
around. We have not been very good about that in the past as we
moved the ships around. If you move ships from one year to the
next, it always costs more. Sometimes I want to move it back,
and then it costs me even more money, and it's almost like lost
cost. So, we realize we really have to stabilize the
requirement and then stabilize what we have in the plan to buy.
We worked very hard to do that in the 2007 budget so that we
didn't change from one year to the next. We're going to
continue our commitment to not changing those numbers because
we sometimes are our own worst enemy as we change. So, one part
of our strategy to make this affordable is to control the cost,
number one, by being consistent in our stating of the
requirement and what we've put in the budget, and then the next
piece of this is to control the cost of the things that we buy.
I have put into place several mechanisms in the Navy
organization to begin to take a very close look at what things
drive the cost of ships. Many times, well-meaning people who
are wanting to put the most capability they can all the time in
these ships turn out inadvertently adding cost that we probably
didn't need to add. We have put a structure in place through
the ships' characteristics board that Admiral Edwards is going
to chair for me. Then myself as the resources and requirements
review board chairman to actually look at these things,
understand the cost drivers, and then make sure that we control
the growth of requirements in those things and figure out
things we can do to produce those ships cheaper. In the case
of, for instance, the Virginia class submarine, I've invested
around $160 million or so in cost reduction-type things to
drive the cost out of those ships. Looking at the cost of a
DD(X), we have invested money, and I've looked at things we can
do to drive the cost out of that ship and deliver at cost
targets. So, we've set some very challenging cost targets for
ourselves, but we have some really smart and hard-working
people and some good models that will now help us to control
the cost there.
One thing I might add, on the CBO study, while it does
postulate there's a large amount of money, I think it's around
$19 billion or so--a lot of that number is driven by some
assumptions that were made in the out-years on what we're going
to do to recapitalize the SSBN force and recapitalize the DDG
force as they reach the end of their service life. In the near-
years, we're not that far off. So, our challenge is to control
the cost and then do what we can in the near-years or the far-
years to keep the cost of those things from growing out of
control.
Senator Talent. It's reasonable to believe that, with a
sustained effort, you can hold these costs down. A lot of that
is going to be culture change, which is going to have to start
at the top. Admiral Edwards, you're going to have to be
committed on the requirements side. I certainly don't want to
keep you from going into that, but the $13.5 billion assumes
you can do all of those things. If you can't do all those
things, the number goes up. Look, I'm not going to ask you to
say this program, this program, this program I'm going to take
out in order to be able to fund that, but do you have a
confidence level that you can get there by fencing off dollars
from your current budget? How much would your confidence level
grow if we could increase the top line above what you expect,
and the Navy could get a piece of that?
Admiral Crenshaw. Sir, I think two parts to that. Number
one, yes, if I get more money on the top line, my confidence
would grow in that area. Having a number for us to shoot for,
in my opinion, is better than not having a number and let it
drift. So I have a number and I have a goal, and part of my
financial strategy now, if I know what that is, there are other
things that drive my cost in the Navy, and the way that I sort
of parse out the budget, in macro terms, is it depends on a
couple of things happening in order to have that $13.4 billion
average: One is I have to continue to very carefully manage the
manpower cost associated with the Navy--one of our most
expensive assets, but also our greatest asset. So part of the
strategy is to continue to do what we need to do to control the
growth in the manpower accounts. Some of that is putting
technology in the ships. Some of that is working smarter. Some
of that is doing some military-civilian transfers where it
makes sense to do so. Some of that is looking very closely at
our shore requirements. I can tell you exactly how many ships
or how many sailors I need to man a ship at sea. I'm not quite
so certain if you ask me about an air station or a naval base
exactly, and I'm working on coming at that.
Senator Talent. Let me interrupt and ask you about that. I
was going to ask about Sea Swap anyway. Now that we have been
working with it for a few years, is it working? Because
critical to holding down your personnel costs, I assume, is
you're going to continue Sea Swap--maybe even try and expand
it. Digress for a minute and tell the subcommittee, is it
working? What are the long-term impacts in terms of wear and
tear on the ships? Crew morale? Are there any negatives you see
emerging that might impair your ability to continue it to this
degree or expand it? Digress for just a minute and cover that.
Admiral Crenshaw. I think Admiral Edwards, as the surface
warfare lead, also will have some very definite comments on
this. In our second round of experimentation with Sea Swap, we
learned a lot. Sea Swap, although we call it that, is not
necessarily a new concept for us. We've done that for a long
time in our submarine force and in some of the other forces. In
our mine warfare force, we've been doing that for a long time,
but we haven't done it on the ships that have large crews, and
we're learning a lot, and I think I will keep it at that and
let Admiral Edwards answer.
Admiral Edwards. Sir, we have an experimentation that's
going to happen on the east coast. It's going to continue the
Sea Swap experiment and has the metrics embedded in it that
we're going to need in order to make some decisions on where to
go. Clearly, on the destroyer-class ship type, the DDGs, the
FFG, or the LCS, the smaller combatants, Sea Swap is definitely
doable. There are some challenges there, but we can get the
crew there. We know what the issues are. On the larger
amphibious platforms, for example, the jury is out on that. We
will have to be very careful how we proceed on that, and we
have not done the experimentation and sea trials we need to do
to see all of the ins and outs of being able to make that
happen. LCS is a ship that's going to have approximately 75
crewmembers onboard. We are going to swap the crews on that
ship, and the first two ships have four crews that have been
assigned already. So that is going to be a force multiplier
with that particular ship.
Senator Talent. The crew morale is holding up?
Admiral Edwards. Everybody is leery when something new
comes in. The crew morale at the end of the day with the
experiments we have done was overall good. The material
condition of the ships were satisfactory, and the experiments
we have done to date would say that the crew swap can be
performed on DDGs and DD-type ships.
Senator Talent. Okay, Sea Swap I think we've pretty much
covered. Admiral Clark was pretty good at getting money out of
the personnel side, and I don't know how much there is left--
how much gold is left in that mine, in that vein for you to
get--but going back for just a minute and then finishing your
discussion of your confidence level in getting to the $13.5
billion.
Admiral Crenshaw. We talked about controlling the manpower
costs. The other piece that I think is critical is when we
talked about controlling the cost of the things we buy and
keeping a lid on what exactly we need to buy there and buy what
we need, not necessarily what we want. The third piece that I
kind of look at and worry about is controlling my operations
and maintenance (O&M) costs, making sure we're getting the best
value for the dollar there as well because if you look at a
display of the major budget categories--the manpower, the O&M
costs, the research and development (R&D) costs, and
procurement cost, everything is relatively flat and under
control. The R&D accounts are going down as we are now shifting
that investment from R&D of new things to buying the new
things. So there is no money there.
So to the extent that the money is in procurement, it
requires me to do those other things. The O&M piece is very
important to me as well. Now, some of that I don't have control
over. As fuel prices go up, I just have to deal with what
happens. But we have done a very good job, I think, over the
last couple of years, particularly in the naval aviation
enterprise, of beginning to run the business part of the Navy,
if you will, the back shop, as an enterprise and looking at the
Commander of Naval Air Forces, Admiral Zortman, and Admiral
Massenburg is his Air Systems Commander, and Admiral Kilcline,
who works for me as his resource guy, and looking at this in
terms of a business and how we go about doing the maintenance
and how we go about providing things.
The naval aviation enterprise has found some significant
savings in the things that they have done. There are several
anecdotes about how they have gone from producing at one
facility--maybe 5 engines a month with 3 shifts to producing 20
engines a month on a single shift because of putting into place
good business practices. I'm very encouraged with what the
aviation enterprise has done. We also are beginning to do the
same thing in our surface and our subsurface enterprises. I
also think in terms of the Expeditionary Combat Command that we
have talked about in this 2007 budget as also being a new
emerging enterprise that pushes things and combat capability
out the door for us.
So, to sum up, controlling the cost of the things that we
want to buy, controlling my manpower costs by a variety of
techniques, trying to be innovative and efficient in how I'm
doing the business part for the O&M piece of that are all
things that will allow me to meet that target. The money is in
the budget for me to do that. I just have to keep it from
eroding for the things we talked about.
Senator Talent. I don't know that I would have the same
confidence level you do, that you have just described $5
billion worth of additions to SCN. It's a crucial time for the
Navy, for all of us to be very direct with each other----
Admiral Crenshaw. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent.--and I have concerns along those lines. I
hope you're not counting on savings that involve perhaps key
policy disputes between the Navy and Congress. In other words,
there may be some savings you're looking at where you know that
from past experience, that Congress might disagree about the
appropriateness of that action. If there's a bank of those
you're looking at, I would caution you to be careful--not
because we can't be convinced, but just because you can't be
certain that we will be convinced. I take what you said before,
your confidence level would be substantially increased if we
could get the top line up and you could get a piece of it. Is
that a fair statement?
Admiral Crenshaw. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. I have 2 minutes left in the vote.
Fortunately, Senator Reed has voted already and is willing to
take the hearing over and ask his questions while I go vote so
I appreciate that.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Mr. Chairman, if I run out of
questions, I'll just put it in a slight recess for a while.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and your service.
Admiral Crenshaw, the QDR talks about repositioning naval
forces in the Pacific, and it says consistent with the global
shift to trade and transport and essentially calls for six
operational and sustainable carriers together with 60 percent
of our submarines. Just in terms of sort of strategic concepts,
trade and transports usually imply surface activity, aircraft
carriers and submarines, stealth air support, the kinetics of
the battlefield. Is this justified simply because trade and
transportation patterns are changing in the Pacific, or is it
something else?
Admiral Crenshaw. Good question, sir. Number one, we are a
maritime nation. Most of the things that we consume around here
generally come by sea, and the things we sell go by sea and so,
for that reason alone, it's good for us to focus in that area.
It is an emerging powerhouse economically, but one of the
things strategically and maybe operationally that sometimes
escapes people in the Pacific area and the western area is the
tyranny of distance. It's a long way to go anywhere over there.
I've been a Mediterranean sailor most of my career. From the
time we left port, in about 10 days or so, we were crossing
through the Strait of Gibraltar. Within 2 weeks, we would be
operating in the Mediterranean theater. If you look at the
Pacific, it takes me a month from the west coast to get to
anyplace where it's important to be, and it takes me another
month to get back. So the tyranny of distance here is such that
wisely positioning those forces allows them to not only be
there to protect the trade and commerce that we have, but it
allows them to be positioned with the type of speed we need in
case something happens in that neck of the woods. So by having
forces over there, we begin to take some of the edge off of the
tyranny of distance, if you will.
It is a risk-reduction maneuver on our part because we know
we have trouble sailing people from the east coast. It takes a
long time to get them over to that theater of operations. So,
it is an important area to us. Those areas of the world are
less stable right now. So that is another reason why we are
moving over in that direction, sir.
Senator Reed. One of the concerns that several of my
colleagues and I have is with the production rate of
submarines. We're building one Virginia class submarine per
year up to fiscal year 2012, at which time we're scheduled to
go to two-a-year production. That has been a threshold that
keeps slipping and slipping away it seems. But with this
projected build rate, anticipated inactivations of submarines,
and scheduled maintenance, the SSN inventory will dip below the
minimum 48 to fulfill mission requirements from 2013 to 2035 to
as low as 40 submarines. At the time, Navy officials today, I
think, would acknowledge that our submarine force of over 50
fast-attack submarines is unable to perform many of the
missions. As I go out, and as my colleagues go out and talk to
combatant commanders, when you ask them what do they really
need, what more do they need of, they say we need more
submarine platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance and for many other capabilities. How is the Navy
going to deal with the shortfall come 2013 and 2035 if we don't
get the two-per-year production quickly?
Admiral Crenshaw. The submarine numbers are an interesting
dynamic, Senator. I had a couple of tours in the Pentagon, and
it's been interesting for me to see how we have evolved our
thinking on this. When we undertook the 313 plan, the CNO
challenged us to take a broad look at all of the things and all
of the good work that has been done over the years from all of
the people in the Department and outside of the Department and
studies like the CBO study. We did so specifically as we looked
at the submarine force structure. The number 48 was kind of a
sweet spot when you took all of these together for us to meet
what we considered to be the minimal acceptable requirement
which is about having, on any given day, about 10 submarines
out doing things, and the 48 number gives us that.
We looked at the availability of the submarines as we began
to build the Virginia class and there's an interesting dynamic
here. One of the things that's the real strength about this
great submarine, is that it is unmatched in the world. It is
one of our asymmetric strengths. By the way, sometimes you hear
about the enemy having asymmetry. We too, have asymmetry, and
our submarine force is one of those. The capability that we
have built into that ship, particularly from the
maintainability standpoint, is such that that ship will not be
required to be refueled, making it more available than the 688
class was. The 688 class has spent about 40 percent of its time
doing various maintenance things and refuelings. The same
figure for the Virginia class will be 10 percent. So, that
alone will mitigate some of that 48 number.
There are also some things that we can do in terms of our
concept of operations (CONOPs) on how we actually employ the
surge of those submarines and have them available at certain
key times when we need them as well as some of the initiatives
that we have done in forward basing some of these submarines--
once again, getting back to that tyranny of distance thing. So
we will drop below but there are some mitigating things we can
do in terms of reduced maintenance. We will need to do some
CONOPs and managing that force more closely than we normally
would. Although we manage it pretty closely, we will have to
spend more time on the maintenance cycles and how we do that.
So, we will drop below that number. That is true, and we will
come back and get to that number.
Senator Reed. Again, just to clarify for my own information
and the committee's, after a lot of deliberation with a range
of numbers, the Navy essentially said well, 48 is the optimal
number of submarines, and there's a lot of debate whether it's
actually sort of a range. It could be 52, but we will go down
in certain periods of 2013 to 2035 to 40 operational
submarines, and I'm not that good at mathematics, but that's 8
submarines out of 48 that aren't there. That's a pretty big
chunk. That is not one or two, and I think it is raising the
risk factor, frankly, and I think we do have to get to two-a-
year much faster than we are doing. Another aspect of this
argument I would like you to comment upon is that one of the
pressures we see is the expense of these individual one-a-year
submarines--over $2 billion, but it's hard to get the
contractors down to $2 billion if they're only building one a
year. Is that something that the Navy is prepared to bring up
also, the notion of being able to get the price down by going
quicker to a two-a-year build?
Admiral Crenshaw. I think in the near-term, getting to a
two-a-year build will probably not significantly decrease the
cost. What will, I think, deliver more cost savings are the
investments that I have made in this budget--over, I think,
about $170 million or so in reducing the costs of the
submarines. There is no doubt that when we get to two a year,
there will be some benefits realized from driving the costs
down, and that is part of our cost-target calculations as we
look at that. So, submarines are interesting. The advance
procurement lines have to be laid in to buy the reactor plant,
and some of the very specific high-end items--reduction gearing
and those kinds of things early on.
In order to do that, we would need significant investments
this year to start doing that any earlier. With the CNO, we
struggle with this, trying to look at balance with all of the
warfare areas we have to deal with. Going to two a year in
fiscal year 2012 was a commitment we made. We have to get
there. We have to do that. I have put the money in to drive the
costs out, and I am continuing to look at any and all ideas I
can to reduce the cost of those things.
Senator Reed. Let me ask a final question before I turn to
the Marine Corps, your colleagues. I know Senator Lieberman and
others, Senator Dodd and myself, are interested in the follow-
on and new design, and I wonder if you could just comment upon
where we are on the new design.
Admiral Crenshaw. I mentioned the asymmetry that we have in
areas, and certainly our submarine design capabilities that we
have are one of those asymmetric advantages that we in the
United States enjoy. In my opinion, they're a national
treasure. There is nobody like them, and this is a serious
issue we have to deal with. We have a RAND study going on right
now that is going to help us work our way through that. I think
there are two pieces of this--there is the submarine design
part, and then there is the nuclear engineering part. We can
mitigate some of the nuclear engineering things by some of the
things we're doing with the aircraft carriers, but the
submarine design part is something that we have to deal with,
and we're working hard at that. I talked to Admiral Munns about
that and Admiral Walsh--he was my resource sponsor that does
that sort of thing regularly on things that we're looking at
working with the industry and working with Congress. But my
opinion is they are a national asset we're going to have to
figure out how to protect. They're not only important to the
Navy, they're important to the Nation, and we're going to have
to figure out how to deal with that.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. General Gardner, your
marines are doing a fabulous job across the globe, particularly
in Iraq and Afghanistan. I've had the occasion to go visit
them. What is their readiness status given the fact that
they're being exercised very vigorously in this global war on
terror and the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq? Do you have
any units that are C-3 or below?
General Gardner. Can you say that again?
Senator Reed. Do you have any units that are C-2, C-3?
General Gardner. Sir, the units in Iraq are at the highest
level of readiness, and we are pulling out all the stops to
ensure that that stays the same in terms of our logistic
support procedures and satisfying any urgent need requirements
that they have. We have taken risks in our homestation forces
and in some of our preposition stocks, as you are aware, to
maintain that readiness forward, and we are using our
supplemental funding request to backfill that bathtub of
readiness that has developed, if you will. We call that reset
the force. We assessed where we were with how deep was that
bathtub. We picked a point in time, October 1, and we felt our
estimate was based on about $11.7 billion that we needed to
backfill that bathtub of readiness and to recapitalize those
assets that have been so heavily used in theater. That's our
estimate of where we are, but I would say the readiness of the
troops in theater is where it needs to be and is at the highest
levels.
Senator Reed. Does the supplemental represent a complete
filling up of that bathtub, that $11.7 billion?
General Gardner. The $11.7 billion represents all that we
know--our estimate, as of October 1. It is a very detailed
estimate which we based on some pretty detailed analysis of
about 300 individual table of allowance material numbers, but
there are some limitations on how fast we can execute that.
Most of those limitations come from the size of the industrial
base, but we're confident we could execute that amount of money
in about 2 years' time. With what Congress gave us in the title
IX bridge supplemental, what we have requested in the 2006
supplemental that's over here on the Hill now we think we'll
have about $5.1 billion towards that $11.7 billion. We will be
looking for another $6.6 billion next year. Could I use some of
that $6.6 in additional money this year? Yes, we could. We
believe that we could spend about another $1.4 billion this
year. We could execute that amount, but that's probably the
extent of the amount of procurement we could actually execute
in 2006.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General Gardner. General Mattis,
end strength numbers, I know the commandant has spoken about
this, and one wrinkle is the creation of the 2,600 marines, the
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC). My understanding is
that essentially the Corps has sort of taken that out of your
hide currently because there is not an increase in end
strength. Any comment on that and just the overall end strength
situation?
General Mattis. Thank you, Senator. The 2,600 marines we
took out, some of the missions went with them. In other words,
some of these marines were on amphib ships when they deployed
before. They will still be there. Their chain of command shifts
slightly so that we have this special operations capability out
there for the commander of Special Operations Command. Some of
them are additive. We have a review group going on right now
looking at which ones we need to restore. For example, do we
need to bring some more signals intelligence marines on Active-
Duty or enlist more? I think we could move some over with this
group, reconnaissance marines, some very highly-skilled
marines. We should have a report out on this by June.
The 5,000 end strength that basically the Hill has given us
over the last several years, we can't thank you enough for
them. They have been great against the enemy. You've resourced
us sufficiently to recruit and train and equip them, and we're
looking right now at whether we have to keep at that number,
which we think we do for the current fight. But can we go down
to 175,000 and have a fully capable Marine Corps and still take
care of MARSOC and these new things that came up? I think we
can give you a very definitive answer by June. Right now, with
what you're doing, you're keeping us balanced where we want to
be. We probably don't want to go higher than that right now
because it would take an extraordinary effort on the part of
our recruiters to maintain the high quality standards we're
insisting on maintaining for reasons you're fully aware of.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent [presiding]. Thank you, Senator. I fully
agree with the point you made regarding the submarine fleet,
and I would just say that unless we can get to two a year more
quickly, I don't think we can maintain 48, and I'm not sure 48
is enough. I see the list of the 313-ship Navy, and I put
question marks next to two things--the 48 attack submarines and
the 81 surface combatants. Now, depending upon how flexible LCS
is, it's not a surface combatant, but maybe it can pick up some
of those requirements, but they are certainly not going to be
able to use them as submarines. We know that. So, I would
concur in Senator Reed's questions on that front.
General Gardner and General Mattis, I am very interested in
the distributed operations concept. I'm intrigued by it. I
wonder if you would give me an overview of how it's going to
affect future force structure requirements as well as Marine
doctrine and expeditionary force capabilities. Then, if you
would tell me how you're planning to fund it. I know you're
funding out in the fiscal year 2006 supplemental, but what are
your plans for funding it after we discontinue the
supplementals? Just share your thoughts on distributed
operations.
General Mattis. Sir, if I could take the first whack at
this as far as the requirement that we see and why we turn to
this. As you are aware, back in the 1990s, our former
commandant, Krulak, came up with the three block war. There
were many of us who doubted that he was right, but we divested
ourselves of self propelled artillery. We didn't buy the F-18 E
and F and decided to wait for the JSF. There were a number of
things going on that were based on a different view of how war
was developing. Part of that was could we distribute marines
more widely, not just geographically across the battle space,
but with skills distributed differently within those ranks that
would allow us to move against the enemy using modern
communications and joint fires to mitigate the risks that are
obvious to all of us.
The experiments have been going on. They have been very
encouraging and we just had a test unit that deployed as part
of its battalion to Afghanistan, and we had a very stressful
situation where a unit came under heavy attack. We were losing
people, killed and wounded, and this unit was able to use the
skills and the equipment they were given to reverse a very
difficult situation. The experiment basically continued when we
went into Afghanistan with a data collector observing what was
going on.
We have British Royal Marine and Australian noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) as a part of this to take advantage of the
skills that they brought from various operations overseas. What
we're finding is that the combination of very high recruiting
standards for the last 20 years and the intense combat
operations have given us one of the most capable NCO corps
we've ever seen in the Marine Corps' history, and we're known
for some pretty strong NCOs.
Right now, distributed operations is going to be an
additive capability to allow us to aggregate those marines,
distribute them, and bring them back together. The bottom line
is using various platforms--MV-22s and Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicles--we'll be able to move them in ways that will confront
the enemy with some very menacing dilemmas. I think it would be
better if I turned over the funding of this capability to
General Gardner.
General Gardner. Sir, I would say there are two aspects to
the funding of this concept, and it is a concept, and that is
the material aspects. We're pushing capabilities down to a
lower level as far as command and control capabilities, weapon
systems, and it comes to around $19 million per battalion. We
intend to outfit all 35 Active and Reserve battalions. Another
point I would like to emphasize is that we're distributing this
capability throughout the entire Marine Corps.
The other major expense would be the training aspects.
We're putting a great deal of emphasis on training in the
Marine Corps, and it is principally successful because of that
training.
So both of these costs are being paid for in supplementals
as you stated, and we have most of those costs in the 2006
supplemental and what we do not, we have in the 2007 bridge
supplemental, which you also have before you. But it's not just
the material aspects of what we're actually giving those
marines and those units, but it is also the training facilities
and the O&M costs necessary to conduct that training. Those
costs are also necessary to support this concept.
Senator Talent. Do you think you can fund it through the
supplementals?
General Gardner. Initially, we would like to get up on the
step with the supplementals. We can do that, and then we will
need to finance those to conduct that training in the ongoing
years the O&M cost out there.
Senator Talent. It's plausible to me that you could at
least take care of the material costs through the supplemental.
General Gardner. That is our intent.
Senator Talent. Admiral Crenshaw, let me go back to one
more 30,000-foot question with regard to the force structure
plans in the 313-ship Navy. The report describes that as
meeting the needs of the national military strategy with an
acceptable risk while pointing out there are capability gaps.
What are the capability gaps? What impact do you think they are
going to have and discuss a little bit how you draw the line
between acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk.
Admiral Crenshaw. If I could tackle the risk piece first,
risk is an interesting discussion. We think about that in a
couple of dimensions. The first thing is that when we begin to
talk about risk, we begin to lay out sort of a matrix, if you
will, of sort of a three-dimensional kind of cube. Put simply,
the first thing we do is, we think about the possibility of
something happening. Then we say if that were to happen, what
would be the consequences. Then we look at it in a time
dimension too. It may not happen now, but it's going to happen
in 2020.
As we look at things, we try to figure out and make some
judgments on, obviously, if this is something that's not going
to happen very much, and even if it didn't have a big impact on
us, we wouldn't look at that too much. That would sort of be
the last thing we would look at funding. We're also very
concerned about the things that may not happen very much but
could have some very catastrophic effects if they did happen.
So we have to hedge against that, and we have to look at making
sure that we have accepted only the risk necessary so that if
that were to happen, the catastrophic event is mitigated, and
it doesn't happen. There is a middle ground of things that can
happen and have various levels of effect.
That said, we kind of look at a matrix like that and then
try to think about what are things that are just absolutely
redline things that we can't do without, and we've talked about
some of those things. One is in the capability area of being
able to deliver a certain amount of presence, looking across
the spectrum of how many carriers need to be present at any
given time and how many submarines need to be present at any
given time. Then, there is this area where it doesn't happen
very much, and even if it did, there is not a big impact. There
isn't a lot of risk there. The big category in the center is
sort of that measured risk/acceptable risk category. As we
began to stack those up, we looked at things that are uniquely
naval, and those are things that only we can bring to the
fight, and that's a category where we cannot afford to take
much risk in those missions--undersea warfare being an example,
if that's ours to do.
So, I don't want to take much risk in that area because
nobody is going to do it but me. Then we begin to look at what
other capabilities are in the joint force where we may be able
to get some help from our joint partners. Those are areas where
then we work jointly with the other Services to figure out if
there are some risks we take in the Navy, depending on some of
our joint partners. One of those is in the area of some of our
tactical air forces where we're not the only Service that
delivers that. That's an area that we can explore in
coordination with the other Services to make sure that if we're
going to take some risks there, we have coordinated with the
other guys to make sure that they're not. So, it's kind of a
complementary affair there.
So, I would say those are some of the areas where you might
be able to find some of those gaps or those areas where there
is overlap and things that our joint partners do. There may be
things in the future that we might have to rely on our joint
partners to provide so that we would divest ourselves totally
of something. There are other areas where we are complementary
to them, and we would sort of back away and do that.
Senator Talent. That's a very logical assessment matrix,
and what I was thinking of when you were going through it was
applying that matrix to seabasing. I said this to Admiral Clark
when he came up with this; is the risk of not having the
seabasing capabilities worth the cost given the risk as you
have defined it? Because you have to make certain assumptions
about our inability to go through certain countries. Other
Services can do some of the power projection you want to do
through seabasing. It's an area where you can anticipate
concerns and maybe use diplomacy, and I have been skeptical. As
supportive as you all know I am of naval spending and
shipbuilding, I have wondered whether, in the context of this
budget environment, this isn't a risk that we should take, not
having this capability and then trying to prevent a situation
where we can't go through a country or using some of the other
Services. I have an ongoing concern about whether this is
something we ought to be funding.
Admiral Crenshaw. Seabasing, in my opinion, is one of those
asymmetric advantages that we enjoy. Nobody can do it like us.
I think in this uncertain world, as we look forward, our
ability to get access when and where we want it may not be as
assured as we've had in the past. General Mattis was certainly
the beneficiary of that asymmetric capability, of being able to
provide a seabase from which we didn't have to put a footprint
ashore. Sometimes, for various reasons, our friends may not
want us to be ashore, and sometimes it's difficult for us just
because they don't mind us being there, but they don't want a
large footprint ashore. So, I think seabasing is one of those
asymmetric capabilities that is worth the investment here
because it's something that only we do. It's in that category
of nobody else can do it but us. Seabasing is not new to us.
We've been doing seabasing since John Paul Jones was sailing
around. But sometimes people tend to confuse the term seabase
with the concept of seabasing.
So, I would offer up that I think it's a very important
capability. It's an evolutionary, not a revolutionary
capability. Those are not my words, those are General Mattis's
words. He was much smarter than I am to come up with that, but
it's about not having to put that whole iron mountain of things
ashore because when we do that, number one, we have to get it
there, then we have to protect it and it becomes a liability to
us. Our seabasing vision is that we're able to not have to rely
on permission or political considerations that we can go where
we want and project that power. We can first assemble our
forces at sea with the right equipment without having to go
through and get people's permission. We can then project those
forces ashore to do things.
I will admit we have not been as articulate as we could in
talking about seabasing from a joint area because it's not only
Navy and Marines. Those soldiers and airmen that are ashore eat
the same beans and shoot the same bullets, and those things can
come from the seabase without having to have a fully-developed
port infrastructure to support it and without having to have
anybody's permission. So, this is a tremendous capability for
us.
Now, one of the things we tried to do in thinking about
seabasing is realize that when we come up with something, it
can't be something that we just don't use. It has to be
something that is out and about and engaged in the global war
on terror and doing the missions in those phase-shaping things.
Many of the seabasing elements we have designed are doing just
that, taking advantage of successful designs that we already
know about that are already in production and being able to
take some of the concepts and do some evaluation of being able
to selectively offload things instead of just having to unload
everything at once.
Now, in our concept, we can now select what we need, pick
and choose, go to the supermarket and then send ashore those
elements of support and power we need. So I think it is a great
asymmetric advantage that only we can do, and we have proven--
in just the last few years, we've done it many times. I would
maybe ask General Mattis to comment.
Senator Talent. General, comment from a marine perspective.
How substantially does this reduce risk for you? How
enthusiastic are you about it?
General Mattis. Sir, we're very enthusiastic. Mr. Chairman,
although your question is very valid, and we have looked at
this amongst the officers at the table to make certain this is
going to really deliver something we need, not something we
would like to have in a less fiscally-constrained time, the
point I would make is it's an increasingly anti-access world.
As best I can determine from open sources, this city offered
$28 billion of loans and grants to Turkey for a one-time
passage of one U.S. infantry division, and Turkey, that stood
by us in Korea, lost billions, and the sanctions against
Saddam, said no. I think what we are seeing is that all
politics are local, not just in Chicago.
When we went, the admiral in 5th Fleet asked me to go into
Afghanistan, I will tell you that had I not had the seabase,
the amphib ships, those beautiful Navy greyhulls, we would
never have opened a naval ground campaign of conventional
forces in southern Afghanistan. When I went into Islamabad, it
was still early after September 11. They didn't know if we were
going to stay the course, and they were eager to hide what we
were doing. Every night when it got dark, the ships would come
in against the coast. We would land the marines across the
coast. We would have Marine KC-130s, Air Force C-17s pick them
up and fly them in. This is after the assault troops took
Rhino, the operating base there.
President Musharraf was betting his political life we were
going to be victors. At one point, he brought newsmen down to
the beach and said, ``I told you we're not supporting the
Americans.'' If they would look closely, they might have seen
the waves washing the tracks off the beach. That is all they
would have seen. I think that when you look at the cost of
this, it's a lot less than the $28 billion we offered Turkey.
It gives us the use of the sea where the Navy is sovereign and
nobody can take on the U.S. Navy there. But it does not put the
second order and third order negative effects of a large U.S.
footprint ashore in a country that may even be our friend but
cannot absorb, for local political reasons, some of the
negative aspects that come with a heavy U.S. footprint. I think
we're enthusiastic about seabasing. Now, what the seabase looks
like, we can work on that, sir.
Senator Talent. On that point, Admiral Edwards, are you
concerned about whether we have the surface combatant
capability to protect the seabase given the change, which I
think I agree with, going to ships that are going to be more
vulnerable because they are just less capable? It does seem to
me, though, that that is going to draw away a lot of your
surface combatant capabilities.
Admiral Edwards. Absolutely. We have to commit what we
would call the sea defense portion of the Seapower 21 in order
to protect the seabase, and that's in the dimension of anti-
air, which includes ballistic missiles, mine warfare, and
surface warfare to protect these. But we do that. We do that
today with the expeditionary strike groups and the other
amphibious shipping.
Senator Talent. All right. Now, you were in the middle, and
I keep making you digress, but that's because your answers are
so interesting, Admiral Crenshaw. You talked about risk, and I
also asked you about capability gaps in the future force
structure plan.
Admiral Crenshaw. I think the risk, Senator, is in terms of
capacity. We have a lot of platforms that deliver a lot of
capability. The question is, do we have the right capacity for
this, have we anticipated the right stuff? We have the right
capabilities. As we begin to do the capabilities-based
approach, we begin to realize that capacity is very important,
just like capability.
So I would say we talked about the capacity in the 48
submarines. If we had more, there would be less risk there. So
if we had more of that type of capacity, then that would retire
some of that risk. As you said, there's a range, and there's a
judgment that we have to make here. Of course, working with you
and others, hopefully we'll make our case that we have accepted
the right amount of risk across the board where it was prudent
to do so, retired risk in certain areas, for instance, in the
riverine area, where we used to do riverine in Vietnam, and we
used to have Navy patrol boats going up in the rivers. As we
looked at the monolithic Soviet Union, that was not necessarily
a capability that was one that we needed right away. We elected
to take some risk in that area. Actually, the Marine Corps sort
of took over that mission for us. Now we have realized, as we
look at the shaping of our partner nations, as we look at the
types of threats we're facing in a global war on terror and in
the long war, this is now a place where we need to reduce risk,
and we need to make some investment.
Senator Talent. How important is it for you to fund the
riverine squadrons through the 2006 supplemental?
Admiral Crenshaw. The money that is in the supplemental,
that's requesting the money that we need to outfit the first of
three squadrons we're going to have in our CONOPs. The first
thing that this first riverine squadron is going to do next
year is to relieve the Marine Corps guarding the Haditha Dam
area. The marines have been doing that, and they have been
doing it with their riverine forces. So the money that we have
requested in the supplemental does several things. It allows us
to outfit that first group that needs to start training very
soon. It allows us to give them the basic equipment they need.
It allows us to get the training done. We're going to use the
Marine Corps facilities at Lejeune and their small boat and
riverine capability to actually train those forces up. Then
they will fall in on the boats that are over there right now
with the marines. Now, that squadron will be over there for a
period of time, and we'll rotate them out.
We also have money in the supplemental to request boats so
that when the second squadron begins, the first rotation comes
out. Those boats will have been over there a long time. Some of
them have been ridden hard and put away wet. Some of them have
been shot. So we're going to need to replace and refurbish
those, and have equipment back in the States for that second
group to be able to go over to and fall in on. Then there is
the third one. So, it's very important to us in the near term
to be able to relieve the stress on the marines and take over
that mission, and this is our first step in getting back in
there. We can't do it all at once, but we're going to take this
first step, get back in the business and then ramp up from
there. The supplemental is important for us to get back in the
business, and I appreciate your support on that.
Admiral Edwards. Sir, if you look at the lead time for some
of the equipment that we're going to need to go over there, and
you back that up to when it will be available, the lead time on
some of these boats is 12 months. The lead time for the
training and equipment part is about 9 months before we're
trained and equipped and get ready to go. So, there is a lag
time which kind of puts it right into the window of this
supplemental.
Senator Talent. We're strongly supportive of the riverine
concept, and I agree with you. I think you need that money in
the supplemental. It'd be a significant impact if you had to
delay that to the regular 2007 budget.
General Mattis and General Gardner, let's talk about H-1
for a second. Now, we're covering a lot of ground. I only have
a couple more. I've been meandering back and forth between my
questions, and I appreciate your responsiveness. It's my
understanding that the third low-rate initial production (LRIP)
you want on H-1 is expected to coincide with the start of
operational evaluation, which is approximately--well, I guess
next month. We know that the program has been over budget and
behind schedule with regard to the first two LRIP lots.
Given the fact that we have cost issues and that H-1
delivery is behind schedule, why do you think you need to move
forward with the third contract at this time? I'm not saying
that it is not an important program. I'm not saying the
problems aren't going to be solved, but I just wonder, if we're
behind schedule on the first two lots, why you want to move
ahead with the third LRIP contract now.
General Gardner. Sir, the Marine Corps has no hot
production lines for its aircraft primarily the CH-46. With the
full production decision on the V-22, we now have a hot
production line for that one particular aircraft, but the LRIP
production that you're talking about for the H-1s is the only
potential that we have to replace the 17 H-1 aircraft we have
lost since September 11.
The aircraft that are over operating in theater are
operating, in the case of the UH-1, at a margin. When you are
operating in the high-altitude areas, for example, in the
Operation Enduring Freedom as they were, it's the high
altitude, the dust conditions, it is marginal to operate there.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition, Dr. Etter, is conducting a study, which is due
to report out next week, to assess the program and where it is
with the necessary restructuring. But we stand firm behind our
requirements to replace these aircraft we have lost in the war,
and we need the capability that those aircraft bring to the
fight, the light utility and the light attack. We look to the
acquisition community to provide those. We have been looking
for these replacement aircraft for over 3 years now.
Senator Talent. I understand your commitment to the
program, and I've certainly lived with and worked in programs
that have had problems. That happens once in a while, but I'm
not sure why we need to move ahead with a third when we are
behind on the first two. Take a minute and update us on I guess
what I will call the mishap with the MV-22. I know that you
haven't had time for a full investigation, but tell us where
you're at, if you would, and if you're drawing any preliminary
conclusions. We do want to stay in touch with what happened
there.
General Gardner. Sir, that incident took place just 2 days
ago, as you're aware. It was a post-maintenance functional
check evolution. It was a VMMT204, which is our training
squadron down in New River. There was some sort of engine
malfunction, and the result was severe damage to the wing and
the engine nacelle. It is under investigation.
Of course, the investigation is focused on the maintenance
activities that took place that led to the requirement to do
the functional check as well as the actions of the crew, which
we always do in this case, and we'll keep the committee
informed.
Senator Talent. Okay. I know it's early, I just wanted to
bring that one up for the record. Let me go back to you,
Admiral Crenshaw, and also Admiral Edwards, if you want to
comment on this. One of the assumptions behind the 313-ship
number is that you'll be able to extend the life of surface
combatant ships to 35 years.
Now, you said before, for example, that you're hopeful of
getting some money out of O&M accounts by reforming the way you
do that, hopeful of getting some more out of Sea Swap. But it
seems to me if you're going to try to extend service life to 35
years and also, with regard to Sea Swap, there is additional
wear and tear on the ships, that those are pressures to
increase the O&M budget.
So maybe you could tell me what your plans are for
modernization and sustainment, let's say, for the Aegis
destroyer because I think the first flight of that is going to
reach its mid-life within the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). How are you going to get to the 35 years. It would be
great if we could, and I know we stretch a point again at 30,
but I think historically, you would rather retire them after 20
or 25 years. So, this is a major leap and a major assumption,
and maybe you could fill me in on what your plans are for
getting there.
Admiral Crenshaw. Yes, sir. This is really in Mark's
category, but one thing that I think is important to know is we
have employed some new concepts on how we're doing maintenance.
Many times, the way we used to do maintenance was take
everything apart and put it back together again, regardless of
whether it was broken. So, we have been doing some more things
on condition-based maintenance to make sure we're fixing the
right things and having the dollars go to the things that it
needs to fix. The other piece of this is to get to that service
life, we need to make sure that we do have a robust investment
in our modernization program for our cruisers and our DDG
fleet. We're blessed to have a great DDG fleet. But one of
these days, it will begin to age too, just like us. We want to
make sure we have done the right preventive maintenance on it,
but we have also gone in for a checkup. I just had Lasik
surgery to get myself back up to speed here, and that's really
what we need to do to our service combatants.
Senator Talent. Did you do both eyes?
Admiral Crenshaw. Yes, sir. So far, I'm doing pretty good.
I'm in my reading mode here, but that type of investment and
the investments that we put in the hull systems of that ship
and the investments that we put into the maintenance--a classic
example is moving from a steam-driven evaporator to a reverse-
osmosis evaporator. Going to an all-electric ship and taking
steam off of those ships are all important things that allow us
to get to that service life. So, I think I'll let Mark comment
on that.
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir, very quickly. We have a
modernization program for the Aegis cruisers and for the Aegis
destroyers. There are two things that enter into that. One is
the hull, mechanical, and electrical work that you have to do
to get the ships' estimated service life out to 35 years, which
it is engineered to do as long as you do some of those
upgrades. But the reason that we have taken ships out early
historically is because of the combat systems upgrades that we
have not done. So, we didn't pace the threat.
So, the ships became obsolete and then the expense of it at
the same time to maintain. We have a program for both those
ships. 2006 is the initial funding for cruisers and we start
the actual cruiser modernization in 2007. Those that are there
are fully-funded right now. Then we have funded the hull,
mechanical, and electrical portion of the DDGs. Then we think
that we're looking at the fiscal year 2012 time frame to bring
in the combat systems, which is right about the time that we
need to pace the threat. So, this program won't happen
overnight. It will be extended over a number of years, but it
will be consistent with pacing the threat that we see and that
the DDGs and the cruisers were built to take on.
Admiral Crenshaw. If I could just add something, sir. Not
only in the modernization, but in the things we buy, looking at
the life-cycle cost of things is very important to us. As we
have looked at ways to take people out of ships, we have also
benefitted greatly from the technologies that we need to
eliminate. For instance, having to go inside of a tank and chip
paint because it's beginning to get rusty. We have invested
some money in the R&D of those tanks so that once we buy those
tanks and they are coated with an advanced coating, we don't
ever have to go in there again.
If you look at the LPD-17, although it may be an expensive
investment upfront, some of the titanium piping we're putting
in there, that piping will be there. In fact, I think we'll
probably have the ship gone, and we'll take the pipes out and
put it in another one, if we're lucky.
So investments and also looking at life-cycle cost of
things is going to be very important to us. One of the benefits
of looking at how to reduce manpower is that we have come
across some of these technologies as well. So, it's kind of a
double bang for the buck there.
Senator Talent. The picture all of this is building to me
is of a Navy that has innovatively looked at ways to make
dollars go further, and I congratulate you on that. It has made
certain assumptions, which are aggressive assumptions. To the
extent that you're betting on the ability of your people to do
things, that's a pretty good bet. I agree with you on that.
Would you agree that it does show the absolute necessity at
minimum of getting to that average $13.5 billion figure over
this program?
Admiral Crenshaw. Absolutely.
Senator Talent. If we don't have that stable, you can't
make these modernization investments, and this whole chain of
reasoning then begins to collapse.
Admiral Crenshaw. Yes, sir, we have to do that. As you
mentioned, we're not there yet. We're building up to that, and
we will get there. Part of being an average is that some years,
we'll have to be above that. We have to smartly regulate, for
instance, the procurement of airplanes and make sure we're
synchronized here. Right now, we're a little out of synch in
that we're having to procure ships at the same time we're
having to procure airplanes, and we're working as a part of
this aircraft study to try to de-synch them, if you will, and
spread the investment out.
So, you're absolutely right. It's important to us. To the
extent that we make these cost caps, that money is there. When
we don't make one of those, then we're going to have to make
some serious trades about what capability we can now afford,
and whether this means that the number is going to suffer. So,
you are right, sir, but I think we want to be aggressive on
this and get it right.
Senator Talent. We want to get it right. Even if we can do
better than $13.5 billion, we still want to get all of this
right. The culture is very important, but it certainly would
reduce that margin of risk in terms of your ability to do all
these things if you had a little margin of error in terms of
the top line on the SCN account. That's a fair statement. If we
could get that above $13.5 billion so that everything didn't
have to happen the way you are hoping it's going to happen,
that would certainly be good, wouldn't it?
Admiral Crenshaw. Yes, sir. But, it's a balance here
because I still have to worry about the aircraft procurement,
Navy accounts and the other procurement accounts as well as
these other ones, so you're right. To the extent that one takes
pressure off of the others, it increases my chances of success.
Senator Talent. I'm talking about a top-line increase,
which we were able to do in the budget resolution anyway. Now,
we have to work through the appropriations process. This is
what I say to my colleagues, if we add a little extra money on
the top line, and it turns out we didn't need to, the downside
is we spent a little extra money that it turned out we didn't
need to spend. If we don't spend the money, and it turns out we
did need to in terms of your risks, the matrix and the balloon
goes up someplace when we're not as ready as we would have
liked to be, that downside is very big.
I think Senator Reed and I were able to get an amendment
that increased the top line, and a number of us are working to
just advocate on the basis of that kind of logic with Congress
rather than make you all just get this exactly on the head of
the pin where you're trying to land it.
Let me ask--and I'm about done. I think one more, but
Senator Kennedy's concern about uparmored Humvees is well-known
in this committee, and he has been an advocate for it. It looks
like he is not going to be able to come back, and we'll
certainly submit his questions for the record. He asked that.
But let me ask you about uparmored Humvees in the Marines,
General Gardner and General Mattis, if you want to comment.
This is the Senator's question. I understand the Marines are
replacing all the Humvees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of
Africa, which are equipped with a Level II Marine Armor Kit,
add-on armor, and with factory-produced Level I uparmored
Humvees. Are all of those uparmored Humvees funded? Are you
concerned it will take until November of this year to complete
those replacements, and is there any way to speed up that
production schedule?
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, they're all funded
completely, all the way through. We should be complete in July
of this year by summer. Right now, basically we have probably
90 percent of the troops going outside the wire already in
them. We are still using the Marine Armor Kits on many of them.
But I think right now, you're going to see an entirely M1114
uparmored Humvee fleet in both Afghanistan and Iraq by
midsummer. So we're in good shape on that. We do want to buy a
few more for sustainment. We know some are going to get knocked
out and that sort of thing. So, we have more of them being
ordered. I think that probably by November we will have the
sustainment vehicles also in our inventory, but that is where
we stand right now.
General Gardner. Yes, sir, and we have worked this out with
the Army as far as their production capacity industry to share
these assets because they have an equal need.
Senator Talent. Now, just one additional point on that. I
understand there is an additional $596.8 million requirement
for armored Humvees in addition to those required in Central
Command and, including the amount funded or requested in the
2006 supplemental, there is still a $136.7 million unfunded
requirement. Is that your understanding? How are you planning
to address that unfunded requirement, and what do you think the
impact will be if that funding isn't forthcoming in fiscal year
2006 in the supplementals?
General Gardner. Sir, our approved acquisition objective is
approximately 20,000 Humvees, and we had a longstanding Humvee
program to achieve that objective. We have been able to
accelerate our Humvee procurement through the supplementals--
once you take out the attrition, of course. But all the
uparmored requirements in theater already are funded through
the supplementals we have already received. Additional money
that we have requested is to fill out that acquisition
objective.
Of course, we want to get the same kind of vehicles back
home for the troops to train in and to operate when they go
into theater.
Then also, the vehicles that we have bought that we have
put forward in our plan reset the force requirements because we
are using these vehicles at such a high rate that we need to go
ahead and buy them in advance. A vehicle that we normally plan
on lasting something on the order of 14 years is averaging
about 4. So, as we buy them now and you get the lead time, that
will be about the time to replace those that are out there. So,
we definitely need to fund all of these vehicles.
Senator Talent. We all have to understand that we all want
the armor on the Humvees, but it's not going to help increase
the life cycle of the vehicle with that extra armor on it. So,
we have to be prepared to step up and replace them as needed.
There are a few other areas I haven't touched on, but I had
planned the hearing until 5:30 p.m., and I know you gentlemen
are busy. I appreciate your time very much. I will submit a few
additional questions for the record, and I know Senator Kennedy
has many others.
Thank you for being here. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Talent
marine corps lift requirements
1. Senator Talent. Admiral Crenshaw and General Mattis, the most
current Navy/Marine Corps lift study dates to the mid-1990s, and
defines a forcible entry requirement to support three Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs)--later reduced to two and a half brigades
under fiscal constraints. The Navy's program for the past decade has
called for 36 amphibious ships organized into 12 Amphibious Ready
Groups/Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) with sufficient warfighting
capability to conduct forcible entry to provide this lift. Today's plan
reduces the force to 31 amphibious ships and 9 expeditionary groups.
Meanwhile, significant changes have occurred to the ships, assault
craft, force structure, and operating concepts since the last
definitive lift study. What is the official Navy/Marine Corps lift
requirement, and how does the Navy's future force structure plan meet
that requirement?
Admiral Crenshaw. While the last lift document signed by the
Secretary of the Navy dates back to the mid-1990s, lift requirements
have been analyzed continuously, evaluating total lift requirements for
the expeditionary force in forcible entry, as well as lesser missions
accomplished by forward presence forces. The maximum requirement for
forcible entry is 2.0 MEBs. The Marine Corps has stated the ship
configuration to lift 1.0 MEB is 5 LHD/LHAs, 5 LPDs, and 5 LSDs for a
total of 15 ships. The current shipbuilding plan will maintain the 27
ships which meet the 9 ESGs needed for forward presence capability with
4 ships for additional capacity for global war on terror missions and
warfighting forcible entry lift. Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
(MPF(F)) ships begin delivery in 2012 and the squadron achieves full
operational capability by 2018. As the MPF(F) achieves full operational
capability to lift 1.0 MEB, the amphibious ships will stabilize at an
inventory of 31 total ships capable of almost 2.0 MEB forcible entry.
Thus, the current amphibious plus MPF(F) shipbuilding plan meets the
requirements for forward presence amphibious ships in ESGs and well
above 2.0 MEBs of total forcible entry lift for major contingencies.
General Mattis. In order to support joint forcible entry operations
(JFEO), the Marine Corps shipbuilding requirement is two amphibious MEB
assault echelons (AE) plus two MPF(F) MEBs.
30 operationally available amphibious ships, of which
10 must be operationally available big-deck aviation-capable
ships to support the aviation assets of two MEB AE.
Note: operationally available--minimum amount
of ships required to conduct the mission. Availability
factors will account for ship maintenance cycles.
Minimum of 10 LPD-17s within the LPD program
to mitigate risk incurred by limiting each MEB AE to 15
amphibious ships.
Both discrete and volumetric analyses
have been conducted to load the ``2015 MEB AE''
on amphibious ships. 17 ships (5 LHD, 5 LPD-17,
5 LSD-41, 5 LSD-49) are required; however, the
Marine Corps has accepted risk with a 7-percent
reduction in MEB equipment by self limiting to
15 ships per MEB AE.
2 MPF(F) MEB squadrons or one MPF(F) squadron
plus two legacy Maritime Preposition Ship squadrons.
MPF(F) squadron will consist of 14 ships with
two types using proven amphibious hull designs: 1 LHD,
2 LHA(R), 3 T-AKE, 3 large, medium speed roll-on/roll-
off (LMSR), 3 Mobile Landing Platform ships, and 2
legacy ``densepack'' maritime prepositioning ships.
We are not ready to commit MPF(F) to forcible
entry in the assault echelon without Sea Shield without
further experimentation in the following areas:
Civilians (Merchant Mariners) crewing
MPF(F) and associated legal implications.
Survivability, preposition loading,
and continued on-load/off-load experiments,
etc.
Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) that meets the
Marine Corps requirement of ``24/7,'' all weather, long range
naval surface fires in support of amphibious operations from
the sea with continuous striking power and volume of fires out
to a range of 63 nautical miles (Threshold) to 110 nautical
miles (Objective) from ships at sea.
Background information in regards to amphibious warships
Our amphibious warships requirement is derived from a capabilities
based assessment. Based on the Strategic Planning Guidance and the
National Defense Strategy, the current force-sizing construct requires
the capability to respond to two swiftly defeat the efforts (SDTE)--
each of which requiring a MEB size force. One of these crises may
become a decisively defeat campaign, bringing our most powerful force,
the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), to bear, for highly capable,
lethal, mobile and sustained operations. Both discrete and volumetric
analyses have been conducted to load the ``2015 MEB AE'' on amphibious
ships. 17 amphibious warships (5 LHD, 5 LPD-17, 5 LSD-41, and 2 LSD-49)
are required. To keep demand on the Navy to an absolute minimum, we
have self-limited each MEB AE to 15 ships, accepting a 7-percent loss
in MEB equipment. The 7 percent loss in MEB equipment will be
transported via assault follow-on echelon shipping.
In support of our joint forcible entry operations requirements, we
assess the Navy's 30 year shipbuilding plan (for amphibious warships)
as moderate risk trending toward high due to the LPD-17 San Antonio
class ship production ending at nine ships, and also concerns regarding
the historical ability to generate operationally available ships. We
have grave/significant concern with meeting our joint forcible entry
requirements with fewer than 10 LPD-17 San Antonio class ships. With
the 10th LPD-17 as one of the 30 operationally available amphibious
warships, the moderate risk will trend towards low in our Navy's
ability to carry, launch, and land marines on hostile shores. Vehicle
stowage, well deck, and aviation support capabilities provided by the
LPD-17 are critical to joint forcible entry operations and providing
the required lift for the 2015 MEB. In addition, the LPD-17s are great
platforms to support the global war on terrorism. Regarding ship
operational availability, we note that OPNAV Notice 4700
(Representative Intervals, Durations, Maintenance Cycles, and Repair
Man-days for DEPOT Level Maintenance Availabilities for USN Ships)
dated 13 June 2005, reflects that 10-15 percent of ships (by class) are
operationally unavailable at any time due to scheduled maintenance.
Therefore, while OPNAV Notice 4700 would suggest that 34 amphibious
warships are required to maintain 30 operationally available amphibious
warships, we take seriously the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
commitment to provide the requisite 30 amphibious warships to embark
sufficient combat power.
2. Senator Talent. Admiral Crenshaw and General Mattis, what is the
Department's plan to conduct an updated lift study and define forcible
entry requirements for the expeditionary force?
Admiral Crenshaw. The Department of the Navy (DON) Lift II study
was updated in 2002 from a threat-based requirements study to a
capabilities-based study that includes future program (Landing Craft
Air Cushion (LCAC) service life extension program (SLEP), MV-22, Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF)) for MEB AE lift. The Department currently has no
plan to further update the DON Lift Study. As we assess current and
projected operational requirements for AE lift, Navy believes that the
requirements, as stated pursuant to the DON Lift II report update, have
not changed.
General Mattis. Building upon the DON Lift II study, the Navy and
Marine Corps are jointly conducting a seabasing capabilities study to:
1. Inform U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) force
structure and force posture requirements for seabasing based
upon Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 08 force structure
decisions, and identify necessary supporting requirements
through the 2024 timeframe.
2. Inform USMC and USN POM decisions on force development and
investment regarding seabasing well beyond the Future Years
Defense Program (up through the 2024 timeframe).
3. Integrate joint capabilities and requirements, where
applicable, identified in the seabasing joint integrating
concept (JIC) capabilities-based assessment process.
This study will be conducted within the context of OA-06, the
seabasing JIC, and other related studies/concepts, and will be based
initially on a designated force structure and posture for amphibious
and prepositioning ships through 2024. After analysis of the baseline
force structure and posture, the study will explore alternative force
postures, concepts of operations (CONOPs), and other possible solutions
to address the gaps or excesses, within the constraints of the baseline
force structure.
Based on the Strategic Planning Guidance and the National Defense
Strategy, the current force-sizing construct requires the capability to
respond to two SDTE; each of which requires a MEB size force. One of
these crises may become a decisively defeat campaign, bringing our most
powerful force, the MEF, to bear, for highly capable, lethal, mobile,
and sustained operations.
Using the above as the requirement, the seabasing capabilities
study will generate the shipping mix required.
seabasing
3. Senator Talent. Admiral Crenshaw and General Mattis, the seabase
has long been an element of the Navy's SeaPower 21 vision, but new
capabilities associated with seabasing have lacked sufficient
definition to gain traction in the budget. In the course of the past
year, the concepts for the MPF(F) ships that contribute to the seabase
have changed significantly, emerging in this Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP) as a centerpiece of the future force.
Previous concerns have been raised regarding vulnerabilities of the
seabase. Crewing concepts (military or civilian), stand-off distances
from hostile shores, warfighting capabilities of the seabase ships, and
the makeup of escorting ships are all factors in the calculus for
ensuring protection of the large force of marines and their equipment
deploying from the seabase. Will you please provide the current concept
of operations for the seabase, the current concepts for the unique
capabilities of the seabase, and how these capabilities will be
employed and safeguarded in a hostile environment?
Admiral Crenshaw. When a regional combatant commander needs
seabased forces, naval presence forces are gathered to provide early
response and battle-space shaping. Forward deployed carrier strike
groups (CSGs) and expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) provide early sea
strike and sea shield capabilities to establish maritime domain
security. Joint and coalition forces, working with naval strike forces,
begin shaping the land battlespace and attrite hostile defensive forces
and eliminate air, cruise missile, and surface craft threats to the
seabase. Sea shield forces gather to eliminate the mine and submarine
threats to the seabase. In parallel, additional sea strike and sea
shield forces surge to the operational area to increase capabilities.
Forces flow to prepositioned assets to activate additional seabase
platforms like the MPF(F).
Once the joint shaping is completed and maritime domain superiority
is established, Marine and Army forces can conduct joint forcible entry
operations (JFEO) through the seabase to establish a land lodgement and
complete decisive land actions. Seabase ships, protected by naval and
joint assets, establish and maintain continuing logistics support for
forces both ashore and in the seabase.
The seabase is an operational collection of capabilities, including
those in CSGs, ESGs, MPF(F) squadrons, Army prepositioned ships, and
logistic support ships. The capabilities of CSGs and ESGs exist today
and are well understood. The new seabase concept is significantly
enhanced by the assault and sustainment capabilities inherent in the
MPF(F) ships, and the logistic throughput capabilities of next
generation connector platforms like the Joint High Speed Vessels.
MPF(F), along with strategic airlift, allow significant forces to
rapidly close the seabase operational area and complete arrival and
assembly operations afloat. Assault forces are quickly readied for
operations, due to the selective offload capability of MPF(F) ships,
and initial air and surface assault waves are prepared for landing and
subsequent operations ashore. The design of the MPF(F) squadron allows
initial surface assault waves to be accommodated on three of the 14
seabase ships (the 3 Mobile Landing Platforms (MLPs)) reducing the size
of the force protection requirements for MPF(F) ships in the inner sea
operations area. Remaining seabase ships remain in a more secure, but
still defended outer sea echelon area.
Once the initial landings are complete and operations ashore
commence, the logistics storage and throughput capabilities of the
MPF(F) squadron allow a continuous logistics supply chain to be
maintained from theater sources to and through the seabase to all joint
forces afloat and ashore.
The inherent sea shield capabilities resident with the ESG and CSG
forces provide an initial force protection capability. Joint and
coalition forces join with naval strike assets to degrade the hostile
force capabilities, and attrite threats to the seabase. Additional sea
shield and sea strike forces surge to the area of operations to augment
the early arriving forces and establish air and sea superiority
necessary to allow penetration of forcible entry forces, including MEBs
and Army combat brigades.
The new naval sea shield platforms, including Littoral Combat Ships
(LCS) with anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and mine
warfare capabilities; along with current and planned cruiser-destroyer
and submarine force capabilities in anti-air warfare and ASW are
sufficient to reduce or eliminate the threats to less robust seabase
ships that arrive to enable the new seabasing capabilities.
The MPF(F) squadron is composed of six different types of seabased
ships. By design, many of these ships do not need to approach the
hostile shore, but can remain in a protected outer sea echelon area to
accomplish their mission. Navy analysis of overall sea shield
capabilities indicates protection for the four to six MPF(F) ships that
may need to close to an inner sea operations area overmatches any
residual threat after the battlespace preparations are completed.
General Mattis. The current concept for seabasing is resident in
the 2005 Seabasing Joint Intergrating Concept (JIC) version 1.0.
Additional detailed seabasing concepts of operations covering major
combat operations, counterinsurgency operations, and humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief operations are available in the classified
annex to the seabasing HC. Seabasing offers the Joint Force Commander
with a national capability of at sea arrival and assembly, selective
offload of tailored capabilities, seabased sustainment of the Marine
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) ashore, and the reconstitution and
deployment of the MAGTF for follow-on missions. The seabase will
provide significant operational advantages in high threat, austere,
anti-access environments and offer the Joint Force Commander the
greatest flexibility in conducting the full range of military
operations.
From the onset of a crisis through the completion of stabilization
operations, seabasing offers commanders additional options to close,
assemble, employ, and sustain joint forces. Seabasing provides the
flexibility to rapidly and effectively build and integrate joint
capabilities with minimal or no access to nearby land bases. It enables
joint force access and enhances power projection by complementing
existing basing. When the political situation restricts or denies
basing, overflight, or U.S. presence, seabasing leverages forward
presence to provide early availability of joint combat power to exploit
unpredictable points of entry, even in austere environments. Exploiting
opportunities created by maritime superiority and the sovereign freedom
of operating from international waters, seabasing allows commanders to
expand the joint maneuver space seaward. Through the protection
provided by maneuvering platforms under a defensive shield, seabasing
provides the opportunity to retain support functions (e. g.
sustainment, fire support, medical, maintenance) at sea and reduces the
need for the build-up of a large vulnerable support infrastructure
ashore, particularly during the early stages of combat operations.
The foundation of seabasing is the seabase, an inherently
maneuverable, scalable aggregation of distributed, networked platforms
and organizations, capable of receiving deploying forces and supporting
the employment of those forces. The capacity and capability of the
seabase could increase over time as more platforms arrive in the
operating area.
Joint forces rapidly close by a combination of means to the
seabase, or locations in the objective area, where they organize for
operations. These forces then project combat power ashore from the
seabase. The seabase continues to support those forces during
operations ashore.
Joint forces deploy directly from global locations to the seabase
using high-speed inter- and intra-theater connectors (air/surface)
where they join forward-deployed and prepositioned assets. Some
deploying forces could link up with seabase platforms while enroute to
the objective area. The joint forces assemble and organize at the
seabase. Combinations of surface and air connector systems transfer
assets among the platforms of the seabase as the force organizes for
its mission.
seabased and global assets perform integrated force protection. The
seabased portion of that protection is provided by assets organic to
the seabase. These forces include surface combatants, submarines,
aircraft, and air and missile defenses as well as assets organic to
forces assembling at the seabase.
Forces maneuver from the seabase to operational depths ashore using
a combination of air and surface means in austere environments.
Depending on the situation, forces may continue to operate from the
seabase, operating ashore only long enough to perform specific missions
before returning to the seabase. As forces flow ashore, additional
forces may deploy to the seabase as part of a continuous build-up of
combat power. Seabasing operations may open additional early entry
points for rapid continued build-up of forces ashore.
Throughout a campaign, seabasing provides persistent joint
logistics to ensure continuous sustainment of select forces afloat and
ashore. Seabasing capabilities that support projection and sustainment
of joint combat power can also be used to recover, reconstitute, and
redeploy select joint forces for further employment.
4. Senator Talent. Admiral Crenshaw and General Mattis, what are
the principal risks you must retire, or new technologies and
capabilities which must be developed, in order to operate from the
seabase?
Admiral Crenshaw. The sea offers security and sovereign freedom of
action for our Nation's forces. Our ability to operate from a seabase
and to project and sustain operational forces from over the horizon
contributes greatly to national security. However, seabase operations
present unique technological challenges that must be fully addressed
before our Nation can maximize our seabasing capabilities. Specific
risk areas that must be addressed are: at-sea transfer of heavy cargo,
advanced cargo handling systems, in-transit visibility/total asset
visibility, en route collaborative planning and virtual rehearsal,
automated warehousing, and selective offload. A number of our programs
of record have made significant progress in researching and developing
these technologies. Inroads have been laid with skin-to-skin ship
operations, landing platform technologies, and advanced cargo handling.
The sea, influenced by geographic location, season, and weather, is
a challenging environment. Sea states will vary and remain
unpredictable, necessitating our ability to operate in a range of
conditions. Our ships must be capable of skin-to-skin operations
through sea state 4, permitting large-scale receipt and transfer of
personnel, equipment, and supplies. This enables assembly of
operationally significant forces at the seabase supporting a joint
operational area, without reliance on land bases.
A principal risk to operating from the seabase is transferring
personnel, cargo, and equipment in a challenging maritime environment.
Skin-to-skin transfer, to include ramp systems, ship motion mitigation,
crane pendulation control, and fendering systems, is a key enabler to
personnel, cargo, and equipment transfer and requires system validation
through sea state 4.
Another risk associated with seabase operations is selective
offload, which includes our ability to efficiently stow, select,
retrieve, and issue equipment and supplies from various ships at sea.
Systems are being developed to improve handling, stowage, selectivity,
and throughput of cargo onboard ship. Automation, such as the Automated
Stowage and Retrieval System, will improve selective offload and
assembly operations and has promise to decrease deployment and
sustainment timelines.
We are making tremendous progress with evolving technological
challenges. Our research and development (R&D) programs are on track
and continue to fully support scheduled programs. For example, within
the MPF(F) program, we are developing and validating systems and
procedures to enable these technologies on these platforms. Tests were
conducted in fiscal year 2005 to demonstrate skin-to-skin capabilities
between an LMSR and a float-on/float-off ship as a surrogate for the
MLP. Skin-to-skin operations were successfully conducted in sea
conditions up to sea state 3. LCAC and other surface craft were able to
interface with the MLP surrogate in sea state 3 conditions. Fiscal year
2006 testing will incorporate our lessons learned in fiscal year 2005,
as we continue to mitigate these collective risks, while we explore new
systems that permit skin-to-skin transfer and operations in
progressively higher sea states.
General Mattis. Our great Navy has been conducting elements of
seabasing since the founding of our Nation. Seabasing is not a
revolutionary concept but rather an evolutionary concept. Tomorrow's
MPF(F) offers the Joint Force Commander a national capability of at-sea
arrival and assembly, selective offload of tailored capabilities,
seabased sustainment of the MAGTF ashore, and the reconstitution and
deployment of the MAGTF for follow-on missions. MPF(F) will provide
significant operational advantages in high threat, austere, anti-access
environments and offer the Joint Force Commander the greatest
flexibility in conducting the full range of military operations. In
order to fully implement seabasing in support of joint forcible entry
operations, the following risk areas require further development and
experimentation:
Layered sea shield force protection
Amphibious command and control (C2) platforms,
process, and command relationships
Sufficient ``intra'' and ``inter'' high speed sea lift
Technology advancement in
Sea state 3 to 4 ramp development for vehicle transfer
Motion mitigation systems to reduce ship movement
Motion mitigation for cargo handling operations (gyro-
stabilized cranes)
Fendering technologies; including dynamic positioning
systems
Personnel transfer systems
Automated storage and retrieval systems
Continued investment in assault connectors
(Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), LCAC(X), etc.)
Lesson's learned from the prior years' experiments with platforms,
such as the LMSR and the float-on/float-off vessels, are used in the
development process. The efforts to date have been extremely
encouraging in that the seabasing concept as supported by MPF(F)
appears technically feasible. Much of the effort will leverage existing
technology (such as a float-on/float-off vessel), but use it in
innovative ways.
5. Senator Talent. Admiral Crenshaw and General Mattis, how do you
rank this capability amongst competing priorities; recognizing that the
increasingly significant investment in the seabase comes to some extent
at the expense of allowing gaps to form in submarine, surface
combatant, and expeditionary strike capabilities?
Admiral Crenshaw. The future Navy will remain seabased, with global
speed and persistence provided by forward deployed forces, supplemented
by rapidly deployable forces through the Fleet Response Plan (FRP). The
MPF(F) Squadron is only one part of the transformational seabasing
capability as defined in the Seabasing JIC. Aircraft carriers,
submarines, amphibious surface combatants, and logistics ships all
contribute to this transformational capability and shape our Navy to
meet current and emerging security responsibilities. The CNO has
developed a shipbuilding plan that balances several factors to include
operational requirements, affordability, and the ability of the
industrial base to execute the plan. The force structure as defined in
the ``Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of
Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2007'' was developed using a capability-
based approach and anticipated threats for the fiscal year 2020 time
period. This balanced approach builds the Navy the Nation needs--a Navy
that is both affordable and meets the future national security
requirements outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) with
acceptable risk. Force structure requirements were developed and
validated through detailed joint campaign and mission level analysis,
optimized through innovative sourcing initiatives (FRP, Sea Swap,
forward posturing) that increase platform operational availability,
balanced with shipbuilding industrial base requirements.
General Mattis. Our blue water Navy remains uncontested due to the
balance of investments across all type ships. Recent history has proved
that our Nation will require continued investment in our Navy's
amphibious force offering significant operational advantages in high-
threat, austere, anti-access environments and offer the Joint Force
Commander the greatest flexibility in conducting the full range of
military operations. The future seabase will center around the MPF(F),
and will offer the Joint Force Commander a national capability of at-
sea arrival and assembly, selective offload of tailored capabilities,
seabased sustainment of the MAGTF ashore, and the reconstitution and
deployment of the MAGTF for follow-on missions. The MPF(F) offsets the
lack of sufficient strategic air and sea lift by having vital combat
power prepositioned afloat and ready to employ. The MPF(F) Squadron is
only one part of the transformational seabasing capability as defined
in the Seabasing JIC. Aircraft carriers, submarines, amphibious surface
combatants, and logistics ships all contribute to this transformational
capability and shape our Navy to meet current and emerging security
responsibilities. America's ability to use international seas and
waterways, as both maneuver space and an operating base unconstrained
by foreign veto, allows our naval forces to project combat power into
the littoral regions which contain more than half the world's
population and more than 75 percent of its major urban areas.
The strategic guidance and recent operational experience has
institutionalized a shift in Marine Corps capability development.
Amphibious capability and capacity represent key operational
requirements to translate our dominance of the sea into relevant power
and influence ashore. The ability to project credible joint combat
power landward without fixed, vulnerable infrastructure concerns gives
the Nation the ability to gain access at a time and place of our
choice. These forces provide unparalleled flexibility to both political
leaders and Joint Force Commanders. Historically, forcible entry
capacity, based on a major combat contingency, was the primary
consideration in determining the total amphibious lift requirement. In
the new security era, the rotational requirements of maintaining
forward postured forces may have equal, and perhaps even greater,
significance in determining amphibious requirements.
forward-basing attack submarines in guam
6. Senator Talent. Admiral Crenshaw, today, the Navy has three
attack submarines forward-based in Guam. In conjunction with the Navy's
recent announcement that it will focus 60 percent of the attack
submarine force on operations in the Pacific, the force structure study
makes aggressive assumptions that the number of attack submarines to be
forward-based in Guam will be significantly increased. This increase to
forward-basing allows for a reduction to today's submarine force
without sacrificing operational effectiveness of the force.
Alternatively, if the Navy is unable to execute these forward-basing
assumptions, the future submarine force will be under-sized.
Recognizing the importance of the forward-basing decision on the attack
submarine force's size and effectiveness, what is the Navy's plan for
basing additional attack submarines in Guam?
Admiral Crenshaw. The Navy plans to homeport three attack
submarines in Guam. There are presently two ships (U.S.S. City of
Corpus Christi (SSN 705) and U.S.S. Houston (SSN 713)) homeported in
Guam. U.S.S. Buffalo (SSN 715) will arrive in fiscal year 2007 as the
third homeported ship. The Navy's Force Structure Assessment assumed
three ships were homeported in Guam and three are sufficient to meet
both warfighting and peacetime presence requirements.
7. Senator Talent. Admiral Crenshaw, what assessments are being
conducted to address vulnerabilities, facilities, and quality of
service to support additional forward-based submarines?
Admiral Crenshaw. We are in the process of developing a Global
Submarine Infrastructure Plan (GSIP). This plan incorporates QDR
guidance and future force structure plans. The GSIP addresses
facilities, force protection, and quality of service for the submarine
force worldwide. All submarine homeports, ports of call, maintenance
and repair facilities, and crew swap locations are included in the
plan. The GSIP will enable us to guide our submarine force ashore
infrastructure investment both at home and at forward bases for years
to come.
dd(x) destroyer and naval surface fire support
8. Senator Talent. Admiral Crenshaw and General Mattis, the DD(X)
program was initiated to fill the capability gap for naval surface fire
support. The original requirement for 24-32 DD(X) ships, each with 2-
155mm Advanced Gun Systems, was reduced to 12 ships, and then 10 ships
in prior years, and is further reduced to 7 ships in the fiscal year
2007 budget. What has changed in the analysis of requirements and
capabilities that allows the 7-ship DD(X) class to meet the mission
originally envisioned for 24-32 ships?
Admiral Crenshaw. DD(X), recently renamed DDG-1000, will fill the
capability gap in naval surface fire support with its Advanced Gun
System (AGS). As part of the development of the fiscal year 2007
budget, the Navy staff conducted a comprehensive review of joint
warfighting demands through the 2020 time frame and the associated
capability and capacity requirements. The Navy conducted extensive
campaign analysis, against a wide spectrum of potential threats, to
determine the sufficient mix of capabilities required to successfully
defeat the threats. This demand was coupled with the routine, day-to-
day operational demand for forces and other factors such as
maintenance, training, and quality of life to develop an overall
minimum force structure requirement. For DD(X), this corresponded to
seven total ships.
Currently, DD(X) is expected to operate exclusively as part of the
ESG typically comprised of an LHA/LHD, an LPD, an LSD, and two to three
surface combatants. In previous years, the Navy planned on operating 12
ESGs, each with 2 DD(X). The analysis conducted as part of the fiscal
year 2007 budget cycle indicates that nine ESGs, when coupled with an
MPF(F) squadron, are sufficient to meet joint demands as depicted in
the QDR with minimal risk. Additionally, analysis of the NSFS demand in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Joint Staff approved
planning scenarios showed one vice two DD(X) per ESG as sufficient.
The combination of these changes in demands for DD(X) reduced the
minimum requirement to seven ships. Seven DD(X) Zumwalt class ships are
sufficient to provide each forward deployed ESG (including the Forward
Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) ESG) with a DD(X) while maintaining
sufficient surge capacity to meet NSFS requirements to support joint
forcible entry demands for amphibious operations in a conventional
campaign.
General Mattis. The Marine Corps analysis of requirements and
capabilities for the DD(X), as the planned second phase of the NSFS
roadmap, has not changed. DD(X), in conjunction with the DDG's Extended
Range Guided Munition (ERGM) fires, is a program of record planned to
satisfy the Marine Corps' NSFS requirements. With two 155mm AGS and 600
Long Range Land Attack Projectiles per ship capable of engaging targets
with precision accuracy in excess of 63nm (threshold), the DD(X)
provides the range, lethality, and volume to address a larger piece of
the target set, complementing the DDG's NSFS capabilities. DD(X)
provides our first integrated, seabased counter-fire capability. In
addition to its powerful sea strike capability, DD(X) will also provide
significant capability as a sea shield asset for the seabase.
Supporting analysis for the 24 ship requirement is contained in the
2002 DD(X) Spiral Design Review, and is consistent with the DD(X)
operational requirements document validated in 2004. Given the current
fiscal environment, we have accepted risk with fewer DD(X)s which will
result in some unaddressed targets and increased time to accomplish the
mission during a forcible entry scenario.
The Marine Corps believes strongly that the Navy is on the right
track for delivering an effective NSFS capability. We have 230 years of
common interest in this area and know that the transformational
technology the Navy is developing will make NSFS relevant and vital to
our concepts for conducting expeditionary maneuver warfare in the
future. Our operational lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan emphasize the
value of volume and precision fires. The same can be said for detecting
enemy indirect fire weapons.
9. Senator Talent. Admiral Crenshaw, what new assumptions are being
introduced in the way the Navy plans to operate DD(X) to meet this
mission?
Admiral Crenshaw. DD(X), recently designated as DDG 1000, will
operate in the same manner as the Navy's other surface combatants in
terms of how it deploys, how frequently it deploys, and where it
deploys. Currently, DD(X) is expected to operate in support of the
combatant commanders' naval force presence requirements as part of the
ESG, typically comprised of an LHA/LHD, an LPD, an LSD, and two to
three surface combatants. The change in total ship requirements stemmed
from analysis of the joint demand for DD(X)'s transformational
operational capabilities, not a change in assumptions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
dd(x) land attack destroyer and fire support requirements
10. Senator Kennedy. General Gardner, the DD(X) land attack
destroyer is being built largely to support shore fire support
requirements. Originally, the Marine Corps said that they needed to
have a firing rate from the DD(X) guns of 12 rounds per minute. Since
then, the Navy changed the design to have a capability of firing 10
rounds per minute. Now the Navy has announced that they only intend to
buy seven ships, rather than a much larger number of DD(X) destroyers.
Does this reduced DD(X) program meet the Marine Corps' requirements?
General Gardner. The Marine Corps analysis of requirements and
capabilities for the DD(X), as the planned second phase of the NSFS
roadmap, has not changed. DD(X), in conjunction with the DDG's ERGM
fires, is a program of record planned to satisfy the Marine Corps' NSFS
requirements. With two 155mm AGS and 600 Long-Range Land Attack
Projectiles per ship capable of engaging targets with precision
accuracy in excess of 63nm (threshold), the DD(X) provides the range,
lethality, and volume to address a larger piece of the target set,
complementing the DDG's NSFS capabilities. DD(X) provides our first
integrated, seabased counter-fire capability. In addition to its
powerful sea strike capability, DD(X) will also provide significant
capability as a sea shield asset for the seabase. Supporting analysis
for the 24 ship requirement is contained in the 2002 DD(X) spiral
design review, and is consistent with the DD(X) operational
requirements document validated in 2004. Given the current fiscal
environment, we have accepted risk with fewer DD(X)s which will result
in some unaddressed targets and increased time to accomplish the
mission during a forcible entry scenario. The Marine Corps accepted the
DD(X)'s reduced firing rate from 12 to 10 rounds per minute, since the
change in rate of fire does not affect the average number of kills
(rounds) per magazine, a more important aspect of a NSFS capability.
The Marine Corps believes strongly that the Navy is on the right
track for delivering an effective NSFS capability. We have 230 years of
common interest in this area and know that the transformational
technology the Navy is developing will make NSFS relevant and vital to
our concepts for conducting expeditionary maneuver warfare in the
future. Our operational lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan emphasize the
value of volume and precision fires. The same can be said for detecting
enemy indirect fire weapons.
11. Senator Kennedy. General Gardner, are there other measures that
the Department of the Navy should be taking to compensate for this
change?
General Gardner. Recommendations for measures to compensate for the
fiscal year 2007 DD(X) capability reductions are:
Reinstatement of the auxiliary convertible magazine on
DD(X). This increases the magazine capacity of the ship by 35
percent, and reduces resupply requirements. The auxiliary
magazine capability would provide an additional 320 round
capacity at a cost of roughly $19 million on the lead ship, and
is at the top of the buyback list.
Acceleration of the ERGM initial operational
capability (IOC) or providing more rounds and ships available
to fire ERGM at the currently planned IOC of fiscal year 2011.
Continued development of electromagnetic launch as a
science and tecnhology (S&T) long-term capability.
Incorporating a NSFS capability into all future
planned surface combatants to maximize return on investment of
AGS technology and enhance flexibility of the force.
The Marine Corps believes strongly that the Navy is on the right
track for delivering an effective NSFS capability. We have 230 years of
common interest in this area and know that the transformational
technology the Navy is developing will make NSFS relevant and vital to
our concepts for conducting expeditionary maneuver warfare in the
future. Our operational lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan emphasize the
value of volume and precision fires. The same can be said for detecting
enemy indirect fire weapons.
Background information on the NSFS plan/DD(X) program is provided
below:
The Marine Corps analysis of requirements and capabilities
for the DD(X), as the planned second phase of the NSFS roadmap,
has not changed. DD(X), in conjunction with the DDG's ERGM
fires, is a program of record planned to satisfy the Marine
Corps' NSFS requirements. With two 155mm AGS and 600 Long Range
Land Attack Projectiles per ship capable of engaging targets
with precision accuracy in excess of 63nm (threshold), the
DD(X) provides the range, lethality, and volume to address a
larger piece of the target set, complementing the DDG's NSFS
capabilities. DD(X) provides our first integrated, seabased
counter-fire capability. In addition to its powerful sea strike
capability, DD(X) will also provide significant capability as a
sea shield asset for the seabase. Supporting analysis for the
24-ship requirement is contained in the 2002 DD(X) spiral
design review, and is consistent with the DD(X) operational
requirements document validated in 2004. Given the current
fiscal environment, we have accepted risk with fewer DD(X)s
which will result in some unaddressed targets and increased
time to accomplish the mission during a forcible entry
scenario. The Marine Corps accepted the DD(X)'s reduced firing
rate, from 12 to 10 rounds per minute, since the change in rate
of fire does not affect the average number of kills (rounds)
per magazine, a more important aspect of a NSFS capability.
mine warfare capability
12. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Crenshaw, this subcommittee has had a
longstanding interest in the Navy's mine countermeasures programs. I
understand the Navy is moving its mine warfare capability from
minesweepers and minehunters to the LCS. I understand there are some
problems with the remote minehunting system that would be used as a
central part of the LCS mine warfare module. How is that effort going,
and how are the other parts of the LCS mine warfare system progressing?
Admiral Crenshaw. The Remote Minehunting System program has
required extra effort within the last year to improve the overall
reliability of the system. Recent at-sea testing demonstrated
significant progress toward resolving reliability issues. The extra
effort has resulted in an additional development cost of $31 million
during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Additionally, fiscal year 2006
procurement has been reduced from eight to four vehicles in order to
allow us to request the reprogramming of the other $28 million within
the Remote Minehunting System program. Also, due to the additional
development efforts needed to improve reliability, the program's
schedule has been reworked, and a full-rate production decision will be
delayed by about 1 year. However, the new schedule still meets our
commitment to deploy from a destroyer in 2007, as stated in the fiscal
year 2007 U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures Plan. The program will also
be able to support the planned delivery to the LCS mine warfare mission
module in 2007.
Current AN/AQS-20A Sonar Mine Detecting Set testing is focused on
the integration of the AN/AQS-20A with the MH-60S helicopter in
preparation for developmental and operational testing in fiscal year
2007. The testing program continues to overcome challenges to its
schedule (weather delays, additional aircraft instrumentation,
integration modifications) however, the program remains on track to
support LCS with an AN/AQS-20A system and flight crew during the
initial deployment.
The Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) is receiving
additional effort to fully demonstrate one of its critical capabilities
during Operational Testing. Recently, the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition approved a re-baselined
schedule that provides the additional time and funding needed to
incorporate more capable components and software into the system. The
additional required development will cause a 1-year delay, pushing the
full-rate production decision to the end of 2008. However, the revised
schedule ensures one unit will be available for LCS when required.
Development costs have increased by approximately $21.6 million and
will be offset by a reduction in the number of ALMDS units procured in
fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Units used for the offset will be procured
in fiscal years 2011 and 2012.
The Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep program is
conducting contractor testing with efforts focused on improving towed
dynamic stability. Alternative platform testing on the MH-53E
helicopter is scheduled to begin in May 2006 with initial MH-60S
flight-testing beginning in December 2006.
The Airborne Mine Neutralization System program completed
neutralizer tank testing in December 2005. The program will conduct
open-ocean testing and alternative platform flight-testing at the end
of 2006, followed by MH-60S testing in 2007.
The Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) program is
developing the initial prototype. The program has seen recent
advancements such as the completion of the complex laser targeting
gimbal. RAMICS does not begin testing on the MH-60S until the end of
2008.
riverine capability
13. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Edwards, I've been reading about the
riverine capability the Navy is developing. When the Army and Marine
Corps moved into Iraq, they failed to take heed of many lessons about
personnel protective equipment. As the Navy takes over the river
missions the marines are doing in Iraq, what will you be doing to
ensure the sailors are properly prepared?
Admiral Edwards. The Navy intends to ensure our sailors are
properly equipped with the most advanced protective measures prior to
taking over river missions from the marines in Iraq. These measures
will include providing each deploying sailor with the best available
(Interceptor) body armor with Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) and
equivalent head protection, rated at no less than National Institute of
Justice (NIJ) Level III. These measures are capable of defeating 7.62mm
X 39 AK-47 rounds. Riverine craft crewmen and boarding teams will also
be equipped with flotation systems integrated with individual body
armor systems. Additionally, each sailor will be equipped with full
sets of individual protective equipment (IPE) that protects against
possible chemical, biological, or radiological attack. Every deployable
tactical vehicle assigned to each riverine squadron will be armored to
the standard mandated by Commander, U.S. Central Command for Operation
Iraqi Freedom, which will be at level I (factory installed) or level II
(post-delivery installation) standard. Tactical vehicles will also be
equipped with appropriate improvised explosive device (IED) electronic
countermeasures (ECM) systems. Riverine craft initially provided by the
marines and later organic to deploying Riverine Squadrons will be
armored to a standard no less than NIJ level III and will also be
equipped with IED ECM systems. Craft will also be equipped with high
resolution/high magnification day/night mast-mounted imaging systems,
complemented by personal and weapons mounted visual augmentation
systems that will provide significantly enhanced tactical situational
awareness.
seabasing
14. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Crenshaw, a central theme in the
Navy's future capabilities is intended to be seabasing. We are very
familiar with the previous Marine Corps discussions of ``Operational
Maneuver from the Sea'' and ``Ship to Objective Maneuver.'' We know
that the Department has decided on a seabasing concept, which you call
the MPF(F), that departs from previous discussions of such concepts as
mobile offshore basing. This new concept involves having a squadron of
14 ships using some existing ship designs, as well as some new designs.
As I understand it, with this new concept, you would have the
capability to support one or two Marine Corps or Army brigades ashore.
How much do you believe that the MPF(F) squadron will cost?
Admiral Crenshaw. The Navy has determined that the one MPF(F)
squadron of 14 ships will cost on average approximately $12.3 billion
of new ship construction dollars. The composition of the 14 ships
squadron includes two existing dense pack cargo ships, which will not
require procurement dollars. MPF(F) is not the seabasing concept,
rather it is a key enabler of seabasing. This squadron will accommodate
one joint forcible entry operations capable MEB. It is also being
designed to support the flow-through of sustainment for an additional
Marine or Army brigade.
15. Senator Kennedy. General Mattis, I understand that the Marine
Corps would like at least one, and perhaps two, of these MPF(F)
squadrons. How would these squadrons count toward your requirement to
have 30 ships operationally available?
General Mattis. In order to support JFEO, the Marine Corps
shipbuilding requirement is two amphibious MEBs AE plus two MPF(F) MEBs
(four MEBs total). The AE is the combat force leading the forcible
entry of a contested/defended beach. The minimum lift requirement of
the two MEB AE must consist of 30 operationally available amphibious
ships, of which 10 must be operationally available big-deck aviation-
capable ships to support the MEB Aviation Combat Element (ACE). The AE
is distinctly different than the two MPF(F) MEBs. Each MPF(F) squadron
will include one LHD, two LHA(R), three cargo and ammunition ships
(TAKE), three fast logistics ships (T-AKR), three Mobile Loading
Platform ships, and two legacy maritime prepositioning ships. This mix
of ships will be capable of prepositioning critical equipment and 20
days of supplies for our future MEB.
Although one of the 14 MPF(F) ships, the LHD, is the same ship
class as one of the 10 AE operationally available big-deck aviation-
capable ships, further experimentation is required prior to suggesting
that it can be used in the AE during the ``fight to the beach'' in
joint forcible entry operations. This is primarily due to MPF(F) ships
being manned by civilian mariners and the ships unique load-out as an
afloat prepositioning capability with enhanced joint seabasing-related
capabilities and technologies. We do, however, view the LHD and LHA(R)
as having a secondary reinforcement role to amphibious platforms in the
conduct of anti-access joint forcible entry operations. It is too early
to commit MPF(F) as a substitute for amphibious ships. As mentioned
above, more experimentation and testing are needed in order to provide
``proof of concept'' and capability before any amphibious fleet
reductions can be seriously considered below the level necessary to
meet 30 operationally available amphibious ships of the AE.
16. Senator Kennedy. General Mattis, since three of the ships in
the MPF(F) seabase would be LHA/LHD type amphibious assault ships,
shouldn't we take some credit for such ships in meeting your
requirements?
General Mattis. In order to support JFEO, the Marine Corps
shipbuilding requirement is two amphibious MEBs AE plus two MPF(F) MEBs
(four MEBs total). The AE is the combat force leading the forcible
entry of a contested/defended beach. The minimum lift requirement of
the two MEB AE must consist of 30 operationally available amphibious
ships, of which 10 must be operationally available big-deck aviation-
capable ships to support the MER Aviation Combat Element (ACE). The AE
is distinctly different than the two MPF(F) MEBs. Each MPF(F) squadron
will include one LHD, two LHA(R), three cargo and ammunition ships (T-
AKE), three fast logistics ships (T-AKR), three Mobile Loading Platform
ships, and two legacy maritime prepositioning ships. This mix of ships
will be capable of prepositioning critical equipment and 20 days of
supplies for our future MEB.
Although one of the 14 MPF(F) ships, the LHD, is the same ship
class as one of the 10 AE operationally available big-deck aviation-
capable ships, further experimentation is required prior to suggesting
that it can be used in the AE during the ``fight to the beach'' in
joint forcible entry operations. This is primarily due to MPF(F) ships
being manned by civilian mariners and the ships unique load-out as an
afloat prepositioning capability with enhanced joint seabasing-related
capabilities and technologies. We do, however, view the LHD and LHA(R)
as having a secondary reinforcement role to amphibious platforms in the
conduct of anti-access joint forcible entry operations. It is too early
to commit MPF(F) as a substitute for amphibious ships. As mentioned
above, more experimentation and testing are needed in order to provide
``proof of concept'' and capability before any amphibious fleet
reductions can be seriously considered below the level necessary to
meet 30 operationally available amphibious ships of the AE.
up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles
17. Senator Kennedy. General Gardner, thank you for your
explanation of the purpose of the unfunded requirement for armored high
mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Could you clarify what
the impact would be if this funding was not achieved?
General Gardner. If we do not achieve funding, we will continue to
use the vehicles currently on hand with the associated inefficiencies
of trying to make aging equipment last longer. As verified by a new
Inspector General (IG) report, our vehicles continue to age at an
accelerated rate. Even the recently fielded up-armored HMMWVs (UAH)
require depot level repair or replacement within as little as 2 years
under current operating conditions in Iraq. When combat losses are
added to an increased number of vehicles lost to increased maintenance
there are simply fewer vehicles available to the commander in the
field.
18. Senator Kennedy. General Mattis, you noted that 90 percent of
the HMMWVs operating outside the bases in Iraq are armored. We had been
previously informed that all HMMWVs operating off-base were armored.
Could you clarify your remark?
General Mattis. All of our wheeled tactical vehicles that operate
outside forward operating bases are armored at either level I or level
II protection. All Marine Armor Kits (MAKs) requirements for our base
HMMWV and A2 models were achieved in November 2005 (2,992 vehicles). As
of May 1, 2006, we have fielded 1,750 M1114 HMMWVs. Our M1114
operational requirement will be complete in July 2006 (2,502 vehicles)
leaving 312 sustainment vehicles to be delivered by November 2006 for a
total of 2,814 M1114s to meet the Marine Corps Central Command
(MARCENT) requirement. The Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)
Armor System (MAS) requirements will be complete by the end of this
month (May 2006).
During the hearing, Lieutenant General Gardner responded to the
chairman's question (asked on behalf of Senator Kennedy) about the
status of HMMWV vehicle armoring. The following quote, ``We should be
complete in July of this year. Right now, basically we have--probably
90 percent of the troops going outside the wire are already in them,''
was Lieutenant General Gardner's response referring to M1114 up-armored
HMMWVs. We look forward to completing the fielding of our operational
requirement of 2,502 M1114s by July 2006. By November of this year,
through a replacement program, our forces in-theater will have 2,814
M1114s and 1,034 HMMWV A2s with MAK (per MARCENT requirements).
long-term affordability
19. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Crenshaw and General Gardner, I
understand the CNO is doing a long-term aviation affordability review
to parallel his shipbuilding study. What will this study entail and
when will the Navy complete it?
Admiral Crenshaw. The CNO is conducting an ongoing review of
aircraft requirements and affordability for fiscal year 2008 through
fiscal year 2020 to inform his decisions in the POM-08 process. POM-08
will determine the fiscal years 2008-2013 future years development
plan. The long-term aviation affordability review is covering the many
elements that affect the Navy's aircraft plan, including the number of
required aircraft, unit cost, annual procurement rate, and service life
remaining on current inventory, and progress in new aircraft
development programs. These procurement considerations must be weighed
against questions concerning sustainment and growth potential in terms
of meeting evolving warfighting requirements. Existing missions are
also being evaluated in light of joint service requirements and
capabilities.
This ongoing aviation review is similar to the shipbuilding study
only in that it attempts to inform important recapitalization
decisions. It does not include a goal for a specific total number of
aircraft like the 313 ships in the shipbuilding plan. Aircraft
procurement planning generally does not have the same level of impact
to the industrial base as shipbuilding. Therefore, this assessment, or
study, does not produce a document similar to the 30-year shipbuilding
plan delivered annually to Congress. While the internal Navy review
supports POM 08, there is also a more comprehensive OSD report
concerning TACAIR requirements which will report out in the October
2006 timeframe. The result of this OSD effort will almost surely
require us to conduct another aviation review to support the next
budget cycle.
General Gardner. The CNO is conducting an ongoing review of
aircraft requirements and affordability for fiscal year 2008 through
fiscal year 2020 to inform his decisions in the POM-08 process. POM-08
will determine the fiscal years 2008-2013 FYDP. The long-term aviation
affordability review is covering the many elements that affect the
Navy's aircraft plan, including the number of required aircraft, unit
cost, annual procurement rate, service life remaining on current
inventory, and progress in new aircraft development programs such as
JSF and Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). These procurement
considerations must be weighed against questions concerning legacy
aircraft capacity and capability and include an assessment of remaining
service life and growth potential in terms of meeting evolving war
fighting and technology requirements. Existing missions are also being
evaluated in light of joint service requirements and capabilities.
This ongoing aviation review is similar to the shipbuilding study
only in that it attempts to inform important recapitalization
decisions. It does not include a goal for a specific total number of
aircraft like the 313 ships in the shipbuilding plan. Aircraft
procurement planning generally does not have the same level of impact
as shipbuilding. Therefore, this assessment, or study, does not produce
any document similar to the 30-year shipbuilding plan delivered
annually to Congress. While the internal Navy review is complete for
POM-08, there is a more comprehensive OSD report concerning TACAIR
requirements which will report out in the October 2006 timeframe. The
result of this OSD effort will almost surely require us to conduct
another aviation review to support the next budget cycle.
expeditionary fighting vehicle
20. Senator Kennedy. General Mattis, I am concerned about the force
protection capabilities of the expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV).
The EFV's key performance parameter relating to armor protection has a
threshold requirement of protecting against 14.5 millimeter rounds at
300 meters and an objective requirement of protecting against 30
millimeter rounds at 1,000 meters. I understand that the objective
requirement will not be met for the base vehicle, and that the Marine
Corps is not pursuing an add-on armor capability to meet the objective
requirement.
I am also concerned about the underbody protection which I
understand only provides protection up to a 2.2 pound mine. This is
significantly less than an up-armored HMMWV which provides protection
against a 12 pound mine in the front and a 4 pound mine in the rear. Do
not the Iraq lessons learned about armor protection also make you
concerned about the survivability of the EFV? What do you intend to do
about it?
General Mattis. By design, the EFV's primary role in combat
operations is in respect to the amphibious aspect of maneuver warfare.
From the over the horizon swim, to breeching a defended shoreline, to
quickly advancing deep inland to the objective, the EFV will protect
our most valuable asset (the marine) per its intended design. The
Marine Corps has designed the EFV to perform a mission that requires
balance in its capabilities. Land and water speed, mobility, firepower
and lethality, communications, and capacity to carry a reinforced rifle
squad have been balanced along with the force protection and
survivability capabilities. An increase in armor protection using
today's technology would add weight, size, and cost to the EFV. As
light weight armor technology further advances, we will procure
materiel solutions to enhance the EFV where applicable.
Global war on terrorism lessons learned with respect to the IED
threat proves that use of IEDs is more consistent with sustained
operations ashore following maneuver to the objective. During OEF/OIF
decisive operations, IEDs were not a significant threat until after the
Iraqi government was removed and coalition forces were assigned zones
to conduct security and sustainment operations (SASO). Using tactics,
techniques, and procedures, through lessons learned, our existing
Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV) units participating in OIF SASO
operations are primarily conducting ``dismounted'' operations and are
also used as a Quick Reaction Force and in reinforcing roles. By
design, our armored HMMWVs and MTVR trucks, and Light Armored Vehicles
(LAVs) are the primary tactical vehicles used to conduct SASO
operations.
joint improvised explosive device neutralizer
21. Senator Kennedy. General Gardner, last month the media reported
that the deployment of the Joint IED Neutralizer (JIN) to Iraq was
delayed by the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) pending further
testing. However, it was also reported that the Marine Corps decided to
circumvent the testing schedule and send JIN units to al Anbar province
for use by the marines there. According to the media, based upon its
performance there, Marine commanders have said that they hope it can
eventually be used throughout Iraq. To the extent that you can answer
this in an open forum, why did the Marine Corps differ with the JIEDDO
and decide to send JIN units to Iraq?
General Gardner. In understanding the context of the question, the
Marine Corps did not differ with the JIEDDO. The Marine Corps conducted
an independent review of JIN when JIEDDO proffered systems previously
declined by Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I). At the conclusion of the
Marine Corps review, JIEDDO sponsored a demonstration of JIN for the
Commanding General of Marine Forces Central Command (CG MARCENT) and
other senior Marine commanders at the Army National Training Center
(NTC). Subsequent to this demonstration, CG MARCENT decided that an
operational evaluation of JIN in its current state would place marines
at risk without bringing a corresponding increase in capability and the
Marine Corps did not deploy JIN to Central Command (CENTCOM). This
decision was made by the warfighting commander for operational reasons
and was not influenced by JIEDDO or the Marine supporting structure.
22. Senator Kennedy. General Gardner, what has the Marine Corps
learned, and what recommendations does the Marine Corps have with
respect to further deployment of the JIN?
General Gardner. [Deleted.]
resetting the force
23. Senator Kennedy. General Gardner and Admiral Crenshaw, the
Marine Corps estimate for ``resetting'' the Marine Corps from the Iraq
conflict is $11.7 billion. Does this estimate include all of the
funding for Marine equipment, particularly aircraft, procured through
the Navy--so-called ``blue in support of green'' money?
General Gardner. Of the $11.7 billion total Marine Corps reset the
force estimate, approximately $2.7 billion is ``blue in support of
green.'' Most of this requirement ($2.5 billion) is for procurement of
aviation systems such as the MV-22, CH-53, or the restoration of other
aircraft to serve as ``gap-fillers'' until successor platforms enter
the inventory. The remaining requirement is spread across several
appropriations, with $100 million for depot level maintenance of
aviation assets and $100 million for weapons, ammunition, research and
development, and other procurement.
Admiral Crenshaw. The Navy submitted an estimate for ``resetting''
the force following the Iraq conflict. With regard to aircraft, the
Navy's estimate does not include Marine Corps aircraft.
submarine design capability
24. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Crenshaw, I appreciate your concern
for the potential loss of submarine design capability. While you are
focusing your continued design work on cost reduction initiatives, I
would ask you to look at modifying the Virginia class design to support
a mixed gender crew. This would increase the potential pool of talent
available to serve in our submarine force, perhaps reducing recruiting
and retention costs. Would this be possible for a Virginia class
modification and for future submarine designs?
Admiral Crenshaw. The Navy recognizes assigning women to submarines
offers potential advantages, and we continue to review this
periodically. However, due to their very unique space limitations,
equipment density, and design constraints, Navy policy currently
remains unchanged. Our experience and commitment with integrating women
on other platforms is not necessarily a model for change on submarines
due to the unique submarine environment and mission.
Although the Virginia class design incorporates improvements in
habitability over previous submarine classes, it does not provide
berthing and sanitary facilities of appropriate size for a mixed gender
crew. To provide berthing and sanitary facilities of appropriate size
for a mixed gender crew would require significant arrangement
modifications to the Virginia's design. Redesign of the Virginia class
to accommodate mixed gender crews would increase cost at a time when
Navy's goal is to reduce Virginia's cost to $2.0 billion (fiscal year
2005$).
The submarine force continually reviews personnel recruitment and
assignment policies to expand and diversify available talent. As the
requirements for future submarine designs are developed, the
incorporation of mixed gender crews will continue to be reviewed.
[Whereupon at 5:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington DC.
POSTURE OF THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:37 p.m. in SR-
222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Talent
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Talent and Kennedy.
Majority staff members present: Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.,
professional staff member; and Sean G. Stackley, professional
staff member.
Minority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Micah H. Harris and Jessica L.
Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to
Senator Talent; and Mieke Y. Eoyang and Joseph Axelrad,
assistants to Senator Kennedy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES TALENT, CHAIRMAN
Senator Talent [presiding]. We'll go ahead and start the
hearing. I know Senator Kennedy has been on the Senate floor
debating, and I understand he is on the way. In the past, what
we have done is gone ahead and begun hearing, and then when the
Senator arrives, we'll just stop and have him give his opening
comments and then proceed with the hearing.
The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the
posture of the United States Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) and strategic lift capabilities in review of the
National Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2007. We
are very pleased to have with us today General Norton A.
Schwartz, who is the Commander of USTRANSCOM, and General
Duncan McNabb, who is the Commander of the Air Mobility Command
(AMC). I want to welcome you gentlemen. Thank you for taking
the time to be with us today to offer your opinions on a wide
variety of important subjects, and especially I want to thank
you for your outstanding leadership and service to the country
in very crucial times.
Our Nation's position of international leadership is
inseparable from our ability to provide persistent strategic
lift of personnel and material to every corner of the globe
virtually on demand. Whether it's sustaining operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan or performing the broad missions of
peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief operations, joint
service operations, and emergent response throughout the world,
the performance of the airmen, the soldiers, the sailors, and
the merchant marines conducting these lift operations every
hour of every day deserve our highest praise. It's an honor for
me to say to you two how deeply proud we are of the men and
women under your command serving around the world and to offer
through you our most sincere gratitude for their service and
their family sacrifice.
The purpose of today's hearing is to discuss the posture of
the USTRANSCOM and the vision for future strategic lift
capabilities. We are particularly interested in your views of
the effect current operations are having on the Nation's
mobility forces, experience gained in support of the growing
number of lift requirements, and challenges faced by the
regional commanders. Today's first priority must be to meet the
demands current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are placing
on our forces. At the same time, however, we are tasked with
sizing and shaping the future force. In so doing, we must
employ the lessons learned from today's operation to ensure our
ultimate ability to meet future challenges to our national
security.
The subcommittee is interested in your current direction
regarding the USTRANSCOM's force structure and the results of
the Mobility Capability Study (MCS). I note with concern the
variance between the underlying assumptions of the MCS and the
more demanding conditions experienced by our lift forces as
they adapt to uniquely stressing mission profiles and unplanned
loading scenarios. In particular the C-17 Globemaster, which
has been the workhorse for lift operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, is experiencing accelerated airframe wear and
tear, leading ultimately to accelerated attrition.
I understand that you have initiated a follow-on study, the
Focus Mobility Analysis, to address the strategic airlift mix
of aircraft. I'm certainly going to be interested in learning
your reasons for that new analysis and the results when they
are ready. In the interim, and in view of the influence that
the MCS may have had on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
and the fiscal year 2007 budget request, it is important that
today's hearing follow through in the assessment best
characterized by the Deputy Secretary as he stated at the
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the QDR, that the
Air Force may have to buy more than the 180 C-17 transport
planes now envisioned because C-17s are wearing out rapidly in
the war. This budget cycle provides a critical opportunity to
act upon this fact of life observation, which is notably
consistent with the Air Force's top unfunded requirement prior
to any irreversible decisions regarding C-17 production.
In conjunction with C-17 procurement planning, we are also
interested in your updated assessment of ongoing efforts to
modernize the C-5 Galaxy aircraft through the Avionics
Modernization Program and the Reliability Enhancement and
Reengining Program. These efforts are critical to meeting
established airlift requirements in support of the national
military strategy.
As well, we welcome your insights regarding future force
planning and the role to be formed by the Civil Reserve Air
Force (CRAF). Recognizing the criticality of this lift
component, we are interested in your assessment and
recommendations regarding employment of CRAF assets for future
defense planning scenarios.
This subcommittee has played a significant role in support
of strategic mobility in the past. We consider it a very
important area of our oversight jurisdiction. We look forward
to working with you and your staff as we move forward on this
budget to provide the resources necessary for continued
successful performance of these operations while also helping
to shape the future USTRANSCOM.
Again gentlemen, I thank you for joining us today. We look
forward to the candid expression of your views on these various
subjects as we have always had them in the past. I see Senator
Kennedy hasn't arrived yet, so let's go ahead and start with
your statements. General Schwartz, why don't you begin and give
us your statement? Then when Senator Kennedy comes, at the
first convenient opportunity, we will break so he can give his
opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Schwartz. Chairman Talent, it truly is a privilege
to be with you today representing the more than 152,000
military and civilian men and women that comprise the
USTRANSCOM and that today are serving the Nation around the
world. USTRANSCOM's success begins with our people, their
dedication, and their vision and hard work, which continue to
improve our ability to support national objectives.
Our people are the heroes who make it happen and get it
done. We are a Nation at war, sir, and supporting the
warfighter is our command's number one priority. USTRANSCOM's
imperative is to provide outstanding support to the warfighter
and the Nation by rapidly delivering combat power to the joint
force commander, effectively linking operating forces to their
sustainment processes and systems, redeploying forces who have
served their time in combat, and moving wounded and injured
troops to locations where they can receive the very best care.
As the Department of Defense's distribution process owner,
USTRANSCOM leads a collaborative effort within the logistics
community to develop system-wide distribution system
improvements. We execute USTRANSCOM's global mission through
our component commands--the AMC of the Air Force, the Navy's
Military Sealift Command, and of course, the Army's Military
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC). I am
honored to have today the Commander of the AMC, General Duncan
McNabb, with me before the subcommittee today.
Our components provide the mobility resources and know-how
in packages capable of seamless transition from peace to war.
Despite the very substantial military force structure that the
components do bring to bear, sir, USTRANSCOM will always be
dependent on a mix of Government-owned and commercial assets.
It is through the combination of military and commercial
capabilities that USTRANSCOM fields a military transportation
and distribution system that is unmatched anywhere on the
planet. I could not be prouder of the USTRANSCOM team and our
national partners. Today, we are supporting the global war on
terrorism while recently providing humanitarian assistance and
relief in both America and in nations abroad. Together, we are
transforming the military deployment and distribution
enterprise, ensuring our Nation's ability to project national
military power wherever and whenever the need may arise. In all
of this, our commitment is that a promise given by us will be a
promise kept.
I am grateful to you, sir, and the subcommittee for having
us before you today for the essential support that you provide
in enabling our capabilities, and I am ready to take any
questions that you may have. Mr. Chairman, with your
permission, may I ask that my prepared statement be submitted
for the record?
Senator Talent. Sure, without objection, and I appreciate
your summarizing it, General. Again, I appreciate how you carry
out your responsibilities. I have visited USTRANSCOM, and it's
just unbelievable, the number of men and women and the amount
of material that you move everyday, and you actually keep track
of it all while you are doing it, and it's pretty incredible.
General Schwartz. Not all of it.
Senator Talent. I said your remarks would be candid and
they are.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Schwartz follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF
introducing the united states transportation command (ustranscom)
Mission/Organization
As a unified combatant command (COCOM), USTRANSCOM provides the
synchronized command and control, transportation, distribution, and
sustainment which make possible projecting and maintaining national
military power where needed, with the greatest speed and agility, the
highest efficiency, and the most reliable level of trust and precision.
USTRANSCOM's imperative is to provide outstanding support to the
warfighter through effective operation of the Defense Transportation
System (DTS) and by providing global patient movement. Further, as the
Department of Defense's (DOD) Distribution Process Owner (DPO),
USTRANSCOM leads a collaborative effort amongst the logistics community
to develop system-wide distribution process improvements. To accomplish
USTRANSCOM's global joint mission we rely upon our component commands:
the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Navy's Military Sealift
Command (MSC), and the Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (SDDC). Our components provide mobility forces and assets in a
force structure capable of seamless transition from peace to war. But
there is one reality that will not change: we'll never be able to own
all the aircraft and ships we need--USTRANSCOM will always depend on a
mix of Government-owned and commercial assets. We simply cannot do
business without our commercial partners. Together we ``Make it Happen
and Get it Done.''
Our wartime objectives are to get the warfighter to the fight,
sustain the warfighter during the fight, rapidly maneuver the tactical
warfighter, get the wounded warfighter to needed care, and return the
warfighter home to family. Whether it is the lives of our sons and
daughters, sums of wealth, or commercial partner contributions, the
portion of our Nation's treasure entrusted to us is precious and we
must be good stewards of that trust.
The operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of the Nation's mobility forces
remains high as they support the ever growing number of requirements
and challenges faced by the regional combatant commanders. It is
important to note that USTRANSCOM is only postured--from a force
structure perspective--as a one major war force. Regardless, USTRANSCOM
supports not one, but all combatant commanders simultaneously, placing
a premium on our lift assets. Additionally, USTRANSCOM's ability to
support multiple competing demands is constrained by access and force
flow dynamics. Our limited transportation assets rely on an optimized
force flow to meet demands.
Enduring Themes
In a dynamic political-military environment, requirements can
quickly exceed capabilities. USTRANSCOM's challenge is to meet the
warfighters' requirements while continuing our leading role in the
transformation of the DOD supply chain. Three themes guide our course:
Theme One: Investing in the care and quality of
USTRANSCOM's most valuable resource--our people.
Theme Two: Continued transformation of key processes,
leveraging information technology to provide seamless, end-to-
end distribution management for defense.
Theme Three: Maintaining force readiness and
continuous modernization to perform our global mobility
mission.
ustranscom in 2005
Meeting Our Commitments to the Nation
The year 2005 found the Nation at war and USTRANSCOM met the
expectations of a nation on a wartime footing. Our greatest commitment
remained supporting the global war on terrorism and its three primary
operations, Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Enduring Freedom (OEF), and
Noble Eagle (ONE). As in every year since 2001, OIF and OEF mobility
requirements were sizeable: total deployment, redeployment,
sustainment, and rest and recreation airlift by AMC moved 1,188,084
passengers and 457,670 short tons. MSC and SDDC's contributions were
equally striking with 169 vessels delivering 1.89 million short tons
(36.9 million square feet). MSC's point-to-point tankers also delivered
over 1.77 billion gallons of fuel supporting worldwide DOD
requirements. Our airborne tankers, a critical power projection
capability, offloaded 1,016.68 million pounds of fuel in support of OIF
and OEF. Their role in ONE was also significant as tankers offloaded
20.18 million pounds, replenishing combat air patrol fighters guarding
major U.S. cities and critical infrastructure.
Our most urgent responsibility in 2005 has been assisting U.S.
Central Command (USCENTCOM) in defeating the terrorists and
neutralizing the insurgency in Iraq. The magnitude of that effort was
enormous. For example, MSC, only one of the three USTRANSCOM
components, provided 11,302,666 square feet (565,133 short tons) of
cargo to USCENTCOM. AMC and SDDC contributions were of similar scale.
Of utmost importance for USCENTCOM was the movement of armored
vehicles and add-on armor kits. In calendar year 2005, SDDC, via MSC
organic and chartered ships and SDDC liner service vessels, shipped
6,294 Level I Up-Armored Humvees (HMMWVs) or 115 percent of the 5,473
required by USCENTCOM Army Forces (ARCENT). This total would fill 3.15
large, medium speed, roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) Bob Hope class vessels.
The timely delivery of Level II armor, factory-built, add-on-armor
kits, has also been a pressing priority. During 2005, AMC airlifted
14,909 short tons of Level II kits for ARCENT, totaling 25,827 kits.
AMC also lifted 78 special purpose Improvised Explosive Device-
resistant vehicles weighing 1,098 short tons. Between June and August
2005, SDDC shipped 763 5-ton truck Level II kits weighing 2,270 short
tons to ARCENT. USTRANSCOM also met Marine Corps armor needs by
shipping 966 Level I Up-Armored HMMWVs amounting to 2,270 short tons
and the airlift of 3,102 short tons of Level II armor, for a total of
3,276 kits. The total Level II airlift tonnage for the Army and Marine
Corps was equivalent to 798 fully loaded C-5 aircraft. Movement of
Level III armor, a locally fabricated steel kit, was completed on 14
February 2005.
Force rotations of units to and from Iraq and Afghanistan have
remained a cornerstone of our OIF/OEF mission. Between January and
March 2005, AMC airlifted 250,000 passengers and over 11,000 short tons
while MSC and SDDC moved more than 711,000 short tons via sealift. This
year, USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM adjusted rotations to meet increased
security needs during Iraqi elections and minimized movements during
the holiday season at home. When the current rotation completes in
spring 2006, AMC will have moved 227,992 passengers and 17,313 short
tons by air, along with 530,000 short tons moved by MSC and SDDC by
surface.
Other support requirements often have been inescapable during our
OIF/OEF force rotations, such as unplanned natural disasters which
required an immediate domestic response.
After Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans and the Gulf Coast,
DOD deployed 20 people to supplement Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) operations planning at Fort Gillem, GA. Fourteen of the
20 people came from USTRANSCOM and its component commands along with
five from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and one from the Maritime
Administration (MARAD). The one-two punch of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita prompted a major response from our mobility forces. During
Katrina, AMC used organic assets in the form of a contingency response
group (CRG) to reestablish airfield operations followed closely by
airlifting relief supplies totaling 339 sorties, 13,717 patients/
evacuees and 5,170 short tons of relief supplies. Air National Guard
(ANG) support operations totaled 3,087 sorties, 30,898 passengers, and
10,834 short tons. SDDC support included the redeployment of 82nd
Airborne and 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit equipment, consisting of
1,342 pieces of equipment totaling 183,000 sq. ft. (9,150 short tons)
of cargo, and the procurement of approximately 250 buses for movement
of personnel. At the request of FEMA, MSC contracted 4 cruise ships
berthing over 7,000 evacuees and relief workers, while the MSC vessels
U.S.N.S. Pollux, Altair, and Bellatrix provided over 130 tons of water
and 1.4 million gallons of fuel.
Katrina and Rita thankfully were not as massively destructive as
the tsunami which roared ashore in several Asian nations on December
26, 2004. USTRANSCOM contributed to Operation Unified Assistance
without interrupting or slowing the OIF/OEF ``surge'' rotation. Total
airlift for the relief effort amounted to 2,943 passengers and 3,786
short tons. One chartered ocean liner delivered 320 short tons of high
energy biscuits and another vessel redeployed just under 2,000 short
tons of equipment.
Another tragedy was the 7.6 magnitude earthquake which killed
thousands in Pakistan on October 6, 2005. This terrible situation
threatened to become even worse since the seismic activity left
thousands injured and homeless in remote locations with the approaching
cold temperatures of winter. An AMC C-17 loaded with relief supplies
left Bagram, Afghanistan for Pakistan on October 9, less than 48 hours
after the earthquake, and additional supplies, including 21 urgently
needed helicopters, were subsequently airlifted from bases in the
United States to Pakistan. By late January 2006, AMC's airlift to
Pakistan totaled 1,674 passengers and just over 5,549 short tons of
critical relief supplies.
Amid all these urgent requirements, USTRANSCOM turned over the
management and reporting of the airlift and sealift for the National
Science Foundation's (NSF) annual research in Antarctica to U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM). Known as Operation Deep Freeze, mobility
totals from the 2004-2005 season show how large the operation can be,
with 573 airlift missions transporting a total of 7,032 passengers,
5,340 short tons, and 696,214 gallons of fuel. Two MSC supply ships
replenished the NSF station with 10,964 short tons and 6.1 million
gallons of fuel. Despite the shift in oversight, USTRANSCOM still
fulfills needs in Antarctica, providing a C-17 for the airlift mission
from New Zealand to Antarctica and nine specially trained crews from
the New York ANG to fly LC-130 missions.
Our Nation's sons and daughters fight like they train and
USTRANSCOM understands the importance of meeting our customers'
training needs without sacrificing the effectiveness of wartime
mobility operations. For example, by collaboratively managing
transportation requirements with USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM assisted
USCENTCOM conduct of Exercise Bright Star, its longstanding field
training exercise, for the first time since 2001. In contrast to the
large-scale Bright Stars of the era before the global war on terrorism,
Bright Star 05 held the number of airlifted forces to 14,038 passengers
and 2,207 short tons. Three vessels moved 37,269 short tons for Bright
Star, far fewer than in years past.
Similarly, the combined USPACOM exercise in the Republic of Korea,
Reception, Staging Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I)/Foal Eagle
and Unified View 2005, a shared effort by U.S. Joint Forces Command
(USJFCOM) and USTRANSCOM to integrate deployment and distribution
processes were also adjusted in scope. Collaborative requirements
management to meet both critical training and wartime needs is
essential and makes good sense.
Conducting ``normal'' operations effectively in demanding times
extended to the highly visible mission of providing Presidential
airlift. AMC aircraft supported six foreign trips by President Bush
during 2005. This support amounted to 5,263 passengers and 5,368 short
tons, enabling the President to consult with the leaders of three
allied nations in Western Europe, to pay his respects at the funeral of
the late Pope John Paul II in Italy, to observe the 60th anniversary of
the end of World War II in Europe, to take part in a Latin American
summit meeting in Argentina, and to attend the Asia Pacific Economic
Conference in South Korea.
In 2005, USTRANSCOM continued meeting new DOD requirements
supporting defense support to civilian authorities (DSCA) missions. In
coordination with United States Northern Command's (USNORTHCOM) Joint
Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), USTRANSCOM is refining ground and
air transportation options to provide rapid access and deliver
consequence management forces to chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) affected sites. Additionally,
USTRANSCOM, in coordination with USNORTHCOM's Joint Task Force National
Capital Region (JTF-NCR), is tailoring rapid high-priority airlift for
survivability and emergency medical evacuation of senior Government
officials to ensure continuity of our Nation's governing bodies.
In addition, USTRANSCOM provided immediate response airlift for
three Quick Reaction Force (QRF) deployments, requiring 12 missions
covering each U.S. QRF sector. AMC logged approximately 1,000 man-days
supporting heightened QRF response postures for high-visibility world
events, including the G8 Summit and Hurricane Katrina. These
deployments honed joint processes with USNORTHCOM and exercised our
immediate response capabilities.
USTRANSCOM and AMC also provided wildland firefighting support. Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve C-130 units, equipped with the
Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS), were used to knockdown
emerging fires. MAFFS aircraft and crews flew 332 sorties and performed
343 retardant airdrops, preventing millions of dollars in damage and
saving countless acres of forest and wilderness areas. USTRANSCOM and
AMC are working with the National Guard Bureau and National Interagency
Fire Center to field a more reliable and capable MAFFS II system on the
C-130/C-130J in July 2006.
Patient movement, one of our more poignant missions, transports
America's wounded and sick warriors, including battlefield casualties,
to higher levels of care. During calendar year 2005, USTRANSCOM
supported 24,942 Patient Movement Requests (PMR) worldwide.
USTRANSCOM's Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center (JPMRC)
performed as a patient movement management cell coordinating the
movement of personnel from the war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan back
to Europe and the United States. Their unparalleled level of care
combined with the safe and efficient movement to higher levels of care
enhanced patient survivability, reaching nearly 90 percent today. The
DOD patient movement system, and in particular aeromedical evacuation,
has transformed into a one-of-a-kind asymmetrical asset. No other
nation on earth has the capability to care for and move her most vital
possession, her people, as safely or effectively in war and in peace.
USTRANSCOM moved 3,813 patients via the National Disaster Medical
System during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We are proud of our
unwavering commitment to bring every warfighter home from the fight.
This promise given to our warfighters will continue to be a promise
kept.
people: ustranscom's greatest asset
Shortages/Areas of Concern
Operational outcomes such as those recounted previously require
exceptionally dedicated professionals. USTRANSCOM's mobility team,
comprised of Active-Duty, Reserve, National Guard, civilian, and
contractor personnel, is literally the engine that powers force
projection. Meeting the needs of our people in terms of manning and
quality-of-life issues leads to increased readiness, and higher
retention, and is absolutely the right thing to do.
The global war on terrorism is requiring us to employ our mobility
assets in new and demanding ways. The stress is evident in several key
fields. In order to meet the high demand for C-130s, the command hosted
a global sourcing conference that affected other COCOMs and Services.
Currently, we are using four U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), four
USPACOM, and four Navy-assigned C-130s to offset high temporary duty
(TDY) rates for USTRANSCOM-assigned C-130 units. In a post-mobilization
setting (majority of Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) C-130
mobilization ends summer 2006, some residual ANG/AFRC mobilization
capability remains) Active-Duty intratheater aircrew TDY rates will
likely increase approximately 20 percent, if requirements remain
constant. In addition, as C-17 Theater Direct Delivery (TDD) capability
is used to further offset C-130 deployments, C-17 utilization and TDY
rates will also increase. We face a similar scenario with tanker
assets.
More than any other COCOM, USTRANSCOM relies on the Reserve
component (RC) for peacetime responsiveness and wartime capability. The
RC provides approximately 56 percent of USTRANSCOM's personnel, 57
percent of continental U.S. (CONUS) surface lift capability, and 59
percent of airlift capability. In fact, the Air Reserve Component (ARC)
operates 30 percent of outsize/oversize airlift fleet (C-5s and C-17s),
owns more than 62 percent of the KC-135 force, and over 61 percent of
our fleet of C-130s.
High rates of RC volunteerism for intertheater airlift and tanker
missions have filled a shortfall in capabilities the Active-Duty has
been unable to provide. To put this in perspective, in fiscal year
2001, RC support to USTRANSCOM staff accounted for 28.2 man-years.
However, with the increased OPTEMPO generated by the global war on
terrorism, support increased to 114.1 man-years in fiscal year 2002,
96.2 man-years in fiscal year 2003, 95.4 man-years in fiscal year 2004,
94.8 man-years in fiscal year 2005 and 89.4 man-years projected in
fiscal year 2006. USTRANSCOM will depend on volunteerism to meet
requirements for the foreseeable future.
The President's executive order authorizing partial mobilization
(up to 1 million reservists for up to 2 years) has proven crucial
during OIF, OEF, and ONE. Although thousands of RC forces volunteered,
USTRANSCOM and its components were required to mobilize thousands more.
With the pending completion of involuntary mobilized tours of duty at
the end of fiscal year 2006, the number of temporary duty days for the
remaining intratheater airlift forces could increase as much as 33
percent. It is essential to maintain RC mobilization agility and
flexibility as we respond to warfighter needs in the future.
Quality-of-Life Issues
With the Nation maintaining an extended war footing, quality-of-
life programs can alleviate some stress experienced by our people. The
movement of service members' personal property is one such quality-of-
life issue. SDDC is developing the Families First Program, a
comprehensive plan to significantly revamp DOD household goods
movements, which began with its Phase I implementation in 2004. Phases
II and III are currently under development. Selecting transportation
service providers based primarily upon performance and customer
surveys, and the inclusion of full replacement value for lost or
damaged personal property transported at government expense, are
paradigm shifts and significant quality-of-life enhancements.
It's imperative that as we demand so much, we watch out for our
military family by providing proper manning and relieving unnecessary
stress when and where possible. Projecting America's national military
power depends on the heroic work of USTRANSCOM's people.
transformation: distribution transformation and process improvement
Distribution Process Owner (DPO)
In its role as the DPO, USTRANSCOM's effort to improve deployment
and distribution processes has yielded real results due in part to
dedicated oversight. Within the DPO management structure, the DPO
executive board is the senior decisionmaking forum charged with
implementing DPO initiatives. With representation from the Director,
DLA, Joint Staff (JS) logistics directorate (J4) and the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness, this forum
ensures collaboration within the DOD and a single view of supply chain
management challenges. To ensure the DPO executive board remains
focused on COCOM and Service requirements, the Distribution
Transformation Task Force (DTTF), with representation from each COCOM,
Service, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), DLA, and the Joint
Staff, advises and works to solve near-term warfighter issues and
refine COCOM support.
USTRANSCOM and USCENTCOM are eliminating seams between strategic
and theater distribution using the USCENTCOM Deployment and
Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC). The CDDOC enables USCENTCOM to
improve operations and avoid costs through a collaborative national
partnership with USTRANSCOM, USJFCOM, DLA, and the Services, providing
increased visibility over deployment and distribution flow. The CDDOC
improved readiness by intensively managing critical items, such as add-
on-armor kits to fulfill critical needs, and by carefully managing unit
moves with the Single Ticket Program by moving deploying troops to the
fight and redeploying them home more quickly. Single Ticket accelerated
force movements, increased troop airlift efficiency, and pushed
passenger seat utilization above 94 percent.
Working with AMC and DLA, CDDOC has also championed the Pure Pallet
Initiative. Individual 463L airlift pallets are built and shipped with
cargo for a single customer, simplifying and accelerating the shipment
process by removing the requirement to break down, sort, re-palletize
and distribute items to individual customers. In a similar but
unrelated initiative, CDDOC has teamed with AMC to improve 463L pallet
inventory tracking, reducing cycle time and making an additional 18,000
pallets available for use (a savings of $27.9 million). Also enacted
with the Public Warehousing Corporation, is an inspection and repair
procedure. Of 11,000 pallets inspected over 4,200 were returned to
service, avoiding almost $1 million in depot repairs.
Similarly, in cooperation with SDDC, USTRANSCOM's global container
manager, USTRANSCOM has made significant progress in container
management. By teaming with USCENTCOM and industry, USTRANSCOM has
reduced container storage needs with improved material management
processes. The cost of storing cargo in containers has been reduced
from a high of $16 million per month to less than $11 million. Long-
term process and contract changes to enhance container use are underway
and are migrating to other COCOMs, including improvements such as
tagging containers for better visibility and leveraging commercial
systems to enhance material management.
We have implemented a cost-management process that allowed us to
capture savings and cost avoidances resulting from DPO-related
improvements. From October 2004 through November 2005, USTRANSCOM
avoided $345.12 million in extra costs by shifting transportation mode
from airlift to sealift or from truck to rail, canceling redundant
storage contracts after DLA built the new defense distribution center
in Kuwait, changing the management and repair of 463L pallets,
returning transportation equipment to the supply system, and upgrading
a lower cost communications system/mode. Overall validated cost
avoidances facilitated by the DPO were $638.42 million as of November
2005. The CDDOC was responsible for $50.58 million of these costs.
USTRANSCOM is taking CDDOC lessons learned and with the cooperation
of the other COCOMs, applying them to other theaters, spearheading the
standardization of a Joint Deployment and Distribution Operation Center
(JDDOC). Each COCOM has established a permanent JDDOC, scaled for their
region and assigned missions, and created by reorganizing existing
theater structures to provide the authority and capability to
synchronize deployment and distribution processes.
The USPACOM JDDOC (PDDOC) was quickly tested in synchronizing the
massive influx of humanitarian aid into the tsunami-devastated parts of
South Asia in December 2004. PDDOC has also established forward
elements in Korea and Japan, PDDOC-K and PDDOC-J, respectively. These
organizations have been observed and assessed during Exercises RSO&I/
Foal Eagle, Ulchi Focus Lens, and Terminal Fury, demonstrating their
worth and codifying their relationships.
USNORTHCOM's JDDOC (NDDOC) was also tested when Hurricane Katrina
devastated the Gulf Coast. The NDDOC served as manager of deployment
and distribution for USNORTHCOM and JTF-Katrina. NDDOC Sustainment
Division's DLA representatives supported FEMA during relief operations
with contracting support and the provision of supplies. Progress was
made in establishing an effective process for sustainment flow between
FEMA and Federal agencies, and promoting visibility of sustainment and
retrograde material despite the lack of common in-transit visibility
(ITV) tools and electronic data interchange (EDI) solutions.
USEUCOM's JDDOC (EDDOC) reached initial operational capability in
May 2005, and has leveraged DPO advisory team visits in conjunction
with Exercises Sharp Focus and Flexible Response. U.S. Southern
Command's (USSOUTHCOM) JDDOC (SDDOC) has reached full operational
capability, refining its operations through the multi-nation Exercise
New Horizons.
In order to provide the best possible support to combatant
commanders, Services, and agencies, USTRANSCOM is spearheading the
development of deployment and distribution command and control (D2C2)
concepts, procedures, and associated doctrine to enable the combatant
commanders to manage theater logistics operations with more visibility,
control, precision, and efficiency. USTRANSCOM's D2C2 assets will be
trained to a common standard, possess common C2 information technology
systems to ensure connectivity across the joint deployment and
distribution enterprise, and will be able to reach back to the national
partners to ensure the rapid deployment and distribution of forces and
materiel. In addition to the JDDOC functional elements like Joint Task
Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) and the Director Mobility Forces-Surface
(DM4-S) have been created to support deployment and distribution
activities. A JTF-PO, established from USTRANSCOM aligned forces and
deployed to regional combatant commanders, is capable of quickly
opening and operating ports in specific theater locations. These forces
will chop to the supported COCOM and will operate until being replaced.
The DM4-S will synchronize and direct the movement of surface
transportation resources to ensure uninterrupted throughput at ports of
debarkation (air and sea) to the theater as prescribed by the Combined/
Joint Force Land Component Commander.
USTRANSCOM is also active in defining future warfighting concepts
and needs and has partnered with the Army to develop a joint
integrating concept (JIC) for distribution. Ultimately, this JIC will
drive the creation of a Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise with
the wherewithal to ensure effective force movement and sustainment
support to the warfighter.
Forces to be deployed must be quickly and effectively sourced. In
2005, USTRANSCOM was assigned the role as the single DOD Mobility Joint
Force Provider in order to maintain visibility of global transportation
capabilities and synchronize the availability of scarce mobility
forces. In this role, USTRANSCOM is responsible for the efficient,
rapid, worldwide availability of mobility forces in support of national
security priorities.
Similarly, and to solidify USTRANSCOM's role as the DPO, it was
essential to amend the wording in the Unified Command Plan (UCP),
language we expect to be approved by the Secretary of Defense and the
President. We have recommended the UCP embody the mandate to employ our
core competencies, to coordinate and supervise the DOD distribution
system to provide interoperability, synchronization, and alignment of
DOD wide, end-to-end distribution.
USTRANSCOM is using a recently established research and development
(R&D) funding line to partner with the Services, defense agencies,
other non-DOD government organizations, industry, and academic
communities to improve our force projection and distribution
capabilities. This R&D line enables us to leverage future technologies
to address intermodal inefficiencies and transform our processes.
USTRANSCOM is seeking limited Research Development Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) budget, and acquisition authority to pursue intermodal
distribution needs which are not addressed by existing R&D activities.
Our proposal leaves traditional organize, train, and equip
responsibilities with the Services, but aligns responsibility with
authority by providing an assigned RDT&E mission, receipt of a modest
RDT&E budget line, and codifying RDT&E acquisition authority.
In order to ensure our initiatives are producing results for the
warfighter, USTRANSCOM evaluates the distribution enterprise's
institutional health through simple but comprehensive metric analysis.
Distribution analysis measures the effectiveness of moving personnel
and material to meet the warfighters' needs based on their
requirements; the quantities ordered and delivered on the date
specified. Examples of the analysis products include intermodal
distribution, requisition wait time, and add-on armor reports.
Intermodal distribution reports pertain to each COCOM's intermodal
distribution lane (point of supply to point of use), and measure the
lane's performance to determine lane effectiveness. Requisition wait
time reports pertain to the Defense Distribution Depot Kuwait,
Southwest Asia (DDKS) and the Theater Distribution Center (TDC). These
reports flagged the need to reduce the average wait time from the DDKS
and TDC from 22 days in March 2005 to a current 12.2 days and we are
nearing the goal of 9 days. Finally, the add-on armor reports provide a
daily snapshot of the armor kits leaving the contractor facility and
arriving at Charleston AFB, Incirlik AB and Balad aerial ports. These
reports support better modal transportation decisions while improving
user confidence in USTRANSCOM distribution processes.
In addition to improving the distribution process within the DPO
framework, USTRANSCOM continues to engage in the Defense Business
Systems Management Committee that oversees the development of world-
class business operations in support of the warfighter. In particular,
we're moving out as the distribution portfolio manager to streamline
distribution systems to ensure effective use of information technology
(IT) resources and to reduce duplicative system overlap and fill gaps
in the Joint Deployment and Distribution Architecture (JDDA).
One example of a cross-department improvement of business
architecture is the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System
(DEAMS), a joint initiative between USTRANSCOM, the Air Force, and the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service. The overall objective of DEAMS
is to implement a single integrated finance system to provide reliable,
accurate, and timely information, which will service our Army, Air
Force, and Navy components' working capital fund financial needs. It
will also combine Transportation Working Capital Fund multiple legacy
billing systems into a single billing module. Upon completion of the
system integrator selection, the integration process is expected to
begin by the second quarter of calendar year 2006.
USTRANSCOM also looks to the commercial sector for transformational
efficiencies. The Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative (DTCI)
is a distribution initiative that contributes to logistics
transformation and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics' goal to integrate logistics. The DTCI
concept will use a commercial transportation coordinator to integrate
and synchronize the movement of DOD freight in the CONUS, improving
effectiveness and efficiency of materiel movement. USTRANSCOM, in
partnership with DLA, is leading the effort, and will award the
contract in September 2006. Transition will commence beginning in
October 2006 with actual phase in the first DOD site in January 2007.
Defense Courier Service Returns to USTRANSCOM
Another cross-department initiative is the return of the Defense
Courier Service (DCS) to USTRANSCOM. This move began when Program
Budget Decision (PBD) 410, dated 5 December 2003, directed the
realignment. On 15 November 2005, the Defense Courier Division under
USTRANSCOM Directorate of Operations (J3) assumed operational control
of worldwide defense courier stations and continues to synchronize
defense courier related activities for our global customers.
USTRANSCOM Sustainment, Force Flow Conferences
Collaboration is a must for USTRANSCOM success. In 2005, we
continued implementation of Adaptive Planning and Collaborative Force
Analysis, Sustainment, and Transportation Force Flow Modeling, by
supporting nine Combatant Commander Operational/Concept Plan Force Flow
Conferences for USEUCOM, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) as well as functional planning for USSOUTHCOM.
Additionally, USTRANSCOM hosts biannual USCENTCOM-chaired force flow
conferences to forecast force deployments, redeployments, and rotations
in support of OEF/OIF operations. This collaborative effort allows the
COCOM to shape the flow of forces to reflect operational requirements.
This process has been further enhanced with the addition of a
sustainment conference. Held in parallel for the first time in the fall
of 2005, this Force Flow/Sustainment conference provides visibility of
sustainment requirements providing a clearer picture of COCOM needs and
enabling the two commands to prioritize movements during surge periods.
ustranscom's readiness and modernization
Antiterrorism and Force Protection
USTRANSCOM ability to accomplish its global mission rests on our
ability to protect our personnel and assets. We are improving force
protection through intelligence information sharing, physical
countermeasures, and employee screening, partnering with COCOMs, our
components, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and commercial
industry. To better share information, SDDC is sponsoring surface
secure classified communication efforts to integrate the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) by late calendar year 2006. In addition, SDDC
has explored similar capability discussions with the American Trucking
Associations (ATA) to facilitate ATA gaining secure connectivity with
SDC.
As an interim solution, SDDC provides classified intelligence
exchanges via Transportation Security Operations Center secure systems
accessible by ATA and AAR representatives, and hosts weekly
intelligence sharing sessions and secure telephone connectivity with
maritime commercial partners. Protecting our military and commercial
seaports will continue to be a serious challenge. USTRANSCOM and SDDC
have continued to secure funding to further improve infrastructure
security at the Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU), North
Carolina and the Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO), California.
In 2005, waterside protective barriers at MOTSU were completed and
$789,000 was invested for two new physical security improvements. As we
upgrade and better fortify these installations from terrorism or
natural disaster, the difficulty ahead lies in providing an adequate
level of security force manning with sustained funding to support base
operations and protect our vital national arms, ammunition, and
explosives (AA&E) transshipment ports.
In 2005, SDDC mobilized a small compliment of the remaining Army
Reserve military police (MP) elements to augment SDDC civilian ports
security. However, their departure and lack of backfill requires
USTRANSCOM to seek alternatives such as contracting security personnel
drawn from local sheriff/police departments during surge periods.
However, availability of these security forces will be at risk during a
local crisis, which makes this solution less than optimal. During a
localized state crisis involving a strategic DOD seaport of
embarkation, DOD may need to depend on augmentation under state control
until military augmentation would be available.
Controlling access to restricted transshipment areas is also
essential to providing comprehensive force protection. USTRANSCOM and
SDDC are working with OSD, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), ATA, and several AA&E carriers to develop an appropriate DOD
identification card, mandated by the Maritime Security Act.
USTRANSCOM also continues to upgrade the access, control, and
vetting of the transportation workforce that loads, unloads, and mans
its strategic sealift fleet. MSC has standardized its ship visitor
badge system, distributed new badges to its entire fleet and hired a
new screener at the El Paso Intelligence Center.
Operation Vigilant Mariner (OVM) continues to protect our sealift
assets following the Secretary of Defense's designation of the Navy as
executive agent for force protection of military sealift assets.
Leading the way is the Maritime Force Protection Command (MARFPCOM),
activated on 1 October 2004. Working in close coordination with MSC,
MARFPCOM continues to provide point defense for sealift assets
supporting contingency operations, using Active-Duty personnel and 54
Reserve component teams ready to deploy.
To protect its aircraft and aircrews from rapidly advancing and
highly-proliferated infrared (IR) manportable air defense systems
(MANPADS), AMC continues to field the Large Aircraft Infrared
Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system, an extremely capable system that has
successfully flown in combat on C-17s and C-130s. Likewise, AMC has
established a requirement for a new capability called Advanced
Situational Awareness and Countermeasures (ASACM), which will provide
detection, identification, and location of radio frequency (RF)
threats, increasing aircrews' survivability in an RF threat
environment.
Currently, AMC has no technical capability other than accepting
cargo from ``known and trusted'' sources and performing random physical
searches with canines to meet the need to non-intrusively inspect cargo
prior to air transport, a method which leaves aircraft and passengers
at risk. USTRANSCOM supported the ``explosive screening'' initiative by
providing the majority of funding thus far and AMC plans to fund 172
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) FidoTM hand held systems in
their fiscal year 2008-fiscal year 2013 POM. FidoTM is a
vapor and particle explosive detection device currently optimized to
detect TNT and DNT explosive materials, and black and smokeless powders
and can screen cargo prior to pallet build-up, rolling stock, and other
types of cargo entering into the DTS.
USTRANSCOM's Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP) made excellent
progress this past year, initiating information sharing with numerous
DOD and interagency organizations such as the Department of
Transportation and DHS. Those CIP actions support and are supported by
our participation in the National Port Readiness Network, chaired by
the MARAD, chartered to ensure seaport readiness to support military
deployment, sustainment, and redeployment while minimizing commercial
traffic disruption.
With DOD's increasing role in combating the global proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and for providing relief in potentially
hostile environments, USTRANSCOM's ability to detect, decontaminate,
and operate in a CBRNE and/or toxic industrial material environment
will continue to require attention and funding for the foreseeable
future. We are making great strides in the areas of individual
protective equipment, throughput capability, and technological
improvements, but there is more work ahead in the areas of detection,
decontamination, and policy development, with emphasis on a
comprehensive DOD cleanliness policy.
USTRANSCOM has embarked on meaningful intelligence reforms under
the aegis of the DOD's remodeling defense intelligence (RDI)
initiative, a Secretary of Defense effort to operationalize
intelligence, improving the capacity to anticipate threats and warn of
impending actions, and strengthening the COCOM's ability to conduct
intelligence activities, through joint intelligence operations centers
(JIOC).
The Joint Intelligence Operations Center--Transportation
(JIOCTRANS) will position USTRANSCOM to engage other JIOCs early in the
planning process, to identify and prioritize requirements and codify
our responsibilities to synchronize transportation intelligence across
the far-flung, collaborative defense intelligence enterprise.
Additionally, the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) regional support
center concept, in which DIA assumes the role of intelligence community
IT service provider, will result in a consolidation of sensitive
compartmented information (SCI) IT services and a reduction in
intelligence IT billets.
Another major pillar of RDI is the Defense Intelligence Analysis
Program (DIAP). DIAP represents a major departure from past
intelligence constructs as it emphasizes analysis over production, and
in so doing will allow JIOCTRANS to move beyond transportation
infrastructure analysis to analysis of transportation as a system of
systems in support of COCOM planning and execution missions.
Additionally, USTRANSCOM has created initiatives to enhance
information-sharing between USTRANSCOM, its components, and selected
coalition and commercial partners. The Intelligence Directorate has
established the DTS Info-Share program as an unclassified internet-
based system for sharing threat warning, incident, and trend reporting.
USTRANSCOM conducts quarterly modal threat meetings between the DHS and
transportation agencies for review of threats to and mitigation efforts
for transportation nodes. The effort's end-state requires continued
USTRANSCOM pursuit of new partnerships with DOD and non-DOD
organizations, particularly DHS and TSA.
Accelerated Deployment Planning & Improved Total Asset/In-Transit
Visibility
USTRANSCOM remains committed to accelerating the planning of
deployments and upgrading in-transit visibility (ITV) at all points of
the deployment and distribution pipeline. An important initiative,
Focus Warfighter, was born out of our advanced concept technology
demonstration, Agile Transportation for the 21st century (AT21). The
USTRANSCOM DDOC reorganized, reorienting its processes to
collaboratively plan with the COCOMs. The goal is to create a
comprehensive plan that aligns and provides longer windows of
visibility on various requirements such as exercises, troop rotations,
deployment, sustainment, and redeployment and eventually gives regional
commanders validation authority on missions like Special Assignment
Airlift Missions (SAAMS) that currently are not in the COCOMs' purview.
With awareness of all requirements we expect to be able to plan
``normal operations'' more efficiently and adjust more rapidly to
crisis situations.
AT21 also showed us COTS products can enhance and support our
overall transportation planning and movement processes with the
potential for significant savings. One such tool is Transportation
Visualizer (TransViz), a visualization and collaboration tool used for
strategic transportation planning. TransViz will revolutionize the way
we analyze transportation movement information, share thoughts,
evaluate courses of action, and make informed, effective and timely
decisions. We expect TransViz to be operational at USTRANSCOM by March
2006.
The Global Transportation Network (GTN) integrates transportation
information from over 23 DOD and 125 commercial source systems
supporting USTRANSCOM's global mission. With the discontinuation of GTN
for the 21st century (GTN 21), we are partnering with DLA and JS J4 to
best meet our customers' ITV needs. Currently, we are bringing two
similar systems, GTN and DLA's Integrated Data Environment, together
under the same acquisition management framework.
We have also implemented active Radio-Frequency Identification
(RFID) technology at our major strategic air and sea ports to provide
COCOMs detailed cargo movement tracking information. In addition,
USTRANSCOM is partnering with DLA, Air Force, Army, and USPACOM to
implement the Alaska, Active-Passive, Inter-modal Deployment (RAPID)
project. RAPID will support an inter-modal, RFID-enabled supply chain
that will integrate passive and active RFID data and improve asset
visibility. The RAPID project will support shipments originating from
the San Joaquin depot passing through distribution nodes on the west
coast and in Alaska with Fort Richardson and Elmendorf Air Force Base
as the end-users.
USTRANSCOM recognizes the nature of our mission creates a need for
more robust bandwidth resources and end-to-end connectivity with
transportation elements and supported forces deployed throughout the
world. As such, we fully support ongoing DOD programmatic efforts to
expand terrestrial Global Information Grid enterprise bandwidth, and
launch robust communications and blue-force asset tracking satellite
constellations.
USTRANSCOM is striving to achieve a common operating picture across
the entire distribution operations continuum, from commodity source to
point-of-effect. This emergent view via fused C2 information technology
systems will be called the Warfighter's Distribution Dashboard. This
``dashboard'' will provide a three-dimensional environment that
integrates deployment and distribution visualization and analysis tools
with a wide array of available USTRANSCOM data feeds as layers within a
geospatial environment, capturing the entire distribution battlespace
in a single web-based location to facilitate rapid analysis and
visualization of links, nodes, and lanes by all stakeholders. Ideally,
the dashboard will exist within an operations center platform thus
improving DDOC effectiveness and efficiency.
Ongoing Studies
In view of September 11 changes to our national military strategy
and current operational experiences, defense strategy objectives have
significantly changed. Accordingly, the JS J4 and OSD Program,
Analysis, and Evaluation (PA&E) Directorate conducted the mobility
capability study (MCS) which provides a starting point for analysis of
pre-positioning, aerial refueling, airlift, sealift, surface
deployment, and distribution capability required to support global
COCOMs in 2012. USTRANSCOM supports JS and OSD efforts and agrees with
the MCS assessment that the overall lift capability is about right,
however, additional analysis must focus on the correct mix of C-17s, C-
5s, and C-130 assets and aerial refueling and sealift recapitalization.
As such, we initiated an internal focused mobility analysis to study
strategic mobility from a USTRANSCOM perspective, concentrating on the
strategic airlift mix of C-17s and C-5s, and sealift recapitalization
alternatives. MCS will be our baseline, but we will explore how changes
in key assumptions may impact the analytical outcome. We will also
support the Intra Theater Lift Capability Study (ITLCS) Phases 1 and 2
to identify the right mix and number of intra-theater aircraft assets.
Air Mobility Readiness and Modernization
Aerial refueling capability is an absolute necessity, as it makes
possible rapid deployment of forces around the globe, and measured
recapitalization of the tanker fleet is my highest acquisition
priority. We envision the Replacement Tanker Aircraft (RTA) with a
multi-mission capability. Configured with cargo floors/doors, and
defensive systems, the RTA fleet will provide significant capability,
complementing our inter/intra theater airlift fleets, as well as Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) transload operations, and aeromedical
evacuation (AE) in a threat environment, something our current legacy
fleets cannot do.
At the anticipated procurement rate of 10-15 aircraft per year,
recapitalization of the current 530 aircraft will take decades. With
aggressive maintenance and corrosion control, the KC-135 can remain
structurally viable until about 2040, but at an ever-increasing cost
and with the realization that they will be 80 years old as the last
replacement enters service.
Though the KC-10 also appears viable until the 2040 timeframe, it
must be modified to ensure the 59 KC-10s can operate in the future
global airspace environment. AMC initiated a KC-10 aircraft
modernization program to comply with international airspace
requirements, address obsolescence concerns, and provide a growth path
for future upgrades.
USTRANSCOM needs the outsized and oversized capability provided by
the fleet of 292 strategic airlift aircraft and relies on its viability
to meet the airlift demands of our national defense strategy. As such,
we must continue the moderate risk program of modernizing C-5s to
improve reliability, availability, and access to international airspace
and foreign airfields.
We are also rapidly approaching a major milestone on C-17
production, as long-lead items near completion for the 180th aircraft.
We continue to rely heavily on our delivered C-17s, currently flying
these aircraft well above their planned annual flying hour profile.
Results of C-5 modernization coupled with aging C-130s, will have a
direct impact on C-17 roles as both an inter- and intra-theater
airlifter, and the amount of capacity it will shoulder compared to
other aircraft in the airlift mix.
The aging C-130 fleet faces obsolete parts, costly repairs,
noncompliance with Air Traffic Management requirements, but most
pressing in the active component are the number of center wing box
cracks and associated unprogrammed repair costs. Eighty-two C-130
aircraft Air Force-wide are currently grounded or restricted, and this
combined with ARC demobilization of ARC C-130E/H personnel in 2006,
places a distinct burden upon the Active-Duty fleet. The planned
acquisition of 168 C-130Js to replace the C-130Es, was limited by PBD-
753 to 53 aircraft. Although rescinded in May 2005, funding to reach 79
C-130Js has only recently been restored. The retirement of C-130Es, if
permitted by law, reduced C-130J procurement, and restricted and
grounded aircraft would push the C-130 fleet below the MCS lower bound
requirement of 395 combat delivery platforms required to meet the
defense strategy as early as fiscal year 2007.
Overall AE requirements have stabilized over the past year and are
not expected to decrease for the foreseeable future. Active-Duty AE
forces are filling a significant portion of deployed requirements;
however, ARC assets are still required in both a volunteer and partial
mobilization status. While the Air Force Surgeon General and Air Force
Director of Operations are reviewing the force mix for AE, the majority
of assets are expected to continue to reside in the Reserve component.
Sufficient material handling equipment (MHE), both in capability
and quantity is key to providing an effective cargo handling
infrastructure required to conduct rapid mobility operations. The Air
Force is modernizing its MHE fleet, procuring 318 Tunners and funding
production of 385 of 512 required Halvorsen loaders through fiscal year
2007. USTRANSCOM encourages the Air Force to continue acquisition and
fielding of the remaining 153 Halvorsen loaders.
Sealift Readiness and Modernization
MSC and the MARAD surge fleets, maintained in the highest state of
readiness provide critically essential lift capability for operations
that our commercial partners cannot handle alone. These fleets,
comprised of 8 Fast Sealift Ships (FSSs), 11 Large Medium-Speed Roll-
On/Roll-Off (LMSR) ships, and 58 Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships,
average 33 years of age for an FSS and 35 years of age for an RRF ship,
compared to the typical 15 to 20 year average economic life of a
commercial vessel. It is imperative for USTRANSCOM, MSC, and our
sealift partners to complete our analysis of recapitalization
alternatives, as key elements of the fleets are nearing the end of
their useful lives and will require recapitalization to meet future
requirements.
The age of MSC's tanker fleet is also a concern, as international
regulations and commercial refinery standards limit the age of tankers
loading and discharging at most worldwide oil terminals to a maximum of
25 years. MSC's controlled fleet of four fuel tankers will pass their
useful age in 2010. In preparation, we are pursuing the long-term
charter of newer commercial tankers to transport DOD fuel. As a vast
majority of U.S.-flagged tankers are active in Jones Act trade, the
desire for additional international trade tankers for DOD cargo may
result in opportunities for new tanker construction in U.S. shipyards.
As the DPO, USTRANSCOM maintains the requirement to provide heavy
lift and float-on/float-off (FLO/FLO) capabilities. The lack of U.S.-
flagged FLO/FLO assets negatively impacts the ability to provide
transport of vessels such as U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) patrol boats and
U.S. Navy (USN) minesweepers that may not otherwise be capable of open
ocean transit--due either to size or capability.
The Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS) supports COCOM
requirements by distributing fuel from a tanker offshore to forces
operating on land. Only three Government-owned OPDSs exist, two
deployed as part of MSC's Afloat Prepositioning Force, and one lay
berthed in CONUS. Each of these ships is a single-hulled tanker over 40
years old. USPACOM's validated requirement for delivery of 50 percent
more fuel (1.7 million gallons) from 8 miles offshore under
significantly more stringent environmental conditions has driven
USTRANSCOM and MSC to initiate an OPDS transformation project to meet
the new requirement. In January 2005, MSC awarded a contract to Edison
Chouest Offshore for an OPDS replacement, including newer, more capable
vessels, fuel-delivery systems, and personnel, to be delivered by June
2007.
Infrastructure Readiness and Modernization
Beginning in the late 1990s, USTRANSCOM, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM,
USPACOM, the JS, DLA, and the Services developed and implemented a
comprehensive plan to improve strategic airlift. Over $1.2 billion in
programmed construction projects to upgrade fuel hydrant systems, fuel
storage, ramps, and runways at 13 key en route airbases in Europe and
the Pacific were approved. Major construction began several years ago
and will continue until achieving full operational capability by the
end of fiscal year 2008, if funding remains on track. Once completed,
this programmed en route infrastructure system will support wartime
throughput requirements as validated by Mobility Requirements Study
2005 (MRS-05) and MCS into Northeast and Southwest Asia.
We have been working closely with OSD, the JS, and the COCOMs over
the past 3 years to expand our global reach and influence into regions
of potential instability, primarily in the Southern Hemisphere and
Southeast Asia. As part of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing
Strategy, civil and military airfields and seaports, known as
cooperative security locations (CSLs), are being nominated and assessed
for their ability to permit transshipment between air, sea, and surface
modes of transport.
USTRANSCOM in partnership with the COCOMs is identifying and
assessing CSLs that can support a notional airlift flow of 1,500 short
tons per day, as well as provide the capability to flow forces and
sustainment seamlessly between neighboring COCOMs. Chosen CSLs will be
integrated into the established strategic en route network in Europe
and the Pacific to provide the vital link between CONUS and more remote
corners of the world, enabling DOD to more effectively support the
warfighter.
Commercial Industry and Labor Teammates: Achieving the Right Mix of
Commercial and Organic Capability
USTRANSCOM readiness depends on maintaining a superb relationship
with our commercial transportation partners and supporting labor
organizations, allowing DOD to leverage significant capacity of
commercial transportation in wartime with reduced peacetime cost. Under
full activation, the CRAF provides 93 percent of our international
passenger capacity, 39 percent of our international long-range air
cargo capacity, and most of our international AE capability. The CRAF
program affords peacetime business to participating airlines in
exchange for their providing specified capacities in wartime, and as
such participants deserve safeguards like the Federal Aviation
Administration's Aviation War Risk Insurance to protect from loss or
damage to capital investments incurred supporting DOD operations in
accordance with the National Airlift Policy.
The CRAF program relies upon a robust civil air industry therefore,
we support the Fly America statute (49 U.S.C. 40118) and what we refer
to as the Fly CRAF statute (49 U.S.C. 41106) as they serve to support
and sustain this critical national asset. We continually review the
program and its incentives, adjusting to keep the program viable in a
dynamic environment.
We have recently studied CRAF incentives and have submitted
legislation intended to guarantee that a proper amount of ``assured
business'' will be available in the future. Other forthcoming
improvements include the restructuring of CRAF stages, aligning them
more closely with expected wartime needs. Within the CRAF program we
desire a U.S.-flagged commercial airline capability to carry outsize
cargo and a new aeromedical evacuation ship set, able to convert
several types of commercial aircraft for the AE mission, to improve
operational flexibility and responsiveness.
The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) is the maritime
equivalent of the CRAF program. In cooperation with USTRANSCOM, MARAD
and the maritime industry developed VISA to provide DOD the commercial
sealift and intermodal shipping services/systems necessary to meet
national defense contingency requirements. USTRANSCOM and MARAD co-
chair the Joint Planning and Advisory Group (JPAG). At JPAG meetings,
ocean carriers participate in the planning process to assure that
commercial sealift capacity will be available to support DOD
contingency requirements. Under VISA, DOD has access to commercial, dry
cargo, U.S,-flagged sealift capacity and intermodal infrastructure in
return for peacetime business preference. Because pre-negotiated
contracts with the carriers permit early access to additional lift
capacity, the time required to close forces for the counterattack phase
of war operations can be significantly shortened. VISA participants
move over 95 percent of USTRANSCOM's global war on terrorism wartime
sustainment cargo.
The Maritime Security Program (MSP) provides financial assistance
to offset the increased costs associated with operating a U.S.-flagged
vessel. In return, participating carriers commit vessel capacity and
their intermodal transportation resources for DOD use in the event of
contingencies. A critical element of our commercial sealift program,
MSP provides assured access to sealift/intermodal capacity and a
readily available, highly-trained and qualified workforce of merchant
mariners. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,
authorizing the expansion of the current MSP fleet from 47 to 60
vessels, including 3 fuel tankers, went into effect 1 October 2005.
MARAD is responsible for administering MSP to assure program
compliance. This expansion is particularly critical should the U.S.
find itself in a position where it must act with minimal allied support
during time of war or national emergency. Additionally, the increase in
the fleet size has had a direct, positive impact on the number of
billets and mariners. Of the 13 new vessel participants, 11 were
previously foreign-flagged and since re-flagged to U.S. colors. As
participants in the MSP, these newly re-flagged vessels will have U.S.
crews and provide a solid job base for the American Mariner.
Advanced Lift Systems and Concepts of Tomorrow
To properly support the combatant commander requirements in the
future, the need for more responsive and flexible lift cannot be
overemphasized. New mobility platforms as well as enhanced
infrastructure technologies and process/organizational improvements are
essential to meet the challenge of transporting greater volumes more
quickly to distant theaters at yet greater distances. There are several
initiatives now under consideration to facilitate these goals.
The potential lack of availability of aerial ports and sea ports of
debarkation overseas has generated an exploration into seabasing, based
on the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution,
and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea. In September
2005, a seabasing joint integrating concept was validated by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, which recognized that seabasing
improves power projection without access to secure foreign bases and
the littoral regions.
As the joint sea base evolves, the development of sea state
mitigation capability (through sea state four), high speed connectors
such as 40-knot plus vessels to transport personnel and equipment, high
speed inter-theater sealift vessels from CONUS to the sea base, and the
ability to utilize capabilities of both military and commercial cargo
and fuel ships will be vital to sustain forces with little host nation
support.
With our military operations being conducted more and more in
austere locations around the globe, coupled with new DOD and joint
maneuver concepts, we find it increasingly important to develop a short
take-off and landing (STOL) airlift capability. Current aircraft like
the C-130 and C-17 do not provide the access we will need from future
land and sea based operations. USTRANSCOM envisions new capabilities
that can lift over 60,000 pounds to or from shorter, unprepared landing
zones while providing improved survivability, speed, and range. These
capabilities will enhance our operational flexibility and our reaction
time to world crises.
In addition, as with the development of STOL technology, USTRANSCOM
envisions a future with a mobility airframe that serves as a common
platform or a family of platforms adaptable for multiple uses. This
approach enables a more affordable acquisition, enabling specialization
of a core design during assembly, as opposed to wholly separate
airframes and production lines for each mission. This can be a cost-
effective way to meet our future aircraft replacement requirements.
In light of all these technological challenges, AMC is currently
assessing their combined feasibility with the Advanced Mobility
Capability Concept (AMC-X). AMC-X is a capabilities-based future
``family of aircraft'' concept designed to provide swift, dominant, and
survivable intra-theater maneuver for all joint customers in the post
2020 timeframe. Variants of the AMC-X family have the potential to
perform a variety of missions to meet the needs of multiple users and
COCOMs. USTRANSCOM supports AMC in these efforts.
Army transformation has changed doctrinal concepts from arraying
forces in large contiguous formations to one of smaller dispersed
operations in austere locations over greater tactical and operational
distances. As such, the Army forecasted a need for a limited, time-
sensitive organic light airlift capability in the form of a Future
Cargo Aircraft (FCA) to support dispersed operations as their current
fixed and rotary wing assets lack the speed, range, and payload
capability to meet emerging requirements. Air Force platforms generally
lack the necessary STOL capability. USTRANSCOM recognizes the Army
requirement to support mission critical, time sensitive delivery
directly to a brigade combat team and supports the current Army Sherpa
replacement program, known as the FCA as currently programmed.
USTRANSCOM is also coordinating with AMC on executing a capability
based assessment that would define requirements for a Light Cargo
Aircraft (LCA) to provide an intra-theater light airlift sustainment,
as well as support to homeland security mobility operations capability,
as part of the future force. In today's fiscally constrained joint
environment, USTRANSCOM fully supports the Department's direction to
field this new Army and Air Force capability as a joint program. The
new FCA/LCA should definitely address evolving airlift requirements,
future force design and be capable of employing advanced precision
airdrop systems such as the Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS).
USTRANSCOM recognizes military operations are being conducted in
austere locations around the world and as such envisions the need for a
precise direct delivery capability via airdrop. The JPADS is key to the
resupply and sustainment of forces pursuing the adversary and engaged
in combat.
USTRANSCOM is also engaged with U.S. Army leadership to help
facilitate transportability of the Future Combat System of Systems
(FCS) and the brigade combat team: two essential ingredients to the
Army's new, transformational dominant maneuver strategy. We fully
support the development of these new, highly robust, lethal, and more
survivable combat vehicles and will work with both the Army and Air
Force to maximize transportability. The FCS Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV)
is the largest vehicle in the FCS family. We anticipate theater airlift
of the FCS MGV will be provided by AMC C-130s (one MGV) and C-17s (up
to three MGVs). USTRANSCOM remains committed to supporting and refining
the transportability and employment of the Army FCS.
final thoughts from general schwartz
We are a nation at war and supporting the warfighter is
USTRANSCOM's number one priority. We have been entrusted with the
authority to lead and to transform and assigned the responsibility to
serve the combatant commanders who will win this war. To that end,
USTRANSCOM brings to bear a military deployment and distribution system
that is unmatched anywhere in the world. USTRANSCOM's success begins
with our people who with superb dedication, vision, and hard work
continue to improve our support to the combatant commanders. Our people
are the heroes who ``make it happen and get it done.''
The enemy and battlespace environment are constantly evolving.
We're changing the way we do business, not because we can, but because
we must to be as adaptive and agile as we've ever been, at any time in
our history. We are operating in a distributed battle space, not
against a state enemy over established borders. We are challenged to be
expeditionary, to anticipate the needs of our agile, highly mobile,
rapidly deployable warfighters.
Our Nation also demands that we rethink what we're doing, change
mindsets, perspectives, the mix of assets, whatever it takes. The
Nation's treasure is more precious than ever and gaining the trust and
confidence of the Nation means being good stewards with all that is
entrusted to us.
USTRANSCOM's DPO initiatives are paying substantial dividends now
in effective support to the warfighter and in efficient use of our
national resources. Our readiness and modernization initiatives will
ensure the combatant commander's ability to swiftly engage and defeat
America's enemies. USTRANSCOM will continue to look to the future and
advocate systems to move America's might at greater distances and
speeds.
I could not be prouder of the USTRANSCOM team and our national
partners. Today, we are supporting the global war on terrorism, while
providing unparalleled humanitarian relief in both America and nations
abroad. Together we are transforming the military deployment and
distribution system, ensuring our Nation's ability to project national
military power--to ensure that America will face its enemies--whenever
and wherever the need may arise. In all of this, a promise given by us
will be a promise kept.
Senator Talent. General McNabb.
STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
MOBILITY COMMAND
General McNabb. Yes. Mr. Chairman, again, it's great to be
here on behalf of the AMC and to represent them to this
subcommittee and to you. We are the air component to General
Schwartz, who is both my friend and my boss, and I would tell
you we represent the 144,000 folks of the AMC, and that's
Active-Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilians. The AMC is very
proud of providing global reach for America, and what it gives
us is the strategic ability to move, and that strategic ability
to move is one that I think is a true cornerstone of our
national defense. I would say we provide the airlift and air
refueling to take our warfighters to the fight, whether that's
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF). That's not only getting them to the fight, but
sustaining them when they are there, providing disaster relief
at home and abroad, like Hurricanes Katrina or Rita, or
overseas, like tsunami relief or the recent Pakistan
earthquake.
Again, what General Schwartz mentioned is the aeromedical
evacuation of our wounded to get them back to the best care
available. It is probably one that both of us are about the
proudest we could be of that system in working together with
our great medical teams to figure out how we can take care of
these great warriors. To give you an idea, today we flew 887
sorties. We do that pretty much day in and day out. That
averages out to about every 90 seconds to 2 minutes, we have an
airplane landing or taking off around the world in different
places. As you mentioned, as General Schwartz and I watch this,
General Schwartz always seems to know the one that doesn't go
that well. So, I would just say that as we watch that, we try
to make sure that is done as safely as possible. They are, in
fact, airplanes that are showing the American flag around the
world. I would say that wherever that flag lands, it not only
represents America, it is America to the people that we help
around the world. Our airplanes are controlled and sequenced
out of Scott Air Force Base, our Tanker Airlift Control Center.
I would say that the way we do that is it's prioritized by
General Schwartz as he works with the combatant commanders
(COCOMs) that we serve, and they will sequence this, and we
will control that from Scott. That portion is one that we truly
are proud of because they will make sure that, as those
airplanes go around the world, we are watching the threat, we
are watching the weather, we are making sure that they are
safe--all the kinds of things that you need to do to make sure
that we can be nimble and quick when we have to change
priorities, such as after a Pakistan earthquake or when there
is a tsunami relief where we need to pick off airplanes very
quickly to respond. Our enroute system is also one that we are
very proud of because we can expand it and contract it very
quickly so that when you think about our system, it is truly
end-to-end. So, when you think about Katrina, the ability to
send a contingency response group into New Orleans Airport to
begin opening up that airfield to receive airplanes and get
them on their way, it truly is awesome. Something that General
Schwartz will talk about is extending that to a joint opening
capability, but it's something that we do today that we are
very proud of. You saw the same thing in Pakistan or anywhere
else is where we look at that portion of it to make sure that
that works.
Senator Talent. It seems to me that that mission is
increasing--that is, a worldwide relief mission. Have you
noticed that? Would you describe it as a significant burden for
you?
General McNabb. Sir, what I would say is that we are
getting better and better at it as looking at end-to-end so
that as soon as you say go, we'll figure out how--what kind of
bridge do you need to build to wherever we need to go to
include maybe opening up airfields that say you know, we are
going to go into this airfield, so what do we need to expand
that airfield's capability for the system--sort of the
throughput, if you will. That is being demanded faster. So,
what we have done is we have created a system in which we are
very responsive, that when the balloon goes up, we can very
quickly expand the bridge overseas and carry that out. When we
think about the expeditionary nature of our force, I would say
that is one of the things that we are very proud of. Folks
don't often realize that it's that portion that is more
important than any other part because it allows you to build
the structure so that you can fall in and keep this airlift and
air refueling moving. Again, it gives General Schwartz and the
combatant commanders a lot of flexibility to figure out where
we need to go and how quickly we can go there. The other one
that I would mention, that I think is very indicative today, is
because of the war, we have the most battle-tested force we
have ever had. So, what you get right now is lessons learned,
and we look at things end-to-end, and we are able to focus on
them and take that to the next level.
General Schwartz, as not only the commander of USTRANSCOM,
but also the distribution process owner, allows us to look
across the joint side of that whole equation to make sure that
we are getting that right. So, sir, I am very proud of our AMC
and the warriors that I get the pleasure of leading and
representing today. I look forward to your questions, and I
would like to say one other thing is that we are very grateful
that, despite the loss of a C-5 yesterday, everybody walked
away from that alive. There was no loss of life. It does speak
volumes about the ruggedness of our equipment and the training
that goes into our crews to egress safely and also allow the
standards that this committee and others have really pressed
for in our aviation industry because the fact that that
airplane didn't catch fire absolutely saved lives. Yesterday
morning, when the airplane first went down I was very worried
that we had lost lives. But as the day progressed and I kept
getting information I was just amazed that the words came back
that we have now accounted for everybody, and then it was
everybody without life-threatening injuries. There were none.
Last night, they had three folks that went through surgery--all
successful. Again, it speaks volumes of our ability to do
emergency response--bring that together, get folks to medical
hospitals, secure the site, and take care of all those things.
Again, it's one of the things that we are very grateful for,
but if you would like me to go into more detail on that during
the hearing, I would be glad to do that.
Senator Talent. We are certainly grateful for that report.
I am sure that when you have studied the accident thoroughly,
you will conclude that one of the reasons there were no lives
lost was the outstanding training and professionalism of the
crew.
General McNabb. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Talent. It's incredible to me they could have had a
crash like that without anybody being killed.
General McNabb. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Talent. So, next time I am on an airline, I am
really going to listen to the safety briefing.
General McNabb. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Talent. Senator Kennedy is ready now.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
welcome General McNabb and General Schwartz and your associates
to the committee. I think we are all mindful about the dangers
that our servicemen and women in the Air Force, in this
instance, are facing as they move through training, let alone
being in the focus of combat. This is really something that all
of us are very much aware of, and we appreciate the fact that--
I think at the end of my time, I am interested in whether we
had anybody from Massachusetts on that crew, but I'll talk to
you a little later about that.
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Let me say we welcome you. As you well
know, this committee has been enormously interested in the
strategic lift. We were very much involved in establishing the
USTRANSCOM, that we encouraged the Department of Defense to
focus on strategic sealift issues and urged the Department to
undertake the mobility requirement studies, and we authorized
needed resources for strategic sealift. We are also the members
of this committee that were there to help in the restructuring
of the C-17 at the time when Senator Nunn was the chairman, and
one of the only times we ever had a success against Sam Nunn
was holding onto that program as well. It probably is the only
mistake that he made in terms of our DOD and the Maritime
Prepositioning Force. He was a tremendous leader and chairman.
So, we are enormously interested and value very highly your
recommendations. I think we are interested in hearing--I've had
a chance the last evening to go through the past
recommendations and reports over the period of the recent years
and the varying requirements that have been there in terms of
the numbers going back to 2001 and 2003 and so on. So, I think
we are always looking at what is the real need. We are aware of
what the administration has requested, but given the kinds of
realities that we are facing--both in Afghanistan and certainly
at the present time in Iraq, we want to examine closely what
those needs are and what is the best way to meet those needs
and to make sure that we are going to have the kind of support
in terms of aircraft and variety that's going to meet our
defense requirements. So, I want to thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, for having this hearing. I will look forward to
asking some questions at the appropriate time.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Senator. Let me just toss a
general question out to you two generals here, and then we can
follow up with some specific ones. I am interested in your view
of how your textbook thinking regarding lift is panning out in
view of the realities on the ground that you are facing. What
would you say, just in your own mind, are the key lessons you
have learned from today's operations regarding force
utilization that you are going to take into account as you move
forward? General, we entered this era, and you probably entered
this job with certain presumptions or assumptions about what
was going to happen. What has happened on the ground that has
most changed your thinking in that regard? What would you say
the key lessons learned are--and General McNabb also.
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, I think for me, it has
reemphasized the notion that we need versatility in the fleet
mix, that having single purpose platforms in the era that we
are now in is not that helpful. This allows the regional
combatant commander and ourselves to organize ourselves
according to the requirements of a specific mission or task, to
do it with a variety of machines and what you have in the way
that will best serve the mission. I think another realization
has been that the days when we consider either maritime or
airlift platforms invulnerable are long gone, and that it was
at one time the thought that only combat aircraft are at risk,
and that is no longer the case. It certainly calls for
equipping our platforms as we have not completely. Certainly,
we need to pursue the end game on this with the right kinds of
self-protection equipment so that they can execute their
missions even with adversaries that are difficult to identify
on the battlefield. I think the final point I would make, sir,
is that although I knew this instinctively coming in, I must
reemphasize that the quality of our people is astounding. We
are very fortunate. From the airmen to the sailor to the
merchant mariner, we have a great team that in fact rocks and
rolls on a routine basis, and it is preserving the quality of
that force, I think, that we need to maintain focus on as well.
We tend to look at platforms, but it is the entire family, I
think, that needs attention too.
Senator Talent. Yes, if there is one lesson I have learned
from my 12 years on this committee or the one in the House,
it's that we tend to be over optimistic about the ability of
our equipment and our platforms to last or do what we want them
to do or come in at the cost we want them to come in, but we
tend to underestimate the ability of our people to make do with
whatever it is we give them. That should lead us, though, I
think to be even more persistent and dedicated to try and get
them the best that we can. General McNabb, do you have a
comment on the question?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. I think that getting to the
statement you just made is that if we can focus on warfighting
effect as opposed to individual platforms, we really make a lot
of money for the Nation and combat capability and also do right
by the taxpayer. I think that, as General Schwartz mentioned,
as we look at our mix of aircraft, if we can figure out
innovative concepts of operations because we have a new airlift
airplane like the C-17 that can move from the strategic to the
theater role very nimbly, to augment the 130 when necessary,
but do the strategic lift like the C-5, when necessary, it
gives us great flexibility to bring an awful lot of effect
where the combatant commanders require. I think that end-to-end
focus of the fact that we know that it's much more than
platforms, it's a system. From my standpoint, sometimes the
most important thing in our system is our ground handling
equipment. I remember when I was a tactical air control center
(TACC) commander, I had 12 C-17s and 12 tunner loaders, which
was our big loaders that could offload a DC-10 and 747 as well
as a C-5 or C-17. I tail number managed both of those because
wherever I put them, they had immediate effect, and it was
easier to turn airplanes faster.
The focus that this committee and others have spent on what
is the proper enroute infrastructure for us to be able to fall
into, you had mentioned talking about the contingency response
groups, our ability to expand that very quickly allows us to
get things done very quickly. That's my take and Senator
Kennedy, you had an awful lot to do with it as we brought
USTRANSCOM onboard. I was aide to General Cassidy during that
period. Your help on both the C-17 and standing up USTRANSCOM,
when you look at where USTRANSCOM has gone under General
Schwartz and his predecessors, I would say that you can see the
effect of that joint look across that is paying huge dividends
for the Nation, looking at better ways of doing this. So, the
flexibility that General Schwartz desires from me allows me to
fill in with sealift and prepositioning equipment, but also see
how we as a system work to the best advantage for the
warfighting combatant commanders. The other portion I would say
is that we focus on velocity and what the combatant commanders
need not only today, but tomorrow as they transform for the
future. I would tell you that when you think about it, General
Abizaid is asking how do we get convoys off the road, how can
we get our folks out of harm's way, when they ask General
Schwartz, and he comes to me and says, ``how might we do
this?'' We brought in C-17s and C-5s that took care of a lot of
the big heavy lift, allowing the C-130s to take care of more of
the ``eaches,'' and the fact that we had the flexibility to do
that really paid some big dividends for the Nation and very big
dividends on getting people off the road that we didn't have to
have out there. So, it saved lives. So those are the big
lessons learned, I think.
Senator Talent. The flexibility, velocity, vulnerability--
I'll ask more about that when we talk about the tanker. Let me
just go a little bit into assumptions, which I just asked
about, and then I'll defer to Senator Kennedy for whatever
questions he may want to ask. We talked about assumptions
versus what's actually happening on the ground, and let me
refer to that in the context of the latest MCS, with which
you're obviously both familiar and had a lot to do. The MCS
made certain assumptions about missions and about how we would
use the various platforms that we have and then came up with an
estimation of what level of lift we would need and what mixes
might be appropriate in the context of those assumptions and
came up with a range, the base of which was 292 units, I guess,
of lift, but that assumes that the assumptions on which the
study was based turned out to be correct. You both would agree
with that, I think. So, let's explore a couple of those. For
example, and the one that I hear the most often, in your
judgment, did the MCS underestimate the amount of intratheater
lift that would have to be carried by C-17s? My understanding
is that in USCENTCOM now, they are using C-17s consistently for
intratheater lift and that the MCS didn't take that into
account. Is that your understanding, and is that a concern that
you would have? General Schwartz, perhaps you would like to
take that.
General Schwartz. Sure. Sir, the MCS in fact did not really
deal with the intratheater lift requirement, it deferred that
to a subsequent study, which is now underway and nearing
conclusion. I think fundamentally, the circumstance that we
have faced, as General McNabb alluded to earlier, in-theater is
a little bit different in that we collectively made a conscious
decision that we were going to try to minimize our footprint on
the road networks in Iraq, and that naturally drove up the air
requirement--and not just for airlift aircraft, certainly it is
also true for C-130s and C-17s. It has also flown the blades
off of CH-47s. C-23s of the Army are flying extensively as
well. So, I think in this particular scenario, the analysis did
not anticipate the improvised explosive device (IED)
phenomenon, which we have seen. The consequence of that, sir,
is that we have operated certain of the assets, C-17 in
particular, at a greater rate than we had planned when we
originally established the laydown, which was 1,000 hours for
30 years. So, there is concern that we are operating certain
pieces of our system at rates greater than we had anticipated.
If you take a longer view of that, it is a legitimate concern.
Interestingly, given that vehicles have relatively short lives,
5 or 10 years, people don't have much problem with talking
about recapitalizing tactical vehicles. On the other hand, when
you are talking about major capital end items, like ships and
like airplanes that last 40 or 50 years, the depreciation of
those assets is not as visible and perhaps not as well
appreciated. I think the argument that the Air Force has made,
I agree with, and that the Deputy Secretary has addressed,
which is that again, taking the longer view, we need to
recognize that we are expending airframe life and that we need
to posture ourselves to the extent that we can to recover, and
reset that scenario as best we can.
Senator Talent. That's kind of an accelerated depreciation,
really, of the C-17 in particular because of the desire to
avoid that footprint. Would you agree with that, General
McNabb?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. I think that again, if you think
about MCS, it did ranges. It did ranges for the strategic lift,
292 to 383. You mentioned the 292 number. It said that the
capacity--and they didn't get into the types of aircraft, but
it didn't do that on the 292 to 383 either. It just said we
need about this capacity for intratheater, and it was 395 to
674. Primarily, discussion and the reason that was a large
range was because of how do you treat the homeland security
mission. Do we have to dedicate airplanes here to handle
homeland security? Then, it did the same thing on the tankers.
One thing that the Department did on MCS was it said that we
want this to be a study that never stops. It stays in
conjunction with the operational availability studies, and we
always get to the next question.
So, the next question was okay, we have had a lot of
discussion on the C-5/C-17, and that was actually answered in
QDR, where we said okay, we have 292 to 383. Where do we come
down on that? A lot of discussion on that was about where we
should go and ended up that we figured 180 C-17s and 112
modernized C-5s. So, that's kind of where the Department came
down in the QDR on addressing the strategic level. On the
theater level, on the intratheater, we need to have the same
discussion, and they are studying that now to take a look at
okay, what's the right mix to meet that intratheater
requirement? As you said, that is one of the lessons learned
that I think that we have figured, is that the C-17 has been
asked to do more and more in the intratheater role--to move
things like Stryker, to move in the Future Combat System (FCS),
to move Patriots, to move the Multiple Launch Rocket System--
things like that that we know is not maybe a strategic
requirement, but it will be what the theater commander will
need to be done there in those initial stages of the war. I
think that portion of the study will be very critical in saying
how do we want to size this to make sure that, from my
standpoint, I have the flexibility to meet General Schwartz's
requirements as he brings in the COCOMs and said okay, now we
have to be set. But this is a little different war than what we
have, and I think that's where we end up saying hey,
multipurpose allows us the flexibility to deal with different
situations and still do it in a reasonable standpoint from a
cost resource standpoint. There are lots of ways to do that,
but I do think that is one of the things that I--there is no
question that we have really been flying the C-17 hard. It has
actually performed probably even better than what people
thought back in the 1980s when we designed it and we said we
are going to build an airplane that complements the fleet. It
was both the future C-5, and then it was also the C-130
intratheater role. We built it that way. We made sure that it
had air evacuation capabilities, and we built it around the
back end. We built it with loadmasters in mind and how fast can
we get stuff on and off an airplane so that we can increase its
throughput.
It has paid huge dividends, as you all have mentioned. I
think one of the best things is that almost every Member of
Congress has flown into Iraq or Afghanistan, or both, on either
a C-17 or a C-130 and got to see firsthand the value of having
an asset like that. So again, I think that there is an awful
lot of room there, and I really am excited about the
intratheater look that's going to take a look and make sure
that we get that portion right as well.
Senator Talent. So, to summarize, that low-end range of 180
didn't take into account the need for intratheater lift. So, we
may need just some more as a requirement. I hear you saying
that. But then in any event, General Schwartz, you are saying
that we need attrition aircraft because we are flying the wings
off. Would you guys agree with both of those statements?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Okay. Let me go to one other assumption,
and Senator Kennedy has been very patient. I know he is
interested in this also, so I'll probably hand it off to him
and then come back and do some more on this. The load levels--
the MCS assumed optimal loading--efficient loading of C-17. You
mentioned, General McNabb, velocity, the importance of turning
things around quickly. I was relating this to if you're running
a trucking firm. In figuring how many trucks you need, you may
assume that you always keep the truck fully loaded. But if the
customer really needs it, you may have to deadhead.
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Has that happened with C-17, and is that an
assumption that perhaps the MCS overlooked?
General Schwartz. Sir, I'll pass to General McNabb in a
second. This is true not only for airlift, but sealift as well.
There are certain assumptions on stow factor for sealift--65
versus 75 percent and a similar sort of assumptions for
airlift. Bottom line is that our sense was, from an operator's
point of view, that perhaps they were slightly optimistic--not
excessively so, but in that range, maybe somewhat toward the
optimistic side. Naturally, military planners tend to try to be
very conservative worst case. Bottom line, though, however, is
that as you indicated earlier, we tend to make good use of the
platforms regardless of the empirical assumptions, and that has
been our experience. For example, during Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, I think few would have imagined that we would have been
combat loading C-5s out of Beaumont with patients as we did,
and there are similar stories with the use of the assets in
Iraq and Afghanistan as well.
Senator Talent. General?
General McNabb. Sir, I think again, there was a lot of
discussion on load factors, and you'll have very good people
disagree on how good you can get it or, however you do that.
What I would say is that one thing that I know is that we are
getting better at this. So, if you look back in hindsight on
what we did in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and
what we do today and what we'll do tomorrow, I still think that
there is an awful lot we can do to streamline that as we take
it end-to-end, and you have the distribution process owner, you
have everybody working together. One example is Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) building pure pallets that don't have to
be transloaded when they get to Charleston or Dover, and we end
up making the system better. While they each may take more time
to do that at Susquehanna, for instance, because of the fact
that you don't have to redo it at Dover and then redo it
another time when you get it into theater, you have saved time
overall in the system. So, those are the kinds of things that I
look at. The overall command and control is something that I
like to--you mentioned truckers, I mention National Association
for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR). I go to NASCAR and you win
NASCAR in the pits. You get to the pits because you know what
you are trying to do when the thing comes in so that you win
and you know, seconds win races. We are trying to design our
systems so that we are constantly getting better and better at
that, and there are a lot of ways of getting at that. Again, I
think the way USTRANSCOM approaches that from end-to-end under
General Schwartz as the distribution process owner is one of
the things that's paying huge dividends. From my part in the
AMC, I am already finding that pays dividends because when we
get the stuff and the receiver is ready to get it off the
airfield and go on and do the next thing, or when I land at a
place to pick things up, they are absolutely ready to go. They
have already been sequenced. They already have the radio
frequency tag all set to go. They are really ready to get out
of town. I would tell you another example is the fact that we
have a very battle-tested force, and most of the people--15
years ago, there were units that had not deployed by air. There
are almost no units today that haven't deployed by air, and you
get better at this as you go. So, I think that what we want to
do is take advantage of the lessons learned and take that to
the next level.
Senator Talent. So, we are getting better, but to this
point, we haven't been able to use C-17 with as optimal a
loadout as the MCS anticipated?
General McNabb. Sir, my take on that is that when you think
about MCS, you have to think about two full-out theater wars.
My take is that we haven't been pushed to have to do that yet,
so in many cases, we have done very good loadouts because of
the way USTRANSCOM forecasts and so forth.
Senator Talent. Fair enough.
General McNabb. We have gotten better at it over time. That
would be my take.
Senator Talent. I think I hear you saying that you haven't
to this point been pushed to the point where you have had to do
that. Senator Kennedy?
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Senator Talent.
General Schwartz, in your posture statement, you say that
``recapitalization of the tanker fleet is my highest
acquisition priority.'' Does that mean that tanker
modernization has a higher priority than buying additional C-17
aircraft beyond the 180?
General Schwartz. It does. In a resource-constrained
environment, sir, if I have to make a choice between the first
KC-X and the 181st or 201st or 221st C-17, I would opt for the
new tanker, and here is why, sir, there are a couple of aspects
to it. The truth of the matter is that again, the KC-135R is a
grand airplane, but it is a single point airplane. Generally
speaking, what it does is it refuels. What we need is a
multimission tanker that can do both boom and basket refueling,
that can do passenger lift, some cargo lift and have defensive
systems that allow the airplane to go wherever we need to take
it. The reason for that is this, sir, I'll give you an example.
We are taking passengers today into Balad and into Baghdad on
C-17s because it can protect itself. If I had an airplane that
could carry passengers there with a defensive system like a new
tanker, I would use that instead, and we would be able to
better manage the workload on the C-17 fleet and apply it
against the things that it does exceptionally well--moving
cargo. Additionally, I think a key thing is that it is
important to understand that we are a system, again, that
involves both organic government assets and commercial
resources. We depend heavily on a Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) on the air side, just as we do on the maritime side with
our commercial partners. The airline industry is in distress.
Three of my CRAF carriers are currently in bankruptcy--Delta,
Northwest, and Gemini. What I need is to have a platform that
gives me a little bit of insurance against continued stress in
my CRAF family. KC-X, that multimission tanker, is the kind of
platform that could buy me that insurance. So, in short, sir, I
do believe that for America, for the Armed Forces, that we get
better marginal value out of a new tanker than we do out of
more than 200 C-17s.
Senator Kennedy. Let me just--these other airlines, the
other planes, I mean JetBlue and Southwest, they don't--they
are planes that go for these low-cost carriers--are they
sufficiently different as to be outside of the----
General Schwartz. Sir, in fact----
Senator Kennedy. I want to get--I don't want to spend a lot
of time on that----
General Schwartz. I understand.
Senator Kennedy. --but I would be interested if you could
give me a quick----
General Schwartz. Quickly, there is a dynamic afoot in the
industry to more efficient airplanes.
Senator Kennedy. I see.
General Schwartz. Fewer wide bodies, more narrow bodies,
and that is not the kind of thing that we need, frankly. Now,
passenger carrying is fine cargo is not, and the bottom line is
that short-legged airplanes are not international operators. It
is the international operations, and it is the--typically, the
wider-body kind of aircraft that we seek.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. Is tanker modernization more
important than any of your other programs funded in the current
budget or in the future years defense program?
General Schwartz. Sir, as we put together the program, and
I believe that the President's budget properly reflects this,
we made judgments on priority. As you are aware, a solicitation
should soon be released by the Air Force to respective vendors
on providing proposals for the new tanker. I think that the
arrangement that we have currently, which is to modify the C-
5s, both reliability and avionics, to perhaps purchase a few
more C-17s in the single digits, and to get after this new
tanker is the right array for best use of the taxpayers'
treasure.
Senator Kennedy. I was just going to ask General McNabb on
this, and perhaps General Schwartz can answer it. Someone
suggested we could retire the C-5 and use the savings to buy
the additional C-17s. So, I understand the C-17 costs roughly
$200 million, and how much does it cost annually for the
operative support of the C-5A aircraft?
General McNabb. Sir, I'd have to take that for the record.
Senator Kennedy. $3, $4, or $5 million, does that sound
generally about right?
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The average C-5A/B direct cost per flying hour is $20,844. The
average annual flying hours per C-5A/B are 603 for the Active-Duty, 458
for the Air Force Reserves, and 250 for the Air National Guard
respectively. Therefore, the average annual direct operating costs per
C-5A/B are $12.6 million for the Active-Duty, $9.5 million for the
Reserves, and $5.2 million for the Guard respectively.
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
General Schwartz. Sir, let me just comment, though, that
from a pragmatic point of view we need to modify the C-5s. The
C-5 is a unique airplane. We need to do that. Now, the bottom
line is that we should not compete C-5 and C-17, just like the
study, and we have argued that you need 292 big airplanes. That
is the bottom line.
Senator Kennedy. All right.
General McNabb. Sir, if I could jump in there.
Senator Kennedy. Sure.
General McNabb. I fully agree with that. I think that as
you look at it, the whole thing was predicated on 292--you need
180 C-17s and 112 C-5s. What we know is we are going to
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) all of the C-5s. We are
testing one C-5A and two C-5Bs to see how they do with the new
engines. I would tell you that as we look at that, one thing
that we know is we have a lot of service life left in those C-
5s. Right now, we have the C-5As in the Guard and Reserve
equipped units. So, we don't fly, we use them as part of our
surge fleet. They do a great job at maintaining them at a
fairly low cost. I think that is working out very well, and
they still have a lot of service life left. So, my take is, as
General Schwartz's, the AMP does essential safety mods that are
absolutely important to us. It also allows it to fly under the
airspace environment that we have today and will have tomorrow.
Then, the reengine portion: we'll get to see how the test goes,
but I think most folks think that that's going to give us a
significant increase in capability, and I think that we can
call that later. But I, like General Schwartz, do not see those
as competitive.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you. General Schwartz, in your
posture statement you note some potential problems with the
tactical airlift. Your statements say the retirement of the C-
130s, if permitted by law, would reduce C-130J procurement and
restrict it, and grounded aircraft would push the C-130 below
the MCS lower-bound requirement of 395 combat delivery
platforms required to meet the defense strategy as early as
2007. So, what steps are you taking to mitigate the potential
shortfall?
General Schwartz. Sir, General McNabb can address this in
detail. Fundamentally, there are a couple of initiatives
underway. Some include rewinging C-130s and improving their
avionics as well. We are going to buy a total of 79 J model C-
130s. That's needed. It's a good airplane, and I certainly
endorse that. There is now a program of record called the Joint
Combat Airlifter (JCA). Sir, that is the way of the future.
Again, this is a question of versatility in the fleet mix. The
answer to every tactical airlift problem is not the C-130 in
the environment we are entering. Having a range of machines
sort of like a mini C-130 that can do two, three, or four
pallets into 2,000 feet, a C-130-type aircraft, and then
perhaps the C-17 in an augmentation role is the right way to
work the in-theater lift problem.
General McNabb. Yes, sir, and I fully agree with that. I
think that there is a way of shaping that fleet, and one of the
things that that intra-theater study under the MCS is looking
at is what is the right mix of airplanes. As you said, the
capacity is about 400. We need a couple of the 79 Js with our
current fleet of C-130 H2s and 3s. My take is we have a little
bit over 300 really good 130s that will last us for a long
time, especially if we get the AMP on those 130 H-2s and 3s to
standardize them and again, put required safety mods on there
so that we can fully use them. So, if you look to the future,
one of the lessons learned from the war is as we look at what
we are actually doing in theater is the 130s are moving folks
around and normally two to three pallets, which is less than a
130 load. The JCA might give us the smaller airplane that meets
that niche, but also provides the persistence that the Army and
our ground forces need.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. Very thorough and
comprehensive responses to a lot of different questions here
have been very helpful to me. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Senator. With regard to the MCS,
my understanding is that the original requirement for the
Army's FCS was that it be C-130 transportable, and they are now
moving towards--I don't know whether this is official or not--
that at least part of that be C-17 transportable. Is that your
understanding? Is that one of the reasons, General Schwartz,
why you are saying you could use some more C-17s if the fiscal
environment permits it?
General Schwartz. Certainly. I think the key thing here,
though, is that the Army has not fallen off the 130
compatibility for FCS, and the reason is because they are
trying to exert discipline on the development process. That's
the right thing to do so that the FCS vehicle--or actually,
it's a family of vehicles--might, in fact, be compatible with
the C-130, but not in its full-up mode. In other words, it
wouldn't have its full complement of exterior equipment, for
example. You might have to take bumpers and fenders off and
that sort of thing to get into the Herc. On the other hand,
clearly, if it's on a C-17, it's a roll-on roll-off kind of
operation. But the key thing is I know that General Schoomaker
is focused like a laser on maintaining discipline in the
development process so that he has a vehicle that is versatile,
just like we prefer airplanes which are versatile, so he can go
different ways. We will never be able to get it on a JCA
probably, but to some extent, a Herc and certainly on a C-17. I
think that the key thing, sir, is that there will be a need for
tactical delivery of those machines. Depending on the timing of
the requirement, if it's early in a deployment, it's difficult
when you are surging your long-range insertion. If it is
subsequent to the major deployment activity, say outside of 15
to 30 days, that is a more manageable circumstance. So, I think
my point would be that FCS will be both the 130 and a C-17 lift
requirement and that the timing and of course, the scope of the
battle we are speaking of will have a lot to do with whether
there is leakage from the intertheater requirement of 292
platforms.
Senator Talent. It's amazing how all of this just depends
on other assumptions you mentioned in the initial phases.
General Schwartz. Without a doubt.
Senator Talent. I know the MCS assumes that you have a lot
of surge, obviously, in the first 30 days and that after that,
it begins to fall out, which is the way that the MCS assumes or
concludes that you can meet the two contingency requirements.
Of course, war being what it is, we don't know whether there
will be a substantial drop off in the first contingency after
the first 30 days, do you?
General McNabb. Sir, one of the things that they found in
MCS is they looked at the inter- and intra-. Again, they looked
at the intratheater capacity that they needed, but one thing
that they found was the peak for intertheater was different
than the peak for intratheater. So, one of the things that came
up is well, we will be able to swing some assets. That's not
surprising because as you think about sealift and you think
about once Sea Line of Communication (SEALOC) closes--what we
used to say about the C-17 is it was primarily strategic until
SEALOC closure, and then it would swing to the intratheater
role and do that. So, that is one way we would look at it. The
only portion that isn't caught in there is during that peak,
when you are doing the strategic flow, if there are
intratheater requirements that require an outsized carrier like
the C-17--and again, I can use Patriots or Strykers or FCS. If,
in fact, they want to move them, that's the one that I really
want to make sure that we get a focus on because that could
happen early, and that is one thing that we are talking to the
Army and the COCOMs about to just get a feel for are there
requirements in there that you will have to have an airplane
the size of the C-17 to do efficiently. Again, you can work
around that. But again, that is not in MCS as it stands now.
Senator Talent. Let me--without going through all these
because I notice--time always goes by when you're having fun,
doesn't it? General Schwartz, let me just ask then if it's
still your view, and you addressed this subject before the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and I'll get the C-17 put
to bed here. I know that you can't just quantify these things
down to absolutely the finest point. But it was your view
before that committee, and I am wondering if it's still your
view, that in view of the evident need for greater intratheater
lift, the potential issues regarding FCS, the questions
regarding a more prolonged phase IV, which I didn't go into at
great length, that subject to the fiscal constraints that you
mentioned before regarding the tanker, that you do think it
would be good or you would like to have more than 180 C-17s,
and what number would you think is appropriate?
General Schwartz. I would say on the high side of 180 to
190. The other aspect of this, Mr. Chairman, is there is a top
line above which I am not very comfortable, and that, as I have
testified previously, is in the neighborhood of 200. The reason
for this is that if you have to manage a fleet, as I am
expected to do, and that includes not just the Government-owned
fleet, but the commercial resources as well who we depend on,
that any time when you're not as stressed as we are now, in
other words, a more peacetime mode, too many organic airplanes
mean you either fly your organic airplanes empty when you train
or you steal cargo from your commercial partners who need that
to remain viable so that they are there to surge with you in
war time. So, my sense is the ceiling on this is about 200. The
spot for me, based on, again, the constraints that I see with
regard to resources and the imperative for getting on with the
tanker is in the high 180s.
Senator Talent. Now, you said the ceiling, and I want to
make certain that we choose your metaphor properly, you told
the House you thought the sweet spot was around 200.
General Schwartz. Right.
Senator Talent. So, the sweet spot or the ceiling, and I
understand fiscal constraints.
General Schwartz. Yes.
Senator Talent. It would be nice to have 200. You think you
probably need because of attrition aircraft in the upper 180s
or 190s?
General Schwartz. Correct. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Okay. I understand that if you are forced
to a choice between the tanker and--that's a pretty tough
choice to be forced to. But if you are forced to a choice, that
you would choose to fund the tanker first. Let's go to that, as
a matter of fact. We do need to recapitalize the aerial
refueling fleet of the KC-135s, and I am wondering how you are
going to make the timing of this work because there are 530 of
the aircraft, and we would anticipate procuring 10 to 15 per
year. It'll take quite a while, obviously, to procure.
Moreover, you have expressed a desire to retire the 78 KC-135Es
in fiscal year 2007 and the remaining 36 135E and D models the
following year, which would obviously be before we would have
the replacement aircraft. Since that one ended up producing the
fleet, should we assume that we can do the actual aerial
refueling requirements with 59 KC-10s and 417 KC-135s, which is
what you would have left in the interim. Should we expect a
one-for-one replacement strategy for recapitalizing the
remaining KC-135 fleet? Also address--when you were talking
before about lessons learned, you talked about the importance
of trying to make these platforms less vulnerable. So, reflect
on how that might affect your thinking as you procure this new
tanker.
General Schwartz. This is really more in General McNabb's
lane, but let me just give you a general sense of things. The E
model 135 fleet is not very productive outside the continental
United States (CONUS). Twenty-nine aircraft are currently
grounded--can't fly. Another 60 or so are restricted, and then
the remainder of the 114 do largely CONUS, what we call
Operation Noble Eagle missions, that is, national air defense
kind of operations--training and so on. So, when we talk about
what goes down range, it's not the E models. We would
probably--if we retired all the E models and did not replace
them, we'd have an 8 or 9 percent reduction in our refueling
capability roughly. My view is that getting after the new
tanker and making space for the crews--in other words, really
getting the crews out of the E models and getting the
maintainers out of the E models and applying them to an
airplane that is very reliable, the KC-135R to get better
utility out of that airplane is the best strategy. So, I am
saying take down the old iron, realign the manpower to the more
capable, more reliable, higher sorti-generating air asset. I
think overall, we will be much better off. One final comment,
there are those who believe that to have a multimission tanker
is a bad idea because you'll never be able to use it as an
airlifter because you'll have to refuel. My experience does not
confirm that. Particularly, in terms of the global war on
terrorism, if we are going to go to war with Iran or Korea or
over Taiwan or a major scenario, the first 15 to 30 days are
going to be air refueling intensive, but what I am talking
about is the global war on terrorism, sir, for the next 15 or
20 or 25 years. That is not an air refueling intensive
scenario, and that's why a multimission airplane to me makes
sense. Focusing this not on replacing R models to begin with,
but rather the E models is the best approach. General McNabb?
General McNabb. Sir, I agree with what General Schwartz
mentioned. Our plan is, in fact, to take those crews and take
those great maintainers and apply them against the KC-135R, and
that's the reason you get the rather smaller decrement and
capability as we want to retire those 114 E models. I think
that that also sets us up well as we look at flowing new
tankers to those units, that they will already have a robust
maintenance base and a robust crew base. Our hope is that the
new tanker will do for strategic mobility, and I would just say
mobility in general, what the C-17 did between strategic and
theater lift. We want the new tanker to be kind of that
multipurpose that can be primarily a tanker, but then can
augment the strategic lift equation when required--so do the
same kind of thing, have the same kind of dramatic impact.
Floors, doors, and defensive systems allow us to do that.
Again, as General Schwartz had mentioned, if you look
across a 30- to 50-year life cycle of an aircraft when we need
to have those as absolute tankers when we are in a two-theater
war scenario, but when you look across 50 years, there are
going to be an awful lot of other times that we are going to be
in a position where we can use that asset if it's properly
configured to do some other things--for instance, augment CRAF.
We talked earlier about the C-17 and the 180 and how did that
all play out. I have mentioned before that my take on that is
it's the leakage from that 180 airplanes that I worry a lot
about. Right now, I have to use those airplanes to transload
stuff from the CRAF, and that's why a new tanker that has
floors, doors, and defensive systems that if the CRAF cannot go
all the way forward, we can offload it to the tanker. Then
folks will say well, ``if the balloon goes up and you need the
tankers for air refueling,'' I, go ``Then I am exactly where I
am now.'' But for most of the time, it'll be fine. So, from my
standpoint, that'll be a very good use of the taxpayer money,
and I think that when you go out to the COCOMs--and as they
came in and said, ``here's the kinds of things we need in the
new tanker,'' they mentioned six things, and they said we must
have defensive systems, we must have realtime information in
the cockpit, and we need the boom and drogue on the same
sortie. There is no difference. You can very quickly do that.
Receiver air refueling--that will allow us to use this airplane
much more to change our concept of operations and not have
airplanes come back with a lot of fuel aboard, which happens
today. Aeromedical evacuation, night vision operations, and
forward air refueling points. Right now, we will use C-17s and
130s to take fuel bladders forward to take care of our forces
on the ground. You can imagine the utility of having a tanker
that could go in there with the fuel already set how great that
would be. This went through the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, and this is what the COCOMs say they need now. I would
say that we can bring this on, and this will have a huge impact
on the way we do business. So, when you ask your question of
whether or not you have to do a one-for-one replacement, I
would say that I think it depends on the concept of operations,
but I think that we can do better than that. But again, you
will have to bring these airplanes in and increase the crew
ratio on them and increase the utilization rates that we are
going to do and how we are going to fly them. Again, I am real
excited about what that new tanker represents. Much like the C-
17 came in and changed how we did airlift, I'm thinking this
new tanker is going to come in and allow us to change how we do
air refueling.
General Schwartz. If we replace one-for-one, we are not
giving you your money's worth.
Senator Talent. Okay. It sounds to me like a key are those
defensive systems. This aircraft can't be vulnerable and do
everything you want it to do.
General McNabb. Not just that one.
General Schwartz. Sir, that is certainly true for the new
tanker, but there are existing assets that we need to equip
with defensive systems as well. Certain very important person
movement platforms, for example, are not so equipped, and they
need to be without delay. That's an important imperative too.
Senator Talent. We're going to have a vote soon, but I
didn't want the hearing to go by without asking a sealift
question because of----
General Schwartz. General McNabb can take that one, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator Talent. Yes. Well, let me keep it general then, and
I am interested in particular--and we can submit others for the
record.
General Schwartz. Sure.
Senator Talent. So, General Schwartz, just give me then
your general views, your vision for recapitalizing our sealift
assets. The Ready Reserve Force on average is 30-plus years
old. Then, give me your thinking about how that would relate to
the Navy's planned seabasing capabilities.
General Schwartz. Right.
Senator Talent. I'm still trying to get a firm grip on the
seabasing concept in action, and I'd like to know what you
think of it--not of the seabasing. That's obviously the Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO), but how would you see our sealift
assets interacting with that?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir. The difference between the way
the Ready Reserve Fleet, which is currently 58 platforms, sir,
performed after Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and for
Operation Iraqi Freedom is night and day. We had readiness and
reliability issues in the 1990s. Your committee decided enough
of that and we're going to invest in the platforms, in their
maintenance and so on so that when we call on them, they'll be
ready. That has been the case for the last 3\1/2\ years, and it
is something we need to continue. We will make some adjustments
in the Ready Reserve Fleet, taking it down. We are going to
reinvest those dollars in readiness and long-term service life
extension so that the platforms will be good for 50 years.
That's the front end strategy on the Ready Reserve Fleet. As
you are aware, we have a number of specialty platforms that are
in various stages of readiness. The fast sealift ships are on
average 30 years old, of which we have eight. We have 11 large
medium roll-on roll-off (RORO) platforms, and they range from
25 years to just very recent production within the last 10
years. Clearly, we need to look ahead on how to recapitalize
the fast sealift capability. We don't need a lot, but the truth
is there is no counterpart for fast sealift in commercial
industry. There is no need for it. So, this is a unique
military requirement. We don't need a ton of it. But
particularly for those scenarios where we have to cycle these
platforms more than one trip, you really gain a lot by having a
27-, 32-, or 34-knot platform rather than 24 knots or below.
Fast sealift is point one. Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off
Ships (LMSRs)--really the crown jewel, which are the vehicle
carriers, there are two ways to do that. We need to have some
in the organic fleet and we need to make these platforms last.
But part of our strategy is to try to gain access to them in
industry, and we have been increasing that through the Maritime
Security Program.
We have added several RORO platforms that are in commerce
that cost us a couple million dollars a year to assure their
availability when we call on them. But otherwise, the
Government does not have to underwrite their maintenance and so
on and so forth. That is a very high leverage way to maintain
the Nation's sealift capacity, and we are working to increase
the RORO contribution as compensation for taking out some of
the oldest very low-utility ROROs in the Ready Reserve Fleet.
So, a combination of things; MCS, sir, because it looked at
2012, said the sealift is fine, and it is. But as we move
beyond 2012 toward the end of the second decade, we will need
to recapitalize. That is a Program Objective Memorandum (POM)-
08 POM-10 issue for us, and we are not going to let that slip
away. You asked me about seabasing. It's a good approach, but
there are those who believe that the platforms that support the
seabase should be dedicated. I'm not one of those. Dedicated
platforms are a bad idea. No more than in the 50 years that
General McNabb talked about will you be in a situation where
tankers will be in a surge refueling mode. It is also difficult
to conceive that you will have a seabase established
indefinitely. So, the platforms that we build to support the
seabase need to be multi-mission too so that when they are not
required to have marines onboard, or Air Force ammunition or
Army equipment, that they can be used in the common user fleet.
In other words, tasked by USTRANSCOM for the benefit of the
Armed Forces more broadly. That is an important imperative
which I am working with the Navy and the Joint Staff to assure
that we retain access to those platforms when they are not
otherwise employed in a seabasing scenario--very important.
Fourteen ships currently is what the Navy is thinking about.
That is not a trivial-sized flotilla, and I believe it would be
unfortunate if those platforms that lend themselves to the
movement of equipment were not generally available to the rest
of the Armed Forces.
Senator Talent. Are you working with the Navy in terms of
requirements for that since it's your position that you'll have
access to them when they are not needed for seabasing purposes?
General Schwartz. Indeed, sir.
Senator Talent. All right. We may have some more questions
for the record, and of course the committee members will have
the opportunity to submit those. But subject to that, the
hearing is adjourned. Thank you, gentlemen.
General Schwartz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. Thank you again for your service and your
testimony.
General McNabb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator John McCain
c-130 modernization vs. replacement
1. Senator McCain. General McNabb, the Air Force cannot fit all its
program requirements into its limited procurement accounts. There are
tough choices ahead concerning several resource-intensive programs and
it will be imperative that fiscally sound decisions are made. There is
an option to update the aging C-130 fleet that includes avionics
modernization, a center wing box replacement, and an engine
modification which will require fewer resources than procuring new C-
130Js and/or Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA). How can the Air Force justify
using a great deal more resources in procuring new aircraft rather than
pursuing the less expensive modernization program for the C-130 fleet?
General McNabb. We are pursuing a dual strategy because neither
approach alone provides the minimum capability required by the
warfighter. This strategy combines targeted new aircraft acquisition
with fleet modernization. First, we are acquiring 72 combat delivery C-
130Js and the JCA to replace 170 aging C-130Es. The C-130J has proven
to be a force multiplier operating in support of global war on
terrorism. The JCA will close a capability gap identified by the Army
during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to resupply/sustain troops in
remote mountainous regions and to support time sensitive combatant
commander (COCOM) requirements.
Second, we are modernizing the C-130H variants to make them
compliant with safety and civil airspace mandates. The C-130 Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) provides a common cockpit configuration and
reduces sustainment costs. Center wing box (CWB) replacement of the H-
model aircraft is imperative to meet ongoing and future commitments.
Our overall strategy reduces the planned combat delivery C-130J
procurement from 150 to 72 aircraft. Retiring the E-models reduces the
overall C-130 AMP and CWB replacement bill as well as the cost of
sustaining a 41+ year old fleet. Additionally, I believe it prudent to
replace the C-130E fleet with an aircraft capable of closing the
capability gap and supporting ground forces well into the future.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
strategic lift to support a transformed army
2. Senator Kennedy. General Schwartz, one of the concerns about the
mobility requirements study (MRS-05) analysis was that it predated the
major restructuring of the U.S. Army, which is now planning on modular
brigades and the Future Combat System (FCS). Did the mobility
capabilities study (MCS) remedy these deficiencies in the previous
analysis?
General Schwartz. The MCS ensured all Services updated required
force structure expected in 2012 and did include Army modular brigades
equipped with Stryker Combat Vehicles. The FCS will be fielded beyond
2012 and therefore is not included in MCS. However, the footprint for
both is similar. Maintaining the unit integrity of these brigades was
considered in the deployment of these forces.
3. Senator Kennedy. General Schwartz, are there other changed
circumstances that MCS did not adequately consider? Are you confident
that MCS and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) allow us to gauge the
proper demand for strategic airlift?
General Schwartz. Our goal is to maintain enough flexibility to
adapt and continue to support the COCOMs. I am inclined to agree with
the MCS and QDR regarding strategic airlift with the 180 C-17s
programmed and the C-5 modernization that could complete by fiscal year
2020 for the scenarios examined. That said, up to an additional 20 C-
17s would add to our confidence and flexibility in supporting
unforeseen events. MCS work continues and is beginning to address the
program needed for recapitalization of our air refueling fleet.
avionics modernization plan and reliability enhancement and reengining
program
4. Senator Kennedy. General McNabb, in 2001, the Air Force
sponsored analysis by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) which
concluded that upgrading the C-5 fleet, both C-5As and C-5Bs, with the
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and the reliability enhancement
and reengining program (RERP) was the most cost effective alternative
for increasing strategic airlift capability. I appreciate your comments
that you are waiting to see how the test program turns out for the C-5A
AMP and RERP process. Has the Air Force seen anything thus far in the
development of the AMP and RERP that would alter the previous Air Force
and IDA conclusion?
General McNabb. No, the Air Force has not seen anything in C-5 AMP
or RERP development that would alter previous Air Force and IDA
conclusions that upgrading the C-5 fleet with AMP and RERP is a cost
effective alternative for increasing strategic airlift capability. The
Aeronautical System Center (ASC) predicts that C-5 AMP operational test
and evaluation (OT&E) will successfully validate all of AMP's key
performance parameters (KPP). The Air Force predicts it will achieve
similar success with RERP KPPs. However, RERP KPPs will not be
validated until RERP OT&E is complete, estimated by fiscal year 2009.
5. Senator Kennedy. General McNabb, assuming that the testing
program validates the expected improvements in readiness, how do you
intend to use the updated C-5A/B fleet to compensate for the
unexpectedly high utilization rates the C-17 is seeing as a result of
Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF)?
General McNabb. A modernized C-5 fleet with defensive systems
capability will fly intertheater direct-delivery to the warfighter. The
demand for airlift still outweighs the supply. The MCS minimum number
of 292 aircraft was predicated on modernized platforms whether C-17 or
AMP/RERPed C5s. One of the critical assumptions of the MCS is that the
C-5 modernization program will be successful. It will take both the
full buy of C-17s and the modernization of the C-5 fleet to meet the
minimum requirements of the MCS. The increased capability that a
modernized C-5 fleet will provide should allow us to reach further down
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) priority list and provide greater
support to the warfighters. It will also provide us with greater
operational flexibility by allowing us to take full advantage of the C-
17's multi-mission capability in support of the warfighter's intra-
theater airlift requirements.
6. Senator Kennedy. General McNabb, the Air Force is on record that
they are using up C-17 service life more quickly than anticipated. Once
C-5 reliability improves, shouldn't we be able to increase its
utilization and cut back on C-17 use for inter-theater lift, in effect
buying back some service life?
General McNabb. With improved reliability, C-5 utilization should
increase. However, the demand for airlift outweighs the supply.
Improved reliability and increased utilization that a modernized C-5
fleet will provide should allow us to reach further down the priority
list and provide greater support to the warfighters. It will also
provide us with greater operational flexibility by allowing us to take
full advantage of the C-17's multi-mission capability. Even after the
C-5 is modernized, it is still a much more expensive asset to operate
than a C-17. To keep the cost of operation down, we plan to put the
majority of our C-5 fleet in our Air Reserve component, our ``surge''
force.
protection systems
7. Senator Kennedy. General McNabb, I know that the Air Force has
previously equipped some of the C-130, C-141, and C-17 cargo aircraft
with an add-on armor ballistic protection system. These kits provide
protection to crew and critical systems from ground fire during
approaches and departures, when the aircraft is most vulnerable to
these threats. Has the Air Force evaluated the effectiveness of this
system? If so, what is your assessment of the effectiveness of making
these improvements?
General McNabb. Based on developmental testing of the system used
on C-130s and C-17s, Air Mobility Command is confident these systems
provide necessary additional measures of protection where installed.
8. Senator Kennedy. General McNabb, we all know that the C-5 was
intended for strategic and not tactical transport applications. In the
new environment we face, however, ``tactical'' threats could be present
anywhere. I am sure that considering this new reality has led the Air
Force to begin testing a version of the large aircraft infrared
countermeasure (LAIRCM) system on a C-5B. Since the crews operating the
C-5 fleet could be subject to such ``tactical'' threats as surface-to-
air missiles, it would seem to be prudent to protect these crews from
direct fire threats as well. Is the Air Force considering applying such
add-on armor ballistic protection systems to aircraft in the C-5 fleet?
If not, why not?
General McNabb. In close coordination with Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E) experts, Air
Mobility Command is evaluating alternatives to add aircraft armor to
the C-5 in much the same way armor was installed on the Lockheed C-141.
tactical airlift in the army and air force
9. Senator Kennedy. General Schwartz, the Army intends to buy a
Future Cargo Aircraft (FCA) as part of the Comanche helicopter
cancellation 2 years ago. While this aircraft would not provide as much
intra-theater lift capability as the C-130 aircraft, it would provide
some capability. Now the Air Force is also intending to buy much the
same aircraft under the Light Cargo Aircraft (LCA) program. I believe
that the Department is now calling these programs the JCA. How does the
JCA program for cargo aircraft affect your plans?
General Schwartz. Most Vietnam-era C-130E/H aircraft show
significant signs of aging due to extensive tactical airlift use. These
intra-theater airlifters suffer from structural problems; evident from
the center wing box failure resulting in 21 grounded aircraft with
another 58 operating on flight restrictions. Grounded aircraft cost $7
million to $9 million per aircraft to fix and restricted aircraft cost
approximately $700,000 to repair, while only increasing aircraft
lifespan by 3-5 years. The bottom-line is that grounded aircraft are of
little long-term value to the Department of Defense and restricted
aircraft are limited to training missions. If we do nothing to fix the
aging C-130 problem, then we would fall below the MCS-stated threshold
as early as fiscal year 2007. However, the Air Mobility Command's most
recent mitigation plan relies, in part, upon JCA acquisition to ensure
the MCS-stated threshold in intra-theater aircraft is not approached.
10. Senator Kennedy. General Schwartz, how would you account for
the contribution of such Army and Air Force cargo aircraft?
General Schwartz. The Department of Defense is just beginning to
shape the contributions that will be made by the JCA. The JCA will be
an integral part of a focused logistics network necessary to support a
dispersed and networked future combat force. Its flexibility, including
robust takeoff and landing capability, will maximize operations across
the spectrum of military operations. Access to unimproved landing areas
will provide the joint force commander a throughput of priority supply,
personnel, equipment, and materiel to the right place, at the right
time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military
operations.
11. Senator Kennedy. General Schwartz, have you and your staff been
involved in considering how to proceed with the JCA program?
General Schwartz. Yes, our involvement began over a year ago when
the program solely resided within Army channels as the Future Cargo
Aircraft. After Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) III directed that the
program evolve into a joint Army and Air Force venture, we have been
involved in shaping the future of the JCA. My staff and our air
component, Air Mobility Command, are working in concert with the Army
staff in the pursuit of this future joint airlifter.
support for civilian-owned strategic lift resources
12. Senator Kennedy. General Schwartz, the administration has asked
for legislation that would require a minimum annual purchase of
services from Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) providers. I understand
that the Department believes that you need to do this to ensure that
the CRAF aircraft owners will have sufficient commercial activity to
ensure that their aircraft are available in wartime.
I also understand that the Department of Defense (DOD) has recently
reversed its policy of relying on commercial shipping companies first
and relying on Government-owned or Government-controlled ships if
commercial vessels are not available. Presumably, these peacetime cargo
bookings help U.S.-flag operators have sufficient commercial activity
to ensure that their ships or aircraft are available in wartime. Now,
however, DOD has said that the priority should go to the Government-
owned or Government-controlled vessels. How are these policies
consistent?
General Schwartz. The administration has submitted section 802 of
the Fiscal Year 2007 DOD Authorization Bill, Minimum Annual Purchase
for CRAF contracts, to allow the DOD to guarantee a minimum level of
business to our commercial partners that more accurately reflects the
services we expect them to provide. DOD currently guarantees a small
part of our annual business based on known requirements at contract
award with the remainder of our business being awarded throughout the
year as needs develop. With fewer troops stationed overseas, the known
requirements at award will continue to dwindle. Air carriers need
guaranteed business contracts to obtain financing for fleet expansion
and operating costs. The proposal should not result in any increased
costs to the Government.
It has been, and continues to be, USTRANSCOM policy to support the
National Sealift Policy in that, ``The U.S.-owned commercial ocean
carrier industry, to the extent it is capable, will be relied upon to
provide sealift in peace, crisis, and war.'' This national directive is
the foundation of our vessel selection process. The bedrock of this
directive is to promote the U.S. sealift industry with Government
business, resulting in an increase in jobs for the U.S. mariner and
more business for U.S. flagged vessels. Vessels that are Government-
owned or Government-controlled should not compete with commercial
industry for business.
Every attempt will be made to satisfy transportation requirements
using commercial resources. However, when commercial resources and
schedules cannot satisfy requirements, Government-owned or chartered
vessels will be activated or utilized. These activated ships shall be
employed appropriately to augment the commercial fleet in support of
DOD requirements. These organic vessels will be used judiciously and
with forethought to ensure they are not in competition with commercial
industry whenever possible.
During wartime and contingencies, we anticipate a surge of organic
capacity to meet wartime requirements. That is not to say that
commercial capacity will not be used, quite the contrary. We will fully
seek commercial solutions early and often throughout the stages of a
contingency in order to satisfy strategic requirements. Relying on the
privately-owned, U.S.-flagged commercial merchant marine as a source
for national defense sealift, benefits the United States military in
many ways. For example, it provides global reach, access to valuable
commercial inter-modal capacity, immediate guaranteed access, reduced
U.S. military footprint, and a reserve of strategic capacity.
13. Senator Kennedy. General Schwartz, does this mean that you do
not need as much sealift augmentation in wartime as we had thought you
would need?
General Schwartz. Not at all. We continue to maintain a proper mix
of organic and commercial assets to meet our sealift requirements. As
our organic fleet ages and is removed from service, recapitalization
options are considered. These options include the Maritime Security
Program and contingency contracts with our commercial partners, new
construction, modification to existing hulls, or other commercial
ventures. The MCS determined that our current sealift capacity is
adequate, and we will maintain that capacity with a mix of organic and
commercial assets.
sell used c-17s and buy new
14. Senator Kennedy. General McNabb, at various times, some have
suggested that the Air Force sell some of its older C-17 aircraft and
use the proceeds to buy new ones. Is there any such proposal that the
Air Force is currently evaluating?
General McNabb. While there have been discussions on the
feasibility of selling used C-17s, the Air Force is not currently
evaluating any proposals to sell older C-17 aircraft to offset the cost
of new aircraft.
[Whereupon at 4:54 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2007
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY SHIPBUILDING
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in
room SR-232, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Talent (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Talent, Collins,
Lieberman, and Reed.
Majority staff member present: Sean G. Stackley,
professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Micah H. Harris and Benjamin L.
Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Mackenzie M. Eaglen,
assistant to Senator Collins; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to
Senator Talent; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
and Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. TALENT, CHAIRMAN
Senator Talent. We will convene the hearing. I know Senator
Kennedy is deeply involved in the immigration debate and may
not be able to come. If he is able to come, of course we will
defer to him for his opening statement when he arrives, as is
convenient for him.
The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the
Navy shipbuilding program and the shipbuilding industrial base
in review of the Department of Defense's (DOD) authorization
request for fiscal year 2007.
We are pleased to have with us today Dr. Delores M. Etter,
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition. Welcome, Dr. Etter.
Dr. Etter. Thank you.
Senator Talent. Ms. Allison Stiller, who is the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Ships. Welcome, Ms.
Stiller.
Ms. Stiller. Thank you.
Senator Talent. Rear Admiral Mark J. Edwards, the Director
for Warfare Integration. Welcome again.
Admiral Edwards. Thank you.
Senator Talent. Rear Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, who is the
Director for Programming.
We will convene the second panel this afternoon with Damien
Bloor of First Marine International, and John F. Schank of the
RAND Corporation to discuss their respective studies regarding
the shipbuilding industrial base. In my time as chairman of the
subcommittee, I have had the opportunity to take aboard much
testimony by the Navy on seapower matters. I have gained a
great appreciation for the Navy's unique perspective on our
national security. A perspective that has been born out through
testimony and through time, that we are a maritime nation. The
security of our Nation, the strength of our economy, the face
of our diplomacy, and the course of our foreign policy have
long been built upon the Navy's ability to maintain global
presence and exercise freedom of maneuver upon the seas.
Our primacy as a naval power is virtually unchallenged
today, due in large part to prudent decisions made in these
rooms, 10, 15, and 20 years ago. That is the nature of
shipbuilding; we have to take the longer view. Decisions
regarding the fleet's capabilities for the distant future are
before us today. When we consider requirements for the future
fleet, we must be careful that we do not undervalue that most
fundamental of capabilities--numbers of ships. To the extent
that we forego the difficult decisions to invest in that
capability, we place at risk our primacy as a maritime nation
and all the security that that affords.
This time last year, the subcommittee expressed its extreme
concern with the steady downward trends in the Navy
shipbuilding program: reduced build rates, increased costs, a
weakened industrial base, and the prospects of our Navy, which
is currently at is smallest size in decades, ultimately falling
well below 250 major combatants. Our concerns trace to the hard
reality of those elements of our national military strategy
which rely upon naval capability, whether engaged in the global
war on terror or in major combat operations. We will certainly
be challenged in regions of the world vital to our national
interests, during the service lives of the ships whose keels we
lay today.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has responded to our
concerns and brought forward with the 2007 President's budget,
the Navy's long-range shipbuilding plan, which calls for a
future fleet of 313 ships. We will continue to work closely
with the Navy to gain a full understanding of the requirements
and capabilities called for in this plan.
The Navy's estimate to construct this force is on the order
of $13.5 billion per year, which would represent a 50 percent
increase above investments of the past 15 years. We are
interested in hearing the Navy's plan to finance this
investment and provide much needed budget stability.
Additionally, the CNO has highlighted that the
affordability of this plan will be enhanced by tight control
over requirement changes and emphasis on threshold capability
for ships under contract, that the Navy's expectation is that
industry will respond to stabilize the program with efforts to
reduce its costs.
I am interested and the subcommittee is interested in your
insights regarding these cost control efforts in the Navy's
initiatives to improve the affordability of the shipbuilding
program, particularly in light of the notably higher
shipbuilding estimates we have received from the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO).
There are a number of new ship programs and new
capabilities, either under construction or being introduced
within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The
subcommittee is keenly interested in your progress bringing
these programs forward: the next generation destroyer, the
DD(X), the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the future aircraft
carriers, CVN 21, and the Maritime Prepositioning Force or
seabase ships. We look for greater clarity regarding your
acquisition strategy for these ship programs, and your plan for
managing risk, design, and production. As well, we continue to
closely follow your progress on the more mature shipbuilding
programs, the Virginia class submarine, and Amphibious Assault
Ship programs, and listen for your recommendations regarding
efficient procurement of these critical capabilities.
Finally, we must consider the effect of the shipbuilding
plan on the overall health and viability of our strategic
shipbuilding industrial base. We look for the Department's
assessment of this important topic and will engage with our
second panel to gain the benefits of their insights and
recommendations in this regard.
Again, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for joining us today
and we look forward to your testimony.
Senator Reed, if you have an opening statement or comments
you would like to make, you can feel free.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No, I do not. I am
interested in hearing the panel. Welcome, ladies and gentleman.
Senator Talent. I understand that Secretary Etter and
Admiral Edwards have opening statements, so we will start with
Secretary Etter.
STATEMENT OF DR. DELORES M. ETTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION
Dr. Etter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members
of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before the
Seapower Subcommittee to discuss the Department of the Navy
ship construction programs and the fiscal year 2007 budget
request. I would like to thank you for your personal support
and the committee's great support for all Navy and Marine Corps
programs.
I would like to submit our joint written statement for the
record.
Senator Talent. Without objection.
Dr. Etter. There has been considerable activity within
shipbuilding over the last year, and in fiscal year 2007 we
will see the Navy's previous research and development (R&D)
efforts begin to bear fruit. There are a variety of platforms
and capabilities that will transform our fleet over the FYDP as
we procure 51 new ships. To support that plan, we must align
the industrial base for long-term force development through
split funding, advance procurement, and cost saving
initiatives. The Navy continues to analyze operational
requirements, ship designs and costs, acquisition plans, and
industrial base capability to further improve its shipbuilding
plan.
I would like to highlight the ships we propose procuring in
fiscal year 2007. At the top of the list is DD(X), which is the
centerpiece of a surface combatant family of ships that will
deliver a broad range of capabilities. Since the award of the
design agent contract in April 2002, the program has conducted
extensive land-based and at-sea testing of the 10 critical
engineering development models, and, as a result, is on track
to mature these systems in time for ship installation. This
level of technological maturity was a key fact in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) granting Milestone B approval
in November 2005. As you are aware, the Navy is proposing a
dual lead ship acquisition strategy. The Navy is confident that
this approach will motivate cooperative and collaborative
completion of detail design, control costs on the lead ships,
and allow a broader set of options for future acquisition
strategy decisions. Our fiscal year 2007 budget request
includes the first funding increment for two DD(X)s. The ship
that I believe will prove to be transformational in terms of
how we research, develop, and acquire capabilities is the LCS.
This asset will bring much to the table in support of the
uncertain security environment we operate in today and in the
future.
LCS will be different from any warship that has been built
for the U.S. Navy. Its modular design, built to open-systems
architecture standards, will provide flexibility and a means to
rapidly reconfigure mission modules and payloads. The program
provides the best balance of risk, affordability, and speed of
construction. The LCS program is on track and within the cost
caps established by Congress. Our fiscal year 2007 budget
requests include funding for two LCSs.
Our fiscal year 2007 budget request also includes funding
for the ninth Virginia class submarine. This boat will be the
fourth boat in the five boat multi-year procurement. The multi-
year contracting approach provides the Navy with a savings of
$80 million per boat. The Navy has proposed the first increment
of split funding for the first amphibious assault ship
replacement ship in fiscal year 2007. This ship is optimized to
accommodate the future aviation combat element, which includes
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and MV-22 aircraft. The Navy is also
proposing procuring the 10th Lewis & Clark class auxiliary dry
cargo and ammunition ship in fiscal year 2007. The first nine
ships are under contract. The lead ship will deliver this
spring. These ships will replace aging combat stores ammunition
ships.
Before closing, I would like to share with you a few of my
thoughts on acquisition program volatility, a term that I am
using to articulate the complex set of challenges that lead to
cost, schedule, and performance issues for acquisition
programs.
Volatility, as defined by tending to vary often or widely,
is fueled by five main factors in our acquisition programs;
program complexity, requirements fluctuation, budget
instability, schedule demands, and contractor and program
manager optimism. These are the factors that are most likely to
generate cost and schedule overruns and performance issues. I
am actively working with my acquisition team to take specific
actions to reduce acquisition program volatility. I look
forward to working with Congress to mitigate the acquisition
program volatility during this and future fiscal years.
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to the committee for the
opportunity to discuss how the Department is working hard to
change its approach to acquisition requirements and the
delivery of the immense capability our shipbuilding programs
bring to the Nation. These ships, submarines, and carriers are
critical to the success of our missions in the global war on
terrorism and to protect our country from the many threats it
faces. Congressional support of the Navy shipbuilding program
is essential to these capabilities. Thank you for your
consideration. We look forward to the questions that you may
have.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Secretary Etter.
[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Etter, Ms. Stiller,
Rear Admiral Edwards, and Rear Admiral Locklear follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Dr. Delores M. Etter, Allison Stiller, RADM
Mark J. Edwards, USN, and RADM Samuel J. Locklear III, USN
introduction
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
the Navy's (DON) fiscal year 2007 shipbuilding programs.
current operations
We are a Nation at war. Today your Navy and Marine Corps team is
postured worldwide, fighting the global war on terrorism, deterring
aggression by would-be foes, preserving freedom of the seas, and
promoting peace and security. As of March 1, 2006, 126 ships are
underway (45 percent) of which 92 (33 percent) are forward deployed.
Navy has 4,959 Reserves and the Marine Corps has over 7,000 Reserves on
Active-Duty.
Today, marines remain committed to the prosecution of the global
war on terrorism. Currently, there are over 35,000 marines forward
deployed in support of regional combatant commanders. Their performance
on the battlefield continues to validate their forward deployed
posture, maneuver warfare doctrine, adaptive logistics backbone, the
unique flexibility and scalability of the combined-arms Marine Air-
Ground Task Force construct, and most importantly, their commitment to
warfighting excellence as the world's foremost expeditionary
warfighting organization.
The 25,000 sailors and marines under the command of I Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) in Al Anbar Province, Iraq and those marines
assigned to transition teams have made significant progress in their
efforts to develop capable, credible Iraqi security forces. In setting
the conditions for the historic constitutional referendum and national
elections, they have also distinguished themselves in places like
Fallujah, Ramadi, and the Euphrates River Valley. In Afghanistan, we
have 1,200 sailors and marines providing support to the increasingly
capable Afghan National Army. As part of Combined Joint Task Force-76
(CJTF-76), a Marine infantry battalion is conducting operations against
the Taliban and anti-coalition militia in the northeastern portion of
the country. Marine officers and senior enlisted leaders continue to
train, mentor, and operate with their Afghan counterparts as part of
Task Force Phoenix.
There are over 10,000 sailors serving ashore throughout the Central
Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) including more than
4,000 in Iraq, and an additional 2,600 in Kuwait, that includes SEALs,
Seabees, military police, explosive ordnance disposal, medical,
intelligence, and civil affairs support personnel. Navy carrier and
expeditionary strike groups continue to deploy in support of global war
on terrorism and conduct combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At
the same time, the Navy and Marine Corps team conducted humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief missions such as tsunami relief, Pakistani
earthquake, and on our own Gulf Coast after Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. Naval forces in support of this effort consisted of 23 ships and
a special purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) employing 2,500
marines, providing command and control, evacuation, and humanitarian
support to military and civilian personnel in affected regions.
Additionally, 104 naval aircraft flew 1,103 sorties in support of
search and rescue and other humanitarian assistance missions. These
efforts resulted in the safe evacuation of 8,518 personnel and the
rescue of an additional 1,582 people isolated by the disasters. In the
weeks that followed, naval relief efforts provided a total of
approximately 2.5 million pounds of food and water to people most
severely affected by the disaster.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request maximizes our Nation's return
on its investment by positioning us to meet today's challenges--from
peacekeeping/stability operations to global war on terrorism operations
and small-scale contingencies--and by transforming the force for future
challenges.
prepared today--preparing for tomorrow
While the Navy and Marine Corps team is engaged in supporting the
global war on terrorism, we also have a responsibility to prepare for
future conflicts and contingencies. The Defense Department's Strategic
Planning Guidance directs balanced capabilities for controlling four
principal challenges: Traditional, Irregular, Catastrophic, and
Disruptive. Our challenge is to determine the right balance of those
capabilities that the Navy and Marine Corps team must provide to meet
challenges across the operational spectrum.
The enemy we are fighting today is different than those in our
recent past. He is a transnational actor with no allegiance to
sovereign nations or respect to conventional rules of war. He can
strike us at will from markedly unforeseen directions. He will go to
any length to inflict harm on America's people and damage to her soil.
A different enemy requires different forms of warfighting capability, a
capability based on military forces increasingly capable of operating
independently in area denial and anti access environments without
benefit of allied and/or host nation support. We must be able to
maintain global presence with an increased relevance of the sea.
Therefore, our ships will have more relevance operating under a variety
of uses, all the while, maintaining ability to mass and conduct large-
scale operations if required.
America's ability to use international seas and waterways, as both
maneuver space and an operating base unconstrained by foreign veto,
allows our naval forces to project combat power into the littoral
regions, which contain more than half the world's population and more
than 75 percent of its major urban areas. Highly mobile and ready for
combat, our forward-deployed expeditionary forces are critical
instruments of U.S. diplomacy and central components of joint military
force packages designed to quickly contain a crisis or defeat an
emerging threat.
The Navy and Marine Corps team of the future must be capabilities-
based and threat-oriented. The United States needs an agile, adaptable,
persistent, lethal, surge-ready force. The Navy and Marine Corps team
must seek to identify the proper strategic balance of capabilities to
ensure we have the agility, speed, flexibility, and lethality to
respond to any threat from any adversary, whether that threat is
conventional or asymmetric in nature. Through agility and persistence,
our Navy and Marine Corps team must be poised to fight irregular
warfare against a ``thinking enemy,'' able to act immediately against a
fleeting target. The challenge is to simultaneously set the conditions
for a major combat operation (MCO) while continuing to fight the global
war on terrorism, with the understanding that the capabilities required
for the global war on terrorism cannot necessarily be assumed to be a
lesser-included case of an MCO. Our force must be the right mix of
capabilities that balances persistence and agility with power and speed
in order to fight the global war on terrorism while being prepared to
win an MCO. To do so, it must be properly postured in terms of greater
operational availability from platforms that are much more capable as a
distributed, networked force. While the fabric of our fighting force
will still be the power and speed needed to seize the initiative and
swiftly defeat any regional threat, FORCEnet's pervasive awareness via
command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) will enable us to achieve essential
effects with less mass. Because of its access from the sea, the Navy
and Marine Corps are focusing significant effort and analysis in
support of joint combat power projection by leveraging the maneuver
space of the oceans through Seabasing.
seabasing--a national capability
The Naval Power 21 vision defines the capabilities that the 21st
Century Navy and Marine Corps team will deliver. Our overarching
transformational operating concept is Seabasing; a national capability,
for projecting and sustaining naval power and joint forces that assures
joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign,
distributed, and networked forces operating globally from the sea.
Seabasing unifies our capabilities for projecting offensive power,
defensive power, command and control, mobility, and sustainment around
the world. It will enable commanders to generate high tempo operational
maneuver by making use of the sea as a means of gaining and maintaining
advantage.
The war against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan provided a
harsh dose of reality for those who assumed traditional threats and the
availability of friendly, convenient land bases to project airpower and
land forces. In the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),
two forward-deployed marine expeditionary units formed Task Force 58
and projected the first major U.S. ``conventional'' combat units into
Afghanistan--more than 350 miles from its seabase of amphibious
shipping. Yet, their operations were far from traditional or
conventional expectations. We believe these recent experiences such as
the prohibition of the 4th Infantry Division using Turkey in the early
stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are compelling insights on how
operations can be conducted in the future. As anti-access, military and
political measures proliferate; even friendly nations may deny U.S.
forces land basing and transit due to their own sovereign interests.
Seabasing represents a complex capability, a system-of-systems able
to move at will. Seabasing, enabled by joint integrated and operational
concepts, is the employment of ships and vessels with organic strike
fires and defensive shields of sensors and weapons, strike and
transport aircraft, communications, and logistics. We will use the sea
as maneuver space to create uncertainty for adversaries and protect the
joint force while receiving, staging, and integrating scalable forces,
at sea, that are capable of a broad range of missions. Its inherent
freedom of movement, appropriate scalability, and sustainable
persistent power provides full spectrum capabilities, from support of
theater engagement strategies, to rapid response to natural or man made
disasters, to MCOs from raids, to swift defeat of enemies, to scale of
major combat and decisive operations. In order to achieve this
capability, the Navy and Marine Corps must be forward based, forward
deployed (on naval shipping), and forward engaged to maintain global
presence as addressed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to
meet these challenges.
The Seabased Navy will be distributed, netted, immediately
employable and rapidly deployable, greatly increasing its operational
availability through innovative concepts such as, for example, Sea Swap
(where deemed appropriate) and the Fleet Response Plan (FRP). At the
same time, innovative transformational platforms under development such
as Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)), LHA(R), and high-
speed connectors, will be instrumental to the Sea Base.
The FRP is the maintenance, training, and operational framework
through which the Navy meets global combatant commander demand signals
for traditional (e.g., global war on terrorism, major combat
operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, shaping and
stability operations, counter piracy, etc.) and emerging mission sets
(e.g., riverine warfare, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC),
medical outreach). The FRP is mission-driven, capabilities-based, and
provides the right readiness at the right time (within fiscal
constraints). It enables responsive and dependable forward presence.
With the FRP we can deploy a more agile, flexible, and scalable naval
force capable of surging quickly to deal with unexpected threats,
humanitarian disasters, and contingency operations. Sea Swap is an
initiative designed to keep a single hull continuously deployed in a
given theater, replacing the entire crew at 6-month intervals. The
primary objective is to effectively and efficiently increase forward
naval presence without increasing operating cost.
seapower 21
We developed the Sea Power 21 vision in support of our National
Military Strategy. The objective of Sea Power 21 is to ensure this
nation possesses credible combat capability on scene to promote
regional stability, to deter aggression throughout the world, to assure
the access of joint forces and to fight and win should deterrence fail.
Sea Power 21 guides the Navy's transformation from a threat--based
platform centric structure to a capabilities-based, fully integrated
force. The pillars of Sea Power 21--Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and
Seabasing--are integrated by FORCEnet which will be the means by which
the power of sensors, networks, weapons, warriors and platforms are
harnessed in a networked combat force. This networked force will
provide the strategic agility and persistence necessary to prevail in
the continuing global war on terrorism, as well as the speed and
overwhelming power to seize the initiative and swiftly defeat any
regional peer competitor in MCOs. Extending FORCEnet to our allies and
partners in the form of multinational information sharing networks will
represent an unprecedented level of interoperability for both global
war on terrorism and MCO. The immeasurable advantage of this effort is
the effective association of a ``1,000-ship Navy'' built from our own
core capabilities combined with the coordinated efforts of our allies
and partners in today's challenging global environment. During the last
year, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established a focused effort
to clearly define naval force structure requirements. The Navy recently
submitted to Congress its 2007 Annual Long Range Plan for Construction
of Naval Vessels. This plan begins our movement toward a more balanced
force that meets the future national security requirements outlined in
the fiscal year 2006 QDR with acceptable risk and is designed to
replenish the fleet, while stabilizing workload and funding
requirements. As this 30 year shipbuilding plan evolves over the next
year, it will produce an investment plan that is both executable and
affordable based on balancing several factors: Naval force operational
capability; risk; and, the ability of the shipbuilding industrial base
to execute the plan.
fiscal year 2006 quadrennial defense review (qdr 06)
The fiscal and temporal realities associated with the design and
development of modern, sophisticated weapons systems requires a
significantly different approach to procurement and operation of or
forces and resources. It is this dynamic that is propelling the Navy
forward in the transformational arena. As recognized in QDR 06, the
size and capabilities of our force are driven by the challenges we will
face. The capacity of the force is determined by its global posture in
peacetime and the requirement to respond from this posture, as well as
to surge, in crisis. In the case of our Navy, it is based upon the need
for a ubiquitous but carefully tailored maritime presence that can
provide our President and our allies with strategic options in support
of dynamic security requirements. QDR 06 developed guidance to achieve
the national defense and national military strategies and shaping the
future force to improve capabilities and expand capacity to address
four priorities:
Defeat Terrorist Extremists;
Defending the Homeland in Depth;
Shaping the Choices of Countries at Strategic
Crossroads; and
Preventing Hostile State and Non-state Actors from
Acquiring or Using Weapons of Mass Destruction.
QDR 06 sets a 20-year course for the Department of Defense (DOD)
and provides an opportunity to continue to reshape the U.S. Armed
Forces to meet current and emerging security responsibilities. The QDR
06 construct places new emphasis on the unique operational demands
associated with homeland defense and the global war on terrorism,
shifts focus from optimizing for conflicts in two particular regions to
building a portfolio of capabilities with global reach and serves as a
bridge from today's threat-based force to a future capabilities-based
transformational force.
force structure
Force structure requirements were developed and validated through
detailed joint campaign and mission level analysis, optimized through
innovative sourcing initiatives (FRP, Sea Swap, forward posturing) that
increase platform operational availability, and balanced with
shipbuilding industrial base requirements. This force structure was
developed using a capabilities-based approach measured against the
anticipated threats for the fiscal year 2020 timeframe. The future Navy
will remain sea based, with global speed and persistence provided by
forward deployed forces, supplemented by rapidly deployable forces
through the FRP. To maximize return on investment, the Navy that fights
the global war on terrorism and executes maritime security operations
will be complementary to the Navy required to fight and win in any MCO.
This capabilities-based, threat-oriented Navy can be disaggregated and
distributed world wide to support combatant commander global war on
terrorism demands. The resulting distributed and netted force, working
in conjunction with our joint and maritime partners, will provide both
actionable intelligence through persistent, maritime domain awareness,
and the ability to take action where and when a threat is identified.
The same force can be rapidly aggregated to provide the strength needed
to defeat any potential adversary in an MCO. The warships represented
by this shipbuilding plan will sustain operations in forward areas
longer, be able to respond more quickly to emerging contingencies, and
generate more sorties and simultaneous attacks against greater numbers
of targets and with greater effect than our current fleet.
Employing a capabilities-based approach to calculate the size and
composition of the future force required to meet expected joint force
demands in peace and in the most stressing construct of the Defense
Planning Guidance, along with detailed assessments of risk associated
with affordability and instabilities in the industrial base, the
analysis concluded that a fleet of about 313 ships is the minimum force
necessary to meet all the demands, and to pace the most advanced
technological challengers well into the future, with an acceptable
level of risk.
thirty-year naval force size
The 30-year shipbuilding plan and the resulting ship inventory, as
outlined in the fiscal year 2007 Annual Long-Range Plan for
Construction of Naval Vessels, represent the baseline as reflected in
the 2007 President's budget submission. There will be subsequent
studies and analyses that will continue to balance affordability with
capability and industrial base capacity. As part of the fiscal year
2008 budget development process, the Navy will be exploring alternative
approaches to attaining the future force structure and ship mix while
retaining the necessary capabilities for joint force operations.
Overall, this plan reflects the Navy's commitment to stabilize the
demand signal to the industrial base while still achieving the
appropriate balance of affordability and capability in all ship
classes. Also, although there is risk with this plan, and not a lot of
excess capacity to accommodate the unforeseen, we believe the risk is
moderate and manageable. Areas of special interest include:
Carriers
Eleven aircraft carriers and their associated air wings are needed
to ensure our ability to provide coverage in any foreseeable
contingency and do so with meaningful, persistent combat power. While
the Navy requirement for carriers remains a minimum of 11 operational
vessels, past delays in beginning the CVN 21 program will result in the
Navy's having only 10 operational carriers in fiscal year 2013 and
fiscal year 2014. This shortfall will require some combination of
shorter turn-around times between deployments, higher operational tempo
(OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO), and restructured carrier
maintenance cycles.
Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN)
A SSN force of 48 boats is needed to meet submarine tasking in
support of Homeland defense, global war on terrorism/irregular warfare,
and conventional campaigns. However, total SSN numbers will drop below
48 between 2020 and 2034. Our remaining fast attack submarine force
will require a combination of shorter turn-around times between
deployments, higher OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, and restructured maintenance
cycles to mitigate the impact of this force structure shortfall. Navy
is also pursuing a number of cost reduction initiatives intended to
lower SSN 774 acquisition costs to $2.0 billion (fiscal year 2005
dollars) at a stable build rate of two-per-year commencing with fiscal
year 2012 as cited in QDR 06.
Amphibious Ships
Our amphibious capability provides the joint forcible entry
capacity necessary to support the sea base as a lodgment point for
joint operations. The current DOD force-sizing construct requires the
capability to respond to two major ``swiftly defeat the efforts''
events--each of which could require a minimum of 15 capable amphibious
ships. One of these crises may further necessitate the use of a MEF,
thus requiring a total of 30 operationally available amphibious ships.
The Marine Corps aviation combat element requires 10 large-deck
amphibious ships to support a MEF. Today's 35 amphibious warships can
surge the required 30 operationally available warships and provide the
peacetime rotation base for Marine Expeditionary Units in up to three
regions. As a Navy and Marine Corps team, we are striving to maintain
the capability to project two Marine Expeditionary Brigades assault
echelons in support of the combatant commander.
shipbuilding programs
There has been considerable activity within shipbuilding over the
last year. Currently, there are 37 naval ships under construction in
the United States: 1 CVN, 13 DDGs, 1 LHD, 4 LPDs, 9 T-AKEs, 2 Littoral
Combat Ships (LCS) and 7 Virginia class submarines. Four additional
LPDs have ongoing contract negotiations. In 2005 the Department
delivered the lead ship for our newest class of Amphibious Transport
Dock Ships U.S.S. San Antonio, LPD 17, initiating a new era of
amphibious assault capabilities that are aligned to the littoral
regions. In January 2006, the Navy commissioned the LPD 17. The Navy
also commissioned three DDGs in 2005. We also laid the keel for the
eighth ship of the LHD class, the second and third Lewis & Clark
Auxiliary Dry Cargo & Ammunition ship (T-AKE), and the third Virginia
class submarine. In 2005, the Navy completed the engineered refueling
overhaul (ERO) and conversion of the U.S.S. Ohio (SSGN 726) the first
SSGN and redelivered the submarine to the fleet in February 2006. In
March 2005, the Navy also completed the Refueling Complex Overhaul
(RCOH) of CVN 69.
Fiscal year 2007 will see the Navy's previous research and
development (R&D) efforts begin to bear fruit. The first increment of
procurement of the lead two DD(X) destroyers is programmed. Follow-on
LCSs are programmed, which will accelerate the Navy's capabilities to
defeat anti-access threats close to shore. Transformation is most
apparent in fiscal year 2007 where new construction increases to seven
ships from the four in President's fiscal year 2006 budget request. The
total number of new ships procured over the Future Years Defense
Program is 51, averaging 10 ships per year including DD(X), CG(X), LCS,
T-AKE, Virginia class SSN, CVN 21, MPF(F) family of ships, LPD 17,
JHSV, and LHA(R). Our fiscal year 2007 budget request calls for
construction of seven ships: two Zumwalt class (DD(X)) destroyers, one
Virginia class submarine; one Lewis & Clark (T-AKE) Class Auxiliary Dry
Cargo & Ammunition ship; the LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship; and two
LCS. In addition, we have requested funding for advance procurement of
the 10th and 11th Virginia class submarines, the ninth San Antonio
class Amphibious Transport Dock ship, and the CVN 21. Modernization
efforts to be funded in fiscal year 2007 include the second increment
of the split funded CVN 70 RCOH, the second year of advance procurement
for CVN 71 RCOH, ERO of an SSBN, modernization of Ticonderoga class
cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers, and the service life
extension for six Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC).
A stable shipbuilding industry is essential to sustain minimum
employment levels and retain critical skills to meet our requirements
for an affordable and capable force structure. We must align the
industrial base for long-term force development through split funding,
advanced procurement, and cost savings incentives. We must build ships
more efficiently, cost effectively, and quickly. To do this, we are
committed to help provide stability in the shipbuilding plan and
rigorously control requirements. Costs and production schedules must be
kept within contractual limits. Industry must be viewed as a trusted
partner while we provide a stable baseline upon which to plan.
The Navy continues to analyze operational requirements, ship
designs and costs, acquisition plans and tools, and industrial base
capacity to further improve its shipbuilding plan. Full funding and
support for execution of this plan is crucial to transforming the U.S.
Navy to a force tuned to the 21st century and its evolving
requirements.
DD(X) Destroyer
DD(X) is the centerpiece of a surface combatant family of ships
that will deliver a broad range of capabilities. It is already
providing the baseline for spiral development of technology and
engineering to support a range of future ship classes such as LHA(R)
and CVN 21. This advanced multi-mission destroyer will bring
revolutionary improvements to precise time-critical strike and joint
fires for our expeditionary and carrier strike groups of the future. It
expands the battlespace by over 400 percent; has the radar cross
section of a fishing boat; and is as quiet as a Los Angeles class
submarine. DD(X) will also enable the transformation of our operations
ashore. Its on-demand, persistent, time-critical strike revolutionizes
our joint fire support and ground maneuver concepts of operation so
that our strike fighter aircraft are freed for more difficult targets
at greater ranges. DD(X) will provide credible forward presence while
operating independently or as an integral part of naval, joint, or
combined expeditionary forces. DD(X) has made tremendous progress in
technological maturity. The 10 critical engineering development models
(EDMs) provide high confidence in our ability to build the lead DD(X).
Since the award of the DD(X) Design Agent contract in April 2002, the
DD(X) Program has conducted extensive land-based and/or at-sea testing
of the EDMs. As a result of these efforts, the DD(X) program has
demonstrated fundamental capabilities prior to ship construction
contract award, completed necessary testing to support a successful
ship critical design review (CDR) this past fall, and is on track to
mature systems in time for ship installation. This level of
technological maturity was a key factor in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense's (OSD) granting of Milestone B approval in November 2005.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $794 million in
research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy (RDT&E,N) for
continued software development and $2.6 billion in ship construction,
Navy (SCN) for the first increment of the first and second DD(X). While
the funding strategy for these ships is unique, the reasons for
supporting a dual lead ship approach are compelling.
Based on congressional direction that prohibits a winner-take-all
strategy, the Navy has consulted with industry, OSD, and Congress to
chart our way forward for the DD(X) program. Our key objectives are:
Acquire the DD(X) class destroyers in as cost
effective a manner as possible;
Create pressures to control and reduce cost;
Acquire these ships on a timeline that meets the
warfighters' needs;
Lower overall risk in the program;
Treat each of our industry partners fairly; and
Preserve a viable industrial capability for complex
surface combatants.
In order to accomplish these objectives, the Navy has defined a new
way ahead: ``Dual Lead Ships''. This effort tries to create a strong,
mutually dependent partnership between the shipyards and the Navy to
reduce cost and improve collaboration. Importantly, the Navy's new
strategy fully addresses industry's key issues and responds to
congressional concerns. The key features are:
Sole source lead ship detail design and construction
contracts with the shipbuilders;
Equal split of common detail design with each yard
doing their respective production design;
Shipyards procure electronics, ordnance, and
integrated power system (IPS) from system developers as
contractor-furnished equipment;
Funding phased to synchronize start of fabrication
dates in both shipyards;
Importantly, the shipyards are mutually dependent on
each other to urgently and cooperatively complete the DD(X)
detail design;
Sole source contracts to software and system
developers;
Transition to production of systems culminating in
production readiness reviews;
Complete software releases and provide to shipyards as
Government-furnished information;
Importantly, this approach lowers the cost to the Navy
by avoiding incremental pass through fee costs; and
Keep open the option for allocated procurement or
various competitions in fiscal year 2009 and beyond.
Navy is confident that the dual lead ship strategy is the
acquisition approach that will motivate cooperative and collaborative
completion of detail design. Further, being able to benchmark the lead
ships against each other provides an unprecedented pressure and
opportunity to control cost on the lead ships. Finally, because each
builder will have completed significant construction on sections of the
ships and will have completed detail design, the Navy will have
information and options for future acquisition strategy decisions.
Virginia (SSN 774) Class Attack Submarine
The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $1.8 billion for the
9th ship, and $677 million for advance procurement for the 10th and
11th ships of the Virginia class. A total of 10 Virginia class
submarines are under contract. The first ship, U.S.S. Virginia (SSN
774), was delivered in October 2004, conducted its first deployment in
2005 and is currently undergoing post shakedown availability. This
year's ship will be the fourth ship in the five-ship multi-year
procurement (MYP). This MYP contracting approach provides the Navy
savings of approximately $80 million per ship for a total savings of
$400 million compared to ``block buy'' procurement. These ships
currently continue to be built under the teaming approach directed by
Congress in 1998, which maintains two nuclear submarine shipbuilders.
Lewis and Clark Class Auxiliary Dry Cargo & Ammunition Ship (T-AKE)
The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $455 million for the
10th ship. The first nine ships are under contract. Lead ship
construction commenced in September 2003, with christening in May 2005.
Projected delivery date of the lead ship is spring 2006. Projected
delivery dates for the other ships are as follows: second, third, and
fourth ships in fiscal year 2007; fifth, sixth, and seventh ships in
fiscal year 2008 and the eighth ship in fiscal year 2009. Exercise of
the option for the ninth ship occurred January 2006. The T-AKE is
designed to replace aging combat stores (T-AFS) and ammunition (T-AE)
shuttle ships. Working in concert with an oiler (T-AO), the team can
perform a ``substitute'' station ship mission to allow the retirement
of four fast combat support ships (AOE 1 class).
LHA(R)
The fiscal year 2007 budget requests $1.1 billion for the LHA 6,
the lead LHA(R). LHA(R) is the replacement program for the aging LHA
class ships that reach the end of their administratively extended
service life between 2011 and 2015. LHA(R) is a modified LHD 1 class
variant with enhanced aviation capabilities specifically designed to
accommodate Marine Corps Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and MV-22 aircraft
of the future aviation combat element. LHA(R) also provides the
improved service life that will accommodate the 21st century evolution
of Marine Corps aviation. The program received Milestone B approval in
January 2006 to award the detail design and construction contract for
the first ship of the class. Ship delivery is scheduled for fiscal year
2012.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
LCS is being built from the keel up to be a part of a netted and
distributed force. The key warfighting capability of LCS is its off-
board systems: manned helicopters and unmanned aerial, surface and
underwater vehicles. It is the off-board vehicles--with both sensors
and weapons--that will enter the highest threat areas. Its modular
design, built to open-systems architecture standards, provides
flexibility and a means to rapidly reconfigure mission modules and
payloads. Approximately 40 percent of LCS's payload volume will be
reconfigurable. As technology matures, the Navy will not have to buy a
new LCS seaframe, but will upgrade the mission modules or the unmanned
systems. LCS will be different from any warship that has been built for
the U.S. Navy. The program provides the best balance of risk with
affordability and speed of construction. We have partnered with the
Coast Guard and LCS shares a common three-dimensional radar with U.S.
Coast Guard cutters. In addition, there are other nations interested in
purchasing the seaframe.
Two contracts were competitively awarded in May 2004, for detail
design and construction of two different LCS seaframes. The
construction is currently underway on the first seaframe of each
design. The Navy is very pleased with the capabilities these two
seaframes will bring. A recent validation of the seaframe capability
development document (CDD) showed that these seaframes will not require
major modifications to provide the required capabilities envisioned for
this platform. To date, all milestones have been met on schedule. Two
LCS seaframes are requested in fiscal year 2007. The LCS spiral
development acquisition strategy will support construction of focused
mission ships and mission packages with progressive capability
improvements. Procurement of one Mine Warfare and one Surface Warfare
mission packages is planned in fiscal year 2007. The Department is well
positioned to proceed with LCS and deliver this needed capability to
sailors as soon as possible.
CVN 21 Class
The CVN 21 program is designing the future aircraft carrier for the
21st century, as the replacement for today's aircraft carriers,
including the Nimitz class. The design provides significant
improvements in capability along with total ownership cost reductions
of over $5 billion per ship as compared to the Nimitz class. Overall,
CVN 21 will increase sortie generation rate and improve survivability
to better handle future threats. The new design nuclear propulsion
plant and improved electric plant together provide nearly three times
the electrical generation capacity of a Nimitz class carrier. This
additional capacity allows for the introduction of new systems such as
Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System, Advanced Arresting Gear, and
a new integrated warfare system that will leverage advances in open
systems architecture to be affordably upgraded. Other features include
an enhanced flight deck, improved weapons handling and aircraft
servicing efficiency, and a flexible command and decision center
allowing for future technology insertion. The fiscal year 2007 budget
request includes $784 million of advance procurement for continued
design, material procurement and advance construction. The Navy plan is
to award the construction contract in fiscal year 2008.
Nimitz Class Aircraft Carrier (CVN 68 Class)
The RCOH program refuels, repairs, and modernizes Nimitz class
aircraft carriers to provide up to 50 total years of service life. CVN
68 class was originally based on a 30-year design life with refueling
at an estimated 14 years. Ongoing analysis of the reactor cores show a
nominal 23 year life prior to requirement to refuel allowing the RCOH
schedule to be adjusted accordingly. The RCOH program recapitalizes
these ships in lieu of procurement and is fundamental to sustaining the
nuclear carrier force structure to meet current and future threats.
RCOHs provide a bridge between maintaining current readiness
requirements and preparing the platform for future readiness
initiatives in support of Sea Power 21. They leverage technologies from
other programs and platforms for insertion during this major
recapitalization effort.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $954 million in the
second of two funding increments for the U.S.S. Carl Vinson (CVN 70)
RCOH execution. The fiscal year 2007 budget also includes $117 million
in advance procurement funding for the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN
71) RCOH scheduled to start fiscal year 2010.
SSGN Conversions and Engineered Refueling Overhauls
SSGN converted submarines will provide transformational warfighting
capability carrying up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles and supporting
deployed special operating forces. The SSGN conversions are being
executed utilizing a public-private partnership, conducting the work in
naval shipyards. The first SSGN, U.S.S. Ohio (SSGN 726), took about 3
years to deliver from its production decision date. U.S.S. Ohio (SSGN
726) was delivered to the fleet in February 2006. U.S.S. Florida (SSGN
728) will be delivered in April 2006. The U.S.S. Michigan (SSGN 727)
will be delivered December 2006 and the U.S.S. Georgia (SSGN 729) will
be delivered in September 2007.
SSBN Engineered Refueling Overhauls (EROs)
In fiscal year 2007, the U.S.S. Alaska (SSBN 732) will begin its
ERO at Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests
advance procurement funding for long lead time materials to support
future EROs in 2008 and 2009. Continued support of these maintenance
efforts will sustain our strategic deterrents well into the future.
Submarine Technology Development and Insertion
The Navy's submarine technology development efforts focus
simultaneously on cost reduction and closure of warfighting gaps.
Advanced submarine system development (ASSD) develops and demonstrates
the most promising technologies including enablers for lower submarine
acquisition and operation costs. Technologies in this line have
applicability to all submarine platforms. The Navy is increasing the
capabilities of the Virginia class through the insertion of appropriate
advanced technology via two parallel approaches. The first approach is
to procure major improvements through block buys as the most economical
and efficient. The second approach for systems such as acoustic,
tactical, and weapons systems is to make improvements through software
updates under the applicable advanced processing build (APB) process.
The Navy plans to introduce future major Virginia improvements in
successive contract blocks provided they reduce acquisition cost and
maintain tactical performance. The next contract block ship improvement
opportunity will be the fiscal years 2009-2013 authorized ships. Major
efforts under advanced submarine systems development include the joint
Navy/DARPA Technology Barrier (Tango Bravo) Program to overcome
selected technological barriers and enable design options for a
reduced-cost submarine. Additional efforts include sonar/combat systems
(e.g. advanced processing builds (APB) that transition to acoustic
rapid commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) insertion), universal
encapsulation for submarine launch of joint force weapons and sensors,
hull and deployable sensor arrays, stealth components and systems, and
composite structural materials (Virginia class advanced sail).
Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) Class Destroyer
The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $356 million to
continue funding program completion and shutdown costs. The Navy
submitted a report to Congress detailing program completion
requirements in November 2005, pursuant to the Fiscal Year 2006 Senate
Appropriations Committee Report 109-141. The fiscal year 2007 budget
request is consistent with this report and is essential to complete
delivery of these mission capable ships. All 62 ships are under
contract and the final ship will deliver in fiscal year 2011.
DDG Modernization
The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $16 million in RDT&E,N
and OPN appropriations to continue the process to bring needed mid-life
DDG modernization enhancements to the mainstay of our surface fleet.
The DDG Modernization Program will ensure that each ship in the class
remains an affordable and viable warfighting asset throughout the
entire projected 35-year service life. It is designed to reduce total
ownership costs across the entire class through significant reductions
in manning requirements and the application of technology to achieve
improved quality of life for sailors, increased survivability, and
improved maintainability. DDG 51 is scheduled to be the first legacy
destroyer to receive the modernization upgrade in fiscal year 2010.
Ticonderoga (CG 47) Cruiser Modernization Plan
The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $359 million across
multiple appropriations to procure long lead time material for the
modernization of Ticonderoga class cruisers occurring in fiscal years
2008 and 2009. The guided missile modernization program was
restructured in fiscal year 2006 in accordance with congressional
direction. Under the restructured plan, the older Baseline 2 and 3
ships will be modernized first. Funding began in fiscal year 2006 for
long lead-time procurements for a fiscal year 2008 Baseline 2
modernization availability of U.S.S. Bunker Hill (CG 52). The Navy's
plan will permit these ships to realize their expected service life of
35 years and substantially increase combat capability of all remaining
22 CG 47 class ships. This modernization will reduce combat system and
computer maintenance costs, replace obsolete combat systems, and extend
mission relevance. It will also incorporate manpower improvements and
quality of service enhancements from the smart-ship program.
LPD 17
The San Antonio (LPD 17) class of amphibious transport dock ships
is optimized for operational flexibility and designed to meet Marine
Air-Ground Task Force lift requirements and represents a critical
element of the Navy and Marine Corps future in expeditionary warfare.
The fiscal year 2007 budget includes $297 million of advanced
procurement for the ninth ship of the class. The Navy plans to procure
the ninth ship in fiscal year 2008. The lead ship was delivered in July
2005, and commissioned in January 2006. Four follow on ships are
currently under construction. New Orleans, LPD 18 was christened on
November 20, 2004, and Mesa Verde, LPD 19 was christened January 15,
2005. Construction also continues on Green Bay, LPD 20 and New York,
LPD 21. Advance procurement contracts for LPD 22 and 23 have been
awarded to support long-lead time material purchases for these ships.
LPDs 22-25 are in negotiation.
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
In addition to the 30 operationally available amphibious ships
needed to employ a MEF during a forcible entry operation, the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) is the key enabler for
Seabasing, providing support and sustainment for early entry Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). MPF(F) enables four new capabilities: (1)
at-sea arrival and assembly of the Sea Base echelon (of the MEB); (2)
projection of one surface and one vertical battalion landing team in
one 8-10 hour period of darkness; (3) long-term, sea-based sustainment;
and (4) at-sea reconstitution and redeployment.
These capabilities will be invaluable in supporting joint forcible
entry operations, forward engagement, presence, and relationship
building operations with allies and potential coalition partners by our
forward deployed forces, as well as support of disaster relief and
humanitarian operations. Additionally, this flexible asset can remain
in support of post-conflict activities and forces ashore from a
relatively secure location at sea.
These future maritime prepositioning ships will serve a broader
operational function than current prepositioning ships, creating
greatly expanded operational flexibility and effectiveness. We envision
a force that will enhance the responsiveness of the joint team by the
at-sea assembly of a MEB that arrives by high-speed airlift or sealift
from the United States or forward operating locations or bases. The
MPF(F) squadrons will be capable of the ``selective offload'' of
equipment and supplies, which will permit our force commanders to
tailor mission packages to satisfy specific mission requirements. As a
part of the Sea Base, MPF(F) will provide the ability to accomplish
force closure and move equipment and troops ashore as a rapid response
asset, interoperate with other ships in the Sea Base, provide
sustainment to expeditionary forces ashore, and permit recovery and
reconstitution of forces and equipment at-sea. As our shipbuilding
programs and technology further mature, thorough experimentation is
essential in order to provide informed decisions prior to long term
commitments in the development of the MPF(F). Examples of planned
experimentation include: interaction with the MPF maintenance cycle
(MMC) to develop selective offload capability, at sea large medium-
speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ship equipment off-load/on-load, and R&D
teams to continue to explore safe and efficient ways for at-sea cargo
and passenger transfers by testing fendering (skin-to-skin)
technologies, motion compensating cranes and ship to ship interface
systems.
The MPF(F) squadron will be comprised of two LHA replacement large-
deck amphibious ships, one LHD large-deck amphibious ship, three T-AKE
cargo ships, three LMSR cargo ships, three mobile landing platform
ships with troops, and two legacy ``dense-pack'' MPF ships taken from
existing squadrons. The mobile landing platforms, the only new-design
ships in the plan, will be based on current technology. This mix of
ships will be capable of prepositioning critical equipment and 20 days
of supplies for our future MEB.
The future MPF(F) squadron will be part of the transformational
seabasing capability as defined in the Seabasing Joint Integrating
Concept and will provide the key capability of a rapid response force
of a 2015 MEB in support of the 1-4-2-1 strategy. MPF(F) with its
associated aircraft, personnel, logistic chains, and surface and air
connectors will provide rapid force closure and support forcible entry
through at-sea arrival and assembly and force employment from the
seabase. In addition, it will replace current aging maritime
prepositioning ship (MPS) capability.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $86 million of
national defense sealift R&D funds to develop technologies to support
future sea basing needs in MPF(F). The first MPF(F) ships are planned
for fiscal year 2009 with advanced funding scheduled in fiscal year
2008. The proposed family of ships solution is a low cost, low risk
solution for meeting the MPF(F) requirements. The solution leverages
existing ship designs to control risk while allowing for broad
participation of the industrial base.
Joint High Speed Vessel
The Navy High Speed Connector has been merged with the Army Theater
Support Vessel to form the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program. This
program will provide a high-speed intra-theater surface lift capability
gap identified to implement Sea Power 21 and the Army Future Force
operational concepts. The JHSV will be capable of supporting joint
force needs for flexible, fast transport of troops and equipment for
the future. Today's only alternative to meeting this gap is through the
leasing of high-speed vessels for rapid troop and equipment transport.
The WestPac Express is a high-speed surface vessel currently being
leased by the Military Sealift Command and used to transport marines in
the Western Pacific operating area. With the Navy designated as the
lead Service, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army are working together to
develop the required documentation to meet a Milestone A decision in
April 2006 with a lead ship contract award planned for fiscal year
2008. The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $14.2 million for
concept studies and development of contract design.
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Service Life Extension Program
Our fleet LCACs saw continued increased operational tempo
supporting worldwide operations during the past year, underscoring the
need for the LCAC Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). LCAC SLEP is a
vital, ongoing effort to Operational Maneuver From The Sea and Ship To
Objective Maneuver options for the naval forces. This will provide
continued critical surface lift for the Marine Corps for the future as
these upgrades offer greater flexibility and endurance options that
allow naval forces to continue to remain expeditionary and versatile in
support of global war on terrorism and into the future. The program,
designed to extend the service life of LCACs to 30 years, had several
notable accomplishments during the past year: LCAC 7, LCAC 8, and LCAC
9 delivered ahead of schedule; and the SLEP crafts, LCAC 8 and LCAC 9,
rendered assistance to the hurricane recovery effort on the Gulf Coast.
The Navy is continuing the strategy of refurbishing vice replacing the
buoyancy boxes and will competitively select the fiscal year 2006 and
fiscal year 2007 SLEP work. The fiscal year 2007 budget request
includes $111 million for SLEP of six craft.
completion of prior year shipbuilding contracts
The cost to complete shipbuilding programs under contract over
fiscal years 2007-2009 is $1.07 billion. The fiscal year 2007 budget
requests $556 million for shipbuilding cost to complete. The allocation
of cost to complete funds is: $348.4 milion for CVN 77, $114 million
for the SSN 774 class, and $93.4 million for the LPD 17 class.
As of December 2005, CVN 77 construction is approximately 57
percent complete. Following several detailed program evaluations with
the shipbuilder in 2005, the Navy revised the CVN 77 program cost
estimate to $6.057 billion. Section 122 of the fiscal year 1998
National Defense Authorization Act imposed an original limitation on
the total cost of procurement for the CVN 77 of $4.6 billion. Section
122 also authorized the Secretary of the Navy to adjust the cost
limitation under certain circumstances and required the Secretary to
notify Congress annually of any adjustments made to the limitation. The
Navy last adjusted the cost limitation to $5.357 billion in 2005,
notifying Congress with the report submitted with the fiscal year 2006
President's budget request. The remaining $700 million cost increase is
the result of factors not covered by the Secretary's existing
adjustment authority, including the costs of increased labor hours to
construct the ship (including rising health care costs), increased
material costs, and the anticipated costs required to cover the Federal
Government's contractual liability to the point of total assumption by
the shipbuilder, Northrop Grumman Newport News. As a result,
congressional action is requested to amend Section 122 to increase the
cost cap to $6.057 billion to accommodate the CVN 77 program cost
estimate.
The Virginia class program office is working with the shipbuilders
to deliver the first four ships of the Class within the available
funding. To accomplish this, descoping actions have been initiated on
SSN 775, with similar descoping actions anticipated for SSN 777 to
deliver on budget.
The remaining six ships of the Virginia class are under a fixed
price incentive (FPI) contract that was converted to a MYP for the
sixth through tenth hulls (five ships) in fiscal year 2004. This
contract includes steep share lines where the contractor bears 55
percent of the overrun and special incentives to focus the shipbuilders
on producing ships for the lowest possible cost. Early indications show
significant savings ($400 million) on material purchases for these five
ships. Future contracts will continue the use of MYP contracting,
subject to congressional approval, and are planned to be FPI contracts
with fair and achievable targets and steep penalties for cost overruns.
In the San Antonio (LPD 17) program, the Navy has incorporated
lessons learned from the construction and testing of the lead ship into
plans for the follow ships. The fiscal year 2007 President's budget
request is for $93.4 million and a total of $159 million across the
Future Years Defense Program. The Navy continues to work to reduce
contract changes and has implemented requirements-to-cost tradeoffs and
contract scope reductions which result in a stable production baseline
for the follow ships. The fiscal year 2007 President's budget request
for the class reflects the use of ``realistic'' shipbuilding inflation
projections. The Navy is pursuing an affordable conversion to a fixed
price type contract for LPDs 18-21. We plan to procure future ships of
this class using fixed price type contracts.
During the last year, the Navy has worked closely with Congress to
identify those prior year costs due to the impact of Hurricane Katrina.
Congress has already appropriated funds to cover much of these costs in
a supplemental appropriation. The Navy is committed to ensuring that
these supplemental appropriations are spent only on Government
responsible costs rising directly from the results of Katrina.
summary
Our mission remains bringing the fight to our enemies. The
increasing dependence of our world on the seas, coupled with growing
uncertainty of other nations' ability or desire to ensure access in a
future conflict, will continue to drive the need for naval forces and
the capability to project decisive joint power by access through the
seas. The increased emphasis on the littorals and the global nature of
the terrorist threat will demand the ability to strike where and when
required, with the maritime domain serving as the key enabler for U.S.
military force.
Accordingly, we will execute the global war on terrorism while
transforming for the future fight. We will continue to refine our
operational concepts and appropriate technology investments to deliver
the kind of dominant military power from the sea envisioned in Sea
Power 21. We will continue to pursue the operational concepts for
seabasing persistent combat power, even as we invest in technology and
systems to enable naval vessels to deliver decisive, combat power in
every tactical and operational dimension. We look forward to the future
from a strong partnership with Congress that has brought the Navy and
Marine Corps team many successes today. We thank you for your
consideration.
Senator Talent. Admiral Edwards.
STATEMENT OF RADM MARK J. EDWARDS, USN, DIRECTOR OF WARFARE
INTEGRATION, N8F, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir. Chairman Talent, Senator
Kennedy, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is a privilege for me to be here today as the
Navy's lead warfare integration officer, to appear before you
to discuss the Navy shipbuilding and industrial base. I am
joined by Admiral Sam Locklear, the Navy's Director for
Programming, and together we are here to assure the
subcommittee that we have a stabilized shipbuilding plan and
the means to execute it.
When Admiral Mullen took over as CNO, he promised to
deliver a capable, affordable, and stabilized shipbuilding plan
that builds to a specific number. He has done that. It is the
313-ship shipbuilding plan. We are going to execute this plan.
To do this, Navy has committed to providing the resources. At
the same time, we are going to reduce the costs and drive out
instability. We intend to uphold our end of the bargain, and we
need a similar commitment from industry to reduce the
shipbuilding cost. The DOD conducted a detailed risk assessment
of all classes of ship construction plans in preparation for
the submission of the President's fiscal year 2007 budget. This
review carefully considered options across the entire Navy/
Marine Corps team and analyzed the future impacts to
warfighting effectiveness and the Nation's shipbuilding
industrial base. This plan provides balance and stability in
warfighting. It should be noted that the fiscal year 2007
budget was the first budget that this CNO could affect albeit
in a minor sense. The fiscal year 2008 budget, currently under
development is his first opportunity to affect changes. Let me
assure you, we have this task and we will carry it out.
Delay, disruption, or changes to the 313 shipbuilding plan
will weaken our ability to field the right force in time to
meet the warfighting requirements of 2020. Admiral Locklear and
I look forward to answering your questions concerning the plan.
Along with shipbuilding, I know the committee has a
longstanding interest in seabasing. Seabasing is a
transformational concept to overcome the challenges of speed
and access. Transformation is required in order to ensure
access when and where we need it. Denied access to coalition
airfields is not without precedence. There are significant
examples in recent years past of nations friendly to the United
States denying us military access. The anticipated global
environment requires the Nation to have a flexible, responsible
response capable of addressing any situation independent of
foreign base availability. That environment also requires the
Nation to have a joint forcible entry capability in time to
seize the initiative in support of national objectives.
Forward deployed forces, carrier and expeditionary strike
groups, surface action groups, and specified Army brigade
combat teams will provide a rapid, initial response and form
the nucleus of the seabase. Additional joint and/or coalition
platforms and capabilities will join as required. Because of
the dynamic nature of these missions and tasks, the seabase
must be capable and scalable across the entire range of
military operations from humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief through opening access for major combat operations. The
seabase is any combination of ships, aircraft, boats, people,
joint or coalition tailored to meet the mission, but flexible
enough to adapt to the changing mission requirements. The fact
that the seabase is maneuverable and capable of remaining at
sea over the horizon will reduce the dependence on other
nations' foreign territory and improve security, as we send
only the teeth of the force ashore to keep logistics still at
sea.
We are grateful for this committee's support for our Navy.
Your continuing support is critical. We look forward to the
future from a continued strong partnership with Congress, and
we thank you for your consideration and are ready to answer
your questions.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Admiral. Let me just ask a
general question and when the other committee members are here,
I will defer to them and see what they cover, and then I will
pick up some other questions.
The shipbuilding plan, which I was relieved to see, I think
is realistic in terms of numbers. It concludes we are going to
need at least $13.4 billion per year. Now, setting aside for a
second the fact that the CBO thinks costs need to be 20 to 30
percent higher, and I have not always bought what CBO has said
in the past but let's set that aside for a second. What are the
Navy's plans to fence the budget in a way that can sustain that
$13.4 billion? Where are you going to get the money, basically?
Admiral Locklear. Mr. Chairman, thanks for that question.
First of all, let me say that again when Admiral Mullen came in
as CNO, he made the 313-ship plan his highest priority. As his
programmer, I am on the final stages of determining how the
budget proposal gets put together. After we talked about
capability and analysis, that type of thing, he in no uncertain
terms has directed me to find the money to ensure that we reach
the goal of 313 ships by 2020. I would say that the $13.4
billion, that is in fiscal year 2005 dollars. In fiscal year
2007, we were unable to achieve that because he had not been
here very long, but what we were able to do in 2007 throughout
the preparation of that budget's submission and throughout the
QDR was to be able to ensure that the shipbuilding plan the
Navy had in 2007 did not become a significant bill payer for
other things that might need to be done.
In the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 2008 process we
are building, the plan through fiscal year 2013 is underway. As
there is to everything we budget for, there will be some
challenges. My expectation is that we will reach that fiscal
year 2005 level of $13.4 billion about midway through the FYDP.
We probably won't realize that right off, but it is a
sustainable ramp that reaches that 2020 timeframe of when we
will have the 313 ships. We are already moving in this process
to pressurize all the other accounts that the Navy has. Our
manpower accounts are a possibility in my view as a programmer,
and we are pressurizing those accounts. We have the greatest
sailors in the world. They have great compensation. We are
grateful for all that you do to provide that. So we are dealing
with trying to control those costs to control the size of the
Navy, so it is affordable.
When it comes to our readiness accounts, we are taking a
very, very hard look at all aspects of our operating accounts
to ensure that we are getting the maximum amount of operating
efficiency for every dollar. It is my opinion that we will be
able to realize this shipbuilding plan that the CNO has and
that you will see it in the fiscal year 2008 President's
budget.
Senator Talent. 2008. Now, you mentioned the manpower
accounts. We pushed sea swap pretty far. I am hearing you say
manpower and readiness. Those accounts have given at the
office. I mean Admiral Clark was pretty good in getting money
out of that. Do you really think you are going to be able to
find $5 billion out of those accounts?
Admiral Locklear. No, sir. I guess what I meant to say was
that we will ensure that we pressurize those two accounts for
maximum efficiency. We continue to do that, as we should. As we
go down the road, we will have other program decisions that
have to be made. There will be other program areas that we will
have to go look at very hard to ensure where they fall on the
CNO's priority list. My expectation is that some of those
programs will end up having to become billpayers for this plan.
Senator Talent. Do you care to share with the committee
which programs you may be thinking of?
Admiral Locklear. I do not have, at this point in time, a
firm enough understanding of which ones we would offer. Those
would be part of the POM 2008 debate that we have internal to
the Navy.
Senator Talent. It is a concern I have. I think we just may
need to confront the fact that we are going to have to get more
money into the Navy budget overall. We have begun to take steps
in the Senate to try and advise our colleagues of the need for
this, as you are probably aware. Certainly, Senator Reed and
Senator Lieberman were leaders in this effort, and I was
involved in it. Senator Collins was also. We see these needs
coming up and I don't know how you are going to get $5 billion,
assuming that is enough for the Ship Construction, Navy (SCN)
account, out of the rest of the Navy, given what we have had to
do in the last few years. So, we are aware of that need. We
want to work closely with you in trying to make certain that we
have the funds to do this. This whole program depends on the
stability of these funding accounts. I know you all agree with
that. We are going to have to do something in order to get more
money in those accounts. We might as well confront that as soon
as possible. I know the chairman is concerned as well about
that. I will go ahead and defer now to Senator Reed. I have
other questions, but I don't know how long he has, so let's go
to him.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for not only your good question, but your suggestion that we
need more money, because I think I agree with you entirely on
that. Secretary Etter, I understand that Congressman Bartlett
asked for some unconstrained shipbuilding program in the House
that would be prepared by the Navy. Are you doing something
like that? A program that would lay out all the long-term
shipbuilding without regard to budgets. I mean what you
precisely need.
Dr. Etter. He did ask us to look at that and we are looking
at it at this point. We have not completed our review.
Senator Reed. When you do complete that I would be
interested in seeing it and I am sure the chairman would also.
If you could provide that to this committee as well. Thank you
very much.
[The information referred to follows:]
As part of our analysis this past year we examined the joint
warfighting requirements for naval forces across the complete spectrum
of operations. For traditional conflicts, we assessed the demands for
both capability and capacity to counter the threats as laid out in the
Defense Planning Guidance. Since no joint document exists defining the
joint demands for the global war on terror and other nontraditional
forms of conflict, we developed an analytically-based requirement
through a combination of modeling and extensive inputs from the Navy
component commanders worldwide. The Navy plan delivers sufficient
capability and capacity to meet these demands, today and in the future.
This should not imply that the force does not incur risk, it
obviously does. The Navy plan minimizes risk in core Navy capabilities
critical to the overall success of the joint force. Some of these areas
include anti-submarine warfare, countering anti-access threats, and
mine warfare (particularly mine countermeasures). In areas where there
is significant joint capability and capacity, the plan accepts more
risk to capitalize on joint interdependencies. It would be inaccurate
to apply a strict modifier across all risk definitions. The campaign
analysis, incorporating the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved
models, assessed criteria consistent with defense planning scenarios in
terms of ``what it takes to win'' major contingency operations. In all
cases, the Navy plan meets the minimum force required ``to win'' the
modeled campaigns, and in most areas with significant overmatch.
As stated previously, the Navy plan minimizes risk in core Navy
capabilities critical to the overall success of the joint force. In
areas where there is significant joint capability and capacity, the
plan accepts more risk to capitalize on joint interdependencies.
Therefore, while the Navy may be taking more risk in certain warfare
areas, the overall joint and/or (combined force that is brought to the
fight reduces this risk significantly. To consider a Navy that would
assume low risk in all warfare areas would be to consider a Navy that
provides a force capable of winning a major conflict as a standalone
force, contrary to current strategic and defense planning guidance.
While a ``low risk'' Navy would most likely have greater capacity and
capability, many of these capabilities would provide extensive
overmatch when considering the joint force as a whole.
Senator Reed. I will follow on and I think Senator
Lieberman will also follow on in terms of questions about the
submarine industrial base and this should come as no surprise.
We are now at a situation where we are building one submarine a
year. We are scheduled to go to two in fiscal year 2012. But
even with this projected build rate, and you factor in
retirement and other situations, we are going to dip down below
48 submarines in the period of 2019-2035. Most people are very
concerned at that level that we will not be able to conduct all
the missions that the commanders of a combatant command need.
In fact, we are going to ensure some strategic risk, which
essentially raises a question of how we deal with this now, so
we don't get into that situation. It compels me to suggest and
I think my colleagues would also suggest, I hope, that we have
to get a two-per-year build rate very quickly. Can you comment,
Admiral?
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir. As you all know, sir, as far as
the combatant commander (COCOM) requirement, we are right now
satisfying probably 60 to 65 percent of that. However, our
analysis that looks out to the 2020 timeframe says that we need
10 submarines deployed worldwide at any one time. Forty-eight
submarines is the number that provides that. As we go down to
40, as you were mentioning, we have 7.5 submarines that we need
deployed all the time for the warfighting aspects. The other
2.5 are for presence only. So from a warfighting standpoint,
our analysis shows that we have enough submarines to carry out
the warfight. That would be at the expense of the presence
requirement. It would be a balance on where we operate the rest
of the submarine fleet. In addition, I think the committee also
knows that we are planning to split the submarine homeporting,
60 percent on the west coast and 40 percent on the east coast
in order to mitigate some of the long time lines associated
with the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR).
The maintenance aspects of the Virginia class submarine are
far superior to the SSN 688, as you also know it is a fantastic
platform. So, we will get a bounce from the increased
operational availability of the submarine.
Senator Reed. I think this issue of operational risk is
significant, even though your analysis suggests that we can
meet the warfighter's requirements with 40 submarines. That is
very close to the edge. I have to presume that is looking at,
not the worst case, but probably the middle case or maybe even
the best case. I know some others like Admiral Konetzni, the
former deputy commander of all submarine forces, who suggest
that when you get that low, the risk is not moderate, it is
severe. It really could be a crisis. We also understand that it
takes awhile to build a submarine, so if we don't reverse this
process, we could wake up in 2013 or so with insufficient
forces. I just want to urge you to look again. The related
issue is, of course, the price of the submarine. The cheaper
they are, the faster I think we get to two per year. But what
the manufacturers tell us is that until they get to two a year,
they really can't lower the price per submarine because of all
the overhead cost and other costs. This is a program where I
sense that the manufacturers are taking price out. There are
some other Navy shipbuilding programs where the price keeps
going up and up and up; in this one I think they got it in the
right direction. It suggests to me this is another argument for
two per year production very quickly to get the price down.
Admiral, do you have comments?
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir. There are always puts and takes.
If we move the submarine procurement rate to the left, and many
say by fiscal year 2009, that money has to come from somewhere.
So, you are going to pressurize the carrier, the large deck
amphibs, the LCS, and the DD(X), so there is no free luncheon
in here. We think we have a plan that is executable. That plan
calls for two submarines by 2012. We think with the investments
that we have made, we will get to the $2 billion per ship and I
think you are right in this particular case, the industrial
base is driving the cost and helping out there to drive the
cost of the submarine down. So, that is what our program is.
Senator Reed. I thank you. I don't want to monopolize time,
just the number of changes I have seen in those procurement
plans for submarines and stretching out the two-per-year
suggests to me that I am not confident the same way as you are.
Also I think the budget pressure that we are seeing building up
this year, next year, and out several years is just as
excruciating as what we might sense this budget cycle and next
budget cycle. So, thank you very much. Thank you members.
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Talent. If I can follow on something in one of
Senator Reed's questions. Are there programs--I am sure there
are programs, and the submarine is one of them--where if we
could invest more money up front, you could save money within
the FYDP? DD(X) may be a similar one. I am sure Senator Collins
would want to follow on that. Would you agree with that,
Admiral Edwards?
Admiral Edwards. Yes, I do, sir. In fact, we have looked in
2007, I think we have put some money in there across the FYDP
about $154 million--and that money was going to drive the cost
of the submarines down. We have not looked at the DD(X).
Allison may have some more information on that.
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. On DD(X), because of where we are in
the detail design phase, what we have done is sat down with the
requirements community and reviewed each of the individual
requirements. There is some capability that we have decided to
back off on that won't impact the key performance parameters of
DD(X). For example, whether to make the storeroom into a
convertible magazine that will save costs. So as we detail
design the ship we won't put that into the design, so we won't
have that cost up front. That is why we feel that on DD(X), as
you have heard the lead ship at $3.3 billion, we feel we can
get about $265 million out of the lead ship and we are actively
working to do that in partnership with the requirements
community. This is unlike the submarine where the detail design
is complete and you are in production. We have put the
investment, as Admiral Edwards said, at about $154 million
across the FYDP to drive us down to the $2.2 billion per
submarine in 2012.
Senator Talent. If you would let the committee know,
certainly with regard to Virginia class, but also any other
programs, where speeding up an investment helps, instead of
always pushing everything to the right, actually pushing
something to the left a little bit. Where you would have some
confidence that you would save some significant dollars within
the FYDP, let's say, if you would give us that and document
that so we can really begin trying to influence this process
here. I think we are all committed to doing that. If we can
show the Senate that we can actually save some money, then we
maybe will be able to get these dollars. We really want to
influence that process. I know Senator Kennedy feels--and I
think Senator Warner also and Senator Levin--that this is the
minimum that we need to do for the Navy. If we are serious
about doing it, let's do it in a way that is going to save us
money within the FYDP. If that means making the case for
getting some more money upfront, let's do that. So if you would
give us that and work with committee staff to document that, at
least with the submarine, but potentially with the other
programs, we would appreciate it.
Admiral Edwards. Aye, Aye, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Navy has $20 million in the fiscal year 2007 budget submission
which is dedicated to cost reduction initiatives on Virginia class
submarines to help achieve the $2 billion submarine (fiscal year 2005
dollars) target. An additional $65 million would enable cost reduction
initiatives such as the Large-Aperture Bow Array, Propulsion Plant
changes, and non-propulsion electronics modernization efforts to begin.
Accelerating this funding would allow cost reduction opportunities to
be introduced to be production submarines earlier than currently
planned. It should be noted that alone the $65 million addition is not
the total amount required to achieve the $2 billion/submarine (fiscal
year 2005 dollars) savings.
General Dynamics Electric Boat currently employs about 3,500
engineers and designers (including life cycle support). They are at an
employment peak and are projected to ramp down as Virginia class and
SSGN design efforts conclude. With current funding levels they are
projected to be at 3,000 engineers and designers at the beginning of
2007 and down to 2,600 by the end of fiscal year 2007. The addition of
$65 million in RDT&E for Virginia class cost reduction initiatives will
support 400 designers and engineers over 2007, allowing Electric Boat
to maintain a level load of 3,000 designers/engineers throughout the
year.
Senator Talent. Senator Lieberman is next.
Senator Lieberman. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. You were here first.
Senator Lieberman. You are very gracious, Senator Collins.
Thank you. I will not be long.
Senator Talent. I should also mention that since you are
older, she thought you should go first. [Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. Right again. A fact-based conclusion. I
thank the witnesses for being here. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Thanks for your excellent leadership of this subcommittee. It
has been a pleasure to work with you. Also, a pleasure to work
with you on the floor for the Senate together. We have
attempted to do what to many people may seem counter-intuitive
because of the overall size of the DOD budget, but basically we
don't think it is enough. I suppose everybody could find their
excess spending within the budget. The other subcommittee--I am
on Airland with Senator McCain and we are focused on how we can
make the acquisition process more efficient, more cost
effective. But Senator Talent has been a real leader in trying
to raise up the budget for the DOD, because the fact is we are
short changing all of the Services in my opinion in the
acquisition of equipment systems needed for our defense. So, I
thank you for what you said.
Just building on the exchange that just occurred and to
give you an example based on what Senator Reed was asking and
Mr. Chairman what you said, we are very concerned. Some of us
are focused, in our case on Electric Boat (EB) and the
submarine budget, on the need--which the Navy, of course
acknowledges--to go to two submarines a year. Otherwise we will
fall below that 48 minimum requirement as the Chinese are
building and others are building more submarines. At the same
time the Navy, the CNO, and the Secretary are saying to EB and
others, you have to bring your cost down. I am very proud I am
not here to sign a contract but I have been in rooms that the
executives at EB have said and they have been asked to cut the
cost of this fantastic Virginia class submarine from
essentially $2\1/2\ billion to $2 billion. The answer that I
have heard people say at the top is we think we can do that if
you would take us to two submarines a year. The sooner you do
that, the sooner we will be able to cut it. So there is a very
specific example of quite a substantial saving that can be
achieved if we can move the two submarines a year forward. We
are all going to be working together on that.
In that regard, I wanted to ask--I suppose any of the
witnesses who care to answer--one of the effects of this short
funding of capital acquisitions by the DOD is having this
effect at EB. Obviously there are two manufacturers of
submarines. I think everybody acknowledges the fact that the
premier and in some ways the only submarine design and engineer
force is at EB. For the first time in almost 50 years, as you
all know, there is no new submarine design on the drawing
board. The current design programs are near completion. So, EB
is in a position, at the status quo, where they are going to
have to start laying off, in fact they have already started
laying off designers. This is a very unique talent. I suppose
it can always be replaced with training but it is going to take
a long time. Our undersea superiority depends on the
maintenance of this workforce.
I was very pleased at the full committee hearing on the
Navy budget, earlier in March. Secretary Winter remarked that
losing this part of the submarine industrial base is an ``issue
of great concern'' to him. I wonder if any of you would talk
about this. Obviously, one possibility here is to look, as we
are, for some new programs to design, not to make them up but
real ones that would benefit the Navy and try to move it to
this force. There have been some very creative assignment of
work on some of the design work on the carrier, going to this
unusually talented workforce. So, I would invite your general
reaction to the problem and what you think we can do about it.
Dr. Etter. I would like to say a few things to that,
Senator Lieberman. I think you are exactly right. This is a
very critical capability that the country must keep because we
do intend to do future submarines. So, we must figure out what
is the right number of designers that we need, and what are the
kinds of activities that we can use to keep them involved in
design. Those are things that are very important to us and we
have a number of steps underway to help us with that.
We have a RAND study that will be completed in the fall. It
is going to look across the various skills within the designer
set and that is going to help us identify the most important
ones. We also are looking at other possibilities, including
whether we can perhaps do some things with the Virginia class
submarine to continue to improve things there.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Etter. There is a whole range of things that we are
looking at. One of the things that, of course, is a challenge
is to try to figure out how do we do this in a way so that by
the time we do need the submarine designers again, we still
have those people available. It is not looking at really just
trying to keep the entire design community that is there now
because many of those would not be around when we get ready to
do this. So, there are a lot of challenges. We understand the
problem and we do think that within the next 6 months to a
year, we are going to have some solutions to do this. Because
of the design being completed for Virginia now and the Ohio
class changes, this was not a surprise. So, it was something
that all of us knew was coming. It is one we have to figure out
how to deal with.
Senator Lieberman. It is.
Admiral Edwards. If I could follow on that?
Senator Lieberman. Please, Admiral.
Admiral Edwards. Sir, I am sorry.
Senator Lieberman. No, go right ahead.
Admiral Edwards. The fact is though, increasing production
of the submarine now, the Virginia class submarine, does not
solve that design issue.
Senator Lieberman. It is a separate issue.
Admiral Edwards. We have to decouple that and then we have
to attack really those critical tasks that these designers do
to make sure that those are kept alive as we go forward with
the submarine program.
Senator Lieberman. Do you have any thoughts about other
kinds of shipbuilding in which these designers might be used?
Dr. Etter. We do have other design activities going on, for
example, the DD(X) is one of the areas we believe that some of
these designers would be able to contribute.
Senator Lieberman. That is good to hear. Of course, we live
in this remarkable age of telecommunications advances, so that
they can design from one place and the designs can be
immediately transmitted and used back and forth in another
place far away. I appreciate those answers. That is a real high
priority I think for the country but obviously also for the
submarine program and the workers who are there. Mr. Chairman,
I think I am going to leave it there. I would ask your consent
that I include a more general statement on the budget, which
Senator Reed and you in some measure have already commented on,
be printed in the record. I would thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
Good afternoon and thank you for attending. I want to welcome all
of the witnesses to our Seapower Subcommittee hearing, which continues
our discussion of the Navy's proposed budget and its warfighting plans
for the future.
I applaud the Navy's ambitious long-range shipbuilding plan, which
was submitted to Congress in February. Our current Navy fleet is at its
smallest size since prior to World War I. However, I am worried about
whether the administration has requested enough money for shipbuilding
in the budget to achieve these goals.
Shortchanging our shipbuilding account jeopardizes our Nation's
security. I am afraid that our plan for submarine construction is
woefully inadequate. The Navy's plan calls for a submarine fleet of 48
boats. I believe this number is too low for the strategic threats we
face. First, several submarine officers and Defense Department
officials argue that fulfilling the day-to-day demands for attack
submarines, particularly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) missions, would require a fleet of at least 70 submarines. We
have been told that even with our current fleet of 54 submarines, the
fleet can only provide combatant commanders with 65 percent of the
``presence with a purpose'' they requested. If our submarine fleet is
too small now to perform the tasks that our warfighting commanders want
done, we are inviting a level of risk that is unacceptable if we accept
an even smaller fleet. Due to the proliferation of new trouble spots
around the world, the need for undersea ISR has dramatically increased.
A diminished submarine fleet cannot meet the demands of a post-
September 11 world.
The prognosis only gets worse. If we adopt the Navy's proposed
plan, which delays an increase of submarine production to two boats a
year in fiscal year 2012, we will fall below the minimal requirement of
48 submarines in 2018. At that time, our intelligence estimates
conclude that China will have a well-equipped, modernized submarine
fleet of at least 50 boats. The Chinese are designing new classes of
submarines with increased capabilities. At the same time, new
submarines are being built elsewhere besides China, and they may be in
the hands of future adversaries. If we do not move to produce two
submarines a year as soon as possible, we are in serious danger of
falling behind China, and we may have to accept dangerous risks
elsewhere because we will have too few submarines.
The submarine is not a Cold War legacy. In fact, the Virginia-class
submarine was designed specifically for post-Cold War operations. It
operates well in littoral waters, gathers intelligence, engages in
strike operations and antisubmarine warfare, and provides Special
Operations Forces with delivery and support. Because of its near-shore
capabilities, our submarines can intercept signals that are invisible
to reconnaissance satellites and other platforms. These unique and
powerful features make the Virginia-class an indispensable weapon in
our arsenal to fight the ``long war'' on terrorism. If we do not
increase our build rate, we will not replace our aging Los Angeles-
class submarines fast enough. As a result, we run the risk of turning a
deaf ear and a blind eye to a gaping hole in our national security. We
live in a world in which we sometimes cannot anticipate attacks upon
our homeland and military. In this instance, we can prevent a looming
threat on the horizon with decisive action.
The very least we can do is escalate production to two submarines
as soon as possible. If we do this, we will maintain the recommended
force structure fleet of 48 boats until 2025. While I still believe a
fleet of 48 boats is too small for the conventional and asymmetric
challenges ahead of us, it does put us in a better position to reduce
the production gap between the United States and its competitors.
We have the brainpower and ability to design and build the best
submarines in the world in the United States. If we don't act now, we
may lose this capability, and it will be difficult to regain it. This
is an issue of national concern. Submarine manufacturing companies are
located in 47 States across the country. As a matter of national
security and economic stability, we must take the necessary steps to
preserve the submarine industrial base in the United States.
I am especially concerned about our Nation's submarine designers.
This is the first time in almost 50 years that we do not have a new
submarine design on the table. As more designers and engineers are laid
off--and we just laid off 154 workers from Electric Boat--they will
likely leave the business and there are no replacements. The news only
gets worse. It is anticipated that Electric Boat will be forced to lay
off up to 2,400 additional workers before the end of the year. Even if
those laid off do return to submarine work, there could be other delays
in restarting production. If designers are out of work or employed
elsewhere for more than two years, they will lose their security
clearances. The process of reinstating those clearances can take over a
year. It is imperative that we preserve our submarine design workforce
before any additional layoffs occur. I intend to fight to include
funding for design work in this bill.
In addition, I think we should transition New London from the
world's submarine center of excellence to the world's undersea warfare
center of excellence. We should concentrate the east coast submarine
force there, and base the LCS antisubmarine warfare and mine
countermeasure modules there to build a true undersea warfare center of
excellence. Devoting more resources to new design at Electric Boat
would further strengthen the remarkable synergy among New London,
Electric Boat, and the world's leading undersea expertise in the
region.
The Defense Science Board has described the attack submarine as the
``crown jewel'' of American defense. If we neglect our submarine
production, we jeopardize our global undersea warfare superiority. We
must move forward to devise a plan that will maintain a robust
submarine force in the United States which can readily meet all of the
challenges of warfighting, reconnaissance, and joint support placed
upon it.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Senator. To follow on what you
asked about, could these designers perhaps be assigned to
finding ways to reduce the cost of a submarine? In other words,
we are trying to get from $2.6 billion to $2 billion. They
designed it. Maybe, if we gave them this discreet assignment.
Look at how the engineers are doing it. Look at how the
operators are doing it in the shipyard. We will put a little
money up front to pay for you trying to figure out how to save
us money faster.
Dr. Etter. There are activities like that going on.
Allison, would you like to describe more of those?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. For the cost reduction, there is $20
million of R&D in fiscal year 2007. As Admiral Edwards
mentioned, there is $154 million across the FDYP that will
employ some of these designers. As part of the RAND study, we
have broken the design capabilities into 24 critical skill sets
that we think need to be looked at. Some of those skill sets
might be able to be accomplished on CVN 21 design or DD(X)
design and others we feel are probably going to end up being
very submarine-specific. So, we will have to look at the
options. As Dr. Etter said, do you do more changes to the
Virginia design or what are the other options? But some of
those designers, yes, they are employed right now for cost
reduction or will be with the fiscal year 2007 dollars.
Senator Talent. All right. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That is
a great segue to an issue that we are working on at Bath Iron
Works, which is to reduce the crew size of the DDG, applying
some of the technology that is being developed for the DD(X).
It sounds like you are proposing a similar effort to the one
underway at Iron Works right now and I suggested a modest
addition to the budget to continue that work. I think it offers
great promise. First of all, I want to say that it is very nice
to see Dr. Etter and Secretary Stiller again, and our admirals
as well. That brings me back to the issue of the cost of the
DD(X). I think lost in this debate has been the life cycle
costs of the DD(X) with its smaller crew size. In fact, not
only are there substantially greater capabilities over the DDG
but that much smaller crew size also produces cost savings in
the long run. I wonder, Dr. Etter, if you could comment on
that? I always hear this great alarm over the $3.2 billion cost
figure and yet, if you look at the life cycle cost and if you
factor in inflation and the increased capabilities, it really
is not a huge difference. Secretary Etter?
Dr. Etter. Thank you. Yes, that is one of the important
capabilities of DD(X). Reducing the crew size is something that
is almost impossible to do once a ship is built. It is
something you have to do from the very beginning, and build the
design around that. So by using that as one of the key things
that we wanted to put into this, we have greatly affected the
life cycle cost of this ship. It also has been enabled by a lot
of the new technologies that we have been working on, so it is
a combination of new technologies and designing the ship in
very different ways that has allowed us to do that.
Senator Collins. Admiral Edwards, I noticed you were
nodding. So, I want to ask you if you have anything to add?
Admiral Edwards. We agree. I mean I am a huge proponent for
the DD(X), but not only for crew size and life cycle costs, but
for the tremendous warfighting capability that DD(X) is going
to give with a much smaller crew. Just as you said, what we are
learning from DD(X) and these technologies are also going
forward and forward fitting the ships of the future, but also
back fitting some good ideas on DDG, so that we will be able to
take out 30 or 40 people, we think, on the DDG during their
modernization.
Senator Collins. That is significant. There is real cost in
people, as we all have learned. If we can reduce by back
fitting the DDGs, the crew size by 30 to 40 people, that offers
significant savings. I think that is why that additional
research is important. It also helps with the industrial base
problem as far as evening out the workload a bit. I do want to
also reinforce the issue that all of us have brought up and
that the chairman so eloquently stated, and that is we have
military requirements for more submarines. For two a year, not
one a year. We have military requirements for more DD(X)s.
Either 12 over the period of time, if you use Admiral Clark's
figure or if you look at Admiral Mullen's proposed fleet, at
least 7, and yet we are only budgeting for 5. So, it is not as
if these ships and these submarines are not needed. They are
needed. But what is happening is not only are we not meeting
the military requirement, but also we are building an
uneconomical production rate and that contributes greatly to
the high costs. So, I wasn't surprised to hear my colleague,
Senator Lieberman, say that perhaps as much as a half of
billion dollars could be taken out of the cost. So, I think we
need to work together to figure how we can build what we really
need to build. It is going to lower the cost per unit. So, I
hope we can work together on that. Admiral Edwards, do you
think that would be a positive direction for the subcommittee?
Admiral Edwards. Absolutely, I do. Yes, ma'am. We look
forward to doing that.
Senator Collins. Thank you. One final question, if I could,
Mr. Chairman? I want to direct it to, I think Dr. Etter is the
one to answer this. Admiral Hamilton recently did a briefing on
the DD(X) program. It was a very helpful briefing. He said
during the course of it that, I should try to find the exact
quote, but it was something on the lines that we will never
again talk of a one-shipyard winner-take-all strategy. I was
very pleased to hear him say that. This Congress has enacted a
prohibition in permanent law against going to a one-shipyard
strategy. But I hope we are not just deferring that idea and
instead that Hurricane Katrina's damage at Ingalls and a
rethinking of the acquisition strategy has convinced, not only
Admiral Hamilton, but also those of you who are in the civilian
positions that that was an idea that should be abandoned
forever.
Dr. Etter. I would respond with two things. I think one of
the things that we recognize from Hurricane Katrina, although
we thought this but it has been driven home by Hurricane
Katrina, is how important it is to have flexibility in our
shipyards. Being able to have options there is very important
to the country. As far as DD(X) goes, we are committed to the
dual lead ship strategy. We think this strategy will help us
get this ship at the right price with the capabilities that we
need. As Admiral Edwards mentioned, it will make the wonderful
new warfighting capabilities that are important. So, we think
the current strategy we are on is really a good strategy and do
not plan to do a winner-take-all.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Senator. Admiral Locklear, let
me ask you a question. When did you say you anticipated getting
to that $13.4 billion, what year?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. In our current planning
process, my expectation is that we will realize that $13.4
billion fiscal year 2005 level about midway through this coming
FDYP. I would anticipate about the 2011 timeframe based on a
plan that we see being laid out. Now, I would like to emphasize
again that critical to this, from a programming perspective, is
stability. So, when we look at individual ship types or
submarines or any other program and we decide to change where
it lies in that program, it makes it very difficult to maintain
that stability and to meet those goals. I would use, for
example, the SSN to move that to the left. By having it, we are
saying in two in 2012. I think we ensure, as I recall about a
14-year period where we drop below the 48 total. To move it to
the left 2 years, I understand, I am told that that will
roughly cut in half the number of years where you would drop
below that level. In order to do that you would not have to put
advance procurement in--we looked very closely at this because
it was appealing to us from the beginning. We looked at
bringing advanced procurement to the left and then moving that
ship to the left. What that did to us is that it gave us an
additional bill of about $7.5 billion in the FDYP that we now
have to account for. It also means that by moving it into
fiscal year 2009, it now comes in competition with the money
that I have set aside for the rest of the shipbuilding. So, as
a programmer I am then forced to go to places where I can find
that amount of money, which might be CVN 21, DD(X), programs
that are all so near and dear to us. So, from my perspective
you have to consider the return on investment that we would get
from where we are today, to cut the time we would have fewer
than 48 submarines down by 7 or 8 years. The cost to do that
was difficult to plan into the program. So stability is
critical in us being able to attain this and keep those ships
in the places because they are such large capital investments.
You know this better than I do, but in our program we have
these big chunks of investment each year and sometimes they go
up and down and whenever you move capital ships into the same
year with a top line that is flat or can't be moved, that
amount of movement in the program competes with everything else
that I have to pay for in the Navy, which includes manpower
already. So, it is critical that we maintain that stability to
be able to get to the $13.4 billion about midway through the
FDYP.
Senator Talent. When you say critical to stability, let me
see if I understand you correctly, you are saying that if we
moved the second submarine to the left and this took money out
of other programs that you had planned to buy and therefore
created instability in those programs, then the cost of those
ships might go up because you could not carry out your plan
regarding those programs. Is that what you are saying?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. I categorize that as churn. We
spend a lot of money in all of defense industry building things
and costing more because of churn. Because the yards can't
plan, the yards can't build. There is not predictability, so we
create this churn. So we have to be very careful. We have to be
cognizant and try very hard to eliminate that churn from our
shipbuilding plan.
Senator Talent. So, the shipyards know, let's say for
DD(X), that if a certain amount is plugged in for fiscal year
2011, that they get that amount for DD(X) and they don't lose
it because we plugged a submarine in a year earlier or
something like that.
Admiral Locklear. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. But if we could find the submarine money,
in addition of course, then you don't have these concerns
regarding instability?
Admiral Locklear. No concern whatsoever, sir.
Senator Talent. Yes, you'll take additional money if we can
get it, I am sure. I think you said fiscal year 2011, to get
approximately to get to $13.5 billion, so would you expect to
see increments you know evenly increasing every year to get to
that figure? We are now at about $8.7 billion, so it is about
$4.5-$5.5 billion. Would you expect to see a ramp up basically?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. I would expect to see a ramp
up.
Senator Talent. At approximately even increments? Is that
what you would expect?
Admiral Locklear. I am unable to tell you definitely that
it would be an even increment. It will be a ramp up.
Senator Talent. Okay.
Admiral Edwards. It is hard, Mr. Chairman, to build average
ships with average dollars.
Senator Talent. Sure.
Admiral Edwards. Because there are spikes in it. So, we can
come back to you with that and give you the exact.
Senator Talent. I would appreciate that and that is for our
oversight purposes.
[The information referred to follows:]
The 30-year shipbuilding plan was designed to acquire the necessary
capabilities to pace the threat, sustain near-term operational
readiness and provide a clear and reliable demand signal to the
industrial base. The Navy has determined that the average annual
investment necessary to achieve and sustain the 313-ship force
structure is approximately $13.4 billion in fiscal year 2005 dollars.
The Navy is making the resource allocation decisions necessary to
quickly increase shipbuilding funding to this average $13.4 billion
level. The plan is balanced and sutainable with our current personnel
and readiness requirements.
Senator Talent. See we know you are serious about this
plan. I think we are all serious too. If you are going to get
to $13.5 billion by fiscal year 2011, you are going to be
ramping up in the mean time. We want to be certain that what
you are submitting is the ramp-up that you really believe we
need to get to $13.5 billion. If in the process of getting your
budget reviewed, that number is driven down because of budget
constraints by people outside of the Department, we want to
know that. If we don't have any idea about what that increment
is going to be, we are not going to know whether that number
was less than you actually want in a particular year and was
driven down by budget constraints or was just the result of a
normal fluctuation as you planned the program. So, I would like
you to work with our staff to give us an idea of how quickly
that ramp up is going to occur, so we can oversee if we see
anything out of the norm and find out if there was some budget
driven reduction in that number. I will just repeat again, I am
serious about this. I think we are all serious. These words
that I put in my statement and that you put in your statements
are not just words, we have to have this naval power.
Admiral Locklear, you mentioned that if we move the
submarine to the left, so we go from 14 to 7 years without that
presence that might destabilize some of the programs. But you
mentioned that you are going to try to get money out of the
readiness accounts and if you can do it without undermining
readiness, that is fantastic. But, the fewer ships we have
trying to cover, it just seems to me, the more stress on the
fleet we do have and so that is going to work against your
attempt to reduce readiness accounts and personnel accounts.
You see this as a kind of thing where we can end up defeating
our purposes, we are trying to save money on shipbuilding but
that increases readiness costs or personnel costs because we
are covering with a fleet that is too small. Then we have
problems. Would you like to comment on that?
Admiral Locklear. I couldn't agree with you more. Just in
my initial comments what I tried to convey to you was that in
the area of personnel readiness we continually pressurize those
to the level that we feel we can. But those accounts are fairly
pressurized, so I agree. As I said earlier, to accomplish this
we are going to have to look at other areas in our program to
be able to accomplish this, which we are doing now.
Senator Talent. Right, and I'm not going to ask you to give
us specifics that you are just developing now. At a certain
point, of course, we are going to be very interested in the
specifics.
Admiral Edwards and Dr. Etter, let's go a little bit into
how you are concretely planning to reduce contract changes,
requirements creep, and how you anticipate the acquisition
community is going to work with you in terms of stabilizing
design. Now, the CNO has focused on the need to minimize change
to ship contracts and requirements creep. I think we are all in
agreement with that. It is an absolute imperative. Admiral,
let's address the requirements standpoint. Tell us with a
little more concreteness, if you can, how the CNO's directions
are being translated into policy and practice. Maybe some
specific examples that would give us confidence that you can
really meet these program estimates. Share with us and make it
a little bit more tangible for us.
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. So, we can see what you are doing.
Admiral Edwards. One of the first things that the CNO
directed back in July, when he came onboard was to set up a
requirements board. We had one in the past that was called the
Ships Characteristics Board. That has now morphed into what we
call the Resources and Requirements Review Board (R\3\B). This
is a board that can be, depending upon the topic, whether you
are talking an acquisition category (ACAT) I program or an ACAT
II. Whether you are talking about it being over budget or
behind schedule and to what degree, we have a means of ramping
up the oversight from a three-star resource sponsor, Admiral
Crenshaw, up to the Vice Chief, who has a threshold limit, and
then to the CNO himself. If we are going to impact a key
parameter of the program or if a key parameter of the program
is the major cost driver and we want to reduce the requirement,
then that has to go before one of these boards and if it is a
key performance parameter, that has to be made at the CNO
level.
Senator Talent. So either requirement changes going up or
down.
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. So, this setup is going to allow you to
identify high cost areas and see whether you can reduce the
requirement in a way that doesn't really affect capability and
reduce cost.
Admiral Edwards. Absolutely. If it does affect capability,
then we want to make sure that is not being done in a stove-
pipe with people that don't understand the impact that may
result in the joint requirement or from another Navy program
that is relying on this capability. So, that has put a very
stringent set of requirement parameters, both on the
acquisition side of the house and also on the requirement side
of the house. Over the past month we have probably had 4 or 5
of these R\3\Bs meet. We have looked at programs that are
behind schedule or have a cost over-run or are not meeting
their parameters and are we willing to reduce the requirement?
Are we willing to cut back on the program or do we want to
cancel the program? So, that is a very concrete direction and
action that the CNO has gone to in order to get his arms around
it. We are not going to pressurize the acquisition side with
requirements when we could live with less, and with a whole lot
less dollars.
Senator Talent. So, this R\3\B is naval officers. Is that
who is on the board?
Admiral Edwards. There are naval officers.
Senator Talent. Also----
Admiral Edwards. Allison is part of that.
Senator Talent. Allison is on that?
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir. Dr. Etter would be part of that
as it went up to the CNO's level, where it would be appropriate
for her.
Senator Talent. Okay. It sounds like--and the Vice Chief is
going to play a key role in this.
Admiral Edwards. The Vice Chief is the bulldog.
Senator Talent. Okay. That is what I was going to--that is
the term I was searching for.
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. What would trigger a review by the R\3\B?
Is this something where the requirement board is looking or
would some other level or officer be able to trigger a R\3\B?
Admiral Locklear. As a matter of fact, the R\3\B now is
already undertaking a look at all of our major programs within
the Navy at this particular time. You can also trigger and
request to go to the R\3\B. It can be done from almost any
venue. It can be done from another resource sponsor within the
Navy, if it has to do with the manpower implication or
readiness implication. They can propose those types of topics
to the R\3\B and have the R\3\B decide whether they need to
bring them forward to basically look at them from a resourcing
perspective.
Senator Talent. Within the contracting or shipbuilding
community, if they see a change that may be a problem, can they
take this to them?
Admiral Edwards. They will be required to.
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. We do. We will. As the Admiral said,
it has just gotten started. Especially with programs that are
just beginning, as we complete the analysis of alternatives and
we set the initial requirements, the requirements community, I
think that will be a natural venue for this to be vetted. So,
as the requirements documentation works through the system,
everybody knows the costs.
Admiral Edwards. Mr. Chairman, the costs of a program,
especially a shipbuilding program, about 90 percent of the
costs or 85 percent of the cost of the program is in the very
initial stages of the program. So, you are adding up other
alternatives and you are looking at options and you have not
even gotten the design yet. But once you set on architecture
and the requirements for the program, you very quickly lock in
about 85 percent of your costs. As you go, even if you try to
get then a requirement out you start to pay for the design
change.
Senator Talent. Sure, you generate a whole lot of costs.
Admiral Edwards. So, you are kind of at a place here. If
you can, as Allison said, start this process at the beginning
that we would call the initial capabilities documentation,
basically, you get the three-star, four-star look at that point
and then we can identify where the cost drivers are and then we
can start really managing.
Senator Talent. Sure. Oh, I understand. It is hard. It is
very difficult to change shipbuilding on the fly. Sometimes the
best is the enemy of the good.
Dr. Etter. If I could offer----
Senator Talent. Yes.
Dr. Etter. Another thing that we are doing particularly on
the ships where we are adding new technologies is we are trying
to keep off ramps for these, so that if we find that a
technology is not maturing as quickly as we thought, we have an
alterative. That is another way that we are trying to control
costs. In fact, on DD(X) we did that in one of the 10 key
technology areas. But, this is an important way that we are
able to also have options. It is also an important thought
because of this timing issue; you have to know when the off
ramp is available because if we get too far in the design, we
don't have those options anymore. This is another one of the
benefits of having this review board.
Senator Talent. All right, so the R\3\B then is both
regularly overseeing the programs and also available for ideas
or suggestions, either within the acquisitions community, the
shipbuilding community, the Navy, or any of the above. I was
going to ask you what the acquisition community was doing to
ensure a stable design. Would you say this requirement board
process is the center of what you are doing?
Dr. Etter. I would not say it is the center; it is one
aspect of it. It is one that is really driven more from the
requirements side. Within the acquisition community, we have a
number of things that we are doing to try to control costs.
Certainly, one of the things that we are able to do early on is
work through the acquisition strategy. If we are able to do
multi-year programs and if we are able to do incremental
funding for some of our larger systems, then that certainly
helps us with costs because we can with multiple ships drive
down the costs. The technology offramps are another example of
what we do. Then we are constantly also looking to reduce
requirements. Certainly, the requirement side is doing that but
we also do that because our program managers are in many ways
in the key position to see where changing a requirement
slightly would impact the cost. We also have some programs
where we have set aside dollars, where we work with industry to
come up with ideas. I think in the submarine community, the
capital expenditure (CAPEX) program is a great example. In the
Virginia class, we have dollars that have been set aside and
the contractors can propose things that they see that would
allow us to cut costs. They make a proposal and if we agree
then we will fund it. I think these are some of the examples of
things that we have done. The bottom line of being ready to
take off some capabilities if we need to is extremely important
in order to stay on budget and on cost.
Senator Talent. As you implement this, both on the
acquisition and the requirement side, if you would share with
staff here these concrete examples of successes that you are
achieving, that would help us. I would like to be empowered
with that as I make the case that you are using the money as
efficiently as you can. I think that is important. We don't
talk enough about our successes and you guys certainly get
enough complaints about the failures or the problems. So, let's
try to balance that out a little bit.
Secretary Etter, how is the industry responding? What kind
of investments would you expect in response to this
shipbuilding plan? We know how capital intensive this industry
is. Does it depend on their confidence that you actually can do
it and how would you describe that level of confidence at this
point, in your view? I probably ought to get them here and ask
them that, but I will get your point of view. Just one other
thing. What other actions are they taking to optimize
shipbuilding and funding?
Dr. Etter. I think having the shipbuilding plan should be
very much a motivation to the industry because they can now, I
believe, plan on longer-term stability. This is critical when
you are going to do long-term investments. It is going to make
a difference. We are still early in the process and I think it
is going to be important that we show, as Admiral Locklear
indicated, that we are committed to doing this. As far as some
specific examples, I think I would ask Allison Stiller, who has
a lot of discussions with the industry, on what she is hearing
on this.
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. In the case of the submarines, that
Dr. Etter referred to, we have a program that, within the
shipbuilding contracts, allows the shipbuilders to come and
propose facility improvements in their yards. They show return
on investment to us like they would to a corporate board. That
will help reduce the cost of the submarine and production. We
have invested to date about $30 million in Electric Boat
location, Quonset Point and Groton, as well as Newport News. We
also had an incentive like that on the carrier contract for CVN
21. In fact, we co-invested in a facility with Newport News, to
cut very thick steel, which is used on the flight deck. It is
an incredible time saver. It has been a wonderful investment
and we have seen it in action. We are also going to employ the
same kind of incentive on DD(X) when we get into production on
DD(X). But these are production type incentives that we are
placing in the contracts. They have to show a return on
investment. We give half the money upfront and half on the back
end so that they are vested as well.
In the case of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems with Hurricane
Katrina, they are relooking at their entire facility to see
where there was damage, and how to best re-facilitize their
yard. A piece of how they are going about that is the First
Marine International study, the benchmarking study that came
out last year. It is yard specific and gives them thoughts on
how they can better lay out their yard to be more efficient.
Another example is Bath Iron Works and the land level facility
that they invested in over the last several years.
We have seen great improvements in the DDG procurement,
coming down the learning curve and being able to outfit more on
the land before you put the ship in the water. So, all of our
yards have made some investments. Some have been co-shared with
the Navy; some have been on their own; some have been State
funded. In the case of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems with their
facilities, this is their private insurance money that will
cover the facilities but we are certainly working with them to
give them thoughts.
Senator Talent. If we do this plan and we certainly intend
to do this plan, as I understand it and I have been briefed, we
are talking 51 ships from the years 2007-2011. That is just 28
major combatant ships and 23 LCS. Which, unless I am reading it
wrong, means that the picture for the next 5 years in terms of
rate of production for the six first tier shipyards is
basically going to be the same as it was the last 5 years in
terms of rate of production. So, given the fact that we need to
increase confidence, we are trying to encourage them to
optimize.
We want them to know that the future is going to be
different than the past. If that low rate of production, if I
can call it that, is affecting their confidence, what impact do
you think that is going to have on their ability to retain
critical skills? Do you have concerns on those lines?
Ms. Stiller. I don't think that there are concerns on the
critical skills other than the submarine design base that we
talked about earlier. I think with this plan they can plan and
know that we are committed to the stability and they don't have
to worry year to year; ``Are you serious?'' ``Is that ship
really going to show up or not in the budget?'' It does give
them a long-range view over the FDYP, the 5-year view to be
able to plan for facilities, investment, or how to shape the
workforce best or what improvements you want to make in the
shipyard. So, yes, it is a stable rate that we have seen in the
past, but I think it gives them more of a commitment that this
is the rate and we are not going to fluctuate the rate.
Senator Talent. So, you think there has been an adequate
buyin to this plan by the shipbuilding community, subject
obviously to them having confidence that it will be carried out
at a stable funding level. You have a fair level of confidence
that industry will respond appropriately to this rate of
production. You see what I am getting at?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. I think we have to prove to them
that we are committed to the stability. We have said it. This
is the first year we have laid it out. We said we were going to
build seven ships in fiscal year 2007 last year. We are saying
that again this year. I think the proof is in the pudding and
we have to continue to show that.
Senator Talent. Again, it is essential that they see a plan
and see it being carried out, which does suggest, Admiral
Edwards and Admiral Locklear, that we get some pretty good idea
of what this ramp-up is going to mean in actual dollars in the
upcoming years, so that we can assure them as we do oversight
that they are going to get that. Because we are going to
challenge them and I don't have them in front of us right now.
At the second panel, we are going to talk about these
things. We expect them to perform. They have been telling me
for 3 years that if we get a stable and adequate SCN account,
you work with them on requirement changes and requirement
creep. Acquisition works with them. They can deliver and they
can optimize. We can expect them to deliver and to optimize. I
think we covered the submarine build rate.
Let's go to seabasing. I don't think it is any secret that
I am still not as clear as I want to be on the seabase concept,
Admiral Edwards. When Admiral Clark first outlined this as part
of his concept for the Navy, it was the thing that I looked at
and I thought, well I am not so sure. Things keep popping up
that raise issues. For example, we had a hearing on lift.
General Schwartz testified at that time that he had a priority
that the seabase ships do not become single mission ships, just
with seabasing. He felt they needed to support Transportation
Command requirements also. They need to be lift vessels. Well,
fine, but now we are talking about multi-mission ships with
additional requirements and I am sitting here saying to myself,
do we have an agreement about what these capabilities of these
ships need to be so that we can get a stable design?
Concerns are also being raised regarding vulnerabilities to
the seabase. What kind of surface combatant strength are we
going to have to devote to protecting them? So, the idea is an
appealing one and I understand the Navy's desire to have this
kind of inherent and organic capability. The Marines have told
us that they would like to not to have to build the iron
mountain. If you would, give me the current concept for the
unique capability of a seabase, how those capabilities will be
employed and safeguarded in a hostile environment and how you
rank that capability among competing priorities. This is going
to be a significant investment. Is it going to put pressure on
our attempts to build surface combatants, submarines, and
expeditionary strike capabilities and how would you address
Transportation Command's concerns?
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir. Let me try this approach. Let's
talk about seabasing today. We have examples of how this worked
in Operations Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom, Hurricane Katrina,
and also the tsunami relief in all those areas, whether you are
talking humanitarian assistance or major combat operations or
war.
Right now, seabasing requires a host nation support and a
fixed port facility to get the whole Marine Corps Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF) on the beach and into the fight. From World War II we had
about 170 different bases around the world and it is down below
50 now. Or 29, somewhere in that area. So, we are losing the
ability to operate the Navy-Marine Corps in a style that we
have been accustomed to in the past. So, what we have to look
at is seabasing tomorrow and in the 2015 timeframe, which is
going to use the whole maneuver space of the ocean as our
operational area. We will have carrier strike groups (CSGs),
expeditionary strike groups (ESGs), and surface combatants. We
will assemble in a seabasing arrangement. It will be a joint
force with Marines and also availability for Army and Air Force
to flow through that phase. We will go right from the assembly
area at sea to the objective area. That is critical. It won't
go ashore and this iron mountain will be at sea and we will
assemble at sea and close the force from the sea. This is
actually an asymmetric capability that we will use both in the
global war on terror and for major combat operations.
So, I think as we see the world environment change this is
a capability that we are going to need and one that we are very
excited about and enthusiastic about.
Senator Talent. If I can just--I don't want to interrupt
you.
Admiral Edwards. No, sir.
Senator Talent. But if it is a convenient point, let me ask
you a couple of questions about what you have said. Let's take
the humanitarian assistance role. Again maybe there is
something I am missing here.
It certainly won't be the first time. But it would seem to
me that for humanitarian assistance could we not expect
cooperation from host countries? If the concern and reason we
need seabasing is a concern that the next Turkey might not
cooperate, is that risk great when we are talking about the
humanitarian mission?
Admiral Edwards. This is a scaleable capability. We
wouldn't need an entire seabasing capability to do humanitarian
assistance.
Senator Talent. All right.
Admiral Edwards. But in Indonesia, for example, there
wasn't a lot of infrastructure there to fall in on.
Senator Talent. So that was a case where a host country
would cooperate but you just didn't have a secure base to
operate from.
Admiral Edwards. Also, some areas are sensitive that the
United States is on the horizon instead of over the horizon,
where they operate out of sight. Somalia was another case where
it was a tough time to bring in a maritime preposition force
and then off-load in piers and other areas. This capability is
one I think that will be used in the future. I think it needs
different capabilities than the seabasing force that we have
today. You have to be able to selectively off-load, instead of
put it ashore and then select the capability you want to take
out as you go forward.
The protection of this force is going to be paramount. We
are going to have to dedicate our assets in order to do that.
We will not let this force be assembled without a requisite
defense for it. In that defense, it could be a carrier battle
group. It can be another amphibious task group (ESG) or it can
be surface combatants and submarines, which we have been
deploying the ESGs with surface combatants in ESGs recently.
So, the sea shield, both from surface, sub-surface, and
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, is going to have to be
defended. What other priority would you have for it, if you had
to use it?
Senator Talent. Right. I can see that. If it is a major
combat contingency, they are going to be there anyway probably.
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Let me follow up on that. It seems to me
from what you described that most of the size of the seabasing
capability that you are contemplating is mostly necessary
because of the major combat contingency requirement. In other
words, if you are just concerned about humanitarian assistance
or the global war on terror, you might need a seabasing
capability but not--I think you have 12 ships, you are
anticipating. Most of that capability is because of the
possibility of another Operation Iraqi Freedom or something
like that.
Admiral Edwards. Yes, sir. To answer the question on
General Schwartz as we go because I think there is an issue:
seabasing is more than just the 12 ships. The Maritime
Preposition Force (Future) (MPF(F)) is part of the seabasing
concept, but it is not the whole concept. We are going to
assemble the amphibious force. Part of that force would be the
MPF(F). We have amphibious ships now, 35 of them. We have three
maritime preposition forces, so that each one has about a MEB's
worth of equipment on it that depending on what part of the
world we are operating in, we can use that equipment. So, when
we talk about seabasing, we are talking about the whole
enchilada of capability here. You were right, if you are doing
a global war on terror operation, then you need only one ship
in that and some helicopters to do that or you may need the
Mercy to be the seabasing focal point. It is scaleable, but it
gives you--this capability will give that whole force the
opportunity to do it at sea and not assemble ashore. Sam, let
me give you an opportunity too.
Admiral Locklear. Our number one joint partners are the
Marines. The desire also was to be able to provide to the
country about a two MEB forcible entry capability anywhere in
the world, in 10 to 14 days in 8 to 10 hours of darkness, which
are criteria the Marines say we need. We believe and the
Marines believe that that is a capability that this country
needs. So, as you look from the humanitarian size kind of
seabase out to the joint seabases that you might realize in the
future, as we lay dollars against that--one of our primary
goals was to lay dollars against the seabase that enabled that
capability first. That is if you take a look at how we designed
and packaged the first--this thing that we call the seabase,
with the 12 ships, it was designed around those criteria. Then
we overlay the dollars on top of it. We made some trades to be
able to get to where we are today with a technology that is
available today.
Now, to answer General Schwartz's question, in my opinion,
that is a connector issue. This seabase, when it is built, will
be able to be used if the investment is made by the DOD and
connectors that will get all the joint partners onboard. But
for the foreseeable future, we and our Marine Corps partners
believe that was the preeminent capability for the Nation that
we had to buy first.
Senator Talent. That is one of the reasons I am inquiring
so specifically into this, other than my concerns about whether
this should have the priority that the Navy has given it. I am
frank in telling you that I am not yet convinced. I am going to
keep looking at it. I don't know how the rest of the committee
feels about it. It is also because we are still at that point,
as you said earlier, 85 to 90 percent of the costs are being
driven here. You mentioned the requirement boards and I told
you what General Schwartz said to me. This early planning
process has to be very joint and you are going to have to
include the Air Force. If they really have these lift ideas in
mind, we don't want to be working ourselves into a situation
where we are having to do with these ships what we are having
to do with these other ships, now that are further down the
line. Let's get this vision concrete and let's get it resolved
early and let's stick with it. We certainly don't want the cost
of these to go up. So I would be interested, as you work with
General Schwartz and your counterpart, Secretary Etter, in how
you are going to resolve the needs for additional sealift that
he wants to realize through these ships. Either we do that or
we don't. I know they are not going to recapitalize all their
sealift. I am still vague on all this but I think we need to
work that piece through. Do you have a comment, Ms. Stiller?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. Part of the MPF(F) squadron that we
came up with as the family of ships includes the large, medium-
speed roll-on roll-off ships, which the Army currently uses. So
we were looking at the joint aspects of how you can make sure
you are bringing an Army's worth of equipment into the fight as
well. We have had discussions early on with the Air Force as
well.
Senator Talent. Yes, in fact, the staff had prepared a
question for you, Dr. Etter, and you, Ms. Stiller, on exactly
that question. How is the Department structured to manage the
development and procurement of the seabase to ensure the range
of end-to-end capabilities are fully integrated and also
support joint operations? Do you have any further comments you
want to add on that?
Dr. Etter. No, I think that covers it.
Senator Talent. Okay. Well we have another panel. I have a
question about LCS, but I think I will submit that for the
record. I thank you for your candor and the real sincerity I
see here and the high priority that you are giving to this
whole plan. There is only one other thing I wanted to add and
then you can add a comment on that and then we will be done
with this panel. We have this whole process. It seems to me it
needs to be infused with a sense of priority about getting this
plan done on time, and at the cost that we projected. There is
a culture issue involved in all this. The one thing I know
about culture is that if it doesn't come from the top and
consistently and people through the process don't see the
priority given it from the top, it doesn't work. I am convinced
that the CNO is absolutely sincere in this. Secretary Wynne is.
I think you all are also. So, I don't know what importance you
would attach to that, but I think the people you work with in
the Department, in the Navy, and in industry need to see that
you are making decisions that show you are going to hang tough
in this thing. You want to comment on that Secretary?
Dr. Etter. Yes, I would just add that we are very committed
to this. One point I would like to make is that any changes in
the plan really do perturb the whole thing because it involves
so many things that as you start to move things around it
really does send us back to the drawing board to look at the
whole thing again. So, we think the stability of the plan is
very critical as we move forward to try to show that we can
build ships to that plan.
Senator Talent. I agree and if that was a euphemistic way
of suggesting that Congress needs to be onboard too and not
force any changes, I agree. In view of that though, we can all
anticipate that there could be things in the plan that are
going to run into concerns here of various kinds. So, let's
anticipate that well in advance, try and deal with Senators who
may have concerns and work that into the plan, so we don't run
into some huge problem. Then if the only unanticipated change
in the plan is more money, I think we can all deal with that.
We will continue trying to work to get that. Thank you, and we
will take the second panel. [Pause.]
I thank the second panel for your patience. That first
panel took a little longer than I anticipated, but I thought it
was very useful. Our first witness in the second panel is Mr.
Damien Bloor, Principal Consultant for First Marine
International Limited (FMI) of the United Kingdom. You will
probably get the prize for having come the longest way to
testify this year. Mr. Bloor, we are very grateful to you for
doing that.
Our second witness will be John F. Schank of the RAND
Corporation. We are very interested in your comments about
shipbuilding.
Mr. Bloor, please.
STATEMENT OF DAMIEN BLOOR, PRINCIPAL CONSULTANT, FIRST MARINE
INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Bloor. Thank you. Chairman Talent, I am a Principal
Consultant with FMI, which is a UK-based, independent,
specialist shipyard consultancy. In 2004, FMI was contracted by
the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Policy to assist with the Global Shipbuilding
Industrial Base Benchmarking Study.
We were tasked to use the FMI benchmarking system to
compare the practices of six large U.S. shipbuilders and seven
leading international shipbuilders in Europe and Asia. Then to
suggest changes to U.S. industry processes and Navy design and
acquisition practices that would improve the performance of the
naval shipbuilding enterprise as a whole. The study found that
the overall average best practice rating for the six U.S. yards
has increased substantially since 1999 although individual U.S.
yards still have large gaps in some key areas.
At the industry level the technology gap with the
international shipbuilders is closing. Estimates of U.S.
shipyard productivity indicated that although productivity
generally lags behind international yards, there is a wide
range across the industry. The core productivity of some yards
compares well to builders of naval vessels overseas. However,
the performance drop-off that occurs on the new first-of-class
and vessels built earlier in a series appears to be much
higher.
The analysis also indicated that the naval acquisition
practices increased shipyard work content by between 10 and 15
percent above commercial norms. This has been called the
customer factor.
It also appears that U.S. naval vessels tend to be more
complex and have more work content per unit of volume than some
similar international vessels. There are few deficiencies in
physical infrastructure. But in general, the industry is now
well-equipped to achieve good levels of productivity. However,
there are major opportunities to improve in the ``soft'' areas
including design, production engineering, planning, estimating,
logistics, accuracy control, and the organization of work.
Deficiencies in these areas result in high levels of inherent
work content, low productivity, high first-of-class performance
drop-off, and poor cost and schedule adherence.
The responsibility of the majority of the improvement
suggested in the study report principally, in our opinion, lies
with the industry. However, Congress, the Navy, and other
Government departments could help. By engineering designs to
reduce work content without compromising functionality, working
with industry to develop pre-production processes to reduce
first-of-class performance drop-off, review the acquisition
rules, regulations, and practices to identify opportunities to
reduce the customer factor stabilizing the ship acquisition
program, improving shipyard incentives, and continuing to
support performance improvement initiatives.
In order of magnitude an estimate of the value of the
potential savings confirms that there is considerable benefit
in reaching the targets suggested in the report. A realistic
timeframe to do this would be in the order of 5 years. We are
currently engaging in part two of this study, which is focused
on the military yards. I hope that you have found part one to
be useful. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bloor follows:]
Prepared Statement by Damien Bloor
First Marine International Limited (FMI) is a small, United Kingdom
(U.K.)-based, independent, specialist maritime consultancy company
formed in 1991. FMI consultants are, in the main, professional naval
architects and marine engineers with shipyard management experience and
knowledge of a wide range of shipbuilding market sectors. Members of
the team have worked on projects in over 50 countries and were first
involved together in the 1970s in the design and engineering of the
some of the largest and most successful shipyards in the world.
In June 2004, FMI was contracted by the Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Industrial Policy) (ODUSD(IP)) to assist with the
Department's Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study
(GSIBBS) Part 1. FMI was tasked to:
1. Compare the practices of the six U.S. first tier shipyards
and seven leading international commercial and naval
shipbuilders in Europe and Asia.
2. Identify specific changes to U.S. shipbuilding industry
processes and to U.S. Navy design and acquisition practices
that would improve the performance of the shipbuilding
enterprise.
The FMI shipyard benchmarking system was used to make the
comparisons as it was in a similar study in 1999/2000. The system
allows the processes and practices applied in individual shipyards to
be compared to others and to international best practice on a
consistent basis.
The study found that the overall average best practice rating for
the six major U.S. yards has increased from 3.1 in 1999/2000 to 3.6 in
2004. This is similar to the rates of improvement demonstrated by
leading international commercial builders and confirms that there has
been a marked increase in the rate of improvement in the U.S. yards
over the last 5 years. This is the result of substantial capital
expenditure by several yards and a concerted, industry-wide effort to
employ higher levels of technology. Although individual U.S. yards
still have some way to go, and there are some large gaps in key
elements, at an industry level the technology gap with the
international shipbuilders is closing. Some U.S. yards have clear
strengths and the benchmarking team was impressed by the improvements
that have resulted from the efforts of the last 5 years.
Indicative estimates of U.S. shipyard productivity were made using
a combination of proprietary and public domain data. The estimates took
vessel complexity and the additional work that the shipyard is required
to do as a consequence of working on Government, rather than
commercial, contracts into account. This has been named the ``customer
factor'' and was estimated to be between 10 percent and 15 percent for
most U.S. naval vessels types. The analysis indicated that there was a
wide range of productivity being achieved across the industry and that
the core productivity of some yards compared quite well to builders of
similar vessels overseas. However, the performance drop-off that occurs
on a new first-of-class appeared to be much higher.
The analysis of vessel work content indicated that U.S. naval
vessels tend to be more complex and have more work content per unit of
volume than some similar international vessels. Cost, risk, first-of-
class performance drop-off, and the probability of cost and schedule
overrun, all increase with vessel complexity. Therefore, if exposure to
all of the above is to be minimized, overly complex vessels should be
avoided.
Some observers have commented that as the commercial vessels built
by naval shipbuilders tend to be expensive, they must inherently be
constructing equally expensive naval vessels. Other studies by FMI have
shown that a naval builder can provide good value for money in the
construction of naval vessels but be unable to compete in high-volume
commercial markets. This said, both navies and naval builders can
undoubtedly continue to make improvements by studying the most
successful commercial models.
Although there are a few infrastructure deficiencies, putting aside
the effects of Hurricane Katrina, the industry is now generally well
equipped to achieve internationally comparable levels of productivity
in naval construction. However, there are major opportunities for
improvement in the `soft' areas including design, production
engineering, planning, estimating, logistics, accuracy control, and
manpower and organization. Deficiencies in these areas results in high
levels of inherent work content, high first-of-class performance drop-
off, and poor cost and schedule adherence. The report titled ``First
Marine International findings for the global shipbuilding industrial
base benchmarking study,'' which presents FMI's findings in full,
contains suggestions for improvements that can be effected through
industry collaboration. Suggestions for individual yards have been made
in proprietary shipyard reports.
The responsibility for the majority of the improvements suggested
principally lies with the industry; however, Congress, the Navy and
other Government departments could take action to assist. The principal
suggestions for the Navy and Government are:
Gain a more in-depth understanding of the relationship
between ship specification, complexity, and work content, and
work with the design authorities to reduce the inherent work
content of naval vessels while not compromising functionality.
Work with industry to develop the pre-production
processes to reduce first-of-class performance drop-off.
Review the acquisition rules, regulations, and
practices to determine if each adds value and work with the
shipyards to find ways to reduce the effect these have on
shipyard work content (i.e., reduce customer factor).
Stabilize the ship acquisition program.
Improve shipyard incentives.
Continue to support performance improvement
initiatives such as the National Shipbuilding Research Program
(NSRP).
The proposals made in the study are aimed at both improving
shipyard productivity and reducing work content by:
Increasing the use of best shipbuilding practices in
U.S. shipyards,
Making more effective use of the technology employed,
Optimizing ship designs to reduce work content in U.S.
naval vessels,
Reducing the customer factor,
Reducing first-of-class performance drop-off, and
Improving the acquisition environment.
An order-of-magnitude estimate of the value of the savings that can
be made confirms that there would be considerable benefit in reaching
the targets suggested in the report for the above actions. The time
required to achieve the targets will depend on the motivation of the
industry, Navy and Congress, and the availability of funding. However,
a realistic time-frame would be in the order of 5 years.
Senator Talent. Thank you. Mr. Schank.
STATEMENT OF JOHN F. SCHANK, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Schank. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to
appear before you today to discuss issues related to the future
of the United States naval shipbuilding industrial base.
For almost 15 years, we at the RAND Corporation have been
exploring these issues in a number of studies funded by the
United States Navy. Because of that experience, in 2001 we were
asked by the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense (MOD) to aid
in conceiving and evaluating acquisition options for a new
class of destroyers. They are Type 45s. Since then we have
completed several other studies for the MOD, including
supporting their future carrier program, their Astute submarine
program, and an overall analysis of their shipbuilding
industrial base.
Mostly, these projects have been directed either by myself
or by my colleagues, Mark Arena, who is here with me today, or
John Birkler, who could not be here. We have prepared a summary
of the messages for the MOD that we derived from our research
for that agency. These include the need for long-term planning
and its implications, ways to achieve design and production
efficiencies, and the need to sustain resources. We have
submitted our statement to be entered into the record.
I will confine my spoken remarks to four of the nine
potential lessons for the U.S. industrial base. We elaborate on
all our recommendations and all the lessons in the written
statement. These recommendations are tentative because we have
not made a thorough study of the U.S. shipbuilding industry,
but on the basis of our current knowledge and pending further
research they represent some actions that could merit further
consideration.
Mr. Schank. Our first recommendation would be to smooth out
demand peaks and valleys over the design and production cycle
for each ship type by planning over the long-term. By long-
term, we mean decades. We do not mean years. This should be
done simultaneously for all ship types, so that the inevitable
peaks and lulls of one type of ship can be balanced against
those of another type of ship. It should be done simultaneously
across all shipyards. This requires a centralized Navy plan
across all programs.
Second, we view competition as one approach to acquisition,
not the approach. It is desirable that shipyards specialize,
and in a market with a limited number of shipyards, competition
may not always be feasible. A different view of competition may
also be appropriate, rather than competition for work share,
the way we typically think of competition. Competition could be
directed for profit levels, award fees, or different shares or
percentages of the work share. Also, competition could be
conducted at the parent corporation level versus the individual
shipyard level. This is one of the lessons we saw in the United
Kingdom, where instead of contracting with the shipyards, they
would contract with the parent company allowing the parent
company to make decisions on allocation of workload across
shipyards, depending on the situation at the time.
Third, protecting and enhancing the design and integration
industrial base. We have already talked a little bit about the
submarine design base. As it has been mentioned, we at RAND are
doing that study. Mark Arena and I are leading that effort. We
know if there are long gaps between new ship designs within a
class of ship, design and integration skills may be lost. These
may be difficult to reconstitute. It is not just because there
is a loss of domain knowledge. What is almost as important is
the experience level of that knowledge. What we see with
successful programs is a combination of the main knowledge and
experience in the field. This is particularly true for complex
platforms that specialize in capabilities such as submarines
and nuclear propulsion. Here solutions may require a
consolidated view of shipbuilding versus a shipyard specific
view. That is, rather than focusing on a shipyard, we need to
focus, we believe, on the industry and look at it from an
industry perspective.
Senator Talent. You mean in terms of preserving design
capabilities. Look at it as an industry rather than within
shipyards?
Mr. Schank. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. You are focusing on design capabilities as
opposed to other parts of the production process. So you think
that is crucial in terms of----
Mr. Schank. We think design is the most difficult
capability to reconstitute. Design, testing, and integration--
we think they are the most difficult skills, and the most
critical skills, the hardest to reconstitute.
Fourth, and my last point: Resist any impulse to shift more
responsibility for assuring safety and performance to the
private sector. DOD should not offer shipyards greater autonomy
in making safety and performance-related decisions. If the yard
takes on more liability for risk, contracting arrangements not
withstanding, it is the Government who is the ultimate risk
bearer and should remain responsible for cost-benefit tradeoffs
and safety considerations. Note that these responsibilities
require a sufficient cadre of skilled personnel to provide
technical authority and oversight of design and production
programs. Technical skills have to exist not only in the
shipbuilding industrial base but also within the Navy to make
technical decisions on safety and performance and to oversee
the programs.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the opportunity
to address the committee today. I will be happy to answer any
questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schank follows:]
Prepared Statement by John Schank \1\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
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Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee: Thank you
for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss issues related to
the future of the U.S. naval shipbuilding industrial base. For almost
15 years, we at the RAND Corporation have been exploring these issues
in a number of studies funded by the U.S. Navy. Because of that
experience, in 2001 we were asked by the United Kingdom's (U.K.)
Ministry of Defence (MOD) to aid in conceiving and evaluating
acquisition options for a new class of destroyers, and we have since
then completed several other studies for the MOD (see the appendix).
Most of these projects have been directed either by myself or by my
colleague John Birkler, who could not be here today, but I need to
acknowledge the work of numerous RAND staff and other associates whose
names I won't mention but who were responsible for the bulk of the
research effort.
I am going to focus on the work we have done for the U.K. MOD,
because this work has particular relevance for decisions to be made at
the strategic level about the future of the U.S. naval industrial base.
Over the next decade and a half, the U.K. will embark upon its largest
naval shipbuilding program in many years. This effort will be
challenging, because it follows a period of reduced warship demand that
has led to consolidation and reduction in the capacity of the U.K.
shipbuilding industrial base and in the oversight resources available
to the MOD. Demands on the U.S. naval shipbuilding industrial base have
also been falling, resulting in concerns, for example, about the
submarine design base. At the same time, the United States also faces a
likely future increase in demand, as the Navy builds to a 313-ship
fleet. Let me review some of the suggestions we made to the U.K. MOD in
three respects--the need for long-range planning, ways to improve
efficiency, and the need to sustain hard-to-replace resources--and then
I will conclude with some possible implications for the United States.
the need for long-term planning
One of the most important findings that has consistently arisen
from our research for the MOD was the importance of a comprehensive,
long-term MOD shipbuilding strategy or plan. By a strategic plan, we
mean one that would require that the MOD define its shipbuilding goals
and future courses of action for the next several decades, establish a
schedule or roadmap to achieve its plans, and identify future
investments that would be needed, for example in facilities or
workforce skills.
A strategic plan would help eliminate the ``boom and bust'' cycle
that has plagued ship production and design in the United Kingdom. It
would allow the MOD to make more efficient use of shipyard facilities
and workforce skills and exploit the government's ``smart buyer''
expertise. It would help the MOD better understand the financial
implications of its acquisition strategy and anticipate problems by
allowing it to independently assess shipyard demand. It should also
lead to reduced cost and schedule risk through greater program
certainty.
implications of long-term planning
Long-term planning would obviously have implications for how the
MOD would manage the industrial base, and we have made some specific
suggestions in that regard. First, we recommended that the MOD attempt
to smooth, or ``level-load,'' the production and design demands it
places on the industrial base. Several factors specific to each class
of ship would affect the loading. These include the interval between
ship starts, the time required to design the first of class and to
build each ship, the fleet size desired, and the expected time in
service. Among the benefits of level-loading would be better workforce
and facilities use, more stable costs, and a greater ability of the
industrial base to make long-term investment decisions.
Second, we observed that long-term planning might force the MOD to
reevaluate its pro-competition policy. To best use the industrial base,
competition might not always by the appropriate option. In some cases,
there might not be enough viable contractors to enable competition--or,
perhaps more to the point, enough contractors to let one of them lose.
For some classes of ship, it might be in the MOD's interest to allocate
work across shipyards. Competition would likely remain a viable option
in most cases, but the desire to achieve it should be only one factor
in considering how best to achieve value for money over the long term.
(I will have more to say about competition later.)
Third, to understand all the factors impinging on its plans, the
MOD would have to work more closely with industry than previously. That
might require the MOD to supply industry with more information
regarding plans, budgets, and procurement options. But the result
should be reduced risk in shipbuilding programs because the government
would have more certain understanding of industrial capacity, as well
as better progress indicators, such as earned-value metrics. At the
same time, long-term planning might also encourage shipyards to work
more closely together as they act to use complementary skills and
facilities, promote skill synergies (such as for design), and give the
MOD procurement options which result in greater industrial
efficiencies.
Finally, any long-term plan would have to be integrated across the
MOD's own ship-acquisition entities. Currently, each class of ships is
the purview of its own integrated project team, which makes acquisition
decisions independent of the actions of other teams. Because one yard
may build ships of different classes, a plan that accounted for
multiple classes would be necessary if the total demand load on a yard
is to be leveled over time.
ways to achieve design and production efficiencies
Based on our research, we have also suggested the MOD consider a
number of ways to improve its design and production efficiencies,
within the context of a long-term shipbuilding strategy. We made five
such recommendations.
First, the MOD should sustain its practice of placing multiship
contracts to provide industry with incentives for training and long-
term facility investment. Because they have received only limited
orders for new ships and have faced a highly competitive market in
recent years, many U.K. naval shipyards have not modernized facilities.
Only with long-term contracts and prospects will the shipyards be able
to justify this type of major investment. Such investments should
permit greater efficiencies, which should result in savings to the MOD.
It should be kept in mind, however, that such long-term contracts work
better for mature designs and, therefore, may not always be appropriate
for the first-of-class ship.
Second, the MOD should facilitate a discussion among the shipyards
and related firms about whether the industry should adopt a common,
interoperable set of design tools or develop industry standards that
would allow design work to be easily interchanged. As the MOD's
shipbuilding program unfolds, U.K. shipyards and firms will probably
need to share design resources. One difficulty in such sharing is that
shipbuilders and design firms often have different computer-aided
design and manufacturing tools. Thus, interchanging data and working
cooperatively on a common design are difficult. Common design tools or
standards for commonality would lead to common product models and
databases and would benefit the MOD in life-cycle logistics support.
Third, the MOD should work to mitigate peak demands that, in spite
of careful planning, arise to strain, if not exceed, industrial
capacity. Several mitigating options are available. Increasing the use
of outsourcing would decrease the labor required to be resident in a
shipyard. Subcontracting peak demand work to smaller shipyards with
excess capacity could ease the burden on yards operating at capacity.
Also, the MOD could consider relaxing the current defense industrial
policy to allow peak workload to be performed outside the United
Kingdom.
Fourth, the MOD should recognize and try to reduce the high number
of design and contract changes introduced after production has begun.
These have been blamed for schedule slippage and cost increases in
recent naval shipbuilding programs. The MOD could help itself out by
ensuring that designs are mature before proceeding into production. The
MOD could also speed production by responding more quickly to changes
proposed by the shipyard to save time or money.
Fifth and finally, the MOD could encourage other best practices to
reduce cost and shorten build schedules. Our research has highlighted
the potential benefits of increasing the use of advance outfitting in
warship construction and encouraging the use of greater outsourcing,
where appropriate. Notably, both of these require a mature design prior
to production, which should by itself reduce cost and schedule
slippage. Additionally, the use of commercially available equipment may
be less costly than equipment conforming to traditional military
standards and thus could be preferable if operations or safety are not
adversely affected.
sustaining resources
The desire to realize efficiencies should not, however, take
precedence over the need to sustain design and production resources and
oversight responsibilities over the long term. The MOD is emerging from
an experiment in transferring responsibilities to the private sector
that the private sector had insufficient incentive to exercise. The
idea was to shift as much risk as possible to the prime contractor and,
at the same time, as much of the authority for design decisions as
possible. Not coincidentally, the MOD was losing the resources
necessary to maintain design skills and, to some extent, oversight
skills in house.
In the case of the Astute submarine, the results of this experiment
were unsatisfactory, as the terms of the prime contract for the first
of class had to be dramatically revised after considerable cost
escalation and schedule delays. The effect was to explicitly transfer
the responsibility for the risk back to the MOD, where, as this turn of
events demonstrated, it lay implicitly all the time anyway.
We drew three lessons from this experience. First, as desirable as
fixed-price contracts may generally be, the MOD should not let such
contracts for high-risk, first-of-class designs of technically
demanding projects. On the contrary, the MOD should consider dividing
the project into different segments (steel-working, outfitting, etc.)
and putting these up for separate, competitive bids. This is one way to
maintain competition in an industry subject to short production runs.
Second, the MOD must retain sufficient design and oversight
expertise in house to see that its objectives are being met and to
responsively engage the contractor. The MOD must be able to make
technical decisions on issues that arise concerning tradeoffs between
cost and performance or cost and safety. The MOD cannot expect a
contractor, in making such tradeoffs, to arrive at the same results the
MOD would. By the same token, the MOD must have the expertise to
estimate costs independently.
Third, the MOD must support the retention of design skills not only
in house but by industry during periods of low demand for such skills.
The atrophy of design resources in the attack submarine case played
some role in the problems encountered with the Astute. Design skills
might be retained through ``spiral development,'' that is, continuous
design improvement, of a current class of ship, through continuous
conceptual design of hypothetical future classes, or through
development of prototypes. There might also be a role for collaboration
with other countries facing peaks and troughs of design resource
demand. The MOD must have, as well, the inhouse resources to support
the R&D that will permit future advances in ship design.
lessons for the united states
Now, what does all this mean for the United States? There are two
important ways in which the U.K. and U.S. shipbuilding environments are
similar. First, as I mentioned earlier, both countries are having to
deal with the issue of sustaining design resources during lulls between
classes at the same time, as they will be ramping up production for
several classes of ship. Second, in both countries, naval demands
dominate the shipbuilding sector. Neither country builds large ships
for the global commercial or warship export markets. Thus, the MOD in
the United Kingdom and the Department of Defense (DOD) in the United
States essentially set demand conditions for the National shipbuilding
industry: They decide the nature of the programs in terms of their
number and size; the nature of the market, that is, whether it's run by
competition or allocation; and, at least indirectly, the number of
firms that will survive.
Considering these similarities, we here make some tentative
recommendations for the U.S. industrial base. They are tentative
because we have not recently made a comprehensive study of the U.S.
shipbuilding industry, but on the basis of our current knowledge, these
are some actions that could merit consideration by DOD, pending further
analysis:
Smooth out demand peaks and troughs over the design
and production cycle for each ship type by planning over the
long term--that is, decades, not years. This should be done
simultaneously for all ship types, so that the inevitable
remaining peaks and lulls for one type can be balanced against
lulls and peaks for another. Such planning must take into
account the production interval, build duration, desired fleet
size, and platform life for each class. Plans should hedge
against risk by recognizing gaps that may be caused by lower-
than-expected funding and how to mitigate them.
Incorporate shipyards' prospects for obtaining non-
Naval shipbuilding clients into long-range planning. The U.S.
Coast Guard, for example, will be undertaking a shipbuilding
program of substantial scope, though the ships will not involve
the same demands as the large Navy ships do. At the same time,
foreign military sales can be expected to decline.
Resist any impulse to shift more responsibility for
assurance of safety and performance to the private sector. DOD
should not offer greater autonomy in making safety- and
performance-related decisions at the price of more liability
for risk. Contracting arrangements notwithstanding, the
government is the ultimate risk-bearer and should remain
responsible for cost-benefit tradeoffs.
Make competition optional. Competition should not be
the default method for obtaining value per dollar for certain
ship types. It is desirable that shipyards specialize, and in a
market with a limited number of yards, competition may not
always be feasible. Competition is better achieved during the
design phase or through subcontracting large segments of the
production process.
Be prepared to close and consolidate industry
elements, however politically unpalatable. It may be true that
every element makes some unique contribution, but it may not be
true that every such contribution is worth what it takes to
sustain it. In particular, it may be difficult to support a
multifirm design base. At the same time, some thought should be
given to maintaining diversity in the industrial base, so yards
should not be closed simply on financial grounds. It may be
that what is needed is not fewer shipyards but smaller ones.
Protect and enhance the design and integration
industrial base. With classes for some ship types following
each other at longer intervals, design and integration skills
may be lost. These may be difficult to reconstitute,
particularly for such specialized capabilities as nuclear
propulsion or submarines. Options for sustaining the design and
integration base include spiral development and the design of
prototypes or one-hull classes.
Consider collaboration with key allies. It may be
that, in a time of uncertain and variable demand, sharing
industrial base resources with a trusted ally will, for certain
ship types or equipment items, reduce costs with no security-
related drawbacks.
Standardize design tools across yards and the
government. Using the same computer-aided design and
manufacturing tools, or tools with compatible formats, could
enable more rapid responsiveness on change requests and more
seamless and economical collaboration across shipyards.
Encourage more outsourcing and advance outfitting. For
maximum effectiveness at enhancing efficiency, subcontractors
should be involved as early as possible in the design-and-build
process, and, where possible, large ships should be built in
blocks that are mostly outfitted before they are assembled.
I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to address the
committee today, and I will be happy to answer any questions you might
have.
Senator Talent. First of all if the staff or you, whichever
is the most convenient place to do it, would get me a written
copy of the summary.
Mr. Schank. I will.
Senator Talent. If you could get me that I would appreciate
that. You mentioned that--your last point was that the
Department should be careful not to offer autonomy to the
shipyards in terms of independently deciding safety
performance, trading.
Mr. Schank. Yes, trade-offs, cost benefits.
Senator Talent. Give me an example of what you mean by
that. What kind of thing in your judgment would be unwise?
Mr. Schank. One of the things we learned from our work with
the Astute program in the United Kingdom was that MOD was at a
point where they tried to shift a lot of responsibility and
risk to the private sector. This included design authority for
the submarine and ability to make technical decisions. This did
not work as well as they thought it would. The industrial base
was not prepared to accept the responsibility and risk. Even if
they were, there is some element of risk, safety, and
performance that have to reside with the Navy and with the
Government, that we can't transfer to a shipbuilder. I think
safety is the primary example of that. It is the Navy, it is
the Government, that is ultimately responsible for the safety
of our sailors and crew members.
Senator Talent. I'm not suggesting that I would want
seriously to do this but, I am interested in why this was one
of the four points that you chose to summarize. Is it just
because you think the decisions that the private sector would
make would be inappropriately weighted toward cost reduction or
is there something about those decisions where the Government
just optimizes better than the private sector?
Mr. Schank. I think the Government optimizes better. I
think the Government has a broader view. I think the Government
metrics for decisionmaking are slightly different than
industry's; as you mentioned, profit drives many of industry's
decisions.
I think the point is important, and why I made the point is
that we see what happened in the United Kingdom MOD, we see
that beginning to happen in our Naval Sea Systems Command; loss
of resources, transfer of resources out of the command, and
belt tightening. We think that had catastrophic consequences in
the MOD. We think it can within the Navy. You need sufficient
talent and sufficient skills to be able to be an informed buyer
of a product. The Navy needs those skills to be an informed
buyer of complex warships. They need the technical authority to
be able to make decisions on safety, performance, and trade-
offs. Our concern is that those kind of skills are beginning to
be lost within the Navy and within the command structure.
Senator Talent. I remember some of my old friends on the
House side thought we could save a lot of money by reducing the
acquisition force within the Department. This sounds to me like
a note of caution against doing that too much.
Mr. Schank. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Talent. Now, you said we need to have reduced
demand peaks and valleys. We are all in agreement with that,
and that we need to do this simultaneously across all ship
types and shipyards and basically what that means is we need a
decades long plan.
Mr. Schank. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. That takes into account all of these
factors in order to optimize production, so that they meet
requirements. Do you think that the plan, so far as you
understand it, that the Navy is proposing is such a plan? Would
you be prepared to say what deficiencies you think might be in
it or have you not familiarized yourself enough?
Mr. Schank. I am well aware of the plan. I think it is a
good start. I think it is a necessary start. I think what is
needed, and I am sure the Navy would agree, and I have heard
it, is commitment to that plan, so that it is not just
something on paper but it is something the shipyards can
believe in and know will unfold. Yes, there will be changes. We
can't predict the future perfectly. But those changes should be
minimized as much as possible. The other part of it that I
think is lacking that, again may not be possible at this point,
looking out 30 years, is it does not tell the shipbuilders. It
tells the shipbuilders how many and what type of ships we will
build. For some of the shipbuilders that is fine. But it
doesn't tell the shipbuilders where those ships will be built
or where all their ships will be built. Again it may be at this
point too early to do that but I think that is an issue where
decisions need to be made soon or at least in the short-term or
at least the next decade. We have talked about competition a
lot. I bring that up in my talk here but it is not clear to me
that we actually have competition. Competition for work share.
I think we rightfully need to protect our industrial base
assets and to do that we have to make sure there is enough work
within our shipyards. That suggests that there has to be some
level of allocation. When you are not building very many ships,
you may end up allocating all the ships that are in your
shipbuilding program and have nothing left to compete. If that
is the way the future will be, then we should recognize that
and we should tell the shipbuilders that.
Senator Talent. That we are going to allocate rather than
compete. You mentioned you can compete not just for work share
but profit levels and award fees. Would you explain that a
little bit more and give me some examples of what you mean.
Mr. Schank. I think the DDG-51 program is an example where
they evolved to a point where they allocated the ships to the
two shipyards, but the profit levels were determined based on
the performance of the shipyards. The shipyards that perform
better would make a higher profit than the shipyards that did
not perform better.
Award fees from my perspective have not achieved the
desired goal. I think they may need to be tied to some level of
proficiency and productivity rather than to milestones being
accomplished. It is not what you accomplish; it is how well you
accomplish it. I think that is what we are looking for. We tend
to write contracts and make decisions on the shipyard basis,
but yet our six shipyards are owned by two major companies.
Possibly, and we have not studied this, this is just a thought.
Possibly, we should be contracting and thinking about
negotiating at the corporate level and bundling contracts
together. Awarding incentives or profits on that bundle of
contracts on how well the corporation does compared to the
other corporation, rather than on how well an individual
shipyard performs on an individual ship.
Senator Talent. Now, in doing that of course we have to
recognize the reality that Senators represent shipyards rather
than corporations.
Mr. Schank. Yes.
Senator Talent. I can say that since I don't have any
shipyards in Missouri. You may be wondering why a Senator from
Missouri is chairing the Seapower Subcommittee. I don't have in
that sense a parochial stake in this but others do. Of course,
they believe very passionately in the effectiveness of their
workforces. So, if we were to do that I think we would have to
work that out carefully to make sure that Senators felt that
their workforces and their shipyards are being allocated
effectively in that context.
Mr. Bloor, I have not forgotten you. I just was following
up on what Mr. Schank said. Do you have any comments on
anything he said to this point? Any you particularly agree with
or perhaps disagree with?
Mr. Bloor. Not at the moment, no.
Senator Talent. Okay. I was interested in your assessment
and pleased that during the 5-year period between the surveys
of the U.S. industrial base, you measured notable improvement
and performance in most areas anyway. You highlighted that that
improvement might be attributed to the capital investments made
by the shipyards. Now, what interested me about that was that
was during the period when the shipyards were operating with
declining workloads. There probably has not been a greater
period of instability and uncertainty in the industry than the
period where you measure improvement. So, can you tell us what
the nature of the capital improvements were that the shipyards
made during the period? Will they offer us insights into the
types of incentives that motivated that or what caused that in
the face of the decline in workload?
Mr. Bloor. Yes, the types of things that we saw where major
investments and things like new cranage, panel lines, steel
building facilities in general, some investments in
construction sites, berths and so on and so forth. There has
also been some investment in some of the softer areas in things
like design tools and so on. We speculated for some time,
during the report, about why this improvement had occurred. We
didn't really reach a conclusion. However, we did represent our
speculation in the document. That was that we felt perhaps it
was a time of industry consolidations as the shipyards were
being consolidated into two corporations. We thought the
pressure being brought to bear by the individual corporations
was probably driving performance to some extent. We also
thought that the fall-off in naval demand and new construction
demand had been anticipated for some time and we thought that
may be some pressure toward driving performance improvement. We
also believe it was a genuine desire almost across the industry
to actually improve. It really impressed us to go around some
shipyards and see what they had done. It was impressive.
Senator Talent. So, when you tell us, both in hearings and
privately, that they are eager to--if we can get them stable
funding and stop changing the requirements all the time--that
they really are eager to perform better, that would be
consistent with what you found in your study.
Mr. Bloor. Yes, I think so.
Senator Talent. I am interested, if you would explain a
little bit more what you meant by customer factor. I think I
understand it but I want to understand it more precisely. You
say it is estimated to be between 10 and 15 percent for most
U.S. naval vessel types. Are you talking about productivity or
cost increases? Just explain a little bit more preciously if
you would.
Mr. Bloor. The customer factor came about because we were
trying to compare the performance of naval builders to
commercial builders, for which we have a lot of data. But in
doing that, it is important to understand exactly what work
content the naval builders have to execute. Most of the
measures that we have are based on a commercial contract where
the shipyard is expected to do certain things as part of a
commercial contract. When a shipyard builds for a government,
inevitably, the shipyard has to do things over and above the
construction of the vessel, which are not the norm in
commercial shipbuilding or at least they might have to do more
of something. So, we tried to get an understanding of how much
additional work that was. It relates to all sorts of things.
There is a list of them in the report. The things that spring
to mind are things like for prime contracts, flow-down, and
additional management time in reporting and attending
meetings--things like the managements have changed orders.
There is a whole raft of things, which do actually affect the
cost.
It was interesting because that represents an opportunity.
We are not saying it is good or bad. We are saying this is
about how much work seems to be tied up in these types of
things. But it does represent an opportunity to make some
savings. Perhaps some of the things are outside the control of
the Navy but some may be within the control of the Navy. It is
just we are recommending it should be investigated.
Senator Talent. So I'm glad I asked the follow-up because
when your statement says, ``the estimates took vessel
complexity in the additional work the shipyarders required to
do as a consequence of working on the government contracts.'' I
thought that meant more complex requirements or perhaps
requirement changes. But it sounds to me now like you are
talking about what a layperson might say is paperwork or the
need to satisfy FAR part regulations or bureaucratic demands,
which again may be justified but aren't directly related to
building a more capable vessel, necessarily.
Mr. Bloor. Yes, the calculations or the estimate took both
of those things into account. So, it was the additional
paperwork and so on. But also the additional complexity of the
vessel and the work content associated with that.
Senator Talent. Would you care to give me any estimate of
what percentage of costs might be attributable to the need to
comply with acquisition regulations that don't exist in a
commercial context?
Mr. Bloor. I don't know whether we could--well, I think as
a whole we thought as we said in the report between 10 and 15
percent.
Senator Talent. That might include some of just the more
complex requirements, though.
Mr. Bloor. The complex requirements of building the actual
vessel itself?
Senator Talent. I am sorry. I should have let you answer. I
understood you to say that the 10 to 15 percent was both the
need to satisfy regulatory demands but also attributable to the
fact that the naval vessels have higher requirements than
commercial vessels.
Mr. Bloor. Oh, no, it was just the former.
Senator Talent. So, it is your sense that 10 to 15 percent
of the cost of the naval vessels attributable to the need to
comply with the various acquisition regulations and go to more
meetings and more oversight and that sort of thing.
Mr. Bloor. Yes, but actually not the whole cost of the
vessel but only the man-hours spent by the shipyard.
Senator Talent. Okay. So that percentage of the labor cost
or the man-hours on that?
Mr. Bloor. Yes, and I should say that this is an estimate.
Senator Talent. Sure. I think what Mr. Schank said cautions
against reacting to that by going out and taking a meat cleaver
to the acquisition, you know personnel or functions. But it
does suggest that perhaps if we could get this body here to
bless it, that it might be good to do some kind of a
government-industry task force to ask themselves what we really
need to have and don't need to have in terms of some of these
regulations.
Mr. Schank. Right.
Senator Talent. My experience has been, though, that we
will need to get an understanding here on this side of the
table that this process is going on and a buy-in in Congress
because most of those regulations are there because Congress
put them there for one reason or another. So, we would need to
get a buy-in over here, I think.
Mr. Schank. One of the things, after doing research in
naval shipbuilding here in the United States for a number of
years, we had the opportunity to go to commercial shipbuilders
in Europe and Asia. One of the things that struck us was how
lean their overhead staffs were. Where in U.S. shipyards you
would see clearly dozens, if not hundreds, of lawyers,
accountants, just basically overhead-related people, you would
see a mere handful in the commercial yards. Now again, part of
it is due to the reporting requirements. We have requirements
we lay onto shipbuilders to periodically report cost. That
doesn't exist in the commercial world. They sign a contract and
the deliverable is the ship. But it struck us as that part of
the customer cost that Damien is talking about was very
obvious, when you look at commercial shipbuilders versus naval
shipbuilders. It is not just the United States; it is in other
countries too. The United States and other European countries
like the United Kingdom and France, where it was the same type
of customer factor.
Senator Talent. Now there was quite an overhead in those
countries as well.
Mr. Schank. Yes.
Senator Talent. When you are building a naval vessel, it is
probably more important in terms of the consequences to get it
right than it is if you build a commercial vessel. Still,
however it might be an area where we can work. I will talk to
the staff afterwards, but again we are going to have to go into
it with our eyes open over here. Because the Pentagon has had
experience with trying to propose these kinds of reforms when
Congress wasn't anticipating it and I don't think the result
was such that people want to repeat the experience. So, we
would have to work on that over here.
Mr. Bloor, you mentioned that some of the things that the
Government could do to improve productivity would be improve
shipyard incentives. What kind of incentives are you talking
about? Could you be a little more specific with that?
Mr. Bloor. This is a huge area.
Senator Talent. I will give you 2 minutes. How is that?
Mr. Bloor. Okay.
Senator Talent. No, take as much time as you need.
Mr. Bloor. I think in a nutshell we think the incentives
should be structured in a way that rewards shipyards for
performing better than spending more man-hours. I think that is
it in a nutshell.
Senator Talent. So, that seems to agree with what Mr.
Schank is saying, that we need some way of perhaps a more
subjective evaluation or at least a more complex evaluation of
what better performance is rather than taking one or two
indexes and measuring it that way. Is that fair?
Mr. Bloor. That might be part of it.
Senator Talent. Did you agree with Mr. Schank's belief that
protecting the design industrial base is a key? Would you agree
with that?
Mr. Bloor. I think that it is very important to maintain a
good design industrial base and also to develop it, to be able
to allow construction to be done more efficiently.
Senator Talent. My understanding is that our warship
construction has been noted for being more labor intensive
compared to commercial shipbuilding practices with a lot of
reliance in in-house capabilities. Would you agree with that?
Would you compare that with practices in foreign shipyards?
Could you draw some conclusions regarding the merits of the two
approaches? Are we more labor intensive here this is for both
of you--doing more in-house compared to what foreign shipyards
do? Would you say that is a good thing, bad thing, or a neutral
thing, if you agree with it?
Mr. Bloor. I think that it is interesting; it is a trend in
naval shipbuilding worldwide. The naval shipbuilders tend to do
more work in-house than commercial shipbuilders. In recent
years, commercial shipbuilders have been subcontracting a great
deal of work to lower cost areas. So for example, some European
yards contract to Eastern European yards. Yards in South Korea
contract to China and things like that. We don't think that it
is a bad thing that the naval shipyards do things in-house.
However, we do think they should have sufficient volume to
justify carrying out the work with a reasonable level of
technology and therefore achieving reasonable levels of
performance to justify doing the work in-house. If they can't,
then perhaps they should consider subcontracting more. In our
report, we did talk about considering some regional centers for
consolidating the work in one area, which would justify higher
levels of technology and production. So, for example, one might
have a pipe shop in one area that would service all shipyards,
it would be very high technology.
Senator Talent. You want to comment, Mr. Schank?
Mr. Schank. I would agree with Damien. Let me say a couple
of things here. We did a fairly extensive study of outsourcing
practices in the United States, United Kingdom, European Union,
and Asian shipyards. We found that in commercial ships there is
a fair amount of outsourcing or subcontracting, especially in
the European Union. We don't see that as much in the Asian
shipyards. They will hire temporary people but we make a
distinction between hiring temporaries to meet short-term peaks
versus turning a complete function like painting or piping over
to another organization. We see that in Europe. We do not see
it so much in Asia, certainly not in the United States or in
the United Kingdom. But even in Asia and the European Union
many shipbuilders that build military and commercial ships--and
there aren't a lot that have been successful in doing both--
will separate within their shipyard (physically separate) the
building of the ships and typically the workforce. Often for
security reasons they will only have permanent employees on the
naval ships versus part-time employees or subcontractors.
Whether that is a good or bad thing, I am not prepared to
judge. It is just an observation. Could we do more
subcontracting? Yes, we could. Should we? We should to help
mitigate the peaks. One way to mitigate peaks is to bring in
temporary help. We tend not to do that. Now, maybe because of
our labor unions, it may restrict some of that.
The other reason that I think is important in European
shipbuilders and Damien can certainly comment on this, is it is
often countries' labor practices that force them in particular
directions. When we were visiting and talking with Spanish
shipbuilders, again Spain is a very Catholic country, the
gentleman I was talking with said, it is cheaper and easier for
him to divorce his wife than it is to lay off one of his
employees. Because of the national labor policies, it is almost
like a university tenure system. Therefore, what many of the
shipyards have migrated to is rather than having permanent
employees and the problem of trying to adjust a workforce in
light of peaks and valleys is that they use subcontractors or
temporary hires.
So, from my point of view you need to not only look at the
practice but the reasons for the practice.
Senator Talent. Okay, you mentioned that there aren't a lot
of shipyards that are successful at doing both naval and
commercial shipbuilding. Our shipyards have focused on the
military shipbuilding.
Mr. Schank. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Do you think it is feasible for them to
develop a competitive commercial capability? If so, what do you
think they need to do?
Mr. Schank. My personal view--and we have not studied this,
but my personal view--we studied it for the United Kingdom and
our recommendation was don't count on it. I don't think a
country like the United Kingdom or the United States or even
European Union countries can compete with the Asian countries
in terms of their productivity and their labor rates. The labor
rates in China are one tenth of what they are here. So, no, I
don't see the United States being competitive in the commercial
marketplace unless it is for specialized kinds of ships.
Senator Talent. Would you agree, Mr. Bloor?
Mr. Bloor. To some extent. I think in parts of the European
Union at the moment there are good order books in shipbuilding
and shipyards are full. Also, ship prices are very high. To be
successful in commercial shipbuilding a shipyard needs to be
configured differently then it should be to be successful in
naval vessel building. That is actually one reason that
shipyards tend to segregate naval shipbuilding and commercial
shipbuilding. It is not just about security and those types of
things. It is about culture and structure, and also to some
extent quality standards. So, it is interesting that in some
vessels in which the United States has good experience they can
offer pretty good prices and are competitive, almost I think.
But, in the vessels where they don't have so much experience
and have not been able to get down the learning curve and all
of those things, then they are less likely to be
internationally competitive. As far as the large yards are
concerned, I think it is quite a challenge to build commercial
vessels in an international market and naval vessels as well.
Senator Talent. Let me ask one more question and then I
will let you gentleman go. I know you have focused on the
first-tier shipyards. Do you have any opinion about the health
of the vendor base? Do you know the second-tier suppliers for
American shipyards?
Mr. Schank. We have looked in that area in a number of our
studies for the United States Navy. Let me segregate it into
two parts. One that supports the nuclear propulsion industrial
base and one for conventional ships. The nuclear propulsion
industrial base is basically down to sole-source providers.
Now, with the new carrier and with one submarine a year they
can remain viable. The refueling/complex overhauls to the
carriers help out the vendors. New cores go in, for example. A
lot of the valves and so forth get replaced. On the
conventional side, we are always surprised. There are always
exceptions. There are always those companies that are hanging
by their thumbnails. But we have always been surprised at how
robust the second-tier vendor base is. What we find, and we
conduct surveys very often, is that the Navy is often typically
a minor customer in their product lines. Now, again there are
exceptions. So, I don't want to paint the whole vendor base
with the same brush. But we think that there is more robustness
in that segment than we often give it credit for.
Senator Talent. Do you have a comment, Mr. Bloor?
Mr. Bloor. Yes, we haven't really looked at the vendor base
specifically except to say that as far as I am aware, it is
actually reducing and I do know that quite a few shipyards are
having reduced choice in terms of where they can buy
components. That is especially the case the more prescriptive
contracts are so owners actually nominate certain suppliers--
that is often the case--in naval work. Then it becomes more
difficult to get good prices and have more choice. Of course,
price goes up. A further restriction in the United States, of
course is the sort of buy America type policies that often
surround these contracts, which also further limit the choice
and therefore the price.
Senator Talent. I thank you gentlemen for your testimony.
Mr. Bloor, thank you for coming such a long way. Mr. Schank,
thank you for your comments.
Mr. Schank. Much shorter for me, sir.
Senator Talent. Yes, sir. The hearing is adjourned.
[On May 18, 2006, Mr. Schank requested that the following
information be included in the record.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Talent
submarine build rate
1. Senator Talent. Ms. Stiller and Admiral Edwards, the Navy's
shipbuilding program results in the attack submarine force dropping
below the requirement for 48 boats, in large part due to the inability
to replace the retiring 688 class at the same rate that they were
constructed. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has expressed his
willingness to increase to a two-boat per year build rate when he can
get the unit cost down to $2 billion.
I believe we would all agree with the CNO's focus on affordability.
There are, of course, added, pressing concerns with minimizing future
shortfalls to submarine warfighting requirements, concerns with
viability of the submarine industrial base, and pragmatic constraints
which the Navy is dealing with regarding the top-line. What is the
Navy's roadmap--what are the extraordinary measures that the Navy and
industry are undertaking to satisfy the somewhat competing, yet
critical objectives of warfighting requirements, affordability,
industrial base, and budget constraints?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral Edwards. Based on the requirements
reflected in the Fiscal Year 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the
Navy developed the 2007 Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of
Naval Vessels. This plan balanced several factors, including naval
force operational capability, affordability, and the ability of the
shipbuilding industrial base to execute the plan.
With respect to Virginia class submarines, we are committed to
increasing the build rate at the earliest opportunity consistent with
affordability. However, we need to ensure in recapitalizing this asset,
we do not put ourselves in a position where we are once again faced
with block obsolescence, which is the problem we are now facing with
the Los Angeles class recapitalization. Today's challenge is to
rationalize Virginia class investment in a way that provides an
affordable ramp for its future replacement. We are pacing submarine
procurements as we go forward so we are positioned in the future to
address recapitalization requirements and not revisit our current
affordability challenge.
The requirement for 48 attack-submarines is focused on pacing the
threat through fiscal year 2020 and the plan sustains the combined Los
Angeles and Virginia Class submarine inventories at 48 through 2020.
Only beyond 2020 do we drop below 48 submarines. When this drop occurs,
there are several options the Navy can employ to mitigate the impact of
the post-2020 inventory shortfall. The first option to consider is the
decision to accelerate the Virginia Class procurement program and
increase the build-rate above 2 per year for some period to avoid the
``bathtub'' completely. While this option would solve the problem,
building this additional capacity earlier is an expensive option that
addresses what is essentially a temporary problem and reintroduces the
probability of block obsolescence in the future. This option would also
have severe negative impacts on other sectors of the shipbuilding
industrial base.
Alternatively, there are management measures the Navy could
institute in the post-2020 submarine force to ensure adequate combat
capacity in the theater of interest. The Navy will likely take
additional risk in non-warfighting missions in lower risk security
environments (e.g., curtail ISR missions not associated with MCO
constructs) to ensure a sufficient number of submarines are available
in the theater that drives our requirement to 48 submarines. While this
creates increased risk in those areas not fully supported by submarine
patrols, it is risk consistent with the level of threat anticipated in
these lower risk security environments. In addition, the Navy has begun
shifting submarine structure towards the Pacific theater. This reduces
response time and improves the relative availability of submarines in
that theater. Ultimately, rebalancing the force between the east and
west coasts of the United States provides the Navy with a more
appropriately positioned force ready to respond to anticipated threats
should they come to fruition.
On balance, we have an optimum investment of resources over the
long-term to preserve sufficient capability and capacity while
recapitalizing other mission capabilities fundamental to operational
success; other requirements such as carrier and surface combatant
presence missions, CONPLAN 7500 execution, and expeditionary strike
force operations. Trading anyone of these capabilities against
submarines could result in the loss of a significant joint force
enabler such as carrier presence, seabasing, or sea strike. Each of
these joint enablers represents equally compelling demands for Navy
resources--our current plan, as reflected in the President's budget,
represents the best overall balance of these competing requirements and
is therefore the most efficient allocation of available resources.
2. Senator Talent. Ms. Stiller and Admiral Edwards, when is the
earliest that you believe we will be able to reliably contract for two
Virginia class submarines per year at $2 billion each, and what
measures are necessary to achieve this level of cost performance?
Ms. Stiller and Admiral Edwards. The option to accelerate the
procurement of two SSNs per year to 2009 instead of 2012 was considered
in the Navy's shipbuilding plan. This option, however, was rejected
since it would add three submarines at a cost of $7 to $8 billion
across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) at the expense of other
vital naval programs.
The Navy has also determined that by procuring two Virginia class
submarines per year in fiscal year 2012 as part of a Multi-Year
Procurement contract with Economic Order Quantity, the Navy will
realize a cost savings equal to about half of what is needed to meet
the Department's goal of $2 billion (in fiscal year 2005 dollars) per
hull.
The Navy has identified five areas that must be addressed to
achieve the remaining cost savings in order to meet the fiscal year
2012 threshold of $2 billion (in fiscal year 2005 dollars). First, the
General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Newport News team
can redistribute work to the most efficient operations to maximize
savings--a modification that is allowed under the current teaming
arrangement. Second, the Navy must refrain from making requirements
changes to the Virginia class design. Requirement creep can add
significantly to the cost of a submarine. Third, the shipbuilders must
meet the contractual requirements and apply lessons learned to the
submarines now under construction. Fourth, the Navy and the
shipbuilders must continue investing in producibility improvements
through the capital expenditure funds set aside in the current Multi-
Year Procurement contract. Fifth, the Navy needs to invest in design
changes that will make the submarines easier, and therefore less
costly, to build. These actions in concert with a continued, stable two
per year build profile will help the Navy achieve the $2 billion (in
fiscal year 2005 dollars)/boat target planned for in fiscal year 2012.
leasing foreign-built ships
3. Senator Talent. Secretary Etter and Ms. Stiller, the Department
executes long-term leases for foreign-built ships in support of
military sealift requirements. These renewable, long-term leases,
slightly less than 5 years in duration, potentially detract from U.S.
shipyard construction of commercial-type ships for military
application. Could you please place in context the extent to which the
Navy, and its components, rely upon leasing foreign-built ships to meet
its requirements?
Dr. Etter and Ms. Stiller. The Military Sealift Command (MSC)
charters ships from the commercial market to meet the requirements of
DOD components and respond to changes in the operational environment.
Very few commercial ships with high military utility have been
constructed in U.S. shipyards in the past 20 years. Consequently, when
MSC has a requirement to charter a vessel, nearly all of the offers are
for foreign-built ships. In cases where the need is immediate or
subject to change, due to the operational environment or other factors,
a commercial charter is the only practical way to obtain the capability
rather than a new construction program which can take up to 5 years for
delivery of the first vessel. Current policy requires the use of U.S.
flagged vessels before foreign flagged vessels, regardless of where
they are built. U.S. flagged vessels may be built either in the United
States or foreign shipyards but must meet, at a minimum, documentation
requirements under 46 U.S.C. to qualify for U.S. flagging.
MSC presently has 23 U.S. flagged vessels, but no foreign flagged
vessels under charter to meet a variety of DOD requirements. Although
all 23 vessels are operated by U.S. companies, only 7 of these ships
were constructed in the United States. Additionally, all of these ships
are crewed by U.S. citizen mariners and any reflagging work to bring
the ships up to USCG standards was completed in U.S. shipyards.
In those cases where we have long-term, consistent requirements
that are best satisfied by the construction of new purpose-built
vessels, then we have established and funded programs such as the Large
Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships and the Dry Cargo/Ammunition
Ships--T-AKE class, to meet these requirements. We are also moving
ahead with the acquisition of the Joint High Speed Vessel as a
replacement for the capability currently fulfilled by the Westpac
Express Charter.
4. Senator Talent. Secretary Etter and Ms. Stiller, what is the
long-term plan regarding renewal of leases for these ships, and what
would be the impact if the option to renew these leases were limited to
2-year duration?
Dr. Etter and Ms. Stiller. The Navy, with DOD, continuously
evaluates the appropriate mix of government-owned and leased ships to
meet U.S. contingency requirements, as well as peacetime classified or
special moves (Patriot missiles, M-42 refueling containers, etc.). We
are undertaking further excursions from the MCS that will evaluate the
lift requirements and available lift capabilities to provide greater
definition for out-year requirements. In the case where we have long-
term, consistent requirements that are best satisfied by the
construction of new purpose-built vessels, we will continue to
establish and fund programs such as Joint High Speed Vessel as a
replacement for the capability currently fulfilled by the Westpac
Express Charter.
With respect to limiting leasing periods to 2 years, the Navy
opposes this legislation as it would have a severe negative impact on
the ability of MSC to carry out its mission of providing sealift
support for a wide variety of DOD activities. If enacted, the
legislation would result in either mission degradation or an
exponential increase in cost to the taxpayer. Generally, savings are
achieved by longer charter contracts. Further, to promote a viable U.S.
merchant marine and support a vigorous and competitive domestic ship
construction and conversion industry longer leases are essential as an
incentive for commercial carriers to invest in either U.S. built new
construction or reflagging of foreign vessels.
5. Senator Talent. Secretary Etter and Ms. Stiller, how would
changes to this practice affect long-term plans for recapitalizing
these support ships?
Dr. Etter and Ms. Stiller. MSC charters ships from the commercial
market to meet the requirements of DOD components and respond to
changes in the operational environment. In reality, very few commercial
ships with high military utility have been constructed in U.S.
shipyards in the past 20 years. Consequently, when MSC has a
requirement to charter a vessel, nearly all of the offers are for
foreign-built ships. In cases where the need is immediate or subject to
change, due to the operational environment or other factors, a
commercial charter is the only practical way to obtain the capability
rather than a new construction program which can take up to 5 years for
delivery of the first vessel.
Changing the current rules regarding leasing would have a severe
negative impact on the ability of MSC to carry out its mission of
providing sealift support for a wide variety of DOD activities. Any
further restriction would result in either mission degradation or an
exponential increase in cost to the taxpayer. Additionally, legislation
further limiting the period of leases may be counterproductive to
promoting a viable U.S. merchant marine and supporting a vigorous and
competitive domestic ship construction and repair industry. Longer
leases are essential to incentivize commercial carriers to invest in
either U.S. built new construction or reflagging of foreign vessels.
seabasing
6. Senator Talent. Admiral Edwards, the Navy's seabase concept
takes shape in the fiscal years 2007-2011 FYDP, with 12 Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future), (MPF(F)) ships plus sea-shore connectors
included in the future force structure plan. Total cost for this
capability is approximately $15 billion. In the course of the past
year, the concepts for MPF(F) ships in support of seabasing have
changed significantly; emerging in this FYDP as one of the centerpieces
of the future force. How do you rank this capability amongst competing
priorities; recognizing that the increasingly significant investment in
the seabase comes to some extent at the expense of allowing gaps to
form in submarine, surface combatant, and expeditionary strike
capabilities?
Admiral Edwards. The future Navy will remain seabased, with global
speed and persistence provided by forward deployed forces, supplemented
by rapidly deployable forces through the Fleet Response Plan (FRP). The
MPF(F) Squadron is only one part of the transformational seabasing
capability as defined in the Seabasing Joint Integration Concept (JIC),
equally important as the aircraft carriers, submarines, amphibious,
surface combatants or logistics ships required to realize this
transformational capability and shape our Navy to meet current and
emerging security responsibilities. The CNO has developed a
shipbuilding plan that balances several factors to include operational
requirements, affordability, and the ability of the industrial base to
execute the plan. The force structure as defined in the ``Report to
Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels
for Fiscal Year 2007'' was developed using a capability-based approach
and anticipated threats for the fiscal year 2020 time period. This
balanced approach builds the Navy the Nation needs--a Navy that is both
affordable and meets the future national security requirements outlined
in QDR 06 with acceptable risk. Force structure requirements were
developed and validated through detailed joint campaign and mission
level analysis, optimized through innovative sourcing initiatives (FRP,
Sea Swap, forward posturing) that increase platform operational
availability, balanced with shipbuilding industrial base requirements.
7. Senator Talent. Admiral Edwards, General Schwartz testified that
his priority is to ensure that the seabase ships do not become single
mission ships with limited utility to support the Transportation
Command's (TRANSCOM) requirements. How will you address the TRANSCOM's
requirements in your process for defining the MPF(F) ship capabilities?
Admiral Edwards. DOD's sealift assets support TRANSCOM's time-
phased transportation requirements to move forces in support of
current/future war plans/fights. These assets can be divided into three
broad categories: (1) preposition, (2) surge sealift, and (3) follow-on
shipping.
As a part of a seabase, the MPF(F) squadron has primary missions to
preposition the 2015 Marine Expeditionary Brigade and be able to
conduct sustained joint operations from the sea. As a prepositioned and
combatant commander (COCOM) asset, MPF(F) fully supports TRANSCOM
mobility requirements, closing a fully deployable and combat ready
brigade to a theater within 10-14 days without the need for a seaport
or airport in the joint operating area and independent of host nation
support. This reduces TRANSCOM's surge sea and airlift requirements in
support of early delivery of joint forces to COCOMs. The primary
sealift asset in the MPF(F), the MPF(F) LMSR variant, is similar to
LMSRs in Army prepo or those designated as surge sealift, but is
specialized for the needs of conducting seabased operations (with added
magazines, troop berthing, maintenance shops, etc). As with all assets
used in the course of a campaign, operational requirements will
determine individual asset availability for strategic sealift and the
COCOM will prioritize requirements and make those ships available to
TRANSCOM for the common user pool just as is done with the MPS ships
today.
8. Senator Talent. Secretary Etter, the seabase is essentially a
high-order expeditionary ``system of systems.'' How is the Department
structured to manage the development and procurement of the full range
of end-to-end seabase capabilities to ensure they are fully integrated
and also support joint operations?
Dr. Etter. The Department is structured in a manner to oversee all
ship configuration matters ranging from the ship's initial concept to
decommissioning. This allows us to adjudicate capabilities/requirements
in each program to identify excess capabilities in our programs and
halt requirements creep while keeping the entire enterprise focused on
reducing the unit procurement costs. This structure allows us to
balance the demands of fleet capability, shipbuilding industrial base,
and cost.
The Department has also instituted policies and mechanisms, across
all appropriations, to allow for tradeoffs to occur between cost and
requirements within our shipbuilding programs to include systems and
subsystems. We have imposed a discipline that limits changes during the
critical phases of the major shipbuilding programs to those related to
safety, contractual defects, unavailable contractor furnished
equipment, testing and trails deficiencies and statutory/regulatory
changes.
These actions have allowed us to control the scope and timing of
changes in a planned manner. The Navy is also engaged with the
shipbuilding industry and sister Services to leverage interrelated
acquisition programs so we can reduce our research and development
costs and gain economies in production. The Navy, as designated lead
Service for the seabasing JIC, as it precedes through the Joint Staff
directed Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), is continually ensuring
that seabasing is looked at as a joint concept and that all Doctrine,
Organizational, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) solution sets that are identified to address
capability gaps, as determined by the Seabasing Functional Needs
Analysis (FNA), address joint requirements and not Service specific
desires.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
new london center of excellence
9. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Edwards and Admiral Locklear, I think
we should begin to transition New London from the world's best
submarine center of excellence to the world's best undersea warfare
center of excellence. Concentrating the east coast submarine force
there, and basing the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) antisubmarine warfare
and countermine modules there would be a good start. Devoting more
resources to new design at Electric Boat would further strengthen the
remarkable synergy among New London, Electric Boat, and the world's
leading undersea expertise in the region, and would go a long way in
preserving the industrial base. What is your reaction to expanding New
London's mission to a center of excellence for undersea warfare and how
can we move toward this goal?
Admiral Edwards and Admiral Locklear. We agree that a historical
synergy in undersea warfare exists because of the proximity of the
Submarine Base New London, Electric Boat Shipyard, and distinguished
educational institutions in Southeastern New England. This synergy will
continue to be a vital component of our national strategy in undersea
warfare dominance.
However, the Littoral Combat Ships and their mission packages must
be able to augment U.S. strike groups wherever they may encounter
threats to freedom of navigation, or to provide access to littoral
regions that may be threatened by mines, submarines, or small boats.
Logistic and fiscal reasons dictate that we collocate our mission
packages with the ships and their crews, both in CONUS and overseas, to
efficiently train sailors and deploy them rapidly to meet worldwide
threats.
Naval Submarine Base New London, and the Naval Undersea Warfare
Center in Newport, Rhode Island, and its research and development
laboratories, share close ties between themselves and with the
University of Rhode Island, the University of Connecticut, and other
educational, research, and industrial partners in the New England
region. We look forward to continuing those valued relationships to
further develop undersea technologies and capabilities that may be
incorporated into future mission module upgrades.
submarine fleet size
10. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Edwards and Admiral Locklear, I
understand that in 2005, the CNO directed a study of existing force
structures. Based upon this assessment, 48 attack submarines presented
an ``acceptable risk'' and also allowed an affordable plan for
shipbuilding. In contrast, a 1999 force structure study suggested a
submarine fleet between 55 and 62. At a subcommittee hearing of the
House Armed Services Committee last week, Admiral Munns conceded that
the decision to move to 48 submarines was budget driven, given that
there are unexecuted missions due to the size of our submarine fleet.
Admiral Munns also classified this risk as ``moderate'' rather than
``low.''
Why have we moved from a larger projected fleet that generates
lower risk to a smaller fleet that allows moderate risk? Quite frankly,
this movement does not make much sense to me, given that China has
increased its submarine production, and certainly the world has become
a more complicated, dangerous place since we entered the war on
terrorism. Please explain how a reduction in the recommended submarine
force structure size could have occurred when it is clear that the
demand for surveillance and reconnaissance missions has increased.
Admiral Edwards and Admiral Locklear. As mentioned, the Navy
conducted a comprehensive assessment of warfighting requirements across
all ship types in 2005, culminating in the submission of the Fiscal
Year 2007 Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels. This
capabilities-based force structure assessment determined the number of
ships needed to source joint warfighting demands across the entire
spectrum of operations--from steady state to surge levels of effort
supporting conventional campaigns (MCOs), global war on terror/
irregular warfare and Homeland defense. To assess the fleet as a whole,
the battle force was segregated into ship types and analyzed
independently. Then using campaign-level modeling and simulation of
OSD-approved Defense Planning Scenarios through the 2020 timeframe and
applying ``what it takes to win'' criteria to define an acceptable
level of risk, the minimum warfighting demands for each ship-type was
established under the most stressful sequence of operations. This
analysis led to an attack submarine force structure recommendation of
48 SSNs.
From a warfighting capabilities perspective, SSNs are just a
portion of the force required to ensure undersea and maritime
dominance. The significant investments in other platforms (P-8A/MMA,
MH-60R), system modernizations, off-board netted sensors, enhanced
undersea FORCEnet, and continued research will ensure the joint force
maintains its critical warfare advantage against all potential threats.
The 2005 analysis indicates a combination of these capabilities is
required for success. From a forward presence and intelligence
collection perspective, sophisticated new-start platforms, such as
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) and MMA, provide additional
capability and capacity to perform a subset of ISR mission sets.
The Navy will continue to work over the next decade to identify
solutions to mitigate projected submarine capacity risks. Potential
options include shifting submarine homeports to areas that require the
highest priority warfighting and forward presence demands, optimizing
future scheduling criteria, and/or changing submarine operating tempo.
The Navy also is transitioning to a procurement rate of two SSN-774
submarines per year in 2012, as described in the 30-year shipbuilding
plan. This plan will help ensure sufficient submarine capacity exists
to maintain maritime dominance, using a wide concept of operations that
integrates the full spectrum of Navy capabilities, without sacrificing
other critical Navy and joint capabilities.
submarine industrial base
11. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, I am very concerned that this
country is in the process of losing a critical national asset in the
form of our submarine design and engineer workforce. For the first time
in almost 50 years, there is no new submarine design on the drawing
board and current design programs are near completion. Without
foresight to ensure that our future military requirements can be met,
today's designers will not be there when we need them. For example, at
Electric Boat in my home State of Connecticut, almost half of the
engineers and designers may face termination by 2008. At the Senate
Armed Services Committee hearing on the Navy's budget earlier in March,
Secretary Winter remarked that losing the submarine industrial base is
an issue of ``great concern'' to him. Our undersea superiority depends
upon the maintenance of this workforce. What can you do and how can we
stop the erosion of this vital workforce?
Mr. Schank. We agree that nuclear submarine design skills are a
critical national resource and an asset that must be sustained. Given
there is no new submarine design effort currently underway or planned
in the near future, our country faces the risk of losing that critical
design capability. Recognizing this, the Navy has asked RAND to address
the problem and to offer solutions. We are in the midst of that
research effort and should have some findings and recommendations to
the Navy by mid-summer. The critical questions include which skills
will be required in the future, how many of those skill should be
sustained until a new design program begins, and how to sustain those
resources in a cost-effective manner. I should mention that Electric
Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding have both been very helpful during
the conduct of our analysis and has supplied various data and
information that is supporting our research.
12. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, how can we preserve these
critical skills?
Mr. Schank. Our study will identify and evaluate various ways to
sustain the critical nuclear submarine design skills. In our work on
basically the same issue for the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence
(documented in The United Kingdom's Nuclear Submarine Industrial Base:
Sustaining Design and Production Resources, RAND, MG-326/1-MOD), we
listed several ways that nuclear submarine design skills might be
maintained including: conducting spiral development of the current
class, performing continuous conceptual designs with some potential
prototypes, designing unmanned undersea vehicles, designing diesel
submarines, development of new technologies, and collaborating with
allies. Of these alternatives, we believe that spiral development of
the Virginia class and collaboration on submarine design programs with
our allies (in much the same way that Electric Boat assisted the U.K.
with their Astute program) are the most viable options.
13. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, several reports indicate that
the Chinese are building new submarines with increased capabilities,
often capitalizing on Russian designs. Why is there no new submarine
design on the drawing board?
Mr. Schank. This is an area RAND has not studied and I do not feel
qualified to comment on.
14. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, how does this decision impact
our ability to address future strategic threats to the United States?
Mr. Schank. Again, I do not mean to avoid your question, but RAND
has not studied this issue and I cannot make any qualified assessment.
15. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, the submarine production
industry is not confined to the northeast. The industry that supports
submarine production includes 4,000 companies in 47 States. Since
decreased submarine production affects the industrial base across the
entire country, this is an issue of national importance. Has the Navy
conducted any studies to examine the impact of reduced submarine
production on the Nation's industrial base?
Mr. Schank. I am not aware of any studies of the health of the
vendor base that supports submarine production; that question might be
directed to the Navy. As part of our study on sustaining nuclear
submarine design resources, we are considering the design resources of
the nuclear and non-nuclear vendors that support the nuclear submarine
industrial base. We have sent out survey forms to approximately 60
vendors identified by the shipbuilders as potentially having problems
sustaining their design resources and have received a number of the
completed survey forms. Our study will address sustaining the design
resources of the vendors.
16. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, how long can the submarine
industry sustain the low rate of production?
Mr. Schank. I believe the industrial base can survive at the low
production rate but that there is a cost involved. That is, low
production adds to the cost of building a submarine, or any product.
17. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, if the Navy decides that
submarine production must be increased quickly due to escalated
threats, do you believe the submarine industry will have the necessary
skilled workforce to meet this demand?
Mr. Schank. Increasing production will require an increase in the
workforce at Electric Boat and possibly at Newport News Shipbuilding
(depending on the status of their carrier workload). Large increases in
the workforce may be difficult since all shipbuilders are having a
difficult time recruiting blue collar labor for their shipyards. Also,
there have been difficulties in the past when production of Los Angeles
class submarines increased. New workers have lower productivity
compared to experienced workers and they also reduce the productivity
of the experienced workforce through required training and mentoring.
The end result is increased costs when production expands at too fast a
rate. Given there is a desire to go to production rates of two
submarines a year sometime in the future and the desire to reduce the
cost of the Virginia class submarines, there is the need for a study to
examine how to accomplish both those goals. For example, reducing the
construction time of the submarines currently under contract could
reduce costs but would also require an increase in some elements of the
workforce. The increase in workforce could be managed in a cost
effective way such that transition to two submarines a year would not
bring about the loss in productivity that ordinarily results from rapid
workforce expansion.
18. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, in order to increase our
production, we must think about getting the submarine's cost down to $2
billion. I understand that for this to happen, we will need our
submarine designers to make important cost-savings alterations. Only
our designers have the critical skills to reduce the cost of the
Virginia class. But if our designers are laid off from their jobs, how
can we move toward producing a more cost-efficient submarine? Please
comment on this important problem, and how we can address it.
Mr. Schank. As mentioned above, one way to sustain nuclear
submarine design resources is to perform spiral development of the
Virginia class. I believe the Navy is already performing such studies
aimed at reducing the production cost of the Virginia class.
rand submarine design capability study
19. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, I understand that the Navy has
commissioned RAND to study the potential impact of losing our Nation's
submarine design capability. I also understand that the study will be
completed this fall. Although I am sure the study will prove
informative, I am concerned about its timing. By this fall, Electric
Boat may have to lay off up to 900 designers. As an author of this
forthcoming report, if we lose almost 1,000 designers this fall, how
will the study help preserve our submarine design industrial base?
Mr. Schank. We, and the Navy, recognize the urgency of the study
results and the Navy has asked us to accelerate our research. We are
doing that and hope to have the initial results of our analysis to the
Navy by mid-summer.
20. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, even if the RAND study
identifies the critical skill sets that we must maintain so that we are
prepared when we design a new submarine, how will those plans be
implemented if designers are already losing their jobs?
Mr. Schank. There have been, and likely will continue to be for
some time, a drop in the number of designers and engineers at Electric
Boat. The key issue is to determine where that reduction should end and
how to sustain the remaining resources such that the capability exists
when needed. Our analysis will help the Navy decide the actions
necessary to sustain appropriate numbers of the critical skills.
21. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Schank, please give me a preview of the
direction your study is taking--what are some good ideas which would
help preserve the design industrial base in this country?
Mr. Schank. It is too early in our analysis to provide any concrete
findings and recommendations. We do believe that the problem should be
viewed from an industry perspective versus an individual shipyard
perspective. We do note that Electric Boat's designers and engineers
are supporting the new aircraft carrier program. They could also
support other new ship design programs such as the DD(X).
[Whereupon, at 4:56 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]