[Senate Hearing 109-523]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-523
YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY PROJECT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TO
RECEIVE TESTIMONY REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY
PROJECT WITHIN THE OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AT
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
__________
MAY 16, 2006
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
29-473 WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska RON WYDEN, Oregon
RICHARD M. BURR, North Carolina, TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CONRAD BURNS, Montana MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia KEN SALAZAR, Colorado
GORDON SMITH, Oregon ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Bruce M. Evans, Staff Director
Judith K. Pensabene, Chief Counsel
Bob Simon, Democratic Staff Director
Sam Fowler, Democratic Chief Counsel
Clint Williamson, Professional Staff Member
Jonathan Epstein, Democratic Legislative Fellow
C O N T E N T S
----------
STATEMENTS
Page
Bunning, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Kentucky.................... 29
Burr, Hon. Richard M., U.S. Senator from North Carolina.......... 27
Domenici, Hon. Pete V., U.S. Senator from New Mexico............. 1
Ensign, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from Nevada...................... 32
Garrick, B. John, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review
Board.......................................................... 3
Golan, Paul M., Acting Director for the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management, Department of Energy............. 9
Loux, Robert R., Executive Director, Nevada Agency for Nuclear
Projects....................................................... 16
Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from Nevada....................... 32
Thomas, Hon. Craig, U.S. Senator from Wyoming.................... 3
Wehrum, William, Acting Assistant Administrator for Air and
Radiation, Environmental Protection Agency..................... 13
APPENDIXES
Appendix I
Responses to additional questions................................ 37
Appendix II
Additional material submitted for the record..................... 55
YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY PROJECT
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 16, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
chairman, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PETE V. DOMENICI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
The Chairman. Good morning. The purpose of this hearing is
to evaluate the progress, or lack of progress, of the
Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain program and to get a
sense of where the project is today.
I would dare say that it is no secret to anyone that I am a
zealous proponent of expanding our Nation's nuclear power
generation.
Currently, we're at 20 percent of our electricity from
nuclear power. But in this age of concern over our Nation's
energy security and worry about the destructive results of
climate change, we ought to promote more and more development
of this limitless domestic resource of energy that produces no
air emissions and no problems with reference to climate change
and many other problems.
But as we do that, we also agree to get on with a plan for
the spent fuel. Each year, American commercial reactors
continue to produce 2,000 more metric tons of spent fuel. And
right now, more than 55,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel
and high-level radioactive waste is now stored at more than 121
sites in 39 States. These reactors sit rather quietly and
produce clean emissions of free electricity. Americans get the
benefit of clean air and can always depend on lights coming on
in their homes.
Beyond the need to maintain a high standard of living for
Americans and a robust economy that is largely energy driven,
we must consider the national security element that is also
related to the spent fuel project. It is important to keep in
mind that 40 percent of our Nation's warships are powered by
nuclear fuel, which eventually becomes spent fuel and needs to
be disposed of in Yucca Mountain supposedly. At least that was
the plan.
Additionally, final disposition is also needed for the
spent fuel from the foreign research reactor programs. Under
these research programs, the United States provides nuclear
fuel for foreign research reactors and the programs attendant
therewith, with the requirement that participating countries
must return the fuel to the United States; that is, return it
to the United States for disposition. Repatriating this spent
fuel to the United States is essential to prevent proliferation
of nuclear materials around the world.
The Yucca Mountain project has a very long and extensive
pedigree, starting back in the late 1950's when the National
Academy of Sciences, which reported to the Atomic Energy
Commission, suggested that burying radioactive high-level waste
in geologic formations should receive consideration.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 established a system
for selecting the geologic repository for the permanent
disposal of up to 70,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and
high-level waste. The Department of Energy, shortly thereafter,
entered into contracts with utilities that owned nuclear
reactors with the expectation to begin high--to begin taking
spent fuel by 1998.
However, it wasn't until 2002 that the Congress passed and
President Bush signed H.J. Res. 87, approving the site at Yucca
Mountain, NV, for the development of a geologic repository for
the disposal of the fuel. The viewpoint in 2002 of many in the
Congress was that this issue was considered ``closed.''
But we have found that isn't the case at all. I believe
many of my colleagues today would ask, ``Why are we here?
Wasn't this issue solved in 2002? What needs to be done to get
this program back on track?''
Well, I would like the answers to these questions today and
to explore with the witnesses how to make this program work if
we can.
Testifying before the committee today are: Mr. Paul Golan,
acting director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste at
the Department of Energy. We thank you very much for being here
and for your continued persistence and knowledge in this area.
Mr. William Wehrum, Jr., acting assistant administrator of
the Office of Air and Radiation at the Environmental Protection
Agency. We thank you very much for your being here and for all
of the highly technical work that you and your people do
regarding this issue.
Dr. John Garrick, chairman, U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical
Review Board. Doctor, thank you very much for being here.
And then we have Mr. Bob Loux, executive director, Agency
of Nuclear Projects, Nuclear Waste Project Office within the
Office of the Governor of Nevada. We welcome you. You have been
in your position for quite some time. How many years now?
Mr. Loux. Over 25.
The Chairman. You are growing old with the project, right?
I don't know what else to say. I have other things going
through my mind that I won't say. Having said that, we will
proceed. We're going to start now with the witnesses and
proceed right on through.
OK, Dr. John Garrick, chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board, from Arlington, VA. Your statement is
available and we will make it part of the record in its
entirety as if read. Now, we would like to hear from you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thomas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Craig Thomas, U.S. Senator From Wyoming
Good morning.
I want to thank all of the witnesses for their participation in
this important hearing. I will be brief, but I think there are some
important points to be made here today.
First of all, I want to emphasize the importance of nuclear power.
This fuel accounts for roughly 20 percent of our nation's electricity.
This Committee met yesterday to discuss reliability. A big part of that
effort is having enough power to meet demand. At 20 percent, nuclear
power is certainly doing its share.
Nuclear Energy is also clean. Unlike coal, which provides more than
half of our electricity, we do not have to worry about carbon dioxide,
nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and all of the
other emissions that we worry about.
It is also safe. Of all the industries in the United States,
Nuclear has one of the most impressive safety records out there.
As a result of all these things, we included significant support
for increased nuclear generation in the Energy bill. The Federal
Government has an obligation to deal with the leftover fuel from those
operations.
Yucca Mountain is an essential part of that obligation.
Massive amounts of time, money, and effort have gone into making
sure that we have gotten this project right. We need to do this the
right way, and I believe we have, but patience is wearing thin on some
of the delays we've seen. I would really like to know what the
realistic timeline is for this project.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses the progress that has
been made in this project, and what needs to be done to begin shipping
spent fuel to that repository.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this important hearing.
STATEMENT OF B. JOHN GARRICK, CHAIRMAN, U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE
TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD
Mr. Garrick. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
good morning.
The 11 members of the board are appointed by the President
and serve on a part-time basis. Most of us have full-time
occupations. In my case, I am a consultant in the nuclear
science and engineering fields, specializing in the application
of the risk sciences to complex technological systems. I am
very pleased to be here today and to represent the board at
this hearing on the status of the Yucca Mountain project.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the board was created by
Congress in the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
and charged with independently evaluating the technical and
scientific validity of the Department of Energy, DOE,
activities related to disposing of, packaging, and transporting
high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel.
The board's technical evaluation focuses on pre-closure and
post-closure issues, including the operational, safety and
security performance of the proposed repository and the overall
performance of the integrated waste management system. The
board believes that an important part of its mandate is
providing technical information to policymakers.
For that reason, I am especially pleased to participate in
the hearing. I will summarize the major points from my
testimony and ask that my full testimony be added into the
hearing record.
Mr. Chairman, the board believes that the Department of
Energy has made meaningful progress over the last year,
especially in obtaining information on the capability of the
engineered barrier system and on groundwater flow in the
repository. DOE has also increased its ability to evaluate pre-
closure and post-closure performance as an integrated system.
In addition, the acting director, Paul Golan, has
reorganized the program and a canister-based system that can be
used for storage, transportation and disposal of spent fuel has
been proposed. As a result, the board is reasonably confident
that the project can develop the additional evidence for the
board to credibly evaluate how the entire waste management
system will perform.
The additional evidence referred to involves a few specific
areas. For example, given the claims of conservatism by DOE in
source term and radionuclide transport models, the board
believes that carrying out realistic performance assessments,
perhaps in parallel with DOE's efforts to develop a compliance
case, could establish a baseline for measuring how conservative
DOE's repository performance estimates are. The idea is to get
from the experts their best shot at just how well they believe
the repository can perform.
We also have encouraged DOE to focus on improving the
understanding of the chemical form of the radionuclide source
term and the tracking of the radionuclides most significant to
dose through the engineered and natural systems. The Department
of Energy Science and Technology Program is conducting
investigations on the source term and the board believes this
important work should continue.
Another important issue that needs to be resolved is the
potential for corrosion of the waste packages. DOE maintains
that the localized corrosion of alloy 22 at elevated
temperatures can be excluded from its performance assessment
calculations. The board believes that the technical basis for
the conclusion is not compelling and that it is important to
obtain better experimental information on localized corrosion
and the likely waste package environment after repository
closure. The board will hold a workshop in September to discuss
these issues.
The board continues to question DOE's understanding of the
potential for retarding and retaining radionuclides in the
unsaturated and saturated zones under the proposed repository
and believes that additional work on radionuclide transport is
warranted, especially for the condition of a more realistic
source term that considers possible secondary phases of the
dose contributing radionuclides. If source term investigations
show that neptunium and plutonium exiting the engineered
barrier system are captured in secondary mineral phases, the
possibility exists that estimates of the natural system's
capability to isolate dose-contributing radionuclides could be
increased.
The Department of Energy's new proposal involving a
canister system for transporting, aging and disposing of spent-
fuel holds promise. However, the board believes that the
project should fully evaluate the range of consequences
associated with its implementation.
An issue that affects pre-closure operations, as well as
post-closure for repository performance, is thermal management.
For example, the new canister system will have implications for
DOE's thermal management strategy and DOE's above-boiling
repository design will affect the potential for corrosion of
the waste packages.
The board believes that DOE needs to consider the system-
wide implications of heat on the waste management system and
strengthen the technical basis for its thermal management
strategy.
Mr. Chairman, the board believes that the work that I have
just discussed is doable and necessary for enhancing confidence
in estimates of the repository and waste management system
performance.
On behalf of the board, I thank the committee for inviting
us to participate in this hearing. We hope that the information
that we have furnished today will be helpful in providing
context for important decisions you will make on disposing of
and managing spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste.
I will be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of B. John Garrick, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, good morning. My name is
John Garrick. I am Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review
Board. The 11 members of the Board are appointed by the President and
serve on a part-time basis. Most of us have full-time occupations. In
my case, I am a consultant specializing in the application of the risk
sciences to complex technological systems in the space, defense,
chemical, marine, and nuclear fields. I am pleased to represent the
Board at this hearing on the status of the Yucca Mountain program.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Board was created by Congress in the
1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and charged with
performing an ongoing and independent evaluation of the technical and
scientific validity of Department of Energy (DOE) activities related to
disposing of, packaging, and transporting high-level radioactive waste
and spent nuclear fuel. The Board began its work in 1989 and has
continuously reviewed the technical and scientific validity of DOE
activities since that time.
The Board's technical evaluation focuses on pre-closure and post-
closure issues, including (1) the operational, safety, and security
performance of the proposed repository and (2) the overall performance
of the integrated waste management system. The Board believes that a
central part of its mandate is providing information on its technical
evaluation to members of Congress who will make important decisions on
the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste. For that reason, the Board is especially pleased to
participate today in this hearing on the status of the proposed
repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.
Mr. Chairman, over the last 18 months or so, the Board held a
series of meetings with the DOE that enabled the Board to engage in
detailed technical discussions of methods of analysis used by the
program. The Board will soon release a report to Congress and the
Secretary of Energy that summarizes the Board's activities over the
last year and that includes details of its evaluation of the DOE's
technical and scientific work. In my testimony today, I will highlight
some of the key issues discussed in that report and other issues that
have emerged in the last few weeks.
Before I discuss in more detail the Board's technical evaluation of
DOE activities related to Yucca Mountain, I want to make clear that, in
general, the Board believes that the DOE has made meaningful progress
over the last year, especially in obtaining information on the
performance capability of the engineered barrier system and on the
chemistry, magnitude, and rates of mountain-scale groundwater flow in
the unsaturated and saturated zones under ambient temperature
conditions. Using sophisticated simulation models, the DOE also has
improved its ability to evaluate pre-closure and post-closure
performance as an integrated system. In addition, efforts have been
made to reorganize the program, and a major proposal for implementing a
canister-based system that can accommodate storage, transportation, and
disposal of spent nuclear fuel has been proposed. As a result, the
Board believes that additional evidence necessary for credibly
evaluating the performance of the entire waste system can be developed.
I will now discuss in more detail the status of some important
technical issues.
REALISTIC PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
Mr. Chairman, as you would expect, the DOE's efforts to prepare a
license application have dominated its work for the last several years.
The primary tool used by the DOE to evaluate the performance of the
repository is total system performance assessment, or TSPA. TSPA is a
comprehensive set of computer models that uses experience, available
data, assumptions, and probabilities to estimate potential dose and
compliance with the regulatory standard. Uncertainty is necessarily
associated with these projections that are made for periods of up to
one million years. To deal with uncertainty or gaps in understanding,
the DOE often uses what it considers conservative assumptions about the
features or processes being modeled. Examples of this are the ways that
the DOE models the temperature dependence of generalized corrosion
rates, sorption in the saturated zone, and the containment capability
of some parts of the engineered barrier system.
However, because the DOE's assumptions are not always conservative,
the overall degree of conservatism is hard to assess. Consequently,
TSPA may not give a realistic picture of how a proposed repository
would perform. The Board believes that carrying out realistic
performance analyses, perhaps in parallel with efforts to develop a
compliance case, could establish a ``baseline'' for measuring how
conservative--or nonconservative--the DOE's repository performance
estimates might be. Having this information would provide decision-
makers, the scientific community, and affected parties with important
and relevant information.
In addition, the Board believes that there is considerable
uncertainty about the source term incorporated in TSPA. (The source
term refers to the compositions, kinds, and amounts of radionuclides
that make up the source of a potential release of radioactivity from
the engineered bather system to the host rock.) To increase confidence
in performance estimates, the Board has suggested that the DOE focus on
analyzing the source term and tracking the radionuclides most
significant to dose (neptunium-237 and plutonium-242) through the
engineered and natural systems. The DOE is trying to increase its
understanding of the source term through work sponsored by its Science
and Technology Program. The Board believes that this important work
should continue.
THE ENGINEERED SYSTEM
The outer barrier of the waste package is made of a corrosion-
resistant material known as Alloy 22. Alloy 22 will not corrode
significantly unless liquid water is present on the waste package
surface. The higher the temperature at which liquid water is present,
the greater the concern because metals corrode faster and are more
susceptible to corrosion at higher temperatures. The DOE maintains that
potential localized corrosion of Alloy 22 at elevated temperatures
under aqueous conditions can be excluded from its TSPA calculations. In
the Board's view, the technical basis for the exclusion is not
compelling. The Board continues to believe that obtaining experimental
data on localized corrosion should be a high priority, especially given
the DOE's current high-temperature repository design. In addition,
future performance assessments should not exclude general corrosion at
elevated temperatures when aqueous conditions are predicted to be
present. The Board will hold a workshop in September at which issues
related to localized corrosion will be discussed.
THE NATURAL SYSTEM
The natural geologic system at Yucca Mountain will play an
important role as a barrier to radionuclide transport. Properties of
the natural system will affect the speed of transport and the
effectiveness of the engineered barriers. Over time, the DOE has
continued to refine and update its model for flow and transport in the
unsaturated zone. At this point, no evidence has been developed that
calls into question the DOE's long-held view that flow in the
unsaturated zone is dominated by fractures and faults. In addition, the
Project's findings on the chemistry of water in the unsaturated and
saturated zones appear broadly consistent with a large body of
empirical data and experience. However, the Board continues to question
the DOE's understanding of the unsaturated zone beneath the proposed
repository in relation to retarding and retaining radionuclides. The
Board believes that obtaining additional information on radionuclide
transport is warranted, especially on secondary minerals and on
colloid-facilitated radionuclide transport. Such information could be
important for assessing repository performance. For example, if future
investigations confirm that neptunium is captured in secondary mineral
phases, estimates of the natural system's capability to isolate dose-
contributing radionuclides could increase.
THE WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The Board believes that the DOE's new proposal for a canister-based
system for transporting, aging, and disposing of (TAD) spent fuel holds
promise as a way of minimizing the handling of bare spent-fuel
assemblies and simplifying the design of surface facilities at Yucca
Mountain. However, the success of such an approach depends on a number
of factors, including close cooperation and coordination among the DOE,
nuclear utilities, and cask vendors. The DOE also must consider the
range of consequences associated with implementing the TAD concept for
pre-closure and post-closure performance. The DOE's evaluation of TAD
should include a more complete set of scenarios for waste acceptance,
waste transportation, repository operations, design of repository
surface facilities, and waste emplacement in the repository.
The DOE has developed the Total System Model (TSM), which can be
used as a tool for analyzing a variety of pre-closure scenarios and the
performance of the entire waste management system. The TSM can be used
to examine system throughput and to identify possible choke points; it
can assess the effects of delayed construction of a rail spur; and it
can evaluate conditions that contribute to efficient operation of the
surface facilities. For the TSM to be used most effectively, it should
have the ability to represent ``upset'' conditions and to analyze all
waste management components, including emplacement. The TSM also should
be based on the most up-to-date information, and the assumptions
underlying the model should be confirmed.
Because of funding constraints, much of the Project's anticipated
work on establishing a transportation network has been deferred.
Nonetheless, the Board believes that the Project should perform a
comparative risk analysis of rail corridors that might be used for
moving spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain,
and, once that analysis has been completed, should inform all
interested and affected parties of what routes it prefers. The DOE also
should develop a contingency plan for greater use of legal-weight and
heavy-haul trucking.
CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
An issue that permeates pre-closure operations as well as post-
closure repository performance is the DOE's strategy for managing the
heat generated by radioactive decay. For example, post-closure thermal
requirements create constraints on plans for pre-closure operations and
the design of surface facilities at Yucca Mountain. Moreover,
implementation of TAD will have implications for the thermal management
strategy that do not appear to have been fully considered. As mentioned
earlier, after the repository is closed, above-boiling repository
temperatures that will last for about 1,000 years (the so-called
thermal pulse) will affect the performance of the engineered system,
including the waste packages. In particular, the potential for
localized corrosion to initiate during the thermal pulse has yet to be
resolved. In general, the Board believes that the DOE should consider
the systemwide implications of and strengthen the technical basis for
its thermal-management strategy, which also will be important for
licensing.
I have referred several times in my statement to one or another
``system.'' The Board often uses this term to emphasize that all the
elements involved in packaging, transporting, and disposing of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste are connected, so the
assessment of the behavior and performance of one element may strongly
depend on or affect the behavior and performance of others. The Board
believes that the DOE's pre-closure and post-closure plans for the
repository should recognize and accommodate those interdependencies.
That is the reason that, over the years, the Board has strongly
recommended integration of program elements across the broad range of
scientific and engineering activities. The Board believes that any
program reorganization should reflect the need to facilitate this
essential integration.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the Board believes that the technical work I
have just discussed is doable and will enhance confidence in estimates
of the performance of the repository and the waste-management system.
The Board thanks the Committee for inviting it to participate in this
hearing and hopes that the information we have furnished today will be
helpful in providing a technical context for important decisions that
you will make on disposing of and managing spent nuclear fuel and high-
level radioactive waste.
I will be pleased to respond to questions.
______
Supplementary Information on the U.S. Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board
ABOUT THE BOARD
The U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was established on
December 22, 1987, in the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (NWPAA)
as an independent agency in the executive branch of the federal
government. The Board is charged with evaluating the technical and
scientific validity of activities undertaken by the Secretary of
Energy, including the following:
site characterization
activities related to packaging and transporting high-level
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.
The Board was given broad latitude to review activities undertaken
by the Secretary of Energy in implementing the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act. However, the Board was not given authority to require the DOE to
implement Board recommendations.\1\ The Board is required to report its
findings and recommendations at least twice each year to Congress and
the Secretary of Energy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Taken from Legislative History of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1987; February 26, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BOARD MEMBERS
The NWPAA authorized a Board of 11 members. All the members serve
on a part-time basis; are eminent in a field of science or engineering,
including environmental sciences; and are selected solely on the basis
of distinguished professional service. The law stipulates that the
Board shall represent a broad range of scientific and engineering
disciplines relevant to nuclear waste management. Board members are
appointed by the President from a list of candidates recommended by the
National Academy of Sciences. To prevent gaps in the Board's
comprehensive technical review, Board members whose terms have expired
continue serving until they are reappointed or their replacements
assume office. The first members were appointed to the Board on January
18, 1989. Current members were appointed by President George W. Bush.
The names and affiliations of the current 11 Board members are
listed below.
B. John Garrick, Ph.D., P.E., is Chairman of the Board. A
founder of PLG, Inc., he retired from the firm in 1997 and is
an executive consultant. His areas of expertise include
applications of the risk sciences to complex technological
systems in the space, defense, chemical, marine, and nuclear
fields.
Mark D. Abkowitz, Ph.D., is professor of civil and
environmental engineering and director of the Vanderbilt Center
for Environmental Management studies at Vanderbilt University.
His areas of expertise include transportation safety and
security, systems analysis, all-hazards risk management, and
applications of advanced information technologies.
William Howard Arnold, Ph.D., P.E., a private consultant,
retired from Louisiana Energy Services in 1996. He holds a
doctorate in experimental physics and has special expertise in
nuclear project management, organization, and operations.
Thure E. Cerling, Ph.D., is Distinguished Professor of
Geology and Geophysics and professor of biology at the
University of Utah. His areas of expertise include terrestrial
geochemistry and geochemistry processes.
David J. Duquette, Ph.D., is department head and professor
of materials engineering at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
His areas of expertise include the physical, chemical, and
mechanical properties of metals and alloys.
George M. Homberger, Ph.D., is Ernest H. Emeritus Professor
of Environmental Sciences in the Department of Environmental
Sciences at the University of Virginia. His areas of expertise
include catchment hydrology and hydrochemistry and transport of
colloids in geologic media.
Andrew C. Kadak, Ph.D., is Professor of the Practice in the
Nuclear Science and Engineering Department at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. His areas of expertise include nuclear
engineering and the development of advanced reactors.
Ronald M. Latanision, Ph.D., is emeritus professor of
materials science and engineering at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and a principal in Exponent, a science
and engineering firm. His areas of expertise include materials
processing and corrosion of metals and other materials in
aqueous environments.
Ali Mosleh, Ph.D., is Nicole J. Kim Professor of
Engineering, director of the Reliability Engineering Program,
and director of the Center for Risk and Reliability at the
University of Maryland. His areas of expertise include methods
for probabilistic risk analysis and reliability of complex
systems.
William M. Murphy is associate professor in the Department
of Geological and Environmental Sciences at California State
University, Chico. His research focuses on geochemistry,
including the interactions of nuclear wastes and geologic
media.
Henry Petroski, Ph.D., P.E., is Aleksandar S. Vesic
Professor of Civil Engineering and professor of history at Duke
University. His areas of expertise include the
interrelationship between success and failure in engineering
design. He also has a strong interest in invention and in the
history of evolution of technology.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir. Your written
testimony has been submitted.
Paul Golan, acting director of the Office of Civilian and
Radioactive Waste, U.S. Department of Energy, we thank you for
being here, sir.
STATEMENT OF PAUL M. GOLAN, ACTING DIRECTOR FOR THE OFFICE OF
CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Golan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to come before this committee to provide a status
update of the Yucca Mountain Project.
A year ago, Secretary Bodman gave me rather explicit
direction to make Yucca Mountain safer, make it simpler and
make it more reliable. Today, I would like to provide a project
status update on actions we have taken.
In October 2005, the Department announced a redirection to
a primarily clean-canistered approach to spent-fuel handling. A
single canister, also called the ``TAD'', would be used to
transport, age and dispose of waste without the need to reopen
the waste package and handle spent nuclear fuel. We are working
with industry to develop the specifications for this canister,
and envision that the spent fuel will be primarily packaged by
the utilities.
The Department would take advantage of existing commercial
fuel-handling and packaging capability while eliminating the
need to construct and operate two massive dry fuel handling
facilities that had been planned.
We are reviewing the design for this approach and, with
approval by the Secretary, will incorporate it into our
baseline. Later this summer, the Department intends to put
forward its licensing schedule and we will then come back and
brief the committee and its staff.
In March 2005, the Department became aware of project e-
mails between some employees of the U.S. Geological Survey that
indicated non-compliance with QA requirements associated with
infiltration modeling work. Infiltration is an important
parameter as it helps predict water flow through Yucca Mountain
over time.
In February 2006, the Department issued its technical
report, which I have a copy of here, which found out that the
USGS infiltration rate estimates were consistent with the
conclusions of work completed by scientists independent of this
project. Our review also confirmed that the USGS infiltration
rate estimates were consistent with arid and semi-arid region
hydrology from around the United States, including estimates
from the Nevada's Engineering Office.
Because our QA requirements were not met, we decided to
replace the affected work and directed Sandia National
Laboratories to redevelop pertinent computer codes. We will
replace the USGS estimates after Sandia's work has been
completed and independently--after it has been completed and
independently reviewed, and expect to complete that work by the
end of this year.
We are working to improve our quality and culture and fix
problems while they are small and, as a result, have directed
several work suspensions and work stoppages over the last
several months. We will take whatever action is necessary to
ensure our work products meet our QA requirements. Our goal is
to have all of our work done right the first time, every time.
We're working to establish a ``trust but verify'' culture
and ensure that we have the ability to independently review key
areas of our technical work. We have tasked a university-based
consortium, the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education,
ORISE, to perform this function.
Also, in bringing the best and brightest to this project,
in January we designated Sandia as our lead lab to coordinate
and organize our scientific work. In choosing Sandia, we take
full advantage of the great resource of our national
laboratories and Sandia stands out as one of our Nation's
finest labs. Sandia, as you will recall, performed similar work
for the very successful waste isolation pilot plant. We expect
to take full advantage of the lessons they have learned.
Transition is underway and we're expecting it completed by
year-end.
In August 2005, the EPA revised--issued revised Draft
Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain in response
to a U.S. Court of Appeals decision to extend peak dose to one-
million years following waste disposal operations. The proposed
rule contains the existing 10,000-year protection standard of
15 millirems and supplements it with an additional 350 millirem
per year standard at the time of peak dose.
The Department supports this approach. Clearly, there are
health effects associated with radiation exposure and we should
work to ensure that any exposure is as low as reasonably
achievable. We believe the proposed standards are protective
and the health effects of such exposures are quite low when
compared to other risks that society normally and routinely
accepts today.
For example, the allowable dose for an individual at the
location of peak dose at Yucca Mountain, several hundred
thousand years into the future, will be similar to the dose a
resident of Denver, or similarly high-altitude areas, receive
today.
Further studies have not detected differences in cancer
rates in populations for people living in areas with higher
levels of background radiation compared to populations that
live in areas of lower background levels of radiation.
Last, in accordance with section 161 of the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act, the Department has formed a task team to evaluate
the need for a second repository, and will prepare the required
report to the President and Congress.
Yucca Mountain is important for our Nation. Yucca Mountain
will receive the waste from commercial nuclear power plants,
which today provide 20 percent of our Nation's electricity, and
over time has precluded the mining and consumption of over five
billion tons of coal.
The Defense waste at Savannah helped our Nation develop a
strategic deterrent to fight and win the cold war. The spent
nuclear fuel from the Navy has powered frontline nuclear-
powered submarines and aircraft carriers defending our freedom
for more than 50 years.
Yucca Mountain is a good site. I believe that our license
application will provide the necessary assurance that we can
operate Yucca Mountain safely and in compliance with the
requirements from both the EPA and NRC.
That concludes my opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Golan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul M. Golan, Acting Director for the Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Department of Energy
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is Paul Golan
and I am the Acting Director of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office
of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM). I appreciate the
opportunity to provide an update of the Yucca Mountain Project to the
Committee.
About a year ago, Secretary Bodman asked us to take a hard look at
Yucca Mountain to find ways in his words to ``make it safer, make it
simpler, and make it more reliable.'' With that direction, we have
taken actions to improve our operations and processes. I would like to
discuss those actions today, including:
1. The clean-canistered approach to waste handling
2. Resolution of concerns associated with infiltration
modeling done by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
3. Designation of Sandia National Laboratories as the
Project's lead laboratory
4. Use of independent scientific review
5. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Radiation Protection
Standards
6. Need for a second repository
7. Licensing schedule
1. CLEAN-CANISTERED APPROACH TO WASTE HANDLING
In October 2005, the Department announced a redirection for the
Project to a primarily clean-canistered approach to spent nuclear fuel
handling operations. A single canister would be used to transport, age,
and dispose of the spent nuclear fuel without needing to re-open the
waste package and handle individual fuel assemblies. While a
transportation, aging, and disposal canister, or TAD, is not certified
today, we believe that the technical challenges of this approach can be
resolved and will result in simpler, safer, and more reliable
operations. We are working with industry to develop canister
specifications and working diligently on an acquisition strategy. Under
this approach, the spent nuclear fuel will be packaged for disposal
primarily by the utilities. This would allow the Department to take
advantage of existing commercial capability and to reduce the risks of
radiation exposure and contamination from spent nuclear fuel handling
operations at the repository by reducing the need to handle individual
fuel assemblies several times prior to packaging for final disposal.
The clean-canistered approach requires an examination of the
existing repository design and operations. Additional time is required
to develop and revise portions of the license application in support of
this new approach. The Department is currently reviewing the existing
design and developing the appropriate documentation to support a
Secretarial decision on the clean-canistered approach. A decision is
expected later this summer.
2. INFILTRATION WORK PERFORMED BY THE USGS
In March 2005, the Department became aware of Project emails
between some employees of the USGS that suggested non-compliance with
certain quality assurance (QA) requirements associated with their work
in preparing the water infiltration model and maps. Infiltration is a
parameter in the Total System Performance Model predicting the flow of
water through the mountain over time.
In February 2006, the Department issued a technical report,
evaluating the infiltration estimates developed by the USGS. The
independent technical evaluation found the infiltration work completed
by the USGS to be consistent with the conclusions of infiltration work
completed by scientists independent of this Project, including the
State of Nevada's Engineering Officer, under present and future
predicted climate conditions. Our review also confirmed that the net
infiltration rate of precipitation into Yucca Mountain is very small,
in the range of one to six percent of annual precipitation (which
itself is a very small amount, approximately 7.5 inches per year).
While we found that the science was sound, some of our QA
requirements were not met, and consequently we are expending time and
resources to replace the affected work. We have directed Sandia
National Laboratories to develop computer codes that will generate new
infiltration rate estimates---in accordance with our QA requirements---
and then replace the infiltration rate estimates. The Sandia
infiltration rates will be independently reviewed prior to
incorporation into the Total System Performance Model.
3. LEAD NATIONAL LABORATORY
In January 2006, the OCRWM designated Sandia National Laboratories
in Albuquerque, New Mexico the lead laboratory to coordinate and
organize all scientific work on the Yucca Mountain Project. Since this
Program represents a major scientific and technical challenge, we want
to ensure the Program takes full advantage of the resources that reside
in our national laboratories.
Today we are working to transition the scientific work to Sandia
and expect to complete that transition by the end of the year.
4. USE OF INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC REVIEW
To further ensure the highest quality and objectivity of the
science and technology supporting the Yucca Mountain Project, we are
working to instill a culture of ``trust but verify.'' As part of this
effort, we will use a University-based consortium to independently
review key aspects of the Project to ensure we stay objective and
without bias. In April, the Department selected the Oak Ridge Institute
for Science and Education to perform this work. Additionally, we are in
the process of implementing the Safety Conscious Work Environment
across the entire Yucca Mountain Project.
5. EPA RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS
In August 2005, the EPA proposed revised standards for Yucca
Mountain in response to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia which vacated portions of the existing EPA
radiation protection standards. Specifically, in response to the
decision, EPA proposed a radiological exposure limit for the time of
peak dose to the general public for a one-million year period following
the disposal of waste at Yucca Mountain. This new evaluation period is
100 times longer than the previous period of 10,000 years, and it is
longer than any other regulatory period involving quantitative limits.
The proposed EPA rule retains the existing 10,000-year individual
protection standard of 15 milliRem per year, and supplements it with an
additional standard of 350 milliRem per year at the time of peak dose.
The Department supports the EPA approach.
A rule with two compliance periods recognizes the extraordinary
challenges in making quantitative predictions of effects a million
years from now. It recognizes:
The limitations of bounding analyses,
The greater uncertainties at the time of peak risk, as well
as
The lessened precision in calculated results as time and
uncertainties increase.
Retaining the existing 15 milliRem per year standard for the
initial 10,000-years ensures that the repository design will include
prudent steps, including the use of engineered and natural barriers to
limit offsite doses.
Through the one-million year performance period, the natural and
engineered barriers will continue to keep exposure levels low, below
what many people receive today, depending on where they work or where
they live. The proposed 350 milliRem annual limit for the out years
reflects a level of risk that society normally lives with today. The
allowable dose for an individual at the location of peak dose at Yucca
Mountain, several hundred thousand years in the future, for example,
would be no greater than the average dose a resident of Denver,
Colorado, or other similar high-altitude location receives today.
Further, studies have not detected that people living in areas with
higher levels of natural background radiation have a higher rate of
cancer or other radiation-linked illnesses than do those living in
areas with lower levels of natural background radiation.
6. NEED FOR A SECOND REPOSITORY
The Department will form a task team to evaluate the need for a
second repository. The Department will provide its report, as required
by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), to the President and
Congress between 2007 and 2010. The Department has projected that more
than one hundred thousand metric tons of spent nuclear fuel will be
generated by the current licensed commercial reactor fleet, there will
be a need for capacity in excess of 70,000 metric tons which is the
administrative limit currently imposed by the NWPA on the Yucca
Mountain repository.
7. LICENSING SCHEDULE
The Department is committed to developing a realistic schedule that
will result in the submission of a robust license application. Later
this summer, we will publish our schedule and strategy for submittal of
the license application to the NRC which will be consistent with
Section 114 (e) of the Act that directs the Secretary to develop a plan
``that portrays the optimum way to attain the operation of the
repository.'' After we publish this schedule, we will provide the
Committee and its staff briefings.
CONCLUSION
Over the last 50 years, our Nation has benefited greatly from
nuclear energy and the power of the atom, but we have been left with a
legacy marked by the generation and accumulation of more than 50,000
metric tons of commercially generated spent nuclear fuel, 2,500 metric
tons of DOE spent nuclear fuel, and an estimated 20,000 or more
canisters of DOE high-level radioactive waste. Additionally, 2,000
metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel will be generated this
year and in every succeeding year by the current fleet of commercial
electrical power generating reactors as they supply 20% of our Nation's
electricity.
There is a clear national need for Yucca Mountain, even if we could
reduce our national electricity consumption by 20% and were able to
shut down every commercial reactor and nuclear project in the country
today. We are taking steps to ensure that we develop and construct the
safest, simplest repository that we possible can, based on sound
science and quality work.
There is a strong international scientific consensus that the best
and safest option for dealing with this waste is geologic isolation.
This consensus includes the National Academy of Sciences which has
generally endorsed the geologic disposal option as far back as 1957.
To conclude, I believe that our license application will provide
the necessary assurances that we can operate Yucca Mountain in
compliance with the performance requirements of the EPA and the NRC. We
will also demonstrate that our approach to operations will be carefully
planned, logical, and methodical.
That completes my prepared statement.
STATEMENT OF WILLILAM WEHRUM, ACTING ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIR AND RADIATION U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
Mr. Wehrum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
Good morning. My name is Bill Wehrum. I am the acting
assistant administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation at
the USEPA.
I'm pleased to be here today to provide you with an update
on the status of EPA's public health and safety standards for
the proposed spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV.
I would like to begin by providing the committee with a
short history of EPA's responsibilities and why we have
proposed revised standards. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982 described the roles and responsibilities of Federal
agencies in the development of disposal facilities for spent
nuclear fuel and high-level waste. EPA was identified as the
agency responsible for establishing standards to protect the
general environment from such facilities.
In the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress delineated EPA's
roles and responsibilities specific to the Federal Government's
establishment of the potential repository at Yucca Mountain.
EPA's role is to determine how the Yucca Mountain high-level
waste facility must perform to protect public health and the
environment.
Congress directed EPA to develop public health and safety
standards that would be incorporated into the NRC licensing
requirements for the Yucca Mountain facility. DOE would apply
for the license to construct and operate the facility, and the
facility would open only if NRC determines that DOE can meet
EPA's standards.
In establishing EPA's role, Congress also stated that EPA's
safety standards are to be based upon and consistent with the
expert advice of the National Academy of Sciences.
EPA established its Yucca Mountain standards in June 2001.
As required by the Energy Policy Act, these standards addressed
releases of radioactive material during storage at the site and
after final disposal.
The storage standard set a dose limit of 15 millirem per
year for the public outside the Yucca Mountain site. The
disposal standards consisted of three components: an individual
dose standard, a standard evaluating the impacts of human
intrusion into the repository, and a ground-water protection
standard.
The individual-protection and human intrusion standard set
a limit of 15 millirem per year to the reasonably maximally
exposed individual, who would be among the most highly exposed
members of the public.
The ground-water protection standard is consistent with
EPA's drinking water standards, which the Agency applies in
many situations as a pollution prevention measure. The disposal
standards were to apply for a period of 10,000 years after the
facility closed. Dose assessments were to continue beyond
10,000 years and be placed in DOE's Environmental Impact
Statement, but were not subject to a compliance standard.
The 10,000-year period for compliance assessment is
consistent with EPA's generally applicable standards developed
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It also reflects
international guidance regarding the level of confidence that
can be placed in numeric projections over very long periods of
time.
Shortly after the EPA first established these standards in
2001, the nuclear industry, several environmental and public
interest groups, and the State of Nevada challenged the
standards in court. In July 2004, the Court of Appeals for the
DC Circuit found in favor of the agency in all issues except
one: the 10,000-year regulatory timeframe. The court did not
rule on whether EPA's standards were protective, but did find
that the timeframe of EPA's standards was not consistent with
the NAS recommendations.
The NAS, in a report to EPA, stated that EPA's standards
should cover at least the time period when highest releases of
radiation are most likely to occur within the limits imposed by
the geologic stability of the Yucca Mountain site. It judged
this period of geologic stability for purposes of projecting
releases from the repository to be on the order of one million
years.
EPA's 2001 standards required DOE to evaluate the
performance of the site for this period, but did not establish
a specific dose limit beyond the first 10,000 years.
EPA proposed a revised rule in August 2005, to address the
issues raised by the appeals court. The new proposed rule
limits radiation doses from Yucca Mountain for up to one
million years after it closes. No other rules in the United
States for any risks have ever attempted to regulate for such a
long period of time.
Within that regulatory timeframe, we have proposed two dose
standards that would apply based on the number of years from
the time that the facility is closed.
For the first 10,000 years, we would retain the 2001 final
rule's dose limit of 15 millirem per year. This is protection
at the level of the most stringent radiation regulations in the
United States today.
From ten thousand years to one million years, we propose a
dose limit of 350 millirem per year. This represents a total
radiation exposure for people near Yucca Mountain that is no
higher than natural levels people live with routinely in other
parts of the country.
One million years, which represents 25,000 generations,
includes the time at which the highest doses of radiation from
the facility are expected to occur.
Our proposal requires the DOE to show that Yucca Mountain
can safely contain wastes, even considering the effects of
earthquakes, volcanic activity, climate change, and container
corrosion over one million years.
The public comment period for the proposed rule closed
November 21. We are currently reviewing and considering
comments as we develop the final rule. We held public hearings
in Las Vegas and Amargosa Valley, NV, and in Washington, DC.
We are considering comments from these hearings, as well as
all the comments submitted to the Agency's rulemaking docket. A
document describing our responses to all comments will be
published along with the final rule. We are making every effort
to finalize the rule by end of this year.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the
committee and present this update on our standards. This
concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony. And
what a job you have.
Now, having said that, we will take Mr. Loux from Nevada,
the 25-year veteran.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT R. LOUX, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NEVADA AGENCY
FOR NUCLEAR PROJECTS
Mr. Loux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be
here and thank you for the invitation. As you know, I am here
on behalf of Governor Guinn.
The Chairman. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Loux. I am Robert Loux and I am the director of the
Agency for Nuclear Projects, which is, as you mentioned, part
of the Office of the Governor.
The current status of the Yucca Mountain high-level waste
repository project can be described in a single word: unknown--
not even uncertain, but unknown. You have heard from the
Department of Energy that it cannot provide a schedule for
submittal of a license application of the NRC for its review,
but the Department representative said it will not take place
in 2007.
You've also watched the progression of a potential
repository opening date go from the statutory 1998 date to more
recent estimates of 2010, maybe 2015, or maybe even 2020.
More recently, just last week at the TRB meeting, one of
the Department of Energy representatives indicated that the
clean canister or TAD approach, final design will not be
available for at least 6 years. And since that design is
integral to the design of the repository, it is hard to believe
that a license application could be submitted before 6 or 7
years from now. Multiple episodes of redirection of the
program, both from within the Department of Energy and
Congress, defined the last 20 years of the Yucca Mountain
project history.
The current status of the Yucca Mountain project is a
product of fundamental, persistent unresolved problems with
both the site and project execution, overlain by layers of
redirection that wrongly assume the problems have been, or will
be resolved. It is bogged down in the morass of technical,
legal and managerial problems and it is unrealistic to imagine
the project can pull itself out. It is unlikely that any
legislative easing of the regulatory rules can alter this
prospect.
The technical problems stem ultimately from the fundamental
unsuitability of the site. The Department of Energy has been
struggling with this since the early 1990's when it discovered
there is a lot more water at the site and it was moving much
faster than expected from when it settled on the site. Instead
of coming back to Congress with the bad news, DOE decided to
compensate for the bad site with better packaging, which also
doesn't solve the problem.
Since then, billions of dollars of so-called scientific
investigation have been directed at rationalizing this
decision. In our estimation, much of it is not really science
at all. It is not surprising, at least in some cases, that the
scientists working the project just made stuff up, as revealed
by the e-mail affair involving staff of the USGS working on
waterflow through Yucca Mountain. Much of this work--much of
the other work now has to be redone at considerable cost.
The quality flag went down in the middle 1990's, too, as
revealed in the recent report by the Government Accountability
Office. DOE has a long history of chronic quality assurance
problems. The latest problems involve Lawrence Livermore Lab.
The Department and its contractors were never imbued with the
sense of doing things right. They apparently thought that it's,
quote, ``all political'', and that they would get their way in
the end no matter what. Rest assured that should the
application be submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Nevada will challenge and question DOE's fitness as an
applicant and as a licensee.
Legal problems are exemplified by the current litigation in
which DOE is desperately fighting to prevent the public release
of key licensing documents, documents paid for by the
taxpayers.
It is a strange position for a Government agency supposedly
devoted to openness in making sound decisions in the public
interest. The truth is it is devoted to secrecy and special
protection of the bureaucratic and contractor-interest involved
in the project.
The main trouble with this approach is secrecy leads to
poor decisions and mistakes, and fortunately, secrecy and
bullying do not work well in the Federal courts. These legal
and technical problems exemplify the poor direction DOE top
management has given to the project. Beyond that, however, the
Department has been beset with unceasing managerial problems at
all level. The latest GAO report lays this out clearly. It
describes incompetent, changing managerial personnel, key
positions unfilled and poor tracking of problems.
Mr. Chairman, in my own 25 years of personal experience and
observation, I believe the project is bogged down by technical
problems that stem from the fundamental unsuitability of the
site, by inadequate scientific evaluation by DOE, and by DOE's
poor direction and inability to manage its contractors. At this
point, it is unrealistic to imagine the project can pull itself
out of this morass.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I'll conclude and be happy to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Loux follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert R. Loux, Executive Director,
Nevada Agency For Nuclear Projects
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
Robert Loux, Executive Director of the Nevada Agency for Nuclear
Projects, which is a branch of the Office of the Governor of the State
of Nevada. The Agency was established by the Nevada Legislature in
1985, to carry out the State's oversight duties under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act. I have served as the Agency director since it was
established. Our Agency also serves as staff for the Nevada Commission
on Nuclear Projects.
The current status of the Yucca Mountain high-level nuclear waste
repository project can be described in a single word: unknown--not even
uncertain, but unknown. You have heard from the Department of Energy's
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management that it cannot provide
a schedule for submittal of a Yucca Mountain repository license
application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for its review.
But, Department representatives have said that it will not take place
in FY 07. You also have watched the progression of potential repository
opening dates go from the statutory 1998 date to a more recent estimate
of 2010, and now to maybe 2015 to 2020. Multiple episodes of
``redirection'' of the program, both from within the Department of
Energy and from the Congress, define the past twenty years of the Yucca
Mountain project history. The current status of the Yucca Mountain
project, within the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, is
a product of fundamental, persistent and unresolved problems, with both
the site and the project execution, overlain by layers of redirection
that wrongly assume the problems have been, or will be resolved.
site recommendation and technical basis for license application
At the time of the Secretary of Energy's Site Recommendation for
development of a Yucca Mountain repository on February 14, 2002, it was
stated that a license application would be submitted to NRC in late
2004. This plan was announced despite the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
requirement that a license application be submitted not later than 90
days after the site designation becomes effective by an act of
Congress, which occurred in July 2002. In November 2004, it was
announced that the license application would not be submitted during
the following month, and it was not known when it would be submitted.
This failure to submit the license application in 2004 came as no
surprise, since a regulatory prerequisite for license application
submittal had not been met. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensing
Support Network Rule requires that DOE certify it has made all
documentary material in its possession on the proposed Yucca Mountain
high-level waste repository publicly available, in a prescribed manner,
at least six months prior to submission of a license application. The
intent of this is to expedite the discovery phase of the licensing
hearing to meet the tight statutory schedule for a licensing decision
by the NRC. On August 31, 2004, the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board ruled that the DOE's June 30, 2004 certification was based on
incomplete documentation, and the manner in which DOE made the material
publicly available on its own internet web site failed to satisfy the
regulations. Nevada's July 12, 2004 motion to strike the certification
was granted. This all transpired two years after the Yucca Mountain
site designation became effective. DOE has not tendered a new
certification, and in its monthly status reports to the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board, as late as this month, stated that it does not
have a schedule for resumption of the process.
At the time of the Site Recommendation, DOE announced its
priorities for FY 03 were to:
a) ``continue vigorous scientific investigation of repository
system behavior;
b) develop a repository license application; and
c) accelerate the transportation program.''
This confirms that, contrary to statements by then Secretary
Abraham and President Bush, the repository program managers were not
prepared to move forward with the licensing process, since by law, site
characterization, i.e. scientific work, is complete at the time of Site
Recommendation with respect to the sufficiency of information for a
license application. President Bush, in a February 15, 2002 letter to
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, said, ``This
recommendation . . . will permit commencement of the next rigorous
stage of scientific review of the repository program through formal
licensing proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.''
(emphasis added).
Even the Nuclear Regulatory Commission understood that at the time
of Site Recommendation, the information for a license application was
insufficient because, in its statutorily required statement to the
President of its view on whether the ``at depth site characterization
and waste form proposal seem to be sufficient for inclusion'' in the
license application, its response was a forecast, not a finding. The
Commission indicated confidence that the information would be
sufficient at the time of license application, but still pending with
the Commission was the resolution of 293 Key Technical Issues that DOE
had agreed with the NRC staff to have resolved prior to submission of a
license application.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act also required that a Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for a Yucca Mountain repository
accompany the Site Recommendation by the Secretary to the President.
The FEIS is the primary document that explains and describes the
Proposed Action and the analyses of the impacts of that action. It
included some (although far from complete) analysis of the plans to
transport the waste to Yucca Mountain from sites in 35 states where the
waste is currently generated and stored. However, a Record of Decision,
the mandatory document which records a federal decision based upon the
FEIS process, did not accompany the Site Recommendation, as it must
have if DOE was ready to proceed with the licensing and development
phase of the repository project. It was not until April 2004 that DOE
issued a Record of Decision that adopted the preferred alternative of
mostly rail transportation to Yucca Mountain and selected the 319 mile-
long Caliente Corridor as the Nevada rail construction route to Yucca
Mountain--the most costly and difficult of the five alternatives
reviewed in the FEIS. Since then DOE has been in the process of
preparing a Draft EIS for the alignment and construction of that rail
line, which is now estimated to cost, not the originally estimated just
under $1 billion, but $2 billion.
In February 2004, the Yucca Mountain project, after at least three
drafts of a license application had been developed, began a
comprehensive evaluation of the key building blocks of the license
application, referred to as Analysis Model Reports (AMRs) that are
intended to cover all safety and performance aspects of the post-
closure repository. This was followed by a critical review of a few
selected AMRs by NRC staff, the results of which forecast to observers
a difficult and uncertain license application review if both
substantive and procedural (including Quality Assurance) remediation
was not undertaken. The Project's Regulatory Integration Team (RIT),
consisting of 150 scientists and regulatory experts, was created to
address problems of traceability and transparency in the documents to
ensure they met NRC requirements and expectations. The RIT identified
3,733 Action Items in its review of 117 AMRs (which were later
consolidated into 89 AMRs). The large majority of items in need of
revision were in the area of insufficient or unclear justification of
scientific conclusions (73%). Technical issues made up 7 percent, and
procedural inadequacies were the remaining 20 percent. The result was
that 89 documents were in need of either significant updating or total
revision. The RIT completed its work in an 8-month period, at a cost of
about $20 million. After completion, other AMRs not in the original
scope of review were found to need similar scrutiny. The Total System
Performance Assessment, the composite model that projects safety
compliance of the repository, was undergoing subsequent revision in
2005 and will continue to be revised, based on new developments in late
2005 that will be discussed below.
QUALITY ASSURANCE
An acceptable Quality Assurance program and requirements,
procedures, and the demonstration of its effective implementation are
integral and indispensable elements of a license application. The Yucca
Mountain project has been plagued by Quality Assurance deficiencies
since its inception. Even before the 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy
Amendments Act, DOE was aware of Quality Assurance problems and the
long-term implications of not correcting them and assuring that an
acceptable Quality Assurance program was persistent and enduring. In
its June 1987 OCRWM Mission Plan Amendment (DOE/RW-0128), DOE wrote:
``As a result of quality-assurance audits performed by the
DOE, ``stop-work'' orders were issued to contractors working on
the Hanford and the Yucca Mountain projects. The DOE found that
the technical and management controls for work performed before
site characterization were not adequate for site
characterization activities. A general upgrading of procedures
and controls is being implemented to satisfy NRC requirements
for establishing a licensing basis and DOE requirements for a
major system acquisition. Personnel associated with the stopped
work were immediately assigned to develop the required
procedures and controls and were given intensified training in
quality assurance. The ``stop-work'' orders were gradually
being lifted on certain activities at both sites as the DOE
receives evidence that the quality assurance requirements are
satisfied.'' (Page 5).
Since 1988, the General Accounting Office, now the Government
Accountability Office, has identified Quality Assurance problems in the
Yucca Mountain project in at least 8 reports, some devoted solely to
the issue of Quality Assurance (QA). In 1988, GAO warned that the
project should not proceed until it had an adequate QA program in
place. GAO found, in 1990, that the project did not comply with NRC QA
requirements. In 1992, GAO again pointed out the need for an adequate
QA program. Reports in 2003 and 2004 spoke to the persistent QA
problems. In testimony just last month, on April 25, 2006, to the House
of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on the
Federal Workforce and Agency Organization, the GAO Director for Natural
Resources and the Environment concluded, based on GAO's most recent
report, the following:
``DOE has a long history of trying to resolve quality
assurance problems in its Yucca Mountain project. Now, after
more than 20 years of work, DOE once again faces serious
quality assurance and other challenges while seeking a new path
forward to a fully defensible license application. Even as DOE
faces new quality assurance challenges, it cannot be certain
that it has resolved past problems. It is clear that DOE has
not been well served by management tools that have not
effectively identified and tracked progress on significant and
recurring problems. As a result, DOE has not had a strong basis
to assess progress in addressing management weaknesses or to
direct management attention to significant and recurrent
problems as needed. Unless these quality assurance problems are
addressed, further delays on the project are likely.''
The GAO Director was testifying in the hearing as part of an
ongoing House Subcommittee investigation of possible data and Quality
Assurance documentation falsification by a few United States Geological
Survey scientists modeling groundwater infiltration for the Yucca
Mountain project. Groundwater infiltration is key to the repository
safety projection in that it affects first the corrosion and failure
rate of the metal waste containers, and then the rate of release of
radionuclides to the environment.
The investigation stemmed from the revelation of e-mails exchanged
among the scientists between 1998 and 2000, but only first discovered
by DOE contractor reviewers in late 2004 and revealed to DOE in March
2005. Inspectors General of both the Department of Energy and the
Department of Interior investigated the case extensively, looking at e-
mail records from the identified time period and later. The reports of
the field investigations were forwarded to the United States Attorney's
Office for the District of Nevada, which, on April 24, 2006, declined
to pursue criminal prosecution in the matter.
After closing his investigation, in an unusual move, the DOE
Inspector General wrote to the Secretary of Energy of his findings and
concerns because, during the course of the investigation, ``certain
internal control deficiencies were identified which were pertinent to
the core allegations we were pursuing.'' The concerns were over three
specific matters: 1) ``The nearly six-year delay in surfacing and
appropriately dealing with the controversial e-mails was inconsistent
with sound quality assurance protocols'' (this was the subject of a
November 9, 2005 Inspector General Report, Quality Assurance Weaknesses
in the Review of Yucca Mountain Electronic Mail for Relevancy to the
Licensing Process, DOE/IG-0708); 2) ``Compromise of scientific notebook
requirements'' (which, in this case were waived to resolve the fact
that, contrary to requirements, no scientific notebook had been
initiated or kept for the infiltration model work); and 3) ``Critical
control files relating to the ``Simulation of Net Infiltration for
Modern and Potential Future Climates'' AMR were not maintained in
accordance with data management system requirements.'' The Inspector
General concluded:
``The discovery of the e-mails that prompted the Office of
Inspector General Criminal Investigation understandably raised
concerns over the Yucca Mountain Project's quality assurance
process. The Department has announced that, in order to address
these concerns, it has initiated steps to remediate or replace
certain work of the Geological Survey and that the quality of
the results of this effort will be reviewed by a body of
scientists independent of the Yucca Mountain Project. We
concluded that these steps are essential in the Yucca Mountain
Project is to overcome historical and current quality assurance
concerns.''
That the e-mail situation was not an isolated problem seems to have
been accepted even by Energy Secretary Bodman, who said, on April 12,
that the culture of the Yucca Mountain organization was ``reflected
in'' the USGS e-mail affair. This would suggest the question of whether
the scientific underpinnings of the entire Yucca Mountain project merit
confidence. For example, the GAO Director's testimony also described a
February 2006 stop-work order on Yucca Mountain work at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory:
``We believe this incident is an example of how the project's
management tools have not been effective in bringing quality
assurance problems to top management's attention. After
observing a DOE quality assurance audit at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory in August 2005, NRC expressed
concern that humidity gauges used in scientific experiments at
the project were not properly calibrated--an apparent violation
of quality assurance requirements. According to an NRC
official, NRC communicated these findings to BSC [Bechtel-SAIC]
and DOE project officials on six occasions between August and
December 2005, and issued a formal report and letter to DOE on
January 9, 2006. However, despite these communications and the
potentially serious quality assurance problems involved, the
project's acting director did not become aware of the issue
until. January 2006, after reading about it in a news
article.'' (emphasis added).
The deficient calibration of the gauges, and other experiment
execution problems with Quality Assurance connections and sound science
implications, discovered in the audit relate to work that is key to the
safety assessment for the repository, because it leads to the
engineered barrier corrosion rate data that are included in the Yucca
Mountain Total System Performance Assessment.
THE ``PATH FORWARD''
A few of the issues currently confronting the Yucca Mountain
project were mentioned in the March 21, 2006 Quarterly Management
Meeting between DOE and NRC:
Spent fuel handling, transport, storage, and disposal:
A key element of the Energy Secretary's new ``simpler, safer''
approach is the major redesign of the waste handling facilities, based
on a changed operational concept for receipt and handling of waste at
the Yucca Mountain site. The concept for receiving commercial spent
nuclear fuel and packaging it for underground emplacement has changed
significantly through the past 15 years, and just recently has taken
yet another turn.
At first the spent fuel assemblies were to have been packaged at
the reactor in conventional transport containers, brought to the
repository site where a few assemblies were to have been placed in a
stainless steel container that then would be emplaced in vertical
boreholes in the floor of the repository drifts.
The idea of the Multipurpose Container (MPC) then took hold, trying
to capitalize on the idea of a large rail container that would increase
the payload per container and have the advantage of bringing some
uniformity to the cask designs, though the more it was studied, the
less uniformity seemed possible because of the variability in fuel
types. The MPC, certified for transport, storage, and disposal, would
be loaded with spent fuel assemblies and welded closed at the reactor.
The large containers then would be emplaced horizontally in drifts
underground at Yucca Mountain. This concept was terminated in 1996 for
policy reasons, but also for an important technical reason. Because of
the provisions of the DOE's Standard Contract with utilities (10 CFR
Part 961) requiring accepting ``oldest fuel first'' (which actually
means only the oldest reactors were served first), DOE would have no
control over the thermal output of the MPCs as they arrived at the
repository for underground emplacement. Thermal output of individual
assemblies varies as a function of original uranium enrichment
percentage, bum-up time in the reactor, and age out-of-reactor. For
technical reasons associated with Yucca Mountain repository rock
stability and waste form integrity, DOE had to be able to set limits
on, and control the thermal characteristics of the stream of waste
packages placed in a repository drift. The MPC represented an
unsolvable logistics problem for repository loading and thermal
management.
The next idea was to bring the spent fuel assemblies to the Yucca
Mountain surface facility in newly designed high-payload shipping
containers, offload the assemblies into a large, 5,000 metric ton
capacity lag storage pool, and then select individual assemblies, based
on their thermal characteristics, to be grouped into a disposal
container for underground emplacement. In this way, the thermal output
of individual containers and the emplacement stream into a disposal
drift could be ``tailored.''
But, concerns over the safety of the lag storage pool and other
transfer pools at the Yucca Mountain surface facility led to a
conceptual change in which hot cells would be used for fuel assembly
transfers from transportation containers either directly to disposal
containers or to storage containers for later assembly selection to
maintain the flexibility for thermal ``tailoring'' of the individual
containers and the stream of containers. This is operationally complex
and requires rigid controls--but is not impossible.
Then, an analysis indicated the possibility of severe radionuclide
contamination and worker safety problems from handling damaged fuel
assemblies in the hot cells. Some existing spent fuel is known to be
damaged and is a potential contamination source. Also, the expectation
is that there is other damaged fuel, though its condition is unknown,
and fuel could also be damaged from vibration during transport. This
leaves the uncertainty of hot cell contamination and worker safety
essentially unknowable for purposes of a safety analysis.
Attempts to resolve this contamination problem apparently were not
satisfactory, because the most recent conceptual change, resulting in
the current redesign effort, involves elimination of normal operation
bare fuel assembly handling in hot cells at the repository surface
facility. Instead, the plan is that commercial spent fuel will be
loaded into canisters that are welded closed at the reactors, then
placed in a transportation overpack for delivery to Yucca Mountain. In
the so-called ``clean'' facility, the welded canisters would then be
placed in disposal overpacks for direct emplacement or in storage
overpacks for later selection for emplacement. This concept is called
``TAD'' (Transport, Aging, and Disposal). It has all the same
logistical drawbacks as the MPC concept, but adds an ``aging,'' i.e.
storage, facility of at least 21,000 metric ton capacity.
Once the current redesign is complete, it will have to meet the
DOE's administrative review requirements and process in order to be
incorporated into the project baseline. It will have to be integrated
into the project design and safety case, and its effect on the Total
System Performance Assessment will need to be evaluated, because a
change in the waste package would be a result of the conceptual change.
In effect, this concept not only revives the failed concept of the
MPC program, but calls for the equivalent of a Monitored Retrievable
Storage facility at Yucca Mountain, despite the fact that placement of
such a facility in Nevada is prohibited by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
as Amended, as long as a repository site is under consideration in the
State. Nevada, in the past, has rejected such an attempt, by Congress,
and the Presidential veto of the bill to develop Interim Storage at the
Nevada Test Site, Yucca Mountain's front door, was sustained.
Uncertainty about the EPA standard:
Nearly nineteen years ago, on June 29, 1987, the DOE Project
Manager for the Yucca Mountain site told this Committee:
``The process of doing the modeling and calculations that
estimate the radioactive releases from the [Yucca Mountain]
repository tells us that we may be five orders of magnitude
below a very conservative EPA standard.'' He added, ``[I]t is
not conceivable to me that we would discover something of a
major nature that would cause us to change our mind about it
[suitability of the site].''
Just five years later, it was clear that the Yucca Mountain site
could not meet the EPA standard with respect to atmospheric releases of
radioactive carbon-14. After efforts to have EPA relax its standard
failed, DOE appealed to Congress, which resulted in a mandate for a new
EPA standard, specific to the Yucca Mountain site, as part of the
Energy Policy Act of 1992. The direction to EPA is as follows:
``[EPA] Administrator shall, based upon and consistent with
the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of
Sciences, promulgate, by rule, public health and safety
standards for protection of the public from releases from
radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the repository
at the Yucca Mountain site. Such standards shall prescribe the
maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members
of the public from releases to the accessible environment from
radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the
repository.'' Section 801(a).
As instructed, EPA contracted with the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) for a report of findings and recommendations to be titled A
Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, which was published in
1995. Among other things, the report found that there is no scientific
basis to limit the repository compliance period to 10,000 years as had
been done in the original EPA standard; and, its recommendation: ``We
recommend calculation of the maximum risks of radiation releases
whenever they occur as long as the geologic characteristics of the
repository environment do not change significantly. The time scale for
long-term geologic processes at Yucca Mountain is on the order of
approximately one million years.'' Page 71-72. The one million year
period is referred to in the report as the period of geologic stability
during which, the report concluded, it is feasible to make a compliance
assessment. The report also noted that, ``In the case of Yucca
Mountain, at least, some potentially important exposures might not
occur until after several hundred thousand years.'' Page 55.
In June 2001, EPA promulgated its rule, Public Health and
Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada
(40 CFR Part 197). The rule set a regulatory period of 10,000 years for
compliance with EPA's maximum individual dose standard, which was set
at 15 millirems per year. A separate groundwater protection standard
was also set for the 10,000 year regulatory period, with dose and
radionuclide concentration limits consistent with Safe Drinking Water
Act standards that apply to all of the nation's public drinking water
supplies. The rule did acknowledge that peak expected doses could occur
after the 10,000 year regulatory period and required DOE to calculate
the peak individual dose during the period of geologic stability after
10,000 years and include the results in the Yucca Mountain
Environmental Impact Statement ``as an indicator of long-term disposal
system performance.'' But, the rule further states, ``No regulatory
standard applies to the results of this analysis.'' Sec. 197.35.
Nevada and others (Nuclear Energy Institute, Natural Resources
Defense Council, and several other environmental and public interest
organizations) challenged the EPA standard in lawsuits filed in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in summer
2001. Among Nevada's and others' issues was that the setting of a
10,000 year regulatory period was not ``based upon and consistent
with'' the findings and recommendations of the NAS, as required by the
Energy Policy Act of 1992. The Court upheld this challenge and vacated
that portion of the EPA standard that applied a 10,000 year regulatory
period, as well as the portions of the NRC licensing rule (10 CFR Part
63) that adopted EPA's 10,000 year regulatory period. Nuclear Energy
Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 373 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
The premise of the NAS Technical Bases report is simple and
straightforward--humans must be protected from the maximum radiation
risk from a nuclear waste repository, whenever. that risk is projected
to occur. If this protection cannot be reasonably assured at the
outset, the problem is with the selected repository site and design,
not with the premise. EPA's selection of a one million year regulatory
period is a reflection of the NAS finding that compliance assessment is
feasible through that time period for most physical and geologic
aspects of a repository at Yucca Mountain, given our knowledge and
understanding of the natural characteristics, features, and processes
at Yucca Mountain and in the surrounding area. The wide range of
possible assumptions about the longevity of the metal waste containers
coupled with our current understanding of the physical and hydrologic
characteristics of Yucca Mountain indicate it is very likely that the
calculated peak individual dose will occur sometime during the million
year period of geologic stability.
If there were no metal containers and shields protecting the waste
from infiltrating water, DOE's calculations for time of peak dose (in
the Site Recommendation performance assessment) put the average peak at
about 2,000 years after repository closure. Using DOE's optimistic
projections of the rate of container failure, the performance
calculation shows the time of peak dose at between 200,000 and 300,000
years after closure. The magnitude of the calculated peak dose, in-both
cases, is , approximately the same, and both far exceed 15 millirems
per year. In the case with no metal waste containers or shields, a 15
millirem per year standard would be exceeded within 500 years after
closure of the repository.
The compliance test for a repository is whether there is reasonable
expectation that the statistical maximum dose (or risk) to humans from
releases from the repository fall within a pre-established regulatory
dose limit. It is of great importance that the complex performance
calculation is scientifically credible because the compliance decision
is to be made prior to waste emplacement. After the waste is disposed
and the repository is sealed, the performance calculation has no
relevance as to how the repository will actually perform and when the
maximum dose to individuals will occur. It could appear in as little as
a few thousand years. The wide range of uncertainty in projected
repository performance is dominated by the great uncertainty in the
failure rate of the metal waste containers, not the geology and
hydrology. Once the waste containers begin failing by corrosion, the
contamination of the groundwater will be relatively rapid, far
reaching, and irreversible. Radionuclides from. waste disposed at Yucca
Mountain will eventually reach the land surface both through
groundwater pumping and through natural playas and springs where
groundwater that has traveled beneath Yucca Mountain reaches the land
surface today.
EPA has indicated it would like to have its final Yucca Mountain
standard in place before the end of this calendar year. But this does
not alleviate DOE's uncertainty about the final rule, as it relates to
the need for revisions in its Total System Performance Assessment. If
the EPA standard were to become final in the form proposed, DOE would
need to revisit the features, events, and processes that previously
were excluded from consideration based on their possible effect on
performance, or their likelihood of occurring during the 10,000 year
compliance period. A credible climate representation also would need to
be constructed for a 1 million year compliance period. And the great
uncertainty is whether the final EPA rule will withstand legal
challenge, should the numerous vastly unprecedented elements of the
Proposed Rule be promulgated as the final standard.
Early in EPA's rulemaking process, Nevada proposed a
straightforward approach to meeting the Court's ruling: simply extend
the 10,000 year compliance period for the standard as written to the
time of expected maximum dose (risk), whenever that occurs in DOE's
Total System Performance Assessment. From the Court's perspective, this
is what should, have been done in the first place. Nevada's proposal
was notably absent from the list of alternative approaches considered
by EPA for its rulemaking, and EPA exacerbated the uncertainty about a
final Yucca Mountain standard by introducing a two-tier, bifurcated
compliance standard and time period.
Improve the ``nuclear culture'' of the Yucca Mountain Project:
In order to be considered for a license from NRC, DOE must
demonstrate that it will be a fit and responsible licensee. This
requires that protection of human health and safety, and the
environment must consistently be held as the highest priority in
decision-making. This attribute can only be judged on the decisions and
actions of the entire Yucca Mountain organization, as demonstrated in
its pre-license application behavior. Given the high level of verbal
importance applied to this matter by top DOE managers, along with the
observations of the DOE Inspector General, and consistent 20-year
history of GAO's finding of persistent managerial deficiencies in the
project, it is clear that the goal is, at least, elusive for the Yucca
Mountain project organization.
CONCLUSION
Energy Secretary Bodman recently said that the nation's high-level
nuclear waste program is ``broken.'' This invites some important
questions. When did it break, and when was the break detected? What
broke--was there a weak link, or a system failure? Can the break be
patched or repaired, or is it beyond repair? If it is beyond repair, is
there a need to replace it--and, if so, with what?
Assuming the answers to the above questions led to the crafting of
plans for resuscitation, rehabilitation, and remediation of the Yucca
Mountain project, a problem remains for which no resolution can exist.
The site does not have the necessary geologic and hydrologic attributes
to support a demonstration of the capability for safe, permanent
disposal of the-nation's high-level nuclear wastes--the goal of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
Three times in the past 15 years, Nevada Governors have advised
Secretaries of Energy and finally the Congress that the site should be
disqualified under DOE's original Site Recommendation Guidelines,
because of its geologic and hydrologic deficiencies. Despite DOE's own
analyses finally vindicating Nevada's basis for this claim, the DOE's
response was to eliminate relevant disqualification factors through
issuance of new guidelines just prior to its Yucca Mountain repository
Site Recommendation to the President. The Yucca Mountain site model,
upon which the Project Manager expressed such confidence to the
Committee in 1987, was shown to be wrong, first in 1992, and again in
1996, both times through data collected at the site. The Yucca Mountain
site so optimistically portrayed to Congress in 1987 is scientifically
not the same site before you today. Yucca Mountain cannot meet any
reasonable test for long-term safety.
You asked for testimony in this hearing on the status of the Yucca
Mountain Repository Project within the Office of Civilian Radioactive
Management at the Department of Energy. The request, in more practical
terms is for information on how the Yucca Mountain project is doing in
trying to make a convincing case for a safe repository at an unsafe
site. The answer is, ``Very poorly--because, even without all the
problems described above, it is an impossible job.''
Thank you for the opportunity to present our views before this
Committee.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony. Now
we will have questions from the Senators. We will start with
Senator Bingaman.
Senator Bingaman. I want to thank you all very much. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Let me go to Mr. Golan and ask you if
DOE's--I know that this law, as signed 4 years ago, in 2002,
contemplated the Department would be able to file a license
application quickly, and that obviously hasn't happened. Could
you explain a little better as to why you understand it's
taking so long to get to a point where an application could be
filed? Are there any statutory impediments to your going ahead
and filing an application, or is this strictly a matter of
internal administrative work that needs to be done?
Mr. Golan. Yes, sir, in terms of why this is so hard, the
simple fact is that this has never been done anyplace around
the world, and the requirements that the Department is expected
to meet are a good set of requirements that we have to make
sure that we meet.
If we look at some of the recent things that we need to
resolve in submitting a license application, the first is we
are developing the design and the license application to
support the clean-canister approach. We received the conceptual
design from our contractor. We are reviewing it right now. We
have a formal structure process to take that through our
Secretary of Energy's Acquisition Advisory Board, and we are
going to incorporate that into our baseline. So, we are--
instead of handling their spent nuclear fuel, our intent is to
handle most of the fuel in a canistered way.
Senator Bingaman. Let me just interrupt there. About a
decade ago, there was a program called the multi-purpose
canister and that was canceled, and now you have the
Transportation, Aging and Disposal canister; how do those
differ?
Mr. Golan. At the heart of it, they are basically the same.
A multi-purpose canister would allow the canister to be used
for a number of different functions: for transportation, for
aging, and potentially, and ultimately, for disposal. The
Transportation, Aging and Disposal canister seeks to add
disposal to what we have today.
We have canisters that have been licensed for aging, spent
nuclear fuel to be aged in, and we have--the same canisters are
licensed to be transported, and we are seeking to extend that
license to allow that canister to actually be licensed for
disposal, where we wouldn't have to open it up.
Mr. Bingaman. I'm still unclear as to why we canceled the
multi-purpose canister a decade ago. It seems like we have now
come up with a multi-purpose canister as the solution to the
problem we've got.
Mr. Golan. Sir, there was a report issued by EPRI around
the time the multi-purpose canister project was canceled. Their
conclusion was that the canister in that approach was not
canceled for any technical or financial reason. I would be
happy to submit that report to the committee for the record.
Senator Bingaman. But if it wasn't a technical or financial
reason, what kind of reason was it?
Mr. Golan. There was some indecision that the team pointed
to that allowed this process not to go forward. But I think if
you go back to the industry, if you just go back to the people
who are familiar with this project, most of the folks who are
familiar with nuclear material handling and waste handling look
at this and say, ``This is the right way to do it.''
So, in a sense, we are going to take advantages of the
lessons we learned from the multi-purpose canister approach,
factor those in so we do have a canister that we don't have to
be handling bare spent fuel several times, and that the
utilities can actually pack once, and we don't have to open it
up and repack it and unpack it. Then we can use this as a means
to just dispose.
Senator Bingaman. But, in fact, we are not learning lessons
from that experience. We are essentially starting up again
where we left off. Is that right? I mean, we had a multi-
purpose canister program and you say for indecision reasons we
canceled it a decade ago. We now have essentially a multi-
purpose canister program again and it is basically the same
thing, we are just at the conclusion this time; is that
accurate or not?
Mr. Golan. That is one way to look at it, sir. This time,
what we are doing is we are involving industry and we are
involving the utilities early-on, up front. We are confident
that this approach is going to end up with fewer times that we
handle the spent fuel. It is going to involve a safer operation
at Yucca, so we are confident that we can take the
Transportation, Aging and Disposal canister and make it work.
Senator Bingaman. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. We will stay with you,
Mr. Golan.
The fuel from our nuclear Navy is destined to be disposed
of at Yucca Mountain; is that correct?
Mr. Golan. Yes, sir, it is.
The Chairman. How much waste is currently planned for
permanent disposition at Yucca Mountain?
Mr. Golan. The legislative cap on Yucca Mountain is 70,000
metric tons. There is a Defense portion which includes the
Navy. The Defense portion right now consists of 7,000 tons of
Defense waste which would go to Yucca Mountain. There is,
however, 14,000 tons of Defense waste, which has been
generated, or will be generated, that is not only from the
Navy, which represents less than 100 tons, but also from the
spent nuclear fuel and reprocessed waste that is at Savannah
River, Idaho and at Hanford.
So there is 14,000 tons of defense waste, and 7,000 of
those tons would go into Yucca Mountain. All the Navy's waste
would be planned to go into Yucca Mountain, which again
represents less than 100 tons.
The Chairman. Their current schedule--when would this waste
be ready for shipment to Yucca?
Mr. Golan. Sir, there is some waste that is more ready for
shipment and there is some waste that is going to require
additional steps before it would be ready for shipment.
Some of the fuel that is at Hanford today, which is in
multi-canister overpacks, the glass waste, the vitrified waste
which has been produced down in Savannah River through the
Defense Waste Processing System, and the waste that--the spent
nuclear fuel that has been generated by the Navy's nuclear
propulsion program could be ready to be shipped as early as the
first part of the next decade.
Some of the other waste is at Hanford and at Idaho, which
is the reprocessed waste which still requires a next step. In a
lot of cases, some of that waste is in liquid form today. It
needs to be vitrified or solidified before it is going to be
ready to be shipped, and until we get some more visibility on
that front, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to necessarily speculate
on when those wastes would be ready to ship.
The Chairman. Well, if Yucca was not available, how would
this waste be handled?
Mr. Golan. As you mentioned in your opening statement, sir,
the scientific community--the international scientific
community has generally endorsed geological repository since
1957. Absent a geological repository, the only alternative, or
one of the alternatives I think we have to look at, would be
perpetual on-site storage.
Now the Department has initiated the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership, which looks at using some of this waste and
recycling it. Some of that waste though, sir, can't be recycled
because it already has been recycled one time, and that is a
lot of the Defense waste.
The Chairman. A lot of which?
Mr. Golan. A lot of the Defense waste that's at Hanford and
at Savannah River. It has already gone through the reprocessing
for the weapons production mission.
The Chairman. And it can't be recycled, one of the modern
concepts of recycling?
Mr. Golan. Maybe it can, but under current technology--
remember this waste has already been reprocessed once, so it
represents the glass waste, the vitrified waste that's at
Savannah River, sir.
The Chairman. I have many additional questions, but I am
going to yield and stick around here awhile anyway.
Senator Burr, you have been here a long time. I am going to
yield to you now for your questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD M. BURR, U.S. SENATOR
FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank all the
witnesses for being here. Mr. Golan, thank you for a very, very
difficult job.
Mr. Wehrum, I think it is likely that your plan will be
litigated as well; do you agree?
Mr. Wehrum. I agree, Senator.
Senator Burr. And I think Mr. Loux, as I understood your
statement, you will litigate--the State of Nevada will litigate
when DOE files an application?
Mr. Loux. We will challenge the application, that is
correct.
Senator Burr. Sure. Now, we are back in a situation where
we are focused on canisters. We have no firm date for our
expectations of the license application. We are at 55,000
metric tons of waste, today, of on-site storage. An additional
7,000-metric-tons-plus of DOE waste. We have a limit, 70,000
metric tons, but by my calculations of about 2,200 metric tons
a year, we are reaching 2010.
By 2010, the likelihood is we haven't finished the
litigation on the final rule; we probably haven't filed the
application, so you haven't litigated yet, and the current
waste will fill the capacity design of Yucca Mountain. In 1987,
Congress selected Yucca Mountain, 19 years and $18 billion of
rate-payer money later, not one canister is in the ground. We
are here with a similar set of issues that I think probably
they thought about very early on in this project.
A State like mine in North Carolina, where the population
is expected to explode, and we are beginning to see it, has
tremendous demands in the future for electricity generation. I
can't see how that happens in North Carolina, or any other
State, without the majority of that being new nuclear
generation.
It is impossible for me to believe today that we will have
a commitment to new nuclear generation if we have not settled
the question of what we are going to do with that spent fuel.
The likelihood is that we are not going to settle it by 2010,
based upon the scenario I just gave you. If my calculations are
right, were we to settle this tomorrow, we have got enough
waste already to fill it up. Then, potentially, shareholders
will not be too excited if their companies go out and commit to
their new nuclear plants.
I would suggest to you, Mr. Golan, that maybe the single
most important thing is not necessarily the work that we are
currently doing on Yucca, it is what's next. Are we going to be
here 20 years from now--and I realize you won't be here. I will
promise you, I will not be here.
Dr. Garrick, you are unbelievably generous to commit to be
on a project that I think at times must seem like it spins its
wheels to some degree. The same with everybody else.
The challenge is where do we go from here? I am not here to
pour water on anybody's parade. I am here to say, at what point
do we collectively--not just Members of Congress, but do we
collectively look at this and say, ``You know what, we have got
to think of something else.'' Should we, as the chairman
suggested, look at reprocessing the nuclear waste within? We
understand the 7,000 metric tons that may have already been
reprocessed. Technologically, aren't we at a different level
than we were in 1987 when we selected Yucca Mountain, many
years after we designated some type of in-the-ground depository
for this?
You are the experts, several of you. I challenge you to be
leaders and not necessarily just to continue to head down the
road that many have headed down before. They continued in the
same direction because they knew they wouldn't be here when
this happened.
My fear is it is never going to happen if, in fact, we
don't think about all the components to it.
Mr. Chairman, there are obstacles that we have yet to
address in this hearing. I am not going to get into the
details. I think that for those that have been involved in it
for a long time, they certainly know what those obstacles are.
I think the No. 1 issue is how long the litigation is going
to take as it relates to this project. I am not excited that
Mr. Loux and the State of Nevada would choose to litigate. They
are not the only ones, so I can't single them out and chastise
them in any way. This is a national problem, and if we don't
solve this problem, the needs that we have for electric
generation in the future, we will not be able to make.
So, I certainly do encourage you to try to find quick
resolution to the canister issue, try to find quick resolution
as to when the application process will proceed, and a timeline
that we might be able to use with some degree of confidence. It
might be presented to us, but more importantly, that which you
have been charged with and that is what is next. I will tell
you, we are there. Now is the time for that.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Senator Domenici. Well, you were right on, and there is no
doubt about it, and I'm sure Mr. Golan knows that. One of the
questions that should be asked, obviously is, ``Is it already
time to be looking at the next repository, under the statute?''
I was going to ask the question, ``How are we going about that
at this point?'' It is kind of ludicrous. We are looking at
another repository under the statute of the same kind, under
the same circumstances--or just what are we looking at? In any
event, you placed the issues right before us, and I think we
are going to have to get the answers sooner or later.
If you are finished, we are now going to go to Senator
Bunning, then Senator Craig, then I will wrap it up in a half-
hour or so.
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like my
opening statement to be put into the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bunning follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim Bunning, U.S. Senator From Kentucky
Nuclear energy accounts for nearly 20 percent of America's
electricity. Looking at Energy Information Administration forecasts, it
is clear we are going to need large growth in coal, nuclear, hydropower
and other sources of energy to fuel our economy and provide reliable
power for our citizens.
Since the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, no new nuclear plants
have come online in America.
Yet recently, utility and nuclear energy companies have entered
into partnerships planning nearly 20 new, nuclear power plants. The
Energy Policy Act we passed last year had incentives for nuclear energy
and I'm proud that we are already stimulating investment.
These new power plants--as well as the many already operating--were
promised a national repository for spent fuel. The Federal Government
collects nearly $750 million a year from nuclear power plants to pay
for this proposed storage.
Last month, Secretary Bodman sent proposed legislation on this
issue to Congress. I look forward to working with the Department of
Energy to ensure that we have safe storage and sage transport of
nuclear waste. We owe it to people in the 39 states that currently
store nuclear waste and their neighbors who will help shipments move to
Yucca Mountain to finish this project as safely as possible,
The bottom line is we need to complete this project. We have spent
too long mired in debate.
We made a promise to the states and nuclear industry to store the
nation's nuclear waste safely. it is time we deliver on that promise.
I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses before us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It will be made a part of the record. Thank
you, Senator.
Senator Bunning. Richard, I couldn't have expressed a more
similar pattern. I have been here since we have been talking
about Yucca Mountain in the Congress of the United States, and
I am not going to lay blame on this group that is at the table
because a different group has been at the table many times and
given us many excuses for not getting the job done.
The Congress of the United States has an obligation to get
the job done, and we don't need bureaucrats getting in the way,
constantly, of the law that was passed in 1987 and expanded on.
I've heard a lot of excuses come out of the table. The same
excuses came out of the prior tables that were before the
Congress. If you want to accomplish the goal of a depository
that we can actually put things into, I would question the
State of Nevada's legitimacy, because they don't want this
place there, and the fact of the matter is if they don't want
it, where is it going, because all of the representatives that
represent the 50 States have voted to put it there?
The Department of Energy has dragged their feet. And you
are not the one that has dragged your feet, but from the
beginning, they have dragged their feet. The EPA has dragged
their feet. All of the people involved at the table have found
reasons for not completing the project.
Switching from one canister to another just because it
wasn't storable and using that excuse, saying, ``Now we are
going to start over, and now we are going to do X, Y and Z with
the canister.'' I mean, give me a break. That is not even
feasible if you are looking from our side of the table and
looking to get the job done for the United States of America
and the American people.
We are to the limit of what we can even put in Yucca
Mountain, and it isn't even open to do it. And now you are
talking about a second depository. I mean, do you know how
foolish that looks to the American people?
And Mr. Loux, you complained in the testimony that the
Yucca Mountain project has been continually delayed. I just
said that. I am frustrated with these delays, but ultimately,
many of these delays are a direct result of the effort to
ensure that the people of Nevada and all Americans are as safe
as possible.
Rather than go back through these changes, do you think it
would be more productive for all of us to work with DOE to
complete this project as safely and quickly as possible?
Mr. Loux. Senator, I don't believe that Nevada is doing
anything that Kentucky, North Carolina, or any other State
would not do, given the same circumstances of seeing an out-of-
control agency that has a blatant disregard for public health
and safety.
Senator Bunning. Unfortunately, you are wrong, because
Kentucky didn't resist. We had a Superfund project, and now we
are charged with the responsibility of taking care of it for
the first--the Federal Government is for the first 25 years and
then Kentucky inherits the responsibility even longer than a
million years, as long as the planet exists. So you are wrong.
I understand you still have concerns to address. How is the
State of Nevada working with DOE to get Yucca Mountain on-line
safely? And what, if anything, do you need from Congress to
help make your partnership work?
Mr. Loux. The answer to the question is the State is not
working with the Department of Energy to make the project work.
Senator Bunning. That is the 20-year process. I yield, Mr.
Chairman. I have had my time.
Mr. Craig. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have as much
reason as the Senator from North Carolina or the Senator from
Kentucky to be pessimistic or frustrated. I am going to try and
remain optimistic, because I believe Yucca is needed and I
think that based on all of the legacy waste and those that have
been spelled out, as are current and available for being
identified, conditioned and placed in a permanent repository,
that we need Yucca, even though we move forward with new
approaches to new waste coming in and this next generation of
nuclear reactor that we are talking about.
Mr. Loux, I read your testimony. I have always been
fascinated by Nevada. I understand the politics of your State
reasonably well. I also understand that when you use rhetoric
like ``out of control agency,'' that is good rhetoric in
Nevada, because that is what you are giving us today.
It is bad rhetoric here, as far as I am concerned, because
I don't see DOE as an out-of-control agency or the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission as out-of-control. They are probably the
most controlled we have, for all of the obvious reasons.
I must tell you, though, that when you talk about
milestones missed and short-falls in funding and all of this
kind of thing, that's largely been a direct result of Nevada's
delegation effort here.
When DOE didn't get its work done, in part it was
underfunded, in part because--and so I am sitting here and I
try to do this with a smile on my face. It is kind of like a
child killing his parents and then throwing himself on the
mercy of the court now that he is an orphan. It really doesn't
track very well here. I know your mission--you just said it--to
deny Yucca to ever come on-line. That is reality. That is the
politics of your state. I understand that. So, we will try to
work around you, but in the process of working around you,
Yucca Mountain will be by far the safest repository every
designed by man.
In fact, the design that has been proposed probably is
beyond man's capability. I am not sure that we get to the
10,000-year mark.
Senator Domenici. A million.
Mr. Craig. No, a million. The odds are out there. Anyway,
Mr. Golan, part of the waste that the Chairman was talking
about and the waste that is in Idaho in part is conditioned for
exit on an agreement that Idaho has with DOE. And this is Navy
waste. It is what we have. It's Three Mile Island waste. We
have old reactor waste, about 65 metric tons of it slated at
the INL to move to Yucca when completed. The agreement says
that will be done by 2035. Are we on schedule?
Mr. Golan. Sir, I am very familiar with the settlement
agreement regarding the waste at your site and the fact that
the settlement agreement requires the waste be removed by 2035.
We also have a sodium-bearing waste and the calcine waste,
which is also covered in the settlement agreement. We are
working right now--first things first--to put together a
technical basis to operate Yucca Mountain, and that is with the
clean canister approach.
Later this summer, we intend to come back to this committee
and provide a licensing schedule on when we are going to get
the license application filed for the NRC. You know, clearly
2035 is 30 years away. I will say that the waste that comes out
of Idaho has some unique characteristics about it which makes
it very good for early placement into Yucca Mountain. So what I
would like to do before we talk about shipment schedule is,
let's talk about a licensing schedule, and then let's talk
about an opening schedule and then we can talk intelligently
about how it is that we are going to take the waste out of your
State and meet the requirements of the settlement agreement.
Senator Craig. Well, that is good to hear. Based on the
history of this issue, I hope we've rounded the corner. I know
that there are great many things on line to be done as it
relates to your licensing application and licensing that allows
us to do that.
It is my belief, and I think the belief of some, that Yucca
is necessary, and a new approach is necessary down the road,
partly because many of us don't believe that a geological
repository in the future is the direction we ought to go in. We
have seen a proposal out of the Department known as GNEP to
develop a reprocessing burning approach to this waste.
How important is interim storage to the success of Yucca
Mountain and does the Department see a need to tie interim
storage with participation in the GNEP program?
Mr. Golan. Interim storage of waste, sir, is less
important, moving Yucca Mountain forward and, I believe, more
important for the future of nuclear energy in this country. If
you just look at the timeframes required for us to have a
license submitted, adjudicated by the NRC, the construction
authorization, followed by the construction, and then the
license to receive and possess, that is going to take several
years under the best case scenario here.
We do understand that within the commercial utilities, they
are running to capacity limitations for on-site, continued
storage. We did--the Department has done two things recently.
The first is the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which I
think addresses a lot of the concerns about recycling the
waste. Even going through recycling, you are still going to
need Yucca Mountain. You are still going to need a geological
repository because no recycling is ever perfect, and there is
going to be a waste by-product.
The other thing that the Department recently did is
introduce legislation. Senator Domenici, I believe, introduced
that by request. One of the things that the proposal didn't
include was interim storage. The Department continues to have
an open mind on interim storage, and the House of
Representatives, in their subcommittee mark-out did provide, at
least in their initial mark, some $30 million to this program
to look at interim storage in 2007. So, the Department has an
open-mind on that and will continue to work with both Houses on
that.
Senator Craig. Well I thank you.
Mr. Chairman, let me turn this back to you. I understand we
have votes at or around noon and you have a good number of
questions. I have a few that I may submit in writing. But
again, thank you for the hearing. It is critical that we stay
abreast of this issue as we work with all of you and the State
of Nevada, and I mean that most sincerely.
We know that Nevada is a reluctant host at this time, but
they have been the large beneficiary, historically, of DOE and
our nuclear programs. It is a legacy that I guess now has found
the State in denial. That is understandable and we thank you.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Craig, thank you for your
observations, sir. We do have a vote at 12. I have about 25
questions. I am going to submit all of them to you even though
I wasn't going to. I am going to ask you to answer all of them.
There are many technical ones. There are others that are
philosophical.
I believe that we are going to receive statements from
Senators Reid and Ensign, and I would request that they be made
part of the record as if they were here and as if they were
read.
[The prepared statement of Senators Reid and Ensign
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Harry Reid and Hon. John Ensign,
U.S. Senators From Nevada
We want to thank the Chair, the Ranking member, and other members
of the Committee for the opportunity present testimony on this issue,
which is very important to us, our home State of Nevada, and the rest
of the country.
The proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository will never be
built because of the numerous and insurmountable scientific, safety and
technical problems with the site. In addition, nearly three decades of
poor management and oversight have demonstrated that the vast body of
scientific and technical work done by the Department of Energy (DOE)
and its contractors, much of which is incomplete or moot due to
constantly changing designs of, and plans for, the repository, do not
meet scientific standards.
In 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to address
the difficult issue of storing such waste. The Act called for disposal
of nuclear waste in a deep geological repository that would remain
stable for thousands of years and directed the Department of Energy
(DOE) to study a number of sites in detail and pick the most suitable
site based on the natural features of the site. The Act instructed DOE
to develop a list of natural, geologic features that constitute a safe
repository, including factors pertaining to rock characteristics,
hydrology, proximity to water supplies and population, and seismic
activity. Some of these criteria specifically disqualified any site
that would require complex engineered measures to prevent groundwater
flow through the repository or damage from earthquake activity, both of
which are concerns at Yucca Mountain.
In 1987, Congress took action based on political expediency and
limited DOE's studies to Yucca Mountain, in spite of the criteria in
the Act that would disqualify the Yucca Mountain site. DOE has been
studying the site for 20 years. While these studies are incomplete,
what they have shown thus far is that Yucca Mountain is not a safe site
for storing nuclear waste. Nor have they shown that spent nuclear fuel
can be transported safely and securely across America's highways and
railways and through our communities, past our schools and hospitals
and through major metropolitan areas.
Transportation of nuclear waste around the country and to Yucca
poses hazards to public health, economic and national security and
environmental safety from accidents and terrorist attacks, which DOE
has not addressed. Moving 77,000 tons of waste to Yucca would involve
about 53,000 truck shipments or 10,000 rail shipments over 24 years,
through counties in which nearly 250 million people live, including
Sacramento, Buffalo, including Denver, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and
Las Vegas. That is an average of approximately 2,800 shipments of
deadly radioactive waste each year, will be rolling through
neighborhoods in 43 states and hundreds of major metropolitan areas on
its way to Nevada for the next several decades.
A few of the scientific problems that we have seen the last year
and a half are:
In 2004, the Court of Appeals threw out the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA's) first radiation protection
standards for Yucca because they were not strong enough to
protect the public from radiation exposure and failed to follow
the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. In
2005, EPA published its revised standards for the proposed
Yucca Mountain high-level waste dump, which are wholly
inadequate, do not meet the law's requirements and do not
protect public health and safety. In fact, EPA is proposing the
least protective public health radiation standard in the world.
It would allow 1 in 10 women to contract cancer, and 1 in 20 to
die from it.
Nearly three decades of scientific and quality assurance
problems with transportation plans, corrosion of casks, the
effectiveness of materials, etc., causing DOE suspend work on
the surface facilities and NRC to issue a stop work order on
the containers.
In addition, DOE revealed that documents and models about
water infiltration at Yucca Mountain had been falsified. While
the individuals who falsified this date were not criminally
prosecuted, the DOE Inspector General's report and numerous
reports from the General Accounting Office demonstrate that DOE
continues to ignore falsification of technical and scientific
data on the project.
Nearly 10 years past its congressionally mandated deadline,
DOE has still not submitted a license application, and DOE has
not set a date except to say that one is not expected for
several years, at the earliest.
Because the scientific, technical and safety problems with the
proposed Yucca Mountain repository cannot be fixed, DOE prepared a
legislative package that will remove these health, safety, scientific
and safety requirements. Senators Domenici and Inhofe introduced this
proposal, S. 2589, The Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act, at the
request of DOE in April. This bill is a complete admission that the
project is a complete public health, safety and scientific failure.
However, DOE has not yet provided Congress with its detailed
statement on this legislation as required by the National Environmental
Policy Act Section 102(C) (43 U.S.C. 4332(C)). Today, we are sending a
letter to DOE requesting this analysis. We expect that DOE will supply
us with this analysis as it is required to do by law in order to enable
Congress to impartially analyze the impact of DOE's proposal before any
action is taken on it.
It should be clear to anyone that the proposed Yucca Mountain
project is not going anywhere. Yucca Mountain will never open. Yet we
must safely store spent nuclear fuel. It is time to look at other
nuclear waste alternatives. Fortunately, scientists agree that the
technology to realize a viable, safe and secure alternative is readily
available and can be fully implemented within a decade if we act now.
That technology is on-site dry cask storage. Dry casks are being safely
used at 34 sites throughout the country. NEI projects 83 of the 103
active reactors will have dry storage by 2050.
That is why we have introduced a bill that would safely store
nuclear waste while we look for a scientifically-based, safe solution:
The Spent Fuel On-Site Storage and Security Act of 2006, S. 2099. Our
bill requires commercial nuclear utilities to secure waste in licensed,
on-site dry cask storage facilities.
There is absolutely no justification for endangering the public by
rushing headlong towards a repository that is fraught with scientific,
technical and geological problems when it can be stored safely and
securely in dry casks. Our bill guarantees all Americans that our
nation's nuclear waste will be stored in the safest way possible.
It is time we addressed to problem at hand--the safe storage of
spent nuclear fuel--and stopped pouring taxpayers' money down the drain
on a project that could endanger all of our citizens.
The Yucca Mountain project is a failure. We vow to continue to
fight this project.
The Chairman. I am intrigued by the fact that the United
States of America is obviously going to have to engage in
recycling. And the question now is going to be, during the next
24 months, in my opinion, what the level of interest and gusto
the United States has in recycling, because recycling is going
to determine which way--what kind of an ultimate repository we
need. It won't solve the problem of the interim storage, but
clearly, if we are going to have a robust recycling program,
then clearly we need a completely different Yucca Mountain
configuration with reference to what we put into Yucca Mountain
and what we need of a Yucca Mountain. And it may very well be a
man at the table that we generally look to as our--not our
friend, maybe--looking with us at what happens to the recycled
product when we, 25, 30 or 40 years from now, have to place it
somewhere and probably will be putting it in Yucca Mountain.
My informed guess today is that it will not be so
objectionable to Nevada when that time comes. But who knows. We
will wait and see. That is such a different world that it might
give us a chance to start over and rethink what we are going to
do.
In the meantime, confusion is rampant, timeframes are out
of whack, and the administration's bill, which I introduced
because they asked me to, has a big vacuum in it, as it does
not address interim storage. And besides, it addresses the
licensing of a process which may not be relevant, as I
indicated, because it is completely different from what I am
talking about here when we speak of reprocessed material. And
because it is not talking about that kind of a program--and
indeed, we have to really seriously think about whether we can
reduce to legislation what I am talking about, because it will
be in such a long term that it will be hard to put that
together.
Nonetheless, I thank all of you for your testimony. I don't
know how informative the hearing has been, but determinative,
obviously, it has not been, for we have completed little or
nothing today except that things are very confused and are not
anywhere near a conclusion. And last month, I introduced, at
the President's request, his package to begin a dialog putting
it back on track. Taking from what we have learned today, and
in reviewing the testimony, and obviously the answers to the
questions, coupled with the administration's proposal, I am
going to work very hard with Senator Bingaman and our joint
staff to see if we can come up with some common ground to move
forward on answering the spent fuel questions.
I am very hopeful that we can. It is delicate and it is
extremely hard to think legislatively in the lengths of time
that are going to be needed for this recycling to take effect
and produce the type of substance that we need and the
quantities we need to take the place of spent fuel rods. And I
guess I will close the hearing by saying it ought to be pretty
clear to everybody that we are not going to be putting spent
fuel rods in Yucca Mountain. I don't know whether that is the
way to end the hearing, but to me it is quite obvious that that
isn't going to work for many reasons.
So, we are kind of kidding ourselves, but we don't want to
give up, because there is somewhere in this a solution that
does involve a Yucca Mountain. It will certainly be a different
Yucca Mountain than we have been talking about, but it will be
a Yucca Mountain nonetheless.
Having said that, I am going to recess. Thank you
everybody. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
APPENDIXES
----------
Appendix I
Responses to Additional Questions
----------
U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board,
Arlington, VA, June 8, 2006.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Domenici: On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board, I want to thank you and the members of the
Energy and Natural Resources Committee for inviting the Board to
testify at a hearing on the status of Yucca Mountain on May 16, 2006.
As I mentioned in my testimony, an important part of the Board's
mandate is providing information on the Board's technical and
scientific evaluation of DOE activities to decision-makers in Congress.
Enclosed are the Board's answers to questions submitted for the
record that were forwarded to the Board with your letter of May 18,
2006. The Board hopes that the technical information in the answers
will be useful to the Committee.
Sincerely,
B. John Garrick,
Chairman.
[Enclosure.]
Responses of B. John Garrick to Questions From Senator Domenici
Question 1. The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board has, on many
occasions, pressed DOE to better address uncertainties in its long term
analysis of Yucca Mountain.
Answer. Over the years, the Board has acknowledged that
uncertainties in predicting repository performance are inevitable
because of the first-of-a-kind nature of the endeavor, the complexity
of the site geology, the implications of high temperatures from
radioactive decay of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste, and the long timeframes involved. The Board also has indicated
the need for understanding better the potential behavior of the
repository system and for the Department of Energy to (DOE) to
supplement its understanding with additional lines of evidence.
DOE uses a probabilistic approach in estimating repository
performance that incorporates uncertainties and sensitivity analyses in
its performance assessments. However, the Board is not yet convinced
that the assessments are realistic. The Board has asked for a realistic
analysis of repository performance so that it can judge the extent of
conservatism and uncertainty in DOE's total system performance
assessment (TSPA). In addition, the Board has recommended that DOE make
its uncertainty analyses more transparent to better expose specific
contributions to uncertainty, such as the effect on performance of
localized corrosion of the waste packages.
Question 2. You have not seen the final license application, but,
in your opinion, what are the greatest uncertainties with the
application? Are these the result of the quality or absence of data, or
the fundamental difficulty in predicting the behavior of the mountain
over these incredibly long time periods?
Answer. The Board evaluates the technical validity of work
undertaken by DOE. On the basis of that evaluation, the Board's view is
that the most important technical and scientific uncertainties related
to the post-closure performance of the repository are the release rate
and chemical form of dose-contributing radionuclides leaving the
engineered barrier system, the extent to which components of the
natural system contribute to waste isolation, and the implications of
high temperatures for repository performance, including the potential
for localized corrosion of the waste packages.
There also are logistical and practical challenges, as well as
temperature considerations, associated with pre-closure activities,
including implementation of DOE's transportation, aging, and disposal
canister concept; designs for repository surface facilities; and
operational plans.
More data could help address some of these uncertainties. It is
important to note that new information may show that the various
repository components perform better or less well than currently
projected. Either way, performance estimates would be more realistic
and therefore would engender more confidence. Estimating repository
performance over long time periods can be a challenge. However, as the
National Academy of Sciences pointed out in its report, Technical Bases
for Yucca Mountain Standards, some uncertainties would increase over
time and others would decrease. The key is to manage uncertainty so
that it does not significantly affect the performance of the
repository.
Question 3. Given these uncertainties, do you believe it is more
likely that DOE's analysis over or under estimates radiation exposures
in the distant future?
Answer. DOE uses TSPA as a tool for estimating whether a Yucca
Mountain repository would comply with the regulatory standard. DOE
believes that the performance estimates in its TSPA are conservative
(i.e., that they underestimate how well Yucca Mountain would perform).
The Board believes that the assumptions underlying DOE's performance
estimates are a mix--most are conservative, others are realistic, and a
few may be optimistic. Although this makes it difficult to assess just
how conservative DOE's repository performance estimates are overall,
the Board believes that the results taken as a whole may be shown to be
conservative. The Board has urged DOE to develop a realistic
performance analysis so that important information on this question can
be provided to the public, decision-makers, and other affected parties.
Question 4. Can you tell us how the risks of disposing of used
nuclear fuel in Yucca Mountain compare to the risks of leaving the
material where it is for thousands of years?
Answer. It is the opinion of the Board that storing spent nuclear
fuel at existing sites for thousands of years is not a desirable option
when compared with permanent deep geologic disposal. Although temporary
storage can be accomplished safely for decades, storing the waste
indefinitely at reactor sites would require storage facilities to be
monitored and maintained constantly and would require periodic
replacement as facilities and components degrade with age. If those
activities are not carried out faithfully for very long periods, the
resulting risks to health and the environment could be significant.
Having to manage a large number of high-level-waste sites also raises
security issues. Disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste in a deep geologic repository would eliminate these
concerns.
Response of B. John Garrick to Question From Senator Craig
Question 1. Does the Board believe that there are outstanding
scientific or technical issues so serious as to prevent the DOE from
submitting a license application?
Answer. The Board has not explicitly addressed the question of what
constitutes a reasonable basis for a license application. The Board's
focus is on the soundness of the science and engineering supporting
DOE's assessment of the performance of the total waste management
system, including pre-closure and post-closure activities.
On the basis of its ongoing technical and scientific evaluation,
the Board's view is that the most important technical and scientific
uncertainties related to the post-closure performance of the repository
are the release rate and chemical form of dose-contributing
radionuclides leaving the engineered barrier system, the extent to
which components of the natural system contribute to waste isolation,
and the implications of high temperatures for repository performance,
including the potential for localized corrosion of the waste packages.
In addition, although DOE's new canister-based concept for
transportation, disposal, and aging of spent nuclear fuel may have
potential to reduce handling of the waste, the Board wants to
understand better the feasibility of the concept, given the status of
spent nuclear fuel in storage at utilities and post-closure temperature
limits on the waste packages.
The Board has stated that resolving these issues appears
``doable,'' provided that selected analyses and investigations are made
to confirm the performance and operation of the repository.
Furthermore, resolving all the issues before submitting a license
application may not be necessary. However, addressing the issues might
substantially increase confidence in DOE's operational plans and
estimates of repository performance.
Response of B. John Garrick to Question From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. You testified that while the DOE has made meaningful
progress, serious technical issues remain unresolved. How long, in you
opinion, will it take the Department of Energy to resolve those issues
and be able to submit a defensible license application to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission?
Answer. The Board is on record indicating that resolving the issues
appears ``doable,'' provided that selected analyses and investigations
are made to confirm the performance and operation of the repository.
Some unofficial schedules have indicated that DOE will submit a license
application sometime in fiscal year 2008. Although resolving all these
issues before submitting a license application may not be necessary,
addressing the issues has the potential for substantially increasing
confidence in DOE's operational plans and estimates of repository
performance. The Board has encouraged DOE to continue its technical and
scientific investigations after the submittal of a license application
to increase confidence in DOE's estimates of repository performance.
Question 2. Does the Board have any reason to believe that Yucca
Mountain is not a technically suitable site for the repository?
Answer. The Board is not aware of any single condition that would
automatically make the site unsuitable; however, the engineered
components of the repository have to be integrated with the
capabilities of the natural system so that they work together to
isolate radionuclides. For example, if localized corrosion of the waste
packages is shown to occur at high temperatures, it could have
implications for repository design and performance. On the other hand,
a more realistic model for mobilizing dose-contributing radionuclides
following the penetration of the waste packages could reduce
uncertainties in the timing and magnitude of the projected peak dose
and could enhance the credibility of repository performance
calculations.
Question 3a. As an authority on risk assessment, what is your view
of the EPA's proposed radiation protections standards? Specifically
What is your view of EPA's decision to use a deterministic exposure
scenario instead of the probabilistic approach recommended by the
National Academy of Sciences?
Answer. EPA's and NRC's regulation of the program is outside the
Board's purview, so I will answer the three questions as they were
posed (as the personal opinion of John Garrick).
It is true that the prescriptive features of the regulations with
respect to the dose calculations preclude a completely probabilistic or
risk-based approach. This is why the Board has repeatedly asked for a
realistic--that is, a traditional--``risk assessment'' of the
repository. I believe, however, that where the regulations are
prescriptive, they are conservatively prescriptive. It should be noted
that the EPA's individual protection standard is, to some extent,
probabilistic. As the EPA stated when it finalized its revised
environmental standards in 2001 (66 FR 32125), ``By specifying the mean
as the performance measure and probability limits for the processes and
events to be considered ( 197.36), and in concert with the intent of
our `reasonable expectation' approach in general, we have implied that
probabilistic approaches for the disposal system performance
assessments are expected.''
Question 3b. What is the difference between the probabilistic and
deterministic approaches?
Answer. Deterministic approaches are scenario-based and rely on
single-valued choices of models and sets of parameters to estimate
performance. Probabilistic approaches incorporate the likelihood that
each of these and alternative models and sets of parameters are
appropriate. The major advantage of a probabilistic approach is the
ability to explicitly incorporate uncertainties and variabilities in
the analyses. An analysis that incorporates uncertainties is essential
to understanding risk.
Question 3c. How does EPA's 350 millirem standard between 10,000
and 1,000,000 years compare with other radiation protection standards
adopted in this and other countries?
Answer. The Board is not aware of any countries that require a
quantitative risk assessment to be carried out to the time of peak dose
or one million years; typical periods for numerical analyses are on the
order of 10,000 years. For today's activities and facilities, the
International Commission on Radiological Protection and the National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements both have recommended
that radiation exposures to members of the public be limited to 100
mrem/yr from all sources (excluding medical and natural background). My
personal opinion is that the EPA standard is reasonable.
______
Department of Energy,
Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 21, 2006.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On May 16, 2006, Paul Golan, then Acting
Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, testified
regarding the Yucca Mountain Project.
Enclosed are the answers to 27 questions that were submitted by you
and Senators Thomas, Craig, and Bingaman to complete the hearing
record.
If we can be of further assistance, please have your staff contact
our Congressional Hearing Coordinator, Lillian Owen, at (202) 586-2031.
Sincerely,
Jill L. Sigal,
Assistant Secretary.
[Enclosures.]
Responses of the Department of Energy to Questions
From Senator Domenici
Question 1a. In your testimony, you mention that the department is
forming a task force to begin the process of looking for a second
repository as required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
When will this task force be formed?
Answer. The task force was established on May 19, 2006.
Question 1b. What is their criteria in selecting the second
repository site?
Answer. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) directs the Secretary
to evaluate the need for a second repository and report to the
President and Congress between January 1, 2007 and January 1, 2010. The
NWPA states that the Secretary may not conduct site-specific activities
with respect to a second repository unless Congress has specifically
authorized and appropriated funds for such activities.
Question 1c. What other factors will you take into consideration in
preparing this report?
Answer. The specific factors that the Department of Energy will
take into consideration in preparing the report are currently being
developed. The focus of the task force will be on determining the need
for a second repository. Some of the factors that will be considered
include determining when the volume of spent nuclear fuel generated by
commercial power plants will exceed the statutory limitation of 70,000
metric ton of heavy metal (MTHM) established by section 114 of the
NWPA; assessing the reasonably expected disposal capability of Yucca
Mountain considering current and projected future volume of spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) inventories and its characteristics; and potential
for waste minimization under advanced recycling technologies being
evaluated in connection with the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP).
Question 2a. Yucca Mountain currently has a legislated capacity
limit of 70,000 metric tons.
Is this limit sufficient to accommodate spent fuel expected to be
generated by the current fleet of reactors through their anticipated
operations?
Answer. No, the 70,000 MTHM legislative limit will not accommodate
all spent fuel expected to be generated by the current fleet of
reactors through their anticipated operations.
Question 2b. How much spent fuel waste from government sources do
you currently plan to emplace in the Yucca Mountain repository?
Answer. Approximately 2,333 MTHM.
Question 2c. What portion of the DOE inventory of spent nuclear
fuel does this represent?
Answer. The estimated 2,333 MTHM represents over 95 per cent of the
DOE inventory.
Question 2d. How many canisters of vitrified high-level nuclear
waste does DOE expect to produce and how many canisters of that waste
do you plan to emplace in the Yucca Mountain repository?
Answer. The Department expects to produce approximately 20,000
canisters of high-level radioactive waste (HLW). Estimates of HLW
canister production at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and
Hanford may change, since facilities to immobilize HLW have not yet
been constructed or operated. Under current plans for emplacement, the
defense HLW allocation for Yucca Mountain is 4,667 MTHM or
approximately 9,334 canisters, which represents about half of the
defense HLW.
The fuel from our nuclear navy is destined to be disposed of at
Yucca Mountain.
Question 3a. How much defense waste is currently planned for
permanent disposition at Yucca Mountain?
Answer. Under current plans, approximately 7,000 MTHM of defense
waste is to be emplaced at Yucca Mountain; 65 MTHM of the 7,000 MTHM
would come from the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP), which
represents the entire inventory of NNPP SNF.
Question 3b. Under current schedules, when will this waste be ready
for shipment to Yucca?
Answer. Defense materials are anticipated to be available when
repository operations begin and will be among the early materials
provided to the repository.
Question 3c. If Yucca were not available, how would this waste be
handled?
Answer. If Yucca Mountain were not available, DOE would continue to
manage the storage of the waste at its current location in a safe and
secure manner until a new path forward was selected.
Question 4. The federal government has a court settlement agreement
with the state of Idaho regarding temporary storage of naval reactor
spent fuel.
When must fuel be moved under this agreement?
Answer. Under the Agreement with Idaho, all SNF is required to be
moved out of the State of Idaho by 2035.
Question 5. Six months prior to docketing a license application,
DOE must have certified by NRC an internet based License Support
Network of relevant documents. NRC denied certification of the draft
LSN submitted in 2004.
What is the Department doing to address the deficiencies in the
initial LSN and are you confident that these actions will result in a
certifiable LSN?
Answer. The Department has evaluated the Pre-License Application
Presiding Officer Board's order striking the Department's June 2004
certification. In response, the Department has reviewed approximately
4.8 million emails from inactive and external accounts to determine the
relevance of each email. In 2004, there were approximately 1 million
privileged documents included in the Licensing Support Network (LSN)
database. All these documents have been reviewed, and the inventory of
privileged documents has been reduced by more than 95%. The June 2004
certification included documents available up to February 2004. The
Program has continued to collect relevant documents and add them to the
DOE collection. The LSN project team has performed assessments to
ensure the LSN will meet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)
requirements and will continue to do assessments until the LSN is
recertified.
Question 6a. In the past year, a decision was made to redirect the
approach taken to fuel handling at the repository to a ``clean''
approach utilizing a single canister for transportation, aging and
disposal (TAD).
What impact has this redirection had on preparing the license
application?
Answer. The canistered approach to fuel handling at Yucca Mountain
requires that portions of the license application (LA) and supporting
information be revised to reflect this approach. The Department
believes the benefits of the canistered approach justify the time
needed for these revisions and will result in greater efficiency and
timeliness on constructing and operating the repository.
Question 6b. What is the cost of TAD development?
Answer. The cost of adopting the transport, aging and disposal
(TAD) approach to the repository system is still being evaluated.
Question 6c. Who will cover those costs?
Answer. The overall cost of procuring TADs for the repository
system is expected to be paid from the Nuclear Waste Fund.
Question 7. How much have we spent on cask development (transport
and storage) through the history of the program?
Answer. Since the Program began in 1983, we have been engaged in
spent fuel storage and transportation cask development activities,
including but not limited to costs expended in the 1980s and 1990s
associated with siting and conducting assessments for a monitored
retrievable storage facility and with studies on the interim storage of
spent fuel. Concurrent with these activities, the Program also pursued
the development of transportation and storage casks to support waste
acceptance and handling operations at both storage facilities and the
geologic repository. The Department estimates that costs associated
with these activities which occurred primarily in the 1980s and 1990s
have been approximately $287 million.
Question 8. Have you analyzed the impact that this redirection
could have on the timing and cost of license review, program
construction and operations?
Answer. The Department is currently analyzing the impacts. However,
it believes the new approach will greatly contribute to the overall
success and timeliness of licensing, constructing and operating the
repository. In particular, this approach will both reduce the risks of
repository worker radiation exposure during surface operations at the
site and eliminate the need for large repository surface facilities
required to handle individual spent fuel assemblies several times prior
to packaging for disposal.
Question 9. Please describe the improvements to site
infrastructure, the planning facilities for receipt of spent fuel and
transportation infrastructure that you plan to accomplish with the FY
2007 budget request.
Answer. Over the next two years, and subject to appropriate
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review, the Department plans
to undertake improvements to certain facilities, structures, roads, and
utilities (collectively referred to as infrastructure) for the Yucca
Mountain Project to enhance safety at the site and to continue
conducting scientific activities, testing, and maintenance until such
time as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission decides whether to authorize
construction of a repository.
The Program's Site Plan identifies the upgrades to site systems and
utilities that are planned for fiscal year (FY) 2006 to FY 2008. Site
safety upgrades address code and safety compliance issues through the
disposition of non-operational systems, structures and/or facilities;
and the modification, upgrade, and/or replacement of potentially
obsolete critical and operational systems and structures which are
necessary to provide a safe and functional facility for continued
support of experiments as well as site tours. These systems include
power distribution, water supply, sanitation, fire protection, and
communications.
In FY 2007, the Program anticipates that it will initiate
procurements for transportation casks, and for the development of a
prototype and testing of new rail rolling stock designs. Funding will
also support awarding of contracts to start design of a security escort
car prototype, review and comment on other new rail car preliminary
designs, and preparation of test plans for the new designs.
Question 10. What additional steps are you taking to reaffirm
confidence in the technical work done in support of repository
performance? Have any of these reviews uncovered any information that
would call into question the site suitability of Yucca Mountain?
Answer. The Department is taking aggressive steps to ensure the
highest level of expertise and credibility, and to reaffirm confidence
in the technical work in support of the repository performance as we
move the Project forward. For example, in January 2006, the Department
designated Sandia National Laboratories the lead laboratory to
coordinate and organize all scientific work on the Project. The
independent, expert review that the scientists at Sandia will perform
will help ensure that the technical and scientific basis for the Yucca
Mountain repository meets the requirements of 10 CFR 63 and NUREG 1804.
Designating Sandia as the lead laboratory will provide the Program with
centralized leadership for its science program and will increase
technical credibility with the scientific community, as well as the
Project's regulators and stakeholders.
In February 2006, the Department issued a technical report
evaluating the infiltration estimates that were used in the site
recommendation. The technical evaluation found that the infiltration
results that had been completed are consistent with the conclusions of
infiltration and recharge results from scientists independent of the
Project, including the State of Nevada's Engineering Officer. This data
fully supported the site suitability of Yucca Mountain. While we found
that the science was sound, because some of our quality assurance (QA)
requirements were not met, we are expending time and resources to
replace the infiltration models and perform the analyses. We''.ave
directed Sandia National Laboratories to develop computer codes that
will generate new infiltration rate estimates developed in accordance
with our QA requirements, and will then replace the infiltration rate
estimates for future analyses. The Sandia infiltration rates will be
independently reviewed prior to incorporation into the Total System
Performance Model.
To further ensure the highest quality and objectivity of the
science and technology supporting the Yucca Mountain Project, in April
2006, the Department also selected the Oak Ridge Institute for Science
and Education to perform independent review of key aspects of the
Project. By bringing in Oak Ridge for independent reviews to assess our
technical work, we will ensure a high level of expertise and
credibility as the Project moves forward.
Question 11. Please summarize the transportation planning
activities you are undertaking this year and what you plan to
accomplish under the FY 2007 budget request.
Answer. In FY 2006, the Nevada Transportation Project anticipates
it will complete the data collection and analyses necessary to support
the pending environmental review pursuant to NEPA, and complete the
rail security escort car conceptual design. The Department will
continue to consult with States and Tribes as the transportation
program is developed and plans to complete the Transportation Design
Basis Threat and the Concept of Operations Document. In FY 2007, the
Department anticipates further actions to complete its NEPA review and
related activities. The Department also will issue the draft Section
180(c) policy and grant application process for comment.
Also in FY 2007, the National Transportation Project will establish
the protocols needed to integrate, manage and safely operate the
transportation system. The Project will continue the procurement
process for casks and associated specialized equipment. The Department
will also begin development of rail cars for transporting SNF and HLW.
This hardware development will include a limited purchase of cask
systems and prototype rail cars. These initial procurements will
support emergency preparedness and security training efforts, as well
as provide opportunities to test communications and tracking systems
and establish relationships with transportation service providers.
The National Transportation Project will also continue to fund
cooperative agreements with State regional groups and other key parties
involved in transportation planning. Section 180(c) pilot grants will
also be awarded to a few states and tribes in each region in order to
support operational testing and to refine the Section 180(c) program.
DOE will also work to integrate safety, security, and emergency
response activities into all shipment plans.
Question 12. What is the status of developing the rail line in the
state of Nevada?
Answer. Work in 2006 has focused mainly on completing the data
gathering and engineering necessary to support the publishing of the
Draft Rail Alignment environmental impact statement.
On May 4, 2006, the Department received a letter from the Walker
River Paiute Tribe indicating they are now willing to permit the
Department to evaluate the impacts of potential shipments of SNF and
HLW across their Reservation. DOE is currently gathering data and
information related to the feasibility of a route across the Tribe's
Reservation, and is evaluating related programmatic, regulatory, and
legal issues.
Question 13. Does the Department continue to support a mostly rail
transportation strategy for the movement of civilian spent fuel?
Answer. Yes, the Department continues to support a mostly rail
transportation strategy for the movement of civilian spent nuclear
fuel.
Responses of the Department of Energy to Questions From Senator Thomas
Question 1. Because of an ongoing failure to meet contractual
agreements with utilities and the expense of storing defense waste,
each year this project is delayed adds over $1 billion to the cost.
When will we realistically be able to start shipping spent fuel to the
Yucca Mountain repository?
Answer. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to decide whether to issue a license that
authorizes construction within 3 years of submission of the license
application with the possibility of a 1 year extension. Construction of
the initial facilities is expected to take 2 to 3 years. There are
factors outside the control of the Department, however, that greatly
influence when we will be able to begin receiving spent nuclear fuel
(SNF) at Yucca Mountain. These include the issuance of the final
Environmental Protection Agency radiation protection standards, funding
levels, the NRC licensing process including issuance of a license
amendment to receive and possess SNF and potential legislation.
Question 2. We have spent 20 years and $8 billion on a scientific
evaluation of Yucca Mountain as a suitable site for a nuclear waste
repository. Will all that time and effort reduce the additional hurdles
that exist for getting the site licensed?
Answer. The Department has engaged in over 20 years of scientific
and technical investigation of the suitability of the Yucca Mountain
site. As part of this investigation, some of the world's best
scientists have been examining every aspect of the natural processes--
past, present and future--that could affect the ability of Yucca
Mountain to isolate radioactive waste. Additionally, there has been
extensive work and investigation in the area of engineered barriers
that are expected to contribute to successful radioactive waste
isolation. The result is an extensive body of scientific work that
supports site selection and the Administration's site recommendation.
The time and effort invested over the last 20 years will support the
submittal of a high quality license application to the NRC.
Question 3. The Administration has developed the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership based largely on the idea that re-processing our
spent fuel in an international and cooperative manner is beneficial.
Will we eventually be able to remove the fuel that is stored at Yucca
Mountain and re-process it?
Answer. While there are no plans to remove SNF from the repository,
it is being designed to allow the retrieval of waste for up to 300
years after emplacement.
Question 4. If we opened Yucca Mountain tomorrow, how long would it
take to ship and store all of the waste we have committed to dealing
with already?
Answer. Under the current planned acceptance rates, the Department
estimates that it would take 25 years to accept the 70,000 metric ton
of heavy metal (MTHM) authorized for Yucca Mountain.
Responses of the Department of Energy to Questions From Senator Craig
Question 1. Will the DOE have the infrastructure and applicable
licenses (for shipping casks, rolling stock, etc.) in place in time to
begin shipping spent fuel as soon as Yucca Mountain (or an interim
storage site, if applicable) is open and ready to accept such waste?
Could DOE begin shipping fuel quickly in the case of a national
emergency?
Answer. The low level of funding has made it difficult to undertake
planning, acquisition and construction in an orderly manner. The
Department is proceeding with is transportation plans and expects to
have transportation capability available when the repository opens.
Question 2. How will DOE prioritize spent fuel shipments to the
repository once Yucca Mountain is open? More specifically, does DOE
plan to begin shipping fuel out of Idaho as soon as the repository can
begin accepting waste? Please explain how the various types of fuel
will be prioritized for shipment out of Idaho, providing a breakdown
according to fuel type (Navy, TMI, etc.). Where in the department's
priorities does fuel from other sites fit?
Answer. DOE high-level radioactive materials are expected to be
part of the initial shipments to Yucca Mountain, including the DOE
spent nuclear fuel in Idaho. The currently planned schedule for
shipping DOE waste is outlined in the Integrated Acceptance Schedule
between the Office of Environment Management and the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management. The commercial spent nuclear fuel
acceptance priority is outlined in the Department's Acceptance Priority
Ranking Report.
Question 3. I understand the department's decision to select Sandia
National Laboratory as the lead lab to oversee the Yucca Mountain
Project's science programs reflects, at least in part, Sandia's
previous success with helping to open the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP) in New Mexico, the world's first permanent geologic repository
for transuranic waste. Mr. Golan: Can you please elaborate on the
department's choice of Sandia Laboratory to fulfill this role?
Answer. Establishing Sandia National Laboratories as our lead
laboratory is an important step in our new path forward. The experience
that Sandia brings to the Project will help ensure that the technical
and scientific basis for the Yucca Mountain repository meets the
requirements of 10 CFR 63 and NUREG 1804. Sandia has unique experience
in managing scientific investigations in support of a Federally
licensed geologic disposal facility having served in that role to the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Designating Sandia builds on DOE's
successful experience at WIPP, where a single national laboratory
coordinated ``post-closure'' science work while a contractor performed
work on the design of ``pre-closure,'' or above ground facilities. This
move more clearly aligns responsibilities within the competencies of
the Project's participants and will more effectively leverage the
capabilities of Sandia's experience with repository science issues.
Designating Sandia as the lead laboratory will provide the Program with
centralized leadership for its science program and will increase
technical credibility with the scientific community, as well as the
Project's regulators and stakeholders.
Question 4. Please provide an estimate for when DOE plans to submit
a license application to the NRC, and explain the reasons for continued
delays.
Answer. The Department will publish its license application (LA)
schedule this summer. The canistered approach to fuel handling at Yucca
Mountain requires that portions of the LA and supporting information be
revised to reflect this approach. The Department believes the benefits
of the canistered approach justify the time needed for these revisions
and will result in greater efficiency and timeliness on constructing
and operating the repository.
Question 5. Please provide the current status of programs related
to rail infrastructure and to truck infrastructure, including projected
expenditures for the remainder of this fiscal year (FY2006).
Answer. None of the constrained FY 2006 funds have been invested in
the development of truck infrastructure since the equipment needed to
perform this work already exists. The commercial sector has the
hardware and the manpower capacity to accommodate a large number of
legal weight truck shipments of spent nuclear fuel. Although less
extensive, the commercial capacity for ``heavy haul'' truck shipments
also exists. It is expected that the DOE will negotiate contracts for
these trucking services closer to the time shipments are scheduled and
will rely on the private sector to provide the hardware assets.
Question 6a. Please provide a breakdown of projected expenditures
for the Yucca Mountain program during this fiscal year (FY2006); that
is, out of the approximately $450M appropriated. Please specify
expenditures for each of the following:
Federal workforce.
Answer. $79.2 M is projected in FY 2006 for the Federal workforce.
Question 6b. National Laboratories (break-down for each).
Answer. The break-down for national laboratories is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2006
(dollars
in
thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Argonne National Laboratory................................. 893
Idaho National Laboratory................................... 9,534
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory....................... 4,591
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory...................... 5,971
Los Alamos National Laboratory.............................. 7,547
Nevada Test Site............................................ 5,972
Sandia National Laboratories................................ 16,058
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory....................... 790
-----------
Total, Nuclear Waste Disposal and Defense Nuclear Waste 51,356
Disposal Laboratory Funding............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 6c. Federal-support contractors (again, for each major:
notably, Bechtel-SAIC & Booz-Allen).
Answer. The break-down for Federal-support contractors is as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2006
Contractor Appropriation
in 000s
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC................................ 235,356
Booz, Allen, & Hamilton, Inc. (OP)....................... 4,839
Booz, Allen, & Hamilton, Inc. (PD)....................... 20,888
CATAPULT (OP)............................................ 690
CATAPULT (PD)............................................ 10,372
Potomac-Hudson Engineering Inc........................... 7,000
ALPHA (PD)............................................... 1,210
BECHTEL NEVADA INC....................................... 924
AECL..................................................... 415
AGEISS Environmental Inc................................. 1,242
LECHEL................................................... 450
WSI...................................................... 1,418
KPMG, LLP................................................ 525
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 6d. Private-sector contractors (i.e., exclusive of
federal-support entities).
Answer. The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management has no
contracts that fit this description.
Question 7. What initiatives has the department undertaken to
ensure meaningful participation by the private sector for developing
the TAD canister, including new incentives and lessons-learned from the
old MPC program? Please provide a schedule (with milestones) for
completing the conceptual TAD design, as well as other important
program steps (e.g. licensing & fabrication), please include critical
TAD-system components (e.g. transport cask, transfer cask, ancillary
equipment, disposal overpack).
Answer. The transport, aging and disposal (TAD) canister based
system is an integral part of the Program's new approach. On April 26,
the Department published in FedBizOps a Notice of Program Interest
soliciting notice from qualified cask vendors of their interest in
participating in the conceptual design of a TAD-based system. The
Department is in the process of evaluating the responses received. The
Department believes that it is necessary to have participation from all
qualified cask vendors in order for the TAD development effort to be
successful.
To stimulate the timely development of TAD-based systems while
relying upon the private sector to perform the detailed design and
licensing required for TAD system deployment, the Department is
considering utilizing a dual path approach to incentivize both the cask
designer/manufacturer industry and nuclear utilities.
The Program is currently developing a timeline for TAD
implementation and is evaluating appropriate measures to incentivize
cask designer/manufacturer industry and utilities. The specifics are
still under development.
Responses of the Department of Energy to Questions
From Senator Bingaman
POTENTIAL LIABILITY TO UTILITIES FOR MITIGATION DAMAGES
OF THE STANDARD CONTRACTS
In April 2005, the United States Court of Federal Claims ordered
the parties in Sacramento Municipal Utility District v. United States
``to show cause why the court should not hold that the . . . Standard
Contract . . . is void'' and order the Government ``to refund all
monies paid to date by plaintiff into the Nuclear Waste Fund as
restitution.'' 68 Fed. Cl. 180,183 (2005). SMUD declined the court's
invitation to seek restitution, however, and, on March 31, 2006, ruled
that SMUD was entitled to insist on the legal remedy of mitigation
damages. Nonetheless, the court expressed its opinion ``that
restitution would be a much more efficient, fair, and final resolution
of the Government's breach'' of the nuclear waste contracts.
It may make sense for the utilities to hold the Government to the
Standard Contracts as long as there is hope that the Department will be
able to open the Yucca Mountain repository and fulfill its contractual
obligations to the utilities in the foreseeable future. It appears to
make much less sense to continue ``the status quo of litigating ad hoc
damage claims and appeals'' and ``to issue rolling damage awards ad
infinitum,'' as the Court of Federal Claims said, if Congress abandons
the nuclear waste management policy embodied in the Standard Contracts
and embarks upon a new policy dependent upon a fuel ``recycling''
scheme that is dependent upon a new, yet-to-be-developed reprocessing
technology and a fleet of new, yet-to-be-built fast reactors 25 or 30
years from now.
Question 1a. Please provide your best estimate of the Government's
potential liability to the utilities for mitigation damages for partial
breach of the Standard Contracts in each of the following cases:
Yucca Mountain is licensed for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel
and begins accepting spent fuel in 2015.
Answer. The Department's best estimate of the Government's
potential liability to the utilities for mitigation damages for partial
breach of the Standard Contract if Yucca Mountain is licensed for the
disposal of spent nuclear fuel and begins accepting spent fuel in 2015
is approximately $5 billion.
Question 1b. Yucca Mountain is licensed for the disposal of spent
nuclear fuel and begins accepting spent fuel in 2020.
Answer. The Department's best estimate of the Government's
potential liability to the utilities for mitigation damages for partial
breach of the Standard Contract if Yucca Mountain is licensed for the
disposal of spent nuclear fuel and begins accepting spent fuel in 2020
is approximately $11 billion.
Question 1c. Yucca Mountain is licensed for the disposal of high-
level radioactive waste from GNEP and the defense program and begins
accepting those wastes in 2035.
Answer. Because this scenario provides no information regarding
timing, i.e., when spent nuclear fuel would have left utility sites,
nor is there information regarding rate, i.e., how much spent nuclear
fuel is picked up at a time, there is not enough information to provide
a meaningful response to this question.
refund amounts paid by utilities into the nuclear waste fund
Question 2. At what point is it in the best interest of the U.S.
Treasury for the Government to ask the courts to void the Standard
Contracts for mutual mistake, as the Court of Federal Claims has
suggested and simply refund the amounts paid by the utilities into the
Nuclear Waste Fund?
Answer. The Department and the Administration are firmly committed
to moving forward with the Yucca Mountain project and do not believe it
would be in the best interest of the U.S. Treasury or the Federal
Government to void the Standard Contracts. As the Government argued in
its response brief to the show cause order issued by the court in the
Sacramento Municipal Utility case, the Government has identified no
basis to conclude that the Standard Contract is voidable based on the
mutual mistake doctrine since mistake of fact cannot be a fact
regarding a future event. Additionally, the Government has been unable
to identify any mistaken belief of facts at the time of the Standard
Contract's formation. Restitution is an improper remedy in this
instance given that there is no basis to conclude the Standard Contract
is void or is voidable.
Practically speaking, if DOE no longer can collect quarterly fee
payments, there is no Nuclear Waste Fund to support the Department's
spent nuclear fuel waste disposal program. One consequence of the
program's failure to operate would be that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) likely could be forced to revisit its waste confidence
rule-making, jeopardizing the continuation of nuclear power in the
country if there is no foreseeable plan to remove spent fuel from
utility sites. Finally, even if the Standard Contract were deemed void,
the Department would still have a statutory obligation to develop a
Federal radioactive waste disposal program as directed by the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended.
Question 3. You stated that the Department has hired the Oak Ridge
Institute for Science and Education to provide an independent review of
the project's scientific and technical work. Congress has already
established the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board to ``evaluate the
technical and scientific validity'' of the project. How does the Oak
Ridge Institute's role differ from that of the statutory Technical
Review Board?
Answer. The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was established by
Congress in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act as an independent
establishment within the executive branch to evaluate the technical and
scientific validity of activities undertaken by the Secretary and
report to Congress and the Secretary its findings, conclusions, and
recommendations.
The Oak Ridge Associated Universities/Oak Ridge Institute for
Science and Education was contracted by, and reports to, the Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) to provide independent
expert reviews of specific scientific and technical issues and provides
OCRWM access to a broad range of independent experts from around the
country to evaluate and review our work products.
______
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington, DC, June 8, 2006.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Domenici: Thank you for the opportunity to testify
before the Senate Energy a d Natural Resources Committee on the status
of the Yucca Mountain project on May 16, 2006. Please find enclosed the
Environmental Protection Agency's responses to the questions for the
record I hope this information will e useful to you and the members of
the Committee.
If you have any questions, please call me or your staff may call
Ronna Landy, in the Office of Congressional Intergovernmental
Relations, at (202) 564-3109.
Sincerely,
William L. Wehrum,
Acting Assistant Administrator.
[Enclosure.]
Responses of William L. Wehrum to Questions From Senator Domenici
Question 1. In July 2004, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found that the timeframe of EPA's standards were not
consistent with the National Academy of Sciences' recommendations.
Answer. The Court ruled that EPA's policy justifications for the
10,000-year compliance period were not sufficiently consistent with or
based upon the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) recommendation.
Specifically, the Court stated that ``The 10,000-year compliance period
selected by EPA violates section 801 of the Energy Policy Act (EnPA)
because it is not, as EnPA requires, `based upon and consistent with
the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences,''
NEI v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1 (D.C. Circuit 2004) at 4.
Question 2. What were the academies' recommendations?
Answer. NAS presented a number of recommendations on the form and
content of the Yucca Mountain standards. Specifically, NAS recommended
that the standards:
Set a limit on the risk individuals of au terse health
effects fro releases from the repository;
Measure compliance at the time of peak (maximum) risk,
whenever it occurs;
Evaluate the adverse effect of human intrusion into the
repository;
Set a limit for the assumed intrusion scenario that is no
greater than the risk limit adopted for the undisturbed-
repository case; and
Use the critical-group approach to identity the individual
for whom the risk calculation is to be made.
Regarding the regulatory compliance period, the NAS committee
further stated that ``there is no scientific basis for limiting the
time period of the individual-risk standard to 10,000 years or any
other value,'' while also stating that the compliance period should be
confined ``within the limits imposed by the long-term stability of the
geologic environment, which is on the order of one million years.''
The NAS committee recognized that, while its focus was on science
and technical aspects, ``the selection of a time period of
applicability . . . also has policy aspects that we have not
addressed.'' For policy reasons, EPA led the compliance period to
10,000 years. EPA also required that DOE perform longer-term
projections and place them in the EIS, but did not specify a compliance
standard. The Court ruled that EPA's policy justifications did not
provide sufficient consistency with the NAS recommendation.
Question 3. Can you briefly walk the committee through how the EPA
arrived at the 15 millirem standard for the first 10,000 years at Yucca
Mountain?
Answer. The 15 millirem per year standard is consistent with the
level established in EPA's generally applicable standards for land
disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and transuranic
radioactive waste in 40 CFR part 191. As such, this level has been
successfully used as the basis of EPA regulatory approval for a 10,000-
year compliance period at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). It is
also consistent with EPA's lifetime cancer risk range of
10-4 to 10-6, which provides a risk and
protectiveness context across EPA programs and pollutants. Further, 15
mrem/yr is within the range identified by NAS as an appropriate
``starting point'' for rulemaking, which is approximately 2 to 20 mrem/
yr.
Question 4. And on the issue of predicting and setting standards on
anything for one million years--how is this possible to do?
Answer. EPA has significant concerns regarding the use of
mathematical calculations of projected performance over periods lasting
hundreds of thousands of years as a basis for regulatory decision-
making. EPA does not believe that such projections can be viewed with
the same level of confidence as projections for even such relatively
``short'' times as 10,000 years, The uncertainties inherent in such
projections led EPA to restrict the compliance period to 10,000 years
in its 2001 standards, although projections were required beyond that
point because they can still provide useful insights, even if they are
not of sufficient quality to serve as a basis for regulatory decision-
making.
EPA believes the approach recommended internationally, y the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), among others, is
appropriate. This approach places more emphasis on numerical
projections for the initial period after closure, but gives more
emphasis to other ``qualitative'' factors as the performance period
increases. Qualitative factors that provide confidence in the
robustness of the disposal system include such elements as engineering
and design specifications, estimates of radionuclide movement through
engineered and natural barriers, comparison with natural analogues
(e.g., uranium ore bodies), radiotoxicity of waste remaining in the
repository, extent of site characterization, and quality assurance
programs.
Ten thousand years is commonly considered a period of significance,
during which projections are generally considered more reliable for
decision-making. EPA's 2001 rule incorporated this approach by leaving
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with discretion in evaluating
the significance of the performance calculations. NRC was therefore not
required to base its licensing decision on whether the projected peak
dose satisfied a specific limit; rather, NRC could use the projections
to inform its evaluation of other aspects of DOE's license application
that directly affect overall safety, such as assumptions regarding
engineered barrier performance. NRC could assign the dose projections
greater or lesser weight in the licensing derision, as it deemed
appropriate.
EPA's 2005 proposed rule, which was drafted to respond to the
decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, adds an additional standard to the 10,000-year standard to
cover the period from 10,000 to 1 million years. However, EPA has
proposed a higher long-term dose limit as a way of emphasizing other
factors important to safety, such as those mentioned above, and
recognizing the significant uncertainties in projections covering
hundreds of thousands of years. EPA chose to base this proposed higher
limit on comparisons of natural background radiation rates within the
United States. The range of variation in natural background radiation
illustrates the levels of radiation exposure with which people live
safely today and provides a reasonable benchmark or judging the overall
safety of the Yucca Mountain disposal system over times approaching 1
million years. No other regulations have ever been contemplated for
such regulatory timeframes.
Responses of William L. Wehrum to Questions From Senator Craig
Question 1. How does EPA's revised standard compare with how other
countries plan to regulate their spent fuel repositories?
Answer. EPA'S overall approach is generally consistent with the
approach taken internationally, which views numeric dose projections as
less reliable for regulatory decisionmaking at very long times.
Guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), among
others, suggests that other ``qualitative'' factors should be given
more emphasis in reaching a decision regarding the overall safety of a
disposal system. Qualitative factors that provide confidence in the
robustness of the disposal system include such elements as engineering
and design specifications, estimates of radionuclide movement through
engineered and natural barriers, comparison with natural analogues
(e.g., uranium ore bodies), radiotoxicity of waste remaining in the
repository, extent of site characterization and quality assurance
programs.
While this view is widely accepted, individual countries lave
adopted different methods to implement For example, France establishes
a dose limit for the first 10,000 years that ``will be applied for
determining the acceptability of the radiological consequences.''
Beyond that point, however, the dose limit is a ``reference value''
that ``may be supplemented, by more qualitative assessments of the
results of these estimates.'' The Finnish standard requires dose
assessments for ``at least several thousands of years.'' In the longer
term, the standard for compliance is based on radionuclide-specific
release limits, with the stipulation that ``at their maximum, the
radiation impacts arising from disposal can be comparable to those
arising from natural radioactive substances.''
Both EPA'S 2001 rule and its proposed amendments incorporate this
viewpoint. However. we believe the 2005 proposal is the only example
that that would set a numerical standard for a compliance period of one
million years.
Question 2. How meaningful is it to estimate potential radiation
doses one million year into the future? And what is EPA perspective on
the one million year timeframe?
Answer. EPA has significant concerns regarding the use of
mathematical calculations of projected performance over periods lasting
hundreds of thousands of years as a basis for regulatory decision-
making. EPA does not believe that such projections can he viewed with
the same level of confidence as projections for even such relatively
``short'' times as 10,000 years. The uncertainties inherent in such
projections led EPA to restrict the compliance period to 10,000 years
in its 2001 standards, although projections were required beyond that
point because they can still provide useful insights, even if they are
not of sufficient quality to serve as a basis for regulatory decision-
making.
EPA believes the approach recommended internationally, by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), among others, is
appropriate. This approach places more emphasis on numerical
projections for the initial period after closure, but gives more
emphasis to other ``qualitative'' factors as the performance period
increases. Qualitative factors that provide confidence in the
robustness of the disposal system include such elements as engineering
and design specifications, estimates of radionuclide movement through
engineered and natural barriers, comparison with natural analogues
(e.g., uranium ore bodies), radiotoxicity of waste remaining in the
repository, extent of site characterization, and quality assurance
programs.
Ten thousand years is commonly considered a period of significance,
during whit projections are generally considered more reliable for
decision-making. EPA's 2001 rule incorporated this approach by leaving
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with. discretion in evaluating
the significance of the performance calculations. NRC was therefore not
required to base its licensing decision on whether the projected peak
dose satisfied a specific limit; rather, could use the projections to
inform its evaluation of other aspects of DOE's license application
that directly affect overall safety, such as assumptions regarding
engineered barrier performance. NRC could assign the dose projections
greater or lesser weight in the licensing decision, as it deemed
appropriate.
EPA's 2005 proposed rule, which was drafted to respond to the
decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, adds an additional standard to the 10,000-year standard to
cover the period from 10,000 to 1 million years. However, EPA has
proposed a higher long-term dose limit as a way of emphasizing other
factors important to safety, such as those mentioned above, and
recognizing the significant uncertainties in projections covering
hundreds of thousands of years. EPA chose to base this proposed higher
limit on comparisons of natural background radiation rates within the
United States. The range of variation in natural background radiation
illustrates the levels of radiation exposure with which people five
safely today and provides a reasonable benchmark for judging the
overall safety of the Yucca Mountain disposal system over times
approaching 1 million years. No other U.S. regulations have ever been
contemplated for such regulatory timeframes.
Question 3. What factors did EPA consider when revising its 2001
radiation standard?
Answer. The major factor that EPA considered was the main subject
of the court remand--the compliance period. Other factors that were
considered include: NAS findings and recommendations; the level of the
peak dose limit (the additional standard applicable from 10,000 to 1
million years); the uncertainties involved in extremely long-term
performance projections and how they can be addressed to make the
standards implementable; international guidance and regulations; and
implications for the human-intrusion and ground-water protection
standards.
Question 4. When will the EPA issue its revised Radiation
Protection Standard for Yucca Mountain?
Answer. EPA is making every effort to issue the final revised
standards by the end of calendar year 2006.
Responses of William L. Wehrum to Questions From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. The U.S. Court of Appeals or the District of Columbia
struck down EPA's original radiation protection standards for Yucca
Mountain because they were not ``based upon and consistent with'' the
findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, as
required by the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
Answer. The Court ruled that the 10,000-year compliance period,
combined with the requirement that longer-term projections be performed
and placed in the Department of Energy's (DOE) Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), did not provide sufficient consistency with the NAS
recommendation.
Question 2. The Academy's recommendation, as understand it,
involved 2 variables. One was the time scale. The Academy recommended a
million year time scale, and EPA's original standards adopted a 10,000-
year period. That was the discrepancy the court focused on, and that is
the discrepancy that your proposed rule would remedy.
Answer. Regarding the regulatory compliance period, the NAS
committee recommended ``that compliance with the standard be measured
at the time of peak risk, whenever it occurs.'' The committee further
stated that ``there is no scientific basis for limiting the time period
of the individual-risk standard to 10,000 years or any other value,''
while also stating that the compliance period should be confined
``within the limits imposed by the long-term stability of the geologic
environment, which is on the order of one million years.''
The NAS committee recognized that, while its focus was on
scientific and technical aspects, ``the selection of a time period of
applicability . . . also has policy aspects that we have not
addressed.'' For policy reasons, EPA limited the compliance period to
10,000 years. EPA also required that DOE perform longer-term
projections and place them in the EIS, but did not specify a compliance
standard. The Court ruled that EPA's policy justifications did not
provide sufficient consistency with the NAS recommendation.
Question 3. The other variable was the so-called exposure scenario.
The Academy said that the chance that people would be exposed to
radiation from the repository ought to be modeled on a statistical or
``probabilistic'' basis. EPA opted instead for a ``deterministic''
exposure scenario, based on a hypothetical ``Reasonably Maximally
Exposed Individual.''
Why did EPA reject the Academy's recommendation that it use
a probabilistic scenario?
Is EPA's deterministic scenario ``based upon and consistent
with'' the probabilistic scenario recommended by the Academy if
the Academy specifically considered and rejected EPA's
deterministic approach when it prepared its report?
Answer. NAS recommended that EPA adopt a critical-group approach
but recognized that such an approach could be implemented in many ways.
The NAS committee offered the ``probabilistic critical group'' as one
method that would meet the overall protectiveness goals while avoiding
``unreasonable assumptions regarding habits and sensitivities affecting
risk.'' Ultimately, however, NAS emphasized ``that specification of
exposure-scenario assumptions is a matter for policy decision.''
EPA selected the RMEI as both a simpler and more conservative
alternative to the ``probabilistic critical group'' preferred by NAS,
The RMEI is. deterministic only in the sense that this hypothetical
individual is always located above the point of highest contamination
in ground water in the accessible environment and is assumed to drink 2
liters of ground water per day from that location. However, other
exposure factors, such diet, are representative of the current
population and lifestyles in the Town of Amargosa Valley. In its
comments on EPA's 1999 proposal, NAS stated its belief that the RMEI
was ``broadly consistent'' with the recommended critical group
approach. The RMEI approach was not at issue in the 2004 Court of
Appeals ruling, and EPA has not proposed to modify it,
Question 4. How do the radiation protection standards EPA is
proposing for Yucca Mountain compare with those in effect for WIPP?
Answer. The level of protection for the first 10,000 years after
disposal at both locations is 15 mrem/yr, and the ground-water
protection standards for both are based on EPA's drinking water
standards. The differences in the two regulations stem primarily from
the site-specific nature of the Yucca Mountain standards, as well as
consideration of the NAS Report. These differences include the size of
the controlled area (point of compliance), description of the RMEI
(compared to ``any member of the public'' for WIPP), and the framing of
the human intrusion standard. WIPP must also comply with radionuclide-
specific release limits, which are not included in the Yucca Mountain
standards. EPA has also proposed to update the method for calculating
doses for the Yucca Mountain standards.
______
Office of the Governor,
Agency for Nuclear Projects,
Carson City, NV, June 13, 2006.
Hon. Pete V, Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Domenici: Enclosed please find responses to the
questions that both you and Senator Craig provided following your
hearing on the status of the Yucca Mountain project. Should you have
additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,
Robert R. Loux,
Executive Director.
[Enclosure.]
Responses of Robert Loux to Questions From Senator Domenici
Question 1. DOE recently released an independent study which was
reviewed by the Colorado School of Mines, the University of Arizona,
and the U.S. Dept of Agriculture regarding the water infiltration work
conducted by the United States Geological Survey that was the subject
of the questionable e-mails. This report confirmed that the data in
question was correct. Do you dispute this conclusion? If so, on what
basis?
Answer. The report referenced in this question is: Evaluation of
Technical Impact on the Yucca Mountain Project Technical Basis
Resulting From Issues Raised by E-Mails of Former Project Participants,
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, DOE/RW-0583, February,
2006. The report does not confirm that the data in question was
correct. The following are the conclusions of the report (page 24):
``From this evaluation. the following conclusions can be
drawn:
1. The net infiltration rate estimates for Yucca Mountain are
developed from, a strong conceptual and hydrologic basis,
including regional and site investigations dating back to the
1970s. The concepts, principles, and methods applied at Yucca
Mountain are consistent with standard scientific practice as
documented in the scientific literature,
2. Corroborating data on long-term net infiltration and
groundwater recharge are publicly available in the scientific
and technical literature. These data, surveyed for Nevada and
the Western United States, are consistent with current
estimates of net infiltration for Yucca Mountain, both under
the modern climate and for potential future climate scenarios.
3. Data plots demonstrate that the net infiltration rate
estimates for Yucca Mountain provide reasonable inputs to
unsaturated zone flow modeling and the total system performance
assessment modeling for the Site Recommendation. Figure 4-5
presents a compilation of all data discussed in this
evaluation, showing that the Yucca Mountain net infiltration
rate estimates are within the ranges of these data.
4. The net infiltration rate estimates and the conceptual
models from which they were developed were published in peer-
reviewed scientific journals and were the subject of an expert
elicitation.
5. Net infiltration at Yucca Mountain is a small fraction of
average annual precipitation, representing between about 1
percent and about 6 percent, meaning that, on average, between
1 and 10 mm/yr infiltrates into Yucca Mountain.''
Based on our review of the report, we generally agree with and do
not dispute these conclusions. But, additional future analysis may
result in revision of the average annual net infiltration into Yucca
Mountain stated in Conclusion 5 above.
Question 2. You have indicated that an aging facility or ``fuel
cooling facility'' would be the same thing as interim storage. However,
if such a facility were simply an operational component of a repository
licensed for permanent disposal, wouldn't this be something very
different from interim storage?
Answer. Fuel cooling is not integral to the operation of a
repository licensed for permanent disposal. Fuel cooling begins with
the removal of irradiated fuel from an operating reactor, and continues
throughout the decay period of the radionuclides contained in the fuel.
Thermal limits for a particular repository geologic setting and design
may require control of the thermal impact of the irradiated fuel within
the repository, but this can be accomplished in various ways, none of
which require ``aging'' the fuel at the repository site. For example,
adjusting the areal mass loading of the fuel to meet repository thermal
limits would eliminate the need for ``aging'' the fuel, thus
eliminating the need for any aging facility prior to emplacement in the
repository.
The ``aging facility'' as conceived for a Yucca Mountain repository
is interim storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel interim between
removal from the reactor site and emplacement in the repository. If the
purpose of the facility was to optimize repository loading operations,
a relatively small lag storage facility could be planned, instead of a
facility intended to store from 21,000 to 40,000 metric tonnes of heavy
metal for an indefinite period of time.
The NRC is withholding judgment on whether the ``aging facility''
would need to be licensed as an Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation, under 10 CFR Part 72, rather than as part of the
repository, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 63. The issue, according to NRC, is
whether DOE can demonstrate that the facility is integral to the
repository operation in its License Application. By calling it an
``wing facility'' DOE has defined its purpose, which is distinctly
separate from the operation of the repository, and will be accomplished
any place the fuel resides, and in whatever amount is stored at any
location.
Question 3. You have indicated that without metal waste containers,
peak radiation doses would exceed the EPA 15 millirem limit within 500
years. Can you please describe the basis for this conclusion?
The source document for this information is: FY01 Supplemental
Science and Performance Analyses, Volume 2: Performance Analyses, July
2001, Bechtel SAIL Company, LLC, TDR-MGR-PA-000001 REV 00. Figure
3.2.2-9, Annual Dose Histories with and without Seepage during the
Boiling Period for the Case with Neutralized Waste Package and Drip
Shields, shows the mean annual dose curve intersecting the 15 millirem
per year dose level at approximately 500 years. The same figure
indicates the mean peak dose, at about 600 millirems per year, occurs
at approximately 2,000 years.
Responses of Robert Loux to Questions From Senator Craig
Question 1. Does Nevada support GNEP? Would Nevada seek to
participate in GNEP if hosting an interim storage site is a required
part of that?
Answer. Nevada does not support GNEP and does not seek to
participate in any way.
Question 2. Given that nuclear waste must eventually be dealt with
in a safe and responsible manner, even with GNEP, do you see[n] any
practical alternative to eventual permanent geologic disposal of
nuclear spent fuel, as endorsed by the National. Research Council?
Answer. At this time, Nevada does not know of any technical reason
to reject the concept of deep geologic disposal of high-level
radioactive waste, whether the waste form is spent nuclear fuel or some
other configuration, Of course, implementation of the concept requires
a suite of rigorous pre-established siting, licensing, and safety
standards that assure the ability to disqualify a proposed repository
at any time prior to closure,
Question 3. From your experience with these issues, could you name
any sites in the U.S. that you feel should be investigated as a
potential repository location[s] that are better suited than Yucca
Mountain?
Answer. For reasons stated in Governor Guinn's Notice of
Disapproval of the Yucca Mountain Site Recommendation, submitted to the
Congress in 2002, Yucca Mountain is not technically acceptable as a
permanent repository location. Sufficient information does not exist to
suggest any specific sites in the U.S. that should be investigated,
especially under the current regulatory and policy regime that is
driven by mission zealots who show little regard for the safety of
affected citizens. It also should be noted that the Congressional
prohibition of investigation of granite sites in the 1987 Nuclear Waste
Policy Act Amendments is scientifically unsupportable and a policy
travesty.
Question 4. If the scientific & technical community can demonstrate
the safety of Yucca Mountain, and the regulatory authority accepts it,
is there any reason why the country should not go forward with Yucca
Mountain?
Answer. With the current state of regulations and safety standards
for a Yucca Mountain repository, there is no basis for demonstration of
the safety of the site. What has been demonstrated is the opposite--
that the site does not meet even a minimal expectation for geologic
isolation of radioactive wastes. See our response above to Question 3
from Senator Domenici. If the original DOE Site Recommendation
Guidelines and process, NRC licensing regulations, and EPA safety
standards were applicable, the Yucca Mountain site would have been
disqualified for technical reasons, as recommended by Nevada Governors
to Secretaries of Energy, first in 1989 and again in 1999.
Question 5. Do you have reason to believe that the NRC is not
capable of granting a license and regulating Yucca Mountain competently
and fairly and with the health and safety of Nevadans being of
paramount importance?
Answer. We have reason to believe that the NRC staff has been
diligent in its effort to convince DOE that its Yucca Mountain License
Application, if submitted, must be complete and of high quality. We
also have reason to believe that, if a license application is
submitted, the NRC review and hearing process is capable of denial of a
license, which it should do, and Nevada will make every effort to
secure such a result.
Appendix II
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
----------
Statement of Admiral Frank L. ``Skip'' Bowman, U.S. Navy (Retired),
President and Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Frank L. ``Skip''
Bowman, president and chief executive officer, at the Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI). Thank you for this opportunity to share the nuclear
energy industry's assessment of the Department of Energy's civilian
radioactive waste management policies and of the Yucca Mountain
project. Having served 38 years in our United States Navy, I am
convinced that our country's national security is inextricably linked
to our energy security, and that nuclear energy must be a large part of
that energy security.
NEI is responsible for developing policy for the commercial nuclear
industry. NEI's 250 members represent a broad spectrum of interests,
including every U.S. electric company that operates a nuclear power
plant. NEI's membership also includes nuclear fuel cycle companies,
suppliers, engineering and consulting firms, national research
laboratories, manufacturers of radiopharmaceuticals, universities,
labor unions and law firms.
SUMMARY
In keeping with the scope of this hearing, I will focus my
testimony on the following key issues:
DOE must make visible and measurable progress in
implementing an integrated national used nuclear fuel
management strategy, which has as an integral component the
Yucca Mountain, Nev., repository. This progress will help
ensure that the expanded use of nuclear energy will play a key
role in our nation's strategy for meeting growing electricity
demand.
The industry's evaluation of DOE's civilian used nuclear
fuel program's actions to address challenges so that the
federal government meets its statutory and contractual
obligations to remove used nuclear fuel from utility sites and
dispose of it in a timely manner.
The industry believes that the provisions of the Nuclear Fuel
Management and Disposal Act, S. 2589, provide a solid basis for making
the necessary progress towards addressing the challenges. We urge the
Committee to hold a subsequent hearing on the, details of this
legislation as soon as possible and report to the Senate its
legislative recommendations to move forward on implementing our
national policy during this session of Congress.
NUCLEAR ENERGY MUST PLAY A KEY ROLE IN OUR ENERGY FUTURE
In the 2005 State of the Union address, President Bush affirmed the
nation's commitment to ``safe, clean nuclear energy'' as part of a
diverse portfolio that Will meet America's future electricity needs. A
long-term commitment to nuclear energy will make the United States more
energy independent and energy efficient. The Administration and
Congress demonstrated strong leadership by enacting the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, which encourages diversity of energy sources, including
emission-free-sources of electricity, such as nuclear energy.
The nation must focus on clean, reliable and affordable energy
sources, such as nuclear, that are available today. Nuclear energy
offers several unique advantages. It is the only expandable baseload
energy source that does not. emit carbon or other greenhouse gases into
the atmosphere. Nuclear energy safely and reliably provides price
stability for electricity customers as the prices for fossil fuels
fluctuate. It also provides exciting new opportunities in areas such as
hydrogen production. Although our nation must continue, to employ a mix
of fuel sources for generating electricity, we believe it is important
that nuclear energy maintain at least the current 20 percent
contribution to U.S. electricity production. Maintaining that level of
production will require construction of a significant number of new
nuclear plants beginning in the next decade.
There is strong, bipartisan support for a continuing significant
role for nuclear power. More than two thirds of the public supports
keeping nuclear energy as a key component of our energy portfolio. Many
in the environmental community recognize the key role that nuclear
energy can play in controlling greenhouse gas emissions. The industry
appreciates the recognition of the nuclear energy's importance that
Congress and the Administration demonstrated in the last year's
comprehensive Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Recently, a new coalition of diverse organizations and individuals
has been formed to educate the public on nuclear energy and participate
in policy discussions on U.S. energy issues. The Clean and Safe Energy
coalition, co-chaired by Greenpeace co-founder Patrick Moore and former
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christine Todd Whitman
includes business, environmental, labor, health and community leaders
among its 120 members.
PROGRESS ON USED FUEL MANAGEMENT MUST MOVE HAND-IN-HAND WITH INDUSTRY
DEVELOPMENT
The provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 clearly stimulated
interest among electric utilities in constructing new nuclear plants.
This increased interest requires progress on the federal government's
used fuel management policies; The federal government must meet its
contractual responsibility to accept, transport and dispose of used
nuclear fuel through a comprehensive radioactive waste management
program including continued progress toward a federal used nuclear fuel
repository.
While it is important to recognize that the industry and other key
stakeholders are not satisfied with the extent of progress made by the
federal government in meeting the requirements of the NWPA as amended,
progress. has been made.
There is long-standing international scientific consensus
that a deep geologic repository is the best solution for long-
term disposition of commercial used nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive byproducts of our nation's defense programs.
The Bush Administration and Congress affirmed the scientific
suitability of Yucca Mountain for a repository in 2002 after
nearly 20 years of scientific study. Over the past three years,
DOE and its contractors have provided further confirmation that
Yucca Mountain is an appropriate site for a national
repository. Federal courts have rejected significant legal
challenges by Nevada and others to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
and the 2002 Yucca Mountain site suitability determination. A
federal. court also affirmed that the Yucca Mountain
Development Act is constitutional and DOE's repository system
design, which incorporates both natural and engineered barriers
to contain radioactive material safely, is consistent with the
law.
Suggestions that DOE postpone Yucca Mountain indefinitely
and leave used fuel at reactor sites for a century or more
while waiting for some ``magic bullet'' solution ignores the
significant safety and security advantages of centralized
storage at a federal facility and the monumental additional
costs that taxpayers would ultimately bear waiting for this
``solution.'' Even if such a solution were found, there is
still a near-term need for the repository to provide disposal
of high-level radioactive waste from defense programs.
The industry believes that DOE has the authority to take
advantage of significant. opportunities to advance its
comprehensive used fuel management program and the Yucca
Mountain project in particular. The industry also believes that
S. 2589 best addresses many of the issues limiting progress at
Yucca Mountain.
PROGRESS TOWARD LICENSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN MUST CONTINUE
The industry, is encouraged by the leadership and management
provided to the program by Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, Deputy
Secretary Clay Sell and Acting Director of the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management, Paul Golan.
They are leading the transition from a purely scientific program,
focused on site characterization and site approval at Yucca Mountain,
to one that is preparing to enter a rigorous Nuclear Regulatory
Commission licensing process. This progress has continued as the
department addresses challenges, such as the revised Environmental
Protection Agency radiation protection standard. DOE has made
significant progress toward resolving key technical issues with the NRC
before it submits a license application for Yucca Mountain. DOE is also
adopting industry best practices to ensure that it will submit a
quality application to the NRC. It plans to include in this application
a revised surface facility design that will handle fuel in standardized
multipurpose canisters. Using transportation, aging and disposal (TAD)
canisters in combination with associated surface facilities will reduce
the need to handle used fuel at Yucca Mountain and increase safety. It
is important that DOE complete these efforts, file a high quality
repository license application in a timely manner and, ultimately,
complete the transition to a design, engineering and construction
project.
The recently announced design changes involving use of standardized
containers can assist the industry in meeting important goals for
management of used fuel at a geologic repository with the potential to
retrieve it if that becomes desirable. The industry is appropriately
engaged with DOE to ensure that these standardized canisters can be
loaded and transported from our facilities safely and efficiently. In
addition, the industry is committed to helping DOE address technical
issues at Yucca Mountain in the same effective, high quality manner
that has become the expected norm at the Nation's 103 reactors. The
industry is encouraged by DOE'S recent progress towards the alignment
of a rail spur to Yucca Mountain. The development of necessary
transportation infrastructure and planning should continue to be a high
priority.
As part of this committee's ongoing review of the DOE repository
program, the industry urges Congress to exercise careful oversight of
the licensing process, starting with the quality and timeliness of the
filing of the license application by DOE. This can ensure that the
program is not further delayed. This Committee should challenge DOE to
show how it will incorporate the proposed design changes into the
license application in a manner that will allow for its submission in a
timely fashion. DOE should provide Congress detailed program
milestones, a revised five-year funding profile for the program, and an
updated life-cycle cost estimate for the repository, in conjunction
with the updated program schedule that DOE officials have promised this
summer.
Legislative deliberations should not preclude DOE from filing a
license application. The NRC should begin reviewing the repository
license application, when it is submitted with the knowledge that DOE
can amend it to address changes, if any, resulting from new
legislation.
THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN LICENSING PROCESS PROVIDES FLEXIBILITY
TO ADDRESS FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
DOE should incorporate, as provided by existing regulations,
features into its repository development plans that maintain
flexibility for future generations to make informed decisions, based on
operational experience, changing energy economics, and technological
developments.
The nuclear energy industry supports enhancements to the Yucca
Mountain repository that would provide greater long-term assurance of
safety and permit DOE to apply innovative technology at the repository
as it is developed. These enhancements include:
extensive monitoring of the used nuclear fuel placed in the
repository and its effects on the surrounding geology for 300
or more years
the ability to retrieve the used nuclear fuel from the
facility for an extended period
periodic review of updates to the repository license that
takes into account monitoring results and ensures that the
facility is operating properly.
DOE already has committed to facilitate the use of these elements
in its repository planning For a period of 50 to 300 years, the federal
government will ``collect, evaluate and report on data'' to assess the
performance of the repository and the ability to retrieve the used fuel
within the facility, if desired. In addition to monitoring material
within the facility, DOE will conduct tests and analyses to ensure that
the repository is constructed and operated according to strict
guidelines. Although DOE is pursuing these elements, the proposed
enhancements would provide greater scientific and regulatory oversight
of long-term repository operation and the condition of the material
stored there. Doing so would require no modification of the existing
federal statutory or regulatory framework.
The Energy Department could include these enhancements as part of
its license application and the commitment to complete them should be
incorporated as a condition of the NRC license.
These recommendations offer greater assurance to the public that
long-term stewardship of used fuel at Yucca Mountain will be carefully
monitored throughout repository operation. They also would allow DOE to
take advantage of future technological innovations to improve the
repository or provide for the potential reuse of the energy that
remains in the fuel.
CHALLENGES REMAIN FOR MEETING FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS
DOE must address a number of issues to provide stability, clarity
and predictability of our national used nuclear fuel policy. Conditions
must be in place to' facilitate near-term movement of used fuel,
assurance of transportation safety and security, licensing and
construction of the repository, and permanent disposal of used fuel in
the repository. The following are the industry's priorities for meeting
the federal obligation.
DOE Should Move Used Nuclear Fuel From Reactor Sites
The industry's top priority is for the federal government to meet
its statutory and contractual obligation to move used fuel away from
operating and decommissioned reactor sites. The government already is
eight years in arrears in meeting this obligation, and it will be at
least another decade before the repository is completed. That failure
is the subject of more than 60 lawsuits. Three of these suits,
representing only a fraction of the reactor sites, have resulted in
settlements or judgments totaling $340 million for costs incurred.
Further. delays in federal receipt and movement of used nuclear
fuel and defense waste products could cost taxpayers over $1 billion
per year in defense waste site life-cycle costs, operating costs at
utilities and Yucca Mountain fixed costs, exclusive of litigation
damages already incurred, according to DOE.
While DOE moves forward to license, construct and operate the Yucca
Mountain repository, the government must take title to used fuel and
move it to a secure federal facility as soon as practicable. The
industry recognizes that there are different interpretations as to the
department's authority to undertake such an action. Therefore, Congress
should work with DOE to take steps that will facilitate the movement of
used fuel from utility sites.
Waste Confidence Should Be Affirmed
The nation's policymakers must be confident that policies are in
place to ensure the safe and secure storage and disposal of used
nuclear fuel. This waste confidence determination is reflected in
Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules that support various licensing
actions. However, such an approach creates uncertainty, because NRC
regulations and licensing decisions are subject to litigation.
Managing the nation's used fuel is a firmly established federal
obligation and, as such, is a matter of broad national policy. There is
solid scientific and technical justification to affirm waste
confidence. In 2001, the National Academy of Sciences confirmed four
decades of international scientific consensus that geologic disposal is
the best method for managing used nuclear fuel. Congress approved a
geologic disposal site at Yucca Mountain in 2002.
In the Energy Policy Act, Congress included provisions that
encourage the construction of new nuclear power plants, illustrating
confidence in the nation's ability to manage used reactor fuel in the
future. In addition, the Energy Department has safely operated a
geologic disposal site for transuranic radioactive waste near Carlsbad,
N.M., and 34 temporary dry-cask storage facilities for used nuclear
fuel have been licensed at nuclear power plants. The first such
facility has been operating since 1986. Congress should codify ``waste
confidence'' so that the NRC need not address this broad public policy
matter as a routine regulatory matter.
Funding Predictability Should Be Established
Congress established the Nuclear Waste Fund to cover costs
associated with disposal of commercial used nuclear fuel. This fund is
paid for by a one-tenth-of-a-cent-per-kilowatt-hour fee on electricity
used by consumers of nuclear energy. Initially, expenditures from the
fund were not scored in the budget as part of the discretionary
spending totals. This was similar to budget treatment of other user
fees, including those for the NRC. More than a decade ago, Congress
deviated from this principle and forced Nuclear Waste Fund expenditures
for Yucca Mountain to compete in the federal budget with unrelated
programs, despite this dedicated source of revenue.
As a result, Yucca Mountain budget requests have been cut by more
than $1 billion over the last decade. Program funding requirements are
forecast to increase substantially over the next few years. If overall
spending totals remain flat, even more significant delays could result
not because nuclear power consumers have not provided the funds
necessary to support the program, but because of inappropriate federal
budget accounting.
To date, consumers of nuclear power have committed more than $27
billion in fees and accrued interest into the fund, and continue to pay
at a rate of $750. million each year. However, only some $9 billion has
been spent on the project, leaving a balance in excess of $18-billion.
In recent years, fee income has been five times as high as annual
spending from the fund.
Artificial Constraints on Repository Operations Should Be Eliminated
Currently, there is a statutory limit of 70,000 metric tons on the
amount of nuclear waste materials that can be accepted at Yucca
Mountain. The Environmental Impact Statement for the project analyzed
emplacement of up to 120,000 metric tons of nuclear waste products in
the repository. Additional scientific analyses suggest significantly
higher capacity could be achieved with changes in the repository
configuration that use only geology that has already been characterized
and do not deviate from existing design parameters.
Decisions on licensing and operations of a deep geologic repository
at Yucca Mountain should be based on scientific and engineering
considerations through the NRC licensing process, not on artificial
constraints. Given the decades of study and the billions of dollars
invested in Yucca Mountain, it makes sense that we fully and safely
utilize its potential capacity.
Clarity and Stability in the Licensing Process Should Be Provided
The NRC repository licensing process should be restructured to
ensure that the proceedings are prioritized. First, there must be a
reasonable, but finite, schedule for review of the authority to
``receive and possess'' fuel that would follow approval of the
construction license. This would be consistent with an established
schedule for the initial review of the construction license application
and could avoid dilatory procedural challenges that would undermine the
government's ability to meet its contractual obligations and avoid the
significant costs of delay.
Second, clarification must be provided as to what activities are
authorized to develop used fuel management infrastructure prior to the
NRC granting a construction license, including the construction of a
rail line to connect the Yucca Mountain site with the national rail
network.
Third, the hearing process for the authorization to receive and
possess fuel should be simplified to provide for clear and concise
decision making.
Finally, clarification is needed with respect to land management,
what regulations will apply to repository construction and operations,
and which agencies will administer those regulations.
ADDITIONAL FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION
Used Nuclear. Fuel Recycling
The nuclear energy industry has shown consistent and strong support
for research and development of advanced fuel cycle technologies
incorporated in the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI). In
anticipation of a major expansion of nuclear power in the United States
and globally, it is appropriate to accelerate activities in this
program. The resurgence in development of nuclear energy is expected to
require advanced fuel cycles. However, a repository will be necessary
to handle defense wastes, legacy commercial used nuclear fuel and by-
products regardless of whatever fuel cycle is ultimately developed.
President Bush has presented a compelling vision for a global
nuclear renaissance through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP). This initiative provides an important framework to satisfy U.S.
and world needs for an abundant source of clean, safe nuclear energy
while addressing challenges for related to fuel supply, long-term
radioactive waste management and proliferation concerns.
We recognize that the Congress has important questions regarding
this program. The near-term focus for GNEP is for DOE to determine, by
2008, how to proceed with demonstration of advanced recycling
technologies and other technological challenges. Consequently, the
industry fully supports increased funding for AFCI in fiscal 2007.
However, neither AFCI nor GNEP, reduces the near-term imperative of
developing the Yucca Mountain repository.
A Constructive Role for Nevadans
The nuclear energy industry supports an active and constructive
role for Nevada in the development of Yucca Mountain to help ensure the
safety of its citizens. The industry also supports compensation for the
state to account for the program's socioeconomic impact, as called for
in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. This model is consistent with the
siting and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Project.
The industry is encouraged that Nevadans at the local level share a
common goal with DOE, the NRC and industry to ensure safe development
of Yucca Mountain and the related transportation infrastructure. One
recent example of this activity is a cooperative agreement initiated in
2004 among three impacted counties, the city of Caliente and DOE.
Another example is the coalition of Nevada business, labor and
community leaders that formed ``For a Better Nevada to promote the
interests of Nevadans with respect to the Yucca Mountain project. The
coalition has particularly identified its interest in incorporating
enhanced monitoring and retrievability into the repository program.
The work of this coalition is particularly important in view of
Nevada public opinion. Most Nevadans believe that the facility will
ultimately be built and that the governor and U.S. Senators of Nevada
should negotiate with the federal government so that the state can
receive millions of dollars in special annual payments to reduce taxes,
help expand the economic diversity of Nevada, improve education, and
for highway improvement, if the Yucca Mountain project is approved for
a disposal facility.
The industry is encouraged by the steps DOE has taken to work with
affected local governments in the state, and we further encourage the
department to expand its interactions with Nevadans interested in being
constructively engaged in the project.
CONCLUSION
We must never lose sight of the federal government's responsibility
for civilian used nuclear fuel disposal, as stated by Congress in the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. The
industry fully supports the fundamental need for a repository so used
nuclear fuel and the byproducts of the nation's nuclear weapons program
are safely and securely managed in a specially designed, underground
facility. World-class science has demonstrated that Yucca Mountain is
the best site for such a facility. A public works project of this
magnitude--the largest ever of its kind will inevitably face setbacks.
Yet, none is insurmountable. DOE and its contractors have made
significant progress on the project and will continue. to do so as the
department prepares to submit a license application to the NRC.
However, DOE is eight years late in meeting its commitment to begin
accepting reactor fuel and must proceed without further delay with an
integrated used fuel management strategy.
A viable used fuel management strategy is necessary to. retain
long-term public confidence in operating existing nuclear power plants
and build new facilities. The public confidence necessary to support
construction of new nuclear plants is linked to successful
implementation of an integrated national used fuel policy, which
includes a continued commitment for the long-term disposition of used
nuclear fuel. This requires a commitment from the Administration,
Congress and other stakeholders to ensure that DOE makes an effective
transition from a scientific program to a licensing and construction
program, with the same commitment to safety. New waste management
approaches, including interim storage and nuclear fuel recycling, are
consistent with timely development of Yucca Mountain.
The challenge before the Administration and Congress is to
implement our national policy for used fuel management, which includes
resolving the near-term difficulties facing Yucca Mountain and setting
the project on a path to success. The nuclear energy industry urges
this Committee to continue to work with the Administration, the
citizens of Nevada, the industry and other stakeholders as DOE
continues its important work to develop a safe, secure repository for
used nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain. It is our responsibility to
America today and to future generations, to ensure timely successful
completion of Yucca Mountain.
______
Statement of LeRoy Koppendrayer, Chairman, Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission, and Chairman, Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition
Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Committee, the
Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition (NWSC) appreciates this opportunity to
present a Statement for the Record regarding a hearing on the status of
the Yucca Mountain Repository Project within the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management, the Department of Energy (DOE).
ABOUT THE NWSC
The Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition. (NWSC) is an ad hoc group of
state utility regulators, state attorneys general, electric utilities
and associate members representing 46 member organizations in 26
states, The NWSC was formed in 1993 out of frustration at the lack of
progress DOE had made in developing a permanent repository for spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLRW), as well as
Congress's failure to sufficiently fund the nuclear waste disposal
program (Program). The mission and purpose of the NWSC is to seek on
behalf of the ratepayers of the United States:
1) The removal of commercial spent nuclear fuel from more
than 73 temporary commercial storage sites located in 33
states.
2) The authorization of a temporary, centralized commercial
spent nuclear fuel storage facility.
3) The allocation of appropriate funds from the Nuclear Waste
Fund (NWF) by the U.S. Congress to the DOE so that it will
fulfill its statutory and contractual obligations.
4) The augmentation of transportation planning and
regulations to facilitate transportation systems.
5) The capping of the NWF payments at the present one-tenth
of a cent per kilowatt-hour by the U.S. Congress.
6) The operation of the permanent repository as soon as
possible.
NUCLEAR WASTE FUND REFORM
NWSC members believe it is vitally important that Congress and the
Administration work together to ensure the Program is funded in a
manner that will allow the DOE to implement the Federal Program in
accordance with the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, amended (NWPA). The
Program is already in default of its requirement to open a facility by
1998, and is slipping further behind schedule. It is imperative that a
long-term fix of the current funding process be implemented and we urge
Congress to support legislation that reclassifies the fees paid into
the NWF as offsetting collections in the 109th Congress.
The NWSC is not calling for carte blanche funds for the DOE without
Program oversight. Over the years, the NWSC has been very supportive of
the OCRWM program and worked to ensure that Congress appropriate
sufficient funds for the nuclear waste transportation and disposal
program. We continue those efforts today as we are working very hard
for passage of comprehensive legislation that reforms the NWPA.
Congress has an opportunity to fast track comprehensive legislation in
the 109th Congressional session to enhance the management and disposal
of SNF and HLRW, ensure protection of public health and safety and
territorial integrity and security of the permanent repository.
Moreover, reforming the annual funding for the Program, assures the 41
states ratepayers that their payments into the NWF are being used for
their intended purpose--the removal of SNF and HLRW from commercial
nuclear power plants.
The members of the NWSC are supportive of S. 2589, the Nuclear Fuel
Management and Disposal Act of 2006, introduced by Chairman Domenici at
the request of the Administration. We note that S. 2539 would provide
funds Through the end of the fiscal year during which construction is
completed for the Nevada rail line and surface facilities for the fully
operational permanent repository. In addition, fees collected by the
DOE and deposited in the NWF, shall he credited to the NWF as
discretionary offsetting collections each year in amounts not to exceed
the amounts appropriated From the NWF for that year. Most importantly,
Congressional oversight of the Program funding will continue, similar
to the annual appropriations process of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Corps of Engineers.
As several members of Congress commented, ``This Program has been
starved for funding'' . . . the 2010 deadline for waste fuel acceptance
at Yucca Mountain was, ``a pipe dream at existing funding levels.'' The
only way that the DOE will ever achieve its objectives is for Congress
to reclassify the NWF receipts as offsetting collections. Only a long-
term funding fix will enable the DOE to stay on schedule; submit a
high-quality licensing application; foster exemplary standards of
quality assurance, accountability and integrity in the Program's
activities; and implement a transportation infrastructure systems plan
that meets the deadlines it sets.
NUCLEAR WASTE FUND
There are adequate funds available to implement the Federal policy
for permanent disposal of SNF and HLRW. That statement is conditioned
on the premise that Congress will vote to support its own legislation--
Congress has failed to support the NWPA. Since 1983, ratepayers from 41
states have paid more than $27 billion, including interest, into the
NWF to fund the DOE's establishment of a safe, timely, and cost-
effective centralized storage and permanent disposal of SNF and HLRW.
The nation's ratepayers pay more than $750 million per year into the
NWF, and with interest credits, this amount exceeds $1 billion
annually. After deducting expenses to date, the fund now holds
approximately $18 billion, including interest. This account balance has
been used to support other programs and camouflage the Federal deficit
rather than the development of the permanent repository. Consequently,
more than 50,000 metric tones of SNF and HLRW are presently stranded at
more than 100 sites (commercial and defense) in 39 states. Congress's
support to codify the NWF annual receipts will ensure that every cent
collected from the ratepayers will be delivered to the Program, as
intended by the NWPA.
LAWSUITS
It is more than eight years since the DOE defaulted on its
obligations, as stated in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, to
remove SNF from the nation's nuclear power plants. In its 1996 Indiana-
Michigan decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed that the DOE was
obligated to start moving waste on January 31, 1998, ``without
qualifications or condition.'' The DOE ignored the Court, prompting 46
state agencies and 36 utilities to again seek relief through the
Courts. The DOE has meanwhile ignored repeated Court orders to begin
moving waste from commercial nuclear plant sites on the grounds that it
has yet to build a permanent repository and has no authority to provide
an interim storage and transport of high-level nuclear material from
plant sites. Several lawsuits are currently being heard in the U.S.
Court of Claims and could find the DOE liable for several billions of
dollars in damages due to its failure to meet its 1998 obligations.
Further, the 11th Circuit Court of the U.S. Court of Appeals has
already ruled that these damage payments will not come from the Nuclear
Waste Fund. Consequently, Congress will have to choose where the funds
should come from and which programs will be affected. If the DOE fails
to meet the deadlines it sets, the financial liability the DOE faces
through lawsuits will continue to mount. As the DOE continues to delay
honoring its contracts with the utilities to remove spent nuclear fuel
from plant sites, both the amount of SNF and HLRW stored and the costs
associated with storing it increase. A DOE contractor has estimated
that each year's delay will escalate Program costs by approximately $1
billion per year for the civilian and defense nuclear waste disposal
programs. The longer Congress refuses to fully fund the DOE
requirements, the greater the potential liability will be to the
nation's taxpayers.
TRANSPORTATION--RIGOROUS SAFETY STANDARDS
The DOE has proven that it can safely transport SNF and HLRW from
plant sites across the nation. Since the 1960s, more than 3,000
shipments of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants, government
research facilities, universities and industrial facilities traveling
over 1,6 million miles, ``without a single death or injury due to the
radioactive nature of the cargo.'' \1\ This equates to more than 70,000
metric tons of SNF, an amount equal to what the NWPA authorizes for
Yucca Mountain. Shipments include 719 containers from the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion program between 1957 and 1999, and 2,426 highway shipments
and 301 railway shipments from the U.S. nuclear industry from 1964 to
1997. In addition, since 1996, shipments of spent nuclear fuel have
been safely transported to the United States from 41 countries to the
DOE facilities;\2\ again, without a single death or injury--not one. If
a repository is licensed at Yucca Mountain, the DOE projects
approximately 4,300 shipments over a 24-year period, averaging 175
shipments of spent nuclear fuel per year, a relatively small amount
compared with the approximately 300 million annual shipments of
hazardous materials (explosives, chemicals, flammable liquids,
corrosive materials, and other types of radioactive materials) that are
currently transported around the country every day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Conference of State Legislatures' Report, January
2000.
\2\ U.S. Department of Energy Report to the Committees on
Appropriations, January 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the DOE has safely and successfully made more than
4,581 shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico
as of May 8, 2006.\3\ The Western Governors' Association (WGA) signed
an agreement with the DOE in April 1996 that affirmed regional planning
processes for safe transportation of radioactive material. All regional
high-level radioactive waste transportation committees also endorsed
the WGA approach. The WTPP transportation planning system is setting
the standard for safety and proving to be a critical step toward
solving the nations spent nuclear waste disposal transportation
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Information Center, May 8, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To ensure safety at on-site spent fuel storage facilities and
during transportation, the material is stored in containers that meet
the NRC's rigorous engineering and safety standards testing. To satisfy
the NRC's rigorous standards for subsequent transportation approval,
these containers have been dropped 30-feet onto an unyielding surface,
dropped 40 inches onto a 6-inch vertical steel rod, exposed for 30
minutes to a 1,475 F fire, submerged under 3 feet of water for eight
hours, immersed in 50 feet of water for at least eight hours (performed
in a separate cask), and immersed in 656 feet of water for at least one
hour.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Nuclear Regulatory Commission Testing Requirements, 10 CFR
Sections, 71.61, 71.71, and 71.73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCLUSION
For the last 20 years or so, those who want to derail commercial
nuclear power in this country have used this program as a political
tool. In fact, the Federal government's failure to deliver extends back
several decades, The U.S. Congress must immediately address the growing
problem of SNF and HLRW that now exists. We can no longer pretend that
stranded waste at plant sites does not exist and is without economic
consequence to the nation's energy supply as witnessed in August 2003
and presently. We can no longer pretend that the problem of stranded
SNF and HLRW is going away. It is vitally important that the leadership
in Congress fast track legislation for the continued progress of the
permanent repository. While the Program continues to face complex
challenges, passage of legislation will allow the Program to remain
viable and ultimately succeed. Legislation has already been introduced
by the opposition for the DOE to take title of SNF at plant sites.
Their bill proposes stranding fuel indefinitely throughout the nation
while the nation's ratepayers continue to pay in perpetuity into the
NWF. it is vitally important that members of Congress place this nation
interest first. Taking title of and stranding SNF and HLRW indefinitely
throughout the nation is not an acceptable option, and it does not
diminish in any way the need for, or the urgency of, a geologic
permanent repository at Yucca Mountain. Under Section 160 (b) of the
NWPA, the Secretary will report to the President and Congress on or
after January 1, 2007, but not later than January 1, 2010, on the need
for a second repository. The DOE has already stated that they would
start with the two-dozen candidate sites that they looked at the first
time.
Those members of Congress that oppose reform of the NWPA are
supporting a short-term political issue. They are urged to take a long-
term view for the best interests of their own state and our country.
The members of the NWSC reiterate the importance for Congress to keep
the DOE on target and schedule by reclassifying the NWF annual receipts
as offsetting collections to bring the nuclear waste disposal program
to fruition as promised and mandated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, amended.