[Senate Hearing 109-470]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-470
STATUS OF THE U.S. ARMY AND U.S. MARINE CORPS IN FIGHTING THE GLOBAL
WAR ON TERRORISM
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 30, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Status of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps in Fighting the Global
War on Terrorism
june 30, 2005
Page
Chu, Hon. David S.C., Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness; Accompanied by Hon. Charles S. Abell, Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.. 6
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 14
Schoomaker, GEN Peter J., USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army 16
Hagee, Gen. Michael W., USMC, Commandant, United States Marine
Corps.......................................................... 24
(iii)
STATUS OF THE U.S. ARMY AND U.S. MARINE CORPS IN FIGHTING THE GLOBAL
WAR ON TERRORISM
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SD-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Roberts, Collins, Talent, Graham, Dole, Thune, Levin, Kennedy,
Reed, Akaka, and Bayh.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Sandra E. Luff, professional staff member; Elaine A.
McCusker, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, counsel;
Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr., professional staff member; Joseph T.
Sixeas, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general
counsel; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Bridget W. Higgins, research assistant; and
Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Benjamin L.
Rubin, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Chris Arnold, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Mackenzie M. Eaglen, assistant to Senator Collins; Lindsey R.
Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Meredith Moseley, assistant
to Senator Graham; Bob Taylor, assistant to Senator Thune;
Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator
Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Todd
Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; and Andrew Shapiro,
assistant to Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The
committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the
current status of our ground forces in fighting the global war
on terrorism the world over. The committee welcomes our
distinguished panel of witnesses: General Richard Myers, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. David Chu, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; General Peter
Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the United States Army; General
Mike Hagee, the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and our
distinguished former colleague, Charles Abell, Dr. Chu's
Principal Deputy and a valued and respected member of our team
over here.
I am going to put my statement into the record such that we
can have the maximum time for the benefit of our witnesses. We
all note the past 3\1/2\ years have been a time of great
success and enormous challenge for the United States Armed
Forces. The Armed Forces of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
Air Force, Active and Reserve components, have performed
magnificently in the months following the attacks of September
11, 2001.
The Constitution says that the Congress of the United
States shall raise and maintain our Armed Forces. We are here
today to get your report on their status and what we in
Congress can do to help our President and Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman, and others to maintain this extraordinary force
which has served America so well.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
The committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the
current status of U.S. Ground Forces in fighting the global war on
terrorism.
I welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: General Richard B.
Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. David S.C. Chu,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; General
Peter J. Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army;
General Michael W. Hagee, the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and
Charles S. Abell, Dr. Chu's Principal Deputy, and a valued former
colleague on the staff of this committee. I thank you all for your
service and for your appearance today.
The past 3\1/2\ years have been a time of great successes and
enormous challenges for the U.S. Armed Forces. The U.S. Armed Forces--
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Active and Reserve
components--have performed magnificently in the months following the
attacks of September 11, 2001. The mission of our men and women in
uniform to defend the Nation has never been executed with better skill
or dedication. The rapid military successes of Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom have evolved into
the hard work of reconstruction and stability operations necessary to
ensure peace and security in these troubled regions. Such important
work brings new challenges, including the extraordinarily high
operational tempo on people and equipment, the technological challenges
of countering asymmetric threats such as improvised explosive devices,
the demands of transforming the Armed Forces for future threats, and
the responsibility of the Nation to properly care for those who
volunteer to serve Active, Reserve, National Guard, and retired--and
their families. Since September 11, our Nation has been at war, and the
men and women of the Armed Forces and their families have been equal to
the task.
Even with these successes, however, we must be mindful of the
impact these ongoing operations are having on our forces. That is our
focus today, the status of our ground forces--the Army and Marine
Corps--both Active and Reserve components. Since the fall of 2003, the
Army has maintained over 120,000 troops in Iraq, and approximately
18,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. The Marine Corps has maintained about
20,000 marines in Iraq since early 2004 and has also contributed
significant forces to Afghanistan. Maintaining these force levels has
required the rotation of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and marines,
in and out of these theaters. The Services, as ``force providers,''
have ensured that the Commander of U.S. Central Command, General
Abizaid, has the ground forces he requires.
Such a high operational tempo raises issues and concerns that must
be understood and addressed. The first of these concerns is recruiting.
We are concerned about recent reports regarding the challenges faced in
military recruiting. On June 10, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
released monthly recruiting data showing that the Army, the Army
Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Army National Guard had
fallen short in achieving their May 2005 recruiting goals. This is not
the first such report on problems with recruiting. I ask our witnesses
to address the impact of recruiting shortfalls on the Active and
Reserve components of the Army and Marine Corps and how those shortages
may affect your ability to meet combatant commanders' requirements.
A second issue is retention. The Services have done a great job of
retaining experienced officers and noncommissioned officers, but there
are warning signs. In the Army Reserve, for example, there are
significant shortfalls in first term reenlistments and higher than
expected requests for retirement. There is no question that the stress
of frequent deployments and family separations, as well as the
improving economy, are having an effect on the willingness of trained
and experienced individuals to continue to serve. We look forward to
your assessment of the current situation and any recommendations you
may have for legislative assistance to help you in meeting your
manpower requirements.
Every battlefield commander has two critical priorities--
accomplishing the mission and protecting the force. Providing the best
force protection to all deployed forces, including personal body armor,
adequate numbers and types of armored vehicles, and the deployment and
acquisition of countermeasures for improvised explosive devices has
been a formidable challenge. The committee has been, and remains,
committed to ensuring that the Department receives whatever authorities
and resources the Services and the combatant commanders need to protect
our deployed forces. I look forward to updates from our witnesses today
on the status of these efforts, and what more needs to be done.
It is the solemn duty of this committee to fulfill its
Constitutional responsibilities to ``raise and maintain'' this
magnificent force. We will continue to do just that. I thank our
witnesses for helping the committee to understand the challenges we
face in sustaining and improving our magnificent fighting forces.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
very important hearing focused on the status of the Army and
Marine Corps in fighting the global war on terrorism. I join
you in welcoming our witnesses. Both of us and a number of our
colleagues have had a chance to shake the hands and thank some
of the extraordinary men and women who are with us today and
who have represented us so bravely and nobly around the world.
There will be more of that, I am sure, later.
We are truly proud of our men and women in uniform. They
are performing superbly in very difficult and dangerous
conditions. I hope that our witnesses today will be able to
assure us that everything possible is being done to give those
men and women everything that is needed to succeed in fighting
our Nation's battles.
One of the concerns that we all have is the impact of the
ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan on the future of our
All-Volunteer Force. The All-Volunteer Force depends on
volunteers, and the statistics show that the number of
volunteers is dwindling. The Army in particular is in trouble.
Through the end of May, the Active-Duty Army is 8,300
enlistments below its goal. That is about a 20-percent
shortfall. The Army Reserve is about 2,400 below its goal. That
is about a 20-percent shortfall. The Army National Guard is
about 9,800 soldiers below its goal and that is almost a 25-
percent shortfall.
Although the Marine Corps is on track to meet its
recruiting goal for the year, it too is facing challenges and,
as General Hagee will say in his opening statement, fiscal year
2005 is proving to be the most difficult recruiting year that
we have had in 10 years. The recruiting marketplace will become
even more challenging in fiscal year 2006.
The Services are meeting or exceeding overall retention
goals. However, this too can change if our military personnel
become exhausted by repeated combat tours. Some are already on
their second and third tours in Iraq. If our career
professionals decide that they have had enough, their departure
has the real potential of breaking our force.
The only way that we have been able to meet our troop
requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan is by mobilizing the
overextended National Guard and Reserves. This has been done at
a great cost to them, their families, and our communities.
Governors are concerned about whether they will have National
Guard personnel and equipment to respond to natural disasters.
We continue to hear from employers about the adverse impact on
small businesses and self-employed National Guard and Reserve
members.
Finally, some are wondering if the National Guard and
Reserves will be ready the next time they are needed. In a
memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Army
Reserves said that ``The Army Reserve is additionally in grave
danger of being unable to meet their other operational
requirements, including those in named op plans and continental
United States (CONUS) emergencies, and is rapidly degenerating
into a broken force.''
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau recently stated that
``My concern is that the National Guard will not be a ready
force the next time it is needed, whether here at home or
abroad.''
Our overreliance on the Guard and Reserve may have severely
impacted them as effective military units. Because we have
virtually exhausted our supply of ground forces, they will not
be readily available if needed for yet another operation. In
the assessment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the
shortage of ground forces will result in taking longer to
succeed in another conflict, such as any possible conflict in
North Korea or Iran.
Mr. Chairman, the balance of my statement has to do with
the equipment issues and some of the other issues involving
personnel, and I would ask that the full statement be
incorporated in the record at this time.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
Senator Levin. I thank the chair.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing
focused on the status of the Army and Marine Corps in fighting the
global war on terrorism. I join you in welcoming our witnesses this
morning.
The American public is truly proud of our men and women in uniform
You should be very proud of yourselves and your service to your Nation.
You are performing superbly in very difficult and dangerous conditions.
Many people are concerned that there are not enough of you for the
missions we expect you to accomplish, that you have not been equipped
with the best protective gear available, and that in some cases, you
have not been properly trained for the missions. Today, I hope that our
witnesses will be able to assure us that we are doing everything
possible to give you what you need to succeed in fighting our Nation's
battles.
While our soldiers and marines have performed magnificently in this
war, and while in general our equipment has performed nearly as well,
we were not as prepared in that regard as we should have been.
Shortages in required equipment were apparent before we invaded Iraq
and have been even more apparent during the violent aftermath for which
there had been inadequate planning. For example, early in 2003 the
Marine Corps did not have the brigade and below battle command systems
that the Army had which provide situational awareness. Consequently,
there was an urgent, last minute program launched to provide marines
with the ``Blue Force Tracker'' system just prior to the kick off of
the Iraq invasion so that Joint Force Commanders could track Marine
Corps units like they could the Army units attacking on the Marine
flank. Had this not been a planned invasion and rather an unanticipated
combat mission, then the Marines would have gone to war without that
capability.
We went into the war with equipment shortages and, even after
pouring billions into supplemental appropriations, are still suffering
from those shortages. We are all well aware of the shortages of
individual and wheeled vehicle armor, of aviation survivability
equipment, of radios and machine guns for support units in both the
Army and the Marine Corps. Now, the Marine Corps Inspector General has
identified even more shortages among Marine Corps units deployed in
Iraq.
Our soldiers and marines, the civilian workers at our depots and
arsenals, and our defense contractors have labored long and hard to put
some degree of armor on over 40,000 wheeled vehicles over the last 2
years. They are to be commended for their work. However, it has not
been without mistakes and unacceptable delays--many related to the
fragmented nature of the ever-growing requests that emanate from Iraq
and Afghanistan. For instance, the Army requirement for factory
installed up-armored HMMWVs increased over time from 247 to over
10,000, and for add-on armor for HMMWVs to over 15,000. Until recently,
the Marine Corps has been reporting a requirement for an additional 498
up-armored HMMWVs and a total of 5,500 add-on armor kits for HMMWVs.
Now the Marine commander in Iraq has requested that all of his HMMWVs
with add-on-armor be upgraded to the factory installed up-armored
version--a total of over 2,200 more.
We, in Congress, are committed to providing our troops all of the
funding necessary, both for force protection, and for prosecuting the
war, but the administration continues to refuse to request the needed
supplemental appropriations on a timely basis. We, in Congress, seek to
address the Services' war related and overall defense requirements in a
comprehensive and coherent way, but the administration's lack of action
hinders our ability to do so. The Services know what they need for
recapitalization of equipment and for equipment shortages, and have a
good estimate of personnel and operations and maintenance costs for the
remainder of the fiscal year, but the administration is unwilling to
share that information with Congress. We expect the Chief of Staff of
the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to be open and honest
with their funding requirements and cooperate with Congress in
addressing their shortfalls.
I am very concerned about the impact of the ongoing conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan on the future of our All-Volunteer Force. The All-
Volunteer Force depends on volunteers, and the statistics show that the
number of volunteers is dwindling. The Army, in particular, is in
trouble. Through the end of May, the Active-Duty Army is 8,321
enlistments below its goal of 49,285. That is about a 20 percent
shortfall. The Army Reserve is 2,392 below its goal of 11,944. That is
a 20 percent shortfall. The Army National Guard is 9,705 soldiers below
its goal of 39,957. That is almost a 25 percent shortfall. That is a
total shortfall of 20,418 recruits for the Total Army. Although the
Marine Corps is on track to meet its recruiting goal for the year, it
too is facing challenges. As General Hagee said in his opening
statement, ``Fiscal year 2005 is proving to be the most difficult
recruiting year we have had in 10 years'' and ``the recruiting
marketplace will become even more challenging in fiscal year 2006.''
The Services are meeting or exceeding overall retention goals.
However, this too can change if our military personnel become exhausted
by repeated combat tours. Some are already on their second and third
tours in Iraq. If our career professionals decide that they have had
enough, their departure has the very real potential of breaking our
force.
The only way we have been able to meet our troop requirements in
Iraq and Afghanistan is by mobilizing the overextended National Guard
and Reserves. This has been done at great cost to them, their families,
and our communities. Local governments have lost key first responders
when they were ordered to Active-Duty. Governors are concerned about
whether they will have the National Guard personnel and equipment to
respond to natural disasters as they occur. We continue to hear from
employers about the adverse impact on small businesses and self-
employed National Guard and Reserve members. Finally, some are
wondering if the National Guard and Reserves will be ready the next
time they are needed. In a memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff, the
Chief of the Army Reserve stated that ``the Army Reserve is
additionally in grave danger of being unable to meet other operational
requirements including those in named OPLANS and CONUS emergencies, and
is rapidly degenerating into a `broken' force.'' The Chief of the
National Guard Bureau recently stated that ``My concern is that the
National Guard will not be a ready force the next time it is needed,
whether here at home or abroad.'' Our over-reliance on the Guard and
Reserve may have severely impacted on them as effective military units.
Because we have virtually exhausted our supply of ground forces,
they will not be readily available if needed for yet another operation.
In the assessment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the shortage of
ground forces will result in taking longer to succeed in another
conflict, such as any possible conflict with North Korea or Iran.
This leads us directly to the question of end strength. The
overriding issue is whether the Army and Marine Corps have sufficient
personnel to maintain current force levels for future rotations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Currently, Reserve Component personnel (National Guard
and Reserves) constitute approximately 40 percent of the 139,000
personnel in Iraq. The Army Reserve is approaching a point at which it
will soon use up all personnel available for deployment, and some
reports indicate that the National Guard has used nearly all of its
combat forces. It is clear that the National Guard and Reserves will
not be able to relieve our Active component forces for much longer.
Many of us have been concerned about the size of our Army and
Marine Corps for some time. The Administration has rebuffed our
attempts over the last several years to increase the authorized end
strengths of these forces. I believe that our proposed increases were
sustainable when we made them because we had a much more favorable
recruiting market at the time. Now I fear that it is too late. Even if
we all agreed to end strength increases, we may not be able to enlist
the volunteers we would need. Earlier this year, the Senate Armed
Services Committee adopted a provision that would increase the Army by
20,000 soldiers over this year's authorized level, and 40,000 soldiers
more than the administration requested for next year. We have to make
an assessment of whether the Army can achieve that increase if it
remains in the authorization act.
Now we must ask ourselves what we can do to help the Army and
Marine Corps address their recruiting problems so that they can meet
end strength requirements. We know that the continuing news about
casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused the influencers--mothers
and fathers, other relatives, teachers, guidance counselors, ministers,
and coaches--to discourage young men and women who would otherwise be
willing to serve in the military. The improving economy and favorable
job prospects have given these young people other attractive options.
The Army has been attempting to address its recruiting shortfall by
adding recruiters, increasing bonuses, lowering standards, and
increasing targeted advertising. But it appears that will not be
enough.
I look forward to hearing what our witnesses have to say about
other initiatives to address their recruiting and equipping challenges.
I am particularly interested in what we can do to help.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Chu, we recognize you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID S.C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS, ACCOMPANIED BY: HON. CHARLES S.
ABELL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
PERSONNEL AND READINESS
Dr. Chu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great privilege
to be here.
Chairman Warner. We recognize you as senior man aboard, but
perhaps the Chief of Staff of the Army would like to make some
introductions.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I was planning to do it within the
opening statement, but I will go ahead and do it right now if
you would like.
Chairman Warner. Well then, go by your plan. We will let
Secretary Chu lead off.
I am going to ask you to draw up that microphone very close
to you.
Dr. Chu. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. That helps.
Dr. Chu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of
the committee. It is a great privilege to be here this morning.
I would like to begin by offering my thanks to our
extraordinary people in uniform today. We have at this table
some of the Nation's most senior military leaders, and we have
in our audience this morning some of the extraordinary
noncommissioned officers that have been so essential to the
Nation's success.
As members of this committee know, it was 32 years ago this
summer that President Nixon returned the United States to its
underlying tradition, and that is a tradition of a volunteer
force. That force has performed magnificently over the last 20
years. We saw that performance in Panama over 15 years ago. We
saw it in the First Persian Gulf War. We saw it in the
protection of the Kurds during the 1990s and the enforcement of
the No Fly Zone in Iraq. We have seen it in Haiti twice within
recent years. We have seen it in the Balkans, in which they
have brought a measure of stability. We have seen it in
Afghanistan, where they have given that country an historic
chance for a democratic government. We see it today in Iraq.
It is a magnificent performance. As I think General
Schoomaker and General Hagee would emphasize, however, it is
not simply an All-Volunteer Force; it is also an All-Recruited
Force. Recruiting and retention are a constant challenge for
the Department of Defense (DOD), no less so at the present
moment in history.
Our success, in my judgment, in sustaining the volunteer
force over the decades is the product of a partnership between
the legislative and executive branches. We particularly
appreciate the authorities that have been given us to achieve
that success. We particularly value the bonus authorities that
you have provided and that you are considering providing in
this year's authorization bill, that allow us to address issues
on a targeted basis. I have in mind the Reserve affiliation
bonus that we have requested; the critical skills retention
bonus for the Reserve Forces to parallel that offered to the
Active Forces; increasing the ceiling for hardship duty pay to
allow us to address the fairness of compensation based upon the
burdens being borne by our personnel; the increase that the
House has offered in the enlistment bonus to $30,000--some have
talked of higher figures; and its endorsement of a new idea
that has been brought forward of a referral reward for those
who help bring others to the ranks.
There is a second way, in my judgment, that you can assist
us, and you have been assisting us, and that is speaking out
about the value of military service and the values that young
men and women will bring back from military service to their
civilian communities. Our Nation's birthday, as we all know,
occurs in just a few days and I can think of no better occasion
on which to celebrate the value of military service than that
date.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared joint statement of Secretary Chu and Mr.
Abell follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. David S.C. Chu and Hon. Charles S.
Abell
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to be here today.
The All-Volunteer Force is performing well. Although the Army is
experiencing recruiting difficulties, recruiting and retention overall
remains solid. Today, we will review with you the current status of
military recruiting and retention and discuss some of the current
initiatives we are undertaking with the Services to address the
challenges we face.
Where we face challenges, we take the necessary steps to resolve
problems. We continually review compensation packages to ensure that
they are adequate to meet the needs of the members, whether the need be
for basic pay, allowances, special pays, or survivor benefits. We work
with the Services to take full advantage of the strength that comes
from combining resources and knowledge, and of the research that we
have done over the years to assist us.
The decisions made about authorities and funding for the next
fiscal year matter a great deal to those who have volunteered to serve
our Nation. We are happy to be here to answer your questions and
discuss the programs that we believe are essential to sustaining our
volunteer military in meeting our National security requirements.
ACTIVE DUTY RECRUITING AND RETENTION
The success of our All-Volunteer Force begins with recruiting, and
the viability of the force is assured with successful retention. This
has been easier in some years than it has in others. We gratefully
acknowledge how Congress provides additional resources during the more
challenging times to facilitate our success in both recruiting and
retention.
Active Duty Recruiting
During fiscal year 2004, the military Services recruited 176,026
first-term enlistees and an additional 6,799 individuals with previous
military service into their Active-Duty components, for a total of
182,825 Active-Duty recruits, attaining over 100 percent of the DOD
goal of 181,308 accessions.
While meeting our quantitative goals is important, we also need to
have the right mix of recruits who will complete their term of service
and perform successfully in training and on the job. The ``quality'' of
the accession cohort is critical. We typically report recruit quality
along two dimensions--aptitude and educational achievement. Both are
important, but for different reasons.
All military applicants take a written enlistment test called the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). One component of
that test is the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which measures
math and verbal skills. Those who score above average on the AFQT are
in Categories I-IIIA. We value these higher-aptitude recruits because
they are easier to train and perform better on the job than their
lower-scoring (below average) peers (Categories IIIB-IV).
We also value recruits with a high school diploma because they are
more likely to complete their initial 3 years of service. About 80
percent of recruits who have received a high school diploma complete
their first 3 years, yet only about 50 percent of those who have not
completed high school will make it. Those holding an alternative
credential, such as a high school equivalency or a General Educational
Development (GED) certificate, fall between those two extremes.
In conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences, the
Department developed a mathematical model that links educational
attainment, aptitude, and recruiting resources to job performance. With
this model we established recruit quality benchmarks of 90 percent high
school diploma graduates and 60 percent scoring above average on the
AFQT. Those benchmarks were set by examining the relationship among
costs associated with recruiting, training, attrition, and retention,
using as a standard the performance level obtained by the enlisted
force cohort of 1990. Thus, the benchmarks reflect the aptitude and
education levels necessary to minimize personnel and training costs
while maintaining the required performance level of that force.
Over the past 20 years, the military Services have met or exceeded
the Department's benchmarks for quality recruits. The quality of new
Active-Duty recruits remained high in fiscal year 2004. DOD-wide, 95
percent of new Active-Duty recruits were high school diploma graduates
(against a goal of 90 percent) and 73 percent scored above average on
the AFQT (versus a desired minimum of 60 percent).
Through May of fiscal year 2005, all Services except Army continued
to meet or exceed both quantity and quality objectives for Active duty
enlistees. The Army has achieved 40,964 of its 49,285 accession goal
through May, for an 83 percent accomplishment. Army quality levels,
however, remain strong (Table 1).
The Army is applying additional resources to achieve its recruiting
goal of 80,000 soldiers by the end of the fiscal year. The Army is
aggressively pursuing three avenues of approach: (1) adding active duty
recruiters; (2) offering stronger incentives, with increased enlistment
bonuses and an increase in the Army College Fund; and (3) using more
targeted advertising, focusing on ``influencers,'' particularly
parents.
The Services accessed 16,431 commissioned officers to Active Duty
in fiscal year 2004, with Army, Navy, and Marine Corps meeting their
numerical commissioning needs. In fiscal year 2005, Active-Duty officer
accessions are on track in all Services for numerical success this
year.
Active-Duty Retention
Over the past 3 years, the Department has worked to improve
servicemembers' quality of life. We continue to work with Congress to
achieve needed military pay raises, and to develop flexible and
discretionary compensation programs. We have every confidence that such
funding and policy modifications will be sufficient to ensure continued
success in achieving authorized strength levels.
Army and Marine Corps met or exceeded fiscal year 2004 retention
goals. Navy and Air Force were retaining more than their desired levels
at the outset of the year, but force-shaping initiatives aimed at
balancing manpower skills and assisting with force reduction caused
them to retain fewer members during the last quarter of fiscal year
2004. For fiscal year 2005, retention is on track (Table 2).
Stop Loss
The Army is the only Service currently using Stop Loss. The Army
Stop Loss program affects less than 1 percent of the total force (9,044
Active component soldiers, 3,762 USAR soldiers, and 2,480 ARNG soldiers
in May 2005). The active Army Unit Stop Loss program takes effect 90
days prior to unit deployment or with official deployment order
notification, and remains in effect through the date of redeployment to
permanent duty stations, plus a maximum of 90 days. Reserve Component
Unit Stop Loss begins 90 days prior to mobilization or with official
mobilization alert deployment order notification, and continues through
mobilization, and for a period up to 90 days following unit
demobilization.
Army initiatives of Modularity, Restructuring, and Rebalancing the
Active/Reserve component mix, and Force Stabilization will, over time,
eliminate any need for Stop Loss.
RESERVE COMPONENT RECRUITING AND RETENTION
There has been considerable discussion about the stress that the
global war on terrorism is placing on the force--both Active and
Reserve. A repeated question is: What levels of utilization can the
National Guard and Reserve sustain while still maintaining a viable
Reserve Force? Recognizing that the global war on terrorism will last
for a number of years, the Department established a strategic approach
to ensure the judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components in
support of the war effort. We will continue to assess the impact of
mobilization and deployments on the National Guard and Reserve, and
adjust our policies as needed to sustain the Reserve components.
One way to examine mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve
is in terms of today's force--those who are currently serving in the
force. Of the 838,300 Reserve component members who are currently
serving in the Selected Reserves, 364,860 have been mobilized between
September 11, 2001 and February 28, 2005--representing 43.5 percent of
the current force.
Compared to Operation Desert Storm when we mobilized 30,000
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members, we have not used the IRR in an
aggressive manner to support the global war on terrorism. In the past 3
years, we have mobilized 8,790 IRR members. However, further
utilization of the IRR remains a viable option for meeting both near-
term and long-term commitments.
We must establish the proper expectations for our Reserve component
members, their families, their employers, and the public in general. We
are undertaking a program to foster appropriate expectations for the
21st century in terms of: (1) the frequency and duration of military
duty and (2) predictability of extended duty.
Reserve Recruiting
The Reserve components continue to face a challenging recruiting
environment. In 2004, four of the six DOD Reserve components met or
exceeded their recruiting goals. While we have seen mixed results in
the first 8 months of the fiscal year, most Reserve components are
struggling to meet their recruiting goals (Table 3). The Army National
Guard achieved 76 percent of its recruiting goal through May fiscal
year 2005, and the Army Reserve achieved about 74 percent of its goal.
While the other Reserve components have been able to meet the DOD
quality benchmarks for new recruits, the Army National Guard has
historically experienced difficulty in meeting those standards. Army
National Guard recruit quality levels, at 85 and 54 percent, are
respectively, 5 and 6 percentage points below the DOD benchmarks of 90
percent high school diploma graduates and 60 percent scoring in the
upper half on the AFQT. Rather than recruiting from a national market
like the active Component, the National Guard must recruit from local
communities to fill vacancies. With National Guard units located in
over 3,000 communities throughout the Nation, meeting the quality
benchmarks has presented challenges. Conversely, the community-based
nature of the Guard works to its advantage in retention, since
``quitting the Guard'' before a guard member completes his or her
service obligation is very apparent to the whole town.
Recruiters report that there is a reduced propensity to join the
military among today's youth. Due to the realities of war, there is
less encouragement today from parents, teachers, and other influencers
to join the military. Our efforts to recognize the value of service
should help this over time. In addition to the reduced propensity to
serve, fewer individuals are separating from the Active components, and
fewer of those who do separate are affiliating with the Reserve
components. These factors, coupled with an improving economy and lower
unemployment, adversely affect recruiting.
The Army is also aggressively attacking any potential shortfall in
Reserve component recruiting through three avenues of approach: (1)
adding Reserve component recruiters, with an additional 1,900 Army
National Guard recruiters and 734 Army Reserve recruiters programmed by
the end of the fiscal year; (2) offering stronger incentives, with
increased enlistment bonuses for both prior service and non-prior
service recruits; and (3) using increased advertising, including
targeted advertising to parents and influencers. Your support of these
efforts is essential.
Reserve Retention
Retention in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve remains
very strong. Attrition in 2004, and thus far in 2005, is consistent
with pre-global war on terrorism levels, and is actually considerably
lower than pre-war levels in the Army Reserve. We expect attrition to
remain within acceptable limits. The support of Congress and stronger
retention incentives help offset what might otherwise be a reduced
likelihood to reenlist. The Department has established planning factors
that will provide greater career stability and predictability to
Reserve members, their families, and their employers. The Services are
implementing policies based on these planning factors now.
LEGISLATION IN SUPPORT OF TOTAL FORCE RECRUITING AND RETENTION
Recruiting and retaining the right people in the right skills in
the right number has always been a challenge and continues to be our
challenge today. None of this comes easily; and congressional support
continues to be key. We are grateful for the across-the-board 3.1
percent pay raise, the increases in Basic Housing Allowance for Housing
(BAH), which allowed us to reduce average member out-of-pocket expenses
from 3.5 percent to 0, and the targeted increases in pays and
allowances for our brave men and women fighting the war in Iraq and
Afghanistan and other dangerous places. We are also pleased with the
related increases in pay and allowances and bonuses for our members in
the Reserve component.
The reductions in last year's special pays and selective
reenlistment bonuses, i.e., Army--$6.3 million, Navy--$12 million,
Marine Corps--$4.8 million, and AF--$90 million, have presented
challenges to retain servicemembers essential for meeting our military
and humanitarian missions around the world. As we face these
challenges, we seek your continued support in the forthcoming mid-year
review and any associated reprogrammings.
We appreciate support of appropriations consistent with the
proposed changes to our authorities. We are requesting an increase in
the maximum amount for the Hardship Duty Pay and the House includes
this provision in their bill. Our request recognizes and compensates
our women and men who are serving in a designated hardship location,
participating in a designated hardship mission. Our leaders need the
flexibility to raise the amounts paid in order to (1) quickly recognize
troops serving under the most arduous of circumstances, (2) support
sequential assignment, and (3) meet future needs as they emerge and we
ask the Senate to pass this provision. Our other major proposal
increases the maximum allowable amount that can be offered under the
Selective Reenlistment Bonus program is also in the House bill. This
increase is necessary for targeting critical skills, as required, to
retain sufficient high quality personnel and counter the lure of the
high technology private sector and we ask the Senate to pass this
provision.
SUSTAINING ARMY STRENGTH
The Active Army, in spite of taking a $6.3 million reduction in its
special pays and selective reenlistment bonus funding this fiscal year,
has increased its enlisted retention mission from 56,100 in fiscal year
2004 to 64,162 in fiscal year 2005, an increase of almost 15 percent.
They are pursuing constructive levers, such as Force Stabilization
policy initiatives, periodic reenlistment bonus program updates, and
targeted special pays to influence soldiers and, most importantly,
families to reenlist.
In September 2003, the Army announced and implemented a $5,000
reenlistment bonus which was paid, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and
South Korea. Through May 2005, more than 14,500 soldiers have taken
advantage of the Present Duty Assignment Selective Reenlistment Bonus
by reenlisting to stay with units in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kuwait. The
Army's current program offers bonus amounts up to $15,000 to soldiers
in these locations.
The Department is taking advantage of a unique force restructuring
process--the ``Blue'' Services, Air Force and Navy, are reducing
strength while the ``Green'' Service, Army, is increasing. Our ``Blue
to Green'' program provides sailors and airmen with a unique
opportunity to ``Go Army'' under an initiative intended to rebalance
the military and preserve human capital. Sailors and airmen in skills
identified as excess who are qualified to remain in Service, shall be
given the opportunity to apply for immediate inter-service enlistment
into the Army. The Department is also working with the Services to
boost prior service accessions by sending letters to military alumni
inviting them back to Active Duty (recapturing first term losses).
The Department is also working closely with the Department of
Homeland Security's Citizenship and Immigration Service to expedite
citizenship applications for resident aliens who serve honorably as
members of our Armed Forces.
To capitalize on our successes in retention and sustain that
momentum, we must continue to invest in areas that leverage readiness.
Authorities for flexible compensation tools enable the Department to
tailor incentives to respond to specific readiness demands and provide
the capacity to efficiently start and stop them.
We note that the House and this committee included two provisions
in their versions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year 2006 that will very positively affect Reserve component
recruiting. The first provision would repeal the current affiliation
bonus authority and combine it with the non-prior service accession
bonus to provide up to $10,000 to an individual who is separating from
the Active Forces with a remaining military service obligation, and
agrees to serve in the Selected Reserve for a period of not less than 3
years in a critical skill, unit, or pay grade. We believe this will
help us overcome the current shortfall in individuals transitioning
from Active to Reserve service.
The second provision would authorize a critical skills retention
bonus for Selected Reserve members similar to the current critical
skills retention bonus available to the active components. While
attrition throughout the Reserve components is consistent with
acceptable norms, attrition in certain skills is too high. This bonus
authority would permit us to target those skills by offering bonuses to
members who agree to serve in those skills for at least 2 years. A
member would be limited to receiving $100,000 over an entire Reserve
career under this authority. This amount is half of the career limit of
$200,000 for Active component members for a similar bonus authority. We
are certain that this bonus authority will help us retain the right
members in the right skills.
Additionally, we note that the House has included two provisions in
its version of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 that will have a definite,
positive impact on military recruiting. The House raises the maximum
level for an enlistment bonus from the current $20,000 to $30,000. The
Services now use enlistment bonuses in support of recruiting for a
variety of purposes: to attract high quality youth, to steer recruits
into ``hard-to-fill'' and critical skills, to even-flow the training
base through seasonal use, to encourage enlistment for longer terms,
and to reward advanced education. Raising the cap to $30,000 will give
the Services more flexibility in combining the uses of the bonus by
encouraging particularly high quality potential recruits to enlist for
longer terms in critical skills and enter Active Duty when most needed.
The second provision authorizes a 1-year pilot test allowing the
Army to offer a $1,000 referral bonus to existing soldiers. This bonus
would be paid for referring an applicant who subsequently enlists and
completes initial entry training. Not only will this bonus be a boon to
Army recruiting at a time when it is needed, the 1-year pilot will give
the Department an opportunity to judge the merit of such a program for
Department-wide adoption. Since your bill includes no such provisions,
we urge you to recede to the House on these two during your upcoming
conference deliberations.
REDUCING STRESS ON THE FORCE
Three other initiatives proposed by the administration would also
help reduce stress on our force: strengthening the authority of the
Department of Defense to train and equip the forces of other nations;
creating in the Department of State a capacity for stabilization and
reconstruction; and civilianizing military positions where appropriate,
returning those billets to military use as needed. We regret that the
amount and the scope of the request remains unfulfilled. The House
State and Foreign Operations Appropriation Bills provide only $7.7
million of the requested $124 million for the newly created State
Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and
neither the House or Senate Authorization bills include a requested
authority for DOD to support S/CRS with a $200 million drawdown
authority. The appropriation process has reduced the funding for
civilianization by $400 million. We urge Congress to reconsider these
marks and provide the funding and authority originally requested, to
help reduce the stress on our forces.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS
Today's environment poses some recruiting and retention challenges
for our All-Volunteer Force. The pressures of high operational tempo,
increases in Army end strength in support of global war on terrorism,
and a rapidly recovering economy have made it difficult to achieve
increased Army recruiting goals. We greatly appreciate how
congressional support in previous periods of difficulty has helped us
maintain the AVF to which we are all committed.
Today I would like to encourage you to support us in a way you may
not have thought of--by lending us your time and your voice. We are
increasing our efforts to communicate the Value of Service to the
American people. Throughout our Nation's history, military Service had
a tremendous formative impact on many of our greatest leaders--from
Presidents to captains of industry to educators and even legislators--
after 10 years of much smaller forces, the patriotic tendency may be
waning in our society.
In order to address this shift, we are developing a focused public
affairs campaign aimed at bolstering patriotic impulses and
highlighting the value of military service. The ultimate objective is
to reach out to target parents and influencers in a way that leads them
to support their son's and daughter's decision to serve. We hope that
you will partner with us in this effort by teaming with our speakers'
bureau to emphasize the importance, nobility, and Value of Service.
With your continued cooperation in support of the programs I have
outlined, we can certainly see the Army through its current challenges,
ensuring continued viability of our All-Volunteer Force.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I want to thank you and members of
this subcommittee for your advocacy on behalf of the men and women of
the Department of Defense. Whether the career of a member of the Total
Force is measured in months or years, whether that career is spent in a
Reserve component, an Active component, a combination of the two, or as
a Department of Defense civilian, the Nation's gratitude for dedicated
service is proved in your continued support and funding for the
programs that keep the force strong and healthy. We look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
other members of the committee. Thank you particularly for your
continued support of our men and women in uniform and this
opportunity to discuss the readiness issues that we have in our
military.
Despite the current operational demands on our forces, we
are fully prepared to support our strategy, and to assure our
allies while we dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat any
adversary. Our forces are the most capable in the world, in
large part because they are the best trained, the best
equipped, and best led. Many are deployed in countries around
the world or at sea providing stability, peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance, and aiding in this struggle against
violent extremism.
Current requirements for the force are significant and are
not likely to decrease in the near term. In Operations Iraqi
Freedom and Enduring Freedom, our high tempo operations have
created challenges in several areas, including our force
sourcing, mobilization, training and reconstitution, and
equipment wear and tear. In the face of continuing demands on
our forces, we are analyzing all our policies and are making
changes to mitigate challenges to our readiness.
Congressional support both in the annual budget and
supplemental funding are absolutely essential to help address
these readiness challenges, and we appreciate very much that
support.
Our Nation's number one military asset, as always, remains
our people. The administration, Congress, and the DOD have made
raising our servicemembers' standard of living a top priority.
I thank Congress for your tremendous support to our troops and
to their families.
Our service men and women continue to perform superbly.
Morale is high under some very challenging conditions. I am
tremendously proud of how they are handling these challenges,
as I know you are.
We anticipate that the rest of fiscal year 2005 will be
challenging as well for both Active and Reserve component
recruiting, as was said, and are particularly concerned with
the Active Army, Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. To
mitigate these challenges, we have increased the number of
recruiters, enhanced enlistment bonuses, and have modified our
recruiting strategy.
The transformation efforts also involve measures to address
our readiness challenges. Some of these include: the
rebalancing of our Reserve components with the Active
components to achieve the appropriate mix for the 21st century;
the Army's modular force initiative, which involves a total
redesign of the operational Army into a larger, more powerful
and flexible force; and the creation of a more efficient global
force management process with U.S. Joint Forces Command as a
single-source force provider that has a global perspective.
I think we have made a lot of progress on our
transformational efforts, and we have had some successes. We
have to continue to invest heavily in transformation both
materially and intellectually to meet the challenges facing our
country today and certainly in the future.
As I said a week ago in this very room, our military is
unwavering in our focus and our resolve and our dedication to
peace and freedom. But we cannot do it alone. We need your
continued leadership to reinforce Americans' resolve. I do
believe our way of life remains at stake in this struggle
against violent extremism, and I think we are also entering a
crucial stage of this long struggle. The price for complacency
would be catastrophic. The reward, on the other hand, will be
freedom.
I thank you again, committee members and Mr. Chairman, for
your continued support. We look forward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General Myers.
Secretary Abell.
Mr. Abell. Thank you, sir. Good morning, sir, Senator
Levin, members of the committee. It is always a pleasure to be
back at the United States Senate.
Despite the sort of dour reports that we hear about the
recruiting efforts of the Department, I think there is a great
deal of good news in the Department's recruiting efforts as
well. Our Air Force, Navy, and Marines are ahead of their year-
to-date numeric accession goals, and I am confident that they
will meet or exceed their annual goals. Our Services continue
to meet the Department's quality benchmarks for the Active
Force. Recent Gallup polls show that public confidence in our
military is high and our All-Volunteer Force is not in
jeopardy.
The Army is facing some challenges, but is focused on the
mission. The emerging results for June show some positive
trends, and I am sure General Schoomaker will report more on
that.
I would like to focus for a minute on something the
chairman said and that is the thousands of the best
noncommissioned officers in our force that are stationed
throughout America, that are on duty in recruiting offices from
Time Square to the most rural parts of our country. These
noncommissioned officers, many of whom are veterans of
deployments in support of the global war on terror, are the
face of our military Services in our local communities. They
work 16 or more hours per day, many of them 7 days a week,
contacting young men and women who meet the high standards that
we demand of those who enlist.
These noncommissioned officers face resistance from many of
our educators and school administrators. They must calmly and
dispassionately discuss the nobility of service, the
opportunity and benefits of military service, to concerned
parents and coaches and mentors. They face intense pressure to
succeed, and, because of the type of people they are and their
commitment to the values and the ethos of service, some of this
pressure is self-generated. Of course, some of it is from folks
like us.
Mr. Chairman, we have to help these great noncommissioned
officers succeed. They need additional tools. Dr. Chu has
mentioned a few, bonus authorities, and new and innovative
ideas that we have asked for in our legislative package. They
also need to hear from national and community leaders that
military service is a noble undertaking and that we appreciate
and respect those who serve.
Our youth have a propensity to service. They want to join.
Many times a parent or a coach or a school counselor or other
trusted adult convinces this young man or woman just to wait a
while, to put off their service. We all need to work with our
respective recruiters to overcome this impediment. We need to
give them better tools. We also need to give them our moral
support.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I stand by for your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Secretary Abell.
General Schoomaker.
STATEMENT OF GEN PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY
General Schoomaker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and distinguished members of
the committee: It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to
appear before you today. With your permission, I would like to
submit a written statement for the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, the statements of all
witnesses in total will be put in the record.
General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir.
Before I begin my short opening remarks, I would like to
introduce the five soldiers to whom we awarded the first Army
Combat Action Badges yesterday in the Pentagon. They are seated
here behind me, and they truly represent our whole Army, our
total Army, Active, Guard, and Reserve.
First of all, directly to my right rear is Sergeant April
Pashley, who is from the U.S. Army Reserve. She is a civil
affairs team sergeant who has served in Iraq with the 173rd
Airborne Brigade in northern Iraq in the early phases of the
war.
Next to her is Sergeant Manuel Montano, a military police
team leader, originally from Colorado.
Sergeant Timothy Gustavson, a forward observer, originally
from Kansas.
Sergeant Michael Boyas, a Stryker crewman, originally from
Washington.
Sergeant Sean Steens, a motor transport operator,
originally from Alabama.
These are the great fine people, the great young people
that everybody has spoken about here. They represent them. I am
very proud to have them here.
Chairman Warner. The committee welcomes them, General.
[Applause.]
We could take a minute to describe the evolution of this
important designator. It originated with the Army, and was
approved by the Secretary of Defense. I notice that you proudly
wear the Combat Infantryman's Badge. Can you distinguish how
those two awards differ?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I would be glad to. The Combat
Infantryman's Badge is awarded to infantry and Special Forces.
The badge originated in 1942 in World War II for those that
participate routinely in direct ground combat. We designed and
authorized the Combat Action Badge this year to recognize the
fact that the battlefield has changed and that all soldiers are
warriors, and that those that perform satisfactorily under fire
in accordance with the rules of engagement, regardless of
military occupational specialty (MOS) or regardless of unit of
assignment, gender, or whatever, should be recognized for their
satisfactory service under fire. It is very similar to the
Marines' Combat Action Ribbon, if that helps.
These five soldiers are the very first, and so all across
the Army today those soldiers--this is retroactive, by the way,
to September 18, 2001, when the President signed the executive
order on the global war on terrorism.
Chairman Warner. But if I can pick up on that, I think it's
an important recognition that the battlefield today is 360
degrees. That was one of the motives, I presume, and a very
important one, that recognition.
General Schoomaker. Sir, that is correct. You will notice
if you examine closely that four out of five of these soldiers
have all been wounded in combat action.
Chairman Warner. We have the greatest respect for these
gentlemen and gentlewoman that have joined us here today. Thank
you very much.
General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir.
Earlier this month, as has been noted, the Gallup
organization reported that the American people's confidence in
the Armed Forces is at the top of all institutions in our
society, and that continues to be the trend. This is due, no
doubt, to the service of soldiers like these that are with us.
We are all humbled by the faith that the American people have
placed in us, and we realize that we cannot take this faith for
granted, that we must communicate with them honestly and
effectively.
Therefore, I appreciate the opportunity to be able to tell
the story of the United States Army before the American people
through forums like this today. America remains a Nation at
war, and this is a war unlike any other in our history and one
we will be fighting for the foreseeable future. While this is
not just the Army's war, we acutely feel its burdens. Our Army
exists to serve the American people, to protect enduring
national interests, and to fulfill our national military
requirements.
Our Army has honorably served the Nation for over 230 years
and, we celebrated our birthday June 14. We continue to do so
now in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the globe,
deterring aggression and securing our homeland. We are doing
all of this and transforming at the same time to meet
tomorrow's challenges.
Of course, while the forms of war may vary, there are
certain constants, and soldiers have been and will remain the
centerpiece of America's Army. The soldiers who are fighting in
Iraq and Afghanistan reflect the very best of what America has
to offer. They are motivated by an unwavering belief that they
are serving for what is good, right, and just, and that they
will be victorious. Today's soldiers epitomize the principle of
selfless service.
Like those in generations past who have worn the uniform
and borne arms in the Nation's defense, today's soldiers
understand that our constitutional liberties and guarantees are
worth fighting for. In fact, by raising their right hand and
taking the oath of military service with its obligations and
risks, today's soldiers have proudly answered the call to duty
that pierces the air once again, and I am humbled by their
service and sacrifices.
As we lead, train, and resource our soldiers, we must not
lose sight of the fact that the Army's character is defined by
those like the sergeants that are with me today here before
you. They have demonstrated daily their commitment to live by
the ideals contained in the warrior ethos and our Army values.
Of course, these values reflect our Nation's values.
While there is much good news, there are some areas of
concern, and I know that is why we are here today. It is
critical to recognize and acknowledge the war-induced strain
felt by our institution and the soldiers and their families who
are bearing the burden of this global war. I know your
questions and our answers will address both our accomplishments
and challenges. It is important to remember, however, that the
challenges and opportunities are not simply the Army's to face.
They are America's challenges, and we will not succeed without
congressional support and the support of the American people.
Our Nation is asking much of its Army, and I remain
confident that we will continue to do our part as we achieve
the critical mission we face together.
In closing, I would like to thank this committee for the
opportunity to appear before you and for your continued
support, which has been tremendous, for the men and women in
uniform today. I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Schoomaker follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, USA
America remains a nation at war. This is a war unlike any other in
our history and one we will be fighting for the foreseeable future.
While this is not just the ``Army's War,'' we acutely feel its burdens.
The Army exists to serve the American people, to protect enduring
national interests, and to fulfill national military responsibilities.
Our mission is enduring: to provide necessary forces and capabilities
to the combatant commanders in support of the National Security and
Defense Strategies. The Army is charged to provide forces able to
conduct prompt, sustained combat on land as well as stability
operations. Moreover, the Army is charged to provide logistical and
other capabilities to enable other Services to accomplish their
missions.
The Army has honorably served the Nation for over 230 years. We
continue to do so now with contributions to the joint team in support
of the combatant commanders. Of particular note are operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other theaters of war, deterring aggression, and
securing the homeland. We are doing all this and transforming to meet
tomorrow's challenges.
Of course, while the nature of war has changed, there is a
constant--soldiers have been and will remain the ``Centerpiece'' of
America's Army--and they must live America's values through Army Values
and the Warrior's Ethos.
The soldiers who are fighting Iraq and Afghanistan are our sons and
daughters. They reflect the best America has to offer. They are
motivated by an unwavering belief that they will be victorious on the
field of battle. Today's soldiers symbolize the principle of selfless
service.
Like those in generations past who have worn the uniform and borne
arms in America's defense, today's soldiers also recognize the ideal of
freedom enshrined in the Constitution. They understand, as few others
do, that our Constitution and the liberties it guarantees are worth
fighting for. They are ideals each swore to ``support and defend.''
They are ideals to which each promised to ``bear true faith and
allegiance.'' They are ideals each thinks worth dying for if necessary.
In fact, by raising their right hand and voluntarily taking the
oath of military service, with its obligations and attendant risks,
today's soldiers have proudly answered the call to duty that pierces
the air once again.
I am humbled by their sacrifices in service to the Nation.
In addition to the Army's statutory responsibilities under title 10
and the Army's critical role in providing Relevant and Ready Landpower
to combatant commanders in support of the full range of our global
commitments, it is our obligation to the soldiers fighting this global
war on terror that focuses our efforts.
Thanks to innovative leaders at all levels of DOD and the continued
support of Congress, the Army is able to do the following despite the
challenges of war.
Train and equip soldiers to serve as warriors and grow
adaptive leaders who are highly competent, flexible and able to
deal with the 21st century challenges they now confront;
Attain a quality of life and well-being for our people
that matches the quality of the service they provide; and
Provide infrastructure to enable the force to fulfill
its strategic roles by establishing and maintaining the
facilities and the information network required to develop, to
generate, to train and to sustain the force.
By accomplishing these difficult tasks while engaged in war, the
Army is effectively meeting the combatant commanders' needs today while
simultaneously transforming to meet the Nation's needs tomorrow.
While there is much good news, there are admittedly some areas of
concern. It is critical to recognize and acknowledge signals of stress
and strain in order to adequately address potential problems. This
testimony addresses both our accomplishments and our challenges.
What is important to remember, however, is that the challenges and
opportunities are not simply the Army's to face, they are America's--
from the young Americans who answer the call to duty, to the vital
financial and moral support of Congress, the President, the Department
of Defense, and the American people as we fight the global war on
terror. The Army and our soldiers are dependent on the resources and
the continued support of the people to achieve the critical mission we
face together.
SOLDIERS AS THE ARMY'S CENTERPIECE
This is the first time in our Nation's history that the All-
Volunteer Force has been tested during a prolonged war. It has
performed exceptionally well because of the high-quality, versatile
young Americans who have answered the call to duty.
Maintaining the viability of this force will depend on several
factors which focus on soldiers. No matter how much the tools of
warfare improve, it is the soldier who must exploit these tools to
accomplish his mission. Conflict remains a human endeavor.
Reinforcing Army Values and the Warrior Ethos
Our soldiers are smart, competent and dedicated to defending the
Nation. All are guided by Army Values. They commit to live by the
ideals contained in The Soldier's Creed which captures the Warrior
Ethos and outlines the professional attitudes and beliefs that American
soldiers have lived in 230 years of service to the Nation.
Mental and physical toughness underpin the beliefs embraced in the
Soldier's Creed and must be developed within all soldiers. The Warrior
Ethos engenders the refusal to accept failure, the conviction that
military service is much more than just another job, and the unfailing
commitment to be victorious. It defines who soldiers are and what
soldiers must do, is derived from Army Values, and reinforces a
personal commitment to service.
Soldiers join the Army to serve. Our soldiers know that their
service is required to secure our Nation's freedoms. However, it is
critical that we continue to extol and reinforce these values and the
Warrior Ethos in all we say and do in order to sustain the Army's
culture of service in a challenging and dangerous wartime environment.
Training Soldiers and Growing Adaptive Leaders
To meet current wartime requirements in light of recent lessons
learned and to prepare Army leaders and soldiers for the future, the
Army relies heavily on both training and education.
The biggest recent change is in our initial military training where
all soldiers are now receiving substantially more marksmanship
training, hand-to-hand combat instruction, an increased emphasis on
physical fitness, live-fire convoy training, and more focus on skills
they need to succeed and survive in combat.
Leader development programs have been adjusted to reflect the
challenging joint environment by incorporating the lessons learned from
current operations. We are developing more rigorous, stressful training
scenarios to prepare leaders to operate amidst uncertainty.
Furthermore, in recognition that we may well have little time to
train prior to deploying, the Army has moved from an ``alert-train-
deploy'' training model to a ``train-alert-deploy-employ'' model. For
this reason, Army transformation is focused on providing key training
and education to increase readiness for no-notice operations.
We have incorporated lessons learned into all of our systems and
training scenarios, at our mobilization stations, and training bases.
For example, we have increased funding to adapt ranges and facilities
to reflect likely combat situations. We have adjusted Defense Language
Institute requirements to meet operational needs for translators. We
have increased soldier live-fire weapons training. Furthermore, at our
Combat Training Centers (CTCs), which are critical ``agents of change''
within the Army, training scenarios are constantly updated to reflect
changing battlefield conditions and incorporate recent lessons learned.
In all scenarios, soldiers and leaders are presented with complex,
cross-cultural challenges by large numbers of role players who act as
both combatants and foreign citizens. Additionally, each of the
training centers is building extensive urban combat training
facilities, as well as cave and tunnel complexes, to simulate current
wartime environments. It is clear that our adaptation of training is
having an immediate, tangible impact in Iraq and Afghanistan and in
other places around the world.
We have also implemented formal assignment guidelines to make best
use of soldier and leader experiences to ensure we learn from our war
veterans. For example, we are assigning them to key joint and
operational billets as well as to key instructor and doctrine
development positions.
The Army remains committed to the education of our leaders even
during war. In fact, we are more aggressively pursuing leaders'
education now than during any other period of conflict in our history.
In addition to preparing leaders for specific billets, we are educating
them to promote intellectual pluralism, increase their cultural
awareness, and to encourage a ``lifetime of learning.''
Additionally, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is even
more embedded throughout Army learning to provide in-depth
understanding of joint, combined, and interagency principles and
concepts. This education is reinforced by joint assignment experiences.
Supported by Army Values, the Warrior Ethos and the experiences
obtained through training and combat, Army leaders at all levels
continue to hone the skills required to win in the complex environment
of the 21st century.
Equipping Our Soldiers
Our soldiers rely on and deserve the very best protection and
equipment we can provide. Of particular note, with the support of
Congress, acting in full partnership with industry, the Army has
dramatically increased the pace of both production and fielding of
vehicle armor. Since February 15, any tactical wheeled vehicle leaving
a forward operating base has had level one- or level two-armor. We are
meeting all the timelines for providing capability to theater. June
production will meet theater requirement for 10,079 Up-Armored HMMWVs
(UAH). While July production of Add-on Armor (AOA) kits will meet the
original requirement for 24,183 vehicles, the recent increase in
requirements to 25,847 will be met in September. Again, all vehicles
leaving forward operating bases have level one or level two-armor.
Of course, our enemies will continue to adapt their tactics. We
remain committed to protect our soldiers by meeting and exceeding
theater requirements in all areas.
The Army is working aggressively to provide soldiers the best
possible equipment. We have established two programs to anticipate
soldiers' needs and respond quickly to those identified by commanders:
The Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) and the Rapid Equipping Force
(REF). Through emergency supplemental appropriations, Congress has been
especially helpful in funding these programs.
The RFI is designed to fill soldier equipment shortfalls by quickly
fielding commercial off-the-shelf technology rather than waiting for
standard acquisition programs to address these shortages. RFI is
increasing soldier capabilities at an unprecedented pace. We are using
fielding teams at home stations and in theater to ensure that every
soldier receives 49 items including body armor, advanced ballistic
helmets, hydration systems, ballistic goggles, kneepads, elbow pads,
and other items. The equipment being issued to units reflects the
lessons learned during 3 years of fighting in complex environments,
including optical sights for weapons, grappling hooks, door rams and
fiber optic viewers to support soldiers' ability to observe from
protected positions. As of June 20, the Army has fielded RFI to 385,946
soldiers. We completed RFI in Iraq in November 2004. We are still on
track to field the entire operational Army (840,000) by the end of
fiscal year 2007.
The Rapid Equipping Force (REF) typically uses commercial and
field--engineered solutions to quickly meet operational needs. REF has
executed numerous initiatives to support the Army's Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) Task Force and the requirements of the other
Services. REF solutions meet immediate needs and are then assessed for
wider fielding and incorporation into standard acquisition processes
and provide predeployment and in-theater training on the technological
solutions it provides.
Recruiting and Retaining Soldiers
To maintain our high-quality Army, we must recruit and retain the
best soldiers in the world. We are proud of the men and women who join
the Armed Forces to make a difference, to be part of something larger
than themselves, and to ``answer the call to duty'' of their country.
As was the case last year, we are exceeding our retention goal in
2005. So far this year we have retained just under 104 percent of our
goal in each of the components--active, Reserve, and National Guard.
This is an incredibly good news story. soldiers who have borne the
burden of this global war on terror for over 3 years, some who have
deployed two and three times, are continuing to serve at an
unprecedented rate. Their patriotism is humbling and testimony to the
fact that they know what is at stake in this war and are answering the
``call to duty'' again. America can be proud.
In contrast, the recruiting environment is a more challenging one.
While the Army continues to attract highly qualified and motivated
young people, the Army's fiscal year 2005 enlisted accession mission of
80,000 is at serious risk and recruiting will remain challenging for
the remainder of fiscal year 2005 and well into the future. In fact,
fiscal year 2006 may be the toughest recruiting environment ever. For
example, the Army is projected to enter fiscal year 2006 with the
smallest beginning delayed entry program in history. This difficulty is
a function of a good economy, declining youth propensity to enlist, and
a declining number of people who recommend military service to those
they know and care about. The negative impact of these factors on
recruiting is not, however, just an Army challenge; it is America's
challenge. Leaders and influencers across America must extol the
virtues of service to the Nation and encourage our young men and woman
to serve in uniform.
The Army has taken important actions to mitigate the recruiting
shortfalls. Our Recruiting Action Plan addresses the normal levers that
affect mission achievement. We have added 1,215 active component on-
production recruiters for a total of 6,279, and provided funding
increases in incentives ($70.6 million), advertising ($70.8 million)
and recruiter support ($86.5 million).
We do, however, ask the committee's assistance in a number of
areas. First, the Army would benefit from an increase in the enlistment
bonus cap. With a strong economy America's young men and women have
many opportunities other than military service. We must compete to the
degree necessary to fill our future ranks. Second, continue to support
the Army's modularization initiatives. The Army Modular Force will
provide the right mix of units to bring stability and predictability to
overseas deployments. Third, we ask the Committee to assist in
communicating the importance of answering the call to duty to the
Nation, to our young adults, and to those who support them in their
decisions. Our core values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service,
honor, integrity, and personal courage are demonstrated by our soldiers
every day. Ours is a noble profession and the country needs their
service.
Caring for Army Families and Soldiers
The quality-of-life programs that support our soldiers and their
families, as well as our civilian workforce, play a major role in
maintaining the overall viability of the All-Volunteer Army. It is also
critical that we acknowledge that this global war on terror places
unprecedented burdens on our soldiers and their families. We are
cognizant of the fact that some marriages are strained by deployments
and that soldiers and their families face significant stresses. We are
tracking numerous metrics to ensure that we can meet the needs of those
that serve and their loved ones.
We must provide an environment in which individual and family needs
and aspirations can be met. Soldiers must understand the frequency and
cycle of projected deployments. They must believe that their families
will be provided for in their absence. Additionally, programs to
encourage civilian employer support to Reserve component soldiers are
essential. Developing the environment, compensation, education, and
other incentives to keep the All-Volunteer Army appropriately manned
may well be the greatest strategic challenge we face.
Army Well-Being programs contribute to the Army's ability to
provide trained and ready forces. These programs enable leaders to care
for their people while accomplishing the missions assigned to their
units. Providing for the well-being of soldiers' families is a
fundamental leadership imperative that requires adequate support and
resources. For example, housing programs like the Residential
Communities Initiative and Barracks Modernization Program, for which
Congress has provided tremendous support, greatly increasing our
ability to retain soldiers and families. Improvements in healthcare,
child care, youth programs, schools, facilities, and other well-being
initiatives also have a positive impact on soldier and family well-
being.
We are pursuing numerous programs designed to improve spouse
employment, ease the transitioning of high school students during moves
and extend in-state college tuition rates to military families. We are
also examining how best to expand support for veterans and National
Guard and Army Reserve soldiers. For example, TRICARE policies now
allow for the eligibility of National Guard and Reserve soldiers and
their families. We are supporting our soldiers who have become
casualties during war through the Disabled soldier Support System (DS3)
an initiative that provides our most severely disabled soldiers and
their families with a system of follow-up support beyond their
transition from military service.
SOLDIER-CENTRIC TRANSFORMATION: MODULAR FORCE, REBALANCING, AND
STABILIZATION
While more closely associated with the Army's mission of providing
relevant and ready landpower to support the combatant commanders, the
Army's Transformation initiatives have a direct, significant, and
positive affect on soldiers.
First, we are restructuring from a division-based to a brigade-
based force. These brigades are designed as modules, or self-sufficient
and standardized Brigade Combat Teams, that can be more readily
deployed and combined with other Army and joint forces to meet the
precise needs of the combatant commanders. The result of this
transformational initiative will be an operational Army that is larger
and more powerful, flexible and rapidly deployable. The Army Modular
Force will increase the combat power of the active component by 30
percent as well as the size of the Army's overall pool of available
forces by 60 percent. The total number of available brigades will
increase from 48 to 77 with 10 active brigades (three-and-a-third
divisions in our old terms) being added by the end of 2006. We are on-
track to achieve 80 percent of our planned conversion to the Army
Modular Force by end of fiscal year 2006--well ahead of schedule. Our
goal for this larger pool of available forces is to enable the Army to
generate forces in a rotational manner that will support 2 years at
home following each deployed year for Active Forces, 4 years at home
following each deployed year for the Army Reserve and 5 years at home
following each deployed year for National Guard Forces. Implementing
this program will provide more time to train, predictable deployment
schedules, and the continuous supply of landpower required by the
combatant commanders and civil authorities.
Second, we are rebalancing our Active and Reserve Forces to produce
more units with the skills in highest demand. This will realign the
specialties of more than 100,000 soldiers, producing a 50-percent
increase in infantry capabilities, with similar increases in military
police, civil affairs, intelligence, and other critical skills. We have
already converted more than 30,000 spaces. This will reduce the
operational tempo of units and individual soldiers.
Third, soldiers are being stabilized within units for longer
periods to increase combat readiness and cohesion, reduce turnover and
eliminate many repetitive training requirements. With fewer soldiers
and families moving, more soldiers will be available on any given day
to train or to fight. This initiative, started in 2004, also
transitions our Army from an individual replacement manning system to a
unit focused system--to prepare soldiers to go to war as vital members
of cohesive units.
Fourth, we are working to complement our operational transformation
by ensuring that our business, force generation and training functions
improve how we support a wartime Army and the other Services. We are
divesting functions no longer relevant and reengineering business
processes to increase responsiveness to the combatant commanders and to
conserve resources. Other improvements include developing a joint,
interdependent end-to-end logistics structure, and fostering a culture
of innovation to increase institutional agility. We seek to improve
effectiveness and identify efficiencies that will free human and
financial resources to better support operational requirements.
Fifth, we are leveraging Army science and technology programs to
accelerate maturing technologies with promising capabilities into the
current force faster than expected. Many of these technologies are
already being fielded to our front-line soldiers to dramatically
improve their capabilities. For example, specific science and
technology initiatives have improved existing capabilities to detect
and neutralize mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), identify
friendly forces in combat, develop medical technology for self-
diagnosis and treatment, identify hostile fire indicators, and enhance
survivability, training systems and robotics.
Our largest and most promising, science and technology investment
remains the pursuit of Future Combat Systems (FCS) technologies by
``spinning out'' FCS capabilities into the Current Army Modular Force.
When completed, FCS will add crucial capabilities to the Future Army
Modular Force to achieve Department of Defense transformation goals.
FCS-equipped units, operating as a system of systems, will be more
deployable and survivable than our current units and will enhance joint
capabilities. They will also be better suited to conduct immediate
operations, over extremely long distances, with other members of the
Joint Force, to produce strategic effects.
I would like to conclude, as I began, with a message about our
soldiers who are protecting our National interests around the globe,
serving in more than 120 countries. In the past 4 years, in joint and
combined environments, soldiers helped to rescue two nations from
oppression, and liberated over 50 million people. Since then, thousands
have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, and many are returning for a
second or third time. Our soldiers understand that this is a struggle
we must win. Despite the hardships and the danger to life and limb,
duty calls and our soldiers continue to answer.
Our Nation's citizens--men, women, and children from all walks of
life--sleep better at night because they know that soldiers, as part of
the Joint Team, defend the freedoms they so richly enjoy.
Today's soldiers are volunteers doing difficult duty against an
enemy who does not value life, is afraid of liberty, and desires to
crush the individual pursuit of a democratic way of life. Their
dedication to this noble effort underscores their determined
professionalism and tenacity. I am proud to serve with them as they
place the mission first and live the Warrior Ethos.
They have made our Army the most respected institution in the
United States and the world's preeminent land power. I thank them for
answering the call to duty.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
General Hagee.
STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL W. HAGEE, USMC, COMMANDANT, UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS
General Hagee. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished
members of the committee: It is my privilege to provide an
update on the state of readiness of your Marine Corps. Your
marines and their equipment continue to perform extremely well,
not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but literally around the
world. They continue to succeed because of the dedication and
commitment of the individual marine and his or her family.
Your steadfast fiscal, legislative, and moral support
remain the cornerstone of sustaining our high-quality young
Americans with the equipment and training required today, and I
thank you for that support.
On the subject of manning, I can report that the Marine
Corps continues to experience a high rate of retention in our
regular, Reserve, officer, and enlisted corps. The Center for
Naval Analyses recently reported that we are retaining higher
quality first-termers this year than we did last year. It also
reports that we are retaining a higher percentage of first-term
marines with families. These are indicators that marines
believe they are accomplishing an important mission, that they
are well-trained, equipped, led, and that they have the support
of the American people.
Additionally, our non-end of Active service (EAS)
attrition, that is, those marines who leave Active-Duty before
the end of their current contracts, is at an all-time low and
continues to decline.
As both the Secretary and General Schoomaker said,
recruiting continues to be a challenge this year. However,
thanks to significant efforts by our recruiters, we are
slightly ahead of our fiscal year 2005 shipping goals for the
number of recruits that we send to boot camp. I am confident
that we will either meet or exceed that final goal by September
30. The quality of individuals that we are shipping to the
recruit depots remains very high.
I know many of you have visited our forward-deployed
marines and know from firsthand observation the
professionalism, selflessness, and fortitude with which they
carry out their tasks. You have also seen the wear and tear on
our equipment as a result of ongoing operations. I remain in
constant dialogue with our forward commanders and, although
they are looking for improved technologies in some areas, they
tell me that they possess the equipment they need to execute
their assigned tasks.
However, because of the harsh environment and high
operational tempo, we are stressing and wearing out our
equipment at a very high rate. Based on the requests of the
forward-deployed commanders, we have provided them with
equipment in several areas above their normal authorization.
This equipment has come from some of our prepositioned supplies
and CONUS-based units. We have started to replace this
equipment, but that effort will take time and continuing
resources.
We need your help to ensure we have sufficient funding to
aggressively replace and reconstitute our equipment. We have
provided to the committee information necessary to identify our
requirements and the planned way ahead to reconstitute the
force.
We are going against an adaptive, thinking enemy, and as
the threat of improvised explosive devices has evolved we have
worked aggressively to adapt our armoring program. Our Marine
armor kit, a bolt-on kit for the A-2 series high mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), is at full production and
ahead of schedule. The commander on the ground has recently
increased his requirement for up-armored HMMWVs, the M-1114s,
and we are pursuing the redistribution of assets in theater, an
operational commander's call, and new procurement.
I thank you for your vital assistance in the fiscal year
2005 supplemental. We are executing the upkeep of the force as
fast as we can obligate the funding provided. We greatly
appreciate the fiscal year 2006 bridge supplemental
appropriations, which will ensure we maintain a continuous
funding stream as we reset your Marine Corps.
In conclusion, let me emphasize that your marines remain
fully dedicated to the idea of service to this great Nation.
They know they are well-equipped, well-led, well-trained, part
of a great team, and have the solid backing of Congress and the
American people. We fully understand that our greatest
contribution is our high level of readiness to respond across
the spectrum of conflict. Marines and their families greatly
appreciate your continued support.
I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Hagee follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Michael W. Hagee, USMC
Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the
committee; it is my honor to provide you an update on the activities
and the state of readiness of your Marine Corps since I last appeared
before you in February. Today, over 27,000 of your marines--regular and
Reserve, of all military occupational specialties--are deployed in
Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Central Command area of
operation. Many are directly engaged in combat operations. The Marine
Corps is a learning organization, and we continue, in close
coordination with our joint and coalition partners, to develop new
means to ensure that our marines--our most lethal weapons and our
Corps' most precious assets--are properly trained, equipped, and
organized to succeed in the face of an intelligent and adapting enemy.
Along with our focus on effectively fighting the current fight, we
continue to prepare to ensure our forces can rapidly respond to new
threats and future contingencies. I would again like to thank you for
your sustained fiscal and moral support of your marines and their
families.
I. CURRENT OPERATIONS
Your marines are fully engaged around the world in prosecuting the
global war on terror. As I highlighted to the committee in February,
the Marine Corps' commitment to readiness--as measured by our
personnel, training, equipment, doctrine, and organization honed over
many years--has repeatedly proven its value in the wide spectrum of
operations that we have been called on to execute since September 11,
2001. The importance of our Nation's ability to project power and
conduct military operations over long distances for extended periods as
part of a joint force has been revalidated a number of times. The
Marine Corps' role as the Nation's premier expeditionary force-in-
readiness, combined with our forward deployed posture, has enabled us
to rapidly and effectively contribute to these joint operations. Our
scalable, combined arms teams, seamlessly integrating our robust ground
and aviation forces with adaptive logistics, create speed, flexibility,
and agility to effectively respond to each unique emerging situation.
The high state of training and quality of your marines along with our
warrior ethos--highlighted by our creed that every marine is a
rifleman--allows marines to thrive in the chaotic, unstable, and
unpredictable environments that have always characterized warfare and
that our very adaptable enemies methodically attempt to exploit.
The Marine Corps has been a key participant in several operations
since the attack on our homeland. When the combatant commander needed
to get ground forces into Afghanistan in late 2001, our flexibility
allowed us to quickly join two Marine Expeditionary Units into Task
Force 58. We then projected this force from the sea more than 350 miles
inland to secure the airfield at Camp Rhino followed by the Kandahar
airfield. Then, 12 months later, we projected 70,000 marines, complete
with their equipment and sustainment--a combat ready Marine
Expeditionary Force--into Kuwait in less than 60 days. Once unleashed,
this Marine Air Ground Task Force attacked over 500 miles inland,
destroying parts of eight Iraqi Divisions, and taking portions of
Baghdad--all in less than 30 days. After returning home, the Marine
Corps was notified in October that we were going back in with a force
of 30,000 in 4 months. Concurrently, with preparing forces for this
deployment as a stability and security force involved in insurgency
operations, we conducted an evacuation of noncombatants in Liberia, and
deployed to Haiti within 24-36 hours. We have also provided significant
forces to support continuing operation in Afghanistan that assisted in
establishing a secure and stable government. As the lead for the Multi-
National-Force-West, responsible for stability and security in the Al
Anbar Province in Iraq, we formed a seamless combined/joint force that
crushed the insurgents in the complex urban environment of Fallujah in
less than 3 weeks. In addition to these examples of our expeditionary
culture and our readiness, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit trained and
deployed with a focus on Iraq was headed to the Middle East aboard ship
when the tsunami struck in the Indian Ocean littoral. They quickly
reoriented to humanitarian assistance operating in India, Indonesia,
and Sri Lanka. These operations all highlight the value of our naval
readiness and requirement for amphibious shipping and forward deployed
forces ready to respond across the spectrum of conflict.
Since February 2005, the II Marine Expeditionary Force has
completed a relief in place and transition of authority with the I
Marine Expeditionary Force and is currently executing multiple
security, urban combat, nation building and counter-insurgency and
force protection missions with great confidence and skill, in the face
of an adaptable and dangerous enemy in the heart of the Sunni Triangle.
Marines are fully engaged in the training and establishment of the
Iraqi Armed Forces. Highly motivated and professionally adept marines
are currently training, supporting, and operating with the new Iraqi
Army. We continue to aggressively match our training and equipment to
the changing threat. Finally, in the Central Command area of operation,
the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) is
supporting Multi-National Division-South East in Iraq, providing
antiterrorism training to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and conducting
bilateral training with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. We expect our
commitment to Operation Iraqi Freedom to remain at about 23,000 marines
and sailors into 2006, with the Marine Corps Reserve Forces providing
about 4,000 of these marines.
In Afghanistan, your Marine Corps continues to support Operation
Enduring Freedom with an Infantry Battalion, an EA-6B squadron, and two
Embedded Training Teams with the Afghan National Army. In the coming
months, the Marine Corps will expand its participation in the training
of the Afghan National Army as well as the training and development of
the Afghan National Police. These Marine Forces are a major element of
the Combined Joint Task Force assigned to defeat the remaining elements
of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and al Qaeda affiliated organizations,
``operationalize'' and deploy the new Afghan Army, solidify and
``professionalize'' the Afghan National Police, and set the conditions
for a successful National Assembly Election in September of this year.
In addition to these operations, our concurrent support to other
regions including the Horn of Africa, the Pacific, and the Republic of
Georgia exhibit the flexibility and effectiveness of your marines in
prosecuting the global war on terror and solidifying relationships with
foreign governments. All of these demonstrate our continued resolve to
be the world's foremost expeditionary warfighting organization--always
interoperable with joint, coalition, and interagency partners--creating
stability in an unstable world with the world's finest warriors--United
States marines.
Since February, over 31,000 marines have remained deployed around
the globe fighting our Nation's battles and winning the global war on
terror. The entire Marine Corps is supporting this sustained effort and
no forces have been fenced. This means that many marine units in the
operating forces are either deployed or training to relieve deployed
units. In an effort to sustain and regenerate Marine forces for service
in Iraq, and in response to lessons learned, the Marine Corps has
trained and deployed a sizable number of provisional units--including
cross-training artillery, tank and engineer units in security, military
police, transportation, civil affairs, and foreign military training
missions.
The Marine Corps continues to provide well trained marines and
units to meet our operational commitments worldwide, and our overall
readiness in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters remains high. This has
come at a cost though. Current operational tempo has had an impact on
unit readiness. Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, overall
unit readiness for battalion and squadron-sized units has dropped by 14
percent. Our readiness priority remains support and sustainment of our
forward deployed forces at the immediate expense of those units that
have rotated out of Operation Iraqi Freedom. As a consequence, the
readiness of the force not deployed has decreased. With your continued
support in resetting and reconstituting our forces, we will continue to
meet our forces for sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and
improve our readiness for any additional contingencies in the future.
II. PERSONNEL RETENTION AND RECRUITING
Despite the high operational tempo, the morale and commitment of
your marines remain high. We continue to work aggressively to reduce
this high tempo and still meet the requirements of the combatant
commanders.
End Strength
The current end strength of 178,000 has allowed the Marine Corps to
increase manning in our infantry units; create a dedicated Foreign
Military Training Unit; add additional recruiters; and increase
training infrastructure and other support to our operating forces.
Coupled with initiatives implemented as part of the recent force
structure review and our military to civilian conversions, we will
place many more marines in our operating forces to reduce the tempo of
operations on marines and separation from their families.
Retention
Strong retention is a complex function of leadership opportunities,
sense of purpose, operations tempo, compensation, quality of life, and
educational opportunities. We are currently meeting or exceeding our
regular and Reserve retention goals.
Enlisted Retention
We are a young force. Maintaining a continuous flow of quality new
accessions is of fundamental importance to well-balanced readiness.
Over 22,000 of our Active-Duty enlisted marines are still teenagers,
and 106,000 are serving on their first enlistment. We are currently
ahead of our plan in meeting our fiscal year 2005 career retention
goal. For first term reenlistments, we are at 98 percent of this goal
with full confidence of making or exceeding mission by 1 October 2005.
Of particular note is that our infantry military occupational
specialties are running well ahead of last year, and we have a 98-
percent first term skill match. Although the Selective Reenlistment
Bonus represents just one-half of 1 percent of our military personnel
budget, it remains a powerful retention tool, and we take pride in our
prudent stewardship of this resource. Current Selected Marine Corps
Reserve enlisted retention remains above historical averages.
Officer Retention
Overall, we continue to achieve our goals for officer retention. We
are retaining experienced and high quality officers, and both regular
and Reserve officer retention rates are above historical averages.
Recruiting
A successful retention effort is but one part of ensuring there is
a properly trained marine in the right place at the right time.
Successful recruiting is essential to replenishing the force and
maintaining a high state of readiness. Fiscal year 2005 is proving to
be the most difficult recruiting year we have had in 10 years. Eight
months into the fiscal year 2005 recruiting year, we have shipped 102.5
percent of our fiscal year 2005 active component goal with 95.2 percent
being Tier I high school graduates. The Marine Corps Reserve has also
achieved its fiscal year 2005 8-month recruiting goal, shipping 100
percent of its non-prior service goal and accessessing 107 percent of
its goal for prior-service marines. Officer accessions, in both the
active and Reserve components, will also achieve their goals.
In enlisted contracting for next year, we are slightly behind where
we had planned to be at the end of May. We have achieved 97 percent of
our 8-month contracting goal, but we are optimistic we will reach 100
percent by 1 October 2005. We believe the recruiting ``marketplace''
will become even more challenging in fiscal year 2006. Your continued
support for a strong enlistment bonus and advertising programs will be
essential to meet this challenge.
Marine Corps Reserve
The morale and patriotic spirit of the Marine Reserves, their
families, and their employers remains extraordinarily high. The Marine
Corps Reserve continues to be fully ready and capable of rapid
activation and deployment to augment and reinforce the active component
of the Marine Corps as required. To date over 31,000 Reserve marines
have served on Active Duty in the global war on terror. Currently,
approximately 10,000 Reserve marines are on Active Duty with
approximately 8,500 in cohesive Reserve ground, aviation and combat
support units and almost 1,500 serving as individual augments in both
marine and joint commands.
Marine For Life--Injured Support
Integral to our warrior ethos is our pride in taking care of our
own. Leveraging the organizational network and strengths of the Marine
for Life program, we have implemented an Injured Support program to
assist our wounded marines, our sailors serving with marines, and their
families. Initial operational capability for this program was achieved
on 15 June 2005. The Marine Corps is committed to effecting long-term
measures to advocate for, inform, and guide our wounded and their
families. Strong command interest is and will continue to be a key
element of this goal and our programs. Resources available to assist
include our interactive Web site (www.m4l.usmc.mil). Further, we have
assigned two officers to the Department of Veterans Affairs' Seamless
Transition Office to liaison and develop cooperative solutions to
complex problems between both organizations.
Deployment Support to Warriors
Deployment support programs and services for marines and their
families are essential to mission and readiness. From lessons learned,
we have developed increasingly integrated capabilities that provide a
continuum of care throughout the deployment cycle. Commanders and
support service providers team up for maximum visibility and impact to
ensure all are aware, engaged, and capable of establishing reasonable
expectations and to successfully sustain the deployment.
Pre-deployment support involves marines and their families and
helps them to prepare for the emotional, financial and logistical
realities of deployment. Briefs are provided that feature information
on resources to assist them in problem resolution, preventive actions
to provide for smooth household operation while the Marine is deployed,
overview of the operational and personal security concerns, and
information on communication flow to and from the unit.
To deal with individual and readiness concerns in theater, the
Marine Corps employs proactive counseling services. We carefully
observe our marines for signs, symptoms, and risks of untreated combat
stress and provide ready and accessible resources for counseling or
treatment as necessary. We have embedded through our Operational Stress
Control and Readiness Program (OSCAR) mental health professionals at
battalion aid stations to keep marines with low-level problems at their
assigned duties and allow those with more severe conditions to
immediately receive appropriate treatment.
Before marines depart theater, we have the first scheduled
decompression period for military chaplains to provide our Warrior
Transition Brief, which consists of various sessions developed to help
marines positively transition back into their family life and
communities. Through our Warrior Reintegration Program we help marines
return to non-combat environments and home station communities. In this
phase of support, units conduct a second decompression period and are
briefed on standards of conduct, safety, alcohol and substance abuse,
sexual harassment, suicide prevention, stress and anger management, and
financial management. Our families also receive return and reunion
information and support to ensure successful homecomings. These are but
samples of our wide-ranging support of our deployment support continuum
of care.
III. TRAINING AND EDUCATION
Ensuring our marines are properly trained for the challenges they
are likely to face is also one of our most important tasks. Deploying
Marine units rotate through standardized pre-deployment training
packages. Building on home station training in basic urban skills,
ground units deploy to the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Center
at Twentynine Palms, California, for in-depth training in convoy
operations, fire support, and small-unit coordinated assaults against
defended positions, followed by a graduate-level training exercise in
urban operations, including stability and support operations. In
addition, ground units scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan train at the
Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center at Bridgeport,
California. Here they focus on gaining the skills necessary to operate
in demanding high-altitude environments similar to what they will
experience in Afghanistan. Marine Corps aviation units continue to
participate in standardized pre-deployment training in Yuma, Arizona.
The Marine Corps continuously incorporates lessons learned from the
global war on terror into all our training. Our schools are using
lessons learned to improve pre-deployment and in-theater training.
Because Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) generate the highest number
of combat casualties, we have aggressively established robust training
programs to counter this threat. This training continues through pre-
deployment training and into the theater of operation. The training
focuses on the integration of tactics, techniques, and procedures as
well as technologies. Lessons learned are quickly incorporated into
training packages.
Recognizing the importance of cultural training as a force
multiplier, we have established a Center for Advanced Operational
Culture Learning. This center will focus all of our efforts and ensure
marines are equipped with the requisite, regional, culture, and
language expertise to enable them to operate successfully in any region
of the world.
Because close combat will never be void of casualties, we place
great emphasis on adapting changes to our first-aid training to ensure
that marines can respond to the type of injuries they are most likely
to face. We have improved our training in this area continually over
the last few years, and we are now completing final improvements on a
uniform Combat Life Saver program that will standardize enhanced first-
aid skills of the average marine. This effort has ensured a greater
density of personnel available to provide advanced life-saving
techniques to injured marines in the highly dispersed operational
environment that we face.
IV. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL READINESS STATUS AND INITIATIVES
Support and sustainment of our forward deployed forces remains our
number one equipment and materiel readiness priority. Currently, the
Marine Corps has 27 percent of our operating forces deployed in support
of the global war on terror utilizing 30 percent of our ground
equipment and 15 percent of our aviation assets. As the marine
continues to engage in sustained combat operations, deployed forces in
the field forces remain fully combat ready. This has not been without
challenges that we are addressing in both the near and mid-terms to
ensure that our high state of readiness is preserved. Challenges for
continual reconstitution of the force to meet current operational
requirements and contingencies include the accelerated wear on
equipment due to both the harsh environment and the increased wartime
demands, combat and other losses, and an overall need for greater
density of equipment in our all units based on lessons learned.
Readiness Status
Equipment readiness for deployed forces remains high, with 100
percent equipment supply readiness and average material readiness of 95
percent for ground equipment and 76 percent for aviation units.
However, continued ground combat operations are starting to take a toll
on equipment availability and unit readiness ratings. The corresponding
ground equipment readiness rates for units in the United States average
81 percent. The average readiness rate for aviation units remaining in
garrison is currently 72 percent. We address our response to this issue
in the Reconstitution and Ground Equipment Density and Mid-Term
Readiness paragraphs below.
Theater Readiness Initiatives
The Marine Corps has initiated several ongoing initiatives to
improve support to deployed forces and ensure they remain at a high
level of readiness, including: (1) establishment of a Forward In Stores
(FIS) equipment pool in theater to reduce customer wait time; (2)
outsourcing of preventative maintenance to reduce the burden on our
mechanics and allow them to focus on corrective maintenance; (3)
creation of a limited aircraft depot maintenance capability; (4)
establishment of a robust equipment rotation plan; and (5) expanded
partnering efforts with the Army to leverage capabilities already
established in theater for maintenance on 25 different weapon systems.
These actions will reduce the overall logistics footprint and the
demand on the intra theater lift/distribution requirements.
Reconstitution and Ground Equipment Density
Over 5,300 major pieces of equipment have been either destroyed or
degraded to the point that they must be rebuilt resulting in a
corresponding increase in maintenance work. As example of the effect of
the harsh desert environment and the increased usage on our equipment,
HMMWVs which have an estimated useful life of 13 years, need to be
replaced after 2 years of operating in Iraq. This accelerated wear and
tear requires increased maintenance actions and greater non-
availability of assets. In addition, the Marine Corps has deployed
forces to Iraq and Afghanistan with the equipment necessary for the
warfighter to carry out the mission. This has resulted in expanded
equipment density lists for these units beyond what they are normally
equipped and what we had planned and procured for them, particularly
with respect to communications and electronics gear, motor transport
support, and crew-served weapons. Consequently, non-deployed units,
from whom we have filled out our deployed units, are experiencing
shortages. We have validated that sustained operations over a widely
dispersed geographic area require more materiel then we had
anticipated. Based on these lessons learned and a rigorous assessment,
we intend to equip all of our units with expanded equipment density
lists, both to train as we intend to fight and to be ready for current
and future operations.
We have taken the following actions to sustain operations and
ensure readiness of our deployed units in theater and those training to
replace them: (1) we are cross-leveling and redistributing assets
across the Marine Corps to ensure that all gear is effectively
allocated, (2) we are employing our war Reserve and pre-positioned
stocks including those in Norway and aboard our Maritime Prepositioning
Ships, and (3) we are utilizing assets in our training equipment
allowances. Through the recently approved fiscal year 2005 supplemental
funding, we are currently initiating procurement of materiel and stocks
to reset the force that will also assist in improving the readiness of
our non-deployed units. We will fully utilize future funding
initiatives to ensure constant reconstitution of our forces for
sustained operations and our readiness for future contingencies,
including expanding the equipment density of all our units based on
lessons learned.
Additional critical elements of our near-term readiness efforts in
meeting operational requirements include:
Armor
Since the beginning of this conflict and as the threat against our
forces has evolved, improvements in armor to protect our marines and
sailors have been an imperative in our readiness efforts. Our goal has
been, and remains, to provide the best level of protection possible to
100 percent of in-theater vehicles. Our efforts have evolved through
various ``generations'' based primarily on lessons learned in theater
and a more robust and sophisticated technology base at home.
Vehicle Armor History
Before I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) relieved the 82nd
Airborne in the Al Anbar province in March 2004, the Marine Corps
provided first generation armor components for 100 percent of the
deploying force's 3,049 vehicles within 10 weeks of receipt of tasking.
This ``Level 3'' armor protection consisted of commercial off-the-shelf
combination of applique panels, 3/16 ``L'' shaped steel doors, and
ballistic blankets.
In response to a thinking, adaptive enemy that increased the
lethality of Improvised Explosive Devices, we sought a more robust
armoring solution for our HMMWVs and other tactical vehicles. We began
fielding of ``zonal'' armor to upgrade all armor kits to a second
generation consisting of the depot built 3/8 rolled homogeneous
armor. In all, more than 4,100 vehicles have been equipped with
upgraded ``Level 2'' 3/8 armored L shaped doors, flanks, underbody,
tailgates, rear cab plates, ballistic glass, and gunner shields.
Additionally in a joint effort with the Army, the Marine Corps received
a Multi-National Corps-Iraq distribution of 200 Add-on Armor kits and
529 up-armored HMMWV (M1114/M1116) from theater level assets, in
addition to the 37 export model up-armored HMMWVs received earlier.
As the threat continued to evolve and change, particularly with
respect to IEDs, which became increasingly sophisticated and more
powerful, it became clear that additional improvements to the ``zonal''
armor were necessary. For non-M1114 variant HMMWVs, this 3rd generation
armor consists of integrated kits, known as Marine Armor Kits (MAK).
The MAK system is a modular, bolt-on system that can be installed by
marines at the unit level. MAK systems offer significantly improved
protection against the most prevalent threats. Because the MAK is kit
armor, it is classified as ``Level 2'' armor, however, it should be
noted that it provides considerably greater protection than the second
generation ``zonal'' armor, particularly when improved underbody armor
is included.
Vehicle Armor Installation
Currently, installation of MAK systems on HMMWVs is occurring at
Camp Al Taqaddum, Iraq. As of 19 June 2005, we have completed
installation on 699 HMMWVs out of 1695 we have scheduled; the
requirement will be completed by December 2005. Similarly, for our MTVR
7-ton trucks, we have developed what is known as the MTVR Armor System
(MAS). We have commenced the installation process for 900 MTVRs, but
are not nearly as far along. The MTVR, with its current suite of armor,
however, is very well suited for the current IED threat. Finally, we
have just initiated a buy of ballistic glass inserts for use on
vehicles that have passengers not entirely encased in armor. This
initiative will also include eventual installation of ballistic glass
deflective plates for turret gunners that are currently in the design
and test stage.
Future Armor Requirements
The Marine Corps is conducting an expeditionary armored force
capability needs assessment as well as developing a ground mobility
integration plan to ensure the future Marine Air-Ground Task Force is
able to perform mounted armored combat operations across the spectrum
of military operations. We will continue to assess our armored vehicle
requirements for those forces in theater and the entire Marine Corps.
IED Countermeasures
Vehicle armor is only one of the aspects of countering this
continually evolving, lethal threat; electronic countermeasures are
another. We cannot address this topic to any degree of depth in an
unclassified document, but we are constantly looking for innovations
that will jam, detect, or pre-detonate these devices as they continue
to evolve. We are also fully integrated into the Joint IED Task Force's
efforts, and are engaged with them at every level. We are prepared to
speak in closed session on this topic.
The Office of Naval Research has established a parallel, but longer
term effort, titled the ``Manhattan Project,'' into basic research to
address the challenge presented by IEDs. This effort significantly
expands understanding into the underlying basic phenomenology involved
in the ability to detect, defeat, and destroy IEDs at range and speed.
This includes explosives, triggering devices, and the kill chain
associated with the IED threat. Long-term basic and applied research
will be conducted to address the foundations of current and future IED
problems. The ``Manhattan Project'' provides a sustained multi-
disciplinary investment in basic research. It is a deliberate effort
that engages the entire academic and scientific research community as
well.
Extremity Body Armor
Over the past few months, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and
Systems Command have been working with the Naval Research Lab to
develop the next generation of body armor. Casualty data and feedback
from medical personnel show that as much as 70 percent of shrapnel
wounds are from small fragments traveling at subsonic speeds. We
believe this information may lead to much lighter body armor. The
biggest challenge with developing an effective body armor system in a
desert environment is the heat. We are experimenting with different
materials that can be worn under the armor that allow for better
ventilation and cooling.
Cupola Protective Ensemble (CPE)
In conjunction with the Joint IED Task Force, the Marine Corps is
conducting an operational assessment of the Cupola Protective Ensemble
(CPE). This bomb suit is modified for wear by turret gunners, who are
more exposed to shrapnel and blast from IEDs and require additional
protection. The suit is worn over the existing OTV and SAPI plates and
weighs about 40 pounds. It comes with a vest that incorporates cooled
water pumped through it from a chiller that runs off vehicle power.
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Efforts
In June 2004, the Navy conducted an out-of-cycle SBIR effort to
seek innovative solutions from small businesses to address the threats
presented by IEDs, RPGs, and Rocket/Mortars. The goal of this effort
was to find ``out-of-the-box'' technologies for rapid development and
deployment into theater. ONR funded eleven proposals as SBIR Phase I
efforts. Two of the 11 IED Phase I efforts have been awarded additional
funds for Phase II efforts. ONR is in the process of conducting
technical reviews of the remaining efforts for additional Phase II
funding.
Meeting Urgent Operational Requirements
A critical factor for both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom in ensuring our marines were as adequately equipped as possible
is the Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) process that we
initiated in 2002. This process has provided a way for the leaders and
members of our operating forces to identify and forward new
requirements for weapons and gear up the chain of command for quick
review and approval--most in less than 90 days. Upon approval by the
Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council, the Marine Corps and the
Department of the Navy have realigned funds as necessary within
permitted reprogramming thresholds. When required by reprogramming
authority rules, we have forwarded requests that exceed the established
reprogramming thresholds to Congress for approval. The sources for
these internal reprogramming actions have been our investment accounts.
In many cases, the funding was made available by our decision to accept
risk and defer the full execution of otherwise approved programs in
order to address immediate warfighting needs. Through this process we
have acquired more than 200,000 pieces of essential warfighting
equipment that have been provided to the operational commanders. Some
examples are:
Vehicle hardening initiatives and IED Jammers noted in
the armor section above.
Numerous types of weapons sights
Advanced Combat Optic Gunsights (ACOG)
Thermal Weapons Sights
Family of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) equipment
including unmanned robotics and blast suits
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)--Dragon Eye and Scan
Eagle
Hardened Engineer Vehicles--13 Cougar vehicles
delivered with 14 pending
Radios: Personal Role Radios, PRC-148, PRC-117F, and
Tropo Satellite Support Radios
Unit Operations Centers
Night Vision Devices
Dust abatement chemicals and sprayer systems
Backscatter X-Ray machines
Blue Force Tracker
As noted, reprogrammings deferred deliveries or delayed the
execution of other approved procurement programs. Affected Marine Corps
programs include personal gear and weaponry, vehicles, command and
control systems, communications, and tactical computers. Marine Corps
initiatives within the Navy budget affected by reprogramming included
ships, naval weapons systems, and aircraft replacements/modifications
that marines man or that directly support us.
V. MID-TERM READINESS
In addition, key acquisition programs will ensure our readiness in
the mid-term, including:
MV-22 Osprey
Although event driven, we expect the MV-22 Operational Evaluation
to finish late summer. The program is scheduled for a Full Rate
Production decision this September. This aircraft will start to replace
the 40-year-old CH-46 starting in fiscal year 2007. In addition to
increasing the safety of air-transported forces, it will significantly
increase our operational and tactical flexibility and adaptability. We
thank Congress for its strong support of this critical capability. We
ask for your continued support to ensure that production is maintained
at an efficient and cost-effective rate to ensure the standup of MV-22
squadrons without lapse in readiness and the tactical mobility of our
forces.
Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR)
As the MV-22 completes development and begins to be fielded, the
replacement for our aging CH-53E aircraft is our next aviation
acquisition priority. The lift capacity of our CH-53E helicopters has
been diminishing with age, while the cost of maintaining them continues
to climb. By 2011, we will be forced to start an expensive process of
inducting our CH-53E helicopters into our depots for major repairs. A
heavy lift capability is the linchpin for future joint naval
operations, Seabasing, and expeditionary warfare. The process needs to
start now if we are to have a suitable replacement and maintain our
essential heavy lift capability. This replacement will provide required
capabilities, not resident in any other platform, to insert and sustain
a credible sea-based force. The HLR will transport 27,000 pounds to
distances of 110 nautical miles, the equivalent of two armored High
Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles per sortie or three independent
sustainment loads. This reliable, cost-effective heavy lift replacement
for the CH-53E will address critical challenges in maintainability,
reliability, and affordability found in present-day operations
supporting the global war on terror.
H-1 (AH-1Z/UH-1Y)
The H-1 Upgrade Program is a key modernization effort designed to
resolve existing safety deficiencies and enhance operational
effectiveness of both the AH-1W and the UH-1N. Additionally, the
commonality gained between the AH-1Z and UH-1Y (84 percent) will
significantly reduce life-cycle costs and logistical footprint, while
increasing the maintainability and deployability of both aircraft. In
March 2005, the program entered low-rate initial production (LRIP) II.
Due to aircraft attrition in operations supporting the global war on
terror, funding was approved for a `build-new' strategy for the UH-1Y
in April 2005 and is currently being pursued for the AH-1Z, in order to
prevent inventory shortfalls. Operational test and evaluation is
planned to begin in October 2005.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let me emphasize that your marines are fully
dedicated to whatever is required to protect this Nation. We will
continue to ensure that we are an agile force, adapting and shaping
ourselves to enhance our capabilities to win the global war on terror
and respond to the 21st century environment. The Marine Corps fully
understands that our greatest contribution to the Nation is our high-
level of readiness--across the spectrum of conflict. With your
continued support, we will ensure that your marines, our equipment, our
training, and our organization remain ready for any potential
contingency. Marines and their families greatly appreciate the
unwavering support of Congress and the solid backing of the American
people that is critical to maintaining our high level of success.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General, and I thank all
witnesses for their opening comments.
We will start a 6-minute round of questioning. I am going
to ask of our uniformed people each the same question, and I
will ask General Myers to lead off in response to my question.
I think all of us have in our minds the question what is at the
root cause of the falloff in recruitment. You pointed out,
General Hagee, recruiting was a challenge. I think the Chief of
Staff of the Army was a little more specific. Secretaries Chu
and Abell addressed it.
I would like to hear and have on our record exactly what
the uniformed people believe is the cause for the difficulty
today that we are encountering, primarily in recruiting and
secondarily, in other areas where there is a problem with
retention. General Myers, would you lead off and just
articulate it?
General Myers. You bet. I would be pleased to do that, Mr.
Chairman. In the area of retention, I am not aware that we have
retention issues anywhere, essentially.
Chairman Warner. The Guard and Reserve?
General Myers. In the Reserve components, both Guard and
Reserve, attrition is the lowest it has ever been, and the
retention is very high, particularly for those that have been
called, mobilized, and are in the field today. If you go to
most Reserve units, the ones that are most disappointed are the
ones that have not been called to the fight. That is just a
fact.
On recruiting, I do not think any of us have the answers.
My understanding of it is that there is a little more hesitancy
on the part of those who might recommend a military career, or
serving some time in the military, from teachers and high
school counselors, parents, aunts and uncles, probably due to
what is going on in the world today and the fact that the
military is on the front line of protecting this country. I
think we need to work on those issues, as we have talked about.
Actually a week ago we talked about this as well.
I think what we need to remember is we are a Nation at war.
As everybody on this panel, I think, has said, the stakes are
extremely high. As we have seen every year since the
declaration of our independence, there have been Americans that
have come forward to defend that freedom and defend our
freedoms, and we just need everybody's help to do that. I think
all the panel members have said that.
I think the economy probably has some effect. The
robustness of the U.S. economy has some effect on recruiting as
well, and with that, I think I will let the other panel members
speak.
Chairman Warner. General Schoomaker?
General Schoomaker. Sir, first of all I agree with what the
chairman has said. I believe that this generation wants to
serve, and wants to join. I believe we have a challenge with
the people that influence this generation--their parents, their
teachers, their coaches, and others in their community. I
believe that we require continued call to service by people
that can influence those influencers about the importance of
service.
That is just my opinion. What I would like to do is cite a
couple facts as they pertain to the Army. First of all, we are
trying to grow our Army, because you have authorized us to grow
an additional 30,000. We have set our goals higher. To put it
in perspective, the United States Army, Active, Guard, and
Reserve, is recruiting every year more than 165,000 new
soldiers. That is more than the Air Force, the Navy, and the
Marine Corps recruit together. Or, said another way, we are
trying to recruit the entire enlisted force of the United
States Marine Corps every year, not just what they are
recruiting, but their entire force. It is a big goal and a big
challenge.
I agree with the chairman that, from the Army's
perspective, it is a fact that we do not have a retention
problem today. Right now, we are at 106 percent of our goal in
the Active Force, 104 percent of our goal in the U.S. Army
Reserve, and 104 percent of our goal in the Army National Guard
in terms of retention. I think this is an indicator that those
who have joined the Army find an institution with values, where
they can trust the people on their right and left, where they
are involved in something bigger than themselves, and where
they find value in service.
We do not have a division or organization in our Army today
that is not making its retention goal, and I think that says a
lot.
The other fact that I will tell you: If you take a look at
the demographics of our population, 17 to 24 years old, we are
all competing with industry and everybody else for about 30
percent of the males between 17 and 24. That is about the
number who are eligible to meet the quality standards of our
Armed Forces. That says something about our education system.
It has to do with other areas of values that you can apply.
I think we have work to do, and that is why I say this is
just not the Armed Forces' challenge. This is the Nation's
challenge, to provide this force.
The last thing I will say: As you well know, those of us up
here are old enough to have served in a time when this force
was broken. That was in the early 1970s. We know what a broken
force looks like, and this force is not broken. This force is
the best force in my 36 years that I can ever remember. It
certainly is better than in my father's 32 years of service in
the Army, so I just stand on that.
Chairman Warner. I share that view, General. I remember so
well when you and I first met in the context of your being
appointed and preparing for the advise and consent procedure of
the Senate. You recounted your early years right there in the
closing period of Vietnam and the struggles that we had with
that force, which was largely a draft-produced force. I
remember vividly your stories that you told me. You do have a
corporate memory and a history that reaches well back into the
draft era and into the All-Volunteer Force, and I respect
greatly your views.
General Hagee.
General Hagee. Sir, I would like to align myself with the
chairman and the Chief of Staff of the Army and say just a
couple of words about the Marine Corps. Like the Army, our
retention is very high. Not only is our retention high, but, as
I mentioned in my opening statement, the quality of individual
marine that we are retaining is higher than it was, higher than
it has been, over the last couple of years. We are retaining
families, marines who are married with families, at a higher
rate, which all indicates to me that these marines feel very
confident in what they are doing, how they are trained, how
they are led, and the quality of life that we, including this
committee, have been able to provide to them.
As far as recruiting is concerned, I would like to add one
other factor that I think is out there besides the influencers.
We have noticed the same thing. A recruiter today spends about
12 hours for each individual recruited. Before September 11,
they were spending about 4 hours for each individual recruited,
and that increase is from primarily talking with the
influencers today.
Even before September 11, the propensity for individuals to
join the Armed Forces was headed down. I think that is
primarily because parents, even grandparents today, are not
that familiar with the Armed Forces. In many cases, young
Americans do not even consider joining the armed services. It
is really up to us, all of us, to talk about the ideal of
service and the necessity to join the Armed Forces.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General. I want to quickly get
in--yes, General Myers; you wished to make an additional point?
General Myers. Yes, one quick anecdote. We talk about
recruiting, and we are primarily talking, of course, about
enlisted recruiting. I think that's what we normally have our
statistics for. I had the privilege of being at West Point for
the graduation ceremony this year and, like all academies, the
classes that graduated this year are the September 11 classes.
They came in before September 11. It happened a few months
after they arrived, and then this Nation went to war. They have
been at school while we are at war, and they have been reminded
from time to time that some of their classmates have been
wounded or lost their lives in this conflict.
Yet they stayed, and they graduated. As you shake their
hands as they come across the stage, 911 of them at West Point
this year, what great men and women. If I were just to tag onto
General Schoomaker's remarks, if you want to join an
organization that is well led by those people we saw walk
across that stage at West Point--and the same thing happened at
Annapolis and the same thing happened at Colorado Springs--this
is a well-led organization. When I say well-led, I am talking
about people who actually do the leading in the field. It is
well led. They are motivated. There is not a better profession
or a more respected profession or a more noble cause.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, General.
I want to finish my time with this question to Dr. Chu and
Mr. Abell. The uniformed side has identified, the word that the
Commandant used, the ``influencers.'' The Chief of Staff of the
Army said, it is that traditional infrastructure, the family,
the counselors at high school and so forth. Therein rests the
problem with regard to recruiting.
What specifically are you planning to aim at that group to
try and regain once again their confidence, so that confidence
can be transmitted to that young person that they are working
with? Dr. Chu?
Dr. Chu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As General Hagee said, we
have noticed this as a trend for some time. It antedates
September 11. We have been working hard to explain through
various media, including advertising, to influencers the value
of military service. You may have seen some of these vignettes
that are very compelling. They show parents, coaches, teachers,
case histories, life stories of individuals who have chosen a
period of military service, whether that is brief, or whether
that is Active or Reserve, and their later civilian careers and
how those civil careers have benefited from the period of
military service.
We think this is a very important message to give to the
parents and the teachers and advisers of America: Your young
person is going to return with stronger values, better
preparation for life, after this period of military service,
whether it is 3 years or 30 years.
Our challenge is to get that word out and to make that case
to the Nation's parents so they see this as a positive and
attractive choice for the young people. As Mr. Abell said, I
think we can sometimes be too much tuned to today's news story,
not to the larger picture here.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Secretary Abell.
Mr. Abell. Yes, sir. This is part of the challenge that we
face that is really sort of less tangible. We have to get to
these influencers and have them understand the nobility and the
true nature of the service and the organizations that their
young men and women will join. Like the President's speech the
other night, in which he appealed to the American people. We
need those kinds of things. We need you and your colleagues to
appeal to the American people and have them understand that
service is a good thing, and the benefits of it, and that the
young men and women who do serve if they do not decide to stay
with us, return to their communities better citizens than when
they joined us.
We looked at the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC)
graduations this year and tried to make sure that we had
influential speakers at those graduation ceremonies, again, to
inspire the newly commissioned officers, but also to talk to
the communities--they are on the college campuses, of course--
so that the graduation ceremony, the commissioning ceremony,
the address was not delivered by the lieutenant colonel or
colonel who had been their teacher and mentor for 4 years, but
by someone who had just come from the fields of Afghanistan or
Iraq and could talk to them about what they saw and what they
experienced.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, I am running over my time.
Mr. Abell. Okay, sir.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, and hopefully in the course
of the dialogue you can finish up.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, in your testimony you indicated that
one of the causes for the recruiting shortfalls that we have in
the Army, despite extraordinary efforts, has been, I think in
your words, the ``war-induced strain'' on our families and on
our troops. Can you expand on that?
General Schoomaker. I was trying to recognize two things.
First of all, the fact that there is a strain because of the
extraordinary pressures as a result of war, because war is a
traumatic experience not only for those that are on the
battlefield, but also for the families that are left behind,
with the stresses and strains and worries and anxieties that
exist and with the absence of that family member from normal
life, from the children that are going to school, and from the
spouse that is left behind to deal with all of the pressures
that exist.
Many a family has experienced it many times, and I have
experienced it as a child with my father in World War II,
Korea, and Vietnam, my senior year in high school with my
father in Vietnam. This is a reality of military service--which
by the way--there are other professions that also have these
kinds of separations, but they do not have the pressures of the
unknown and the dangers that exist when we are at war.
That is primarily what I was talking about. I also was
saying, though, that the Army is not the only one bearing this
burden. We have other services that are bearing the burden. We
have other aspects of government and civil society that are
bearing the burdens of this war.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
We learned this morning that the Active-Duty Army exceeded
its June recruiting goal by more than 500 enlistees, and that
is good news. The Army recently began accepting more non-high
school graduates and more recruits scoring in category IV on
the standardized aptitude tests. Was there a larger percentage
of non-high school graduates as a percentage in the June
recruiting class than there was in previous ones?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I do not know, and I will have to
give you the specific answer for the record. But I would like
to make clear that the DOD standard for recruiting is that less
than 4 percent of the total can be in the lowest acceptable
aptitude category. Greater than 60 percent have to be in the
upper category and greater than 90 percent have to be high
school graduates.
We are far exceeding--our standard right now--our
attainment right now is greater than 73 percent against that 60
percent goal.
[The information referred to follows:]
During the month of June, the Army accessed 10.9 percent of its
year-to-date non-prior service soldiers who were non-high school
diploma graduates or 1.4 percent of the total year-to-date non-prior
service accessions. These soldiers have a General Education Development
(GED) certificate and are considered high school graduates. There was
no ``surge'' in June for non-high school diploma accessions. Quality
marks are an annual requirement and we continue to maintain the highest
quality of soldiers possible.
Senator Levin. There was a change, was there not, in terms
of a larger percentage within that range of non-high school
graduates being accepted?
General Schoomaker. I will have to give you the answer for
this month.
Senator Levin. No, not for the month.
General Schoomaker. But I must remind you that it is
measured against an annual goal.
Senator Levin. Right, I understand.
General Schoomaker. So there may be months where you have a
change in percentage, but we are not going to exceed it in
terms of the year. I believe, quite frankly, that we have not
broken any of those.
Senator Levin. No, I am confident of that. I am sure you
are still within the range. My question was, was there a change
recently where you were accepting more non-high school
graduates?
General Schoomaker. We have not changed the standard.
Senator Levin. Not the standard, but in terms of the
percentage that had been accepted.
General Schoomaker. I will have to give you that for the
record.
Senator Levin. All right.
[The information referred to follows:]
See response above.
General Schoomaker, the press reports indicate that the
Army is considering some unique recruiting incentives tailored
to the current recruiting environment. Can you tell us what
kind of new recruiting incentives that the Army is considering?
General Schoomaker. We have asked for a variety of changes
in authorization caps, for instance, in enlistment bonuses. We
have raised the education dollar limits. We have targeted
retention goals. We have some ideas in terms of home mortgage
incentives for people, and for education incentives.
Dr. Chu, I will have to defer to you.
Senator Levin. Just briefly, if you would, do some of these
proposals require legislative authorization?
General Schoomaker. I believe they do.
Senator Levin. Which ones would require legislative
authorization? Just give us an example?
General Schoomaker. Raising the cap for an enlistment
bonus. I think we are capped now at $20,000.
Dr. Chu. Yes, sir. The current cap on the enlistment bonus
is $20,000. The House bill has raised it to $30,000. Some have
talked about a higher number, which obviously would have its
attractions.
Senator Levin. We are already considering those. I am
talking about new ones other than the ones already under
consideration.
General Schoomaker. The Secretary of the Army has a
proposal that is up for consideration at the DOD on a home
mortgage incentive, as an example.
Senator Levin. We have increased the Army's and the
Marines' end strength. Is it likely that we are going to be
able to meet those new end strengths that we have authorized? I
look to both of you, General Schoomaker first. The Army's new
authorized end strength is 512,000. We have approved an
increase to 522,000. Is it likely we will be able to meet that,
given recruiting challenges?
General Schoomaker. I do not believe you have approved
522,000 yet. I think we have 502,000 for this year, 512,000 by
next year, and then we have actually until 2009 for the
additional increase.
Senator Levin. Let us take the 512,000. Is it likely we can
meet the 512,000?
General Schoomaker. We have to meet these recruiting goals.
Senator Levin. My time is up. I have one last question that
has to do with retention issues and the high level of
deployments we have seen--in the Army, sometimes two and three
times soldiers being deployed, and some marines have completed
their third combat tour in the last 4 years. In both the Army
and Marine Corps, can we sustain the current OPTEMPO and still
not have a problem in terms of reenlistments? Just give a quick
answer. In your judgment does that threaten our good
reenlistment numbers?
General Schoomaker. The quick answer is from the Army's
perspective, we have had one unit that we have turned around
quickly with just less than a year to return to Iraq. So to the
best of my knowledge we do not have one flag--I am talking
about a unit now--that we have turned around for a third time.
We now have two units for sure that we have turned around
for their second tour, Third Infantry Division, Third Armored
Cavalry Regiment. We have some, like the 82nd in small
portions, that we have used for short periods of time in and
out, during the elections for instance.
Senator Levin. Do you see any challenge to reenlistments
based on these high levels of deployments?
General Schoomaker. Of course, over time that would be an
increased challenge. That's why we came to you and why our
transformation is so important, in order to increase the number
of deployable units, because that is what increases the dwell
time. We now are averaging almost 20 months dwell. That is only
4 months short of our goal of 2 years dwell between
deployments.
Senator Levin. Okay, thank you.
General Hagee, do you have a quick answer?
General Hagee. In the short term, no, sir. In the mid-term,
we could, and that is why we are working so aggressively to
bring that turnaround time down.
Senator Levin. Thank you all.
Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
witnesses. I share their view wholeheartedly about the
outstanding quality and patriotism and work that the men and
women in our military are performing and the pride that we all
feel in them.
Just as an aside, General Myers, you brought up these
wonderful young men and women who just graduated from West
Point in 2005. Do you know that applications for the service
academies are down, to all three service academies, rather
significantly?
Dr. Chu. If I could address that, Senator.
Senator McCain. I asked General Myers since he brought up
the subject of West Point.
General Myers. The only one I knew about was based on a
comment I got from the Superintendent of West Point, but I
thought he said that the applications remained very strong,
higher than the year before.
Senator McCain. You might check into it. The applications
are down.
I am sure that many of you, particularly General Hagee and
General Schoomaker, know General Barry McCaffrey, who just
returned from an extended trip to Iraq, where he received
logistics and other assistance from DOD. I was very gratified
by his overall assessment of the progress of the war and
comforted to some degree, because he and others I have talked
to have said, as he said, ``I believe President Bush showed
great political and moral courage knocking down the sanctuaries
of both Afghanistan and Iraq. Now we have the right forces in
Iraq, superb leadership, growing traction of the ISF, a
developing Iraqi-led political strategy, and an Iraqi economy
that is struggling off its knees. I think that is all very good
news.''
He also says: ``We are also in a race against time. The
U.S. Army and Marines are too undermanned and underresourced to
sustain this security policy beyond next fall. They are
starting to unravel. Congress is in denial and must act. In
addition, the American people are losing faith in the
statements of our Defense Department leadership. Support for
the war is plummeting along with Active-Duty and National Guard
recruiting.''
General Hagee, do you disagree with General McCaffrey's
assessment, ``The U.S. Army and Marines are too undermanned and
too underresourced to sustain this security policy beyond next
fall''?
General Hagee. I strongly disagree that the--and I can only
address the marines there in the Al-Anbar Province--that they
are starting to unravel. I would say that in fact it is just
the other way. When I go over there and I talk with those
marines, they are very confident that they are accomplishing
the mission.
Senator McCain. That is not what he said, General Hagee. I
will quote it again, and I commend this article for your
reading. He said they are ``undermanned and underresourced to
sustain this security policy beyond next fall,'' referring to
the rotations and the strain on the military resources we have.
He was specifically speaking of the Army and Marine Corps.
Do you have sufficient forces indefinitely to maintain the
kind of rotation with the size force you have?
General Hagee. We have sufficient forces to go through next
fall. I am not sure I would say indefinitely at this current
OPSTEMPO, sir, but talking with the commander on the ground,
which I did just this morning, he is very satisfied with the
forces and the equipment that he has on the ground today.
Senator McCain. Thank you. So there are no problems really?
General Hagee. Sir, there are always challenges when we are
at war, but as far as the number of troops and the equipment
they have, he is satisfied with what he has today.
Senator McCain. Then why is it, General, that after going
into Fallujah in one of the toughest battles that the marines
have ever fought, that now we are fighting again in Fallujah?
General Hagee. Sir, we are not fighting in Fallujah the way
we did.
Senator McCain. No, we are not, but they are back there,
and they are inflicting casualties on American forces, and we
see a renewal of conflict there. My point is that we go in and
we do a magnificent job, then we have to withdraw because there
are responsibilities and challenges in other parts of Iraq,
which goes back to the fundamental disagreement that many of us
have about the ability to win and hold and expand, rather than
strike, win, and leave. We are sustaining casualties in
Fallujah as we speak.
General Hagee. Sir, we are--true. We are fighting an
insurgency, an adaptive enemy, it is not a squad versus squad,
or a platoon versus platoon. There are marines, soldiers, and
Iraqi security forces in Fallujah taking on that insurgency.
Having visited Fallujah before the battle last November,
and having visited it twice since, I can tell you that the
security situation there is much better than it was in October
and is constantly improving. Also, the economy is starting to
grow there. The people who are living in Fallujah are starting
to give us intelligence and information, because they do not
want the insurgents to come back.
Senator McCain. Dr. Chu, there are many of us that are very
concerned about retention and recruiting, and I think again
that we are hearing from too many people in the field, from too
many recruiters, from too many people who are telling me that
they are not staying because of the overstress on themselves
and their families.
We need input as to what Congress can do to provide further
incentives for recruitment and retention both. The Department
of Defense authorization bill will be on the floor within a
couple of weeks. We would like to have some specific
recommendations, or I would like to have some specific
recommendations, between now and when the bill goes to the
floor.
If we have received enough recommendations to provide
incentives and all of the options we are considering, home
mortgages, whatever it is, and we do not need to do it, that is
fine, then do not submit it. If you think we do, we would like
to have some guidance from the DOD as to how we can best ensure
that we retain and recruit the highest quality men and women.
Do you have any specific proposals that you would be
willing to send over in the next couple of weeks for us?
Dr. Chu. I would be delighted to, sir. Let me take this
opportunity----
Senator McCain. I cannot hear you very well.
Dr. Chu. Sorry. I would be delighted to, sir. Let me take
this opportunity to reiterate our support for several things
already on the table: a higher enlistment bonus, per the House
mark, or perhaps even greater; second, which I believe you are
acting on favorably, a critical skills retention bonus for the
Reserves, which we do not have today; third, which I know you
are supporting, an affiliation bonus when someone leaves Active
service, to give them an incentive, which really does not exist
in any meaningful way today, to consider joining a selected
Reserve unit. Those are three very important changes that we
would like to see.
Fourth, an increase in the ceiling on hardship duty pay,
which is in the President's original request. Fifth, as is in
the House mark, a notion the Army has pioneered, which is used
extensively in civil life, that when you refer successfully a
candidate for service that you get some kind of modest reward.
It is recognition as much as anything else, but there is also
something tangible in there.
We would be glad to submit that for you, sir, and add those
things that have, as you implied with your question, come up
since our original request.
Senator McCain. Thank you, sir. I think it would be very
helpful to us and I would be--I cannot ever speak for all of my
colleagues, but I know I can reflect the sentiment of my
colleagues. We would be eager to do whatever is necessary and
it would be helpful to us to have your specific
recommendations.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker. Mr. Chairman, could I add? Sorry to
interrupt. Could I add to that--first of all, you have been
very helpful in the kinds of things that Dr. Chu has talked
about in the past. I tried to make the point earlier, I think
that it is very important that you and your colleagues use your
considerable influence to explain to the American people and to
those that are influencers out there how important it is for
our young people to serve this Nation at a time like this.
I know you have been doing that, and I would just encourage
you to continue to help lead our people in that direction.
Senator McCain. Some of us do that every day, General.
Thank you very much. Thank you for the encouragement, and I was
very pleased at the President's emphasis on that in his speech
at Fort Bragg.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I simply say that I have been privileged
to know this fine Senator for many, many years, prior to and
during his service in the Navy, and he has at every opportunity
done precisely what you recommend. He is too modest to
recognize it.
Dr. Chu, have you had adequate time to respond to all the
questions that have been asked here recently? I saw one time
you wanted to add something?
Dr. Chu. Yes, sir, thank you. I did want to add something
on this issue of applications to the academies. What we had,
sir, was a surge post-September 11, and a return to pre-
September 11 levels. There was no change, interestingly enough,
in the number of applicants that the academy superintendents
would call qualified. Now, that is a mix of several factors.
I am pleased, again consistent with what General Myers
reported, that there remains a strong desire of Americans,
young Americans, to serve, and that continues in terms of
applications to the academies.
Chairman Warner. In follow-up on Senator McCain's request,
it is important that your staff, and majority and minority
staff of the committee, quickly determine whether our bill as
it is going to be proposed on the floor has in it now, or would
have by virtue of amendments, those matters that you have
raised today and that we will continue to discuss here. We need
to do that very promptly.
Dr. Chu. Thank you, sir. We look forward to it.
Chairman Warner. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me welcome
the young soldiers that are here, and thank them for their
service and their sacrifice on behalf of the country and the
Army. Thank you very much.
General Schoomaker, what is your recruiting goal for next
month?
General Schoomaker. Can I give it to you for the record? I
do not know it off the top of my head.
[The information referred to follows:]
In terms of achieving the annual recruiting goal of 80,000
accessions, the Army would have to access 32,879 soldiers as of the end
of June 2005.
Senator Reed. Fine, sir.
I guess, doing the math, though, it would be considerably
larger than the recruiting goal you had this month, since, I
think, to meet your annual goal you have to recruit about
11,000 inductees a month from now until the end of the fiscal
year.
General Schoomaker. You are correct. The trend has to go
up. We have to make up for what we failed to access during the
spring. First of all, I think you know that this is seasonal
and that the spring time frame has always been difficult. We
did not meet the goals that we set in the spring, even though
those goals were set lower than they would be set during the
summer period. We will have to elevate our goals, and that is
why I am not quite sure exactly.
Chairman Warner. Let us take a moment, Senator. I think it
is important. That answer must be here in the room. Have you
got it now to his first question?
General Schoomaker. The June goal was 7,450 Active-Duty.
Senator Reed. What will be the July goal?
General Schoomaker. What will the July goal be?
I am sorry, this is the July goal, 7,450.
Senator Reed. My rough math is even if you recruit 7,000
soldiers, you will still be short since--and I might be wrong--
you need to recruit about 11,000 soldiers a month for the next
3 months until the end of the fiscal year.
General Schoomaker. This is Active. We have July, August,
and September left in the year.
Senator Reed. Let me ask it another way. How many soldiers
do you need to recruit before the end of this year to meet your
yearly goal?
General Schoomaker. Let me give the specific numbers to you
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
In terms of achieving the annual recruiting goal of 80,000
accessions, the Army would have to access 32,879 soldiers as of the end
of June 2005.
Senator Reed. I appreciate that, sir.
General Schoomaker. We are at about 84 percent of our goal
right now.
Senator Reed. Let me echo the chairman's, I think,
instruction, which is that if we could get those numbers today
or tomorrow it would be very useful.
General Schoomaker. I will get them to you before the end
of the hearing.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you.
Let me ask you another question, General Schoomaker. Just
so I am accurate, how many brigades do you have in Iraq today,
Active and Reserve component?
General Schoomaker. A total of 17 brigades, 2 of which are
Marine Corps, the remainder are Army.
Senator Reed. I will just concentrate on the Army. You have
15 Army brigades?
General Schoomaker. That is correct, seven of which are
National Guard.
Senator Reed. Fifteen brigades. How many brigades have you
designated for the next rotation?
General Schoomaker. We are planning the same number.
Senator Reed. Fifteen. That leaves how many brigades in
your force, both Reserve and National Guard?
General Schoomaker. The Guard brigades will be down. I
think we are going down to two or three Guard brigades in the
next rotation.
Senator Reed. What I am trying to get at is, you have a
certain number of brigades in country, you have a certain
number of brigades that have been designated to go in country?
General Schoomaker. Correct.
Senator Reed. Then you have a remaining group of brigades
that are scattered throughout the United States. How many
brigades are those, roughly?
General Schoomaker. We have 15 in there--there is not a
clean break between this. It is a constant flow of brigades. So
we are planning for the next, for subsequent rotations, exactly
what we have in there today.
Senator Reed. No, I understand that, sir.
General Schoomaker. The dwell time between those brigades
is roughly 19, 20 months. We have sufficient brigades to
continue to do this.
Senator Reed. I am just trying to get a handle--let me cut
to the chase. Of those brigades that are not in Iraq, that are
not scheduled to go to Iraq and training up for it, the
remaining brigades, what is their readiness status in
personnel, equipment, and training?
General Schoomaker. I will have to give that to you for the
record, because it is very complex, and it is different, and
especially since we are transforming and changing the brigades
that we have brought out into the Army modular force.
[The information referred to follows:]
The information to answer the question is sensitive in nature and
can best be answered using the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model.
The remaining brigades are in the reset/train phase. In order to meet
the demands of the strategic context, the Army has implemented a new
ARFORGEN Model. The ARFORGEN provides a structured progression of
increased unit readiness over time resulting in recurring periods of
availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for
operational deployment in support of regional combatant commanders and
civil authorities. Army units will be placed into one of three force
pools as they progress through the ARFORGEN Operational Readiness
Cycles. Units will progress through the Reset/Train, and Ready force
pools, culminating in full mission readiness and availability to
deploy. Units returning from deployment and in the reset/train phase
will be considered unavailable for major combat operations in order to
recover equipment, and receive and stabilize new personnel. All units
will be prepared to conduct unit training and missions appropriate to
their respective force pools.
Senator Reed. I understand that modularization is going on,
but there are repeated reports that units that are here, not
getting ready to go to Iraq, are short of personnel,
significantly short of equipment, and, because of the shortage
of equipment, are not actively training as effectively as they
could because they do not have the equipment. As a result,
their readiness status is something below what we have seen
over the last----
General Schoomaker. I think in some cases that is a true
statement. I think the units that we are breaking apart and
resetting are not ready, and we knew that, and we planned for
that, and that is exactly what we are doing. Others are more
ready.
Senator Reed. What percentage of this residual force
constitutes those unready brigades? I am trying to get a feel
for what our strategic reserve is really.
General Schoomaker. I will have to give you the detail for
the record, and I think it probably would also be better if we
did not do it in open session.
Senator Reed. I understand that, but I think one of the
problems we face is that we have people come up and say there
are no real problems, and then when we try to press for the
real numbers and the real readiness status, we do run into
issues.
General Schoomaker. I do not think anybody is telling you
there are no real problems. I am certainly not telling you
there are no real problems. I think we have enormous
challenges, and we are transforming an Army in the middle of a
fight, a sustained fight. My belief is we are doing it quite
well. My belief is we are building an Army for the future that
is the kind of Army we are going to need for the future, and I
do not know how to get from here to there without going through
the ugliness that is required to make the transformation.
Senator Reed. I think you are right in terms of the
transformation, but I think we have to get a sense of the
readiness of the forces overall, the readiness of the Reserve
Forces, because frankly all of us have been told or have read
where, particularly with the Reserve component, that these
forces are breaking down because they do not have equipment,
they do not have all their personnel, and the training is being
affected.
I know this is a transformation process, but I think we
have to have that sense.
General Schoomaker. Senator Reed, we will come and lay out
everything, and I know you know that we have done this. In all
fairness, we have been in constant dialogue, not only with
members of this committee, but with both houses, any time that
we have been asked to lay out everything that we need to lay
out, and we will be glad to do it again.
It is a moving shot group. You are right, there is a
considerable amount of ugliness in here. We understood that. We
planned it, and we have to do it, but I might remind you that
we started this with the force that we came through the 1990s
with. We started with the force that already had a considerable
amount of hollowness in it. We started with a force that had
less than 500 up-armored HMMWVs in it in the entire United
States Army before this whole thing started. We are now at over
38,000 up-armored vehicles, as an example.
We started with a force that was short body armor, and if
we had gone on the programmatic schedule that was there it
would have taken us 49 years to equip the Army with body armor.
We were short on crew-served weapons, night vision goggles,
almost everything that you can imagine. It has everything to do
with drawing down a force and taking a multi-billion dollar,
almost a $100 billion, procurement holiday in the decade of the
1990s.
We are not only digging our way out of a hole from that,
but we are also transforming to a force that is 30 percent
larger and about 60 percent more ready.
Senator Reed. Does not something have to do with our
operations in Iraq? Frankly, the Army went into Iraq with a lot
of up-armored HMMWVs and for months there was no change.
General Schoomaker. We went into Iraq with less than 500.
Senator Reed. That is right. If we were not in Iraq, we
would probably have less than 500 up-armored HMMWVs, because
the need would not have arisen.
General Schoomaker. If your point is that the war has
helped us transform more rapidly, you are correct, because
Congress has provided resources we did not have before to
transform.
Senator Reed. I think my point, General, is that you have
suggested that you inherited an Army that was in very bad
shape, and you are trying to get it better. One of the major
reasons why you have to acquire new up-armored HMMWVs and body
armor, is because we have actively engaged in combat in Iraq,
and frankly, the first impression of the Army was that this
HMMWV problem was not a big problem, I will tell you that.
General Schoomaker. We had an Army--and I would like to
restate what you just said. I inherited an Army that was
designed to do something different than we are doing today. It
was designed for the Cold War kind of conflict. It was designed
to be filled out once the--we took risks, because everybody
thought there was going to be time----
Senator Reed. General, you used the term ``the hollow
Army'' before you took charge.
General Schoomaker. It was certainly more hollow than it is
today.
Senator Reed. General, you are switching from a hollow Army
to a Cold War Army to everything else. What I asked simply was
to tell me how ready your Army is for contingencies other than
what we are in.
General Schoomaker. Our Army is much readier than it was.
There is considerable turbulence in it because we are
transforming it. I will tell you, we have a combat-experienced
Army, and we have an Army that is rapidly, every day becoming
more capable to do what we are going to have to do for the 21st
century. I know no way to pole-vault over all of this that we
have to do to get there.
Senator Reed. General, I look forward to your specifics
about the readiness of the forces that you have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, just to answer Senator Reed.
One part of that question, which is on readiness. Title 10
requires the Chairman to submit a strategic risk assessment
every year, and that was submitted, I think in April, to
Congress. I might be off on the month, but it was submitted. It
contains a lot of that information. I assume you have read
that. It is classified, of course. It was a product of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the Chairman's assessment. Of
course, you rely on the Service Chiefs for their input, and the
combatant commands, for that matter.
That goes a long way to explaining what we can do, and it
is the backdrop and the foundation for the statements I make
about our readiness to take on other challenges. If you want to
break it down by Service in more detail, you would have to go
to the Army to do that.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, if I may.
I understand from the public reports of your report that
for the first time--and you have issued the reports over the
last several years--you indicated some concern about our
ability to respond in a timely fashion. If that is correct,
then how do you square it with General Schoomaker's remarks
that the forces are better now than they were several years
ago?
Chairman Warner. Let me say, Senator, it is an important
question, and I would like to have the Chief respond to it for
the record. We have quite a few members waiting for their
question period.
Senator Roberts. You're not kidding?
Chairman Warner. Thank you for the echo chamber. Anyway,
Senator Inhofe, we are doing the best we can here to operate a
hearing.
General Myers. I will do that, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
The report referred to by Senator Reed is the 2005 Chairman's Risk
Assessment Report, provided in accordance with title 10, United States
Code, section 153(b). This report provides the CJCS assessment of the
military and strategic risks associated with executing missions called
for under the current National Military Strategy over the next 12
months. The report addresses several issues with respect to response
timelines.
[Deleted.]
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, following along this transformation
thing, we have been living through this. I think when Senator
Akaka and I started the Army Caucus that was our main thrust
and the thing that we talked about. You and I have talked about
it, and General Shinseki. It goes back to two of your
predecessors.
The Army is trying to modularize, modernize, recapitalize,
reorganize, and all of this, at the same time we are in the
middle of prosecuting a war. I have a concern that as we focus
on our current force, we lose focus on the future. The Army has
already cancelled over 29 systems in the last 4 or 5 years,
leaving them with only one major system for the future, the
Future Combat System (FCS). We are all very excited about the
FCS. We want to see it coming. We know it is lighter and
faster. We know it meets the needs as we think they are going
to be needed in the future.
But what is your level of confidence right now in the
Army's ability to deliver the FCS and the set of manned ground
vehicles on schedule and to put us and the Army in a position
to be able to handle these contingencies as they come up?
General Schoomaker. Senator, you are exactly right. This is
our future. The FCS of the Army is not just one system; it is a
system of systems, and it is very complex and technologically
advanced.
I have a high degree of confidence that if we can stay on
the current plan that we will be able to bring FCS in as we
need to. I am concerned that there may be language in the
authorization bill that would move our manned ground systems
and other things back into science and technology (S&T). If
that occurs we will not be able to afford FCS nor will we be
able to complete it, because we are modernizing our force and
transforming it with the spinouts from FCS into the current
force.
I think we have to keep it on track as we have restructured
it, both from the standpoint of the way I reprogrammed and
restructured it last year and the way the Secretary of the Army
has taken the business side of it and worked the contractual
side. If we can do that, I have a high degree of confidence.
Senator Inhofe. Those comments will come in handy as we go
through our reauthorization process. I agree, that we have to
stay on schedule. We would have never guessed 10 years ago what
our needs would be today, but we have a pretty good idea where
we are going and I think there is general agreement. I worry
that we are going to slide on this thing, so I appreciate your
comments.
Let me, while we are talking, compliment you on your
courage to admit that we started off with a real serious
problem after the 1990s. There were two problems in the 1990s.
One was the deterioration in the military. The other was what
happened to our modernization program. I remember when General
Jumper, back in 1997, 1998, stood up and said: ``Now, our
potential enemies have a better strike vehicle than our F-15 or
F-16,'' talking about the Su-30s that are being sold, were
being sold at that time, to China and other countries.
I am glad that you are stating that this came along at a
time when there was hollowness in the force. We know that. We
know it is true. Nobody says it. So I compliment you on saying
it.
Now let me get into something else. Admiral Tom Hall, who
is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and
from Oklahoma, and he is now running the Guard and Reserve, he
was in my office this week, and we talked about how things have
changed. He said, and this is his quote now: ``You recruit a
soldier and you retain a family.'' He talked about the big
problem that they are having right now Guard and Reserve
recruiting. I do not want you folks to imply there is no
problem in recruiting when we are having a problem.
His estimation is something that I have believed for a long
time. One of the problems you are having is the family is
involved in not encouraging their young people to get into the
military because of all the negative media that is out there.
I applaud a guy that I went over to see. I was so impressed
with Lieutenant Colonel Tim Ryan and his courage to stand up
and tell the truth that I went over to Iraq just to talk to
him. He said--now listen to this: ``All right, I have had
enough. I am tired of reading distorted and glossy exaggerated
stories from major news organizations about the failures in the
war in Iraq. The inaccurate picture they paint has distorted
the world view of the daily realities in Iraq. The result is a
further erosion of international support for the United States
efforts there and a strengthening of the insurgents' resolve
and recruiting efforts while weakening our own. Through their
incomplete, uninformed, and unbalanced reporting, many members
of the media covering the war in Iraq are aiding and abetting
the enemy.''
He finished this one statement by saying--and this is
really important: ``The key to the enemy's success is use of
his limited assets to gain the greatest influence over the
masses. The media serves as a glass through which a relatively
small event can be magnified to international proportions, and
the enemy is exploiting this with incredible ease. There is not
good news to counteract the bad, so the enemy scores a victory
almost every day.''
I was very proud of him. As I go over there--and I have
been over there many times now--the first thing that is said to
me by the troops--these are marines and soldiers--is: ``Why is
it that they do not like us?'' They are talking about the
media. ``Why is it that people back home do not have a clear
picture of our successes?'' If we could just have the picture
of these guys in Fallujah, General Madhi, who was actually a
brigade commander for Saddam Hussein, who is now the brigade
commander for the Iraqi security forces, he was so impressed
with what the marines were doing there that he changed the name
to the ``Fallujah Marines.'' Here is a guy who hated Americans
before then. It was all because of the embedded training with
the marines.
The same thing is true in Tikrit. We went to Tikrit. Those
kids had the same response. So this I know is having a negative
effect on our ability to recruit. If any of the three of you
uniformed officers would respond to that, I would appreciate
it.
General Schoomaker. I will respond first because I
personally second what Colonel Ryan is saying. I think that
those views are broadly held across our Army, and it is
routinely stated by those that come home, on leave or
otherwise, that they cannot believe the difference in what they
know is going on over there and what people here are being
told.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
General Hagee. I align myself with the Chief of Staff of
the Army on that, sir; absolutely correct.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, General.
General Myers. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, General Myers.
General Myers. Of course I align myself with the two
Service Chiefs. I think all of us that occupy senior leadership
positions, no matter where it is in this country, have to be
very careful about what we say because it is, as you said--our
adversary is much better at what I would call strategic
communications than we are. It will comfort them if we say
wrong things or intemperate things, and it certainly confuses
our troops.
You hear it all the time, and it is demoralizing to folks
that have been sent over to do a job, are doing a job, doing a
darn good job, and to hear comments that somehow besmirch
either their integrity or the nobility of what they are doing.
It is not helpful. It is very harmful.
Senator Inhofe. It is very harmful also when we have
members of the United States Senate saying things that are
critical, because that is used in their propaganda machine.
I would just like to have you keep that in mind, because
the story that needs to be told is the true story, the story of
the soldier helping someone repair a roof after a problem and
helping the kids. As I was flying over the Sunni Triangle, our
kids, our troops, were throwing out candy and cookies, little
kids in these villages waving American flags. I can remember on
the first freedom flight in 1991 going back to Kuwait when a
little boy, a 9 year old boy, who had both of his ears cut off
only because he was holding an American flag, and they are
waving them now. That story has to be told.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today and for your
service to the country. Your dedication is appreciated. To our
warfighters that you have introduced, General Schoomaker: Bless
your hearts and thank you very much for your service.
Return with me now to those not so thrilling days of
yesteryear of about 5 years ago, to the issue of hollowness. I
can remember very well at that particular time that this
committee was holding a hearing and we had the Joint Chiefs
here. I asked the question, do you have the funding necessary,
the wherewithal necessary to accomplish your mission, because
there had been a lot of talk about our military being thin and
stretched and hollow. Every one of the chiefs answered: Yes,
sir, we can do our mission with the current funding, with the
exception of General Krulak, bless his heart. He said: No, sir,
I cannot do the mission that I am assigned to do the way that
we should do it. Now, the United States Marine Corps can put
cold steel on the enemy any place, any time, that the President
wants, but we could do it better if we had additional funding.
General Krulak's phone number was on speed dial in regards
from the White House, but he had the courage to say what was on
his mind. Now, that was in the spring. In the fall everybody
said: Okay, it's Chicken Little time and we have to have more
money, and we passed a supplemental. So the Army and the Navy
and the Air Force and the Marine Corps that you inherited, all
of you, was at that time stretched and thin and hollow.
Then we got ourselves in a situation with Kosovo and also a
situation with Afghanistan, and then we got into a situation
with Iraq and the global war on terrorism, plus transformation.
Why would you not have a problem? Then in the theater in which
we have the war that is being conducted, it is the most
obtrusive in regards to conditions for equipment that you can
imagine. Why would you not have a problem?
So I really empathize with your statements. It is not that
we cannot fix it, cannot do it, but Congress should stand up to
that and admit to the situation that you inherited and the new
challenges that you have had.
Having got that out of my system, General Schoomaker, you
enlisted 6,157 new soldiers, 507 more than the monthly goal, in
the finest Army in the world. I want to congratulate you for
that. I know we have problems. You also said that our retention
numbers also remain high. General Hagee, you said the same
thing on that. That does not mean that we do not have problems
on down the road.
But basically, I agree with Senator Inhofe. With the deluge
of negative news that we get daily, it is just amazing to me
that anybody would want to sign up. Now, I can recount back in
the dark ages when I joined the Marine Corps, the reason I
joined is because some lieutenant colonel with a sty in his
eye, who was not happy being a recruiter to begin with, asked
me what in the hell I could do for the Marine Corps, instead of
what the Marine Corps could do for me, and said that if I got
in trouble, why, a squad would come after me. If the squad
could not do it, a platoon would come after me; if they could
not do it, a company; and then a battalion, and then we went
right up to the entire Marine Corps, and he said: Son, we have
not been stopped yet. I raised my right hand.
I think there is still that kind of service-induced
patriotism that exists out there, and I think as we stabilize
Iraq that will take care of itself.
I was out at Fort Riley this past weekend when a battalion
came back, and there were 12 Purple Hearts, 3 Bronze Stars
awarded. I went over, shook their hands. I said: ``Thank you
very much on behalf of the Senate Armed Services Committee,''
and I mentioned your name, Mr. Chairman, and those of us on the
committee, and I said, ``and the Congress of the United
States.''
The last gentleman, who had two Purple Hearts, looked at me
and he said: ``What in the Lord's name is going on in Congress
with all these negative comments?'' Everything that we say has
a bearing in regards to our adversaries and also on the morale
of our troops. I think we have to be very careful in regards to
what we say.
Now, I have made a speech, and so I will probably run out
of time for my question. Yesterday General Pace said during his
nomination hearing--and by the way, he did a great job; and by
the way, he does happen to be the first Marine to be the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and follows an outstanding
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who just happens to be a Kansan.
At any rate, General Pace said this: ``It is going to take
us 2 years, 2 years, in depot repair and maintenance to get
back to the place that we should be if, in fact, we faced a
threat, a serious threat someplace else around the world.''
That is, I think, what worries this committee, that we are
wearing out our equipment. I am not sure we are wearing out our
troops. They still remain committed, although I know it is a
very tough challenge.
Is that about your estimate of where we are--I would ask
probably Secretary Chu and also General Myers to comment on
that--in regards to the time it will take to repair and
basically get regeared, if that is the proper word for it, to
fight another major battle if we have to once we are successful
in regards to the Mideast?
Dr. Chu. It is, sir, a matter given constant attention. It
does take time. Some of the time is the physical limit required
to effect the repairs, but there is another element that ties
in with General Schoomaker's comments on transformation. We are
changing the equipment that units have, so in many cases we
have decided we would rather wait for the new equipment and
structure the unit along the new lines rather than expend
taxpayers' resources on something we are not going to keep for
the long run.
There are some risks taken there. There is a balance. There
is an issue of how best to do that. It will take time. It does
not mean that the United States cannot meet its military needs.
We can.
General Myers.
General Myers. Senator Roberts, you are right. The
equipment is under--we are wearing out our equipment pretty
fast. As Secretary Chu said, there is a big lag time, whether
it is depot repair or whether it is new production. The
supplemental funding that we got this year, in 2005, is
absolutely essential, and it started to right this problem, but
a lot of that we are not going to see for a year, or in some
cases, 2 years. So General Pace is absolutely right.
The fact remains that, as I said in my strategic risk
assessment earlier, that we have the equipment to do what we
are doing and fulfill our national security strategy, which is
to conduct another operation. We can do what we need to do with
the equipment we have, but we have to stay at this procurement
and this repair cycle. If I were going to focus somewhere, that
is where I would focus. That is very important.
We have already talked about the procurement holiday that
we all know we took in the last century. We are coming out of
that holiday, but the accounts that are first to support other
needs are the procurement accounts. It is always where we go in
the DOD when we need to do other things like operations. We put
operations first, we put future procurement a little lower
priority, and that is where we go. We overdid it in the 1990s.
We are coming out of that now. We are in my estimation almost
well, but not quite well.
Senator Roberts. I thank you all. My time is up and I thank
you for yours.
Chairman Warner. We thank the distinguished chairman of the
Intelligence Committee for his participation this morning, as
always.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Gentlemen, I am concerned about post-
traumatic stress disorder in our servicemembers and the stress
on families associated with the long deployments. In the Red
Cross we stood up a program with regard to mental health
counseling for those who have experienced emotional trauma
because of disasters. Of course, through our Armed Forces
Emergency Services the Red Cross has provided counseling for
families since World War II.
General Hagee, in your submitted opening statement you
mentioned your operational stress program where you have mental
health professionals at aid stations. I would be interested in
hearing how you think that program is working, how effective
you feel it has been, and, General Schoomaker, whether the Army
has a similar program.
Let me also mention that the Department of Veterans'
Affairs published a study--this was March 31, the New England
Journal of Medicine--and it reported that 17 percent of marines
and soldiers reported early symptoms of depression, anxiety, or
post-traumatic stress disorder. But of those servicemembers,
only 40 percent sought any sort of mental health care.
So I would also be interested in hearing from all of you
what is being done to get these troops to seek and to receive
the kind of mental care that they need. A lot of questions in
one here. But General Hagee, if you could begin; and General
Schoomaker; and then I would like to hear from all of you on
that second part.
General Hagee. Yes, Senator. Thank you very much for that
very important question. I do not believe that there is any one
program that will solve this particular issue. First, I believe
that every single individual is affected by combat in one way
or the other. Some are affected more than others. The
operational stress control and readiness program that you
talked about, where we put a trained individual with a
psychiatrist down at the battalion level, is just one part of
an overarching program that we have.
We spend a great deal of time before the unit leaves
talking about the stress that they will realize when they are
overseas, when they are in combat. We have programs while they
are there. For the first time that I can think of, we actually
rotate individuals out of the ``front lines''--I use that in
quotes because, of course, there are no front lines over
there--but back to areas of relative stability and safety, to
where they can recoup. We do that as a unit.
We stress the fact that everyone is affected by combat and
that if you feel stress that you should come forward and look
for help. As the unit gets ready to come home, we spend time
with the individual marine talking about what he has seen, or
what she has seen there, and what the reunion is going to be
like. On the other end, we spend a great deal of time with the
families talking about the same thing before they come back.
Then after the reunion, we actually have standdowns by
battalion, where everyone has to participate in the program,
once again underlining the fact that there's nothing wrong with
feeling this stress and, most importantly, providing points of
contact and references where they can go, people with whom they
can talk if they feel this stress.
The plan is is to continue that, not just after they come
back, but this has to be an ongoing process, because you never
know when these symptoms might develop.
Senator Dole. General Schoomaker.
General Schoomaker. I align myself totally with the
Commandant and what he said. I just add, to maybe put a little
perspective on it from the standpoint of the Army. We deal with
it. First of all, everybody is affected by combat. Anybody that
denies that is truly in denial. So we are trying to deal with
it before the fact, during now workups and our training in
terms of heightening people's awareness to the fact that they
will be dealing with things and that it is important to deal
with them realistically and directly.
Second, while in theater, we have formal combat stress
teams that every time that, let us say, a unit experiences a
traumatic situation, where we can directly intervene and start
that process there. Upon return, during the reintegration
process, we have a formal reintegration process. I am
personally encouraged by the fact that we are having more and
more people that are willing to come forward and get help and
treatment, regardless of rank, and we are seeing some
considerable success in the people that do participate, whether
it be in personal counseling through the variety of resources
that are available or in marriage counseling, for instance, on
reintegrating with the family or with the spouse when they
return. Then of course we are having, with those who do have
continuing problems, continued contact and follow-up.
I think we are approaching this very comprehensively. It
would be fair to say that we continue to learn as we go on
this, and we continue to adapt as we find necessary, but I
think it is a good news story.
Dr. Chu. Senator Dole, if I might add----
Senator Dole. Yes.
Dr. Chu.--I would like to pick up on a point that General
Schoomaker touched on, which is leadership of the units. What
is given a little less attention in that New England Journal
article is the reality that there is a background level of some
of these issues in any community of individuals. What is
striking to me is how little these stress indicators change.
They do go up post-deployment, but, given what these troops
have sustained, I think it is a great tribute to the leadership
of the noncommissioned officers and the commissioned officers
of our forces, that we have seen such a modest rise.
Nonetheless, every returning individual, as General Hagee
and General Schoomaker have described, receives an evaluation
on this issue and other health issues. We recognize that post-
traumatic stress disorder often does not show up right away,
and so we have inaugurated an effort to reach out to every
returning individual at roughly the 3 to 6-month point,
including those who have been discharged, to reevaluate their
situation and reinforce the message that General Schoomaker and
General Hagee offered, that we do offer you assistance, it is
just fine to ask for it, do not be shy. There is that issue in
our society, as you have underscored.
I have worked personally with Gordon Mansfield, the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Deputy Secretary, on this
issue. He is adding the capacity of the VA, which has been a
leader in this field for many years, as I know you are aware.
We are very much dedicated to offering our people the support
that they deserve.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I will submit some additional questions for
the record. My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I wish to point out
because of your interest and work on the committee, our bill,
which hopefully will be going to the floor here in a week or
two, contains provisions on this.
Senator Dole. Yes.
Chairman Warner. We thank you for your interest in this
subject.
Senator Dole. Yes, indeed. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today, and thank you
for your extraordinary service to our country and the soldiers
you brought with you today. I cannot tell you how much we all
appreciate, despite sometimes the random statements that come
out of this place--those are not reflective of the enormous
support that we have here in Congress for the good work the
troops are doing, and I would say around the country as well. I
know, certainly in my home State of South Dakota, that we are
extremely appreciative of the way that you are taking the fight
to the terrorists so that we do not have to deal with many of
those threats here at home. So thank you.
I want to explore a question here and come back a little
bit to what Senator Roberts was referring to earlier. Clearly,
the war in Iraq and Afghanistan has involved one of the largest
operations probably since World War II in terms of logistics,
lift requirements, and repeated rotational deployments of major
units to those theaters. In fact, some units and personnel are
rotating in theater for their third tour.
As was alluded to earlier by Senator Roberts, yesterday at
his confirmation hearing, General Pace stated that it would
take 2 years to put the deployed equipment through maintenance
depots and to get them back into shape. Following up on that,
Secretary Chu, General Myers, perhaps you could describe more
broadly--what impact and strain the repeated rotational
deployments of ground units and air squadrons to Iraq and
Afghanistan have had on yearly training cycles, readiness
ratings, maintenance cycles, and, of course, on the home base
infrastructure that support these units?
Dr. Chu. Thank you, Senator. A very important question. Let
me pick up on something General Schoomaker mentioned in
response to Senator Reed's questions about readiness of Army
units. One of the by-products of the extraordinary times in
which we find ourselves is that, indeed, the experience level
of our force has increased. This is a battle-tested force. It
knows what it is doing. It is extremely professional. I think
the great news in terms of the state of this force is the high
retention rates that we have been privileged to enjoy.
Those retention rates are not an accident. They are a
result of your willingness to give us the tools necessary to
persuade people to continue with us. They are a reflection of
the extraordinary leadership of the military units.
But in my judgment, in any organization, while equipment is
important, ultimately its performance comes down to the quality
of its people and their motivation. I want to associate myself
with the views of these two service chiefs and the chairman
about the high quality of both attributes in our military force
today.
There certainly are issues about equipment repair,
resetting the force, as people like to describe it. It does
take time. It takes funds, and we are grateful for the funds
that Congress provides in that regard.
We are also beginning to move, particularly the Reserve
Forces, to a different paradigm. To ensure that the deploying
units have the most up-to-date equipment, we are concentrating
that equipment on those units, often leaving the equipment in
theater. This is not the way traditionally the American
military did it--leaving the equipment in theater, so the unit
comes to the equipment, rather than bringing everything with it
and then shipping everything back home.
The corollary may be that for the units at home, if they
are not intended to be next in line, they will have a smaller
allocation of the most modern gear. That is deliberate. We try
to ensure they have enough to train on realistically and be
prepared, but not necessarily--and this is a change I think the
Army is trying to make in how it thinks about units and their
equipping, especially Reserve units--not necessarily have every
unit have every item of the most modern gear.
We can never have as much of the most modern gear as we
like, because by definition, it is the item just off the
assembly line. So the strategy is to concentrate that gear at
the point where it will make the most difference, which is
disproportionately in the deployed theater.
General Schoomaker. If I could add, the reason I was having
difficulty with Senator Reed in answering his questions, is
that we are consuming equipment in Iraq, depending upon which
equipment we are talking about, from three to ten times what we
would normally experience. This is why we have gone to a
strategy where we leave equipment in Iraq and rotate soldiers
on the equipment, because that gives us an opportunity to reset
those units when they return on top of equipment we have been
working on during their absence.
If you were to go to the 101st Air Assault Division today
or the 82nd Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, 4th
Infantry Division, you would find a considerable amount of
sparks and dust flying down there building a far more capable
organization than left going to Iraq. That is why this whole
issue of readiness is, it truly is, a moving train.
Now, the idea of reset. I have testified now for 2 years as
we have been talking about the supplemental funding required to
reset this force. It will take us at least 2 years to reset
this force from what we are consuming in this war. There is no
doubt in my mind. We have historical precedents for this. If
you look at Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, that is
exactly what it took us, about 2 years to do it just for that.
This conflict has far greater consumption than that one did. I
am very confident it will take us 2 years and that is why we
have been testifying to that effect.
I am most concerned that we will lose interest at the end
of this conflict and forget the fact that we are going to have
to reset this force, and we will start out again with the kind
of challenges we had when we went into this particular
conflict.
Senator Thune. If I could just follow up on that. Obviously
these challenges that you have noted and the fact that it is
going to take time to reset, and the likelihood, obviously,
that we are going to be in Iraq for several more years in
significant numbers, it seems intuitive that by beginning this
massive process of relocating and consolidating units and
missions at bases throughout the United States, that the Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process is only going to add to
that strain.
We obviously did not envision this situation in 2001 when
Congress envisioned this current round of BRAC. I guess
layering that on top of all the challenges that we now face in
light of the issues that were addressed yesterday by General
Pace, and which you have responded to here this morning, how do
you plan to adapt to yet another major mission involving major
realignments and consolidations at the same time we are
rotating units into and out of Iraq and Afghanistan without
adding further burdens to our military at the worst possible
time?
General Schoomaker. From the standpoint of the Army, our
transformation really is like a rope. It has BRAC involved in
it, it has the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) involved, it
has the overseas realignments, the global force posturing. It
has our transformation to a modular force in there. All of this
comes together in a momentum and gives us opportunity we did
not have before as we fight this war.
One of the few silver linings in the cloud of having to be
at war is the fact that it gives us opportunity to take
advantage of the velocity and the momentum you gain as you
reset the force to reset it the way you want it to be in the
future. That is what we are doing. Part of the ugliness that we
have been discussing here is the fact that we started with
three armies. We had the Army of the Cold War that we were
organizing to go fight the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, that we
come back and reset to the Army of the future. So there are
three different armies going on at the same time, and when this
is over we should all be reset forward to the kind of Army that
is more relevant to the 21st century.
I will just give you a real quick example. The 507th
Maintenance Company that everybody remembers, Jessica Lynch was
assigned to, was not trained to be in the situation they were
in, was not equipped to be there--no Global Positioning System
(GPS), no radios, no training on crew-served weapons, only one
crew-served weapon in there, no night vision goggles.
Chairman Warner. We are losing your voice, General. You are
not into the mike.
General Schoomaker. I am sorry.
The 507th Maintenance Company found itself in contact with
the enemy; no radios, no night vision goggles, one crew-served
weapon, no training on the kinds of situation they found
themselves in, because they were organized for a Cold War
battlefield that was echeloned and they were not supposed to be
placed in that position.
That is what I was trying to say here. It is not that the
Army was hollow to the total extent. It was because it was
organized for a different kind of fight, and it was hollow at
the same time. Now we are trying to overcome both the
hollowness and the transformation for the kind of world that we
have now in the 21st century--realigning, global force
reposturing, transforming, and fighting a war. We are doing
this very well. It is extraordinary, and it is because of these
soldiers and because of the support that Congress has given us.
We ought to be damn happy about the way things are going.
Senator Thune. I think that the resources Congress has
provided have certainly helped, and we are doing a masterful
job of fighting the war, but as we project out and we start
looking at the length of this conflict and these deployments, I
am worried about personnel, manpower, everything else. It seems
like a complication, because we do not know what some of the
overseas basing requirements are going to be, and we do not
have yet a good feel for--I know you are in the process of
modernizing----
General Schoomaker. Senator, if we do not transform, we
will be in trouble for the long term. We have to transform to
increase the capacity and to make ourselves more relevant. We
are talking about building an Army that has 30 percent more
capability and about 60 percent increase in availability. We
are talking about bringing a National Guard that was terribly
hollow, disorganized, overstructured, the same with the
Reserves, the same with the regular force, and bringing it into
a context that is a total Army.
The difference in the three components is availability, and
we have a force generation model now that will generate. The
chiefs of both the Guard and Reserve are back here, and they
will tell you that we could do this indefinitely when we get
into the formation that we are going to. By 2006 we will have
80 percent of that done.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. That was a very
important colloquy that you had.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, let me just, first of all,
support everything that General Schoomaker said. We had a
choice when September 11 happened, as we got into conflict,
that was: do we fight the war and put transformation on hold,
or do we transform? For all the reasons that General Schoomaker
said, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior leadership of
the Department said we have to transform.
I would only add that I think BRAC is an important part of
that transformation. Depending on what the administration and
what Congress does with the BRAC recommendations, we have 5
years to implement them. That should give us plenty of time to
smooth-flow any big issues that we have. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff are fully behind the BRAC recommendations. We have stated
that before in hearings. This is an important piece of our
transformation.
If you take one piece out, then we are, as General
Schoomaker said, left without a full bucket, and it would make
life a lot more difficult.
Chairman Warner. I thank the panel. We will have to move
on.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome. One thing, General Schoomaker. I find that those
in the National Guard in Massachusetts who have left their
equipment over there find that they are not able to keep up the
training here back home, and they do not feel that they can
fulfill their Guard responsibilities. That is something that I
have heard. I am sure you have heard it, and you are going to
have to address it. I can understand your earlier answer, but
that is certainly something that we picked up.
The President spoke on Tuesday night about the hard work of
our troops, and he urged Americans to send them letters, raise
flags in their honor, and to help the military family down the
street, but he did not assure them that they would have the
equipment they need to fight the war, and I believe he should
have.
More than 400 of our troops in Iraq have died in military
vehicles hit by roadside bombs, grenades, and the so-called
improvised explosive devices. Yet our troops do not have the
protective equipment they need. The marines are still waiting
for the 495 armored HMMWVs they ordered last year. There is no
excuse, absolutely no excuse, to send the military into battle
unprotected.
General Schoomaker, I raised this issue with you in
November 2003 and again with you and General Hagee at a hearing
in February 2004. General Myers, I raised this issue last April
before one of our hearings. In December, Secretary Rumsfeld was
confronted by soldiers so desperate for armor that they had
been forced to dig through the trash for scrap metal.
This April, General Hagee's deputy testified at a Seapower
Subcommittee hearing that the marines had all the funding they
needed for the up-armored HMMWVs. Yet last week General Nyland
and General Cato testified before the House about the lack of
urgency in solving the problem.
When the Department refuses to speak up for our troops, it
is hard to convince Congress to act. Over a year ago, Senator
Bayh and I offered an amendment to the defense authorization
bill to include an additional $600 million for armored vehicles
and we faced resistance.
This year we tried to add the funds for the armored
vehicles to the Iraqi supplemental. We knew there would be a
production gap if we did not act, but we were told that the
military had all the money it needed. Senator Stevens said on
the floor: ``We have met these requirements. We do not need
additional money from the emergency bill to be spent on up-
armored HMMWVs.'' But we succeeded in adding $213 million
anyway. This was resisted by even members of our committee
here.
Again and again we have been reassured that we have enough
armored vehicles for our troops. Now we learn that the Marine
Corps requirement for up-armored HMMWVs has gone from 498 to
2,400. That is a fivefold increase. Why can we not get it
straight? Should not the safety of the troops be your, the
President's, and our highest priority?
I hope you will work with us to see that this new
requirement is fully funded so we do not have to keep repeating
the mistakes of the past while our soldiers are dying in the
roadside blasts.
General Myers or General Hagee?
General Myers. Senator Kennedy, you are absolutely right,
safety and the force protection of our troops is absolutely the
first priority. As was covered just a little bit earlier in the
hearing, we have a thinking adversary, which changes sometimes
the requirements. We have tried to keep pace with those
requirements, and I think we have done a fairly good job of
that. I will not say it was a perfect job, but a fairly good
job of trying to provide the equipment that our men and women
need as they go into battle.
I think in terms of whether it is the protective vest and
then upgrading those to meet the different threats or some of
the other equipment that I would rather not talk about in an
open hearing--the vehicles certainly we can talk about and the
standard--the Secretary of Defense said that by February 15 of
this year we would not have any vehicles off compounds that did
not have armor protection. We have done all that, and we will
continue to do that, and we will continue to try to look around
corners to try to predict what it is this adversary will throw
our way so we can continue to provide the protection that our
folks need.
One of the things that we forget very often when we talk
about protecting our forces is that while equipment is a big
piece of it, another big piece of it is their training. Another
big piece of it is their leadership. I think on those counts we
do very well in most cases. We work that piece very hard, and
that in many cases is as important as the equipment that we
provide.
Senator Kennedy. General Hagee, would you respond? You
might have had an opportunity to read that New York Times
article in the last week, which was all related to the Marine
Corps' request and the marines. If not, I suggest that you get
a hold of it. They are talking about that they did not get the
money for the 498 HMMWVs until February, and now they are going
to have a request for 2,600 additional HMMWVs for Iraq.
General Hagee. I have read the article, Senator, and I
would like to align myself with the Chairman. When we went back
into Iraq in February, when we were told that we were going to
go back into Iraq in September 2003, we had about 30 armored
vehicles. By the time that we put the marines on the ground in
February 2004, every single vehicle that went in harm's way was
armored. Was it an up-armored HMMWV? No, sir. It was not. But
it was the best steel that we could find, using the best
engineers that we could find, to armor those vehicles.
Since that time, we have continued to spiral development
that armor, providing the very best that we can to the marines
and soldiers that are there. As the Chairman said, the force
protection of our troops is absolutely priority number one.
We have also testified that this is an adaptive, thinking
enemy, and we are responding very aggressively as he changes
his tactics. Right now we have 1,000 of the Marine Armor Kits
(MAK), the so-called MAK vehicles. This is add-on armor that we
put on the A-2s, in country. We are ahead of schedule on
producing those vehicles. We hope to have here in just the next
few months about 1,700 of those particular vehicles done. Then
we want to replace the remainder of our vehicles that are in
harm's way, not only in Iraq but in Afghanistan, in the Horn of
Africa, on our Marine Expeditionary Units. We want to replace
those that have armor on them with the up-armored HMMWV, and
that is the reason for the request for the 2,600.
Senator Kennedy. My time is just about up. But your
testimony here is that no marine goes out on patrol now in any
vehicle that does not have the up-armored----
General Hagee. No, sir.
Senator Kennedy. --or the armor plating?
General Hagee. No vehicle leaves the compound without
armor, not the up-armored HMMWV. We do not have sufficient
quantities of those, but right now, we have either the up-
armored HMMWV, which is designated level one, or the level two
up-armored.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up, but you will give me a
breakdown of, if they go out on patrol, what is armored, what
is up-armored?
General Hagee. Yes, sir, I would be happy to.
Chairman Warner. I think you raise an important question.
Let us take a minute to try and get the terms correct. An up-
armored vehicle, I think in the dictionary version of it would
simply be something that has a measure of increased armor. But
if I understand you, ``up-armored'' has a specific designation
in the Pentagon now?
General Hagee. Yes, sir. We really talk about three levels.
When I use, and I think when most individuals in the military
talk about it, ``up-armored HMMWV,'' they are specifically
talking about the M-1114. That vehicle is put together at the
factory where the armor is integrated into the vehicle. That is
level one, and only if the armor is integrated into the vehicle
can it be classified as level one.
Chairman Warner. Up-armored.
General Hagee. Up-armored.
Chairman Warner. Now, what is the next level?
General Hagee. Level two, which for us is an A-2 HMMWV with
bolt-on armor, actually has on the sides the same protection as
an up-armored HMMWV, that one built at the factory. But because
it was not built at the factory, it is defined as level two.
General Myers. There are factory kits. Level two is factory
kits.
General Hagee. That is correct.
Chairman Warner. I presume it provides somewhat less
protection than the fully up-armored HMMWV, number one?
General Hagee. On the MAK, it provides less protection on
the undercarriage. The up-armored HMMWV will provide protection
for a 12-pound blast, undercarriage. The MAK provides 4 pounds.
Chairman Warner. So level two is somewhat less. Now let us
go to level three.
General Hagee. Level three is less than that. Level three
is the homogeneous rolled steel that has been applied to the
vehicle. Even though it comes in a kit, it is less than the
protection provided by the MAK or the level two.
I can provide exactly what those protection levels are,
sir.
Chairman Warner. In today's operation with the marines,
what is the level of equipment that those marines have?
General Hagee. Level two or level one.
Chairman Warner. General Schoomaker, your troops?
General Schoomaker. Sir, we go by exactly the same
definitions, level one, two, and three. Our goal is to have
every vehicle at level one or two, factory-configured, either
the integral in the factory or the factory-added armor.
Chairman Warner. You said ``goal.'' Let me get that down.
You said that is a goal, implying that it is not that way
today, with your operating forces in Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Schoomaker. We have some level of vehicles that are
still in level three, but this is satisfactory steel that has
been applied in the field locations to the vehicles. But level
one, level two, just like what the Commandant says, is the
goal.
Chairman Warner. I understand the goal. We are trying to
establish what is in use today as the troops at this very hour
are operating.
General Schoomaker. All three and I believe that is the
same in the Marine Corps.
Chairman Warner. No, he claims one and two.
Senator Levin. What percentage are at level three in the
Army?
General Schoomaker. About roughly 20, 20 to 24, 25 percent,
something like that, are at level three.
Chairman Warner. Does that answer your question, Senator
Kennedy?
Senator Kennedy. This is, I guess they call it the
``hillbilly armor,'' level three, is what I understand is the
term there?
General Schoomaker. We are not using hillbilly armor.
Senator Kennedy. You do not use the term any more.
General Schoomaker. I might add that this is more than just
HMMWVs, and that is the important thing, because we are talking
about trucks, Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs),
everything.
Chairman Warner. I know.
Senator Kennedy. Just a final question----
General Myers. Let me, before you finish this discussion--
--
Chairman Warner. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Let us start from
the top so we can listen.
General Myers. For level one, two, and three, the goal is
that we will only have level one and two--and we are going to
make our goal--by September.
Chairman Warner. By September of this year?
General Myers. This year, we will only have level one and
level two. We will no longer have a level three in the field.
Chairman Warner. That is Marine Corps and Army?
General Myers. That is all forces. Remember, we have Navy
and Air Force over there as well on the roads, actually.
Chairman Warner. I understand. When I used ``Army'' I meant
those operations.
General Myers. Right.
General Schoomaker. Could I add something here very
quickly? I am sorry.
Chairman Warner. Yes.
General Schoomaker. Senator Kennedy, when we talked in
November 2003, the requirement in theater was less than 2,000
of these vehicles.
Senator Kennedy. So the requirement has gone up to 9,000 or
even more, 10,000 or 12,000. Someone has to be responsible for
not understanding last fall why we were not going to--you need
400 times more of these. That is what parents ask me. That is
what the Hart family is asking me.
General Schoomaker. I am trying to reinforce your point. We
have funding from you now for 42,000 of these vehicles, and we
are right now at a level of about 38,000. So we have gone from
less than 500 to 38,000 vehicles--I am talking about Army
figures now--in the last 22 months. So I think we have gotten
considerable support out of Congress to do this, and it is an
enormous undertaking. As far as I can tell, the requirement
will continue to grow.
Again, the tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the
ability of an adaptive enemy to attack these are going to
continue to be a challenge.
Chairman Warner. Has everyone had the full opportunity to
testify on that series of questions?
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will try to get back to recruiting and retention. That
was a very good exchange, to talk about how enormous and what
the enormous tasks are of this war. It is ever-changing. It is
costly in terms of money and lives, and we are doing the best
we can. Sometimes we make mistakes, but that is part of the
war.
I want to congratulate all of you for coming today and
accepting critiques, criticism, and praise, because that is
democracy. No one is going to be able to change how the media
reports the war. I wish it would be more balanced. With freedom
comes responsibility. So it is not just about money when it
comes to recruiting. It is about message.
If you want to defend your country, if you want to play a
part in your country's future, join the military, because we
need you right now. What happens in Iraq really determines
their own freedom.
Now let us talk a little bit about what we are trying to do
to address the problem of recruiting and retention. One, I
think it is a chronic problem in the area of recruiting, that
it has been building, and we need to stay ahead of it.
General Myers, you are a fighter pilot, is that correct?
General Myers. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. You do not let the plane fly you; you fly
the plane, right?
General Myers. You got it, sir.
Senator Graham. You stay ahead of it. I can tell you,
working with Chairman Warner and Senator Ben Nelson, my
Democratic colleague, that we have one of the most robust
recruiting and retention packages possible in the Personnel
Subcommittee.
Dr. Chu, thank you for coming to our committee. I want
Americans to know there is more money on the table than there
has ever been to keep qualified people in. There is more money
on the table than there has ever been to get people to join.
There is a real good package for quality of life issues for
people under psychological stress. This committee, in
collaboration with the Department of Defense, is addressing the
problem of recruiting and retention.
Dr. Chu. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. I am pleased to be part of that process.
Now, my concern is where are we going to be in the future?
We know how the HMMWV situation is ever-changing. The
likelihood of a major military footprint being in existence in
Iraq a year or 2 from now I think is great, because you have
just discussed the enormity of adapting to the war in terms of
procurement practices. Look what we are asking of the Iraqi
people and the coalition forces, to build an army from scratch.
The army in the past was loyal to the dictator, not to the
people. Buying into civilian control of the military is
something not known in the Mideast and we are trying to
institute it.
You get paid in cash in the Iraqi army, so you have to take
your money and go home and pay your bills. We do not have Sure-
Pay. There is no bureaucratic infrastructure to support the
military. You are having Sunnis and Shias work together for the
first time in a coordinated fashion, maybe in the Kurdish
north.
The political task ahead to bring this country together
under a written constitution, setting aside a 1,400 year-old
religious split between the Sunni and Shia Muslims is an
enormous task.
Why is it taking so long? The same reason it took us a long
time: It is hard to get people with different views of life to
live together. It is hard to get a military to work as a
national military, not a group of militia. We are making
progress. But if we are there a year or 2 from now, which I
think we will be, with a large number of troops suffering
casualties, we have to turn this around on message, and we have
to do more in terms of recruiting.
General McCaffrey has just gotten back. He has made an
observation that we are in a race against time in terms of
getting it right in Iraq with our force, that he sees stress on
the force, and that time is not on our side. General Myers,
what would your answer be to that observation?
General Myers. I actually outbriefed General McCaffrey
after he came back, I asked to see him. He said several
interesting things, and I think some of them seemed to be
misperceived a little bit. One of the things he said that I
thought was good is that morale is terrific. Talking about a
``broken Army'' that we hear from time to time--this is a great
Army. This is the best Army, the best Armed Forces this planet
has ever seen.
General McCaffrey through his visit at least, that was his
observation as well.
He does worry and he has worried from right after September
11, I think, when we first went into Afghanistan, that to
sustain this war we need larger ground forces. I think the way
that the Joint Chiefs and the Department have addressed this is
increase the size of the Army by 30,000--and increase modestly
the size of the Marine Corps--but also addressed all sorts of
other internal efficiencies that could make our forces more
accessible. That is what Army modularity is all about.
I do not know that folks that are not actively involved in
these processes understand them fully or understand what they
are going to bring to the table, but I think that it is really,
really important that we continue our transformation across all
our Services, so we have the availability of these terrific
forces for contingencies either current or potential.
Senator Graham. Transformation helps recruiting, retention,
and capacity to fight, is that correct?
General Myers. Absolutely, I think everything we do in that
regard is part of it. It relates back to Senator Thune. I think
BRAC is part of it; our overseas posture is part of it. It all
goes hand in hand. Overseas posture, for instance, one of the
tenets that the United States Army had when it thought about
its overseas posture and its stateside posture was if we can
get more families back to the United States, where we can have
more stability with spouses and children, that this is going to
increase retention.
So it all goes hand in glove.
Senator Graham. One last question. Is there anything that
we are not doing on the Hill to help you win this war that we
could be doing?
Dr. Chu. If I might, Senator, it is not that you are not
doing it, but I would like to join my colleagues in advocating
your continuing to speak out, just as you have done in these
last few minutes, about the value of military service, about
the importance of military service. As the President said in
his speech, it is the highest form of public service. Just
continuing to offer that message to the American people is one
of our most powerful and most effective recruiting tools.
Chairman Warner. Senator, do you want another question?
Senator Graham. No, thank you.
Chairman Warner. We will now go into another round of
questions. It looks like the distinguished ranking member and
myself are here together. This has been a good hearing. We have
had a very valuable exchange of information, and I just want to
dwell for a minute on this issue of transformation. I am among
the strongest of the proponents to have this transformation,
but we must not take on that difficult task at a rate that in
any way would impede our effort to finish achieving the goals
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Better that some aspects of it be
stepped back in time to allow the full resources and energies
of the Department to be devoted to bringing about the
achievement of the goals, namely to establish a situation of
security such that the new governments of Afghanistan and Iraq
can have a footing to establish for their people a measure of
freedom and democracy. I hope that those that are pacing this
keep that in mind.
Second, General, the first Gulf War was a remarkable feat
of arms and strategy. We repelled the Iraqi forces in 100
hours, 100 hours, through the extraordinary professionalism of
a coalition of forces, primarily led by the United States, and
utilizing the equipment that we had at hand at that time of an
unexpected event, namely Iraq invading Kuwait.
I think it left us all with a sense of enormous pride, but
maybe a bit overconfident as we undertook the second phase of
conflict with Iraqi forces. I will leave that to history.
My recollection is that the HMMWV was in the inventory at
the time of the first Gulf War, but I am not sure to the extent
any of those units were employed in that battle.
General Schoomaker. Sir, the HMMWV was there. We did not
even have a term of ``up-armored HMMWVs'' in those days. They
were all unarmored, and there were scores of them involved.
Chairman Warner. In that operation?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. That is the point I wished to make. You
talk about the Army that you took to this battlefield and the
shortage of the up-armored HMMWVs and the dramatic pace with
which we armored them. Now, presumably the QDR will begin to
look at this inventory of weapons today and try and project
beyond the conflict in both Iraq and Afghanistan what the
threats are in the world that could call upon our forces to be
involved somewhere else, in a different battle at a different
time. We might have to revert to the fact that the up-armored
HMMWV, which loses a degree of mobility, which is an important
factor in any warfare, and suddenly we have to revert to the
HMMWV as it was originally designed.
I have to assume that at the time that the HMMWV was
designed the best minds were put to work on it and the best
minds looked at the projected scenarios of battle and, as you
say now, it was used and used successfully in its original
configuration in the first Gulf War. Now that we have been
faced with the second Gulf War, and we had to make a dramatic
right turn in terms of trying to rework this vehicle, first
using whatever armor we could put together, I suppose, to
create the category threes, then slowly category two, and now
we have the evolution of this fully armored HMMWV from the
ground-up in design and manufacture.
General Schoomaker. Sir, if I could add. That is why we
have the strategy that we do. We are now building only the
heaviest HMMWVs, in other words the 1151s, 1152s, which are the
heaviest version, strongest engine, strongest transmission,
strongest suspension. That is what we are going to do as we go
forward.
Second, only a portion of these HMMWVs will be manufactured
to the level one specification, because those are the ones that
you cannot remove the armor from. Most of our HMMWVs in the
future we will build to the level two. The reason is because
you can remove that armor and put it back into the
configuration that you are describing, so that we can extend
the life of these suspensions, engines, and transmissions, and
then put that armor on so that--it is basically snap-on, snap-
off--providing the same degree of protection where that armor
is that a level one HMMWV would provide.
Chairman Warner. That is something we have to focus on,
because I do not want to sit here, if I am privileged to be
here many years hence, and be confronted with an entirely new
panel of witnesses--the same Senators, a new panel of
witnesses--and we are going back through how the equipment for
that conflict, whatever it may be--hopefully we will not have
one, but if we do--and testimony to the effect that we just
simply did not have the right equipment to meet that
contingency.
General Schoomaker. Mr. Chairman, if I could add another
thing about the first Gulf War. It is not having to do with
HMMWVs, but you might remember that the 7th Corps of the United
States Army was one of the major corps that was in that fight.
That corps was being disbanded at the time the first Gulf War
broke out, and it was saved by the first Gulf War and then
disbanded after that fight.
When we entered the first Gulf War, we had an Army of over
700,000 soldiers, 200,000 more than we have today. It was
during that process that we started bringing it down. There are
many, many differences about what we went into that fight with
and what we entered this fight with.
Chairman Warner. On a totally different matter, but one
that is of great importance to this committee, we had last
week, a series of briefings and hearings really on the status
of forces of the Iraqi training program. General Petraeus--
chief, you were here. The committee desires to ask the
Department of Defense--we have done it in different ways, but I
am going to formalize a letter to the Department, that I will
acquaint you with Dr. Chu and General Myers. We feel very
strongly that we need to declassify to the extent we can, the
status of forces of the Iraqi trained force today. What is its
readiness, comparable to whichever benchmarks you wish to make,
because the American taxpayer put a tremendous investment in
that retraining and equipping. I think they are entitled to
understand, because from that base of facts as to their degree
of readiness we can better translate where we are in terms of
hopefully providing them with trained individuals and the
equipment to eventually replace our forces.
I think that information should be in the public domain.
There is a great deal of discussion about when we can achieve
the goals that our President, I think courageously, has
established. But that is an integral set of facts needed for
any reasonable translation of how we can achieve those goals.
I would like to now go to the question of the improvised
explosive devices (IEDs). We continually monitor this very
important issue here in the committee. I would like to start
with you, General Hagee. We have through the past 2 years
really followed the progression, first of the procedures
adopted by the Department of Defense--they now go to the Joint
Task Force. General Votel is the head of it.
I want you to describe what has been the structure of the
Marine Corps addressing this issue, which I think you have done
very effectively. Is that structure still performing as you
intended it to perform, or is it to be more fully integrated
into the Joint Task Force? I know that it chops to the Joint
Task Force now, but it seems to me there is a measure of
independence the Marine Corps has had, using their own
initiatives and innovations, and I really want to hopefully
protect that.
General Hagee. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I did not
understand the first part of the question regarding the
structure.
Chairman Warner. I am trying to look at the structure of
the various entities within the Department of Defense
addressing the serious issue of the IEDs, namely what are we
doing by way of research and development; what is the private
sector doing; how quickly are we getting the equipment into the
field, because it is the IED which is the focal point, frankly,
of so much of the concern among the American population with
regard to their young people going into this series of
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We understand General Votel's structure. We were briefed on
it. He was before us. But the Marine Corps has been doing some
independent, innovative work on their own in conjunction with
the Joint Task Force, and I ask you, is that still functioning
to your satisfaction?
General Hagee. First off, Mr. Chairman, yes, sir. It is
still functioning. We are working very closely with not only
the Joint Task Force, but with the individual Services, because
we are obviously all in this together. There in the Al-Anbar
Province we have the 155th Brigade. So we are all concerned
about the IEDs.
At the same time, we are also using our engineering
expertise to try to come to solutions, and when we do, just
like with the Army, we share that with either the Service or
the Joint Task Force or both.
I can also say that we are working with several of our
coalition partners who have had experience with IEDs to find
out what they have learned, and they are sharing their
information with us.
So am I satisfied with the process? Yes, sir, I am. What I
am not satisfied with is the speed at which our scientific and
engineering community--and I know they are working hard--are
coming up with new technologies to address this problem.
Chairman Warner. That would be the private sector that you
are concerned about--or the in-government entities? What is the
community to which you refer?
General Hagee. Sir, I would say all of the above. Not that
they are not working hard, but we are just not coming up with,
in my opinion, the technologies that we need rapidly enough,
for example technologies that would allow us to locate the IED,
some sort of sensor that would allow us to locate that IED
rather than having to physically see it; technologies that
would allow us to set that IED off before we even got there.
The academic community is working on it. The scientific
community is working on it. I know the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working on it, but we have
not had significant success yet, and I would just ask those
communities, urge those communities, to continue to work on
them.
Chairman Warner. I just want to make sure that you are
satisfied that the work being done in the Corps continues, and
it can be done to the extent--working with everybody, but
nevertheless you can come up with your own ideas and implement
them; is that correct?
General Hagee. Sir, I am very satisfied with that, and I
have to say I am satisfied with the effort that the other
communities are putting into it, too.
Chairman Warner. I thank you. I just have to tell you from
a little personal experience that during the Korean War someone
in the Marine Corps had the foresight to develop what was
called the ``Mickey Mouse boot.'' It was a thermal boot. It was
an ugly-looking thing and it was tough to wear and difficult to
handle, but it saved Marines from frostbite. The Army units
next to the Marine units suffered four times the cases of
frostbite as did the Marines because they did not have that
boot; they still had the old World War II boot.
I have always been very respectful of what the Corps can do
on its own initiative sometimes, and I saw that firsthand.
General Schoomaker, the National Guard and the Army Reserve
rely on prior service soldiers to a great extent, who have the
training and experience needed to fill the ranks. Increased
reliance has been placed in recent years on non-prior service
recruits. The failure or inability of these individuals to
complete their enlistments seems to be of growing concern.
How big a problem is attrition in the active Army, Army
Reserve, and National Guard?
General Schoomaker. Sir, it is a challenge. The Guard and
Reserve have long relied upon soldiers that are leaving the
Active service to fill their ranks, and of course we are
growing the Active Force, retaining more, so that adds to their
challenge.
I would say across all of the Active, Guard, and Reserve
that first-term attrition is something that we keep a very
close eye on, and we remain very concerned about any spikes in
that. We have seen a little rise in it, specifically in the
initial entry training. Part of the reason for that in my
opinion is we have ratcheted up, necessarily, the rigor in the
initial entry training because of the things we have to
introduce at that stage because of the war that we are in.
But what we have seen is a corresponding decrease in
attrition in their first units of assignment. We are hoping as
we watch this trend a little bit longer that what we are going
to see is a balancing and a maintenance of about what the
traditional norms have been. I would like to see it go down,
but you are right. Maybe Dr. Chu has a broader view of it.
Chairman Warner. Do Dr. Chu or Secretary Abell have any
comment on that?
Dr. Chu. Attrition, sir, has long been an issue with the
military forces. We lose about a third of an enlisted cohort
before it completes its normal term of service. About half of
that typically occurs in the initial training period. Each
Service has advanced some innovative ideas of how to deal with
this issue. We are all eager to see better outcomes here.
Charlie, did you want to add a word or two here?
Mr. Abell. Yes, sir, it is an enduring problem. We have
searched for solutions. They are fleeting. We find one and then
another pops up. I think the increased rigor is what accounts
for the spike we are seeing right now.
Chairman Warner. I thank you.
On the subject of the Army and Marine Corps capabilities
and acquisition programs, although the Army and Marine Corps
have different missions and capabilities, there are shared
concerns and competencies. We have seen, however, that the Army
and the Marine Corps have divergent paths for acquiring
equipment, such as helicopters and heavy wheeled vehicles. What
are your views regarding the joint development and acquisition
of Army and Marine Corps equipment? I will start with you,
General Myers. Do you wish to address that? You are in charge
of the jointness.
General Myers. You bet. It is an issue of course that we
look at. I think the forum for that, as it is in all of this,
is our Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) that looks
at the requirements that the Services have and ensures to the
maximum extent that is practical and reasonable that we share
the same sort of equipment.
The best example that is coming along right now is the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which is going to be shared by
three Services. When this comes to fruition, it will be the
first time we have had an aircraft of such commonality that it
can operate off carriers, off land bases, and have a short
field takeoff capability that would satisfy one of the
components.
Absolutely, it is something that is very important to us.
We have recently looked at trucks, for instance, you may be
referring to trucks. Trucks is one of the areas where the
Marine Corps and the Army have had different procurement paths,
but I will let them explain what they are doing to merge those.
Chairman Warner. All right, then we will start with you,
General Schoomaker.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I will talk to it from two
perspectives: one as Chief of Staff of the Army; and also as a
former combatant commander of a joint command, U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM). So I am quite familiar that we have to have
both some separate views, because we have some separate
realities. For instance, the Marine Corps has to operate its
helicopters off of ships and so they have some very specific
requirements to be able to operate off of those ships. For
instance, rotor brakes to stop the rotor blades, and the
ability to fold those rotor blades so that they can economize
on the space on the deck. Those are not requirements in Army
aircraft. Those are expensive additions that we do not require
and therefore we do not build.
So we have--going from that level of reality to the fact
that the Marine Corps has a requirement for amphibious
vehicles, and I am talking about amphibious vehicles that come
out of a salt water environment, that we do not have. So there
are some differences in how we build trucks, how we build our
tracked vehicles, and those kinds of things.
We do have commonality in things like HMMWVs we have
commonality in artillery pieces. We have commonality in a
variety of weapons systems that we share. Not only that, but
the Marine Corps and Army soldiers train at Fort Knox together
on tanks. We train together at Fort Leonard Wood, and I believe
at Fort Sill, for instance, in artillery.
I think that we have some pretty good economies going on
here and we are working together.
Chairman Warner. What you are saying is indigenous
differences between the missions and the equipment have to
reflect that. What I want to leave with is the assurance that
you think the proper balance is being struck between the need
to get as much commonality as we can for cost savings, spare
parts, maintenance, training, and at the same time we are
respecting those differences.
General Schoomaker. I think that is a true statement. I
will go back to the IED question. The IED task force was an
Army initiative and we developed that to a point. After about a
year, we went to the DOD and asked for them to provide kind of
top cover so we could make it a joint program. It is a joint
program. All of the Services participate, but the Army
maintains the same degree of independence as what you just
talked about in the Marine Corps to operate in our specific
lane for things that are specific to our needs. Yet we share
those in that forum with each other.
Chairman Warner. Can you wrap up, Commandant?
General Hagee. Sir, I would just align myself with both you
and the Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Understood.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. I want to go back to the HMMWV issue and the
article in the New York Times last Sunday, which had a lot of
allegations and statements which it seems to me need to be
addressed. I want to insert that article into the record now.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Levin. ``The Army did not give up,'' it reads, ``on
trying to speed production by involving more armor makers.
Brigadier General Patrick O'Reilly said that several armor
companies were eager to be part of a plan to produce armored
HMMWVs entirely on the AM General's assembly line. In January,
when it asked O'Gara''--that is the manufacturer--``to name its
price for the design rights for the armor, the company balked
and suggested instead that the rights be placed in escrow for
the Army to grab should the company ever fail to perform.
`Let's try this again,' an Army major replied to the company in
an e-mail message. `The question concerned the cost, not a
request for an opinion.' ''
Now, the cost that he was referring to there was what would
be the cost of obtaining the design rights for the armor so
that we could produce HMMWVs a lot more quickly. They never got
the cost from the O'Gara company.
Then the article reads: ``The Army has dropped the matter
for now, General O'Reilly said, adding that he hoped to have
other companies making armor by next April.''
So, General Schoomaker, is that accurate?
General Schoomaker. Sir, number one, I have not read the
article. Number two, I have no direct knowledge of what you are
talking about. I heard just before the hearing, and had an
explanation, that there was some discussion about whether
O'Gara-Hess would release the copyright or whatever the rights
so that other people could produce the armor, but I could not
comment on the accuracy of that.
Senator Levin. Does anybody know the answer to that?
General, do you know the answer?
General Myers, have you read the article, the Sunday New
York Times front page article?
General Myers. Senator Levin, I have not read that article,
no, sir.
Senator Levin. I must tell you I am a little bit surprised.
It is a major newspaper. It is a front page article that goes
into massive detail about the armor failings. This is a huge
article on the subject, and I would urge that you read the
article and that you give us an answer for the record. I will
address this to you, General Schoomaker, and ask that you give
us an answer for the record as to whether or not it is true
that the Army sought to purchase the design rights so that we
could produce the up-armored HMMWVs a lot more quickly, so that
we could protect our troops, and that the company balked. If
that is true it would be very disturbing to me, that they would
put profit ahead of patriotism. I say, if that is true. I do
not want to judge it before we get the Army's answer and before
we get the answer from the company.
It is a very serious statement here. We are talking about
life and death issues here, and I hope everybody that is either
in this room or realizes what the motivation is here of these
questions and questioners in trying to get to the bottom of
what the shortfalls were in armor. There are a lot of changing
needs and requirements. We understand that. There was not
planning for a violent aftermath. We understand that. It is a
moving train, we understand that.
But, factoring all that in, you still have allegations in
this article that a company refused to license someone else to
produce the armor which would protect our troops. That is, if
true, if true, simply not acceptable.
General Schoomaker, we would rely on you and General Myers.
I guess I will look mainly at General Schoomaker for this,
although you may want to also give us an answer for the record.
General Schoomaker. Sir, it is proper that Secretary
Bolton, our acquisition executive, provide it for the record
and we will get that, because we are the executive on this.
[The information referred to follows:]
On January 5, 2005, the Army requested O'Gara-Hess and Eisenhardt
(OHE) to submit a cost proposal for procurement of the Up-Armored High
Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Level III Technical Data
Package (TDP) with unlimited data rights. OHE was advised that this
request was being made for informational purposes only; however, that
the government's intent was to obtain a price for a TDP complete enough
for any firm to manufacture the current M1114. In addition, OHE was
requested to provide, along with the cost proposal, a timeline for
providing a complete competitive TDP.
On January 14, 2005, Anthony Crayden, OHE, provided an informal
response to the government's request for a Level III TDP cost proposal.
In their response, OHE voiced their concern about proprietary rights,
but did propose an escrow arrangement for the government to acquire the
TDP data. The government response requested a cost proposal; however, a
formal cost estimate was never received from OHE.
The Army is no longer pursuing the purchase of the M1114 TDP as our
production of the M1114 will end in the February 2006 timeframe as we
transition to a long-term armor strategy for the M1151 and M1152.
Senator Levin. All right. Let me ask you, General Hagee,
did you read the article?
General Hagee. I have read the article, sir.
Senator Levin. Here is what the article says about the
Marine Corps. It says: ``Asked why the Marine Corps is still
waiting for the 498 HMMWVs that it ordered last year, O'Gara
acknowledged that it told the Marines that it was backed up
with Army orders and has only begun filling the Marines'
request this month. But the company says the Marine Corps never
asked it to rush. The Marine Corps denies this.''
Did you ever ask O'Gara to rush this order?
General Hagee. Sir, when we requested those 498 vehicles we
knew that the company was producing vehicles for the Army. The
United States Army gave us 498 vehicles with the proviso that
once we got our vehicles that we would return those vehicles to
them.
Senator Levin. But the question is, did you ask O'Gara to
rush production?
General Hagee. I will have to take that for the record,
sir. I do not know.
Senator Levin. Would you do that?
[The information referred to follows:]
The Marine Corps Systems Command has made multiple requests of
O'Gara-Hess to expedite production of M1114s. More specifically, during
September/October 2004, Barry Dillon, Deputy Commander, Marine Corps
Systems Command spoke with John Mayles, O'Gara-Hess Vice President for
Business Development regarding this matter. Mr. Dillon contacted Mr.
Mayles for confirmation of production levels and for available
forecasts of first available delivery for the Marine Corps of the
M1114s. Mr. Mayles confirmed first deliveries would be June/July 2005.
Chairman Warner. Excuse me, Senator. On that point, the
Senator and I will be forwarding a letter to the Secretary of
Defense that we would like to have the Secretary review this
article and make comments on it as to its accuracy for the
committee. So we will be formally requesting it. The article
struck us as being a very comprehensive review, and it took
several positions which we would like to have the DOD have the
opportunity to give its perspective.
Senator Levin. It is a highly disturbing article. Let us
leave it at that. We need to get the answers from the
military's perspective and from the company if they want to
comment on that. I would suggest that the letter that we write
to the Secretary of Defense, that we send a copy of that letter
to the company so that they can also comment on that, because I
must tell you, when we have defense contractors we expect that
they will put patriotism ahead of profit. They can license
others to produce these vehicles and to armor them, and if they
were asked to do that and refused to do that then I think they
have a lot of explanation, as far as I am concerned, to a lot
of families in this country.
I am going to leave it at that because I want to hear from
them and give them a chance to respond.
Now, General Schoomaker, I want to ask you about the
readiness numbers. We have testimony this morning from General
Hagee relative to the Marine Corps. I do not know if this was
in his prepared statement, and I do not think that these
numbers were used in your oral testimony, but if they were I
will repeat them here so you can give us your comparable
numbers.
This is on the bottom of page 3--``Current operational
tempo has had an impact on unit readiness. Since the beginning
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, overall unit readiness for
battalion and squadron sized units has dropped by 40 percent.
Our readiness priority remains support and sustainment of our
forward-deployed forces, at the immediate expense of those
units who have rotated out of Iraqi Freedom. As a consequence,
the readiness of the force not deployed has decreased.''
Is that true also in the Army?
General Schoomaker. I would say yes, sir. I think that is
an accurate statement. I do not know--I cannot sign up to the
percentage. That is the Marine Corps's percentage. But I will
be glad to give it to you for the record.
Senator Levin. I think it would be very important that we
have that in the record. It seems to me that is--I was not here
when Senator Reed was asking questions, but I think that is
clearly the point here, that the unit readiness has dropped
because of the reasons which were given here. But nonetheless,
they have dropped.
So my question to you, General Schoomaker, is this: Has the
percentage, without giving me the specific percentage because
you do not know, of the units in the Army at the highest
readiness level decreased overall?
General Schoomaker. I will have to give you that for the
record, but my belief is our Army is more ready than it was
before.
Senator Levin. I understand that, but I want to know in
terms of these----
General Schoomaker. I will have to give it to you for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
A temporary decline in measured resource levels after redeployment
is normal and expected. Declines are primarily due to equipment losses,
the unavailability of equipment undergoing maintenance, and personnel
transitions. Along with resetting returned units, the Army is also
transforming units into brigade-based modular, combined arms teams that
increase Army capabilities for full spectrum operations. The increased
number and conversion of brigades to more capable Army modular force
designs is placing additional demands on the Service for both equipment
and personnel. Units reporting against Army modular force
organizational structure may initially report lower readiness levels
(due to increases in ``denominators'' for equipment and personnel), but
are as capable, or more capable, than they were before conversion.
Senator Levin. We do keep readiness levels. We get them
every quarter. We do it for a reason. We have gotten readiness
information from the Army, from the Marine Corps, and the
information that we have is that the overall readiness levels
have dropped. That is the information we have. If that is not
right, we have to know. That means the information that you
have sent us is wrong.
Now, the Marine Corps has given us a specific percentage.
But the reports that we got from either the DOD or the Service
is that the overall readiness of both the Army and the Marine
Corps has declined over the past year. I am not asking you for
the specific numbers. I am asking you whether the percentage of
the highest ready units has dropped, and that is something you
will give us for the record.
General Schoomaker. Let me answer it this way and then we
will give you the specific percentages. We have more units than
we had 2 years ago, more brigades.
Senator Levin. That is why I am asking percentage. That is
why I am asking percentage.
General Schoomaker. Of those brigades, we have taken some
of them totally off line to reset them. So I would say the
answer is yes, the readiness level has dropped that way, but we
actually have more capacity and that capacity is far more ready
than the capacity that we had previously.
We will give you the numbers. I think it is a true
statement to say that the war and transformation and everything
else we are doing, the movements we are doing, have dropped the
percentage of readiness. But what we have ready is very ready,
and we can deal with what it is that we have been asked to deal
with.
Senator Levin. So the percentage that is ready is very
ready, but overall the number of units that are very ready has
dropped?
General Schoomaker. Correct.
Senator Levin. That is helpful. It is reassuring, but it is
helpful to get a direct answer on that.
Now, our staff was briefed last week about the
prepositioned tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles that we would
use in the event of combat in Korea that are fully mission-
capable. Apparently a significant percentage of the
prepositioned tanks and fighting vehicles that we would use in
such an event are not fully mission-capable; is that correct?
General Schoomaker. First of all, we ought to talk about
that in a different hearing or a closed session.
Senator Levin. That is why I did not use the percentage.
General Schoomaker. Let me say this generically. We are
doubling the size of that prepositioned stock. We are taking
what is there and putting it through depot level reset so that
it is very ready.
Senator Levin. I got that, I got that. But my question is
whether or not a significant percentage of the prepositioned
tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles that we would use in that
event are not fully mission-capable. That is my question.
General Schoomaker. Once again, it depends upon whether
your baseline is what we are growing to or what we used to
have. If you are talking about what we used to have, there is
no change. If you are talking about what we are growing to, the
percentage would be less because we are doubling the size of
the stock.
Senator Levin. Then we need to get both figures.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The information contained in this response is classified and was
provided in a briefing on July 21, 2005, to committee staff.
Senator Levin. Okay. General Myers, the President said the
other night that as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down in
Iraq. That was his statement. So irrespective of when troop
reductions may occur, I would like to know what the decision
criteria are, since he announced a very specific path relative
to, as Iraqis grow in capability, we will stand down.
Here is my specific question. How many Iraqi battalions,
approximately, will need to be judged capable of operating
independently of U.S. forces for the standing down to begin?
There has been a statement in the press that 3 Iraqi battalions
are fully capable out of I believe 80. Putting aside the
accuracy of that--and that may be a classified number; that is
why I quote a press statement--what percentage would you say of
the Iraqi units will need to be capable of acting independently
and operating independently in order for the standing down to
begin? Give us a rough estimate, since the President laid out
that path?
General Myers. I think it is going to depend on where we
are, in what part of the country. It goes back to General
Casey's strategy, which I think he outlined partly in here,
that as the Iraqis stand up and given the conditions in the
part of the country you are talking about, it will enable some
of this to happen faster than later. I am going to have to go
back to General Casey and look at what his estimate would be,
if there is a percentage we can put on that.
The fact is we want to have 100 Iraqi security force army
battalions ready. I do not have the chart in front of me, but
it is somewhere over 30 that are ready to do that today. One of
the problems we have with the chart you have seen before is
that there is some ambiguity about what the various readiness
ratings mean, and we are busy trying to make sure that it is
sharp and clear, that it makes sense to you, and that it makes
sense to the American public, if that is appropriate to
declassify and get out to them.
There is a lot of ambiguity about what those ratings mean.
I have had long discussions with General Abizaid and General
Casey about that. The plan is that we will stand up over time.
Events will drive that, of course, but we will stand up over
time as Iraqi units become more capable. It will depend on what
part of the country they are in and the specific units. I have
a pretty good sense of that, but to try to make a percentage
out of it, we have not calculated it that way so I do not want
to make a guess here.
Senator Levin. I think it would be very important that we
get some material that would support that kind of a policy, so
that there is some meat on the bones. It is one thing to say as
Iraqis stand up we are going to stand down. But I would assume
that that is based on a military calculus that as the direction
of the Iraqi units are standing up and there are more that are
mission-capable, that we will be removing forces. I assume the
President had some kind of a military basis for his statement.
I would like to know what that basis is, what it is based on,
and what those criteria are, if you could supply those for the
record.
General Myers. You bet. It is based on General Casey and
General Abizaid's strategy and it is----
Senator Levin. You can provide that for the record? Can you
give us some detail?
General Myers. We will try to do that, yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
MNF-I is now working with the Iraqi Prime Minister through a joint
committee to transfer security responsibility. This ongoing process
will refine the conditions necessary to transition security
responsibility from coalition forces to the ISF.
Senator Levin. Thank you very much. General Hagee, in terms
of the HMMWVs and the Marine Corps, I think what you have said
is your goal is that they all be ones and twos. The Army's
position is that there is going to be a group of vehicles which
are going to have the armor which is bolted on the sides, so
that it can be unbolted in more routine environments.
Are the Marines going to change to that strategy, which
means there is going to be some threes.
General Schoomaker. Sir, the vehicles that we will build at
O'Gara-Hess, you cannot snap the armor off. That is solid.
Senator Levin. You are going to make it so you can snap the
armor off, but you are going to keep the underbody strong?
General Schoomaker. That is correct.
Senator Levin. Are the Marines going to shift to that
strategy, or are you going to change to your making them all
ones and twos?
General Hagee. Sir, we are looking very closely at what the
Army is doing with the 1151s. I personally believe that we need
to go to a bolt-on, bolt-off type of configuration. I would
like to see us go to some composite type of material in the
future, rather than using the same type of armor we are using
right now. But bolt-on, bolt-off I believe is the way to go.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
One last question, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence here.
Dr. Chu, what is the current Department policy about calling up
members of the Guard and Reserve after they have been mobilized
once?
Dr. Chu. Let me emphasize the difference between units and
individuals, because individuals change in units, so we may see
units called up a second time even though individuals are not.
Second, let me emphasize that every mobilization decision
is carefully scrutinized by the military department involved,
by the Secretary's staff, and by the Secretary himself to be
sure we have the right balance of meeting the combatant
commanders' needs in the appropriate way and ensuring we do it
with the most thoughtfulness about our people.
That all said, with one exception, the Secretary has not
been prepared to approve the remobilization of any individual
involuntarily who has already served his or her time in
theater. He has on occasion, when there is a compelling case
for that skill, approved the remobilization of individuals who
have served briefly in the United States. This typically
involves units that were called up right after September 11 or
units called up, for example, to support the 4th Infantry
Division that did not go into Iraq as planned, and those people
were demobilized promptly thereafter.
I should also emphasize that we are always delighted when
people volunteer for additional mobilization. I am actually
very proud of our Reserve Forces in all the Services about the
number of volunteers that have, in fact, come forward in this
process.
Senator Levin. So as I understand your answer, then, with
one exception, did you say? Did I hear you correctly, the
report was one exception to the rule?
Dr. Chu. There is, to the best of my recollection--and I
will let Mr. Abell check my recollection--only one exception
where the Secretary approved the remobilization of individuals
who had already served their time in theater.
Senator Levin. Where they did not volunteer?
Dr. Chu. When they did not volunteer, that is right.
Senator Levin. Was that a unit or was that individuals?
Dr. Chu. That was a unit and it was composed of individuals
who had already served.
Senator Levin. One unit which was called up involuntarily.
Other than that, unless people volunteered to be called up,
after they have been mobilized once there is no involuntary
mobilization a second or a third time?
Dr. Chu. Let me be more precise, sir. The Secretary has
approved remobilizations for units that were called up briefly,
units and individuals called up briefly, served in the United
States and demobilized. The one exception I am speaking to is
people, a unit and individuals, who went to Central Command,
served in Central Command, came back, were demobilized; that
unit was remobilized.
Senator Levin. So let me see if I understand this. The one
exception you are talking about is where a unit had been--there
is more than one exception for units that have been briefly
mobilized in the United States; they have been remobilized
involuntarily. But in one case where a unit served in theater,
they also were remobilized. Have I stated that correctly?
Dr. Chu. You did, sir. I would emphasize that the number of
times that we have remobilized involuntarily individuals who
served briefly is small.
Chairman Warner. What is the parameters of ``small''?
Dr. Chu. I would have to give the exact numbers for the
record, sir, but it is a small proportion of the total, less
than 10 percent.
Senator Levin. Does that mean just a few times, a few
units, or a small proportion?
Dr. Chu. It is both a small number of units and it is not a
large number of people, either.
Chairman Warner. You will provide the specifics for the
record, then.
Senator Levin. That would be great. Thank you so much.
[The information referred to follows:]
To ensure judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components, the
Department of Defense employs a very rigorous process to authorize
remobilizations. Voluntary remobilizations are encouraged and approved
by the Secretary. Fewer than 260 personnel from elements of the 4th
Marine Division who previously served in Iraq were involuntarily
remobilized to support continued combat operations. Additionally,
involuntary remobilization of individuals have included only members
who either previously served in the continental United States providing
force protection or who served at the mobilization station, and that
total represents less than 1 percent of the total forces mobilized.
Chairman Warner. I say to the panel, we have had a very
good hearing and we leave this hearing with the understanding
that some of the solutions rest on Congress to help you in
terms of your recruiting, and hopefully the American public. I
commit to you, as I am sure all of us will, to give it our best
effort, because I do not know who could say it better than the
President: the highest public service is that of those who wear
the uniform. I think he probably meant the first line of
fighters also here, our fire and police and others, but
certainly wearing the uniform is the highest form of public
service.
Anyone else have any comments that they feel they should
like to make for this record? [No response.]
If not, thank you very much, the hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
NATIONAL CALL TO SERVICE
1. Senator McCain. Secretary Abell, I agree with General Pace. Our
military leadership must do more to encourage our young people of
America to serve. The National Call to Service (NCS) is one way to
attract 17-22 year olds for shorter periods of military service with a
considerable lump-sum payment to pay college tuition costs. In addition
the legislation allowed for transition incentives if the NCS enlistee
stays for longer periods of military service. Secretary Abell, we
worked together to craft the final legislation that was approved by the
President. Current DOD statistics show that fewer than 3,000 people
have been recruited under this program since it was authorized in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. In addition,
various college surveys still list as a major detractor for military
service the long enlistment contracts--8-year enlistment contracts--for
first term enlistments. Please update the committee on the NCS
enlistment program and should we do more to encourage military service
through this program--as General Pace and I believe?
Mr. Abell. The Department of Defense initiated the NCS enlistment
option on October 1, 2003, with all four Services participating.
Although the program is new and it is too early for evaluation, we are
pleased with its beginning and are enthusiastic about the program. It
is offering young Americans an opportunity to serve in the military who
would normally not serve due to the length of traditional enlistments.
Additionally, NCS is helping the Reserve components by providing high
quality servicemembers with current Active-Duty experience.
The Department recruited 1,916 NCS participants in fiscal year
2004. Through June 2005, the Department has recruited 2,435 young
Americans under this enlistment option: 108 in the Army, 1,938 in the
Navy, 145 in the Marine Corps, and 244 in the Air Force.
The Army's relatively low number is mitigated by two factors. In an
effort to study the impact of NCS on the enlistment of high-quality
youth, the Army originally limited the program to 10 recruiting
battalions. However, in May of this year they opened the program
nationwide. Additionally, the Army is finding that most who meet with
recruiters concerning NCS opt for a longer enlistment when they see the
more lucrative incentives offered for such enlistments.
As for doing more to encourage military service, we welcome any
assistance in our efforts to explain the virtues and nobility of such
service to the American public, regardless of whether it is under the
NCS program or any other enlistment option.
RETENTION AND RECRUITING
2. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, as a total
force, recruitment numbers have been down. Despite this month's
figures, the Army has missed their recruitment goals by nearly 8,000.
The Marines are still struggling. Guard and Reserve numbers are off by
15,000. What are your Services' plans to try and rectify these
recruiting difficulties?
General Schoomaker. The Army developed and implemented a recruiting
action plan in August 2004 that increases resources across all Army-
controlled recruiting ``levers.'' Those levers include the number of
recruiters, incentives, and advertising funding. Resourcing has
increased across all three components. We have also leveraged solid
retention efforts to offset accessions shortfalls. Progress is
continually monitored and adjustments are made accordingly. Recruiting
difficulties are of national importance and not just an Army issue. The
lower propensity to serve that we are currently challenged with, is a
product of the improving economy and lower unemployment, in addition to
possible public perceptions regarding the global war on terrorism.
These factors induce negative feedback from influencers of potential
recruits.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps has thus far exceeded its accession
requirement for fiscal year 2005, shipping 24,936 compared to a goal of
24,491 as of the end of June 2005 (102 percent of the requirement). We
have fallen short of our self-imposed contracting objective (those
applicants that enter the Delayed Enlistment Program) 30,227 compared
to a goal of 31,181 (97 percent of the objective). As we all know, this
reflects a tougher environment. On a positive note, aside from meeting
our accession requirement, quality has continued to be above our
standards with 95.80 percent of our accessions being high school
graduates and 70.70 percent falling within the Mental Group Category I-
IIIA. We continue to attract the highest caliber of individual.
We have taken a series of measures to include increasing our
advertising funding, addressing advertising efforts on key influencers,
and reviewing our processes. We will meet our fiscal year 2005
accession requirement, and foresee continued challenges in recruiting
for fiscal year 2006.
JUNIOR OFFICER RETENTION
3. Senator McCain. Secretary Abell, General Myers, General
Schoomaker, and General Hagee, in a recent New York Times article, West
Point graduate Lucian Truscott, the grandson of a World War II General,
reported on the growing issue of junior officer retention. He found,
time and again, that many had decided to resign from Active-Duty at the
end of their commitment. One said: ``I'm getting out as soon as I
can.'' Another young man who has seen duty in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and
Iraq said: ``I know I'm going to be coming back here a year from now. I
want to get married. I want to have a life. But I feel like if I get
out when my commitment is up, who's going to be coming here in my
place? I feel this obligation to see it through.'' These statements
highlight some unique issues. Our constant deployments, many of which
are a year in length, are beginning to wear on the force. I applaud
this second young man's apparent desire to see this conflict through,
but understand that he may still choose to leave the service. The first
officer's statement though, if it is at all representative, greatly
concerns me. I know that many servicemembers have spent more than 1
year deployed as a result of this war on terror, and while I know it is
difficult, if not impossible, to reduce the deployments at this time, I
encourage you to consider what can be done to retain these combat
experienced junior officers and would appreciate your comments on this
issue.
Mr. Abell. The Army is currently exceeding junior officer retention
historical norms, and junior officer retention in the other Services is
not experiencing any adverse effects. Nonetheless, the demand for
forces to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan makes reducing
stress on the force one of the Department's highest priorities. We are
employing a two-pronged strategy to attempt to reduce the requirement
for forces, while at the same time increasing the efficiency in the
supply of forces that are called upon to deploy.
The strategy to reduce the requirement for forces--and reduce the
stress on the force--includes efforts to develop the Iraqi capacity to
conduct police and other security tasks; to seek increased
international military participation in Iraq; and to increase
actionable intelligence to disrupt attacks on coalition forces and
other threats to security. The increasing efficiencies in the current
force include such initiatives as increasing jointness to gain synergy
and lethality, rebalancing the Reserve and Active component mix,
realigning skill sets to meet higher demand areas, better management of
mobilization and demobilization, more efficient use of contractors,
better use of volunteers and incentives to extend deployments, and
more.
Through a combination of efforts to reduce demand, and increased
efficiencies in the supply of forces, we seek to keep stress on the
force within acceptable levels. We continue to monitor recruiting and
retention metrics closely to ensure solid progress is achieved, and our
focus will not be diminished as long as demand for forces remains high.
General Myers. Current stresses on the force are significant and
will remain so for the near term. Although we would like to retain
every officer and enlisted member who has served our Nation proudly,
reality is that some of our best and brightest will make a decision
that they have performed their service and depart to become valued
members of our civilian community. Right now, indications are that we
do not have a retention problem with our junior officers--they remain
within historical standards. However, we will never take this good news
for granted and will continue our efforts to make the military a
profession of choice. We also offer new accessions a compensation and
benefits package that is competitive with the civilian sector. In the
end we'll appeal to our junior officers that although we place heavy
demands on them and their families, the stakes for our national
security couldn't be higher and there has never been a more important
time to serve. We will also continue to ensure that our junior officers
receive the best education, training, and leadership opportunities
available; provide them challenging jobs with opportunities to excel
and advance; and ensure they know that their service to our Nation is
valued and essential during this time of war.
General Schoomaker. The Army has analyzed junior officer attrition
behavior and is implementing programs to retain our highly motivated
and combat experienced officers. Company grade attrition for fiscal
year 2005 is projected to be 8.1 percent which is below the historical
average of 8.4 percent. The Army is planning to offer a menu of
multiple incentives to each officer upon promotion to captain. The top
retention incentive for these officers, from our most recent officer
survey, is full time attendance at graduate school. Based on this
input, the Army is expanding graduate school opportunity from 400 to
1,000 seats per year. This will help retain our young officers
returning from combat, educate them in needed areas such as Middle
Eastern Studies and provide an operational break. The second most
desirable incentive is monetary. The Army is considering providing
across the board continuation pay in return for an obligation to extend
Active-Duty service. However, continuation pay for Army officers
requires a legislative change in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007. The Navy is currently using continuation pay for
surface warfare officers and the Army desires similar authority for its
junior officers. The Army is also leveraging desirable items such as
branch, posting and stabilization to increase retention. If available,
the Army will match the officer's desires in return for an additional
service obligation. These incentives are low cost and may increase
satisfaction for both the soldier and their family. A commander's
officer retention toolkit is also being developed to assist our leaders
in providing information about benefits, incentives, and retirement.
Officer retention is a leadership issue and all levels within the chain
of command are energized to keep these superb officers, who have
performed so magnificently, in our great Army. Additionally, increased
promotion rates and changes in career management may decrease attrition
of junior officers. An officer now will have the opportunity to change
career fields after 4 or 7 years of service as opposed to the previous
decision at 10 years. This may help retention by providing an
opportunity to change career goals and will also spread these combat
experienced officers among all career fields.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps is not currently experiencing a
retention problem in its officer corps, although manpower planners
continue to look for any indicators that would show higher attrition in
the future. Between fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2003, the Marine
Corps' overall retention rose from 89 percent to 93.8 percent. In
fiscal year 2003, officer retention was at a 19-year high. In fiscal
year 2004, officer retention returned to the historical average of 90.8
percent and the Marine Corps ended the fiscal year with a 91-percent
retention rate (9.0 percent attrition rate). With 2 months remaining in
fiscal year 2005, the officer retention rate is at the historical norm
of 90.8 percent (9.2 percent attrition rate). Retention forecasts for
fiscal year 2006 indicate that the current trend will continue.
However, should fiscal year 2006 retention drop below the desired rate,
the Marine Corps is prepared to target specific qualifications and
skills through both monetary and non-monetary tools. Monetary tools
already in place include aviation continuation pay, and law school
education debt subsidy. The Marine Corps has developed a plan to offer
a critical skills retention bonus should it be required. Nonmonetary
tools include lateral moves from `over' MOSs to short MOSs,
interservice transfers, and return to Active-Duty from the Marine Corps
Reserves. These different tools provide incentives to officers for
continued service even in the face of significant operational tempo,
while allowing flexibility to manpower planners to meet requirements
across the Marine Corps total force.
The Marine Corps Reserve is similarly not experiencing officer
retention problems in the Selected Reserve at this time. Officer
retention in the Selected Reserve for the first 9 months of the fiscal
year was 84 percent, well above the historic norm of 78.8 percent.
Reserve manpower planners continue to monitor officer retention and are
alert for any changes to the current trend. While officer retention in
the Selected Reserve remains strong, the Marine Corps Reserve continues
efforts to recruit company grade officers to meet vacancies in the
combat arms specialties. The affiliation bonus passed in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 remains a strong tool in
assisting in this effort.
ARMY PERSONNEL END STRENGTH
4. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, in this year's submission of
the Army budget, the total end strength proposed for the next several
years is 482,400. Congress has approved and the President authorized an
increase of 20,000 with temporary authority given last year to add
another 10,000. What disturbs me and many members of this committee is
the Army's apparent desire to fund only the 482,400 in the base budget.
As we continue to debate the overall size of the Army, including
another 20,000 we will vote on this year in the 2006 Defense
Authorization Bill, when can we expect the Army to begin to budget for
these increases in the base budget, rather than relying on
supplementals?
General Schoomaker. The Army programs its payroll budget to end
strength guidance provided by OSD. The DOD is currently reevaluating
force structure requirements for the Army and all Services as part of
the QDR. At this time, the Army has not received instructions to budget
for a base force beyond 482,400.
5. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, additionally, we have been
briefed that the Army intends to keep as many as 10,000 on Active-Duty
using Stop Loss. With this war continuing to impact both retention and
recruitment, do you foresee a time in the near future when the Army can
begin to reduce and potentially limit the use of Stop Loss?
General Schoomaker. The focus of Army deployments is on trained and
ready units, not individuals. Stop Loss is the policy that effectively
sustains a force which has trained together, to remain a cohesive
element throughout its deployment. Consequently, the commitment to
pursue the global war on terrorism and provide our combatant commanders
with the cohesive, trained, and ready forces necessary to decisively
defeat the enemy, require us to continue the Active Army and Reserve
Component Unit Stop Loss programs currently in effect. Stop Loss is not
about numbers, it is a temporary measure that does not permanently
affect the Army's end strength and has not been a key planning element
in determining or growing the force.
We fully understand DOD guidance to the Services is to discontinue
Stop Loss policies as soon as operationally feasible. However, there is
not a specific end date for the Army's current use of Stop Loss. The
size of future troop rotations will in large measure determine the
levels of Stop Loss needed in the future.
Maturation of the Army initiatives of modularity, restructuring/
rebalancing the Active component/Reserve component (AC/RC) force mix,
and the stabilization criteria associated with converting units to
their force stabilization design (3-year life cycled managed units)
will, over time, alleviate much stress on the force and will help
mitigate Stop Loss in the future. The proposed smaller overseas
footprint associated with fixed long and short tours, coupled with
reduced deployment requirements, will also reduce the need to fully
employ the Army's Stop Loss policy.
Clearly, Stop Loss is an issue with soldiers that are affected.
Although a small number of soldiers have gone public over their concern
with Stop Loss, it appears the great majority of soldiers affected
understand the need to keep trained, motivated, and cohesive teams
together. All three components are doing extensive surveys and sensing
sessions with our soldiers to get their feedback and insights. To date,
there has been much discussion of concerns over issues such as
deployments and family stress; however, Stop Loss does not appear to be
an overbearing retention issue.
6. Senator McCain. General Hagee, the Marine Corps is not using
Stop Loss at this time. How do you work around the need to retain unit
cohesiveness during deployments without using Stop Loss?
General Hagee. We maintain unit cohesiveness without the use of
Stop Loss through the management of our personnel assignments. The
Marine Corps Teaming initiative assigns entry-level school graduates to
their new units in groups from the same graduating class. Our junior
officers and staff noncommissioned officers are assigned to maximize
their time in the unit with the goal of a minimum of two deployments.
Our senior commanding officers are selected by a Command Selection
Board and assume command prior to the unit pre-deployment workups.
Finally, the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs has
completed an extensive personnel analysis and, beginning in October
2005, our current 90-day stabilization deadline for marines being
assigned to their deploying units will be increased to 120 days.
Overall, the unit cohesion program is accomplishing its goal of keeping
intact teams of marines who have trained and fought together as a
combat-ready force. The Marine Corps views Stop Loss as an extreme
measure to increase forces rapidly, as was needed for Operation Iraqi
Freedom I, not as a tool for sustaining the force to meet current
global war on terrorism needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
ARMY FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM
7. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, the Army is trying to
modularize, modernize, recapitalize, reorganize, and fight a war all at
the same time. Many people don't believe we have the resources to do
all this at once and that the Army will fall short. I have a concern
that as we focus on our current force we will lose focus on the future
force. The Army has canceled over 29 systems in the last 4 or 5 years
leaving them with one major system for the future: the FCS. There has
been a lot of discussion about the FCS and the Army's ability to
deliver manned ground vehicles (MGVs) meeting the current costs and
schedule, and most importantly, with the kind of survivability and
lethality required for future combat. Are you confident in the Army's
ability to deliver the FCS set of MGVs without shortcomings in
survivability and lethality, in accordance with the current costs and
schedule?
General Schoomaker. I share your concern that we cannot lose focus
on the needs of the future Army. The Nation faces a period of prolonged
and persistent global conflict. While we cannot predict the future, we
know that future enemies will seek to deny us the positions of military
advantage that we have used successfully in the past. We will require
improved survivability, lethality, sustainability, maneuverability, and
situational awareness. We must provide our soldiers with the tools they
need so that they never face a fair fight. With the help of Congress,
the Army has moved out to restructure the Army to grow the capability
that our soldiers need in today's fight and provide for the capability
that future environments will demand. By the end of fiscal year 2006,
we will have grown the Army combat capability by nearly 10 brigades and
reorganized it into a more deployable, lethal, and joint capable force.
Adaptable soldiers and leaders are already demonstrating the improved
capabilities of the current modular force on the battlefield. The FCS
strategy provides the material component of the modular force
capability as our central modernization effort. Our ability to spin-off
technology into the modular force as it matures accelerates our
modernization. I am confident that we are on glide path to deliver the
FCS set of MGVs as a key component of the system of systems capability
that the FCS strategy is providing. MGV tests are on track and
demonstrating today the range of capabilities that we seek.
Capabilities such as the 120-millimeter lightweight cannon, the Non-
Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and the 3D-millimeter cannon are but a
few examples. The 120-millimeter lightweight line-of-site cannon is
doing very well in test firings at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG),
Maryland. A breach-mounted mortar is also test-firing at APG, while the
NLOS-C is firing at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. The 3D-millimeter
cannon for the infantry vehicle is the same weapon that will be used by
the Marine Corps and Navy and is undergoing type classification of
munitions today. There are various active protection systems, close-in
active protection systems being developed and tested. Some of them are
successfully bringing down rocket propelled grenades right now. If you
look at the unmanned aerial vehicles, the class-four Fire Scout is
successfully flying right now for the Navy and the Army, and the first-
generation of underground robots, known as UGBs, the PacBot, is being
used in Afghanistan to search caves and in Iraq to identify IEDs. We
have developed a flexible and adaptive strategy designed to sustain the
current force and meet the emerging threats of the future. We are on
schedule and with the continued support of Congress we will maintain an
Army capable of accomplishing today's missions and field a future force
well prepared to meet future challenges.
8. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker, will this family of vehicles
give you that leap-ahead capability the Army desires?
General Schoomaker. We are a nation in the first stages of a
prolonged global conflict. Our enemies are adaptable and will
undoubtedly seek to avoid our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. We
believe for instance that future enemies will seek to deny us the
positions of military advantage that we have used successfully in the
past. As we look to the capabilities that we seek for the future
modular force, we have identified some capability gaps in our current
capability that we seek to fill with our modernization effort. The FCS
strategy encompasses all aspects of technological modernization of the
Army to provide projected gains in survivability, lethality,
situational awareness and reduction of operating and maintenance costs
while reducing the logistical footprint. I am confident that we are on
glide path for the FCS strategy and the MGVs to give us the leap-ahead
capability that we will need for the current and future modular force.
RECRUITING AND RETENTION
9. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, one of the
most interesting comments I have heard lately came from General Casey
when asked about recruiting and retention. He said: ``We have never had
to recruit an all volunteer Army during a long shooting war before.''
He went on to say we are learning as we go. General Casey also pointed
out, and I find very interesting and quite heartening, is that
retention amongst soldiers who have been deployed to Iraq and
Afghanistan is at a higher rate than those who have not deployed. This
tells me that those soldiers get it. They understand what we are up
against, understand the enemy, and understand our mission--its value
and importance. Secretary Hall was in my office recently and we talked
about recruiting and retention. In the past the saying was ``you
recruit a soldier and you retain a family''. Admiral Hall pointed out
that now we need to recruit the family in many cases. Negative media
reports and constant criticism that undermines the perception of
support for our troops seem to be having a very negative affect on our
ability to recruit. As the numbers indicate, once the soldier or marine
sees first hand what we are accomplishing and why we are there, he
understands what needs to be done and why it is so important. The
numbers seem to support this. Army retention is about 104 percent of
your goal in all components--Active, Reserve, and National Guard.
Marine retention is also on or above the goals set. However, both the
Army and Marine Corps have had trouble recruiting new members. What are
we learning about recruiting an Army and Marine Corps during a shooting
war?
General Schoomaker. The global war on terrorism, lower propensity
to serve, and negative feedback from influencers, coupled with the
improving economy and lower unemployment rates, have combined to
present a very challenging recruiting environment. We are finding that
it takes more resources to maintain our forces and expand them, than we
ever anticipated. To offset these challenges, the Army has increased
its resources dedicated to recruiting. However, we reiterate that
today's youth have a broad set of opportunities to choose from. These
choices do not necessarily include serving as a soldier. This is not
only an Army issue, but more importantly, a national issue. We must
communicate to today's youth that service to our Nation remains
critical for the Nation's security and well-being. As Army and national
leaders, we must ensure that today's youth fully comprehend how
important and rewarding service to our Nation can be for them and their
country.
General Hagee. What we are learning about recruiting during a
shooting war is the importance of ensuring our recruiters have the
tools to reach out to family members and community leaders who
influence the decisions of those interested in military service.
Recruiting is affected by much more than media reports and criticism.
We have learned that it takes much more time and effort to recruit
marines in the current environment. More important today is the active
role of the influencers in the decision making process. We have made a
conscientious decision to ensure they are part of our process.
10. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, how do we
transfer the positive can-do attitude that our veteran soldiers and
marines possess into the minds of our young men and women so that they
understand and desire to serve?
General Schoomaker. The key point is communication. The Army is
diligently working to get our message out to the public and the
Nation's youth. We are doing so in several ways, such as advertising
and through our soldiers and our leaders. We shape our advertising
messages for the Nation's youth and influencers to address the value of
being a soldier. We are also providing more recruiters to the
accessions effort. In addition, soldiers are currently dedicated to
assisting recruiters in their hometowns and local communities. This
program is called the Special Recruiter Assistance Program. These
soldiers, as well as many of our recruiting force, are veterans of
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Our soldiers
are doing very well in communicating to the public. We also appreciate
America's leaders' continued support in speaking on behalf of, and with
our soldiers, the proud service they perform on a daily basis.
Developing and strengthening the can-do attitude and desire to serve
remains a national issue.
General Hagee. We are all painfully aware the recruiting
environment is extremely challenging right now for all of us. We
aggressively capitalize on all available resources, to include our
veteran marines in the community. The Marine Corps will continue to
send only the best-qualified marines to serve on recruiting duty. These
highly-qualified marines will be tasked with seeking out and enlisting
the best and brightest of our young Americans. They will represent the
Corps' best.
MEDIA AND IRAQ
11. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, for a
very long time I have been concerned about the media's reporting of
what is going on in Iraq. In my trips there, I have found that the
whole story is not being portrayed. The positive results of our
military's work and the hard work of the U.S. Government as a whole to
restore freedom to Iraq has been trampled over by reporters more
focused on trying to find ways to diminish the work our young men and
women are doing there rather than portraying a balanced view by
reporting on the many key successes they have accomplished.
Before one of my previous trips, I was fortunate to come across an
article in World Tribune.com written by Lieutenant Colonel Tim Ryan, a
battalion commander with the First Calvary Division in Iraq. He led
troops into battle in Fallujah late last year and was involved in
security operations for the recent election. I also spoke to this
courageous, dedicated American soldier. Being on the ground in Iraqi
hot spots, he is best able to reflect what is actually occurring there.
Listen to his words: ``The key to the enemy's success is use of his
limited assets to gain the greatest influence over the masses. The
media serves as the glass through which a relatively small event can be
magnified to international proportions, and the enemy is exploiting
this with incredible ease. There is not good news to counteract the
bad, so the enemy scores a victory almost every day.''
I could go on and on. I am disturbed that soldiers like Lieutenant
Colonel Ryan do not feel we are winning the public relations war. He is
right. Distorted, negative news both here at home and in the Middle
East score victories for the insurgents.
Last Thursday, we heard very much the same story from Secretary
Rumsfeld, General Myers, General Abizaid, and General Casey. Opinion
polls are showing that more Americans are questioning our operations
over there, and I think that's due in large part to the biased media
coverage.
We've just started to hear that our troops are beginning to ask
whether the American public has the will to support them in their noble
efforts. Are you beginning to hear these questions from your soldiers
and marines?
General Schoomaker. Due to modern communications technologies like
the Internet, today's deployed soldiers have more access to information
from home than any soldiers in our Nation's history. Today's deployed
soldiers know how critical our current military operations are to the
future security of the United States; therefore, when they see news
stories about recent polling showing any erosion of support in American
public opinion, they are naturally concerned and have expressed those
concerns to me.
General Hagee. First, I'd like to thank you very much for your very
strong and extraordinary support to our men and women in uniform. Our
marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen know full well that you are
behind them. It's very important for our marines to know that the
American public is behind them also and I don't think that's in
question. The marines I've talked to know that the American public
appreciates their sacrifice in serving our great Nation and understand
the great effort being put forth to assist Iraqis in establishing
security in their country. There is no shortage of people who actively
show support for our troops and the fight against terrorism with notes
and care packages sent to the troops, scholarships for family members,
support for our injured servicemembers, grassroots fundraisers, benefit
functions, family appreciation events, and much more. Our deployed
marines certainly recognize and appreciate this outpouring of support.
Nevertheless, our marines are not oblivious to the fact that all
segments of the American public do not support the political goals of
the government that has sent them into harm's way. They also understand
that Americans are perfectly justified in disagreeing with the means by
which their government attempts to achieve its goals, which is the very
freedom our troops will fight to the death to protect for others. I
have not seen any indication that our troops don't believe the American
public supports them. However, our marines, sailors, soldiers, and
airmen are, after all, human beings with hopes and dreams of their own.
They want to know that the American people are behind the government
that is sending them into harm's way.
12. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, is there
concern about the American public's support?
General Schoomaker. The support of the American people is vital to
the ultimate success of our ongoing military operations. When our
soldiers deploy, they are confident that the American public,
regardless of their differing political views, supports every soldier
working to protect the citizens of this great Nation on a daily basis.
General Hagee. First, I'd like to thank you very much for your very
strong and extraordinary support to our men and women in uniform. Our
marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen know full well that you are
behind them. It's very important for our marines to know that the
American public is behind them also and I don't think that's in
question. The marines I've talked to know that the American public
appreciates their sacrifice in serving our great nation and understand
the great effort being put forth to assist Iraqis in establishing
security in their country. There is no shortage of people who actively
show support for our troops and the fight against terrorism with notes
and care packages sent to the troops, scholarships for family members,
support for our injured servicemembers, grassroots fundraisers, benefit
functions, family appreciation events, and much more. Our deployed
marines certainly recognize and appreciate this outpouring of support.
Nevertheless, our marines are not oblivious to the fact that all
segments of the American public do not support the political goals of
the government that has sent them into harm's way. They also understand
that Americans are perfectly justified in disagreeing with the means by
which their government attempts to achieve its goals, which is the very
freedom our troops will fight to the death to protect for others. I
have not seen any indication that our troops don't believe the American
public supports them. However, our marines, sailors, soldiers, and
airmen are, after all, human beings with hopes and dreams of their own.
They want to know that the American people are behind the government
that is sending them into harm's way.
13. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, is this
negative media coverage one of the reasons we're struggling with
recruiting numbers in your branches?
General Schoomaker. The media coverage has accentuated the
negative, and we know a lot of good that is being done by soldiers goes
unreported. To the extent that the news media focus on military
casualty information, there is a negative impact on recruiting. We
believe that influencers, such as parents, may hesitate to support
their child's decision to enlist because of the perceived risks of
injury and death.
General Hagee. Today's environment is challenging for recruiting. A
number of factors contribute to the environment such as: current
operations, world events, increasing the recruiting numbers, and an
improving economy. Specifically, we have seen an increase in the amount
of time it takes to enlist an individual. This additional time is spent
working with both applicants and their parents, addressing the
opportunities and benefits of serving in the Marine Corps. It would not
be fair to say that negative media coverage has solely affected our
recruiting numbers. Although the media has continued to cover the role
of the Marine Corps in the current global war on terrorism, the
American people, to include the media, have always recognized the
Marine Corps as a tough, smart, elite organization and marine
recruiters continue to sell that same message today.
14. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, how are
we combating this negative media coverage in the recruiting office?
General Schoomaker. We are taking proactive steps to provide
alternative sources of information in recruiting offices to mitigate
negative media coverage. For example, we provide monthly talking points
down to the recruiting station level, on a variety of topics, and take
special care to include talking points about positive progress in Iraq
and Afghanistan. We also forward the Headquarters, Department of the
Army's ``Stand To'' newsletter to our brigades and battalions, for
forwarding to the recruiting companies and recruiting stations. Our
very best means to counter misinformation is our soldiers themselves.
We use soldiers who are Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OEF/OIF) veterans in the Special Recruiting Assistance Program
by bringing them to our recruiting stations to share their first-hand
experiences within the local community. Further, an overwhelming
majority of our detailed recruiters are now OIF and/or OEF veterans. We
are also planning a series of televised local townhall meetings across
the country. We will bring together small panels of soldiers of various
backgrounds (officer, noncommissioned officer, enlisted) and parents of
soldiers to answer audience questions about the Army and what it means
to be a soldier.
General Hagee. As previously stated, we have not seen significant
negative media coverage of the Marine Corps or the marines fighting the
global war on terrorism. The coverage has shown the realities of how
tough this fight is and the sacrifice that is required. Well before the
events of September 11, 2001, our recruiting message was and continues
to emphasize that marines are trained to fight and win against our
country's foes. We remain confident that this message will continue to
resonate allowing us to continue to succeed in recruiting marines that
are needed to fight and win while the country is at war.
RECONSTITUTION OF FORCES
15. Senator Inhofe. General Myers, General Schoomaker, and General
Hagee, I am concerned about the capabilities of our military units who
have been engaged in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and
those units getting ready for the next contingency as they rotate back
to their home bases. Many units will return to their home units without
the equipment they took to the war because that equipment was still
needed in theater by the men and women coming to replace the troops who
were rotating out. So there will be no equipment or less equipment to
train with once they are back at their home station; or, they will be
bringing home equipment that underwent untold stress operating in the
Southwest Asia environment, in some cases with regular servicing
inspections delayed or waived in the interest of the mission. We need
to ensure ongoing training so that our military can maintain its
readiness for the next contingency. What is the DOD's plan to meet
these shortfalls or limitations in equipment needs?
General Myers. The Services, in coordination with the Joint Staff,
are continuously developing return and/or replacement plans for
military equipment in theater. When feasible, equipment transfers or
reimbursements are taking place between units relinquishing equipment
to units taking possession upon arrival in theater. Where equipment
shortages exist due to operational wear and replacements are scarce,
the Joint Staff is assisting in the prioritization of requirements to
return and/or replace equipment from several sources, such as pre-
positioned stocks, to mission-ready condition without sacrificing the
necessary training of deployable forces.
General Schoomaker. As units redeploy from the theater of
operations, the Army will continue to reset the force to meet future
requirements. The goal is for all returning Active-Duty units to
achieve a sufficient level of combat readiness within 3 months of
equipment arrival at home station. When equipment shortages exist, the
Army is reallocating equipment from lower priority units or from
current production, if available, to fill voids. Replacement of
equipment is imperative to ensure the units will be able to train for
future deployments.
Active component units undergoing modular transformation are
provided 180 days to complete their reconstitution and reorganization
to ensure a return to high readiness. Reserve component units will
likely take longer to achieve the desired readiness level. The working
assumption is that Reserve units will take 1 year to reestablish pre-
deployment readiness after equipment returns to home station. Our
Reserve component formations are experiencing a little personnel
degradation upon their return home station; therefore, efforts are
being implemented to reorganize them into modular units and supply
sufficient equipment for these units to provide depth to our available
forces.
Readiness involves three essential components: people, equipment,
and training. It is only by addressing our soldiers' needs,
reconstituting our organizational equipment, reorganizing and training
to standard on our collective combat tasks that units will return to an
acceptable readiness level. The goal is to culminate these intensive
reconstitution efforts by conducting a certification exercise at one of
the combat training centers. By adopting such an aggressive approach,
the Army will continue to ensure its ability to meet the combatant
commanders' near-term requirements.
Further, both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the National Guard
Bureau are in the process of redistributing equipment to ensure the
proper amounts and types of equipment are available to permit training
to standard. They are also cooperating to ensure our governors have
adequate equipment on-hand to support our homeland security, homeland
defense, and military support to civil authorities responsibilities. In
addition to the intense maintenance efforts by Army installations, Army
Reserve and Army National Guard maintenance organizations, the Army
Material Command has an aggressive depot maintenance program to rebuild
and refurbish equipment that was stressed beyond its useful life.
Finally, funding for new equipment as replacement or to support
modularity is providing much needed modernization for our aging fleets.
General Hagee. The Corps remains engaged to address the shortfalls
of Marine Corps units. The Strategic Ground Equipment Working Group
(SGEWG) was established in August 2004 to specifically engage this
issue; membership includes representatives from the Marine Forces
(MARFOR), Logistics Command, Systems Command, Combat Development
Command, and Programs and Resources Department, and the individual
Marine Expeditionary Forces. The charter of the working group is to
take action on equipment readiness issues for the Marine Corps. To
date, the SGEWG has formally met on five different occasions to address
these specific equipment deficiencies for units returning to CONUS.
The SGEWG has initiated the following actions to source MARFOR
deficiencies:
1. Cross-leveling. Business rules were developed based on input
from the SGEWG members and the MARFORs. They are:
For Active Component units:
Priority 1 units (within 6 months of deploying to global war on
terrorism)
Goal--equip to 90 percent of Table of Equipment
Priority 2 units (all other units)
Goal--equip to 75 percent of Table of Equipment
For Reserve component units:
Priority 1 units (within 6 months of deploying to global war on
terrorism)
Goal--equip to 100 percent of Table of Allowance
Priority 2 units (all other units)
Goal--equip to 85 percent of Table of Allowance
Marine Forces Pacific and Marine Forces Atlantic each published
internal cross-leveling guidance based on the SGEWG business rules.
Both MARFORs are currently executing. The business rules are recognized
as goals and in many cases cannot be met due to equipment availability/
density. The intent is to ensure that units have the equipment
necessary to conduct training to prepare them for their next rotation
into the theater. MARFORs submitted shortfalls by priority unit on 15
Nov 2004. The SGEWG continues to explore and develop executable
sourcing solutions for the MARFOR shortfalls.
2. The individual MARFORs have conducted internal redistribution in
order to support the training of units within a 6-month deployment
window.
3. Some of the identified equipment shortfalls were sourced through
the fiscal year 2005 supplemental. Any known unfounded requirements
will be requested via the next funding opportunity as appropriate.
The Marine Corps will continue to address deficiencies across the
Corps to ensure that all units have the capability to conduct training
in order to prepare their marines for current and future operations.
16. Senator Inhofe. General Myers, General Schoomaker, and General
Hagee, yesterday at his nomination hearing to be the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace estimated that it would take
upwards of 2 years from the conclusion of U.S. operations in Iraq to
reconstitute. What would you ask of this committee to ensure our
military is reconstituted to prepare for future threats?
General Myers. The Joint Staff would ask Congress to fully support
requested funding, including supplemental funding, in order to fully
reconstitute our equipment and facilitate the Department's preparation
for future threats.
General Schoomaker. We greatly appreciate the understanding and
support of the committee in providing supplementary funding for the
global war on terrorism. Supplemental funding has been the key to
maintaining readiness and provisioning throughout the fight. Continued
support of the base budget and supplemental requirements is necessary
to maintain the required state of readiness to prosecute the global war
on terrorism.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps has prepared preliminary resetting
the force estimates and we have been briefing the committee staff on an
ongoing basis as to those evolving requirements. I concur with General
Pace's estimation that it will take at least 2 years after the
conclusion of operations in the Area of Operations to reconstitute. I
ask for the committee's continuing support of our supplemental funding
requests in which we have begun to address our resetting the force
requirements. Replacement and repair of equipment that has attrited or
is rapidly approaching the end of its useful life due to the high
OPTEMPO and harsh environmental conditions in both Iraq and Afghanistan
are critical if the Marine Corps is to maintain unit readiness, restore
our prepositioned stock, and conduct adequate pre-deployment training.
17. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Chu and Secretary Abell, as a follow-
up to my previous question on equipment status, how has the global war
on terrorism impacted the readiness status of the personnel themselves?
Dr. Chu and Mr. Abell. Our soldiers and marines are currently
better prepared and ready than at any time in our recent history. They
are battle hardened, combat tested, and able to accomplish the missions
asked of them. There are certain occupational areas that do require
specific attention, e.g., military police, civil affairs, and Special
Operations Forces, where more capacity is needed. The Department is
addressing this need with several initiatives to include rebalancing
the force between the Active and Reserve Forces, conversion of military
to civilian positions to free up more military personnel, and joint
solutions where each Service can contribute in non-traditional areas to
ease the stress on the force and even the workload among the Services.
18. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Chu and Secretary Abell, what will it
take to reconstitute these smart, competent, and dedicated service men
and women?
Dr. Chu and Mr. Abell. As experienced service men and women return
to their home stations after deployment, they are able to share the
valuable knowledge and experience they have gained with new
servicemembers coming into the Service and with those preparing to
deploy. They will provide valuable leadership within the tactical units
as well as experienced trainers to support the combat training centers
and the Joint National Training Capability. This will allow the
Department to maintain a high level of competency and proficiency
across the force.
19. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Chu and Secretary Abell, what
concerns can we expect, regarding reconstitution, and how do we best
prepare to address these concerns?
Dr. Chu and Mr. Abell. All of the Services have developed
executable plans to ensure forces returning from current operations are
reconstituted and postured to ensure continued support for our current
and future operations. For example, as brigades return from Operation
Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom, the Army is transitioning
them into the new modular Brigade Combat Team structure. The brigades
then go through a cycle of maintenance and training to prepare them for
future operations. The Services are moving to a new force management
model: the Air Force Air Expeditionary Force, the Naval Fleet Response
Plan, and the Army Force Generation Model. This will improve the
ability of our forces to respond and to reconstitute once have done so.
BUDGET NEEDS
20. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, this
question is not designed to erupt into a turf battle; however, it may
invoke such a response. The land combat component of the joint force is
currently under tremendous stress. These rotations in Iraq and
Afghanistan as well as numerous other smaller operations around the
world are very costly possibly jeopardizing future modernization. Are
we adequately funding your Service?
General Schoomaker. Congress has been very supportive of Army
requirements throughout this period of tremendous stress. Supplemental
appropriations have funded incremental costs associated with military
operations, sustained our transformation efforts, and allowed us to
begin to reset our force. Your continued support will be essential. In
addition to funding the costs associated with rotations to Iraq and
Afghanistan, we estimate we will require continued supplemental funding
to reset for the force for at least 2 years beyond the end of the
conflict.
General Hagee. To a degree we have been able to protect our future
modernization plans by requesting the repair or replacement of
equipment attrited or damaged in global war on terrorism through
supplemental funding. However, the unfunded bill to completely reset
the Marine Corps to the capabilities which existed before September 11,
2001, is growing exponentially with each passing month. This
jeopardizes our ability to maintain funding for both essential
modernization and global war on terrorism operations.
It will take, in my judgment, a minimum of 2 years of supplementals
after the cessation of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to reset the
Marine Corps. In the absence of such funding our modernization efforts
would have to become the primary source for resetting the force.
21. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, do we
need to increase your shares of the pie?
General Schoomaker. Although relative Service shares of the base
budget have remained fairly constant, the Army has received by far the
largest share of supplemental funding. In effect, it's a bigger pie and
the Army has an increased share at this time. Without the additional
funding, it would be impossible for the Army to sustain military
operations, continue the transformation to the Army modular force
structure, and reset our force.
General Hagee. Decisions regarding resource allocation within the
DOD are very carefully assessed by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Staff. A balanced approach has been adopted in
that process to ensure that the most urgent needs are addressed without
sacrificing longer term departmental objectives. The budget requests,
including supplemental funding, the DOD submits to Congress reflect
those decisions.
22. Senator Inhofe. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, how
important are the emergency supplementals you have projected for fiscal
year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 to your ability to sustain and
reconstitute your force?
General Schoomaker. The fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007
supplementals will be critical to sustain military operations and to
reconstitute the force. We will require supplemental funding to cover
the incremental cost of military operations, our increased Active
component end strength, and, in fiscal year 2006, our investment in
Army modular forces. We estimate we will require continued supplemental
funding to reconstitute our force throughout the period of conflict and
for at least 2 years after.
General Hagee. The fiscal year 2006 supplemental request we are
currently developing will be critical in maintaining the resetting the
force efforts we began with the funding received in the fiscal year
2005 supplemental. Due to production leadtimes and the continuing
impact global war on terrorism operations are having on our ground and
aviation equipment, we must continue to procure replacement equipment
to sustain current operations without further degrading training and
readiness throughout the Marine Corps.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT
23. Senator Collins. General Hagee, according to a Marine Corps
Inspector General assessment of ground equipment in Iraq completed in
May 2005, and delivered to this committee last week, Marine Corps units
fighting in some of the most dangerous territory in Iraq do not have
adequate weapons, communications gear, or properly outfitted vehicles.
The report notes that because of the extensive theater in which the
marines are operating and the specific mission for the forces, the
standard ``T/E sets,'' or metric that determines what equipment is
needed, is ``not sufficient for the Marine units.'' The report
continues, ``the force requires additional capabilities in mobility,
engineering, communications, and heavy weapons assets regardless of the
size of any specific element of the Marine Air Ground Task Force.''
I would like to note that throughout the report, the dedication and
resourcefulness of our marines are repeatedly and deservedly praised.
But in my view, we have failed them if we are not providing adequate
long-term assessments of what resources--whether it is machine guns,
armor, vehicles, or communications equipment--our troops need.
Such a report should prompt a reevaluation of our efforts to arm
and supply our troops. One fine member of my staff is in the Marine
Corps Reserve and served a tour in Iraq this past year. I want to be
sure that we are providing our Marine Corps and all troops with the
resources they need to perform their duties. What measures have been
taken to ensure that our troops have adequate communications gear,
vehicles, protection, and weapons that they need?
General Hagee. You are correct; the standard table of equipment (T/
E) set is not adequate. Over in the OIF theater of operations, the
Marine Corps is not adhering to the T/E, but to the Equipment Density
List (EDL). The EDL is a task-organized T/E that provides the operating
force with everything they require and is based upon their mission
analysis. That EDL is significantly more than the T/E with more than
twice the HMMWVs and significantly more weapons and communications. The
intent of the statement from the report was to point out this disparity
between the way we are used to operating and how we must operate in the
austere environment of OIF. We are supplying the marines deployed
forward with the equipment they need to accomplish the mission--they
validate the EDL quarterly and their requirements as the combat
environment matures and changes, due to the opposition's emerging
tactics, becomes the Marine Corps' priority.
24. Senator Collins. General Hagee, are you concerned by the
findings of this Marine Corps Inspector General report?
General Hagee. The report validates our concerns: That OIF's
austere, combat environment requires a greatly increased equipment list
with increased capabilities throughout the deployed force. The harsh
conditions and combat operations have accelerated the deterioration of
our ground equipment. This report has provided me with an assessment of
the effectiveness of our equipment replacement and rotation plan and
pinpointed areas where we need to provide more support.
25. Senator Collins. General Hagee, are you exploring how to
implement the report's recommendations through 2006 and beyond?
General Hagee. Yes. The Marine Corps has done and is doing the
following:
- Conducted a Force Setting and Equipment Conference;
- Approved the EDL and developed sourcing solutions for OIF EDL
deficiencies;
- Captured unfunded requirements for inclusion into the fiscal
year 2006 supplemental;
- Developing a plan to globally source remaining OIF EDL
deficiencies; and
- Sourcing the executable portion of the Principal End Item
rotation plan with available equipment sources. The fiscal year
2005 supplemental was used to source a portion of this
requirement; we are looking at other solutions and will address
this issue in the August Strategic Ground Equipment Working
Group conference in Albany, GA.
MARCENT or HQMC will conduct an annual assessment of the equipment
deployed to OIF. Further, the Marine Corps Inspector General will
deploy assessment teams into theater every 9 months and provide a
report on equipment condition/status.
26. Senator Collins. General Hagee, why are we are having trouble
adequately arming and supplying our marines?
General Hagee. Our marines in OIF/OEF are adequately armed and
supplied. They are the focus of effort in the global war on terrorism.
Because of the conditions in those theaters of operation, they require
considerably more equipment; in communications, mobility, and weapons,
more than twice in some areas from what our units are outfitted. We
have had to draw from forces back in garrison and from our strategic
supplies to fully outfit our forward deployed forces. This has created
some shortfalls back home which are being mitigated through a cross-
leveling of our assets and ensures that those units preparing to deploy
have the equipment necessary to train.
SERVICEMEMBERS TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN LIFE
27. Senator Collins. Secretary Chu and Secretary Abell, a GAO
report issued in May assesses how the U.S. Government helps
servicemembers transition to civilian life. The report discusses the
Transition Assistance Program (TAP), which is jointly administered by
DOD, the Department of Veterans' Affairs, and the Department of Labor.
The program offers pre-separation counseling, employment workshops, a
session on veterans' benefits, and, for those in need, a session for
disabled veterans. The report notes that improvements are especially
needed in transition assistance services for Reserve and National Guard
members. Given the rapid demobilization of Reserve and National Guard
members, they participate in abbreviated versions of the program and
generally do not have time for any employment preparation. The GAO
report urges that DOD, Department of Veterans' Affairs, and the
Department of Labor work together, with DOD as the lead, to improve
outreach to members of the Reserve and National Guard. Are you familiar
with this recent GAO report?
Dr. Chu and Mr. Abell. Yes, the Department is familiar with the
recent GAO Report GAO-05-544, ``Military and Veterans' Benefits:
Enhanced Services Could Improve Transition Assistance for Reserves and
National Guard,'' and we are taking appropriate steps to address GAO's
recommendation.
28. Senator Collins. Secretary Chu and Secretary Abell, how do you
plan to implement the recommendations of this GAO report?
Dr. Chu and Mr. Abell. The Department has formed an Interagency
Demobilization Working Group consisting of representatives from all
three agencies to review and assess TAP and the demobilization process.
They will report to the senior leadership of DOD, Department of
Veterans' Affairs, and Department of Labor with recommendations for
implementation.
29. Senator Collins. Secretary Chu and Secretary Abell, is DOD
prepared to handle the growing number of former Active-Duty
servicemembers who will need assistance from the TAP?
Dr. Chu and Mr. Abell. Yes, the Department is committed to
supporting former Active-Duty servicemembers who need assistance from
TAP.
RECRUITING PRACTICES
30. Senator Collins. Secretary Chu, Secretary Abell, and General
Schoomaker, I would like to address the issue of recruiting practices.
Let me say that I salute the fine work of our military, and I fully
understand the importance of having a strong recruiting program to
bring young people into our Armed Forces. However, we need to be sure
that recruiters are not under so much pressure that they use
unprofessional tactics to encourage young people to join. I would like
to bring to your attention the case of a constituent of mine from
Maine. He wrote to me that he is a firm supporter of our military and
of our President. He joined the Army Reserve, in fact. But his
experiences with Army recruiters were less than professional. I don't
want to get into the details of his specific case, but I do want to
hear your reaction to some of his allegations. My constituent wrote
that some Army recruiters:
Coach potential recruits on how to best complete
enlistment questionnaires;
Promote fast weight loss programs in order to
encourage potential enlistees to get down to the acceptable
limit; and
Encourage cessation of drug use so that tests can be
passed without broader counseling or screening of illegal drug
users.
This constituent concluded, ``recruiters are far more worried about
losing a recruit than they are about getting quality persons for the
Army. It is my opinion that the Army needs to relax the standards on
recruits and increase them on recruiters.'' What safeguards are in
place to ensure the professionalism of recruiters and recruiting
practices?
Dr. Chu and Mr. Abell. We will share your concerns with the
recruiting commanders. We assure you that the Services take the issue
of unprofessional conduct very seriously and have the appropriate
safeguards in place to remedy violations and forestall future
occurrences. Each Service has an office that provides recruiter
oversight regarding misconduct and unethical behavior. Recruiters found
guilty of violating the standards are generally punished under the
Uniformed Code of Military Justice.
Each of the Services understands the importance of recruiting with
integrity and being professional. Each Service utilizes focused
training, implements sound policies, and fosters a professional culture
to instill a sense of professionalism in their recruiter force. Army
leadership recently displayed this resolve by conducting a 1-day
``stand down'' on May 20, 2005, for recruiters to discuss the standards
and to reinforce their importance to the mission.
We would be glad to investigate any specific cases you are prepared
to share with us.
General Schoomaker. Army values guide our recruiters to do the
right thing when no one is looking, just as any other soldier or leader
on the battlefield. We have an Enlisted Standards Program in place to
maintain oversight of our recruiters and to identify trends that might
indicate problems. We track new recruits through initial entry training
and their performance is linked back to the recruiter who enlisted
them. We investigate all allegations of recruiting impropriety and take
appropriate corrective actions as needed. Since 1999, less than 1
percent of recruiters assigned have been relieved as a result of a
recruiting impropriety. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command held a
command-wide Army Values Stand Down on May 20, 2005 to restate our
commitment to achieving our recruiting mission with the utmost
professionalism and adherence to Army values.
31. Senator Collins. Secretary Chu, Secretary Abell, and General
Schoomaker, are unreasonable demands being placed on recruiters to
achieve unrealistic quotas?
Dr. Chu and Mr. Abell. The current recruiting environment clearly
presents a challenge for our recruiters, but we believe the demands
placed on them are realistic and achievable. Through your continued
support, we have been able to provide them with additional resources to
help reduce the burden. We have found that the single greatest tool in
reducing the demand on individual recruiters is to better man the
recruiting force and, in response, both the Army and the Marine Corps
have increased their recruiter manning. We will continue to monitor the
expectations levied on our recruiters, and the resources provided them.
General Schoomaker. Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force is
challenging, even in the best of times. Today's environment,
characterized by low unemployment, a decline in the propensity among
influencers to recommend military service, and a general lack of public
support, makes recruiting a very challenging task. We have increased
the number of recruiters commensurate with the increase in recruiting
goals to mitigate the demands of the mission. Given the current
environment, the level of effort required of the individual recruiter
is significant, but no more demanding than what is being asked of
soldiers around the world. We are an Army at war, and we must provide
the Army the number of new soldiers that it requires. That is our
mission, and we can do no less.
32. Senator Collins. Secretary Chu, Secretary Abell, and General
Schoomaker, has the situation damaged the professionalism of our
recruiting practices?
Dr. Chu and Mr. Abell. Any time a recruiter violates the trust of
his or her organization and the people they are sworn to protect, it
calls their professionalism into question. While every infraction is
serious, media coverage of these infractions distorts the size of the
issue. Few news stories are written about recruiting success, or about
the recruiters who uphold our high expectations. Our recruiters, with
very few exceptions, are an outstanding group of professionals
performing a vital mission for their country. The contributions that
these recruiters make to their communities and country are vital to
maintaining a truly professional force. We solicit your assistance in
giving prominence to their fine performance.
General Schoomaker. No. Our recruiting practices are intact and as
professional as ever. The majority of recruiters conduct themselves
with integrity everyday. Although there was media coverage of a few
recruiters who allegedly violated our recruiting regulations, we do not
believe that there was any widespread damage to our recruiters'
reputation as a whole. We continue to receive many positive comments
from proud parents and influencers, complimenting our recruiters for
their professionalism and care in assisting their sons and daughters
through the enlistment process. We believe the public knows that we are
a values-based institution and that despite the actions of a few, Army
recruiters live and work in accordance with Army values.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole
FAMILIES OF SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN
33. Senator Dole. Secretary Chu and Secretary Abell, in General
Schoomaker's opening statement he mentioned that he is ``examining how
to best expand support for veterans and National Guard and Army Reserve
soldiers.'' I would offer that in North Carolina we have a very
successful pilot program called the Citizen Soldier Support Program
that partners with DOD programs to link existing community services
with families' needs. Is there anything the Department is doing across
the Services to support the families and thereby reduce stress on our
deployed Guard and Reserve servicemembers?
Dr. Chu and Mr. Abell. The Department facilitates family support
during sustained operations in the global war on terrorism and other
contingencies. Taking care of families is a top priority for the
Department.
The Department and Services operate over 700 family assistance
centers around the world to enhance family support. Approximately 400
of those are National Guard Family Assistance Centers. Programs include
education, training, outreach, and personal support.
A variety of options keep military families and servicemembers in
direct contact, including e-mail, telephone cards, and videophone
access. Military OneSource gives access to professional advisors and
referral services via toll-free numbers and the Internet, 24 hours a
day. A number of Web sites have been established that address all
aspects of military life and deployment. Military and civilian
community-based resources provide professional, non-medical,
readjustment and family counseling, including education and referral
services. The Department provided $53 million, over 2 years (fiscal
years 2003 and 2004), from supplemental funding to help families manage
work schedules while one parent is gone and to offer time to take care
of other family business. This money provided extended child care to
cover additional work shifts, opened centers for additional hours,
subsidized in-home care, created ``satellite homes'' in which centers
and homes share care, and located spaces for those geographically
isolated from military installations.
34. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, in your opening statement I
was heartened to hear you acknowledge the strain on soldiers' marriages
and families. You mentioned that you are ``tracking numerous metrics to
ensure that we meet the needs of those that serve and their loved
ones.'' What are these metrics?
General Schoomaker. Individual programs report statistics based on
utilization and use surveys and questionnaires to determine rates of
success and identify where improvements are needed. Examples of these
metrics would include:
Army OneSource (AOS): A division of Military OneSource, this is a
24-hour, 7 days-a-week, toll free information and referral telephone
service available worldwide to Active-Duty, Reserve, and National Guard
military members, deployed civilians, and their families. AOS provides
information ranging from every day concerns to deployment/reintegration
issues. Total contacts made to AOS as of June 2005 was 96,652. These
contacts include phone, e-mail, in-person counseling sessions, and
online visits. The top three issues for in-person counseling sessions
are emotional well-being of couples, depression, and family
relationships accounting for over two-thirds of the total sessions.
Overall satisfaction for these services was extremely high. Over 88
percent of the customers were positively impacted by their services,
over 96 percent were satisfied with in-person counseling, and over 99.5
percent found the overall quality of online services and educational
materials to be excellent.
Because chaplains are mostly embedded in Army units, much of the
counseling they do is informal and not reportable. However, anecdotal
reports from the field suggest family stress and consequent counseling
services is up significantly. This is supported by the data gathered at
the chaplain counseling training centers on Forts Hood and Benning
where statistics are showing a 42-percent increase of families
accessing services comparing similar reporting periods from 2005 and
2004. The Chaplain Corps has fielded a rapidly expanding series of
reinforcing marriage retreats and training events called Building
Strong and Ready Families (BSRF). From 2001 to 2005, utilization and
funding of these retreats for Active-Duty couples has expanded
dramatically from $500,000 in 2001 to $1.8 million in 2005. The Army
Reserve and Army National Guard are funded at $5 million for this year.
In 2005 the program will provide 621 marriage retreats to be attended
by more than 23,375 volunteer deploying and reconstituting soldier
families. Based on exit and follow-up surveys, Army couples are
reporting considerable improvement in their overall relationship
satisfaction, conflict resolution, confidence, and mitigating negative
interactions. In total more than 75 percent of the couples questioned
showed improvements in these areas compared to their pre-BSRF scores.
Couples completing BSRF reported that it helped them relate to each
other better, handle the stress of Army life, and want to stay in the
Army longer.
35. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, what factors do the metrics
account for?
General Schoomaker. The metrics account for factors like
constituent satisfaction, availability, as well as program utilization
in categories such as family support, healthcare, standard of living,
values, continuous learning, and welfare of our soldiers and families.
36. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, what are these metrics
showing?
General Schoomaker. There has been increased utilization of
services and demand for information and counseling from both physical
and Web-based services by soldiers and their families. Many family
programs have added to the variety of services provided and lengthened
their hours of operation to meet increased demands. When Reserve
component soldiers are mobilized and deployed, often their families are
not located near the deploying unit's home station or an Army
installation where services are available. The Army is working to
mitigate Reserve component issues through the development of additional
Reserve component capabilities within the Army's ``People'' programs.
These Reserve component centric capabilities include Web-based and
toll-free services to assist these families in finding local assistance
and answers to their concerns.
37. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, what trends are we seeing
from the metrics?
General Schoomaker. The trends are showing escalated utilization
for programs already in existence and an increase in the variety of
programs being offered Army-wide.
38. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, how are you translating these
findings into tangible help for families?
General Schoomaker. For both mandatory and voluntary services, most
programs show considerable levels of success and satisfaction for those
who participate in them. Examples include:
a. Army OneSource (AOS): A division of Military OneSource, this is
a 24-hour, 7 days-a-week, toll-free information and referral telephone
service available worldwide to Active-Duty, Reserve, and National Guard
military members, deployed civilians, and their families. AOS provides
information ranging from everyday concerns to deployment/reintegration
issues. Face-to-face counseling referrals are available for six
sessions per issue with professional civilian counselors at no cost to
the soldier or their families. To date, AOS has assisted almost 100,000
people requiring services and educational material with a 90-percent
satisfaction rating.
b. Building Strong and Ready Families (BSRF): The Chaplain Corps
has fielded a rapidly expanding series of reinforcing marriage retreats
and training events called BSRF. From 2001 to 2005, use of these
retreats has expanded dramatically, and beginning in 2005 they were
offered to the Reserve component. For fiscal year 2005, the program
will provide several hundred marriage retreats for more than 20,000
volunteer soldier families. Couples completing BSRF report that it
helps them relate to each other better and stay longer in the Army.
c. Spouse/Family Employment Program: The Employment Readiness
Program is focused on assisting eligible family members who are
relocating as a result of a military or civilian sponsor's transfer by
providing accurate, timely information and other supportive services
necessary to minimize the employment problems associated with such
moves. The U.S. Army Community and Family Support Center has
established 17 collaborative partnerships with public and private
sector companies to create career and training opportunities for
military spouses.
d. Deployment Cycle Support (DCS): DCS assists the total Army
family in meeting challenges during all phases of the deployment cycle.
Deploying soldiers, civilians, and their family members participate in
a series of classes, discussions, screenings, and assessments. Topics
covered range from household budgeting and services available to
reunion expectations and how to identify symptoms of deployment related
stress. Redeploying soldiers and their families receive multi-faceted
reintegration orientation and services beginning in-theater and
continuing several months after arrival home.
e. Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR): In calendar
year 2004, the Nation released just over 109,000 Reserve component
soldiers from Federal Active Duty. Of these, less than 3 percent
(approximately 3,100) required mediation services from the ESGR. Of
that group, less than 2 percent reported being denied the right to
return to work. ESGR resolves such problems through its ombudsman
volunteers. Using education and mediation, these volunteers resolve 95
percent of all cases. Unresolved cases are referred to the Department
of Labor for formal investigation.
f. Multi-Component Family Support Network (MCFSN): The MCFSN
partners with States and communities and creates joint, multi-agency
support for Active and Reserve components. It leverages current systems
to provide robust, cohesive support systems with alternative delivery
options to ensure diverse needs of Active, Guard, and Reserve soldier
families are met. The five pilot regional programs developed and
underway include the Southwest, Southeast, and Northwest.
g. Child and Youth Services (CYS): CYS offers quality programs and
accountability for children and youth which reduce the conflict between
mission readiness and parental responsibility. CYS responds to these
requirements by providing programs with flexible hours and reducing
child care fees for deployed soldiers.
h. Deployment Related Stress Treatment and Healthcare for Reserve
Component Soldiers: The U.S. Army Medical Department has a
comprehensive and integrated system for combat stress control,
including prevention, intervention, and care. The combat stress control
teams are deployed to areas of current operation to work closely with
leaders and soldiers to help them cope with both the stresses of combat
and the challenges of being on extended deployments. Educational
activities include combat and operational stress control, suicide
prevention classes, symptoms of combat and operational stress
reactions, self-help techniques and exercises they can use to counter
these reactions, and professional services available to help them.
TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) is a premium-based TRICARE health plan
available to eligible Reserve component soldiers who are ordered to
Active-Duty in support of the global war on terrorism. All who were
mobilized for 90 or more continuous days are eligible for TRS. TRS
coverage is similar to TRICARE Standard or Extra.
TECHNOLOGIES FOR COUNTERING IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
39. Senator Dole. General Myers, in General Hagee's submitted
opening statement he mentioned an out-of-cycle small business
initiative to find new technologies and quickly procure them to counter
IEDs. In North Carolina we have several successful initiatives to marry
small business capabilities and technologies with the needs of DOD in
the areas of biotechnology and aircraft parts. Currently, it is left up
to Congress to help small business through adds and earmarks on
specific projects. What can be done systemically to expand the DOD's
utilization of small businesses for meeting current and future
procurement and technological requirements?
General Myers. The DOD has a Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization Office that represents the Secretary of Defense on small
business matters. This office develops DOD-wide small business policy
and provides oversight to ensure compliance by all military departments
and defense agencies. They are responsible for recommending systemic
changes to the Secretary of Defense regarding DOD utilization of small
businesses.
40. Senator Dole. General Myers, wouldn't such expanded outreach
not only help our small business but will also help our Nation maintain
an important technological advantage?
General Myers. The value of industry continually advancing
technology to meet warfighter needs is vital to our success. The
Department strives to identify promising technologies in our
laboratories, research centers, academia, and domestic commercial
sources, and these ideas are shared among DOD elements.
Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DOD strategy for rapid
acquisition of mature technologies. An evolutionary approach delivers
capability in increments, recognizing the need for future capability
improvement. The objective is to balance needs and available capability
with resources, and to put capability into the hands of the user
quickly. The success of the strategy depends on consistent and
continuous definition of requirements and the maturation of
technologies that lead to disciplined development and production of
systems that provide increasing capability.
Representatives from multiple DOD communities assist in formulating
broad, time-phased, operational goals and describing requisite
capabilities. The Department then examines multiple concepts and
materiel approaches to optimize ways to provide these capabilities. The
examination includes robust analyses that consider affordability,
availability of technology, and responsiveness.
______
Questions Submitted Senator Daniel K. Akaka
IDENTITY THEFT
41. Senator Akaka. Secretary Chu, you recently stated that the
military has purchased data from commercial vendors for quite some
time. You also stated that you did not know why a firm specializing in
target marketing was hired to compile a database of personal
information on potential military recruits and that the information
managed by the new contractor would be used only by local recruiters.
Given the numerous recent accounts of identity theft incidences with
large numbers of records being lost, what checks do you have in place
to ensure that this personal data about potential recruits is protected
and the individuals' privacy will be protected?
Dr. Chu. Recruiting activities are conducted solely by the
Services, not by any private company. BeNOW is the company that
warehouses the data that the DOD collects. The subcontract was awarded
based solely on BeNOW's ability to maintain and securely store large
amounts of data and does not include marketing efforts of any kind. The
Department is dedicated to protecting the privacy and protection of all
personal data and recognizes the importance of ensuring that the data
it collects are safely compiled, handled, stored, and securely
transferred to the Services. All data are transferred via a Secure File
Transfer Protocol. These data are stored in a highly secure and
restrictive environment. Vulnerability and risk assessment reviews are
conducted on a regular basis to ensure maximum safeguarding of
information. Access cards are required to enter the facility and video
monitoring is conducted on a continuous basis. All data are password
protected and access to these data is on a need to know basis.
42. Senator Akaka. Secretary Chu, do you not believe that
collecting students' Social Security numbers and other sensitive date
is an infringement on one's privacy?
Dr. Chu. No, the Department only uses the Social Security number
(SSN) and other demographic data in order to carry out its functions.
Contacting young Americans and making them aware of their options to
serve in the military is critical to the success of the All-Volunteer
Force and is an activity conducted under a 23-year old congressional
mandate. SSNs have been provided to the Department through two input
sources--Selective Service System Registrants, and the Military
Entrance Processing Command accession files. The Department does not
keep actual SSNs in the database. The SSNs are scrambled and stored in
a secure manner and the original numbers are securely expunged. SSNs
provide the most accurate method to match and remove duplicate records
in the database. Additionally, SSNs are the most accurate way to match
Selective Service responders to the accession files. This matching
allows DOD to better understand who has joined the military.
MILITARY PAY
43. Senator Akaka. Secretary Chu, in March of this year, Secretary
Rumsfeld chartered the Defense Advisory Committee on Military
Compensation (DACMC) to identify approaches to balance military pay and
benefits in sustaining recruitment and retention of high-qualified
people, as well as a cost-effective and ready military force. The
operating cost of the DACMC was founded for $3.5 million. The DACMC is
scheduled to conduct numerous public hearings this summer and is
expected to file an interim report in September of this year. Have you
received any interim reports from the DACMC that would give an
indication of how significant the impact of disparity in pay between
Active-Duty servicemembers and reservists and National Guard when it
comes to recruiting and retaining a ready military force?
Dr. Chu. In May 2005, the DACMC began conducting monthly public
meetings as it deliberates on military compensation issues. As
indicated, it is slated to provide an interim report to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense by October 2005, with the final report due in
April 2006. As part of its review, the DACMC is examining the area of
Reserve and Guard compensation. Since the DACMC is still in the process
of gathering and analyzing data, it is anticipated that any findings or
recommendations will first be available as part of the interim report.
EFFECTIVENESS OF FIGHTING WARS IN MULTIPLE THEATERS
44. Senator Akaka. General Myers, as the 2005 QDR looks to shift
the focus of the previous QDR from being prepared to fighting two major
conventional wars in separate theaters, it is considering having the
force-planning construct revolve around homeland defense, the global
war on terrorism, and conventional major warfare. What measures has the
administration already instituted to ensure that the homeland security
and global war on terrorism are being carried out most effectively and
what reviews are in place to measure success?
General Myers. a. Homeland Security: On 4 July 2004, the Joint
Staff Director of Operations directed an evaluation of standing
homeland security execution orders (EXORDs) for currency and relevance.
As a result, EXORDs in the air, land, and maritime domains have been
rewritten, as well as the EXORD for consequence management. The updated
consequence management EXORD gives U.S. Northern Command and U.S.
Pacific Command the capability to respond to multiple chemical,
biological, radiological/nuclear, and explosive consequence management
(CBRNE CM) events in support of a lead Federal agency within their
areas of operation.
The Joint Staff is supporting an OSD-led interagency analysis
effort to develop DOD concept of operations, task lists, and force
requirements for several of the Homeland Security Council's planning
scenarios. This coordinated analysis effort will serve to inform the
Department in the development of CBRNE CM capabilities.
b. War on Terrorism: The Department of Defense has developed a
process for assessing progress with respect to war on terrorism based
on the six military strategic objectives (MSOs) outlined in the
National Military Strategic Plan for the war on terrorism. Progress
toward achieving the first two MSOs (``Deny terrorists the resources
they need to operate and survive'' and ``Enable partner nations to
counter terrorism'') was studied during an accelerated assessment
conducted during the spring of 2005. A complete assessment of progress
measured against all six MSOs will commence in the fall of 2005.
[Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the committee adjourned.]