[Senate Hearing 109-462]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-462
DOMESTIC PASSENGER AND FREIGHT RAIL SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 20, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine Drager Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
David Russell, Republican Chief Counsel
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Samuel E. Whitehorn, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General
Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Policy Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on October 20, 2005................................. 1
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 46
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 47
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 41
Statement of Senator Ben Nelson.................................. 76
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 74
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 1
Witnesses
Berrick, Cathleen A., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office.................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Boardman, Joseph H., Administrator, Federal Railroad
Administration................................................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Crosbie, William L., Senior Vice President, Operations, Amtrak... 59
Prepared statement........................................... 62
Hamberger, Edward R., President/CEO, Association of American
Railroads...................................................... 49
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Hawley, Edmund ``Kip'', Assistant Secretary, Transportation
Security Administration........................................ 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Wytkind, Edward, President, Transportation Trades Department,
AFL-CIO........................................................ 65
Prepared statement........................................... 67
Appendix
Pryor, Hon. Mark, U.S. Senator from Arkansas, prepared statement. 81
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye
to:
Cathleen A. Berrick.......................................... 81
Joseph H. Boardman........................................... 98
William L. Crosbie........................................... 86
Edward R. Hamberger.......................................... 82
Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley........................................ 87
Edward Wytkind............................................... 97
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg to:
Joseph H. Boardman........................................... 100
Edward R. Hamberger.......................................... 86
Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley........................................ 94
DOMESTIC PASSENGER AND FREIGHT RAIL SECURITY
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
The Chairman. Good morning.
Mr. Hawley. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I welcome you here today and I want to thank
you for your willingness to appear before the Committee to
discuss the security of our Nation's rail system. Alaska, has
only one railroad, as you know. As a matter of fact, it's
really essential to our livelihood and it has an interesting
history, which I won't go into now. This is one of a series of
hearings we're going to hold, to try and fulfill our oversight
responsibilities on TSA, to work to develop our understanding
of the security systems that are going to be implemented for
all modes of transportation. I hope that we can get other
Senators here to explore some of the details that are involved
here, in your reports. I have gone through them briefly, but,
I'm very interested in pursuing the whole subject.
We have a report here from GAO that I find very interesting
and it indicates there remains confusion among the various
entities, as to who is actually in charge of the initiatives
that are necessary to improve rail security. So, I look forward
to your testimony. I'm going to put my statement in full in the
record and will give a similar opportunity for all the members,
to put their statements in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska
I welcome the witnesses who are here today and I thank you for your
willingness to appear before the Committee to discuss the security of
our Nation's rail system, a matter that is essential to the
preservation of interstate commerce and the U.S. economy. In my State
of Alaska, freight and passenger rail lines are a vital means of
transportation for resources, as well as tourism. The Alaska Railroad
Corporation hauls 7 million tons of freight and 500,000 passengers each
year, and employs more than 700 Alaskans.
Today's hearing is one in a series of hearings that the Committee
will hold to fulfill its oversight responsibilities over the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as we work to develop ways
to further improve the security of all modes of transportation,
including our rail systems.
However, in securing any mode of transportation, we must achieve a
balance in our approach that ensures the greatest security possible
while not inhibiting the free flow of commerce. Senator Inouye and I,
along with several of our Committee colleagues, have attempted to
achieve that balance in legislation that we introduced that addresses
the security of all modes, including the security of our rail systems.
Much has been done since September 11th to enhance the security of
our Nation's rail systems, particularly by the freight and passenger
rail industries, which have invested substantially to ensure the
security of their infrastructure and assets. But the London bombings
and the recent threats to the New York City subway system underscore
the fact that much more remains to be done.
Despite TSA being designated the lead agency with authority over
rail security nearly four years ago, the agency has been criticized by
the Government Accountability Office and the rail industry for not
seeking industry input in policy decisions, and for not acting quickly
enough to assess risk and allocate resources. GAO recently reported
that TSA has yet to finalize risk assessments of passenger rail systems
around the country, or set a time-line for the completion of such
assessments. GAO indicated that there remains confusion among
stakeholders concerning who is actually in charge given that several
Federal agencies have initiatives to improve rail security.
I welcome Mr. Hawley's testimony on these topics, and I look
forward to a constructive dialogue concerning ways to enhance rail
security.
Our first witness today, is the Assistant Secretary of the
Transportation Security Administration, Kip Hawley. I am
pleased to have your statement, Mr. Hawley.
STATEMENT OF EDMUND ``KIP'' HAWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and good morning. I
appreciate my first opportunity to appear as head of the TSA
before this Committee and this morning, I will discuss our
efforts to assure domestic passenger and freight rail security.
At the outset, I want to acknowledge the team nature of
security in today's world and express appreciation for the
Government Accountability Office and Cathy Berrick, who's
represented on this panel and the Department of Transportation
today, represented by Federal Railroad Administrator, Joe
Boardman.
America's passenger and freight transportation system is a
dynamic, interconnected network. It consists of overlapping
sub-networks and multiple organizations, with a variety of
governance structures and a mix of public and private
ownership. In terms of security, decentralized systems such as
this are more difficult to ``secure,'' but they also have
advantages. They present more operational uncertainty to those
who would do them harm, and they are more robust in the face of
catastrophic failure of any single component of the network.
Despite the good work that has already been done to improve
security and transit, the London bombings and other events
throughout the world have demonstrated the need for a refined
approach to transportation security.
Fundamentally, our challenge is to protect our
transportation networks in a constantly changing threat
environment. We understand better that terrorists will not only
look for weaknesses in our transportation system and in
security measures, but they will also adapt to perceived
security measures. As a result, it is not possible to precisely
``predict'', with any degree of certainty, the next attack
based on previous terrorist activity. In the face of
unpredictability and rapid change with respect to threats, our
approach to security in every transportation sector must be
based on flexibility and adaptability.
While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to
protect ourselves against known or suspected terrorists; we
must protect ourselves against people with no known affiliation
to terrorism.
While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to focus
on finding threat devices like guns, explosives and knives, we
must enhance our ability to find terrorists before an attack is
underway.
And while it is necessary, but no longer sufficient to
subject every passenger to basic security procedures, we must
create uncertainty and an element of unpredictability in
security operations in order to disrupt terrorist planning and
attempts.
To accomplish these objectives, TSA is pursuing a security
strategy based on Security Chair Chertoff's Second Stage
Review. There are four core operating principles applicable to
TSA. First, we will use analysis based on risk, vulnerability
and consequence to make investment and operational decisions.
Second, we will avoid giving terrorists an advantage based on
our predictability. TSA will deploy resources, canine teams,
air marshals, or inspectors, for example and establish
protocols, standards and best practices, flexibly based on
risk. Terrorists will not be able to use the predictability of
our security measures to their advantage in planning or
carrying out an attack. Third, we will continue to intervene
early based on intelligence, law enforcement information and
counter-surveillance suspicious incident reporting, to focus
our security measures on the terrorist, as well as the means
for carrying out the threat. Effective analysis and
dissemination of timely information to those who need them is a
vital component of this effort.
Finally, we will build and take advantage of security
networks. We are pursuing a restructuring of TSA that will put
a renewed emphasis on building information sharing networks in
every transportation sector. Through these efforts, we work
more closely with stakeholders and put a renewed emphasis on
sharing intelligence, capacity and technology with other law
enforcement, intelligence gathering and security agencies at
every level of government. As we move forward, we are fortunate
to be able to build upon a solid foundation of work, not only
at the local level, but nationally as well. This foundation
includes products and resources, developed by our Federal
partners, especially the Department of Transportation, with the
Federal Transit Administration and the Federal Railroad
Administration, and partners in industry, such as the American
Public Transportation Association, the Association of American
Railroads and its members, labor unions and individual public
transportation systems.
This collective experience fortifies our knowledge,
expertise and overall strategic approach. We value the critical
role that Congress, and especially this Committee, plays in the
effort. We look forward to working with you on the full range
of these issues. I'll be happy to answer any questions at the
appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley, Assistant Secretary,
Transportation Security Administration
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Co-Chairman Inouye, and Members of the
Committee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on the
subject of domestic passenger and freight rail security.
At the outset, I acknowledge and appreciate the work of the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its recent report on
passenger rail security. The strategic approach, programs, and
initiatives I will discuss today move us well along in addressing the
GAO's recommendations.
As you know, the September 11 attacks focused Congress, the
Administration, and the public on improving the security of our
aviation system. It was an honor to be a part of the team that helped
create the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at the
Department of Transportation (DOT), and it is an honor today to have
the opportunity to lead the agency at the Department of Homeland
Security, as we refocus and realign TSA to reflect the changing reality
of terrorist threats to the transportation sector. Of necessity, much
of our early work at TSA focused on the very real and present threats
and vulnerabilities in aviation. We were fortunate to have partners at
DOT and in industries and communities around the Nation who immediately
stepped forward at that time to initiate security improvements in the
transit and rail sectors. Today, we continue to work with these
partners and build upon their record of success to address the changing
transportation threat environment.
Overview of Surface Transportation
America's passenger and freight transportation system is a dynamic,
interconnected network. It consists of overlapping sub-networks and
multiple organizations, with a variety of governance structures and a
mix of public and private ownership. In terms of security,
decentralized systems such as this are more difficult to ``control,''
but they also have advantages. They present more operational
uncertainty to those who seek to do them harm, and they are more robust
in the face of catastrophic failure of any single component of their
networks.
Public Transportation. America's public transportation system is
actually composed of over 6,000 separate local transit systems. These
local systems range from very small bus-only systems in rural
communities, to very large multi-modal systems in urban areas that may
combine bus, light rail, subway, commuter rail and ferry operations.
Transit systems are not only locally operated, but they are also
protected largely by State and local law enforcement.
Americans took 9.4 billion trips using public transportation in
2003. The 30 largest transit systems in the U.S. carry most (almost 80
percent) of the Nation's transit passenger trips. There is now some
form of rail transit (light rail, subway, or commuter rail) operated by
53 different transit agencies located in 33 cities and 23 states. These
rail systems provide a combined 11.3 million passenger trips each
weekday, compared to 1.8 million domestic emplanements per day
nationwide.
Approximately 28 percent of all transit trips and 77 percent of all
rail transit trips are on heavy rail. There are 14 heavy rail transit
systems (also known as subways) in the U.S., consisting of more than
2,000 route miles, with over 1,000 stations and approximately 10,500
subway cars. The New York City subway system is the largest in the
U.S., carrying about 75 percent of the Nation's heavy rail passengers,
with half of the stations and more than 6,000 scheduled trains per day
carrying over 3 million riders. In New York's Penn Station alone, more
than 1,600 people per minute pass through dozens of access points
during a typical rush hour.
Intercity Bus Transportation. Though not owned by public entities,
intercity bus service is an important component of America's
transportation network. Intercity bus service is provided by over 4,000
private operators across the country, 90 percent of which operate 25 or
fewer buses. Greyhound is the largest intercity bus operator, with a
fleet of more than 2,400 buses. Public transit buses annually carry
about 8 times the number of riders as intercity buses; heavy rail
(subway) operators carry over 3 times as many riders as intercity
buses.
Intercity Passenger Rail. Intercity passenger rail service is
provided by two entities: Amtrak and the Alaska Railroad Corporation
(ARRC), which is a public corporation of the State of Alaska. The ARRC
provides freight and passenger service from Whittier, Seward and
Anchorage to Fairbanks, Denali National Park and military
installations.
Amtrak carries approximately 25 million passengers per year or an
estimated 68,000 passengers per day, operating as many as 300 trains
per day and serving over 500 stations in 46 States. In many large
cities, Amtrak stations are co-located with stations serving rail
transit, intercity bus, and other modes of transportation. Amtrak
operates over more than 22,000 route miles. It owns 650 route miles,
primarily between Boston and Washington, D.C., and in Michigan. In
other parts of the country, Amtrak trains use tracks owned by freight
railroads.
Freight Rail. U.S. freight railroads operate over a network
spanning more than 140,000 route miles. This system is vital to the
economy, linking businesses and ensuring products reach consumers in an
efficient, safe, and cost-effective manner. Still, recent events, such
as the accidental derailment in Graniteville, SC, that resulted in the
release of chlorine gas, have highlighted the need to focus additional
attention on the potential security risks associated with freight rail.
Over 64 percent of toxic inhalation hazard chemicals are currently
transported by rail. In 2003, over 60,000 tank cars of chlorine or
anhydrous ammonia chemicals were shipped, each carrying an average of
90 tons of chlorine or 30,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia.
London Lessons Learned
Al-Qaeda and its affiliated extremist groups and sympathizers
demonstrated their ability to strike mass transit targets with suicide
bombings on buses in Israel, Turkey and China, and bombings of subways,
rail systems, and ferries in India, Pakistan, Thailand, Chechnya,
Russia and the Philippines. The Madrid train attacks in 2004 and the
London subway and bus attacks on July 7 and 21 of this year have
further reminded us that our trains, subways and buses may be terrorist
targets.
Heavy rail transit systems in the U.S., like the London
Underground, are particularly high consequence targets in terms of
potential loss of life and economic disruption. These systems carry
large numbers of people in a confined environment, offer the potential
of targeting specific populations at particular destination stations,
and often have stations located below or adjacent to high profile
government buildings, major office complexes, or public icons. Threats
to particular economic sectors, like government or financial
institutions, may also be carried out through attacks on public
transit.
The London attacks were particularly noteworthy from a security
perspective.
In a relatively short period of time, unknown and apparently
unaffiliated individuals/groups were able to plan and execute
the attacks with little or no surveillance or rehearsal
activity.
The perpetrators came through fare-gates directly onto the
train; they did not access storage yards, tunnels or bridges.
As a result, London's extensive intrusion detection devices and
security cameras did not prevent the attacks. Recording
capability was helpful, but only after-the-fact in helping to
identify suspects.
The improvised explosive devices used by the attackers were
assembled with materials readily available in local shops. The
devices fit easily into backpacks of the type and design
commonly carried by students, commuters, and tourists.
Even with markedly increased public awareness,
countermeasures, and law enforcement presence after the first
London bombings, the same methods were able to be used in the
second attack without suspicion or detection.
Immediately following the first London attacks, transit agencies
and local officials took action. Responding to a joint inquiry by TSA
and DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the 30 largest transit
agencies reported that they:
Extended patrol hours through law enforcement overtime and
the deployment of administrative and operational personnel;
Expanded the use of canine explosive detection patrols; and
Issued more frequent and more detailed public awareness
announcements regarding how to report unattended bags and
suspicious behavior and how to evacuate from particular transit
environments (i.e., train cars, tunnels, and bridges).
These actions built upon the important security foundation that was
established over the last several years. In contrast to their pre-9/11
security posture, all of the largest transit agencies have now:
developed and implemented action plans that are specific to each
Homeland Security Alert System threat level; sent front-line employees
to Federally-funded security and emergency response training courses;
instituted public awareness campaigns, many utilizing Federally-
developed materials; developed and tested emergency response plans; and
hardened numerous assets to protect against security threats.
Adapting to a Changing Threat Environment
Despite the work that has already been done, Mr. Chairman, the
London bombings and other events throughout the world have demonstrated
the need for a new strategic approach to transportation security.
Fundamentally, our challenge is to protect passengers, freight, and our
transportation network in a constantly changing threat environment. We
understand better that terrorists will not only look for weaknesses in
our transportation system and its security measures, but they will also
adapt to perceived security measures. As a result, it is not possible
to ``predict'' the next attack based on previous terrorist activity or
put into place specific security measures to protect against it. In
this dynamic environment, history is an unreliable guide.
In the face of unpredictability and rapid change in terms of
threats, our approach to security in every transportation sector must
be based on flexibility and adaptability.
While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to protect
ourselves against known or suspected terrorists; we must
protect ourselves against people with no known affiliation to
terrorism.
While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to focus
on finding weapons and common explosives; we must enhance our
ability to recognize suspicious behavioral patterns and
demeanors to identify people who may have devised a new means
to attack our transportation systems or passengers.
While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to subject
every passenger to the same basic security procedures; we must
create uncertainty and an element of randomness in security
operations in order to disrupt terrorist planning and attempts.
While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to focus
solely on identifying the actors, like suicide bombers; we must
integrate our security measures with local law enforcement to
identify those who make the bombs and provide support.
Therefore, TSA is pursuing a security strategy based on Secretary
Chertoff 's Second Stage Review, the National Strategy for
Transportation Security, and the following four operating principles:
First, we will use risk/value analysis to make investment and
operational decisions. That means that we will assess risks based not
only on threat and vulnerability, but on the potential consequences of
a particular threat to people, transportation assets, and the economy.
Further, we will assess and undertake risk management and risk
mitigation measures based on their effect on total transportation
network risk. This holistic approach to risk assessment and risk
mitigation may lead us, for example, to redirect the actions of our
airport screeners to focus less on identifying and removing less
threatening items from carry-on luggage, so that their time and
attention can be spent on identifying potential components of an
improvised explosive device.
Second, we will avoid giving terrorists or potential terrorists an
advantage based on our predictability. TSA will deploy resources--
whether they are canine teams, screeners, air marshals, or inspectors--
and establish protocols flexibly based on risk, so that terrorists
cannot use the predictability of security measures to their advantage
in planning or carrying out a threat. This may mean changing or adding
to inspection routines on a daily or hourly basis to introduce
uncertainty into terrorist planning efforts.
Third, we will continue to intervene early based on intelligence,
and focus our security measures on the terrorist, as well as the means
for carrying out the threat. Enhancing and expanding the techniques to
identify suspicious persons at the transit, train, or bus station, or
to detect explosive devices is necessary. However, the strongest
defense posture detects the terrorist well before the attempt to launch
an attack has begun. A coordinated interagency intelligence collection
and analysis effort must stand as the first line of defense. Effective
dissemination of timely intelligence products to those who need them is
a vital component of this effort.
And, finally, we will build and take advantage of security
networks. As you may know, I am pursuing a restructuring of TSA that
will put a renewed emphasis on building information sharing networks in
every transportation sector--rail, transit, maritime, and trucking, as
well as aviation. Not only will we work more closely with stakeholders
in these industries, we will put a renewed emphasis on sharing
intelligence, capacity and technology with other law enforcement,
intelligence gathering and security agencies at every level of
government. We will build a more robust, distributed network of
security systems to protect America.
As we apply these operational principles, I have also directed my
staff to rededicate themselves to important customer service
principles, as well. As we move forward:
TSA will identify opportunities and engage the private
sector in its work to develop and implement security systems
and products.
We will protect the privacy of Americans by minimizing the
amount of personal data we acquire, store and share, and we
will vigorously protect any data that is collected, stored or
transmitted.
And TSA will remember, in all that we do, our goal in
stopping terrorism is to protect the freedoms of the American
people. Therefore, we will work to make travel easier for the
law-abiding public, while protecting the security of the
transportation network and the people who depend upon it.
A Solid Foundation
As we move forward strategically to enhance our security efforts in
the public transportation and rail sectors, we are fortunate to be able
to build upon a solid foundation of work, not only at the local level,
but nationally, as well.
Grants. Substantial Federal assistance has been and will continue
to be provided to support improved transit and rail security. TSA has
assisted the DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparation (SLGCP) in the development of its Transit Security Grant
Program (TSGP). To date, SLGCP has provided more than $255 million to
State and local transit agencies through this program to increase
protection through hardening of assets, greater police presence during
high alerts, additional detection and surveillance equipment, increased
inspections, and expanded use of explosives detection canine teams. In
April 2005, DHS announced $141 million in TSGP funding, of which more
than $107 million has been dedicated to owners and operators of rail
systems. An additional $6 million was awarded to Amtrak through the
Inter-city and Passenger Rail Security Program (IPRSGP) for security
enhancements to passenger rail operations in the Northeast Corridor and
at Amtrak's hub in Chicago. Additionally, through SLGCP's State
Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security Initiative, the
Department has allocated more than $8.3 billion for general
counterterrorism preparedness.
The FY 2006 appropriations bill includes an additional $2.5 billion
for this purpose. The bill also includes a total of $390 million in
discretionary grants specifically for surface transportation security
programs, including $150 million for rail and transit security, $175
million for port security, $10 million for intercity bus security, and
$5 million for the Highway Watch program. TSA will continue to work
closely with SLGCP on these programs, as well.
Security Exercises and Training. TSA has held numerous security
exercises that bring together stakeholders, Federal, State, and local
first responders, and security experts to test preparedness and
response and identify best practices and lessons learned. We are also
seeking new and improved ways to exercise and train for prevention
methods, which will help strengthen a national prevention capability.
These efforts will develop and support effective relationships among
Federal, State and local entities and the private sector, and they
significantly enhance our ability to anticipate and respond quickly and
appropriately to security issues.
Additionally, through an interagency agreement with the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), TSA has trained over 400 law
enforcement officers, transit police, and first responders through the
Land Transportation Anti-Terrorism Training Program. TSA has also
contracted with the FTA's National Transit Institute to develop a CD-
ROM-based interactive training program for passenger and freight rail
employees. This product is expected to be completed before the end of
the current fiscal year. These training programs emphasize
antiterrorism planning and prevention for land transportation systems.
Areas of focus include security planning, transit system
vulnerabilities, contingency planning, recognition and response for
threats involving explosives and weapons of mass destruction, and
crisis and consequence management. Guest instructors with specialized
expertise supplement the FLETC staff, providing the benefit of actual
experience through case studies.
Self-Assessment Tool. TSA has developed the Vulnerability
Identification Self-Assessment Tool (VISAT), a multi-modal tool that
public transportation agencies may voluntarily use to self-assess
vulnerabilities within their systems. Specific modules focus on mass
transit (heavy rail/subways), rail passenger stations, highway bridges,
maritime, and operations centers. Additional modules under development
will ensure this tool covers the spectrum of modes for which TSA holds
lead responsibility for security. In general, the tool focuses on the
prevention and the mitigation of an array of threat scenarios developed
for each mode within the sector. Users rate their entity in terms of
target attractiveness (from a terrorist's perspective) and several
consequence categories that broadly describe health and well-being,
economic consequence, and symbolic value of the entity. The tool
enables a user to capture a snapshot of its security system baseline,
assessing vulnerabilities in the system and assisting in the
development of a comprehensive security plan.
Surface Transportation Security Inspector Program. The Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for FY 2005 provided $12
million to TSA for rail security, including $10 million to deploy 100
Federal security compliance inspectors and Congress has continued this
funding in FY 2006. TSA has made substantial progress in developing a
robust and comprehensive surface transportation security compliance
inspector program with emphasis on hiring, training, and logistical and
procedural planning. A total of 99 inspectors are now on board. Among
other tasks, the security compliance inspectors will identify gaps in
security and validate compliance with TSA's security directives.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to assure you
that TSA is pursuing a robust strategy to support rail and transit
security that builds upon the work of other Department of Homeland
Security agencies, the Department of Transportation, and our public and
private sector partners at the State and local level. We value the
critical role the Congress, and especially this Committee, plays in
this effort. The success of Secretary Chertoff 's Second Stage Review
and the strategic approach I've described today depend upon retaining
the flexibility to determine risk-based priorities and to adjust our
tactics to respond to developing circumstances and emerging trends. We
look forward to working with Congress and this Committee on the full
range of subjects so critical to protecting America's transportation
infrastructure, its passengers, and the commerce that depends upon it.
Thank you. I would be pleased to respond to questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator McCain, do you
have an opening statement?
Senator McCain. Since you've already begun, I'd be glad to
wait until after the witnesses, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you. Our next witness is the
Administrator of the FRA, Mr. Joseph Boardman.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH H. BOARDMAN, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Boardman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
other Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today
to testify, on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation, about
the security of our Nation's passenger and freight railroad
network.
Since June 1 of this year, it has been my privilege to
serve as the Administrator of the Federal Railroad
Administration.
Although DOT has not yet prepared a views report on Senate
1052, which precludes me from providing official views on the
provisions of that bill, we're certainly willing to work with
this Committee on any legislative ideas that will enhance rail
security.
The FRA administers the Federal Railroad Safety Laws, which
provide FRA with authority over every area of railroad safety.
It also enforces hazardous material transportation regulations
issued by PHMSA or the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration. And although the railroad industry's overall
safety record has improved over the last decade and most safety
trends are moving in the right direction, significant train
accidents continue to occur.
As a result, in May of 2005, Secretary Mineta announced a
Railroad Safety Action Plan and FRA has begun to move forward
on all elements of that action plan. FRA has a role in
transportation railroad security. To date, FRA personnel have
reviewed security plans, and security training records, and
since April of 2004, FRA and PHMSA have also worked with DHS on
a coordinated plan to improve the security of the rail
transport of hazardous materials classified as `` Toxic
Inhalation Hazards.'' In the area of passenger security, FRA
inspectors have conducted basic security reviews of Amtrak and
commuter railroads, in work with TSA inspectors after the July
transit bombings in London, together, to ensure safety in
passenger service.
FRA sponsors and conducts research, development and
technology demonstrations that are related to rail security
through its Office of Research and Development such as
exploring various methods to harden tank cars.
In September 2004, DOT and DHS entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding concerning their respective roles on security
issues. The MOU requires early coordination between the parties
on the development of regulations affecting security and will
help delineate each department's specific area of
responsibility.
FRA works closely with the managers of the Transportation
Security Administration's new Rail Security Inspection Program.
A day to day connection with that is extremely important for
the event of catastrophic events. FRA's primary mission is
helping to ensure the safety of railroad transportation. In
some areas such as hazardous material transportation, safety
and security are inextricably intertwined, which means that FRA
safety activities will no doubt continue to have an effect on
security. In general, however, FRA's role is to support DHS and
TSA in carrying out their security responsibilities to the
extent FRA can do so within its present authority and with its
current resources.
Thank you and I'm available for questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boardman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph H. Boardman, Administrator, Federal
Railroad Administration
Chairman Stevens, Ranking Member Inouye, and other Members of the
Committee, I am very pleased to be here today to testify, on behalf of
the Secretary of Transportation, about the security of our Nation's
passenger and freight railroad network. Since June 1 of this year, it
has been my privilege to serve as the Administrator of the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA). By delegation from the Secretary, FRA's
primary mission is to promote the safety of the U.S. railroad industry
and to reduce the number and severity of accidents and incidents
arising from railroad operations. Our railroad safety mission
necessarily includes our involvement in railroad security issues. The
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the primary
responsibility for transportation security. FRA plays a supporting
role, providing technical assistance and assisting DHS when possible
with implementation of its security policies, as allowed by statutory
authority and available resources
My testimony today will provide some background on FRA's railroad
safety program and briefly describe the role that FRA plays in railroad
security.
FRA's Railroad Safety Program
FRA administers the Federal railroad safety laws, which provide FRA
with authority over ``every area of railroad safety,'' 49 U.S.C.
20103(a). The agency has issued a wide range of safety regulations
covering such topics as: track; passenger equipment; locomotives;
freight cars; power brakes; locomotive event recorders; signal and
train control systems; maintenance of active warning devices at
highway-rail grade crossings, accident reporting, alcohol and drug
testing, protection of roadway workers; operating rules and practices;
locomotive engineer certification; positive train control; and use of
train horns at grade crossings. We currently have active rulemaking
projects on a number of important safety topics, including locomotive
crashworthiness, noise exposure of railroad employees, and continuous
welded rail. In addition, FRA enforces hazardous materials regulations
issued by another DOT agency, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA). Those regulations include requirements
that railroads and other hazardous materials transporters, as well as
shippers, have and adhere to security plans.
FRA has an authorized inspection staff of about 400 persons
nationwide, distributed across its eight regions. (In addition, about
160 inspectors employed by the 30 States that participate in FRA's
State participation program inspect for compliance with FRA's
standards.) The inspectors are experts in specific disciplines,
including track, signal and train control, motive power and equipment,
operating practices, and hazardous materials. In addition, we have 16
grade crossing experts in the field. Our inspectors conduct thousands
of inspections every year, investigate more than 100 train accidents,
investigate hundreds of complaints, develop recommendations for
hundreds of enforcement actions, and engage in a range of educational
activities on railroad safety issues. Although some inspectors have had
basic familiarization training on security issues, they are not
security experts.
The railroad industry's overall safety record has improved over the
last decade, and most safety trends are moving in the right direction.
However, significant train accidents continue to occur, and the train
accident rate has not shown substantial improvement in recent years.
Moreover, recent train accidents have highlighted specific issues that
need prompt government and industry attention, and the strong growth of
rail and highway traffic continues to drive up exposure at highway-rail
grade crossings. FRA developed its Railroad Safety Action Plan to
address these critical issues, and Secretary Mineta announced the plan
in May 2005.
This Action Plan will:
Target the most frequent, highest risk causes of accidents;
Focus FRA's oversight and inspection resources; and
Accelerate research efforts that have the potential to
mitigate the largest risks.
FRA's plan includes initiatives in several areas: reducing human
factor-caused train accidents; acting to address the serious problem of
fatigue among railroad operating employees; improving track safety;
enhancing hazardous materials safety and emergency preparedness;
improving highway-rail grade crossing safety; and better focusing FRA's
resources (inspections and enforcement) on areas of greatest safety
concern. One of the primary elements of the Action Plan is FRA's
implementation of its National Inspection Plan, which uses
sophisticated trend analysis to ensure that FRA is properly allocating
its inspectors within the regions so that they are directing their
efforts toward the railroads that pose the highest risks. In addition,
FRA has developed guidance for its inspectors in each discipline to
help them use all available data to focus not only on the railroads
with the highest risks but also on the particular kinds of
noncompliance that involve the most significant hazards.
FRA has begun to move forward on all of the elements of its Action
Plan, and has implemented its National Inspection Plan in the three
areas that account for more than 75 percent of all train accidents:
human factors; track; and equipment.
FRA's Role in Railroad Security
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, FRA has been
actively engaged in the railroad industry's response to the threat of
terrorism. The railroads have developed their own security plans, and
FRA has worked with the railroads, rail labor, and law enforcement
personnel to develop the Railway Alert Network for the distribution of
information and intelligence on security issues. Working with the
Federal Transit Administration, another DOT agency, we have
participated in security risk assessments on commuter railroads. FRA's
security director works on a daily basis to facilitate communications
on security issues between government agencies and the railroad
industry.
In 2003, PHMSA (then the Research and Special Programs
Administration) issued a rule requiring transporters and shippers of
certain hazardous materials to develop and adhere to security plans.
PHMSA issued its rule under its authority, delegated from the
Secretary, to ``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation,
including security, of hazardous materials,'' 49 U.S.C. 5103(b)(1).
Under the rule, security plans must include an assessment of security
risks and appropriate measures to address those risks. The plans must,
at a minimum, address three specific areas--personnel security,
unauthorized access, and en route security. To assist railroads that
transport hazardous materials and shippers that offer those materials
for transport by rail, particularly small and medium-sized companies,
to comply with this new requirement, FRA field personnel have spent a
considerable amount of time in outreach efforts. To date, FRA personnel
have reviewed more than 3,600 security plans and more than 29,000
employee security training records.
Since April 2004, FRA and PHMSA have also worked with DHS on a
coordinated plan to improve the security of the rail transport of
hazardous materials classified as toxic inhalation hazards (TIH). These
include materials such as chlorine, which is used in water filtration
plants, and anhydrous ammonia, which is used extensively in
agriculture. DHS's Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the
lead on this project. TSA has led vulnerability assessments of a number
of rail corridors where TIH materials are transported. DOT and TSA
published a notice and request for comments in the Federal Register
asking for input on aspects of TIH rail shipments, the DOT security
program requirement, and the need for additional regulation, 69 Fed.
Reg. 50988 (Aug. 16, 2004). More than 100 comments were received,
addressing the following issues:
security plan improvements;
shipment identification and hazard communication;
temporary storage;
tank car integrity; and
communication and tracking.
DOT is considering possible amendments to the PHMSA security plan
rule that would enhance the security of the transportation of TIH
materials.
In the area of passenger security, FRA inspectors have conducted
basic security reviews of Amtrak and commuter railroad security both
after the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and after the July 2005 transit
bombings in London. In both cases, FRA inspectors were deployed
immediately after the bombings to assess the security readiness of
passenger railroad facilities based on a checklist of major security
criteria. In the aftermath of the London bombings, FRA worked closely
on these security reviews with TSA's new rail security inspectors. TSA
focused primarily on urban rapid transit lines, while FRA inspectors
concentrated on commuter and intercity passenger operations. In some
situations, inspectors from the two agencies worked jointly.
FRA also supports research, development, and demonstration projects
related to rail security through its Office of Research and Development
(OR&D), often in cooperation with DHS. One completed project to
evaluate tank car security and two current, follow-up projects provide
examples. The tank car security evaluation project was conducted
jointly by FRA OR&D and DHS in October 2003 at FRA's Transportation
Technology Center, Inc., in Pueblo, Colorado. Its first purpose was to
evaluate the ability of hydrophones inside tank cars to detect breaches
and to distinguish noise coming from a breach of the tank car from
other background noises such as those present in the normal tank car
operating environment. Its second purpose was to develop emergency
response techniques, tools, and procedures to plug punctures in
pressurized tank cars caused by small arms fire or other means. A
confidential report has been completed. The acoustic signatures of the
small arms fire and other projectiles were recorded from both the
hydrophones and accelerometers. The results of this test proved the
feasibility of developing algorithms to monitor tank cars while under
load. As a follow-on to this test, DHS and FRA funded an effort to look
at the effects of small arms fire on tank cars and the use of
hydrophones to sense a ``hit.'' Development of the algorithm for
detecting a hazardous material release event continues.
As a result of these tests, the Association of American Railroads
(AAR) and contractors have examined various methods to ``harden'' tank
cars. All of the options to ``armor'' tank cars available with today's
technology are either too heavy or so expensive as to be economically
impractical. FRA has learned about a new material, Dragon Shield, which
is currently being used for armor coating military vehicles in Iraq.
The Railway Supply Institute, the American Chemistry Council, the
Chlorine Institute, and the AAR have worked with DHS and FRA in putting
together a test plan to determine the feasibility of using this liquid
armor (Dragon Shield) technology to reduce tank car vulnerability based
upon the threat previously identified. Testing of the material will
start in FY 2006. FRA's Office of Research and Development will
continue to partner with DHS on these and other security initiatives.
In September 2004, DOT and DHS entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) concerning their respective roles on security
issues. The MOU notes that DHS has the primary responsibility for
security in all modes of transportation and that DOT plays a supporting
role, but notes that both agencies have regulatory responsibilities in
the area of transportation security. The MOU requires early
coordination between the parties on the development of regulations
affecting security. The MOU also contemplates the development of
separate annexes on specific task and areas of responsibility. DOT and
DHS have executed an annex concerning their joint project on the
security of the transportation of TIH materials. FRA has also prepared
a draft annex concerning rail security issues in general and has
recently shared that draft with TSA. We hope to complete that annex
soon.
FRA's Cooperation with TSA's New Inspection Force
The FY 2005 DHS Appropriations Bill Conference Report No. 108-774
earmarked $10 million for TSA to deploy up to 100 Federal rail security
compliance inspectors. The first class of these inspectors completed
training in early June 2005, and since then FRA has worked closely with
the managers of TSA's new inspection program. Through regular meetings
and frequent contacts, we are developing working relationships at the
headquarters and field levels of both agencies. We are trying to ensure
that the two agencies' roles are clearly distinguished and do not
result in duplicative inspections of the rail industry. As mentioned
previously, inspectors from the two agencies have already engaged in a
successful joint security review of passenger operations.
As TSA's full complement of inspectors becomes fully functional,
FRA anticipates that there will be less need for FRA inspectors to
participate in activities related purely to security. FRA's safety
mission is critical and requires the constant attention of its
inspection force. Of course, if FRA's inspectors are needed to support
TSA's efforts for a limited duration in a time of an elevated security
threat, FRA will make every effort to provide that support. Moreover,
in those areas such as hazardous materials transportation where safety
and security are significantly interrelated, FRA inspectors will
continue to play an active role (e.g., in enforcing PHMSA's security
plan regulations).
Conclusion
FRA's primary mission is helping to ensure the safety of railroad
transportation. In some areas, such as hazardous materials
transportation, safety and security are inextricably intertwined, which
means that FRA's safety activities will no doubt continue to have an
effect on security. In general, however, FRA's role is to support DHS
and TSA in carrying out their security responsibilities, to the extent
FRA can do so within its present authority and with its current
resources.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Ms. Berrick, Director of
Homeland Security and Justice at GAO, please?
STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator McCain,
for the opportunity to discuss passenger rail security in the
United States. My testimony today focuses on actions DHS has
taken to assess the risk posed by terrorism to the rail system.
Federal actions taken to enhance passenger rail security and
security practices implemented by domestic and selected foreign
passenger rail operators.
DHS, in conjunction with its grant-making authority, has
completed numerous risk assessments of passenger rail systems
around the country and has provided technical assistance and
training to rail operators. The Department has also begun to
develop an overall framework to help agencies in the private
sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and
comparing risks to transportation and to other sectors.
TSA, as the lead agency responsible for securing all modes
of transportation, has also begun to conduct risk assessments
and establish a methodology for analyzing and characterizing
risks. However, these efforts have not yet been completed or
fully coordinated within the Federal Government and with rail
operators. TSA has also missed deadlines in issuing its
Transportation Sector Specific Plan, which is required by law
and it's to identify and prioritize infrastructure protection
efforts and key resources.
Until these efforts are completed, it may not be possible
to compare risks within the rail sector and across different
sectors, prioritize them and allocate resources accordingly.
After the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Transportation
took several actions to strengthen rail security, including
providing security training to rail operators and technical
assistance in conducting risk assessments.
More recently, following the Madrid bombings, TSA issued
emergency security directives to rail operators and pilot
tested explosive detection technology for use in the rail
system. However, some Federal and rail stake holders question
the feasability of implementing and complying with these
directives, claiming that they were not always based on
industry best practices or were unclear. TSA also had not yet
developed criteria or procedures for rail inspectors to use in
enforcing compliance with the directives.
In response to a prior recommendation, DHS and DOT signed a
Memorandum of Understanding last year, intended to improve
coordination among Federal agencies and with rail stakeholders.
And recently, in September of 2005, signed a transit security
annex to this MOU. We are hopeful that this effort will
increase coordination between the two departments and
stakeholders to create a more unified and effective approach to
securing rail.
We also found that domestic and foreign passenger rail
operators have generally taken similar actions to secure their
rail systems. For example, most have implemented customer
awareness programs, to encourage passengers to report
suspicious activities, increased the number and visibility of
security personnel and upgraded their security technologies.
However, we also observe security practices among certain
foreign rail operators or their governments that are not
currently used or used to the same degree in the United States.
These practices include the random screening of passengers and
their bags, the utilization of covert testing to help keep
employees alert to security threats, and building security into
the design and refurbishing of rail stations. We also found
that certain foreign governments maintain a clearinghouse of
rail security technologies, which is not currently done in the
U.S.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged by the steps
DHS has taken to use elements of a risk management approach to
guide infrastructure protection decisions for rail and across
all sectors. However, we believe that enhanced Federal
leadership is needed to help ensure that actions and
investments designed to enhance security are properly focused
and prioritized. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening
statement. I'd be happy to respond to any questions at the
appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security
and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on
passenger and freight rail security. The London rail bombings that took
place in July--resulting in over 50 fatalities and more than 700
injuries--made clear that even when a variety of security precautions
are put in place, passenger rail systems that move high volumes of
passengers on a daily basis remain vulnerable to terrorist attack.
While securing the U.S. passenger rail system is a daunting task--a
shared responsibility requiring coordinated action on the part of
Federal, State, and local governments and the private sector--it is
important nonetheless to take the necessary steps to identify and
mitigate risks to passenger rail systems.
As we have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders
involved in securing these systems can lead to communication
challenges, duplication of effort, and confusion about roles and
responsibilities. Key Federal stakeholders with critical roles to play
within the rail sector include the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), which is responsible for transportation security
overall, and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which provides
grant funds to rail operators and conducts risk assessments for
passenger rail agencies, both within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS); and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), both within the Department of
Transportation (DOT). One of the critical challenges facing these
Federal agencies, and rail system operators they oversee or support, is
finding ways to protect rail systems from potential terrorist attacks
without compromising the accessibility and efficiency of rail travel.
At the Federal level, another significant challenge to securing
rail systems involves allocation of resources. The U.S. passenger rail
systems represent one of many modes of transportation--along with
aviation, maritime, and others--competing for limited Federal security
resources. Within the passenger rail sector itself, there is
competition for resources, as Federal, State, and local agencies and
rail operators seek to identify and invest in appropriate security
measures to safeguard these systems while also investing in other
capital and operational improvements. Moreover, given competing
priorities and limited homeland security resources, difficult policy
decisions have to be made by Congress and the Executive Branch to
prioritize security efforts and direct resources to areas of greatest
risk within the passenger rail system, among all transportation modes,
and across other nationally critical sectors.
In this regard, to help Federal decision makers determine how to
best allocate limited resources, we have advocated, the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11
Commission) has recommended, and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires, that a risk management
approach be employed to guide security decision making. \1\ A risk
management approach entails a continuous process of managing risks
through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, assessing and quantifying risks, evaluating alternative
security measures, selecting which measures to undertake, and
implementing and monitoring those measures. In July 2005, in announcing
his proposal for the reorganization of DHS, the Secretary of DHS
declared that as a core principle of the reorganization, the Department
must base its work on priorities driven by risk.
My testimony today focuses on the progress Federal agencies and
domestic passenger rail operators have made in setting and implementing
security priorities in the wake of September 11 and terrorist attacks
on rail systems, and the security practices implemented by foreign
passenger rail operators. In particular, my testimony highlights three
key areas: (1) the actions that DHS and its component agencies have
taken to assess the risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail
system in the context of prevailing risk management principles; (2) the
actions that Federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the
U.S. passenger rail system; and (3) the security practices that
domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented
to mitigate risks and enhance security, and any differences in these
practices. My comments today are based upon our recently issued report
to Senators Snowe and Boxer of this Committee, the Chairman of the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Railroads, and
Representative Castle. \2\
In summary:
Within DHS, ODP has completed numerous risk assessments of
passenger rail systems around the country, and TSA has begun to
conduct risk assessments as well as establish a methodology for
determining how to analyze and characterize risks that have
been identified. Until TSA completes these efforts, however, or
sets timelines for doing so, the agency will not be able to
prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security
investment decisions. At the department level, DHS has begun
developing, but has not yet completed a framework to help
agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach
for analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other
sectors. Until this framework is finalized and shared with
stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks across
different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources
accordingly.
In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger
rail conducted by the FTA and FRA, in 2004, TSA issued
emergency security directives to domestic rail operators after
terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid and piloted a
test of explosive detection technology for use in passenger
rail systems. However, Federal and rail industry officials
raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and
complying with these directives, citing limited opportunities
to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices
were incorporated. In September 2004, DHS and DOT signed a
memorandum of understanding to improve coordination between the
two agencies, and are developing agreements to delineate
specific security-related roles and responsibilities, among
other things, for the different modes. An agreement for transit
security was signed in September 2005.
Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted
have taken a range of actions to help secure their systems.
Most, for example, had implemented customer awareness programs
to encourage passengers to remain vigilant and report
suspicious activities, increased the number and visibility of
their security personnel, increased the use of canine teams to
detect explosives, enhanced employee training programs,
upgraded security technology, tightened access controls, and
made rail system design improvements to enhance security. We
also observed security practices among certain foreign
passenger rail systems or their governments that are not
currently used by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or
by the U.S. Government, which could be considered for use in
the United States. For example, some foreign rail operators
randomly screen passengers or utilize covert testing to help
keep employees alert to security threats, and some foreign
governments maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail
security technologies and best practices. While introducing any
of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose
political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they may
nevertheless warrant further examination.
In our September 2005 report on passenger rail security, we
recommended, among other things, that to help ensure that the Federal
Government has the information it needs to prioritize passenger rail
assets based on risk, and in order to evaluate, select, and implement
commensurate measures to help the Nation's passenger rail operators
protect their systems against acts of terrorism, TSA should establish a
plan with timelines for completing its methodology for conducting risk
assessments and develop security standards that reflect industry best
practices and can be measured and enforced, by using the Federal rule-
making process. In addition, we recommended that the Secretary of DHS,
in collaboration with DOT and the passenger rail industry, determine
the feasibility, in a risk management context, of implementing certain
security practices used by foreign rail operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak
generally agreed with the report's recommendations.
Background
Overview of the Passenger Rail System
Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and
22 states use some form of rail transit (commuter, heavy, or light
rail). \3\ Commuter rail systems typically operate on railroad tracks
and provide regional service (e.g., between a central city and adjacent
suburbs). Commuter rail systems are traditionally associated with older
industrial cities, such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago.
Heavy rail systems--subway systems like New York City's transit system
and Washington, D.C.'s Metro--typically operate on fixed rail lines
within a metropolitan area and have the capacity for a heavy volume of
traffic. Amtrak operates the Nation's primary intercity passenger rail
service over a 22,000-mile network, primarily over leased freight
railroad tracks. \4\ Amtrak serves more than 500 stations (240 of which
are staffed) in 46 states and the District of Columbia, and it carried
more than 25 million passengers in 2004. Figure 1 identifies the
geographic location of rail transit systems and Amtrak within the
United States.
Passenger Rail Systems Are Inherently Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks
According to passenger rail officials and passenger rail experts,
certain characteristics of domestic and foreign passenger rail systems
make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and therefore
difficult to secure. By design, passenger rail systems are open (i.e.,
have multiple access points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in
some cases, no barriers) so that they can move large numbers of people
quickly. In contrast, the U.S. commercial aviation system is housed in
closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The openness of
passenger rail systems can leave them vulnerable because operator
personnel cannot completely monitor or control who enters or leaves the
systems. In addition, other characteristics of some passenger rail
systems--high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance,
and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)--
also make them attractive targets for terrorists because of the
potential for mass casualties and economic damage and disruption.
Moreover, some of these same characteristics make passenger rail
systems difficult to secure. For example, the numbers of riders that
pass through a subway system--especially during peak hours--may make
the sustained use of some security measures, such as metal detectors,
difficult because they could result in long lines that could disrupt
scheduled service. In addition, multiple access points along extended
routes could make the cost of securing each location prohibitive.
Balancing the potential economic impacts of security enhancements with
the benefits of such measures is a difficult challenge.
Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Security Passenger Rail
Systems
Securing the Nation's passenger rail systems is a shared
responsibility requiring coordinated action on the part of Federal,
State, and local governments; the private sector; and rail passengers
who ride these systems. Since the September 11 attacks, the role of
Federal Government agencies in securing the Nation's transportation
systems, including passenger rail, have continued to evolve. Prior to
September 11, DOT--namely FTA and FRA--was the primary Federal entity
involved in passenger rail security matters. In response to the attacks
of September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its
primary responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of
transportation. \5\ The Act also gave TSA regulatory authority for
security over all transportation modes. ATSA does not specify TSA's
roles and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land
transportation modes at the level of detail it does for aviation
security. Instead, the Act broadly identifies that TSA is responsible
for ensuring the security of all modes of transportation. With the
passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, TSA was transferred,
along with over 20 other agencies, to the Department of Homeland
Security. \6\
With the creation of DHS in 2002, one of its components, ODP,
became primarily responsible for overseeing security funding for
passenger rail systems. \7\ ODP is the principal component of DHS
responsible for preparing the United States for acts of terrorism and
has primary responsibility within the executive branch for assisting
and supporting DHS, in coordination with other directorates and
entities outside of the Department, in conducting risk analysis and
risk management activities of state and local governments. \8\ In
carrying out its mission, ODP provides training, funds for the purchase
of equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises,
technical assistance, and other support to assist states, local
jurisdictions, and the private sector to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to acts of terrorism. Through the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) grant program, ODP has provided grants to urban areas
to help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to
prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. The DHS
Appropriations Act of 2005 appropriated $150 million for rail transit,
intercity passenger rail, freight rail, and transit agency security
grants. \9\ With this funding, ODP created and is administering two
grant programs focused specifically on transportation security, the
Transit Security Grant Program and the Intercity Passenger Rail
Security Grant Program. These programs provide financial assistance to
address security preparedness and enhancements for transit (to include
commuter, heavy, and light rail systems; intracity bus; and ferry) and
intercity rail systems.
While TSA is the lead Federal agency for ensuring the security of
all transportation modes, FTA conducts nonregulatory safety and
security activities, including safety and security-related training,
research, technical assistance, and demonstration projects. In
addition, FTA promotes safety and security through its grant-making
authority. FRA has regulatory authority for rail safety over commuter
rail operators and Amtrak, and employs over 400 rail inspectors that
periodically monitor the implementation of safety and security plans at
these systems. \10\
State and local governments, passenger rail operators, and private
industry are also important stakeholders in the Nation's rail security
efforts. State and local governments may own or operate a significant
portion of the passenger rail system. Even when state and local
governments are not owners and operators, they are directly affected by
passenger rail systems that run within and through their jurisdictions.
Consequently, the responsibility for responding to emergencies
involving the passenger rail infrastructure often falls to state and
local governments. Passenger rail operators, which can be public or
private entities, are responsible for administering and managing
passenger rail activities and services. Passenger rail operators can
directly operate the service provided or contract for all or part of
the total service. Although all levels of government are involved in
passenger rail security, the primary responsibility for securing
passenger rail systems rests with the passenger rail operators.
Assessing and Managing Risks to Rail Infrastructure Using a Risk
Management Approach
In recent years, we, along with Congress (most recently through the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004), \11\ the
executive branch (e.g., in presidential directives), and the 9/11
Commission have required or advocated that Federal agencies with
homeland security responsibilities utilize a risk management approach
to help ensure that finite national resources are dedicated to assets
or activities considered to have the highest security priority. We have
concluded that without a risk management approach, there is limited
assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are properly
prioritized and focused. Thus, risk management, as applied in the
homeland security context, can help to more effectively and efficiently
prepare defenses against acts of terrorism and other threats.
A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing
risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, performing risk assessments, evaluating alternative actions
to reduce identified risks by preventing or mitigating their impact,
management selecting actions to undertake, and implementing and
monitoring those actions. Figure 2 depicts a risk management cycle that
is our synthesis of government requirements and prevailing best
practices previously reported.
Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first
step in implementing a risk management approach and helps to ensure
that management decisions are focused on achieving a strategic purpose.
These decisions should take place in the context of an agency's
strategic plan that includes goals and objectives that are clear,
concise, and measurable.
Risk assessment, a critical element of a risk management approach,
helps decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that
countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate
the effects of the risks. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or
quantitative determination of the likelihood of an adverse event
occurring and the severity, or impact, of its consequences. Risk
assessment in a homeland security application often involves assessing
three key elements--threat, criticality, and vulnerability:
A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential
threats on the basis of factors such as capabilities,
intentions, and past activities.
A criticality or consequence assessment evaluates and
prioritizes assets and functions in terms of specific criteria,
such as their importance to public safety and the economy, as a
basis for identifying which structures or processes are
relatively more important to protect from attack.
A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be
exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address
those weaknesses.
Information from these three assessments contributes to an overall
risk assessment that characterizes risks on a scale such as high,
medium, or low and provides input for evaluating alternatives and
management prioritization of security initiatives. \12\ The risk
assessment element in the overall risk management cycle may be the
largest change from standard management steps and is central to
informing the remaining steps of the cycle.
The next step in a risk management approach--alternatives
evaluation--considers what actions may be needed to address identified
risks, the associated costs of taking these actions, and any resulting
benefits. This information is then to be provided to agency management
to assist in the selection of alternative actions best suited to the
unique needs of the organization. An additional step in the risk
management approach is the implementation and monitoring of actions
taken to address the risks, including evaluating the extent to which
risk was mitigated by these actions. Once the agency has implemented
the actions to address risks, it should develop criteria for and
continually monitor the performance of these actions to ensure that
they are effective and also reflect evolving risk.
Federal Agencies with Risk Management Responsibilities
A number of Federal departments and agencies have risk management
and critical infrastructure protection responsibilities stemming from
various requirements. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created
DHS, directed the Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) Directorate to utilize a risk management approach in
coordinating the Nation's critical infrastructure protection efforts.
This includes using risk assessments to set priorities for protective
and support measures by the Department, other Federal agencies, State
and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and
other entities. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)
defines critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS,
sector-specific agencies (those Federal agencies given responsibility
for transportation, energy, telecommunications, and so forth), and
other departments and agencies. The President instructs Federal
departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the
protection of critical infrastructure to prevent, deter, and mitigate
the effects of terrorist attacks. The Secretary of DHS is assigned
several responsibilities by HSPD-7, including establishing uniform
policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies for integrating
Federal infrastructure protection and risk management activities within
and across sectors. To ensure the coverage of critical sectors, HSPD-7
designated sector-specific agencies for 17 critical infrastructure
sectors. \13\ These agencies are responsible for infrastructure
protection activities in their assigned sectors, including coordinating
and collaborating with relevant Federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector to carry out their responsibilities
and facilitating the sharing of information about vulnerabilities,
incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices.
Pursuant to HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP), DHS was designated as the sector-specific agency for the
transportation sector, a responsibility the Department has delegated to
TSA. \14\ As the sector-specific agency for transportation, TSA is
required to develop a transportation sector-specific plan (TSSP) for
identifying, prioritizing, and protecting critical transportation
infrastructure and key resources that will provide key input to the
broader National Infrastructure Protection Plan to be prepared by IAIP.
DHS issued an interim NIPP in February 2005 that was intended to serve
as a road map for how DHS and stakeholders--including other Federal
agencies, the private sector, and state and local governments--should
use risk management principles for determining how to prioritize
activities related to protecting critical infrastructure and key
resources within and among each of the 17 sectors in an integrated,
coordinated fashion. DHS expects the next iteration of the NIPP to be
issued in November 2005, with the sector-specific plans, including the
TSSP, being incorporated into this plan in February 2006. HSPD-7 also
requires DHS to coordinate with DOT on all transportation security
matters.
DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but
Additional Work Is Needed to Guide Security Investments
DHS component agencies have taken various steps to assess the risk
posed by terrorism to U.S. passenger rail systems. ODP has developed
and implemented a risk assessment methodology intended to help
passenger rail operators and others enhance their capacity to respond
to terrorist incidents and identify and prioritize security
countermeasures. As of July 2005, ODP had completed 7 risk assessments
with rail operators and 12 others were under way. Further, TSA
completed a threat assessment for mass transit and rail and has begun
to identify critical rail assets, but it has not yet completed an
overall risk assessment for the passenger rail industry. DHS is
developing guidance to help these and other sector-specific agencies
work with stakeholders to identify and analyze risk.
ODP Has Worked with Passenger Rail Operators to Develop Risk
Assessments to Help Prioritize Rail Security Needs and
Investments
In 2002, ODP began conducting risk assessments of passenger rail
operators through its Mass Transit Technical Assistance program. These
assessments are intended to help passenger rail operators and port
authorities enhance their capacity and preparedness to respond to
terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and identify
and prioritize security countermeasures and emergency response
capabilities. ODP's approach to risk assessment is generally consistent
with the risk assessment component of our risk management approach. The
agency has worked with passenger rail operators and others to complete
several risk assessments. As of July 2005, ODP had completed 7 risk
assessments in collaboration with passenger rail operators. \15\ Twelve
additional risk assessments are under way, and an additional 11
passenger rail operators have requested assistance through this
program. The results developed in the threat, criticality,
vulnerability, and impact assessments are then used to develop an
overall risk assessment in order to evaluate the relative risk among
various assets, weapons, and modes of attack. This is intended to give
operators an indication of which asset types and threat scenarios carry
the highest risk that, accordingly, are likely candidates for early
risk mitigation action.
According to rail operators who have used ODP's risk assessment
methodology and commented about it to DHS or us, the method has been
successful in helping to devise risk reduction strategies to guide
security-related investments. For example, between September 2002 and
March 2003, ODP's technical assistance team worked with the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) to conduct a risk
assessment of all of its assets--its Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH)
passenger rail system, as well as airports, ports, interstate highway
crossings, and commercial properties. \16\ According to PANYNJ
officials, the authority was able to develop and implement a risk
reduction strategy that enabled it to identify and set priorities for
improvements in security and emergency response capability that are
being used to guide security investments. According to authority
officials, the risk assessment that was conducted was instrumental in
obtaining management approval for a 5-year, $500 million security
capital investment program, as it provided a risk-based justification
for these investments.
The six other passenger rail operators that have completed ODP's
risk assessment process also stated that they valued the process.
Specifically, operators said that the assessments enabled them to
prioritize investments based on risk and are already allowing or are
expected to allow them to effectively target and allocate resources
toward security measures that will have the greatest impact on reducing
risk across their system.
ODP Has Sought to Promote Risk-Based Decision Making Among Federal
Agencies and Rail Operators
On the basis of its own experience with conducting risk assessments
in the field, and in keeping with its mission to develop and implement
a national program to enhance the capacity of state and local agencies
to respond to incidents of terrorism, ODP has offered to help other DHS
components and Federal agencies to develop risk assessment tools,
according to ODP officials. For example, ODP is partnering with FRA,
TSA, the American Association of Railroads (AAR), and others to develop
a risk assessment tool for freight rail corridors. \17\ In a separate
Federal outreach effort, ODP worked with TSA to establish a Federal
Risk Assessment Working Group to promote interagency collaboration and
information sharing. In addition, in keeping with its mission to
deliver technical assistance and training, ODP has partnered with the
American Public Transportation Association (APTA) to inform passenger
rail operators about its risk assessment technical assistance program.
\18\ Since June 2004, ODP has attended five APTA conferences or
workshops where it has set up information booths, made the tool kit
available, and conducted seminars to educate passenger rail operators
about the risk assessment process and its benefits.
ODP has leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based
funding decisions for passenger rail. For example, passenger rail
operators must have completed a risk assessment to be eligible for
financial assistance through the Fiscal Year 2005 Transit Security
Grant Program administered by ODP. To receive these funds, passenger
rail operators are also required to have a security and emergency
preparedness plan that identifies how the operator intends to respond
to security gaps identified by risk assessments. This plan, along with
a regional transit security strategy prepared by regional transit
stakeholders, will serve as the basis for determining how the grant
funds are to be allocated.
Risk assessments are also a key driver of Federal funds distributed
through ODP's Fiscal Year 2005 Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program.
This $7.1 million program provides financial assistance to Amtrak for
the protection of critical infrastructure and emergency preparedness
activities along Amtrak's Northeast Corridor and its hub in Chicago.
Amtrak is required to conduct a risk assessment of these areas in
collaboration with ODP, in order to receive the grant funds. \19\ A
recent review of Amtrak's security posture and programs conducted by
the RAND Corporation and funded by FRA in 2004 found that no
comprehensive terrorism risk assessment of Amtrak has been conducted
that would provide an empirical baseline for investment prioritization
and decision making for Amtrak's security policies and investment
plans. As another condition for receiving the grant funds, Amtrak is
required to develop a security and emergency preparedness plan that,
along with the risk assessment, is to serve as the basis for proposed
allocations of grant funding. According to an Amtrak security official,
it welcomes the risk assessment effort and plans to use the results of
the assessment to guide its security plans and investments. According
to ODP officials, as of July 2005, the Amtrak risk assessment was
nearly 50 percent complete.
TSA Has Begun to Assess Risks to Passenger Rail
In October 2004, TSA completed an overall threat assessment for
both mass transit and passenger and freight rail modes. \20\ TSA began
conducting a second risk assessment element--criticality assessments of
passenger rail stations--in the spring of 2004, but the effort had not
been completed at the time of our review. According to TSA, a
criticality assessment tool was developed that considers multiple
factors, such as the potential for loss of life or effects on public
health; the economic impact of the loss of function of the asset and
the cost of reconstitution; and the local, regional, or national
symbolic importance of the asset. These factors were to be used to
arrive at a criticality score that, in turn, would enable the agency to
rank assets and facilities based on relative importance, according to
TSA officials.
To date, TSA has assigned criticality scores to nearly 700
passenger rail stations. In May 2005, TSA began conducting assessments
for other passenger rail assets such as bridges and tunnels. TSA
officials told us that as of July 2005, they had completed 73
criticality assessments for bridge and tunnel assets and expect to
conduct approximately 370 additional assessments in these categories.
Once TSA has completed its criticality assessment, a senior group of
transportation security experts will review these scores and
subsequently rank and prioritize them. As of July 2005, TSA had not
established a time frame for completing criticality assessments for
passenger rail assets or for ranking assets, and had not identified
whether it planned to do so.
In 2003, TSA officials stated that they planned to work with
transportation stakeholders to rank assets and facilities in terms of
their criticality. HSPD-7 requires sector-specific agencies such as TSA
to collaborate with all relevant stakeholders, including Federal
departments and agencies, state and local governments, and others. In
addition, DHS's interim NIPP states that sector-specific agencies, such
as TSA, are expected to work with stakeholders--such as rail
operators--to determine the most effective means of obtaining and
analyzing information on assets. While TSA's methodology for conducting
criticality assessments calls for ``facilitated sessions'' involving
TSA modal specialists, DOT modal specialists, and trade association
representatives, these sessions with stakeholders have not been held.
According to TSA officials, their final methodology for conducting
criticality assessments did not include DOT modal specialists and trade
associations. With respect to rail operators, TSA officials explained
that their risk assessment process does not require operators'
involvement. TSA analysts said they have access to a great deal of
information (such as open source records, satellite imagery, and
insurance industry data) that can facilitate the assessment process.
However, when asked to comment on TSA's ability to identify critical
assets in passenger rail systems, APTA officials and 10 rail operators
we interviewed told us it would be difficult for TSA to complete this
task without their direct input and rail system expertise.
TSA plans to rely on asset criticality rankings to prioritize which
assets it will focus on in conducting vulnerability assessments. That
is, once an asset, such as a passenger rail station, is deemed to be
most critical, then TSA would focus on determining the station's
vulnerability to attacks. TSA plans to conduct on-site vulnerability
assessments for those assets deemed most critical. For assets that are
deemed to be less critical, TSA has developed a software tool that it
has made available to passenger rail and other transportation operators
for them to use on a voluntary basis to assess the vulnerability of
their assets. As of July 2005, the tool had not yet been used.
According to APTA officials, passenger rail operators may be reluctant
to provide vulnerability information to TSA without knowing how the
agency intends to use such information. According to TSA, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to project any timelines regarding
completion of vulnerability assessments in the transportation sector
because rail operators are not required to submit them. In this regard,
while the rail operators are not required to submit this information,
as the sector-specific agency for transportation, TSA is required by
HSPD-7 to complete vulnerability assessments for the transportation
sector. Figure 3 illustrates the overall progress TSA had made in
conducting risk assessments for passenger rail assets as of July 2005.
We recognize that TSA's risk assessment effort is still evolving
and TSA has had other pressing priorities, such as meeting the
legislative requirements related to aviation security. However, until
all three assessments of rail systems--threat, criticality, and
vulnerability--have been completed in sequence, and until TSA
determines how to use the results of these assessments to analyze and
characterize risk (e.g., whether high, medium, or low), it may not be
possible to prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment
decisions about protecting them.
Finalizing a methodology for assessing risk to passenger rail and
other transportation assets and conducting the assessments are key
steps needed to produce the plans required by HSPD-7 and the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. DHS and TSA
have missed both deadlines for producing these plans. Specifically, DHS
and TSA have not yet produced the TSSP required by HSPD-7 to be issued
in December of 2004, though a draft was prepared in November 2004. DHS
and TSA also missed the April 1, 2005, deadline for completing the
national strategy for transportation security required by the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. In an April
2005 letter to Congress addressing the missed deadline, the DHS Deputy
Secretary identified the need to more aggressively coordinate the
development of the strategy with other relevant planning work such as
the TSSP, to include further collaboration with DOT modal
administrations and DHS components. The Deputy Secretary further stated
that DHS expected to finish the strategy within 2 to 3 months. However,
as of July 31, 2005, the strategy had not been completed. In April
2005, senior DHS and TSA officials told us that in addition to DOT,
industry groups such as APTA and AAR would also be more involved in
developing the TSSP and other strategic plans. However, as of July
2005, TSA had not yet engaged these stakeholders in the development of
these plans.
As TSA, other sector-specific agencies, and ODP move forward with
risk assessment activities, DHS is concurrently developing guidance
intended to help these agencies work with their stakeholders to assess
risk. HSPD-7 requires DHS to establish uniform policies, approaches,
guidelines, and methodologies for integrating Federal infrastructure
protection and risk management activities within and across sectors. To
meet this requirement, DHS has, among other things, been working for
nearly 2 years on a risk assessment framework through IAIP. \21\ This
framework is intended to help the private sector and state and local
governments to develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk and
vulnerability across infrastructure types and across entire economic
sectors, develop consistent terminology, and foster consistent results.
The framework is also intended to enable a Federal-level assessment of
risk in general, and comparisons among risks, for purposes of resource
allocation and response planning. DHS has informed TSA that this
framework will provide overarching guidance to sector-specific agencies
on how various risk assessment methodologies may be used to analyze,
normalize, and prioritize risk within and among sectors. The interim
NIPP states that the ability to rationalize, or normalize, results of
different risk assessments is an important goal for determining risk-
related priorities and guiding investments. One core element of the DHS
framework--defining concepts, terminology, and metrics for assessing
risk--had not yet been completed. The completion date for this
element--initially due in September 2004--has been extended twice, with
the latest due date in June 2005. However, as of July 31, 2005, this
element has not been completed.
Because neither this element nor the framework as a whole has been
finalized or provided to TSA or other sector-specific agencies, it is
not clear what impact, if any, DHS's framework may have on ongoing risk
assessments conducted by, and the methodologies used by, TSA, ODP, and
others, and whether or how DHS will be able to use these results to
compare risks and prioritize homeland security investments among
sectors. Until DHS finalizes this framework, and until TSA completes
its risk assessment methodology, it may not be possible to determine
whether different methodologies used by TSA and ODP for conducting
threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments generate disparate
qualitative and quantitative results or how they can best be compared
and analyzed. In addition, TSA and others will have difficulty taking
into account whether at some point TSA may be unnecessarily duplicating
risk management activities already under way at other agencies and
whether other agencies' risk assessment methodologies, and the data
generated by these methodologies, can be leveraged to complete the
assessments required for the transportation sector. In the future, the
implementation of DHS's department-wide proposed reorganization could
affect decisions relating to critical infrastructure protection as new
directorates are established, such as the directorates of policy and
preparedness, and other preparedness assets are consolidated from
across the department.
Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail
Security
FTA and FRA were the primary Federal agencies involved in passenger
rail security matters prior to the creation of TSA. Before and after
September 11, these two agencies launched a number of initiatives
designed to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA also took steps to
strengthen rail security, including issuing emergency security
directives to rail operators and testing emerging rail security
technologies for screening passengers and baggage. Rail industry
stakeholders and Federal agency officials raised questions about how
effectively DHS had collaborated with them on rail security issues. DHS
and DOT have signed a memorandum of understanding intended to identify
ways that collaboration with Federal and industry stakeholders might be
improved.
DOT Agencies Led Initial Efforts to Enhance Passenger Rail Security
Prior to the creation of TSA in November 2001, DOT agencies (i.e.,
modal administrations)--notably FTA and FRA--were primarily responsible
for the security of passenger rail systems. These agencies undertook a
number of initiatives to enhance the security of passenger rail systems
after September 11. FTA, using an $18.7 million appropriation by the
Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
2002, launched a multipart transit security initiative, much of which
is still in place. The initiative included security readiness
assessments, technical assistance, grants for emergency response
drills, and training. For example, in 2003, FTA instituted the Transit
Watch campaign--a nationwide safety and security awareness program
designed to encourage the active participation of transit passengers
and employees in maintaining a safe transit environment. The program
provides information and instructions to transit passengers and
employees so that they know what to do and whom to contact in the event
of an emergency in a transit setting. FTA plans to continue this
initiative, in partnership with TSA and ODP, and offer additional
security awareness materials that address unattended bags and emergency
evacuation procedures for transit agencies. In addition, FTA has issued
guidance, such as its Top 20 Security Program Action Items for Transit
Agencies, which recommends measures for passenger rail operators to
implement into their security programs to improve both security and
emergency preparedness.
FTA has also used research and development funds to develop
guidance for security design strategies to reduce the vulnerability of
transit systems to acts of terrorism. In November 2004, FTA provided
rail operators with security considerations for transportation
infrastructure. This guidance provided recommendations intended to help
operators deter and minimize attacks against their facilities, riders,
and employees by incorporating security features into the design of
rail infrastructure.
FRA has also taken a number of actions to enhance passenger rail
security since September 11. For example, it has assisted commuter
railroads in developing security plans, reviewed Amtrak's security
plans, and helped fund FTA security readiness assessments for commuter
railroads. More recently, in the wake of the Madrid terrorist bombings,
nearly 200 FRA inspectors, in cooperation with DHS, conducted multi-day
team inspections of each of the 18 commuter railroads and Amtrak to
determine what additional security measures had been put into place to
prevent a similar occurrence in the United States. FRA also conducted
research and development projects related to passenger rail security.
These projects included rail infrastructure security and trespasser
monitoring systems and passenger screening and manifest projects,
including explosives detection.
Although DOT modal administrations now play a supporting role in
transportation security matters since the creation of TSA, they remain
important partners in the Federal Government's efforts to improve rail
security, given their role in funding and regulating the safety of
passenger rail systems. Moreover, as TSA moves ahead with its passenger
rail security initiatives, FTA and FRA are continuing their passenger
rail security efforts.
TSA Issued Mandatory Security Directives to Rail Operators but Faces
Challenges Related to Compliance and Enforcement
In response to the March 2004 commuter rail attacks in Madrid and
Federal intelligence on potential threats against U.S. passenger rail
systems, TSA issued security directives to the passenger rail industry
in May 2004. TSA issued these security directives to establish a
consistent baseline standard of protective measures for all passenger
rail operators, including Amtrak. \22\ The directives were not related
to, and were issued independent of, TSA's efforts to conduct risk
assessments to prioritize rail security needs. TSA considered the
measures required by the directives to constitute mandatory security
standards that were required to be implemented within 72 hours of
issuance by all passenger rail operators nationwide. In an effort to
provide some flexibility to the industry, the directives allowed rail
operators to propose alternative measures to TSA in order to meet the
required measures. Table 1 contains examples of security measures
required by these directives.
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Table 1: Examples of Measures Required by TSA Security Directives
Issued to Passenger Rail Operators and Amtrak
TSA directives require passenger rail operators to:
designate coordinators to enhance security-related
communications with TSA;
provide TSA with access to the latest security assessments
and security plans;
reinforce employee watch programs;
ask passengers and employees to report unattended property
or suspicious behavior;
remove trash receptacles at stations determined by a
vulnerability assessment to be at significant risk and only to
the extent practical, except for clear plastic or bomb-
resistant containers;
install bomb-resistant trash cans to the extent resources
allow;
utilize canine explosive detection teams, if available, to
screen passenger baggage, terminals, and trains;
utilize surveillance systems to monitor for suspicious
activity, to the extent resources allow;
allow TSA-designated canine teams at any time or place to
conduct canine operations;
conduct frequent inspections of key facilities, stations,
terminals, or other critical assets for persons and items that
do not belong;
inspect each passenger rail car for suspicious or unattended
items, at regular periodic intervals;
ensure that appropriate levels of policing and security are
provided that correlate to DHS threat levels and threat
advisories;
lock all doors that allow access to train operators' cab or
compartment, if equipped with locking mechanisms;
require Amtrak to request that adult passengers provide
identification at the initial point where tickets are checked.
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Source: TSA.
Although TSA issued these directives, it is unclear how TSA
developed the required measures contained in the directives, how TSA
plans to monitor and ensure compliance with the measures, how rail
operators are to implement the measures, and which entities are
responsible for their implementation. According to the former DHS
Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security, the directives
were developed based upon consultation with the industry and a review
of best practices in passenger rail and mass transit systems across the
country and were intended to provide a Federal baseline standard for
security. TSA officials stated to us that the directives were based
upon FTA and APTA best practices for rail security. Specifically, TSA
stated that it consulted a list of the top 20 actions FTA identified
that rail operators can take to strengthen security, FTA-recommended
protective measures and activities for transit agencies that may be
followed based on current threat levels, and an APTA member survey.
While some of the directives correlate to information contained in the
FTA guidance, such as advocating that rail personnel watch for
abandoned parcels, vehicles, and the like, the source for many of the
directives is unclear. For example, the source material TSA consulted
does not support the requirement that train cabs or compartment doors
should be kept locked. Furthermore, the sources do not necessarily
reflect industry best practices, according to FTA and APTA officials.
FTA's list of recommended protective measures and the practices
identified in the APTA survey are not necessarily viewed as industry
best practices. For example, the APTA member survey that TSA used
reports rail security practices that are in use by operators but which
are not best practices endorsed by the group or other industry
stakeholders.
TSA officials have stated that they understood the importance of
partnering with the rail industry on security matters, and that they
would draw on the expertise and knowledge of the transportation
industry and other DHS agencies, as well as all stakeholders, in
developing security standards for all modes of transportation,
including rail. TSA officials held an initial meeting with APTA, AAR,
and Amtrak officials to discuss the draft directives prior to their
issuance and told them that they would continue to be consulted prior
to their final issuance. However, these stakeholders were not given an
opportunity to comment on a final draft of the directives before their
release because, according to TSA, DHS determined that it was important
to release the directives as soon as possible to address a current
threat to passenger rail. In addition, TSA stated that because the
directives needed to be issued quickly, there was no public comment as
part of the rule-making process. Shortly after the directives were
issued, TSA's Deputy Assistant Administrator for Maritime and Land
Security told rail operators at an APTA conference we attended in June
2004 that if TSA determined that there is a need for the directives to
become permanent, they would undergo a notice-and-comment period as
part of the regulatory process. As of July 2005, TSA had not yet
determined whether it intends to pursue the rule-making process with a
notice and comment period.
APTA and AAR officials stated that because they were not consulted
throughout the development of the directives, the directives did not,
in their view, reflect a complete understanding of the passenger rail
environment or necessarily incorporate industry best practices. For
example, APTA, AAR, and some rail operators raised concerns about the
feasibility of installing bomb-resistant trash cans in rail stations
because they could direct the force of a bomb blast upward, possibly
causing structural damage in underground or enclosed stations. DHS's
Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
recently conducted tests to determine the safety and effectiveness of
13 models of commercially available bomb-resistant trash receptacles.
At the time of our review, the results of these tests were not yet
available.
Amtrak and FRA officials raised concerns about some of the
directives, as well, and told us they questioned whether the
requirements reflected industry best practices. For example, before the
directives were issued, Amtrak expressed concerns to TSA about the
feasibility of the requirement to check the identification of all adult
passengers boarding its trains because it did not have enough staff to
perform these checks. However, the final directive included this
requirement, and after they were released, Amtrak told TSA it could not
comply with this requirement ``without incurring substantial additional
costs and significant detrimental impacts to its operations and
revenues.'' Amtrak officials told us that since passenger names would
not be compared against any criminal or terrorist watch list or
database, the benefits of requiring such identification checks were
open to debate. To resolve its concern, and as allowed by the
directive, Amtrak proposed, and TSA accepted, random identification
checks of passengers as an alternative measure. FRA officials further
stated that current FRA safety regulations requiring engineer
compartment doors be kept unlocked to facilitate emergency escapes \23\
conflicts with the security directive requirement that doors equipped
with locking mechanisms be kept locked. This requirement was not
included in the draft directives provided to stakeholders. TSA did call
one commuter rail operator prior to issuing the directives to discuss
this potential proposed measure, and the operator raised a concern
about the safety of the locked door requirement. TSA nevertheless
included this requirement in the directives.
With respect to how the directives were to be enforced, rail
operators were required to allow TSA and DHS to perform inspections,
evaluations, or tests based on execution of the directives at any time
or location. Upon learning of any instance of noncompliance with TSA
security measures, rail operators were to immediately initiate
corrective action. Monitoring and ensuring compliance with the
directives has posed challenges for TSA. In the year after the
directives were issued, TSA did not have dedicated field staff to
conduct on-site inspections. When the rail security directives were
issued, the former DHS Undersecretary for Border and Transportation
Security stated that TSA planned to form security partnership teams
with DOT, including FRA rail inspectors, to help ensure that industry
stakeholders complied with the directives. These teams were to be
established in order to tap into existing capabilities and avoid
duplication of effort across agencies. As of July 2005, these teams had
not yet been utilized to perform inspections. TSA has, however, hired
rail compliance inspectors to, among other things, monitor and enforce
compliance with the security directives. As of July 2005, TSA had hired
57 of up to 100 inspector positions authorized by Congress. \24\
However, TSA has not yet established processes or criteria for
determining and enforcing compliance, including determining how rail
inspectors or DOT partnership teams will be used in this regard.
Establishing criteria for monitoring compliance with the directives
may be challenging because the language describing the required
measures allows for flexibility and does not define parameters. In an
effort to acknowledge the variable conditions that existed in passenger
rail environments, TSA designed the directives to allow flexibility in
implementation through the use of such phrases as ``to the extent
resources allow,'' ``to the extent practicable,'' and ``if available.''
The directives also include nonspecific instructions that may be
difficult to measure or monitor, telling operators to, for example,
perform inspections of key facilities at ``regular periodic intervals''
or to conduct ``frequent inspections'' of passenger rail cars. When the
directives were issued, TSA stated that it would provide rail operators
with performance-based guidance and examples of announcements and signs
that could be used to meet the requirements of the directives,
including guidance on the appropriate frequency and method for
inspecting rail cars and facilities. However, as of July 2005, this
information had not been provided.
Industry stakeholders we interviewed raised questions about how
they were to comply with the measures contained in the directives and
which entities were responsible for implementing the measures.
According to an AAR official, in June 2004, AAR officials and rail
operators held a conference call with TSA to obtain clarification on
these issues. According to AAR officials, in response to an inquiry
about what would constitute compliance for some of the measures, the
then-TSA Assistant Administrator for Maritime and Land Security told
participants that the directives were not intended to be overly
prescriptive but were guidelines, and that operators would have the
flexibility to implement the directives as they saw fit. The officials
also asked for clarification on who was legally responsible for
ensuring compliance for measures where assets, such as rail stations,
were owned by freight railroads or private real estate companies.
According to AAR officials, TSA told them it was the responsibility of
the rail operators and asset owners to work together to determine these
responsibilities. However, according to AAR and rail operators, given
that TSA has hired rail inspectors and indicated its intention to
enforce compliance with the directives, it is critical that TSA clarify
what compliance entails for measures required by the directives and
which entities are responsible for compliance with measures when rail
assets are owned by one party but operated by another--such as when
private companies that own terminals or stations provide services for
commuter rail operations.
The challenges TSA has faced in developing security directives as
standards that reflect industry best practices--and that can be
measured and enforced--stem from the original emergency nature of the
directives, which were issued with limited input and review. TSA told
rail industry stakeholders when the directives were issued 15 months
ago that the agency would consider using the Federal rule-making
process as a means of making the standards permanent. Doing so would
require TSA to hold a notice-and-comment period, resulting in a public
record that reflects stakeholders' input on the applicability and
feasibility of implementing the directives, along with TSA's rationale
for accepting or rejecting this input. While there is no guarantee that
this process would produce more effective security directives, it would
be more transparent and could help TSA in developing standards that are
most appropriate for the industry and can be measured, monitored, and
enforced.
TSA Has Begun Testing Rail Security Technologies
In addition to issuing security directives, TSA also sought to
enhance passenger rail security by conducting research on technologies
related to screening passengers and checked baggage in the passenger
rail environment. Beginning in May 2004, TSA conducted a Transit and
Rail Inspection Pilot (TRIP) study, in partnership with DOT, Amtrak,
the Connecticut Department of Transportation, the Maryland Transit
Administration, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA). TRIP was a $1.5 million, three-phase effort to test the
feasibility of using existing and emerging technologies to screen
passengers, carry-on items, checked baggage, cargo, and parcels for
explosives. Figure 4 summarizes TRIP's three-phased approach.
According to TSA, all three phases of the TRIP program were
completed by July 2004. However, TSA has not yet issued a planned
report analyzing whether the technologies could be used effectively to
screen rail passengers and their baggage. According to TSA officials, a
report on results and lessons learned from TRIP is under review by DHS.
TSA officials told us that based upon preliminary analyses, the
screening technologies and processes tested would be very difficult to
implement on more heavily used passenger rail systems because these
systems carry high volumes of passengers and have multiple points of
entry. However, TSA officials stated to us that the screening processes
used in TRIP may be useful on certain long-distance intercity train
routes, which make fewer stops. Further, officials stated that
screening could be used either randomly or for all passengers during
certain high-risk events or in areas where a particular terrorist
threat is known to exist. For example, screening technology similar to
that used in TRIP was used by TSA to screen certain passengers and
belongings in Boston and New York during the Democratic and Republican
national conventions, respectively, in 2004.
APTA officials and the 28 passenger rail operators we interviewed--
all who are not directly involved in the pilot--agreed with TSA's
preliminary assessment. They told us they believed that the TRIP
screening procedures could not work in most passenger rail systems,
given the number of passengers using these systems and the open nature
(e.g., multiple entry points) of the systems. For example, as one
operator noted, over 1,600 people pass through dozens of access points
in New York's Penn Station per minute during a typical rush hour,
making screening of all passengers very challenging, if not impossible.
Passenger rail operators were also concerned that screening delays
could result in passengers opting to use other modes of transportation.
APTA officials and some rail operators we interviewed said that had
they been consulted by TSA, they would have recommended alternative
technologies to explore and indicated that they hoped to be consulted
on security technology pilot programs in the future. FRA officials
further stated that TSA could have benefited from earlier and more
frequent collaboration with them during the TRIP pilot than occurred,
and could have tapped their expertise to analyze TRIP results and
develop the final report. TSA research and development officials told
us that the agency has begun to consider and test security technologies
other than those used in TRIP, which may be more applicable to the
passenger rail environment. For example, TSA's and DHS's Science and
Technology Directorate are currently evaluating infrared cameras and
electronic metal detectors, among other things.
DHS and DOT Are Taking Steps to Improve Coordination and Collaboration
With Federal Agencies and Industry Stakeholders
In response to a previous recommendation we made in a June 2003
report on transportation security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) to develop procedures by which the two departments
could improve their cooperation and coordination for promoting the
safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods throughout the
transportation system. The MOU defines broad areas of responsibility
for each department. For example, it states that DHS, in consultation
with DOT and affected stakeholders, will identify, prioritize, and
coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure. The MOU between
DHS and DOT represents an overall framework for cooperation that is to
be supplemented by additional signed agreements, or annexes, between
the departments. These annexes are to delineate the specific security-
related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for mass
transit, rail, research and development, and other matters. The annex
for mass transit security was signed in September 2005. \25\ According
to DHS and DOT officials, this annex is intended to ensure that the
programs and protocols for incorporating stakeholder feedback and
making enhancements to security measures are coordinated. For example,
the annex requires that DHS and DOT consult on such matters as
regulations and security directives that affect security and identifies
points of contact for coordinating this consultation.
In addition to their work on the MOU and related annexes, DHS and
TSA have taken other steps in an attempt to improve collaboration with
DOT and industry stakeholders. In April 2005, DHS officials stated that
better collaboration with DOT and industry stakeholders was needed to
develop strategic security plans associated with various homeland
security presidential directives and statutory mandates, such as the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which
required DHS to develop a national strategy for transportation security
in conjunction with DOT. Responding to the need for better
collaboration, DHS established a senior-level steering committee in
conjunction with DOT to coordinate development of this national
strategy. In addition, senior DHS and TSA officials stated that
industry groups will also be involved in developing the national
strategy for transportation security and other strategic plans.
Moreover, according to TSA's assistant administrator for intermodal
programs, TSA intends to work with APTA and other industry stakeholders
in developing security standards for the passenger rail industry. \26\
U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure
Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic
Security Actions May Exist
U.S. passenger rail operators have taken numerous actions to secure
their rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the
United States, and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. These actions
included both improvements to system operations and capital
enhancements to a system's facilities, such as track, buildings, and
train cars. All of the U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted have
implemented some types of security measures--such as increased numbers
and visibility of security personnel and customer awareness programs--
that were generally consistent with those we observed in select
countries in Europe and Asia. We also identified three rail security
practices--covert testing, random screening of passengers and their
baggage, and centralized research and testing--utilized by foreign
operators or their governments that are not currently utilized by
domestic rail operators or the U.S. government. \27\
Actions Taken by U.S. and Foreign Passenger Rail Operators to
Strengthen Security Reflect Security Assessments, Budgetary
Constraints, and Other Factors
All 32 of the U.S. rail operators we interviewed or visited
reported taking specific actions to improve the security and safety of
their rail systems by, among other things, investing in new security
equipment, utilizing more law enforcement personnel, and establishing
public awareness campaigns. Passenger rail operators we spoke with
cited the 1995 sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system and the
September 11 terrorist attacks as catalysts for their security actions.
After the attacks, many passenger rail operators used FTA's security
readiness assessments of heavy and passenger rail systems as a guide to
determine how to prioritize their security efforts, as well as their
own understanding of their system's vulnerabilities, to determine what
actions to take to enhance security. Similarly, as previously
mentioned, the rail systems that underwent ODP risk assessments are
currently using or plan to use these assessments to guide their
security actions. In addition, 20 of the 32 U.S. operators we contacted
or visited had conducted some type of security assessment internally or
through a contractor, separate from the federally funded assessments.
For example, some assessments evaluated vulnerabilities of physical
assets, such as tunnels and bridges, throughout the passenger rail
system. Passenger rail operators stated that security-related spending
by rail operators was also based, in part, on budgetary considerations,
as well as other practices used by other rail operators that were
identified through direct contact or during industry association
meetings. \28\ Passenger rail operators frequently made capital
investments to improve security, and these investments often are not
part of Federal funding packages for new construction unless they are
part of new facilities being constructed. According to APTA, 54 percent
of transit agencies are facing increasing deficits, and no operator
covers expenses with fare revenue; thus, balancing operational and
capital improvements with security-related investments has been an
ongoing challenge for these operators. Several foreign rail operators
we interviewed also stated that funding for security enhancements was
limited in light of other funding priorities within the rail system,
such as personnel costs and infrastructure and equipment maintenance.
Foreign rail operators we visited also told us that risk
assessments played an important role in guiding security-related
spending for rail. For example, one foreign rail operator with a daily
ridership of 2.3 million passengers used a risk management methodology
to assess risks, threats, and vulnerabilities to rail in order to guide
security spending. The methodology is part of the rail operator's
corporate focus on overall safety and security and is intended to help
protect the operator's various rail systems against, among other
things, terrorist attacks, as well as other forms of corporate loss,
such as service disruption and loss of business viability.
U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices
Both U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have
implemented similar improvements to enhance the security of their
systems. \29\ A summary of these efforts follows.
Customer awareness: Customer awareness programs we observed used
signage and announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if
they observed suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. Of the 32
domestic rail operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a customer
awareness program or made enhancements to an existing program. Foreign
rail operators we visited also attempt to enhance customer awareness.
For example, 11 of the 13 operators we interviewed had implemented a
customer awareness program. Similar to programs of U.S. operators,
these programs used signage, announcements, and brochures to inform
passengers and employees about the need to remain vigilant and report
any suspicious activities. Only one of the European passenger rail
operators that we interviewed has not implemented a customer security
awareness program, citing the fear or panic that it might cause among
the public.
Increased number and visibility of security personnel: Of the 32
U.S. rail operators we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of
security personnel they utilized since September 11 to provide security
throughout their system or had taken steps to increase the visibility
of their security personnel. In addition to adding security personnel,
many operators stated that increasing the visibility of security was as
important as increasing the number of personnel. For example, several
U.S. and foreign rail operators we spoke with had instituted policies
such as requiring their security staff, in brightly colored vests, to
patrol trains or stations more frequently, so they are more visible to
customers and potential terrorists or criminals. These policies make it
easier for customers to contact security personnel in the event of an
emergency, or if they have spotted a suspicious item or person. At
foreign sites we visited, 10 of the 13 operators had increased the
number of their security officers throughout their systems in recent
years because of the perceived increase in risk of a terrorist attack.
Increased use of canine teams: Of the 32 U.S. passenger rail
operators we contacted, 21 had begun to use canine units, which include
both dogs and human handlers, to patrol their facilities or trains or
had increased their existing utilization of such teams. Often, these
units are used to detect the presence of explosives, and may be called
in when a suspicious package is detected. Some operators that did not
maintain their own canine units stated that it was prohibitively
expensive to do so and that they could call in local police canine
units if necessary. In foreign countries we visited, passenger rail
operators' use of canines varied. In some Asian countries, canines were
not culturally accepted by the public and thus were not used for rail
security purposes. As in the United States, and in contrast to Asia,
most European passenger rail operators used canines for explosive
detection or as deterrents.
Employee training: All of the domestic and foreign rail operators
we interviewed had provided some type of security training to their
staff, either through in-house personnel or an external provider. In
many cases, this training consisted of ways to identify suspicious
items and persons and how to respond to events once they occur. For
example, the London Underground and the British Transport Police
developed the ``HOT'' method for its employees to identify suspicious
items in the rail system. In the HOT method, employees are trained to
look for packages or items that are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and
not Typical of the environment. Items that do not meet these criteria
would likely receive a lower security response than an item meeting all
of the criteria. However, if items meet all of these criteria,
employees are to notify station managers, who would call in the
authorities and potentially shut down the station or take other action.
According to London Underground officials, the HOT method has
significantly reduced the number of system disruptions caused when a
suspicious item was identified. Several passenger rail operators in the
United States and abroad have trained their employees in the HOT
method. Several domestic operators had also trained their employees in
how to respond to terrorist attacks and provided them with wallet-size
cards highlighting actions they should take in response to various
forms of attack. It is important to note that training such as the HOT
method is not designed to prevent acts of terrorism like the July 2005
London attacks, where suicide bombers killed themselves rather than
leaving bombs behind.
Passenger and baggage screening practices: Some domestic and
foreign rail operators have trained employees to recognize suspicious
behavior as a means of screening passengers. Eight U.S. passenger rail
operators we contacted were utilizing some form of behavioral
screening. For example, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA), which operates Boston's T system, has utilized a behavioral
screening system to identify passengers exhibiting suspicious behavior.
The Massachusetts State Police train all MBTA personnel to be on the
lookout for behavior that may indicate someone has criminal intent, and
to approach and search such persons and their baggage when appropriate.
Massachusetts State Police officers have been training rail operators
on this behavior profiling system, and WMATA and New Jersey Transit
were among the first additional operators to implement the system.
According to MBTA personnel, several other operators have expressed
interest in this system. Abroad, we found that 4 of 13 operators we
interviewed had implemented forms of behavioral screening similar to
MBTA's system.
All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we contacted have
ruled out an airport-style screening system for daily use in heavy
traffic, where each passenger and the passenger's baggage are screened
by a magnetometer or X-ray machine, based on cost, staffing, and
customer convenience factors, among others. For example, although the
Spanish National Railway screens passenger baggage using an X-ray
machine on certain long-distance trains that it believes could be at
risk, all of the operators we contacted stated that the cost, staffing
requirements, delay of service, and inconvenience to passengers would
make such a system unworkable in highly trafficked, inherently open
systems like U.S. and foreign passenger rail operations. In addition,
one Asian rail official stated that his organization was developing a
contingency plan for implementing an airport-style screening system,
but that such a system would be used only in the event of intelligence
information indicating suicide bomb attacks were imminent, or if
several attacks had already occurred during a short period of time.
According to this official, the plan was in the initial stages of
development, and the organization did not know how quickly such a
system could be implemented.
Upgrading technology: Many rail operators we interviewed had
embarked on programs designed to upgrade their existing security
technology. For example, we found that 29 of the 32 U.S. operators had
implemented a form of CCTV to monitor their stations, yards, or trains.
While these cameras cannot be monitored closely at all times, because
of the large number of staff they said this would require, many rail
operators felt the cameras acted as a deterrent, assisted security
personnel in determining how to respond to incidents that have already
occurred, and could be monitored if an operator has received
information that an incident may occur at a certain time or place in
their system. One rail operator, New Jersey Transit, had installed
``smart'' cameras, which were programmed to alert security personnel
when suspicious activity occurred, such as if a passenger left a bag in
a certain location or if a boat were to dock under a bridge. According
to the New Jersey Transit officials, this technology was relatively
inexpensive and not difficult to implement. Several other operators
stated they were interested in exploring this technology. Abroad, all
13 of the foreign rail operators we visited had CCTV systems in place.
As in the United States, foreign rail operators use these cameras
primarily as a crime deterrent and to respond to incidents after they
occur, because they do not have enough staff to continuously monitor
all of these cameras.
In addition, 18 of the 32 U.S. rail operators we interviewed had
installed new emergency phones or enhanced the visibility of the
intercom systems they already had. Passengers can use these systems to
contact train operators or security personnel to report suspicious
activity, crimes in progress, or other problems. Furthermore, while
most rail operators we spoke with had not installed chemical or
biological agent detection equipment because of the costs involved, a
few operators had this equipment or were exploring purchasing it. For
example, WMATA, in Washington, D.C., has installed these sensors in
some of its stations, thanks to a program jointly sponsored by DOT and
the Department of Energy that provided this equipment to WMATA because
of the high perceived likelihood of an attack in Washington, D.C. Also,
at least three other domestic rail operators we spoke with are
exploring the possibility of partnering with Federal agencies to
install such equipment in their facilities on an experimental basis.
Also, as in the United States, a few foreign operators had
implemented chemical or biological detection devices at these rail
stations, but their use was not widespread. Two of the 13 foreign
operators we interviewed had implemented these sensors, and both were
doing so on an experimental basis. In addition, police officers from
the British Transport Police--responsible for policing the rail system
in the United Kingdom--were equipped with pagers to detect chemical,
biological, or radiological elements in the air, allowing them to
respond quickly in case of a terrorist attack using one of these
methods. The British Transit Police also has three vehicles carrying
devices to determine if unattended baggage contains explosives--these
vehicles patrol the system 24 hours per day.
Access control: Tightening access procedures at key facilities or
rights-of-way is another way many rail operators have attempted to
enhance security. A majority of domestic and selected foreign passenger
rail operators had invested in enhanced systems to control unauthorized
access at employee facilities and stations. Specifically, 23 of the 32
U.S. operators had installed a form of access control at key facilities
and stations. This often involved installing a system where employees
had to swipe an access card to gain access to control rooms, repair
facilities, and other key locations. All 13 foreign operators had
implemented some form of access control to their critical facilities or
rights-of-way. These measures varied from simple alarms on doors at
electrical substations on one subway system we visited to infrared
sensors monitoring every inch of right-of-way along the track on three
of the high-speed interurban rail systems.
Rail system design and configuration: In an effort to reduce
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase overall security,
passenger rail operators in the United States and abroad have been, or
are now beginning to, incorporate security features into the design of
new and existing rail infrastructure, primarily rail stations. For
example, of the 32 domestic rail operators we contacted, 22 of them had
removed their conventional trash bins entirely, or replaced them with
transparent or bomb-resistant trash bins, as TSA instructed in its May
2004 security directives. Foreign rail operators had taken steps to
remove traditional trash bins from their systems. Of the 13 operators
we visited, 8 had either removed their trash bins entirely or replaced
them with blast-resistant cans or transparent receptacles.
Many foreign rail operators are also incorporating aspects of
security into the design of their rail infrastructure. Of the 13
operators we visited, 11 have attempted to design new facilities with
security in mind and have attempted to retrofit older facilities to
incorporate security-related modifications. For example, one foreign
operator we visited is retrofitting its train cars with windows that
passengers could open in the event of a chemical attack. In addition,
the London Underground, one of the oldest rail systems in the world,
incorporates security into the design of all its new stations as well
as when existing stations are modified. We observed several security
features in the design of Underground stations, such as using vending
machines that have no holes that someone could use to hide a bomb, and
sloped tops to reduce the likelihood that a bomb can be placed on top
of the machine. In addition, stations are designed to provide staff
with clear lines of sight to all areas of the station, such as
underneath benches or ticket machines, and station designers try to
eliminate or restrict access to any recessed areas where a bomb could
be hidden.
In one London station, we observed the use of netting throughout
the station to help prevent objects, such as bombs, from being placed
in a recessed area, such as beneath a stairwell or escalator. In this
station and other stations we visited, Underground officials have
installed ``help posts'' at which customers can call for help if an
incident occurs. When these posts are activated, CCTV cameras display a
video image of the help post and surrounding area to staff at a central
command center. This allows the staff to directly observe the situation
and respond appropriately. See figure 5 for a photograph of a help
post.
Underground officials stated that the incorporation of security
features in station design is an effective measure in deterring some
terrorists from attacking the system. For example, officials told us
that CCTV video recorded the efforts by Irish Republican Army
terrorists attempting to place an explosive device inside a station--
and when they could not find a suitable location to hide the device,
they placed it outside in a trash can instead, thereby mitigating the
impact of the explosion.
In the United States, several passenger rail operators stated that
they were taking security into account when designing new facilities or
remodeling older ones. Twenty-two of 32 rail operators we interviewed
told us that they were incorporating security into the design of new or
existing rail infrastructure. For example, New York City Transit and
PATH officials told us they are incorporating security into the design
of its new stations, including the redesigned Fulton Street station and
the World Trade Center Hub that were damaged or destroyed during the
September 11 attacks. In addition, in June 2005, FTA issued guidelines
for use by the transit industry encouraging the incorporation of
particular security features into the design of transit infrastructure.
These guidelines include, for example, increasing visibility for
onboard staff, reducing the areas where someone could hide an explosive
device on a transit vehicle, and enhancing emergency exits in transit
stations.
Figure 6 shows a diagram of several security measures that we
observed in passenger rail stations both in the United States and
abroad. It should be noted that this represents an amalgam of stations
we visited, not any particular station.
Amtrak Faces Challenges Specific to Intercity Passenger Rail in
Securing Its System
In securing its extensive system, Amtrak faces its own set of
security-related challenges, some of which are different from those
facing a commuter rail or transit operator. First, Amtrak operates over
thousands of miles, often far from large population centers. This makes
its route system much more difficult to patrol and monitor than one
contained in a particular metropolitan region, and it causes delays in
responding to incidents when they occur in remote areas. Also, outside
the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak operates almost exclusively on tracks
owned by freight rail companies. Amtrak also utilizes stations owned by
freight rail companies, transit and commuter rail authorities, private
corporations, and municipal governments. This means that Amtrak often
cannot unilaterally make security improvements to others' rights-of-way
or station facilities and that it is reliant on the staff of other
organizations to patrol their facilities and respond to incidents that
may occur. Furthermore, with over 500 stations, only half of which are
staffed, screening even a small portion of the passengers and baggage
boarding Amtrak trains is difficult. Last, Amtrak's financial condition
has never been strong--Amtrak has been on the edge of bankruptcy
several times.
Amid the ongoing challenges of securing its coast-to-coast railway,
Amtrak has taken some actions to enhance security throughout its
intercity passenger rail system. For example, Amtrak has initiated a
passenger awareness campaign, similar to those described elsewhere in
this report. Also, Amtrak has begun enforcing existing restrictions on
carry-on luggage that limit passengers to two carry-on bags, not
exceeding 50 pounds. All bags also must have identification tags on
them. Furthermore, Amtrak has begun requiring passengers to show
positive identification after boarding trains when asked by staff to
ensure that tickets have not been transferred or stolen, although
Amtrak officials acknowledge their onboard staffs only sporadically
enforce this requirement because of the numerous tasks these staff
members must perform before a train departs. However, in November 2004,
Amtrak implemented the Tactical Intensive Patrols (TIPS) program, under
which its security staff flood selected platforms to ensure Amtrak
baggage and identification requirements are met by passengers boarding
trains. In addition, Amtrak increased the number of canine units
patrolling its system, most of which are located in the Northeast
Corridor, looking for explosives or narcotics and assigned some of its
police to ride trains in the Northeast Corridor. Also, Amtrak has
instituted a policy of randomly inspecting checked luggage on its
trains. Finally, Amtrak is making improvements to the emergency exits
in certain tunnels to make evacuating trains in the tunnels easier in
the event of a crash or terrorist attack.
To ensure that security measures are applied consistently
throughout Amtrak's system, Amtrak has established a series of Security
Coordinating Committees, which include representatives of all Amtrak
departments. These committees are to review and establish security
policies, in coordination with Amtrak's police department, and have
worked to develop countermeasures to specific threats. According to
Amtrak, in the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings, these
committees met with Amtrak police and security staff to ensure
additional security measures were implemented. Also in the wake of the
London attacks, Amtrak began working with the police forces of several
large east coast cities, allowing them to patrol Amtrak stations to
provide extra security. In addition, all Amtrak employees now receive a
``Daily Security Awareness Tip'' and are receiving computer-based
security training. Amtrak police officers are also now receiving
specialized counter-terrorism training.
While Amtrak has taken the actions outlined above, it is difficult
to determine if these actions appropriately or sufficiently addressed
pressing security needs. As discussed earlier, Amtrak has not performed
a comprehensive terrorism risk assessment that would provide an
empirical baseline for investment prioritization and decision making
for Amtrak's security policies and investment plans. However, as part
of the 2005 Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program, Amtrak is required
to produce a security and emergency preparedness plan, which is to
include a risk assessment that Amtrak currently expects to finish by
December 31, 2005. Upon completing this plan, Amtrak management should
have a more informed basis regarding which security enhancements should
receive the highest priority for implementation.
Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used in the
United States
While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail
systems are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are
implementing, we encountered three practices in other countries that
were not currently in use among the domestic passenger rail operators
we contacted as of June 2005, nor were they performed by the U.S.
Government. These practices are discussed below.
Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited
utilize covert testing to keep employees alert about their security
responsibilities. Covert testing involves security staff staging
unannounced events to test the response of railroad staff to incidents
such as suspicious packages or setting off alarms. In one European
system, this covert testing involves security staff placing suspicious
items throughout their system to see how long it takes operating staff
to respond to the item. Similarly, one Asian rail operator's security
staff will break security seals on fire extinguishers and open alarmed
emergency doors randomly to see how long it takes staff to respond.
Officials of these operators stated that these tests are carried out on
a daily basis and are beneficial because their staff know they could be
tested at any moment, and they, therefore, are more likely to be
vigilant with respect to security.
Random screening: Of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed, 2
have some form of random screening of passengers and their baggage in
place. In the systems where this is in place, security personnel can
approach passengers either in stations or on the trains and ask them to
submit their persons or their baggage to a search. Passengers declining
to cooperate must leave the system. For example, in Singapore, rail
agency officials rotate the stations where they conduct random searches
so that the searches are carried out at a different station each day.
Prior to the July 2005 London bombings, no passenger rail operators in
the United States were practicing a form of random passenger or baggage
screening on a continuing daily basis. However, during the Democratic
National Convention in 2004, MBTA instituted a system of random
screening of passengers, where every 11th passenger at certain stations
and times of the day was asked to provide his or her bags to be
screened. Those who refused were not allowed to ride the system. MBTA
officials recognized that it is impossible to implement such a system
comprehensively throughout the rail network without massive amounts of
additional staff, and that even doing random screening on a regular
basis would be a drain on resources. However, officials stated that
such a system is workable during special events and times of heightened
security but would have to be designed very carefully to ensure that
passengers' civil liberties were not violated. After the July 2005
London bombings, four passenger rail operators--PATH, New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New Jersey Transit, and Utah
Transit Authority in Salt Lake City--implemented limited forms of
random bag screening in their system. In addition, APTA, FTA, and the
National Academy of Science's Transportation Research Board are
currently conducting a study on the benefits and challenges that
passenger rail operators would face in implementing a randomized
passenger screening system. The study is examining such issues as the
legal basis for conducting passenger screening or search, the
precedence for such measures in the transportation environment, the
human resources required, and the financial implications and cost
considerations involved.
National government maintains clearinghouse on technologies and
best practices: According to passenger rail operators in five countries
we visited, their national governments have centralized the process for
performing research and developing passenger rail security technologies
and maintaining a clearinghouse on these technologies and security best
practices. According to these officials, this allows rail operators to
have one central source for information on the merits of a particular
passenger rail security technology, such as chemical sensors, CCTVs,
and intrusion detection devices. Some U.S. rail operators we
interviewed expressed interest in there being a more active centralized
Federal research and development authority in the United States to
evaluate and certify passenger rail security technologies and make that
information available to rail operators. Although TSA is the primary
Federal agency responsible for conducting transportation security
research and development, and has conducted the TRIP as previously
mentioned, most of the agency's research and development efforts to
date have focused on aviation security technologies. As a result,
domestic rail operators told us that they rely on consultations with
industry trade associations, such as APTA, to learn about best
practices for passenger rail security technologies and related
investments. Several rail operators stated that they were often unsure
of where to turn when seeking information on security-related products,
such as CCTV cameras or intrusion detection systems. Currently, many
operators said they informally ask other rail operators about their
experiences with a certain technology, perform their own research via
the Internet or trade publications, or perform their own testing.
No Federal agency has compiled or disseminated best practices to
rail operators to aid in this process. We have previously reported that
stakeholders have stated that the Federal Government should play a
greater role in testing transportation security technology and making
this information available to industry stakeholders. \30\ TSA and DOT
agree that making the results of research testing available to industry
stakeholders could be a valuable use of Federal resources by reducing
the need for multiple rail operators to perform the same research and
development efforts, but they have not taken action to address this.
\31\
Implementing these three practices--covert testing, random
screening, and a government-sponsored clearinghouse for technologies
and best practices--in the United States could pose political, legal,
fiscal, and cultural challenges because of the differences between the
United States and these foreign nations. For instance, many foreign
nations have dealt with terrorist attacks on their public
transportation systems for decades, compared with the United States,
where rail transportation has not been specifically targeted during
terrorist attacks. According to foreign rail operators, these
experiences have resulted in greater acceptance of certain security
practices, such as random searches, which the U.S. public may view as a
violation of their civil liberties or which may discourage them from
using public transportation. The impact of security measures on
passengers is an important consideration for domestic rail transit
operators, since most passengers could choose another means of
transportation, such as a personal automobile. As such, security
measures that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or
otherwise cause inconvenience could push people away from transit and
into their cars. In contrast, the citizens of the European and Asian
countries we visited are more dependent on public transportation than
most U.S. residents and therefore, according to the rail operators we
spoke with, may be more willing to accept more intrusive security
measures, simply because they have no other choice for getting from
place to place. Nevertheless, in order to identify innovative security
measures that could help further mitigate terrorism-related risk to
rail assets--especially as part of a broader risk management approach
discussed earlier--it is important to at least consider assessing the
feasibility and costs and benefits of implementing the three rail
security practices we identified in foreign countries in the United
States. Officials from DHS, DOT, passenger rail industry associations,
and rail systems we interviewed told us that operators would benefit
from such an evaluation. Furthermore, the passenger rail association
officials told us that such an evaluation should include practices used
by foreign rail operators that integrate security into infrastructure
design.
Differences in the business models and financial status of some
foreign rail operators could also affect the feasibility of adopting
certain security practices in the United States. Several foreign
countries we visited have privatized their passenger rail operations.
Although most of the foreign rail operators we visited--even the
privatized systems--rely on their governments for some type of
financial assistance, two foreign rail operators generated significant
revenue and profits in other business endeavors, which they said
allowed them to invest heavily in security measures for their rail
systems. In particular, the Paris Metro system is operated by the RATP
Corporation (Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens), which also
contracts with other cities in France and throughout the world to
provide consulting and project management services. RATP 's ability to
make a profit, according to its officials, through its consulting
services allows the agency to supplement government funding in order to
support expensive security measures for the Paris mass transit system.
For example, RATP recently installed a computer-assisted security
control system that uses CCTV, radio, and global positioning technology
that it says has significantly reduced the amount of time it takes for
security or emergency personnel to respond to an incident or emergency,
such as a terrorist attack. Because of RATP 's available funding for
security, the corporation also purchased an identical system for the
Metropolitan Paris Police, so the RATP and the police system would be
compatible. In contrast, domestic rail operators do not generate a
profit and therefore are dependent on financial assistance from the
Federal, State, and local levels of government to maintain and enhance
services, including funding security improvements.
Another important difference between domestic and foreign rail
operators is the structure of their police forces. In particular,
England, France, Belgium, and Spain all have national police forces
patrolling rail systems in these countries. The use of a national
police force is a reflection that these foreign countries often have
one nationalized rail system, rather than over 30 rail transit systems
owned and operated by numerous state and local governments, as is the
case in the United States. For example, in France, the French National
Railway operates all intercity passenger rail services in the country
and utilizes the French Railway police to provide security. According
to foreign rail operators, the use of one national rail police force
allows for consistent policing and security measures throughout the
country. In the United States, in contrast, there is not a national
police force for the rail transit systems. \32\ Rather, some transit
agencies maintain individual police forces, while others rely on their
city or county police forces for security.
Conclusions
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged by the steps DHS
components have taken to use elements of a risk management approach to
guide critical infrastructure protection decisions for the passenger
rail industry. However, enhanced Federal leadership is needed to help
ensure that actions and investments designed to enhance security are
properly focused and prioritized, so that finite resources may be
allocated appropriately to help protect all modes of transportation and
secure other national critical infrastructure sectors. Leadership on
this issue should reflect the shared responsibilities required to
coordinate actions on the part of Federal, State, and local
governments; the private sector; and rail passengers who ride these
systems.
Specifically, both DHS and TSA could take additional steps to help
ensure that the risk management efforts under way clearly and
effectively identify priority areas for security-related investments in
rail and other sectors. We recognize that TSA has had many aviation
security-related responsibilities and has implemented many security
initiatives to meet legislative requirements. Notwithstanding, TSA has
not yet completed its methodology for determining how the results of
threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments will be used to
identify and prioritize risks to passenger rail and other
transportation sectors. In order to complete and apply its methodology
as part of the forthcoming transportation sector-specific plan, TSA
needs to more consistently involve industry stakeholders in the overall
risk assessment process and collaborate with them on collecting and
analyzing information on critical infrastructure and key resources in
the passenger rail industry. Without consistent and substantive
stakeholder input, TSA may not be able to fully capture critical
information on rail assets--information that is needed to properly
assess risk. In addition, as part of the process to complete its risk
assessment methodology, TSA needs to consider whether other proven
approaches, such as ODP's risk assessment methodology, could be
leveraged for rail and other transportation modes, such as aviation.
Until the overall risk to the entire transportation sector is
identified, TSA will not be able to fully benefit from the outcome of
risk management analysis--including determining where and how to target
the Nation's limited resources to achieve the greatest security gains.
Once risk assessments for the passenger rail industry have been
completed, it will be critical to be able to compare assessment results
across all transportation modes as well as other critical sectors and
make informed, risk-based investment trade-offs. The framework that DHS
is developing to help ensure that risks to all sectors can be analyzed
and compared in a consistent way needs to be completed and shared with
TSA and other sector-specific agencies. The delay in completing the
element of the framework that defines concepts, terminology, and
metrics for assessing risk limits DHS's ability to compare risk across
sectors as sector-specific agencies are concurrently conducting risk
assessment activities without this guidance. Until this framework is
complete, it will not be possible for information from different
sectors to be reconciled to allow for a meaningful comparison of risk--
a goal outlined in DHS's interim NIPP.
Apart from its efforts to formally identify risks, TSA has taken
steps to enhance the security of the overall passenger rail system. The
issuance of security directives in the wake of the Madrid bombings was
a well-intentioned effort to take swift action in response to a current
threat. However, because these directives were issued under emergency
circumstances, with limited input and review by rail industry and
Federal stakeholders--and no public comment period--they may not
provide the industry with baseline security standards based on industry
best practices. Nor is it clear how these directives are to be measured
and enforced. Consequently, neither the Federal Government nor rail
operators can be sure they are requiring and implementing security
practices proven to help prevent or mitigate disasters. Collaborating
with rail industry stakeholders to develop security standards is an
important starting point for strengthening the security of passenger
rail systems.
While foreign passenger rail operators face similar challenges to
securing their systems and have generally implemented similar security
practices as U.S. rail operators, there are some practices that are
utilized abroad that U.S. rail operators or the Federal Government have
not studied in terms of the feasibility, costs, and benefits. For
example, an information clearinghouse for new passenger rail
technologies that are available and have been tested might allow rail
operators to efficiently implement technologies that had already
received approval. In addition, while FTA plans to require rail
operators to consider its security infrastructure design guidelines
when renovating or constructing rail systems or facilities,
opportunities may still exist to further research and evaluate ways of
integrating security into design, as some foreign rail operators have
done. Another rail security practice--covert testing of rail security
procedures--is being used in two foreign rail systems we visited and is
considered by them as an effective means of keeping rail employees
alert to their surroundings and potential security threats. And
finally, random searches of passengers and baggage are being used by
two foreign rail operators and this practice has recently been adopted
by four domestic rail operators in the wake of the London attacks.
Introducing these security practices into the United States may
involve cultural, financial, and political challenges, owing to
differences between the United States and foreign nations. Nonetheless,
as part of the overall risk management approach, there may be
compelling reasons for exploring the feasibility, costs, and benefits
of implementing any of these practices in the United States. Doing so
could enable the United States to leverage the experiences and
knowledge of foreign passenger rail operators and help identify
additional innovative measures to secure rail systems against terrorist
attack in this country.
In our recently issued report on passenger rail security, we
recommended, among other things, that to help ensure that the Federal
Government has the information it needs to prioritize passenger rail
assets based on risk, and in order to evaluate, select, and implement
commensurate measures to help the Nation's passenger rail operators
protect their systems against acts of terrorism, TSA should establish a
plan with timelines for completing its methodology for conducting risk
assessments and develop security standards that reflect industry best
practices and can be measured and enforced, by using the Federal rule-
making process. In addition, we recommended that the Secretary of DHS,
in collaboration with DOT and the passenger rail industry, determine
the feasibility, in a risk management context, of implementing certain
security practices used by foreign rail operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak
generally agreed with the report's recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may
have at this time.
ENDNOTES
\1\ Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
\2\ GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005).
\3\ The American Public Transportation Association compiled this
Fiscal Year 2003 ridership data from FTA's National Transit Database.
These are the most current data available. Rail transit systems in the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are included in these statistics.
\4\ The Alaska Railroad Corporation also operates intercity
passenger rail service.
\5\ Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
\6\ Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
\7\ The Department of Justice established ODP in 1998 within the
Office of Justice Programs. ODP was subsequently transferred to DHS's
Directorate of Border and Transportation Security upon DHS's creation
in March 2003 (Homeland Security Act of 2002, section 403(5), 6 U.S.C.
203(5)). In March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security consolidated
ODP with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination to form
the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
(SLGCP). SLGCP, which reports directly to the DHS Secretary, was
created to provide a ``one-stop shop'' for the numerous Federal
preparedness initiatives applicable to state and local governments.
\8\ At the time of our review, DHS was undertaking a department-
wide reorganization that will affect both the structure and the
functions of DHS directorates and component agencies.
\9\ Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298 (2004).
\10\ FRA administers and enforces the Federal laws and related
regulations that are designed to promote safety on railroads, such as
track maintenance, inspection standards, equipment standards, and
operating practices. FRA exercises jurisdiction over all areas of
railroad safety under 49 U.S.C. 20103.
\11\ Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
\12\ GAO, Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to
Optimize Resources, GAO-05-357T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2005);
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001); and Combating
Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target
Program Investments, GAO/NSIAD-98-74 (Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1998).
\13\ Sector-specific agencies have been designated for the
following sectors: transportation; agriculture and food; public health
and health care; drinking water and wastewater treatment; energy;
banking and finance; national monuments and icons; defense industrial
base; information technology; telecommunications; chemical; emergency
services; postal and package shipping; dams; government facilities;
commercial facilities; and nuclear reactors, materials, and waste.
\14\ The transportation sector includes mass transit; aviation;
maritime; ground/surface; and rail and pipeline systems.
\15\ ODP has completed risk assessments with the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, Tri-
County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon, and the Delaware
River Port Authority.
\16\ PANYNJ is a bi-state public agency that manages and maintains
bridges, tunnels, bus terminals, airports, the PATH passenger rail
system, and seaports in the greater New York/New Jersey metropolitan
area. PANYNJ was also the property owner and operator of the World
Trade Center site and the PATH passenger rail station underneath the
site that was destroyed by the September 11 terrorist attacks. At the
request of PANYNJ, ODP's technical assistance team worked with
authority personnel to conduct the first risk assessment using ODP's
model. This collaborative effort provided the means for ODP to test and
refine its methodology and develop the tool kit now in use.
\17\ The Association of American Railroads is an association
representing the interests of the rail industry, focused mostly at the
Federal level. Its members are primarily freight rail operators in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico. However, it also represents some
passenger rail interests, including Amtrak.
\18\ The American Public Transportation Association is a nonprofit
trade association representing over 1,500 public and private member
organizations, including transit systems and commuter rail operators;
planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product and service
providers; academic institutions; transit associations; and state
departments of transportation.
\19\ Up to 30 percent of the available funds will be available to
assist Amtrak in meeting its most pressing security needs in the
Northeast Corridor and Chicago (as identified through previously
conducted site-specific assessments) prior to completion of the risk
assessment. However, the remainder of the grant funds will not be
released until Amtrak has completed the risk assessment and also
submitted a security and emergency preparedness plan. Amtrak is also
required to demonstrate that its planning process and allocations of
funds are fully coordinated with regional planning efforts in the
National Capitol Region, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Chicago.
Amtrak is using approximately $700,000 of the grant funds for the ODP
risk assessment.
\20\ The results of TSA's passenger and freight rail threat
assessments contain information that is security sensitive or
classified and therefore cannot be disclosed in this testimony.
\21\ DHS refers to this framework as a Risk Analysis and Management
for Critical Asset Protection.
\22\ According to TSA, in issuing the passenger rail and mass
transit security directives, TSA exercised its authorities under 49
U.S.C. 114. We are currently examining whether TSA met all relevant
legal requirements in the promulgation of the directives.
\23\ 49 CFR 238.235.
\24\ These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act
of 2005 and its accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with
$12 million in funding for rail security activities.
\25\ Congress required that an annex to the MOU be signed that
would, among other things, define and clarify the respective transit
security roles and responsibilities of each department. Pub. L. 109-59,
Sec. 3028 (2005).
\26\ APTA is a standards development organization recognized by DOT
that has set standards for commuter rail, mass transit, and bus safety
and operations.
\27\ At the time we completed our work in June 2005, these three
practices were not utilized. However, as discussed later in this
report, some rail operators began using random screening in the
aftermath of the July bomb attacks on the London subway system.
\28\ As we have previously reported, since the mid-1990s, Federal
funding for transit and commuter rail operators has generally been
limited to assistance with capital projects involving building new
transit service, extensions of existing lines, or rehabilitation of
existing transit infrastructure, such as tracks, rolling stock, or
stations. See GAO-03-263.
\29\ Actions taken by Amtrak to enhance security are discussed
later in this testimony.
\30\ GAO-03-843.
\31\ See GAO-03-843.
\32\ Unlike domestic rail transit agencies, Amtrak maintains a 342-
member police force for its national network.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator McCain, do you
have an opening statement or questions?
Senator McCain. I follow you, Mr. Chairman. After you, sir.
The Chairman. All right, let me just put it this way to all
of you. We sought to assure that we would have jurisdiction
over TSA, rail security and other aspects in this Committee
because of the existence of the authorities that Mr. Boardman
has just mentioned concerning FRA and existing systems prior to
the reorganizations that brought about TSA. But it appears that
we are still going along two roads. You talk about
coordination, but what about consolidation? It seems to me that
this is going to be extremely confusing to everybody in the
railroad industry if we don't find one way to deal with this.
Now, the solution of the 9/11 Commission was to just wipe out
FRA as far as security is concerned and our solution was to try
and bring it together so that we'd have a comprehensive system
for improving rail security but not have duplicated functions
that require coordination.
Now, how are we going to get it together? And Mr. Hawley,
notwithstanding what Ms. Berrick said--I thought that was kind
of complimentary that you are trying to work on risk assessment
but you haven't accomplished anything yet. When can we expect
that risk assessment and when can we expect a plan to put
together the system so that there's one coherent system for
safety on our railroads?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. On the risk management approach, we
use that today. I think what we are referring to there, are
specific major models that are very complex that are useful but
are not really the operational drivers in terms of a flexible
risk and a flexible network. So we use absolutely the risk-
based approach on a daily basis on operational matters as well
as we devote our investment resources.
The Chairman. If you are doing that every day what's Mr.
Boardman doing? He says they're in charge.
Mr. Hawley. Well, Mr. Boardman is in charge of safety and
we have a very good working relationship that I think, that the
report that Ms. Berrick referred to is highly instructive,
highly useful, and as I was preparing for my confirmation
before this Committee, I had the opportunity to review it and
the comments there about single point of contact, being
connected, one voice from the Federal Government to the
industry or the transit community is one that we whole-
heartedly adopt. And, in fact, Secretary Chertoff recently
approved a reorganization of the entire agency to enable us to
speak with one voice to these communities.
The Chairman. What agency? Your agency?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir, TSA. And to plug into FRA on a daily
basis and build institutional connections among us so it
doesn't depend on a good relationship among administrators, but
the actual work process of the two agencies take advantage,
certainly from our point of view, of the expertise that the FRA
has and expect that the good working relationship that we've
had to this point will continue to evolve to be even better
coordinated and reflected in the work process.
The Chairman. Mr. Boardman, what do you say?
Mr. Boardman. I think that, Mr. Chairman, I do think FRA
and TSA, especially since Mr. Hawley has come onboard, have
been able to work in a very hand-in-glove fashion, especially
with their inspectors out in the field today. I think there is
a difference between safety and security in a couple of ways.
Safety in terms of thinking about it, it's really being certain
that adverse effects will not be caused by some agent under
defined conditions. In other words, when the FRA puts its
standards and its activity together there are some risks, and
terrorism against the passenger train is beyond the conditions
that FRA really considered when it set those standards in the
past. One of the difficulties, I think, with security has been
that it's not only being free from danger and injury, it's also
being free from anxiety and fear. And, I think that there is a
need for us to work together as a Federal Government to find a
way to find those conditions, those adverse effects that we
can't establish in terms of a process or effective conditions
that, as I think Mr. Hawley talked about, that keep terrorists
off balance in terms of how we look at this thing for the
future. I think that we have an important role in the FRA in
security because we benefit security because we don't
differentiate what that agent is that causes a catastrophic
event. It could be a broken rail from a joint fracture, it
could be vandals, it could be something more sinister, but
there are those risks that are beyond that and we want to work
with DHS to resolve that.
The Chairman. John?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Along the lines of
what the Chairman was just asking, tell me Mr. Hawley and Mr.
Boardman, who is in charge?
Mr. Hawley. For security, TSA is in charge and for safety
it's FRA. It is very similar with FAA and TSA. So, it's a
similar pattern that we have throughout the transportation
sector.
Senator McCain. Ms. Berrick, does that seem workable to
you?
Ms. Berrick. I think it is today. About a year ago we did
some work and talked to rail operators. They felt that the role
between FRA and TSA wasn't always very clear to them. One of
the recommendations we made coming out of that work was that
the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland
Security establish a Memorandum of Understanding, clearly
delineating roles and responsibilities and they did that about
a year ago. And recently, last month they signed a Transit
Security Annex to that MOU which I think further delineates
roles and responsibilities.
So I think they've gone a long way and are being more clear
on who's responsible for rail security.
Senator McCain. Well, apparently, it's not clear to the
Association of American Railroads because they submit testimony
that they will present that says TSA and FRA should clarify
which agency has ultimate responsibility for which aspects of
rail safety and security. Today, the allocation of
responsibilities is not always clear, so the people that they
are serving are not that clear, at least according to Mr.
Hamberger's testimony.
Ms. Berrick, are we devoting sufficient funds to rail
security today? My information is, this year's Homeland
Security Appropriations bill appropriated $150 million for
intercity passenger rail transportation, freight rail and
transit security grants. Senator Lieberman, recently noted that
while the government has spent about $15 billion in aviation
securities since September 11th, about $300 million has been
spent on mass transit security. Does this seem a little unequal
particularly in light of the Madrid attacks and other threats
to rail security both in America and overseas?
Ms. Berrick. I think if you look at TSA's budget which is
about $3.9 billion and within TSA, in addition to the $150
million at the DHS level, within TSA there is $8 million that's
devoted to higher additional rail inspectors this year. So I
think, if you just look at the budget, that certainly raises
questions about whether or not that's an appropriate amount. I
don't think that anybody can really answer the question right
now, What is the appropriate amount to devote to rail security?
Just because the risk assessment----
Senator McCain. I'm not asking for an appropriate amount,
I'm asking if whether we are spending enough?
Ms. Berrick. Yes, I would say that you can't answer that
question right now. I don't know the answer because DHS hasn't
completed these risk assessment efforts to identify where the
vulnerabilities are that need to be fixed. And I think, until
they do that in any systematic way, it really can't be
estimated what they need.
Senator McCain. Well, in all due respect, Mr. Hawley, the
year is 2005 and we still haven't made an assessment yet?
Mr. Hawley. No, sir, we have and it gets to the question of
protecting infrastructure which is different. Which is a solid
definable place geographically with defining a flexible
transportation network where in the New York City Transit
System alone, I'm sure if you know this, four and a half
million passengers a day going in and out of 400 and some----
Senator McCain. And it still remains a question of the
security of the tunnels as well.
Mr. Hawley. Well, it's almost certainly a piece of that but
we have taken the whole network of transportation and all the
modes because it is an open system. It is vulnerable and as you
know, the targeting can be flexible and adaptive. So, if we
were publishing a list of the top 100 things in priority that
we're allocating our resources to, that is too simple a guide
to give to somebody else and I think we go back to the person
connecting the dots on CBP, and ICE, and FBI to find the
person, before the attack is in progress against a particular
transit system or aviation target.
Senator McCain. What are your priorities without comprising
security?
Mr. Hawley. Sure, it is absolutely to do what is possible
to identify the terrorist in advance which can be done and how
you do that specifically is with connecting the information
systems that we have within DHS, the Customs and Border
Protection as well as us and ICE and FBI and the reporting we
get from industries, suspicious incidents.
Senator McCain. I need to rephrase my question, without
compromising security, what are your highest priorities for
defending?
Mr. Hawley. For the, essentially aviation would be the
highest priority.
Senator McCain. As far as rail security is concerned.
Mr. Hawley. For rail security it gets to first,
establishing that unlike aviation which is operated by the
Federal Government, rail is operated by either transit systems
or railroads and to first establish what they are doing. Then,
if what they are doing makes sense and then are they doing what
they say they are doing? All of those things have----
Senator McCain. I'm still asking what your priorities are.
Is it the tunnels, is it New York City, is it New Mexico? I'm
asking which areas need to be addressed first. You have to
prioritize. I remember right after 2001, one of the highest
priorities that was given to this Committee were the tunnels
that connect on the eastern corridors.
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Senator McCain. So.
Mr. Hawley. We are very focused on tunnels in New York and
elsewhere and look at things that would be effective against
tunnels wherever they are but clearly, the New York City area
is very visible as is the D.C. Metro area in the northeast
corridor there. There are priorities within that but the----
Senator McCain. I'm sorry to interrupt, Mr. Hawley. But,
it's hard for us to recommend authorization and appropriations
in a prioritized fashion since clearly, we can't fund
everything until we get your priorities.
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Senator McCain. Do you see my point?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, yes, sir, and the way the President's
budget is put together, puts a lot of, now the decisionmaking
at the state and local level where they can make the operation
tradeoffs as to----
Senator McCain. And that assumes then that they don't want
any Federal money. I'm saying is, if it's Federal dollars we
have to know what the Federal priority is.
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Senator McCain. If they, if local authorities want to set
their priorities and fund them, that's fine with us. OK? I'm
still having trouble getting your priorities which would then
help us, as we go through the authorizing and appropriating
process.
Mr. Hawley. Sure, OK, information, communication, training,
drilling, preparedness----
Senator McCain. I'm talking about areas that need specific
priorities. I understand that education and training and
communication are very important. That's why we are about to
have a big fight over allocation of spectrum.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir, so you want the geography or the part
of the train system or----
Senator McCain. Is it New York tunnels? Is it the West
Coast rail network? Is it the Union Station here? I just think
we need to know some priorities if we are going to earmark
specific funds for specific purposes.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. We're just going to give you a whole bunch
of money and say spend it however you want, then it doesn't
matter. But I don't think we are going to do that.
Mr. Hawley. No, sir. But the flexibility and adaptability
of the resources we have is critical. So, for instance, we have
resources like canine teams, that we have on a mobile basis so
that in a situation where----
Senator McCain. Is that your highest priority?
Mr. Hawley. It's not my highest priority.
Senator McCain. Well, that's what I keep asking, Mr.
Hawley.
Mr. Hawley. OK, it is, it's the flexible resources to be
able to----
Senator McCain. All right, Mr. Hawley then I will submit on
the floor an amendment for flexible resources. I'm sorry that
you aren't more forthcoming. Mr. Chairman, I know there are
other witnesses. You are very unforthcoming, Mr. Hawley and I
am very disappointed.
The Chairman. Well, let me follow on to what Senator McCain
has discussed, we also oversee airline transportation and
airline transportation has been funded as far as security
concepts are concerned primarily by increased taxes on
passengers. I have not seen any recommendation from anyone that
the people who use rail transportation should pay a portion of
the cost of providing their own security. Have you examined
this? Any one of you examine why it is that we can't ask the
rail passenger to pay as the airline passenger pays for at
least part of the security we are trying to provide?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, it's done. That's where the money comes
out of the local level and part of the fare box goes to
programs from the local level that affect security.
The Chairman. Have you recommended any increase in cost to
the passengers for rail security?
Mr. Hawley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you, Mr. Boardman?
Mr. Boardman. No, Mr. Chairman. I wouldn't recommend that.
The Chairman. Why?
Mr. Boardman. Most transit systems in operation today don't
cover their operating costs. Most of them in rural areas cover
as much as maybe 30 or 40 percent of their costs. When you're
in New York City itself, you might be as high as 70 percent of
its costs. So today----
The Chairman. That's looking at it the wrong way. Do you
know what gasoline costs today post-9/11?
Mr. Boardman. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The people who are driving cars, the people
who are flying are all paying increased costs. Why is it that
railroad passengers are such preferred characters that they
can't pay a portion of these costs? Everyone seems to be
turning to the Federal Government for the total support of the
security system for rail.
Mr. Boardman. I understand sir.
The Chairman. Why?
Mr. Boardman. I think that all transit systems today
receive Federal assistance and they do that because they lose
money.
The Chairman. Well, almost every airline in the country is
in bankruptcy now and has been since 9/11 because of the
increased costs put on airlines themselves in addition to the
increased cost to the passengers. But, we haven't seen any
increased burden put on the passengers for rail transportation.
Ms. Berrick, have you looked at that?
Ms. Berrick. Well, we did look at who pays for rail
security and found that it is really shared between the Federal
Government, State and locals who own a lot of the transit and
then also the private sector. The American public----
The Chairman. Wait, back up. The allocation to them is
still based upon pre-9/11 fares, isn't it? Have you seen any
increase in the cost of rail transportation?
Ms. Berrick. We didn't look at the actual fares and the
increases over time.
The Chairman. Why not?
Ms. Berrick. The objective of our study was to see what was
being done first of all within the U.S. to secure passenger
rail and whether or not there were any practices in foreign
countries that we could apply here to secure the rail system.
We also looked in a general sense of what's been spent on rail
security on the Federal level, not a whole lot of money last
year, about $150 million in grants. The American Public
Transportation Association estimated that since 9/11 the
private sector, the private rail operators, spent about $1.7
billion on security. So I think the rail operators themselves
through fees are devoting a lot to security.
The Chairman. It seems like just a simple matter of
economics to me that with the increase in price of gasoline
people who would otherwise drive from here to New York are
going to go by train. Right? There's not been any increase in
cost to go by train. So you have to plan for increased burdens
on the rail transportation system because the increased cost of
alternative means of transportation, both air and auto or bus
has increased substantially. Rail has not. And yet we are
hearing we have to have more money to protect those people who
are riding the rails.
Ms. Berrick. I think what the highest priority should be,
in my opinion, for the Department is to complete their risk
assessment efforts. It's right, TSA has started these efforts.
They haven't yet completed them. The Department level, they
also have risk assessments. They need to be coordinated to
determine, first of all, what's the requirement----
The Chairman. I would accept your concept of risk
assessment. I think we all do. That should be the number one
priority. But, the question of who's going to pay for the
changes that are necessary ought to be primary too, shouldn't
it?
Ms. Berrick. I think it should and I think the first step
is the risk assessment to determine how much do we actually
need and where we need to focus our money.
The Chairman. Well, meanwhile you are just attracting more
and more people to the rail transportation system, aren't you?
If airline costs are going up and transportation by bus or by
automobile is going up, isn't it natural that people are going
to go where prices are not going up?
Ms. Berrick. That's possible and we did not study the
pricing.
The Chairman. Would you study that just to see if I'm
right?
Ms. Berrick. OK, we'll look at that and get back with you.
Thank you.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, could I just make one
addition?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Mr. Hawley, I understand you have a very
tough job and I don't mean to be too hard on you but we really
need to have a sense of your priorities. If that has to be done
in a classified fashion so that the Members of this Committee
can know what you want, I'd be glad to understand that aspect
of national security, but I think it would help us, because we
are going to engage in some prioritization ourselves, and I
think it is important for us that you provide that information.
Mr. Hawley. Yes sir.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I join in that request. I'd also like to know
if you can tell us, I admire the way New York City handled the
crisis after the London catastrophe in rails but they really
started a system of really improving inspection, for anyone who
went onboard those subways or their trains. But, I also
understand that there is an increased allocation to pay for
that service and I wonder why? I come from a state where 90
percent of travel is by plane and our people are paying--
although we are a very small state, our people are paying a
substantial increase in costs every month it seems.
The people that are using these massive transportation
systems down here, they are not paying any increased costs for
security at all and I think that's not only unfair but it's not
wise. That means that unless, as Senator McCain says, we
outline some more money to allocate to these systems, they are
not going to get the securities required to maintain the
securities necessary for that mode of transportation. Senator
Boxer?
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you. I am so sorry that I was late, I
was at a meeting about Hurricane Katrina aftermath relief, I am
really sorry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding
this hearing.
A new GAO report, which Senator Snowe and I requested,
shows that the Transportation Security Administration has not
adequately secured America's passenger railways and it's not
for lack of warning. We've seen what's happened in Madrid, we
saw what happened in London, we know because we've had access
to documents that show that the trains are definitely on the
al-Qaeda lists. So, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, we've ignored
warning after warning and I say ``we'', I don't really mean
this Committee, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to show you a chart that
I made up here if I could.
Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to share with you a chart
because I think that this Committee under Senator McCain's
leadership before has acted on this issue a couple of times and
I just wanted to note it. In 2001, the Commerce Committee
approved the Rail Security Act of 2001. No action was taken by
the full Senate, and then in 2004 the Commerce Committee
approved the Rail Security Act of 2004. The full Senate
approved that Rail Security Act but then the House didn't act.
So, I think this Committee has tried very hard to do something
but we haven't had the entire Congress going.
So, I think what we need to do is get on with it. I want to
talk about my state which has the second-highest Amtrak
ridership in the country and I see Senator Lautenberg here, but
people don't recognize that California has a very large Amtrak
ridership. Almost nine million passenger trips began or ended
in California during 2004. Amtrak operates an average of 70
intercity and 200 commuter trains per day in California. So,
when people think Amtrak, they think East Coast, they've got to
say West Coast because we are the second largest ridership.
In addition, the freight rail system is extremely important
for goods movement throughout the country. California ports
receive over 40 percent of all the goods that are shipped into
the U.S.; the ports of L.A. and Long Beach comprise the largest
port complex in the U.S. and they are crucial for our Nation's
economy.
Now, here's what happens, Mr. Chairman. The goods arrive
and then they are taken by train throughout the country, and
once these trains emerge through the Alameda Corridor, which is
in the Los Angeles area, they often cross a road where there is
no grade separation. So, grade separation is another critical
issue because if there were to be a terrorist attack and those
grades are blocked, we cannot get the emergency vehicles
through.
So, Mr. Chairman, I once again thank you for having this
hearing. I understand it was pretty contentious before I got
here but I just want to say we expect more from this
Administration; we have to. It's not that we are being
argumentative. It's that we've been warned. How many times do
we have to be warned? We've seen al-Qaeda documents, we saw
what happened in Madrid, we saw what happened in London, we saw
what happened recently and rumors spread in New York and
there's lots more we can do. We can't 100 percent protect
anything, any asset. But we can surely do better. GAO makes
that point and I'm just hopeful that you will read that report
and you will move to finally secure our Nation's rail system
because we've been warned and how many times could we get away
with this? Not too many more times. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, may I?
The Chairman. Senator Boxer, are you finished?
Senator Boxer. I'm finished with my statement.
The Chairman. Thanks. Senator Lautenberg?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks
to you and Senator McCain, we're moving legislation, trying
arduously to move legislation. We look back and I don't want to
be repetitive if things have been said before that have taken
care of some of the issues. But when we look forward at the
vulnerability that we have as a result of possible hazardous
cargo being transported or materials being carried and not
really facing up to the reality of what we've got to do to
protect ourselves. Particularly obvious is the railroad track
that sits right here at the Capitol. We in New Jersey are so
dependent on transit and passenger rail service and I'm just
wondering why it is that when we've seen these incidents pass
before in London, Madrid? Why is it that we are still waiting
here for a plan by our government to do something about it, to
make the investment that is necessary?
What we saw in Graniteville, South Carolina, hazmat
releases can have the same effect as a weapon of mass
destruction. Now what's TSA doing to track the thousands of
hazmat rail cars each day? Secretary Hawley, does the
Administration believe that active monitoring of the movement
of these cars in necessary?
Mr. Hawley. Yes sir, and that is done in the current setup
by the companies themselves and in the circumstance where we
would require access to the specific location of individual
trains or cars or shipments, that is something we can get from
them.
Senator Lautenberg. How do we monitor the quality of their
security? Years ago the screening at aviation destinations was
done by airlines and we found that they were quite inadequate.
So, the government stepped in and said, ``OK, private sectors
had its end, they haven't done a good job. We are going to come
in here and we're going to do it.'' What's the difference, Mr.
Hawley, between that situation and the current need?
Mr. Hawley. In regards to freight rail? As regard to
freight rail, the consequences of a safety problem or a
terrorist act against--involving hazardous material can be the
financial death penalty for a freight railroad and so they are
highly motivated for a lot of reasons to do what is necessary
to prevent that happening and what we do to monitor that, we do
the trust/verify approach to have security reviews to
understand what it is they do and then verify in fact, that
they are doing it.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, if we looked at Texarkana, the
train derailment there is an example, it's quite recent, about
a week ago. Hundreds of homes were evacuated after seven empty
train cars and a tanker containing propylene, derailed in a
switch yard, exploding in a ball of fire. Initially, the police
thought that the chemical involved was vinyl acetate which
releases poisonous fumes and officers went door to door urging
thousands of people in a two by five mile area to move to the
north side of town and I think it once again, does say we've
got to make certain if we are going to rely entirely on the
private sector that things are done in a fashion that protects
the people in the areas.
So, I think that is something that has to be looked at and
I would appreciate getting some data about what it is precisely
that the government does to check to see if these things are
done.
Mr. Chairman, I'm anxious to hear the next panel and I'm
finished with mine.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Boxer, you have an
additional question?
Senator Boxer. I just have one question to ask to Mr.
Hawley and Mr. Boardman, whoever feels comfortable doing it.
One of the ways that I am told back home we can really help the
situation is to have enough canine patrols because they're
pretty effective. What do you think the needs are in terms of
dollars to provide for canine patrols?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, ma'am, I believe that the canine patrol is
an excellent flexible and adaptive security measure that can be
used in a transit environment, aviation environment, and we
recently did a test with the inter-city bus environment. So,
that is an important aspect of our program. We've recently
increased from the 340 range up to--we're now going to be close
to about 450 dog teams and we, in addition----
Senator Boxer. How many dogs in a team?
Mr. Hawley. Three.
Senator Boxer. And we have 450 operational now, teams?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, 420 now. We have added through a program
that people are in training now, 30 additional dogs or 10 teams
for specifically transit including four in California.
Senator Boxer. Are these all for Amtrak?
Mr. Hawley. These are for transit agencies and for Amtrak,
we are working with Amtrak to make it operationally smooth for
us to deploy dog teams from either other locations or from
airports, other cities.
Senator Boxer. Do you know what Amtrak says it needs for
dog teams?
Mr. Hawley. I don't know the dollar number, no.
Senator Boxer. OK, well they need $156 million additional
to secure their largest stations, so I would appreciate if you
would talk with them so that you know what it is that they need
because they are telling us. They should be telling you or you
should be asking them.
Mr. Hawley. We do have conversations about it at all
levels.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just think--I just
say that Amtrak is saying and they will tell us, they need $156
million in additional funds to secure the largest stations with
canine teams and I'm just saying $156 million, given the
tragedies that could befall us, it's a small investment. Every
time a car comes in here, Senators or otherwise, they bring out
a canine team and it seems that the officers feel very
confident and comfortable with that and it seems with all the
high tech equipment we have, as you say Mr. Hawley, using
canine teams works for a relatively small amount of money. So,
I'm done with my questions but I hope that you'll get with the
Amtrak people.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, my colleague elicits a
question for me, if you don't mind, about the same subject. Mr.
Hawley, the Secretary of Transportation or his designee sits on
the Amtrak Board. In April, the Board approved Amtrak's funding
request for its security and needs up to $254 million a year.
If this funding was needed to help secure Amtrak and the 25
million people who ride it annually, why didn't the President
ask for that in the budget?
Mr. Hawley. TSA, I'll speak for TSA, has the multi-modal
responsibility and as such, we view--I view and our team views
that Amtrak is very much within the zone that we worry about
and without regard to whether we have specific Amtrak programs
that we use programs we have for other modes including Federal
Air Marshals to be available for opportunities that may be
required for Amtrak. As well, as we mentioned the canine teams
and even more broadly than that is the whole area of
information sharing and intelligence sharing that I think, as
far as TSA is concerned, Amtrak is very, very high on the
priority list on an operational level and we work on that on a
very intensive basis.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator, we are going to have to
move on.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, OK.
The Chairman. I wish you the best, I would ask that you
provide us with a list of the cost of passengers on the major
rail systems which you are talking about, what Amtrak and other
passenger systems throughout the country on a basis of--let's
go back about 4 years and bring it forward. To what extent have
any of those people been asked to pay any portion of increased
cost to safety and security. Thank you all very much but we
will have to turn to the next witness list.
Ms. Berrick. Thank you.
Mr. Hawley. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT/CEO, ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN RAILROADS
Mr. Hamberger. I appreciate the opportunity to be here to
discuss freight railroad security with the Committee. The
safety and security of hazardous materials transportation, of
course, is of the utmost concern to the Nation's industry and
perhaps to this Committee as well so, let me move right into
that issue.
As common carriers, let me emphasize that railroads are
required by Federal law to move hazardous material and we move
it in the safest, most efficient way possible. In fact, we have
a very good safety record notwithstanding the fact that
accidents do occur. In 2003, we moved 1.7 million carloads of
hazardous materials--99.998 percent of those shipments arrived
at destination without any release from an accident along the
way.
Railroads are sensitive to the concerns of those who live
along rail lines and we take very seriously our obligation to
move hazardous materials safely and securely. We assist
communities in developing and evaluating emergency response
plans and help train more than 20,000 emergency responders each
year. We provide local emergency responders with a list of the
most dangerous chemicals likely to be moved through their
communities and work with the chemical manufacturers, shippers
and tank car suppliers to improve operating procedures and tank
car safety.
As you are aware, Washington D.C. has enacted legislation
to ban hazmat shipments over certain routes. Other cities,
Baltimore and others, are considering such bans. Legislation
has been proposed in Congress to force rerouting of hazardous
materials. We believe that is the wrong approach to take. Local
transit bans would not eliminate the risk inherent in moving
hazmat, instead they would shift the risk from one jurisdiction
to another. Rerouting can actually reduce safety because it
involves increased mileage, additional yard handling and dwell
time, and may involve use of lines that for a variety of
reasons, are less suited to hazardous materials movement.
Banning certain hazmat movements by rail over specified routes
would put the government in a position of assigning the risk of
hazmat-related incidents and then shifting hazardous material
transport from one location to another.
An alternative approach which railroads support, is to
increase efforts aimed at finding and utilizing safer
substitutes for the most toxic hazardous materials. These
constitute a fraction of the hazardous materials moved by rail
but, are responsible for approximately half of the overall cost
of railroad insurance rates. The railroad industry is acutely
aware of the magnitude of this challenge and that is why we
reacted swiftly to the events of September 11th, hiring outside
experts to work with us to develop a comprehensive security
plan.
The plan includes an inventory of critical assets and has
as its foundation a risk-based analysis of potential
vulnerabilities. It includes a variety of countermeasures that
are keyed to specific threat levels. The security processes and
analysis detailed in the plan are periodically evaluated for
effectiveness and modified as appropriate.
Because the U.S. rail network is vast, more that 140,000
route miles and open, our plan relies very heavily on access to
intelligence information and we are in constant communication
with intelligence and security personnel. I've testified here
in the past about our plan so, I will not repeat anything
further here. Let me just move quickly to what we believe
should be included in any new rail security legislation.
We believe it is appropriate for the AAR Security Plan to
serve as the basis for a government rail security plan because
we have already identified the most important rail assets and
the biggest threats to those assets. Any new legislation should
also include adequate funding to implement anti-terrorism
programs including funds to safeguard tunnels used by Amtrak
and commuter railroads in the Northeast. We believe that funds
should be appropriated to research and deploy rail security
technologies including automated security inspections,
infrastructure integrity monitoring, communication-based
training control systems and reductions in tank car
vulnerability.
Railroad police officers should be authorized to exercise
law enforcement powers on any railroad, not just their own. To
date, railroads have underwritten the cost of security measures
to benefit the general public and national defense. But,
protective measures required at the highest alert levels cannot
be sustained by railroads alone. The industry security plan
calls for use of the National Guard and local police to augment
protection of critical infrastructure. States should be
reimbursed by the Federal Government in those instances.
Congress should also extend the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act to
provide stability and certainty. Freight railroads are proud of
the efforts we have taken to keep our Nation's vital rail
transportation link open and secure since the terrorist attacks
of September 11. We will continue to work with this Committee,
others in Congress, the various Federal agencies and relevant
parties to further enhance the safety and security of the
Nation's railroads.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President/CEO, Association
of American Railroads
On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss
railroad security. AAR members account for the vast majority of rail
mileage, employees, and revenue in Canada, Mexico, and the United
States.
Our Nation's freight railroad industry, which has developed a
comprehensive approach to protecting our rail network against terrorist
threats, is keenly aware of the tension between the need for
transportation efficiency and the assurance that our transportation
systems are adequately protected from terrorist and other threats. We
urge Congress to strike a proper balance between protecting our
country's transportation assets and its citizens, and providing for the
free flow of goods and promoting our international competitiveness. As
Secretary Mineta has remarked, ``What we don't want is for our
checkpoints to become chokepoints.
Below I will discuss the many ways that U.S. freight railroads have
addressed security in the post 9/11 era and how security efforts can be
improved. I will also discuss pending proposals regarding railroad
security from the perspective of freight railroads.
The Immediate Aftermath of September 11
The rail industry reacted swiftly to the events of September 11,
2001. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, railroads tightened
security and intensified inspections across their systems. Major
railroads--which maintain their own police forces to help ensure the
security of employees, property, and freight--put into place more than
50 permanent security-related countermeasures.
In late September 2001, the AAR Board of Directors established a
Railroad Security Task Force. The task force had the full participation
of AAR members, including our Canadian and Mexican members and the
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association. The overarching
goals of this task force were (1) to ensure the safety of rail
employees and the communities in which railroads operate; (2) to
protect the viability of national and regional economic activity; and
(3) to make certain that railroads can continue to play their vital
role in support of our Nation's military.
Over the next several months, the task force conducted a
comprehensive risk analysis of the freight railroad industry. Using CIA
and national intelligence community ``best practices,'' five critical
action teams (consisting of more than 150 experienced railroad,
customer, and intelligence personnel) examined and prioritized railroad
assets, vulnerabilities, and threats. The critical action teams were:
1. Information Technology and Communications: This team
examined the security of railroad communications, control
systems, and information systems, including an evaluation of
procedures regarding system redundancy, data confidentiality,
emergency incident handling, and reconstitution of service.
2. Physical Infrastructure: This team assessed the physical
security of essential bridges, buildings, dispatch centers,
tunnels, storage facilities, and other structures, and created
a database of critical assets. The team also addressed cross-
border and port ``gateway'' physical security issues.
3. Operational Security: This team documented the ``life cycle
of a train and determined ways to minimize exposure to
unplanned occurrences while trains are in operation. It also
addressed fuel supply.
4. Hazardous Materials: This team examined the transport of
hazardous materials by rail, with emphasis on materials that
pose the greatest potential safety risk, such as poisonous
gases.
5. Military Liaison: This team worked with the Department of
Defense and its Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to
determine immediate and ongoing military traffic needs. The
MTMC, which has since been renamed the ``Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command, has designated 30,000 miles of rail
corridors known as the Strategic Rail Corridor Network
(STRACNET)--as essential to national defense.
In addition to the above activities, freight railroads cooperated
fully with a separate team that covered passenger railroad security and
involved the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), commuter railroads,
and Amtrak.
The Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan
The end result of the work of the critical action teams was the
development of a Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan (
``Plan'' ), a comprehensive, priority-based blueprint of actions
designed to enhance the security of our Nation's freight rail network
and its ability to support our economy, national defense, and public
health.
The AAR Board of Directors adopted the Plan on December 6, 2001,
and it remains in effect today. The security processes and analyses
detailed in the Plan, including actions and countermeasures, are
periodically evaluated for effectiveness and modified as appropriate--
to ensure maximum efficiencies from advances in security technology and
procedures.
The Plan defines four security alert levels and details the actions
to be taken at each level as the terrorist threat increases.
Alert Level 1 is ``New Normal Day-to-Day Operations'' and exists
when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but
warrants only a routine security posture. Actions in effect at this
level include conducting security training and awareness activities;
restricting certain information to a need-to-know basis; restricting
the ability of unauthenticated persons to trace certain sensitive
materials; and periodically testing that security systems are operating
as intended.
Alert Level 2 is ``Heightened Security Awareness.'' It applies when
there is a general non-specific threat of possible terrorist activity
involving railroad personnel and facilities. Additional actions in
effect at this level include security and awareness briefings as part
of daily job briefings; conducting content inspections of cars and
containers for cause; conducting spot content inspections of motor
vehicles on railroad property; and increasing security at designated
facilities.
Alert Level 3 means there is ``a credible threat of an attack on
the United States or railroad industry.'' A decision to declare Level 3
will be evaluated in light of the specificity of threat against
railroad personnel and facilities. Examples of Level 3 actions include
further restricting physical access and increasing security vigilance
at control centers, communications hubs, and other designated
facilities, and requesting National Guard security for critical assets.
Alert Level 4 applies when a confirmed threat against the rail
industry exists, an attack against a railroad has occurred, an attack
in the United States causing mass casualties has occurred, or other
imminent actions create grave concerns about the safety of rail
operations. Security actions taken at this level include stopping non-
mission-essential contract services with access to critical facilities
and systems; increasing vigilance and scrutiny of railcars and
equipment during mechanical inspections to look for unusual items; and
continuous guard presence at designated facilities and structures.
Alert Levels 3 and 4 can be declared industry-wide for a short
period of time or can be declared in a particular geographic or
operational area (e.g., the Midwest or hazardous materials) where or
when intelligence has identified that terrorist action against a
specific location or operation is imminent.
The Railway Alert Network and ST-ISAC
To help ensure that the parties involved have access to pertinent
intelligence and other information, the rail industry is in constant
communication with intelligence and security personnel at the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and elsewhere in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense, the
Department of Transportation (DOT), the FBI's National Joint Terrorism
Task Force (NJTTF), state and local law enforcement, and others. A
railroad police officer and knowledgeable railroad analysts work
literally side-by-side with government intelligence analysts at NJTTF
and within DHS to help evaluate intelligence at the Top Secret level.
The heart of this communication system is the Railway Alert Network
(RAN). The major purpose of the RAN is to monitor the level of threat
to the rail industry and to alert the industry if it changes. The hub
of the RAN is AAR's Operations Center, which operates at the Secret
level and is staffed with mobile communications around the clock at
Alert Level 2 and is physically staffed at Alert Levels 3 and 4.
The RAN is linked to the Surface Transportation Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC). The ST-ISAC, which was created by the
AAR at the request of the U.S. DOT, provides a robust capability for
collecting, analyzing, and distributing security information from
worldwide resources to protect vital physical assets and information
technology systems. AAR-member freight railroads and Amtrak are members
of the ST-ISAC. Cleared at the Top Secret level, the ST-ISAC also
operates 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week.
In addition, approximately 75 transit and commuter rail authorities
(through APTA, the American Public Transit Association) have been
members of the ST-ISAC. However, Federal funding for ST-ISAC membership
for public transit agencies was discontinued by DHS. APTA recently
asked TSA to consider restoring those funds. AAR supports APTA's
request and, at the same time, asks that TSA also consider providing
funds necessary to expand the reach of the ST-ISAC to all freight and
commuter railroads that are not members of AAR.
As all of these efforts make clear, the rail industry strongly
concurs with the July 2004 Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States which called for ``a different
way of organizing government'' that emphasizes a unity of effort as
reflected in the phrase ``one fight, one team.'' The Commission called
for ``unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and
their knowledge in a network-based information sharing system that
transcends traditional government boundaries.'' Toward this end, we are
working cooperatively with TSA leadership on operational and policy
issues that will further enhance rail security.
Obviously, rail security efforts depend a great deal on the efforts
of railroads' dedicated and highly professional employees--including
engineers and conductors aboard trains, maintenance of way crews and
inspectors working along the tracks, railroad police officers, and
others. They are the ``eyes and ears'' in the industry's security
effort, and we should all be grateful for their vigilance and care.
In recognition of the thoroughness of the railroad security plan
and the dedication with which it has been put into effect, in June 2003
the Association of American Railroads was named a recipient of the U.S.
Department of Defense's James S. Cogswell Award for Industrial
Security. The Cogswell Award is the most prestigious award in the
industrial security field. Of nearly 11,000 cleared contractors, only
15 were selected to receive the award in 2003. The railroad industry is
also one of the few private sector industries to receive an ``A'' for
its security efforts in an independent analysis by The Washington Post.
Notwithstanding all of these rail industry efforts, there can be no
100 percent guarantee against terrorist assaults. If such an assault
involving freight railroads occurs, railroads have established programs
and procedures that can and will be invoked that are designed to
respond to, mitigate, and minimize the impact of such incidents. The
programs and procedures include the establishment of emergency response
plans for hazardous materials incidents, business continuity plans, and
the training of rail employees and public emergency response personnel.
As previously mentioned, the freight rail industry works
cooperatively with the Federal Government in efforts to enhance
security. However, there are some areas where better coordination is
needed. These improvements should focus on unifying government policy
regarding freight rail security and more effectively coordinating the
many governmental projects that affect rail security. In addition, the
current system of dissemination of counter-terrorism information could
be improved. The railroads' security plan is risk-based--the industry
cannot protect everything all the time. Therefore, the government must
provide timely and actionable threat information to enable efficient
and effective deployment of limited resources.
Hazardous Materials Movements by Rail
Approximately 1.7 million carloads of hazardous materials (hazmat)
are transported by rail throughout the United States each year--meaning
that thousands of hazmat carloads are in transit by rail every day--and
99.998 percent of these shipments reach their destination without a
release caused by an accident. Moreover, railroads have reduced overall
hazmat accident rates by 90 percent since 1980 and by 49 percent since
1990.
In 2003 (the most recent year available), hazardous materials of
all types accounted for 4.9 percent of total U.S. freight rail
carloads, 5.4 percent of tonnage, and 6.3 percent of ton-miles. Tank
cars transport approximately 68 percent of rail hazmat, 28 percent
travel on intermodal flat cars, and the remainder moves in covered
hoppers, gondolas, and other car types. The most potentially hazardous
materials, termed toxic inhalation hazards (TIH), are a subset of these
and nearly all are transported in tank cars.
No one disputes that efforts should be made to increase hazmat
safety and security where practical. Railroads understand this better
than anyone: because of their common carrier obligation, railroads are
required by law to transport these shipments, even though this
transportation involves extraordinary risks for the industry. This is
one reason why railroads support the extension of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act (TRIA) before it expires at the end of 2005. Even with
TRIA, insurance has become more expensive and difficult for railroads
to obtain, and it is not possible to fully insure against a truly
catastrophic incident. Even though TIH accounts for a fraction of rail
carloads, it contributes approximately 50 percent to the overall cost
of railroad insurance rates. Insurance rates for AAR members have
doubled this year alone. For these reasons, the transport of certain
hazardous materials has the potential to be a ``bet the business''
activity for railroads. This leads to our recommendation that Congress
should consider limiting railroads' liability for carrying out this
public service, perhaps modeled after the Price-Anderson Act.
Freight railroads are constantly working to ensure the continued
safety of hazmat transport.
The industry operates under its comprehensive Terrorism Risk
Analysis and Security Management Plan, as described earlier.
Railroads assist communities in developing and evaluating
emergency response plans; through their own efforts and the
Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response
Program (TRANSCAER) provide training for more than 20,000
emergency responders per year; and support Operation Respond, a
nonprofit institute that develops technological tools and
training for emergency response professionals.
Trains containing specific amounts of the most hazardous
materials are subject to special speed limits, passing
restrictions, and inspections. Railroads increase track
inspections, training, and installations of wheel defect
detectors on routes over which these trains operate.
Railroads work closely with chemical manufacturers in the
Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (Chemtrec), a 24/7
resource that coordinates and communicates a broad range of
critical information that may be needed by emergency responders
in mitigating a hazardous material related incident.
Upon request, railroads provide local emergency response
agencies with, at a minimum, a list of the top 25 hazardous
materials transported through their communities. The list
assists local emergency responders in prioritizing their
emergency response plans to what is most likely to be
transported through their areas.
Railroads participate in a variety of R&D efforts to enhance
tank car and hazmat safety. For example, railroads, tank car
builders, and car owners jointly fund the Tank Car Safety
Research and Test Project (Project), which carefully analyzes
accidents involving tank cars and continually updates a
comprehensive database on the precise nature of damage to tank
cars. Analysis of these data improves safety by improving
researchers' ability to identify the causes of tank car
releases and help prevent future occurrences. The database is
often cited by the DOT as a role model for other modes of
transportation.
In addition to data gathering and analysis, the Project is
engaged in numerous ongoing research efforts, including
developing better steels for tank cars; measuring the railroad
operating environment to refine tank car design requirements;
investigating the forces generated in accidents to better
understand ways to further improve tank car damage resistance;
determining the effects of thermal protection degradation of
rail tank cars in service; and providing validation and input
data for a model used to evaluate the effects of fire on tank
cars.
Beyond the Project, the rail industry and rail suppliers are
constantly investigating other ways to enhance tank car safety.
For example, the AAR's Tank Car Committee (a group of technical
representatives from railroads, shippers, and tank car
builders/lessors that works closely with the FRA to, among
other things, establish detailed tank car design standards and
review individual tank car design drawings) recently supported
a proposed new design for a chlorine tank car that would reduce
the risk of a rupture while also reducing the number of
shipments. Railroads are also working to determine what
standards should apply to the next generation of tank cars that
handle TIH.
Freight railroads support the tank car vulnerability studies
contained in the recently-passed SAFETEA-LU legislation and the
requirement that the FRA initiate a rulemaking on tank car
design, and we urge the FRA to meet the deadlines for these
important projects.
Railroads are working with TSA and independently to identify
opportunities to reduce exposure to terrorism in high threat
rail corridors and terminals.
Railroads comply with DOT rule HM-232.
Despite rail efforts to ensure the safety of hazmat transport, a
number of local and Federal proposals have been offered that would
restrict rail movements of hazardous materials in one way or another.
One such proposal would give state or local authorities the ability to
ban the movement of hazmat through their jurisdictions. Another
proposal would order railroads to provide local authorities advance
notification of hazmat movements through their jurisdictions. Still
another proposal mandates that hazmat routing decisions must be made by
the Federal Government, rather than by railroads themselves.
The stated rationale for these types of proposals is often
``protection'' against terrorist attack (especially in perceived ``high
threat'' areas) or a desire to be able to react more quickly to hazmat-
related incidents, should they occur. The proposals may be well
intended, but the end result of their enactment would likely be an
increase in exposure to hazmat release and reduced safety and security.
Banning Hazmat Movements by Rail
Banning hazmat movements in particular jurisdictions would not
eliminate risks, but instead would simply shift them from one place to
another. In shifting that risk, it could foreclose transportation
routes that are optimal in terms of overall safety, security, and
efficiency. For example, the rail network is not similar to the highway
network where there are myriad alternate routes. In the rail industry,
rerouting could add hundreds of miles and several days to a hazmat
shipment, and those additional miles and days could be on rail
infrastructure that is less suitable (for a variety of reasons) to
handling hazmat. (In fact, CSX has determined that rerouting hazmat
traffic away from Washington, D.C., as proposed by the D.C. City
Council, would result in some 2 million additional car-miles per year
the hazmat would have to travel.) Emergency responders along alternate
routes may lack requisite expertise in handling the most dangerous
commodities. Additional switching and handling of cars carrying hazmat
could be needed, as could additional dwell time in yards. As the
Department of Justice and the DHS noted in a joint brief opposing the
D.C. hazmat ban, the increase in the total miles over which hazmat
travels and the increase in total time the materials are in transit
would ``increase their exposure to possible terrorist action,'' and
therefore potentially reduce safety and security. The U.S. DOT also
submitted a statement recognizing that banning hazmat shipments through
certain areas reduces both safety and security. Moreover, the costs to
manufacturers and consumers of products that incorporate hazardous
materials in their production would rise commensurate with the
additional costs to transport these commodities.
If hazmat transport were restricted in one jurisdiction (either by
Federal or local action), other jurisdictions would undoubtedly want to
follow suit. In fact, that is already happening. In the wake of action
(so far unsuccessful) by the D.C. City Council to ban hazmat movements
through Washington, similar efforts are being discussed in Atlanta,
Baltimore, Boston, Cleveland, Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and
probably other cities too, as well as the entire State of California.
Banning hazmat shipments in even one city would be problematic; banning
them in cities throughout the country would cause immense confusion and
economic disruption nationwide--and would virtually shut down hazmat
shipments by rail in this country.
Moreover, banning hazmat movements by rail would likely lead to
many more movements by truck, but there is a much greater chance of
release due to an accident when hazmat is carried by truck than when it
is carried by rail. Railroads and trucks generate roughly equal hazmat
ton-mileage, but trucks have 16 times more hazmat releases than
railroads.
An integrated, effective national rail network requires uniform
standards that apply nationwide. This uniformity, and the clarity and
efficiency it brings, would be lost if different localities and routes
were subject to widely different rules and standards or if local and/or
state governments could dictate what types of freight could pass
through their jurisdictions. The problem is especially acute for
railroads, whose network characteristics and limited routing options
mean that disruptions in one area can have profound impacts hundreds or
even thousands of miles away. These disruptions negatively affect all
rail traffic, not just hazmat traffic.
Banning certain hazmat movements by rail over specified routes
would put the government in the position of assigning the risk of
hazmat-related incidents, and then shifting hazmat transport from
locations with higher assigned risk to locations with lower assigned
risks. An alternative approach, which railroads support, is to increase
efforts aimed at finding and utilizing safer substitutes for TIH
hazardous shipments.
Hazmat Prenotification
Hazmat pre-notification to local authorities is problematic for
several reasons and may not accomplish the goals of those seeking it.
First, the rail industry already notifies communities, upon
request, of the top 25 hazardous commodities likely to be transported
through their area.
Second, at any one time, thousands of carloads of hazardous
materials are moving by rail throughout the country, constantly leaving
one jurisdiction and entering another. The vast majority of these
carloads do not--and due to the nature of rail operations, cannot be
made to--follow a rigid, predetermined schedule. The sheer quantity and
transitory nature of these movements would make a workable pre-
notification system extremely difficult and costly to implement, for
railroads and local officials alike. That's why the Fire Chief of
Rialto, California, commented, ``You'd have to have an army of people
to stay current on what's coming through. I think it wouldn't be almost
overwhelming. It would be overwhelming.'' The greater the number of
persons to be notified, the greater the difficulty and cost would be.
Third, by definition, prenotification would vastly increase the
accessibility of hazmat location information. Making this information
far more accessible than it currently is could actually increase
vulnerability to terrorist attack, not decrease it, because it would
magnify the possibility that the information could fall into the wrong
hands.
Fourth, railroads provide comprehensive training for hazmat
emergency responders in many of the communities they serve, and they
already have well-established, effective procedures in place to assist
local authorities in the event of hazmat incidents. In fact, through
the Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response Program,
railroads help train more than 20,000 local emergency responders per
year.
Finally, since railroads already make communities aware of what
types of hazardous materials are likely to be transported through their
area and since they already provide 24/7 assistance for emergency
responders (many of whom railroads have trained), it is not at all
clear that information obtained by local authorities through a
prenotification system would actually improve their ability to respond
to hazmat incidents in any meaningful way.
Railroad Security Legislation
A number of proposals have been offered in the Senate and House of
Representatives regarding railroad security. Freight railroads are
always ready and willing to discuss how security can be enhanced more
effectively. To that end, we support the following provisions of rail
security legislation:
A comprehensive security plan should be developed that
includes the identification of the most important rail assets
and the identification of the biggest threats to those assets.
In developing this plan, the government should use the AAR's
Security Plan as the basis. Certain provisions of S. 1052, the
``Transportation Security Improvement Act of 2005'' and S.
1379, the ``Rail Security Act of 2005,'' are consistent with
this approach.
Adequate funding to implement antiterrorism programs for
passenger and freight railroads should be appropriated,
including funding to safeguard tunnels used by Amtrak and
commuter railroads in the Northeast. S. 1052 and S. 1379 each
authorize more than $1 billion for grants for these purposes.
Freight railroads should be able to apply for the grants
directly rather than have to go through the states.
Funds should also be granted to research and deploy rail
security technologies, including automated security
inspections, infrastructure integrity monitoring systems,
emergency bridge repair and replacement, communication-based
train control systems, and tank car vulnerability reductions.
S. 1052 and S. 1379 authorize funds for these purposes.
Railroad police officers should be authorized to exercise
law enforcement powers on any railroad. This provision is in S.
1052 and S. 1379.
Railroads respectfully suggest that additional provisions would
enhance rail security legislation:
To date, railroads have been underwriting the cost of
security measures for the benefit of the general public and for
national defense. However, protective measures required at the
highest alert levels cannot be sustained by the rail industry
alone. This is reflected in the railroads' Terrorism Risk
Analysis and Security Management Plan, which, at the highest
alert levels, calls for the use of National Guard and local law
enforcement support to augment industry protection of critical
infrastructure. States should be reimbursed by the Federal
Government for expenses associated with helping to guard
critical rail assets at high levels of alert.
The TSA and the FRA should clarify which agency has ultimate
responsibility for which aspects of rail safety and security.
Today, the allocation of responsibility is not always clear.
A Federal grant program should be established to reimburse
railroads for expenses mandated by the TSA or by other
government entities, including mandates that result from high-
risk corridor assessments.
As noted previously, Congress should extend TRIA before it
expires at the end of 2005. The need for a Federal backstop
that provides stability and certainty remains.
Congress should endorse the rail and chemical industries'
request for a narrowly-tailored relaxation of antitrust
prohibitions that would allow chemical companies and railroads
to work together to reduce the public's exposure to IH
shipments.
Finally, railroads believe that certain provisions of rail security
legislation, including the following, are not necessary or appropriate.
Banning hazmat transport by rail through certain
jurisdictions or requiring prenotification (as called for, for
example, by S. 1256, the ``Hazardous Materials Vulnerability
Reduction Act of 2005'' ) should be opposed. Earlier in this
testimony I explained why railroads oppose this legislation.
On a somewhat related note, S. 1052 calls for DHS to approve
railroads' ``high hazard security threat mitigation'' plans,
``including alternative routing and temporary shipment
suspension options.'' Routing of hazmat by railroad dispatchers
is based on dynamic factors such as the condition of track,
weather, and traffic congestion so as to ensure the selection
of the safest possible route at any given moment. As the rail
industry's response to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita
makes clear, the industry is capable of quickly detouring
traffic as conditions warrant. The Federal Government is ill-
suited to perform this task, so the requirement for DHS
approval of these plans should be dropped.
Mandating that freight railroads submit employee security
plans to DHS or DOT for approval, as called for in S. 1052 and
S. 1379, is unnecessary.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, freight
railroads have provided ongoing general security awareness
training to all employees, and some railroads have gone so far
as to include security training as part of the annual FRA-
mandated employee certification process. In an effort to
further increase the level of security awareness for their
employees, AAR member railroads are working with the National
Transit Institute (NTI) at Rutgers University to develop a
uniform security awareness curriculum that will significantly
enhance the level of employee security training. The curriculum
is modeled after the program NTI and the Federal Transit
Administration developed for public transit agency employees.
The goal of the training is to provide rail employees with an
understanding of their role and responsibility in system
security, and how to implement their companies' procedures upon
detection of suspicious objects or activities. Course modules
include instructions on reacting to threats, identifying
suspicious activity, identifying suspicious objects, and
responding to incidents.
Mandates regarding the use of wireless terrestrial or
satellite communication technology to track and locate rail
cars carrying hazmat or to identify actual or imminent
hazardous material release are premature. While railroads agree
that there is benefit to the ability to detect hazmat breaches
from rail cars and to communicate breach events to train crews
and dispatchers, this technology must be carefully developed to
ensure full functionality, appropriate design, reliability, and
security. AAR is working with DHS and FRA to that end.
Passenger Railroads
As Members of this Committee are aware, more than 90 percent of the
route mileage over which Amtrak operates, as well as a significant
portion of the trackage over which many commuter railroads operate, is
actually owned and maintained by freight railroads. Therefore, actions
taken by freight railroads to enhance security also benefit passenger
rail. Freight railroad police coordinate with and support Amtrak police
to, among other things, increase uniformed police presence in rail
passenger stations. Amtrak, commuter rail and transit authorities, and
the freight railroads receive and share threat and incident information
through the RAN and the ST-ISAC.
That said, freight railroad security-related plans and procedures
are not specifically designed to protect passengers or to be a
substitute for actions that Amtrak or other passenger railroad
operators might choose or be requested to take.
Port and Border Security
The issue of port and border security extends far beyond the issue
of rail security, although railroads, by virtue of the fact that they
carry millions of containers unloaded from or loaded on to steamships
each year and move hundreds of thousands of railcars and intermodal
units across the Canadian or Mexican borders each year, are certainly
impacted.
Ports have spent hundreds of millions of dollars enhancing their
security, much of it funded by Federal grants. Railroads work closely
with the Captains of Ports to ensure compliance with Coast Guard
regulations regarding port facility security.
U.S. freight railroads also work diligently with the U.S. Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and others to enhance border
security. For example, a couple of years ago the U.S. and Canadian
customs agencies and Canada's two major railways signed a declaration
of principles to enhance security at the Canada-U.S. border and to
ensure secure rail access to the United States. The declaration--signed
by the CBP, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), Canadian
National Railway (CN), and Canadian Pacific Railway (CP)--outlines
principles for targeting, screening, and examining rail shipments
transported by the Canadian carriers into the United States. The
declaration includes guidelines for the electronic transmission of
cargo information by the railroads to customs officials in advance of
each train's arrival at the border and installation of Vehicle and
Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) and radiation detection equipment at CN
and CP border crossings.
Rail VACIS systems, which are also in use at rail border crossings
with Mexico, use gamma ray technology to scan entire trains one railcar
at a time. The gamma ray source and detectors are stationary as the
train moves through the system. Inspectors examine scanned images of
rail cars for contraband, potential terrorists, or terrorist weapons
without opening them and potentially endangering lives. Suspicious rail
cars are segregated for inspection, with minimal disruption to the flow
of legitimate commerce. Today, where CBP has installed this equipment
on the borders with both Canada and Mexico, 100 percent of rail cars
are screened.
U.S. freight railroads are also active participants in the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a joint government-
business initiative within the CBP to build cooperative relationships
that strengthen overall supply chain and border security. Through this
initiative, CBP is asking businesses--including railroads--to ensure
the integrity of their security practices and communicate their
security guidelines to their business partners within the supply chain.
I am happy to report that all U.S. Class I railroads are currently C-
TPAT certified. The certification process involves a comprehensive
review of a railroad's procedural security, physical security,
personnel security, education and training, access controls, manifest
procedures, and conveyance security.
Railroads have also been active participants in the significant
expansion of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) across the
U.S./Canada border. The mandate of these teams is to enhance border
integrity and security by ``identifying, investigating and interdicting
persons and organizations that pose a threat to national security or
engage in other organized crime activity.''
Finally, on January 5, 2004, CBP regulations requiring all
transportation modes to submit cargo information electronically before
arriving at the U.S. border came into effect. The rail industry was an
active participant in developing these regulations, and railroads are
complying with this requirement.
Conclusion
U.S. freight railroads are proud of the success they achieved in
keeping our Nation's vital rail transport link open following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since then, railroads have taken
many steps to increase the security of our Nation's rail network,
including the development of a comprehensive security management plan
that incorporates four progressively severe alert levels. We will
continue to work with this Committee, others in Congress, Federal
agencies, and all other relevant parties to further enhance the safety
and security of our Nation's railroads and the communities they serve.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. CROSBIE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
OPERATIONS, AMTRAK
Mr. Crosbie. Thank you Mr. Chairman and Members. I would
like to thank this Committee for the opportunity to testify on
passenger rail security and the steps Amtrak has taken to
enhance security and safety for our passengers.
You are to be commended for organizing this hearing and for
advancing legislation to increase funding for rail security. I
applaud your efforts and leadership on this matter and the
attention given to rail security in S. 1052. I say this because
time is of the essence. None of us can afford to wait until
another catastrophe occurs. Those who use our trains should
have the confidence that every reasonable action to protect and
secure their well-being and safety has been taken.
Despite the openness of our Nation's rail system and the
challenges it brings, I believe we have taken long strides in
making our facilities and trains more secure. For us, security
has become one of the costs of doing business because we know
the nature of the threats our Nation faces will be with us for
a long time.
Today, let me briefly outline for you what we have learned
from previous terrorist events both here and abroad, the steps
we have taken to address the knowledge learned from these
events, and what we have planned to do in the near future. As
part of the testimony I have submitted for the record, I have
explained what steps Amtrak has already taken in the wake of
the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London.
What I would like to do today in the short time I have
allotted is explain what additional measures we have identified
in our Security Investment Plan and what we at Amtrak could do
to enhance the safety of our passengers and employees if we had
additional resources.
For us, one of the more significant recent occurrences has
been our ability to receive Federal funding for rail security
improvements through the Fiscal 2005 Homeland Security
Appropriations bill under the Intercity Passenger Rail Security
Grant Program. Prior to Fiscal 2005, the Corporation did not
qualify for such grant programs because it did not meet the
eligibility requirements of being a state or local transit
agency. In addition to having a risk assessment of Amtrak's
Northeast Corridor and Chicago hub area performed by Homeland
Security through their contracted corporation, Amtrak will use
$6.1 million in funds for a number of security priorities,
including but not limited to: increasing the number of
explosive detection canine teams. Purchasing new explosive-
resistant trash cans, adding radiological detection and
verification pagers, and implementing a new passenger awareness
program.
The funding provided as part of the Homeland Security grant
will go a long way and will be put to good use. In addition to
hardening our assets and improving our technology, we are
relying more and more on the improved intelligence-sharing
initiatives among key domestic agencies that are geared toward
improving security within the rail industry.
Coordination with Federal agencies and national law
enforcement organizations is essential to thwarting future
potential terrorist attacks. We also worked with international
partners, particularly those in Spain and England who have
direct experience in dealing with rail-related terrorism. From
a planning perspective, Amtrak has recently modified its
security investment plan and has identified $156 million in
critical funding needs. This is a detailed plan that
prioritizes and itemizes our most urgent projects.
Amtrak maintains several control centers that need to have
redundancy and to have a secure location for these vital
communication and control operations. This project would
consolidate these activities into one building. I cannot
emphasize enough how crucial this element of our plan is to the
entire package of security proposals. Amtrak needs to upgrade
security at our largest stations which typically handle
hundreds of thousands of people per day. In addition to closed
circuit television and physical security improvements,
explosive detection devices and additional radiological pagers
would be disseminated to our sworn personnel for use in major
stations and other strategic stations along the Northeast
Corridor.
Amtrak effectively tracks train movement over the tracks
that the Corporation owns, mainly over the electrified
Northeast Corridor. Throughout the rest of the country,
however, the chief means of communications with trains is
through radio and cell phone telecommunication systems. Such
systems do not adequately address reliable train tracking,
emergency response efforts and have failed during critical
incidents.
Amtrak has identified the need to significantly upgrade its
existing, antiquated GPS system and would like to have it
integrated with Amtrak's central computer system to provide the
exact location for each train. Thus, additional funding in this
area is critical and badly needed.
Last, with regard to our ongoing fire/life safety program,
there are numerous infrastructure projects funded by the
existing $100 million tunnel life safety grant provided in the
Fiscal 2002 Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations for Recovery and Response to the terrorist
attacks on the United States of which $71 million has been
expended. This work is ongoing and significant progress has
been made.
Funding is being used to improve radio coverage, wayside
communication and tunnel portal security to secure all tunnel
access points and improve security for trains traveling through
the major tunnels on the Northeast Corridor. The nature of
improvements consists of physical and technology-based security
improvements, such as closed circuit television, event
activated alarm systems, high-security fencing and lighting,
the strategic placement of vehicle barriers. In addition, this
tunnel security portion of the plan would also include similar
upgrades at the Washington, D.C. First Street Tunnel and the
Baltimore tunnels. Fencing improvements in the area of the
Baltimore tunnels has already begun and fencing improvements
are scheduled throughout Amtrak's 5-year capital plan.
The bottom line is this, we have learned much through the
recent tragedies and terrorist attacks against public
transportation. We have done our best to identify and
prioritize our needs and use of the scarce funds where they
will have the most impact. As you and this Committee are all
too aware, as much as we would like to, Amtrak is not in a
position financially to allocate huge amounts of additional
resources to security. We are engaged in a very costly but long
over due capital reinvestment program to rebuild our plant and
equipment and to bring infrastructure to a state of good
repair.
At the same time, we have also allocated additional
resources where feasible for security as well as the
operational----
The Chairman. We limit people to 5 minutes. I would
appreciate it if you could find a way to end your testimony.
Mr. Crosbie. I'm just about finished, sir. These dollars
only go so far and we need additional resources to enhance the
security of our national system. I'd be happy to answer a few
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Crosbie follows:]
Prepared Statement of William L. Crosbie, Senior Vice President,
Operations, Amtrak
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee, I would like to thank this Committee for the
opportunity to testify on passenger rail security and the steps Amtrak
has taken to enhance security and safety for our passengers.
You are to be commended for organizing this hearing and for
advancing legislation to increase funding for rail security. I applaud
your efforts and leadership on this matter and the attention given to
rail security in S. 1052. I say this because time is of the essence.
None of us can afford to wait until another catastrophe occurs. Those
who use our trains should have the confidence that every reasonable
action to protect and secure their well-being and safety has been
taken.
Despite the openness of our Nation's rail system and the challenges
it brings, I believe we have taken long strides in making our
facilities and trains more secure. For us, security has become one of
the costs of doing business because we know the nature of the threats
our Nation faces will be with us for a long time.
Today, let me briefly outline for you what we have learned from
previous terrorist events both here and abroad, the steps we have taken
to address the knowledge learned from these events, and what we have
planned to do in the near future.
Amtrak Reactions to Events at Home and Abroad
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, followed by the
Moscow, Madrid, and London tragedies, the landscape of Amtrak's law
enforcement responsibilities and duties changed markedly. Amtrak Police
now have to ensure that thorough terrorism-based vulnerability and
threat assessments are conducted, that emergency response and
evacuation plans have been formulated, implemented and tested, and that
Amtrak develops security measures that address not only vandalism and
other forms of street crime, but the potential for Madrid and London
type attacks on our passengers and on our property.
Since September 11, the Amtrak Police and Security Department has
established and reinforced the following security improvements:
Instituted Passenger ID procedure for purchase of most
tickets.
Improved baggage weight restriction policies for carry-on
and checked baggage.
Created a baggage tagging requirement.
Developed and instituted a Security Threat Level Response
Plan that is tied to the Homeland Security Advisory System and
requires a series of security measures be undertaken at each
alert level.
Added 12 explosive detection canine teams.
Created a Security Information Center in which bulletins,
updates and security messages are disseminated to employees.
Purchased and deployed radiological gamma/neutron pagers at
Amtrak's major stations to address radiological threats and
coordinated alerts with local police agencies.
Coordinated security counter-measure issues with transit and
freight railroad counterparts.
Commissioned blast vulnerability studies of the New York
tunnels and major stations.
Revised the five-year Capital Plan to include numerous
security upgrades, including high security fencing, yard
security improvements, and access control upgrades.
After the Madrid bombings, Amtrak again increased uniform patrols
at stations and on platforms and checked baggage rooms in greater
frequency as well as critical infrastructure. It also:
Issued Security Handbooks to all employees.
Made technological improvements to the Railphone system on
trains so that 911 could be dialed and individuals directly
connected to a 911 Operator.
Created security focus groups made up of employees and
passengers to ascertain if security measures and objectives
were being properly performed.
Obtained assistance from freight law enforcement agencies
who patrolled some Amtrak stations.
Held system-wide security conference calls for managers and
directed them to engage employees on their role in security
matters.
As Amtrak continued to review its security needs and
vulnerabilities, it recognized the need to create a security
consciousness for all employees at all levels and to have a clear chain
of command. Last year the corporation created an executive-level
position, the Vice President of Security. Alfred J. Broadbent, a former
Metropolitan Police Department Assistant Chief, was appointed to this
position on August 2, 2004. All police and security functions now
report to Mr. Broadbent, who reports to me. An Executive Security
Committee was also established and meets weekly with him to discuss
security policy, procedures, operational and capital security planning
as well as terrorist threat and intelligence information.
One of the first efforts undertaken by the Vice President of
Security was the re-engineering of Amtrak's primary terrorist security
plan, the Security Threat Level Response Plan. This plan now contains
more meaningful and measurable countermeasures and it is closely
coordinated with recently created Security Coordinating Committees that
consist of management level officials across Amtrak's operating
departments. Each Amtrak operating division has a Security Coordinating
Committee that meets regularly with Police and Security Managers to
ensure that basic security practices and steps are undertaken and
completed. The countermeasures contained in the Threat Level Response
Plan provide a coordination of efforts directed to specific threats and
attempt to create some basis for a layered security system that would
improve deterrence capabilities. Some of the countermeasures that would
be drilled down and enforced by Amtrak Police personnel and the
Security Coordinating Committees would be assurance that only necessary
access points are kept open, that gates, doors and other barriers are
locked and secured, and that rolling stock and locomotives are locked
and secured while this equipment is in a yard and/or standing at a
station. Since August of 2004, the Amtrak Police and Security
Department has also developed and implemented the following programs:
Tactical Intensive Patrols (TIPS)--Sworn Amtrak personnel
patrol specific station areas and conduct checks of baggage
with passengers, provide security tip information and establish
uniform presence.
Train Riding Patrols--Sworn Amtrak personnel have been
riding trains in a greater degree of frequency, mostly on the
busy NEC.
Counter-terrorism training conducted by the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) has been scheduled for all
sworn personnel and was completed in FY05.
Amtrak Management, DHS and the National Transit Institute
developed a Security Awareness Training Program for all
employees. This training is underway and is scheduled for
completion in December 2005.
Amtrak Police and Security coordinate its security concerns
and initiatives with its Federal partners: DHS, TSA, DOT, and
FRA.
Access to Resources
For Amtrak, one of the more significant recent occurrences has been
our ability to receive Federal funding for rail security improvements
through the FY05 DHS Appropriations bill under the Intercity Passenger
Rail Security Grant Program. Prior to FY05, the Corporation did not
qualify for such grant programs because it did not meet the eligibility
requirements of being a state or local transit agency. In addition to
having a Risk Assessment of Amtrak's NEC and Chicago hub area performed
by a DHS contracted corporation, Amtrak will use $6.3 million in funds
to increase security at Amtrak by:
Adding explosive detection canine teams.
Purchasing new explosive resistant trash cans.
Deploying PROTECT (chemical detection equipment) systems at
major stations.
Conducting a Pilot Program with the Transportation Security
Working Group and DHS on next generation CCTV systems.
Adding radiological detection and verification pagers and
portals.
Increasing tunnel protection.
Implementing a new passenger awareness program.
Conducting a major exercise in Washington, D.C.
We have also been involved in numerous initiatives with the
agencies that are geared toward improving security within the rail
industry. Highlighted below are some of these interactions:
Improved intelligence gathering capabilities by working
closely with Federal and State agencies and industry partners.
Agencies include: DHS, TSA (Transportation Security Operations
Center--TSOC), DOT (Office of Intelligence and Security--OIS),
FRA (Surface Transportation-Information Sharing and Analysis
Center--ST/ISAC), and the industry AAR (Railway Alert Network--
RAN).
Continued assignment of an Amtrak investigator to work with
the FBI in the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force. Other
investigators will be assigned to the National Capital Region,
Chicago, and Long Beach, CA JTTFs in the near future.
DHS/TSA sponsored two emergency response drills in which
multiple Federal, State and local agencies participated. Drills
were based on terrorist act scenarios.
DHS/TSA has worked with Amtrak as a venue location for the
Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) program.
DHS/TSA and ICE has worked with Amtrak and upgraded the
delivery of international traveler information for border
inspection travel improvements and counter-terrorism purposes.
FRA/TSA has partnered with Amtrak and used ``airport type''
screening at Amtrak stations during National Security Sensitive
Events (RNC and Inaugural Event).
TSA is also doing clearances and working closely with Amtrak
in improving passenger manifest information and in coordinating
Amtrak's industrial security clearance program.
In addition to Amtrak's security programs with the above agencies,
Amtrak has also received the expertise and help of the State of New
York's National Guard. It has provided additional resources in the form
of National Guard personnel to support uniform forces at Penn Station,
New York.
Next Steps
Today, Amtrak Police and Security continue its efforts to improve
the safety and security of Amtrak passengers, employees and patrons. In
February of this year, it participated in a special meeting and
debriefing with leaders of Spain's law enforcement and military
agencies and Renfre, the Spanish Commuter line involved in the Madrid
bombings. Police and Security managers attended a special briefing last
week in relation to the London bombings and plan to have a meeting with
British Transport Police later this year to receive a similar briefing
and ``lessons learned'' update on these terrorist tragedies. The
department is also in the midst of a reorganization that will channel
and deploy resources in a more effective manner to address the security
realities of today's rail systems.
From a planning perspective, Amtrak has recently modified its
Security Investment Plan and has identified $156 million in critical
funding needs.
Dispatch and Control Centers--Amtrak maintains several
control centers that need to have redundancy and to have a
secure location for these vital communication and control
operations. This project would consolidate Amtrak's CETC
(Centralized Electrified Traffic Control Center), CNOC
(Consolidated National Operations Center) and the NCC (Police
Department Radio Center) into one building. This location would
be constructed so that access is restricted and basic CPTED
(Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) concepts
employed. I cannot emphasize enough how crucial this element of
our plan is to the entire package of security proposals.
Securing Amtrak's Largest Stations--Amtrak needs to upgrade
security at the largest stations which typically handle
hundreds of thousands of people per day. In addition to CCTV
and physical security improvements, explosive detection devices
and additional radiological devices/pagers would be
disseminated to sworn personnel for use in major stations and
other strategic stations along the NEC.
Amtrak Train Tracking, Communications and Critical Incident
Response--Amtrak effectively tracks train movement over the
tracks that the Corporation owns, mainly over the electrified
NEC. Throughout the rest of the country, however, the chief
means of communications with trains is through radio and cell
phone telecommunication systems. Such systems do not adequately
address reliable train tracking, emergency response efforts and
have failed during critical incidents. For example, Amtrak's
radio system cannot be used where it does not own track and,
therefore, Amtrak radio train communications is dependent upon
the host railroad network. Cell phone technology can be
limiting and is often dependent upon the footprint of the cell
phone provider. Amtrak has also identified the need to
significantly upgrade its existing, antiquated GPS system (over
8 years old). The GPS system needs to be integrated with
Amtrak's central computer system and CNOC to provide the exact
location for each train on a minute-by-minute basis. Thus,
additional funding in this area is critical and badly needed.
Such upgrades and the introduction of satellite telephone
communication systems would provide uninterrupted
communications.
Fire/Life Safety
Last, with regard to our ongoing fire/life safety program, there
are numerous infrastructure projects funded by the existing $100
million tunnel life safety grant provided in the FY02 Department of
Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery and
Response to terrorists attacks on the United States (Pub. L. 107-117)
of which $71 million has been expended. This work is ongoing and
significant progress has been made.
Funding is being used to improve radio coverage, wayside
communication and tunnel portal security. Other components of this
element are to secure all tunnel access points and improve security for
trains traveling through this area of the NEC. The nature of
improvements consists of physical and technology based security
improvements, such as CCTV, event activated alarm systems, high
security fencing and lighting, and the strategic placement of vehicle
barriers. In addition, this tunnel security portion of the plan would
also include similar upgrades at the Washington, D.C. First Street
Tunnel and the Baltimore tunnels. Fencing improvements in the area of
the Baltimore tunnels have already begun through the capital plan and
fencing improvements are scheduled throughout Amtrak's five-year
capital plan.
I hope that this overview has provided you with a better
understanding of what Amtrak has done, and continues to do, to enhance
safety for our employees and passengers. I will gladly respond to any
follow up questions that you may have on rail security.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD WYTKIND, PRESIDENT, TRANSPORTATION TRADES
DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO
Mr. Wytkind. Thank you Mr. Chairman for having this
hearing. At the outset, I just want to say that we believe, on
behalf of the employees in the rail industry, that rail
security in this country and the actions of the Department of
Homeland Security or I guess, inaction, have been sorely
lacking. We've heard a lot from the railroads over the years
and including this morning about action teams, task forces,
countermeasures and a lot of good sounding initiatives. But, I
must report that the workers in this industry and their unions
haven't been enlisted as partners in these efforts.
Access control at key facilities and infrastructure is
lacking and security training is basically non-existent.
Workers are still being discouraged, if not intimidated, from
reporting safety and security risks and Federal funding in our
judgment hasn't kept pace with the needs of rail security in
this country.
The workers that I have spoken to, inform me that they feel
no safer or more prepared then they were before 9/11. They feel
as if too many railroads are getting away with showing videos
as a substitute for real training and they feel as if the rail
network hasn't been adequately secured. These are the workers
that work on the front lines. They don't just talk about
working, they actually go to work every day and make the system
as safe and secure as possible.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and the Members of this
Committee for your introduction of S. 1052. The rail title is
especially comprehensive and will address a number of serious
security issues in the rail system. We've heard from Mr.
Hamberger about our workers being the eyes and the ears of the
system but the railroad companies are failing to give these
workers the tools they need to be those eyes and ears. Let me
be clear, the workers are not receiving the training that you
are hearing about today. I'm still puzzled by the TSA's
testimony about all these front line workers being trained
because they, themselves have been slow in moving security
training initiatives. Our members at one of the freight
carriers told us just a few days ago that they get a 14-minute
video at best, maybe once a year. I've seen one of the videos
and it does little to prepare workers. It offers vague and
often very conflicting guidance and one video actually told the
workers not to overreact but not to under-react. I'm just kind
of wondering what that means. They don't know what a security
risk is, they are being told to be vigilant but they have no
idea what these so called ``countermeasures'' the railroads are
putting into place mean and how they apply to their lives as
workers.
Perhaps worst of all, the initiatives that the industry has
instituted since 9/11 have had no involvement by the unions and
their members in the rail industry. Front line workers are in a
position to spot security risks. Every witness will tell you
that, including those in the government. They are the first on
the scene along with firefighters and police. We have come to
the conclusion that the only way that the workers will be
trained is for the government to be told that they will
institute regulations and for the carriers to have to abide by
those regulations. It's not enough for the railroads to pay
experts to provide very nice Power Point presentations. If the
workers are not getting the training done at the rank and file
level then it doesn't make a difference. I'm here to tell you
that four years after 9/11 it's not happening and we believe
it's a disgrace.
I want to commend you Chairman Stevens, Senator Inouye and
others for including Section 310 in the legislation which will
bring real training to the workers. But, I must caution that
oversight will be badly needed because the Department of
Homeland Security has been badly delinquent in fulfilling
Congressional mandates that this Committee instituted to force
flight attendants training on the air carriers. The railroads
have told you this morning that the training is unnecessary,
they claim that they are working with the National Transit
Institute to develop a program. They are missing the point. It
doesn't matter how good the program is, we know NTI does a lot
of good work in public transportation but the training
curriculum is useless if it doesn't get down to the local
level. My rail union leadership told me that they didn't even
know about the NTI program that's being peddled this morning,
until it arrived in the mail coincidentally this week, right
before today's hearing.
I know that my comments conflict with Mr. Hamberger's, but
they are based on personal assessments by workers and their
union reps that know what the vulnerabilities are in the rail
system. And we hope that the Committee will reject the
industry's pleas to water down or eliminate these worker
training requirements because the provisions in your bill will
really make a huge down payment in that effort.
I'll summarize by saying that we think the system itself
needs to be better secured as well. I've heard too many stories
from too many local workers and union reps about locomotives
being left with no one around, about the ability to waltz in
and out of rail facilities and about the ability to trespass
with really very little resistance from the railroads. And in
regards to Amtrak, that's also a problem but I believe that
Amtrak has a resource problem, I believe that Amtrak wants to
try to deal with the security concerns but the workers are
being left untrained. A lot of them aren't even credentialed
and the resources that Amtrak is dedicating to security is just
this tiny down payment for what the railroad actually needs.
So, I'm happy to work with this Committee to try to get a
strong rail security bill passed but I think something needs to
be understood. The railroads are not providing the training
that is so urgently needed. The resources Amtrak is getting are
not enough to deal with security and it's very important in my
judgment that the Department of Homeland Security has to be
held accountable for the lack of action and attention rail
security has recorded. Thank you and I'm happy to answer any
questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wytkind follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward Wytkind, President, Transportation Trades
Department, AFL-CIO
Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, and Members of the Committee,
on behalf of the 29 affiliated unions of the Transportation Trades
Department, AFL-CIO (TTD), I want to thank you for giving
transportation labor an opportunity to testify today on our priorities
and strategies for enhancing rail security. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Attached at 1 is a complete list of TTD's affiliated unions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This hearing occurs at an auspicious time. Having just observed the
fourth anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
America, we are reminded again that rail security measures--both in the
transport of passengers and freight--have been sorely lacking. The
brutal attacks in the passenger rail systems of London and Madrid
served as the most recent wake-up call, but in reality we have long
known that rail transportation is a tempting target for those that wish
this Nation harm. Unfortunately, beyond vague warnings by the
Administration, and promises of action by the rail industry, little has
actually been done. Vulnerable rail targets have not been hardened,
access control at key facilities is lacking, security training is
basically non-existent, workers are still being discouraged from
reporting safety and security concerns, and Federal funding has not
kept up with the immediate security needs of this vital sector of our
transportation system.
Last month, the new head of the Transportation Security
Administration told a Senate committee that the state of transit
security was, and I quote, ``outstanding.'' Echoing this assessment, I
am sure that freight rail industry representatives will trot out fancy
reports and charts supporting their claims that much has been done to
secure our rail transportation system. We will hear about ``action
teams,'' task forces, ``countermeasures,'' daily security briefings,
worker training and a whole host of wonderful initiatives. And we will
hear about the industry's partnering activities with others in the
private sector and government. Unfortunately, I must sadly report that
workers and their unions have been left in the dark about these
activities and the railroads have not enlisted their employees as
partners in this endeavor. In fact, the workers I have spoken to inform
me that they feel no safer or more prepared than they were before the
September 11 attacks. This situation has gone on for too long and is
simply unacceptable. We need to get serious about rail security and we
need leadership from Congress to address the critical areas of concern
that workers and other stakeholders have so readily identified.
On this point, I want to thank you Chairman Stevens, Senator
Inouye, the Co-Chairman of the Committee, and the other Senators who
have joined with you in introducing the Transportation Security
Improvements Act of 2005 (S. 1052). While there are some changes we
would like to see to this bill, the product you have offered is
comprehensive and would address a number of security vulnerabilities
across the various modes of transportation, including of course the
rail sector.
When you remember the size and scope of our rail system and
infrastructure, the lack of attention and focus on security is hard to
understand or accept. \2\ In addition, we must recognize that given the
open nature of our rail transportation network, we are never going to
be able to secure it entirely, since, unlike aviation, it simply is not
housed in a relatively closed or contained infrastructure. Indeed,
inter-city and commuter rail is designed to be accessible and at least
part of its appeal is this relative ease of use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ There are over 100,000 miles of rail in the U.S.--22,000 of
miles of it used by Amtrak in 46 states and the District of Columbia.
In 2004, Amtrak served 25 million passengers, or approximately 68,000 a
day. Commuter rail operations add approximately 978,000 passenger trips
each weekday. The freight rail carriers carry 42 percent of our
Nation's domestic intercity freight and in 2002 alone over 109 million
tons of hazardous material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given these facts, it is absolutely imperative that we take the
steps that can be implemented and that are compatible with a system
that is so critical to our national economy. I will concede that we
can't build a fence around every train track in America. But we can
train workers and leverage technology to better monitor and control
this vast infrastructure. We may not be able to screen every passenger
at every station, but there is simply no reason, not one, that workers
should be discouraged, or discriminated against, for speaking out on
security.
Treating Employees as Partners
We need to start treating front-line employees as true partners in
the effort to protect our rail system. These workers greet passengers,
sell tickets, operate and staff the trains, maintain and inspect track
and equipment, dispatch trains and fix cars. In short, they are in an
excellent position to spot security risks and terrorist threats. And in
the event that an attack does occur, our members will be on the scene
and the first to respond along with firefighters and police.
Security Training
Let me be extremely clear about this point--despite the claims of
some in industry, workers are not receiving meaningful security
training. Our members at one freight carrier have told us that at best
they get a 14 minute video--maybe once a year, but maybe not. And one
local leader reported that new hires don't even get to see the movie.
Mr. Chairman, I have seen this so-called training video and there's
only one problem--it does virtually nothing to prepare a worker on how
to address security problems. It offers vague and often conflicting
guidance. My personal favorite is when it instructs workers, in dealing
with a person on the property who is not supposed to be there, to not
overreact, but also not to underreact. What does that mean? Workers
still do not know what constitutes a security risk, though they are
told to be ``vigilant.'' They do not know how to respond when they do
see someone or something suspicious and they certainly don't know what
to do if something actually happens. I realize that my comments
conflict with those of Mr. Hamberger. But I am offering my observation
to this Committee based upon personal assessments by rank-and-file
workers and local leaders who understand their railroad property and
its vulnerabilities and know first-hand how little is being done to
deal with security risks.
It is well known that real training is effective. We know this from
positive experiences in the safety arena and experts confirm that it is
even more crucial in security. Rafi Ron, former Director of Security at
Tel-Aviv Ben-Gurion International Airport told a Senate committee last
month that behavior pattern ``techniques implemented by trained
security and non-security personnel have proven to be a valuable
measure in the detection and prevention of terrorist attacks in public
faculties.'' Ron went on to observe ``training provides the skills and
confidence not only to law enforcement officers . . . but also to
employees who are present at every point in the system. No one is in a
better position to recognize irregularities on the ground than the
people who regularly work there.''
The Volpe Center recently concluded that ``probably the most
significant factor in determining whether a transportation employee
makes a helpful or harmful decision during an emergency is training.
Trained and alert transportation professionals can make the difference
between success and disaster. Characteristics such as acting
responsibly to protect the lives of the public; keeping one's cool and
keeping passengers calm; contacting emergency assistance authorities
quickly and reporting the essential details accurately; working
cooperatively as a member (and sometimes a leader) of a team with a
common goal--can all be enhanced through proper training.''
These observations and conclusions are not surprising--it is quite
frankly common sense that a robust and consistent training regime is a
cost effective way to enhance rail security. Unfortunately, employers,
under profit and operational pressures, too often short-change this
critical security component. We have come to the conclusion that the
only way workers are going to get the security training they need is
for the Federal Government to come in and tell the carriers that they
must offer this training because it is too important to ignore. It is
not enough for the railroads to pay experts to develop nice reports
unless the materials developed are delivered to the employees in the
form of a comprehensive, mandatory training program. That is not
happening today and we believe this is a disgrace.
On this point, I want to commend Chairman Stevens and Senator
Inouye for including a provision (Section 310) in S. 1052 that would
accomplish this objective. Specifically, Section 310 would require DHS,
within 60 days of enactment, to develop and issue detailed guidance for
a rail worker security training program. The guidance issued by DHS
will require a training program that would encompass a number of
appropriate elements including crew communications and coordination
activities; evacuation procedures; use of protective devices; live
situational training exercises and ways to determine the seriousness of
any situation. Sixty days after DHS issues these guidelines, each rail
carrier is required to develop a training program and submit it to DHS
for review and approval. DHS may also require the rail carrier to make
revisions to the training program that the Secretary considers
necessary to ensure that the program meets the guidance requirements.
The carrier will then have 180 days to complete the training of all
front-line workers in accordance with the DHS approved program.
I have little doubt that some in industry will complain that this
program is too burdensome and that they should be allowed to institute
training on their schedule. I am also sure that some rail carriers will
claim that since training is already being done, that this Committee
should simply stand down and allow industry to proceed on its own. We
hope you will reject those pleas for more inaction. As I have stated,
we have talked to too many front-line workers who dispute the
industry's claims to allow this fiction to perpetuate any longer.
Comprehensive security training must be mandated, and it must be
instituted as soon as possible. I applaud you Mr. Chairman and Senator
Inouye for recognizing this fact and I urge the Committee to retain
this provision as your bill moves through the legislative process.
Providing Whistleblower Protections
We must also ensure that workers who report or identify a security
risk will not face retribution or retaliation from their employers.
Simply put, a rail worker should not have to choose between doing the
right thing on security and his or her job. Unfortunately, too often
this is exactly what occurs.
Rail workers and their unions have long argued that despite the
whistle-blower protections included in current law (49 U.S.C.
Sec. 20109), employees still experience employer harassment and
intimidation when reporting accidents, injuries and other safety
concerns. Indeed, in a Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) report
issued in July 2002 entitled An Examination of Railroad Yard Workers
Safety (RR02-01), the FRA conducted focus group interviews with certain
groups of rail workers. The FRA stated, ``Perhaps of most significance,
rail labor painted a generally adversarial picture of the safety
climate in the rail industry. They felt that harassment and
intimidation were commonplace, and were used to pressure employees to
not report an injury, to cut corners and to work faster.''
Section 311 of S. 1052 does attempt to address this problem by
providing certain whistleblower protections for workers who report
security concerns. While this provision is a step in the right
direction, and I want to thank Senator Lautenberg for working with us
on this issue, it needs to be strengthened to provide workers with a
fair and expedited process to seek redress in whistleblower situations.
In addition, if we are ever going to stop discrimination against
workers who report security problems, penalties and fines must be
increased to create a real deterrent and not just make violations a
cost of doing business.
I should note that as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress, on
a bi-partisan basis, included whistle-blower protections for those who
report shareholder fraud violations or violations of Securities and
Exchange Commission rules. (See, 17 U.S.C. 1514A). Surely, if we can
protect whistleblowers who report financial security problems, we can
also protect those who report rail security concerns.
Everyday, rail carriers and the government ask front-line workers
to be more vigilant about security risks and to report possible
breaches. With the right training, rail workers are more than happy to
play this role. But it is disingenuous to ask workers to report
problems and at the same time refuse to provide the basic protections
needed to ensure that such reporting will not result in employer
retribution.
Securing Rail Facilities
Our members are also increasingly concerned that rail yards and
facilities are largely open areas where people can come and go
virtually unchallenged. In general, we need to ensure some type of
security perimeter around yards and other sensitive facilities and
better access control. Indeed, I would note that shortly after the
Madrid attacks Amtrak issued a security notice reminding employees to
wear their identification badges despite the fact that, according to
reports from workers we have received, many employees have still not
actually received their credentials. This of course raises the question
of how access control is being achieved in those situations.
On a related issue, we need procedures and technology in place to
better monitor and protect tracks, signals and switches. Given the
amount of hazardous material that is moved by our rail system, it does
not take a lot of imagination to see how a terrorist could sabotage key
points in our infrastructure to create a deadly accident. Signal
systems and track switches are too easy to manipulate and access to
these systems must be better controlled.
When problems are spotted, our members are told to contact
appropriate security personnel. The problem (besides the fact that
there is no training or set procedures on who to contact) is that in
many instances, especially in rural areas, security guards are often
not on the property and many miles away. In fact, one rail worker
stationed out West recently told me that the carrier had one security
person to contact during emergencies covering a 1,000 mile territory.
And yet we can't seem to convince our employers that front-line workers
need training on what to do when there is a security threat and
security personnel are not available to immediately respond.
In general, we are increasingly concerned with the lack of security
with respect to the transport of hazardous materials. Tank car
integrity standards are critical and out-of-date equipment must either
be brought into compliance or retired. While not the work of
terrorists, the tragic accident in Graniteville, South Carolina, where
nine people died, 310 required medical attention and 5,400 residents
were forced to evacuate, was a stark reminder of the consequences of a
hazardous material release. And just last Saturday, two Union Pacific
trains collided in Texarkana, Arkansas, releasing propylene and leading
to a massive fire and explosion. Simply put, rail transportation is a
dangerous business on a normal day. In the post-9/11 environment the
challenge of protecting the Nation from terrorist threats directed at
rail transportation multiplies.
Amtrak Security
Let me say a word about rail security as it relates specifically to
Amtrak. It is no secret that every year Congress provides Amtrak just
enough funding to limp through another fiscal crisis. In this
environment, it is impossible for our Nation's national passenger
carrier to invest the capitol resources needed to make major
improvements to rail security. This starvation diet that we have put
Amtrak on must end; not only because it represents bad transportation
policy, but because it creates security issues and problems that are
unacceptable. Again, on this point, let me note the leadership of
Chairman Stevens, Chairman Lott, Senator Lautenberg and others who have
pushed this Committee to approve a multi-year reauthorization bill and
have led the fight in the annual appropriations process that is still
ongoing as we speak.
Clearly, Amtrak needs stable, long-term resources to shore up its
financial challenges. But in the context of security, we cannot expect
Amtrak to fend for itself while we spend billions addressing so many
other aspects of homeland security and the war on terrorism. We have
always believed that transportation security is an integral element of
our homeland security efforts and publicly supported transportation
systems like Amtrak deserve adequate Federal resources to protect their
passengers, workers and the public from terrorist threats.
There has also been a lot of talk, both from Amtrak and the
Administration, about the need to contract-out as many Amtrak services
as possible and to privatize parts or all of the system. Again, we have
serious transportation policy reasons why these proposals should not be
adopted and I will not expand on them at this hearing. But let me also
point out that in-house employees are known quantities that in many
cases have security responsibilities they must perform. If these
functions are contracted-out, as they already are in some areas, it
calls into question how these functions will be handled and makes it
that much more difficult to reliably control access to train
operations.
Final Thoughts
Achieving rail security is of course not a simple task. But we
cannot allow this challenge to go unmet any longer. Four years after 9/
11 and in the wake of deadly attacks in London and Madrid, our
government and rail employers are still not doing enough to make rail
transportation as secure as possible. Rail security needs and deserves
attention and focus from policy makers. Carriers must be required to
follow security procedures, employees must be trained and afforded
whistle-blower protections, and rail yards, facilities, tracks,
equipment and signal system must be secured. All of transportation
labor has a vested interest in improving rail security and Mr. Chairman
and Co-Chairman Inouye, TTD stands ready to work with you to achieve
this common agenda.
Thank you again for giving TTD an opportunity to share our views
today.
TTD Affiliates
The following labor organizations are members of and represented by
the TTD:
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU)
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME)
American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
Association of Flight Attendants-CWA (AFA-CWA)
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA)
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS)
Communications Workers of America (CWA)
International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF)
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAM)
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Blacksmiths, Forgers
and Helpers (IBB)
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers (IFPTE)
International Longshoremen's Association (ILA)
International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU)
International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA
(MM&P)
International Union of Operating Engineers (IUOE)
Laborers' International Union of North America (LIUNA)
Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association (MEBA)
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)
National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC)
National Federation of Public and Private Employees (NFOPAPE)
Office and Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU)
Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS)
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA)
Transportation Communications International Union (TCU)
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU)
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA)
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy,
Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW)
The Chairman. Thank you very much, I would urge the
gentlemen to be precise in your answers because we are limited
on time.
Matter of fact, there's two amendments on the floor right
now that affect my state and I'm anxious to get this hearing
over. But, Mr. Hamberger, you've alluded to some confusion as
to whose in charge, TSA or FRA, who do you think is in charge
and who should be in charge?
Mr. Hamberger. I believe that TSA should be in charge of
security, and FRA in charge of safety. The two, however,
overlap. As you heard in the first panel, a tank car could
involve a safety issue, it could also raise a security issue.
So, I think there needs to be better coordination. I think
Secretary Hawley and Mr. Boardman have undertaken that and have
had a series of meetings. Within the Department of Homeland
Security itself, however, there is still, and I think Mr.
Hawley alluded to it this morning, there needs to be a single
point of contact for the industry. We hear from the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Group, from the Coast
Guard, from TSA, from different organizations within DHS coming
to our members and asking for oftentimes overlapping requests
for data. There just needs to be a single point of contact.
We've met with Secretary Hawley on that and I think he is
moving in that direction.
The Chairman. Mr. Crosbie, I'm sure we're going to hear
more about the needs of Amtrak, but has the Board explored
increasing the cost to the passengers instead of totally
requesting additional Federal money to meet the improvements
you've mentioned?
Mr. Crosbie. As I understand it, it was before my time at
Amtrak, it was considered post 9/11 and there was a significant
push back from some of the state governments on adding a
security fee.
The Chairman. Well, I remember right after 9/11 going to
Nome and finding TSA in the terminal there at the small
airport. They had taken over a third of the terminal, which has
been paid for by the state and the city. They were charging
passengers more money to provide security. Why is it that rail
transportation has not been willing to step up to the plate and
ask the passengers to pay part of the security and safety
costs?
Mr. Crosbie. We, within Amtrak, we've certainly considered
doing that and in the past when we had proposed, like I had
said, there was a significant resistance to implementing that.
We haven't ruled it out entirely, but based on the past
response, we haven't considered it further.
The Chairman. Am I right that your number of passengers has
increased since 9/11?
Mr. Crosbie. Yes.
The Chairman. Substantially?
Mr. Crosbie. Sorry, sir.
The Chairman. There's been a substantial increase?
Mr. Crosbie. Substantial, yes, it has been.
The Chairman. Mr. Wytkind, I appreciate your comments about
Senator Inouye's and my involvement in this bill and I
understand what you're saying about training. One of the
problems is, when I think of some of the airline unions,
they've been very much involved in training themselves. Why
haven't you?
Mr. Wytkind. Well, actually they have been and that's
actually a good example of the problem. In the hazardous
materials area, the rail unions have had a very robust hazmat
training program that actually receives some Federal support.
But, when we've tried to approach the railroads to participate
in that program and perhaps even help us finance it so that it
has the support it needs, we've met a lot of resistance. And
any attempts we've ever made to strengthen training for workers
or to have them covered by certain safety regulations, we've
always met with resistance from the railroads. Anytime safety
re-authorization legislation has been pending in this
Committee, we've met resistance from the railroads.
So, my message to you is, I think the rail unions have a
strong track record of delivering training to their members
under very limited resources. I would submit to you, that given
the sheer size of the workforce in the country and the amount
of responsibility that they bring every day to work, to the
job, that they need the support to make sure they're prepared.
When I hear local union reps tell me things like our members
don't feel any more prepared today than they did 4 years ago,
before 9/11, that brings chills down my spine and I'm sure to a
lot of other people.
The Chairman. I don't know if you know, but I probably
carried a union card longer than anyone in the room. But, as a
practical matter, I understand that when your people are laid
off they automatically continue to receive full pay. There's a
real question about the retirement and layoff costs of labor in
terms of these railroads, particularly Amtrak. What do you say
about that?
Mr. Wytkind. I don't think those issues are applicable to
security in the sense that----
The Chairman. It takes money away from the system.
Mr. Wytkind. Well, the Congress has affirmed and reaffirmed
its very strong support for the railroad retirement system that
the rail employees are covered by, including the railroads
themselves that have always supported it. So, the costs on the
system for retirement, to me, are unrelated to whether we
should be training workers at the rank and file level.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We'll go by the early
bird rules so, we have Senator Lautenberg's, Senator
Lautenberg, I have a call from the Co-Chairman, I'll be right
back. Would you proceed?
Senator Lautenberg. [presiding] Thank you very much. The
concerns that we have about rail security loom largely in front
of us, and yet we hear--well, in one instance--that the private
sector will provide it. And in response to a question I asked
about oversight and providing the appropriate budget for rail
security review by the Federal Government, we were told that--
well, we have standby personnel, we have Air Marshals, we have
people--they are going to be called upon long after the fire
has begun. They can't suddenly switch from the Air Marshal
population over to the railroads. The problem, Mr. Wytkind, is
that we know that Amtrak is under funded to begin with. It is
difficult to compare with the airline situation, with its
repeated bankruptcies that we're called upon to bail them out
of. Also, the infrastructure and operations that provide our
great aviation service that we have in our country are largely
supplied by the Federal Government, looking at much of the FAA
and the other government services that are connected with
aviation. Amtrak has never been able to get its head above
water, because from the day that Amtrak became a corporation on
its own being, we work with the same old equipment, we work
with the same old systems, we work with a constantly reduced
level of funding and once and for all, we're going to have to
take a plunge. And that plunge is going to say that we are
going to upgrade things, that we are going to buy cars that are
better than 40- or 50-year old ones and locomotives as well and
make the investment that so many other countries make.
And we see it, for instance, in Germany with maybe $7-10
billion dollars a year going into their system and if you take
a ride on it, you'll know where it's going. The TGV in France
will take you from Brussels to Paris at an hour and 20 minutes
for a 200-mile ride. If we supply that kind of service here, we
could reduce congestion in our aviation system that now has us
late for appointments, et cetera. So, I think that we have some
opportunities to take a realistic look at where we go here and
I'm appreciative of the commentary that we've heard from our
witness and I'm sorry that I wasn't here at an earlier point.
Mr. Wytkind, one of the things that we noticed is the
substantial increase in violations of the Federal hazmat worker
training laws and you talked extensively about that and I
commend you for it. Now, I worked with the Committee to almost
double the minimum civil penalty in law for these types of
violations. You talked about how important hazmat training is
to running a safe and secure railroad. What do you think we
ought to do? Should the government take the responsibility
directly, for training these people? Should that be a part of
the TSA responsibility to do that? How do we get an assurance
that these people are receiving sufficient training?
Mr. Wytkind. Thank you for that question. I think we
separate freight from Amtrak in a couple of ways but, overall I
think you need strong training mandates the way this Committee
has provided mandates in the airline side and then you need
strong oversight to make sure the Department of Homeland
Security actually carries out its mandates. Because that's part
of the problem. This Committee mandated flight attendant
security training after 9/11 and to this day TSA has not
provided the kind of guidance that you asked for in this
Committee or actually directed the TSA to do so. But I think
the issue for Amtrak is one of resources and the mandate on
Amtrak, if it doesn't also correspond to some financing and
support for security upgrades across the board, including
training, we're afraid that it's not going to get down to the
rank and file level.
On the freight side, these are very cash rich companies
that spend enormous sums of money on operations, efficiencies,
infrastructure and as we've heard this morning, obviously on
some security or maybe a lot of security. What we would argue
is that if you put the mandate in the law, like you have in the
current bill pending for this Committee, then the railroads
will be required to finally make sure that their rank and file
workers are getting trained. I think it's that simple but it
requires a strong mandate out of this Committee and then it
requires strong oversight of the DHS to make sure they actually
carry out their regulatory responsibilities. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Rockefeller?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm giving
myself double coverage in hopes that I might be heard. Let me
ask Mr. Hamberger, it hasn't been gone into deeply here but, I
think you made in your statement something which maybe
harbingers what you may be going for later on and that is to
have the Federal Government deciding what chemicals are safe to
carry and which ones aren't. Now, a number of years ago, I
guess it was after the Exxon Valdez thing, all ships had to
double hull. You have some presumably in stock that are double-
hulled. Explain to me why all of your stock is not double-
hulled, even under the circumstances in which the chemical
companies, which I am very, very sorry, are not represented
here today because that precludes us from having a good
discussion. I don't know why they weren't invited but, I regret
that. Why is it that you just can't double hull or whatever is
the corresponding guarantee of safety that the shipping
industry went through.
Mr. Hamberger. I appreciate that question Senator because
it is a very important issue. In fact, I was a little late for
the hearing this morning because we had a conference call with
members of the American Chemistry Council (ACC) to discuss the
fact that in my testimony, there is a sentence that says long-
term, it should be a policy to look for safer chemicals. It is
a little bit of a different issue from the double hull because
this is really more of a security issue than a safety issue. We
can require tank cars to double hull, we can do everything
possible but, there is no way long term to ensure against a
terrorist attack. The only way to ensure that a community
through which hazardous material is moving is safer, would be
to have that hazardous material be less toxic.
Senator Rockefeller. Do you routinely use GPS and other
systems to always----
Mr. Hamberger. About 45 percent of the locomotives do have
GPS. We're moving to 100 percent.
Senator Rockefeller. On all of those that carry chemicals
that are potentially in danger, are they covered by the GPS?
Mr. Hamberger. I don't have the answer to that.
Senator Rockefeller. Isn't that fairly important?
Mr. Hamberger. I just don't know the answer.
Senator Rockefeller. Yes.
Mr. Hamberger. But we do have the immediate capability of
locating all locomotives.
Senator Rockefeller. You all make a lot of money and I know
that you always declare yourselves revenue inadequate, we won't
get into that today.
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you.
Senator Rockefeller. But, I look forward to having your
annual reports. But, the chemical companies are merging and
having all kinds of problems. Now, not to the extent that the
airlines are. Railroads are an absolute necessity for this
country.
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir.
Senator Rockefeller. This country could not exist without
them. So, two questions. One, why doesn't industry just go
ahead and double hull or whatever the proper word is, as a
matter of course? Because nothing has changed since 9/11
fundamentally. Part of that is the Federal Government's report,
I mean, the report we were meant to have gotten and still
hasn't arrived, which doesn't speak very well for us but, why
can't you go ahead and do something which doesn't, you know,
somebody puts a bomb underneath the track, double-hull isn't
going to do it or whatever the comparable thing is. But, there
are ways of racheting up.
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir.
Senator Rockefeller. Safety which can help----
Mr. Hamberger. And in fact we are working very closely with
the tank car manufacturers and ACC in determining whether or
not there is a safer design. We are taking a close look at that
and we're not going to mandate that but----
Senator Rockefeller. What does that mean? I mean, you know
that if you have two layers of hard metal around something it's
going to be safe, so what does it----
Mr. Hamberger. Well, frankly Senator, that has cost
implications for our customers, the chemical companies. The
fact that we have moved 99.998 percent of the hazardous
materials without accidental release calls into question
whether or not that meets the cost-benefit test. There are
about 12,000 tank cars out there. It would cost $1.2 billion to
replace the fleet and so you want to make sure that the cost-
benefit analysis is observed.
Senator Rockefeller. Is the cost-benefit analysis which
ultimately resolves what the railroad car safety matter will
look like?
Mr. Hamberger. Obviously, if we were to make the skin of
the car 2-3-4 inches thick, it would be much safer. But then
the payload would be much less. So, there is that balance. And
it is the chemical companies, as you know, who own the cars. We
have to work with them in determining what is the appropriate
standard.
Senator Rockefeller. Well again, $1.2 billion is a lot of
money. On the other hand, if you have an explosion because you
have 99.998 percent--in the Intelligence business, that doesn't
impress anybody because it's always the .2 percent.
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir.
Senator Rockefeller. Which is going to happen. So, you're
betting the farm on something not happening because it hasn't.
Well, I mean, we've got reams of studies about 9/11 which
proved that was not a very forward-looking aspect in terms of
national security and what could we have done and people have
come up with all kinds of answers. But, I really think that
it's going to cost us money and therefore we shouldn't do it,
even though you agree that it would make it safer is a little
difficult for me.
Mr. Hamberger. I appreciate that input Senator. I will take
that back to the tank car committee and when we get push-back
from the chemical companies and tank car manufacturers, I'll
invoke this conversation.
Senator Rockefeller. Can I go to that tank car committee
meeting too?
Mr. Hamberger. We'd love to have you.
Senator Rockefeller. OK, now Mr. Wytkind?
Mr. Wytkind. Yes?
Senator Rockefeller. Do you think----
The Chairman. Could we move along a little bit?
Senator Rockefeller. I'll stop.
The Chairman. We have each taken 5 minutes.
Senator Rockefeller. Well then, I'll stop.
The Chairman. Do you want to ask your question?
Senator Rockefeller. No, not if it breaks the 5-minute
rule.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson?
STATEMENT OF HON. E. BENJAMIN NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hamberger,
I understand that before I arrived this morning that you made
reference to the importance of getting TRIA, Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act reenacted this year, re-authorized or put in
place for the future. I share that view and I hope that we will
be able to get the support that we need to get that in place.
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. In the Committee's bill, it focuses on
threats about high hazard materials and a lot of the discussion
this morning has already been about that and there have been a
number of recent accidents, as we know, South Carolina and
Texarkana. It all reminds us of the dangers that an accident
that involves toxic chemicals can really present to the public
at large. Particularly those that are somewhere in the
proximity of rail traffic. If you were required as S. 1052
contemplates to develop threat mitigation plans for high hazard
hazardous materials traveling in specific rail quarters in a
high threat area such as Washington, D.C., can you tell me why
the DHS shouldn't have some authority, some relationship with
the question of the security aspects of it, if not the safety,
but at least with respect to the security aspects?
Mr. Hamberger. Before Senator Rockefeller leaves, I would
like to say that it is indeed a bet-the-farm issue for us when
we move this material. As I pointed out in my testimony, given
the limitations on insurance and given that our common carrier
obligation, requires us to move hazmat, it clearly is a bet-
the-farm situation for our railroads. In fact, Senator, we are
working with TSA and the Department of Homeland Security in
developing risk-assessments for high hazardous materials
corridors. Four, I believe, have been completed for Washington,
New Orleans, Cleveland and New Jersey. We will continue to work
with them to identify the risks and then put in place
countermeasures for those corridors where high hazardous
material does move.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I have talked to some of your
members and I know that there is a significant interest on
their part to make the rail traffic safer and more secure.
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir. And I think one of the questions
is, once, if a plan is adopted and reduced to a regulation or
has to go through a governmental approval process to change,
then we believe we will not be as nimble as we need to be. For
example, using Rita and Katrina as examples, our members acted
immediately to detour materials out of the hurricane area up
through Memphis and Kansas City. We want to work with the
agency to develop the plan, but not have it as a mandate or
regulation that would require an approval process before we can
implement change based on intelligence we might get from the
National Joint Terrorism Task Force, for example.
Senator Ben Nelson. Now, the rail industry hauls various
pieces of equipment on the track, some of which may belong to
the rail industry but, some of which may not belong to the rail
industry. Who owns the tank cars that Senator Rockefeller was
asking about, for example?
Mr. Hamberger. The tank cars are owned by the chemical
companies or by a leasing company that leases them to the
chemical companies. We do not own them.
Senator Ben Nelson. So they are, as opposed to let's say
box cars?
Mr. Hamberger. That is correct. We own a substantial amount
of the box car traffic or the gondola traffic cars but, none of
the tank cars.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Crosbie, in conjunction with the
cost of security and who pays for the cost of security,
obviously, with respect to air traffic, there's an addition to
the ticket, $2.50 per segment for air travel. What kind of a
push back could you possibly get by adding that kind of a
surcharge, if you will, or security charge as more properly
described, what kind of a push back could you possibly get for
adding some of the cost of security for travelers?
Mr. Crosbie. We have one that occurred, I'd say that it
happened before my time with Amtrak, I joined Amtrak in 2003,
January of 2003 and at the time, as I understand it, there was
a push back from the states on basically, increasing the fares
and you've seen, I think, some of that recently as well on the
Northeast Corridor related to fares or reductions on discounts
are sensitive----
Senator Ben Nelson. Nobody likes the security charge on the
airline tickets, we've had discussions here about the fact that
if you travel non-stop from Washington to L.A. you paid one
surcharge and one security charge, if you go where it said to
stop in between, you have to pay for both segments which could
be the $5 dollars versus the $2.50 that you pay if you fly non-
stop on a longer journey. I mean there are all kinds of
questions about it but, it does seem reasonable to expect that
the travelers would pay part of that security charge.
Mr. Crosbie. We've certainly considered it.
Senator Ben Nelson. You certainly didn't have a lot of
competition to worry about in terms of passenger rail travel.
Mr. Crosbie. And we can go back and revisit it again. We
certainly haven't ruled it out, we never have ruled it out.
But, like I said when we proposed it in the past, it was not
received well throughout the Northeast Corridor.
Senator Ben Nelson. I would imagine. I didn't receive it
very well when they added it to airline travel. But, it's
always a question of not only how much, but who pays? So, I
appreciate the fact that you will take another look at that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
The Chairman. Thank you, I appreciate that line of
questioning, I've sort of been playing the bad guy here, before
you got here, Ben. But I do think there has to be some
examination of this, because there is a limit to how much more
we can allocate for Federal funds and I think Amtrak is
vulnerable now, because of the failure to find some way to
increase revenues, I really do. Mr. Hamberger, I hate to tell
you, but after the big Valdez disaster, I was the one that went
to London.
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And came back and said that the only answer
was to double-hull those tankers and people didn't like me at
all. You better listen to these guys. Someone ought to test
whether double-hulls on these tank cars will provide additional
security because I think right now the attitude in Congress
would be to mandate that all of those cars carrying chemicals
be double-sided. And the only thing that is going to deter that
would be sufficient proof that it wouldn't make any difference.
If that won't make a difference then I would urge you to go and
look and see what we're doing in Iraq by some of the changes
that are classified as a matter of fact to the tank cars that
are carrying fuel or the trucks that are carrying ammunition.
They have new facilities, new ways to improve the safety for
those people driving those by virtue of changes that have been
made in country to those tanks and those trucks.
And, I think Congress right now would be in the mood to say
that is a risk that should not be, that the cities of the
country should not be exposed to that risk if it really exists.
Mr. Hamberger. In fact Senator, we are working on a polymer
additive at our Pueblo rail research facility, the
Transportation Technology Center. It was developed for the Iraq
environment to see whether it can make the tank cars more
impervious. It is also a self-sealant so that if there is a
breach, it would self-seal. So, you are absolutely right and I
appreciate that.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, thank you all very much
for coming. I appreciate it and we will continue to consider
this bill that Senator Inouye and I and others have introduced.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mark Pryor, U.S. Senator from Arkansas
I would like to thank Chairman Stevens and Co-Chairman Inouye for
holding this hearing on rail security this morning. It is a very timely
hearing Mr. Chairman, especially for Arkansas. As many of you have
read, just last Saturday we had a tragic accident in Texarkana,
Arkansas. A Union Pacific train coming into station collided with
another Union Pacific train that was stationary on the tracks in the
Texarkana rail yard. The resulting explosion killed one Arkansan,
hospitalized 20 others, destroyed two homes and a rail bridge, and
temporarily evacuated close to 700 people from their homes.
The gas that caused the explosion, propylene, is a respiratory
toxicant that is abundantly produced in this country, typically used in
the production of plastics and rubber. I am sorry that this accident
happened, and I don't know the cause. I do know that the Federal
Railroad Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board
are already investigating, and I hope they have a report that will tell
us the cause of this terrible accident soon. I also hope that they will
keep me informed of the progress of the investigation as it moves
forward.
I have a couple of observations I would like to make in regards to
this accident. First, my thoughts and prayers are with the family of
the individual who was killed as well as the families whose homes were
destroyed or damaged as a result of the accident. Second, I would like
to publicly recognize the first responders of Texarkana who responded
so quickly to the explosions and kept fires from spreading to many,
many other homes in the area. This could have been a much larger
disaster but for their efforts.
Mr. Chairman, it is time that we ensure governments--local, State,
and Federal have the plans in place and the resources in place to be
able to quickly respond to accidents or terrorist attacks throughout
our rail system. It is too important. Too many people and too many
essential commodities move through the system each day to ignore the
risks inherent in the system. The first thing we must do in order to
put these plans in place is to conduct a risk assessment. You can't
decide where to spend precious resources unless you know where the
threats are. I encourage the Transportation Security Administration and
the Department of Homeland Security to work in coordination with the
Federal Railroad Administration and Department of Transportation in
conducting this risk assessment as quickly as possible. After
performing the assessment, we must move forward to ensure that workers
are properly trained to recognize safety risks and threats, and we must
ensure that appropriate technologies are developed and utilized to
protect our vital rail infrastructure.
I look forward to discussing rail security with all the interested
parties, including industry and labor as well as the Administration and
my colleagues in the Congress. I am happy to be a cosponsor of S. 1052.
the Transportation Security improvement Act of 2005, and look forward
to the thoughts of the witnesses on the rail aspects of this important
legislation. I thank the Chairman and Co-Chairman.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Cathleen A. Berrick
Question 1. The rail provisions of S. 1052 include security
upgrades, threat assessments, security training, research and
development, and several other important initiatives, many of which
were unanimously approved by the Senate last year. What is your
position on the rail provisions of S. 1052? How can we improve them?
Answer. Our comments on the rail provisions of S. 1052 pertain to
those affecting passenger rail operations. In general, we concur with
the provisions recommending that grants be awarded to upgrade rail
security. Some of the upgrades identified in the proposed legislation,
such as implementing public secure awareness campaigns for passenger
train operations, employee security awareness programs, and emergency
response training, reflect practices we have observed in our recent
work on rail security. It will be particularly important, as noted in
the legislation, for improvements in these areas and others to reflect
the results of vulnerability and risk assessments conducted by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and other appropriate agencies that identify
critical rail assets.
On the issue of rail risk assessments, we support the creation of a
task force to ensure that these assessments are completed and critical
assets and infrastructure and related vulnerabilities are identified.
It is unclear, however, if the task force is meant to include non-
federal stakeholders such as rail industry associations and regional
passenger rail agencies. We encourage the inclusion of these non-
federal stakeholders in the risk assessment process to leverage their
expertise. Consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,
we believe that it is important that these assessments incorporate an
overall methodology that will enable different rail assets to be
evaluated on a consistent basis. We also recommend that funds disbursed
to Amtrak for system wide security upgrades be based on a comprehensive
terrorism risk assessment and response plan that provides a baseline
for investment prioritization and decision making. During our review of
passenger rail security, we observed that Amtrak had not yet completed
such a system wide assessment.
With regard to the provision (Sec. 314(b)) instructing TSA to
review existing DOT regulations to identify areas where regulations
need to be revised to improve security, we believe that other actions
may also be taken to strengthen security. Specifically, we believe that
TSA should review existing rail security regulations, directives, and
standards and report to the Committee the results of its review of (a)
an assessment of whether established security regulations, directives,
and standards are consistent with industry best practices, and (b) a
plan and schedule for rail inspections to be conducted by rail security
inspectors. We further recommend, based on unique security practices
observed in foreign countries during our review, that the Department of
Homeland Security evaluate the feasibility of establishing and
maintaining an information clearinghouse on existing and emergency
security technologies and security best practices used in the passenger
rail industry both in the U.S. and abroad. We further recommend that
the Department be required to evaluate the potential benefits and
applicability of implementing covert testing procedures to evaluate the
effectiveness of rail system security personnel, practices used by
foreign rail operators that integrate security into infrastructure
design, and random searches and screening of passengers and their
baggage, pending the results of and ongoing joint Federal and industry
review of the impact of random screening on passenger rail operators.
Question 2. During GAO's investigation on passenger rail security,
did you have an opportunity to review a preliminary version of the
National Strategy for Transportation Security? Now that it has been
released, do you think it addresses some of the concerns that you
identified in your report, particularly your concerns regarding the
lack of a coordinated plan for rail security?
Answer. We did not have an opportunity to review a draft of the
NSTS during our recent audit work on rail security because, according
to TSA, the document was not available before we completed our work. We
believe that the NSTS since issued by DHS provides a broad framework
for conducting transportation risk assessments, and is a first step for
determining how critical transportation assets are to be evaluated for
protection. However, we believe that the strategy as written is too
general to address our concerns about how risk assessments are actually
to be conducted and how stakeholders are to be involved in the process.
It is also not clear from the strategy how assets within different
transportation sectors, such as passenger rail and aviation, are to be
compared in order to prioritize risks and allocate resources. Nor does
the strategy include transportation modal security plans, as required
by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
although broad elements of modal strategic plans are discussed. Other
strategic planning documents that TSA is expected to issue in 2006,
such as the Transportation Sector Specific Plan, may include these
specific details not contained in the NSTS. We believe it is important
that more specific information related to the Department's strategy for
securing all modes of transportation be developed, coordinated, and
shared with appropriate stakeholders, beyond what is published in the
NSTS.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. As the representatives of the major sectors of the
railroad industry, you live with the challenges of securing your
railroads everyday. We have tried to craft a bill that will help make
this job easier. Yet, I'm sure we can do more. Can you tell us which of
our provisions you feel are most needed and why? If there were one
thing more we could do in this bill to help you reach your goal of a
safe and secure railroad and workplace, what would it be?
Answer. The AAR supports provisions in the bill that call on the
Administration to develop a comprehensive security plan that includes
the identification of the most important rail assets and the
identification of the biggest threats to those assets. In developing
this plan, the government should use the AAR's Security Plan as its
basis. Additionally, freight railroads should be able to apply directly
for rail security grants rather than have to go through the states. The
AAR also fully support funding for research and the deployment of rail
security technologies, including automated security inspections,
infrastructure integrity monitoring systems, emergency bridge repair
and replacement, communications-based train control systems and tank
car vulnerability reductions.
One additional measure that the bill could address concerns the use
of the National Guard and local law enforcement support to augment
industry protection of critical infrastructure. To date, railroads have
been underwriting the cost of security measures for the general public
and national defense. Protective measures that would be required at the
highest alert levels could not be sustained by the rail industry alone.
Rail security legislation could make clear that states would be
reimbursed by the Federal Government for costs associated with
increased protection of critical rail infrastructure assets under
heightened alert conditions.
Question 2. The Committee's bill, S. 1052, focuses on the threats
posed by the rail shipment of ``high-hazard materials'' and requires
railroads to develop threat mitigation plans. While the safety
statistics you quote are impressive, recent accidents in Graniteville,
SC and Texarkana, AK, remind us of the dangers that an accident
involving toxic inhalants and explosives presents. If you were
required, as S. 1052 contemplates, to develop threat mitigation plans
for high-hazard hazardous materials traveling in specific rail
corridors in high threat areas, such as Washington D.C., why should the
DHS not have the power to approve those plans? If there is no approval
or enforcement authority, how can anyone be sure that the plans are
adequate?
Answer. The AAR and member railroads are working with TSA and the
Department of Homeland Security in developing risk assessments for high
hazardous materials corridors. Four have been completed to date
including Washington, New Orleans, Cleveland and New Jersey. We are
continuing to work with these agencies to identify risks and put in
place countermeasures for those corridors where high hazardous material
moves. We have consulted and conferred and they have not taken
exceptions to our plans. Further, on request, railroads have altered
their operations and cooperated with DHS for special situations and
events.
The USDOT, both under the Federal Rail Safety Act and the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act, already extensively regulates the safe
transportation of hazardous materials. The Research and Special
Programs Administration (now the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration, PHMSA) regulation HM-232, published in 2003,
requires railroads to develop and implement security plans when
transporting hazmat. This agency also has oversight authority for the
implementation of these plans.
If legislation requires a governmental approval process for threat
mitigation plans, we believe that it could actually jeopardize security
by limiting the ability of the railroads to respond to quickly changing
circumstances. The response of the railroads after Katrina and Rita is
illustrative. The railroads were able to act immediately to detour
hazmat materials out of the hurricane area using a routing plan
specific to that particular situation and without having to wait for an
approval from Washington.
To implement this provision as written, DHS would have to develop
criteria to define a satisfactory threat mitigation plan. Such criteria
would no doubt be promulgated by regulations. Regulations, then create
a certainty as to what the railroads are or are not doing, when for
true security, uncertainty is best. Equally, situations could occur
where railroads would need to alter their plans on short notice but
could be hamstrung by conflicting regulatory requirements. DHS already
has the authority to review our transportation security plans. We
believe that the most effective approach is to work in consultation
with DHS rather than a Federally-directed command and control effort.
Question 3. In your written statement you also oppose the
provision in our bill, Section 310, which requires that DHS and DOT in
consultation develop and issue guidance on rail worker security-
training programs and to review and approve training programs submitted
by railroad carriers. Do you believe the existing freight railroads
security-training program is sufficient?
Answer. The AAR does not oppose the provision that would require
DHS and DOT to develop and issue guidance on rail worker security
training or to review the security training programs advanced by
railroad carriers. The AAR opposes the institution of a Federal
approval process for the railroads' security training programs for the
following reasons. First, a Federal approval process tends to make it
difficult for the industry to adapt quickly to new circumstances and
adjust security training requirements on a real time basis. We are
concerned that railroad workers would then refuse to undertake any
security training unless it was specifically approved by the Federal
Government. Second, the provision unfairly singles out the railroad
industry--as opposed to all manufacturing and service industries--as
requiring Federal approval for corporate training practices.
Since the days of railroad bandits and terrorist outlaws, the Class
1 freight railroads have employed and maintained their own railroad
police forces to help protect the security of its employees, passengers
and freight. Some 2000 railroad police are employed today as duly
appointed sworn law enforcement officers certified or commissioned
under State and Federal statues. Reacting swiftly to the events of
September 11th, the major railroads put into place more than 50
countermeasures to ensure the security of the industry. Access to
important rail facilities and information was restricted. The industry
significantly increased cyber-security procedures and techniques.
Employee records were compared with FBI terrorist lists. Security
briefings, like safety briefings, became a daily part of an employee's
job. Some railroads have gone so far as to include security training as
part of the annual FRA-mandated employee certification process. In an
effort to further increase the level of security awareness for their
employees, AAR member railroads are working with the National Transit
Institute (NTI) at Rutgers University to develop a uniform security
awareness curriculum that will significantly enhance the level of
employee security training. The curriculum is modeled after the program
NTI and the Federal Transit Administration developed for public transit
agency employees.
The goal of the training is to provide rail employees with an
understanding of their role and responsibility in system security and
how to implement their companies' procedures upon detection of
suspicious objects or activities. Course modules include instructions
on reacting to threats, identifying suspicious activity, identifying
suspicious objects, and responding to incidents. These course modules
will be rolled out by the AAR member railroads within the next 90 days.
Question 4. How do you explain the disparity between AAR's
perception of the rail workers' confidence in the security training
they have received and the results of a recent Teamsters Union Rail
Division survey in which 85 percent of those responding claim to not
have received security training in the last twelve months?
Answer. Despite an enviable record of safety over more than two
decades, some rail labor union leaders are attempting to attack the
industry by tallying responses to a loaded union questionnaire and
touting it as a nationwide ``study'' of security gaps on U.S.
railroads. Union leaders more than a year ago gave the short
questionnaire to members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and
Trainmen (BLET) and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
Division (BMWED), both part of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Rail Labor Bargaining Coalition. It carried a Teamsters logo
and instructed members to ``please give this form to your local
chairman.''
Teamsters admit their report is not a scientific analysis. In
reality, it is a tactic aimed at the bargaining table that ignores the
facts and misrepresents the industry's strong safety record.
The fact is that after 9/11, America's railroads worked quickly
with Federal security agencies to develop and implement a multi-
layered, risk-based security plan for the Nation's freight rail network
that included security awareness training for rail employees. Since 9/
11, freight railroads have implemented more than 100 new security
actions and 50-plus changes in their operations. That's in addition to
the intensive safety training required of all railroad operating
employees and the special security training that all rail employees who
handle hazardous materials movements receive.
The industry is currently working with the National Transit
Institute (NTI) at Rutgers University to create an enhanced security
awareness training program for railroad employees throughout the
country.
America's freight railroads have developed train control technology
that will improve significantly the safety of freight operations. This
21st Century technology will help to prevent train collisions, improve
productivity and reduce accidents caused by fatigue and human error,
the most common causes of train accidents. Taking the Nation's freight
rail network to this next level of safety and success will require 21st
Century labor agreements and changes to antiquated work rules
negotiated years prior to these technological advances. U.S. freight
railroads are now in negotiations with unions representing engineers
and train crews--hence the interest of the Teamsters in discrediting
the safety and security record.
Question 5. I would like to compliment the railroad industry for
its commitment to Operation Respond. According to our information the
Operation Respond software is now available to over 56,000 response
agencies. Have the railroads given any thought to how this valuable
connection with emergency responders can help them deal with
communities concerns over railroad security? I am referring
specifically to advanced information and rerouting of hazardous
materials.
Answer. The Class 1 railroads have joined the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation in sponsoring
Operation Respond, a public-private partnership that develops software,
mapping systems, alert networks and training programs for community
responders. The AAR supports Operation Respond financially and is a
member of its Steering Committee. The AAR and Operation Respond signed
an agreement in November 2003 to assist emergency responders, promote
safety and increase security along our Nation's railroad system. This
agreement includes the development of an ``information sharing system''
to benefit emergency responders and railroad carriers, and the
integration of the Emergency Services Information Network Corporation
(ESINC) network and the AAR Rail Alert Network.
The freight railroads work aggressively to make sure that railroad
employees, first responders, emergency personnel and other necessary
officials are prepared to respond quickly and efficiently. Railroads
provide local emergency officials with information on the types of
hazardous materials being transported through their communities. The
railroads also work closely with Local Emergency Planning Committees to
make sure they have comprehensive and up-to-date emergency planning
information.
The Nation's freight railroads, both individually and in
partnership with the American Chemistry Council (ACC), train more than
20,000 emergency responders each year in communities across the Nation.
Railroad companies are active participants in the ACC's
TRANSCAER' (Transportation and Community Awareness and
Emergency Response), a nationwide effort to assist communities with
emergency response plans as well as CHEMTREC' (Chemical
Transportation Emergency Center), the ACC's 24-hour emergency response
operation. TRANSCAER requires its industry partners to adhere to a
rigorous code of management practices and strict standards for self-
evaluation, systems management and performance measurement and mutual
assistance. Under TRANSCAER, railroads bring hands-on and classroom
training to thousands of emergency first responders. They also help
emergency planning groups identify the general types of hazardous
materials moving through the community; provide guidance for local
officials to develop and evaluate their emergency response plans;
assist with testing and training.
Railroads also participate in CHEMTREC, a 24/7 operation that
provides immediate emergency response information and assistance during
emergencies involving chemicals. Each CHEMTREC member puts CHEMTREC's
number on its packages and tank cars. CHEMTREC maintains an extensive
database of information on chemicals, shippers and emergency response,
used by first responders during hazmat accidents. The railroads provide
needed information to CHEMTREC during railroad accidents so that the
information can be communicated to local emergency responders to help
mitigate accidents.
Individually, railroads sponsor annual training for first
responders across the country at the Emergency Response Training Center
in Pueblo, Co. The training includes hazardous materials technician;
tank car specialist; advanced tank car specialist; intermodal
specialist; incident commander; advanced hazmat technician; highway
emergency response; weapons of mass destruction; hazmat monitoring; and
transportation specialist. The railroad industry sponsors an Annual
Hazardous Materials Seminar attended by hundreds of emergency
responders, shippers, contractors as well as railroad emergency
response personnel to provide up-to-date training on the latest
emergency response techniques and regulations. It also provides hands-
on training to familiarize responders with equipment used in hazmat
accidents.
In big cities, small towns, and rural areas, railroads work with
communities to conduct full-scale emergency response drills that can
take up to six months to plan and involve responders from local,
county, state, regional and Federal levels. The railroads help planners
include every public agency that needs to be notified and involves them
in the drill. Drills are sometimes conducted across multiple towns and
regions to test how well communities work together in an emergency
situation.
Since 9/11, emergency training has also included a terrorism
component. AAR member railroads own four tank cars that are used for
both the emergency response drills as well as training purposes. Other
safety initiatives conducted by various railroads include mock safety
drills and table top simulations in communities; on-going assessments
of potential risks to employees and local communities resulting from
accidents or other emergencies; on-going training programs for those
employees who have response or communications responsibilities in the
event of an emergency; emergency exercises, at least annually, to test
operability of written emergency response plans; facility tours for
emergency responders to promote emergency preparedness and provide up-
to-date knowledge of facility operations; special environmental
monitoring teams, located along the railroad system, which can be
immediately mobilized to relay information to health experts. These
teams are equipped with advanced detection and monitoring equipment;
audits of hazmat contractors to ensure that equipment, training and
response capabilities meet standards; audits of internal operations and
chemical shippers for correct shipping documentation; reviews of non-
accident releases from tank cars and, if necessary, offers to retrain
chemical shippers regarding safe loading and sealing procedures.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. Are all AAR member railroads offering security training
for their employees?
Answer. All railroad employees have received security awareness
training. Security is also a part of employees' daily job safety
briefing. As a general rule we want our non-security employees to
report suspicious activity to the railroad police so they can take
appropriate action. We do not want non-security employees to put
themselves at risk in addressing a security concern. Railroad employees
will be briefed at daily job briefings when they need to take
additional action and what that action entails.
Question 2. Do you believe that the Federal Government has a role
in the development of uniform standards for employee security training
programs?
Answer. The most effective role that the Federal Government can
play with respect to employee security training programs is to share
best practices information with the industry. The AAR is currently
developing a uniform security awareness curriculum with the National
Transit Institute that will be deployed throughout the industry in 2006
that significantly enhances the level of employee security training.
The goal of the training is to provide rail employees with an
understanding of their role and responsibilities in system security,
and how to implement their companies' procedures upon detection of
suspicious objects or activities. Course modules include instructions
on reacting to threats, identifying suspicious activity, identifying
suspicious objects and responding to incidents.
The Department of Transportation implemented security training
requirements in 49 CFR Sec. 172.704. Since the railroads already comply
with the current regulations, and we have a system in place to instruct
employees on what they will need to do at increased alert levels, we
see no reason for additional regulations or standards.
The AAR does not believe it to be an appropriate Federal Government
role to mandate uniform standards to the private sector for employee
security training. Private industry inherently has an interest in the
protection of its employees and assets and is in the best position to
appropriately discern how best to train its workforce. Worker security
training practices across manufacturing and service industries will
vary greatly depending on many circumstances. What may be appropriate
security training for a locomotive engineer will not be the same as for
a hospital nurse, a cafeteria worker or a nuclear plant operator.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
William L. Crosbie
Question 1. As the representatives of the major sectors of the
railroad industry, you live with the challenges of securing your
railroads everyday. We have tried to craft a bill that will help make
this job easier. Yet, I'm sure we can do more. Can you tell us which of
our provisions you feel are most needed and why? If there were one
thing more we could do in this bill to help you reach your goal of a
safe and secure railroad and workplace, what would it be?
Answer. The Rail Security Act of 2005 provides the most
comprehensive approach to improving rail surface transportation systems
to date. Because of Amtrak's continuing fiscal uncertainty on future
funding levels for the Corporation as a whole, the most needed
provisions of S. 1052 for Amtrak are the rail security and life safety
sections (Sections 303, 304 and 305). While Amtrak is currently
committing capital resources to security improvements. it is critical
that the Federal Government provide an equitable share of funding for
the rail transportation mode.
Since 9/11, rail security issues and funding have been given short
shrift. The most important thing that this Committee could do to help
Amtrak reach its goal of a safe and secure railroad and workplace is,
simply, to have this legislation passed and enacted.
Question 2. Amtrak has been very proactive in working with DHS/TSA
and DOT/FRA to engage in pilot programs and other security activities.
What additional assistance do you need, in addition to more funding,
from the Federal Government to ensure adequate security for your
passengers?
Answer. Amtrak believes that some of the initiatives it has
coordinated with DHS/TSA provide a guide for government/industry
relations that can reasonably improve rail security. An example is the
use of TSA baggage screening personnel and equipment based upon certain
events (RNC, Inaugural events). This ought to be extended to
intelligence driven threats at specific locations or areas. In
addition, systematic security schemes ought to be deployed and
developed by government to keep terrorists off balance or to eliminate
security predictability. Such efforts performed in coordination with
rail agencies would improve rail security.
Intelligence information and sharing is one of the key elements for
helping to secure Amtrak. Like all rail agencies, Amtrak needs to
receive timely information to address threats. DHS/TSA must ensure that
dissemination of threat information is performed in a quick and
effective manner.
Because of the expanse of the Amtrak route system, Federal agencies
ought to provide assistance to Amtrak upon request to support security
initiatives (such as the TSA canine program). Consideration ought to be
given to state and local agencies receiving grant funding for
initiatives designed to improve rail and transit security.
DHS passenger rail and transit security grant programs should be
expanded and used as models for development of integrated rail security
plans and policies.
As stated in GAO report, 05-851, there needs to be a security
technology clearinghouse established by the government that rail
agencies can use to develop, coordinate or seek assistance in
purchasing, implementing and improving equipment to protect rail
security assets.
Question 3. Amtrak has shown leadership in its support of Operation
Respond hazardous materials tracking technology, particularly as it
relates to providing police and fire departments with valuable response
guidance. If and when something does happen, the Operation Respond
software is a valuable response tool for Amtrak. What do you think can
be done to encourage a more widespread incorporation of the Operation
Respond software by the communities Amtrak serves and the commuter rail
industry?
Answer. First responder training grants have been available to
state and local agencies for years. The grants are usually conditioned
upon a Federal agency approving the course or actually providing the
course. A possible method of expanding the use of the Operation Respond
program would be to allow first responders to receive funding for
Operation Respond training, to have Federal agencies conduct and/or
approve training and funding for Operation Respond training, and/or to
condition grant funding for first responders to take also Operation
Respond training. An evaluation of the ability of Operation Respond to
handle increased training demands should also be explored and/or
funded.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. I have worked hard, together with Chairman Stevens, to
craft a solid blueprint for future Federal actions to secure our
Nations' railroads. The rail provisions of S. 1052 include security
upgrades, threat assessments, security training, research and
development, and several other important initiatives, many of which
were unanimously approved by the Senate last year. Yet, if we can
strengthen our efforts, we must. I hope each of you will help us do
that. What is your position on the rail provisions of S. 1052? How can
we improve them?
Answer. The Department's views on S. 1052 were sent to the
Committee on November 10, 2005. We stand ready to render any technical
assistance that the Committee may request.
Question 2. In less than a year and a half, terrorists have killed
almost 300 people in bombings of mass transit systems, most recently in
London and in Madrid. Yet, this summer, Secretary Chertoff indicated in
an interview that the protection of transit and rail should largely be
the responsibility of cities and states and not the Federal Government.
Do you believe that funding for rail and transit security is a lower
priority for the Federal Government than for other transportation
modes?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
Congress have focused the majority of transportation security funding
towards what has been considered the largest and most consistent
potential threat--attacks on our aviation system. At the same time, TSA
has been working to improve security in other modes of transportation.
The Nation's transportation system is vast and complex, but
historically only in aviation security is the Federal role direct and
pre-eminent. For that reason, TSA and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) have known that the aviation model of security would not
work for securing other modes of transportation. Thus, the Department,
in coordination with TSA continues to work with State, tribal, local,
regional and private partners to help secure our transportation system.
These efforts span the spectrum of security, from intelligence and
information sharing to awareness through prevention, response, and
recovery from a potential terrorist attack in the United States.
The responsibility for securing our Nation's transportation system
is a shared one between Federal, State, and local governments, and
private industry stakeholders, and system users. Public and private
stakeholder investment in security is both appropriate and expected.
Currently, the Federal Government is providing funding, in the form of
security grants, to help ameliorate the cost borne by the private
stakeholders. TSA and ODP will continue to assist system operators
identify their security risks through: (1) security assessments, both
government-facilitated and through use of self-assessment tools, (2)
compliance efforts, and (3) through cooperative partnerships with
industry associations and operators to develop effective and cost-
efficient mitigation strategies.
An example of a cooperative partnership is the work that DHS,
including TSA have done and continues to do with Amtrak. TSA has
provided explosives detection canine teams to Amtrak upon its request
on several occasions, including during the Republican National
Convention, Inauguration and in New York during the fall 2005 security
alert. TSA is engaged in a continuous dialogue with Amtrak regarding
use of canine resources and is exploring the possibility of instituting
a more formal framework for providing such support to Amtrak in the
future. TSA fully integrates Amtrak into its security planning and is
working to further enhance information and intelligence sharing
capabilities.
Question 3. I am sure you are aware of the recent survey of the DHS
staff that showed a low morale. You are new to the Agency, or rather,
returning to it. How do you plan on addressing the morale issue?
Answer. Workforce morale is very important to me and I am pleased
to say that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken
a number of actions to improve morale since we initially surveyed our
entire workforce in February/March 2004, which was followed by a
resurvey of a sample of our workforce by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) and the Department later in 2004. Our Corporate
Organizational Action Plan outlines the broad interventions that fall
under four general areas that were highlighted as important for change:
fairness and treatment of others, rewards and recognition,
communication, and work environment/quality of worklife. Additionally,
our recently published TSA Compendium of Positive Practices identifies
interventions that can and have been taken by local leaders to address
workplace and workforce issues in a variety of areas.
Underlying the first two areas was a general sense that outstanding
performance does not result in any tangible rewards, such as increased
pay or bonuses, promotional opportunities or other career advancement.
I am pleased that both national and local rewards and recognition
programs have been established since the survey was administered. These
programs allow for both monetary and non-monetary recognition for a job
well done. A screener performance management system is being designed
that will better identify top performers and link their outstanding
performance to pay increases. This system will consider objective
measures of performance, assessment of competencies and will
incorporate continual feedback and coaching as critical components. We
will continue to seek suggestions for ways to publicly recognize and
reward those who do an outstanding job for TSA, both at the national as
well as the local, airport level.
Expanding career opportunities for our screener workforce is very
important to me. I recently announced a change in the job series and
title for TSA screeners that better signifies the important
professional role that they serve. We will also be establishing intern
programs that will assist members of our workforce to transition into
Federal Air Marshal and Inspector positions. I have decided to reserve
some Federal Air Marshal openings to be filled exclusively by TSA
employees. We currently have a variety of career planning services
available to TSA employees, including a career coaching service to help
guide employees in identifying career interests, conducting job
searches, and developing effective application materials. We also have
a web-based Career Toolbox to support employees' career planning.
Communication is also critical to employee morale. An important
aspect of that is to give employees at all levels a voice in matters
that directly affect them. To that end, there are initiatives at many
airports across the country to do this, many of them folded under
broader Model Workplace Programs--town hall meetings, screener advisory
groups and small on-site meetings through which action plan results for
an individual work location are fed back directly to the employees who
work at that site. At the national level, we have the Employee Issues
Coordination Council, bringing together organizations that deal with
employee issues, to provide a corporate focus and clearinghouse for
information on employee issues as well as to collect and analyze
information on employee issues, recommending corporate priorities for
action.
I have personally conducted numerous town hall meetings, both in
Headquarters and in airports across the country, since rejoining TSA.
Visible and empowering leadership is important. Role clarity is
essential to achieving optimal action planning and results. We must
highlight the leaders who are accountable and celebrate those who
achieve results. At a national level, I've announced the establishment
of a Screener Advisory Group and an Assistant Federal Security Director
Advisory Group. As their first charge, I have asked both groups to
propose a set of incentives that they believe are key to retaining our
most talented employees, and I eagerly await their suggestions.
We are also taking steps to address concerns related to the quality
of the work environment. Of utmost concern to me is the safety and
well-being of our workforce, particularly the screener workforce. I
will be focusing additional attention first on preventing injuries and
second, getting employees back on the job as soon as possible. The
physical work environment of many of our screeners continues to require
the attention of both local and national leadership. I am pleased that
many improvements have been put in place already and others are
underway in airports across the country.
Finally, it is important to continually assess employee morale and
whether the programs put in place make a difference. To that end, we
expect to again survey the entire TSA workforce in early 2006 to see
whether morale has improved, and in what areas. With those results, we
will be able to determine where additional effort and/or resources must
be focused to achieve further gains. Additionally, in November 2005,
TSA launched a National Exit Survey for departing employees, with the
same end in mind.
While I am pleased that some progress has been made, I recognize
that we have much more work to do. It is a challenge that is worth the
effort--to create the model workplace and become an employer of choice.
Question 4. How many staff does TSA have dedicated to rail
security--people whose primary job functions is to work on rail
security issues? How many people whose primary function is working on
non-aviation security issues? How many staff working on aviation
security issues?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is basing
its answers to these inquiries on an analysis of the funding source for
the salaries and benefits of TSA employees.
As of October 15, TSA staff includes a total of 116 individuals
dedicated to rail security, including 96 Rail Inspectors. The total
number of individuals whose primary function is on non-aviation
security issues is 220. This figure includes the 116 dedicated to rail
security. Employees paid from the Aviation Security budget category,
which include primarily security screeners, total about 51,440.
TSA notes that these totals do not include individuals serving in
cross-cutting areas such as credentialing, intelligence, and
administrative support.
Question 5. What percentage of TSA funding, apart from grants are
directed exclusively to rail security? How much is that in comparison
of funding directed exclusively to aviation?
Answer. Under the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006 (Pub.
L. 109-90), Congress appropriated funding to the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) as follows:
$4,607,386,000 for necessary expenses relating to providing
civil aviation security services;
$36,000,000 for necessary expenses related to providing
surface transportation security activities;
$74,996,000 for necessary expenses for the development and
implementation of screening programs of the Office of
Transportation Vetting and Credentialing;
$510,483,000 for necessary expenses relating to providing
transportation security support and intelligence; and
$686,200,000 for necessary expenses of the Federal Air
Marshals Service.
Of the $36 million for surface transportation security activities,
Congress directed that $8 million be set aside for the rail inspector
program and canine teams. TSA also intends to spend approximately $8
million for rail security efforts in FY 2006, for a total of about $16
million.
However, this number is not reflective of all efforts directed
towards rail security either within TSA, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), or the Federal Government. First, it should be noted
that other efforts and funding streams within TSA, particularly under
the transportation security support and intelligence category,
contribute to rail security efforts. For example, cross-cutting
offices, such as the Chief Technology Office, Office of the Chief
Counsel, Transportation Security Operations Center, Human Resources,
Chief Information Officer, and Transportation Security Intelligence
Service, provide support to all programs within TSA, including the rail
security programs. Specifically, TSA and the Department have focused
significant resources on intelligence with the goal of identifying and
stopping a terrorist before he reaches the intended target. Because of
these cross-cutting offices and other Departmental efforts, it is
impossible to parse a percentage of funds spent exclusively on rail or
aviation.
Additionally, Congress has funded programs for infrastructure
protection and research and development through other DHS entities. TSA
works closely and its programs align with the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) and Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorates efforts on rail and infrastructure security along with the
Department of Transportation's modal administrations efforts in rail.
In summary, TSA's spending on rail security is obviously significantly
less than the amount spent on aviation security. That is the result of
the congressionally mandated security role TSA provides in aviation by
screening passengers and baggage versus a more standard-setting and
compliance role that it plays in rail security.
Question 6. TSA may use ``risk/value analysis,'' but will the
funding & staff be there to address the risks?
Answer. As indicated above, Congress recently appropriated funding
for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for FY 2006, and
TSA will manage the level of resources that have been made available by
utilizing a threat-based, risk-management approach to transportation
security. TSA constantly reassesses these resources and budget
priorities as part of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) risk-
based management approach to securing the Nation's critical
infrastructure. In addition, since the creation of TSA, Congress has
provided very specific direction as to how funds are to be spent. TSA
is responsible for evaluating risk to the transportation system across
a changing array of threats, sharing threat and risk information with
transportation stakeholders (public and private), establishing
consistent national transportation security standards across all modes,
monitoring compliance with those standards by transportation
stakeholders and in the event of a transportation security incident,
ensuring rapid restoration of service and public confidence. TSA and
our partners within DHS, in coordination with the Department of
Transportation (DOT), have conducted vulnerability assessments on
transportation assets, such as rail and transit, to determine their
susceptibility to attack or compromise.
Ensuring that our Nation's transportation systems are secure must
be accomplished through effective partnering between appropriate
Federal, State, local and private industry entities. Of course, DHS is
charged with the responsibility for protecting all modes of
transportation, but it has consistently held that this responsibility
must be shared with Federal, State, local and private industry
partners, many of whom were already in the business of providing
security for their particular piece of the transportation puzzle. The
Administration and Congress have recognized the importance of
supporting these efforts through grants to our governmental and
industry partners. In the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006
(Pub. L. 109-90), the Office for Domestic Preparedness will mange the
following transportation security programs as directed by Congress to
include the following:
Rail and Transit Security--$150,000,000
Port Security--$175,000,000
Intercity Bus Security--$10,000,000
Trucking Security--$5,000,000
Additionally, DHS has allocated $8.6 billion since its creation for
counterterrorism preparedness. These funds can be allocated by State
and local governments for rail security efforts.
Question 7. How much of the Transit Security Grant Program funding
has been actually obligated? What percentage of this has gone to
freight rail security?
Answer. In FY 2005, Congress directed that $150 million be made
available for rail and transit security grants. Of these funds, the
Department of Homeland Security's Office for Domestic Preparedness
(ODP) made available nearly $134 million under the Transit Security
Grant Program (TSGP). To date, ODP has obligated all funds under the
TSGP. While none of these funds were awarded to promote freight rail
security efforts, the Department did make available $5 million from the
remaining rail and transit security grant funding provided by Congress
for a Freight Rail Security Program. This $5 million was awarded to the
Railroad Research Foundation to undertake three projects: (1)
development of a Rail Corridor Risk Management Tool; (2) development of
a Rail Corridor Hazmat Response and Recovery Tool; and (3) development
and demonstration of ``Safe Haven'' concepts for in-route toxic
inhalation hazard shipments. These projects were made available and are
being managed by the Office for Domestic Preparedness as identified
through partnerships with other DHS entities, including TSA, the Border
and Transportation Security Directorate, and the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, as well as with the Federal
Railroad Administration and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration within the Department of Transportation. These projects
offer the potential for long-term enhancement of freight rail security.
Question 8. In June 2005, Mr. Ed Wytkind, President of the
Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO, sent a letter to Secretary
Chertoff outlining several concerns over the status of transportation
security in this country. Specifically, the letter points out that no
Federal agency has issued security training mandates for rail workers
and urges DHS to ``address this problem by immediately issuing training
standards and requirements.'' To my knowledge, the Department has not
yet responded to this letter and DHS and TSA still has not mandated
that passenger rail agencies provide security training to employees as
a condition of receiving security grants. What is TSA doing to ensure
front line rail employees are receiving security training?
Answer. TSA has issued two rail security directives (SD RAILPAX-04-
01 and SD RAILPAX-04-02), which require rail operators to implement
various security measures. While ``security training'' in a specified
manner or amount of time is not expressly mandated, each of these
measures requires passenger rail systems to educate their personnel on
security requirements and ensure their implementation through repeated
advisories and guidance. Training programs and materials delivered to
employees meet this responsibility.
In addition, DHS is partnering with the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) to assist its employee member
organizations in developing training standards for public
transportation employees. These training standards are developed in
collaboration with transit industry professionals, industry experts,
and professional training institutes. In addition, both the Federal
Transit Administration and TSA fund and support a variety of safety and
security training initiatives for transit agencies and their employees.
Much of the training is available at no cost. Transit-specific training
programs include recognizing terrorist activity and response,
explosives incidents, weapons of mass destruction, and responding to a
hijacking. For example, through the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center, TSA sponsored the Land Transportation Anti-Terrorism Training
Program which has trained over 400 Law Enforcement and Transit
personnel as of the end of FY05.
Question 9. During a hearing on the London bombings, you described
security on the Nation's mass transit systems as ``outstanding''
despite the fact that TSA had not completed its security risk
assessments and transit workers, like rail workers, are not being
trained. How would you characterize the state of security on our
railroads? What steps need to be taken to improve rail security and
what is TSA doing about it?
Answer. The mass transit and rail industry, and State and local
governments, are to be commended for their proactive response and
significant commitments in addressing homeland security issues, both
pre- and post-9/11, and following the Moscow, Madrid and London bombing
incidents. The responsible government approach has been to continue to
leverage these efforts as we developed baseline standards and refined
our rail security strategy.
To this end, the United States Government has made significant
enhancements to transportation security, specifically in rail and mass
transit, and put specific measures in place after the Madrid attacks.
Security standards for rail are in place; criticality and vulnerability
assessments have been completed and are continuing; inspectors are
being deployed across the country; and new technologies have been
tested. For example, TSA took major strides in developing and field-
testing a new technology, in the Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot
(TRIP) for screening passengers and baggage in a rail environment for
deployment during high threat scenarios. (Deployed to the Republican
National Convention in August 2004 and Presidential Inauguration in
January 2005 at the request of Amtrak).
Nevertheless, I recognize that improving the state of security in
our Nation's transportation network and facilities is a continuing
endeavor. Specific efforts that TSA is taking in the rail area include:
continuing rail corridor assessments in high threat urban
areas where Toxic by Inhalation (TIH) materials are
transported;
expanding inspections of passenger rail operations and their
associated facilities for compliance with the TSA issued
security directives and identification of potential security
gaps, utilizing TSA's 100 rail inspectors; and
Continuing to partner with the DHS' Science & Technology
Directorate to pursue and test detection and other technologies
applicable in the rail and mass transit environment.
TSA will also continue to assist system operators identify their
security risks through: (1) security assessments, both government-
facilitated and through use of self-assessment tools, (2) compliance
efforts, and (3) through cooperative partnerships with industry
associations and operators to develop effective and cost-efficient
mitigation strategies.
Question 10. Does TSA have plans for more non-aviation related
security requirements for the industry? If so, in what areas?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security publishes a semiannual
summary of all current and projected rulemakings, reviews of existing
regulations, and completed actions of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and its component agencies and divisions. This agenda
provides the public with information about DHS' regulatory activity,
thereby enabling the public to be more aware of and effectively
participate in the Department's regulatory activity. DHS made its most
recent semiannual publication on October 31, 2005 (70 FR 64629). The
following, relating specifically to TSA's regulatory agenda, is
excerpted from the October 31, 2005 entry in the Federal Register:
Transportation Security Administration--Proposed Rule Stage
Regulation
Sequence Number Title Identifier
Number
1441 Aircraft Repair Station Security 1652-AA38
1442 Foreign Air Carriers 1652-AA40
1443 Transportation Worker 1652-AA41
Identification Credential
(TWIC) Maritime
1444 Modification of the Aviation 1652-AA43
Security Infrastructure Fee
(ASIF)
1445 Due Process for FAA Certificate 1652-AA44
Holders and for Other Threat
Assessments
1446 Registered Traveler (RT) 1652-AA47
Transportation Security Administration--Final Rule Stage
Regulation
Sequence Number Title Identifier
Number
1447 Imposition and Collection of 1652-AA00
Passenger Civil Aviation
Security Service Fees
1448 Aviation Security Infrastructure 1652-AA01
Fees (ASIF)
1449 Air Cargo Security Requirements 1652-AA23
1450 Privacy Act of 1974: 1652-AA34
Implementation of Exemptions;
Intelligence, Enforcement,
Internal Investigation, and
Background Investigation
Records
1451 Flight Training for Aliens and 1652-AA35
Other Designated Individuals;
Security Awareness Training for
Flight School Employees
1452 Secure Flight Program 1652-AA45
1453 Technical Amendment: 1652-AA46
Administrative Organizational
Changes
1454 Privacy Act of 1974: 1652-AA48
Implementation of Exemptions;
Secure Flight Records
Transportation Security Administration--Long-Term Actions
Regulation
Sequence Number Title Identifier
Number
1455 Civil Aviation Security Rules 1652-AA02
1456 Security Programs for Aircraft 1652-AA03
Weighing 12,500 Pounds or More
1457 Private Charter Security Rules 1652-AA04
1458 Background Checks for Airport 1652-AA06
Workers
1459 Protection of Sensitive Security 1652-AA08
Information
1460 Security Compliance Program for 1652-AA09
Aircraft Operators
1461 Security Compliance Program for 1652-AA10
Airports
1462 Criminal History Records Checks 1652-AA11
1463 Transportation of Explosives 152-AA16
From Canada to the United
States Via Commercial Motor
Vehicle and Railroad Carrier
1464 Security Threat Assessment for 1652-AA17
Individuals Applying for a
Hazardous Materials Endorsement
for a Commercial Drivers
License
1465 Surface Transportation Security 1652-AA26
Directives
1466 Enhanced Security Procedures for 1652-AA39
Operations at Certain Airports
in the Washington, D.C.,
Metropolitan Area Flight
Restricted Zone
1467 Ronald Reagan Washington 1652-AA49
National Airport: Enhanced
Security Procedures for Certain
Operations
Question 11. The recent GAO report on passenger rail security (GAO-
05-851) questions the feasibility of enforcing the TSA security
directive issued to passenger rail operators following the Madrid
bombings in May 2004. Are the May 20, 2004 passenger rail security
directives enforceable? Does TSA have penalty authority with regards to
non-aviation security directives? Has TSA issued fines against any
passenger rail operator or owner for noncompliance?
Answer. The TSA Security Directives issued on May 20, 2004, are
fully enforceable. TSA has available a number of enforcement mechanisms
to ensure that regulated entities comply with applicable requirements.
TSA may employ a variety of tools to encourage action that secures
compliance, including:
On-the-spot counseling: Minor instances of noncompliance are
identified and can be immediately corrected in the presence of
the inspector.
Corrective action: Measures taken by the passenger rail
system to correct a deficiency in a manner that protects
against recurrences. These measures may be developed by the
passenger rail system and approved by TSA, expressly prescribed
by TSA, or mutually prepared by the system and TSA. Written
documentation of the corrective action is made through a simple
written description of measures taken to address the
discrepancy or preparation of the formal written plan
compliance plan.
Compliance notice: TSA may issue a compliance notice to a
passenger rail system following an inspection that reveals
noncompliance with mandatory security requirements, such as the
security directives. The notice requests the passenger rail
system owner or operator to submit a compliance plan, describe
corrective actions already taken, or dispute the allegation of
noncompliance within 10 days of receipt.
TSA also possesses general authority to seek civil penalties
through proceedings in Federal District Court, against any party for
any violation of a TSA issued standard, regulation, or requirement.
Under 49 U.S.C. 46305, a civil penalty ``may be collected by bringing a
civil action against the person subject to the penalty, a civil action
in rem against an aircraft subject to a lien for a penalty, or both.''
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 46301(a)(4), the maximum penalty available for
non-aviation security related violations is $10,000. Initiating any
proceeding in Federal District Court requires the concurrence and
assistance of the Department of Justice. To date, TSA has not initiated
any enforcement action through Federal District Court proceedings. TSA
may seek and impose civil penalties for alleged violations of aviation
security standards through an administrative proceeding (unless certain
statutory exclusions under 49 U.S.C. 46301(d) apply). However, TSA
requires additional authority from Congress to seek and impose civil
penalties for alleged violations of surface security standards through
an administrative proceeding.
Question 12. The results of the Teamsters Rail Security Report
released on September 29, 2005, are very distressing. Sixty-eight
percent of the respondents of the survey saw trespassers in the rail
yard on the date the survey was taken, and 96 percent responded that
there was no security presence in the yard that day. Additionally, 84
percent of the respondents stated they had received no additional
training relating to terrorism prevention in the last twelve months,
and 62 percent responded they had not been trained in the railroads'
emergency action or response plan. Has TSA issued any security
directives that address these security problems? If so, does TSA intend
to enforce them? If not, are such security directives being put under
consideration?
Answer. TSA issued rail security directives in May 2004 (SD
RAILPAX-04-01 and SD RAILPAX-04-02). In crafting the security
directives, TSA required rail operators to take steps to provide for
the physical security of rail facilities, such as rail yards. Among
other things, rail operators are required to ensure that their
personnel are notified through various media of changes in threat
conditions, reinforce employee watch programs, and ensure that
employees maintain vigilance and immediately report through the
appropriate chain of command any situation that constitutes a potential
threat or suspicious activity. Additionally, the systems are required
to inform passengers of heightened security measures and the need to be
vigilant and report suspicious activity. While ``security training'' in
a specified manner or amount of time is not expressly mandated, each of
these measures requires passenger rail systems to educate their
personnel on security requirements and ensure their implementation
through repeated advisories and guidance. Training programs and
materials delivered to employees meet this responsibility.
In addition, DHS is partnering with the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) to assist its employee member
organizations in developing training standards for public
transportation employees. These training standards are developed in
collaboration with transit industry professionals, industry experts,
and professional training institutes. In addition, both the Federal
Transit Administration and TSA fund and support a variety of safety and
security training initiatives for transit agencies and their employees.
Much of the training is available at no cost. Transit-specific training
programs include recognizing terrorist activity and response,
explosives incidents, weapons of mass destruction, and responding to a
hijacking. For example, through the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center, TSA sponsored the Land Transportation Anti-Terrorism Training
Program which has trained over 400 Law Enforcement and Transit
personnel as of the end of FY05.
As indicated in the response to question #11, TSA possesses a
variety of enforcement tools to elicit compliance with the security
directives.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. What is your agency doing to ensure that front line
rail employees--the eyes and ears of the railroad environment--are
receiving appropriate security training?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has issued
two rail security directives (SD) (SD RAILPAX-04-01 and SD RAILPAX-04-
02), which require rail operators to implement various security
measures. While ``security training'' in a specified manner or amount
of time is not expressly mandated, each of these measures requires
passenger rail systems to educate their personnel on security
requirements and ensure their implementation through repeated
advisories and guidance. Training programs and materials delivered to
employees meet this responsibility.
Through the Annex to the Interdepartmental DHS and DOT MOU the
Office for Domestic Preparedness is partnering with the FTA to
determine and deliver where appropriate cross discipline training
programs designed to enhance the awareness, and ability to prepare for,
respond to, and recover from an incident. In addition, DHS is
partnering with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
to assist its member organizations in developing training standards for
public transportation employees. These training standards are developed
in collaboration with transit industry professionals, industry experts,
and professional training institutes. In addition, both the Federal
Transit Administration and TSA fund and support a variety of safety and
security training initiatives for transit agencies and their employees.
Much of the training is available at no cost. Transit-specific training
programs include recognizing terrorist activity and response,
explosives incidents, weapons of mass destruction, and responding to a
hijacking. For example, through the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center, TSA sponsored the Land Transportation Anti-Terrorism Training
Program which has trained over 400 Law Enforcement and Transit
personnel as of the end of FY05.
Question 2. By law, the Secretary of Transportation--or his
designee--sits on the Amtrak board of directors. In April, the board
approved Amtrak's funding request for Amtrak's security needs of up to
$254 million a year (figure includes ``support'' functions as well). If
this funding was needed to help secure Amtrak and its 25 million annual
passengers, why didn't President Bush ask for it in his budget?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) believes
that this question would most appropriately be directed to the
Department of Transportation, since Amtrak funding is within its
purview.
Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of State
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) has provided
$6,373,730 in grant funding to Amtrak in FY 2005 for security
enhancements for intercity passenger rail operations in the Northeast
Corridor (service between Washington, D.C. and Boston, Massachusetts)
and at Amtrak's hub in Chicago, Illinois. In addition, a further
$726,270 in technical support is being provided to Amtrak in FY 2005
through the SLGCP Mass Transit Technical Assistance Program. This
support will entail a facilitated risk assessment of Amtrak's Northeast
Corridor and Chicago operations designed to provide Amtrak with a risk
management strategy and roadmap for making funding allocation decisions
on security enhancements to the most critical portions of its system.
Question 3. Will the Administration specifically request funding
for Amtrak's security needs in FY07?
Answer. Again, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
believes that this question would most appropriately be directed to the
Department of Transportation, since Amtrak funding is within its
purview. TSA fully integrates Amtrak into all of our security planning
and is working to further enhance information and intelligence sharing
capabilities.
Question 4. How would you characterize the state of security on our
railroads?
Answer. The mass transit and rail industry, and State and local
governments, are to be commended for their proactive response and
significant commitments in addressing homeland security issues, both
pre- and post-9/11, and following the Moscow, Madrid and London bombing
incidents. The responsible government approach has been to continue to
leverage these efforts as we developed baseline standards and refined
our rail security strategy.
To this end, the United States Government has made significant
enhancements to transportation security, specifically in rail and mass
transit, and put specific measures in place after the Madrid attacks.
Security standards for rail are in place; criticality and vulnerability
assessments have been completed and are continuing; inspectors are
being deployed across the country; and new technologies have been
tested. Federal efforts have focused on greater information sharing
between the industry and all levels of government, addressing
vulnerabilities, developing new security measures and plans, increasing
training and public awareness campaigns, and providing greater
assistance and funding, mostly in the form of security grants, to help
ameliorate the cost borne by the non-federal stakeholders.
Following both July incidents in London, Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) surface transportation security inspectors were
deployed to operations centers for passenger rail and mass transit
systems. Those inspectors were supplemented by Federal Railroad
Administration inspectors. Working together, they found the systems had
initiated actions to ensure compliance with security requirements and
swiftly implemented enhanced security measures, even before the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had raised the threat level for
mass transit to Orange.
Of note, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) reported that as
of August 2005 some 90 percent of the Nation's top 50 transit systems
were in full compliance with its Top 20 Security Program Action Items
for Transit Agencies. FTA developed this list following the 9/11
terrorist attacks and has regularly monitored compliance with these
guidelines. TSA will continue to build upon this frame work as it
utilizes a threat-based, risk-management approach to continually focus
resources, as needed, to ensure the security of the Nation's
transportation system and its critical infrastructure.
Question 5. What is TSA doing to track high-hazmat rail cars?
Question 6. Does the Administration believe that active monitoring
of the movement of high-hazmat rail cars is necessary?
Answer to Questions 5 and 6. There is no class of materials
classified as ``high hazmat'' in Federal law or regulation. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is currently studying the
feasibility and value of actively monitoring rail cars that carry
materials that are Toxic by Inhalation (TIH). The study will encompass
both testing of available technology, cost and the development of
systems to allow for third-party tracking of rail car movements. At
present, the rail industry has the ability to track these TIH shipments
using existing technology that has been established for commercial and
operational purposes. TSA is studying enhanced technologies to
supplement the current method of tracking rail cars. It is envisioned
that these enhanced technologies may provide more accurate real-time
location tracking and provide additional data such as product releases
and container tampering. TSA is also considering what level of threat
will require active monitoring and the value of the data generated by
active monitoring.
In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
Department of Transportation (DOT) have been working on various
initiatives that support the development of a national risk-based plan
to address the shipment of hazardous materials by rail and truck. For
rail, DHS and DOT are focusing on the assessments of vulnerabilities of
high threat urban areas where TIH are transported, identification of
practical alternatives to placards on rail tank cars, new rail car
design standards, and the development of hazardous materials security
plans to improve the adequacy and effectiveness of industry security
plans. Through the FY 2005 TSGP, the Office for Domestic Preparedness
provided $5,000,000.00 for three projects designed to enhance the
security of TIH corridors. The three projects are:
1) Development of a Rail Corridor Risk Management Tool;
2) Development of a Rail Corridor Hazmat Response and Recovery
Tool; and
3) Development and demonstration of ``Save Haven'' concepts for
in-route toxic inhalation hazard shipments.
These projects were made available and are being managed by the
Office for Domestic Preparedness as identified through partnerships
with other DHS entities, including TSA, the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate, as well as with the Federal Railroad
Administration and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration within the Department of Transportation. These projects
offer the potential for long-term enhancement of freight rail security.
Question 7. Assuming the Federal Government is able to collect
vital information about hazmat releases, how will it distribute this
data to first responders who may be putting their own lives at risk
just by arriving on scene?
Answer. Measures are in place to provide state and local
governments, and by extension first responders, sufficient information
to protect their communities in the event of an accident or an attack
involving hazmat releases. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently provide
notification to municipalities on the pending movement of hazardous
materials through local jurisdictions on a case-by-case basis. DHS/TSA
believes that case-by-case notification is sufficient and that in
otherwise normal circumstances comprehensive real-time notification is
not warranted. For example, here in Washington, D.C., for special
events such as the Fourth of July and President Reagan's funeral, local
governments were provided information in advance of hazardous materials
shipments passing through the local jurisdictions in this area. In such
rare cases, information provided to local jurisdictions can be analyzed
by the governments in light of the risk and threat to determine whether
additional measures are necessary. In addition, rail carriers annually
provide the governments with a picture of the types and quantities of
the hazardous materials that have come through the jurisdiction. This
information enables the governments to prepare, plan, and train for any
incident involving a hazardous material that is typically transported
through their jurisdictions.
As noted in question 6 above, the vision for the Development of a
Rail Corridor Hazmat Response and Recovery Tool would be to improve
response by providing first responders with the appropriate tools,
equipment, and training for responding to a major freight rail
incident.
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, concerns were
raised that placards may unduly draw attention to the transport of
hazardous materials on rail cars. On July 25, 2003, TSA coordinated and
hosted a Placard Workshop to enable industry and first responder
representatives to discuss with TSA the issues surrounding the
potential removal of placards on rail cars. As a result of the Placard
Workshop, TSA was requested to conduct an independent study, and it
contracted with the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) to determine
whether there are feasible alternatives to the current rail placarding
system. The comprehensive study examined the available technology, and
input from first responders, rail operators and other key stakeholders
was included. As a result of the findings of the study, Secretary
Chertoff announced on April 7, 2005, that the Department was
recommending continuation of the placard system for hazardous materials
transported by rail, which is designed to ensure the safety of citizens
and first responders.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Edward Wytkind
Question 1. As the representatives of the major sectors of the
railroad industry, you live with the challenges of securing your
railroads everyday. We have tried to craft a bill that will help make
this job easier. Yet, I'm sure we can do more. Can you tell us which of
our provisions you feel are most needed and why? If there were one
thing more we could do in this bill to help you reach your goal of a
safe and secure railroad and workplace, what would it be?
Answer. As explained in my submitted written statement, Section
310, the Rail Worker Security Training Program, is extremely important
and will from our perspective make important improvements to rail
security. Training is relatively inexpensive and experts have confirmed
that a well prepared and informed workforce can help prevent a
terrorist attack and mitigate harm if one does occur. As far as
improvements that we would like to see, we continue to believe the
whistleblower protections need to be enhanced to ensure that workers
are not discouraged or intimidated from reporting security concerns.
Question 2. From listening to your testimony and the statements of
other witnesses at the hearing, there seems to be some disconnect
between what we have heard and the perception from the vantage point of
the rail worker. Based on the Teamsters Rail Security Report released
on September 29, 2005 and your testimony, we learned that rail workers
are not receiving the training they need to do their jobs effectively,
and that there is too often open access to facilities where an ill-
intentioned person could do significant harm. Can you provide more
information concerning what your members are seeing everyday and what
we can do about it?
Answer. We agree that there is a disconnect between what industry
is reporting and our perspective on what is actually happening on the
ground. I should note that my observations are based on conversations
we have had with local leaders and rank-and-file workers. These are the
employees who are on the front lines and understand their railroad
property and its vulnerabilities as well as know first-hand how little
is being done to deal with security risks. Specifically, our members
report that rail facilities, tracks and other infrastructure are not
being adequately protected or secured. Credentials are not being fully
used and there is potential for unauthorized individuals to enter
facilities. In addition, and as explained in more detail below,
security training is sorely lacking.
Question 3. Are you familiar with the survey, discussed above, of
rail workers regarding rail security efforts undertaken by the
Brotherhood or Locomotive engineers and Trainman that found that
workers do not feel adequately trained to address a rail security
incident? Do you believe that these findings are generally consistent
with the situation facing the employees that you represent?
Answer. While we cannot speak to the specifics of the survey, we
can report that the findings are generally consistent with the
situation that is faced by the employees represented by TTD unions.
Question 4. Can you explain some of the benefits of consistent
worker training standards, and why from the perspective of your members
a Federal mandate is needed?
Answer. Workers need to know how to identify a security risk, what
to do in response, and the steps that must be taken in the event an
attack does occur. While we understand that not all workers need the
same training, without Federal standards and guidelines that carriers
must follow, our experience is that the content of training will be
highly deficient. Furthermore, if training is left to the discretion of
individual carriers, we know that too often carriers will opt not to
provide training across the board. Safety and security should not vary
from carrier to carrier - we must have one level of security throughout
the system. Simply put, a mandate is needed because without it the
status-quo will remain in effect and that is simply not acceptable.
Question 5. Do you know what percentage of the front-line rail
employees that you represent have received any security training?
Answer. We do not currently have that data for our members. It
should also be noted that even if training has occurred, it is a
separate question if that training is comprehensive and if recurring
training is being done.
Question 6. You mentioned in your testimony, the need for more
robust whistleblower protection for rail workers. What about the
provision of this Committee's bill, Sec. 311 of S. 1052? What changes
do you recommend to what is already provided? Are you aware of specific
cases where employees have been punished for raising security concerns?
Answer. Section 311 is a good start and we supported its inclusion
but we believe that improvement should be made. Specifically, the
provision should follow the model of protections provided for financial
whistleblowers as in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This law ensures that
whistleblower complaints are considered in a more timely fashion and
allows workers to pursue a action in Federal court if agency response
is unnecessarily delayed.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Joseph H. Boardman
Question 1. I have worked hard, together with Chairman Stevens, to
craft a solid blueprint for future Federal actions to secure our
Nations' railroads. The rail provisions of S. 1052 include security
upgrades, threat assessments, security training, research and
development, and several other important initiatives, many of which
were unanimously approved by the Senate last year. Yet, if we can
strengthen our efforts, we must. I hope each of you will help us do
that. What is your position on the rail provisions of S. 1052 ? How can
we improve them?
Answer. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has worked with
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide the
Administration's views on S. 1052. Those views were conveyed to
Chairman Stevens by letter dated November 10, 2005. We would, however,
like to point out some additional issues with S. 1052 that should be
considered.
Sec. 304. Fire and Life-Safety Improvements
This section would authorize a total of $670 million for FY 2006-
2008 to be made available to the Secretary of Transportation, from
funds appropriated under section 102 of the bill to the Secretary, to
make grants to Amtrak for design and construction of fire- and life-
safety improvements to tunnels in New York, New York; Baltimore,
Maryland; and Washington, D.C. Funds appropriated pursuant to this
section would remain available until expended. Amtrak would be required
to submit for the Secretary's approval an engineering and financial
plan for projects and a project management plan for each project. The
Secretary would not be authorized to disburse funds to Amtrak unless
the Secretary had approved such plans. The section would also establish
a complex series of deadlines for the Secretary's review of the plans.
DOT opposes this provision as an unnecessary infringement on the
Secretary's discretion to carry out the review of Amtrak's plans. DOT
recognizes the benefits of fire- and life-safety improvements to these
critical elements of the Nation's rail infrastructure. In recognition
of the importance of these tunnels, not just for intercity but also for
commuter rail service, we believe that any funds made available for
this purpose should flow through a Federal-State partnership such as
that proposed in the Administration's April 13, 2005 legislative
proposal to restructure intercity rail passenger service--the Passenger
Rail Investment Reform Act.
Sec. 315. Welded Rail and Tank Car Safety Improvements
This section would mandate that FRA undertake certain actions to
improve the safety of railroad track and railroad tank cars.
There does not appear to be a need for this legislation because a
very similar provision was enacted in August 2005 as section 9005 of
the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity
Act of 2005 (SAFETEA-LU, Pub. L. 109-59).
Sec. 316. Report Regarding Impact on Public Safety of Train Travel
Communities Without Grade Separation
This section would require that DOT, in consultation with the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and State and local
governments, study and report to Congress on the effect of blocked
highway-rail grade crossings upon the ability of emergency responders
to perform public safety and security duties.
There does not appear to be a need for this legislation as a
similar provision was enacted in section 9004 of SAFETEA-LU.
Question 2. The FRA issued a Safety Advisory earlier this month
calling on railroads that transport hazardous materials to improve
procedures for tracking the movement of time-sensitive shipments. The
advisory also emphasized that all railroad employees who handle such
shipments be aware of, and clearly understand, the procedures. The
Advisory was issued as a result of an incident that occurred in
Cincinnati this summer, when a tank car carrying styrene sat idle on
the same railroad for seven months and as a result of the long delay,
exploded. Such negligence poses obvious security risks. What is the FRA
doing to ensure compliance with these new requirements, including
employee awareness? What additional steps has the FRA taken to secure
the movement of hazardous materials by rail?
Answer. FRA issued Safety Advisory 2004-05 on September 29, 2005,
to improve the safety and reliability of hazardous materials shipments
by railroad. The Safety Advisory informs shippers, consignees, and
railroads of the dangers of allowing cars of time-sensitive chemicals
to remain undelivered beyond their anticipated date of placement, and
recommends enhanced procedures to avoid such occurrences. While FRA
cannot enforce compliance with the Safety Advisory, as it does not
impose any requirements in itself, FRA is closely monitoring the
industry's efforts to promote the timely shipment of time-sensitive
hazardous materials in accordance with the recommendations in the
Safety Advisory. FRA is also closely monitoring the compliance of
railroads, shippers, and consignees with existing DOT regulations,
which require notification and special awareness for those time-
sensitive materials posing a significant risk in transportation. FRA
will pursue future regulatory or other action should the Safety
Advisory and existing regulations prove insufficient to minimize the
safety risks associated with the movement of time-sensitive hazardous
materials.
FRA recognizes that employee awareness and understanding of the
regulations and procedures governing the safe transport of time-
sensitive hazardous materials shipments are critical, and DOT
regulations at 49 CFR 172.700 et seq., provide for initial and
recurrent training of all employees engaged in the transportation of
hazardous materials. Railroads also impose additional training
requirements, and FRA expects that this Safety Advisory will be made a
part of the industry's hazardous materials transportation training
curriculum.
FRA has taken additional steps to promote the safety and security
of the movement of hazardous materials by rail. On October 24, 2005,
FRA issued Emergency Order No. 24, which requires railroads to modify
their operating rules and take other action necessary to ensure that
railroad employees who dispatch non-signaled territory or who operate
hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory restore the
switches to their proper (normal) position after use. The failure to
restore such switches to their proper position after use has resulted
in a number of accidents and fatalities. This Emergency Order is part
of a broader focus on human factor-caused train accidents that is being
conducted under the auspices of FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee (RSAC). RSAC has tasked its Operating Rules Working Group to
develop recommendations to reduce human factor-caused train accidents
generally, and the Working Group is scheduled to report its findings
and recommendations to the full RSAC in February 2006.
FRA also has ongoing a number of additional initiatives to promote
and enhance the safety and security of hazardous materials shipments.
Since January 2004 FRA has inspected more than 3,600 security plans
(including the plans for all the major rail carriers) and reviewed the
training records for more than 29,000 rail hazmat employees. As a
result, we are processing 120 recommended civil penalty actions for
violations of the DOT security regulations. DOT and DHS are examining
the feasibility of specific security enhancements, including
improvements to security plans, modifications of methods used to
identify shipments, enhanced requirements for temporary storage,
strengthened tank car integrity, and implementation of tracking and
communication systems. FRA staff have also provided support to the
vulnerability assessments led by TSA on several rail corridors.
FRA and DOT 's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) are also coordinating with DHS in formulating
proposed regulations that would enhance the current security plan
requirements, as a follow-up to an August 16, 2004, notice (jointly
issued by PHMSA and TSA). Possible enhancements under consideration
include data collection on shipments of Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH)
and other highly hazardous materials; analysis of safety and security
risks along rail transportation routes where these materials are
transported; alternative routing options; and en route storage.
Question 3. Are there plans to cross-train FRA and TSA rail
inspection staff so that when conducting inspections, both sets of
inspectors can be looking for safety and security problems? What do you
think of the concept of creating a unified Federal rail inspection team
to ensure maximum efficiency and coordination, rather than having
separate TSA and FRA inspectors essentially performing the same
function separately?
Answer. There are generally no plans to cross-train FRA and TSA
rail inspection staff so that both sets of inspectors look for both
safety and security problems. Instead, FRA has been working closely
with the managers of TSA's new inspection program to ensure that the
roles of the two agencies' inspectors are clearly distinguished and do
not result in duplicative inspections of the rail industry. FRA's
safety mission is critical and requires the constant attention of its
inspection force. FRA believes that public safety is best served by
having FRA inspectors direct their expertise in monitoring compliance
with the extensive body of laws and regulations governing the five
major areas of railroad safety: track, signal systems, equipment,
operating practices, and hazardous materials shipments.
FRA does not believe that uniting TSA and FRA inspectors into a
single, Federal rail inspection team would ensure maximum efficiency
and coordination, as the question suggests, as TSA and FRA rail
inspectors generally do not perform the same functions. For example,
TSA rail inspectors are focused on securing the rail transportation
network from terrorist attack through the evaluation of potential
terrorist targets, identification and elimination/neutralization of
security gaps, identification of suspicious persons and objects, and
more--functions which are generally distinct from those performed by
FRA safety inspectors.
Of course, FRA's railroad safety mission necessarily includes
involvement in railroad security issues and, in those areas such as
hazardous materials transportation where safety and security are
significantly interrelated, FRA inspectors will continue to have an
active role. FRA has been and will continue to be engaged in the
railroad industry's response to the threat of terrorism, as detailed in
Administrator Boardman's written testimony. Yet, FRA believes that
through careful delineation of that role, and close coordination with
TSA, FRA's security efforts will dovetail with those of TSA while
continuing to allow FRA to keep its principal focus on railroad safety.
Question 4. I understand that the FRA and TSA have been working on
a rail security annex to the MOU developed between the Department of
Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security. S. 1052
requires the agencies to complete this annex within one year following
enactment. Can you tell us what the current status of this rail
security annex is?
Answer. FRA has prepared an annex addressing rail security issues,
including relations between FRA inspectors and TSA's new inspection
workforce. FRA has shared the draft annex with TSA, and we hope that it
will be completed soon.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Joseph H. Boardman
Question 1. What additional enforcement action is the Federal
Railroad Administration taking to ensure railroads and hazmat shippers
are complying with your recent safety advisory on rail hazmat
transportation?
Answer. Please see the answer to Question 2 from Senator Inouye.
The answer addresses this question and provides additional information.
Question 2. Is rail transportation of high hazmat and handling
incident thereto inherently dangerous?
Answer. Rail transportation and handling of any hazardous material,
especially TIH materials, are dangerous when not properly done.
Congress recognized this very danger long ago and has regulated these
activities. Over the years, a body of statutory law and detailed
administrative regulation has been developed to address the risks
associated with the transportation and handling of hazardous materials.
FRA and DOT as a whole continually seek ways to further mitigate these
risks, such as through efforts to enhance the security of TIH
shipments. The effectiveness of this regulatory regime is evidenced by
the remarkably low number of incidents in light of the high volume and
length of haul of TIH materials transported by rail.
Question 3. Does it present a safety or security risk?
Answer. By definition, hazardous materials pose various types of
risks to safety, including security. Under DOT 's hazardous materials
transportation regulations, there are nine designated classes of
hazardous materials, most of which are further subdivided by specific
hazard. See 49 CFR 173.2. As noted above, DOT 's promulgation and
enforcement of these regulations help to manage the risks posed, and we
continually seek ways to further mitigate these risks.
Question 4. By law, the Secretary of Transportation--or his
designee--sits on the Amtrak board of directors. In April, the board
approved Amtrak's funding request for Amtrak's security needs of up to
$254 million a year (figure includes ``support'' functions as well). If
this funding was needed to help secure Amtrak and its 25 million annual
passengers, why didn't President Bush ask for it in his budget?
Answer. FRA does not believe it correct to characterize the $254
million figure as a funding request, per se. Rather, this amount was
for use as an internal budgeting threshold. Funding for Amtrak's police
and security needs would come from Amtrak's operating funds, up to this
dollar amount, as determined by Amtrak's management. Further, the
President's budget for FY06 had already been submitted to Congress by
April 2005.
Question 5. Will the Administration specifically request funding
for Amtrak's security needs in FY07?
Answer. The President's FY07 budget request has not yet been
finalized. As a result, it would be premature to discuss what specific
initiatives will be in that request. We will be glad to share with the
Committee the details of the FY07 budget request, once we are in a
position to do so.