[Senate Hearing 109-386]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-386
U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS AND STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 3, JUNE 23, SEPTEMBER 29, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director, before August 1, 2005
Charles S. Abell, Staff Director, after August 1, 2005
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
U.S. Military Operations and Stabilization Activities in Iraq and
Afghanistan
february 3, 2005
Page
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense................ 6
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff....... 22
Schlicher, Ronald L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Coordinator for Iraq........................................... 24
Quinn, Maureen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Coordinator
for Afghanistan................................................ 129
U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq
june 23, 2005
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., U.S. Secretary of Defense.............. 158
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 165
Abizaid, GEN John P., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command....... 166
Casey, GEN George W., USA, Commanding General, Multi-National
Force-Iraq..................................................... 167
U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq
september 29, 2005
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense................... 245
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 246
Abizaid, GEN John P., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command....... 247
Casey, GEN George W., USA, Commanding General, Multi-National
Force-Iraq..................................................... 255
(iii)
U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS AND STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Talent, Dole, Thune, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson,
Dayton, Bayh, and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Thomas L.
MacKenzie, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel;
and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member;
Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority
counsel; and William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill, Catherine E.
Sendak, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Chris Arnold, assistant to Senator
Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; James
P. Dohoney, Jr. and Mackenzie M. Eaglen, assistants to Senator
Collins; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A.
Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley,
assistant to Senator Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to
Senator Dole; Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants
to Senator Kennedy; Christine Evans and Erik Raven, assistants
to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assisant to Senator
Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator
Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric
Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum,
assistant to Senator Bayh; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The committee meets this morning to
receive the testimony of Secretary Wolfowitz, General Myers,
and Mr. Schlicher on the broad range of issues relating to
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the other trouble spots in the world. It
is the hope of the chair, and I think joined by the ranking
member, that we can move along swiftly.
I am going to ask unanimous consent that my full opening
statement be placed into the record. But I do want to observe
that this past weekend the world had the observation of a
courageous people, the Iraqi people, fulfilling the dreams that
have been repressed in that nation some half century. That is
one dream that we accept on a daily basis here in this great
nation, the right to vote.
It was an extraordinary moment, not just in Iraqi history,
but world history. It sent a strong message far beyond the
borders of Iraq. That event took place because of the
sacrifices of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the
United States, the men and women of the Iraqi Armed Forces, and
most importantly the sacrifices of the courageous people of
Iraq.
On March 20, 2003, U.S. and coalition forces crossed the
borders to start the liberation of those people. We are not
finished yet. We will dwell this morning in some detail on
where the professional witnesses here view this situation and
what remains to be done.
But our President I think most eloquently stated on the
afternoon of the election, ``Today the people of Iraq have
spoken to the world and the world is hearing the voice of
freedom from the center of the Middle East.''
We should also be very mindful that in Afghanistan the
elections have been held, after a brutal battle against the
Taliban and efforts to eliminate the forces of al Qaeda. These
elections were held on October 9, 2004. President Karzai was
inaugurated on December 8.
In the aftermath of these historic elections, the committee
meets today to receive this testimony, and we have foremost in
our mind the sacrifices of so many that made them possible.
There were 200 instances of terrorism in the course of the
weekend of the elections. The Iraqi forces deserve great credit
in showing their professionalism to step up and deal with the
polling places and the security situations to enable this
election. Coalition forces were at the ready, but, in the words
of General Casey, they were really there but not called on. The
Iraqi security forces did the job.
We hope that harkens for the future, because our plans are
to strengthen in every way possible the effort to train these
forces, and we are anxious to hear from General Myers
particularly this morning as to the plans of Generals Abizaid
and Casey and the recommendations of General Luck and his team
that went over there.
We learned that there will probably be a concept of
integrating small numbers of our forces into the Iraqi units.
It seems to this Senator a very wise and sound tactic. But I
congratulate certainly our President, the Secretary of Defense,
the Deputy, the Chairman, the Secretary of State and his team,
and all that made it possible for these accomplishments to date
and making clear what remains to be done.
We will hear, I think, from the Secretary this morning in
some detail the steps that must be now taken to put in place
the new government. It is going to be somewhat time-consuming
in the judgment of this Senator. The election results have to
be confirmed, then a series of steps must be taken to put in
place a prime minister, and a series of other ministers have to
be ratified. The basic security for each of these individuals
must be developed as well as the infrastructure in which to
bring this enlarged and new interim government, preparing to
write a constitution and to have subsequent elections in
December.
So I conclude by again expressing my deep reverence and
concern and compassion for all the sacrifices that have taken
place to enable the success that we have had thus far.
The Iraqis understand, however, very clearly the need for
U.S. and coalition forces to stay and assist them in developing
the capacity to ensure the security of their country. I quote
interim President al-Yawer, who stated on Monday: ``It is only
complete nonsense to ask the troops to leave in this chaos and
vacuum of power.''
I commend our distinguished colleague Senator Lieberman,
who earlier today in a public setting addressed the issues as
he saw them--and I agree with you, Senator--on what lays ahead
on the road for the eventual return of our forces and other
coalition forces.
So with that I conclude and put the balance of my statement
in the record, and I turn to our distinguished colleague the
ranking member.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
On March 20, 2003, U.S. and coalition forces crossed the Iraq-
Kuwait border and began the liberation of Iraq. Twenty-three months
later--last Sunday--the Iraqi people took a bold, courageous step--in
defiance of the terrorists--on the path to liberation. This important
milestone would not have been possible without the contributions of the
men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces, their coalition partners, and
the Iraqi security forces. President Bush characterized it eloquently
on Sunday afternoon when he said, ``Today the people of Iraq have
spoken to the world and the world is hearing the voice of freedom from
the center of the Middle East.''
Similarly, 3 years after U.S. forces initiated operations to
liberate Afghanistan from the brutal rule of the Taliban and to
eliminate al Qaeda training bases and sanctuaries, elections were held
on October 9, 2004 and President Karzai was inaugurated on December 8.
The Taliban is gone and al Qaeda is scattered and on the run. The
Afghan people have spoken in favor of freedom and democracy.
In the aftermath of these historic elections, the committee meets
today to receive testimony on continuing U.S. policy and military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We welcome our witnesses: Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; General Richard B. Myers, USAF,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Ronald L. Schlicher, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Iraqi Affairs. We look forward to your
testimony.
Many of us take the freedoms and liberties we have in our country
for granted. How humbling and awe-inspiring it was to watch the Iraqi
people--in defiance of the terrorists--go in large numbers to vote, in
pursuit of their dream for a free, prosperous nation. How heartening it
was to see the Iraqi security forces step up to the task, and perform
admirably in providing a relatively secure environment for the voters.
This has inspired pride and confidence in the Iraqi security forces, as
evidenced by the fact that over 3,000 Iraqis volunteered to join the
new Iraqi Army in the days immediately after the election.
Clearly, there remains much to be done to help the Iraqi people
realize their dream, but they have seized the moment to free themselves
of a tyrannical past and to soundly reject the insurgent violence of
the moment. We can be justly proud of being their partners in this
worthy endeavor.
I want to congratulate each of you, and the countless men and women
who you represent, for this historic accomplishment. Many had begun to
question whether the sacrifices our soldiers and diplomats were making
in a decidedly difficult environment were justified. The efforts of
these brave Americans were given a strong vote of confidence on Sunday
by the courage of the Iraqi people.
The elections in Iraq and Afghanistan have stoked the fires of
liberty and democracy in these lands and in the entire region. In this
moment of optimism for the future, our thoughts and prayers are with
the families of those who have been lost or seriously wounded defending
liberty on distant shores, helping oppressed nations find their way to
freedom.
While I do believe that a measure of optimism is warranted, we
should harbor no illusions about the difficult work ahead. The Iraqis
must construct a constitution and a government that is inclusive of all
ethnic, religious, and tribal elements that represent the richness of
the Iraqi nation and its heritage. We must help them develop the
security forces that will enable political and economic development.
As we absorb the significance and meaning of this election, the
question highest in the minds of the American people is: ``When are our
troops coming home?'' It is an important question, but a complex one,
and one our witnesses will address today.
The question of an exit strategy has been the subject of much
discussion in recent days. I prefer to talk about an overall strategy
to achieve our goals--goals that are tied to clear milestones and
objectives; not to dates on a calendar. Once those goals are achieved,
we can and should begin an orderly departure.
The Iraqis understand the need for U.S. and coalition forces to
stay and assist them in developing the capacity to ensure the security
of their country. As President al-Yawer stated on Monday, ``It's only
complete nonsense to ask the troops to leave in this chaos and vacuum
of power.''
As we discuss the way ahead, we must make it clear to Iraqis and
all others that we remain committed to successfully completing the
mission. We will adjust tactics as goals are achieved, giving the Iraqi
forces as much responsibility as they believe they can assume. It
worked in this election; it can work in the future.
It has become apparent in recent months that a key element of our
strategy in Iraq is the training, equipping, and mentoring of the Iraqi
security forces--in sufficient numbers and sufficient quality--so that
they will be able to take over responsibility for defending their
nation from both external and internal threats. The performance of
these forces in providing security for the elections was a promising
sign, but they are far from ready for the full range of current and
future missions.
Over the past several months, many members of this committee have
traveled to the region. Most of us have met with General Casey and
Lieutenant General Petraeus to discuss the security situation and the
status of efforts to train the Iraqi security forces. It is a difficult
undertaking. We all recognize that a young person who has just gone
through a few weeks of training is not a seasoned, ready combat troop
or a street smart cop. Readiness to take over full responsibility for
security involves many dimensions in addition to the number of
``trained and equipped'' soldiers or police. It involves competent,
trustworthy leadership; equipment readiness; patriotism; unit cohesion;
and acceptance by the people, among many other things. Building forces
fully prepared to undertake these responsibilities takes time. The
committee received a comprehensive briefing from the Department
yesterday on this mission and what remains to be done. We must not lose
patience now when the path to success is clear.
The days and months ahead will not be easy and more sacrifice of
American lives and treasure will be required to transform Sunday's
election into the permanent symbol of Iraq's march to democracy it
deserves to be. The insurgency will not go away immediately. Those
determined to return to the past will not give up easily. They can be
defeated however, with our help and with our willingness to stay the
course, not only militarily, but across the broad spectrum of
political, economic, and social development.
Finishing the liberation and democratization of Iraq is a worthy
cause, and a cause about which our men and women in uniform can be
justifiably proud. It is my sincere hope that the elections and the
optimism they have produced will be perceived as a great opportunity
for more nations to join in this noble endeavor. It is not only the
United States and its coalition partners that have a stake in Iraq. The
whole world will be a better, safer place with a free, democratic,
prosperous Iraq that will serve as a model of hope and inspiration for
the region and beyond.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Last weekend millions of Iraqis, many at great personal
risk and many who walked long distances, exercised their right
to vote in the elections. They walked through a door that was
opened by our soldiers and marines, who worked so bravely and
tirelessly in the development and execution of a complex
security plan that made the election possible.
The challenge now is to defeat the continuing insurgency,
to find a way to involve the Sunnis in the political process,
and to ensure that minority rights are enshrined in a new
constitution, which is scheduled to be considered by referendum
this fall. It is essential that we develop what should have
been developed before we initiated military operations: an exit
strategy. Once we see who the new government is, we should
discuss with that government what our exit strategy will be.
Part of that strategy should be to promptly end our status
as an occupying power. The insurgents have used that status
against us in their propaganda. If the new Iraqi Government
invites the international community, including us, to stay on,
that invitation would end our status as an occupying power
because we would then be there at the invitation of a
democratically elected Iraqi Government, just as we are in
South Korea at the invitation of a democratically elected South
Korean Government.
Such an invitation from an Iraqi Government could also for
the first time bring the military forces of Muslim nations into
the international coalition.
In the meantime, we should move ahead on an accelerated
basis with the training and equipping of the Iraqi security
forces. Part of that effort must be a realistic assessment of
the capabilities of those forces now. We should stop
exaggerating the number of Iraqi security forces that have
already been fully trained and are capable and willing to take
on the insurgency. We need to mix a healthy dose of realism
with our hopes. Currently we have no way of measuring the
capabilities of Iraqi security forces. We have to establish
badly needed training and equipping standards for Iraqi units,
which will allow an assessment of their readiness and
capability.
We already have a model in the unit status report system,
by which we judge the readiness of our own military forces.
Only in that way will we be able to determine and apply the
resources required to establish and maintain the necessary
readiness and capabilities in Iraqi units which will allow
American units to turn over security responsibilities to
Iraqis.
The elections in Iraq were an important milestone in a long
process. That process will continue to require sacrifices of
our military personnel and significant additional resources. I
am satisfied those resources should be provided and will be
provided. Regardless of the differences over the policies which
isolated us from most of the world and all of the Muslim world
when we went into Iraq, regardless of the mistakes that were
made in failing to have a plan for the post-combat stability
phase and in thoughtlessly disbanding the Iraqi Army, it is
essential that we support our troops. Now that we are there, we
must succeed in leaving Iraq secure and free of major civil
strife.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses laying out
the plans for the next phase in Iraq, as well as addressing the
next steps in Afghanistan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
I note that yesterday afternoon this committee had an
extensive briefing from members of the Department of Defense
(DOD). I know other members present here expressed their
appreciation for a detailed briefing which I believe, Senator
Levin, went a long way to clarify the means by which we are
assessing the degree of achievement in training and the
professional capabilities of the Iraqi spectrum of security
forces from police through and including the Guard and Reserve.
That by necessity was behind closed doors, but I feel that
our witnesses today will make some reference to the same
material we received yesterday.
I also am very pleased to note the presence, at the
invitation of the chair and the ranking member, of Ambassador
Maureen Quinn, the Coordinator for Afghanistan. Good morning,
Madam Ambassador. We thank you and perhaps at some point in the
course of the questioning we will ask you to join the panel.
Secretary Wolfowitz.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this
opportunity. We meet in an historic week in the history of Iraq
and our relations with Iraq. There are some appropriate
cautions that people give about avoiding euphoria at this
moment. I think those cautions are correct. I think the right
way to think of what happened on Sunday is that it was a major
victorious battle in a war that is still not yet won, and it is
appropriate to celebrate that victory, but it is also important
to think about the way ahead.
As we do so, I think it is particularly appropriate to pay
honor to the memory of the 1,417 Americans that have been
killed so far in this effort, but also to the 1,342 Iraqi
police and army that have been killed and 126 other coalition
members that have been killed. This has been a victory that has
been won at considerable cost.
That sacrifice has not been lost on the Iraqi people
themselves. An Iraqi blogger--which are the people who post
their news on Web sites--this one named Allah, publishes his
views on a Web site called ``The Mesopotamian.'' He stated it
eloquently on election day when he wrote: ``My condolences to
the great American people for their recent tragic losses of
soldiers. The blood of Iraqis and Americans is being shed on
the soil of Mesopotamia, a baptism with blood, a baptism of a
lasting friendship and alliance for many years to come through
thick and thin. We shall never forget the brave soldiers fallen
while defending our freedom in the future.'' I think we had a
most vivid expression of that in that remarkable hug that we
all witnessed last night.
I would like to thank the members of this committee and the
entire Congress for your continued support to our great men and
women in uniform and to their civilian counterparts, including
several State Department officers who have made the ultimate
sacrifice in Iraq.
At the end of the day, the indispensable heroes of Sunday's
historic events were the Iraqi voters who risked their lives,
and at least 35 of whom paid with their lives to vote for their
government representatives for the first time in their lives.
As Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, the Commander of the
Multinational Corps Iraq, said in congratulating his troops for
the magnificent job they did on January 30: ``The one thing we
could not do for the Iraqis was vote and, impressively,
millions of them had the courage to do so.''
One of the most impressive examples of that courage
occurred in Baghdad when a bomber approached the line of voters
outside a primary school polling place. A 14-year police
veteran named Abdul Amir al-Shuwayli pushed the bomber away,
yelling: ``Let me save my people, let me save my friends.'' As
a result of al-Shuwayli's heroism, the bomber was only able to
detonate his belt of explosives 50 feet away from the voting
line, saving the lives of countless Iraqis but taking the life
of this brave Iraqi policeman. This is one of several instances
in which Iraqi police and soldiers gave their lives to shield
Iraqi voters from suicide bombers and insurgents trying to
penetrate the security rings around polling sites.
I think it might be appropriate on this occasion, Mr.
Chairman, to put up the article from USA Today and the picture
of Sergeant al-Shuwayli. I think he deserves that kind of
recognition.
[The information referred to follows:]
I would note that in fact, according to our reports, of
eight attempted suicide bombings, every one of them was stopped
by Iraqi security forces at the outer security perimeter. That
is a pretty impressive 100 percent record. From what we can
tell from reports--and we are still checking on this--that
life-giving sacrifice by Policeman al-Shuwayli was not the only
such incident. There seems to be another one in which a
policeman was inspecting an attacker when he discovered the
explosive-laden belt. The attacker pushed him to the ground,
ran toward the polling station, and this policeman pursued him,
tackling him outside the station in a body embrace that
triggered the explosives. There seem to be, from what we can
tell, two separate instances of devotion far above and beyond
the call of duty.
Although the final tally of votes will not be known for
several days, it is already clear that Sunday's election has
been an epoch-making event. But as impressive as that election
was, Iraq still faces a very difficult road ahead to defeat the
terrorist threat and to achieve stability, much less freedom
and democracy. Nevertheless, I think it is appropriate to take
just a few moments to dwell on the breath-taking images we saw
this past weekend.
In fact, Mr. Chairman, I thought, since a picture is worth
a thousand words, I could save you many words and some minutes
by handing out this packet of photos that my staff pulled off
the Internet. I am not quite sure about copyright, so I am a
little concerned about distributing beyond the members of the
committee. But I think if you look at them, there is just an
incredible story there of Iraqi passion for democracy.
[The packet of photographs referenced by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
has been retained in committee files.]
Two of my favorites, if I could hold them up for a minute,
are this one of an old man crying as he puts his ballot in; and
then this one of two young women hugging each other and crying.
We saw an incredible display of passion for democracy. But
I would say even more significantly, we saw incredible bravery.
It is important to remember that. This demonstration of Iraqi
commitment to the newfound democracy took place in the face of
a systematic campaign of terror and intimidation that is almost
unimaginable to most Americans. It included assassinations and
beheadings of election workers. It included threats to the
children of candidates and threats to ordinary voters, not just
risking their lives when they went to the polls, but fearful of
what might happen to them afterwards.
We who are lucky enough to take for granted that our
elections will take place in complete peace and security can
not appreciate the significance of what Iraqi voters have just
done. Indeed, I think some of the most remarkable stories from
last Sunday are about the courage of these voters. Two in
particular that I heard from General Hamm, who is our commander
up in Mosul, are worth repeating.
At one polling station in Mosul--and I would point out it
was in a Sunni Arab neighborhood--the polls had been open for 2
hours and no one had come to vote, but there was a crowd
gathered some distance from the polls to watch what happened.
Finally, an old woman who seemed to be in her late sixties came
forward and said, ``I have waited all my life for this
opportunity,'' and she came forward to vote and the rest of the
crowd followed.
At another polling place in Mosul, also in a Sunni Arab
neighborhood, the enemy actually brought a line of voters under
small arms fire, wounding one of the voters. No doubt they
expected the other voters to run. They did exactly the
opposite. They stayed in line. They shifted the line and
crouched down to protect the wounded voter while Iraqi soldiers
evacuated him to a hospital.
Forty-four Iraqis lost their lives attempting to cast their
ballots. By 1 p.m. Sunday, terrorists had launched a record
seven suicide bombings in Baghdad and one south of Baghdad.
Despite that violence, the Iraqis did not leave the lines that
they had waited all their lives for.
Before the election there was concern that this purple dye
that was used to mark voters' fingers--as a fraud prevention
measure--could become an intimidation instrument, that people
would be fearful that it would target them from the terrorists.
But rather than deterring people, these marks have become a
purple badge of courage, as you will see in these photos I am
sure you have seen already.
One Sunni voter raised his forefinger and declared: ``This
is my badge of honor and, no, I am not keeping my hand in my
pocket.'' Another Iraqi wrote: ``When I moved to mark my finger
with ink, I dipped it in deep, as if I was poking the eyes of
all the world's tyrants.''
Mr. Chairman, this election also helps to clarify without a
doubt who the enemy is in Iraq. Our enemy in Iraq is not the
Iraqi people. It is not a nationalist insurgency. It is an
unholy alliance of old terrorists and new terrorists. The old
terrorists are the ones who brutalized and tortured the country
and murdered hundreds of thousands of their countrymen over the
course of 3\1/2\ decades.
These secret security forces of the former regime, best
analogized I think to the Gestapo and the SS of the Nazi
regime, are now allied with the new terrorists drawn from
across the region. Like their Baathist allies, these new
terrorists are ideologically opposed to democracy and fearful
of what the success of freedom in this important Arab country
will mean for them.
Just 1 month before the election, Osama bin Laden declared,
``Any Iraqi who takes part in this election consciously and
willingly is an infidel.'' With that statement, bin Laden made
preventing the Iraqi election one of al Qaeda's highest
priorities and provided ideological justification for murdering
Iraqi voters.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, bin Laden's appointed prince in Iraq,
also denounced the election. Indeed, he denounced democracy
more broadly, declaring ``a fierce war on this evil principle
of democracy and those who follow this wrong ideology.''
``Democracy,'' he said, ``is based on the right to choose your
representatives and that is against the rule of God.''
Through their opposition to elections and democracy, the
terrorists have demonstrated that they are not interested in
winning hearts and minds, but rather to simply intimidate the
Iraqi people into submission. Unlike almost every other
historical insurgency, they offer no positive agenda beyond
their own pursuit of power, and they explicitly seek to deny
Iraqis a voice in their future. That is why Iraqis refer to
such men as Abdul Latif Humain, a so-called ``religious''
adviser to Saddam before the fall of the regime, who fled the
country with large amounts of money, leaving his recruits
behind, as terrorists.
Yet the determination of the terrorists to disrupt the
election was defeated by the overwhelming majority of Iraqis,
who want democracy to prevail. As Major General John Batiste,
commander of our 1st Infantry Division, said, ``Iraq votes are
bullets to the hearts of the terrorists.'' Iraqis know who they
are fighting and they know they are fighting people who want to
take them backwards to some new form of dictatorship as
terrible as the one they have just been liberated from.
Mr. Chairman, as dramatic a moment as these elections were,
this is not a time to sit on our hands congratulating
ourselves, nor to declare victory and abandon a task that is
only half accomplished. Although I find it hard to agree with
anyone who would say that the election was just the easy part--
it was hardly easy--there is no question that there is still
much hard work to be done, principally by the Iraqis
themselves, but also by those of us upon whom they still depend
for support.
While the election clearly demonstrated that the hearts and
minds of the Iraqi people do not lie with the terrorists, no
one should imagine for one moment that these would-be tyrants
will quit just because of Sunday's vote. The next few months
will be particularly challenging because, while this election
will produce a national assembly, that body will still face a
formidable challenge to putting together a government, and it
must do so in the face of a continuing war against a brutal
enemy.
Mr. Chairman, while attempting to think about our immediate
focused efforts in the next few months, I would suggest there
are five. First is to recognize that success in this effort
will require the integration of all elements of national power,
both U.S. and Iraqi, as well as those of our coalition partners
and hopefully others who may join in now. This is not a
military effort alone and there must be equal and parallel
efforts in governance and infrastructure, in economic
development, in strategic information. Governance in particular
presents important challenges, not only in standing up a
government and writing a constitution, but in establishing
government ministries that can both function effectively, which
is enough of a challenge, but also that will serve the
interests of the people, not their own personal agendas. The
entire international community has an interest in the success
of that effort.
Second, there will be many difficult compromises that will
have to be made among different Iraqi groups, on everything
from fundamental constitutional questions to practical
questions involving the sharing of power and resources. Iraqis
will have to work out these compromises. That is a big part of
what democracy is really about. But we have enormous influence
in Iraq and we should use it, not to advance our own agenda,
but to constantly remind Iraqis of the importance of resolving
these issues in ways that preserve national unity in the face
of a ruthless enemy.
Third--and I will talk more about this in a few minutes--on
the military side, the key to victory clearly lies in
developing more and increasingly capable Iraqi security forces.
That effort has produced important successes so far and we need
to learn the lessons from those successes so that we can build
on it and hopefully accelerate it.
Fourth, we and the Iraqis need to attach high priority to
the development of an effective legal and judicial system, one
that enforces the rule of law, that punishes the guilty, that
protects the rights of all citizens, and that provides the
equal justice under law that is not only a key hallmark of
democracy, but which is also crucial for fighting corruption
and promoting economic development.
Iraq's currently weak judicial system is not yet able to
punish lawbreakers effectively, even those who are guilty of
the most serious crimes against the Iraqi people and against
coalition forces. Finding ways to protect judges from
intimidation needs to be a high priority. We also need to help
the Iraqi Government strengthen the tools of law enforcement
through everything from better communications equipment to
identification systems for criminals and foreigners to forensic
bomb analysis capability.
Fifth, we need to work with the Iraqi Government to keep up
pressure on neighboring countries, particularly Syria, to stop
the activities of Baathists and other terrorist supporters
working from outside Iraqi and to stop the flow of foreign
fighters into the country. Some of Iraq's neighbors probably
fear a free Iraq, but they need to understand that it will be
much more harmful for them if they try to obstruct Iraq's
progress toward freedom.
Let us remember that we are facing an enemy who is not only
ruthless, but adaptive and fiendlishly clever, an enemy who
obviously did not give up just because Baghdad was liberated,
that did not give up just because Saddam Hussein was captured,
and that did not give up just because the interim government
was stood up successfully on June 28. It is an enemy that will
adapt, and we need to be prepared for its adaptations and
anticipate them and try to be ahead of them.
But the good news, Mr. Chairman, is that this enemy does
not offer anything positive to the Iraqi people. It is not an
enemy that can ever defeat our soldiers one for one on the
battlefield. It is an enemy that has shown itself to be
horribly clever and viciously evil, with no respect for the
laws of civilization or for the Iraqi people. But that will be
their undoing. Ultimately it is the Iraqi people who will
defeat them, with our continued help.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Schlicher I think will discuss in more
detail the political process going forward. I have already
emphasized the critical importance in that process of
compromise. There has been a lot of attention given to the fact
that the election results may be distorted by the fact that
intimidation was much more severe in predominantly Sunni areas,
not because I think Sunnis predominantly support the
insurgency, but because the insurgents are predominantly Sunni
and that is where they live. That is I think why the vote was
particularly low in places like the Al-Anbar Province.
What I find encouraging is that the non-Sunnis have been
very forceful in expressions like this one that came from the
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) chief,
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who leads, I believe, or is near the top
of this United Iraq Alliance list. ``The National Assembly''--
and this from a Shia cleric--shall represent all Iraqi strata
and we will make an all-out effort to this end. We will defend
the rights of our Sunni brothers just the same way we do for
those of the Shiites.''
I think these statements are good indicators that Iraqis
will work to form a transitional government that will attend to
the interests of all Iraqis, including those Sunni Arabs whose
vote was suppressed by severe intimidation in some places.
Mr. Chairman, I know this committee has a particular
interest, as do we in the DOD, in the development of Iraqi
security forces. I think it is worth recalling that last year
we intercepted a letter from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to his al
Qaeda colleagues in Afghanistan. In that letter he warned of
the dangers of Iraqi sovereignty and especially the creation of
capable Iraqi security forces. He wrote, ``With the spread of
the Iraqi Army and the police, our future is becoming
frightening. You end up having an army and police connected by
lineage, blood, and appearance to the people of the region. How
can we kill their cousins and sons? This is a democracy; we
will have no pretext.''
Mr. Chairman, the endeavor to create those forces has not
been without setbacks and disappointments. Most significantly,
barbaric acts of intimidation have targeted Iraqi soldiers and
police and their families, thinning the ranks of some units and
rendering others ineffective. Let me recall that since June
2003 nearly 1,400 Iraqi soldiers and policemen--I would say
that is by our count, which may well be an underestimate--
nearly 1,400 Iraqi soldiers and policemen have been killed in
the line of duty as they sought to defend their newfound
freedom.
Through it all, however, the coalition and the Iraqis have
continued to press forward, modifying training programs,
adapting operational constructs, and increasing equipment
authorizations. Throughout that we have had strong support from
this committee and from the U.S. Congress that has been
critical in making that progress possible.
Mr. Chairman, this progress does not always transfer into
quantifiable measures, and the quantifiable measures we come up
with are sometimes undone by the shifting in categories. The
shifting in categories is a necessary adaptation to
circumstances and I know it gets confusing, even to those of us
who track it every day.
One that I think has caused particular confusion, and let
me just try to clear it up, has to do with this change when we
were carrying numbers on the order of 200,000 and it seemed to
suddenly drop to 130,000. Those 70,000 people are people we had
always identified as the least trained, I sometimes call them a
kind of Pinkerton Guard Force, the so-called Facilities
Protection Service, and we took them out of our counts,
frankly, because the Iraqis took them out of the Ministry of
Defense and the Ministry of Interior and shifted them over to
individual ministries where they were protecting oil or
protecting electricity. Since they are not part of the training
responsibility of General Petraeus's command, we thought it was
better not to keep them in the number count. They are still
there. They performed even on election day.
More generally, we have repeatedly tried to caution against
making too much of raw numbers when there are large qualitative
differences that are generally more important. The term
``trained and equipped'' when applied to Iraqi forces cannot be
analogized to how we measure readiness in American military
units.
One impressive metric is the one I mentioned last Sunday,
the number of suicide bombers that were stopped at the outer
security perimeter of the polling sites. That was 100 percent
out of a total of eight attempted attacks and it is an
impressive record.
Measurement is also complicated by the fact that there has
been a consistent development of new kinds of units with
different capabilities. One such unit is the special police
commando battalions, which are an entirely Iraqi invention. The
first one I believe was formed only last November. They are
among a number of different kinds of units that have the
important capability that they can be deployed anywhere in the
country, not just in their local area.
Since Prime Minister Allawi took office last June, 44
deployable military and police battalions out of a total of 85
battalions overall have been established. The additional
battalions include regionally-oriented National Guard
battalions that were recently incorporated into the Iraqi Army.
These deployable battalions have the feature that they can be
moved anywhere in the country and in many cases currently are
deployed in the most challenging areas. They are responsible in
no small measure for the successful security that we achieved
in Mosul and Baghdad on election day. There were seven such
battalions helping maintain security in Mosul, nine in
Fallujah, three in Samarra, and at least seven in Baghdad.
At the same time, none of these Iraqi forces are capable of
replacing coalition units on a one for one basis. In fact, they
may never be one for one the equivalent of our forces. But in
some respects they will always be superior. What do I mean by
that? I mean that they bring to the fight skills that our
soldiers will never possess, particularly their understanding
of the languages and cultures of Iraq, their ability to
immediately recognize just by how someone speaks whether he is
an Iraqi or a foreigner--that is no small talent--and they will
contribute even more as we and Iraq leaders continue their
development, replace their losses, and help develop their
higher headquarters, combat support elements, and logistical
units and systems needed for their support.
As we try to increase the speed with which they grow and
with which, more importantly, they improve qualitatively, a
major component in the effort will be the substantially
increased emphasis that General Casey, our great commander in
Iraqi, has directed be given to Iraqi security force
development this year. Increasingly, I think you could say
Iraqis have what I would call the hardware force component of
personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. Their most important
gaps are in the intangible components that all successful
military units need, what you might call the software:
leadership, command and control arrangements, experience, and
unit cohesion. These intangibles take time to develop. Some of
them are, frankly, best developed by actual combat experience.
Some of the most important development will therefore take
place on the job, in active military operations.
Mr. Chairman, the President and Secretary Rumsfeld are
committed to providing the resources needed for this endeavor
and the forthcoming request for supplemental funding will
include a substantial funding request for expansion of the
Iraqi security force effort. We are counting on your support
and I am confident we will have it.
In sum, we believe that considerable momentum has been
achieved in the development of Iraqi security forces. However,
much remains to be done as we help Iraq build not just
battalions, brigades, and divisions, but the institutions that
support them and the civilian ministries that direct them. That
is an enormous endeavor. It is historically unprecedented. It
has encountered challenges and suffered setbacks. But in recent
months we have seen the results of the coalition's
investigation, most importantly in the performance of Iraqi
units deployed to hot spots on January 30.
Mr. Chairman, democracy is on the march in Iraq and this
past Sunday Iraq's own army and police force helped to
safeguard that march. Their performance was captured in an
anecdote related by another Iraqi blogger, this one named Ali,
on his Web site, which is called ``Iraqi Lib,'' I guess meaning
``liberation.'' He describes an encounter with one of the
guards. He does not say whether he was a soldier or a
policeman. The guard actually apologized to the voters for
searching them. He said: ``We do not know how to thank you;
please excuse any inconvenience on our part. We wish we did not
have to search you or limit your freedom. You are heroes.''
I think that politeness from an Iraq soldier was something
that is probably also a bit unprecedented in that country. This
Iraqi voter said: ``I thanked him back and told him that he and
his comrades are the true heroes and that we can never be
grateful enough for their services.''
Mr. Chairman, today we all share that gratitude for the
courage of the Iraqi forces and for the courage and sacrifice
of American service men and women who have done so much to help
bring Iraq to this moment and, hopefully, soon to many more
like it.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Paul D. Wolfowitz
HEROISM AND SACRIFICE
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, I am happy
to be here today to testify on the Iraqi election and on our strategy
for Iraq in the coming months. On the eve of the election, an American
lieutenant stationed near Baquba wrote:
The soldiers of 2-63 armor battalion are out there hardening
the election sites and working around the clock to provide
security for the Iraqis. I'm pretty excited about being out
there for something historical. Not all my soldiers can be out
there but I have guys begging to be taken out in sector. Seeing
how bad these locals want the elections to happen has been
pretty inspiring for us.
I believe it goes without saying that Sunday's events, both in the
bravery of the Iraqi people, as well as in the dedication of our men
and women in uniform, is inspiring to all of us as well.
It is impossible to say enough about the heroism and sacrifice that
it took to make this day possible. U.S. troops and our Iraqi and other
coalition partners did an incredible job in preparation for the
election, safely moving more than 3 million tons of election programs,
and helping to secure more than 5,000 polling stations throughout Iraq.
American soldiers, marines, sailors, airmen, and coast guardsmen,
as well as their civilian colleagues serving in Iraq, have performed
magnificently, not just on election day but throughout Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Each day for almost 2 years, American men and women have put
their lives on the line to protect our security, and to help bring
freedom to Iraq. Whether rooting terrorists out of strongholds such as
Najaf and Fallujah, or rolling up their sleeves to rebuild and paint
Iraqi schools, they have performed their duties nobly and without
complaint. They have done everything that has been asked of them and
more. More than 1,400 Americans have lost their lives in the process,
and thousands more have been wounded.
This sacrifice has not been lost on the Iraqi people themselves.
The Iraqi blogger named ``Alaa''--who publishes his views on the Web
site called The Mesopotamian--stated it eloquently on election day when
he wrote:
``My condolences to the great American people for the tragic
recent losses of soldiers. The blood of Iraqis and Americans is
being shed on the soil of Mesopotamia; a baptism with blood. A
baptism of a lasting friendship and alliance, for many years to
come, through thick and thin, we shall never forget the brave
soldiers fallen while defending our freedom and future.''
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of these brave young Americans, I'd like to
thank the members of this committee and the entire Congress for their
continued support to our great men and women in uniform and to their
civilian counterparts.
At the end of the day the indispensable heroes of Sunday's historic
events were the Iraqi voters who risked their lives--and at least 35 of
whom paid with their lives--to vote for their government
representatives for the first time in their lives. As Lieuteant General
Thomas Metz, Commander of the Multinational Corps-Iraq, said in
congratulating his troops for the magnificent job they did on January
30, ``the one thing we could not do for the Iraqis was vote''--and,
impressively, millions of them had the courage to do so.
Sunday's election in Iraq was also a heartening testament to the
growing capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. On election day,
those forces--and millions of Iraqi citizens--stood very tall,
demonstrating courage and determination in the face of over 100
attempts to disrupt the voting process.
Coalition planning, backup, and assistance were very important on
Sunday; however, it was alert, determined Iraqis who ensured that the
elections were not disrupted throughout the country--and who suffered
the vast majority of the casualties.
One of the most impressive examples of Iraqi heroism occurred in
Baghdad when a bomber approached the line of voters outside the Al-
Zahour Primary School. Fourteen-year police veteran Abdul Amir al-
Shuwayli pushed him away yelling, ``Let me save my people. Let me save
my friends.'' As a result of al Shuwayli's heroism, the bomber was only
able to detonate his belt of explosives 50 feet away from the voting
line, saving the lives of countless Iraqis, but taking the life of this
brave Iraqi policeman. This is one of several instances in which Iraqi
police and soldiers gave their lives shielding Iraqi voters from
suicide bombers and insurgents trying to penetrate the security rings
around polling sites.
The performance of Iraqi soldiers and police this past week is the
most visible and tangible evidence of progress from our substantial
investment in Iraqi security forces over the past year--and, in
particular, over the past 6 months.
AN EPOCH-MAKING EVENT
Although the final tally of votes will not be known for several
days, it is already clear that Sunday's election in Iraq has been an
epoch-making event. As President Bush noted, by successfully conducting
free elections, Iraqi men and women have taken rightful control of
their country's destiny, and have chosen a future of freedom and of
peace. There is almost no precedent for this event in modem Arab
history, where too often the voice of tyrants and terrorists has
predominated. But on Sunday, the voice of liberty resounded from the
center of the Middle East.
As impressive as Sunday's election was, Iraq still faces a
difficult road ahead to defeat the terrorist threat and achieve
stability, much less freedom and democracy. Nevertheless, it is
appropriate to take a moment to dwell on the breathtaking images we saw
this past weekend, and the stories of Iraqi bravery and fortitude that
have emerged from this election, because this election was not only a
demonstration of the passion of the Iraqi people for the opportunity
they have been given for self-government--although it was certainly
that. It also had strategic significance in the ongoing war, because it
was a demonstration of Iraqi bravery and also a statement of the
``correlation of forces,'' a statement to both the old terrorists who
used to run the country and the new terrorists like Zarqawi who have
joined them to fight democracy that the overwhelming majority of the
Iraqi people do not support them. That is the meaning of scenes like
these:
Iraqis, some dressed in their finest clothes, could be
seen dancing and singing as they waited in line to vote.
Mohammed Nuhair Rubaie, the director of a polling station in
Baghdad's Sunni neighborhood of Tunis, said: ``It's like a
wedding. I swear to God, it's a wedding for all of Iraq. No one
has ever witnessed this before. For a half-century, no one has
seen anything like it.''
Crowds of Iraqis formed phalanxes to protect
themselves as they marched, almost parade-like, to the polling
centers. When a polling station closed in one Sunni town,
thousands of people lined the highway as they walked 13 miles
to Gazalia to vote for the first time in their lives.
Samir Hassan, who lost his leg in a Baghdad bombing in
October 2003, stated: ``I would have crawled here if I had to.
I don't want terrorists to kill other Iraqis like they tried to
kill me.'' In Sulaimaniah, a 94-year old woman was carried to a
voting center in a wheelbarrel by her son.
When a shortage of ink at some polling sites was
reported on Diyala Radio, callers said they would gladly use
their own blood on their thumb to seal their ballots.
The Mayor of Baghdad, Alla Al-Tamimi, said, ``I can't
believe my eyes. This is the greatest moment of our history.
This is the future of our children. . . People are voting for
women, for freedom, for no more violence against our family,
for tomorrow, for no more hunger . . . Iraqis are ready to
sacrifice their life for this moment!''
Mayor al-Tamimi's statement is even more poignant considering the
terrorists' threat to make the ``streets run with the blood of the
voter.'' For this demonstration of Iraqi commitment to their new-found
democracy took place in the face of a systematic campaign of terror and
intimidation that is almost unimaginable to most Americans--including
assassinations and beheadings of election workers, threats to the
children. of candidates and threats to ordinary voters, not only at the
polls but even in their homes afterwards. Americans--who are able to
take for granted that our elections will take place in complete peace
and security--can appreciate the significance of what Iraqi voters have
just done.
Indeed, some of the most remarkable stories from Sunday's election
are about the courage of ordinary Iraqi voters. Brigadier General
Carter Ham, the commander of coalition forces in Mosul, told me
recently about two particularly impressive occurrences:
At one polling station in a Sunni Arab neighborhood in
Mosul, no one had voted by 9 a.m., 2 hours after the polls had
opened. But a crowd of several hundred people had gathered to
observe the polling place from a distance. Finally, an old
woman who appeared to be in her late sixties came forward
saying ``I've waited all my life for this opportunity,'' and
came forward to vote. The rest of the crowd followed shortly
behind her.
Another polling place in Mosul--also in a Sunni Arab
neighborhood came under enemy small arms fire and one of the
voters waiting in line was wounded. No doubt the enemy sniper
expected the other voters to run. Instead, they staved in line,
while crouching down, and shifted to provide cover for the
wounded voter while Iraqi soldiers evacuated him to a hospital.
Forty-four Iraqis lost their lives while attempting to cast their
ballots. By 1 p.m. Sunday, terrorists had launched a record seven
suicide bombings in Baghdad. Despite this violence, Iraqis did not
leave the lines they had waited all their lives for. To the contrary,
the lines of voters at the polling centers grew steadily throughout the
day.
Before the election, there was concern that the purple-dye used to
mark voters' fingers as a fraud-prevention measure would also make
voters targets for terrorists. But rather than deterring people, these
marks have become a ``purple badge of courage'' in even the most
dangerous areas. In the Doura neighborhood, normally a haven for
terrorist activity, one Sunni voter raised his forefinger and declared,
``This is my badge of honor. No, I'm not keeping my hand in my
pocket.'' Another Iraqi wrote, when ``I moved to mark my finger with
ink, I dipped it deep as if I was poking the eyes of all the world's
tyrants.''
In addition to the remarkable bravery demonstrated by the Iraqi
people on this historic day, we should also remember the hundreds of
thousands of Iraqi victims of Baath Party rule who did not live to see
this day. I do not have to recount for the members of this committee
the extent of Saddam's brutality, and the degradations he imposed on a
proud people. The haunting images of mass graves and of Halabja that we
have all seen speak for themselves.
After voting, one Iraqi, whose father was jailed and executed as
part of the mass murders following the failed Shia uprising after
Operation Desert Storm, said:
``My father helped bring this election today. This election is
the fruit of every drop of blood that was shed in 1991. I thank
my father. He had three sons who married. None of us had a
wedding party, out of respect for him. Today, we can celebrate.
Today, we will have a wedding party.''
This election was made possible in part by the courage and
sacrifice of countless Iraqis who died resisting Saddam and did not
survive to see this day.
WHO THE ENEMY IS
This election also helps to clarify without a doubt who the enemy
is in Iraq. Our enemy in Iraq is not the Iraqi people. It is not a
nationalist ``insurgency.'' It is an unholy alliance of ``old
terrorists'' and ``new terrorists.'' The old terrorists are the ones
who brutalized and tortured the country and murdered hundreds of
thousands of their countrymen for 35 years. These secret security
forces of the former regime are now allied with new terrorists drawn
from across the region. Like their Baathist allies, these new
terrorists are ideologically opposed to democracy and fearful of what
the success of freedom in this important Arab country will mean for
them. One month before the election Osama bin Laden declared that ``any
Iraqi who takes part in this election consciously and willingly is an
infidel.'' With this statement, Osama bin Laden made preventing the
Iraqi election one of al Qaeda's highest priorities. Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, bin Laden's appointed ``prince'' in Iraq, also denounced the
election, stating: ``We have declared a fierce war on this evil
principle of democracy and those who follow this wrong ideology.
Democracy is . . . based on the right to choose your religion'' and
that is ``against the rule of God.''
Through their opposition to elections and democracy, the terrorists
have demonstrated that they are not interested in winning the ``hearts
and minds'' of the Iraqi people, but rather to simply intimidate them
into submission. Unlike almost every other historical insurgency, they
offer no positive agenda beyond their own pursuit of power, and they
explicitly seek to deny Iraqis a voice in their future.
This is why Iraqis refer to men such as Abed al Latif Homayen, a
``religious advisor'' who before the fall of the regime received more
than 2 billion Dinar from Saddam to recruit Iraqis for Jihad and then
cravenly fled the country with the money, leaving his recruits behind,
as terrorists, not insurgents. Yet the determination of the terrorists
to disrupt the election was defeated by the overwhelming majority of
Iraqis who want democracy to prevail. As one Iraqi woman told Major
General John Batiste, Commander of the 1st Infantry Division, Iraqi
votes are ``bullets to the hearts of the terrorists.'' Deputy President
Ibrahim Ja'fari declared that ``Iraqi voters today have proven the
strength of their votes is more powerful than the strength of
bullets.'' Iraqis know who they are fighting, and they know they are
fighting people who want to take them backwards to some new form of
dictatorship as terrible as the one they have just been liberated from.
Iraqi voters have demonstrated that the true nationalists are those who
express themselves with ballots rather than with bombs.
THE WAY AHEAD
As dramatic a moment as these elections were, this is not a time to
sit on our hands congratulating ourselves, nor to declare victory and
abandon a task that is only half accomplished. Although I find it hard
to agree with people who say that the election was ``just the easy
part,'' there is no question that there is still much hard work to be
done--principally by the Iraqis, but also by those of us upon whom they
still depend for support. While the election clearly demonstrated that
the ``hearts and minds'' of the Iraqi people do not lie with the
terrorists, no one should imagine for a moment that these would-be
tyrants will quit as a result of Sunday's vote.
The next few months are going to be particularly challenging,
because, while this election will produce a National Assembly, that
body will still face a formidable challenge to put together a
government. It will have to do so in the face of a continuing war and a
brutal enemy. Among the principal things we need to focus on the next
period leading up to writing of a Constitution and two more votes
before the end of the year are:
1. Number one, I think, is to recognize that success in this
effort is going to require the integration of all elements of
both U.S. and Iraqi national power, as well as those of our
coalition partners. This is not a military effort alone, and
there must be equal and parallel efforts in governance and
infrastructure, economic development and strategic information.
Governance presents particularly important challenges, not only
in the writing of a Constitution but in establishing government
ministries that can function effectively and serve the
interests of the people, not their own personal agendas. The
entire international community has an interest in the success
of this effort.
2. Second, many difficult compromises will have to be made
among. different Iraqi groups, on everything from fundamental
constitutional issues to practical questions involving the
sharing of power and resources. Iraqis will have to work out
these compromises themselves. That is a big part of what
democracy is really about. But the United States has enormous
influence in Iraq and we should use it--not to advance our own
agenda but to constantly remind Iraqis of the importance of
resolving these issues in ways that preserve national unity in
the face of a ruthless enemy.
3. Third, on the military side, the key to victory clearly
lies in developing more and increasingly capable Iraqi security
forces. That effort has produced important successes so far,
and we need to figure out how to build on it and accelerate it.
4. Fourth, we and the Iraqis need to attach high priority to
the development of an effective Iraqi legal and judicial
system--one that enforces the rule of law, that punishes the
guilty, that protects the rights of all citizens, and that
provides the equal justice under the law that is one of the key
hallmarks of democracy and is also so important for economic
development. Iraq's currently weak judicial system is not yet
able to punish lawbreakers effectively, even ones who are
guilty of the most serious crimes against the Iraqi people and
against coalition forces. Finding ways to protect judges from
intimidation needs to be a high priority. We also need to help
the Iraqi Government strengthen the tools of law enforcement,
everything from communications equipment to identification
systems for criminals and foreigners to forensic bomb analysis
capability.
5. Finally we need to work with the Iraqi Government to keep
up pressure on neighboring countries, in particular Syria, to
stop the activities of Baathists and other terrorist supporters
working from outside Iraq and to stop the flow of foreign
fighters into the country. Some of Iraq's neighbors probably
fear a free Iraq, but they need to understand that it will be
much more harmful for them if they try to obstruct Iraq's
progress toward freedom.
It is critically important to remember we are facing an enemy that
is not only ruthless but adaptive and fiendishly clever; an enemy that
obviously didn't give up just because the Baghdad was liberated, that
didn't give up just because Saddam Hussein was captured and did not
give up just because the interim government was stood up successfully
on June 28. It's an enemy that will adapt and we need to be prepared
for its adaptations and anticipate them and be ahead of them.
The good news is that the enemy does not offer anything positive to
the Iraqi people. It's not an enemy that can ever defeat our soldiers
one for one on the battlefield. But it is an enemy that's shown itself
to be horribly clever and viciously evil, with no respect for the laws
of civilization or for the Iraqi people. Ultimately, it is the Iraqi
people who will defeat it, with our continued help.
THE POLITICAL PROCESS
In the coming days, after the votes are counted, the Transitional
National Assembly (TNA) will form a new government and begin the ardous
process of drafting a new Iraqi constitution. In October, this
permanent constitution will be put to the Iraqi people for ratification
through a popular referendum. In December, Iraqis will again return to
the polls to elect a new, permanent government under the rules of that
constitution.
As Americans know well, democracy should not impose a ``winner-
take-all'' system on a nation. Successful democracy requires leaders to
respect the rights of minorities and of those who did not vote for them
and to attend to the aspirations and interests of all citizens. Many
leading political figures in Iraq have already demonstrated both their
commitment to respecting minority rights and that most crucial of
democratic skills, compromise.
This was evident in the drafting of an impressive document, the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), sometimes described as Iraq's
interim constitution. Many of the current candidates for the TNA were
instrumental in the negotiation of the TAL--which lays out the
framework in which the present political process is taking place--and
which also contains important assurances of freedom of religion,
expression, assembly, and of the press. The TAL guarantees equal rights
for all citizens of Iraq regardless of ethnicity, denomination, or sex.
The TAL is already the freest basic governance document in the Arab
world, and gives promise that in the future, Iraq will not belong to
one dictator, one clan, or one tribe.
Recent statements by Iraqi leaders suggest they are strongly
committed to ensuring that the TNA will represent the entire Iraqi
nation, rather than a narrow sectarian or ethnic interest.
In a recent press interview, Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) chief Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim
said that ``the National Assembly shall represent all Iraqi
strata, and we will make an all-out effort to this end. We will
defend the rights of our Sunni brothers just the same way we do
those of the Shiites.''
Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Iraq's former national security
adviser and a confidant of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, said, ``The
Shiites will form a majority, but there has to be a prominent
presence of Sunnis in the government. Now is the time for the
Shiites to exercise statesmanship.''
On Monday Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi noted,
``The whole world is watching us. As we worked together
yesterday to finish dictatorship, let us work together towards
a bright future Sunnis and Shiites, Muslims and Christians,
Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen.''
These statements are good indicators that Iraqis will be able to
form a transitional government that will attend to the interests of all
Iraqis, including the Sunni Arabs whose vote appears to have been
suppressed somewhat by the severe intimidation they face in some
provinces.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
This election, in fact, is part of a larger 2-year process that,
despite setbacks and tragedies, is still on track. The key to this
process has been enabling Iraqis to emerge from the shadow of
dictatorship and gradually become more self-reliant. Nowhere is this
process more important than in the development of the Iraqi security
forces.
Last year we intercepted a letter from Zarqawi to his al Qaeda
colleagues in Afghanistan, in which he warned of the dangers of the
advent of Iraqi sovereignty, especially the creation of capable Iraqi
security forces. He wrote:
With the spread of the [Iraqi] Army and the police, our future
is becoming frightening. The problem is you end up having an
army and police connected by lineage, blood and appearance to
the people of the region. How can we kill their cousins and
sons . . . This is the democracy . . . we will have no pretext.
The endeavor to create these forces has not been without setbacks
and disappointments. Most significantly, barbaric acts of intimidation
have targeted Iraqi soldiers and police--and their families--thinning
the ranks of some units and rendering others ineffective. Since June
2003, nearly 1,400 Iraqi soldiers and policemen have killed in the line
of duty as they sought to defend their newfound freedom.
Through it all, however, the coalition and the Iraqis have
continued to press forward, modifying training programs, adapting
operational constructs; and increasing equipment authorizations. Over
time, we have achieved substantial progress in the effort to equip
Iraqi forces, to reconstruct their infrastructure, and, most
importantly, to develop Iraqi units--police, as well as Army--that will
fight aggressively for their country. None of this has been easy, and I
want to publicly recognize the Iraqis and coalition members who have
been engaged in this critically important endeavor, particularly the
advisors who helped train and then fought alongside Iraqi soldiers and
police and who have, in some cases, shed blood with them as well in
Najaf, Fallujah, Baghdad, Samarra, Mosul, and numerous other locations.
Of course, the support of the United States Congress and this committee
has been especially critical in helping to make this progress possible.
This progress does not always translate into quantifiable measures
such as number of personnel and equipment. There is understandable
confusion when the total strength of the Iraqi security forces
fluctuates dramatically due to the refinement of definitions or the
reclassification of various categories of forces. An important example
of this confusion occurred when the roughly 70,000 members of what had
been called the Facilities Protection Service were devolved into their
respective ministries, and out of the control the coalition command or
the Ministries of Defense or Interior, resulting in what appeared to be
a sudden drop in the total strength we were reporting for Iraqi
security forces, from roughly 200,000 to roughly 130,000. However, that
was really nothing more than an accounting change and the Facilities
Protection Service continue to perform their functions, although as we
have always emphasized their capability is largely limited to simple
guard duty and they are not part of Multi-National Force Iraq's (MNF-I)
training and equipping effort.
More generally, we have repeatedly tried to caution against making
too much of raw numbers, when there are large qualitative difference
which are generally more important. The term ``trained and equipped''
when applied to Iraqi forces is not intended to be analogous to how we
measure readiness in American military units. There are currently
136,000 personnel listed as ``trained and equipped.'' These individuals
have met the training and equipping criteria for their element of the
police or military, and the growth in this number is a reflection of
progress. But other intangible factors such as leadership, cohesion,
and morale are even more important determinants of the capability of
Iraqi units, and these factors are difficult to measure numerically.
A better indicator of the progress of the Iraqi security forces
than raw numbers of troops is how well these forces did on January 30.
One impressive metric is the number of suicide bombers stopped at the
outer security perimeter of the polling sites, which was 100 percent of
a total of eight attempted attacks.
Measurement is also complicated by the fact that there has been a
consistent development of new kinds of units with different
capabilities, such as the development of special Police Commando
Battalions. These are among a number of different kinds of units that
have the important capability to be deployable anywhere in the country,
not just in their home area. Since Prime Minister Allawi took office
last June, 44 deployable military and police battalions--and more than
85 battalions overall--have been established. (The additional units
include regionally-oriented Iraqi National Guard battalions that were
recently incorporated into the Iraqi Army.)
Deployable battalions can be moved anywhere in the country--and, in
many cases, currently are deployed in the most challenging areas. On
election day, for example, there were seven such battalions helping
maintain security in Mosul, nine in Fallujah, three in Samarra, and at
least seven in Baghdad. Smaller numbers were deployed at numerous other
locations. Few of these battalions are fully manned, most will profit
from the additional training they will receive as they go through the
``train, fight, train'' cycle MNF-I is establishing, and none are yet
capable of replacing coalition units on a one-for-one basis. However,
they are contributing enormously already. Iraqi security forces lack
many of the capabilities that our forces demonstrate so superbly.
However, Iraqi forces bring to the fight skills that our soldiers will
never possess, particularly their understandings of the languages and
cultures of Iraq. They will contribute even more as we and Iraqi
leaders continue their development, replace their losses, and help
develop the higher headquarters, the combat support elements, and the
logistical units and systems needed to support these units. All of that
is planned.
Much work clearly remains to be done. To help Iraq achieve full
responsibility for its own security, we must intensify our efforts to
assist Iraq in the organization, training, equipping, and mentoring of
Iraqi security forces. We must continue to help rebuild Iraqi security
force bases, training academies, border forts, and other facilities. We
must assist in establishing robust institutions--institutions that can
provide appropriate support, oversight, and direction to Iraq's
military elements and police forces, and institutions that can gather
and analyze the intelligence that is so important in counter-insurgency
operations.
A major component in this effort will be the substantially
increased emphasis that General Casey, the MNF-I Commander, has
directed be given to Iraqi security force development this year.
Increasingly, Iraqis have the ``hardware'' force component of
personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. Their. most important gaps
are in the intangible components required of all successful military
units: leadership, command and control, experience and unit cohesion.
These intangibles will take time to develop and some of the most
important development will take place on the job--in active military
operations.
The President and Secretary Rumsfeld are committed to providing the
resources needed for this endeavor and the administration request for
supplemental funding will include a substantial funding request for
expansion of the Iraqi security force effort. We are counting on your
support.
In sum, we believe that considerable momentum has been achieved
recently in the development of Iraqi security forces. However, much
remains to be done as we help Iraq rebuild not only battalions,
brigades, and divisions, but the institutions that support them and the
ministries that direct them.
This is an enormous endeavor, one that is historically
unprecedented. It has encountered countless challenges and suffered
numerous setbacks. In recent months, however, we have seen the results
of the coalition's investment, most importantly in the performance of
Iraqi units deployed to the hot spots in that country. We should be
particularly heartened by the performance of Iraqi soldiers and police
on January 30, when they courageously thwarted the enemy's concerted
effort to deny the Iraqi people the tremendous opportunity that U.S.
and other coalition forces have provided to them--the opportunity to
vote for own representatives. Democracy is on the march in Iraq. This
past Sunday, Iraq's own Army and police force helped to safeguard that
march.
Their performance was captured in an anecdote related by another
Iraqi blogger named Ali on his Web site ``Iraqilibe'':
As I left [the polling place] one of the guards said to me as
he handed me back my cellular phone, ``God bless you and your
beloved ones. We don't know how to thank you. Please excuse any
inconvenience on our part. We wish we didn't have to search you
or limit your freedom. You are heroes.'' I was struck with
surprise and felt ashamed. This man was risking his life all
these hours in what has become the utmost target for all
terrorists in Iraq and yet he's apologizing and calling us
heroes. I thanked him back and told him that he and his comrads
are the true heroes and that we can never be grateful enough
for their services. [misspellings in the original]
Today, we all share his gratitude for the courage of the Iraqi
forces, and for what our American service men and women have done to
help Iraqis achieve this moment, and hopefully soon, many more like it.
Thank you, I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Again, I thank
you for your long participation in this endeavor personally,
professionally.
General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHIEF, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin
and members of the committee, for your continuing support of
our men and women in uniform and for this opportunity to report
on our progress in Iraq. After visiting our troops in Iraq many
times, I can only imagine their great pride as our troops and
their coalition partners witnessed the Iraqi people lining up
at the polls, bravely and emphatically taking responsibility
for their own future.
Some Iraqis compared election day to a wedding or a
birthday and, as you saw on the TV news footage, some carried
their children with them to the polls. By voting these Iraqis
were helping to chart their own future and the Iraqi that their
children would inherit.
The election was not without violence, as Secretary
Wolfowitz said. One U.S. marine and a number of Iraqis gave
their lives protecting this fledgling democracy on election
day.
Not every Iraqi chose to vote. Yet we have hope that many
of them will see this election as a call to abandon the
insurgency and join the political process, just as we saw with
the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the days before the election, as
Secretary Wolfowitz said, terrorist leader Zarqawi declared war
against democracy. To Zarqawi, the Iraq people have said: We
will not let you win.
A senior U.S. Army officer serving in Baghdad commented on
what he had witnessed on Sunday. His quote is: ``Voters paraded
down the street, holding up their fingers, marked with the blue
ink from the polls, in overwhelming pride. Every Iraqi I talked
to said thank you for this opportunity, for this freedom. Today
they earned their freedom.'' This lieutenant colonel went on to
say: ``We should all be joyful for that.''
Of course, we are, because the election was a very
important milestone on a very long road. The Iraqi Government
and the coalition, as Secretary Wolfowitz also said, still have
much work to do. The coalition must focus our efforts on
reaching the point where we can shift our mission from fighting
the counterinsurgency ourselves to developing Iraqi capacity to
conduct those operations and create an environment that
encourages sustained political and economic progress.
Since this last July, the coalition has accomplished a
great deal in improving the quality of the Iraqi security
forces on duty. Many of these forces are now much better
trained and equipped, and if you look at their performance in
Fallujah this past October and during the election you can see
that.
I believe we have also gained a better understanding of
their capabilities. For them to be able to operate
independently, they are going to need our continued help to
build their leadership, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities at all levels.
I would also like to reemphasize that security means more
than just physical security. Iraqis need help building the
Iraqi economy and industrial base to create jobs and incomes
sufficient to support local and State government services for
individuals and families. They must be able to provide for
their social welfare, ensuring educational opportunities,
adequate wages, health care, and other safety net programs are
available to ensure the population has basic human services.
All Iraqis must be able to participate in government without
fear of intimidation. They need a mature judicial system and
confidence in the government's ability to maintain the rule of
law.
Since the transition to Iraqi sovereignty last June, the
Iraqi Government has 26 ministries working to provide services
to the country along with governments at the regional and local
level. But these organizations have a very tough task because
Saddam Hussein's regime sapped the Iraqi people of their spirit
and tried to render them totally dependent. Saddam's government
left behind a decayed infrastructure and no tradition of caring
for the needs of the population. The Iraqi Government needs our
continued support and mentorship as well.
So we must stay focused and we must not waver in our
resolve. The Iraqi people and the Iraqi security forces showed
their resolve on Sunday, as did the coalition. We are grateful
for the support of the American people and that support must
continue.
Now is the time for the entire international community to
show its resolve in the war on terrorism. As I have said
before, this war is ultimately a test of wills, and the Iraqis
certainly passed that test on Sunday. So right now there is an
enormous upsurge of hope and enthusiasm, but the situation in
Iraq certainly remains dynamic.
I firmly believe we have the right strategy for
capitalizing on this recent success and helping build a new
Iraq, democratic, at peace with its neighbors, and
representative of all its people. I am extremely proud of how
well our military has performed, especially their flexibility
and their adaptability in dealing with a difficult enemy. I am
proud of their ability to cooperate with the Iraqi Government
and its citizens. I am proud of their courage and am equally
proud of their compassion under some very challenging
conditions.
So on behalf of all the Joint Chiefs, I express my
condolences for all the American, coalition, and Iraqi men and
women and their loved ones who have either been killed or
wounded in this very noble endeavor. Because of their
sacrifices, 25 million Iraqis have the chance to build a new
democracy.
I thank you for your continued support and look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General. All of us
here on the committee share the sentiment you have expressed.
These elections would not have taken place had it not been for
the steadfast commitment of the Coalition Forces and the
sacrifices that they took, and then in the final round they
fought really side by side with their Iraqi military partners
and it is a partnership which we have henceforth that will make
this successful.
Mr. Schlicher, do you have an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF RONALD L. SCHLICHER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir, I do have some brief opening
remarks.
Chairman Warner. All right, let us have your brief opening
remarks.
Mr. Schlicher. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the
committee: I thank all of you for the opportunity to come and
appear before you today to discuss the progress that we have
seen in Iraq as the Iraqis lay the foundations of the
democratic government that they have so clearly shown us that
they are determined to achieve.
With your permission, I will make a few brief remarks and
submit my complete statement for the record. Please let me
remind, as the chairman noted at the beginning, that, though my
remarks are about Iraq, we also have with us today Ambassador
Maureen Quinn, the Afghan Coordinator in the Department of
State, who is available to answer any questions about
Afghanistan that the committee might have.
Please let me amplify and echo some of the themes that
Secretary Wolfowitz so eloquently laid out earlier. Earlier
this week, we saw enormously brave Iraqi men and women defy
threats and bombs, lining up in their streets, walking to cast
their votes in Iraq's first genuine election in a generation.
Even as we speak, independent Iraqi election officials are
counting those votes and Iraqi political leaders, anticipating
the results, are debating the shapes of possible alliances to
best represent their constituencies and the interests of their
entire nation. Iraqi voters meanwhile are celebrating the
opportunity to shape their own future.
As Secretary Wolfowitz noted, the bravery of the millions
of Iraqi voters has really been remarkable. Terrorists
threatened, kidnapped, and killed candidates, killed election
officials, killed security forces, killed potential voters, and
intimidated many thousands, perhaps millions, of other voters.
Some Iraqis unfortunately as a result of this intimidation
chose to stay home, some out of fear, but there are also those
who chose to stay home out of alienation and perceived
disenfranchisement.
We hope and expect that the new government, when it is
formed, will reach out to all Iraqis to ensure that the voice
of all elements in Iraq are heard in the continuing development
of the democratic process. This subject principally alludes, of
course, to the question of Sunni inclusion. We, like Secretary
Wolfowitz, have noted the many public statements and we have
also heard private statements in which all elements of the
political class in Iraq right now are determined that the
approach to the upcoming political processes that they have be
inclusive and include all members of society. We certainly do
applaud that intention on their part.
But in the face of violence, of threats, millions of Iraqis
did go to the polls. They cast their secret ballots in
accordance with their personal convictions. You may have seen
on TV this very illustrative scene of an Iraqi official holding
up the ballot for this election on Sunday with 111 choices and
a ballot from the last so-called election of the Saddam era
where there was one choice. I think that kind of said it all,
especially if you are an Iraqi.
It is also really important to note the enormous numbers of
Iraqi women who came forward to vote for their freedom. After
the election, people celebrated, not for the victory of any
particular party because the results are not yet known;
instead, they celebrated democracy.
Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me a personal comment at
this point, as someone who spent the last quarter century
working in this part of the world and I think understands the
yearnings of average people there pretty well, I have to say
this was a deeply, profoundly moving moment, and I feel very
proud to have been a small part of it.
While nothing should dim the glory of the election day, we
should recognize that the election process was still new to
Iraqis, so there are certain aspects in which it was not
perfect. There have been a few reports of logistical problems,
of voting irregularities, of some communities, villages, that
did not have the opportunity to vote. The Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IECI), which is the same body that has done
so well in managing the logistics of Sunday's election, they
are charged with administering and addressing all of these
complaints, and we think that they will do so. We will be
watching and encouraging them to do so, and we think it is
really important that they do so in a transparent process,
especially a process that is transparent to all Iraqis, and if
there are glitches that were the result of logistical problems,
to explain those glitches to the people. If there is some case
where an election official did not do what he or she should
have done, the commission should point that out to the people
as well.
At the same time, in the wake of the election all Iraqis
can be pleased with the report of the International Mission for
Iraqi Elections. That is the international mission that was
established to observe the elections. They found that the IECI
prepared and put in place a framework for an election that
generally meets recognized standards in terms of the election
law, of planning, and of preparations.
We think that the Iraqi people likewise can be pleased by
the courage and professionalism displayed by the Iraqi security
forces and police, which Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers
have also mentioned. This played an essential role in
safeguarding the elections and preventing their disruption by
the practitioners of terror.
Now, without question and again as my colleagues have
pointed out very clearly today, the Iraqi people still have a
long struggle ahead. But we are determined to stand resolutely
beside them. The sacrifices of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-
I) to assure security and assist with logistics and the
tireless work of the American civilian and military personnel
have helped make this great day possible for the Iraqis. In
this regard, Mr. Chairman, please allow me to salute the
incredible job that Ambassador John Negroponte and his team at
the embassy in Baghdad and at the embassy offices throughout
Iraq have also done in this regard.
We also salute the United Nations (U.N.) Election
Assistance Division, which did really an heroic job of working
with the IECI to actually make the elections possible in the
face of all of the problems of security, of logistics, of
organization that they have faced. We look forward to continued
U.N. involvement in Iraq in support of the subject matter and
in the manners that the Iraqi Government may request of them.
Sir, the elections as I judge it will have a longer-term
effect on security as well. The elections can help to convince
those who have been sitting on the fence that an elected
legitimate government of Iraq is empowered and is here to stay,
that it is receiving support from Iraqis of all ethnicities,
all religions, and from all provinces. In the end, I hope it
will convince them that the solution to their problems lies
within the political process and not with the ranks of those
who practice terror and seek to disenfranchise their fellow
citizens via that terror.
By voting, millions of Iraqis have told the insurgents that
they are not wanted, that their agenda is not accepted, that
their way is not legitimate, that their way is not
representative of the people of Iraq. The Iraqis have decided
that security and the freedom to choose are what are important
to them.
Our continued commitment will be necessary to help the
Iraqi people rebuild their country. They need and deserve to
see the quality of their daily lives improve. Hand in hand with
increased security, Iraqis want dependable electricity and
water and medical care, all of which the practitioners of
terror have also been trying to deprive them of over the last
months.
Closely coordinated with the Iraqi Government, our
reconstruction efforts have made progress in restoring central
services, in expanding the availability of quality medical
assistance, in rehabilitating public buildings and roads, in
advising the government on economic and financial reforms, and
in introducing Iraqis at all levels to the basics of democratic
practice and the rule of law.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schlicher follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ronald L. Schlicher
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss developments in Iraq
and the progress of the Iraqi people as they rebuild their country and
lay the foundations of a democratic government. Earlier this week, we
saw brave Iraqi men and women defying threats and bombs, lining up in
the streets to cast their votes in Iraq's first genuine election in
generations. Even as we speak, independent Iraqi elections officials
are counting those votes, and Iraqi political leaders are debating the
shape of possible alliances to best represent their constituencies and
the interests of their nation. Iraqi voters are celebrating the
opportunity to shape their own future.
But some Iraqis did not survive the election. Terrorists
threatened, kidnapped, and killed candidates, elections officials,
security forces, and voters. Some Iraqis, unfortunately, chose to stay
home--some out of fear, and others out of alienation and
disenchantment. We firmly hope that the new government will reach out
to all Iraqis to ensure that the voice of all is heard in the
continuing development of the democratic process.
But in the face of violence, threats, and intimidation, millions of
Iraqis did go to the polls. They cast their secret ballots in
accordance with their personal convictions. Women came forward to vote
for their freedom. Afterward, many people celebrated--not the victory
of any particular party, because indeed the results of the election are
still unknown. They celebrated democracy. In some parts of the country,
people danced and sang in the streets, while in other areas there was a
quiet pride and determination to defy those who would deny Iraqis a
democratic future; to go out and vote and move Iraq one giant step
forward from its authoritarian past. Some Iraqis brought their children
to the polls to teach them the value of freedom, and afterward many of
those children went out to play in streets that during Saddam's rule
were filled with fear and despair.
The election process was not perfect. We have heard reports of
logistical problems, voting irregularities, and communities that did
not have an opportunity to vote. In a process of this magnitude,
carried out in this short timeframe, under such challenging security
conditions, these kinds of problems were expected. The Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), charged with administering the
elections from top to bottom, is also charged with hearing and
resolving all challenges and complaints to the electoral process.
Meanwhile all Iraqis should be pleased with the preliminary report
of the International Mission for Iraqi Elections--the international
mission established to observe the elections--which found that ``Iraq's
Electoral Commission has prepared and put in place a framework for an
election that generally meets recognized standards in terms of election
law, planning, and preparations.'' They can be pleased by the courage
and professionalism demonstrated by Iraqi security forces and police
which played an essential role in safeguarding the elections and
preventing their disruption by the insurgents and terrorists.
Without question, the Iraqi people still have a long struggle
ahead. But we will stand resolutely beside them. The sacrifices of the
Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) to ensure security and assist with
logistics, the tireless work of American civilian and military
personnel--including, if I may be excused some pride, the tremendous
job done by Ambassador Negroponte and his dedicated staff at the
Embassy in Baghdad and Embassy offices throughout Iraq--and the
contributions of the international community helped make their great
day possible. As called for in United Nations (U.N.) Security Council
resolution 1546, the U.N. provided critical assistance to the IECI. We
look forward to continued U.N. involvement in Iraq's political
transition.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to describe our understanding of the
next steps of the political process, according to the Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL) and the regulations of the IECI. In most
areas, voters participated in two elections simultaneously--the
National election and their respective provincial election. In
addition, voters in the Kurdish areas in northeastern Iraq participated
in an election for the Kurdistan Regional Government. Immediately after
the close of polls, election workers at each poll began to count the
ballots. When they were tallied, those results were secured and
physically transported to the IECI national headquarters in Baghdad for
tabulation.
Once the IECI has received and tabulated all of the results from
the more than 5,000 polling stations around Iraq, it will begin to
calculate the allocation of seats to the respective assemblies--the
275-seat Transitional National Assembly (TNA), the 18 provincial
assemblies, and the Kurdistan Regional Government. The IECI has stated
that it expects to announce the progress of the tally periodically; its
target for final results is February 15. Meanwhile, we understand that
political parties have already begun negotiating the shape of the
coming government, on a speculative basis, as they await the election
results.
Once the allocations of seats are announced, we expect that the TNA
will convene. The Assembly's first responsibility is to elect its own
leadership and adopt internal rules. It will then select, by a two-
thirds majority vote, the three-member Transitional Government
Presidency Council, consisting of the President of the State and two
Deputy Presidents, on a single slate.
Under the TAL, the three members of the Presidency Council are
required to unanimously name a Prime Minister within 2 weeks. If the
Presidency Council fails to name a Prime Minister within 2 weeks, the
responsibility moves to the TNA, which in this instance must confirm a
nomination by a two-thirds majority.
The Prime Minister then has up to 1 month in which to name a
Council of Ministers. If the Prime Minister is unable to nominate a
Council of Ministers within 1 month, the Presidency Council shall name
another Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers must then be approved
by a simple majority vote of the TNA before commencing their work as a
government. The current Iraqi Interim Government Prime Minister and
Council of Ministers will remain in place until their replacements are
confirmed. Upon confirmation by the TNA, the new Prime Minister and
Council of Ministers will assume power.
The new transitional government will govern for only a limited
period of time. Its primary task will be drafting a new constitution,
which, according to the TAL timeline, is to be completed by August 15
and put before Iraqi voters in a referendum not later than October 15.
If Iraqi voters approve the constitution, they will vote again
according to its precepts for a permanent government by the end of this
year.
We believe that the development of the political process will
encourage all Iraqis to put faith in their elected officials as they
continue to work with MNF-I forces to improve security. The key to U.S.
force reduction in Iraqi is improving the readiness and training of the
Iraqi security forces; our goal remains doing all we can to facilitate
Iraqis becoming responsible for their own security in all its aspects.
An essential part of this effort, in addition to training, will be the
dedication, patriotism, and courage of the Iraqi security forces and
their leadership, whose members step forward--as they did on election
day--in defense of their country to overcome the terrorism, threats,
and intimidation directed against them and their families.
We have seen a steady increase in capability as measured by success
in fighting on the ground. Iraqi forces had limited success in the
fighting last April. But since then, they have done steadily better in
the disarming of the Sadr militia in August and the fighting in
Fallujah in November. Most recently, security forces displayed
vigilance and preparedness in providing security for the elections.
My colleagues from the Department of Defense are here today to
address how we are training the soldiers, and how we are inculcating
leadership skills, including through promising experiments with
advisory teams. I would like to make two points to add to their
remarks:
First, this is an area in which international engagement is
necessary and has been forthcoming. On the military side, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has begun its training mission,
which will be specializing in officer and staff training. NATO training
will expand rapidly as its instructors arrive on the ground in Iraq.
Jordan has offered to host some NATO training, and Norway has already
hosted a course for senior officers. Other countries are also pitching
in, including Egypt, which has trained several hundred soldiers.
On the police side, we have police liaison officers from a number
of countries helping with on-the-ground mentoring in Iraq. Again, we
should recognize the contribution of Jordan, which has helped us set up
the International Police Training Center near Amman. Germany has
trained 400 police in the United Arab Emirates, and France has offered
out-of-country training to up to 1,500.
Second, security can only move forward in tandem with the political
process. Soldiers will fight only if they have something to fight for.
In this regard, I would like to highlight the successful cooperation
between the Iraqi security forces and the IECI, a partnership that
further demonstrated that Iraqi forces will fight for responsible Iraqi
political leadership and defend the Iraqi public against aggression.
Mr. Chairman, the security situation in Iraq is still difficult.
There are still thousands of insurgents, loose weapons, and explosives
are still easily obtained, and terrorists are still able to assassinate
and kill. We have seen no diminution in the number of incidents.
But the elections will, I believe, have a longer-term effect on
security. They can help to convince those who are sitting on the fence
that an elected, legitimate government of Iraq is empowered and here to
stay, that it is receiving support from Iraqis of all ethnicities,
religions, and provinces; and that, in the end, the solution to their
problems lies within the political process, and not with the ranks of
the insurgents. By voting, millions of Iraqis have told the insurgents
they are not wanted. The Iraqis have decided that security and the
freedom to choose are what is important to them. We hope that those
Iraqis who have heretofore been undecided will take heart from the
courage and democratic yearnings of their fellow citizens, and make the
environment much tougher for insurgents to operate in.
Engaging the population in the political process--especially in the
process of drafting the new Iraqi constitution--is a key to changing
the security environment for the better. As the Iraqi Transitional
Government gains the trust of Iraqis, Iraqis will make the country less
hospitable to the insurgents. This will take time, patience--and
commitment.
It will also require our continued commitment to help the Iraqi
people rebuild their country. Iraqis need and deserve to see the
quality of their daily lives improved. Hand in hand with increased
security, Iraqis want dependable electricity and water and medical
care. Closely coordinated with the Iraqi Government, our reconstruction
efforts have made progress in restoring essential services, expanding
the availability of quality medical assistance, rehabilitating public
buildings and roads, advising the government on economic and financial
reforms, and introducing Iraqis at all levels to the basics of
democratic practice and rule of law.
Most of this work occurs out of the media spotlight. It is easy to
overlook the progress when compared to the monumental challenges that
remain in a country so devastated by decades of conflict and Saddam's
neglect. But despite the continuing hardships of their daily lives,
Iraqis know and appreciate what donors are doing to help accelerate
reconstruction and promote economic and political reform. The election
demonstrates the importance of programs to promote democracy and re-
forge the links of civil society.
Despite the formidable security challenges, we have now obligated
$13 billion (or 62 percent) of the $20.9 billion in Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction I and II funds. We have disbursed over $4.7 billion, or
22 percent of the total. We continue to adapt our programs to
circumstances on the ground in order to ensure that funding is
available for the most urgent needs. We appreciate the support from
Congress we have in all these efforts, including recent efforts to
reallocate Iraq reconstruction resources.
As we enter this post-election period, our reconstruction efforts
will be focused on assisting the Iraqi Transitional Government to
improve security, create jobs, develop economic policy and regulatory
frameworks, and expand private enterprise. Establishing momentum toward
longer-term stability will help improve the climate for other donors
and private investors to join the reconstruction and economic
development effort, stimulate economic growth, and enable the Iraqis to
progressively assume a greater role internationally.
Let me be clear: I think Iraqis are anxious to take on that role.
In fact, they have already begun to speak loudly and proudly on the
international stage. As President Bush said on the day of the
elections, ``The people of Iraq have spoken to the world, and the world
is hearing the voice of freedom from the center of the Middle East.''
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again for the
opportunity to testify about our progress in Iraq. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Schlicher, we are going to have to get
to the questioning now.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I am going to put your full statement in,
and I am glad that you acknowledge, as we do, the very valuable
work done by our diplomatic corps under Ambassador Negroponte
and the many who serve with him in civilian capacities.
Mr. Schlicher. Thank you, sir. I will pass that on.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
We are going to move quickly into a first round, gentlemen,
and we hope to have a second round. General, I would like to
start with you. The President last night made these remarks
which bear directly on the future of the employment of our
military forces. I paraphrase him: Our strategy is adapting to
circumstances. So my first question would be, what visible
changes have there been in strategy and the manner in which we
coordinate our responsibilities with the growing, presumably,
professional capabilities of the Iraqi security forces?
The President continued: We will not set an artificial
timetable. I thoroughly agree with him on that and I would like
to have your views on that.
Lastly, the President said: We are in Iraq to achieve a
result--a country that is democratic, representative of all of
its people, at peace with its neighbors, and able to defend
itself. When that result is achieved, our men and women serving
in Iraq will return home with the honor they have earned.
Can you expound on those very wise remarks by our President
last night in the State of the Union Address?
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I will. I think one of the
things that most Americans ought to be proudest of is how U.S.
and coalition forces have adapted in Iraq, starting with major
combat. But as major combat ended, the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) was stood up, and that gave way to the current
Iraqi Government, which will give way now to a new government.
Over that time frame also we had a change in the opposition
and the insurgency built up slowly over the first year and
became very intense over the last 6 months for sure. So we have
adapted all the way along. Secretary Wolfowitz talked about
part of that adaptation as we tried to categorize the sort of
Iraqi security forces that were there to help provide for their
own security. Initially we tracked those that were on the
payroll and realized very quickly that was not sufficient. Then
we tracked those that were trained and decided later on that,
no, it is not just training; it is training and equipping, and
we have to move--one of the adaptations you will see is we are
going to have to move--and I think Senator Levin mentioned this
in his opening remarks--we are going to have to move to a way
where we can start tracking the capability.
This is not easy. We have spent a lot of decades trying to
perfect a way to track our true U.S. military capability, and
you have to realize in that country without a robust Ministry
of Defense, without a robust Ministry of Interior, without the
sort of reporting and communications abilities that we have,
this will be difficult. But I talked to General Petraeus today
and that is certainly one of the adaptations where we have to
go.
The other thing, I think yesterday in your briefing with
General Sharp and others we talked about, and in my opening
statement while we focused on fighting the insurgency, we need
to now focus on helping the Iraqis become self-reliant in their
own security capability. So you will see some changes in how we
do that in some of our emphasis, some of our focus.
That is going to have to occur over time. That is why I
think setting time lines--this ought to be conditions-based,
not timelines-based, and that is what we have said all along. I
hope that we will have support to do that. Certainly that is
the President's intention and that is the order we are marching
to.
If you will put up that first slide on the mission.
[The information referred to follows:]
This is the mission that we have been using and it is in
our national strategy, not just military strategy. This is the
U.S. mission statement. I think it goes right along with what
we heard last night in the State of the Union message and what
we have been marching to. But that is our mission. That is in
the first few pages of our national strategy.
Chairman Warner. Can you give us a few specifics? For
example, we have received, obviously, through some of our
sources the recommendations of General Luck, and I fully
understand that Generals Abizaid and Casey are working through
that and through the Secretary of Defense and his staff and
yourself you will give us more specifics. But generally, we are
looking at the option of including relatively small numbers of
our forces into the Iraqi units. You might call it embedding.
That is a term the American people understand now because of
the courage of the journalists actually working with them. This
is on a daily basis. They are actually 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week right with that unit, doing some training, coordinating,
and the like.
Can you expound on that. To me, that is a very important
change in our basic tactics.
General Myers. We have already instituted some assistance,
training support, where we essentially do what you just said,
Mr. Chairman, and that is to embed trainers with Iraqi units.
Of course, our forces, while fighting the insurgency, have also
trained the National Guard Forces, who in many cases work right
along side our forces.
So this is just an extension of that, realizing that when
you talk about capability with the Iraqi security forces it is
a function of several things. It is certainly a function of
leadership. It is a function of motivation. It is a function of
training, experience, and the infrastructure they have to
operate. It is a function of the equipment they have.
One of the things, of course, we do well is we can help
them in many of these areas in terms of mentorship. We can also
bring them real capability. We often throw around the term,
which is another acronym, but ``C\4\I,'' which is command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence. If you
think about it in terms of Iraqi forces, command and control,
we can help with that because we bring the next ``C'', which is
communications. We can help with moving----
Chairman Warner. Let me just finish up. In summary then, in
every way we are recognizing the growing competence of the
Iraqi forces and enabling them to go into positions and
missions which formerly were performed by our forces; am I
correct in that?
General Myers. Well, obviously the goal is that, to get
them to take over.
Chairman Warner. They certainly exhibited that on election
day. That gave them a tremendous sense of confidence. I would
hope that momentum--as a matter of fact, am I mistaken, some
2,000 or 3,000 Iraqis have volunteered in the last 72 hours to
join their military forces? That is a clear manifestation.
General Myers. Yes, sir. General Petraeus said in the last
2 days that there have been 2,500 people on each day trying to
sign up----
Chairman Warner. On each day?
General Myers. On each day, trying to sign up.
Chairman Warner. Well, that is a strong sign. Thank you.
General Myers. Yes, they have been empowered.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, the coming government as it
begins to take charge, what changes in terms of their
relationship with the direction and the operation of our troops
do you anticipate, and will there be a new status of forces
agreement to give adequate protection to our troops and its
missions?
Secretary Wolfowitz. If I could preface that, Mr. Chairman,
by responding to your question about the changes in strategy
the President referred to. I think it is important to help
people understand that we have adapted to circumstances as we
find them on the ground. I think the most significant change
was what we saw in the elections on Sunday, because, as you
recall, Ambassador Bremer's original plan was to keep the CPA
in operation as an occupation authority until the end of this
year. When it became clear in the summer of 2003 that that was
not a satisfactory way to go forward, first we talked about a
transfer of sovereignty to an appointed government. When the
Iraqi reaction was, well, wait a minute, particularly from
Sistani in particular, but I think more broadly, we would like
an elected government, we came up with the plan that the
President announced in I believe it was in the fall of 2003,
which has produced first the interim government on June 28 and
now this election.
We need to be prepared to adapt further. As you correctly
point out, we are going to have what is called a transitional
government, which will be elected, which now has authority
under the U.N. resolution that the previous government did not
have, to negotiate a status of forces agreement, a security
agreement. You can call it different things, but it is the
arrangement under which coalition forces will continue to
operate in Iraq.
Also, as we have said over and over again, if they want us
to leave they have the authority to ask us to leave.
Chairman Warner. Yes. Very clearly both the President and
the Prime Minister said unequivocally that for the time being
it is essential that these coalition forces remain in place.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is clear.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have been given a sheet of paper I guess that comes from
the Department of State, but which carries the estimate that we
had as of January 19, 125,373 trained on-hand Iraqi security
forces. General, I would like to ask you the first question.
Approximately how many of these Iraqi security forces are would
you say fully-trained and equipped and capable and ready to
neutralize insurgents? Give us an estimate. Is it half? Is it
two-thirds? Is it one-third?
General Myers. Let me put up that other chart, on the train
and equip. We will just put the chart up. I think it uses the
same numbers, Senator Levin, that you have, so everybody can
see them.
[The information referred to follows:]
A couple of things about the numbers. These are, as you
correctly said, these are trained and equipped. So in some
cases those numbers are folks that have been trained and
equipped a while back and have great capabilities. In other
cases they are just fresh out of training. I might add, though,
the training has very high standards and it is also tailored to
the specific units, because, as you have seen before, there are
several different types of police units, there are several
different types of Iraqi Army units and Navy and Air Force
units buried in those numbers. So it is complex.
You will also notice that for the Ministry of Defense we
think we are counting the actual numbers that are on duty. In
the Ministry of Interior we have a lot less confidence that our
numbers include those that may be absent from their duty
station. The reporting there, the Ministry of Interior just put
out a new policy where they are going to issue new ID cards and
do a complete accounting of their forces.
Of those numbers, Senator, you cannot give one number. Of
those numbers that are deployable around the nation to meet the
most pressing needs, General Petraeus says 48 battalions, which
is about--and that is police and Ministry of Defense
battalions, and that is about 40,000 that can go anywhere in
the country and take on almost any threat.
It does not mean the rest of them are not useful, because
in many parts of the country all you need are police on duty,
and police on duty in the southern part of the country are very
useful doing police duties down there. So that is what I
mentioned earlier when I was trying to answer Chairman Warner's
question, is that we have to devise better ways to track their
overall capacity, and that is one of the things we are going to
do.
Senator Levin. Would you be able to give us an estimate as
to what percentage, just an estimate, of the 136,000 are in my
description fully-trained and equipped, capable and ready to
neutralize the insurgents? Would you give us a percentage, a
rough estimate? Half, two-thirds, one-third?
General Myers. I think what I just said was that there are
48 deployable units around the country, which equals about
40,000 men, which is the number that can go anywhere and do
anything. No, I cannot give you an estimate because that
capacity and capability is building every day and it varies
widely, as I just tried to describe. So it is difficult to do
that.
It is, by the way, as we try to describe our own forces,
you may remember there have been times when a U.S. Army
division will come back from combat and they will go from
reporting C-1, which is our highest level of readiness, to
reporting C-3, and people ask the question: Well, wait a
minute; they just came out of combat; are they not exquisitely
trained and prepared and motivated? The answer is, yes, but
then they come back and they take leave and they do other
things.
So we even have a harder time describing in these numbers
because we do not have the exquisite system yet to do that. It
is not just our system. It is a system the Iraqis have to
devise with their Ministry of Defense and their Ministry of
Interior.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Levin----
Senator Levin. I am going to run out of time here.
If I could just ask you about that specific number.
Yesterday we were given a chart which says ``Department of
State,'' which had a total of 130,000, but did not break down
the components by number. We were told that that was
classified. But now today you are giving us apparently
unclassified numbers for police. I am very glad. I was going to
raise havoc here this morning with the Department of State for
giving us just a total without a breakdown of the components
and I was going to ask them whether or not this represents a
new approach of not giving us the breakdown component by
component.
But I gather from the fact that you have given us a January
31, 2005, listing of components with numbers, General, that
that is going to continue to be an unclassified approach. Is
that fair to say?
General Myers. Yes, sir. Yes, Senator.
Senator Levin. Now, General, could you give us an estimate
as to how many insurgents there are? Here is the reason I ask
you that question: General Casey, who is the MNF-I Commander,
said just last week that Coalition Forces had killed or
captured about 15,000 suspected insurgents last year. He went
on to say that this means that the previous U.S. estimates of
an insurgent force of 6 to 9,000 fighters were clearly
inaccurate.
In response to a question, he stated that he thought that a
recent estimate by Iraq's intelligence chief that the
insurgency numbered as many as 40,000 hardcore fighters or--
excuse me--or 200,000 when part-time combatants and
sympathizers were included, was too high an estimate. That is
what General Casey said last week.
Could you give us an estimate of the number of insurgents
that we are facing, both hardcore fighters and then that second
figure that was used by the Iraq intelligence chief of part-
time combatants and sympathizers, just a rough estimate?
General Myers. Sir, I will have to do that for the record,
if we can get that from the Intelligence Community. We do not
have the insight into those numbers in most cases to provide a
good estimate that would be a fair thing to throw in front of
the committee right now.
What I can say is that there is a good intelligence report
out just recently by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that
details an individual and what motivated this individual to
participate in the insurgency. As General Luck stated when he
came back--and we have described the threat I think very
accurately several times in front of the committee in closed
session. So we know the elements of the threat very well. But
to put numbers, accurate numbers, against them, because there
are so many fence-sitters--and fence-sitters can be very
dangerous. They can have an occupation by day and then plant an
improvised explosive device (IED) at night, and they can attack
the coalition, they can attack Iraqi security forces, they can
attack Iraqi citizens.
I think one of the things that we know from the elections,
there will be a lot less fence-sitters because they saw their
fellow citizens go out and vote. I think that will help.
But to come up with accurate estimates is just very
difficult in this type of insurgency.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Defense Intelligence Agency/J-2 assess current insurgent
strength is between 10,000-20,000. It is further estimated that an
additional 1,100-1,200 foreign fighters are active in the insurgency;
however, the National Intelligence Council recently determined that
current methods for determining insurgent manpower trends in Iraq are
too uncertain and ill-suited to be used in gauging the evolving
strategic strength of the insurgency. Insurgents drift in and out of
active participation as the political environment and their personal
situation evolves. Moreover, robust criminal networks act as insurgent
and extremist force multipliers.
Many Sunni Arabs, motivated by fear, financial incentive,
perceptions of marginalization and exclusion from Iraqi government and
security institutions act as insurgent sympathizers or ``fence-
sitters,'' capable of supporting the insurgency. The estimated 2.5
million Sunni Arab males in Iraq will remain an insurgent recruiting
pool and support network as long as the social, economic, and
historical grievances persist.
Individual coalition insurgent capture and kills have modest impact
on the overall strength of the insurgency due to insurgent
regeneration. In addition to active sympathizers, the former regime's
military and security apparatus provides a pool of well-trained
personnel. Pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom uniformed military and security
personnel are contributing skill sets, organization and leadership to
insurgent cells.
Senator Levin. Is it fair to say it is more than a few or a
handful?
General Myers. Certainly, yes.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I want to thank the witnesses and we share
their exuberance as we take this victory lap over the
elections. We are indeed encouraged and optimistic about the
future. I also think that we should view it with some concern
because we know that it is going to be a rather long and
difficult experience.
General Myers, I am disappointed that you do not have even
a rough estimate of the number of insurgents. I do not know how
you defeat an insurgency unless you have some handle on the
number of people that you are facing.
General Myers. We do have estimates. I said I would provide
them. Most of them are classified----
Senator McCain. I am surprised you do not have them readily
at hand.
General Myers. The ones I have seen----
Senator McCain. Since it is a fundamental aspect of the
conflict that we are facing.
General Myers. Right.
Senator McCain. I do not have much time. Secretary
Wolfowitz----
General Myers. They are classified, Senator. I will get
them to you. I will get the classified numbers to you.
Senator McCain. I think the American people should know the
nature of the enemy that we are facing. I am not sure that
classified numbers are appropriate here.
Secretary Wolfowitz, what level of U.S. forces would you
expect us to maintain for the next 6 months or the next year?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think we will be able to come down
to the level that was projected before this election. Senator,
we overlapped our deployments and extended the, I guess it was,
Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 (OIF-3) so that we get a bump-up of
about 15,000 to cover the elections, which I think was, in
hindsight, a prudent thing to do.
We believe that we can come down by that 15,000, which I
think would bring us--General Myers knows the numbers better
than I--I think to about 17 brigades, about 135,000 troops.
That is what we are looking at----
Senator McCain. I would just like a number.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Pardon?
Senator McCain. I would just like a number.
Secretary Wolfowitz. 135,000.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
In the case of this continuing question about fully trained
and equipped Iraqis, one of the reasons why there are
continuous questions is because of the various setbacks we have
had in the training and equipping of the Iraqis, and we know
how important it is for them to assume those responsibilities.
I think it would be--and I made the suggestion yesterday
that we go to a grading system, such as we use for U.S.
forces--we do not know how many individual American soldiers
are fully-trained and equipped, but we do grade their units.
Perhaps we could at some point get a better handle as to unit
readiness, and that would help us in assessing their ability to
take on the tasks.
By the way, how many of the--it says ``Unauthorized
absences personnel not included in the numbers'' of the
Ministry of Defense forces. How many unauthorized absences are
there?
Secretary Wolfowitz. There is a considerable number, in
part, Senator, because the whole notion of absence in their
system is different from ours and in part because of, frankly,
the mechanics involved in paying. There is no way for a soldier
to send a check to his family in southern Iraq, so he has to
take the cash and travel with it.
I think the level--it is hard to say whether it is
authorized or unauthorized, but I would say--and General Myers,
please correct me--that on average for the fill-in units, it is
about 60 percent. One of the things that General Luck is
looking at is what can be done to get that up.
What you say, sir, I think is absolutely correct. It is
units that really are most important. One of the reasons these
numbers seem to change constantly is because a lot of
experimentation is going on with units. We had I believe on
June 28, when the interim government took over, only one
battalion that was considered deployable and there are now 45
such units. My sense is that is one of the most important
measures. It is still maybe 20 percent of the total force, but
it is the most important part of the force.
Senator McCain. I agree. Again, I think that combat
readiness of units is probably a far more accurate indicator of
our ability to carry out the mission.
I want to talk just for a minute about the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). We continue to hear about NATO
involvement. At one time there was going to be a NATO training
battalion and other involvement. What is the current level of
NATO involvement in training and what are the plans for
increasing it?
Secretary Wolfowitz. General Myers?
General Myers. NATO has agreed to take on training at staff
college level, officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO)
development, and NATO nations have done some of that outside
Iraq. For instance, Germany is training truck drivers on
specific equipment they are donating to the Iraqi forces in the
United Arab Emirates. But the status inside Iraq is they are in
the process of standing that capability up inside Iraq to
provide the higher level education of the officer and the Iraqi
NCO corps.
Senator McCain. That is the extent of NATO involvement?
General Myers. To this point, I think that is where they
are focused. They are looking at things that they can do in the
future and, of course, we are always hopeful they will want to
provide more.
Senator McCain. Well, Mr. Secretary, I would, since we have
such an enormous strain on our Active, Guard, and Reserve
Forces, place a high priority on a common interest that we and
our NATO allies have, and that is to see democracy established
in Iraq. It seems to me it is now in our NATO allies' interest
as well as ours to see that happen. I would give a very high
priority to consultations with our NATO allies to see if there
are ways they can help us.
I do not think we are going to get a lot more troops there,
but there certainly is a myriad of ways that our NATO allies
could assist us in training and equipping, relieving us of some
of our non-combat responsibilities and others, because I think
there are many of us who are aware that this burden that has
been placed on our present-sized Active-Duty, Guard, and
Reserve Forces is a very heavy one. It seems to me that after
this election has proven to our NATO allies that we can win
this thing, they should take a fresh look at assisting us.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I think you are absolutely
right. The numbers are not where we would like them in terms of
NATO contribution. I think you are right, there is an
opportunity now to boost those numbers. I think also that we
need to look at whether some of our coalition partners might
better participate in training than in some of the sort of
fixed site protection they are doing now, which is much less
needed. I think it is something we should be taking up.
I think you will be going to Vercunda. I am sure you will
take it up and I think it is important.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz. By the way, on that point, if I just
might add one other thing. The number of trainers is in some
ways--the total number may not sound demanding, but since you
need capable field grade officers for training, you are taking
those numbers out of a much more limited pool. I think NATO has
a lot of very capable field grade officers and it would be a
wonderful thing for them to contribute more.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I wish to associate myself with Senator
McCain's observation about NATO participation. I just checked
with staff. My own recollection is that NATO made the
announcement in July that they were going to go in there and
start that training program. Would you supply the committee
with the number of boots on the ground and what they have
achieved in this period of time? Because that is a fairly
significant lapse of period of time and I just wanted to know
how far along they are on this program. But I do not want to
interfere with other members going.
General Myers, on the important question asked by Senator
McCain, the threat from these insurgents and the quantum, I
asked that question in closed briefings yesterday and they
said, ``We are building up the Iraqi forces in proportion to
what we perceive that threat would be.'' So I am confident
there are some figures out there, and I think it is important
that we release these figures publicly, with regard to the
magnitude and the quality of the insurgency that is being
mounted in the past and we hope will begin to attenuate in the
future, given the extraordinary performance by so many over the
weekend.
Did you have an opportunity to----
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, let me just talk a little bit
more about it. Part of the reticence is that the numbers I see
are normally classified, so in an open hearing I am a little
reluctant to release that. If that is the wish, then we will
look at that, of course.
I think we have a pretty good handle on the number of
foreign fighters that are in Iraq. We generally say around a
thousand or so. But there are for instance, criminals. General
Luck comes back and tells us that he thinks a lot of the
activity we are seeing is just basic criminal activity. How
many criminals there are in Iraq is pretty difficult to tell in
any country. So that is why I am hesitant just to throw out a
number of what the enemy is, because the character of the enemy
is so different. Zarqawi, who is absolutely amoral, will do
anything, will kill anybody to achieve his view of the world,
is different from the fence-sitter that I described, of which
there are probably thousands, but who on any given day or
depending on how the situation is going might be willing to
join the political process in Iraq.
So it is a very difficult thing to get our hands around and
throwing out one number probably does not do the complexity of
the threat justice. We will provide it to the committee and as
we can we will work with those who classify it to declassify
it. There are parts of it that are classified.
[The information referred to follows:]
At the time of the testimony, DOD was still working on the possible
declassification of the size and nature of the insurgent threat. As
stated later by Secretary Rumsfeld in the annual Defense Authorization
Request for Fiscal Year 2006 hearing on February 17, 2005:
``On the insurgency question, one can't help but agree with
you. In a perfect world you would like very much to have a good
grip on the numbers.
You, obviously, have access to the classified different views
that exist within the government and they're all qualified by
saying it's a moving target and it's difficult to pin down.
Since I didn't do these, I can't declassify them myself. But
I can certainly ask the Intelligence Community to what extent
they're willing to declassify the estimates as to the
insurgency.
I think the important thing, as you hinted at, is that the
insurgents are, first of all, a moving target. They're not
static. The numbers change.
Second, they're made up of different elements, criminals,
Baathists, the former regime elements, the Zarqawi network and
jihadists. Even though the jihadists are the smallest portion
of them, they appear to us to be the most lethal; they're the
ones that are doing the most damage.
The recruiting base is fairly large if you think of criminals
in that country and people who are available to be recruited.
So how successful we are in reducing the money is a big part of
how big the insurgency is.
So it's a dilemma. It would be nice to have a hard number,
but my fear is that the number would change from week to
week.''
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, could I just mention why this
is important?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator McCain. We went from a few dead-enders to killing
or capturing 15,000 in the period of a year, and that is why
there is a certain credibility problem here as to the size and
nature of the enemy we face. It is our responsibility to
provide the wherewithal to conduct the conflict and if we go
from a few dead-enders to 15,000 killed or injured, and without
any good handle on the threat that we are facing, I think it is
hard for us to do our job and it is hard for the American
people to realize how difficult is the task that lies ahead of
us.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kennedy.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, do you want the NATO
numbers? Because I did find them.
Chairman Warner. Quickly.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Very quickly, the total mission size
is 459 personnel and 30 percent of that is U.S. Of the other 70
percent, there are still some 50 spots that are not filled, and
the initial operating capability is scheduled for February 20.
It is in my view a first step, and I encourage all of you to
urge more steps. It is the right direction, but it needs to go
faster.
Chairman Warner. There has been sufficient time.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think all of us take extraordinary pride in the
incredible achievement of the Iraqis and their willingness to
vote in these past elections. I think all of us take
recognition of that.
Of course, the United States for some 200 years has been a
beacon of hope to peoples all over the world. I can remember
when democracy was restored in Chile, turning out Pinochet. I
remember when it was restored with Alfonsin in Argentina. I
remember the people that waited 72 hours--because one gentleman
was 72 years old--to get a vote in South Africa. So we have
seen over the period of history that America has had a very
important impact in terms of seeing the march towards
democratic regimes.
But now we have in Iraq, in listening to what is going to
be determined as success as defined by Mr. Wolfowitz, the
governmental agencies are going to be up and they are going to
be functioning. There are going to be compromises. Iraqis are
going to need help. We are going to be helpful to them in
reaching compromises. Iraqi security forces are going to be up
and trained. They are going to be related to the number of
terrorists, and yet we are unsure--one thing we are sure is the
total number is increasing. They are going to have a legal and
judicial system that is going to protect all rights of people.
It is going to give equal justice under law. We are also going
to protect justices and develop the capability of bombing
experts. Then we are going to put pressure on Syria and other
countries.
You talk about mission creep. Where is Osama bin Laden?
This whole process started as the war on terror. This started
with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This started with the
alleged fact that Iraq was involved, as later disproved, with
the terrorists. Now we hear the spokesman for the
administration talking about the maintenance of American
personnel and troops, where we have already lost over the
1,400, and they are going to be there until some governmental
agencies are functioning effectively. Many people do not think
governmental agencies are functioning effectively here in this
country. They will be there until the Iraqi security forces are
up and trained, as well as the legal-judicial system.
America, listen to that. How long are we going to be there?
That is why we went to Iraq? That is why we went to Iraq? We
have our forces over there.
Now, given the extraordinary achievements and
accomplishments of this last week, where the Iraqi people
indicated that they want to control their own political
destiny, people ask me, how long is it going to take to train
Iraqis to fight for their own country, to shed their own blood,
as Americans are doing it?
My wife has a nephew. Let us just call him Charles William.
I will spare his last name. He is from Shreveport, Louisiana. A
little over 8 months ago he joined the United States Army. He
went for 12 weeks to Fort Benning and got infantry training. He
had 10 days off, then he went to Fort Lewis, where he got his
equipment. He was supposed to go to Kuwait for additional
training. He went directly to Mosul. He is a tail gunner on a
Stryker. Nine personnel in that. He is the oldest one. They
call him ``Pops.'' He is just back here now after 8 months over
there and he is rotating back.
This soldier wants to stay in the military. But he had that
amount of training and he is over there representing the best
of the best.
You are getting 2,500 people that want to join that Iraqi
military. You have the 127,000 or 140,000 you think are
equipped. When are the Iraqis going to fight for their own
country? When are they going to start shedding that kind of
blood?
We are all proud of those individuals, Mr. Secretary, that
exhibited this extraordinary heroism on election day. No one is
begrudging that. We are all proud of that. We have other times
in American history. We are proud of our service men and women.
We want to know when the Iraqis are going to go out there and
shed their blood, as American service men with this amount of
training are willing to shed theirs.
Is that going to take 4 months? Is it going to take 12
months? Is that asking too much? Is it asking too much that
after the new administration takes over we are going to say,
look, okay, in 12 months we will start drawing down some of our
troops? Are we prepared to say that after 18 months we should
be able to get a good many of our troops out, with the goal of
getting the rest of ours out of Iraq, as I have stated?
When in the world are we going to have the Iraqis being
able, and why in the world cannot we expect them to take on
these responsibilities when American service men are doing it
and they are losing their lives, and American taxpayers are
paying out? How long are we going to do this? Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Kennedy, first of all I recall
vividly that same process you described, the advance of
democracy in the 1980s. I was at the State Department playing
some role in supporting the transition to democracy in the
Philippines when Ferdinand Marcos was removed peacefully, the
following year when Korea established its first democracy in
history, one which has proven to be vital and viable. I
witnessed that process in Indonesia, where I was ambassador. It
took longer than I would have liked, but that country is on a
march toward democracy.
It is an impressive movement. People want freedom, they
want to pick their own representatives. There is something
importantly different in Iraq. In all the cases that you
mentioned and that I just mentioned, these people were not
fighting the remnants of a regime that was as brutal and as
evil as Stalin or Hitler. That is what the Iraqi people are
facing.
The level of intimidation is extraordinary, and they are
facing it bravely. They are shedding their blood. As I
mentioned in my opening comments, nearly 1,400 by our count. As
I said, I think we underestimate. We count our people by name.
We are not so good at counting Iraqis. 1,342 Iraqi soldiers and
policemen have died in the line of duty fighting for a new
Iraq, and those numbers are going up faster, not that we want
to see any numbers go up, those numbers are going up faster
than ours.
They are assuming more and more responsibility. One of our
principal objectives here--we are not going to wait until they
have functioning governmental institutions before we hand over
security to Iraqi forces. But what I said in my comments is
they will be able to handle the job sooner the more effective
their government is at functioning. This is not just a military
task.
But our goal is to get them up and capable as fast as
possible. That is one of the principal considerations that I
know General Casey and General Abizaid will have in mind when
they make recommendations on things like force levels. The goal
is not just to get our people home if that leaves the people
who are still there in greater danger. The real thing is to get
Iraqis on the front lines and Americans in a supporting role.
Senator Levin referred earlier to Korea. We have had for
over 50 years a strategy for winning in Korea, a strategy for
preserving peace on the peninsula and creating conditions under
which the Koreans have been able to create one of the most
impressive democracies in the world. We have not left. We have
not exited yet. But with some tragic exceptions over the course
of that 50 years, we have been able to avoid a war and keep
Americans from dying.
I think that is what we have to keep our eye on here. I
think you will see that process proceed. I have talked to some
of our commanders in the area. They believe that over the
course of the next 6 months you will see whole areas of Iraq
successfully handed over to the Iraqi Army and Iraqi police.
But what we do not want to do is prematurely hand over an area
and then create a place where the enemy can organize and
operate. I think you can see over the last couple years there
have been a couple such mistakes. We do not want to repeat
them.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know that we are all very aware that the cut-and-runners
are out there and they are sincere. I think the argument out
there that should not be there any longer is that there is
reason for the insurgency that is out there, to protest the
American occupation there, American troops there, as opposed to
the fact that it was a long-calculated risk.
I would like to read from three publications that are
certainly not Republican publications. In October 2003 Newsweek
reported: ``The terrorist campaign was planned by Saddam
Hussein and his lieutenants, and Iraqi agents bought vast
quantities of detonators, timers, and wiring supplies, as well
as a coordinated guerilla and war strategy hatched before the
invasion of Iraq.''
Last April, The New York Times reported that: ``The Iraqi
officers of the special operations and antiterrorism branch
were responsible for the planted IEDs and some of the larger
car bombs in Iraq,'' and ``they had prepared explosive-laden
vests for suicide bombers before the war.''
In December U.S. News and World Report disclosed that
``Saddam sent more than 1,000 security and intelligence
officers to military facilities near Baghdad in the fall of
2002 for 2 months of guerrilla training.''
I would just like to ask for a short answer, Mr. Secretary
and Mr. Schlicher. The continuation of violence in Iraq, is it
a popular uprising stemming from the U.S. presence there or
part of a calculated campaign by Saddam Hussein's security
apparatus? Just a short answer.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Inhofe, I think there is a
growing body of evidence that we are dealing with Saddam
Hussein's security apparatus, that some degree of what we are
confronting--and maybe a large amount--was prepared before the
war. If you read the Duelfer report carefully, which almost no
one has, you will see it in there. I reference in my testimony
his religious adviser who was recruiting foreign fighters
before the war.
In testimony before this committee, I have shown passports
of foreign fighters that came in from Syria in March 2003
during the major combat phase. One of them crossed the border
with an entry in his visa permit, and the stated purpose of
visit was to perform jihad. Syrian intelligence knew what this
guy was doing. Iraqi intelligence knew what this guy was doing.
It was Iraqi intelligence that moved this guy down south where
our marines killed him.
One of the problems with answering the question that we
heard earlier about numbers of enemy is that, I would say, one
of the few strengths this enemy has beyond its brutality is the
ability to keep secrets. In fact, the brutality is part of how
it does keep secrets. So we are trying to figure out how much
of what appears to be a growth in enemy is simply a growth in
our estimates of the enemy, because we are learning more about
them and how much is in their ability to recruit more.
I have to say, I was personally somewhat pleasantly
surprised by what appeared to be a relatively ineffective
attack on January 30. I thought they were capable of much more
than they showed and I do not think anyone would say they were
holding back.
But as to your question, I think to some very large degree
we are fighting the old regime. There are, by the way, within
Zarqawi's network former members of the Special Security
Organization, former members of the Special Republican Guards.
This is not a simple independent operation.
Senator Inhofe. This bothers me. It always bothers me to
have people continuously say that there is not a relationship
between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, Zarqawi, the training that
was taking place there. We knew that before the invasion took
place. I think you probably agree with that statement, do you
not?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do. As Secretary Powell pointed out
to the U.N., a man like Zarqawi does not hang around in a
police state like Iraq without somebody noticing he is there.
Senator Inhofe. I do not want to run out of time here, so I
am going to, with your indulgence--tonight, Senator Thune and I
are going to Iraq and we have a number of things we want to do
there. First of all, we want to see what it looks like after
the election. But I have another mission. I was very proud of a
very courageous Lieutenant Colonel, Tim Ryan, the Commander of
Task Force 2, 12th Cavalry, in the First Cavalry Division in
Iraq. He led the troops into battle in Fallujah late last year
and recently was involved in security operations.
He is not afraid to come out and talk about it, and I am
going to actually quote from an article that he has written. I
plan to meet with him. I plan to talk to other soldiers over
there. To me, the most effective voice we can have to getting
the truth out about our victories in Iraq is from our soldiers
themselves.
He said: ``All right, I have had enough. I am tired of
reading distorted and grossly exaggerated stories from major
news organizations about the failures of the war in Iraq. The
inaccurate picture they paint has distorted the world view of
the daily realities in Iraq. The result is a further erosion of
international support for United States efforts there and a
strengthening of the insurgents' resolve and recruiting
efforts, while weakening our own. Through their incomplete,
uninformed, and unbalanced reporting, many members of the media
covering the war in Iraq are aiding and abetting the enemy.''
That is pretty strong. ``From where I sit in Iraq''--and he is
sitting where he knows things we do not know--``things are
going quite well. We are not under attack by the enemy. On the
contrary, we are taking the fight to him daily and have him on
the ropes. Fallujah, the area around the former insurgent
stronghold, is more peaceful than it has been for more than a
year. The total number of attacks in the greater al-Anbar
Province is down by at least 70 to 80 percent since late last
October.''
Still quoting now: ``Why do not the papers lead with
`Coalition crushes remaining pockets of insurgents' or `Enemy
forces resort to suicide bombings of civilians'? Instead,
headlines focus almost exclusively on our hardship. The key to
the enemy's success is use of his limited assets to gain the
greatest influence over the masses. The media serves as that
glass through which a relatively small event can be magnified
to international proportions, and many of the enemy is
exploiting this with incredible ease. This is not good for the
news, to counteract this. So the enemy scores a victory almost
every day as a result of the media.''
Every time I come back from over there I feel like I am
coming back as a truth squad to tell the American people what
these kids come up and tell me, the ones who are in the lines,
risking their lives, and recognizing that they have a mission
that is the most significant mission perhaps that any soldier
has ever had on the battlefield before.
So I would only say that if we are going to encourage them
to do this, I would hope that, General Myers, as you talk to
people you will encourage them to come out and tell the truth
about what is going on, the great job that we are doing over
there. It does not require an answer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Warner. I think we should give the witnesses the
opportunity if they wish to respond. It is an important
observation that you made.
General Myers, you looked as if you wanted to add.
General Myers. Well, I am just very sympathetic to what
Senator Inhofe said. I have a chance to speak at many different
forums around this country and I always tell them that you
would be better off if you could just beam in one soldier,
sailor, airman, or marine that is over there in Iraq or
Afghanistan. If you could just beam them in, pick a social
security number at random and ask them to come up here and tell
you what they think, you will get it straight and you will be
proud of their understanding of the problem and their devotion
to the mission. So I just identify myself with those remarks
and I think that is absolutely right.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, General.
Senator Reed.
Secretary Wolfowitz. You can beam them in. You can go to I
think it is worldtribune.com for that particular account. I
found a lot of valuable information that is not in our main
news media, both from Americans in Iraq and from Iraqis in
Iraq, that appears on these Web sites. It is a fascinating
phenomenon. I quote it, too, in my testimony.
Chairman Warner. In the next round I intend to invite Mr.
Schlicher to give his views as to how the Arab press has
covered the elections. But I will wait for that time.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Secretary, you indicated to
Senator McCain that you anticipate 135,000 troops to be in Iraq
next year. By rough calculation that is about $50 billion. Will
those funds be in the President's budget that is submitted in
the next few days?
Secretary Wolfowitz. They will be in the supplemental
request which will come up shortly after the budget.
Senator Reed. So we are already looking at a supplemental
budget for operations this year, I believe?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Correct.
Senator Reed. These troops next year will be paid out of
the supplemental budget that is going to be considered in the
next few months?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, you will have a supplemental
budget request that will be up here for fiscal year 2005, along
with a fiscal year 2006 authorization request. The fiscal year
2006 authorization request will not make a prediction about
what we think our force levels will be in 2006. Those will be
covered in the second supplemental. We plan to fund the 2006
expenditures for Iraq and Afghanistan with another supplemental
request in fiscal year 2006.
Senator Reed. So we can assume that we will consider an $80
billion supplemental this year for 2005 and we will have
already anticipated a $50 billion or more supplemental in 2006,
is that accurate?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would not predict 2006. I was asked
what force levels we are planning on, I thought, over the next
6 months or through the end of this calendar year, and I said
we are planning on 135,000, and that is not a prediction. That
is a planning factor. If we can bring those numbers down
intelligently, we will always work to bring them down.
But let me make an important point here. At roughly $4
billion a month for our forces, if we can bring Iraqi forces up
more quickly by keeping Americans in Iraq a little bit longer,
just in cost alone it is a worthwhile tradeoff, and in terms of
American lives at risk it is an even more worthwhile tradeoff.
As I said earlier in comment to Senator Kennedy, we want to
do whatever we need to do to increase Iraqi capability as fast
as possible. That may mean a little more investment at the
front end in our capabilities so that we bring them on line
faster.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, I do not argue with your
logic, but I think that logic suggests rather strongly that it
is more than a planning estimate, that it is probably the best
estimate right now of roughly 130,000 troops, 17 brigades, in
Iraq through the end of 2006. I think officials of the Army
have indicated that. In fact, I think I would not be surprised
if even the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander would
support that estimate.
So to sit here and suggest that we are going to consider an
$80 billion supplemental for this year, but we should not even
think about a significant $50 billion supplemental next year, I
think is a little disingenuous.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I did not say there will not
be a significant supplemental in 2006. I said I cannot tell you
what the size of it will be. General Myers may comment. I do
not think CENTCOM makes a prediction about what we will need in
2006.
I think we have a reasonably good fix on what we will need
through the end of this calendar year and certainly through the
end of this fiscal year, and the Army general you referred to I
think is making a prudent assumption about what he may be asked
to provide forces for. But what we will actually need in
calendar year 2006, unless General Myers has a different
estimate, I think it would be a wild guess at this point.
General Myers. That is correct, Senator Reed. The process
that both the Army uses and that we use on the Joint Staff,
trying to source what General Abizaid in CENTCOM and General
Casey needs, we do a lot of worst case planning because of the
stress on the force, so we can make sure we can fulfil what we
think would be the worst case needs.
But those are not the predictions. That will be up to
General Abizaid and General Casey, and they continually think
through those. So to say that our worst case planning is going
to reflect reality, that is not correct.
Secretary Wolfowitz. But there will be, I would predict, a
substantial request for supplemental funding in fiscal year
2006.
General Myers. Right, that is right.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think we all can
agree upon that.
Let me get one other metric. If the figure is 136,000
troops, it would roughly equate to about $50 billion?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would want to check that for the
record, but I think for Iraq alone that is right.
[The information referred to follows:]
Your metric is roughly correct. The Fiscal Year 2005 Supplemental
Appropriations request includes about $56 billion for Operation Iraqi
Freedom based on an assumption that deployment levels for U.S. military
personnel deployed to Iraq will return to about 138,000 troops by the
summer of 2005--after reaching about 160,000 in January 2005 because of
the Iraqi national elections.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Remember, the $80 billion includes
Afghanistan as well as Iraq and some other things as well.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Myers, you indicated when you had your chart up,
that chart in fact, that these are very high standards these
troops are being exposed to in terms of their training. How
long is the training for a Ministry of Defense soldier, either
National Guard or military?
General Myers. I will have to make sure I get this to you
for the record. It varies by the type of unit.
Senator Reed. Let us just say, what is the average?
General Myers. The average, I will get back to you exactly.
I will get you all the units and I will break out the averages.
Senator Reed. You do not have sort of just a rough notion
of how long these troops are being trained?
General Myers. Sir, several months. But there are so many
different types of units buried in those numbers that I would
like to give you specifically by unit. There are some units
there that are--the regular Army, for a regular Army
individual, 12 weeks. There is some basic training that goes on
for 8 weeks and there is 4 weeks of cadre training.
For the National Guard it is 3 weeks of basic training and
then 4 weeks of collective training. For the intervention
force, which is a little bit higher level force and some of
those forces that we talked about earlier that are deployable
around the country and that can handle the bigger threats, it
is 8 weeks of basic training, 4 weeks of cadre training, and
then some urban operation training that goes on for 5 weeks.
Then you get up into the special forces type units and they
have 13 weeks on top of all that. I can provide that for the
record if you wish.
[The information referred to follows:]
Iraqi Regular Army (RA): Officers and noncommissioned officers
(NCOs) in the Iraqi RA begin their training with a 4-week cadre
preparation course. This course is designed to make the officers and
NCOs effective instructors so they can eventually teach and train their
own troops. The cadre course covers leadership, training, techniques,
weapons training, and tactics. Following this cadre training of the
officers and NCOs, basic trainees are introduced into their units to be
taught by these new instructors, under the supervision of Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).
Basic Training is 5 weeks long although the entire 1st week is
considered the selection and in-processing week. After 4 weeks every
soldier is sent to skills training, which runs from a minimum of 5
weeks (Iraqi Medic Course) to as long as 7 weeks (Infantry Course). The
cadre teaches their own soldiers physical training, soldier discipline,
basic infantry skills, weapons training, land navigation, and squad-
level tactics. This method of having the officers and NCOs train their
own troops is used so that unit cohesion can be quickly established
between the officers, NCOs, and soldiers.
Following graduation, soldiers are sent to their units for
collective training following a training program outlined by MNC-I.
This program consists of a series of collective training gates each
squad, platoon, company, etc., must pass through to be considered
initially operationally qualified and eventually fully operationally
qualified.
Selectees from each unit are sent to attend the four levels of NCO
training, Squad Leader Course, Platoon Sergeant Course, Company Warrant
Officer Course, or Battalion Command Sergeants Major School. Currently,
only the first two courses are being offered and the latter two begin
in August as a pilot program. Only infrastructure limits the number of
attendees, not the course itself. By the end of August, we anticipate a
throughput of over 1,000 soldiers per month in the Noncommissioned
Officers' Educational System.
Selectees from each unit are also sent to branch school training
for enhanced skills education. This includes front line NCOs,
supervising NCOs, and both the Company and Battalion-level officers.
Currently we are training all logistics specialties, including
transportation, medical, supply, maintenance management, and personnel
management. The engineer and military police schools conduct leader
training concurrent with a collective training formal program. Combat
unit training includes a combat platoon leader course and company
commander pilot course.
Iraqi National Guard: Officers, NCOs, and soldiers receive a 3-week
block of instruction taught by cadre from the Major Subordinate
Commands (MSC) in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). The training
course includes many of the same topics taught to the RA recruits
including physical training, weapons training, land navigation and
basic infantry skills. The new officers, NCOs, and recruits are
partnered with an MSC unit in the. area in which they will operate and
transition into a 4-week collective training phase where they practice
newly acquired skills.
Iraqi Intervention Force: Officers, NCOs, and soldiers initially
follow the same process as the RA, beginning with the 4-week cadre
course followed by the 8-week basic training course. After the cadre
and basic training, Iraqi Intervention Force soldiers receive an
additional 5 weeks of specialty training that focuses on military
operations in urban terrain in order to conduct anti-insurgent
operations in cities and towns.
Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF): These forces consist of two
components: the Counterterrorist Task Force and the Commando Battalion.
The soldiers who go through the standard 8-week basic training course
are identified and recommended by the U.S. Special Forces cadre for
recruitment into the ISOF. Many of the recruits recommended to join the
ISOF have Special Operations training from prior service. Once
accepted, the recruits identified for the Counterterrorist Task Force
are cycled through a 13-week special operators course in Jordan. Those
recruits identified for the Commando Battalion undergo a 3-week
commando course taught by U.S. Special Forces that focuses on small
unit tactics and U.S. Army Ranger-type specialty skills.
Iraqi Police Service (IPS): Iraqi Police recruits undergo an 8-week
academy training course taught at the Jordan International Police
Training Center (JIPTC) or in one of the seven police academies in
Iraq. Training highlights include basic police skills, basic criminal
investigation, kidnapping investigation and marksmanship. The
instruction has been modified to reflect the security environment
focusing more on survival skills and combat skills. Police recruits who
were former police officers under the previous regime are trained under
the 3-week Transition and Integration Program (TIP). This program,
taught by Iraqis, reinforces police professionalism, standards, and
accountability. Additionally, there are several advanced and
specialized training courses for the IPS to combat the insurgency.
Examples of these include post-blast investigations taught by Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) officials, counterterrorism investigations
taught by the FBI and Explosive Hazardous Awareness Training taught by
the U.S. military.
Iraqi Civil Intervention Forces (CIFs): CIFs operate in two
components: public order battalions and a mechanized police brigade.
Recruits brought into the service for public order battalions undergo a
5-week training course taught by the U.S. Investigative Services.
Training focuses on riot control, civil disorder management and
explosives awareness. Recruits joining the mechanized police brigade
undergo a 5-week course designed to familiarize them with operating and
maintaining their armed personnel carriers. In addition, they are
taught perimeter security techniques, light armor movement skills,
marksmanship and civil disorder management.
Emergency Response Unit (ERU): The ERU is an elite team trained to
respond to national-level law enforcement emergencies. Recruits undergo
a robust 8-week specialized training course focusing on high-risk
search, arrest, hostage-rescue and crisis-response operations. Recruits
for the force must first complete the standard 8-week police academy or
TIP training before entering specialized training modeled after the
U.S. DOD antiterrorism and ATF training programs.
Special Police Commando (SPC) Battalion: SPC recruits are Iraqi
officers and soldiers made up of prior-service special forces
professionals and other skilled service members with specialty unit
experience. Recruits complete a 3-week training program focused on
marksmanship, weapons training, and small unit paramilitary training
focusing on offensive counterterrorism tactics.
Department of Border Enforcement (DBE): The formal training program
for DBE officers and guards is a 4-week course taught at the JIPTC.
Training topics include customs and immigration, cargo search and
marksmanship. Current and new border policemen attend training at
JIPTC, the first centralized training program established for DBE
personnel since the coalition began training Iraqis. Prior to this
training program, the major subordinate commands conducted training of
border police. Regional DBE training academies in Iraq are being
established with an operational date of mid-spring. Border assistance
teams will help train current border guards in the coming months.
Iraqi Highway Patrol (IHP): Until recently, IHP officers first
completed the standard 8-week police academy or TIP training. Following
graduation, they were assigned to one of the six highway patrol
barracks throughout Iraq for further specialized training on IHP
equipment and patrol techniques. MNSTC-I has recently established a 3-
week training program specifically for the IHP and future patrolmen.
Bureau of Dignitary Protection: Officers identified for dignitary
protection duties undergo an initial 3-week course taught at the
Baghdad Police Academy by the U.S. Investigative Service. They receive
an additional 3 weeks of specialized training taught by U.S.
contractors.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
Let me just follow up on an issue related to General Luck's
report. It is the suggestion in at least the press that 5,000
soldiers and marines would be assigned as mentors embedded in
Iraq units. Do we have 5,000 trained, not just professionally
trained as military officers and NCOs, but with language skills
and cultural skills, to work in a unit maybe with one or two
other Americans? Mr. Secretary, General Myers?
General Myers. The numbers that I have seen, the estimates
that were in the--I did not see any numbers in the Luck report.
I saw some assessments by----
Senator Reed. You have an advantage on us, General. We have
not seen the Luck report or General Luck, which I think would
be very helpful to us. Do you have any objections, by the way,
if General Luck would come up here and testify before the
committee or informally brief us?
General Myers. I will leave that to the Secretary.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, do you have any objections?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think, Senator, General Luck is
providing his advice to General Casey and General Abizaid, and
the Secretary is waiting to hear what they recommend based on
that report. We would certainly want to make information
available that might be--in a closed session I think you
discussed that the other day with the Secretary. We certainly
want to make the information available, but we would like to
have a chance to see what our commanders conclude from it
first.
Senator Reed. That is entirely fair. But getting back to
your point----
General Myers. The answer is we do not know the numbers
yet. General Casey and General Abizaid are looking at that, and
General Metz, who is the MNC-I Commander over there. They are
going to have to look at this and see what the numbers would
be.
But you are absolutely right. The types of individuals you
would place with these units would be officers and NCOs. You
would need translators. You would need people that would
hopefully be culturally aware. So they are people of some
talent. But how many and how we are going to put those in the
units, that is up to General Casey to figure out, the total
number, the final number. In fact, for that matter the exact
concept has not been determined by General Casey. We are going
to wait for him. He has been asked to provide that detail and
he will.
Senator Reed. My time has expired, but just a final point
if I may, General Myers. Are you concerned there is a capacity
limitation, though, in terms of whatever numbers that are
agreed to, that will limit our ability to fully staff all of
these brigades or slow down our ability to integrate American
mentors into these units?
General Myers. We are going to have to wait and see what
General Casey finally comes up with. But as you pointed out,
these would be some very highly qualified individuals if we go
that route, and depending on how extensively we go down that
road.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz. But I might say, Senator Reed, I think
there are different levels of that capability. You referred to
language capability, for example, which is an extraordinarily
high requirement. I think for the most part we would probably
look at having people working through translators. It is not
perfect, but right now I think Major General Chiarelli has some
500 of his people essentially doing that with the 7 Iraqi
battalions that are in Baghdad and they I am assuming, most of
them, are not Arabic speakers, so they must be working through
translators.
I think it is important to recognize that one of the
principal functions of that is to provide not so much advice
and mentoring, although there is a large piece of that, but
also just the connection with the capabilities that we have
that are way above the level of what Iraqis might have in terms
of intelligence and communications and air support and so
forth.
Senator Reed. Again I am presuming on my colleagues, but I
would suspect that you are looking back to our experiences in
other places, particularly Vietnam, about both the
effectiveness and limitations of advising cultures that are
much different than ours.
Secretary Wolfowitz. There are some lessons from the past.
Frankly, I think there are more lessons from the last couple
years in Iraq, because each culture is different and each
condition is different.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Reed. I appreciate your
bringing up the issue of General Luck. The Senate was informed
in great detail about his mission and it was highly publicized
when he went over and we can understand that there is a time in
which he has to consult with his military commanders and
prepare Secretary Rumsfeld. But it seems to me that time has
run pretty full length now. I think it is appropriate that the
Department as early as possible begin to share that report with
the Congress of the United States. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General Myers, you mentioned that you wished that you could
beam service members here so we could talk to them directly and
hear what they say. I would suggest that, although we cannot do
that, we can communicate with them by e-mail. I hear from
marines and soldiers in Iraq all the time.
They are very patriotic. They are very proud of the work
that they are doing. But they are also frustrated by continuing
shortages of safety equipment and basic supplies. Over the past
year I have repeatedly brought to the attention of the Pentagon
specific instances that I have heard from my soldiers about.
Yet the problems persist.
Today I want to read you parts of three different e-mails
from three different soldiers serving us in Iraq. I would note
that each of them is involved in training Iraqi security
forces. Here is what the first soldier wrote:
``We have tried to get ammo from other sources and
through our proper chain of command. In this case we
have been told to get Iraqi weapons and ammo as backup
weapons. We have done this, but nobody is very
confident with this plan. We have very little training
in their weapons. We are not qualified with the AK-47.
We have not sighted these weapons in and they are not
as reliable as our American weapons.
``I am proud to serve my country and I am willing to
give my life for it. I hope that if one thing is
accomplished here it is that I will not have to send my
son here 10 years from now. I need ammunition to make
this happen and to be able to return home to my family
in a year or so.''
Here is the second one:
``The holidays are very tough on the guys. I am
planning a Christmas Eve service because we cannot get
a chaplain to come out here. We cannot keep oil or
water delivery truck drivers, nor interpreters, nor
other civilian help, because they all think it is too
dangerous. We are on the road where insurgents travel
from Syria to Mosul. We have had problems with water,
fuel, shortage of ammunition, et cetera.''
Here is the third one:
``Right now we do not have radios to communicate with
our units. We depend heavily on e-mail. Yup, e-mail,
Yahoo, is our communications line.''
I cannot tell you how troubled I am about this. I have
written to the Pentagon. I brought it up at previous hearings
last year. I keep getting these reports. There are a sufficient
number of them that I have to believe there is some sort of
logistics problem.
This is not a question of money. We in Congress will give
you all that you need to make sure that our troops who are
serving so bravely have everything they need to accomplish
their dangerous mission as safely as possible. Why are we still
having these problems with such basic supplies, not to mention
safety equipment like the up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and body armor?
General Myers. Senator, you raise a very good question and
I obviously would be deeply troubled by that as well. I
appreciate when you do send us specific instances so we can run
them to ground and find out if we do have a problem. The only
one of those issues you have just mentioned that I am aware of
would be the radio issue, because I know in the type of combat
that our Army and Marine Corps finds itself in today, the
ground combat, they want radios at levels that they have never
had to have radios before.
I do not know that we are short. I have never heard that.
But I know that they have had to aggressively pursue additional
radios so that all echelons, echelons that were never planned
to have radios, would have them so they could communicate, as
indicated in that e-mail.
So all I can say is we will go back and look at this. None
of this has come to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
I can guarantee you that. We will continue to try to chase this
down.
Senator Collins. With one of these units, in December I did
contact the Pentagon and they did act to get this unit
resupplied. But you can imagine how troubling it is to me that
these soldiers are having to come to a United States Senator to
get the ammunition, water, food, and basic supplies that they
need.
General Myers. You bet.
Senator Collins. In each case, these soldiers are telling
me that they went up the chain of command and just could not
get what they needed. Now, as I said, in one of these cases it
has been solved, but solved through my intervention, which it
just should not be.
General Myers. It should not take that, no. But the point
you raise about logistics is very important. That is critical
to our capability over there. We will go back and talk to our
commanders to make sure that they have what they want. But we
do not see any of those shortages. I do not see those. I get
briefed on this every day and we do not see that. So I do not
know where the disconnect is, but it will be my obligation to
go find it.
Senator Collins. I think there is one. While I appreciate
the help we have had from the Pentagon in solving some of these
specific issues, in my mind they just should not be happening.
We have to solve this problem once and for all.
General Myers. Agreed.
Senator Collins. General Myers, I also want to just very
quickly touch on the training of the Iraqi troops. I too find
the election so inspiring and I am so proud of the courage
shown by the Iraqi security forces. But again, I think the
numbers indicate that we have a long ways to go to have fully
equipped, trained, reliable, and willing Iraqi forces who can
substitute for American forces.
Again, I have an e-mail from someone who is deeply involved
in the training. This major tells me: ``It is scary to think
just how out of touch the chain of command is from what we are
doing. The Iraqis are starting to quit now that we have been
here 2 weeks. When they quit the Iraqi commander says that they
are on leave so that we do not drop them from the rolls. They
have been lying about their numbers in order to get more money.
They say they have 150 when there are only 100. The senior
officers take a cut from the top.
``We have caught soldiers in houses stealing property and
the commander will not react to it. They have no interest in
learning the job because right now the marines are doing all of
it. We have to let them take a week's leave every 3 weeks and
they usually return late, if at all. We had 134 go on leave a
week ago and only 37 returned.''
I thought that Secretary Wolfowitz made a very important
distinction between the hardware versus the software and the
training of unit cohesion, leadership. I guess I would ask you
whether you think this case that I just read to you is an
isolated incident or is there a pattern that is very
challenging for us?
General Myers. I think the case you read is--first of all,
I think you said that this individual does not think the chain
of command is aware of the situation over there. I would take
exception to that. When I talk to General Casey, I know who he
talks to and I have been with his division commanders when I
visit there. They know very well what is happening and they
know that we are in a system--let me go back to General Luck's
comments, some of which I had in my opening statement.
A system that was devastated under many decades under
Saddam--he broke their spirit. Corruption was rampant. There
was a sense of helplessness. Anybody that showed initiative
would be whacked on the head or their family members hurt or
injured, killed, tortured. So that is what has to change.
I think on January 30 a lot of that did change. I think we
saw a lot of Iraqis stand up and take responsibility. So
hopefully that will have an impact on the culture that was
devastated by Saddam Hussein. So I do not know if that is
typical. Certainly it happens, but that was the kind of society
that has bred over all these decades.
I think one of the things that whoever sent you that e-mail
ought to take a lot of pride in is that our men and women in
the Armed Forces, a lot of what they do besides train people
how to shoot an AK-47 or platoon tactics--they learned well in
their civics classes and they are role models about what
democracy means, what tolerance means.
So is it going to take time? Yes. Are those incidents going
to continue? Probably. I do not think they are necessarily the
rule. I think those are issues.
The leave issue is interesting. Under Saddam Hussein, since
they had a conscript army, they would allow them to go on
leave, but there was no penalty for not returning on time. The
only penalty was you had to add that time on to your
conscription time. Say they were going for a week. They would
come back in 2 weeks and they had to add 7 days on to their
year, so now it is a year and 7 days.
So it is a different culture and it is hard to get used to.
It is hard for us to probably understand it. It is part of what
has to develop. So I do not know if that is typical. I know
that that happens certainly, and I think our commanders are
well aware of that.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Collins, I just might say I do
not think it is typical, but I also would hasten to say that
the hero I mentioned earlier and whose picture I put up is not
typical either. The typical is somewhere in between and we are
trying to raise the level of typical. I think the events of
last Sunday not only give us some confidence that things are
working better, but I think it creates two important facts.
Number one, enormous pride in what Iraqis as a whole have done
and what the Iraqi Army has done, and pride is a critical part
of countering the kind of phenomenon you describe. Second, more
and more they will be feeling that they are fighting for their
country, for their government, and this impression that it is
all us pulling the strings and it is an occupation force
hopefully will change some of that pattern.
But as General Myers said, we are dealing with a number of
pretty deep-seated habits that will take some time to work out.
Senator Collins. Thank you, and thank you all for your hard
work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Collins. I commend the
witnesses for their clear responses to those good questions,
and I would hope that maybe in this hearing you can address
that culture, because it is perplexing, Mr. Schlicher. It is
such a stark contrast to our strong discipline: You are absent,
you are in trouble. But it is not true in that culture. They go
back home for extended periods. As was pointed out, they have
no banking system, they have no way to convey the money they
receive for their services to their wives and children and
needy persons, so they have to journey all the way home with a
pocket full of cash and then come back again.
At this time I must go to the floor to deliver remarks on
behalf of Judge Gonzales for Attorney General. Senator Sessions
will continue as the chair. Thank you very much.
We will now have Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, thank you for your presence here
today and thank you for your service to our country. I agree
with all the sentiments that have been expressed both by you
and members of this committee about the election being a proud
moment for freedom and a proud moment for our country, and I
hope you will let those who are serving under your command know
how grateful we are to them for having brought this about.
I have a couple of questions. Let me start by praising the
administration and what I understand may be the decision to
increase the death benefit for those who have lost their lives
in the line of duty. I think that is exactly the right thing to
do.
What I would like to ask is whether you would be willing to
consider going a bit beyond that, and let me tell you about a
conversation I had just last week with a bankruptcy official in
Indiana, who was recounting to me an alarming increase in the
number of bankruptcies by military families, particularly
reservists and guardsmen and women who have been called up for
extended periods of time and have found themselves with an
inability to meet their mortgage payments, health care bills,
that sort of thing. So many of these families are being forced
into bankruptcy.
I have referred to the pay cut that many of them take as
the patriot penalty that they are now paying. Some of our
businesses are willing to step forward and make this up, but
many cannot afford to do that. I proposed some legislation to
deal with this, but there is no pride of authorship. I would
like to know whether you would be willing to take a look at
this issue, because many of these families are under great
financial distress and it is, frankly, heartbreaking to think
that they are being forced into bankruptcy while they are
putting their lives on the line for our country and the cause
of freedom.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would be happy to take a look at it,
and I guess I would also--first of all, I would like to thank
all of you and Senator Sessions, who I know particularly took a
lead on this question of death benefits. One thing you can help
us with is, if you agree with me that we have some special
obligations to those people who are risking their lives in
combat zones and we need to extend special benefits to them--
but if we then say, well, it is such a nice thing to have we
should extend it elsewhere, because after all military service
is dangerous even here in the United States, if we cannot put
some boundaries around benefits in combat zones we will quickly
find that they are not affordable for anybody. I think some
special care and attention is necessary for service members and
their families who are living with that kind of risk and danger
for a year at a time, and that is what we need to look after.
Senator Bayh. I hope we can work together on this in a way
that is sustainable financially, but in a way that does right
by these families, because I do not think any of us want to see
the kind of situation that is beginning to increase as the
periods of being called up are longer and longer, beyond what
they could have reasonably expected or planned for in their
financial situation.
So I hope we can work together to try and address this in a
way that is responsible.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am happy to take a look at that.
Senator Bayh. On to my second question, Mr. Secretary. I
want to agree with something that you said in your testimony
about the role of Syria and Iran. The Syrians seem to me to be
playing a game which I have called a strategy of passive
aggression, where they may not be actively assisting those who
are coming into Iraq to do us harm, but certainly they are not
doing enough to prevent that.
The Iranians, if you believe published reports, have
infiltrated into the Shia community and are awaiting that day
when it might be in their interest to more actively participate
in the insurgency, clearly building up a capacity, maybe not as
actively involved right now, but clearly with the potential to
do that at some future point in time.
I agree with your sentiment that we need to send them a
clear signal that it is not in their best interest, either of
them, to facilitate the insurgency in Iraq. With the position
that we are in right now, being stretched fairly significantly,
what kind of credibility do our warnings have? In other words,
what could we look at to do in either Syria or Iran that would
in a tangible way discourage them from inappropriate behavior
in Iraq, other than just our verbal warnings?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, let us be clear. I do not think
it has anything to do with our capacity being limited. We are
not looking to end this behavior with another war. But I think
there are many things that--I mean, Syria is not a strong
country. Part of what they do, as I indicate in my testimony,
is out of fear of how a successful Iraq may further weaken
their own people's support for them.
But I think what we need to stress is there is going to be
a successful Iraq, and it is in your interests to be on
friendly terms with that successful Iraq. We notice what you
are doing. I think it is very important to call attention to
what they are doing. Frankly, I think it may be important to
call attention to who is responsible. There is some argument as
to whether President Assad is fully in control in Syria or not.
But we do know this is a police state and somebody is in
control, and we have a list of who the top 12 leaders are. They
all have some accountability here.
But we also need to make clear that we are not in a
position of hostility. It is not our policy to destabilize
Syria. It should not be their policy to destabilize Iraq, or
Lebanon for that matter.
I think another thing to do is to point to a potentially
important opportunity. Things are moving forward on the
Israeli-Palestinian front. I guess we should caution here too
about the danger of euphoria, but I think a lot of us are
hopeful that some real breakthroughs are possible there. I
think the Syrians should think about whether they want to be
left behind in that process or whether they want to
participate, and if they want to participate then they had
better stop interfering with their neighbor.
Senator Bayh. Just briefly, Mr. Secretary--and thank you
for that--my final question would be with regard to--we all
want the new government to be successful. I am concerned that
if time passes without some tangible improvement in the
economic activity at the local level, perhaps some
disillusionment will set in, which could undermine all of the
euphoria that rightfully has existed after the election and
could itself feed the insurgency.
So my final question would be, what can we do to try and
demonstrate some tangible results at the local level? We have
focused heretofore on larger projects, infrastructure projects.
That is understandable. But those take time and I am concerned
that we have a window of opportunity here to try and show that
democracy has some tangible benefits in addition to the obvious
political freedom. What can we do to step up our economic
development efforts in a way that will be felt at the street
level and encourage people that, yes, this is the right thing
to do?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, first of all, let me agree
strongly with the concern you expressed. In fact, the euphoria
has a risk built into it, that people's expectations may now be
too high and can be disappointed, although I think most of the
euphoria is just the pride they take in having stood up and
taken risks and sent a message to the terrorists.
But I am sure there is also a sense that somehow this is
going to make their lives better. So I think it is important to
try to make sure that happens. One of the challenges--and this
is why I talked about effective government ministries--is the
Iraqis have very substantial revenues. Mr. Schlicher can
correct me, but I think it is on the order now of $20 billion a
year. We need to get them to put more of that money into places
like Fallujah, for example, where people are coming to our
marines and asking, where are the payments that we were
supposed to get for rebuilding our houses?
So we need to keep the pressure on the Iraqi Government.
But I think also we need to look at how our own resources are
being allocated. I agree with what was implied in your
question, that it is important to focus on things that produce
immediately visible results, even if that means giving up some
of the desirable longer term infrastructure projects. In that
respect, I guess I am going to appeal to what you just said.
Sometimes I encounter people downrange, as we say, meaning
people in Iraq, who say, well, there is this complicated
process for notifying Congress and all this stuff has been
notified and it is in certain lines and we cannot move the
lines. I say my impression is if you come back with any
reasonable justification for reallocating you will get it. You
may have to notify and consult, but it does not take forever.
So tell us what you need to have. Do not feel you are in some
kind of straightjacket because of what you said 12 months ago.
Then finally, let me also say I hope that this
demonstration by the Iraqi people of what they are capable of
will generate more support from other countries, so if we have
to shift our funds from long-term infrastructure into more
immediate projects, that there is money coming from other
countries to backfill what we have to do. This should not be
just the United States and Iraq paying for this.
I think it's time in particular--I'm going to say this:
It's time in particular for those countries that are enjoying
huge revenue windfalls from the high oil prices to stop and
think what their interest is. I am not asking them out of
altruism. I think those countries have a stake in success in
Iraq and that that success should come sooner rather than
later. One thing they can do is help provide financial support.
Senator Bayh. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Bayh. You
raise some important comments.
I thank you, Secretary Wolfowitz, for mentioning Fallujah.
I was there just 2 weeks ago with General Sadler and he was
concerned that some of the commitments the Iraqi Government had
made with regard to refurbishing that town had not been met.
Mr. Schlicher, just briefly, who is responsible, who has
the authority or responsibility for ensuring that the water,
electricity, and other, sewage, in the country is being
improved from our side? Is it State or Defense?
Mr. Schlicher. Sir, all of the programs that help bolster
the programs of the Iraqi ministries are centered in the
embassy under an organization called the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office (IRMO). That is a State organization. It is
headed by Ambassador Bill Taylor, who prior to this mission was
our Afghan Coordinator. He works very closely in turn with the
Projects and Contracting Office (PCO), which answers to the
DOD.
Senator Sessions. That is a State Department entity?
Mr. Schlicher. IRMO is State, PCO is DOD, Department of the
Army I believe.
General Myers. Yes.
Mr. Schlicher. If I could, sir, they partner both with the
Iraqi ministries and, in the case of certain post-conflict
zones like Fallujah, the Iraqi Government has identified
ministerial action officers, if you will, who are--it is
minister Hajamal Husni in the case of Fallujah. Prime Minister
Allawi wants those points of contacts to get together the
different line ministries who can help in those places to
coordinate their efforts together and in turn to partner with
the mission's efforts.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, it is a somewhat complicated
division of responsibilities and, rather than try to add any
detail to what Mr. Schlicher already said, I would like to
second what he said earlier about Ambassador Negroponte and,
for that matter, his number two, Ambassador Jim Jeffrey. There
is a great State Department team. There is real cooperation
between State and DOD.
A wonderful example of it I believe is how they went
through the difficult reallocation, I guess it was in August,
to move $1.8 billion of project money from infrastructure into
security forces to meet General Petraeus's needs. So I do not
know any way to do this in a simple way. We have two U.S.
Government departments and then we have multiple Iraqi
ministries, as Mr. Schlicher just said, and we just have to do
the best to work closely together.
Senator Sessions. Well, I have worked in the Federal
Government with a lot of different agencies and I know how
difficult it can be. But I suppose the answer to the question
is if we in Congress have questions about how well the
infrastructure improvements are going we call you.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir; I am your man.
Senator Sessions. Then you can blame it on the DOD if they
did not do their part. We used to blame Secretary Wolfowitz for
it all, I guess. Now we have a relationship with General Casey
and Ambassador Negroponte that I hear is working real well. I
guess that is at the bottom line, the personal relationships.
Meeting every day, as I understand they do, is a key to that
cooperational level we need.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. Our impression is that that
cooperation is excellent. In addition to the great personal
relationship and working relationship, the mission has built in
different sorts of institutions into the scheme to make sure
that the political and military sides of the house are knit up.
Senator Sessions. I think we would like to see if we can
improve that. I think there is a consensus here in Congress
that we would love to see the electricity and water and all do
better, for the reasons you have previously stated.
Secretary Wolfowitz, I am just going to take a moment to
say this. I have been so proud of our men and women in uniform
and we have repeatedly talked about that. But I also want to
say, I have been proud of President Bush for his steadfastness
and his insight and courage to stay the course. I think the
same goes for Secretary Rumsfeld. He is a man of extraordinary
experience and good judgment, who has seen this big picture
correctly.
I know many have blamed you. They have said you are the
ones that really thought it all up and conjured these things
up, so any difficulty is your fault. But I think you have been
a brilliant Deputy Secretary of Defense and you have served our
country extraordinarily well. The election that we had just a
few days ago, those pictures, if you looked at them, that you
passed out would bring tears to anyone's eyes who has
sensitivity to the historic moment.
I would also say that this has not been the only
accomplishment. I have visited with President Karzai in
Afghanistan on two different occasions. He is a wonderful,
decent, good person. They are establishing a decent good
government. A war of 20 years' decimation of that country has
ended.
You have worked with Pakistan and they have turned against
terrorism and they are a good ally with us in fighting the
terrorists. We have seen now the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein
collapse and a new election occur, a historic thing. Qadafi in
Libya has renounced terrorism. We have had an election for the
Palestinian leader. Sure, we are not there yet, but that is an
historic event. The Ukraine has had a free and democratic
election, tense and tough, and you were on the right side of
pushing for a reelection count that allowed forces for progress
to succeed.
This Abdul Khan and his proliferation of nuclear weapons
ended because the United States was willing to use force when
we had to to confront the bad problems that are around our
world.
So I will just say that, no, we do not need to get overly
optimistic. There are a lot of difficulties ahead. But I am
telling you, that election just a few days ago in Iraq I
believe was historic. It was achieved by the excellent
performance of our men and women in uniform and the courage and
the professionalism, General Myers, they have shown. But it
also is--I think those of you who have been in the hot seat,
who have had to make the tough calls day after day, have
performed well.
Nobody is perfect, but I think we have made real progress,
and I for one want to say thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Sessions, thank you for that
and thank you for the personal comment. I must say I find it
almost laughable when people suggest that Secretary Rumsfeld
needs me to tell him what to think or Secretary Powell somehow
needs me to tell him what to think and, most of all, that the
President of the United States needs other people to tell him
what to think. He has made some very tough decisions, as you
point out, which have had some very big successes.
Let me just say, the one in that list--it is an impressive
list, but one that you did not mention and people are very
afraid to mention it because if we talk too much about our
success in preventing attacks on the United States, we know we
could be attacked tomorrow. We know the enemy is out there
plotting every day.
I cannot tell you that we are safe. But I can tell you that
we know that many attempted plots have been broken up because
we have killed or captured thousands of terrorists, because we
have worked with some 90 countries around the world to get
information about those plots. It has required, by the way,
difficult decisions, which I know have caused controversy about
how you deal with detainees, how you get information from
detainees. But that information is life-saving information. The
President has taken a lot of criticism for it and I think he
deserves a lot of credit for the fact that we have done as well
as we have.
But people should not be lulled into a false sense of
complacency that, because we have not been attacked here since
September 11, things are safe. The enemy is out there. Osama
bin Laden is still out there, although there are a lot of
indications that he is in increasingly difficult circumstances.
Let us not forget: He declared war on Sunday's election. It was
a big defeat for him and for his friend Mr. Zarqawi.
We are really in a fight to not just protect the lives of
Americans, but to protect the open society that we live for and
that the whole world depends on. It is not going to be over any
time soon, but I think we have made a lot of progress in the,
what is it, 3 years since September 11.
Senator Sessions. I have to agree. I think any objective
observer would agree.
Senator Byrd, I believe you are next.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. I know that
millions of Americans are pleased at the results of the recent
election in Iraq. Iraq by all indications, then, if we base it
on the election results--and we are not sure that we know
exactly the results yet--is beginning to take care of itself.
To me this indicates that we should start bringing our troops
home soon.
I think our troops have performed magnificently, under the
most stressful conditions. The wounds that they bring home are
the most terrible wounds of the most terrible war that our
service men have ever fought. I wonder about the mental strains
and stress that these men undergo 24 hours a day, how they must
watch to their left and watch to the right and watch to the
rear and watch to the front, because they know not from where
that single bullet or that explosive may leave a resounding
hole in their own flesh, and that concern and prayerful waiting
by those who love them and who await their return.
I do not think, Mr. Chairman, that we realize to the
fullest extent how much these men deserve, how much they have
suffered. They did not ask to go there, most of them, and they
were made promises that have not been kept. I think they have
been imposed on in many respects. Yes, they are patriotic. They
are doing what they were told to do. But they are not there for
what they were told was the cause and the reason or reasons why
we should invade Iraq.
I think this is a major imposition upon them and their
loved ones. So I shall do everything I can insofar as the
Appropriations Committee is concerned to support every penny
that is asked for for those men and women, the soldiers and the
marines and the people who have served so well in this most
dreadful of wars that will leave the most dreadful of wounds
upon our body politic.
We are fighting two wars, Mr. Secretary. We are fighting a
war in Afghanistan in which we were attacked, in which the
United States was attacked by 19 hijackers on September 11,
2001. Not one of these hijackers was an Iraqi, not one. That
war is different from the war that we are fighting in Iraq.
I was fully supportive and am still supportive of the war
in Afghanistan. Our country was invaded by these 19 hijackers.
I was supportive and am still supportive of our Commander in
Chief, our President--I prefer to call Mr. Bush our President
rather than the overdrawn term ``Commander in Chief.'' I was
supportive of everything he did, his quick reaction, his going
after the attackers. I am still supportive of that war.
But that is not the same war that we are fighting in Iraq.
They are different wars. In Iraq we were not attacked. No, we
did the attacking. That war is the result of the Bush
administration's pernicious preemptive strike doctrine and
nothing we can say will erase the blot upon the escutcheon of
the Senate when it voted 77 to 23 to turn over lock, stock, and
barrel the power to send our military forces wherever the
President wished, whenever he wished, and for whatever he
wished in respect to Iraq. That was a terrible blotch upon the
escutcheon of the Senate and that is why today the President
can say, we will do this, or we will not do this, and Mr.
Rumsfeld can say, we will do this and we will stay there until
this happens or that happens. It is because we turned over the
Senate's, Congress', prerogative to declare war under the
Constitution to one man. Whether he be Democrat or Republican,
that turnover of power will remain there until kingdom come
unless Congress at some point votes to retrieve that power.
This preemptive strike doctrine, on which I suppose you had
a considerable amount of input, is unconstitutional on its face
because it takes away from the collective bodies, not just one
but bodies, of the Legislative Branch under the Constitution,
it takes away from those collective bodies the power to declare
war and shifts it to one man, which the framers would never
have intended happen. I am not one of the 77. I am one of the
23.
But all that aside now--we can talk about that for a long
time. All that aside, the war in Iraq and the war in
Afghanistan, not being the same but two separate wars, the war
in Afghanistan having been a war which resulted from the
invasion of our country by 19 hijackers, causing the deaths of
3,000 Americans and causing many other terrible results, that
war is one war.
But the war in Iraq is the result of, as I say, that
pernicious doctrine under this administration of preemptive
strikes. I am against that war. I was against it. I will remain
against it. But I shall never fail to support the American
troops. It was not their fault that they were lulled in or
brought into a war to which the American people were lied about
and misled time and time again about.
Having said that, these two wars have already cost the
American taxpayers almost $150 billion. We are told that the
President will be requesting another $80 billion for the war
effort in the next few days. Yet the President stubbornly
refuses to share with the American people any notion of a
timetable--you see, that would not have been the case if the
Senate had done its duty. That would not have been the case--
any notion of a timetable for withdrawing our troops from Iraq
or Afghanistan.
It has been almost 2 years since the invasion of Iraq and
the U.S.-led coalition, which was never robust to begin with,
is shrinking, not growing. I read that the President made a
round of telephone calls to world leaders about the Iraqi
elections. That is all well and good, but telephone calls do
not pay the bills.
What, if anything, is the administration doing to relieve
the burden on American taxpayers and attract more monetary
support and more military support from Iraq's neighbors and
from the international community? How much longer does the
President expect the American people to shoulder almost 100
percent of the cost in Iraq and 90 percent of the casualties,
90 percent of the blood that has been shed there of the
occupation forces?
Could you give us some insight as to when the burden on the
American taxpayers can be expected to be at least one in which
there is attracted more monetary and military support from the
world community and from Iraq's neighbors?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Byrd, if I could just make I
guess four points. First of all, with enormous respect for your
views and your real scholarship about the Constitution, I do
not believe that these are separate wars. Mr. Zarqawi was alive
with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and running training camps
in Afghanistan. He was organizing worldwide terrorist
operations in France and England and Turkey and Georgia before
we went into Iraq. He is now focused on Iraq. He is a major
enemy.
Osama bin Laden is focused on Iraq. He has attached his
prestige to this war. Winning this war in fact will be a big
blow against Osama bin Laden.
Second, you spoke eloquently and I cannot improve on it
about the tragic price of war. I think any war is terrible, and
with an enemy that resorts to the kinds of vicious weapons that
this one does it has a particular ugliness. But I think it is
also a lesson that we can take from history that it is
important not to leave a weakened enemy out on the battlefield.
In fact, I think it is fair to say that we rested on our
laurels when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan and
concluded we had dealt with the problem and we could ignore it,
and that is part of what created a sanctuary from which Osama
bin Laden could organize the attacks of September 11. I think
it is very important that we not only defeat them, but that we
not give them that opportunity in Iraq.
Third, I think it is very important to say, while every
American casualty is painful, we are not 90 percent of the
casualties. As I mentioned previously, the Iraqis police and
army have lost almost as many now as we have and in a shorter
period of time. Since June 1 they have taken a larger share of
the combat. Our goal is to have them take an increasing share
of the combat.
Finally, on this question of who pays, I agree with you
that I think it is in the interest of the entire world to see
the Iraqi people succeed and I think Sunday was a powerful
statement to the whole world of what the Iraqi people want, and
I hope it will inspire those countries that love freedom and
democracy--our closest allies around the world--to look at this
issue in a different light after the Iraqi people made that
statement on Sunday.
Second, I agree with you that the countries in the region,
especially the ones that enjoy substantial oil wealth, have an
interest in stability and that interest in stability will be
promoted by helping to bring this war to an end as quickly as
possible, and I think that is what our goal should be.
So while we may disagree on certain points, I think we
agree on the way ahead.
Senator Sessions. Senator Thune.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, may I not pursue that just a
moment?
Senator Sessions. Briefly, yes, sir. I give extra time to
the Senator from West Virginia.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, a little extra time here I do
not think is going to make any of us suffer. I have waited a
long time. I have listened to the rosy scenarios that have been
spread before this committee time and time and time again. I am
about filled up with these scenarios, these wonderful
scenarios. I have heard of them time and time and time again.
So the credibility as far as I am concerned, Mr.
Secretary--and I say it with all respect to you--your
credibility has suffered and so has the administration's by the
time and time again rosy scenarios and by the failure to find
those WMDs which would lead to mushroom clouds. Thank God there
were none, but that is why we went into Iraq.
So credibility is an important thing here, too. But I still
have not heard the Secretary answer my question. How much
longer does the President expect the American people to
shoulder almost 100 percent of the cost of the war in Iraq and
90 percent of the casualties, 90 percent of the casualties?
Would I give my son, if I had a son, would I give a
grandson? Mr. Secretary, would you give a son? Would you give a
grandson? Perhaps you have given some. I know not. But would
you give them and then answer the questions as you have?
Let me ask you once more: What, if anything, is the
administration doing to relieve the burden on American
taxpayers and attract more monetary and military support from
Iraq's neighbors and the international community? Can you
answer that question?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We have made several efforts, Senator
Byrd, over the last 2 years--and Mr. Schlicher might elaborate
on them--in various fora to elicit contributions from
international financial institutions and from our allies, and
those have met with some success, though not as much as we
would have liked, I think.
We have a new opportunity in the wake of these elections to
look at going further and, while it is a little early to say
how we will do it, I think we should.
Ron, do you want to add anything?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir, if I could add on the military
burden side with just a few observations on recent coalition
developments. The MNF-I includes 28 non-U.S. contributors right
now. They total 25,000 troops. There are four other non-MNF-I
nations which contribute to U.N. protection and to the NATO
training mission.
The number of coalition nations has dropped at the end of
2004 as countries completed their scheduled deployments. But in
the most recent period the number of troops as I understand it
has actually grown, in part due to the new arrival of 3,000
Korean troops. Additionally, the U.S. is helping Bosnia prepare
an explosive ordnance disposal unit for their first deployment
this summer, and there are also going to be additional troops
from Romania and Georgia, 550 and 100 respectively, who are
going to be coming in the next few weeks to do U.N. protection
duty. Those are recent additions, so that that helps answer the
part on the military burden, sir.
On the economic burden, we have been working closely with
the Iraqis and the bilateral joint economic commission on a
full range of economic issues. One of those issues is how the
Iraqis can get out in front in organizing according to their
desires how the international donor community can help them
meet their needs. There is another donor meeting scheduled--
please do not hold me to it--I think it is in April. So that is
going to be a very pivotal point.
We are certainly going to be in touch with a very wide
variety of countries to urge them to seize the opportunity
presented by these elections to show their support for that new
government. Some may choose to do it in military terms. Some
may choose to do it in economic terms. But the time is
certainly ripe for it.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
General Myers. Senator Sessions, could I make a comment on
the comment that Senator Byrd made?
Senator Sessions. General Myers.
General Myers. Senator, you eloquently talked about the
sacrifice that our military makes and it is absolutely right.
But I think we need to realize that, of all the people that are
involved in this, whether it is the American public or whether
it is Congress or whether it is those of us in the Pentagon,
the ones who probably understand what is at stake here more
than anybody else are the men and women that are out there on
the front line, whether it is in Iraq or Afghanistan. They
understand that.
I have to tell you that I think they are very proud of
their service, that they understand why they are there, and
they are proud of their sacrifice. The reason I say that is
that as you visit those that are, as you put it eloquently
again, so badly injured, because there are some terrible
weapons out there these days, the IED being one of them,
mangling human bodies, but the people that I meet, the men and
women that I meet in Bethesda, Walter Reed, and other places
around this country, are proud of what they are doing.
It is more than Iraq. It is more than Afghanistan. I think
they understand what this threat is all about. These are
people, Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri, Zarqawi, and others who join
with them in jihad, not just in Iraq, not just in Afghanistan,
but essentially around the world. Their stated intent, often
stated, recently stated, is to do away with our way of life.
Our military personnel are proud of their contributions to
stopping this threat. General Abizaid has said you can fight
them there or you can fight them here. I have not said that,
but General Abizaid has said that. There is a great deal of
truth in it.
Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony this morning in response
to these questions. This is a global war on terror and Iraq is
a breeding ground for that war. It has been for some time. I
have believed for some time that it was only a matter of time
until we were going to go in and have to deal with the
situation there.
But I think what we have seen in this last week is a
remarkable display of courage on behalf of the Iraqi people. It
also occurred to me that the Iraqi election may also be part of
the much larger trend, and that is the democratization of the
Muslim Arab world. You had mentioned the hatred that they have
for our way of life, but if you look at just in this last year,
in April the world's most populous Muslim country, Indonesia,
held parliamentary elections in which they rejected Islamist
extremist parties.
Of course, you mentioned Afghanistan, which had elections
in October of last year, and more recently there have been
elections in the Palestinian territories, and now Iraq. You
look at what these people, when they have a taste of freedom,
what they are doing. They display incredible courage, with
turnout numbers that are comparable to what we experience here
in this country, under threats to their very lives and the
attacks that they are exposed to consistently. Still they
turned out in huge numbers to express their support for freedom
and democracy.
I really believe that, Mr. Chairman, 2005 could be a
decisive year in the cause of freedom in the Middle East and
democracy in that area of the world. I think it is so important
because I do see that, in this broader global war on terror
that we are fighting, as the epicenter for where that threat
will come from in the future.
Just one question perhaps, Mr. Chairman, as sort of a
follow-up to that. That is, do you believe the success of the
Iraqi election offers any lessons regarding the President's
stated goal of expanding democratic opportunities in the Middle
East? In other words, based on what we have seen and
experienced there, is this a trend that we can see continue?
The policies that have employed there--again realizing full
well that there is a lot of turbulence ahead, there will be a
lot of adversity and a lot of heavy lifting ahead for the Iraqi
people and for their neighbors in the region. But is this
something that we could see expand and grow and really
transform that area of the world, the democratization of the
Middle East, what traditionally has been an area very hostile
to the United States?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, it does and it does not. It
does in the sense that what we saw was this passion for freedom
and for self-government that we have seen in Ukraine, in Chile,
in South Africa, in South Korea. In the Philippines I
experienced that very closely in 1986. Even in Iraq, under
conditions of unbelievable intimidation, people want to be
free. They want to choose their leaders. That I think is what
the President was talking about as something universal.
It does not, however, in the following very important
sense. I hope Iraq will be an exception, but this was a case
where we used American force because we believed, based on I
think very strong intelligence, that this country, that regime,
was a threat to us, and that changed the calculations. But I
think if you look at the trend over the last 20 years--and it
is an impressive trend--Senator Kennedy talked earlier about
the spread of freedom and democracy in Latin America in the
1980s and in South Africa. I do not know if you were here. I
commented on my own experience when I was Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asia with the Philippines and with Korea and
with Taiwan and then, much later, unfortunately, 10 years
later, Indonesia came along. Thailand has come along.
We have seen an incredible expanse of freedom in central
and eastern Europe and most recently in Georgia and Ukraine. It
is stunning, and every one of those cases happened without
American combat forces. I would hope that that is the kind of
change we can see in the Middle East going forward. I hope the
governments that feel, correctly, that they are being called
upon to reform will understand that it is not meant to
destabilize them, it is not to bring about revolutions, but
that in fact I think reform is the best way for them to
preserve stability.
In fact, when I was Ambassador to Indonesia, I had my
farewell call on President Suharto, who was the dictator of
that country at the time, a mild dictator compared to Saddam
Hussein, I would note, but a dictator nonetheless. I talked in
sort of oblique ways about the need to have political change in
Indonesia and he talked less obliquely about the need to
preserve stability. I said: ``Well, Mr. President, you talk
about dynamic stability; I do not actually preserve stability
by standing still. You have to move forward.''
I would submit that what happened to him 10 years later is
because he did not move forward, is because he tried to stop
progress, because he tried to suppress civil society in
Indonesia, because he drew more and more power around him.
There are examples elsewhere. Taiwan is a stunning one.
Actually South Korea is a stunning one, where authoritarian
leaders--Spain is another one actually if you go back 30
years--where authoritarian leaders have seen the need to
prepare the way for something that is less authoritarian after
them. It is possible. It happens. The whole world is better off
for it. I think that is what the President is talking about.
I hope Iraq will be an exception, that we will not need to
use American troops to protect ourselves, and there are ways
through many peaceful means to support free and democratic
forces throughout the Muslim world.
Senator Thune. I would just say that I share that view and
I hope that the power of example, which can be a powerful tool
as other nations in that region and around the world see and
begin to taste what freedom and democracy are about, that it is
the power of that example and the power of freedom and not the
power of the military that can bring that result about.
But clearly we have made tremendous strides and progress in
Iraq and I hope we continue on that path. I would say to the
general, please convey to the troops as well our appreciation
for the extraordinary work that they are doing. I share what
you echoed earlier today, that there is not hardly anywhere I
go where I talk to people who have been in the theater or their
families, for that matter, who do not believe profoundly in the
mission and in what they are trying to accomplish there. They
really are very committed to it and they think that what they
are doing is making a difference. I happen to share that view.
So thank you.
General Myers. Thank you, Senator.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, if I could just say I agree
with you very strongly about the power of example. You
mentioned those four cases--Indonesia, the Palestinian
Authority, Iraq, and Afghanistan. I think there is a message
there that is having an effect.
Senator Sessions. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
not being able to be here in person for the testimony of the
witnesses and I thank them for appearing before the committee.
I too want to express my profound admiration for the Iraqi
people and their desire to have their voices heard through the
ballot box. I think no one could see the pictures coming out of
Sunday's election without being very moved by the notion of
ordinary Iraqis braving threats, risking lives, even losing
their lives, in order to vote. There is no doubt it could not
have happened without our men and women in uniform being there
to guarantee that vote going forward. They deserve our equal
support, respect, and gratitude.
I do not think that there is any argument about the
extraordinary display of freedom and the move toward democracy
being in the short-, medium-, and long-term interests of
humanity and the United States. But as is clear from the
questioning, there are lots of concerns about the direction
that we have headed and some of the decisions that have been
made. There has been relatively little oversight. This
committee I think is notable in Congress for performing more
oversight than anyone else, in a bipartisan way, thanks to our
chairman and ranking member.
But I think vigorous oversight and hard questions are part
of democracy. So I hope that we can keep focused on what are
the real issues that we need to address going forward.
Mr. Secretary, we are going to be receiving a supplemental.
Many of us have argued that we need a larger Army, and indeed
the Army is currently using temporary measures paid for through
supplementals to pay for a larger force in order to meet our
needs in Iraq. We obviously have a strain on our active duty as
well as our Reserve components. That is an issue that is not
going away. Every day we wait to deal with it means it is going
to take longer and be more expensive if a decision is made to
permanently expand the size of the standing Army.
Is the DOD considering making the larger Army a permanent
part of the defense budget and will the DOD be looking at the
size of the overall force during its Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) this year?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The answer to both questions is yes.
In fact, in the 2006 budget and the 5-year defense plan that
will come with the 2006 budget you will see that we will bring
the cost of this larger Army into what we call the top line in
our regular budget starting in fiscal year 2007 and that we
have had to make some very considerable adjustments in the rest
of the defense program in order to pay for that.
We need to fund it through supplementals in this fiscal
year and next fiscal year because that is not the kind of
change you can--it is like trying to turn a tanker on a dime.
But we are not trying to hide the cost, either. One of the
reasons we are very pleased that we have put out the fiscal
year 2005 supplemental number along with the 2006 budget
request is so that Congress can see what those costs will be
going forward.
But yes, we think the only prudent thing at this point is
to plan for that as a permanent change. Permanent changes, of
course, mean permanent bills and that is how we have to adjust
the defense program.
Definitely, I think in the QDR the question of whether this
increase is the right one is one of the questions that we will
be addressing.
General Myers, do you want to add to that at all?
General Myers. I would only say--and I think Senator
Clinton knows this well--it is more than just the people. There
are equipment needs as well and that is why, as you will see in
the budget submission, the Army needs additional resources to
do what they need to do in the future, and that is all wrapped
in there.
Senator Clinton. I think it is a very difficult decision, I
grant that. But it is also a very important one for this
Congress and the American public to grasp. The budget
implications, given the extraordinary deficit situation we are
facing, are ones that have in my view very serious consequences
for our long-term ability to sustain any kind of aggressive
defense posture. So we need to start this conversation now and
not do it in a piecemeal way.
Let me ask you too, Mr. Secretary. Can you clarify once and
for all: Is there any consideration being given to extending
Reserve component deployments?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think you are referring to this
issue of whether or not--this question of I think a narrow
interpretation of the law. This is the question of the 2 years.
Senator Clinton. Right.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think our very strong view is there
is enough burden on reservists as it is with the prospect of 24
cumulative months and nobody should start saying, well, it is
consecutive in the law. I think our policy is very clear.
Chairman Warner. I can take that as a clear policy
statement?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes. If I could add, too, on your
point about the Army, it is important. As I think both you and
General Myers noted, it is not just more people, but a major
reorganization of how those people operate. We have a typically
opaque bureaucratic term called ``modularity,'' and what it
really means is restructuring the Army so it is deployable in
more small units. One of the things that does is it spreads the
burden of these difficult deployments over a much larger
portion of the force and makes it considerably less stressful
on everyone.
General Myers. The discussion includes the Reserve
component as well. It is one total piece.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that. My time is up, but
perhaps this is something for the chairman and the ranking
member to consider, running parallel with these decisions,
moving from supplemental to top line budgeting, looking at the
QDR, it may be time to consider perhaps that Congress take a
look in a sort of Goldwater-Nichols, but it would be perhaps
Warner-Levin, approach toward acquisition and purchasing rules
in the Pentagon.
I think that we have so many tough decisions ahead of us
and I for one am not convinced that we have really done all we
need to do legally to set forth a road map and working with the
DOD to have a new approach, some new thinking, some 21st
century, on-time inventory kinds of thinking that we have done
from the back end, but in a more forward-looking way.
Because we are going to face a lot of very tough decisions
on this budget with respect to some of the reports we hear
about decisions that have been made with respect to certain
weapons systems. Taken out of context, they will be great
fodder for political battles. Put into a broader context of
what we are trying to achieve, that might or might not be the
case. But I think we need a new look at that.
Chairman Warner. Senator, we thank you for that
observation. It is a matter that the distinguished ranking
member and I are frequently discussing and I can assure you and
other members of the committee that we will in this Congress
address those critical questions, and do it not just in a
simple hearing but in a more extensive way.
I thank the Senator.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
apologize for not being here to hear the testimony of Secretary
Wolfowitz, General Myers, and Mr. Schlicher. The reason is that
I have been at the Veterans Affairs Committee's hearing on
survivor benefits and we just concluded that hearing.
Chairman Warner. Well, as ranking member of that committee,
that was very important and essential that you be there. I am
delighted, and it is the intention of Senator Levin and myself,
Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman, to be in consultation
with you and Senator Craig as to how quickly we can move that
piece of legislation.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, Senator Craig and I heard the
witnesses who are survivors and widows of some of our service
people.
But I am here to ask a question or two of our panel.
Secretary Wolfowitz, it is reported that Army leaders are
considering seeking a change in Pentagon policy that would
allow for longer and more frequent callups of some reservists
to meet the demands of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. My
question is very close to what has been asked by Senator
Clinton on this matter. Here is the question. As the Army
considers making last year's temporary increase to 30,000 Army
troops permanent, what is the DOD doing to ensure that as our
troops are being stretched out throughout and around the world,
to ensure that we continue to have the quality force that we
need?
Second, what is the DOD doing to ensure that the tempo of
operations (OPTEMPO) does not diminish the quality of life to
the point of impacting retention for Active-Duty, Reserve, as
well as National Guard troops?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think the heart of the answer is
that we are looking not only to increase the size of the Army
but also to do two other things. One is what we call
modularity, as I said, which is to create a larger number of
deployable units, kind of along the way the Marine Corps is
already organized, so that the burden of these deployments if
they have to be sustained is across a larger effective force.
Second, a lot is being done to redistribute roughly 100,000
positions between the Reserve and the Active-Duty Force so that
we are not in the position where for certain critical
specialties that we are short on we have to keep calling up the
same reservists over and over again. That has been a problem
going back to Bosnia and Kosovo, and I think the Army is doing
a lot to shift the Active-Reserve balance in these critical
specialties so that that stress is relieved.
Senator Akaka. Members of this committee are interested in
readiness and keeping the quality of the force.
General Myers. You bet, we all are. I spend a great deal of
my time trying to look around corners to make sure that as we
ask a lot of our forces, Active-Duty and Reserve components,
that we are taking those steps to make sure that recruiting and
retention stay healthy.
I think today actually we are in pretty good shape, thanks
to Congress and the help that they have given in providing
incentives and bonuses for people to stay in, and also the
increase of our recruiting force almost across the board. We
are staying up with recruiting in most cases.
The one area you need to watch very carefully is in the
Army Reserve. The Army Guard is in pretty good shape. The Army
Reserve is going to take some attention and we are putting the
attention to it.
But the most important thing we can do and we have tried to
do is provide, particularly for our Reserve component forces,
predictability in their lives. So the Secretary of Defense has
instituted policies about how often they can be called up and
the timelines that we are going to follow. We started off not
doing that very well several years ago. We are doing that much
better today. I think we are providing better predictability,
in fact pretty good predictability. Every once in a while we
will be caught by a condition. For instance, in Iraq we have
had to make some change and had to extend, no Reserve units,
but active duty units, for 15, 30, 45 days longer than we
anticipated having them in there.
So we focus very hard on predictability and where the
situations permit, which is in most cases, we try to live up to
the promises we make. We feel like if we do not do that we are
actually breaking our promise. So we take that very seriously,
and the Secretary in particular takes that very seriously.
On top of that, there are a myriad of things that are going
on. Some of this will be reflected in the budget in terms of
balancing between the Active and Reserve components, making
sure we have the right forces in both components, and that they
are well trained. I think you will see a lot of that as we look
at what the Army is going to do over the next many years as
they try to fashion an Army for this 21st century.
Senator Akaka. This committee has been trying to maintain
and improve the quality of life of our military. This plays
into the retention factor. I am asking these questions just to
be sure we are focusing on retention and trying to keep our
forces there.
General Myers. Absolutely, sir. It is a critical issue. I
am very happy that you are focusing on it. I think a lot of
people need to focus on this particular issue. We have a very
important mission. We have very high OPTEMPO, personnel tempo,
in trying to meet that mission, and the last thing we want to
have happen is to come out of this period with a force that is
not fully recruited, that we do not have the numbers we need. I
am not talking again just active duty, but in the Reserve
component as well.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses, Mr.
Secretary and General Myers.
General Myers. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, could I just make one
note?
Chairman Warner. Of course.
Secretary Wolfowitz. On a statistical point earlier, I
think I was asked about the personnel fill of Iraqi units and I
think I used a figure of roughly 60 percent. That figure if I
understand it applies to regular Army units. The fill for
National Guard units is actually considerably better, according
to General Petraeus, well over 90 percent. These special police
battalions, of which there are now seven, average 85 to 90
percent strength.
We will try to give you a breakdown in detail, but it is
one more illustration of the fact that we are dealing with a
force that is made up of many diverse components and it is a
bit hard to generalize.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We will do that.
It is important that we cover Afghanistan in this hearing.
That is an extraordinary success story and I would like to
invite Ambassador Maureen Quinn, the Coordinator for
Afghanistan, to join our witnesses. Mr. Schlicher, I desire you
to remain.
You can make such opening comments as you so desire,
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers. I think we want to keep
the comments to a minimum. Then we will turn to Ambassador
Quinn for her overview of the Afghan situation.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator Levin. I am wondering if you might yield to me for
two questions on Iraq.
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator Levin. I have to go to the floor I believe right
now.
Chairman Warner. All right.
Senator Levin. I would appreciate that.
Just one question for Mr. Schlicher. The Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL) provides that two-thirds of the voters
in any three Iraqi provinces can veto the constitution, which
would mean that the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shiites could
probably defeat the constitution if they were united in
opposition to it.
My question is this: Will that TAL for the referendum on
the constitution that is to be drafted under the new assembly,
will that be controlling? That is my question: Will the TAL be
controlling for the referendum on the constitution that is
going to be drafted under the new Transitional National
Assembly (TNA)? Or can that assembly amend the TAL?
Mr. Schlicher. Sir, it is my understanding----
Chairman Warner. Let me interrupt. I think it is a very
important question. I think the witness should be given the
opportunity to explain the origin of that law, how it was under
a previous group and is carried forward.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. The TAL in many senses serves as
the interim constitution of Iraq. It was negotiated actually
during this time period last year, culminating in March last
year. Again, in many senses it serves as an interim
constitution. It does many important things, especially giving
the Iraqis for the first time an equivalent of a bill of
rights.
But it also sets out many procedures for the political
processes that we are going to see during the course of this
year, which is where Senator Levin's question hooks in. Senator
Levin, it is my understanding that the TAL will be controlling
until the adoption of a new constitution.
Senator Levin. Which means that it will be controlling as
to how that new constitution is adopted?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir, that is my understanding.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
One last question, Secretary Wolfowitz. The Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Stuart Bowen, issued
an audit report this week in which he concluded that the CPA
failed to establish or implement managerial, financial, and
contractual controls needed to ensure that funds provided to
the interim Iraqi Government ministries were properly used
during the period before the transfer of sovereignty on June
30, 2004. That report indicated that the CPA was ``burdened by
severe inefficiencies and poor management and failed to review
and compare financial, budgetary, and operational performance
to planned or expected results,'' and that left the expenditure
of about $9 billion in Iraqi funds ``open to fraud, kickbacks,
and misappropriation of funds.''
It said in this report there was no assurance that funds
were not provided for ghost employees and gave a number of
examples of where that was a likely or a very real possibility
because the authorization of payments to numbers of people were
way above the validated number of those employees.
I am wondering whether or not you have made a response to
the CPA Inspector General's report and, if not, if you have not
given a written response, do you agree with it in general and
will you give a detailed written response to this committee?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Ambassador Bremer gave a very detailed
response to the initial report and I will submit that for the
record. It is pretty powerful and quite eloquent. I think I
could summarize it by saying that you have to weigh the risks.
There are risks of not having adequate controls on how money is
spent and there are risks of having such controls on how money
is spent that important functions do not get performed, like
paying police and paying school teachers and keeping the
country functioning.
It is almost as though there is criticism when it comes to
U.S. appropriated funds that we have not spent it fast enough,
and now when it comes to Iraqi funds that we spent it too fast.
I think on the whole it seems to me Ambassador Bremer made some
difficult decisions and made them the right way. But this was a
difficult situation. There was no perfect answer and you
certainly could not have waited until you had a perfect system
of controls. I think that you will see is the thrust of this
letter and I will find out, Senator Levin, if he has changed
his views at all in light of the report.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Levin. Whether that represents the views of the
Department.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Okay.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
Now, Mr. Secretary, some overview on Afghanistan, I think a
success story of considerable proportions owing to the
leadership of the President, the Secretaries of State and
Defense, yourself, and many others.
Secretary Wolfowitz. In this case also we have a case where
the enemy declared war on democratic elections, and the
elections went ahead in spite of them. The intimidation level
was not as severe as it is in Iraq, but it was real. You have
these very moving stories of women dressing themselves,
preparing themselves for death to go out and vote.
I had the privilege when I was in Indonesia to look at the
tsunami relief operation just recently to talk to a woman who
is head of one of the largest Indonesian Muslim women's
organizations, who turns out to have been the only woman on the
11-member U.N. Election Commission. She was there for 6 months.
She said the passion of Afghan women to vote was just something
extraordinary.
I think it is producing results on the battlefield. Not
that this war is over, not that the Taliban is going to give up
tomorrow, but I think they are losing public support. I think
we are getting better intelligence and we are even seeing some
of them talking about maybe giving it up.
So it is a perfect illustration, I think, of the point that
these counterinsurgency wars are not won just on the
battlefield, that the political piece of it is just as
important.
Chairman Warner. It is an extraordinary contribution by
President Karzai. It is a great chapter in world history.
General Myers, any comment about your force structure
there? NATO is really heavily pulling on the oar in
Afghanistan, am I not correct?
General Myers. You are correct. Two quick comments. One is
that our forces that are there are primarily there along the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border and working on our Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, along the border because that is where
the residual threat of al Qaeda remains. By the way, it is
negligible at this point. But also in other parts of
Afghanistan----
Chairman Warner. On that point, we should put in the
record: 7 days and 7 nights a week, we are concentrating on
Osama bin Laden and the possibility of taking him into custody,
am I not correct?
General Myers. You bet, it is a 24/7, 365 days a year
operation. I will just leave it at that, but it is a very
intense operation.
I think NATO is expanding its responsibility right now.
They have the northern part of Afghanistan. It is their
responsibility. They also have a force in Kabul that provides
security there at the airport and in the city. That will
continue to expand to the west and eventually to the south and
to the whole of the country, so we can see a day in the not too
distant future where NATO could conceivably be in command of
the whole operation.
Chairman Warner. Well, that is a success story. I commend
General Jones for his leadership on that. He has kept the
members of this committee individually and collectively very
well informed on that issue.
General Myers. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Now, Madam Ambassador, we would like to
have your observations. We thank you for your work.
STATEMENT OF MAUREEN QUINN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN
Ambassador Quinn. I heard a comment at the beginning asking
if we can look at the next steps on Afghanistan. So maybe I can
just make a few comments on what we are focused on in 2005.
Obviously, this year we are working with President Karzai, his
government, and the U.N. community on the National Assembly and
local elections. Probably late spring, early summer.
In addition, we are continuing the development of the
security success. Our military, the DOD, have very successfully
worked on the Afghan National Army. That continues at full
speed. We are working as well on the development of the Afghan
National Police and we are addressing the other elements of the
security sector, countering narcotics, promoting justice, and
hopefully, probably taking until 2006, but completing the
demilitarization, demobilization, reintegration process.
This year in particular, we are giving an extra focus to
counternarcotics. I am not going to go into detail now on that
here, but we are very much engaged on that issue.
Chairman Warner. Well, some detail on that is important
because proliferation of that narcotics situation could
undermine to some extent the successes that the coalition has
brought together to liberate that country, and now under the
presidency of Karzai it has to be a problem addressed. We
cannot let this continued growth and proliferation expand.
Ambassador Quinn. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I agree fully. What I
would add on that point is President Karzai has committed
himself to address this issue. He has mobilized his government
to do that. They had a very successful mini-Loya Jirga in
December where they called in the mullahs and the governors and
the district leaders to give them the central government
message that they needed to take back to their provinces, which
they are doing. We have had some preliminary reports of
voluntary actions on eradication, plowing over poppy fields.
In support of that government effort, what we are looking
at is five key areas. We are again promoting the public
information message, getting the message out that this is
wrong, that there are no benefits in it, and that the fields
will be eradicated.
We are focusing on interdiction as well, going after the
drug traffickers, helping them there. Our Drug Enforcement
Agency is very much involved in that.
We are also focused on the law enforcement aspect. In
Afghanistan, unluckily, the judicial system is really being
built from scratch. So in the narcotics area we are focused on
a special judicial-prosecutorial task force, so that when
people are brought in they can be prosecuted. Therefore, we are
looking for secure detention facilities and building those up.
We believe in a comprehensive approach, so we are looking
at and working very hard at the alternative livelihoods area,
so that when the farmers who depend so much on this crop, if
their fields are destroyed, they have the opportunity to
develop other--it is not only crops, but it is also the
community development, so that they can get other crops to
market, et cetera.
Finally, it is the eradication of the key elements----
Chairman Warner. You are of the professional opinion that
the maximum attention that not only our Nation but the outside
world can bring to bear on it is now being exerted?
Ambassador Quinn. I believe so, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I accept that. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Quinn. The final point I want to mention is the
reconstruction. I think the United States has done a
significant job already, particularly in the roads area. But we
are continuing to focus on that, the roads, the power sector,
water, energy, schools, clinics, and most importantly
developing the human capacity of the Afghan people. We are
continuing that and committed to it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Now, Ambassador Schlicher, I think we should have the
record today reflect your personal observations as well as the
factual chronology of how this new government is going to, as
we say, be stood up. You have had the elections. Are we on time
for the February 15 date for certification, the best you know?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir, to the best of my knowledge we
are. With your permission, I will go through what I know about
the coming process.
Chairman Warner. I think it is important for those
following this hearing, and particularly the American public,
to understand the magnificence of these elections. Let us hope
that that can be in some way replicated in each of these steps,
because these are not inconsequential nor easy steps to be
taken as this government is stood up.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir, that is absolutely right.
Chairman Warner. I would appreciate your best estimate of
the times, even though your professional judgment may be at
variance with some of the printed timetables and the like. I
think we should have at least your opinion, because you have
extensive experience in this area.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. Let me go through what the process
is as we understand it. Once the Election Commission has
received and tabulated all of the results from the more than
5,000 polling stations around Iraq--and that is what is
happening now--it will begin to calculate the allocation of the
275 seats in the TNA, and at the same time in parallel it is
allocating the seats in the 18 provincial assemblies that have
been elected and in the Kurdistan Regional Government election
which also took place.
The commission has stated that it expects to announce the
progress of the tally periodically and its target for
announcing final results in all of those electoral processes is
still February 15. We have received no indication that that
timeline is slipping.
Meanwhile, we understand that in parallel to the tallying
effort, informally the political parties have begun to talk
with each other and negotiate the possible shape of the coming
government as they await the final results themselves.
Now, once the allocation of seats is announced the TNA,
this 275-person body will convene. Its first responsibility is
to select that body's leadership and adopt that body's internal
rules. It will then select by a two-thirds majority vote a
three-member Transitional Government Presidency Council for the
executive branch, which will consist of a president of the
state and two deputy presidents.
That three-person presidency body will be selected as a
single slate and perhaps there will be competing slates. It
depends on how the politicians negotiate.
Now, under the TAL the three members of the Presidency
Council are required to unanimously nominate a prime minister
within 2 weeks of their assumption of office. If the Presidency
Council fails to name a prime minister in that 2-week period,
the responsibility for naming a prime minister reverts to the
TNA itself. In that instance, the TNA would have to confirm a
nomination by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly.
After the naming of a prime minister, that prime minister
then has up to 1 month in which to name a council of ministers.
If the prime minister----
Chairman Warner. They need not be members of the TNA?
Mr. Schlicher. Sir, they may be members----
Chairman Warner. They may be or may not be.
Mr. Schlicher. That is right.
Chairman Warner. That is an important fact. I want to point
that out because that is the area in which presumably the
strong Shiite faction--I am not going to quantify how strong it
may be--can begin to show its hand as to whether or not they
feel it is, as we do I am sure here in this country, important
to get some Sunni participation in that ministerial level. Am I
correct on that?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir, that is certainly one of the
opportunities.
Now, if the prime minister is unable to nominate a cabinet
within that 1-month period, up to 1-month period he has, the
Presidency Council would then nominate another prime minister.
When the prime minister has named a council of ministers, that
slate must then be approved by a simple majority vote of the
TNA.
Now, in the interim, in the period we are in now, the
current interim Iraqi Government will remain in place until
their replacements are confirmed. Upon confirmation by the TNA,
the new prime minister and council of ministers will then
assume power.
So, sir, that is an overview of the process we are likely
to see.
Chairman Warner. Let us put some time on this. If there are
no extensions of times, the earliest date could be what? You
mentioned several 30-day periods. Then what would be the
furthest date?
Mr. Schlicher. Sir, as I calculate it--and I have to say I
am not very good at math--the earliest that we might see would
be around March 1, which I understand is an informal target
date for the politicians.
Chairman Warner. That is for all the steps you enumerated
to be completed?
Mr. Schlicher. At least some of the most important ones.
Very optimistically, I think they could do it in that time
period. I think what they are talking about in Iraq right now
is a more generic formulation of several weeks.
Chairman Warner. So that could now go into the month of
April?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir, I think that is right. If you tag
all the worst case scenarios for each of these out----
Chairman Warner. So April. If suddenly they got tied up and
they could not agree on the prime minister, you are talking
about running into May and June because of those 30-day
extensions.
Mr. Schlicher. The 30-day period, sir, is for the prime
ministerial nominee to nominate a cabinet.
Chairman Warner. But then if they cannot settle on the
prime minister it goes back to the TNA and then goes back to
another prime minister. I presume that starts another 30-day
period.
Mr. Schlicher. Up to 30 days.
Chairman Warner. Right. So you are looking at built-in time
sequences that could result--and I am not faulting this system,
but I think the people of this country need to understand----
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir, that is absolutely right.
Chairman Warner. --the complexity of this process and how
it could extend into April or May before a government is up,
everybody has taken his oath of office, and they can begin to
function.
Mr. Schlicher. I hope that we all understand the political
delicacy of each of these steps for the Iraqi people.
Chairman Warner. Correct.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, that is very important
because part of the euphoria is the expectation there is going
to be a government when they count the ballots on February 15.
Chairman Warner. That is true. That is why I am taking this
time.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you for pointing that out. It is
very important.
Chairman Warner. If I may say, I have publicly said this
three or four times when the Secretary of Defense--and by the
way, I am delighted to have you here today, but the record
should reflect that he came before this committee last week for
about 2\1/2\ to 3 hours of intensive questioning in our
committee room. So we have had good representation from the DOD
before this committee here.
I think it is important that that is all laid out. Within
that period of time, General, we can anticipate that the
insurgents and those antithetical to this government could well
exercise these horrific measures that they have had in the past
to try and delay or somehow disrupt this process that has been
laid out by Ambassador Schlicher. Am I correct?
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, that is certainly possible.
Chairman Warner. We had better remain on guard, and that is
why all this discussion of pulling troops out at this time in
the judgment of this Senator--I think the President stated it
well: We have milestones to reach, and it is achievement and
facts on the ground and the situation that are going to dictate
our troop level policy.
Senator Byrd, would you like to ask a question?
Senator Byrd. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are always
very considerate of the members of this committee and you give
us an opportunity to speak our minds, ask our questions. You do
an excellent job with respect to fairness and consideration and
courtesy.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator. I have to say I
learned some of that from you.
Senator Byrd. Well, thank you.
It has already been referenced that the Inspector General
of the CPA reported that $8.8 billion from the Development Fund
for Iraq, comprised mostly of Iraqi oil revenue, was spent with
virtually no financial controls at all--$8.8 billion. Mr.
Secretary, that is $8.80 for every minute that has passed since
Jesus Christ was born 2,000 years ago.
The report concluded that the accounting controls over this
money were weak or nonexistent, leaving the door open to fraud,
kickbacks, and misappropriation of funds. In short, this
Inspector General report illustrates that there is no way that
the DOD could know what exactly happened to $8.8 billion in
reconstruction funds for Iraq.
I am somewhat concerned by your answer to Senator Levin's
question on reconstruction spending. I was concerned by your
initial response as you responded to the question concerning
this Inspector General's report. Perhaps I was wrong, but your
response struck me, Mr. Secretary, as somewhat dismissive,
nonchalant, blase.
I remember a great Roman once who was taken to task by his
fellow countrymen for having put aside his wife. He was
reminded of what a great Roman matron this was, how loyal she
had been, what a beautiful woman she was, how careful she had
been in the rearing of her family. He was taken over the coals,
as it were, whereupon he took off one of his shoes and he said:
You see this shoe? It has a wonderful color about it. The
leather has been properly selected. The tone of the color and
the pliability of the leather is certainly without equal. A
beautiful pair of shoes it is. But, he said, only I know where
it pinches.
Well, your response, Mr. Secretary, reminded me of that
story. It was as if to say, I think: Well, so what? It was a
huge sum, but keep in mind the difficulties we were up against.
Keep in mind what would have happened if we had not spent it.
So father knows best. Do not ask any questions.
Again, this seems to me to be an outgrowth of our unwise
decision to turn everything over to one man or woman, the
President of the United States. So the Pentagon has repeatedly
asked for more and more flexibilities on how it spends money.
Ted Stevens and I have had to wrestle with this in our
appropriation of moneys over the past few years. It appears
that the Pentagon had unlimited flexibility with this $8.8
billion, and now the Inspector General tells Congress that the
Pentagon cannot tell us where these funds went. That does not
speak well for the DOD's use of flexibilities.
So I have been after the Pentagon for years, I have talked
with Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly, about the failure of the
DOD to account for the funds that it spends. But I have to say
that this instance here involving $8.8 billion certainly takes
the cake. How can the DOD be held accountable for wasted
reconstruction money if it does not bother to regulate how it
spends billions upon billions of dollars in Iraq?
So father does not always know best. Our problem is this.
Our problem is that we have to go back time and again to the
people and ask for money. How do we know that the expenditure
of this $8.8 billion in reconstruction funds has done any good
for Iraq? This report paints a picture of Pentagon officials
throwing cash around willy-nilly while Iraq was falling into
chaos.
I know I asked Mr. Bremer would he come back before the
Appropriations Committee if the chairman, the then-Chairman
Stevens, should request that he come back. He said: I am too
busy, I am too busy. Well, that was the attitude. That is the
attitude that we were met with.
I can guarantee you that would not have been the attitude
had we not given away our power, the power of Congress to
declare war. How can you possibly assure the American people
that these funds were well spent if the Pentagon cannot even
tell Congress where that cash ended up? That is my question.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Byrd, there is nothing
nonchalant about my view of this issue. I think it is a
difficult issue. I would encourage you--I will give you
Ambassador Bremer's response to the draft report and see if
there is an additional one. Let me just for example read from
it. He says, and this is Ambassador Bremer writing:
``The draft suggests that the CPA should have delayed
paying Iraqi public servants until we had fully modern
pay records. This would have taken many months, if not
years. More than a million Iraqi families depended on
the Iraqi Government for their salaries. When the CPA
arrived in Iraqi after liberation, unemployment was
over 50 percent. Not paying the civil servants would
have been destabilizing and would have increased the
security threat to Iraqis and to Americans. In brief,
such a course would have cost lives.''
There is nothing nonchalant about that concern.
Let me point out--and I do not want it to be said I do not
care how the Iraqis spend their money, but let us be clear.
This was not U.S. appropriated funds. This was Iraqi money. We
were there under authority of the U.N., which specifically said
that, under successive U.N. Security Council resolutions, ``it
was policy to transfer to the Iraqis as much responsibility as
possible, as quickly as possible.'' I am quoting again from
Ambassador Bremer's letter. It said that to have tried to have
the sort of controls that the Inspector General is suggesting
would have been directly contrary to U.S. Government policy and
to the mandate of the U.N.
I think this is an important question. Senator Levin has
asked for any final response Ambassador Bremer might have. I
think we should look at whether things could have been done
differently and we should see if there are lessons to be
learned if there were a similar situation. But there was a
crisis at hand. There were very large Iraqi funds available to
deal with that crisis, and I think that basically Ambassador
Bremer made the right decision to go to those Iraqi funds
before coming back to the taxpayer and asking for appropriated
funds.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I simply close by saying that
Mr. Bremer might very well have added: I didn't have time to
appear before the Appropriations Committee again to make
explanations, even though the people's representatives in the
Senate and the House might have asked more questions as to how
the money was spent.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Byrd. Senator Byrd, I
want the record to reflect that Senator Levin and I wrote
letters to the Secretary of Defense at the time Ambassador
Bremer was completing his duties, urging that he come before
this committee, and he did not come.
Senator Byrd. Yes. I thank the chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Byrd. He has certainly not left any step along the
way out of the equation. He has done everything he can and so
has his counterpart, Mr. Levin. I thank them.
Chairman Warner. I thank my senior colleague. Thank you
very much.
Finally, gentlemen, just an observation by myself. That is,
I look forward to this trip being undertaken by the President
of the United States to Europe. I do hope in the course of that
trip, and I know he will, and rightly so, that he will talk
about Iraq and the successes we have had to date. I am just
hopeful that our President will receive some reciprocal
acknowledgments on this trip and those acknowledgments might
well result in further participation by nations in the European
theater and others in helping us--when I say ``us,'' the
existing coalition forces--conclude our goals.
So I wish our President well on this trip. He certainly has
the support of this Senator in his efforts to try and increase
participation by other countries in a variety of ways--training
the Iraqi security forces, working on the infrastructure
improvements that are necessary--a variety of ways to bring
this chapter of world history to a conclusion successfully so
the people of Iraq can manifest in so many ways the exuberance
and courage that they did here of this recent weekend. I hope
you share that view, Secretary Wolfowitz.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do, very strongly, Senator.
Chairman Warner. I am highly optimistic about this trip
coming up.
I thank our witnesses. We have had an excellent hearing. I
realize it has gone a little bit longer than we planned, but we
had a number of Senators, well over half the committee,
participate. The hearing is now concluded.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
1. Senator Roberts. Secretary Wolfowitz, we have been briefed that
the original plan for the Iraqi Army has been filled. However, Prime
Minister Allawi has indicated he may want a larger army than planned.
How would such a decision impact the current U.S. training efforts in
Iraq?
General Myers. An Iraqi decision to increase the size of their Army
would have minimal impact on our training efforts. In addition to the
current training provided by the Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), the Ministry of Defense has established an
Iraqi training battalion that conducts basic recruit training. This
unit is expanding to a full brigade and will eventually assume the lead
in training recruits. Iraq is a sovereign country dedicated to building
security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and deny Iraq a
safe haven to terrorists. Prime Minister Allawi's proposal to build a
larger Army is one of several initiatives that are being evaluated by
Embassy Baghdad, Multi-National Force-Iraq and the new Iraqi
Transitional Government. MNSTC-I stands ready to adjust their training
efforts and courses as required.
2. Senator Roberts. Secretary Wolfowitz, by most accounts, the
Iraqi security forces performed well during the election, establishing
perimeters and protecting thousands of polling locations around the
country. Are the Iraqi security forces ready for more sophisticated
counter-insurgency operations?
General Myers. At this time, not all Iraqi security forces are
capable of taking the lead in fighting the insurgency. They lack the
maturity and mid-level institutional leadership necessary to
independently deal with the insurgent threat. However, there are
several specialty units within the Ministry of Interior and the
Ministry of Defense that have gained the experience and combat skills
necessary to execute sophisticated counterinsurgency operations. As
conditions warrant, Multi-National Force-Iraq will progressively
transition the counterinsurgency mission to capable Iraqi security
forces and assign coalition forces to supporting roles with a less
visible presence.
3. Senator Roberts. General Myers, according to the Department of
Defense (DOD), there are a little over 130,000 Iraqis ``on-hand and
trained.'' However, there are questions, and I believe this was brought
up during the Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Tuesday,
concerning the actual number of Iraqis ready to conduct border patrol
operations, policing operations, or combat operations. I would like to
talk about fully-trained Iraqi soldiers, those who are reliable and
ready to go into the field. At what rate is the DOD currently training
these soldiers, and how will that rate increase if more U.S. soldiers
are pulled away from combat operations for training purposes?
General Myers. Currently, there are over 17,800 Ministry of Defense
and Ministry of Interior recruits conducting institutional training.
These recruits are in numerous courses ranging from 3 weeks to 13 weeks
of training and graduate at different rates each week based on the
length of their course. Additionally, the number of recruits in
training changes each week as new volunteers are recruited, vetted and
begin courses. The progressive shift by the Multi-National Force-Iraq
from fighting the counterinsurgency to building the Iraqi Security
Force capacity to conduct independent operations will not affect
institutional training.
There are two techniques employed to ensure training requirements
do not impact on combat operations. For collective training, units are
employed on a cyclic basis, for instance: 9 days training, 18 days
combat, 6 days vacation. In regards to individual training, units are
provided the quotas for schools and can manage attendance per their own
priorities. Overall priorities are established by MNC-I in order to get
the critical warfighting assets trained first, and courses are shorter
(3-4 weeks) in order to reduce the impact on operations. Generally, we
do not pull all leaders out of a unit for training, but rather stagger
attendance to reduce any impact on operations.
A positive effect of the shift of MNF-I policy is to allow for a
qualitative increase in the capability of the training institutions.
Some schools, such as the skills training wing of the Iraqi Training
Battalion, have been affected by the absence of critical training
equipment. The shift has established a priority of fill at this
training facility, providing weapons and vehicles to increase the
quality and quantity of training. The shift from a 4-week infantry
course to a 7-week course is producing soldiers with better skills,
enhanced leadership, and stronger determination.
NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT
4. Senator Roberts. Ambassador Schlicher, how are other Sunni
governments in the region responding to Sunday's elections? Are they
giving any indication of support to Iraqi Sunnis claiming that the
elections were not valid? What steps are being taken to ensure Sunni
participation as those elected on Sunday prepare to form a new
government and draft a new constitution?
Ambassador Schlicher. January 30 marked a historic day for millions
of Iraqis who voted in their first democratic election in generations.
Despite ongoing violence, threats, and intimidation, over half of all
eligible Iraqi voters demonstrated resolve and a commitment towards
democracy. The international community, including many Islamic, Arab,
and regional governments, responded favorably and welcomed the
elections as a positive step in Iraq's political transition. The
governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Indonesia, Pakistan, and
others cited the January 30 elections as an important step toward Iraqi
national reconciliation, development, stability, and independence.
Although the composition of the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG)
has not yet been determined, individuals who are cited as likely to
hold influential positions in the new government have made gestures to
be inclusive and welcoming of all Iraqis, including Sunnis. Iraqi
leaders have made clear that the political process should be as
inclusive as possible, including the drafting of a permanent
constitution and the formation of the transitional government.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
IRAQI COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
5. Senator Sessions. Secretary Wolfowitz, it appears from all
testimony thus far that security remains the top priority for the U.S.
presence in Iraq. However, there appears to be a lack of infrastructure
facilitating communication among Iraqi national, regional, local, and
U.S. authorities and, perhaps most importantly, individual Iraqi
citizens. It would seem that a communications network would be central
to an improved security situation. Would a more robust communications
infrastructure in Iraq improve the intelligence gathering process and
allow for more rapid data collection and analysis of changing security
threats, coordination, and deployment of security assets to address
unfolding threats and more focused planning to reduce future threats to
security?
Secretary Wolfowitz. A more robust communications infrastructure in
Iraq would most assuredly improve the intelligence-gathering process.
Iraq currently does not have a fully deployed communications
infrastructure, as measured by today's standards. Without a doubt,
major gaps in network coverage and services impede the ability to
rapidly collect and analyze intelligence data. In addition, such gaps
reduce the sources and restrict the means by which intelligence may be
gathered. Reducing future threats to security requires a multi-pronged
approach, with communications at the center of the strategy.
Communications are the lifeblood of modern society, and more robust
networks and information technologies will increase stability by
enhancing the improvement of every other economic and political sector,
across the board
The current communications infrastructure in Iraq includes
telephone service provided by the Iraqi Telecommunications and Postal
Corporation (ITPC). ITPC's service, unfortunately, is confined to parts
of Baghdad and other major cities. As of the beginning of this year,
there were roughly 1 million active landline telephone subscribers in
Iraq, a number that represents only a small fraction of the country's
population. Cellular companies have begun to provide mobile telephone
service in many areas of the country. However, relatively high-priced
satellite phone service is the only communications option available for
sizable parts of Iraq that have no telephone or cell phone service.
Involvement of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq brought numerous
changes to network infrastructure that were necessary to support
operations. Rapidly deployable wireless systems were in heavy use in
the early phases of our involvement there, including various satellite
earth station and microwave systems. Additional wireless systems are
planned for larger-scale deployment to provide high-capacity services
to various government organizations, commercial enterprises, and other
prospective users in the center of Baghdad.
Various wireline communications technologies are also in place in
Iraq, including fiber optic and legacy copper loop systems. In
addition, several projects are now under way to restore, reconstruct
and upgrade Iraq's landline communications infrastructure.
Communications infrastructure of this nature needs to be in place and
operational to run essential telephone service and the Internet.
Government and private enterprise sectors run more efficiently when
broadband data services are available at competitive prices.
6. Senator Sessions. Secretary Wolfowitz, what role does the DOD
envision a robust communications network playing in the overall
security strategy and what steps is it taking to ensure that the
communications infrastructure is funded sufficiently to make it viable
to support the security environment in Iraq?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The role of information and communications
technologies (ICTs) in rebuilding Iraq cannot be overemphasized. It
would be a grave mistake to minimize the communications sector as
simply one of many infrastructure sectors requiring attention during
stabilization and reconstruction operations. For certain,
communications infrastructure requires perhaps the most immediate and
thorough attention, because ICTs underwrite and facilitate every aspect
of security and reconstruction. Communications infrastructure enables
success in most fields of operations, such as policing, governance,
border control, oil and gas production, medicine, education, shipping,
and construction.
Data is the lifeblood of any modern society, and communications
infrastructure is the circulatory system that brings nourishment to
make that society grow and function. Moreover, the knowledge gained
through access to data can help moderate and broaden political and
social discourse and limit extremism, leading to development of a more
stable and pluralistic society. While having modem communications and
information technologies does not by itself guarantee pluralism, it is
a prerequisite to the growth of a vibrant civil society that will value
pluralism and allow it to unfold.
Though much remains to be done, much is being accomplished in the
civilian telecommunications sector. The impact of this effort is
affecting the lives of every Iraqi citizen and, if allowed to flourish,
will continue to affect them for generations to come. Iraqis are being
empowered through the use of information and communications
technologies and are gaining confidence in their government and their
future.
The DOD is well aware of the communications revolution that has
swept the globe over the past decade and a half. Indeed, the rapid
advances in the creation and movement of knowledge are perhaps the
cornerstone of the Department's 21st century transformation. Moreover,
the ongoing transformation in the DOD is a reflection of the advances
in computing power, communications capacity and the resulting creation
of knowledge in civil society. Therefore, the Department is committed
to increasing Iraq's civilian capacity, both in terms of communications
networks and information management. Iraq's future lies within a global
society that recognizes the power that information technologies can
bring to institutions and individuals.
Among those institutions are the national and local government and
security agencies that Iraqis have established and are continuing to
build. As the DOD fulfills the potential of its network-centric vision
for itself, it will continue to support the power of networks and
information management, enabling the Iraqi people to become full
members of the international community and the global marketplace.
The DOD, in conjunction with other U.S. Government agencies, are
providing information and communications technologies to enhance public
safety, emergency services, as well as support to various Iraqi
ministries and other organs of government. Lastly, the Department is
also engaged in supporting the use of modern fiber optic technologies
in various applications in Iraq. All these efforts will enhance efforts
to reconstruct the country and have well along the path to modernity
with a 21st century infrastructure.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
DEALINGS WITH THE NEW TRANSITIONAL IRAQ GOVERNMENT
7. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and Ambassador Schlicher,
once the new ITG is assembled, it will be the first democratically-
elected Iraqi Government since U.S. forces have occupied Iraqi
territory. Will the United States deal differently with the ITG than it
did with the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) and the Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC) and, if so, will that have any impact on the manner in
which decisions are made with respect to the training and equipping of
the Iraqi security forces?
Secretary Wolfowitz. There will not be a significant difference in
how we deal with the ITG from how we dealt with the IIG. Although the
ITG stems from Iraq's first genuine election in nearly 50 years, the
IIG was already internationally recognized as the sovereign authority
in Iraq since June 28 of last year. The United States will continue to
deal with the ITG primarily through Embassy Baghdad and offer advisors
to the Iraqi ministries. But all decisions on Iraqi governance will
remain the province of the Iraqis themselves. Similarly, decisions
regarding the training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces will
continue to be made by the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) in
partnership with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
Ambassador Schlicher. Iraq has had a sovereign, independent
government since the end of the occupation and dissolution of the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on June 28, 2004. The IIG, formed
on that day, and the ITG, to be formed as a result of the January 30
elections, exercise full sovereign authority over Iraq.
We believe, however, that the elections on January 30 mark a
dramatic milestone in the development of a secure, prosperous,
democratic Iraq. Under the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) the
ITG will assume greater authorities than were exercised by the IIG,
which was designed to serve in a caretaker capacity until the lTG's
formation. These responsibilities include, most significantly, the
drafting of a new constitution for Iraq.
On June 28, 2004, the role of the Coalition in Iraq shifted from
governing (through the CPA) to partnership with the sovereign Iraqi
Government. We are committed to assisting the Iraqis in this
transitional period, both by assisting them in the political process
set out in the TAL and in contributing to the maintenance of security
and stability in Iraq. Responsibility for the security of Iraq and for
the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces lies with the Iraqi
Government: we will continue to provide the needed security support to
Iraq until it is ready to assume this burden.
In practice, the IIG has worked very closely with the United States
since June 2004, particularly in respect to security matters (including
the training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces). Iraq's
political leaders have emphasized the importance of continued MNF-I
assistance, although we expect that the ITG will take on increasing
responsibility for the internal and external security of Iraq as more
and more capable Iraqi security forces become available. We expect to
cooperate with the forthcoming elected government under the same
principles of partnership and consultation as we did with the IIG.
STATUS OF THE U.S.-LED MULTINATIONAL FORCE
8. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and Ambassador Schlicher,
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 1546 of June 8, 2004
provided that the mandate of the U.S.-led MNF-I shall be reviewed at
the request of the Government of Iraq in June 2005 and that the mandate
shall expire upon the completion of the political process leading to a
constitutionally-elected Iraqi Government by December 31, 2005.
As I noted in my opening statement, I believe we should discuss
with the new government what our exit strategy should be and determine
if the new government will expressly invite the international community
to maintain military forces in Iraq, thus clearly stating to the world
that our presence in Iraq is at the invitation of the democratically-
elected government and increases the likelihood that Muslim nations
will send military forces as well. What are your thoughts about such
discussions with the new Iraqi Government after it is formed in the
next few months?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Iraqi leaders are taking tremendous risks as
they attempt to construct a new political system and reconstruct their
nation. For the United States to initiate discussions of how to exit
Iraq before we have completed our mission there would undermine
confidence in our commitment to defeating the terrorists in Iraq.
Doubts about American resolve would only lead to increased attacks
against U.S. forces in Iraq, and possibly to more attacks against
Americans throughout the world. I think it is far more important,
therefore, to focus on the objectives we are trying to achieve rather
than on setting an arbitrary deadline by which to withdraw.
The MNF-I already operates in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi
Government as expressed in the Iraqi letter attached to U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1546. No additional invitation from the ITG is
required, and whether the ITG will wish to issue one is a political
decision it will have to make once it assumes office.
Finally, it is unclear whether a democratically-elected ITG would
welcome troops from non-democratic Muslim nations inside its borders.
Although we would welcome such troop contributions, Muslim nations
already have an existing invitation to contribute forces under U.N.
resolutions, but to date have declined to do so.
Ambassador Schlicher. The U.S. Government should not do anything
that might lead the people of Iraq to question our commitment to the
success of their fledgling democracy. Many leading Iraqis who may play
roles in the new government have already asked us to stay, and we have
said very clearly that American forces will stay as long as they are
needed, but not 1 minute longer. Raising the discussion of an exit
strategy prematurely could undercut this message.
The IIG has actively sought international military assistance, to
be integrated into the MNF-I or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Training Mission in Iraq. It is likely that the ITG will
continue to make such invitations, which we agree are politically
helpful. However, it is not likely that the ITG will invite military
forces from other nations to operate in Iraq independently of MNF-I or
NATO coordination. Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, the ITG
has the authority to request a review of the MNF mandate at any time.
However, we believe it would unhelpfully distract from the ITG's
pressing security, reconstruction and constitutional development
priorities if this authority were exercised early in the ITG's tenure.
Rather, as you note, in June 2005 the ITG will have the opportunity to
review MNF-I's mandate, and make explicit its desire for MNF-I's
continued assistance, or to request its departure. The President has
stated that U.S. forces will not remain in Iraq if the Iraqi Government
no longer desires their assistance.
VETO POWER OF KURDS AND SUNNIS
9. Senator Levin. Ambassador Schlicher, the TAL provides that two-
thirds of the voters in any three Iraqi provinces can veto the
constitution. That would mean that the Kurds, the Sunnis and, of
course, the Shiites, could defeat the constitution if they were united
in opposition to it. Will the TAL be the controlling law for the
referendum on the constitution that is to be drafted under the new
Transitional National Assembly (TNA), or does the TNA have the power to
amend the TAL or to establish a new legal regime for the constitutional
referendum?
Ambassador Schlicher. The TAL is the current controlling law of
Iraq on elections-related matters. You are correct that the TAL
includes a provision allowing a two thirds majority of voters in three
provinces to veto the draft constitution. The U.S. supports the TAL, as
drafted and approved by Iraqis, in its entirety. We believe it
represents a useful compromise between all Iraqi groups on the issues
with which the Iraqis must grapple as they draft Iraq's permanent
constitution.
As for the legal questions you raised, we rely on Iraqi legal and
judicial professionals to interpret the provisions of the TAL. That
said, we note that Article 3(A) of the TAL reads that no amendment may
be adopted except by a three-fourths majority of the members of the TNA
and the unanimous approval of the Presidency Council. That level of
support would be difficult to achieve without broad-based consensus
among all Iraqis.
U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN IRAQ
10. Senator Levin. General Myers, Marine leaders have briefed us
that they are planning to reduce Marine troop levels in Iraq from
31,000 to 20,000 in March. They said they will turn over the current
responsibilities of those marines who depart to the Army. Do you
approve of the Marine troop reductions?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
11. Senator Levin. General Myers, will Army troop levels in Iraq be
increased to cover the responsibilities of the departing marines?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Levin. General Myers, if not, why do you believe that
reduction will be possible in March? What tasks will no longer be
undertaken because of a lower overall troop level?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Levin. General Myers, what decision criteria will you
consider in determining possible troop reductions in the future?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
TRAINING OF IRAQI FORCES
14. Senator Levin. General Myers, at various times over the last
year and a half U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has reported different
numbers of Iraqi security forces as being on hand and trained.
Consequently, it is extremely difficult for Members of Congress and the
American people to fully understand the true capability of the Iraqi
security forces, and to understand how that capability will
realistically change over time in the future. Has CENTCOM developed a
readiness reporting system for Iraqi forces that is at least in some
respects analogous to that used by U.S. forces?
General Myers. CENTCOM, in coordination with Multi-National Force-
Iraq, is developing a process for assessing capability of the Iraqi
security force. Measuring capability within the Ministry of Interior
force is challenging due to the vast number of local police stations
and border enforcement guard posts throughout Iraq. We expect the first
iteration of readiness reporting using this new process will be
completed at the end of April 2005.
15. Senator Levin. General Myers, how do you measure the capability
of Iraqi units, as opposed to simply determining the numbers of
individuals recruited and to some degree individually trained?
General Myers. The new process for measuring Iraqi security force
capability looks at six areas of readiness. They are: personnel,
command and control, training, sustainment, equipping, and leadership.
Using these measurements, units are assessed on their ability to
execute counterinsurgency operations and are given a readiness rating
of level 1 through 4. A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning,
executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations. A
Level 4 unit is forming and/or is incapable of conducting
counterinsurgency operations. Iraqi commanders and Coalition forces
will jointly report these assessments with parallel reporting up the
chain to Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters/
Iraqi Army Headquarters. We expect the first iteration of readiness
reporting using this new process will be completed at the end of April
2005.
16. Senator Levin. General Myers, what is your current assessment
of the capability of Iraqi security forces?
General Myers. The Iraqi Security Force (ISF) is developing well in
the nine southern and three Kurdish provinces; unevenly in the six
Sunni provinces ranging from ineffective in the Al Anbar Province to
strong in some other Sunni areas. ISF successfully secured polling
sites for democratic elections on 31 January. A number of police gave
their lives while moving to stop suicide bombers. Unauthorized absences
within the Ministry of Defense have significantly decreased and are no
longer impacting operations. Regular police and border forces continue
to struggle in high-threat areas except where strong leadership and
close links to coalition forces are present. ISF is in the fight.
17. Senator Levin. General Myers, approximately how many of the
stated total of 130,000 Iraqi security forces in all types of units
(police, army, etc.) are fully trained, equipped, and ready to take on
the insurgency?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
18. Senator Levin. General Myers, in a December 6, 2004 interview,
LTG Petraeus was questioned about problems in training the Iraqi
security forces and military. According to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), when pressed whether the problem with the
security forces was low morale, infiltration, cowardice, leadership, or
intimidation, Petraeus replied, ``It's probably all of the above.'' How
would you answer that question? Do you agree with LTG Petraeus?
General Myers. I agree with Lieutenant General Petraeus that there
are elements of these problems present. However, these issues will not
prevent the Iraqi security force (ISF) from continuing to mature and
develop the capability to defend Iraq. The ISF, as evidenced by the
election, is standing up, fighting and dying for their country. The
real question that we should address is how fast ISF will mature over
the year and when will it be strong enough to fight the insurgency and
win? Our goal is to help this happen as soon as possible.
MENTORS OR ADVISORS
19. Senator Levin. General Myers, the Joint Staff has briefed us
that CENTCOM was directed to apply fewer troops to the operational
mission and more to the training mission. I understand that you are
considering assigning several thousand U.S. mentors or advisors to
Iraqi security forces units. How many U.S. mentors or advisors will be
assigned to this mission, and at what level will they be integrated
into Iraqi units?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Levin. General Myers, how long will it take to get
American mentors or advisors into all Iraqi units at that level of
integration?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
21. Senator Levin. General Myers, will U.S. troop levels be
increased for that purpose, or will you redirect those troops from
current operational missions as we were briefed?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
22. Senator Levin. General Myers, if the latter, what effect will
that have on current operations against the insurgents? What missions
will no longer be undertaken?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Levin. General Myers, the Iraqi police have appeared to
be more problematical than other Iraqi security forces, both dying and
deserting at higher levels. Does CENTCOM have the resources to provide
adequate mentors or advisors to Iraqi police to accomplish the same
objectives as those who will be assigned to Iraqi military units?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
24. Senator Levin. General Myers, what is being done to address the
specific problems of the Iraqi police forces?
General Myers. Iraqi police recruits undergo an 8-week academy
training course taught at the Jordan International Police Training
Center or in one of the seven police academies in Iraq. Training
highlights include basic police skills, basic criminal investigation,
kidnapping investigation and marksmanship. The instruction has been
modified to reflect the security environment focusing more on survival
skills and combat skills. The academies use a modular-based curriculum
with 75 percent instruction covering practical exercise work and the
remaining 25 percent devoted to classroom theory. Cadets spend the
majority of their time conducting practical exercises and hands-on
training. Greater emphasis is now placed on critical tactical
operations such as checkpoint operations, building searches and
counter-ambush operations. Instead of marksmanship training that
focused primarily on pistols, firing of the AK-47 and other heavier
weapons is being added. All of these instructional areas are reinforced
with hands-on field exercises with the greatest possible realism.
Police recruits who were former police officers under the previous
regime are trained under the 3-week Transition and Integration Program.
This program, taught by Iraqis, reinforces police professionalism,
standards and accountability. In addition, there are several advanced
and specialized training courses for the Iraqi Police Service to combat
the insurgency. Examples of these include post-blast investigations
taught by Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms officials, counterterrorism
investigations taught by the FBI and explosive hazardous awareness
training taught by the U.S. military.
IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD
25. Senator Levin. General Myers, on January 6, Iraqi Army Day, the
IIG announced that the National Guard would become a part of the Iraqi
Army. What does this mean in practical terms? Is there a difference in
intended uses for units of the Iraqi Army which have not agreed to be
deployed throughout Iraq; for what is known as the Iraqi Intervention
Force, which is part of the Iraqi Army; and now the National Guard,
which is also part of the Iraqi Army?
General Myers. In practical terms, there are implications to this
announcement. First, the Ministry of Defense is incorporating National
Guard battalions into Iraqi Regular Army (RA) divisions and brigades.
These battalions will help fill out the RA brigades and divisions. Some
of the soldiers in the National Guard battalions will not agree to be
deployed around the country. Those soldiers will be given opportunities
to join the local police, border forces, or other security forces that
maintain a regional focus. Second, Multi-National Force-Iraq will
evaluate the level of maturity and combat experience of these National
Guard battalions, determine if additional training is necessary and
incorporate them in future RA basic training courses.
26. Senator Levin. General Myers, is there a distinction between
Active and Reserve components in the new Iraqi Army now that the
National Guard is a part?
General Myers. No, the goal is to field a national army capable of
deploying throughout Iraq. With the help of Multi-National Force-Iraq,
the Iraqi government will formulate a strategy to regionally base the
Iraqi Regular Army divisions throughout Iraq for counterinsurgency
operations.
27. Senator Levin. General Myers, is the Iraqi National Guard (ING)
at all analogous to our own National Guard?
General Myers. Yes, when first developed, the mission of the ING
was to provide security for the region in which members were recruited
much like our own National Guard provides security in their states
during emergencies. The key difference is that the ING was controlled
by coalition forces and the Iraqi government, not by provincial or
regional governments. As the ING becomes part of the RA the analogy to
our National Guard will no longer pertain.
28. Senator Levin. General Myers, the Iraqi Army members were
receiving 8 weeks of basic training, while National Guard members were
only receiving 3 weeks. Will members of the National Guard be returned
to the training base for additional training?
General Myers. Yes, Multi-National Force-Iraq will evaluate the
level of maturity and combat experience of these ING battalions,
determine if additional training is necessary, and incorporate them in
future Iraqi Regular Army basic training courses.
EQUIPPING IRAQI FORCES
29. Senator Levin. General Myers, we are spending billions of
dollars to equip our troops with the latest in body armor, truck armor,
reactive armor for Strykers, Bradleys, and the venerable M-113 armored
personnel carrier, and other high-technology items such as night vision
devices. Recently there was a news clip of a heavily armed and armored
American unit accompanied by Iraqi soldiers in open pickup trucks. The
convoy was attacked and four of those Iraqi soldiers were killed and
several others wounded. One has to wonder what those Iraqi soldiers
thought about accompanying American soldiers in their heavily protected
vehicles while they were in an open pickup truck. How important is
modern equipment to the effort to build reliable Iraqi forces?
General Myers. Equipping the Iraqi security force (ISF) with the
right tools to fight the insurgency is extremely important. Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq, in coordination with the
Iraqi government, developed the requirements to equip Ministry of
Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces. Iraqi special
operations forces are fielded with modern, high-tech equipment
comparable to our forces. Conventional MOD and MOI forces receive new
uniforms, body armor, weapons and ammunition that sufficiently
increases their survivability and enhances their capability to conduct
counterinsurgency operations. In addition, as part of the NATO mission,
the NATO Training and Equipment Coordination Group is receiving
donations of modern equipment from several countries for the ISF.
30. Senator Levin. General Myers, are you satisfied with the scope
and speed of efforts to equip Iraqi forces? Is there more that we could
and should be doing?
General Myers. The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
(MNSTC-I) has taken great steps to accelerate equipment flow to the
Iraqi security force (ISF) and it is moving in substantial numbers.
Equipment flow continues to improve, but in theater distribution is
still a challenge. Since transfer of sovereignty, ISF has received over
406,000 uniforms; 129,000 sets of body armor; 247,000 weapons; and
266,600,000 rounds of ammunition.
31. Senator Levin. General Myers, do you believe that Iraqi forces
should have at least the same level of protective equipment as do U.S.
forces in Iraq?
General Myers. Equipping the Iraqi security force with the right
tools to fight the insurgency is important. Iraqi Special Operations
Forces are fielded with modern, high-tech equipment comparable to our
forces. Conventional Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior
forces receive new uniforms, body armor, weapons, and ammunition that
increases their survivability and enhances their capability to conduct
counterinsurgency operations.
32. Senator Levin. General Myers, are there plans to transfer
American armored vehicles and other equipment to Iraqi forces once our
forces begin withdrawing?
General Myers. Yes, the Department of Defense is planning to
transfer U.S. equipment to the Iraqi security force (ISF). We have
already asked CENTCOM to identify specific equipment, not required by
our forces, which can be utilized by the ISF. Initial lists of
equipment are expected by July.
33. Senator Levin. General Myers, I understand that there may be
several thousand armored personnel carriers here in the U.S. that are
excess to the Army or National Guard's needs. Would it make sense to
provide those to the Iraqi Army on an expedited basis?
General Myers. I do not believe giving excess U.S. armored
personnel carriers to the Iraqi Army is a viable option at this time.
We looked at a related issue several months ago as part of an Army
effort to up-armor armored personnel carriers, and found that excess
vehicles--mostly 1970s vintage--were in need of extensive repair and
were becoming increasingly difficult to support logistically. However,
as the dual-hatted NATO Training Mission-Iraq commander, General
Petraeus is identifying requirements and procuring equipment, including
armored wheeled vehicles, through the NATO Training and Equipment
Coordination Group. In addition, Hungary recently donated 77 T-72 tanks
to NATO for use by the Iraqi Army. These tanks are undergoing
maintenance and we are working with NATO to effect the transfer late
this summer.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
34. Senator Levin. General Myers, there continue to be media
reports about American forces conducting counter-insurgency sweeps and
raids by entering Iraqi homes, destroying Iraqi property, terrifying
Iraqi families, and detaining Iraqis who later are determined to be
innocent of any involvement in the insurgency. Several polls of Iraqi
public opinion indicate that the vast majority of Iraqis now oppose the
U.S. presence and view the Americans as purely an occupying force. Have
we reached the point that such offensive operations are actually
becoming counter-productive and that we are now making more enemies of
ordinary Iraqis and increasing support for the insurgency?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
35. Senator Levin. General Myers, do you believe that the time is
rapidly approaching when we should cease offensive operations by U.S.
forces and should turn over such missions solely to Iraqi forces
accompanied by U.S. mentors or advisors?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
MILITIAS
36. Senator Levin. General Myers, there are reports that American
military and IIG officials are relying heavily on the Kurdish Peshmerga
militia, not only as a source of individual recruits for Iraqi security
forces, but even more so for its established military units, in
countering the Sunni insurgency. For instance, I understand that the
Peshmerga was brought in to help restore order in Mosul after large
numbers of Iraqi police deserted their posts under assault from
insurgents who had escaped the U.S. attack on Fallujah. Is there a
change of policy, either formal or otherwise, with respect to
integrating militias into the Iraqi security forces?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
37. Senator Levin. General Myers, how would you describe that
policy at the current time?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
38. Senator Levin. General Myers, will militias, including the
Peshmerga, be allowed to maintain military units apart from the
official Iraqi security forces?
General Myers. Iraq must have no militias other than those agreed
upon by the Iraqi government that are necessary to maintain peace and
security. They will be strictly controlled, come under government
supervision and not allowed to operate independently. The militia end
state, as reflected in Transitional Administrative Law, Article 27, is:
``An Iraqi State in which there are no armed forces or militias not
under the command and structure of the Iraqi Transitional Government
except as provided by Federal law.'' The Iraqi government has
established within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) a ``Director General
of Iraqi Veterans'' agency. The mission of this office is to
incorporate all militias into the MOD and Ministry of Interior. They
provide civilian training and education, retirement planning and
integration training for those individuals that transition into the
other ministries.
39. Senator Levin. General Myers, do you see a potentially
significant problem in using Peshmerga units to fight the insurgency?
Could this possibly accelerate a potential move toward civil war?
General Myers. The limited use of militias in order to counter
insurgent activity before the election process was in some ways a
positive step. It demonstrated that local people were very interested
in protecting their interests and moving forward in the political
process. The effort to involve all players in the political process
should mitigate the potential for civil strife. We are very mindful of
the fact that the Peshmerga fought next to us as allies in the war and
in some situations provided a stabilizing role in urban areas.
40. Senator Levin. General Myers, do you see problems down the road
with militias?
General Myers. We do not see any issues that cannot be resolved. As
the new Iraqi Transitional Government emerges we will see changes that
reflect Iraqi initiatives to do different things in different ways,
which may include how they address and use militias. The Iraqi
government understands that militias must be strictly controlled, come
under government supervision and not be allowed to operate
independently.
41. Senator Levin. General Myers, according to The Wall Street
Journal the Iraqis formed a number of militias to guard the polls for
the recent election. One of them, called the Defenders of Baghdad
Brigade, was supplied with rifles, ammunition and body armor by U.S.
officials. A second militia from the town of Al Amarah, a Shiite city
in southern Iraq, set up in early January in Baghdad's old Defense
Ministry. The Journal quotes LTC Jim Bullion as saying, ``These groups
just started appearing like mushrooms. In the last month they have been
appearing so quickly we can barely keep track of them. It's really
heartening to see the Iraqis seizing the initiative.'' According to the
Journal, military officials say they aren't sure what will happen to
these groups after the elections.
Is this true that U.S. officials armed and equipped militias,
including the Defenders of Baghdad Brigade, prior to the elections?
General Myers. Yes, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-
Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) armed and equipped
``the Defenders of Baghdad Brigade. Prior to the January elections,
there were two brigades formed. They have since been incorporated into
the Regular Iraqi Army as 5th Brigade, 6th Division (2d BDE, Defenders
of Baghdad) and 1st Brigade, 7th Division (1st BDE, Defenders of
Baghdad). The Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD), on its own initiative,
has recruited approximately 5,600 militia soldiers and formed them into
units. MNSTC-I tracks and monitors these units, providing some
equipment and aligning them with US forces for employment. The MOD will
integrate these units into the Iraqi Army structure and will coordinate
with Multi-National Force-Iraq to align them with coalition forces for
training and partnership. One of the units created by the MOD was the
Defenders of Baghdad Brigade. This brigade has three battalions, two
located in Eastern Baghdad, near Sadr City and the third training at
Muthana Airfield, in Baghdad. The total manning is about 1,800, all
from the Baghdad area. These three battalions were under the tactical
control of the 1CD, which used them effectively to provide polling
station security on election day. This brigade was fully equipped by
MNSTC-I and 1CD with weapons, uniforms, and ammunition but the MOD is
ultimately responsible for this unit.
42. Senator Levin. General Myers, if true, why? What will be done
about those militias now?
General Myers. MNF-I support of these units enhances the security
of the Iraqi people. The Ministry of Defense will integrate these units
into the Iraqi Army structure and will coordinate with MNF-I to align
them with coalition forces for training and partnership.
POST-ELECTION SITUATION
43. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, in an
interview with The London Financial Times, Prime Minister Blair said
that the coalition was set to agree to ``timelines'' with the new
government that would indicate the pace at which Iraqi forces could
take control of peaceful parts of the country. Other recent media
reports indicate that senior U.S. administration officials expect the
new Iraqi Government to ask the U.S. for a specific withdrawal
timetable from the entire country. How do you see dealing with the
insurgency in the post-election period? Do you envision coalition
forces stepping back in that regard?
Secretary Wolfowitz. On January 30, the Iraqi people demonstrated
their sympathies lie with democracy and freedom rather than with the
tyranny and intimidation offered by the terrorists. The increase in
national unity created by the elections has led to an increased flow of
intelligence on terrorist activities. Iraqi forces also bring unique
knowledge of Iraq's language and cultures to counterinsurgency
operations, and their role will gradually increase in the future.
Although in some areas coalition forces will step back into more
supporting roles, they will continue to work in partnership with Iraqi
security forces to defeat the terrorists.
General Myers. As conditions warrant, Multi-National Force-Iraq
will progressively transition the counterinsurgency mission to a
capable Iraqi security force and assign coalition forces to supporting
roles with a less visible presence.
44. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, is the
coalition set to agree to ``timelines'' that would govern the pace of
Iraqi forces taking control of peaceful parts of the country?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Iraqi forces will begin to take control of
parts of Iraq as their experience and performance warrant. It would be
unwise to establish artificial ``timelines'' to govern this process as
it would reduce the flexibility the military trainers of Multi-National
Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) need in order to effectively
train the Iraqi security forces. it is important that we continue to
train Iraqis up to required standards rather than in accordance with
arbitrary dates.
General Myers. The transfer of control to Iraqi units is
conditions-based and not timeline-based. The pace of transition will be
driven by the capability of the ISF, the level of insurgent activity
and the ability of the Iraqi government to provide essential services,
infrastructure, and good governance.
45. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, have you
developed metrics or decision criteria for turning over
responsibilities to Iraqi forces? What are they?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The MNF-I, in coordination with the Iraqi
Ministries of Defense and Interior, is developing a system to evaluate
the capacity of Iraqi security forces, under the criteria laid out by
General Myers in his response.
General Myers. MNF-I, in coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense and the Ministry of Interior, are developing a system to
evaluate and assess the capacity of the Iraqi security force (ISF).
MNF-I understands the importance of developing these capabilities
metrics as the next step in security force reporting. Once approved and
implemented, this will assist MNF-I's decision to progressively
transition the counterinsurgency mission to capable ISF and assign
coalition forces to supporting role with a less visible presence.
46. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, do you
expect the new government to seek a definitive withdrawal timetable?
Secretary Wolfowitz. To my knowledge, no Iraqi expected to assume a
prominent leadership role in the ITG favors such a timetable. Instead,
Iraqi leaders have made it quite clear that they want U.S. and
coalition forces to remain in Iraq until they are capable of defeating
the terrorists themselves. These leaders have made it clear that they
are more focused on how coalition forces can help them to defeat the
terrorists than how soon they can get the coalition forces out of Iraq.
General Myers. In our regular discussions with the Iraqi Interim
Government, members from all the major political parties in Iraq
acknowledge the critical role of the MNF-I in helping to maintain
security and stability in Iraq, given the tenuous security situation in
parts of the country. In these discussions about the size and role of
the MNF-I and the transition to Iraqi control, it is clear that
withdrawals are predicated on conditions, not on a calendar-based
timeline.
47. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, if asked,
how would you construct such a timetable?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Given that this has not yet been proposed by
an Iraqi official, I will not speculate on the specifics of such a
scenario. We are focused on defeating the terrorists, not on how soon
we can withdraw from Iraq. Discussion of a premature withdrawal based
on artificial deadlines only undermines our credibility with our
partners in the ITG, and impedes our ability to successfully complete
the mission in Iraq.
General Myers. The mission and role of the MNF-I is tied to the
mandate from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 and the invitation
of the Iraqi government. The mandate from the resolution extends to the
completion of the political process described in Iraq's Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL), which is the blueprint for Iraq's democratic
development as they form a permanent government. Therefore, the
continued role of the MNF-I is not dependent on an artificially
constructed timetable, but is tied to the progress of Iraq's political
development. Currently, the TAL calls for a constitutional referendum
in October 2005, followed by elections based on that constitution by
the end of December 2005. However, there are extensions built in the
TAL's timeline in the event the Iraqis require more time.
48. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, do you
agree with reported Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that
the elections will be followed by more violence, including an increased
likelihood of clashes between Shiites and Sunnis, possibly even leading
to civil war?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The Baathist and extremist jihadists
responsible for the overwhelming proportion of attacks in Iraq
recognize that the Iraqi people decisively rejected their extremist
ideologies on January 30. Because these terrorists can never hope to
win the political debate in a free Iraq, they continue to try to
intimidate the Iraqi people through acts of mass violence.
However, I disagree with the assessment that civil war is somehow
more likely in the wake of the successful elections. Since the
election, prominent Shia and Kurdish leaders have stressed the
importance of reaching out to Iraqis of all sects and strata in the
formation of a new government and drafting of a new constitution.
Similarly, Sunni leaders who boycotted the election are stating that
they now want to be a part of the political process in Iraq, indicating
that they are opting for accommodation with their compatriots rather
than civil war.
General Myers. Prior to the elections, the Defense Intelligence
Agency assessed that an increased overall level of violence and
possible increased tensions along ethnic lines would mark the post-
election security environment. However, post-election levels of
violence and ethnic tensions remain below what was anticipated and the
post-election security situation more closely resembles the period
preceding the elections. In fact, the success of the Iraqi elections
has clearly shown the will of the large majority of the Iraqi people to
seek a government built on votes and the rule of law, instead of rule
by fear that the insurgents offer. Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis are engaged
in political discussions as the parties selected in their recent
elections attempt to form a government in accordance with the
Transitional Administrative Law.
49. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, according
to Britain's Channel 4 News, Iraqi Interim Foreign Minister Falah al-
Naqib said, ``I think we will not need the multinational, foreign
forces, in this country within 18 months. I think we will be able to
depend on ourselves.'' Do you believe that is a prevalent view among
Iraqi interim government officials?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Interior Minister al-Naqib's statement
suggests that Iraqi Government officials are optimistic about the
progress made to date by Iraqi security forces, and about their
continued progress in the coming months and years. Although I believe
most Iraqi officials share this optimism, the prevailing view amongst
Iraqi leaders is that multinational forces remain in Iraq until the
mission is accomplished rather than withdraw at some arbitrarily
established date.
General Myers. Interior Minister Naqib is no doubt referring to the
great progress in training the Iraqi security force (ISF) over the last
year, both police forces in the Ministry of Interior under his
jurisdiction, and also the Armed Forces in the Ministry of Defense. I
believe his statement suggests Iraqi government officials are
optimistic about the progress of the ISF as well as their continued
success in the coming months and years. I believe the prevailing view
among Iraqi leaders is that coalition forces remain in Iraq until the
ISF is capable of maintaining domestic order and denying safe haven to
terrorists. Our experience is that we cannot rush to a simple timeline
when determining when the Iraqis will be able to take full
responsibility for securing their own country.
50. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, do you
agree with that assessment?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is not possible to make a precise
prediction about when the Iraqi security forces will be able to take
over all security operations in Iraq. As I have stated previously, I
see no purpose in speculating on when coalition forces will be able to
withdraw from Iraq. We are concentrating all our efforts on winning in
Iraq, not on planning our withdrawal.
General Myers. While we will certainly see progress over the next
18 months, it is premature to say that the Iraqis will be completely
ready in that timeframe to undertake the full range of tasks required
for the internal and external security of their country. In our
discussions with Minister Naqib and other Iraqi officials, they have
all recognized the importance of training to a credible standard, and
not just a certain number of Iraqi troops in uniform or a date on the
calendar.
CORRUPTION
51. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, media reports claim that
Iraqi Government officials, including Defense Minister Hazem Shaalan,
have moved $300 million in Iraqi funds to Lebanon. What do you know
about the truth of this claim?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I understand that some Iraqi politicians have
already called for an investigation into Hazem Shaalan's transactions
while Minister of Defense. However, at this time, I do not have enough
information to make a definitive statement regarding Minister Shaalan's
activities.
52. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, what is your assessment as
to the degree of corruption in the IIG and how concerned are you about
it?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Although there is no way to determine the
degree of corruption in the Iraqi Interim Government, it clearly has
the potential to become a serious problem. For more than 30 years
promotions in the Iraqi civil service were not based upon merit, but
rather were a reward for loyalty to Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party.
As a result, a culture of corruption permeates the Iraqi bureaucracy,
and threatens to become a drain on our reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
53. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, what steps is the U.S.
Government taking in this regard?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Before transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi
Interim Government, the Coalition Provisional Authority established
Inspectors General in each of the Iraqi ministries. Current anti-
corruption efforts fall under the purview of USAID, which has several
programs designed to build the human resources capacity within Iraqi
ministries.
TRAINING MISSION
54. Senator Levin. General Myers, I have read of U.S. officials
describing our training objective as providing the Iraqi security
forces with the ability to take on a greater portion, or a larger share
of the security responsibility. If that is true, then presumably we
would still be required to keep our military forces in Iraq after the
training is complete.
Is our objective to have the Iraqi security forces develop the
capability and the responsibility to provide entirely for their own
internal and external security, without relying on U.S. military
forces, or are they only going to shoulder a portion of their security
responsibilities?
General Myers. Yes, ultimately as a sovereign nation Iraq is
responsible for its internal and external security by maintaining
domestic order, denying safe haven to terrorists and maintaining peace
with its neighbors. As ISF capabilities develop and its leadership
matures, Multi-National Force-Iraq will progressively transition the
counterinsurgency mission to ISF and assign coalition forces to
supporting roles with a less visible presence.
55. Senator Levin. General Myers, if we continue the train and
equip mission at the current rate, how long do you expect it would take
to complete that mission to the point where Iraqi security forces can
provide for their own security without U.S. military assistance? Is it
possible that it could take several years, or longer? What is the
longest you can currently foresee that training mission lasting?
General Myers. At this time, I cannot predict how long our training
mission will last. However, in 2005 ISF will take the lead throughout
the majority of the country in fighting the counterinsurgency. The pace
of transition and the completion of our training mission will be driven
by ISF capability, the level of insurgent activity and the ability of
the Iraqi government to provide essential services, infrastructure, and
good governance. ISF is gaining valuable combat experience and
continues to make progress toward taking the lead in the
counterinsurgency fight.
PERMANENT U.S. PRESENCE IN IRAQ
56. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and Ambassador Schlicher,
there has been some public confusion about our long-term plans for the
U.S. military presence in Iraq. For example, there has been public
concern about the U.S. building 14 ``permanent'' bases in Iraq. Can you
clarify whether we are building permanent U.S. bases in Iraq, or
whether our plan is to bring our military forces out of Iraq when we
complete the training mission. In other words, are we planning to keep
our military in Iraq permanently, or to withdraw them as soon as our
mission is complete?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We are not building permanent bases analogous
to those in Germany or Korea after World War II, though we are
currently making improvements to existing bases that will improve the
security and quality of life for our brave troops now serving in Iraq.
As the President has stated on numerous occasions, our forces will not
stay in Iraq longer than is necessary to complete the mission of
defeating the terrorists.
Ambassador Schlicher. We are planning to withdraw our forces from
Iraq as soon as their mission is complete. Their mission will be
concluded when Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi Government are
capable of assuming full responsibility for the security of Iraq, or
when the Government of Iraq asks them to depart. We are upgrading
facilities in Iraq to support our forces in the performance of their
mission, not to keep them in the country longer than needed. When they
return home, the facilities may be useful to the Iraqi security forces.
INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT
57. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, Stuart Bowen, the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), issued an audit
report earlier this week in which he concluded that the CPA failed to
establish or implement managerial, financial and contractual controls
needed to ensure that funds provided to IIG ministries were properly
used during the period before the transfer of sovereignty on June 30,
2004. The IG's report indicates that CPA was ``burdened by severe
inefficiencies and poor management'' and failed to ``review and compare
financial, budgetary, and operational performance to planned or
expected results,'' leaving the expenditure of nearly $9 billion in
Iraqi funds ``open to fraud, kickbacks, and misappropriation of
funds.''
As a result, the report states, there was ``no assurance that funds
were not provided for ghost employees.'' The report states: ``For
example, CPA officials authorized payments of [Development Fund for
Iraq (DFI)] funds for approximately 74,000 Facilities Protective
Services (FPS) guards' salaries even though the FPS sites and number of
guards were not validated. CPA staff identified at one ministry that,
although 8,206 guards were on the payroll, only 602 guards could be
validated. CPA staff at another ministry validated the payroll at one
FPS site and found that although 1,471 guards were on the payroll, only
642 guards could be validated.''
What is your response to the CPA IG's report? Do you agree that the
CPA should have instituted better managerial, financial and contractual
controls over spending through the Iraqi ministries?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The DOD fully support the important work of
the SIGIR. However, we strongly disagree with many of the findings of
the audit. We concur with Ambassador L. Paul Bremer's response to the
report, which is included in the SIGIR's report. Our response to the
audit is also included in the SIGIR's report. I have provided a copy of
the SIGIR's report along with this response to the committee's
questions.
We agree that the CPA faced managerial, financial, and contract
challenges, given the numerous difficulties inherent in the
establishment of a coalition organization exercising governance
authority, the historic nature of its tasks, and the requirement to
fulfill this vital mission in a combat zone. The CPA acted to address
these challenges. In this light, we disagree strongly with the
conclusion that, because of policy decisions regarding Iraqi management
of the execution of the Iraqi funds, the CPA failed to meet objective
standards for transparent stewardship of DFI funds. The attached SIGIR
report includes our comments which provide additional detail.
[See inserted SIGIR report on page 73 of this hearing.]
58. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you support the IG's
recommendation that we should perform a lessons learned study for the
planning of specific managerial, financial, and contractual controls in
future situations of this nature?
Secretary Wolfowitz. In its report, the SIGIR recommended a lessons
learned study ``addressing not only the planning for specific
managerial, financial, and contractual controls in future situations of
this nature but also the national planning aspects necessary to overall
management of these type of endeavors should they occur in the
future.''
The lessons learned study is currently underway and we support it.
U.S. MILITARY ROLE IN COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN
59. Senator Levin. General Myers, last December our staff was told
about a new interagency plan to deal with the drug problem in
Afghanistan. That plan aimed to increase the capacity of the Afghan
Government to deal with the production and trafficking of drugs in
Afghanistan. However, U.S. military forces would not be required to
seize drugs or drug-related infrastructure unless they came upon them
in the course of their normal counterterrorist duties.
On January 31, 2005, in a letter to Secretary Rice, 31 non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) recommended that coalition forces:
(1) ``focus intelligence collection efforts on identifying
major traffickers;
(2) cease all payments to traffickers; and
(3) assist in the destruction of laboratories and
interdiction of imports of precursor chemicals and exports of
narcotics.''
What percentage or proportion of the Afghan drug profits go to
funding terrorist activities in Afghanistan or elsewhere?
General Myers. We believe that drug revenues may equal 60 percent
of Afghanistan's current gross domestic product, but we cannot say with
any certainty what. percentage is funneled to terrorist or insurgent
groups. We do not have sufficient intelligence collection against
narcotics trafficking to draw clear lines of support to terrorist
groups. Afghanistan's nascent banking system, combined with the
traditional hawala remittance system, make drug trafficking funds
difficult to track. The illegal narcotics industry in Afghanistan is
comparatively fragmented, with numerous organizations and smuggling
networks involved. We do not believe that terrorist elements, including
al Qaeda, remnants of the Taliban and Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin control
narcotics networks or rely exclusively on narcotics revenue to fund
their operations. However, these groups undoubtedly garner some level
of support from narcotics-related activities. We know that some
traffickers provide logistical assistance to extremists and some
extremist groups are raising money by taxing poppy production and
profiting from the processing and sale of narcotics.
60. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, given the
argument that Hamid Karzai has made that the cash from drug proceeds
could be used to benefit warlords and terrorists, do you believe that
the U.S. military should take direct action against the production and
trade of illicit drugs?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The goal of the U.S. Government in Afghanistan
is to help the Afghan government build a capacity to govern themselves,
and to provide for their own security, including to help them to take
action against the production and the trade of illicit drugs in their
country. The U.S. military is assisting in this effort by supporting
DEA, UK, and Afghan law enforcement activities. We believe it important
that the U.S. follow the Afghans' lead and to maintain an Afghan face
on the war against drugs; thus, the U.S. military is not taking direct
action in this area.
General Myers. No, coalition forces should not conduct direct
action against narcotics operations except as consistent with existing
guidance, which incorporates U.S. law with regard to military
involvement in law enforcement operations. Our ultimate objective is to
assist Afghanistan in developing its own capacity to address the drug
problem in the long term, while providing the support necessary to have
an immediate impact. An ill-conceived counternarcotics campaign could
be de-stabilizing to Afghanistan and provide a boost for the recruiting
efforts of our enemies. U.S. forces do have specific guidance on
handling narcotics and drug equipment when they are discovered during
normal military operations, but we believe the right approach is to
continue to support the law enforcement agencies as part of a multi-
faceted approach to the narcotic issue and continue to help the Afghan
government develop the capability to deal with the problem.
61. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, could you describe the
administration position on when and how U.S. forces should destroy
labs, interdict drugs, and pursue major traffickers?
Secretary Wolfowitz. In Afghanistan, U.S. troops are authorized to
conduct military operations against drug trafficking targets when these
targets are encountered in the course of regular counterinsurgency
operations. If our troops come across drugs or drug equipment, they
have been instructed to take action against these targets while doing
everything possible to keep an Afghan face on counterdrug actions. U.S.
forces discovering drugs or drug paraphernalia contact Combined Joint
Task Force-76 for instructions on disposition of the contraband.
Whenever possible, local Afghan officials will be asked to participate
if drugs are to be destroyed. If such officials are not available,
troops are instructed to photograph and report the location of drug
caches to higher U.S. authorities. Disposition of large caches of drugs
are coordinated at the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan level.
62. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, what
payments are being made with DOD funds currently, and if there are any,
would you favor halting them?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We know of no DOD funds that are being
provided to known narcotics traffickers.
General Myers. We know of no DOD funds that are being provided to
known narcotics traffickers.
AFGHAN DRUG ERADICATION EFFORTS
63. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, the U.N. estimated that the
amount of land used for poppy cultivation increased 64 percent from
2003 to 2004, and the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy
stated that there was a 73-percent increase in poppy-cultivated land
from 2003 to 2004.
President Karzai has committed the Afghan military to manually
eradicating about 30,000 hectares of the opium (poppy) crop in 2005,
only about a 15-percent reduction in the crop if the total harvest is
as large as last year's. However, Afghan capabilities are very limited;
the amount of land used for poppy cultivation increased about 73
percent last year and is likely to grow again in 2005; and eradication
must take place before the April harvest, coinciding roughly with the
elections.
All of this implies that the likelihood of any meaningful
eradication this year without foreign assistance is very low. According
to a January 26 Washington Times story, State Department officials
wanted Congress to earmark funds for aerial eradication, but postponed
their proposal because of President Karzai's opposition. The 31 NGOs
who wrote to Secretary Rice on January 31 argue that ``massive
eradication efforts in 2005 could risk destabilizing large areas of the
country.''
What is the DOD position on aerial eradication this year, or in the
future?
Secretary Wolfowitz. President Karzai has stated that aerial
eradication is not an option for this year. Our understanding is that
Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement will
provide support to Afghan ground eradication teams. There are no plans
to have U.S. military forces conduct drug crop eradication.
64. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, will there be any special
effort to augment Afghan hand-eradication capabilities by the United
States or other military forces?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The U.S. Government will work with the Afghan
Government to help it build its own capacity to eradicate poppy in
Afghanistan. The goal is to allow the Afghan Government to
independently keep its level of poppy production below a level that
threatens the Nation's stability and security. Toward this end, the
Department of State has reprogrammed funds originally slated for aerial
eradication to increase the ground eradication program. There are no
plans to have U.S. military forces conduct drug crop eradication.
[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS IN IRAQ
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Dole,
Cornyn, Thune, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka,
Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, professional staff
member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Sandra E.
Luff, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff member; Elaine A. McCusker, professional
staff member; David M. Morriss, counsel; Stanley R. O'Connor,
Jr., professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional
staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member;
Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; and Scott W.
Stucky, general counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member;
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Bridget W.
Higgins, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, minority
counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; and William G.P.
Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill, Nicholas W.
West, and Pendred K. Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Chris Arnold, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mackenzie M.
Eaglen, assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant
to Senator Ensign; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator
Talent; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Meredith Moseley, assistant to Senator Graham; Bob Taylor,
assistant to Senator Thune; David S. Lyles, assistant to
Senator Levin; Sharon L. Waxman, Mieke Y. Eoyang, and Jarret A.
Wright, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans, Barry
Gene (B.G.) Wright, and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd;
Frederick M. Downey, assisant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth
King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and
Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh;
and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The committee meets this morning to
receive testimony on U.S. military strategy and operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. I welcome our distinguished panel of
military witnesses: General Richard Myers, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; General John Abizaid, Commander of U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM); and General George Casey, Commander
of the Multinational Forces-Iraq.
I particularly want to thank Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
for his total cooperation in working with the leadership of
this committee to arrange this very important hearing. When I
first discussed the need for this full complement of military
and civilian witnesses, the Secretary's reply was: ``Name the
day.'' Today is the day. Thank you.
I want to thank each of our witnesses and the countless men
and women in uniform and the civilians that they lead, for
their service and their tireless efforts to protect our Nation
and our allies from the ever-present terrorist threat,
particularly those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan working to
secure the peace and self-determination for the Iraqi and
Afghan people, and to bring hope to these troubled regions.
Speaking recently to those who have lost their family
members, President Bush, who has shown a steady and unflinching
resolve, has asked us to remember the following; ``One, we are
not going to leave them, not going to allow their mission to go
in vain; and two, we will complete the mission and the world
will be better off for it.'' I agree with that assessment.
Likewise, we are ever mindful of the loss of life and limb
and the sacrifices of the Iraqi and Afghan people. They are
more and more each day assuming greater responsibility to
secure and lead their respective nations.
On January 30 this year, the Iraqi people took a bold,
courageous step, in defiance of the threats from insurgents, to
rescue their country from decades of tyranny and to move in a
sequence of steps to form a democracy of their own choosing.
These historic elections in Iraq gave the world hope that an
important milestone had been reached in the combined efforts of
the international community to bring peace and security to the
Iraqi people.
These initial hopes have been tempered somewhat by the
reality of the political and ethical challenges that have
delayed the establishment of the Iraqi Transitional Government.
The process over the coming months by which the Iraqis adopt a
constitution and form a permanent government is the key to
success. With the support of the coalition governments, the
Iraqi Government must not allow any extensions or delays in
providing for a constitution, elections, and the formation of a
permanent government. Only strong political leadership will
provide a free Iraq.
All governments must work as partners, must stay the
course, strengthen their resolve, in order to achieve the
common goal. All must be truthful and realistic with their
people about the difficulties that lie ahead. Political courage
must be as steadfast as the military courage.
As we look back over the history of the men and women of
the Armed Forces of the United States in preserving our
freedom, never have the challenges and responsibilities been
greater than those that rest upon today's shoulders of the
generation of military leaders. Terrorism knows no boundaries.
Terrorists follow no international rules. They have no respect
for life, limb, or anyone in their path of destruction.
Terrorism of the magnitude the world is confronting today has
no precedent in history. They are today's enemy.
I ask our witnesses to give us their candid assessment of
the situation and the strategy for the way ahead. The American
people must clearly understand what is at stake and why their
mission in Iraq contributes to the United States' security, the
security of the region, and to a great extent the security of
the world. It is vital that our witnesses candidly give us
their assessment of the commitment of the Iraqi people, the
Iraqi security forces, and their willingness to increase their
level of responsibility to defeat terrorism and build a
peaceful nation.
No matter what level of troops, both coalition and Iraqi,
no matter what level of weaponry they employ, we will not win
this battle against insurgents unless every Iraqi citizen joins
in supporting the efforts to ferret out and rid their nation of
the insurgency.
Our great Nation has an enormous capacity for sacrifice and
hardship when we understand the cause is just and that success
is critical to the security of our Nation. Americans can and
will accept difficult challenges and continue to support a call
for service and sacrifice from our Nation's leaders. Many of us
lived through such calls during World War II. This global war
on terrorism today is no less vital to America's future.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First let me join you in welcoming our witnesses this
morning, thanking them for their presence. I join with you, Mr.
Chairman, in expressing the gratitude of the committee to our
troops for their courage, their professionalism, and their
sacrifice. Every American is in their debt.
Our men and women in uniform are serving with great honor.
They deserve an objective assessment of the situation in Iraq.
They deserve a clear layout of the next steps there. They are
not getting either from the administration. Instead, they get a
repetitious bugle that sounds: Things are going well, things
are going well, stay the course, stay the course.
The Vice President said on Memorial Day that the insurgency
is in its ``last throes.'' But the fact is that the insurgency
has not weakened. On Tuesday, Lieutenant General John Vines,
Commander of the Multinational Corps in Iraq, acknowledged the
following: ``We do not see the insurgency contracting or
expanding right now.''
Indeed, growing numbers of fanatic jihadist suicide bombers
are coming to Iraq with the intent of killing our troops and
destroying the prospects for an Iraqi nation. Brigadier General
Don Alston, the chief U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, said a
few weeks ago: ``This insurgency is not going to be settled
through military options or military operations. It is going to
be settled in the political process.''
The administration has said that Shia and Kurdish militias
operating independently are not acceptable and that only a
national army is. But the ground truth is that militias are
becoming more entrenched and relied upon to maintain order. The
Iraqi President and Prime Minister in effect acknowledged this
recently by praising the militias publicly.
Since March of 2003, more than 1,700 American lives have
been lost in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), almost 13,000
Americans have been wounded, and untold numbers of Iraqis have
met the same fate. The cost to the American people in dollars
is $230 billion and rising. Staying the course is not only
hollow-sounding rhetoric, it is an unacceptable policy. We need
to change the current dynamic in Iraq. The status quo is
neither static nor acceptable.
Some have proposed setting a fixed date for departure. I
believe that policy would be counterproductive. It would give
an incentive to insurgents and jihadists to simply outlast us
and would also increase the chances of civil war on our
departure. At the other extreme, the Secretary of State
recently said that we would stay in Iraq ``as long as needed.''
That is also the wrong signal, an open-ended commitment to the
Iraqis that we will be there even if they fail to agree on a
constitution. That lessens the chances that the Iraqis will
make the political compromises necessary to defeat the
jihadists and the insurgency and become a nation. Suggesting to
the Iraqis that we are willing to remain without limit is not
only unacceptable to the American people, it is also placing
great stress on our Armed Forces and reducing military
recruitment. Indeed, it is jeopardizing our volunteer army.
In looking for ways to change the current dynamic, two
points are clear. First, only a political settlement will end
the insurgency. The insurgency cannot be defeated by military
means. Our troops and a gradually improving Iraqi force will
help facilitate a settlement, but they will not on their own
produce one. As General Casey said recently, the political
process will be the decisive element.
Second, none of the Iraqi communities want us to leave
precipitously or to leave without a political settlement in
hand. Sunni Arabs gradually are becoming aware that the
departure of U.S. troops would leave them vulnerable militarily
because of the growing strength of the Shia in and out of the
army. I believe Sunni Arab leaders recognize that our presence
provides them some protection, not so much against the
insurgents, but rather against the Shia prevailing if civil war
broke out. Sunni leadership, which used to call for our
immediate departure, no longer does so.
As for the Shia, their principal leader, Grand Ayatollah
Sistani, has consistently supported our continued presence.
Peaceful majority rule favors the Shias since they are in the
majority, while civil war may or may not have the same result.
The Shia also want settlement with the Sunnis as the only way
the country can unite against the foreign jihadists, who aim
their terror mainly at the Shia. The Kurds also favor our
continued presence.
If those two points are correct--there is no military
solution without a political one and none of the ethnic groups
in Iraq want an immediate U.S. withdrawal--there is one clear
message that we can and should send to the Iraqis: You need to
reach a political settlement on the timetable to which you have
agreed.
Secretary Rumsfeld said earlier this week that the
political process in Iraq ``has to move forward on schedule.''
I agree. The Secretary said in addition, ``The more the Iraqis
delay, the greater the damage, and my view is that it must go
forward on schedule and that is the President's view.'' I
agree.
Our following through on that message is essential. The
Iraqis have approved a timetable for adopting a constitution,
August 15, with the possibility of one and only one 6-month
extension. The United States needs to tell the Iraqis and the
world that if that deadline is not met we will review our
position with all options open, including but not limited to
setting a timetable for withdrawal.
The successful drafting of a constitution surely does
involve some different issues, such as the role of Islam, the
degree of autonomy for the Kurdish areas, and the protection of
minority rights. We need to put some pressure on the Iraqis to
deal with these issues in a satisfactory and timely manner.
Failure to adopt a constitution as scheduled would represent a
lack of will to create a country and would instead reflect a
continued willingness to rely on U.S. troops to carry a burden
that Iraqis must carry.
The possibility of our withdrawal would also lead to
increased pressure on the Sunni Arabs from Iraq's Sunni
neighbors. Those neighbors do not want U.S. forces to leave
without a political settlement, given their fear of the
prospect of civil war and instability. Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and Syria are all Sunni Arab states. Instability in Iraq would
threaten their own stability because they perceive it as
possibly leading to the growth of Iranian power and Shia
influence closer to home and to greater Kurdish pressure to
separate from the rest of Iraq, with accompanying pressure from
Kurdish populations in Syria and Turkey to join them.
Just the possibility that U.S. forces would leave Iraq
before a political settlement would motivate Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, and Syria to pressure their Sunni Arab brethren in Iraq
to reach a political settlement.
The most important action that we could take to change the
current dynamic in Iraq would be for the President to inform
the Iraqis that unless their own timetable for adopting a
constitution is followed we will need to rethink our presence
there with all options open. We must demonstrate to the Iraqis
that our willingness to bear the burden of providing security
has limits. We have opened the door for the Iraqis at great
cost, but only they can walk through it. We cannot hold that
door open indefinitely.
Only a constitutional agreement, a political settlement,
can change the status quo and end the insurgency in Iraq. The
possibility of our leaving unless such a settlement is reached
can help bring about that agreement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
If I could make an administrative note, there will be a
cloture vote at 10 o'clock this morning. We will recess the
hearing at 10:15 and promptly resume upon the completion of
that vote. If in the course of the questioning period any of
our witnesses feel that their answers to be full and complete
would require a closed session, we are prepared to recess at
the conclusion of this open session and hold a brief closed
session such that we can receive that testimony. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
Let me begin by saying that the general officers that you
introduced sitting next to me: General Myers, General Abizaid,
and General Casey, are doing an outstanding job for our
country. The American people and our Nation are truly fortunate
to have men of this professionalism and skill and talent and
dedication and courage.
One year after World War II ended, a leading news magazine
published an article about post-war reconstruction efforts in
Germany. It was titled ``Americans Are Losing the Victory in
Europe.'' The author disparagingly wrote: ``Never has American
prestige in Europe been lower. People never tire of telling you
of the ignorance and rowdyism of the American troops and of
America's misunderstanding of European conditions.''
The year was 1946. But consider how different 1946 looks to
us today. In retrospect, it was not a time to despair, but a
time to build, and that is what that generation did.
It has now been 1 year since the turnover of sovereignty to
the liberated Iraqi people and, just as Europe was a central
battlefield, ideological and military, in the war against
communist aggression, so too the Middle East and Central Asia
are centers of gravity in today's struggle against violent
extremism.
I know the American people still have the same
determination and resolve. They know today, as then, that
struggles are not won on defense; they are won on offense.
Violent extremists have made clear their intention. It is to
kill as many westerners and moderate Muslims as possible. They
have access to money and weapons, and they are seeking even
more dangerous weapons. They are surveying and targeting
landmarks in our country and other civilized countries.
Terrorists have to be stopped and the world must find ways
to encourage would-be recruits to choose a better path. Our
Nation's actions to liberate Afghanistan and Iraq have
eliminated two state sponsors of terrorism, most certainly
contributed to Libya's decision to open its nuclear weapons
programs to international inspection and to renounce terrorism,
and encouraged democratic movements in regions that have long
been breeding grounds for violent anti-western extremism.
It is not surprising that there are questions about the
situation in Iraq today. That has always been the case in a
time of war. Today the questions I hear are something like
this: Is the effort underway worth the cost and the sacrifice?
How are the coalition and the new Iraqi Government really
doing? When will Iraqi security forces be able to assume full
responsibility for securing their country? What happens next,
and should Congress set a timetable for withdrawal of U.S.
troops?
It is important to note what success will mean.
Specifically, a free, democratic, peaceful Iraq will not
provide aid to violent extremists, will not plot the
assassination of American Presidents, will not invade or fire
missiles at its neighbors, and it will not use chemical weapons
on its neighbors or its own people, as Iraq had done in the
past.
Let there be no doubt, if the coalition were to leave
before the Iraqi security forces are able to assume
responsibility, we would 1 day again have to confront another
Iraqi regime, perhaps even more dangerous than the last, in a
region plunged into darkness rather than liberated and free.
Americans ask, how are we doing in Iraq? The President's
strategy is clear. It is to empower a democratically elected
Iraqi Government to aggressively go after the insurgents and
terrorists, and that is exactly what their forces are doing,
with some success, to pursue an inclusive constitutional
political process, to improve public services with the help of
the international community and the quality of life for the
Iraqi people, and to enable Iraqi security forces to take
charge of their own country.
Each of these strategies depends on the others. Success
will not be easy and it will require patience and progress on
each of those three fronts. But, consider what has been
accomplished in 12 months--not 12 years, but 12 months--since
sovereignty was passed on June 28. More than 8 million people
defied terrorist threats and voted in the January election.
Duly elected Iraqi leaders with input from the Sunni minority
are now drafting a constitution, to be voted on by the Iraqi
people by October 15.
Under their new constitution, a permanent government will
then be elected on December 15, 2005. I agree completely with
Senator Levin that it is critically important that that
timetable not be changed.
Iraqis are building an economy and it is growing. The
insurgency remains dangerous, particularly in several parts of
Iraq. But terrorists no longer can take advantage of
sanctuaries like Fallujah, and coalition and Iraqi forces are
capturing or killing hundreds of violent extremists on a weekly
basis and confiscating literally mountains of weapons.
The general officers here today are leading the troops that
are contributing to these accomplishments. They are prepared to
provide a detailed report on the progress of Iraqi security
forces. The number of U.S. troops in Iraq has moved from a high
during the Iraqi election period of about 160,000 to less than
140,000 currently. But, their priorities have also shifted,
from conducting security operations essentially to a heavier
focus on training, equipping, and assisting the Iraqi security
forces.
In the past, as we all know, the performance of the Iraqi
security forces has been criticized as being mixed. Fair
enough, but consider that 2 years ago few Iraqi security forces
had the critical equipment, such as radios, vehicles, and body
armor. Today, the vast majority of Iraqi security forces do
have the appropriate equipment. The Iraqis had an inexperienced
military chain of command and weak Ministries of Defense and
Interior. Today, both are improving, but they have a way to go.
They had weak unit cohesion and insufficient mid-level
leadership. Today the leaders at all levels are stepping
forward. A year ago, six Iraq army battalions were in training.
Today dozens of trained battalions are capable of conducting
anti-insurgent operations, albeit with coalition support.
Sections of the country are relatively peaceful and essentially
under control of Iraqi security forces at the present time.
Finally, the question is asked, when can the coalition
leave and should Congress establish a deadline to withdraw?
Some in Congress have suggested that deadlines be set. That
would be a mistake, as Senator Levin has said. It would throw a
lifeline to terrorists, who in recent months have suffered
significant losses and casualties, been denied havens, and
suffered weakened popular support.
Timing in war is never predictable. There are no
guarantees, and any who say that we have lost this war or that
we are losing this war are wrong. We are not. Coalition
military personnel are in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi
Government. They are under the United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council Resolution 1546. The objectives of the overwhelming
majority of the Iraqis and the coalition are the same and that
is a peaceful and prosperous Iraq with a representative
government. Even today, that is a radical notion in that part
of the world, and the fact is that a new approach is going to
result in confusion, resistance, and difficulties, as we have
seen, we understand that.
Iraq was a violent place before its liberation and there
will undoubtedly be some violence in Iraq after the coalition
forces depart. But success in this effort cannot be defined by
domestic tranquility. Rather, success will be when there is a
free Iraq where Iraqis are the guaranteer of their own
security, with minimal coalition involvement, and that will be
an historic accomplishment.
The timing must be condition-based. It will depend on the
extent to which the various ethnic factions reconcile--and they
are now doing that--the level of support from the international
community, and with the successful meeting recently in Brussels
this week international support is growing. The U.N. and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, are
increasing their commitments.
The timing will depend on Iraq's neighbors as well, whose
behavior continues to be unhelpful. Insurgents continue to come
into Iraq from Syria and Iran. Nations that serve as conduits
for mass murderers are not friends of the Iraqi people, they
are not friends of the United States, and they are certainly
not friends of the civilized world.
One final point. Someone recently asked me about the
differences between my current tenure as Secretary of Defense
and my previous service some 30 years ago. One thing that has
remained the same is the tendency in some quarters to blame
America for the world's troubles. Well, I am not one who wakes
up every morning seeking ways to suggest that America is what
is wrong with the world. The people who are going on television
chopping off people's heads and using disabled children as
suicide bombers, they are what is wrong with the world. The
violent extremists that killed 3,000 innocent men, women, and
children on September 11, they are what is wrong with the
world.
In every war there are individuals who commit wrongdoing
and there are setbacks and there are hardships. Recently the
noted historian and author David McCullough recalled the year
1776 as the most important year in the most important conflict
in our history. He said: ``If it had been covered by the media
and the country had seen how horrible conditions were and what
a very serious soup we were in, I think that would have been
it.''
In 1864 many, including President Lincoln himself, believed
that he would lose the upcoming election, due in part to the
slew of criticism he was receiving for his prosecution of the
Civil War. Speaking to an Ohio regiment, President Lincoln
said: ``I wish it might be more generally and universally
understood what the country is now engaged in. There may be
mistakes made some time and things may be done wrong, while the
officers of the government do all they can to prevent mistakes.
But, I beg of you as citizens of this great Republic not to let
your minds be carried off from the great work we have before
us.'' That was good advice.
Today's service men and women, like the generations before
them, are performing noble work. Though some pundits and
observers and nonparticipants have criticized the American
military with inaccurate comparisons and purple rhetoric, those
of us who work with the men and women in the U.S. Armed Forces
know otherwise. Our fellow citizens in uniform serve with great
compassion, with professionalism, amid danger and provocation,
and we should not allow the actions of a few to distract from
the mission we face or from the necessity to succeed.
To all U.S. military personnel and their families, who
sacrifice while guardsmen and reservists are deployed in
battle, I offer my fullest appreciation. One day, all those who
have made sacrifices on behalf of this cause and the American
people who support their important work will find a place of
honor in our country's history and they will have won the
appreciation and respect that they have richly earned, and I
include the three general officers here today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.
I am joined today by:
General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff;
General John Abizaid, Commander of U.S. Central
Command; and
General George Casey, Commander of the Multi-National
Force in Iraq.
These general officers are doing an outstanding job and our Nation
is truly fortunate to have their able service. I am grateful and proud
to be serving with them.
One year after World War II ended--a leading news magazine
published an article about post-war reconstruction efforts in Germany.
It was entitled: ``Americans are Losing the Victory in Europe.''
The author despairingly wrote:
``Never has American prestige in Europe been lower. People
never tire of telling you of the ignorance and rowdy-ism of
American troops, of our misunderstanding of European
conditions.''
The year was 1946. But consider how different 1946 looks to us
today. In retrospect, it was not a time to despair but to build as they
did.
Now it has been 1 year since the turnover of sovereignty to the
liberated Iraqi people. Just as Europe was a central battlefield--
ideological and military--in the war against Communist aggression, so
too the Middle East and Central Asia are the centers of gravity in
today's struggle against violent extremism.
I know the American people still have the same determination and
resolve. They know today as then that these struggles are not won on
defense, they are won on offense.
The task is to help more people understand the nature of this
struggle we are in. Violent extremists have made clear their
intentions: It is to kill as many Westerners and moderate Muslims as
possible.
They have access to money, and to weapons--and they are seeking
even more dangerous weapons. They are surveying and targeting landmarks
in our country.
They have to be stopped. Together with the world we must find ways
to encourage any would-be recruits to choose a better path.
Our Nation's actions to liberate Afghanistan and Iraq have:
Eliminated two state sponsors of terrorism;
Most certainly contributed to Libya's decision to open
its nuclear weapons programs to international inspection and
renounce terrorism; and
Encouraged democratic movements in regions that have
long been breeding grounds for violent anti-Western extremism.
It is not surprising that there are questions about the situation
in Iraq today. That has always been the case in a time of war. It was
true in Washington's time, and Lincoln's time, and Roosevelt's to be
sure.
Today the questions I hear are something like this:
Is the effort underway in Iraq worth the cost and the
sacrifice?
How are the coalition and the new Iraqi government
really doing?
When will Iraqi security forces be able to assume full
responsibility for securing their country? and
What happens next, and should Congress set a timetable
to withdraw?
I will comment on each of these questions.
First, whether the effort underway in Iraq is worth the costs.
It was not long ago, there was relatively little disagreement--
either here at home, or in the United Nations--as to the danger the
former Iraqi regime posed to the region and the world.
The only question then was how long the United Nations should wait
for Iraq to comply with the 17 Security Council Resolutions it had
defied.
By contrast it is important to note what success will mean.
Specifically, a free, democratic, and peaceful Iraq:
Will not provide aid to violent extremists;
It will not plot the assassination of American
Presidents;
It will not invade or fire missiles at its neighbors;
and
It will not use chemical weapons on its neighbors or
its own people.
Let there be no doubt: If the coalition were to leave before the
Iraqi security forces are able to assume responsibility--which we must
not do--we would 1 day again have to confront another Iraqi regime--
perhaps even more dangerous than the last--in a region plunged into
darkness, rather than bathed in the light of freedom.
Americans ask: how are we doing in Iraq?
The President's strategy is clear--to empower the democratically
elected Iraqi government:
To aggressively go after the insurgents and
terrorists--and that is exactly what their forces are doing
with solid success;
To pursue an inclusive constitutional political
process;
To improve public services and, with the help of the
international community, improve the quality of life for the
Iraqi people; and
To enable Iraq's security forces to take charge of
their own country.
Each of these strategies depends on the others. Success will
require patience and progress on each of the four.
But consider what has been accomplished in Iraq in 12 months time--
not 12 years, but 12 months:
More than 8 million people defied terrorists' threats
and voted in the January election;
Duly elected Iraqi leaders, are drafting a
Constitution to be voted on by the Iraqi people by October 15,
2005. Under their new Constitution, a permanent government will
be elected on December 15, 2005;
Iraqis are building an economy and it is growing--with
a stock market and a stable currency;
While the insurgency remains dangerous in parts of
Iraq, Coalition and Iraqi operations are disrupting terrorist
sanctuaries, such as Fallujah, and keeping them on the run;
U.S. forces are capturing or killing hundreds of
violent extremists on a daily basis and confiscating literally
mountains of weapons.
The general officers here today are leading the troops that are
contributing to these achievements. They are prepared to provide a
detailed report on the progress of Iraq's security forces.
The number of U.S. troops in Iraq has moved from the Iraqi election
high of 160,000 to less than 140,000 currently. But their priorities
have shifted--from conducting security operations to a heavier focus on
training, equipping, and assisting the Iraqi forces.
In the past, the performance of Iraqi security forces has been
criticized for being mixed. But consider that:
Two years ago, few Iraqi forces had critical equipment
such as radios, vehicles, or body armor. Today, the vast
majority of Iraqi security forces have this equipment;
The Iraqis had an inexperienced military chain of
command and weak ministries of Defense and Interior. Today,
both are improving, but they have a way to go;
They had weak unit cohesion and insufficient mid-level
leadership. Today, leaders at all levels are stepping forward;
A year ago, six Iraqi Army battalions were in
training. Today, dozens of trained battalions are capable of
conducting anti-insurgent operations with Coalition support;
Large sections of the country, including much of the
north and south, are relatively peaceful and essentially under
the control of Iraqi security forces; and
Responsibility for what had been one of the most
dangerous neighborhoods in Baghdad was recently turned over to
the Iraqi security forces, and has been relatively free of
serious violence.
Don't believe it when you were told the Iraqi security forces can't
cut it. They can and they are, to their credit.
Finally, the question is asked: when can the coalition leave? Should
Congress establish a deadline to withdraw?
Some in Congress have suggested that deadlines be set for
withdrawal. That would be a terrible mistake. It would throw a lifeline
to terrorists who in recent months have suffered significant losses in
casualties, been denied havens, and suffered weakened popular support.
Let me be clear: the United States made a commitment to finish the
job and we must do so. Timing in war is never predictable--there are no
guarantees. We can and will prevail, but only if we persevere. Any who
say we have lost or are losing are flat wrong. We are not.
Coalition military personnel are in Iraq at the request of the
Iraqi government and consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution
1546. The objectives of the overwhelming majority of Iraqis and the
coalition are the same: a peaceful and prosperous Iraq with a
representative government. Even today, that is a radical notion in the
Middle East. The fact that that is a new approach is going to result in
occasional confusion, resistance, and difficulties. We understand that.
Iraq was a violent place long before its liberation, and there may
undoubtedly be some violence in Iraq after Coalition forces depart.
But, success in this effort cannot be defined as domestic tranquility.
Rather, success will be when there is a free Iraq, where Iraqis are the
guarantors of their own security, with minimal Coalition involvement.
That will be a truly historic accomplishment.
The amount of time this will take is not knowable.
The timing must be condition based. It will depend on:
The extent to which various ethnic factions
reconcile--and they are now doing so in impressive ways;
The level of support from the international
community--and it is growing. The U.N. and NATO, for example,
are increasing their commitments. The international conference
on Iraq that recently took place in Brussels elicited strong
political statements of support for the emerging Iraqi
democracy;
The timing will also depend on Iraq's neighbors, whose
behavior continues to be unhelpful.
Insurgents continue to come into Iraq from Syria and Iran. Nations
that serve as conduits for mass murderers are not friends of the Iraqi
people, or of the United States, or of the civilized world.
One final point. Someone recently asked me about the differences
between my current tenure as Secretary of Defense and my previous
tenure some 30 years ago. One thing that has remained the same is the
tendency in some quarters to blame America for the world's troubles.
Well, I'm not one who wakes up every morning seeking ways to
suggest that America is what's wrong with the world. The people who are
going on television chopping off people's heads or using disabled
children as suicide bombers--they are what's wrong with the world. The
violent extremists that killed 3000 innocent men, women and children on
September 11 are what's wrong with the world.
In every war, there are individuals who commit wrongdoing. There
are mistakes, setbacks, and hardships.
Recently the noted historian and author, David McCullough, recalled
the year 1776 as ``the most important year in the most important
conflict in our history.'' He said:
``If it had been covered by the media and the country had
seen how horrible the conditions were . . . and what a very
serious soup we were in, I think that would have been it.''
Similarly in 1864, many--including President Lincoln himself--
believed he would lose the upcoming election due in part to the slew of
criticisms he received for his prosecution of the Civil War. Speaking
to an Ohio regiment, President Lincoln said:
``I wish it might be more generally and universally
understood what the country is now engaged in. There may be
mistakes made sometimes; and things may be done wrong, while
the officers of the Government do all they can to prevent
mistakes. But I beg of you, as citizens of this great Republic,
not to let your minds be carried off from the great work we
have before us.''
That was sound advice then--and it is wise counsel today.
Today's service men and women, like the generations before them,
are performing noble work. Though some pundits and observers--non-
participants--have criticized the American military with irresponsible
comparisons and purple rhetoric, those of us who work with the men and
women in the U.S. Armed Forces know otherwise.
Our fellow citizens in uniform serve with great compassion and
professionalism amid danger and provocation. We should not allow the
actions of a few to distract us from the mission we face. Or from the
necessity to succeed.
To all U.S. military personnel, to their families who sacrifice
while guardsmen and reservists are deployed in battle, I offer my
fullest appreciation.
One day, all those who have made sacrifices on behalf of this
cause--and the American people who support their important work--will
find a place of honor in our country's history and they will have won
the appreciation and respect that they have richly earned.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I might add that
when a group of us had a chance to be with the President the
other day, he likewise indicated the extraordinary trust and
confidence he has in the military officers appearing before us
today in this hearing and others throughout the world. We are
fortunate to have them in the service of our country.
General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
members of the committee. Thank you for your continuing support
of our men and women in uniform and for this opportunity to
discuss our progress and challenges in Iraq.
In the year since the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, we
have watched the Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces
make steady progress in providing for their own security. Of
course, many challenges still remain. We see that every day as
violent extremists murder innocent men, women, and children and
sabotage the efforts of the Iraqi people and the coalition.
But, that is only part of the story. Every day as well, the new
Iraqi government, with the help of the coalition, takes
significant positive steps down the road to freedom and to
security.
We are on the right course and we must stay that course.
Under General Abizaid's and General Casey's leadership, we have
the right strategy for helping build a new and secure Iraq, at
peace with its neighbors, with a representative government that
respects human rights and maintains the rule of law.
The stakes in Iraq are enormous. Iraq is not just a battle
in the struggle against violent extremism and al Qaeda. It is
currently the central battle. The enemy is counting on our
resolve to weaken. I can assure you, however, that our men and
women in uniform are firm in their resolve.
We are grateful for the support of the American people and
that support absolutely must continue until the job is done.
While we are all eager to see our troops come home, leaving
before the task is complete would be catastrophic, not only for
Iraq, but also for the overall struggle against violent
extremism and for our national security.
Our troops understand exactly what is at stake in Iraq and
they know that they are making a huge and important difference.
One Army captain from Pennsylvania, currently on his second
deployment to Iraq, wrote him in an e-mail: ``When I am really
tired, I occasionally think that I am giving a little more than
my share. But, then I think back to World War II and Korea,
when soldiers deployed oftentimes not knowing when they were
coming home. That gets me back in the correct frame of mind.''
I am very proud of all our service men and women, as I know
you all are, proud of their tremendous determination, their
courage, the compassion that they show every day under very
challenging conditions.
Shortly we are going to celebrate the Fourth of July, the
day that our Nation's first leaders told the world what we
stand for as Americans. As we approach the Fourth, we are also
reminded that building a free and open society is a very
difficult task and it takes a long time. But, it is a most
noble task. I think we are all grateful for our freedoms, we
are grateful for those that have fought for those freedoms in
the past and those that today are fighting to defend those
freedoms as well.
We thank you for your support and we look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
At this time the committee will stand in recess until the
completion of the vote. [Recess from 10:10 a.m. to 10:31 a.m.]
Chairman Warner. General Myers, I believe you had completed
your statement.
General Myers. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. We will now hear from General Abizaid.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND
General Abizaid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
and members of the committee. I thank all of you for the
opportunity to join you today.
I just returned from the region and spent some time in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Djibouti. Our troops and their
commanders remain confident, competent, and courageous. We
honor their dedication and sacrifice.
Discussions with Afghan and Iraqi security force leaders
and visits to their units in the field showed growing
confidence, increased capability, and increasingly better
organized chains of command. The keystone to our theater
strategy is to build effective local forces and, while they
have made much progress, they are not yet ready to stand and
operate alone.
I know we are here today to talk primarily about Iraq, but
we must not lose sight of the broader struggle under way. The
same enemy that brought us September 11 fights us in
Afghanistan and Iraq. They challenge our partners in Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan. They attack friends in Turkey, Spain, and
Morocco. They organize to develop or acquire weapons of mass
destruction and connect their hateful ideology and recruitment
through the tools of the connected world.
While we do not exclusively fight al Qaeda and their
associated movements in our region, they represent the main
enemy to peace and stability. Their vision of the future is
best seen in the example of the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan:
no music, sequestered women, executions in soccer stadiums, and
destruction of treasured art. Like the ideologies of fascists
and communists before them, al Qaeda seeks to be the vanguard
of the extremist movement and the oppressor of free-thinking
people.
Our campaign since September 11 has put them on the
defensive. The enemy is under pressure, but still dangerous,
still seeking to hit us again at home. I share the view of many
of our troops in the field that fighting this enemy abroad
makes it more difficult for them to strike us at home. We can
decisively weaken the ideological extremists led by bin Laden,
Zawahiri, and Zarqawi by stabilizing Iraq, stabilizing
Afghanistan, and actively helping regional nations help
themselves against this threat.
The great sense of confidence I gain from American, Iraqi,
and Afghan troops in the field stands in often stark contrast
to those who see no obvious progress on the battlefield. I can
understand the confusion. This is no longer a war of mass fires
and easily traced maneuvers, but rather a war of subtle
intelligence action, position, precise strikes, and the
painstaking work of institution-building.
The enemy does not seek to defeat us militarily, but to
wait us out, to sap our confidence, and to break our will. We
must not let their success about grabbing headlines confuse us
about our ability to help the people of the region build better
futures. Militarily, our forces are strong. They provide the
shield behind which legitimate institutions form. They gain
time for the political process in Iraq and Afghanistan to
mature. Elsewhere in the region, their presence and assistance
help shape capabilities that allow our friends in the region to
resist extremism.
For those of us who have spent many months in the field, we
see good progress in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We sense good
progress against the extremism that once seemed so pervasive in
the region. But, we are realistic and we know that great change
is almost always accompanied by violence.
It is not our intention today to paint a rosy picture of
tasks easily accomplished. We have sacrificed much and there is
much more work ahead. Progress in counterinsurgency and
counterterrorist work is not easily recognized. Setbacks,
casualties, and difficult problems undoubtedly remain ahead,
but with your support and the support of the American people
success is undoubtedly ahead as well.
We will need patience and strength to achieve success. Our
men and women in uniform have both.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
General Casey.
STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL,
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ
General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all of
the committee for their continued support. As we approach the
1-year anniversary of sovereignty in Iraq, I continue to be
inspired by the demonstrated courage, conviction, tenacity, and
commitment of the Iraqi people as they march toward democracy.
After more than 3 decades of living under a brutal dictator,
the Iraqis have embraced the ideals of self-governance and
tolerance and are fighting and dying to build a better future
for all Iraqis. Such commitment deserves our admiration and
continued support.
In the past year the Iraqis, supported by the coalition,
have established an interim government, neutralized the Shia
insurgency, eliminated terrorist and insurgent safe havens
across Iraq, mobilized their security forces to confront the
insurgency, increased the pace of economic development, seated
a democratically elected Transitional National Assembly (TNA),
and peacefully passed control from the interim government to
the transitional government. The new government, after a
transitional period, has formed and aggressively continued the
campaign against the terrorists and insurgents while building
inclusive political, governmental, and constitutional
processes.
The Iraqi people are serious about their future, they are
serious about building a government that respects the human
rights of all Iraqis, and they are serious about defeating the
terrorists and the insurgents that are doing the utmost to deny
them their dreams.
I sense that many view the daily snapshots of violence in
Iraq in isolation and conclude that our efforts in Iraq are not
progressing. That is what the terrorists and the insurgents
would like you to believe. Quite the contrary, the Iraqi people
make progress every day. They are fighting for their future
against the remnants of the regime that tyrannized them for
over 3 decades and they are fighting for their future against
the extremists with the same goals as those who attacked the
United States on September 11.
Now, you hear a lot about what the insurgents do, so I
thought it might be useful to consider what the insurgents and
the terrorists have not done over the past year. First of all,
they have lost their safe haven in Fallujah and they have not
been able to reconstitute it.
Second, they have not been able to expand their support
base across Iraq, nor have they attracted a broad following,
largely because they have no positive vision for Iraq's future
to offer. Even by our most pessimistic estimates on the size of
the insurgency, we believe the insurgency constitutes less than
one-tenth of 1 percent of the Iraqi population. As I have said
several times, this is a localized insurgency and in 14 of the
18 provinces they still average less than 3 incidents of
violence per day.
The insurgents also have not prevented the growth of the
Iraqi security forces, even with almost daily attacks. Iraqi
security forces, after struggling last spring and fall, drew
great confidence from their decisive role in protecting the
January 30 elections. These Iraqi security forces, that now
number around 170,000, have been further enabled by a more
proactive partnership with coalition forces that, while only a
few months old, has enabled the Iraqis to begin moving toward
assuming the lead for their counterinsurgency effort.
The insurgents have also not sparked sectarian violence,
although they work hard at it every day. They cannot do this
because the Iraqi commitment to something better is so strong.
Lastly and perhaps most importantly, the insurgents have
not stopped political and economic development in Iraq. The
well-known January 30 elections where 8.5 million Iraqis defied
intimidation and terror to take a stake in their future, the
formation of the first democratically elected government in
decades, and the beginnings of the development of an Iraq
constitution all indicate that the momentum is in favor of
democracy and not terror.
What perhaps is less well known is the progress in the
economic sector, progress that only begins to meet Iraq's
needs, but progress nonetheless. In the last year, through the
hard work of Iraqis, the U.S. embassy, and coalition forces, we
have started over 2,500 of the 3,100 reconstruction projects
funded by our government and we have completed over 1,300 of
those. Even more heartening is the private construction of
homes and businesses that we witness on a daily basis and
attribute to Iraq's growing economy and public confidence. Iraq
slowly gets better every day.
Unfortunately, the tough part about counterinsurgencies is
that the insurgents do not have to win; they just have to not
lose. This, as General Abizaid said, is a battle of wills and
the terrorists and insurgents are challenging ours. They will
continue to contest the Iraqi political, economic, and social
advances by attacking innocent men, women, and children,
symbols of the government, and coalition forces. But they will
not succeed.
The stark reality is that insurgencies have not done well
against democratically-elected governments, particularly
insurgencies that offer no positive vision. Recent polls
confirm that Iraqis are: one, confident in their government and
in their security forces; two, optimistic about their future;
and three, they intend to vote in large numbers in both the
upcoming constitutional referendum and the democratic
elections. The Iraqi people are committed to something better
than the tyranny that they have known for the past 3 decades
and are fighting every day for the dream of a better future.
The last year was one of progress and firsts for Iraq, but
one also impacted by terror and violence. Yet the Iraqi people
persevered to their greatest accomplishment in decades, the
January elections. Six months before the constitutional
elections, I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, that we are well
positioned for another Iraqi success. To be sure, there are
long-term development challenges and much to be done. To be
sure, Iraq's steady progress will be contested. But, this
insurgency and these terrorists will ultimately be defeated as
Iraqis elect a government based on an Iraqi constitution that
respects the human rights of all Iraqis, as they build Iraqi
security forces that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraq
as a safe haven for terror, and as they continue economic
development programs that help Iraq recover from decades of
neglect.
The Iraqi people will continue to be enabled in their
journey by the determined efforts of the coalition and our
embassy personnel that have done so much and that have given so
much over the past 2 years.
We are humbled by the sacrifices that they and their
families have made and we continue to be humbled by their
commitment and their resolve. I could not be prouder of the
magnificent men and women of our Armed Forces.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that we make
progress in Iraq every day. But, it is hard work and it is a
challenging environment. That said, after a year on the ground
I can tell you that I am more convinced than ever that this
mission is both realistic and achievable. It will require
patience and will, but both the region and our country will be
better when Iraq succeeds.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
We have had I think very good opening statements from our
distinguished panel and we will now proceed to a 6-minute round
of questions.
Mr. Secretary, I would like to reread a brief part of my
opening statement and a brief part of Senator Levin's opening
statement. I said the following: ``The process over the coming
months by which the Iraqis adopt a constitution and form a
government is key to their success. With the support of the
coalition governments, the Iraqi government must not allow any
extensions or delays in providing for a constitution,
elections, and the formation of a permanent government. Only
strong political leadership will provide a free Iraq.''
Senator Levin has taken it a step further than I have:
``The United States needs to tell the Iraqis and the world that
if the deadline is not met we will review''--that is with
regard to this formation of government--``our position with all
options open, including but not limited to setting a timetable
for withdrawal.''
In your opening statement you said you agree with Senator
Levin and I would like to have your further amplification with,
I presume, the statement ``we will review our position''--
certainly we would. ``All options are open.'' That seems to me
reasonable. ``But not limited to setting a timetable for
withdrawal.''
My point is that I see no alternative whatsoever for the
coalition of governments, and most particularly ours, from
allowing Iraq to not succeed in the formation of its
government. I am just wondering, if they are not able to make
this timetable as laid down for the constitution, the
elections, and the formation of the permanent government, what
are our reasonable options? Because we have no alternative but
to see that that government does succeed at some point in time.
Otherwise, it will be a signal to worldwide terrorism that they
stayed the course and indeed thwarted the efforts of the
coalition forces to achieve the goals of some form of new
government in Iraq.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, there is no question, as
each one of us have said this morning, but that there must be
progress on the political side, there must be progress on the
economic side, and there must be progress on the security side,
and they are all linked. To the extent there would be, for
whatever reason, a delay in moving forward with drafting a
constitution or a referendum on the constitution or holding the
elections, it would retard the entire process. During this
process coalition people are being killed, Iraqis are being
killed, and it would be an enormous disservice in my view to
delay the constitution or the elections under the new
constitution.
That is what I said I agreed with. It is not for me to tell
the Iraqi government what the President might do with respect
to reviewing our situation or anything like that. I might make
recommendations to the President, but it is for him to make
those decisions, not me.
But there are a number of things the Iraqi people must do.
A number of countries, 32 countries, have sent their finest
young people over there and liberated that country. They now
have an opportunity to grab a hold of that country and take all
the wealth they have in water, intelligence, education, and oil
and turn it into a model for the Middle East. It is their task
to do that. They are going to be ultimately the ones who will
win this insurgency.
The Iraqi people have to have confidence that they have a
voice in it, all the Iraqi people. But, they have to fight
corruption. They are going to have to move forward on the
political side. They are going to have to provide information
to the Iraqi security forces so they know where the terrorists
are hiding and the extremists are so that they can capture or
kill them. They are going to have to take responsibility for
all the Iraqi detainees and build prison facilities and
establish a criminal justice system to see that people are
dealt with in a proper manner.
They have a lot of things they have to do. But, one of the
first and foremost clearly is to see that they move forward on
the political side and that the Iraqi people feel they have a
stake in the future of that country.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Abizaid, you have had a very long and distinguished
career in our military and much of that career of service has
been in this region of the world. Your understanding of the
people and the culture and their capabilities and the history--
there is a lot to be said that we should have examined with
greater care the history of this culture as we proceeded with
this military mission.
What are your assessments as to the ability of the Iraqi
people to succeed in the goals outlined very clearly by
Secretary Rumsfeld just now and in other testimony?
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman, I think both General Casey
and I would tell you that we spend a lot of time working very
closely with Iraqis on the political side and on the military
side, and we have known Iraqis that have been killed by the
terrorists, that have succumbed to the insurgents. It is
interesting how many times when one of them is killed another
one will stand up and take their place.
The desire to be free, the desire to develop a society
within their own cultural norms, that allows them freedom and
opportunity for a better future for their families, is not only
an Iraqi desire; I think it is a desire of most human beings
everywhere on this planet. That the United States Armed Forces
help to give them that is absolutely one of the most important
things I think we have ever been engaged in.
We often do talk past one another culturally. We do have
barriers of understanding that get in the way of efficient
business sometimes. But, as we go down this road, both in
Afghanistan and Iraq and in other places in the region, the
cultural gap is closing, and it needs to close faster. There is
nothing about Islam that says Iraq cannot move in the direction
it is moving. There is nothing about the Arab culture that says
that people cannot participate in their future in a free and
participatory manner.
The opportunity for a new beginning is clearly there. I
believe that people throughout the region, not only in Iraq but
elsewhere, in Lebanon, in Syria, in Saudi Arabia, you name the
country in the Middle East--but they are all looking for the
opportunities for reform and a better future and for
accountability from their governments, and I think that is
possible.
Chairman Warner. Let me ask a second part of this question.
Should there be a delay in adopting the constitution, or the
invoking of the 6-month extension, creating a perception that
the formation of this new permanent government is being
delayed, for whatever reason, what is likely to be the reaction
of the insurgents and others who want to stop this process in
Iraq? Will they redouble their efforts? Will there likely be
more participants from other nations that are flowing into Iraq
daily? What would be the consequences from a military
standpoint should that scenario become a reality?
General Abizaid. My view is that if there is a delay it
gives the insurgents the opportunity to get better organized,
it increases the number of deaths and the tempo of action. It
would be a bad thing, but not fatal.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Casey, the committee received an extensive
briefing----
General Casey. I am sorry, sir. Before you go on, could I
just add something on your question about the abilities of the
Iraqis to succeed in accomplishing their goals? I alluded to it
in my testimony, but we should not underestimate the impact of
having lived under the regime of Saddam Hussein. We should not
underestimate the impact that that has had on the psyche of the
Iraqi people and the desire for something better.
They are very resilient. Again, as I said in my opening
statement, they want something better.
Chairman Warner. They manifested that in the election
period.
General, in terms of the improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) and other weapons that are being directed at the
coalition forces, and indeed these insidious type of weapons
are taking a very high toll of life and limb, our committee
received I think an excellent briefing from those in the
Department of Defense (DOD) yesterday who have the
responsibility of developing the technology and getting it into
the field to counteract this problem.
There is a certain realism here that our technology has
been, I think, reasonably successful in overcoming the
complicated electronics and the variety of electronics being
employed in these IEDs. But, now the insurgents seem to be
departing from burying them and putting them in static
positions and going more to the mobile platform, namely
stealing a car and then utilizing that car and the armaments in
it to bring about death and destruction.
Much of the technology that we put into effect does not
have the same level of deterrence in overcoming those systems
once you go into that mobile platform. How are we going to
address this situation?
General Casey. Senator, just two points I would make here.
First of all, I thank the committee up front for their great
support. I think you might be interested to know that as a
result of the additional protective gear and vehicles that have
been sent over there, what we have seen over the last several
months is that our return to duty rate, someone who is wounded
but not seriously enough to be evacuated from the theater, has
gone up by over 10 percent. So now over 70 percent of our young
men and women who are wounded are only wounded slightly. So
that is a huge step forward.
On the shift to car bombs, I think it is not so much a
shift as an increase in the use of car bombs to create terror.
I think it is interesting that, while the overall number of
attacks has gone down, the casualties of those attacks have
gone way up because they are driving car bombs into crowds of
civilians for the sole purpose of terror.
Now, how do you deal with that? This is part of the nature
of the war that we are in, and really any war. Action,
reaction, counteraction. Our commanders on the ground are
continuously adapting and adjusting, not only to what the enemy
does, but also to try to out-think the enemy and get ahead of
him.
So as we work against the car bombs, while the
technological solutions are not a silver bullet, as you
suggested, they are a part of the adaptation of a more holistic
strategy: one, to conduct operations along the borders to
disrupt the flow of the suicide bombers and foreign fighters
that drive those suicide car bombs; two, to attack the
facilitators that take those car bombers, match them up with
the car; three, to attack the car bomb makers and the cells
that make those.
We have been attacking each of those three areas here
across Iraq over the past 6 weeks to 2 months. So we are
adopting a holistic approach to this.
But I will tell you, Senator, it is very hard, if not
impossible, to defend against someone who is willing to kill
themselves to accomplish their objective.
Chairman Warner. The suicide participant, I agree.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, can you give us your assessment of the
strength of the insurgency? Is it less strong, more strong, or
about the same strength as it was 6 months ago?
General Abizaid. Senator, I would say, in terms of
comparison from 6 months ago, in terms of foreign fighters, I
believe there are more foreign fighters coming into Iraq than
there were 6 months ago. In terms of the overall strength of
the insurgents, I would say it is about the same as it was.
Senator Levin. So you would not agree with the statement
that it is in its last throes?
General Abizaid. I do not know that I would make any
comment about that, other than to say there is a lot of work to
be done against the insurgency.
Senator Levin. Well, the Vice President has said it is in
its last throes. That is the statement of the Vice President.
It does not sound to me from your testimony or any other
testimony here this morning that it is in its last throes.
General Abizaid. I am sure you will forgive me from
criticizing the Vice President.
Senator Levin. I just want an honest assessment from you as
to whether you agree with a particular statement of his. It is
not personal. I just want to know whether you agree with that
assessment. It is not a personal attack on him, any more than
if he says that something is a fact and you disagree with it.
We would expect you to say you would disagree with it.
General Abizaid. I gave you my opinion of where we are.
Senator Levin. General Casey, you have said that the
political process will be the decisive element. Can you expand
on that?
General Casey. I can, Senator. As we look at how to fight
this war, we are fighting a counterinsurgency. If you look back
historically at how insurgencies have been defeated, they have
been defeated when the insurgents saw their options as better
protected in the political process and their prospects for
economic advancement to be better protected by the political
process than fighting for them. That is the essential element
here.
The timetable that has been established for the political
process is a great forcing function to keep this moving. As was
discussed earlier, I also support the notion that any extension
of the constitutional process would not be a good thing.
Senator Levin. Beyond their own timetable?
General Casey. I am not sure what you mean by ``beyond
their own''----
Senator Levin. They have a timetable of August 15 for a
constitution and then they have allowed themselves under their
own law one 6-month extension. That is it.
General Casey. Right, and what I am saying is I do not even
believe that they ought to have the 6-month extension.
Senator Levin. I agree with that fully. But if they do not
meet their own timetable, what you are saying is it could have
severe negative consequences on our troops and on the outcome?
General Casey. It certainly has the potential for that,
Senator.
Senator Levin. Well, I agree with that.
I think everybody wants them to meet that timetable. The
President has flat-out said that they should meet the
timetable. Our Secretary of Defense has said again this morning
how important it is, how essential it is that they meet their
timetable, and again earlier this week said that it is
absolutely important that they meet their timetable. It seems
to me that it is important that the administration say publicly
that there will be consequences or might be consequences in
terms of our policies and actions if they do not meet that
timetable.
I very much welcome the statements here this morning as to
how essential it is that they meet it. But, unless we do more
than just say the words that it is important or essential or
critical, unless we also give a message that we are going to
have to review our situation if they do not meet their own
timetable, it seems to me those words become hollow.
The Secretary of State made a statement, which is that we
are going to keep our forces there as long as they are needed.
That has the opposite effect of telling them that if they do
not meet their timetable for a political agreement, which is
essential to ending the insurgency according to all your
testimony, we are going to need to assess our situation. We are
not going to decide in advance we are setting a deadline. We
are not going to say what the consequences are going to be, but
we are going to look at all options, including the possibility
of setting a timetable.
That, it seems to me, is a critically important thing for
the administration to do, and what troubles me is that the only
public statement that really we have had on that so far that I
think is relevant is the opposite, which is the Secretary of
State saying we will be there as long as we are needed. That is
open-ended. If they do not agree to a constitution, if they do
not agree to a political settlement, we are going to be needed
for a much longer time than if they do.
So I would hope, Secretary Rumsfeld, that you would take
back at least this suggestion to the administration, to the
President, even though you do not want to tell us or do not
know perhaps what your own advice would be on this key issue as
to what public statement should be made if they do not keep
their own timetable. I would hope that you would take back the
suggestion that, in order for those important words to have
some kind of ``oomph'' behind them, some kind of impact, there
has to be a suggestion which is explicit: Folks, political
settlement is essential to ending the insurgency. Our experts
all here say that. A political settlement requires a
constitution, and if you do not meet the deadline for settling
your political differences and adopting a constitution, then we
are in a deeper soup than we are in now relative to the
insurgency. That is the testimony here this morning.
I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that you would pass along this
suggestion, that there be an explicit statement to the Iraqis
that not only do we expect them to keep their timetable for
adopting a constitution, but that if they do not that we would
have to assess our position, not prejudging what we would do,
but looking at all options, including but not limited to
setting a timetable for withdrawal. Are you willing to at least
consider that and take that suggestion back?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will be happy to take that back, and
I do know what I think. I would like to clarify one thing. You
seem to include in their timetable the possibility of a 6-month
delay. I want it very clear that I do not favor a 6-month delay
even though that may be permitted under the Transitional
Administrative Law.
Senator Levin. Well, good for you. I hope that the words
then are followed by actions as to what will be the effect if
they extend it. That is fine with me.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Fair enough.
Let me make one other comment, Senator Levin. You raised
the question of the Vice President's remarks about the ``last
throes.'' You and I both have emphasized the importance of
progress on the political side. The enemy knows that as well,
and they know that if a democracy is established with a
permanent government under a constitution in Iraq that they
have lost a great deal. I do not doubt for a minute that they
will respond to that challenge and recognize how important it
is for them not to lose and in these final months between now
and that constitution-drafting and the election they may very
well be in their last throes by their own view because they
recognize how important it will be if they lose and in fact if
a democracy is established.
I think those words, while I would not did not use them, I
think it is understandable that we should expect that kind of
response from the enemy.
Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses. General Casey and General
Abizaid, thank you for your outstanding leadership to the men
and women who are serving this Nation. Also, I would express my
appreciation to others, like General Petraeus, who are doing
such an outstanding job.
I share your view that there are some signs of progress
that should be encouraging to us and I share your view that we
have to stay the course and the worst thing we could do would
be to set a time or date of withdrawal of U.S. troops until the
Iraqi military is able to take over those responsibilities of
ensuring the security and safety of the Iraqi people as they
transition to democracy.
I also must tell you I am very worried. My concerns range
from overstressing our National Guard and Reserves, some of
whom are going back to Iraq for the second and third time, to
our recruiting shortfalls. I am not satisfied yet with the
plans that you may have to address that issue.
General Casey, I may have gotten the wrong briefing
yesterday, but I understand the attacks are up and casualties
are up, not down, over a year ago. Go ahead, please.
General Casey. I was specifically speaking about attacks
against civilians.
Senator McCain. I see, thank you.
General Casey. I am sorry. Just to be clear, attacks now
currently as compared to a year ago are actually about the
same. If they are up it is only slightly, it is not
significant.
Senator McCain. Thank you. But the fact that it is not
significantly down is not encouraging to me.
General Casey. As it should not be.
Senator McCain. General Casey, could we talk a little bit
about the training of the Iraqi military? We went back and
forth, perhaps for too long, in this committee about how many
were trained and equipped, and then I think all of us agreed
that we should grade by units rather than individuals. What
percentage of the Iraqi units would you judge now are combat-
ready?
General Casey. Senator, let me use the same kind of
criteria we use for the United States Army.
Senator McCain. Go ahead.
General Casey. Let me give you some generalities here.
First of all, let me tell you what we have done over the past
months. We have developed a readiness assessment very similar
to our own readiness assessment process. We have established
four readiness categories. I think General Petraeus may have
talked to you about that. It is a classified assessment, just
like our own is a classified assessment.
We categorize the units by those who are ready for
independent counterinsurgency operations--that is a very high
standard and we do not expect many of those to make that gate
for some time.
The second category is those that are capable of
counterinsurgency operations with enabling support from us,
with our transition teams and with intelligence and medevac,
those kind of supports from us. That number is increasing daily
and we will get a good number of units there probably before
the end of this year.
The third category is those that are good enough to operate
with us, but not operate by themselves even with our help. Then
the last category are those that are forming and are not ready
at all.
Senator McCain. I understand.
General Casey. So, that is how we lay that out.
Senator McCain. Well, I think we need to know that
information, General Casey. I do not know why it is classified.
We need to know how things are progressing in Iraq. That is the
key element to success in Iraq.
Maybe, Mr. Chairman, we can somehow elicit that. We seem to
have great difficulty getting information, including redacting
of information in the Boeing thing and the failure to get other
information. I find that very frustrating.
General Casey, I do not think it is an illegitimate nor
should it be a classified answer, what percentage of those
170,000 are combat-ready.
General Casey. Okay, and I am not----
Chairman Warner. We can proceed to a closed hearing
following----
Senator McCain. Well, then we will proceed to a closed
hearing. I think the American people need to know, Mr.
Chairman. They are the ones who are paying for this conflict.
But, I will drop the question for now.
General Abizaid, obviously one of the major problems that
we have is this new influx of foreigners into Iraq across
Syrian borders; is that not correct?
General Abizaid. That is correct, Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. A larger and larger percentage of these
suicide bombers come from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other
countries, is that not correct?
General Abizaid. That is correct. We have also seen an
influx of suicide bombers from North Africa, specifically
Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.
Senator McCain. Syria is facilitating this passage through
money, training, equipment, and other means; is that correct?
General Abizaid. I think I would put it somewhat
differently. I would say that there is a clear node inside
Syria which facilitates it. Whether or not the Syrian
government is facilitating it or ignoring it is probably a
debatable question. But the key node is Damascus in Syria.
Senator McCain. It is a growing problem?
General Abizaid. It is.
Senator McCain. If Syria does not enforce its borders,
should we reach a point where we may not want to respect those
borders?
General Abizaid. I think that question is best put to the
policymakers. But I would tell you that the Syrians have not
done enough.
Senator McCain. I think it is probably a tough question for
you.
General Abizaid, my other comment is that I believe that
too often we are going into the same places we have been in
before, and that means we are not staying and clearing as
opposed to coming in and striking and leaving. Maybe it is the
training of the Iraqi military that would help us, because
clearly we do not have enough troops to do all that. Maybe it
is the training of the Iraqi troops that would do that.
But, do you see any improvement in that scenario? For
example, I hear in Fallujah now we are having firefights again
after one of the toughest battles in really American military
history, much less in the Iraqi war. I would be interested in
your comments about that.
General Casey. If I could, Senator. It is probably more
appropriate for me to take that question than it is for General
Abizaid.
Senator McCain. Go ahead, General.
General Casey. As I mentioned, we are fighting a thinking
enemy here. This conflict ebbs and flows--action, reaction,
counteraction. We are constantly moving forces around, trying
to take advantage of vulnerabilities that we see in him, and
sometimes we move forces to react.
These Marine operations that we have just seen out west are
intelligence-based operations designed to disrupt the flow of
foreign fighters through the Euphrates River Valley into
Baghdad. The operations that we are doing up north, in the
northwest, with our Third Armored Cavalry Regiment and the
Third Iraqi Army Division, are the same thing: going out after
intelligence and then conducting operations based on that
intelligence.
Your notion that after these operations are conducted
putting in Iraqi security forces to sustain the success is
exactly the right notion, and it is exactly the notion that we
are following. As they continue to develop, you are going to
see more and more Iraqis taking charge of areas and coalition
forces stepping back. But your notion is exactly right.
Senator McCain. Thank you. Again, I want to thank you for
your leadership. You give us confidence, you give us hope. I
can only speak for myself, but I know I speak for many of my
colleagues. This is a conflict we have to win and we cannot
afford to lose. We are appreciative that we have the quality of
leadership that we have there today.
Thank you.
General Myers. Can I follow onto just a couple of
questions?
Chairman Warner. General Myers.
General Myers. Senator McCain, the one on Syria. My worry
is not just the border, it is the ease with which foreign
fighters transit through Syria and somehow are facilitated as
well, not just getting past the borders, but what might happen
in terms of identification they acquire somewhere along the
way. Whether or not the Syrian Government is involved in that
is pretty murky. But it is clear that foreign fighters are
going----
Senator McCain. At least they must be acquiescing, would
you think?
General Myers. You would think so. I mean, it is a pretty
tightly controlled country, so you have to assume that they
have some knowledge of what is going on in their capitals and
in their land. I think that is inexcusable. It disrupts
stability in Iraq and it contributes, of course, to the killing
of coalition men and women. So, it is unacceptable behavior and
it is happening. I would enlarge that a little bit.
The other question, you mentioned the health of the Reserve
component, and I share your concerns. I think we have worked
all our forces very hard. That is one of the things that we
have to be very aware of. I do not know of reservists that have
gone back for a second or a third time unless they have done it
voluntarily. Now, in the Air Force they will have done that,
but I do not know of other reservists, unless it is voluntary,
that have gone more than once.
We track that. If we could track it by name we would. We do
not have the data to do that, but we track it by individuals,
basically, in units is how we do it.
But, I do share the concern about the health of the force,
certainly.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to thank General Casey, General Myers, General Abizaid, and
Secretary Rumsfeld for their service to our country.
During the course of their presentations we heard the words
``dedication,'' the ``commitment,'' ``sacrifice,'' and
``courage'' to describe our Armed Forces, and that is something
that all of us admire, respect, and commend for those men and
women in the regular forces, the Reserves, and the Guard. Quite
frankly, it puts an additional burden, I think, on all of us to
make sure that we are going to get it right over in Iraq,
because the kinds of sacrifice that all of you have talked
about about American service men and women and in terms of the
Iraqis as well mean that we have a real responsibility to get
it correct.
That comes to the policymakers and moves out of those that
are out there going on patrols every day and every night and
doing the job that they feel is important and is important in
terms of the United States. So it is the policy. It is the
policymakers.
Which brings me, Mr. Secretary, to you. Secretary Rumsfeld,
we are in serious trouble in Iraq and this war has been
consistently and grossly mismanaged. We are now in a seemingly
intractable quagmire. Our troops are dying and there really is
no end in sight.
The American people I believe deserve leadership worthy of
the sacrifices that our fighting forces have made and they
deserve the real facts. I regret to say that I do not believe
that you have provided either.
You were wrong in September 2002 when you told the House
Armed Services Committee that, knowing what we know about
Iraq's history, no conclusion is possible except that they have
and are escalating their weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs. You were wrong when you told this committee that no
terrorist state poses a greater, more immediate threat to the
security of our people than the regime of Saddam Hussein in
Iraq.
When General Shinseki estimated that we would need several
hundred thousand soldiers, you scoffed and said the idea that
it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces was far from
the mark. When the massive looting occurred after Baghdad fell
because we did not have enough troops for security, you
callously said: Stuff happens.
You wrongly insisted after Saddam fell that there was no
guerrilla war, even though our soldiers continued to be killed.
In June 2003 you said, ``The reason I do not use the phrase
`guerrilla war' is because there is not one.''
You wrongly called the insurgents ``dead-enders,'' but they
are killing Americans, almost three a day, and Iraqis with
alarming frequency and intensity.
You wrongly sent our service members into battle without
the proper armor. When asked by a soldier about inadequate
equipment, you said: ``You go to war with the army you have.
They are not the army you might want or wish to have at a later
time.''
You exaggerated our success in training capable Iraqi
security forces. In February 2004, you told this committee:
``We have accelerated the training of Iraqi security forces,
now more than 200,000.'' That was in February of this year. In
fact, we had far fewer actually able or capable of fighting
then and far fewer that are capable even now.
So, you basically have mismanaged the war and created an
impossible situation for military recruiters and put our forces
and our national security in danger. Our troops deserve better,
Mr. Secretary, and I think the American people deserve better.
They deserve competency and they deserve the facts.
In baseball it is three strikes, you are out. What is it
for the Secretary of Defense?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, that is quite a statement. First
let me say that there is not a person at this table who agrees
with you that we are in a quagmire and that there is no end in
sight. The presentations today have been very clear, they have
been very forthright.
Second, the suggestion by you that people are painting a
rosy picture is false. There has been balance in my remarks. It
is always possible for you to select out a word or two and cite
it and suggest that that was the thrust of it, but the fact is
from the beginning of this we have recognized that this is a
tough business, that it is difficult, that it is dangerous, and
that it is not predictable.
Third, the issue of a guerrilla war. I mean, my goodness, I
do not think it is a guerrilla war. You may think so. I do not
know if anyone at this table thinks so. It is an insurgency. It
is a semantic issue, but listing that as some sort of crime or
wrongdoing or misleading it seems to me is a world class
stretch.
I did call them ``dead-enders.'' I do not know what else
you would call a suicide bomber. What is a person who straps a
vest on themselves, walks into a dining hall, and kills
themselves and kills innocent Iraqi people or innocent
coalition soldiers? It seems to me that that is a perfectly
appropriate comment.
With respect to the Iraqi security forces, there has been a
great deal of misinformation that has been thrown around in
this country. You know and we have told this committee on
repeated occasions that in the early periods they included the
site protection people, so the numbers were higher by some
80,000. We said that. It is in the material that is presented
to your committee every week or 2. There is an asterisk in
there, a footnote; it says it. We have repeated it, and to then
pull that number out and say it is less today it seems to me is
misleading.
I will say that the idea that what is happening over there
is a quagmire is so fundamentally inconsistent with the facts.
The reality is that they are making political progress without
question. Reality is that the American forces that are training
and equipping and mentoring the Iraqi security forces are doing
a darn good job, and the number has been going up steadily and
consistently, and I would be happy to have General Abizaid or
General Casey mention the effective work they are doing.
To denigrate them and to suggest that they are not
capable--to be sure, they are not like the U.S. forces. They
are never going to be like U.S. forces. There is not an army or
a navy or an air force on the face of the Earth that is
comparable to the United States military. But that does not
mean that they are not capable of doing that which needs to be
done.
To talk about the total number of 168,500 and suggest that
because they all cannot be deployed across the country at any
given moment, with their own lift and their own intelligence
and their own combat support, it seems to me misunderstands the
situation. In the material we give you a large number of them
are police. They are not supposed to deploy anyplace. Policemen
in Washington, DC, do not get in airplanes and fly to
California.
These people are trained to be border guards. They do not
deploy. They do not need to deploy. They go out to the border
and they guard the border. They are policemen; they go to the
city and they do their police work. There is a full range of
security forces. Site protection people, they go out to an oil
well and they sit there and guard the oil well.
There are a limited number of military people and special
police battalions that have the responsibility of
counterinsurgency and they do an increasingly good job.
I must say that I think the comments you made are certainly
yours to make and I do not agree with them.
Senator Kennedy. Well, my time is just expired. But, Mr.
Secretary, I am talking about the misjudgments and the mistakes
that were made, the series which I have mentioned, the
disarming of the Iraqi army. Those were judgments that were
made and there have been a series of gross errors and mistakes.
Those are on your watch.
Isn't it time for you to resign?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I have offered my resignation
to the President twice and he has decided that he would prefer
that he not accept it, and that is his call.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Casey. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. But, as the
commander in Iraq, I would like to put myself on the record,
Senator Kennedy, as saying that I also agree with the Secretary
that to represent the situation in Iraq as a quagmire is a
misrepresentation of the facts. I thought I was fairly clear in
what I laid out in my testimony about what is going on in Iraq,
but you have an insurgency with no vision, no base, limited
popular support, an elected government, committed Iraqis to the
democratic process, and you have Iraqi security forces that are
fighting and dying for their country every day. Senator, that
is not a quagmire.
Senator Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I put in the record the
interview of General Vines, who says the situation is
absolutely static in Iraq today. That is on June 21, 2005. I
will put his in the record as well. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Warner. This is an important issue. Are there any
other members of the panel that wish to address that question?
General Myers. It is clearly not a quagmire. It never has
been. The term has been used loosely and it is not accurate in
my estimation. I identify myself with General Casey's comments.
Chairman Warner. General Abizaid.
General Abizaid. I guess the only thing I have to say is I
have been fighting this next to the Secretary for a long time
and there is no doubt that I certainly have made my mistakes.
But, when it comes to toughness and ``stick-to-it-iveness'' and
fighting the enemy the way they need to be fought, I am
standing by the Secretary.
Chairman Warner. Now, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we all know that the cut-and-run caucus is always
alive and well. It does not matter what war it is, what
conflict it is, and it certainly is active today.
In the opening statement you made, General Myers, you said
that for us to leave prior to the time that our mission is
complete, it would be catastrophic. I agree with that, but I
want to make sure that the other three witnesses get on the
record as to agreeing with that statement. General Casey,
General Abizaid?
General Casey. I am certainly in agreement.
General Abizaid. I agree with General Casey, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Good.
A year ago the American people would not have known what we
were talking about if we mentioned an IED. They do today. We
had a hearing, as the chairman said, yesterday or the day
before on this and at Fort Irwin last week there was an IED
seminar. You have briefly addressed this, but I would like to
get on the record any progress that is being made, anything
specific to the IED and what it is looking like in the future,
if you could comment, any of you who want to, to elaborate any
more than you already have.
General Casey. Other than the session, Senator, that you
have already alluded to, where the Army continues to focus
their efforts technologically to give us the tools that we need
to defeat these IEDs, that process is continuous and it is
ongoing.
I will tell you that I have asked several times. What we
really need is a way to set off a blasting cap from a distance.
All of these IEDs and car bombs are all triggered by a blasting
cap and if you can set that off--if you think about it, have
you ever been by a construction site where you see the sign
that says: ``Turn off your two-way radios; blasting caps in
use.'' My sense has always been if you can do it with a radio,
why can you not do it in Iraq?
Senator Inhofe. General Casey, some of us have been exposed
to some new technologies out there that are working on that
right now, and hopefully there will be technological help in
the field for you on that.
Any comment, General Abizaid?
General Abizaid. Senator, it is very clear that, in today's
connected world, the insurgents are sharing lessons learned.
They do it on the Internet. They do it in a lot of different
ways. We see their technologies moving from the battlefield in
Iraq to the battlefield in Afghanistan and no doubt we will see
that elsewhere.
This is, like General Casey said, it is action, reaction,
counteraction. We have to tighten our tactics, techniques, and
procedures as much as we can. But, I am convinced, like General
Casey is, that there are technologies out there that could be
more useful and we have to work real hard to find them.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. We will try to help in that
regard.
It has appeared to me that most people who are critical of
what is going on over there are the ones who do not go over and
see for themselves. Unfortunately, if you rely on the media for
your information as to the progress of the conflict over there,
then you are in really bad shape. This has bothered me a lot. I
think most of the members of this committee have been there. I
have been there quite a few times, twice in the last 3 months.
You go over, like in the Sunni Triangle, and experience
over there with General Madhi, all of you know him. He used to
be the brigade commander for Saddam Hussein in Fallujah. He
hated Americans, and now he has been training with our marines.
He looked at us and said that when the marines had to rotate
and go out they actually cried. Here is a general that just
hated Americans under Saddam Hussein and he has actually
renamed his Iraqi security forces the ``Fallujah Marines.''
At the same time we were there, at Tikrit they had the
blow-up of the training area. Ten were killed, 30 were severely
wounded. General Myers mentioned, or one of you did, the fact
that they are giving members of their family to replace those
who are killed. All 40 families that were involved replaced the
person that was either killed or injured with their own people.
As you go across the Sunni Triangle, where they are
supposed to hate us the most--in a helicopter maybe 100 feet
off the ground is the safest way to do it--and you see our
troops throwing candy and cookies that came from the people
back home, and the little kids in the villages waving American
flags and waving at us. That is not the picture you get in the
media.
I would only ask you this question. That was about a month
ago. Do you see any deterioration in that support that we are
getting from those people out in the villages as a result of
some of the increase in attacks or of the negative media that
we have?
General Casey. Senator, we do not. As I mentioned, the
insurgents and the terrorists have a fairly narrow base that
they operate from, and the people in the villages that you
mentioned are the same people who want a better future for
their family and they want to be part of the political process.
If I could just give you an indicator, that being recent
polling across Iraq. Better than 80 percent of the population
says that they want to vote, they are going to vote in the
referendum and they are going to vote in the election based on
that constitution. They want to be part of this process.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
General Myers. In fact, Senator, let us put up the chart,
``Confidence in the National Government.''
[The chart referred to follows:]
General Myers. It is a different slant on it, but recent
polling data. This is the confidence that the Iraqi people have
in their government. It starts back in December 2004 and it
goes through May of this year. I know some of it is hard to
read, but you can see the increase in the green and the
percentage of people that have now more and more confidence as
time goes on. The big surge after the elections, and that surge
has continued, I think, which just adds to, adds to what
General Casey said.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate it.
Mr. Chairman, I think we should get copies of that. It is a
very significant chart.
Again, let me just thank you for the great job you are
doing. Hopefully we can--one last question, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I have to say, Senator, roughly
calculating, these witnesses have to appear before the House at
2:00.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I am anxious to have all members have
their opportunity.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, we are at a juncture in this effort that
requires not only military forces, but complementary civilian
forces--State Department personnel, aid workers--because we are
in a phase where we have to inspire political engagement and
also reconstruct the shattered infrastructure. Do we have
sufficient civilian personnel throughout the country to do
that?
I am under the impression that State Department personnel
are volunteers and many are volunteering out of their
expertise. Is that your impression?
General Abizaid. Senator Reed, I do not know that I can
comment specifically on their authorized strength versus what
is out in the field. But, I can say that this war must be
fought with all of the agencies of the United States Government
fully engaged, with people that stay in the field long-term,
that are in the right place at the right time. I believe that
there are clear indications that we have to do better in this.
Senator Reed. So, without putting words in your mouth, your
impression is they are not fully engaged? Again, that goes to
the overriding issue of how serious we are about winning this
war if a major component of our strategy, the civilian side, is
manned by volunteers and is not fully engaged.
General Abizaid. Senator, of course a State Department
person, for example, is not the same as an infantryman on the
battlefield. But a State Department person in a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan, or a U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) person in that same sort of a
location is worth an awful lot to us. As a matter of fact, the
combat troops provide the shield behind which their work can be
done.
I think we need more of those types of dedicated
professionals out in the field. I want to make it very clear,
from the time that you traveled around with me, that when you
find those people out there they are magnificent, they are
every bit as magnificent as our troops. We need to check to
make sure we have the right ones at the right place for the
right amount of time.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Casey, you are the ground commander. What is your
estimate of how long this level of violence can be sustained,
the car bombing? Again, we are talking about terrorist
activities more than conventional engagements. Is this a year
or 2, given the flow of insurgents, given the access to
weapons?
General Casey. As several people have commented on over the
course of the hearing here, Senator, political and economic
advances will impact on that. So, it is very hard to gauge. I
will tell you that there is sufficient ammunition stashed
around Iraq purposely that is available to these insurgents.
That will be available to them for some time. They are not
having to import the ammunition that they put into these
devices.
But, as the political process takes hold here, I think you
will see a gradual lessening of the insurgency.
Senator Reed. General Casey, it is interesting because we
saw the political process take hold with the elections, which
were quite stirring. When I was there over the Easter holiday
with you and General Abizaid, there was a sense that perhaps a
breakthrough had been made. But, since that time they have
shown, the insurgents, great resiliency, cunning, the ability
to supply themselves from indigenous stockpiles, and to create
a level of violence that is extremely disturbing, at least here
in the United States. I do not know if further political
progress in the next year or 2 will have that much of a
dampening effect.
But let me----
General Casey. If I could, Senator. I am sorry----
Senator Reed. Yes, General.
General Casey. That first election was a first step. It was
a great step. It was a magnificent day for the Iraqi people.
But, as we discussed when you were there, it is a first step. I
tried to talk to everybody who came over, just to say, look,
this is not over yet; this is a resilient insurgency. They are
committed in their own way and we are in a fight.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
I am glad General Myers put that chart up, Mr. Secretary,
because if you did the numbers for the American public you
would probably be running exactly the opposite direction. We
have a credibility gap here with the American people. Forget
people here on this dais. I think it is obvious why some
Americans are very distrustful of what is going on. They were
told this was a war about WMDs and there are no WMDs. They were
told that it was about terrorism, but there are tenuous links
to terrorists. In fact, there are more international terrorists
in Baghdad today than there were several years ago. They were
told that we would be greeted as liberators. We are engaged in
a very fierce fight that is taking roughly a battalion-sized
group of Americans every month as casualties, killed, wounded,
and injured. Your own plans called for a steep reduction in
troops immediately after the conventional efforts. That never
transpired.
We have, I think, an erosion of trust which this hearing I
suppose was an attempt to stem. I think they also see at the
end of this process, not this transformed democratic state in
the Middle East, but a fragile client of the United States for
many years to come, and that has given them great concern. The
polls measure that.
I think also our moral clarity was seriously undercut by
Abu Ghraib, and I do not feel yet we have held senior officials
accountable for what took place there and other parts of the
area of operations and indeed in Guantanamo.
Now, at the end also I think we will find a broken Army. We
cannot sustain the tempo of operations for the next year or 2.
The comments that Senator McCain and others made about our
Reserve Forces. We still have huge threats, I would argue much
more daunting than Iraqi, North Korea, Iran, and other places.
So I guess, Mr. Secretary, the question is what can you say
to try to bridge this credibility gap? As General Abizaid has
said, we are not truly engaged on the civic side. We have
volunteer State Department people. They struggle to find enough
people to go out there. That is not a serious effort to win a
war. As General Casey said, this violence is likely to
continue, because of supplies in country and the commitment of
these terrorists, for many months ahead.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you said even my own plan
called for steep reductions. I did not have a plan like that. I
am sure you can find somebody who had a plan like that, and
maybe General Abizaid did or Tom Franks did. But, we had not
made judgments. We had a plan that would have flown in as many
troops as were needed to succeed in defeating the Saddam
Hussein regime, and it happened that that occurred at the level
where we stopped it.
It was not my recommendation. It was the battlefield
commander's recommendation. They had a variety of sensitivities
as to what they would do with the troop levels. In the event it
got worse, it would go up. If it got better it would go down.
But, to pull up that and suggest that that is some error or
wrong or mistake is just inconsistent with the facts.
The broken Army argument worries me. The United States Army
is the finest in the world, without question. The Air Force and
the Navy and the Marine Corps are in good health. There are
some shortages in recruiting for elements of the Army.
Retention, however, is high. Retention is particularly high of
people who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus far we
have used something less than 50 percent of the Reserve
components, the Guard and the Reserve. That is just a fact.
There are people who have, as General Myers said,
undoubtedly served two or three times over there, or in Bosnia
or Kosovo or Afghanistan or Iraq. The process we have is to do
everything humanly possible to see that those are individual
volunteers, and that has been overwhelmingly the case. They are
people who put their hand up and said: I have been there and I
want to go back and I want to serve my country.
You are quite right, there are other threats and dangers in
the world. If you ask General Myers or General Pace, the people
who meet with the chiefs and the combatant commanders, whether
the United States is capable of meeting those other demands,
they will answer you that we are capable of meeting those other
demands. If you ask what are we doing about avoiding having a
broken Army, the answer is--we had yesterday I think another 2
hours on the subject of all the things we can do to reduce
stress on the force. We have something like 47 items that we
are working on and have been for well over a year and a half to
see that the stress on the force is relieved. It has involved
tens of thousands of people who have been rebalanced and
shifted.
The implication that there is an inattentiveness or a lack
of concern about the stress on the force is simply not correct.
We are deeply concerned about it and we are working the
problem, and when this is over we will not have a broken Army.
Senator Reed. Well, Mr. Secretary, what I think I heard you
say is if the plan works it is your plan; if the plan does not
work it is the Army officer's plan. I do not think that is
responsible.
Chairman Warner. Senator, we are not going to be able to
allow other Senators their opportunity. I want to make certain
that there is a full response to your important question. I see
that the Chairman wishes to respond to the question.
General Myers. Just 10 seconds. I just need to state my
belief, and my belief is that we really--in my view, we do not
have a more daunting threat to U.S. national security than
violent extremists. I think that is our primary threat right
now. I do not think it is North Korea or other places in the
world. I think it is violent extremism is the most daunting
threat and the one that can have the biggest impact on our way
of life.
Chairman Warner. General Abizaid, do you wish to respond?
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed, I think it
is very important that we never lose sight of this problem of
WMDs. This enemy that we are fighting in the region seeks to
obtain a biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon, and if they
can acquire it or develop it they will use it against us. There
should be no mistake about that.
Chairman Warner. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Gentlemen, we appreciate all of your service. Secretary
Rumsfeld, I am particularly pleased that you have committed
yourself to serving this country in the way that you have. You
and the President made a commitment to allow the military to
make honest suggestions about how to fight this war and to give
them the resources they have needed, and I do not think it is
fair to say that you are blaming them for problems if they did
not ask for more soldiers. I think we know how that happened
and everybody understands it, and I certainly do not believe
you should resign and I honor your commitment, your
transformation of the military, your tough, steadfast support
for the soldiers in the field, and for our military efforts in
the war against terrorism.
General Casey, this chart that was put up there I think is
rather important. It showed that in December only 6 percent of
the Iraqi people had a great deal of confidence, but as of May
it is now 41 percent. A total of 74 percent have confidence in
their national government.
Would you say that that is an absolutely critical question
for the future of Iraq, the confidence that the people of Iraq
have in the ability of their government to function? Is that
not a source of encouragement for us of a significant nature?
General Casey. It is certainly a source of encouragement to
me in my job. In fact, you recall I mentioned that in my
opening statement, the fact that the confidence of the Iraqi
people in their government is high.
Senator Sessions. This is in the face of this newer tactic
or repeated tactic of automobile attacks that hit so many
civilians. They move into crowds and have killed and injured
quite a number of civilians in recent months. But still the
numbers are holding firm. How do you evaluate that?
General Casey. As I mentioned, we should not underestimate
the commitment of the Iraqi people to wanting something better.
What is happening there with these car bombs is murder and we
ought not forget that. As I said, one tenth of 1 percent of the
population we think may be supporting or participating in this
insurgency. The rest of the Iraqi people are moving forward, as
this chart here indicates.
There is another chart up here, if you do not mind,
Senator. If you would put up the chart there with the four pie
charts on it.
[The chart referred to follows:]
General Casey. This is also very important to me here,
because it reflects how the Iraqi people think about their
security forces. You can see up in the top left-hand corner
that they believe the Iraqi security forces are winning the
battles against the terrorists. If you look on the right-hand
side, they believe that their Iraqi security forces are
professional and well-trained. You can follow your way around
that chart.
Chairman Warner. Excuse me, General. We will need to know
who prepared that poll and the circumstances under which it was
prepared.
General Casey. I will give you that data for the record,
Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Warner. Senator Sessions, please proceed.
Senator Sessions. We all value free speech and people are
able to express themselves as they desire in this great
country, and we want to see people around the world have the
opportunity to express themselves. It seems like to me,
however, that we need to be careful about the comments that we
make. We know a false story in Newsweek magazine led to riots
in Pakistan when it was alleged that a Koran had been flushed
down a toilet, whereas the truth is that our soldiers in
Guantanamo wear gloves, they give everyone a Koran that wants
one, and they treat it with respect, and many other things are
done to show respect for the Islamic religion.
We have had 29 hearings on prisoner abuse and, frankly,
there has been absolutely no proof of any systematic abuse, and
what we have seen is consistent prosecutions and discipline of
soldiers and military people and others who violated our
standards of treating prisoners in a humane way.
I would just say that I think the military has handled that
well. But, it does appear to me that, if you read the
newspapers, you would draw a different conclusion.
General Abizaid, you have been in the region for some time.
Would you say that, with regard to recruiting these terrorists
to come in the country, the riots in Pakistan, the ability of
our troops in Iraq to win the confidence of the people there,
that our efforts can be adversely affected by false charges
against our military, and does it have impact on the personal
safety of the soldiers this Congress has sent in harm's way to
execute our policies?
General Abizaid. Senator, this conflict in which we are
engaged is more about perceptions in many respects than about
true battlefield capability. Our enemies want people to believe
that we do not respect them, that we dishonor them, that we are
against Islam. They want to create the impression that we will
steal their resources, that we will ravage their countryside.
The truth is that as long as we tell the truth and get that
story out and concentrate, not only about whatever we may have
done wrong, but also telling the story, the great untold story,
about this enemy, I think we will be just fine. The vast
majority of people in the region hate the extremists. They do
not want to follow them. False stories giving them an
opportunity for hope, however, really hurt us very much.
In one of Zarqawi's letters to his followers he gave
numerous reports from U.S. media sources that showed we were
losing, that we were losing our will, that we were unable to
fight this fight. I do not think we should give false hope to
this enemy. We will defeat them.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Clinton.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, if I may, please.
Chairman Warner. Yes, General Myers.
General Myers. Let me just tag onto General Abizaid's
comments. Fundamentally this is going to be about resolve, the
perception issue. It is about resolve, about staying power,
about patience. All war, particularly this conflict I think,
demands that. When it is about resolve and persistence and
patience, I can guarantee you our military is being very
effective over there every day.
Our folks know how to fight. Sometimes you hear criticism
about our inability to wage urban warfare. That is rubbish. We
are the best urban warfighters in the world. We are better than
the adversary. We have not made this a contest of who kills the
most, because in the end I do not think that serves anybody
very well. We have learned our lessons, and I do not want us to
do that.
But, I think the American public can be assured that our
military is very effective at what they are doing.
So if resolve is important, then leadership is important,
and we have to be very careful what we say, all of us. We do
not want to say it is too easy, it is too hard. We want to say,
as best as we know, the facts and present them.
Earlier today we were talking about the threat and there
was a comment made about the threat, that the threat is static
according to General Vines in a Baghdad press conference that
he had with the press corps back here. Here is what General
Vines said. He said: ``I need to clarify. The reason that I
said that I assumed the condition will remain relatively
static''--and I think the condition is the insurgency--``keep
in mind that those elections are only 4 months away. I mean,
there--I do not have any reason to believe there is going to be
a significant change in 4 months, absent a political
breakthrough.''
So they were well-qualified statements. We have to be very
careful when we make statements that we say what we mean and we
portray the facts the best we can.
I would like to enter General Vines statement in the
record, please.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Warner. Without objection, General; and I thank
you for that contribution.
Secretary Rumsfeld.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, where
we have inaccurate statements or inaccurately cited statements,
Senator Kennedy cited this statement that we go to the war with
the Army we have. Let me read the full answer that I gave and
if anyone can find any implication of callousness in it, I just
cannot detect it.
I said: ``I talked to the general coming out here about the
pace at which the vehicles are being armored. They have been
brought from all over the world, wherever they are not needed,
to a place where they are needed. I am told they are being--the
Army is, I think, something like 400 a month are being done,
and it is essentially a matter of physics. It is not a matter
of money, it is not a matter on the part of the Army of desire.
It is a matter of production and capability and doing it. And
as you know, you go to the war with the Army you have. They are
not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.
Since the Iraq conflict began, the Army has been pressing ahead
to produce the armor necessary at a rate they believe--and it
is a greatly expanded rate from what existed previously, but--a
rate that they believe is a rate that they can accomplish at
the moment.
``I can assure you that General Schoomaker and the
leadership in the Army and certainly General Whitcomb are
sensitive to the fact that not every vehicle has the degree of
armor that might be desirable for it to have, but that they are
working on it at a good clip.
``It is interesting. I talked a great deal about this with
a team of people who were working on it hard at the Pentagon.
If you think about it, you can have all the armor in the world
on a tank and a tank can still be blown up, and you can have an
up-armored HMMWV and it can be blown up, and you can go down in
the vehicle. The goal we have is to have as many of those
vehicles as is humanly possible with the appropriate level of
armor available for the troops, and that is what the Army has
been working on.''
The Washington Post put on the front page: ``You go to war
with the Army you have,'' implying a disinterest. It is that
kind of treatment and the kind of treatment here today,
dredging up that old quote out of context, that I find harmful
to what we are trying to accomplish.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, let me just say, there is a
lot of politics here and we are used to give and take, and we
take people's statements out of context politically a lot of
times. All of us have done it. But this is a war. We have
soldiers out there, and we need to be particularly careful that
we do not misrepresent things that place our soldiers in more
harm's way than they need to be.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and thank you for your
service under very difficult circumstances. I think that one of
the challenges we face in our country as well as in Congress is
that there are grounds for reasonable disagreements about how
we pursue our goals in Iraq and elsewhere. I absolutely agree
that our enemies are violent, nihilistic extremists. I agree
that if we and the Iraqi people and their government are
successful in Iraq it will be a transformative historic event.
I think it is also fair to point out that there are great
risks and dangers associated with this strategy, and that the
young men and women who wear the uniform of our country are put
in harm's way every day. I know how heavily that weighs on all
of us, those of you who command them and those of us who vote
to send them there and vote to try to provide the resources
that they need.
So, while there might be reasonable disagreements about how
we pursue our goals, I hope, Mr. Secretary, you would agree
that Democrats and Republicans, people of every political
belief and none at all, united after the September 11 attacks
on our Nation. That has been especially evident here in this
Senate Armed Services Committee, under the bipartisan
leadership of Chairman Warner and Ranking Member Levin.
Mr. Secretary, would you agree with that statement?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, there is no question but that
the country and Congress united after September 11.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, I am going to read you a
quote from today's newspaper: ``Conservatives saw the savagery
of September 11 and the attacks and prepared for war. Liberals
saw the savagery of the September 11 attacks and wanted to
prepare indictments and offer therapy and understanding for our
attackers.''
Mr. Secretary, do you agree with that statement by a senior
member of this administration?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know who made the statement or
the context of it, and I have just gotten through saying that
when one takes a single sentence or a single comment out of a
longer statement that may have context, I find frequently that
it is harmful. I do not know who said it or what the context
was, and obviously it is not something I said.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that.
Well, it is a statement by Karl Rove and it is the kind of
statement that is particularly harmful and painful. It is the
kind of statement that is unnecessary. It is the kind of
statement that demonizes Americans of good faith, seeking to
support the men and women in uniform, seeking to protect them,
seeking to support you, despite the fact that we might have
serious questions and even disagreements about strategy and
tactics.
It politicizes and turns into a partisan game something as
serious as the attack on our Nation on September 11 and
something as deadly as the conflict in which we are currently
engaged.
I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that you and other members of
the administration would immediately repudiate such an
insulting comment from a high-ranking official in the
President's inner circle.
It is very disturbing to many of us, increasingly so, that
we cannot have a national conversation about something as
important as the conflict that we face, which I for one believe
is a long-term challenge to our very existence, and is
certainly a challenge that you are attempting to deal with in
the field and in the Pentagon.
It is not just people on one side of the aisle who have
raised these issues. A recent bipartisan group of Members of
Congress called for an end to the conflict, a withdrawal of our
troops, something I do not agree with. But, I understand the
frustration and the concern and anxiety that motivates such a
statement and question, and I would not in any way question the
resolve, toughness, or patriotism of anybody who raises
legitimate questions and has disagreements about how we are to
pursue our objectives.
With due respect, I think it would be helpful if we would
hear a little bit more of that tone from our President and from
our Vice President and from our other high-ranking officials in
the administration. I am old enough to remember how deeply
divided our country was in Vietnam. I never want to see that
again. We may have disagreements about how to engage in this
conflict and how to win it, but I never want to live through
that again and I do not think any of us do.
I would respectfully suggest that perhaps we adopt a
somewhat different tone and approach in discussing these very
critical matters for the benefit of all of us, and particularly
for the benefit of the young men and women who we are so proud
of and so grateful to for their sacrifice.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I certainly agree. I think you
will find the tone in my remarks fit what you are talking
about. I think that it is unfortunate when things become so
polarized or so politicized, and you have heard some of that
here today. It is not helpful.
In my remarks I pointed out that there are a number of
questions that are raised by the public, by Members of the
House and the Senate, and that is a perfectly proper and
legitimate thing to do. Our democracy permits that. We can live
through it in a wartime period if we do it in an orderly way
and a sensible way and a civil way.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Senator Collins, I understand you yield. Senator Graham
must soon leave to preside over the Senate, so Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator Collins, for that. Mr.
Chairman, thank you very much.
Just recently here in the Senate we have spent a lot of
time discussing what one Member said. That was, I thought, way
out of bounds. That Member apologized. That was good. There was
a time when no one seemed to want to correct that statement,
and some of the things that Senator Clinton talked about are
really not helpful.
We talk about losing the war and what it would mean. The
only way, gentlemen, I see that we could possibly lose in Iraq
is to leave the country in shambles, not prepared, not capable
of defending itself and taking care of this new democracy
because we left too soon, before they had a chance to get a
functioning army and a functioning police force and to create
honest judges and to have the rule of law that we would put the
whole world at risk.
So to anyone, Republican or Democrat, who thinks that a
timetable is the answer, I could not disagree more. How hard is
it to create a country where everybody buys in? It is pretty
hard, and 100 and something years ago we were in a Civil War.
It started in my State. This is hard. How long does it take to
get over a 1,400-year religious dispute? Probably a little
longer than between now and December.
We have bought into a model that is extremely difficult,
and you cannot kill enough of these people. The model is to
leave in Iraq the chance for them to govern themselves where
moderation trumps terrorism, where mothers have a say about
their children, where you can go to court based on what you
did, not who you are. That is a very big challenge and the only
answer.
Losing is leaving before the job is done. What would make
us leave? The last time an American lost on the battlefield was
when the Confederacy was defeated. We will not lose a battle.
It is not a military problem in terms of losing. We will lose
this war if we leave too soon, and what is likely to make us do
that? The public going south, and that is happening and that
worries me greatly.
So, Mr. Secretary, you have described the dynamic in 1946,
I think very accurately. There was a lot of concern about
reconstructing Europe after World War II. I see this engagement
in Iraq as very similar to our World War II endeavor, not
Vietnam. This is not about trying to take sides in a dispute
within a country. This is about taking sides in a dispute
between freedom-loving people and terrorists.
Whether we should have been there or not is no longer the
question. We are there. The people who want us to leave are the
same people who tried to kill us on September 11.
It is a World War II event, but the public views this every
day, Mr. Secretary, more and more like Vietnam. Only 39 percent
in the last poll support the idea that we should be there.
What do you think is going on and how can we correct that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the members of this committee,
everyone in this room, and everyone listening know the answer
to that question as well as I do, and possibly better. Our
system says that we place all our faith, all our hope, in the
people of the country, and that, given sufficient information,
over time they will find their way to right decisions. I
believe that.
I have watched polls go from 0 to 55 percent and back down
to 15 percent in 6 weeks, and anyone who starts chasing polls
is going to get seasick.
Senator Graham. Do you believe this is an acute problem or
a chronic problem, with the public support waning?
Secretary Rumsfeld. An acute or a what?
Senator Graham. Chronic problem. Because in the last year,
sir, the public support in my State has turned, and I worry
about that because that is the only way we will ever leave
before we should, is if the public loses faith in us. I am here
to tell you, sir, in the most patriotic State I can imagine
people are beginning to question, and I do not think it is a
blip on the radar screen. I think we have a chronic problem on
our hands. If you disagree, I certainly respect that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, that is the time that leadership
has to stand up and tell the truth, and if you are facing a
headwind you have two choices: You can turn around and go
downwind or you can stand there and go into the wind, and that
is what needs to be done. We have leadership in this country
that is capable of doing that, let there be no doubt.
I think the American people have a good center of gravity.
Individually they have inner gyroscopes that may tilt from time
to time, but they get recentered, and they, given appropriate
leadership and continued success on the political and the
security side in that country, I am absolutely convinced that
we will have the willpower and the staying power and the
courage to do what is right there.
The alternative is to turn that region back to darkness, to
people who behead people, and that is not a happy prospect.
Senator Graham. I could not agree more.
One last thought and I have to go. General Abizaid, based
on the military situation as you know it, what is the
likelihood of the insurgents and the terrorists combined
launching a Tet-type offensive, where there are coordinated
attacks throughout the country that would result in substantial
loss of American or coalition lives? Because if that did happen
I really worry about the response in this country. How likely
is that and what can we do to prevent it?
General Abizaid. Senator, I can tell you, and George will
undoubtedly talk about this for Iraq in particular, but there
is always a likelihood of a militarily surprise. There is
always an opportunity for the enemy to figure out a way to
inflict casualties, to grab the headlines.
The challenge for us is to stay tough enough when that
happens to see ourself through it. We cannot be defeated by the
headlines. We cannot be defeated by this enemy. No doubt that
they can do us damage. In Afghanistan right now in particular,
we are getting ready to go to an election in September. The
enemy is coming as hard as they can. They have issued orders to
everybody that they can get their hands on to try to disrupt
this election because they are so afraid of it. But the
violence will not win.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
General Casey. I am sorry, Senator; if I could add to that.
Chairman Warner. Yes, General Casey, you may reply.
General Casey. Senator, I would just respond to that last
question about Tet. I believe we have greatly reduced the
potential or the capability for that to happen.
As I have listened here this afternoon there seems to be
some perception that the attacks have increased. Well, they
have from the low levels they sank to after the elections, but
last August the rate of attacks was at 800 per week. Last
November--I am sorry: they were over 900. In the elections,
over 800. We are talking for the last 7 weeks they have been
relatively constant at about between 450 and 500. So we are
almost half of where we were when it was really hard.
We have brought down that capability, and that is why the
absence of a safe haven becomes so important.
Senator Graham. I would like to correct the perception that
some people may have. I did not disagree with what Senator
Clinton said. I am all for us working together, and there are
no bad Americans here. Whether you are liberal, moderate, or
conservative, you are not the enemy. The enemy is the people
trying to kill us.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, I would like to thank all of you
for your service to our country.
General Myers, I would like to start with you if I could.
In February, in speaking about the history of insurgencies, you
indicated that they tended to run from 7 to 12 years in length.
I would like to ask you about that. If we say that this one has
been going on for about 2 years now, does that mean we are
looking at by historical standards another 5 to 10 years of
this insurgency?
General Myers. I think the answer is that we do not know.
One of the things we have not done very well in the hearing so
far is, when we talk about the insurgency, to describe for a
minute its constituent parts, because it is not homogeneous.
You have the foreign fighters who, despite what happens
politically in Iraq, will continue to try to do the coalition
and Iraqis in. They will only be persuaded to quit in a
political sense when the Iraqi people say enough is enough and
we are not going to----
Senator Bayh. I guess another way to ask my question is,
knowing what you know about this particular insurgency, do you
have reason to believe that it would take less time than the
average that you cited, the same, or perhaps more?
General Myers. Well, I do not know. I do not know the
answer to that question. I do think that, with the political
progress we have talked about, the insurgency will crest and
will start to reduce. A lot of these fighters are fighting
because there are foreign forces in the country. Some of them
are fighting because they want to be the next Saddam Hussein
regime. Those will go away. I think it will lessen over time.
How long it goes on, I do not know. Certainly not at this scale
for 7 to 9 years. That is not anything that I have in my mind.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, General.
Mr. Secretary, that leads me to you and a very difficult
question of how do we define success. I think I would associate
myself with the comments of Senator Graham and my other
colleagues that the key here is the American people, our
endurance. I think what they are looking for is two things: how
do we define success; and second, some benchmarks for
evaluating our progress toward reaching that goal. I would like
to ask you about both of those things.
What concerns me is that this may be an asymmetric
situation, where even though the political process moves
forward, even though the Shia and the Kurds get their act
together, including some of the responsible Sunnis in this
process, if you just have a hard-core--pick a figure--5
percent, 4 percent, armed and violent people, are they able to
undermine the wishes and the progress of the vast bulk of a
society?
So in an insurgency that may go on in some form for a
considerable period of time, when do we determine the country
is stable enough, no longer a threat to its neighbors, not a
haven for terrorists from which to threaten the rest of the
world? We may conclude that the success is something less than
perfect.
So my first question is, how do we define success? Then my
second question would be, what benchmarks do we look to?
General Casey, this may involve you. You mentioned that there
was a surge leading up to the elections, now we are at about
450 attacks a month. A year from now, what benchmark can we
set? Should it be 350 attacks, 250 attacks? Are there other,
economic benchmarks we should set, numbers of jobs created,
that kind of thing?
What objective criteria can we look to to evaluate our
progress toward what we define as success?
So, Mr. Secretary, first you on how we define success. Then
you and perhaps the other gentlemen in terms of the objective
benchmarks we should look to to evaluate our own performance.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I do not know if you were here
when General Casey made a comment estimating the size of the
insurgency, but it is nowhere near 4 or 5 percent of the
population.
Senator Bayh. No, I was just using that as an example. Some
small number of people and whether--it is an asymmetric
situation. Half a percent, whatever the figure might be, if
heavily armed----
Secretary Rumsfeld. What did you use, George?
General Casey. One-tenth of 1 percent.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will answer. A handful of people
can--it does not take a genius to kill people. It was 18 people
who killed 3,000 people on September 11. You do not have to
have armies and navies and air forces or large numbers. A small
number of people, determined to give up their own lives, can go
around and indiscriminately kill thousands and thousands and
thousands of human beings.
Now, how do you define success? I think I would separate it
between success for the United States and success for Iraq
slightly. In the last analysis, if this does go on for 4, 8,
10, 12, 15 years, whatever--and I agree with General Myers; we
do not know--it is going to be a problem for the people of
Iraq. They are going to have to cope with that insurgency over
time. They are ultimately going to be the ones who win over
that insurgency, and I believe they will win.
Now, for the United States success is slightly different.
Success for us is liberating those people, which is done by
passing sovereignty to an Iraqi government, which is done by
putting them on a path to fashion a constitution, which is
underway, and a path to elect a new government under that new
constitution, helping them get support from the international
community, which they now have from NATO and the U.N., and
helping them to raise money from the international community to
help train, equip, and organize their security forces so the
security forces can take over the responsibility for the
security of that country.
It is not our task to stay there forever. The success will
be if you have a single country, a moderate regime that is
respectful of the various elements within it, even if there is
a low-level insurgency that continues at 300 or 500 or whatever
the number may be, but that they have the people who can cope
with that, and that they are not attacking their neighbors and
they are not using chemical weapons on their own people and
they are not giving $25,000 to suicide bombers' families after
they go out and kill innocent men, women, and children, as
Saddam Hussein was.
Senator Bayh. Which leads to the question of the benchmarks
and how we can determine that point at which our job is done,
even if the low-level insurgency may continue for some time. So
do you, Mr. Secretary, gentlemen, do you have----
Secretary Rumsfeld. We have dozens of benchmarks in the
security side for our forces and our successes. We have dozens
of benchmarks that we use for the Iraqi security forces. The
State Department has dozens of benchmarks they look at with
respect to electricity, water, schools, those types of things,
and the economic things. So you have political, economic, and
security benchmarks and they all have to go forward together.
The benchmarks are there and we would be happy to brief you on
them.
General Myers. If I may, let me just go into a little bit
more detail on those benchmarks. In the National Security
Strategy for Iraq, there are now seven strategic objectives. We
just added one. The last one we added was to promote strategic
communications.
The first one is to transition to Iraqi security self-
reliance. So that is one of them, and that is the objective.
Under the objective then we have some objectives and goals and
metrics to measure our progress, just exactly what the
Secretary said.
The second one, a strategic objective, is a free and
democratic state of Iraq. That has a lot to do with their
political development. We have objectives and goals and metrics
under that one as well.
The third one is to provide essential services to the
citizens of Iraq, and we have metrics under that.
The fourth one is to establish a foundation for a strong
economy, and you hit on that. One of the things we track is job
creation. That is one of the things that would be one of the
benchmarks you would want to track.
Senator Bayh. General, will we be publishing our progress
toward meeting these benchmarks at regular intervals, so that
the American people can know about our progress?
General Myers. I think we would be happy to brief people on
it, sir, yes.
The fifth one is to promote the rule of law, because that
is so essential to dealing with the situation they have there.
The sixth one is international engagement and assistance, so we
track the international community and how they support a free
and democratic Iraq.
So we have done a lot of work in the strategic planning. It
is not just the DOD. This is the U.S. Government. The
objectives came out of the Department of State, as a matter of
fact. But it is an inter-agency effort to develop metrics to
track these objectives and we do that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, you have a great deal of understanding and
knowledge of the Iraqi people and their leaders. For that
reason, I want to pursue with you the very intriguing proposal
that Senator Levin advanced in his opening statement. That is
that we need to find a way to put more political pressure on
the Iraqis to make more progress toward a political solution,
and he has suggested that we do that by, if deadlines are not
met, saying that we would reevaluate all of our options.
I share Senator Levin's concern that we need to change the
dynamic in Iraq. It worries me greatly when I read the briefing
that Lieutenant General Vines gave, in which he says that,
``Attacks against the civilian populace in May were the highest
total since major combat operations terminated in 2003.'' I am
convinced that a political solution is the key to ending
support for the insurgency.
How do we send a message to the Iraqi leaders that they
must make more rapid, sustained progress toward the kind of
political settlement that is needed to end public support, to
the extent that it exists, for the insurgency? Do you think it
would be useful to send the kind of message that Senator Levin
has suggested?
I am not talking about a timetable for a withdrawal, which
I oppose, but creating some idea that there would be
consequences if progress is not made.
General Abizaid. Senator Collins, actually the person that
knows the Iraqis the best in this room is the guy that meets
with their leadership every day, and that is George Casey,
sitting down there at the end. I defer to him.
I will say I think it is our duty to tell them what we
think, to demand in a way that partners demand of one another
proof of principle that they are serious about what they are
doing, that they are serious about moving forward in a society
that includes all Iraqis, serious in moving forward in a
society where they protect human rights. We have to ask it of
them. It is not too much.
Senator Collins. General Casey, are we sending that message
very clearly?
General Casey. Loud and clear, Senator. The charge and I
meet with the Prime Minister regularly. He fully understands
that they need to move out with the constitutional development
process. The chairman of the TNA fully understands. The
director of the constitutional drafting committee fully
understands. That message gets sent loud and clear, Senator.
Senator Collins. General Myers, you and I have talked many
times about the strain that we are placing on our Guard and
Reserve, and I have to tell you that I think this is getting
worse, not better, and that we are simply asking too much of
the Guard in particular through multiple, repeated, and lengthy
deployments.
I want to give you an example. A constituent of mine who is
a helicopter mechanic, and she is an Army National Guard Staff
Sergeant, her name is Jessica Wing. She left Bangor, Maine,
last Friday morning for what will be her fourth deployment
overseas in 10 years--four deployments in 10 years. She has
been deployed to Haiti, to Bosnia twice, and soon she will be
in either Iraq or Kuwait.
Now, I understand that the Department's policy mandates
that Guard and Reserve members must not be deployed for more
than 24 cumulative months unless they volunteer. But the key
here is the word ``cumulative.'' I also know there is the one
in five rule, stipulating that only one 24-month cumulative
deployment can take place within the 5-year period. But even if
the deployments are not for 24 months, it still imposes a
tremendous hardship for a Guard member to be deployed overseas
four times in 10 years.
What specifically is being done to alleviate repeated
deployments of those, like this staff sergeant, who have
specialty skills in areas that have unusually high demand? In
her case she is a helicopter mechanic and I can see why you
would need helicopter mechanics.
I have to tell you, from my personal conversations with
Guard and Reserve members in Maine, we are already seeing the
impact on recruitment and I think we are going to start seeing
it on retention as well.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Myers. Senator Collins, we are all concerned about
that. The health of our Reserve component is very important to
the national security of this country. There are lots of
efforts going on. A couple of the major ones--and I think we
have discussed these in previous hearings perhaps, but we came
out of the Cold War and into this century with a Reserve Force
that was pretty much set up for the Cold War, the thought being
that you pressed a button--you are in World War III, you push
the button, the Reserves have about 9 months to train and then
they follow forces to defend the North German Plain against the
Warsaw Pact.
We find ourselves in this security environment with a much
different threat and a much different need. Even before this
threat, we recognized the need to transform our Reserve
component. So we are rebalancing over 100,000--I think it is
115,000 or 125,000--reservists so we have more of what we need.
We clearly have in our Reserve components--I am talking
Army now--more artillery capability than we need, less military
police (MPs), less intelligence companies, less transportation
companies. So the Army is about, while we are at war,
transforming their Reserve components to be configured more
appropriately with the needs of today. That will take time.
In the meantime, helicopter mechanics are at a premium
because a lot of our capability, by conscious decision back in
the 1970s and 1980s, was put in the Reserve component. So when
the Nation is at war, that is where you go.
Now, we have also tried very hard for the last, well, since
September 11--and we have done this imperfectly at the
beginning; I think we are still not perfect, but we are pretty
darn good at trying to provide predictability to people like
the mechanic you talked about in Maine, because you are right,
reservists make big sacrifices, not only like the rest of the
active duty, but they have employers to worry about and other
situations. So, it is more difficult.
I cannot talk about her four deployments and how long each
one was and so forth. My guess is some of them were probably
not all that long. We do not argue with the cumulative issue.
We know what the law is, but the Secretary's policy is, we
mobilize you one time and you may not reach your 25 cumulative
months, but we are not going to remobilize you just because you
have 6 months or a year left. We are not going to do that. We
have a policy of no remobilizations of the Guard and Reserve
unless they are volunteers. I do not know the status of this
young lady, if she is a volunteer or not. She might very well
be a volunteer. You probably know. I do not happen to know.
[The information referred to follows:]
So I think as we go forward we need to restructure the
Guard and Reserve so we do not have shortfalls and have to rely
on a lot of in lieu of training, which means we pick units that
are not particularly trained for a certain skill, MPs for
instance. We will take an infantry unit or we will take an
artillery unit and we will train them in MP skills. That takes
more mobilization time to do that.
We have to reconfigure our Guard and Reserve. We are doing
that. I think we are providing very good predictability. The
Guard and Reserve know they are only going to be called up one
time for this conflict. That is our policy right now.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
Senator, it is such an important question. Would you try
and provide for the record the questions raised by the General?
Senator Collins. I would be happy to.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Guard and Reserve understand they are likely to be called up
one time, not to exceed 24 months during this conflict. As of May 31,
2005, 509,229 Reserve component service members had been mobilized, 86
percent were mobilized once; 12 percent were mobilized twice, and 3
percent were mobilized more than twice; none were mobilized in excess
of 24 months.
Chairman Warner. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
witnesses very much for being here today.
I want to begin in an unusual place. By total coincidence,
in going through the annual reading of the Bible that I do,
this morning the page turned to a story from the Book of
Numbers where the children of Israel, having been liberated
from slavery in Egypt, having experienced the miracle at the
Red Sea, having been brought to Mount Sinai to receive the Ten
Commandments, are now getting closer to the Promised Land.
The people essentially ask Moses to send some
representatives to scout out the Promised Land. As well
remembered, most of them come back with what turns out to be an
unreliably negative report, that there are giants there and
that this is an impossible situation, except for Joshua and
Caleb, who argue: Remember our history, remember what we have
just experienced. Remember the promise we have, the purpose we
have, one might even say the destiny we have.
The people, unfortunately, listen to the naysayers, and
actually ask if they might be returned to Egypt. The Lord is
not happy with this response and the rest, unfortunately, is
history, which is they wander for 40 years before they enter
the Promised Land.
Now, I am not comparing the situation in Iraq today to that
story from the Bible. But as always, I think the Bible is
instructive and offers us some lessons here, and particularly
because we are at a moment, as Senator Graham described, where
I fear that American public opinion is tipping away from this
effort. We have to, as Joshua and Caleb did, remind them of the
history and of our own national purpose and destiny, that in
fact because of the bravery and brilliance of the American
military the people of Iraq were liberated from a brutal
dictator and a real enemy of ours, a ticking time bomb to us, I
believe; that the Iraqi people came out and voted in great
numbers; that they have formed a government; that they are
working on a constitution; and that they face a brutal enemy,
but one that will never defeat the American military on the
field of battle.
They will only defeat us, as one of you said earlier, on
the field of American public opinion. We cannot let that
happen. The consequences for our security would be disastrous.
I happen to believe, following the State Department, that
Saddam Hussein was a supporter of terrorism. That is what the
State Department said before the war. Many did not believe
that. But today there is no doubt about it, this is the central
battlefield in the global war on the terrorists who attacked us
on September 11. They are streaming in there. If we hesitate,
if we do not draw together, if we do not understand how much we
and the Iraqi people have accomplished and that we have a
purpose here that is related to our national destiny, the
future for our children and grandchildren is going to be a lot
less safe than we all want it to be.
I believe that is an opinion that is shared broadly in this
Congress. There may be differences of opinion about tactics,
but we have to draw together to make that case to the American
people, because today most of what they know about the war is
the stories they see every evening about the suicide bombers.
They do not know about the progress on the ground. They do not
know about the political progress, et cetera, et cetera.
So I want to ask, toward a strategy of victory, this
question, Mr. Secretary. We have been over this ground before
and all of us I think have to be honest with each other and
with the American people. I continue to be worried about
whether at this moment we have enough troops in Iraq. I read
the stories in the paper of field commanders saying they take a
city but they do not have enough people to leave, either our
own coalition forces or the Iraqi security forces, to secure
it, and then the insurgents, the terrorists, come back.
When I was last in Iraq--and I have been there three times
in the last year--I was so proud of our military and the great
morale there. I asked about the stream of insurgents and
foreign fighters coming across the Syrian border, why do we not
stop it? They said we do not have enough personnel to do it.
I want to ask you two questions about that. One, at this
moment--forget the past; we are talking about now and in the
future--until the Iraqi security forces are fully where we want
them to be, do we not need--let me ask it in a more open way:
Do we need more troops?
Then I would ask a second question. If we had a larger
active duty Army and Marine Corps, would we have more troops
there on the ground? I know you understand the difference
between those two forms of that question.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Lieberman, I must say I find
myself in agreement with almost every word that came out of
your mouth and I respect the thoughtfulness of it. I guess the
only thing I would say is, you say you sense the American
people are tipping away from support. I have a feeling they are
getting pushed myself.
But it has always been so. George Washington was pounded
and pounded and pounded and almost fired. Abraham Lincoln was
pounded and pounded. It was not popular. There were deep
divisions, deep disagreements, and our country survived them
all.
My goodness, in the first part of World War II we lost
battle after battle after battle and people said: Oh my
goodness, is it not terrible; we are going to lose. In the Cold
War, people wanted to toss in the towel. We have always
survived these things. We can do that.
The American people are solid, and I do not mean solid in
support of the war. They are solid human beings, and if we tell
them the truth and provide the right kind of leadership, by
golly, they will support a worthy, noble goal. When it is done
they are going to be able to look back with a great deal of
pride on what has been accomplished, just as the men and women
in uniform do.
Now, we cannot seal our own borders. It does not surprise
me a bit that you can say some commander in Iraq says we do not
have enough troops to seal the border. But my goodness, that is
the plus side. You might seal the border if you had solid
people along there and all kinds of military equipment. You
would have to have force protection for it, and you would
become a world-class occupying power. You would immediately
assume all the burden of the intrusiveness of hundreds and
hundreds and hundreds of thousands of troops trying to seal
that border.
Now, I am not the one to answer your question. The people
at this table are the ones who give military advice as to how
many troops we ought to have in that country. I am the one who
catches the dickens from everyone who says we should have more
or we should have fewer. The number we have is the number they
have asked for. The number they have is the number I have
agreed with. The number they have is the number I have
recommended to the President, and I happen to believe they are
right. I am convinced they are right.
There is a tension between too many and too much
intrusiveness and too much of an occupation and alienation of
the population and too few. I think we are about right. I would
like to hear their answers.
Senator Lieberman. So would I. Thank you.
General Abizaid. Senator Lieberman, I will certainly
comment about the force levels within the CENTCOM area of
operations. It sometimes is not readily apparent, but having
more troops in the region is not necessarily the answer to all
of our problems out there.
First of all, we have to recognize that we are the shield
behind which politics has to take place, economic development
has to take place, diplomacy has to take place, et cetera. Too
much of a footprint in the region creates more resistance than
I think people generally appreciated. It is very important that
we work the art of this, which is to have the right number that
allows the development of local security forces to be
successful.
This is really an insurgency that Iraqis and Afghans will
have to win. This is really a part of the world where the
people of the region will have to show that they want a better
future and they are willing to fight for themselves. We can
help them. We can help them shape that future. But, to do it
with too many troops I think creates a burden and a direction
that is not necessarily one that will be successful.
Senator Lieberman. If I may just shape the question to
General Myers and General Casey: I hear you and my question is
now in this next period of months, which are very important
because of the constitution-writing, the referendum, and the
election, when there is going to be an incentive on the
terrorists to escalate, do we have enough troops there? Are the
Iraqi security forces adequately prepared to take on the
responsibility themselves?
General Casey. Senator, we do today. As I mentioned, we are
constantly reading the enemy, adjusting, adopting, looking for
ways to affect him. I have said since my confirmation hearing
before you: If I assess that I need more troops, I will ask for
them. Before the last election, we did our assessment, saw that
we needed more troops, and we asked for them and we got them,
and they made a huge difference in the election.
Now, we are certainly looking ahead to October. It is 4
months out. We are looking at that very carefully. You have the
Iraqi security forces who are developing and, as I mentioned,
we have increased our focus on their development with our
transition teams and with partnership relationships between our
units and theirs. So they are getting better faster.
We are in the process right now of doing what I mentioned
to you. We are reading the situation and we will make our
assessments, and if we decide we need more, Senator, we will
ask for them.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Ensign.
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Obviously we all agree that getting America and American
troops out of there as quickly as possible is in all of our
interests. I am one of those who believe that our very presence
there inspires more insurgents. But frankly, it is obviously
way too early to get us out.
I think the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government really
appreciate the fact that we are there, that we are sacrificing,
that we are losing some of our troops and others being wounded.
They would like to see us out as early as possible, but, as has
been said, not too early.
To address that need, and you all have shared before this
committee many times, the key to withdrawing that is to get the
Iraqis up and trained as quickly as possible. I was just in a
meeting with the Senate leadership and the Prime Minister of
Iraq just about an hour and a half ago. The whole issue of
training came up and there were several questions addressed
with the Prime Minister on training.
Historically, if you look at what America has done with
Latin America, we have brought a lot of their folks up here and
we have trained them here. It has been something that has been
very effective, not only for the training itself but also post-
training and when they are in government we have then a lot of
people who actually think pretty positively about America and
some of the values that we have up here.
We posed this question to the Iraqi Prime Minister. France
I guess has offered--although the Iraqi Prime Minister does not
think that they have been clear on exactly what they have
offered--and some of the other countries have offered to train
in their country. We are doing, obviously, a huge amount of
training. We are trying to get it up as quickly as possible.
But the question remains, how do we get more countries to
step up to the table to help us with the training and how do we
get the Iraqis then to accept, if those countries want to do
the training in their country? With our experience with Latin
America it seems to have had a positive effect. How do we get
the Iraqis to go along with that? Anybody who wants to answer
that I would be more than pleased to hear from.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We are already training Iraqis outside
of the country. They are being trained in several countries for
different purposes, and certainly they can be trained in
country, they can be trained out of country. It is something
that is already happening.
Senator Ensign. I realize that, but the question--even the
Prime Minister answered this morning on, for instance, the
French. The French have supposedly offered to train 1,700,
taking some of the Baathists who, when we de-Baathified there,
trying to take some of those folks who we have cleared through
and get that officer corps up and trained. That was something
that was addressed with the Prime Minister and he did not seem
to think that the French had necessarily made clear exactly
what they have offered. Some of the Senators who were there
thought that the French had made it clear what they had offered
to train on their soil, but the Iraqis were resistant to
bringing them to France to train.
General Casey. I am not aware of that, but I will certainly
look into it when I get back.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It just came up very recently and I am
sure the Iraqis are sorting it out with the French.
Senator Ensign. Let me go down a different line of
questioning, then. I believe, and it has been said today, the
critical piece of this is that the American people--there is no
question that the American military is the best fighting
military in the history of the world and these insurgents
cannot on a military level defeat us. The only way that they
can win is back here, back home, defeating us politically if we
lose the support of the American people and if the leaders do
not stand up and show the kind of leadership that leaders in
the past in America have shown.
General Abizaid, I would like to ask you--and with what has
happened in these last 2 weeks, this puts you in a tough
position, but you are a big boy and you have been in tough
positions before. This is a very political institution here and
I want to ask you a tough political question, because I think
we have responsibilities as political leaders to be careful
when we are at war in the words that we choose, how we say them
and what we say.
Recently we have had some leaders here in the U.S. Senate
and the House that have talked about and compared what some of
our troops have been doing at Guantanamo Bay to the Nazis and
other terrible regimes around the world in the past. Does that
damage what is going on in our war efforts? Does that encourage
recruitment, funding for the terrorists, the morale? Does it
hurt the morale of our troops? Does it help the morale of the
other side?
I guess I would like to have some honest assessment of some
things that have been said up here, and I know we all know what
we are talking about here.
General Abizaid. Well, Senator, I have been in a lot of
tough positions, but I am certainly not going to comment on any
specific political person who might have made a specific
political comment.
I will tell you something very important. I travel around
the region a lot and as I was just coming out of Afghanistan,
Iraq, Djibouti, and various places where I talked to our troops
and the troops we are training in the Iraqi and the Afghan
security forces, I never sensed the level of their confidence
higher. When I look back here at what I see is happening in
Washington, within the Beltway, I have never seen the lack of
confidence greater.
Now, I cannot answer that question. Maybe it is something
we are not doing right in the field. But, I can tell you that
when my soldiers say to me and ask me whether or not they have
support from the American people, that worries me. They are
starting to do that. When the people that we are training,
Iraqis and Afghans, start asking me whether or not we have the
staying power to stick with them, that worries me too.
I would say we need to have a frank discussion with
ourselves. I am not against the debate. We that are fighting
the war and think it is a war worth fighting. We are making a
huge difference. The people we are helping think that we are
fighting a war that is worth fighting. We are making a huge
difference. But, we cannot win the war, American soldiers
cannot win the war, without your support and without the
support of our people.
We cannot ignore the problem. We need to move together to
understand it and fight it together.
Senator Ensign. Well, Mr. Chairman, I realize my time is
expired and I appreciate your indulgence. The point that I
think is important to make here is that all of us as leaders,
we have a responsibility in choosing our words very carefully
at a time of war.
America is about free and open debate and we should never
back away from that. However, with freedom comes
responsibility. We as leaders have a great responsibility,
especially when it comes to the lives of the men and women who
are in uniform who are in harm's way. If we are endangering
those, if we are encouraging the enemy, we had better be
careful with the words that we choose.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator, that is a very important question
that you have asked and I commend General Abizaid for his very
candid and forthright reply.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for this
hearing, and I thank our friend here for what he has said, your
ranking member.
I have been listening to what has been said here, and there
has been a good bit of speechifying on both sides. I regret
that it seems to be a situation in which the witnesses have all
the time they want to talk, but not the Senators.
Mr. Secretary, I watched you with a considerable amount of
amusement. We have to be careful what we say, that is what
everybody is saying, so I am going to try to be careful in what
I say.
I have been here a long time, longer than you have. But
that does not make any difference. I have seen a lot of
Secretaries of Defense that have come before this committee. I
was on this committee years ago when the late Senator Richard
Russell was the chairman. I do not think I have ever heard a
Secretary of Defense who likes to lecture the committee as much
as you appear to do. I hope I am not wrong in my judgment.
I say with all due respect to you, I think you have a very
tough job and in many ways you have been a good Secretary of
Defense.
Let me tell you, nobody knows more about the courage of our
soldiers and marines and people, nobody knows more about that
than we do. We know about that. Nobody questions the ability of
our soldiers. They are the finest in the world. Of course they
are. We all know that. Nobody criticizes that. I hope that
anything I say never leads the people out there who are risking
their lives every day, risking their lives this very minute, I
hope nothing I ever say reduces the respect for them or makes
them feel that we do not respect them. We love them, our
troops. Our troops, yes, they are out there every day giving
their lives.
I think we all have to be careful what we say, we here and
you too. There have been a lot of careless statements made by
the administration, and you too, Mr. Secretary, I say most
respectfully. I make mistakes too. Who does not? But to come up
here and lecture these people, you seem--you are pretty feisty.
I kind of like that in a way, but at the same time I remember
that it is we the people that count. We are up here, we try to
represent the people. We have to run for election and re-
election.
I cannot refute a sneer. Who can refute a sneer? Many times
I think that that is what we get, Mr. Secretary, when you come
up here. I cannot refute a sneer. I say that with great
respect.
But, let me tell you something. The people up here have to
go before the people out there. You may not like our questions,
but we represent the people. This Constitution [indicating],
what is it about? ``We the people.'' Now, you may not like our
questions, but we represent the people.
I have had my fill of the administration forgetting that
this is a constitutional system in which there are three
separate but equal branches. Sometimes I think this
administration forgets that the legislative branch is the first
branch mentioned in this Constitution. We poor Senators, you
can lecture us if you like, but we ask the questions that the
people ask of us, whether you like it or not. We are going to
ask you.
The problem is we did not ask enough questions at the
beginning of this war that we got into, Mr. Bush's war.
I know that my time is up, but I have been waiting a while.
That is the problem here, we do not have time. I know you have
another engagement.
There are three separate branches, and it is about time
that the administration understands that we have not asked
enough questions. The press did not ask enough questions. The
Senate did not ask enough questions when they voted wrongly to
shift the power to declare war, as it were, to one person. That
was wrong. I do not care whether he is a Republican or a
Democrat.
We represent the people of this country. We are elected. We
have to ask questions whether you like it or not. These people
around here may phrase their questions any way they want and
some of them may be loaded, they may be political. I have heard
a good bit of politics on both sides of this question.
But, when it is all said and done, the men and women out
there who are dying and their people back home, their wives,
their sisters, their fathers, their brothers, their husbands,
their mothers, they are wondering, too.
We did not ask enough questions when we went into this war.
The Senate did not ask enough questions and I am ashamed of my
own great body here that it did not ask enough questions. It
was said, well, you will appear to be unpatriotic if you ask
questions.
We are asking questions. The American people are asking
questions. I may not like it, but they are asking questions.
They are the people who are in there--the American people have
not been told the truth. You say we should tell them the truth,
Mr. Secretary. That is the problem, the American people have
not heard enough of the truth.
Forgive me to appear to be perhaps discourteous. I do not
mean to be discourteous. I have just heard enough of your smart
answers to these people here who were elected. We were elected.
You are not elected. We are elected. You have been elected. You
know what it is to have to run for office, so you asked
questions too when you were on this side of the table. We have
to ask questions. The people out there want us to ask
questions.
Get off your high horse when you come up here. I have to
run for reelection. You do not, I do. This is the Constitution
and we represent the people who send us here. That is what we
are supposed to do.
Now let me ask a question. We have been paying for the war
in Iraq on a cash and carry basis from the very beginning. I
have asked these questions before. I do not necessarily hold
you to blame, but somebody ought to do better. We have been
paying for the war in Iraq on a cash and carry basis from the
very beginning. The administration has consistently refused to
budget for the war--you have heard me say this before--in the
annual budget process, opting instead to present a series of
must-pay bills to the American people in the form of
supplemental appropriation requests.
When are we going to see some truth in budgeting from the
administration? The cost of the war in Iraq is not just a one-
time pop-up expense. It has evolved into a long-term financial
burden on the American people.
Now, Congress is considering proposals to add billions of
dollars in bridge funding to this year's defense authorization
and appropriations bills. Simply put, Congress is being forced
to take up the slack for the administration's refusal to budget
for the war.
The American people have not been told the truth. You say
if we tell the American people the truth. The American people
have not been told the truth. I have asked this question from
the beginning: What is this war going to cost? Well, I kind of
get a sneer back. What is it going to cost? It is costing the
American people in blood and it is costing them in their
treasure.
Is this any way to budget for a war? Why will not the
administration send to Congress a detailed budget estimate for
Iraq for fiscal year 2006? That is a good question, Mr.
Chairman. It is a rhetorical question, but we have to face it
here. We do not get a budget from the administration. We just
get supplementals: These are bills we have to pay. The American
people do not really see and understand what we are paying for
this war.
Chairman Warner. Could the witness respond to your
question, Senator?
Senator Byrd. Yes, but I am going to have my say, too.
If you wish to respond to this, Mr. Secretary, in your
usual fashion, go ahead. But, I am asking questions that the
people back home ask me. All I have said, I hope I have said it
with considerable respect. I respect you. You have a hard job.
I know that. We have a job, too. We have to ask questions.
So what is your answer to that question, if you care to?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Byrd, my recollection is that
we did try to budget in advance for Operation Enduring Freedom
and Congress refused to allow us to do it and said that the
information was too tentative and preliminary because you
cannot know what is going to happen in the future in a war, and
they preferred that we do it in supplemental. It is a matter
that was worked out between the Office of Management and Budget
and Congress. It is not something that any Department has a
voice in.
Senator Byrd. That was at the beginning. That was a long
time ago.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. My understanding is that wars
have historically been budgeted through supplementals.
Senator Byrd. That is not exactly the truth.
Secretary Rumsfeld. In any event, the American people do
get told the truth. Congress is presented with a budget, and
then it is simultaneously frequently presented with a
supplemental and all the information is there. It is just not
integrated into the budget. But, it is not as though there is
something that is not known to Congress, because Congress has
the responsibility of appropriating the funds, as you know
better than any.
Senator Byrd. Is that your answer?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is my answer, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator Byrd. I have to move
on. I have three other colleagues.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. You are a great
chairman and I respect you. I know what you are up against. It
is not your fault. Thank you very much.
Thank you, thank you. I thank all of you for what you are
doing every day for our country. I respect that. I respect that
uniform that you wear, every one of you. But, you too have to
understand that we are the elected representatives of the
people. We have to ask questions and they do not have to be
softball questions.
Thank you very much for what you do. Have a little respect
for what we try to do.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Talent.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just give you my evaluation of what you have been
telling us and then ask a couple of questions----
Chairman Warner. Would you allow me an interruption?
Senator Talent. Sure.
Chairman Warner. The full panel has to appear before the
House of Representatives. I will recognize each of the
remaining Senators here, then we will have to draw this hearing
to a close.
Senator Talent. All right, then maybe I had better skip my
evaluation and just ask the questions.
Chairman Warner. Just in terms of others who would like to
follow.
Senator Talent. It seems to me that, in the areas of
economic reconstruction, political activity, and the formation
of a government and political institutions, we are making
progress. I think it is a significant thing that there has been
no ethnic or religious civil war as such there. That was always
the worst case scenario in my mind. I think maybe we have
Ayatollah Sistani and some other people to thank for that.
There has been no attack here, and I think we have to take
the cost of the war, a couple hundred billion dollars--what is
that, 1 to 2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the
last couple of years. I do believe there is a connection
between that and the fact that we have not been attacked here.
It is harder for them to attack us when we are on the offense,
and that is a big plus.
I also think it is an enormously important strategic
objective for us to gain. All that I think may be on the side
of progress and, if not good news, progress toward
accomplishing the objective. On the con side, if you will, or
the negative side, the IED problem is worse than we
anticipated, and I do not know that we have figured out yet
what to do about it.
It is striking to me that the training is harder than I
think we maybe thought it was going to be. Let me ask you this
with regard to the training. One of my difficulties is a lot of
what I want to ask about I think I have to ask about in closed
session. Is it your sense that a substantial proportion of the
Iraqis that we are training are willing to stand and fight in a
combat situation? Maybe they are poorly led, maybe they do not
have all the sophistication that our troops have, but do they
have the fire to fight? That is the first question.
If they do not and to the extent that they do not, what can
we do about that? Because wars against terrorism are part
combat, but they are also a lot questions of resolution between
who has the resolve. They are struggles between peoples in that
sense.
The second is a broader issue. It does seem to me that this
whole enterprise would be easier if we had a larger Army,
simply for a larger rotational base. Mr. Secretary, I hope--and
I liked your comment on this--that as you do the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) and we move forward that we consider this
with regard to all the services, that we do not--we try and
predict with the QDR what the threats are going to be, but we
do not know. I hope that we will err on the side of having too
much rather than too little.
I said this all throughout the 1990s, when we went at the
beginning of that decade from 12 divisions to 10. I suspect if
we had those other two divisions and maybe if we had done some
different apportionment between the Reserve components and the
Active-Duty components, this would be a lot easier now just
from a rotational perspective.
So first, is it your sense that they are willing to stand
and fight, if you can answer that in an open session? To the
extent that that is not true, what are we doing about that?
What can we do about that?
Then, Mr. Secretary, would you comment on whether the
situation with the Army in Iraq has affected your thinking
regarding the QDR?
General Casey. Senator, I will take the first one there. As
I mentioned in my opening statement, after some difficulties
last spring the Iraqi security forces are in the fight every
day and we have not had a failure of the Iraqi security forces
in the face of fairly determined opposition since the
elections.
Again, as I said in my statement, they gained a lot of
confidence in themselves in what they did during the elections.
You have heard the stories about tackling suicide bombers and
falling on top of them to protect the people. So that spirit
has continued on through our training and development.
Senator Talent. When you say ``have not had a failure,''
you mean that they have not just turned and run or hunkered
down and refused to confront the enemy?
General Casey. Just exactly the opposite. They have been
attacked by multiple car bombs. They have stood and they have
fought.
I will tell you, our strategy to put small teams of
coalition forces with them has also helped to stiffen their
will and their resolve and their capacity.
Senator Talent. That is true when they are encountering
bands of insurgents in small arms attacks and ambushes and the
like?
General Casey. Everything we have seen so far.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you are quite right, the QDR
is underway and one of the key questions is the size of the
forces, particularly the ground forces. Simultaneously we have
been doing a series of things that have the effect of
increasing the size of the Armed Forces, and particularly in
the skill sets that are needed.
For example, in the Navy we have been using sea swaps,
where we change crews overseas, so we maintain a capability and
use fewer people for longer times. We have thus far only used
about 40 or 45 percent of the Guard and Reserve. The problem is
that their skill sets are not properly balanced, so we have
been shifting the balance within the Guard and Reserve, and as
between the Active Force and the Guard and Reserve.
Under the new National Security Personnel System, we are
going to be able to do a much more effective job with our
civilian force and we are going to be able to take a number of
military people out of the jobs they are in, which are
essentially jobs that can be done by civilians. So, without
increasing the overall size, we will have a larger number of
uniformed personnel available for military functions.
In addition, we have increased the size of the Army. We are
increasing it by 30,000 troops beyond the increases that we are
achieving through all of these other activities. But in the
process, the QDR should come out with some visibility as to
what might make sense for the period.
Senator Talent. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. But I am
speaking more in terms of an attitude as you size all this up.
I know this is what I am going to be thinking when we receive
the QDR over here, that let us err on the side of too much--
because if we are wrong, if we cut it too fine an area, we have
to spend a whole lot more to try and deal with that than we
would if we had sustained a somewhat larger force.
I know the recommended force when I came into Congress in
1993 was 12 divisions, and I am wondering if we should not, to
take care of all contingencies, just err on the side of having
too much rather than too little. I hope you will consider that
as you consider the QDR.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Talent.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
gentlemen. As always, thank you for your appearance here today
and providing the information, but most of all thank you for
the great leadership that you are providing. General Abizaid,
General Casey, when you get back in theater just let your
troops know that we greatly appreciate the great service that
they are providing, not just to our country but for freedom
around the world and the hopeful freedom of the Iraqi people.
General Myers, I was interested in your comment in your
opening statement where you said troops understand what is at
stake in Iraq. You are exactly right.
General Casey, you were kind enough to host a couple of us
over there several months ago. We were there at Thanksgiving.
When I had the opportunity to go out and look your troops in
the eye, what we saw were very professional men and women who
are committed to freedom, who understand why they are there,
and who would rather be at home, but they know they are there
for the right reason and they are doing great work.
You have a young captain over there who happens to be from
my home town, a young man that I have known all his life. He is
my first West Point graduate. I sent him an email. It has been
about a month or so ago, I guess. He is with the 3rd Infantry
Division. He was in the original march to Baghdad. He is back
over now for his second tour.
He responded with an email. Mr. Chairman, I would like to
quote a little bit of this email that I got back from this
captain. He said: ``Things have been progressing well here in
our sector, although Baquba still sees its fair share of
violence every now and then. Most if not all attacks are
conducted via car bombs, probably the most cowardly manner in
which a terrorist can become a martyr. We think these car
bombers are mostly foreign fighters.'' Again, you have verified
today that exact fact.
He talks about, General Abizaid, something called a q-a-d-
a-h. Is that a ``qadah''? I do not want to be mispronouncing
that. Apparently it is the equivalent of a county in the United
States. He says: ``We have over $19 million dedicated to the
qadah assistance alone. We have built countless numbers of
schools, roads, mosques, water treatment plants, switchboards,
et cetera. We just recently finished up a project that will
provide fresh drinking water to over 25,000 people in three
different villages for the first time in 35 years. The local
governments would be operating completely on their own if it
were not for the lack of a budget. They are in the process,
however, of compiling and submitting budget requests for fiscal
year 2006 to Baghdad by no later than the end of July, so we
are seeing great progress in that area.''
He then talks about the economy over there and what is
happening in the local community relative to an increase in
economic activity, and he concludes that paragraph by saying:
``Once the security situation is under control, I think we will
see a huge capacity for private businesses investing in the
local economy.''
Secretary Rumsfeld, in agreeing with you, as I do, relative
to what you said about getting pushed, I think that is exactly
right. This young man said: ``Most people back home do not hear
about all of these things and I wish the press would do more to
cover them.''
He then goes on to address an issue that a lot of us have
asked questions about and a lot of the press have asked
questions about for the whole time that we have been there. I
did not ask him this in my email to him. He volunteered this.
He says: ``Additionally, our equipment is all to standard. We
receive updated material and technology almost weekly and
soldiers feel more than safe with their equipment. The biggest
threat by far is still roadside bombs, followed by vehicle
accidents. The armored HMMWV is an excellent machine, however,
and it does its job 99.99 percent of the time. Whenever we
leave the gate, it is standard operating procedure to wear all
protective equipment--throat guard, shoulder guard, groin
guard, arm guards, kevlar vest, helmet, ballistic eye
protection, and earplugs. It is plenty heavy, but it saves
lives.''
He concludes by saying: ``The bottom line is that we are
making great progress, and we may be replaced by an Iraqi
battalion instead of a U.S. unit. This is in line with reducing
the footprint of coalition forces in Iraq.''
I wanted to get that in the record. We have a job to do
here. Senator Byrd is right, we are required to ask tough
questions, but by the same token when things are being done
right over there I think we have an obligation to tell the
American people it is going right.
Part of your responsibility in being here today is to
answer those tough questions, but also to get the message out
that things are being done right. War is very difficult, it is
nasty, and we are dealing with people who want to kill and harm
Americans every day. That is their sole goal in life. But,
thanks to the folks that are operating under each of you every
single day in Iraq today, in Afghanistan and other parts of the
world, we are making progress with freedom. We are going to
continue fighting until we win this war. It is all because of
the leadership of you gentlemen here, but it is also primarily
because of the brave men and women that serve under you. So I
just thank you for that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I thank you for your statement
and I wish to associate myself with your observations.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank each of you gentlemen for your tremendous
leadership, for all that you are doing in service to our
country. It is a privilege to have you here and to hear from
you.
General Casey, you mentioned in your opening statement that
the Iraqi people make progress every day. I have been heartened
to learn of the Iraqi government's television ad campaigns
encouraging the Iraqis to report insurgents' movements. I have
been interested in this very popular Iraqi television program,
``Terrorism in the Hands of Justice,'' that profiles captured
suspected insurgents. Apparently there are hundreds of calls
coming in through the insurgent tip line.
Could you comment on this growing trend of the Iraq people
to speak out and not tolerate insurgents in their midst? I
would be interested in just hearing more of your thoughts on
that.
General Casey. We have, Senator, seen quite a large
increase in the willingness of Iraqis to come forward and
provide information on the insurgents.
This television program that you mentioned, ``Terrorists in
the Hands of Justice,'' has become a national phenomenon. When
you talk to the Iraqis, when they see someone who tries to be
looked at as something to be feared and they see that it is
just a wimpy little man, they feel much stronger than that.
On the tips, you mentioned that. We have seen a huge
increase in the tips on these hotlines. We had less than 50
back in January. We are up over 1,700 now.
I am not sure what this chart here says.
[The chart referred to follows:]
General Myers. That is the number of hotline tips and how
they have grown since January. They have really started to
spike since April when the Iraqi government started to
advertise that this service was available. In an insurgency, of
course, intelligence is key and indigenous intelligence is even
more key, and that is what that represents.
General Casey. So, we have seen them up over 1,700 when you
add up the ones from all of the different division areas across
the country.
The other thing I would say is people are walking in and
pointing out weapons caches to us in large numbers. We have
picked up over 1,300 weapons caches just since the elections.
These are people going out and saying: See that stick right
there; dig underneath there. There will be tons of ammunition
underneath it.
So the Iraq people are taking a stake in the future and are
becoming more and more forthcoming.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Now, in the past reconstruction projects have been spread
throughout the country. Utilizing this approach can be
difficult because security forces can be spread too thin. The
Iraqi Foreign Minister is now advocating for a more
geographically focused reconstruction effort in safer areas, as
I understand, where there is less risk and security can be
concentrated.
What about this? Secretary Rumsfeld, can you comment on
that? What do you recommend to better facilitate reconstruction
efforts?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, as we indicated, Senator, all
three pieces have to go forward together. The security has to
go forward for the economic piece of it and the reconstruction
to take hold, and the political piece has to go forward for
each of them to take hold.
There has been a tension clearly over time of in some
instances trying to put more reconstruction funds into areas
that are the least friendly, on the idea that it will make them
happier and their electricity will be better and their water
will be better. The argument against that, obviously, is that
you are rewarding bad behavior. So, there are others who say
put the reconstruction money first into places that are
behaving properly and supporting the government and doing
things that are rational, and that is a perfectly legitimate
position as well.
No matter where you put it, it makes no sense to use
reconstruction funds if it is going to be destroyed immediately
thereafter. As I say, it does not take a genius to blow up
something and to damage something. It takes a genius to build
something.
I am not familiar with what you said about the latest Iraqi
government. Are you, George?
Senator Dole. The Foreign Minister.
General Casey. No, I am not familiar with that, either.
But, I agree with what the Secretary said. There are different
ways of looking at this, but all of our commanders have some
flexibility with the money that they have for economic
projects. They use that to influence support for us rather than
support for the insurgents.
General Abizaid. Senator, if I could add just one comment.
It kind of gets back to the points that Senator Levin was
making about asking our partners in Iraq to be accountable. We
really must focus in on the rule of law in terms of justice,
prisons, detainees, et cetera. In the long run, corruption and
criminality could be a greater threat to a free Iraq than
terrorism, and it is vital that we focus on the rule of law.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
The Center for Army Lessons Learned released a report in
April, I believe, of 2004. They emphasized: ``A missed intent
in local negotiations can mean future significant problems in
dealing with other issues. It is imperative that communications
be clear and effective and that all concerned are aware of its
implications.''
I would like to ask you just to comment briefly on the
efforts to overcome the cultural barriers; the previous
shortage, for example, in translators, where we are on that.
General Casey. We have made great progress in translators
here over the last 6 months, and I am well over 80 percent of
filling our requirements for that. It is especially important
because I added a requirement for an additional thousand
translators for these teams that we are putting out with the
Iraqi units.
For all those teams, we have put them through an extensive
training program that emphasized the cultural context,
basically to inform them so they could deal well with the
Iraqis. We worked that very hard, and I think what we are going
to see is the more time that our folks spend working directly
with the Iraqis the closer the bonds become and the more
effective the working relationships become.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
This concludes the question period. Senator Levin, do you
have a comment?
Senator Levin. Just very quickly. Senator Dayton was really
looking forward to the hearing, but he has a Base Realignment
and Closure Commission regional meeting today in North Dakota
and he is therefore unable to be here. But, I wanted just to
make that note for the record.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this
hearing. As you and I think all of us agree, we are deeply
appreciative of the dedication and service of our witnesses
here. These hearings always should be lively, given the
circumstances that I think are very challenging, and it lived
up to that description.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
I would like to make an observation. I thank you again, Mr.
Secretary and our witnesses, for making this hearing possible.
It really is of historic proportions, and I think we have had
an excellent exchange of views and I commend you on your
responses to a series of tough questions.
There remains, General Casey, some material which I am sure
you will provide the committee with regard to the classified
sections relating to the status of the training and the ability
of the current Armed Forces of Iraq.
Senator Byrd mentioned Senator Russell and it reminded me
that I was privileged to be at the DOD at the time he was here
in the Senate and occupied a chair not unlike that which you
are in now, Mr. Secretary, before that distinguished Senator. I
have had the privilege of dealing with every Secretary of
Defense in the 35 years that I have had the opportunity and
really the privilege to associate with the DOD in one way or
another.
I want to say, Mr. Secretary, through the years that we
have known each other I have enjoyed our working relationship.
I look forward to continuing that and I have full confidence in
your ability to lead the DOD, under the direction of a
courageous Commander in Chief, our President.
The hearing is concluded.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
1. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, in the last 2
days, there has been a great deal of media coverage with regard to
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It is apparent from our casualties
that the biggest danger our military faces in Iraq is a result of IEDs.
Coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians face these
same threats. Brigadier General Joseph Votel, USA, the Director of the
IED Defeat Task Force, is quoted in Defense News as stating that IED
incidents--the discovery or detonation of a bomb--have surged in recent
months and are currently running at about 30 per day. I realize and
applaud all the fine work that is being done by this Task Force in a
very time critical environment to diminish any further escalation of
these devices. Like you and my colleagues and all Americans, I remain
concerned about what more we can do to keep the insurgency from
continuing to make and adapt these devices to combat whatever offensive
or defensive measures we put in place.
I know there was a counter-IED seminar at Fort Irwin last week,
which was also attended by some of our coalition partners. Without
getting into any classified areas, what assurances can you offer that
there continue to be initiatives in the pipeline to defeat the
insurgency's successful use of IEDs, especially the recent elevated use
of vehicle-born IEDs, and what can Congress do to better protect our
troops on the ground?
General Abizaid and General Casey. Central Command's (CENTCOM)
counter-IED initiatives fall into two broad categories: adaptive
tactics and material solutions. The Joint Improvised Explosive Defeat
Task Force (JIEDD TF) Field Teams are very effective in developing and
teaching tactics to our deployed units. Material solutions, such as
enhanced body armor and armored vehicles reduce the lethality of IED
attacks. Moreover, the growing suite of technical countermeasures is
also very beneficial in countering the IED threat. Congress' continued
support to programs which develop and field counter-IED solutions
provides many of the tools our service members need to adapt to
evolving IED threats.
2. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, it is my
understanding that to track and capture the makers of these IEDs, human
intelligence (HUMINT) plays an especially critical role. Are there any
blockers to continuing to build our HUMINT capability as rapidly as we
need to and what are we doing to overcome any such blockers?
General Abizaid. HUMINT does play an especially critical role in
the effort to identify, track, and capture IED makers and others
involved in these attacks against U.S. and coalition forces. CENTCOM is
working to build a HUMINT capability that will make us more effective
in countering IED and other types of attacks; however, there are
blockers that will need to be overcome. Primarily, the blockers fall
into two related areas, Operational and Technological.
Operationally, CENTCOM is challenged by the lack of trained and
experienced collection teams. Due to increased demand in Iraq and
Afghanistan, beyond pre-war projected requirements, there are not
enough trained personnel to meet requirements for continued force
rotations into the AOR. To address this issue, the Services are making
a concerted effort to recruit and train HUMINT collectors to satisfy
current requirements and provide for a sustained HUMINT collection
effort to support OIF, OEF, and the global war on terrorism. CENTCOM is
also doing a better job of educating our tactical commanders who
control these assets to ensure efficient utilization and to focus on
priority threats such as IEDs.
Technologically, CENTCOM is challenged by the lack of a streamlined
information management architecture that puts priority intelligence
information into the hands of the warfighters in a timely manner. To
address this issue, CENTCOM has developed web-based reports portals for
U.S. and coalition collectors and this has greatly improved the ability
to report and disseminate validated intelligence information. CENTCOM
is also working on solutions, such as the Joint Intelligence Operations
Capability-Iraq (JIOC-I), that will enable the movement of information
from battlefield collectors to analysts and on to the affected
commanders who need the intelligence to counter IED and other threats.
CENTCOM will need a continued commitment of resources to sustain this
effort and to seek advanced solutions, up to and including an
overarching intelligence community architecture that is capable of
direct support to the warfighter.
General Casey. HUMINT plays a critical role in tracking and
capturing the makers of IEDs. Our HUMINT experience base is increasing
and our methods are evolving to meet the threat. The services are
increasing the number of interrogators and tactical HUMINT collectors
to meet our current needs. We have certainly had HUMINT successes and
continue to integrate lessons learned to develop sources that can
provide the actionable intelligence we need.
3. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, I believe we
all agree that the success of a new Iraq depends on Iraq being able to
secure itself. We are making great progress in this area. I have seen
positive changes in my two visits to Iraq this year. What I'd like to
know is, with the increasing casualties amongst Iraqi security forces
and civilians, are you seeing the Iraqi populace and the new Iraqi
government providing critical information or taking definitive actions
to ``help us, help them'' be a free people and defeat this insurgency
by pinpointing where the insurgent is hiding, and where the IEDs are
being manufactured?
General Abizaid. The Iraqi populace and the new Iraqi government
are both providing an increasing amount of critical information to
counter the insurgency to include taking definitive actions in
pinpointing where insurgents are hiding and where they are emplacing
and manufacturing IEDs. CENTCOM's goal in this effort is to facilitate
the establishment and growth of coalition and partner nation Counter-
IED capability, including transfer of C-IED Technology, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (TTP).
General Casey. Overall, there is an extremely positive trend in the
flow of information between the Iraqi people and coalition forces. For
example, the number of tips that we are receiving from average Iraqi
citizens is significant. In the month of May alone, Multi-National
Corps-Iraq received 1,282 tips of which over 70 percent were considered
actionable.
Multi-National Force-Iraq and the Iraqi Transitional Government
routinely share intelligence and operational information to detect and
defeat insurgents. This organizational cooperation, along with
information provided by the Iraqi people, are powerful tools toward
defeating the insurgency in Iraq.
TROOP LEVELS AND END STRENGTH
4. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General
Abizaid, and General Casey, recently, many of my colleagues in Congress
have been pressing the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
administration to reduce the number of troops in Iraq. Right now we
have about 135,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq. They have a
mission, a critical mission: to defeat the insurgency, train the Iraqi
security forces to protect themselves, and enable a free Iraq. I
believe and support strongly that we base any withdrawal timeline on
the mission, and only on the mission. There has been significant
progress in Iraq. I have seen it. We expect continued progress with the
Iraqis scheduled to hold their first election under their new
constitution at the end of this year which the current Iraqi government
is working toward.
Along with our Active-Duty Forces, we have relied heavily on our
Reserve and National Guard, all of which who have done an exemplary
job. However with recruiting and retention challenges, I am concerned
if we are maintaining adequate end strength in our military forces to
meet the rotational needs of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) mission.
Gentlemen, is this a concern you share?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Thanks to you and the other
members of this committee and the support of Congress, we have adequate
end strength to meet the needs of the Nation. However, current
operational and personnel tempos are significant and will likely remain
so for the near term. Accordingly, the Services are working to
rebalance within and between Active and Reserve components to increase
warfighting capability and responsiveness and to ease stress on our
units, troops, and their families. Some of the initiatives include the
Army's transition to 43 ``modular'' brigade combat teams, shifting
billets across the Services from low demand to high demand skills, and
capitalizing on military-to-civilian conversions. In addition, end
strength is a significant focus item for the Quadrennial Defense
Review.
General Abizaid. Recruiting and retention is a concern to everyone
that wears the uniform but this question is better answered by the
Services since they are responsible for recruiting. The Services have
continued to fill Central Command's force requirements with properly
trained and equipped units for our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as
well as the rest of the Central Command area of responsibility.
General Casey. I maintain a consistent dialogue with the services
that provide forces for OIF, and they are able to meet the operational
requirements with the existing personnel structure. I defer any
assessment of overall end strength issues to the Service Chiefs and
Department of Defense leadership.
5. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General
Abizaid, and General Casey, what do you see on the horizon with regard
to the negative recruiting trend, particularly in the Army and Marine
Corps, and what plans are there to address this concern?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. We anticipate that the rest
of fiscal year 2005 will be very challenging for both active and
Reserve component recruiting, and are particularly concerned with the
active Army, Army Reserve, and Army Guard. To mitigate the challenges,
we have increased the numbers of recruiters, enhanced enlistment
bonuses, and have focused our marketing strategy not only on potential
recruits but also on the influencers (parents, teachers, etc.) who play
an important role in our overall effort.
General Abizaid. Recruiting and retention is a concern to everyone
that wears the uniform but this question is better answered by the
Services since they are responsible for recruiting. It should be noted
that the Services have continued to provide the forces needed in the
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) and those troops remain fully
capable of completing the mission.
General Casey. First, let me say that the patriotism and
performance of the young men and women serving with me in Iraq is
unsurpassed. These young Americans serving in Iraq--from both the
active and Reserve components--tend to re-enlist at rates exceeding the
established goals.
I remain confident that recruiting and retention programs of each
service will continue to meet the foreseeable operational requirements
in my command. I defer any assessment of overall end strength issues to
the Service Chiefs and Department of Defense leadership.
PRISONERS AT GUANTANAMO BAY
6. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General
Abizaid, and General Casey, a lot of controversy has surrounded the
prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay lately. Inflammatory statements have
been made and inflammatory articles have been written. Many claim that
we should charge these prisoners or just let them go. This is of course
the same group of people who believed we should treat terrorism as a
crime and not as a war. This is the same group of people who watched as
Osama bin Laden and his thugs attacked American interests repeatedly
and simply sent the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
investigate and try to bring these people to justice, after the fact.
In a Washington Post article dated October 22, 2004, John Mintz
wrote: ``At least 10 detainees released from the Guantanamo Bay prison
after U.S. officials concluded they posed little threat have been
recaptured or killed fighting U.S. or coalition forces in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. . . . One of the recaptured prisoners is still at large
after taking leadership of a militant faction in Pakistan and aligning
himself with al Qaeda. . . . In telephone calls to Pakistani reporters,
he has bragged that he tricked his U.S. interrogators into believing he
was someone else.'' The reporter further reported about one former
detainee named Mehsud: ``Mehsud said he spent 2 years at Guantanamo Bay
after being captured in 2002 in Afghanistan fighting alongside the
Taliban. At the time he was carrying a false Afghan identity card, and
while in custody he maintained the fiction that he was an innocent
Afghan tribesman, he said, U.S. officials never realized he was a
Pakistani with deep ties to militants in both countries. . . .''
Last week, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said, ``There are 12
people that we have released that we know have come back and fought
against America because they have been recaptured or killed on the
battlefield. . . .''
I would like to hear your view of this debate. Should these men be
charged or released? Do you believe they would return to theatre to
cause you additional trouble?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. The bottom line is crystal
clear: the United States Government (USG) should not serve indefinitely
as the world's jailer. Much of the controversy surrounding the
prisoners detained at Guantanamo Bay is based upon an inadequate
understanding of who we have detained there, the circumstances of their
capture, and of the processes we have instituted to continually
evaluate their status. When detainees began to be captured in the
field, the USG created a formal system of evaluations culminating with
annual reviews to determine the status of each individual detainee.
Despite protests to the contrary, our system and its procedures are
fair and impartial; detainees' rights are acknowledged. Some detainees
are released. A few have been recaptured. To date, the rate at which
released detainees from Guantanamo Bay have ``returned to the fight''
has been between 5 percent and 6 percent.
The Department of Defense continues to believe that detainees
remaining under military control should be carefully screened,
thoroughly evaluated, and either released or transferred to their home
countries, or charged and tried in a military commission. No evaluation
process is without risk, and we are confident that we have mitigated
that risk as much as possible.
General Abizaid. Those detainees that the U.S. Government believes
to be credible and continuing threats to U.S. interests should continue
to be detained until they are no longer a threat. These individuals
will in fact, as they have asserted, and in some cases have shown,
return to the fight if given the opportunity. Releasing detainees from
Guantanamo prematurely will endanger not only U.S. military forces, but
the United States, its citizens, allies, and interests. CENTCOM
strongly believes the majority of detainees held at Guantanamo would
attempt to re-engage our military forces in armed conflict if released.
General Casey. Although the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay are outside
my direct purview, whether any individual will be released or charged
will be decided on the facts and circumstances of each person's case.
It is always possible that anyone who is released may return to cause
us trouble in the future. Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546,
we are working with the Iraqi Transitional Government to secure Iraq
and help establish an Iraqi system of processing detainees based on due
process principles.
MEDIA COVERAGE
7. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, during my
last two trips to Iraq I met many soldiers and marines who believed the
media coverage was unbalanced. They told me the successes achieved by
our forces seemed to not be news worthy, and the media at every
opportunity touted the insurgents' successes. With the exception of the
coverage of the election in January, I must agree. What is your
perception of the media coverage? How does that affect your mission?
General Abizaid. The media trends toward reporting on the negative
and/or sensational issues; that is the nature of the news business. To
some extent the events in Iraq and Afghanistan are viewed through a
``soda straw.'' The 24-hour news cycle compresses the allotted time for
coverage forcing the new agencies to pick the most sensational stories.
This results in not every story being reported. The most unreported
story in Iraq and Afghanistan is the true nature of the enemy. This is
a despicable enemy that people need to understand. They are killing
civilians, Muslims, and are destroying Iraq's national infrastructure.
This continued perception that the media only reports the negative out
of Iraq and Afghanistan does have an impact on the morale of the troops
and CENTCOM does all it can to counter that effect.
General Casey. Media coverage needs to focus on the progress in
Iraq as well as the violence.
8. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, what can we
do to get a more balanced story?
General Abizaid. CENTCOM has a proactive and aggressive program of
embedding and getting interviews and stories out to the news media.
Transparency is the best policy and CENTCOM has worked hard with the
media to maintain that transparency and will continue to do so. In
Afghanistan, hundreds of media embeds have taken place and since the
beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, CENTCOM has embedded over a
thousand media representatives with CENTCOM forces. Observing the
events as they occur, and living with U.S. forces for days or weeks at
a time has produced some of the most accurate reporting we have seen.
CENTCOM has also devised a ``virtual embed'' program in which we use
satellite technology to enable a news anchor to speak directly with a
home town soldier, marine, sailor, or airman. The potential audience
reached through this program has totaled more than 2 billion. CENTCOM
will continue to seek new and innovative methods to tell our story.
General Casey. Have reporters get out with units and stay long
enough to understand what is going on.
DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD
9. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid, in a recent article you stated:
``Politics will assure the defeat of the insurgency, provided the
politics are open, transparent, and legitimate. It is clear we are
moving in that direction.'' It seems to me that this same strategy is
starting to work in Lebanon, Libya, Afghanistan, and maybe someday in
Egypt and Saudi Arabia to name just a few countries in the region. What
do you see as the major obstacle to achieving an open, transparent,
legitimate political environment in Iraq and what is your assessment of
the changes we see taking place in the region? Are they sustainable?
General Abizaid. The main obstacle to achieving an open,
transparent, legitimate political environment in Iraq is providing
inclusiveness in the political process for the diversity of religious,
ethnic, and tribal influences throughout the country. Eventual success
in Iraq will not be won by military operations on the ground, but by
the formation of a central government that is representative of the
people, and therefore fully supported by the people. This inclusiveness
must be protected by a constitutional structure that guarantees the
minority rights. If the Iraqi people truly believe that their voice is
fairly represented in governmental decisions and that the government
represents stability and a better future for them and their children,
the insurgency will no longer have a place to hide.
The need for inclusiveness during the political process is well
recognized at all levels of the political spectrum and continues to be
a priority of all concerned. More importantly, the Transitional
Government of Iraq recently demonstrated its commitment to inclusion
when the parliamentary committee charged with drawing up Iraq's new
constitution approved the appointment of 15 additional Sunni
representatives to assist with this all important task. So while equal
representation for all in the political process is a major obstacle, it
is an obstacle that is receiving the proper attention at all levels and
will be overcome.
The recent political events observed throughout the region in
Lebanon, Libya, and Afghanistan is indeed encouraging. These events
also lend credibility to the concept that an open, transparent, and
legitimate political process can significantly alter the direction in
which a country is moving. The sustainability of these events
throughout the region cannot be predicted, but our eventual success in
Iraq and Afghanistan will certainly play a role in the continuation of
future change throughout the region.
10. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid, in the same article you
stated: ``The Afghans and Iraqis on this trip kept saying to me over
and over again, `Are you going to stick with us?'. . . I kept telling
them over and over again, `Yes we will.' I ask the American people not
to make a liar of me.'' What will happen in the region if we don't
stick with them?
General Abizaid. While it is hard to predict the unknown, it is
possible to foresee certain possible outcomes. Leaving Iraq before the
security forces and government are ready to take on the challenges of
an evolving democratic state could have far reaching consequences for
Iraq and the region as a whole. The greatest concern would be that the
fledgling government would collapse and Iraq would devolve into civil
war, with the country eventually splitting into the autonomous regions
of Kurdistan, Shia south and Sunni western and central Iraq. If this
were to happen, Iraq could become a major terrorist sanctuary and a
destabilizing influence for Iraq's surrounding neighbors, resulting in
a regression from the gains in regional democratization that has been
recently witnessed.
Iraq's energy infrastructure would also likely continue to fall in
a state of disrepair due to internal strife resulting in increased
pressure on the world's oil markets. Certainly, none of the above would
be in the strategic interests of the United States and would require an
even greater investment than currently anticipated to rectify such a
situation.
With regard to Afghanistan, the effect of abandonment would be
slower to evolve than in Iraq due to the more advanced progress of the
political process and the greater degree of governmental control there.
Yet, while greater maturity exists, the political, economic, and
security infrastructure simply is not in place to ensure the continued
success of democracy in Afghanistan. Recognizing the presence of a
substantial narcotics influence in the country, you could see a gradual
degeneration into a narco-terrorist state dominated by warlords and
terrorist activities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE DEPLOYMENTS
11. Senator Collins. General Myers, you and I have talked many
times about the strain that we are placing on our National Guard and
Reserve. I am concerned that the situation is getting worse, not
better, and that we are asking too much of the Guard in particular,
through multiple, repeated, and lengthy deployments.
I would like to share an example with you. A constituent of mine is
a helicopter mechanic and an Army National Guard staff sergeant. Her
name is Jessica Wing. Staff Sergeant Wing left Bangor, Maine, last
Friday morning for what will be her fourth deployment overseas in 10
years. She has had four deployments in 10 years--to Haiti, to Bosnia
twice, and soon she'll be in either Iraq or Kuwait.
I understand that the DOD's policy mandates that Guard and Reserve
members must not be deployed for more than 24 cumulative months unless
they volunteer, but the key here is the word ``cumulative.'' I also
know there's the one-in-five rule stipulating that only one 24-month
cumulative deployment can take place within the 5-year period. But,
even if the deployments aren't for 24 months, it still imposes a
tremendous hardship for a Guard member to be deployed overseas four
times in 10 years.
I would like to know what specifically is being done to alleviate
the repeated deployments of those like this staff sergeant who have
specialty skills in areas that have unusually high demand? In her case,
she's a helicopter mechanic, and I can see why there is a high demand
for helicopter mechanics. From my personal conversations with Guard and
Reserve members of Maine, we are already seeing the impact on
recruitment, and I think we are going to start seeing it on retention
as well.
General Myers. The senior DOD leadership shares your concerns. At
least 47 specific initiatives across the Department of Defense address
these concerns regarding the high demand for our Reserve Forces and
there is progress. Many of our guard members and reservists have
volunteered to serve longer, but none have been involuntarily mobilized
for more than 24 cumulative months.
Staff Sergeant Wing is a well-respected Soldier who has served this
Nation with honor and distinction. During her 12 years of service with
the active component of the Army, she deployed overseas three times,
for an approximate total deployment time of 15 months. The number and
length of these deployments is well within the norm for Army Active-
Duty Forces. After a 1-year break in service, she joined the Army
National Guard in 2001, and is currently preparing for her first
overseas deployment as a guard member.
______
Question Submitted by Senator John Thune
OPERATIONAL TEMPO
12. Senator Thune. General Myers, can you describe the impact and
strain of the repeated rotational deployments of ground units and air
squadrons to Iraq--some are beginning their third tour--has had on
yearly training cycles, readiness ratings and maintenance cycles--and,
of course on the home-base infrastructures that support these units?
General Myers. As we continue to source theater requirements, there
are many units that are going to experience significant operational
tempo and personnel tempo, impacting on people, equipment, and
training. These stresses are not likely to decrease in the near term.
Low-density, high-demand assets, combat support and combat service
support forces are especially strained because their skills are
critical to current global operations. The continuing operational
requirements for these specialists will result in reduced between-
deployment dwell time and additional training requirements. Because
many of these units are in the Reserve component; their challenges are
further affected by Reserve mobilization policies and time constraints.
The most significant impact of repeated deployments has been on at-
home preparation for full-spectrum wartime missions. In some cases,
units are completing training cycles that are modified to suit theater-
specific requirements, including additional work on non-primary tasks.
For example, combat units that would usually train to high-intensity
conflict also train for stability operations, or an in-lieu-of unit
receives additional training because it will be performing a non-
primary task. Over the course of repeated deployments, our challenge is
to ensure that each unit maintains its readiness in primary tasks while
prepared for its current mission.
The requirement to leave equipment in theater, wear and tear, and
combat losses have accelerated maintenance cycles and increased some
equipment requirements in theater. These requirements have been met by
focused depot maintenance in theater, cross-leveling into deploying
units, and by sourcing from new production. These efforts ensure
deployed units have everything they need, but some non-deployed units
and home stations will report reduced readiness rates as a result.
We have initiated multiple efforts to reduce and mitigate the
impacts of these challenges. The Active/Reserve component balance is
being restructured to relieve stress on high demand units. Supplemental
funding has been targeted to address many materiel shortfalls. U.S.
Joint Forces Command, as the joint force provider, is now sourcing
globally to address requirements.
Along with resetting returned units, the Army is transforming to a
modular force that will increase the number of available combat units,
reducing sourcing stress. In addition, the Army has implemented a new
process of Army Force Generation, the structured progression of
increased unit readiness over time. Army Force Generation results in a
larger steady-state pool of usable, trained, ready, and cohesive units
available for operational deployment in support of regional combatant
commanders and civil authorities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
FORCE PROTECTION
13. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, recently General Conway,
Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters
that insurgents are developing a shaped explosive charge ``sufficient
to penetrate certain levels of armor.'' Could you tell us what steps
you are taking to improve the armor on High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), Bradleys, and Strykers to compensate for
this new explosive?
Secretary Rumsfeld. [Deleted.]
U.S. STRATEGY IN IRAQ
14. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, recently we have witnessed
little reduction in the number of insurgent attacks, little increase in
the ability of the Iraqi Armed Forces and police to protect their own
countrymen, and have seen a drop in support by Americans of the ongoing
conflict in Iraq. My question to you is what efforts, if any, are being
undertaken by the Department to adjust the U.S. military strategy in
order to make progress in these areas before there is any further
erosion in the support of the global war on terrorism?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Although I share your concern over the how the
continued violence in Iraq may affect support for the war on terror, I
do not believe that events in Iraq warrant a major change of U.S.
military strategy at this time.
The key to victory in Iraq, as with all counterinsurgencies
throughout history, is the creation of an indigenous Iraqi security
force capable of protecting its people from internal and external
threats. Although the American forces in Iraq represent the most lethal
and highly trained military force ever deployed in history, there are
limitations to what they can achieve. Iraqi forces possess linguistic
and cultural knowledge that U.S. forces lack, and can undertake
missions such as searching for weapons caches in mosques that may be
self-defeating when performed by Americans. Our basic strategy,
therefore, is to hunt and kill or capture terrorists in order to create
the breathing space necessary to train and equip the Iraqi security
forces that are the key to winning the counterinsurgency fight.
Although the terrorists can still achieve tactical victories by
slaughtering innocent Iraqis, this basic strategy is succeeding. As of
20 June 2005, we have trained and equipped more than 168,000 Iraqi
forces. While it will take time for all of these forces to develop
leadership, unit cohesion, and field experience, it is incorrect to say
that there has been little increase in the ability of the Iraqi Armed
Forces and police to protect their own countrymen. Iraqi security
forces now bear the primary responsibility for securing Haifa Street
and portions of the Diyala Province--two former focal points of
insurgent activity--with the result being a significant reduction in
terrorist attacks. Equally tellingly, not a single police station has
been abandoned under fire this year, a quantum improvement over some of
the worst setbacks of 2004.
The terrorists have similarly failed to deal any significant
setbacks to our political strategy of developing a representative
government in Iraq that is effective, suited to Iraqi culture and
conditions, respectful of Iraq's diverse population, and conducive to
the development of free institutions. Although the terrorists have
nihilistically killed scores of Iraqis, they have failed to stop the
transfer to Iraqi sovereignty, failed to incite an Iraqi civil war,
failed to stop the Iraqi elections, failed to stop the formation of a
democratic Iraqi government that represents all of Iraq's diverse
population, and failed to derail the drafting of the constitution.
Because of our efforts to build a democratic government that represents
all of Iraq's religious, ethnic, and sectarian groups, Iraqis continue
to volunteer in droves to serve in the Iraqi security forces.
We will obviously make adjustments to the development of these
forces as necessary. This year we have begun to place greater emphasis
on improving their logistical capability to sustain operations and
their ability to support and conduct operations above the battalion-
level. We have also begun deploying U.S. military mentors with Iraqi
security forces to help with their on-the-job training. But, in my
opinion eschewing patience and determination for radical shifts in our
military strategy, even as we see that strategy bearing fruit, would be
a mistake at this time.
15. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, the preferred targets of the
insurgents continue to be the Iraqi police and security forces. In the
past you have testified that while there is no exit strategy for the
United States, we are committed to ensuring that the Iraqis can provide
security for their citizens and their elected government. In the past,
you have provided testimony to this committee that included the number
of Iraqi security forces that have volunteered, the number that have
been trained, and lines of Iraqis waiting in line to volunteer, thus
increasing the size of the Iraqi security forces. What impact do these
insurgent attacks have on the U.S. strategy of remaining in Iraq until
the Iraqi security forces are capable of maintaining order in that
country?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Each terrorist attack in Iraq is a tragedy, and
the United States regrets the loss of life and suffering caused by each
bombing. However, although attacks against Iraqi recruits represent
tactical successes for the insurgents, they do not alter the reality
that the terrorists have failed to achieve any of their strategic
objectives. The terrorists have failed to stop the transfer to Iraqi
sovereignty, failed to break our coalition and force a mass withdrawal
by our allies, failed to incite an Iraqi civil war, failed to stop the
Iraq elections, and failed to stop the formation of a democratic Iraqi
government that represents all of Iraq's diverse population. Similarly,
despite the brutality of the attacks you cite, they have failed to stop
Iraqis from volunteering in droves to serve in the Iraqi Security
Forces. Leaders from all of Iraq's major ethnic, religious, and
sectarian groups (including the Sunni Arabs) have declared that it is
permissible and desirable for their followers to serve their country
and join these forces. Hence, the size and capability of the Iraqi
security forces continues to grow, and these attacks have had no
decisive impact on our broader strategy in Iraq.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
16. Senator Akaka. General Abizaid and General Casey, the preferred
targets of the insurgents continue to be the Iraqi police and security
forces. In the past this committee has received testimony that while
there is no exit strategy for the United States, we are committed to
ensuring that the Iraqis can provide security for their citizens and
their elected government. Previous testimony to this committee has
included numbers of Iraqi security forces that have volunteered,
numbers that have been trained, and have shown lines of Iraqis waiting
in line to volunteer, thus increasing the size of the Iraqi security
forces.
My question for each of you is with the increase in insurgent
attacks against the Iraqi forces, are you seeing a reduction in the
number of volunteers similar to the reduction the U.S. is seeing in its
recruitment numbers?
General Abizaid and General Casey. There has not been a decrease in
the number of volunteers to join the Iraqi security forces. On the
military side, there are more than 15,000 recruit volunteers in the
pipeline waiting for basic military training dates. Additionally, the 5
active military recruiting centers continue to process between 50-100
recruits per day. On the police side, there is currently a hiring
freeze because the Ministry of Interior exceeded their authorized
police personnel requirements by 70,000. There remains great interest
in joining the Police service as evidenced by the Baghdad Police
recruiting center turning away 1,200 volunteers on 10 July 2005 because
of the aforementioned hiring freeze.
17. Senator Akaka. General Abizaid and General Casey, news reports
indicate that in some cities it is the political parties that control
security through their militias, not the Iraqi police forces or Iraqi
security forces, especially in the south. Reports, for example,
indicate that in the southern city of Basra the local mullahs have to
give individual approval to police officer recruitment. These militias
may become even more important as the Iraqis take over more political
control. Are you concerned about this and what should we do about it?
General Abizaid and General Casey. CENTCOM is aware of the militias
and closely monitors their activities. Currently, there are no
indications that political parties control security through their
militias. Ultimately the status of militias will be determined by Iraqi
law. Until that decision is taken, CENTCOM's objective is to ensure
that militias do not interfere with the function of government or the
legitimate political process in Iraqi.
[Whereupon, at 1:31 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS IN IRAQ
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn,
Thune, Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Charles S. Abell, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
Fletcher L. Cork, receptionist.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, professional staff
member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T.
Kiley, professional staff member; Sandra E. Luff, professional
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
Elaine A. McCusker, professional staff member; David M.
Morriss, counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
member; Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr., professional staff member;
Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Kristine L.
Svinicki, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Gabriella Elsen, research assistant; Bridget W.
Higgins, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, minority
counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; and William G.P.
Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Micah H. Harris, Jessica L.
Kingston, Catherine E. Sendak, Jill Simodejka, and Pendred K.
Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; Chris Arnold, assistant to Senator
Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Mackenzie M. Eaglen, assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy
Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Lindsey R. Neas,
assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Jen Wilson, assistant to Senator Graham;
Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C.
Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke
Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Erik Raven, assistant
to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Darcie
Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey and
Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Kimberly Jackson, assistant to
Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; and
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The committee meets this morning to
receive testimony on U.S. military strategy and operations in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other areas of the Central Command
(CENTCOM). We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses:
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General Richard B. Myers,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; General John Abizaid, Commander,
U.S. Central Command; and General George Casey, Commander,
Multi-National Forces-Iraq. We look forward to your testimony.
I, and other members of this committee, wish to thank each
of our witnesses and the countless men and women they represent
for their service and their tireless efforts to secure peace
and self-determination for the Iraqi people, Afghanistan
people, and others.
I want to especially thank General Myers for his service,
not only for the past 4 years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
but over 40 years of distinguished service in uniform.
Tomorrow, you will turn over your responsibility as Chairman to
General Peter Pace, United States Marine Corps. This will be an
important day for you, your lovely wife and family, and General
Pace and his family. You've served the Nation faithfully, with
distinction, and with great credit to the uniform that you
proudly wear, General. Well done, sir.
General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. We're ever-mindful of the sacrifices of
the men and women of the Armed Forces, and that of their
families at home, as we open this hearing.
We have an unusual day in terms of the schedule of the
Senate before us; and, in consultation with the ranking member,
I've made the decision that we will proceed this morning until
the hour of approximately 11:15, at which time we'll stand in
recess, such that the colleagues on this committee can join all
others in the vote on the next Supreme Court Justice, Chief
Justice. So, after that, we'll resume at 12:15. At about 1:15,
we will go into a closed session for a short period, in room
219, following which our distinguished panel of witnesses go
over to the House of Representatives.
Given that set of circumstances, I'll ask unanimous consent
that my statement, in its entirety, be put into the record,
such that we can move promptly to our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
The committee meets this morning to receive testimony on U.S.
military strategy and operations in Iraq. I welcome our distinguished
panel of witnesses: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General
Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General
John Abizaid, USA, Commander of U.S. Central Command; and General
George Casey, USA, Commander of Multinational Force-Iraq. We look
forward to your testimony.
I want to thank each of our witnesses, and the countless men and
women they represent, for their service and their tireless efforts to
secure peace and self-determination for the Iraqi people, and to bring
hope to a troubled region. I want to especially thank General Myers for
his service, not only for the past 4 years as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, but for his 40 plus years of distinguished service in uniform.
Tomorrow, you will turn over your responsibilities as Chairman to
General Pete Pace, USMC. This will be an important day for you, your
family, General Pace, his family, and the Nation. You have served your
Nation faithfully and well--well-done, sir!
On October 15, the Iraqi people will take another courageous step--
in defiance of the terrorists--to rescue their country from decades of
tyranny and move a step closer to democracy. The historic elections in
Iraq--elections for a transitional government last January, this
upcoming referendum on the constitution, and elections for a permanent
government in December--give us hope that success is within reach in
our efforts to achieve peace and security for the Iraqi people.
Political, religious, and ethnic challenges remain, and a persistent
insurgency continues to hinder stability and reconstruction efforts,
underscoring the importance of our continued commitment to `stay the
course.'
I ask our witnesses today to give us their candid assessment of the
situation and the strategy for the way ahead. The American people must
clearly understand what's at stake, why the operation in Iraq
contributes to U.S. security and the security of the region, and why
continued sacrifice of blood and treasure is necessary, particularly in
light of new, pressing needs at home.
We are mindful of the loss of life and limb, and the sacrifices of
the Iraqi people, as they are more and more--each day--assuming greater
responsibilities to secure and run their nation. It is important that
our witnesses address the commitment of the Iraqi government, the Iraqi
Security Forces and the Iraqi people to defeating the terrorists and
building a peaceful nation. We have seen many Iraqis sitting on the
fence to see who will win. We even hear talk of the possibility of
civil war in Iraq. The turning point in this conflict will come when
Iraqis truly want to take charge of their destiny and join in ferreting
out those who perpetrate violence and chaos to further their own goals.
During the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, we have often heard
of ``turning points'' or ``critical milestones.'' I too believe we are
approaching a ``turning point,'' in terms of the willingness of the
American people to continue to support the effort in Iraq, particularly
as we face significant challenges at home in the aftermath of two
devastating hurricanes.
I have great confidence in the wisdom of the American people. Our
great Nation has an enormous capacity for sacrifice and hardship when
we understand that the cause is just and that success is critical to
the security of our Nation. Americans can accept difficult news and
support a call to service and sacrifice from our Nation's leaders. Many
of us have lived through such calls to duty during World War II and the
Korean War. This global war on terrorism is no less important. We must
show the American people we are making real progress, and if we are
not, we must work harder. They will respond with their support.
At the same time, we must ensure that the Iraqi Government is
developing the structures that will fairly and efficiently provide the
services its citizens require. We have heard that the several changes
of interim governments and the associated turbulence within ministries
has caused uneven development and shortfalls in the support for the
Iraqi people. I hope our witnesses can address how we can expect that
recent announcements that the Department of Defense will take over
assistance and mentoring of the Iraqi ministries of defense and
interior will improve and accelerate the ability of the Iraqi Security
Forces to establish a more secure, stable environment in Iraq.
Over the next 3 months, the Iraqis will vote on a constitution and
elect a permanent government that is, hopefully, inclusive of all
ethnic, religious, and tribal elements and committed to democratic
principles. We must help them to develop the security structures that
will allow for necessary political and economic development, and that
will allow our troops to begin coming home.
We are engaged in a worthy cause in Iraq; a cause about which our
men and women in uniform are, and should be, justifiably proud. It is
not only the United States and its coalition partners that have a stake
in Iraq. The whole world will be a better, safer place with a free,
democratic, prosperous Iraq that can serve as a model of hope for the
region and beyond.
Yesterday, Generals Abizaid and Casey, in a classified briefing for
all Senators, outlined the strategy for the way ahead. I hope some of
the key points of those very thorough briefings can be shared with the
American public today so they can understand the scope of our efforts,
the importance of this endeavor, and the challenges that lay ahead.
Yesterday's session was very comprehensive and informative, but did
not permit detailed questions. I intend to manage the time this morning
so that all Senators have the opportunity to ask their questions and so
that we can adjourn for a classified session in order to permit a full
discussion. As you all know, we have a very important vote at 11:30
p.m. for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, we will
recess this hearing at 11:15 a.m., reconvene at 12:15 p.m., and recess
at 1 p.m. We will then proceed to a closed session from 1:15 p.m. to
1:45 p.m., and then adjourn.
Mr. Secretary, I know you and your fellow witnesses are scheduled
to testify before the House Armed Services Committee this afternoon. I
will ask my colleagues to help me manage our time to be respectful of
that commitment, as well.
I thank all of our witnesses for being with us today.
Chairman Warner. After the Secretary's comment, we'll
receive briefings from General Abizaid and General Casey. The
Senate, in closed session yesterday, had those briefings, again
this morning at a breakfast briefing, on the House of
Representatives side, for Senators and House members.
I wish to make a point that I think you're setting forth,
with great clarity, the strategy of this country and the
importance of everything that is being done by the Armed Forces
of the United States to secure the freedom of this country here
at home and abroad. I commend you for what I have heard in the
past 24 hours from each of you.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join Senator Warner in welcoming our witnesses
this morning.
I especially want to express our gratitude and our
congratulations to General Myers for his more than 40 years of
distinguished service to this Nation. I have a fuller statement
about that, but like most of the rest of my statement, I will
be putting that in the record.
General Abizaid and General Casey, thank you both for your
service, and please convey to the personnel under your command
our gratitude for all that they have done, and are doing.
Please assure them that while there are differences among us
about a number of issues relative to Iraq, all Americans hold
our troops in the highest esteem and are united in our
determination to give them and their families our full support.
This is a important hearing, coming, as it does, a little
more than 2 weeks prior to the national referendum in Iraq on
its draft constitution. Our military leaders have repeatedly
told us that there is no purely military solution in Iraq and
that a genuine broad-based political settlement among Iraqis is
essential for success and for the defeat of the insurgency.
That means that we must do all that we can to encourage that
political settlement, which many believe is not embodied in the
Iraqi constitution in its present form.
While the Kurds and Shiites are generally happy with the
draft constitution, the Sunni leadership strongly opposes that
draft constitution. While our hope is that a new constitution
would serve to unite the Iraqis, the more likely scenario is
that the Sunni Arabs will vote overwhelmingly against it, but
will be unable to defeat it. If that scenario comes to pass,
the danger is that the draft constitution will cement the
differences between the Sunni Arabs, on the one hand, and the
Shiites and Kurds on the other.
The distinguished International Crisis Group, in a policy
briefing released just on Monday, concludes that ``Without a
strong U.S.-led initiative to assuage Sunni Arab concerns, the
constitution is likely to fuel, rather than dampen, the
insurgency, encourage ethnic and sectarian violence, and hasten
the country's violent breakup.''
I believe that if the Iraqis do not come together to reach
a political solution by the end of the year--and adopting the
draft constitution in the face of overwhelming opposition of
one of the three main Iraqi groups doesn't meet that
description--that we must then consider a timetable for the
withdrawal of our forces. I emphasize the word ``consider.''
That is not setting a date for departure at this time. That's
simply conveying clearly and forcefully to the Iraqis that the
presence of our forces in Iraq is not unlimited. The
administration's repeated statements that we will stay in Iraq
as long as needed sends the wrong message. We should not
mislead the Iraqis into thinking that they have unlimited time
to reach a broad-based political settlement. Because if they
think that, they are less likely to make the compromises
necessary to reach a political settlement.
I would hope that our witnesses would address the
importance of a political coming-together on the part of the
Iraqis, in terms of a military success. I would hope our
witnesses would talk about whether the insurgency has declined
or whether it has increased or whether it's about the same as
it was a few months ago, when they were here last. I would hope
that our witnesses would discuss the status of Iraqi forces, in
terms of their capability and their ability to take on the
insurgency.
I would ask that the balance of my statement, Mr. Chairman,
be inserted in the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
Senator Levin. I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
I want to join Senator Warner in welcoming our witnesses this
morning.
I especially want to express my gratitude and congratulations to
General Myers for his more than 40 years of service to the Nation.
General Abizaid and General Casey thank you also for your
extraordinary service and please convey to the personnel under your
command our gratitude for all that they have done and are doing for us
and to assure them that, while there may be differences among us about
a number of issues relative to Iraq, all Americans hold our troops in
the highest esteem and are united in our determination to give them and
their families our full support.
This is an important hearing, coming as it does a little more than
2 weeks prior to the national referendum in Iraq on its draft
constitution.
During my last trip to Iraq in July, I met with many of the leaders
of Iraq's three major groups--Kurds, Shiites, and Sunni Arabs--to
obtain their views on a number of issues. On one issue, I found the
leaders of all three groups to be in agreement, but for different
reasons. None of them wanted the U.S. military forces to leave Iraq now
or in the immediate future. Shiites want us to stay until the Iraqi
security forces are strong enough to deal with the insurgency on their
own. The Kurds want us to stay indefinitely. The Sunni Arabs want us to
stay as a deterrent against those who might want to take revenge
against them for the actions of Saddam Hussein who favored the Sunni
Arabs.
Our military leaders have repeatedly told us that there is no
purely military solution in Iraq and that a genuine, broad-based
political settlement among the Iraqis is essential for success and for
the defeat of the insurgency. I believe that we must do all that we can
to encourage that political settlement, which many believe is not
embodied in the Iraqi constitution in its present form. The Kurds have
pushed for a loose federalism in which they can organize into an
autonomous region with a strong measure of local control over the
region's natural resources.
The Shiites have also supported a loose federalism with an
expectation that they can also organize into one or more autonomous
regions with control over natural resources. The Sunni Arabs, on the
other hand, who are predominant in the central and western areas of
Iraq, which are lacking in oil resources, favor a strong central
government that has a higher degree of control over Iraq's natural
resources.
The upshot is that the Kurds and Shiites are generally happy with
the draft constitution and their leaders, notably including Grand
Ayatollah Sistani, are encouraging their followers to vote for the
draft constitution in the October 15 referendum. The Sunni leadership
strongly opposes the draft constitution.
While our hope was that a new constitution would serve to unite the
Iraqis, the most likely scenario is that the Sunni Arabs will vote
overwhelmingly against it but will be unable to defeat it. If that
scenario comes to pass, the danger is that the draft constitution will
cement the differences between the Sunni Arabs on one side and the
Shiites and Kurds on the other. The distinguished International Crisis
Group, in a policy briefing released this past Monday, concludes that
``Without a strong U.S.-led initiative to assuage Sunni Arab concerns,
the constitution is likely to fuel rather than dampen the insurgency,
encourage ethnic and sectarian violence, and hasten the country's
violent break-up.''
Within recent days, the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-
Faisal, has been warning that Iraq was hurtling toward disintegration
and could drag the region into war. He is quoted as saying that ``There
is no dynamic now pulling the nation together. All the dynamics are
pulling the country apart.'' He said that his concerns are shared by
Iraq's neighboring countries. What, if anything, can we do to encourage
a different result?
I believe that, if the Iraqis do not come together to reach a
political solution by the end of the year (adopting the draft
constitution in the face of the overwhelming opposition of one of the
three main Iraqi groups, doesn't meet that description), we must
consider a timetable for the withdrawal of our forces.
That's not setting a date for departure at this time. That's simply
conveying clearly and forcefully to the Iraqis that the presence of our
forces in Iraq is not unlimited. The administration's repeated
statements that we will stay in Iraq as long as needed sends the wrong
message. We should not mislead the Iraqis into thinking they have
unlimited time to reach a broad-based political settlement. If they
think that, they are less likely to make the compromises necessary to
reach a political settlement.
Nor should we engage in self-deception. We can't stay for an
unlimited time due to the strain on our forces and the impact on
recruitment from repeated tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There are other important reasons why we can't stay in Iraq for an
unlimited time: The United States has borne a heavy burden to rid Iraq
of Saddam Hussein and to try to bring stability to the country. More
than 1,900 U.S. service men and women have made the ultimate sacrifice
and more than 14,000 have been wounded. We are also mindful of the more
than $200 billion of taxpayers' funds that have been expended in
support of that effort. The American people will not support an open-
ended ``we'll stay as long as they need us'' commitment if the Iraqis
don't make the compromises they need to make so they can achieve the
political unity so vitally necessary to defeat the insurgency.
We must also be candid about the situation in Iraq.
Consider this statement:
Four months ago, Vice President Cheney said ``I think the
level of activity that we see today, from a military
standpoint, I think will clearly decline. I think they're in
the last throes, if you will, of the insurgency.''--Larry King
Live, May 30, 2005.
That's wishful thinking, according to all the sources available to
me.
Similarly, we must not engage in wishful thinking about the
capability of the Iraqi security forces. The Department of Defense, at
first, and the Department of State, now, provide an unclassified report
relative to that on a weekly basis to Congress. The most recent report,
dated September 21, 2005, states that there are 192,000 trained and
equipped Iraqi security forces, with 104,000 under the Ministry of
Interior and 88,000 under the Ministry of Defense, of whom 87,000 are
in the Iraqi Army. What is missing is any statement as to the
capability of that force, particularly what number of Iraqi security
forces are capable of dealing with the insurgency independently of U.S.
and Coalition forces.
Secretary Rumsfeld, in a press briefing on September 9 with Iraqi
President Talibani, said ``The coalition forces and the Iraqi security
forces now numbering something like 190,000 are aggressively attacking
or capturing or killing terrorists or insurgents all across this
country. . . . The skill of the Iraqi security forces is improving
every week. . . .''
That statement inaccurately suggests that 190,000 Iraqi security
forces are aggressively attacking or capturing or killing terrorists
all across Iraq. But the facts are far different than that suggestion.
Thus far the Department refuses to give Congress and the American
people unclassified information about the capability of the Iraqi
security forces. The justification that providing the information in an
unclassified form would be aiding the enemy just doesn't wash. The
enemy knows very well what the capabilities and weaknesses of the Iraqi
forces are--Americans have a right to know too.
General Pace's answer to my question for the record on June 29,
2005 at his nomination hearing to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff provided more unclassified information than any report we have
received to date. In his answer, General Pace stated:
``Only a small number of Iraqi security forces are taking on
the insurgents and terrorists by themselves.''
Exaggerating our progress in defeating the insurgency or in
standing up an Iraqi Army that is capable of independently dealing with
the insurgency serves no useful purpose.
Our best chance of success in Iraq is to press for a political
solution by letting the Iraqis know that our military forces can't stay
in Iraq indefinitely and if they do not reach a political settlement by
the end of the year--one way or another--we must consider a timetable
for our withdrawal. For as our military leaders often remind us, there
is no purely military solution in Iraq and a genuine, broad-based
political solution among the Iraqis is essential for success and for
the defeat of the insurgency.
I wish to convey my congratulations to General Richard D. Myers on
his retirement from the Air Force and thanks for his nearly 40 years of
faithful service. General Myers entered the Air Force through the
Reserve Officer Training Corps and served in a variety of operational
command and leadership positions in a variety of Air Force and joint
assignments, culminating the highest position a military officer can
hold--that of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Chairman, he
joined a very select group of only 14 other generals who came before
him in that position. Unlike many of those generals, General Myers
served as Chairman during war, with the extraordinary responsibilities
attendant to a wartime Chairman. In so doing, he never forgot that his
first loyalty, and his highest priority, was toward the health and
welfare of all of our military personnel and their families. I wish
General Myers and his family the best for a well-deserved retirement.
Chairman Warner. Colleagues, before we begin to hear from
our witnesses, I recognize that a quorum is present. I now ask
the committee to consider a list of 3,979 pending military
nominations. These nominations have been before the committee
the required length of time. No objections have been raised
regarding them.
Is there a motion to favorably report 3,979 military noms
in the Senate?
Senator Levin. So moved.
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman Warner. Hearing both, all in favor, say aye. [A
chorus of ayes.]
Opposed? [No response.]
Ayes have it. Passed.
Secretary Rumsfeld.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. Chairman Myers and I are joined today, as you
pointed out, by the combatant commander of the Central Command,
General John Abizaid, and the Iraq commander, General George
Casey. They are back in Washington for meetings of the
combatant commanders and to brief the National Security
Council. We're all pleased to be able to have this opportunity
to meet with this committee.
These general officers have been entrusted with protecting
the interests and security of the American people in those
vital parts of the world. The President has great confidence in
them; and the country, I believe, can be encouraged and
grateful to them for their leadership.
General Abizaid's briefing is based on his perspective as
the combatant commander responsible for the region of the world
most troubled by violent extremism. General Casey will discuss
the situation in Iraq--certainly an important front, but not
the only front in the global war on terror.
As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, this will be General
Myers' last appearance before this committee as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the past 4 years, Dick Myers has
been a wise and valued counselor to the President, to the
National Security Council, and to me during all of the most
important discussions and decisions affecting the security of
the American people. Members of the National Security Council
have asked his advice on literally thousands of matters. It has
always given me great confidence that I always knew that every
piece of advice he has given has been rooted in his devotion to
the United States of America, to the American people, and to
the men and women in uniform. I certainly want to join in
thanking General Myers for his four decades of superb service
to our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the
committee, as the Secretary said, I have just over 24 hours
left as the chairman. I also understand that this is my 64th
congressional hearing. Perhaps it's fitting that this is one of
my last official activities since the job began, with
confirmation hearings, just over 4 years ago.
Through all the national security discussions we have had
over the years, it's clear that all of us share a deep love for
our country, and we share a strong belief in the ideals upon
which this Nation was founded--freedom, justice, equality--and
we share our commitment to defending those ideals. Our united
efforts to meet this commitment--never been more important than
today, when violent extremists and terrorists threaten all that
we hold dear. So, I thank you, this committee, for your
leadership in sustaining our Nation's unity and resolve for the
long war.
I think we also share tremendous pride in our troops and
all their accomplishments--their professionalism, their
courage, their selflessness, their compassion. They are 100
percent committed to accepting nothing short of winning this
important struggle, and they understand perfectly what they've
been asked to do.
They can take great pride in their many successes--the
recent elections in Afghanistan, the constitution being debated
in Iraq, and the growing capabilities of Iraqi and Afghan
security forces. All they need from us is the resources to
finish the job, the continued resolve of the Nation, and the
support of the American people. I thank you for ensuring they
have those three things. It's been an honor to serve alongside
all our men and women in uniform and to represent them in front
of this committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General Myers.
General Abizaid.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to join you
today.
Over the past several months, I have spent considerable
time in the CENTCOM theater meeting with regional leaders, our
commanders and troops, and our partners' commanders in the
field. The region churns with undercurrents of change
representing both opportunities and challenges for us. Our
troops continue to perform at levels of operational excellence
that are unmatched. It's a privilege to lead such courageous
young men and women. They are courageous, they are committed,
they are competent. If I could bottle up what they represent,
and sell it, I'd be a rich man.
I want to talk briefly today about the al Qaeda threat.
That's the main threat that we face in a region beset with many
difficulties. While al Qaeda does not represent the main part
of the insurgency in Iraq, it is certainly present in Iraq.
While it doesn't represent the main source of difficulties in
Pakistan's Northwestern Territory and Waziristan areas, it
certainly plays a role there. Al Qaeda has struck in Saudi
Arabia, in Egypt, in Spain, in London, in Washington, in New
York. Its global reach and its ability to inflict damage should
not be underestimated. In this year alone, over 400 suicide
bombers have been deployed worldwide, and thousands and
thousands of innocent civilians, most of whom are Muslims, have
been killed by al Qaeda, as al Qaeda attempts to become
mainstream, ideologically, in the region.
In June, I briefly spoke to you about the broader struggle
in the region, and I wish to deepen this discussion by focusing
on the al Qaeda threat. I think such a focus should also
provide a fuller understanding of what's at stake in the
region, where Iraq and Afghanistan fit, and causing the
dialogue to extend beyond just what's happening in Iraq and
just what's happening in Afghanistan, as if what's happening
there is unconnected to the broader pressures in the region
caused by extremism, such as represented by al Qaeda, and other
issues, such as Sunni/Shia violence that we see starting to
develop in various places.
Al Qaeda and associated extremists are the main enemy to
peace and stability in the region. The enemy that brought us
September 11 continues to represent one of the greatest dangers
to this Nation.
First, this enemy is driven by a militant ideology that
celebrates murder and suicide. In the Taliban's rule, in
Afghanistan, we saw how this ideology oppressed the masses and
covered a nation in darkness--no music, executions in soccer
stadiums, women sequestered, works of art destroyed.
The good news, however, is that the vast majority of people
in the Middle East and Central Asia and the Horn of Africa
don't buy this perverted view of Islam. They want to lead a
better life. They want to lead a more prosperous life. They do
not want the extremists to win.
But the grip of this ideology should not be underestimated.
Communism and fascism started with relatively few, but deeply
committed adherents, and the hate preached by al Qaeda
resonates with some misguided people who believe that al Qaeda
represents a true Islamic alternative. It does not.
Second, the enemy is empowered by modern communications,
expertly using the virtual world for planning, recruiting,
fundraising, indoctrination, and exploiting the mass media.
Their main effort is not to defeat us militarily, but to break
our will by capturing the headlines, by making us think that we
cannot help the people in the region help themselves against
the extremist ideology. They know that propaganda and grabbing
headlines are more important than military operations.
Importantly, this enemy seeks to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, and will certainly use such weapons if they obtain
them. They experimented with anthrax in Afghanistan. They tried
to develop crude chemical weapons in Afghanistan. They're
always talking about how they might develop a radiological
dispersal device. If they could buy or acquire a nuclear
weapon, they would. This is not my guess; this is what they
say. It's well known, they want to do this, and they'll stop at
nothing to try to do that.
These extremists are ruthless. Their depraved attacks and
robust suicide-bomber network intimidates entire communities,
and, indeed, intimidates entire countries. They are masters of
intimidation, but they are not masters of the battlefield. They
can kill innocents, but they can't win a single engagement
against military forces properly deployed. This ability to
intimidate gives them power beyond their relatively small
numbers. It also gives them a chance, if we fail in our mission
to prevent them from spreading their ideology, to gain more and
more adherents, and eventually gain an opportunity to achieve a
safe haven, not unlike the one that they achieved in
Afghanistan.
I'd ask the committee to bear with me for a few moments and
look at a few charts that describe the enemy's strategy in
their own words.
[The slide referred to follows:]
Their objectives are very clear. They believe in a jihad--a
jihad, first and foremost, to overthrow the legitimate regimes
in the region. But, in order to do that, they have to first
drive us from the region. This is what they believe. They
believe, ultimately, that the greatest prize of all is Saudi
Arabia and the holy shrines there, and no one knows this better
today than the Saudis do.
The enemy will then try to create and expand a geographic
safe haven in the region, which they will call the Caliphate.
That's what they called it in Afghanistan. That's what they
called it in Fallujah. That's what they call it in Waziristan.
They will try to reestablish a Caliphate throughout the entire
Muslim world and apply a very, very narrow form of Shariah law,
a form of Shariah law not believed in, or practiced, anywhere
in the Muslim world today. It certainly would allow al Qaeda
and their proxies to control a vast degree of oil wealth that
exists in the region. It certainly is clear that they intend to
destroy Israel in the process, as well.
Next slide.
[The slide referred to follows:]
As they expand to look for safe havens, they are moving
into areas of the world, such as the middle of Africa, the Horn
of Africa, Southeast Asia, and they operate from bases of
relative safety, especially within the virtual world, where
they purvey their hatred through the Internet from places such
as Germany, Holland, and even use servers here within the
United States. They aim to take advantage of open societies and
strike those open societies when they're ready, at their time
and place of choosing.
Next slide.
[The slide referred to follows:]
There are many active jihads, of course, that they are
participating in. While they are not the main enemy in all of
the jihads, they participate in every one of them because they
are trying to cause instability. They feed on instability.
You see here the future fight. They'll eventually exhaust
the far enemy, which is us and our allies, and overthrow the
regimes of the region.
To see, in their own view, off of one of their Web sites--
next slide--to give a view of how they see it, you see here, in
green, the first step to achieve an al Qaeda-dominated
Caliphate throughout the known Muslim world. Then you see, down
in the corner, where they think it will go in a hundred years.
Let there be no doubt about what they think.
[The slide referred to follows:]
Just as we had the opportunity to learn what the Nazis were
going to do from Hitler's words in ``Mein Kampf,'' we need to
learn what these people intend to do, from their own words.
Next slide.
[The slide referred to follows:]
There are a lot of different ways to look at this enemy.
Perhaps the most classic way to look at this enemy is by taking
a look at a map and see support nodes and leadership nodes,
lines of communication, places where the enemy can operate,
where we know them to operate, where we understand that their
cells exist, where they are not openly active, yet somehow
manage to organize suicide bombing and activity against
reasonable governments and properly appointed governments in
the region. They also operate in areas where there is no
governance, and they take advantage of these ungoverned spaces
to operate decisively, and organize and plan and train.
If you look at the geographic representation of al Qaeda
and their associated movements, and you see how distributed it
is, you get the mistaken belief that it is not a global or
borderless organization. It's not like IBM, a monolith that's
centrally led from a central headquarters; it's much more like
McDonald's, a franchise that is decentralized and linked, in
many ways that I think the next chart represents in a much
better way.
It shows, at the bottom, the traditional areas of where we
find the enemy--in training camps, places where military forces
can have effect against them, where leaders and fighters can be
captured and killed, where technical expertise can be
interdicted. But, in reality, this enemy has adapted to the
environment of our strength and our power, and the strength of
regional governments, and they have developed a media and a
propaganda campaign, that you see up here in the blue, an
Internet and proselytizing campaign.
[The slide referred to follows:]
Recruitment and education. They develop safe havens that
are both geographic in ungoverned spaces and virtual, within
the Internet and within the mass media world. They have front
companies. They buy off politicians. They develop facilitators
and smugglers. They deal with financiers that move drug money
around, as well as other illicit money. They have sympathetic
nongovernmental organizations that they sponsor to transfer
some of their hateful ideology in very, very insidious ways
around the region.
This type of enemy is a type of enemy that requires not
only military pressure to get at those things that you see in
yellow, but it requires all elements of international and
national power to put pressure throughout the network over time
in order to squeeze the ideology, defeat its sources of
strength, and ultimately allow the good people of the region to
have the courage and the ability to stand against this type of
an organization.
We know the enemy's strategy, and we have a rare
opportunity to get in front of these extremists and focus on
them now before al Qaeda and its underlying ideology become
mainstream. We will do this through an indirect approach. We
must help others in the region help themselves by promoting
self-reliant partners who are willing to face the enemy from
within their own countries and within their own borders. As we
do this, we should in fact, in the long war over time, reduce
our military footprint in the region, being mindful of the fact
that first we must stabilize Afghanistan, stabilize Iraq,
continue to deter Syria and Iran, and protect the flow of oil
vital to all the economies of the world and the peoples of the
region. We must make clear to the people of the region that we
have no designs on their territory and resources. We must make
clear that we fight with them out of mutual respect and mutual
self-benefit.
We must also enhance our own networks among our agencies,
our allies, our coalition, and the partner governments to
ensure that we're coordinating all of our instruments of
national power in the fight against al Qaeda.
Our military forces in the region are playing a key role in
implementing this strategy to defeat al Qaeda, and we have had
much success. We recently were able to kill the number-two
leader in al Qaeda in Iraq. Our allies in Pakistan, and our
friends in Saudi Arabia, have relentlessly produced results
against al Qaeda in certain parts of their territories. Our own
forces have fought al Qaeda wherever we've found them, and have
had good effect, but we have not finished the job. Their
leadership remains at large, their financial flows remain, and
we must continue to keep pressure on them over time to ensure
that the ideology that they represent does not grow mainstream
within the societies.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, our forces provide the shield
behind which legitimate and representative governments and
economic development are taking root. It is so important for us
to understand that it is a combination of military power,
economic power, diplomatic power, and political power that will
ultimately spell the end of al Qaeda's hateful ideology.
Elsewhere, such as in the Horn of Africa, our training
assistance enables nations to strengthen their military
capabilities and to strengthen their counterterrorist
capabilities over time. We are part of a much broader force.
Back in March 2003, there were about 275,000 American
troops in the region. Today, it's about 200,000. As Afghanistan
and Iraq stabilize over time, you could see it possible--and
indeed beneficial--for that strength to come down as, and only
if, indigenous capabilities improve to the point that local
nations can fight the fight themselves.
Certainly there has been progress, and General Casey will
talk about progress in Iraq. But in Afghanistan, the recent
successful elections there constituted another significant
setback for the Taliban and al Qaeda. In Pakistan, President
Musharraf is leading his country, not only in hunting down
extremists, but in discrediting their ideas. In Saudi Arabia,
security forces are aggressively combating that country's
terrorists that have been so aggressively pursuing all of the
instruments of national power that exist within the Kingdom.
It is important, I think, in closing Mr. Chairman, that we
recognize the global threat that al Qaeda presents to the
United States and to the civilized nations of the world. We are
not yet organized to the extent that we need to be to fight
this enemy with coordinated and synchronized international and
interagency action. We have time to do that, but we need to
seize the moment and do it now.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General. I appreciate
that you and General Casey have returned from your duties
abroad to meet the important challenge to brief not only the
President, but as you have been briefing here for 2 days,
Congress and the American people about this global threat and
how we, working with other nations, are combating it.
General Casey.
STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL,
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ
General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As we approach the referendum on the Iraqi constitution,
and for the elections for a government based on that
constitution, the Iraqi people are locked in a struggle between
tyranny and democracy.
They're fighting for their future against the remnants of
the regimes that tyrannized them for over three decades and
against the elements of the global terrorist network, that
General Abizaid just talked about, who seek to establish Iraq
as a base from which they can export terror throughout the
Middle East and around the world. With our support, I am
convinced that the Iraqis will prevail.
Our efforts in Iraq have been guided by a campaign plan and
a strategy based on proven counterinsurgency principles in
close coordination with successive Iraqi governments to guide
us to our end state, and that end state is an Iraq at peace
with its neighbors and an ally in the war on terror, with a
representative government that respects human rights and
security forces that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraq
as a safe haven for terror.
I'll say more about the strategy, the operational concept,
and our assessment of the enemy and the insurgency in closed
session, but I think it's important to note some of the broad
concepts that underpin our efforts in Iraq.
First of all, the capacity of Iraqi security forces has
increased quantitatively and qualitatively over the past year.
At transfer of sovereignty last June, there was one battalion
in the Iraqi Army, some number of partially trained and
equipped National Guard Forces--Iraqi National Guard Forces,
and some 3,000 police. Today, the number of police is more than
doubled. We have more than 100 Iraqi Army and special police
battalions participating with us in conducting
counterinsurgency operations. We have also developed with the
Iraqis, a readiness reporting system, not unlike that we have--
the one we have in place for our own forces, that allows us to
measure their capabilities and their growth monthly. So, over
the past 18 months, we have built enough Iraqi capacity where
we can begin talking seriously about transitioning this
counterinsurgency mission to them.
Second, our strategy was underpinned by a close study of
the histories of counterinsurgency operations, and that told us
a few things that we have weaved into the strategy:
First of all, history tells us that external powers,
without a strong indigenous partner in the security side, have
not fared well in dealing with insurgencies.
Second, the average counterinsurgency in the 20th century
has lasted 9 years. Fighting insurgencies is a long-term
proposition, and there is no reason that we should believe that
the insurgency in Iraq will take any less time to deal with.
Third, based on history and my personal experience in the
Balkans, we determined that the longer that the coalition bears
the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight, the longer we'll bear
the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight. This is about
dependency.
So as we looked at all those things, we adopted a strategy
to take early action to empower Iraqis. I think this is a key
element of our strategy that everyone needs to understand. The
Iraqi people have confidence in their security forces, and they
want to be protected by them. Iraqi leaders want to take the
lead in defending the Iraqi people, and the strategy that we've
crafted helps them do this.
Third point. We and the Iraqis adopted programs to enhance
the development and performance of the Iraqi security forces by
placing coalition transition teams with Iraqi security forces
and by partnering Army units with coalition units to enhance
the amount of training and capabilities that were available to
help the Iraqis grow. This process began in the spring, and is
currently implemented across Iraq in army, special police, and
border units. These programs allow us to directly improve the
operational capability and effectiveness of Iraqi units, to
build strong Iraqi chains of command and counterinsurgency
capability, and to enhance the development of Iraqi military
and police institutions. We have just completed an assessment
of the transition team concept, and we're very pleased with the
positive impact that these programs have had across the Iraqi
forces.
Fourth point. Our aim is to defeat the terrorists and
foreign fighters and to neutralize the insurgency while we
progressively transition the counterinsurgency campaign to
increasingly capable Iraqi security forces and ministries. This
is no easy task, and it will not be done overnight. But we
strongly feel that getting the Iraqis into leading the
counterinsurgency effort, as they are capable, will allow us to
gradually reduce the visibility of coalition forces across Iraq
and ultimately, as conditions warrant, to begin to reduce our
presence in Iraq, taking away one of the elements that fuels
the insurgency, that of the coalition forces as an occupying
force. We are quite clear that whatever we do with the Iraqi
security forces must be sustainable over the long term.
Now if I could, I'd just like to take a moment to address a
couple of questions that relate to this that I am continually
asked:
Question one: Do you have enough troops?
Question two: Do you still see it's possible to take fairly
substantial reductions next spring?
Now, these are difficult questions that cause some people
to scratch their heads, especially when you ask them both at
the same time. But let me take a couple of swings at those.
First of all, I have and I will continue to ask for what I
need to--what I need to have to accomplish this mission. You
asked me that, Mr. Chairman. I think the ranking member asked
me the same thing at my confirmation hearing. I've continued to
do that. Today in Iraq, we have over 350,000 coalition and
Iraqi security forces available for security operations.
Second, I think it was Yogi Berra that said, ``Predictions
are hard, especially when you're talking about the future,''
and it is. You can only make predictions if you make
assumptions and then by going back and continually evaluating
those assumptions. With my subordinates, we continually
reassess the situations on the ground in Iraq, we challenge the
assumptions that we've made, and we make projections on our
requirements for forces, and we adapt our projections to the
situation on the ground.
Third, as I suggested earlier, in Iraq more coalition is
not necessarily better. More and more capable Iraqi security
forces are better. Increased coalition presence feeds the
notion of occupation, it contributes to the dependency of Iraqi
security forces on the coalition, it extends the amount of time
that it will take for Iraqi security forces to become self-
reliant, and it exposes more coalition forces to attacks at a
time when Iraqi security forces are increasingly available and
increasingly capable.
Fourth point, reducing the visibility and ultimately, the
presence of coalition forces as we transition to Iraqi security
self-reliance remains a key element of our overall
counterinsurgency strategy. Any changes to our posture will be
conditions-based and made in conjunction with our coalition and
Iraqi partners; but it remains a key element of our overall
strategy.
So, there are a lot of factors that we consider and some
tough calls that we're going to have to make here over the
coming months, but I want to reiterate to you again, Mr.
Chairman, what I said to you at my confirmation hearing. I'll
continue to ask for what I need to successfully accomplish this
mission.
Back to the strategy then. We've crafted a strategy for
success in Iraq based on historical lessons, counterinsurgency
principles, and the realities on the ground in Iraq, and this
is a strategy that will enable the Iraqis to take charge of
their future. To be sure, the next couple of months are going
to be tough and difficult, as our enemies also recognize what's
at stake here as we complete this political process. They're
already challenging the referendum process with increased
terror attacks to create the impression that attempts at
progress are futile and that Iraq will never become a modern
democratic society. They're attacking the will of the Iraqi
people and the will of coalition publics. They're failing in
Iraq.
Across Iraq, 98 percent of eligible Iraqis have registered
to participate in the referendum and the elections. Better than
90 percent of Iraqis have stated their intent to vote. Probably
most importantly, Sunni Arabs who boycotted January's election
remain committed to participating in both the referendum and
the election. This is a significant step forward from earlier
this year.
Further, as I mentioned, we continue to make substantial
progress with Iraqi security forces. Today, we expect to have
60,000 to 70,000 more Iraqi security forces available for
referendum security than we had in the January elections. By
the elections in December, we expect that to rise to about
100,000 more Iraqi security forces available for election
security. As a result, I only asked for 2,000 additional forces
to help us with this year's election process, as compared to
12,000 that I asked for, for the January elections.
Militarily, coalition forces and Iraqi security forces
continue to pressure terrorists and insurgents across Iraq, and
Iraqi security forces are progressing and continuing to take a
more prominent role in defending their country. In the recent
success in Tal Afar Iraqi security forces outnumbered coalition
forces for the first time in a major operation. A year ago,
that division didn't exist. We've also had good successes
against the al Qaeda network, killing or capturing more than 20
of their key leaders since July, including the recent death of
one of Zarqawi's key lieutenants, Abu Azzam.
We and our Iraqi colleagues remain postured to provide
security for the referendum and the election. While I expect
the insurgents and the terrorists to pull out all the stops,
they will not be able to stop the political process from going
forward.
We're in a tough fight, but we've been in tough fights
before to advance the cause of democracy and to protect our way
of life. We should not be afraid of this fight. We and the
Iraqi people will prevail in this battle of wills if we don't
lose ours.
Now, I know some of you worry about the impact that the
calls for early withdrawal from Iraq has on our troops in Iraq.
In some recent discussions with a group of soldiers, I asked
them, what was the impact--what did they think about with what
was going on in the United States with the antiwar movement? A
sergeant major responded to me that he'd just had a
conversation about that with some of his soldiers. Here's what
they said, ``Tell those folks not to speak for us. September 11
won't happen again. We'll beat them here.''
The soldiers get it. This is the mettle of our troops. As
I've said many times, and as General Abizaid said at the
beginning of his statement, I continue to be amazed at their
courage, their commitment, and their ability to make a
difference in a challenging environment every day.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we and our Iraqi colleagues
continue to make progress in Iraq every day. Some days, the
steps are smaller than others, but we are more relentless in
our progress than those who seek to disrupt it. We have a
strategy and a plan for success in Iraq, and we are broadly on
track in achieving our goals.
It's hard work in a challenging environment, but we have
the best of America and coalition countries, military and
civilian, committed to defeating terrorism and tyranny in Iraq
so that we can all live safer. Success in Iraq will require
patience and will, but both the United States and the region
will be safer when we prevail.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Again, General Abizaid, General Casey, those are strong
statements preparing Congress with new knowledge with regard to
your detailed plans to confront the uncertainties of the
future. Through each of you, we convey, again, to the men and
women of the Armed Forces under your command and their
families, our deepest appreciation for their service and their
sacrifice.
Secretary Rumsfeld, we often hear the phrase ``stay the
course,'' and we are now receiving, I think, a good briefing as
regard to the military progress. I personally agree that there
is progress. I was privileged to be in Iraq several weeks ago,
and I saw it with my own eyes. General Casey, the thoughts of
your troops, I confirm their belief in what they are doing and
their willingness to stay the course.
But, Secretary Rumsfeld, the infrastructure in Iraq is an
integral part of any measure of progress. In the course of our
visit--myself with Senator Stevens--I'll speak only from my own
views--I felt that the Secretary of Defense in that
organization was not, in my judgment, showing the strength and
the decisiveness that is needed at this time. To some lesser
extent, I was concerned about the Interior Ministry, and that
individual's ability to step up and deal with this situation.
I want to ask you--I saw reports the other day about a
change, which I heartily endorse. When we started, the basic
responsibility of the refurbishment of the infrastructure--now,
that's electricity and water and security and other matters--
was largely under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Defense, and then it shifted when Ambassador Negroponte took
his office to the Department of State. Now, could you clarify,
with regard to the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry,
some, as I understand it, re-shifting of that responsibility
back to your Department. I, frankly, endorse it, but I think
the details should be made known.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that
the--if, by ``infrastructure,'' you mean electricity and water
and sewage and all those types of things, I know of no plans to
move those--responsibility for those to the Department of
Defense. I am told that General Casey and U.S. Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad, have recommended to Washington that the
Department of Defense take over responsibility for the Ministry
of Interior and the Ministry of Defense, which have also been
under the Department of State.
When I say ``take over responsibility,'' these are very
fragile institutions. They don't have a history there of strong
ministries that are democratic and representative of all the
elements in the society. The problem we have in the country is
that you could have security forces, but unless the security
forces on the military side work well with the police side,
unless they have a chain of command that's clear, unless the
ministries are able to support them and see that they can
provide the kinds of combat support and combat service support
and logistics that hare needed, unless they are properly
connected to the Intelligence Community, they don't do as well
as they otherwise would do. General Casey, who could respond to
this, has recommended, I believe--and it's now being considered
in Washington--that the Department of Defense, which has a
major interest in seeing that those two ministries, alone--not
the reconstruction ministries or the infrastructure ministries,
but just those two ministries--work very closely with the
train-and-equip activity, both ours and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's (NATO) activity, and that we assume
responsibility for strengthening the competence in those
ministries.
One of the problems we face is a real one. If you think
about it, we've gone in Iraq from the governing council to the
interim government, now a transitional government, and we have
an election in December for a permanent government. Every time
you change governments, there's a lot of turbulence. Those
ministries have not had the stability that would be desirable.
We look forward with a great deal of hope to the time when
the Iraqis will have a 4-year government, and those ministries
will have some stability and less turbulence, and that we will
be able to assist them in developing the kinds of systems and
procedures and approaches that will make them more effective.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, when we were there, we
learned--and I'll address this to General Casey--that the
Minister of Defense didn't have the money to pay his troops in
some instances. Is that correct, General Casey? I mean, to me,
that is an egregious breakdown of responsibility.
General Casey. That's exactly the type of ministerial
capacity that we intend--or try to help them build. He had the
money, Senator. He didn't have a system in place that got the
money to the right place at the right time. That's something
that is symptomatic of both the Ministry of Interior and
Ministry of Defense.
What we tried to do with this proposed shift is to have one
person responsible for the ministries, from the foot-soldier
all the way up to the ministers, so that we can generate the
institutional systems that you all look at here, with all of
our Armed Forces, that will sustain the Iraqi security forces
so they can accomplish their mission.
Chairman Warner. Can you give us your own views with regard
to the forthcoming referendum on the constitution, and the
likelihood of its being adopted?
General Casey. I can, Senator. My personal views are--and
this is backed up by my intelligence analysts--is that it will
likely pass, that there will be a sizeable no-vote by the Sunni
minority--but we don't think right now that they have the
capability of getting a two-thirds majority in the three
provinces they need for this to pass.
That said, there's a lot that could happen here in 2 weeks,
and we'll really just have to wait and see what the outcome is.
Chairman Warner. Fine.
Colleagues, I've just been handed my card. I'm going to
stop my questioning promptly, because I'm hopeful we can get as
many Senators in before the 11:15 termination.
Senator Levin?
Senator Levin. Thank you.
General Casey, you indicated that you were going to comment
about previous statements of yours about prospects for
reductions in American forces next spring. You laid out all of
the factors that go into that kind of a decision. Are you
projecting now, based on any assumptions you want to make, that
there will be a drawdown of American forces, starting next
spring? Are you making that projection at this time?
General Casey. As I said, Senator, reductions in coalition
forces--conditioned-based reductions of coalition forces is a
critical element of our strategy----
Senator Levin. Right.
General Casey.--and we certainly do look to do that over
the course of next year.
Senator Levin. Are you projecting that those conditions
would exist next spring, as of this time?
General Casey. Senator, the next 75 days are going to be
critical in what happens after that. I'd like to wait until we
get through this political process here to give you a better
assessment of that.
Senator Levin. Do you have milestones, a timeline, which
would reflect how we would reduce our forces? When Iraqi forces
gain certain strength, how many Iraqi battalions would have to
be assessed at a particular level in order for a U.S. battalion
to withdraw? Do you have that kind of a timeline and that kind
of a milestone?
General Casey. We do not have a timeline or milestones that
directly tie the drawdown of coalition units to numbers of
Iraqi battalions. As this happens, it will happen in a phased
way around the country. So, it's not something that lends
itself--that when--for example, when you have 20 Iraqi
brigades, you'll be able to downsize four U.S. brigades--it's
not quite that simple.
Senator Levin. All right.
General, I want to just reinforce something the chairman
said about the Iraqis not having funds to pay their troops.
When we met with President Talibani here a few weeks ago, he
confirmed reports that they did not have the funds to pay their
troops. It wasn't a matter of not getting the money to the
right place at the right time; he said they did not have the
funds to pay their troops. Are you saying that's not accurate?
General Casey. I know that was true for the Ministry of
Interior. I do not recall that being true for the Ministry of
Defense.
Senator Levin. All right, but the Minister of Interior
handles the police.
General Casey. That's correct.
Senator Levin. How many of the 190,000 are police?
General Casey. About 84,000.
Senator Levin. So half, roughly, of the so-called security
forces were not being paid, because the money wasn't there.
Now, that represents more than incompetence. I'm afraid that
may represent corruption, and worse. But how can we tolerate
that situation? Was there corruption involved in that, in your
judgment?
General Casey. I have no knowledge or evidence that
corruption was directly involved in that.
The other thing, Senator, my knowledge of this situation is
it wasn't that half of the people couldn't get paid; there were
spots, like Fallujah and like different places, that could not
be paid.
Senator Levin. Some of the 84,000--I overstated that--but
some of the 84,000 in the police. Do we have any idea what
percentage were not paid?
General Casey. I don't. I don't, Senator.
Senator Levin. Well, it's totally intolerable. I would hope
that you'd give the committee a report on that.
General Abizaid, let me ask you the----
General Casey. Senator, if I could, the Secretary just
showed me. It's about 67,000, on the local police.
Senator Levin. Who were not paid, or a part of that----
General Casey. No, that's the total number----
Senator Levin. Total.
General Casey.--of that 84,000.
Senator Levin. Total. Okay, thank you.
General Abizaid, in your judgment, what is the importance
of a genuine broad-based political coming-together among the
Iraqis as being vital to defeat the insurgency? How important
is that, that there be a political coming-together among the
Iraqi factions?
General Abizaid. Senator Levin, I think it's absolutely
vital.
Senator Levin. Do we know whether or not, if the
constitution passes, but with a strong majority of Sunnis
opposing that passage, whether or not the passage, under that
circumstance, would represent a plus or a minus, in terms of
their coming together politically? Do we have a prediction on
that, a feeling about that?
General Abizaid. I would defer to General Casey on that,
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. General Casey, do you have a feeling about
that? If there's a strong majority of Sunnis--which is very
possible--that vote against that constitution, could that not
possibly lead to a worsening political situation, rather than a
better one?
General Casey. I think that's entirely possible, Senator. I
mean, as we've looked at this, we've looked for the
constitution to be a national compact. The perception now is
that it's not, particularly among the Sunni.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Current indication, Senator, is that a
majority of the Sunnis will vote against it. That's the
impression you get from the polls and the conversation.
Senator Levin. Right.
Secretary Rumsfeld. On the other hand, the positive side of
it is they do plan to participate fully in the election.
Senator Levin. Right. But I think General Casey's answer,
that if a vast majority vote against the constitution, and that
that could, indeed, worsen the political situation, I would
hope the administration would not just simply continue to say,
``We're there as long as you need us. We're there as long as
you need us.'' I mean, we're doing our part, and the Iraqis, it
seems to me, must be told that they have to settle their
political differences and come together politically. If that
constitution is adopted, and that adoption does not represent
the coming-together, as, I think, is very possible--and,
indeed, likely--I would hope the administration, Secretary
Rumsfeld, would let the Iraqis know they have work to do
politically to pull together their house, their political home,
even if the constitution's adopted, that that isn't enough, if
there's going to be a faction which is seriously opposed to
that constitution, even if they do participate in the
elections. Can that message be delivered to the Iraqis so they
don't think they have us there for some unlimited period and it
doesn't make any difference if they work out their political
differences?
Secretary Rumsfeld. General Casey, you're in the meeting
with the Ambassador and the Iraqis on a continuing basis. I
would say that that message does get communicated, wouldn't
you?
General Casey. I would not say it's necessarily as forceful
as Senator Levin just put it.
Senator Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Levin. I would hope it would be forcefully
delivered.
General Casey. If I could----
Chairman Warner. Yes, go ahead, General.
General Casey.--just respond. Senator, you asked me,
``Could it have an adverse effect?'' I said yes. But it could
also have a positive effect. If you look at what has been
kicked into the next assembly in the constitution, which are
really the major building blocks of federalism and other
things, it could drive the Sunni to participate even greater in
the elections in December, to get into the assembly. They then
could get into an alliance with other secular parties, and this
process could move forward. So, it can work both ways.
Senator Levin. Either way.
General Casey. It's not necessary bad.
Senator Levin. It could work either way.
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. When we commenced the hearing today, I
advised the committee that we would have a closed session. We
are continuing to do that, but we've shifted it from SH-219 to
the Armed Services hearing room, room SR-222.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers, thank you again for all your great service
to this Nation. We'll miss you, and we appreciate everything
that you have done in service to our Nation.
General Abizaid, there was a report sent over, I think,
last June that three of the hundred Iraqi battalions were fully
trained and equipped, capable of operating independently. What
is that number now?
General Abizaid. The number now is, if you're talking about
level-one trained----
Senator McCain. Yes.
General Abizaid.--it's one.
Senator McCain. They have one battalion.
General Casey. Senator, if I might, could I take that?
Because I think I'm more familiar with it than General Abizaid.
Senator McCain. Sure.
General Casey. I mentioned, in my opening testimony, that
what we were focused on is putting Iraqis in the lead as soon
as they are capable. We fully recognize that Iraqi armed forces
will not have an independent capability for some time, because
they don't have the institutional base to support them. So,
level one, as you'll recall from the slide, is--that's what's
got one battalion. It's going to be a long time----
Senator McCain. It used to be three. Now we've gone from
three to one?
General Casey. Pardon me?
Senator McCain. It was three before.
General Casey. Right.
Senator McCain. Previous report was we had three
battalions. Now we're down to one battalion.
General Casey. Right, and things changed in the battalions.
I mean, we're making assessments on personnel, on leadership,
on training. There are a lot of variables that are involved
here, Senator.
Senator McCain. Your response to Senator Levin was that you
are not planning on troop withdrawals, because you want to see
what happens in the next 75 days. Is that--was that a correct--
--
General Casey. Senator, that's not how I'd characterize----
Senator McCain. Okay.
General Casey.--my response. I said that we're--
conditioned-based reductions of coalition forces remains an
integral part of our overall strategy. I believe I did say to
the Senator that that still remains possible in 2006.
Senator McCain. Are you planning on troop withdrawals for
next year?
General Casey. I just said that, Senator, yes.
Senator McCain. Yes or no.
General Casey. Yes, Senator, I do believe that the
possibility for conditioned-based reductions of coalition
forces still exists in 2006.
Senator McCain. The Camp al Qaim, senior U.S. Marine
commander said, ``Insurgents loyal to Abu Zarqawi have taken
over at least five key western Iraqi towns on the border with
Syria.'' How many times are we going to read about another
offensive in Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi, al Qaim, where we go in,
we take control, and we leave, and the bad guys come back
again? How often are we going to read that, General Casey?
General Casey. Hopefully not too frequently, Senator. In
the last 90 days, we've pushed five Iraqi brigades and about
four coalition battalions into Anbar Province. The issue has
always been the availability of Iraqi security forces to remain
and retain control.
Senator McCain. Some would argue that maybe it was the
availability of American forces. There's 1,000 marines
stationed in the desert, populated by 100,000 Sunni Arabs. The
border between Syria and Iraq, obviously, is not under our
control. Do you agree with that? Is the border between Syria
and Iraq under our control?
General Casey. No, Senator, it's not. Since April, we have
had an objective of restoring Iraqi control to that Syrian
border before the elections. The operation you saw in Tal Afar
is a part of that strategy, and you will see operations along
the Euphrates Valley here in the near term.
Senator McCain. I was interested in your comment, ``The
longer we carry the brunt of the insurgency fight, the longer
we will carry the brunt.'' Does that mean that the Iraqis are
able to carry the brunt?
General Casey. That means, the longer that we lead,
Senator, the longer we'll continue to lead. That's why we have
a conscious strategy of passing that off--the lead off----
Senator McCain. That assumes----
General Casey.--to the Iraqi----
Senator McCain.--that assumes that the Iraqis are capable
of assuming that leadership, General Casey. Most people that I
talk to say, by most measures, they're not ready to do that.
So, what we're doing here--I'd refer to General--David
Ignatius' column, from what they--the military described a
military approach that's different, at least in tone, from what
the public perceives for their commanders. Iraq is in an
endless tunnel. They're planning to reduce U.S. troop levels
over the next year to a force that will focus on training and
advising the military--Iraqi military.
Nobody could argue with that, but there's one fundamental
problem with it, and that is whether the Iraqis are capable of
carrying out their own military responsibilities. The
President, yesterday--you might understand that the American
people are a little confused--says, ``Bush warns of upsurge of
violence in Iraq before next month's voting.'' So, Americans
are seeing, on the crawl on their television set, ``American
marines killed, soldiers killed, more people killed, hundreds--
a couple of hundred in 1 day,'' and yet we are now planning on
troop withdrawals.
General Casey, I'm not worried too much about the impact on
American military morale, because I have great faith in them.
I'm worried about the impact on the insurgents. You're planning
on troop withdrawals--you and General Abizaid--without any
criteria being met, that I can see. We're certainly
broadcasting that in very loud and clear tones, as you did
several months ago, when the President said, ``We are going to
do whatever is necessary,'' it stopped for a while, and now
it's there again.
We're making--you're taking a very big gamble here. I hope
you're correct. I don't see the indicators yet that we are
ready to plan or begin troop withdrawals, given the overall
security situation, and that just isn't my opinion alone.
General Abizaid would like to respond, Mr. Chairman. My
time is expired.
General Abizaid. Thanks, Senator McCain. If I may, I'd like
to point out a couple of things.
First of all, the war has moved to the west, which is a
good scene, a good indicator that Iraqi and U.S. forces are
having an effect elsewhere. The amount of infiltration across
the Syrian border remains a concern, but it's down--not so much
because of Syrian activity, but because of U.S. and Iraqi
activity.
Iraqi casualties are probably taking place at around four
times the level of our own, which indicates a willingness to
fight for their own country. Their organizational capability is
pretty good, as well.
But I can assure you, Senator McCain, General Casey and I
want to win this war. If we need to ask for more U.S. troops,
in the short term or in the long term, we will.
Senator McCain. General, there is no expert that I know
that doesn't attest that we needed more troops at the time a
lot of us said we needed them.
My time's expired, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. General Casey, do you wish to add anything
to this very important question by Senator McCain?
General Casey. If I could, to the Senator's point that we
don't have any way of measuring the progress of these forces.
That's exactly what the purpose of putting the transition teams
with these forces and producing these monthly readiness reports
is. We are fighting with them side-by-side on a daily basis,
improving their capabilities day-by-day. Our sense is that when
we get them in the lead, they'll learn faster and they'll
improve faster, rather than following us around and watching us
do what we do. We're measuring this very carefully, and we're
not going forward with this capriciously. As I said, this is an
integrated strategy, and the reductions will come when the
conditions are met, as an overall part of the strategy.
Chairman Warner. General Myers.
General Myers. Thank you, Chairman.
Just a comment on Senator McCain's comment that experts
have said we've always needed more troops. We've all heard
those calls. I respect the people--some of the people who have
made those calls. But the facts, as I know them, that there's
not been anybody in a position of responsibility for carrying
out the mission in Iraq--that has said that or believes that--
it's a complex situation that is not well understood by folks
who fought in Vietnam, for instance, or fought in the World
Wars. This is a much more complex situation. The task is very
hard. I think General Casey established it in his opening
remarks, when he said that if we're viewed as occupiers, we
draw fire just by being occupiers.
I think the thing we have to do, Senator McCain, is
convince people this is not a cut-and-run strategy, this is a
win strategy. It's trying to walk that very fine line between
being seen as an occupier and being effective in winning this
war and helping the Iraqis stand up on their feet and take the
fight to the enemy. I just keep hearing, ``More troops,'' but I
can tell you that the people we talk to, the academics that we
bring in, the ex-military experts--and we'll talk to anybody
that will write about this or talk about it; we're happy to
talk about it--and this strategy has been reviewed--George, I
don't know how many times we've picked at your strategy, but--
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we certainly don't think that
more American forces is the answer.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, I felt compelled to just make
one comment.
General Myers seems to assume that things have gone well in
Iraq. General Myers seems to assume that the American people--
the support for our conflict there is not eroding. General
Myers seems to assume that everything has gone fine and our
declarations of victory, of which there have been many, have
not had an impact on American public opinion.
Things have not gone as we had planned or expected, nor as
we were told by you, General Myers. That's why I'm very
worried, because I think we have to win this conflict. So,
you've been bringing in the wrong experts, in my view, because
the conflict has not gone as it was testified to before this
committee by this group of witnesses.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. The record will remain open for purposes--
I will allow you to rebut that--the record is open on this very
important question. Any of the witnesses may supplement.
One last comment.
General Myers. I don't think this committee or the American
public has ever heard me say that things are going very well in
Iraq. This is a hard struggle. We are trying to do in Iraq what
has never been done before. This is historic. It's historic, in
terms of our security, because it's part of the global war that
General Abizaid talked about. This is, for al Qaeda, a center
of gravity. Whether we like it or not, those are the facts. We
have the al Qaeda leader in Iraq that's been charged to
continue the fight, not only in Iraq, but in Europe and the
United States. That's a fact. That's what he's been charged to
do by the leader of al Qaeda.
I don't know how you characterize what goes on in Iraq, but
we set out milestones way back at the end of major combat. The
first remarkable thing that happened in Iraq was, our troops
took Baghdad just weeks after many critics said, ``You're in a
quagmire''--maybe some of the same experts that think we need
more troops--that, ``You're in a quagmire.'' Then, a few weeks
later, Baghdad falls.
It is not easy to do what we're trying to do in Iraq. It's
not easy for the U.S. Government or our coalition friends to do
it. We've made lots of mistakes along the way, Senator McCain--
no doubt about it--because it's never been done before. It's
never been attempted before. But the outcome is so potentially
stabilizing for the region and for our country.
So here we are, we've had several transitional governments.
We said the Iraqis would develop a constitution and have a vote
in October. That's going to happen. We're going to have
elections in December. I think that in a sense, things are
going well. It's not easy. The people that understand that are
the people that volunteer to go over there. If you talk to the
men and women, they understand what's at stake, and they're
willing to go out on patrol, on raids, to protect
infrastructure, to protect individuals, and put their lives in
harm's way, because they understand what's at stake.
So, I'm not going to be Pollyannaish about this--this is
tough--and I don't think I ever have been. But I think I've
been a realist, and I think I trust the judgment of people on
the ground and people on the Joint Staff that have just come
back from Iraq, the battalion commanders, the brigade
commanders, the general officers. I respect their opinion.
They've been over there in the crucible with the blood and the
dust and the gore, and those are the people that I trust their
opinion. I particularly trust the opinion of General George
Casey and General John Abizaid. They've been at this a long
time, and they know what they're doing. We should trust them.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank all of you for the continued service to the country.
I'm concerned, Mr. Secretary, by the continuing reports
that the Iraqi police and security forces we're training are
substantially infiltrated by the insurgents. Earlier this
month, I received a shocking letter from a retired military
officer, whose nephew is a marine recently sent to Iraq, and
his letter says that, ``My nephew was briefed by just-returned
marines that 100 percent of the Iraqi police and army have now
been compromised by insurgents. He and his fellow marines were
warned that any and all operations that involve the Iraqi
police or army units would result in ambush. Not all Iraqi
police or army are members of the insurgency, but he was
briefed that all units were infested with hostile
collaborators, to the point of being dysfunctional as a part of
security forces.''
We've had warning signs before about infiltration. A year
ago, the New York Times reported that an advisor to Prime
Minister Allawi said that as many as 5 percent of the Iraqi
Government troops are insurgents who have infiltrated the ranks
or they're sympathizers. At the time, we had Lieutenant Colonel
Jeffrey Sinclair, the 1st Division, said, ``The police and
military forces all have insurgents in them. You don't have a
pure force.''
Then in February, Major Don McArdle, who is the deputy
commandant of the 4th Iraqi Division Training Academy, said,
``After a recent battle in Mosul, some insurgents' bodies were
found wearing identification tags from the academy.''
In February, Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic
International Studies said, ``Penetration of the Iraqi security
and military forces may be the rule, not the exception.
Then on July 25, the Inspectors General of the State
Department and Defense Department released a joint report
saying this, ``Even more troubling is infiltration by intending
terrorists or insurgents. There is sufficient evidence to
conclude that such persons are, indeed, among the ranks of the
Iraqi Police Service (IPS).''
The report also says, ``A nettlesome issue has been the
fact that some graduates do not enter the Iraqi police service
after completing training. Even tracking of the numbers
trained, but not assigned, is an elusive problem. Some U.S.
sources assert that the number might be as high as a third or
more of those who have gone through basic training.'' A third
or more.
The report went on to say that the questions of
accountability for controlled equipment is particularly
critical. The specter of weapons issued to members of the Iraqi
police service but falling in the wrong hands is a concern. As
we all know, President Bush has said that our forces will stand
down as the Iraqis stand up. The question is, Who are we
helping to stand up? Are the insurgents benefitting from the
military training and the equipment and using inside knowledge
to ambush and kill our soldiers?
Can you assure us, Mr. Secretary, and the American people,
that we're not training the insurgents in the Iraqi security
forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, there's no question but that
the vetting issue is a difficult one, and an imperfect one. The
people who are volunteering undoubtedly have among them
individuals who are attempting to infiltrate. The percentages
you have cited, I've not heard from anyone in any kind of
authority, the 100 percent or 30 percent or those kinds of
things.
It's a problem that's faced by police forces in every major
city in our country, that criminals infiltrate and sign up to
join the police force. We know that this is a difficulty. They
do have a vetting process. They also, today, have a better
insight into it, as General Casey said, because they have
embedded Americans in the Iraqi forces, so they're better able
to see how the leadership is, where the weaknesses are, and
where the possible infiltrations might have occurred.
General Casey may want to comment on it.
Senator Kennedy. Yes, perhaps, General Casey, tell us the
extent--I mean, through your--how much of a problem. We have
the IG's report, as of July. It's quite extensive on this, the
other kinds of comments and statements that have been made that
it is a problem, and that it's not getting any better. I would
want your response.
General Casey. Senator, my assessment is that it is more
problematic with the police than it is with the army, because
the police are primarily recruited locally, and the army is
broadly recruited nationally. As the Secretary suggested, there
is a vetting process, but it's a very difficult process, and
it's not a failsafe process for sure.
Numbers like 100 percent are not numbers that I know. We
certainly do expect that there is some infiltration of the
police, and, to some extent, the military forces, but we don't
see it in a way that would render these forces incapable.
Now, if I could just add one last thing?
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
General Casey. We saw something down in Basra that is also
troubling, and that is the presence of people in the police
departments whose loyalty are more to their militia leaders
than they are to the chief of police. That was part of the
situation down there.
Senator Kennedy. In your report that you're coming out in
October with can you expand on this, give us a fuller kind of
report?
Just in the last moments that I have, I'm deeply concerned
by the grisly photos, American soldiers near the dead and
mutilated bodies that have been posted on the Internet. There's
a story in the Washington Post today, and it's reminding us of
the pictures that were there after Abu Ghraib. It's against the
background of that excellent letter by that extraordinary young
captain--it was in the Post yesterday--Ian Fishback. It said,
``Despite my efforts, I've been unable to get clear, consistent
answers from my leadership about what constitutes lawful and
humane treatment of detainees.'' What in the world is going on
when we see, in the Internet, the American servicemen posed
against mutilated bodies? What does it say about our respect,
for those that we are fighting certainly, but our respect for
the dead, and particularly the dead of other countries and
other traditions? What are we doing about it?
General Casey. Senator, those photos are not something that
we condone, and we're taking appropriate action to ensure that
that practice, such as it exists, is halted.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up.
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, for clarification purposes, there was an
article in one of yesterday's papers talking about how the
suicide bomber had penetrated the Green Zone. Then it was
retracted today. Did it not happen?
General Casey. Senator, I don't have specific knowledge on
that particular article that you're talking about.
Senator Inhofe. Oh.
General Casey. But I have no knowledge of a suicide bomber
penetrating the Green Zone.
Senator Inhofe. That's very good. Very good.
The chairman talked a little bit about some of the things,
in terms of infrastructure, and when--on quite a number of
trips that I've been over there, and I have--and on, in
particular, I remember General Petraeus talking about the
effectiveness, Mr. Chairman, of the Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP), and how significant that is. For a
very small amount of money they're in a position to see what
needs to be done immediately in certain areas. I'd like to have
you comment--perhaps General Casey, you'd be the best one--on
that program.
General Casey. It's probably our most effective program,
Senator. Last year we spent over $700 million, dispensed out
through the commanders--small, high-impact projects that
affected the local communities. This is one of the best
programs we have, and that our commanders have, to influence
things economically within their areas.
Senator Inhofe. In other words, the money spent there is
far greater than going through a process where something might
be done 6 months from now.
General Casey. Certainly, it has greater local impact.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Casey. But the country still needs big projects and
long-term----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that. Thank you very
much.
Yesterday in the closed briefing--and I can say it now,
since you repeated it in this open briefing--you talked about
the average insurgency, and it takes about 9 years to put down.
Consequently, one of the participants, or one of the Senators
in the audience--said, in a rather loud voice, right after
that, where several people were listening, ``Well, we've signed
up for 9 years.'' I'd like to--my interpretation of that
statement, that you repeated today is, yes, that's true, and
this could take 9 years, but it doesn't mean that we are going
to be doing it for 9 years. Would you clarify that?
General Casey. That's exactly right, Senator, and that's
the thrust of the strategy. The strategy is to put the Iraqis
in a position to deal with the insurgency while we bring it
down to a level----
Senator Inhofe. Very good. That clarification, I think, is
very important.
I think, if you're--we all remember the prophets of doom
before the January election. We found them to be wrong. Those
same prophets are out there right now. I have every reason to
believe--quite frankly, I take the oversight responsibilities
of this committee very seriously. I've been over there many
times, and I will be over again next week. But, you did an
excellent job, General Casey, of outlining those good things
that have taken place and you put it in a very good light.
I would suggest any of those who are here--the Senator from
Massachusetts, in my understanding, has not been there
personally--if you rely on reports, and if you rely on the
media, and the distorted way in which the media is reporting
what's going on there, you're not going to get a very good idea
of what's really going on. I can remember so well spending one
whole trip in the Sunni Triangle, in Fallujah, just talked to
the troops there. You used that quote, ``September 11 won't
happen again, because we'll defeat them here.'' I heard that
same thing said by a Marine sergeant over there in Fallujah.
The former brigade commander that is--hated Americans--he was a
brigade commander for Saddam Hussein--now, after having
experienced embedded training with our marines over there, has
totally changed his mind. He loves them. He actually cried when
the rotation came. I mean, these things are actually happening
over there. He renamed the Fallujah security forces the
``Fallujah Marines.''
I was there right after, in Tikrit, when the explosion took
place. Forty people, Iraqis in training for security forces,
were either killed or were injured. In that case, the families
of those who were killed or injured actually replaced, with
another member of the family, each one who went down.
Now, that's very significant that we talk about that,
because these things are happening, and anyone who's been over
there will tell you, the first thing you get from the young
troops that are there is, ``Why is it the media doesn't
understand what we're doing, what our commitment is, the threat
that our Nation is facing?''
Now, last June, we had a hearing on the Improvised
Exploding Devices (IEDs) by General Votel. I'd like to know,
since that time, is there any update on that particular
progress--any progress that's being made in terms of the threat
of the IEDs?
General Abizaid. Senator, with your permission, I'd like to
hold the IED discussion for the closed hearing.
Senator Inhofe. That's perfectly reasonable.
Since my time is rapidly going by, let me get one last
question in here.
General Abizaid, I'm reading a quote from you, ``The
Afghans and Iraqis on this trip kept saying to me over and over
again, `Are you going to stick with us?' I kept telling them
over and over again, `Yes, we will. I ask the American people
not to make a liar out of me.' ''
That was a great statement. I've thought the cut-and-run
caucus is alive and well here in Washington. I'd just like to
have you make any comment you can make. If we should surrender,
if we should cut-and-run at this time, what would be the
result?
General Abizaid. It would be a disaster for the region, it
would be a disaster for the United States, it would be a
disaster for the people in the region. Senator Inhofe, I look
at this region--I've been around this region most of my
professional life--there are good things happening in the
region that aren't measured by what soldiers do. People are
debating the future of governments. People are participating in
electoral sorts of organizations and activities that were
unheard of years ago. People are standing up for their rights.
People are coming forward and debating their future in a way
that I've just never seen before. I don't believe any of that
would have happened were it not for the American soldier,
sailor, airman, and marine.
In the long run, there's nothing to be afraid of. We can
win the fight. It's difficult. It's costly. But the
implications of allowing the region to become dominated by the
ideology of al Qaeda are the same as the implication, in the
years previous to World War II, of allowing fascism to become
the ideology of Germany. It will lead to a big war that none of
us can stand.
We have to fight. We have to win. We can't walk away from
this enemy. Nor can we walk away from the good people of the
region. We're fighting their enemy side-by-side, and over time,
more and more people will realize that.
It's easy to wring our hands and say, ``Oh, woe is us.''
But those of us that are in the field don't say that. We say,
``We're winning.'' But it's not going to be easy.
General Myers. Senator Inhofe, if I may, just let me add a
comment to that. If we were to lose in Iraq, whatever that
means--pulling out, or whatever--that is a battle in this
longer war that we've talked about, the war on terrorism. My
view is that as soon as we pull out, that would embolden this
al Qaeda organization, their violent extremist techniques, and
that surely the next September 11 would be right around the
corner. It would embolden them beyond belief if we were to cut-
and-run, as some have said, and we can't afford to do that.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General. By the way, let me
associate myself with the remarks and the compliments about
you, General Myers. Thank you so much for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General Abizaid and General
Myers, for those very powerful statements.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. First, General Myers, let me too, compliment
you on 40 years of honorable service to the Nation in the
uniform of our country. That's something we all can agree upon,
it's something to be very proud of. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Secretary, last September General Kern came before the
committee and, in response to a question from Chairman Warner,
indicated that the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense and the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) had taken upon the task, in his words, ``of
investigating the ghost-detainee policy.'' Can you give us an
update on those investigations, when they are to conclude and
when we might get the results?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have no information about the CIA
investigation. I certainly can get you an answer as to when the
IG in the Department estimates that they'll complete it.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, one other thing. In response
to Senator Kennedy's question, you--and I might have misheard
you, but you seemed to imply that every police department is
infiltrated by criminals?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No. I think what I said was, if you
look around our country and other nations, and look at big-city
police departments, they do have a problem of vetting to see
that they are not infiltrated by criminals. We do know, from
time-to-time, that there are scandals in police departments in
major cities in the United States--certainly in my lifetime,
I've seen it--where individuals did end up inside the police
department. But I didn't make any blanket statements----
Senator Reed. I just wanted to clarify that, Mr. Secretary.
General Abizaid, I agree with your analysis of the threat
we face. It's a distributed network threat, entrepreneurial,
ideologically driven, and committed, regardless of what we do
in Iraq to attack us here in the United States again. The
question you raised, I think, is the primary question before
us, How does Iraq fit into that overall threat?
Many Americans today are suggesting it doesn't fit very
well. That because of our presence there, because of the
activities there, because of the events there, we are not
winning the allegiance, support, and cooperation of allies. You
have the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, who has said
recently that he sees the country disintegrating, and that
disintegration could lead to a regional conflict between Sunni
and Shia. Just yesterday, Secretary Hughes was assailed by a
Turkish women's rights activist about our policy in Iraq; the
very good people that we would expect would be with us and be
supportive. On the tactical level, evidence suggests that there
are numerous recruits going to Iraq from other countries in
order to fight us, to keep this insurgency going.
An issue that I find very troubling is that, in some
respects, all of our activities there might be of marginal
relevance to those other cells in other places, particularly
Europe, who might be much more capable of mounting an attack
against our homeland because of language skills and ability to
move quickly through airports. I think the American's idea of a
terrorist is someone dressed like an insurgent in Iraq, with--
not someone with a British accent or a European accent.
So, the question is, how much does Iraq complement and help
our strategy overall, which I agree with you, is a long-term
battle?
General Abizaid. I think, in the long-term strategy,
Senator, we certainly have to stabilize Iraq. I believe we have
to stabilize Iraq. We haven't made the terrorists that have
come our way; al Qaeda has made the terrorists that have come
our way. We didn't ask for this war; it was thrust upon us. The
entire region plays in different ways in the overall battle.
The most important thing is that Iraq stabilizes, Afghanistan
stabilizes. I believe, when that happens, it starts to be the
beginning of the end for the extremist movement.
Senator Reed. But General, just in response, we did not ask
to be attacked on September 11, but we certainly made a
conscious decision to attack Iraq, on evidence which some
people debate. Now many people--not just myself, but many
others--are questioning whether that commitment of resource,
commitment of effort, is really going to defeat this, overall,
on a much more lethal threat, which you described very well,
which is located in London, in Hamburg, in Manila, in Jakarta.
We're engaged there. I agree with you, we can't leave it
unstable. But that might be just because of the fact we at
least prompted the instability by our actions.
General Abizaid. Senator, I don't know that I would say
it's our actions at all. I'd say that the main theater of
military activity is Iraq. The main effort is George Casey. We
have to stabilize Iraq in order to fight the broader al Qaeda
threat. The foreign-fighter network is not just focused on
Iraq. It moves worldwide. It's global. The fact that it happens
to manifest itself by a large number of suicide bombers in Iraq
gives us an opportunity to attack it, gives us an opportunity
to understand the network. This suicide bombing network that
exists in Iraq exists in other places all around the world.
So, al Qaeda, as I said in my presentation Senator, is not
the main enemy in Iraq; it is the most dangerous enemy in Iraq,
and it feeds on the instability of Iraq. We have to stabilize
Iraq in order to fight the broader enemy, and the broader
enemy's going to be with us for a long time. But we can't walk
away from al Qaeda. They won't let us.
Senator Reed. My time is up.
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers, let me begin my comments today by echoing
the thanks of my colleagues for your extraordinary service. We
very much appreciate your strong commitment to your country,
and we wish you well.
General Casey, for the past year, this committee has
received regular briefings on the status of the training of the
Iraqi security forces. The training and equipping of those
forces are a key part of our strategy, as you've outlined again
today. It is, therefore, discouraging to hear today that there
is only one Iraqi battalion that is fully capable. As Senator
McCain has pointed out, that number is fewer than just a few
months ago when we were briefed on the status of the training
efforts. That contributes to a loss of public confidence in how
the war is going and whether the strategy is the appropriate
one and it's being executed properly, whether or not we're
making progress. It doesn't feel like progress when we hear
today that we have only one Iraqi battalion that is fully
capable.
I have two questions for you. One, have we lost ground in
the training of the Iraqi security forces? Two, how many fully
trained Iraqi forces do we need in order for American troops to
withdraw from the country without plunging it into chaos, an
outcome that none of us wishes to see?
General Casey. Thank you, Senator. I'm struggling here a
little bit with this ``fully capable,'' because when--and it
may be something that we put on ourselves because of our
military ethic. But when we say a unit is ``fully capable,''
that means something to us. It means that they are capable of
going out and conducting operations without any other support.
That's a high standard, and we recognize that.
We also recognized that it was going to take the Iraqis--
one, because of recruiting and training issues, but also
because of ministerial support along the lines of what the
Senators were talking about earlier, in terms of pay systems--
that it was going to be a while before the institutions of Iraq
could support a military. So, we didn't want to wait until
everybody was 100 percent fully capable. We adopted a strategy
that says, ``Give them the transition teams, get them to a
level two, where they can lead, and get them into the lead with
our transition teams and enablers.'' That's the one we're
focused on and there's over 30 battalions already in that
category.
So, I understand what you're saying, how it could be
perceived as disappointing, but really, at level two and level
three, all of those units are operating with us. In level two,
they have the capability to lead.
So, have we lost ground? Absolutely not. In fact, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, the transitions that we
placed with the Iraqi security forces have enhanced what these
organizations and these units have been able to do.
I will tell you, there's a lot of intangibles with unit
readiness. For example, if a battalion commander gets dismissed
and he goes off, that unit takes a couple of steps backwards,
and then you have to rebuild that. So I mean, this is a
constant battle and challenge, but the transition teams have
given us the insight and the visibility into the real
capabilities of these units. So we see it, warts and all.
That's the only way we're going to get it fixed.
How many fully-trained Iraqis does it take before we can
start drawing down coalition forces? As I mentioned to somebody
else earlier, it--we are not tied to a specific number. This
will take place regionally, as regional--as the forces within
those regions reach appropriate levels. Then we will gradually
start pulling coalition forces out. So, it's not: we have to
get to some number and then we can start. We'll be able to
start gradually, as these Iraqi security forces become capable
of taking the lead, with our support.
Secretary Rumsfeld. If I might add, Senator Collins--if one
thinks about it, out of 194,000 Iraqi security forces, the army
is 75,000. There are any number of other elements included in
that number that are able to do what they are designed to do. A
police unit's able to do what it's designed to do. The border
enforcement, the highway patrol, the special police commandos,
dignitary protection, these people are out doing what it is
they are trained and equipped to do. What we've done is to look
at a grading system that we use here in the United States and
try to determine for the Iraqi Army how they would fit. That's
where you get that one unit.
On the other hand, if you think about it, we don't judge
our other alliances that way. We have NATO activities that
don't have the enablers that they need to operate
independently, and we have to participate with them, with
intelligence or with command and control or with airlift or
special reconnaissance activities. If you think about it, our
alliance with Korea is one where we're together, and a good
deal of what they do, we do with them in assisting them.
So, it's not clear to me that this ability to operate
independently is necessarily the determinative metric. It needs
to vary for each of the various elements as to what we ought to
set as a standard. I think reality is, these folks are not
going to end up at a level of U.S. forces, period. There isn't
a military in the Middle East that's anywhere near U.S. levels.
General Myers. Senator, as a way to measure progress--and,
George, help me on this--but I think we have 86 Iraqi army
battalions today that are operating with us. How many did we
have a year ago, of those 86?
General Casey. Probably no more than a handful, Chairman.
General Myers. I think that bespeaks the progress as we
move forward. Those are 86 battalions that are out there
operating with our folks.
The people I've talked to, in my recent trip over there--
talked to this great army major--sorry, captain----
Chairman Warner [presiding]. General, I regret to----
General Myers. Okay.
Chairman Warner.--say that we--I've been informed by our
respective leadership that we're asked to take our seats for a
very important vote of the Senate. So, we will now stand in
recess, but before I do so, until the hour of 12:15--Secretary
Rumsfeld, I had a very interesting telephone call last night
from a Paul Steiger, managing editor of the Wall Street
Journal. He represents, in his capacity, a large group of
people. They're experiencing--he was speaking on behalf of the
entire media, which is his responsibility in his group--that
they're encountering some difficulties. I'm going to leave with
you, as I depart now, the copies of the correspondence that I
have received from him, which I understand has also been
forwarded to your office. Perhaps when we resume, you might
have some comment on that. I think it will require a period of
time for you to fully assess the problem that he described, and
in all probability, to put in place such corrective measures as
you desire.
So, I'll leave that with you, in hopes that maybe you can
make some brief comment when we return.
We stand in recess until 12:15. [Recess.]
Chairman Warner. The hearing will resume.
Mr. Secretary, as we concluded, I gave you correspondence--
which has been forwarded to your office, but through other
channels--from various individuals who have responsibility
regarding the press that are, I think, serving the interests of
our country as well as they can under difficult circumstances.
My understanding is that you'll take this under consideration.
Perhaps General Casey, who has the action responsibility, has a
comment or two. Am I correct in that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, indeed, thank you.
General Casey. Senator, I haven't had a chance to go
through the whole letter, but I understand the issue. It's an
issue that we take very seriously. What I will do when I get
back to Baghdad is, I'll get a few of the local journalists
together and work through some of their concerns with them.
I'll also take a look at this letter here and get some
responses back.
[The information referred to follows:]
My impression is Multi-National Force-Iraq's practice of holding
periodic forums between coalition public affairs personnel and western
media representatives is an effective tool. Representatives gather,
voice concerns and, where possible, we endeavor to resolve issues. We
meet quarterly in Baghdad with western media bureau chiefs. Reuters,
along with other major news organizations, participates in these
meetings. These meetings provide Multi-National Force-Iraq and the
media an effective forum for sharing information and addressing issues
and concerns and strengthening the relationships between the media and
Multi-National Force-Iraq. My staff and subordinate commanders are
sensitive to the significance of journalist detentions and continue to
explore additional methods and processes for tracking the status of
detained journalists.
Chairman Warner. Yes. If I might suggest, I would, on
behalf of CENTCOM--because it relates, I'm sure, to the
journalists in Afghanistan, as well--make a direct
communication with the two principals that have forwarded the
letters to myself, other Members of Congress, and to the
Secretary of Defense, as well as convening, in country, a
representative group to try and get their views. Then once we
gather the facts, I'm sure we can hopefully address this
matter.
Now, I also suggested during the interim that it was my
concern that listening very carefully to testimony this
morning, we need to have a clarifying and condensed set of
facts to give the American public--and, indeed Congress--a more
exact status of our efforts, together with coalition partners,
NATO, and others, to train the Iraqi security forces. I think
you're prepared to give that, General Casey?
General Casey. Thank you for the opportunity, Senator,
because I don't think I did Senator Collins' question justice
in trying to explain the way we rate these forces. I would not
want people to think, because, in the first category, we've
gone from three to one, that we're actually taking a step
backwards with the Iraqi security forces, because that's just
not the case.
A couple of points:
First of all, this ``fully capable.'' I mentioned in my
testimony that one of the driving forces behind all of the
strategy is that we need the Iraqis to be able to sustain the
capability that they have as we progressively draw down and
after we're gone. So, we wanted to set a very high standard,
and that became category one.
Now, we recognize that it was a standard that they were not
going to achieve for some time. That's why we focused on the
second level, and that's the level where they take the lead and
we put them in charge.
I'll give you an example of the capabilities of those units
that are in that second category. Just recently, the 3rd Iraqi
Infantry Division conducted a three-brigade operation into the
town of Tal Afar with coalition forces. I mentioned in my
testimony that that was the first major operation which the
Iraqi security forces outnumbered the coalition forces. All
those brigades and all the battalions in those brigades were
level-two/level-three, yet they fought with us into a major
urban area, into an urban defense, and conducted the toughest
type of ground combat very successfully. You'll recall, about
500 insurgents and terrorists killed or captured as a result of
that whole operation.
So that's the kind of capabilities these units that are
categorized as level-two and level-three have, because they're
able to do it with our enabling support. If they had been able
to do it all by themselves, without any of our support, they
would have been in level-one, and that's some time in coming.
So, I don't know if that gives it a little bit more
granularity, but as I mentioned, we are making great progress.
Chairman Warner. Yes. Bottom line, you are making progress,
and the progress can be documented, and you see it every day
with the performance, which is, every day increasing in the
professional capabilities of these forces.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator. I couldn't have said it
better.
Chairman Warner. Well, I thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson, you----
Senator Levin. If Senator Nelson would just yield for 1
minute--just for 30 seconds.
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Levin. It would be helpful to your point if you
gave us how many level-two there were 4 months ago or a year
ago, and how many there are now, how many level-three a year
ago, how many there are now.
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Levin. Talk about granularity, it would help the
point you're making, and I think you should just do it very
clearly. But I'd just suggest that to you, and I don't want to
take any more of Senator Nelson's time.
General Casey. I'm sorry, if I could just respond to that?
We didn't start this until May.
Senator Levin. Fine, give us May and now.
General Casey. Okay. May was just a trial, too, so--I got
it.
Chairman Warner. All right.
Senator Levin. Excuse me.
Chairman Warner. The Chairman has indicated that you wish
to address----
General Myers. If I could tag onto General Casey's point
for just a minute, some of the things that we measure, I think,
are interesting. The task forces that conduct raids in Baghdad,
26 percent of those are either Iraqi-led or Iraqi-only. So,
over a quarter of the major activities take place in Baghdad
are Iraqi-only or Iraqi-led. Just 3 or 4 months ago, George,
that was probably zero.
Task Force Baghdad Combat Patrols--this is the last week of
July, basically--43 percent of the combat patrols in Baghdad
are Iraqi-only or Iraqi-led. Forty-three percent.
Task Force Baghdad Checkpoints, in the last week of July--
it's 22 to 28 July, actually--Iraqi-only/Iraqi-led, 72 percent.
Seventy-two percent of the Task Force Baghdad Checkpoints, 72
percent, are Iraqi-only/Iraqi-led.
If you go to multinational operations in North Central, we
can compare the period 3-to-9 June to 2-to-8 September. In
June, Iraqi-only/Iraqi-led checkpoint operations in North
Central Iraq, 77 percent to 92 percent in September.
So, everything you measure, the Iraqis are more and more
involved, and those aren't just, obviously, the level-one
battalion; those are all Iraqis in the fight.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson?
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me extend my appreciation to General Myers for your
outstanding service and best wishes for a long and happy
future.
As we look back, our mission in going to Iraq was to remove
Saddam and, ultimately, democratize, through the workings with
the Iraqi forces and people, the country of Iraq. Now, we've
removed Saddam from power, and historic elections have been
held to elect the National Assembly and Prime Minister, and, of
course, a constitution has been approved by the Assembly.
Hopefully, the Iraqi people will vote it up or--well, vote it
up, but we'll soon know whether they're going to vote it up or
down.
So, really what we're working at, it seems to me, is
helping the Iraqi people do two things--one is govern
themselves; and, two, defend themselves, because if they can't
defend themselves, it's going to be very difficult--mostly
likely impossible--to govern themselves.
We have measurable benchmarks and events that work toward
self-governance. One of the frustrations that I keep picking up
from people when I'm talking to them back home is, we don't
have similar measurable guideposts or measurable results to be
able to determine what is happening. So, you have some people
saying we're winning the war and others saying we're losing the
war, when the truth of the matter is, we need to find out what
kind of progress we're making. Many of the questions today were
based on trying to determine progress. I don't think there's
anybody that's going to raise question about whether or not
we're making progress, but there probably will be some
questions about: How much progress do we need to make and--
maybe, Have we made?--and, more important, maybe, How much
progress do we need to make, to be able to satisfy both self-
governance and self-defense?
Now, I understand the importance of capability and
readiness of the Iraqi forces to be able to do what is
necessary to defend themselves. I understand condition-based
reductions.
My first question is, what are our goals to achieve--to
train, equip, and I suspect, get experience for sufficient
troops to be able to defend themselves in Iraq?
General Casey. As I mentioned earlier in this, Senator, we
have said that we were going to train and equip a total number
of around 350,000 Iraqi security forces. That process will go
on for some time, and particularly because the police training
is a 10-week program----
Senator Ben Nelson. It's obviously important to have the
entire security forces in place, because of other things, but
what kind of numbers do we look at or what percentage have we
achieved with Iraqi forces, equivalent of Special Operations
Forces, capable and ready to fight the insurgency to a
standstill and defeat it?
General Casey. There are 10 Iraqi divisions, and they have
been placed around Iraq and partnered with coalition divisions.
The Iraqis have placed two divisions in the most--each--in the
most difficult areas.
Senator Ben Nelson. Are these part of the level-one force?
General Casey. They are a part of the force that is
progressing from level-three to level-two to level-one, and
will progress there over time.
But we don't need to have that whole force at level-one, or
even that whole force at level-two, before we can begin
considering coalition reductions, because regionally, there
will be units that achieve capability faster than other units.
We're not waiting to get all 10 of these divisions all across
Iraq level-two before we start drawing down forces. We'll
actually start drawing them down by smaller-sized units as
Iraqi brigades take over places around Iraq.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do we know, in our own minds--and this
is probably something that needs to be handled in a secure
setting--what the number is that is really going to be required
of those 10 units to be able to defeat the insurgency? We talk
about it in 10 years, so is the variable 10 years? Can we
defeat them faster if we have more? Are we faced with 10 if we
have less? Or how does this equation work?
General Casey. Last year--or, actually, around this time--
we went through a very thorough analysis of what security
forces the Iraqis needed, and--both on the military side and on
the police side--and that is the force we are building to now.
I just instructed General Dempsey, who just replaced
General Petraeus now, that I thought it was time to conduct a
similar review to go back and look at what we have programmed,
where we are, and decide if those forces are in fact, still the
forces that we need to do what you say, to be able to defeat
this insurgency over the long haul. We will continue to assess
and evaluate this as we go forward.
Senator Ben Nelson. The American people understand the
checkpoints for self-governance. Is it possible to put
together, whether we're 20 percent capable at the present time,
30 percent--in 6 months, will we be at 50 percent capability
and readiness to defeat--``they'' with our embedded help--when
I say ``we,'' I'm talking about Iraq and our embedded help--
will we be at a point, in 6 months, at 50 percent capability,
to defeat the insurgency?
General Casey. As has been suggested here, from a
military--in a police capability, we're not going to defeat the
insurgency. Then, as you mentioned, the political side also has
benchmarks and milestones.
So, it's really the interaction of all of the different
elements--political, economic, military--that has to come
together over the next period of months and years if we're
going to ultimately defeat this insurgency.
Senator Ben Nelson. But most of the people want to know
whether it's months or years. I'm not trying to pin you down in
an unfair way, but I hear this constantly about those who are
trying to push for a timetable. I'm less interested in pushing
for a timetable than I am in knowing what percentages we are at
the level of reaching our ultimate goal. That is also a factor
that's variable for time, as well--as you say, for the
political capabilities, as well as military capabilities, and
perhaps as well as governing capabilities. I understand it's
all tied together.
General Casey. Right, and your question's a fair one. We
have now good visibility on the military units. We also are
starting to get better visibility on the ministries, because
those are the institutions that provide the logistical and the
pay and all the other support that these military units and
police units need, to exist.
Now--and it's all--again, the military and police side of
this is all interrelated, as well. I do not have an overall
metric that ties all that together and say, okay, we're 60
percent there, in terms of security capability toward our broad
objective.
Senator Ben Nelson. But don't you think the----
Secretary Rumsfeld. May I make a comment?
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure.
Secretary Rumsfeld. First of all, I think you mentioned 10
years----
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I--9 years.
Secretary Rumsfeld.--for an insurgency, and I would like to
make sure that everyone understands----
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
Secretary Rumsfeld.--that that is not General Casey's
prediction.
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That's the average length----
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand.
Secretary Rumsfeld.--of insurgencies. Insurgencies
ultimately are defeated by the indigenous people in that
country, not by outside forces, because outside forces can, in
fact, contribute to the growth of an insurgency if they are
seen as an occupation force.
With respect to your question, the answer is, it seems to
me, in two parts. First, the political and the economic and the
security all have to go forward together. To the extent there's
a failure on the economic or the political side, it makes the
security situation in an insurgency environment more difficult.
Now, that means that there isn't an answer to your question,
where you could say 10 percent, 20 percent, or 30 percent, I
don't believe.
Second, we've looked at the things that are easy to count--
numbers of divisions, readiness levels, and the like. The
reality is that the soft stuff that you can't count is every
bit as, and possibly even more, important than the hard stuff.
What do I mean by the ``soft stuff''? The relationship between
the police and the military, the relationship between those
entities and the Intelligence Community, the noncommissioned
officers and the ribcage of a military or a police
organization, the strength of the ministry and the
effectiveness of the chain of command, the turbulence in the
ministry. All of those things are going to either favorably or
unfavorably affect the progress on the security side, and it
seems to me that----
I'm going to give you one example. Let's say that we have
an election--the constitution passes, which I believe it will,
and there's an election December 15, and a new government comes
in. Let's say it takes 30 days to form the new government.
There's a new Minister of Defense, and he's effective, and he
decides not to change everything for the sake of change, and he
immediately takes advantage of the outside assistance and forms
an effective ministry. That's one scenario.
The other is, the election takes place, there isn't a new
government in 1 month; it takes 4 months or 5 months to form
the new government. The Minister comes in, and he decides he's
going to swing the wheel this way or that way and change
everybody, and there's turbulence.
Now, all of that's going to affect the effectiveness of the
security forces every bit as much as the numbers.
Senator Ben Nelson. Would that be part of the equation that
you're working on for condition-based reduction?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
Senator Ben Nelson. So, it's pretty hard to decide whether
you're going to do anything in the next 6 months, isn't it, if
you don't know all these variables?
Secretary Rumsfeld. You can't know the variables. You can't
know how--what Syria's behavior's going to be. Are they going
to be helpful or harmful? You can't know what Iran's going to
be doing. Are they going to be helpful or harmful? That's why
you have to use the phrase ``condition-based.'' It is not
possible to look out there.
But the progress that's being made politically is real.
They did draft a constitution, they are going to vote on it,
there is going to be an election. That's good stuff. That's
historic. By the same token, the progress on the security
forces--every single week that goes by, the numbers of security
forces go up. Total. Even if we were to come down, even if the
coalition were to go down, because of the growth in the Iraqi
security forces, the total forces are going up. That's a good
thing. We believe that, over this period of time, there will be
opportunities to transfer, as the General says, pieces of
responsibility, pieces of real estate, over to Iraqi security
forces and that's a good thing.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld, I think that was a honest and direct
answer to our questions. It's just a difficult thing to build
from scratch a military and police force capable of operating
on its own.
General Myers, it's an honor to have served with you, in a
way, to think that you've testified before 64 committee
hearings is a stunning and ominous thought, really. You have
done so and won the constant respect and admiration of the
Members of Congress. None of them have ever doubted your
integrity, your commitment to our men and women in uniform,
your commitment to victory, and your willingness to take any
effort possible. You've been honest with us time and time
again. If that had not been so, you would have felt the sting
in complaint. You've not felt it. It's a remarkable
achievement. Your 40 years of service is something you can take
pride in, and all Americans do.
General Myers. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sessions. General Abizaid, you gave us a great
briefing yesterday, that was a closed briefing, and a part of
that--and some of the same things you've said today. I thought
it was comprehensive. I thought it was wise. I thought it was
good advice for America. No less than Ted Stevens, who's the
President pro tempore of the Senate, who chairs the Defense
Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and who's
been a champion of defense, said it was an extraordinary
briefing, one of the best he'd heard in years. I felt the same
way.
So, I was a bit taken aback when the assistant Democratic
leader came out of the meeting--I'm not sure he stayed to the
end--and said no plan had been presented. I think you felt you
gave a plan. I did. Perhaps I won't ask you to comment on that.
But that's the way I felt about it.
As with regard to the American people and our concern over
the progress, the American people want to see progress. There
have been ups and downs, we'll always have. But I have no doubt
that they are committed to seeing this through. There's no
movement out there to abandon our soldiers, and what I hear
from families who have lost loved ones is that they want us to
succeed and to affirm the sacrifice their family members made.
General Myers, let me start off with you. If others would
like to comment on this, I'd like to pursue it with some
interest. That is the military's role. Many of the questions
that have been given to you today have dealt with
infrastructure, they have dealt with political issues, they
have dealt with relations with foreign countries, they have
dealt with electricity and water and sewage, and the mood of
the people in Iraq, and communications to the people in Iraq.
We have a lot of questions about that, and in the Armed
Services Committee, it's you, in uniform, that are here
answering all those questions. But isn't it a fact that the
political process, the economic program, the education and
health program, the infrastructure, electric and water, dealing
with matters like corruption and political efficiency, that is
not the Defense Department--Defense Department is not the lead
agency for that, but it is now the State Department?
General Myers. Senator Sessions, you make a very good
point. Insurgencies we've talked about aren't defeated just
militarily. There's always a political component, an economic
component, educational opportunities, an information component,
both internally and externally. What we've tried to do is
harness all instruments of our national power, and all the
instruments of national power for our international friends and
partners in this--is to bring those instruments of national
power, of which the military is just one, to bear on the
problem.
I think that our military has done a terrific job, being
first on the ground, to fill a lot of those roles. We had 21-
year-old soldiers advising town councils on how to organize,
relying on their high school civics lessons, of course, and
their own good common sense and judgment. But that has to
transition at some point to where we have seasoned individuals
that are steeped in these kind of matters to be mentoring the
Iraqi folks, and that is certainly not the role--not the sole
role of the Department of Defense. Most of those areas you
mentioned are the responsibilities of other departments and
agencies in this government, to include the State Department,
as you said.
Senator Sessions. You might advise in that, and you may
even support them, but as the decisionmaking authority and
responsibility would be those agencies and not the Department
of Defense that's responsible.
General Myers. That's correct. As we do with our troops
that are in Iraq, and as we've done with our commander in Iraq,
General Casey is going to serve, as far as we know now, about 2
years in Iraq. Our troops serve about a year. We need other
departments and agencies to put their people over there with
that same dedication and that same commitment of time to do the
sort of work they need to do to finish the job.
Senator Sessions. I think we have to make sure that State--
we all--we've been asking, ``Is the military adequately
prepared, staff committed, got an adequate program?'' We also
need to be asking whether the other agencies of government
are--who, in recent months, assumed primary responsibility for
these ideas, whether they're making adequate progress.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I agree with you. It seems to me,
Mr. Secretary, that's been brought up by, first, General
Abizaid, in his opening comments, now General Myers, the fact
that the military is doing its job, but we need greater support
from other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
Do you have a comment on how we can bring to bear--what could
the Congress do to help you?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is a fact. Another fact is that the
United States Government, in the domestic areas, is not
organized, trained, and equipped to do those things. We're not
structured in a way that they can readily deploy people of
certain competence levels, the way the Department of Defense
can. It is a reality that, to the extent our country's going to
be called upon to be engaged in these types of things, that we
do need to look at roles and missions in the executive branch
of the Federal Government, and the mirrored relationship in
Congress. I mentioned one of the things earlier today, and
that's the authority to help train and equip other countries.
To the extent we can build partnership capacity in other
countries, we relieve ourselves of that burden. To the extent
we can do things like getting coalition countries to help us,
we relieve ourselves of that burden.
The NATO train-and-equip in Iraq is a perfect example,
where we are getting--all of the NATO countries are, in one way
or another, now assisting in Iraq. So, too, in Afghanistan,
where the NATO has taken over the north, it's now taken over
the west, it's going to be taking over the southern sector of
Afghanistan, as well as the original Kabul ISAF activity, and
that's good progress. It's important that--as General Myers
says--we recognize.
I'll just make a comment about Afghanistan. The bond
process produced an arrangement whereby lead countries would
take responsibilities for certain things. The British took
responsibility for the drug problem in Afghanistan. The
Italians, as I recall, took the civil justice system and the
criminal justice system. The Germans took the border patrol and
various things. The reality is that the progress in those areas
in Afghanistan has been slow, because it's hard stuff. It isn't
easy to do. Those countries don't have a background in
developing that kind of competence. They're used to functioning
in dictatorships.
So, partly it's just because it's hard stuff, partly
because it's--the other countries and other elements of our
government haven't fully arranged themselves to do as good a
job as might be necessary.
Chairman Warner. Let's just take a minute on our
government. We have to put that as the highest priority,
because we are, daily, taking casualties. To the extent that
infrastructure is not being brought together contributes to
that casualty rate.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The executive branch has created a new
entity inside the Department of State on--what's it called?--
Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization--they have selected
a new individual to assist in that--Ambassador Pascual, as I
recall, who is a very capable person. The Department is
focusing on that. The Department of State also has assigned
Karen Hughes to be involved.
Chairman Warner. All right.
Secretary Rumsfeld. So, there are steps being taken.
Chairman Warner. All right. Thank you.
General Abizaid, do you----
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman, if I could
just add something to this.
I want to make sure we make it clear here that we don't
regard the other agencies of the U.S. Government as not doing
their jobs. We want to make clear to everybody that we need
them with us out in the field, because they add so much,
especially in the counterinsurgency environment. A young State
Department officer that can work the politics in an Afghan
province is worth a battalion. A USAID person that can help
move a road project forward is worth a company. It's just so
important for us to understand that it's these young people
that can come forward, stay with us long enough to learn the
area--I believe there's absolutely no shortage of volunteers,
but we need to make sure the priorities are right--in the
field, not in Washington.
Chairman Warner. All right. I'll address this further,
because I witnessed a superb job being done, on my last trip,
by the State Department people that are implanted with our
forces.
Senator Dayton, you're next.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers, I want to join with my colleagues in
thanking you for your extraordinary service to our country.
General Abizaid, you define the war in Iraq as a war
against al Qaeda. If so, I think you're describing the failure
of U.S. policy there, which is not a military failure at all,
but it's a failure caused by strategic miscalculations by
policymakers and the operational disasters that have plagued
the last 2\1/2\ years. Whether they were avoidable or not, I
guess hindsight will see. But Iraq was not a haven for al Qaeda
before the U.S. invasion. Iraq was not, as it's been called,
the front line of the international war against terrorism
before the war began.
I agree you, what you've all said, that we are there, and
that we must be successful. I think, as you've defined it, I
would read ``success'' as when the Iraqis can prevail there, so
that we don't have to. I don't question the absence of a plan,
but I think what people are asking here today the progress, or
lack thereof, toward the goal, and what the anticipated
timetable is.
It's been now, almost, I believe, 2 years since the
training of the Iraqi forces has begun--began in earnest.
General Petraeus and others undertaking that, extremely well-
qualified U.S. leaders in that regard. As I talked to
Minnesotans, particularly those whose husbands and wives and
fathers and mothers are serving over there, they keep asking,
``Why is it that we have to--their loved ones--why do we have
to keep doing what the Iraqis seemingly can't, or won't, do for
themselves?''
I'd like to read just a brief excerpt from the recent Time
magazine--describes the situation recently--September 6 in Tal
Afar--and just ask you your response. It said, ``The 2-day
grace for civilians to evacuate stretches to a 4-day standstill
as the Iraqi Prime Minister orders a tactical pause. He insists
on assurances from his military commanders that the battle will
be a decisive success. The wait leaves U.S. troops embittered,
their momentum lost to what they see as political
calculations.'' ``This is turning into a goat blank,'' bemoans
angry Green Beret. ``By the time the Prime Minister approves
the assault into al Qaeda's heartland, it fizzles. Not a
hostile shot is fired, not a single enemy fighter is found.
Safe-houses and weapons caches are empty, cleansed like an
operating room.''
It sounds to me, if that's an accurate portrayal of--
description by somebody who was onsite, that this is--as
Senator Levin said, an indication of a government or a
military--Iraqi military command that believes they have all
the time in the world and that we're going to be there with
them, or for them, for as long as the 9 years, or whatever it's
going to be.
I guess I echo what others have said, but the absence of
their demonstrated willingness or ability, or combination of
the two, to stand up and take responsibility for their own
country against insurgents from within their own country, or
outside the country--but I gather, the insurgent force--the
military insurgent is primarily in--from within the country--I
mean, at what point are they going to be responsible? Why
won't--if they won't take responsibility after 2 years of
training, how do we believe that they will in the next 6
months, 12 months, or whenever?
General Casey. Let me take that, Senator.
First of all, I haven't read that article, but what you
read is not an accurate portrayal of the Prime Minister's role
in the sequence of operations in Tal Afar. I was personally
involved with that.
Senator Dayton. I've known the media to be wrong, myself.
General Casey. Right. But that was not the case.
Senator Dayton. Okay.
General Casey. In fact, the government was working quite
closely with us to set the conditions that made the military
success there possible. They sent a team up to Tal Afar and
negotiated with the sheikhs, got all the sheikhs from the
different tribes together, and got them to invite the military
force in. That was a huge plus for our soldiers. They put in
place emergency measures--curfews, vehicle bans, closed the
border, put an exclusion zone on the border, again--to make the
job easier for our troops. They pulled together a $50 million
reconstruction package and compensation package for Tal Afar.
Those were some of the conditions that were being set as we
went between the 6th and the 10th of September. So the Prime
Minister wasn't pulling the string on that, but they were
actively helping us.
On your question of, ``Why do we have to keep doing things
for the Iraqis?''--and, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
we recognize that we need to empower the Iraqis and to get them
in the lead as soon as they are capable. They want that. The
leaders want it. The Iraqi people want it. It's a matter of us
assisting them with their training and equipping and making
them better faster. They're embracing that. We are making
progress on that, and we're really at a different level now
than we were 2 years ago.
Senator Dayton. General, how long does basic training for
basic American soldier take?
General Casey. I think it's about 9 weeks, and then
advanced training after that is added on.
Senator Dayton. So, again, I just--I cannot understand how
almost 2 years now after we've begun the training--and I don't
question the capability of General Petraeus and others who have
led the training--but almost 2 years later, we don't have
Iraqis that are trained to do what I guess our soldiers are
trained to do after 9 weeks, or whatever advanced training
thereafter.
General Casey. It's--basic training, they've done, and they
are--most of the Iraqi soldiers that have been through the
basic training are--not as capable as ours, certainly, but they
can do basic tasks. But it's taking those soldiers, putting
them in units, training them as units at progressively higher
levels. Until Iraqi commanders at the colonel and general-
officer level can direct and plan Iraqi forces in conducting
Iraqi operations, they're not going to be able to take over,
and that's the whole strategy.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld. May I make a brief comment?
General Abizaid. Senator, I'd like to make a comment, if I
may. It has to do with the Iraqis. You ought to read David
McCullough's book, ``1776,'' about the----
Senator Dayton. I've read it.
General Abizaid. --the birth of our own Army. It's amazing.
You ought to consider, in most of the 33 years I've been
serving in the United States Army, we've struggled to make
ourselves better. We just do that all the time. So, I have
great respect for the Iraqis and what they're trying to do.
Sometimes we give the impression that they're not organized,
they're not trained, they're infiltrated. More Iraqis have died
fighting for Iraq against this insurgency than have Americans,
and that deserves our respect and thanks. We're fighting with
them, not against them. It's just, time and time again, that we
have to understand that this war in the Middle East is as much
about respect for the people that are fighting with us as it is
anything else.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Graham?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, may I make a quick
comment on that?
Chairman Warner. Yes, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. This is an important subject.
First of all, just historically, we ought to refresh
ourselves that Zarqawi was already in Iraq before the war ever
started. Zarqawi was running terrorists out of Iraq in several
countries before the war ever started. Saddam Hussein was
listed as a terrorist state before the war ever started. Saddam
Hussein was giving $25,000 to the families of suicide bombers
before the war ever started.
With respect to the Iraqis taking hold, General Abizaid's
right, the Iraqi security forces have lost more people than the
coalition have since a year ago September. They've lost twice
as many. The people who are running for office are threatened.
Their lives are threatened. The people who are voting, their
lives are threatened by the people who are trying to prevent
democracy from occurring in that country. There is a lot of
Iraqi courage that's being demonstrated in that country every
day.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I
think it's helpful that we get the full picture on this very
important issue.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you. You just stole my first
question. My first question was going to be to say that I think
the casualty figures for us is 1,922. That may be wrong, but
it's over 1,900. Is that correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I was using the killed-in-action. Ours
are currently 1,475, I believe. The Iraqis have had roughly
double since--I think it's a year ago September.
Senator Graham. That was the point I was going to make. If
there's a reason to be optimistic in all of this, I think the
reason to be optimistic is, this is the only place in the Mid-
East, or anywhere in the world I know, where people are taking
up arms against the Zarqawis of the world.
Mr. Secretary, I would suggest to you, you give us a
complete number if you can later on. How many Iraqis have died
fighting the insurgency? How many Iraqis have been killed
trying to run for office? How many Iraqis have been killed
joining the army? I think the numbers are large, and it gives
me a sense of optimism because, at the end of the day, all you
can ask of anyone is to be willing to fight and die for your
freedom. So, I think that's the most optimistic thing that's
available to us, something for us all to hang onto is that the
Iraqis whatever problems they have, they are still fighting and
dying for their own freedom, and it makes me proud to be their
partner.
Now we need to know a number because I think the American
people need to know a number too.
But the one thing I've found about this hearing, the tone
has changed as there's certainly a political component of
whether we should have went into Iraq to begin with, and it's
being replaced with some pretty good questions on both sides of
the aisle.
You mentioned trust, General Myers, about the officers
serving with you on the panel and the people in the field. It's
not a question of trust, but I think we're in a position now of
``trust, but verify.'' Because I've heard things from panels
before. I'm no military expert. I'm a military lawyer, so I
certainly know my limitations. But I do have common sense,
General Casey, and you said the last time we were here the
insurgency was one-tenth of 1 percent. I was amazed at how you
could pick a number so accurately. I was skeptical if anybody
really knows the number of insurgents over there to the point
that it's one-tenth of 1 percent. When you say that, it bothers
me. Do you still believe that?
General Casey. Senator, what I said was, ``Even by our most
pessimistic estimates of the insurgency, we estimate it to be
less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the overall population of
Iraq.'' I think that's still about right.
Senator Graham. My comment to you is that you have no way
of knowing, and no one does. I don't have any confidence in
that number. I know you're on the ground. I know you're risking
your life. But the point we've learned about Iraq is that it's
fluid and it changes. Getting your hands on this is very
difficult. The insurgency changes. Its makeup is changed to
where the foreign fighters are now the biggest threat. The
Sunnis are beginning to join. So I'd just caution you, just--
okay to say we don't know how many, but we're going to go after
all the ones we can find. There are a lot of Iraqis who are
fighting them in addition to us.
Zarqawi has lasted a long time in Iraq--who said he was
there before--was that you, Mr. Secretary? He was there before,
but he survived a long time. Common sense tells me there must
be a support network over there, fairly sophisticated, for this
guy to have survived this long, and that's just common sense.
My question, fairly simply put: In hindsight, looking back,
has there ever been a point in time, to anyone in this panel,
where it was clear looking backward, that we did not have
enough troops to secure the country?
General Myers. I guess I'll start. It's been clear to me
from the beginning--from the beginning--that we've had the
right number of troops, given the balance that we're trying to
balance, given the balance between being occupiers--seen as
occupiers or seen as liberators. It's a tough balance.
Now, things have changed. So, in hindsight--I don't know in
hindsight that I would change my opinion. There are some things
we'd do different in hindsight, there is no question, but I
don't think it has to do with the number of troops.
Senator Graham. I don't mean to cut you off, but I've only
have 5 minutes.
General Myers. Okay.
Senator Graham. I would suggest that one of the lessons of
Abu Ghraib is that we had an ill-prepared force for the mission
assigned to them, that the people in that prison weren't really
well trained to run a prison. They were overwhelmed, because in
August you had 600 prisoners, by October you had 6,000
prisoners, and it's clear to me that the people at Abu Ghraib
weren't equipped and trained to handle the mission, and they
got overwhelmed. That would be an example. It was clear to me
that the looting was rampant right after the fall of Baghdad.
I'm not blaming you. I'll take blame. I thought it would be
a lot easier than it has been. I thought the Iraqi people would
step up to the plate. I missed it a mile. If you want somebody
to blame, I went home and said, once the statue fell, ``Good
times are ahead.'' I misunderstood.
The point I'm trying to make, it's clear to me there have
been times in the past where we didn't have enough troops. If
you don't see that, that bothers me and please, anyone else,
join in in answering.
General Casey. I'd just note, Senator Graham, that the--on
two occasions--last year's elections and this year's
elections--I didn't have enough troops to do what I needed to
do, and I asked for more, and I received them.
If I could go back to your original comment, Senator, my
comment on the one-tenth of 1 percent was more a comment about
the 99.9 percent of the Iraqi population that wants something
better, rather than a comment on the size of the insurgency,
which we all know is very difficult to calibrate.
General Myers. It is difficult to calculate, even though
we've been pressed, right here in this hearing room, by the
way. I've been pressed, personally been talked to very
strongly, ``Give us the number. Give the American people the
number.'' As you've just stated, Senator Graham, when you're
dealing with an insurgency, you can't come up with a number. I
think we've done exactly the right thing there. I think the way
General Casey puts it is about right. I mean, we do have ideas
and numbers, but in insurgencies, you always have people that
on one day, are insurgents; on the next day, are
businesspeople, and depending on how the political process is
going and their economic fortunes are going, will have
different views.
Whether or not we had the right training and the right
number of folks in Abu Ghraib is one issue. Whether or not, in
the broader sense, which I thought you were talking about, that
we had the right number of troops, generally in Iraq, is
another issue. I'll stand by the commanders' requests for those
troops. Of course, right after major combat there were
proposals to go way down in troop strength, and it was others
that prevailed and said no, we should not do that. We've made
adjustments from the day major combat was over, and we had the
flexibility to do that, because we brought the 4th Infantry
Division (ID) in after major combat for the very purpose of
trying to work through the stability and reconstruction that
would follow.
So, I think we've called our audibles. I agree that the
folks at Abu Ghraib obviously could have been better trained,
and perhaps they needed more. Now, it turns out there are
resources in country that could have been redistributed, but
unfortunately, commanders on the ground that were involved in
Abu Ghraib, and responsible for it, didn't make those requests.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
General Abizaid. Senator, if I could say a word or two.
Chairman Warner. Go ahead.
General Abizaid. Obviously there's a certain amount of
frustration where we're obviously not getting through. At one
point, I think it was in--during the presidential election
period, we were very close to 200,000 U.S. troops in Iraq,
which was more than we had at any time during the ground
campaign, by a substantial amount. So our numbers have gone up,
and they've gone down, and they have responded to what we think
we need. But at the same time, we've always been mindful of
saying, ``Look, you Iraqis need to understand that you have to
step up to the plate.'' So, there's a tension and there's an
art in all of this that's difficult.
But I would like to say something. I don't believe that
we're fools. We have made mistakes. Abu Ghraib was a huge
mistake that we've tried to recover from in a lot of different
ways. We made probably a clear mistake in the way that we
originally resourced our headquarters right after the movement
phase of the ground war, and we corrected that. As I look out
now, I'll take responsibility for that. There are a lot of
mistakes in war. The key is whether or not you can learn from
your mistakes. I think in balance, we've done pretty damn good.
Senator Graham. See, that's the ultimate question. Mr.
Chairman, I don't mean to belabor this. Because there's some of
us who believe that a larger military footprint, particularly
in the support area, would have advanced the cause quicker.
When you see a city cleaned up with a major military action, to
be reoccupied, whether it's a lack of Iraqi troops or American
troops, that dynamic needs to stop. So, we've seen several
instances of where the insurgencies have been defeated by Iraqi
and American troops fighting very bravely, only to reappear in
the same areas and that confuses us.
General Abizaid. But Senator, if I may, there is no
straight line in counterinsurgency business. There's an awful
lot of learning that has to go on. For example, you take the
first battle of Fallujah--obviously, if you had just taken away
the military component and isolated it and said, ``Do this,''
and then not added into it the governance component, you might
have had a different conclusion, but you might have, overall,
destroyed your ability to accomplish the mission in the long
term.
Getting back to Senator Nelson's point, this issue of
governance and military indigenous forces being built together
in a synchronized fashion, it's the key to success. But there
are so many outside influences that move around it and flurry
around it, that make it difficult for commanders on the ground
to sense, the most important sensing is whether or not the
Iraqis are willing to fight for their own country. So far,
General Casey and I can say to you and to our Secretary, yes,
they are. The day they're not, by the way, we'll come forward
and we'll tell you. But give them a chance.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Before we proceed--Mr. Secretary, you quite accurately
reported that the total number of deaths associated with
combat-related activities is around 1,450. But when you add
those that have lost their lives in a noncombatant, nonrelated
status, it's about 1,922. That's the figure that so often is
reported, and I want those following this hearing to be able to
reconcile the two different figures.
I think it's always imperative, when we talk about our
casualties of the wounded, and that is over 12,000 who have
suffered, in one degree or another, the combat wounds.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Just for the record, you're quite
right. I said killed in action, and there have been an
additional 450 to 500 that have been killed in noncombat
environment. The wounded--the actual killed-in-action thus far
is 1,480, and--I don't know what the date of this is, but the
U.S. wounded is roughly in the 14,700----
Chairman Warner. I think it's very important that we----
General Myers. Another important number there, Mr.
Chairman, is that of the wounded, of which we see many of them
back here in the two major hospitals here in town, of the
14,752--is the number I have as of yesterday--about 50 percent
were returned to duty in just several days, which is--which I
think is a tribute to the commanders and NCOs, their tactics,
techniques, and procedures, and the gear that has been----
Chairman Warner. Good.
General Myers. --provided, and equipment that's been
provided----
Chairman Warner. Protection gear.
General Myers. --protection gear, and so forth, which is a
remarkable number, unlike any other time in our history, in
terms of combat. I mean, it's just absolutely remarkable.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers, let me join the chorus of thanks to you for
your extraordinary service. I was thinking, as the hearing was
going on, that it's a measure of the respect that this
committee has for you that, on the day before you end your
remarkable career in the military, we're still asking you tough
questions, and you're answering them.
General Myers. I appreciate the opportunity and thank you
for the comments, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
I thank all of you for being here. I particularly thank
General Abizaid and General Casey for coming back. I think you
know, and you've testified to it, that in a conflict of this
kind there's a battlefield at home, as well as a battlefield
over there. Support for the war is eroding here. We can feel it
at home, when we go home. We can see it in the public opinion
polls. It's very critical that you, in the uniformed military,
be part of two things--two questions we have to answer. One, is
it worth it for us to be in Iraq? Two, is what we're doing
working? I think you've fanned out across Capitol Hill this
week in a very effective way. Tough questions. But those are
the kinds of exchanges from which progress occurs. I think we
have to figure out a way that you do the same with the--more of
the American people, that they get to see you, hear you, and
maybe even have opportunities to question you.
I appreciate General Abizaid's introduction. The global war
against Islamist terrorism is critical to our future security.
I don't think you'd get anybody on this panel, or most anybody
in this country, who would disagree with that.
Senator Reed raised an important question, which is--there
are a lot of people out there who don't get it, exactly how
Iraq fits into that. I think we have to begin to describe what
would happen if we failed in Iraq, which is that there--and one
of you said it, and we have to say it over and over again--
would undoubtedly be a civil war, there would undoubtedly be
destabilization in the entire region. If any of us were the
terrorists, you'd say, ``Well, how about that? We have a method
that works here, so--we did it in Iraq, now let's take it to
Saudi Arabia or Egypt or the Gulf States.'' You just think
about the implications for them and for us. So, I think maybe
people need to be reminded, in a very personal way, why this is
important.
But the second part of it is, is it working? Here, we have
a real challenge, because what the people see every night on
the television is suicide bombing. In the classified briefing
you gave yesterday, you gave a measure of how successful we've
been at not losing battles, if you will, or platoons, or any
platoon. But as the people see those suicide bombings going
off, they interpret them as defeat. I think we have to convince
them, one, that we've--I think you've convinced us that you
have a plan. I think the question is, is the plan working? The
second part of that, I would appeal to you--I think you said it
to Senator McCain when he talked about people arguing for more
troops there; I'm sympathetic to that point of view, myself--I
hope you'll--I said to John afterward, ``We ought to give you a
list of names of people who tell us we need more troops there,
we'd be better off,'' and urge you to hear them out and respond
to them.
But here's my question, and this is the difficulty. How do
we defeat an enemy of this kind, where it is a fraction of the
overall Iraqi population, but it's--they're prepared, in
unbelievable numbers, to blow themselves up? They hate--as
somebody--Tom Friedman said they hate us, or they believe in
their cause more than they love their own lives and they keep
coming back. I think, by one standard, it would be hard to say
that there were fewer of the enemy today than there were 6
months or a year ago.
So, as I look at Iraq--and I think a lot of people are just
following with less support of what we're doing there than I do
say, ``Wow, the economic reconstruction isn't going very
well.'' Maybe that's because of the security problems.
Remarkably, the political situation is going a lot better than
most people had a right to expect. People came out and voted in
January, constitution formed. It's not perfect--overall, real
progress. Hopefully, it'll be adopted in the referendum and
then the election.
But I think so long as the suicide bombers go on, and we
don't show the progress better than you've reported today, in
the training of the Iraqi security forces, we have a problem
with American public opinion.
So, see if I can focus that in the question. How do we
defeat an enemy like this, where they're not fighting fair,
they're just going to vulnerable targets and blowing themselves
up? That creates a certain amount of havoc, both on the
battlefield and particularly here at home.
General Casey. Why don't I take a swing at that first?
Because that's precisely the challenge that we're working to
deal with. I may go into a little more detail in--if you're
there for the closed session. But in general terms, first you
have to stop them from coming into the country. That was the
discussion we were having earlier about restoring Iraqi control
to their borders. We've had success up in the north, and we'll
continue to work that. We're working on the Euphrates River
Valley, which is where most of these guys are coming in now.
We'll restore Iraqi control over that border.
Then you have to disrupt the facilitation networks all
throughout the country. Then you have to go after the leaders
and the facilitators who are actually instructing these folks
where to go, and to linking them up with the car bomb, and then
the last part is the guy who makes the car bomb.
There are all these pieces of this network that have to be
attacked, and are being attacked, simultaneously. But trying to
kill and capture someone who's willing to kill himself is not
an easy task.
General Abizaid. Senator, I would just add a point that I
have tried to make on other occasions. We have to expose the
enemy. No culture will respect itself when it understands that
its young people are killing themselves by killing innocent
women and children that are minding their own business. I don't
believe any culture anywhere can stand for that. Ultimately,
there are antibodies within the true Islamic community that
will prevent this from happening, and we have to help those
people help themselves against this phenomenon. We see the
Saudis, in particular, working very hard now to fight against
this phenomenon. They've dropped down the number of people that
are infiltrating into Iraq, because they're pushing it, they're
attacking the sickness within the extremist groups. But it's
incumbent upon everybody in this part of the world to not use
extremists to further their ends, but to stamp it out before it
becomes their worst enemy, as well.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate the answers, particularly
the part, which I wish we had begun earlier, to try to block
the borders across which those foreign fighters are coming.
My time is up. I just want to say--and I'm not going to ask
another question--there's a confusion--I think we have to--I
urge you to try to work up a better explanation of the progress
we're making in the training of the Iraqi security forces,
because I know it--Senator McCain said there were three at the
top level. I heard, in an earlier briefing, that there was one.
So, it's one-to-one. Now, we still might ask, ``Why hasn't it
improved?'' But at least it hasn't gone down.
The second is--in that second category, where they can
stand up and fight, but they need our logistics support,
there's been an increase there, and I think we have to give
people a sense of--as I said, ``It's worth it, and it's
working.'' Part of the ``working'' is that we're making
progress. I thank you for your testimony, look forward to
working with you toward that progress.
General Myers. Senator Lieberman, if I--could I just--let
me just tag onto----
Senator Lieberman. Sure.
General Myers. --what General Abizaid said on how you
confront the long war. He had a chart up--I think it was his
last chart--and it had a big circle, and it talked about the
virtual and the real elements that--an insurgency--that
attracts people to commit suicide for their extremist's
beliefs--needs to function. On that chart, perhaps the most
important element is getting the voice of moderation, of
moderates, heard.
I think, on the good-news front, if you check in the Middle
East, and around the world, for that matter--that the moderates
are speaking out more and more. The al Qaeda and these violent
extremists, I think have way overplayed their card, and the
moderates are now understanding that what they represent is
outside any religion that anybody believes in, and it's
certainly outside civilization. This is uncivilized behavior,
and that is something nobody wants to tolerate.
So, there are parts of this that are working, but it needs
a broader strategy. If you look at that chart--the financing,
the rest of that--there are lots of parts of that that have to
be addressed, that has to be addressed with all instruments of
national power, both here and internationally, and that's how
you eventually get to the point where people aren't willing to
come forward and do that, where it's just so abhorrent.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join in thanking General Myers for your many years of
service and wish you well as you head into retirement.
One of the challenges for those of us sitting on this side
of the table is that the strategy which you have described--and
I think, earlier, was characterized as a strategy with great
clarity--has neither benchmarks nor results that we can see,
which lead us to believe it's a strategy that is working. So,
even if it's a strategy with clarity, it may not be a strategy
with success. I think that's the challenge for us, to try to
understand where we are in this situation.
Secretary Rumsfeld, when you were actually a Member of
Congress years ago, you said, about a previous war--namely,
Vietnam--``The people of the United States must know not only
how their country became involved, but where we are heading.''
So, to that end, I'd like to ask, first, General Casey, a
recent article in Foreign Affairs by Andrew Krepinevich asserts
that the United States lacks a coherent strategy for defeating
the insurgency and winning in Iraq. He argues that the
President's statement that, ``As the Iraqis stand up, we will
stand down,'' describes a withdrawal plan rather than a
strategy.
Mr. Krepinevich lays out a strategy for countering the
insurgency by shifting U.S. military efforts from focusing on
chasing and killing insurgents to seeking to provide security
and opportunity to the Iraqi people by ensuring the safety of
key areas, and gradually expanding those secure areas over
time--sometimes referred to as the ``oil spot theory''--thereby
denying the insurgency the popular support it needs.
Now, the article concludes that in order for this strategy
to succeed, it will require at least a decade of commitment and
hundreds of billions of dollars, and will result in longer U.S.
casualty rolls.
General Casey, do you have an opinion of Mr. Krepinevich's
assessment that we need to focus in Iraq away from hunting down
insurgents and toward an emphasis on providing secure areas
that deny popular support to the insurgency?
General Casey. I read the article, and a couple of general
impressions. I think he has a very good view of history, and he
has a very good feel for counterinsurgency doctrine. But my
sense is, he has misapplied this strategy in Iraq. I read it as
is a sequential strategy for a rural insurgency, rather than an
urban insurgency that we're dealing with in Iraq.
These cities, like Tal Afar for example, have a quarter-
million people, so they're not hamlets. They're fairly
substantial cities.
The other piece is the sequential piece. While it is a
well-accepted piece of counterinsurgency doctrine that you need
to protect the population and you need to isolate them from the
insurgents--and we are doing that across Iraq--I think there is
a misperception that all we're doing is running around chasing
people and trying to kill them, that our soldiers and leaders
are not out there every day gathering intelligence, protecting
the population, assisting the population, and things--as was
mentioned earlier, the CERP program, where they invest in the
communities.
So, our soldiers have a very good feel for
counterinsurgency doctrine. I recently sent a team out there to
see how they were applying it, and the team came back and said
that they generally have it about right. Sure, there are things
we can do better, but we're applying counterinsurgency doctrine
to the situation in Iraq, and doing it fairly well.
So broadly, good thoughts on how to deal with things, but I
think a sequential strategy like he suggests in Iraq, I think
we're past that. We had to do it in Fallujah and those places
last year, when we didn't have enough Iraqi security forces.
Now we're getting to the point where we do.
Senator Clinton. General, the problem, of course--again,
from this side of the table--is that we can't even secure a 6-
mile road from the airport into Baghdad. It's very hard to get
whatever the metrics are that we are asked to judge success by.
I think there is a--at least--again, based on people with whom
we speak and who reach out to us--an acceptance of the fact
that the insurgency has gotten more organized, more deadly, and
larger.
The London Times quoted an American intelligence officer in
Baghdad, who said, ``We have reason to believe that Zarqawi has
now given tactical command in the city over to groups that have
had to merge under him for the sake of their survival.''
This week, the Washington Post quoted the top U.S. military
intelligence officer in Iraq, Major General Zahner, as saying,
``I think what you really have here is an insurgency that's
been hijacked by a terrorist campaign.''
What is troubling to many of us is that the numbers that
are reported to us of the insurgents continues, if not to grow,
at least not to decrease. A recent Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) study concluded that there was an
unsettling realization that the vast majority of Saudi
militants who have entered Iraq were not terrorist sympathizers
before the war, and were radicalized almost exclusively by our
invasion and what happened next.
So it is difficult for us. On this committee, you have
people who have spent a lot of time trying to understand this.
If we can't understand what the metrics of success are, if we
don't see the results of this strategy with clarity, I think it
is hard to expect the American people, who tune in and out of
this as the information comes to them, to understand exactly
where we are headed. So, I guess I join my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle in expressing concern and frustration that
we just don't see the success of the strategy that you have
described and that you have very eloquently defended in the
course of this hearing and on other occasions.
General Casey. Senator, I take your point on the metrics. I
would say that the rude Irish myth is a little dated. There has
not been a casualty there since June. Iraqi security forces
have gone out there with our coalition forces, and we are able
to use that route without great danger of casualty.
Your comments on the insurgency, on the levels of violence,
I recognize that that is what it appears, but that is what the
terrorists and insurgents are trying to convey. They're trying
to convey that they are winning. They're doing it by murdering
innocent Iraqis and by putting car bombs and improvised
explosive devices against us and our Iraqi colleagues and
against civilians. It's a tough situation, but that's what a
terror campaign is all about. This is about political will and,
as I said in my opening statement, they are attacking ours and
the will of the Iraqi people. They're not winning in Iraq, and
they will only win here if we lose our will.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers. A couple of extra points, Mr. Chairman.
We have Andy Krepinevich--he's either been in or he will be
in--we've asked him to come in and talk to us on the Joint
Staff and talk about his theory, because as this has been from
the beginning, we're happy to have folks that think there's a
better way of doing this come talk about their particular
strategies.
Then back to Senator Lieberman just for a minute--but it
ties into this as well, about winning. Every time a terrorist
blows himself up or injures civilians, the violent-extremist
cause loses. Now that might not have been true early on, but
it's certainly true today. If you remember, after the London
bombings, there was a fatwah issued by moderate Muslim clerics
in Europe, in Asia, and in the United States. Those bombings
have dropped Osama bin Ladin's rating, which was--at some
point, he was favored in Iraq by over 70 percent. Seventy
percent said ``pretty good guy.'' Now it's around 20 percent.
So their strategy is not working, they have no offer of
hope, and I would say our strategy is. But as George says, it
is the test of wills. In Iraq, they get it. We have to make
sure we stay stalwart too, at the same time being flexible
enough to adjust strategies as required. I think that you have
a team here that's willing to do that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
For the benefit of all present, recognizing we have two
members that have yet had their question opportunity--both
members will be accommodated--at the conclusion of their
questioning period, this hearing will be completed.
Mr. Secretary, we will ask that the record remain open,
such that we can place into the record certain classified
material which General Casey was anxious to provide. Now, we
have to close the hearing, in recognition that you have to
appear before the other body at 2 o'clock. We want to, in every
way, accommodate that schedule. Am I not correct in that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That's correct, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. I appreciate that we've had a
very good hearing, and we've been able to accommodate all
Senators.
You're next, Senator Chambliss, for a period of 6 minutes,
followed by Senator Nelson.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
will be brief.
Gentlemen, first of all, let me once again thank you for
great service that each of you provide to our country. We can't
tell you enough how much we appreciate you, and particularly
those brave men and women that serve under you.
General Myers, I don't know how many more times we will see
you, but just know how much we appreciate your great service to
America, as well as to the United States Air Force.
General Myers. Sir, it's been a privilege.
Senator Chambliss. You have been a great trooper in every
single way.
I just want to make a comment, because I take a little bit
of a different take than some of my other colleagues do about
what's happening over there now. General Casey and General
Abizaid, I had the privilege of meeting with you--I didn't see
you the last trip, General Abizaid, but did see General Casey
once again--I was there in Thanksgiving last year, was back
last month, and, gentlemen, I don't have to tell you that the
difference in what I saw between November last year and August
this year was amazing.
When General Petraeus laid out for us the chart which
showed the dynamics of what we have done under his leadership
in transforming the Iraqi Army, it's truly amazing what's been
done in a short period of time. We've argued within this
committee about how many troops were trained. There have been a
lot of numbers that were thrown out there. We all have
ultimately agreed that it doesn't make any difference what the
numbers are, it's how many are ready to go to battle. What
General Petraeus has done with your help is to take whatever
number--and it's probably 170,000 that have been trained; they
may not be ready to go into battle, but there is 170,000--and
he's taken individuals who had never held a gun before, in
hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of instances, and trained
those individuals to be, not just infantrymen, but to drive
tanks, to be medical corpsmen, to be engineers, to do all the
things that people have to do at every level of a trusted and
competent military, and that has not been an easy task.
The one thing that General Petraeus, or any other person
who is responsible for training the military can do, is to
train somebody how to be a leader. Leadership has to come from
within. Anybody who is a member of the Iraqi Army now who
exhibited leadership before would have probably been in
opposition to Saddam and he'd have been killed, or his family
would have been raped and tortured. So, these are individuals
who have never exhibited leadership before, because they've
been afraid to.
As you have gone through this process of training those
individuals, the leadership within the Iraqi Army is starting
to surface. General Casey, I know you talked to us about the
fact that we have three Iraqi patrols now. I don't remember
whether they--what, really, the size of them were, but they
have taken over segments of Baghdad, and they are patrolling
Baghdad on their own. Sure, we'll continue to advise them, but
they're doing it. The leadership has surfaced within those
groups of soldiers, and it's spreading. It's going to take some
more time for that to happen, but it is happening.
The other thing I will say, in closing, is--and we have
expressed this to the White House, and I'm pleased to see that
you're here today talking about the good things that are
happening over there, and that you're going to be doing more of
this, because the American people have to hear it. They have to
hear about the good things that are happening over there, in
addition to what they're going to read in the paper tomorrow
about the IED that exploded today and took some more American
lives. The people who need to be talking about that to the
American people are you.
I told General Petraeus if he could go on the Sunday talk
shows, or in whatever forum, to talk about what he's doing it
would have a much greater impact than any of us talking about
it, and certainly the individuals who are critics of what's
going on over there are not talking about the good things that
are happening.
So, I'm pleased to see you here. I will have to say,
General Casey, the morale of your troops was unbelievable. My
National Guard unit, which has 3,500 people over there today,
had lost 16 soldiers when I was there. I talked to General
Rodeheaver when I got out of the vehicle. He came to me, and I
said, ``How's the morale of your troops? What's going on?'' He
said, ``You won't believe it.'' He said, ``We're still grieving
for our lost comrades, but morale is extremely high. These are
very professional men and women.'' What he told me is exactly
what I saw when I had a chance to look those national guardsmen
and women in the eye.
So, in spite of all the negative press and the negative
comments that are ongoing, I walked away from there with the
feeling that it's tough--and, General Myers, you're right--it's
not a pretty picture to paint--but those men and women are
doing a hell of a job of winning this war. We may not be
winning the political war right now, but if we don't win the
military side of it--and we're doing that--we'll never win the
other side of it.
So, I appreciate the great job you're doing, and I know we
have to stay the course, and we have to continue to do the
things that each of you, and the folks under you, are doing
every single day over there. So, thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to shift to another subject about Iraq, Captain
Scott Speicher.
But, before I do, General Myers, thank you for your public
service. You've been at this for 40 years. I too was
commissioned 40 years ago, but my public service took a
different path. On the occasion of your retirement, Grace and I
look forward to seeing you and Mrs. Myers socially.
General Myers. I hope so, too, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, sir.
Also, before we get to Captain Speicher, Mr. Secretary, it
needs to come to your attention--as I spoke with one of your
Assistant Secretaries, Mr. Grone, you are about to have the
threat of taking away the entire Gulf of Mexico off of Florida
as one of the most significant training areas that you have,
where you're not only training the F-22 and the F-35 pilots,
but also you're shooting a lot of your more exotic warfare that
you need plenty of airspace. What Mr. Grone did not understand
was, he thought he had the luxury of several years to work this
out with the Minerals Management Service in the Department of
the Interior on the expansion of oil and gas leasing on the
surface of the Gulf below, when in fact, you have a matter of
days, or at least weeks, to register how this would impair the
training capability for the United States military if you are
denied that area. Because yesterday a bill was marked up in a
House committee that, in fact takes all of the area, except for
25 miles from shore, and opens it to oil and gas leasing. I've
been the one that has been raising this, trying to protect the
interests of the United States military. I think the Department
has had the idea, ``Well, we can work this out with the
Department of the Interior.'' Well, there is a freight train
that is starting to move in the aftermath of Katrina and the
fear of the shortage. In this atmosphere, I don't want your
United States military preparedness to get hurt by you being
denied all of that area, because you can't be shooting things
down there on the surface of the water if they have oil and gas
rigs all over there. So, I bring that to your attention.
Now, I want to get to Captain Speicher. There was the
review board. They concluded there was no evidence that he was
dead, and that there was sufficient evidence that he probably
survived being shot down, and that there may be Iraqis who know
of his fate. Both the review board and Secretary England agree
that the search must continue.
So, General Casey, can you describe the effort to continue
to try to determine the fate of Captain Scott Speicher?
General Casey. Senator, I have not had an update on Captain
Speicher since the review board has met, so I cannot give you
that. But, as soon as I get back to Iraq, I will get right back
with you and let you know what that is.
[The information referred to follows:]
The recovery and return of Captain Michael Scott Speicher to
friendly control remains an operational priority for MNF-I. To that
end, intelligence collection and operational efforts are continuously
planned and, where actionable intelligence exists, recovery missions
are executed. In addition, all necessary and appropriate follow-up
actions are taken, to include the testing and analysis of all remains
uncovered during any exploitation of a reported burial site, to
determine if the remains are those of Captain Speicher.
In November 2005, a suspected burial site in the Baghdad area
[Deleted.]
The most recent [Deleted.]
[Deleted.]
The Defense Intelligence Agency's exploitation of captured regime
documents continues in Iraq, Qatar, and the United States, providing
new insight into Iraq's prisoner handling procedures. A thorough review
of those documents is ongoing and any leads derived from the
exploitation will be vetted and developed with the goal being the
production of actionable information to locate and repatriate Captain
Speicher.
Senator Bill Nelson. Does anybody else on the panel want to
comment on that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We do know that Captain Speicher
remains on the priority list for gathering of intelligence and
information. There's data-searching taking place in Iraq,
there's data-searching taking place outside of Iraq, in another
Gulf location. The interest that we have is the same as your
interest.
General Myers. We're doing the same thing for Sergeant
Maupin, as well.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
I ask the witnesses if they could indulge just a few
minutes. We've been joined by the Senator from Missouri.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. This panel must get to the House of
Representatives.
Senator Talent. Then other than to say thank you, General
Myers, for your service in particular, and all of you, two very
brief questions. Number one: Are we, in your judgment, doing
enough to empower local commanders to do smaller projects that
are appealing to the population in their particular area? I saw
a lot of this in Sadr City when I was there last--almost, if I
can say it, a kind of a petty-cash fund to go out and do some
local work. Evidently, that's been very successful in helping
to recruit the population in our behalf.
What, if anything, can we do when we go into places like
Tal Afar, to help ensure a longer-term, more secure type
situation? Because I know we've been going in, search-and-
destroying, and then having to--what, in your judgment, can we
do there? Maybe to General Abizaid and General Casey?
General Casey. I'll take first on the CERP. We have
something we call bulk-CERP, which does exactly what you said,
almost a petty-cash thing that the local commanders use to get
that out there. I don't think you were here when I said we've
spent over $700 million in CERP this year, and it has been the
best assistance for the local commanders.
Senator Talent. I'm really glad you recognize that, and I
hope we make as much available as they think they can need.
General Casey. Thank you. Now, on Tal Afar--and this is a
great question, because it speaks to a strategy that we have
used in Najaf, Fallujah, Samara, and we applied with this new
government in Tal Afar. Before we go in--and this gets to the
question--we sit down with the government and say, ``Okay, what
are you going to do politically here to make it easier for our
troops? What are you going to do economically to ensure there's
humanitarian assistance available, that there's reconstruction
money available, that there's compensation available? Then what
are you going to do to ensure that there are police programs
and the police training program is put in place there so that
you generate the Iraqi local security forces that will make
this a long-term success?''
As I said, we've done it--we started it in Najaf, did it in
Samara, we haven't been as successful in Samara because,
largely, the Iraqis could never put together a local political
leadership that wanted to make this succeed. I told the Deputy
Governor up there the other day, I said, ``Look, we can't want
this more than you do.''
Fallujah is coming up on the first anniversary of the
battle. I think what you're going to see is the great success
that's gone on there inside Fallujah. Almost 70 percent of the
people in Fallujah have electricity and running water. This is
something that--those of you who were there shortly after the
battle, I was there last week--it's amazing.
So, we applied the same things in Tal Afar. Again, it's a
holistic package done in advance, and then followed up with
steady pressure to ensure that people don't take their eye off
the ball after the battle is over, which is hard.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
indulgence.
Chairman Warner. The subject of IEDs--that's the explosive
devices which have taken such a heavy toll--we were going to
largely cover in the classified session, but I think you can
give us an assurance publicly that everything that can be
brought to bear in the way of technology, equipment, people,
and otherwise, are being devoted to try and contain that type
of threat to our forces. Am I not correct, General Casey?
General Casey. Senator, you are. I met with General Votel,
head if the IED Defeat Task Force yesterday, and I will tell
you that we continually try to find new things as the enemy
adapts his tactics, and we continue to work on improving our
capabilities to deal with these.
Chairman Warner. Our committee regularly meets with the
General.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. We have had a very good
hearing.
The hearing stands adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
1. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, there
continues to be a great deal of media coverage with regard to
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It is apparent from our casualties
that the biggest danger our military faces in Iraq results from IEDs.
Coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians face these
same threats. General Joseph Votel, the director of the IED Defeat Task
Force, briefed this committee in June that IED incidents, the discovery
or detonation of a bomb, had surged recently and were currently running
at about 30 per day. I applaud all the fine work that is being done by
this Task Force in a very time critical environment to diminish any
further escalation of these devices. Like my colleagues and all
Americans, I remain concerned about what more we can do to keep the
insurgency from continuing to make and adapt these devices, seemingly
combating whatever offensive or defensive measures we put in place.
This greatly concerns me. Without getting into any classified areas,
what trends are we actually seeing since our committee had this
briefing in June with regard to IED incidents?
General Abizaid. The volume of IED attacks has continued to rise
steadily and IED makers have refined their techniques and are focusing
their energies in certain areas like explosive formed projectiles
(EFPs) which are capable of penetrating some types of armored vehicles.
There is also a growing trend towards under-vehicle attacks, the use of
command-wired detonations, and the use of actuators which are triggered
by the intended victims.
While the number of attacks has risen, the rate of U.S.
servicemembers killed or wounded in IED attacks has actually declined
when compared to this same time period in last year. This can be
credited to the improved tactics, techniques, and procedures being used
by U.S., coalition, and Iraqi forces along with new technologies being
developed by the Joint IED Defeat Task Force. In addition to new
technologies and techniques, U.S., coalition, and Iraqi forces are
improving ways to gain the support of local Iraqis in preventing IED
incidents.
General Casey. [Deleted.]
2. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, what
assurance can you offer that initiatives are in the pipeline to defeat
the insurgency's successful use of IEDs, especially of the vehicle
borne IEDs?
General Abizaid. To facilitate the efforts of the Joint IED Defeat
Task Force, Central Command has also established its own Counter-IED
Task Force. Functioning as a team, these two task forces identify enemy
tactics, techniques, and procedures; evaluate the latest IED trends;
identify operational needs and requirements of U.S. forces; and
identify areas in which training can be improved to defeat IEDs. The
teamwork of these two task forces has already succeeded in getting many
new technologies fielded to attack the IED problem. Those initiatives
have already placed into the hands of U.S. forces new means of
conducting surveillance, locating buried or hidden IEDs, disrupting the
functioning of IEDs, and identifying and locating individuals who make
or emplace IEDs. These technologies continue to be refined, and
resources are being allocated to develop those showing the most
promise. In addition to receiving new technologies, U.S., coalition,
and Iraqi forces are learning ways to gain the support of local
populations in preventing IED incidents.
General Casey. The Multi-National Force implemented an array of
measures, both technical and operational, to defeat IEDs and vehicle-
borne IEDs throughout Iraq. Initiatives include establishing a Joint
Task Force dedicated to countering IEDs, fielding electronic warfare
equipment to counter radio controlled IEDs, improving armor for our
inventory of vehicles, introducing new vehicles designed specifically
for mined environments and improving tactics, techniques, and
procedures.
3. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, the IED
Defeat Task Force identified human intelligence (HUMINT) as critical in
tracking and capturing the makers of these IEDs. What advances are we
making in this arena?
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
General Casey. We continue to improve our capability to exploit
human intelligence. Recent initiatives include the establishment of a
single, centrally located, interagency strategic debriefing center to
facilitate more timely and effective debriefings to gain vital human
intelligence information from foreign fighters and those who enable
them. Another initiative is the formation of an intelligence-based
development team designed to accelerate data base research and provide
feedback on captured detainee documents and other media to forward
maneuver elements for on-site exploitation and follow on operations.
4. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, are there any
blockers to continuing to build our HUMINT capability as rapidly as we
need to and what are we doing to overcome any such blockers?
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
General Casey. We do face a challenge acquiring sources with
sustained access to IED cells. To overcome that challenge, the Multi-
National Force in company with the Iraqi Transitional Government
instituted telephone ``tips lines'' that provide not only effective and
actionable IED leads from Iraqi citizens but also individuals willing
to serve as sources.
5. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, I believe we
all agree that the success of a new Iraq depends on Iraq being able to
secure itself. We are making great progress in this area. I have seen
some very positive changes in my two visits to Iraq this year. I
commend the people of Iraq as they prepare to go to the voting booths
in a few weeks to vote on the proposed constitution. The Iraqi
population must continue to become ever more responsible for itself. In
this vein, this is what I'd like to know. With the increasing
casualties among the Iraqi security forces and civilians, are you
seeing the Iraqi populace and the new Iraqi government providing
critical information or taking definitive actions to ``help us, help
them'' be a free people and defeat this insurgency by pinpointing where
the insurgent is hiding, and where the IEDs are being manufactured?
General Abizaid. The Iraqi populace and Government of Iraq are
indeed providing critical information to U.S. forces. The Ministry of
Interior (MOI) has instituted a very successful national tips hotline
which allows concerned Iraqi citizens to call in information. During
the month of October alone, there were 718 calls which provided
actionable intelligence one of which resulted in the defusing of an
IED. Between 1 May and 28 Oct 2005, there were 4,592 tips processed
through the national tips hotline program. Additionally, there were
over 40 reports in the month of October from sources who were motivated
by their ``love of country.''
General Casey. [Deleted.]
TROOP LEVELS AND END STRENGTH
6. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General
Abizaid, and General Casey, recently, some in Congress have been
pressing the DOD and the administration to reduce the number of troops
in Iraq. They have a mission, a critical mission: to defeat the
insurgency, train the Iraqi security forces to protect themselves, and
enable a free Iraq. I strongly agree with the President in the belief
that we base any withdrawal timeline on the mission, and only on the
mission. There has been significant progress in Iraq. I have seen it.
We expect continued progress there. Based on the results of their
constitutional referendum on October 15, the Iraqis are then scheduled
at the end of the year to hold their first election under their new
constitution. Along with our Active-Duty Forces, we have relied heavily
on our Reserve and Guard Forces, all of who have done an exemplary job.
However, we have had some recruiting challenges, particularly in the
Army and the Marine Corps. I am concerned about our maintaining an
adequate end strength in our military forces to meet the rotational
needs of the Iraqi freedom mission. Is this a concern you share?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thanks to you and the other members of this
committee and the support of Congress, we have adequate strength levels
to successfully meet present rotational needs in prosecuting the war on
terrorism. Through the flexibilities allowed in law, the ongoing
efforts to realign and conserve military manpower (e.g., by converting
certain billets to civilian or contractor when not essential to
rotation needs), continued prudent and judicious use of our Reserve
Forces, and aggressive recruiting and retention programs, we have
enough troops to meet current needs.
Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required prolonged
use of some of our military capabilities, particularly our ground
support forces. To minimize the strain on the individuals in these
high-demand skill areas, we have used individuals from our air and
naval forces with similar skill sets to meet theater mission needs.
These forces have been well-prepared for their mission and have
performed superbly. The flexibility afforded by this approach to force
management has not only allowed us to provide qualified, effective
forces for this operation, it has also increased our ability to
effectively respond to future unforeseen crises.
General Myers. Thanks to you and the other members of this
committee and the support of Congress, we have adequate end strength to
meet the needs of the Nation. However, current stresses on the force
are significant and will remain so for the near-term. Accordingly, the
Services are actively working to rebalance within and between Active
and Reserve components to increase warfighting capability and improve
responsiveness, to ease stress on our units, troops, and their
families. Some of the initiatives include the Army's transition to 43
``modular'' brigade combat teams, shifting billets across the Services'
critical skills, and capitalizing on military to civilian conversions.
Additionally, end strength is a significant focus item for the
Quadrennial Defense Review. If at the end of the review it appears that
our other efforts fall short of the projected force level requirements,
I will not hesitate to recommend additional end strength.
General Abizaid. Recruiting and retention remain a concern to
everyone in uniform but this question is better answered by the
Services since they are responsible for recruiting. Central Command's
force requirements continue to be filled with properly trained and
equipped units and individuals for our efforts throughout the Central
Command Area of Responsibility but especially in Iraq and Afghanistan.
General Casey. Recruiting and retention continue to be a concern to
all of us in uniform but this question is better answered by the
Services since they have responsibility for recruiting.
7. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General
Abizaid, and General Casey, what do you see on the horizon with regard
to the negative recruiting trend, particularly in the Army and the
Marine Corps, and what plans are there to address this concern?
Secretary Rumsfeld. A strong economy and low unemployment, while
good for America, present challenges we already are working to
overcome. Each component of the Army, for example, has expanded its
number of recruiters, as well as the age constraints that had limited
the pool of eligibles.
The Department will continue to be attentive to the recruiting
environment and actively seek the assistance of Congress with new and
creative initiatives. Increased flexibility in the types of recruitment
incentives the Department may employ, as well as an upward adjustment
in the discretionary cap constraining those incentives, will be key to
our success. We solicit your support of those initiatives.
General Myers. We expect fiscal year 2006 to be a very challenging
year for both Active and Reserve component recruiting and are
particularly concerned with active Army, Army Reserve, and Army Guard.
To mitigate the challenges, we have increased the numbers of
recruiters, enhanced enlistment bonuses, and have focused our marketing
strategy not only on potential recruits, but also on the influencers
(parents, teachers, etc.) who play an important role in our overall
effort.
General Abizaid. Recruiting and retention continue to be a concern
to all of us in uniform but this question is better answered by the
Services since they have responsibility for recruiting. It should be
noted that the Services continue to provide forces to meet the needs
within Central Command's Area of Responsibility and the troops remain
fully capable of completing the mission.
General Casey. Recruiting and retention continue to be a concern to
all of us in uniform but this question is better answered by the
Services since they have responsibility for recruiting.
MEDIA COVERAGE
8. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid and General Casey, during my
last two trips to Iraq I met many soldiers and marines who believe the
media coverage is unbalanced. They want to know why the media is not
sharing the many success stories that are occurring in Iraq. The
soldiers and marines tell me that what they read does not fully reflect
what they see happening on the ground. They tell me the successes
achieved by our forces seem to not be newsworthy, with the media at
every opportunity touting the insurgents' successes. With the exception
of the coverage of the election in January, I must agree. It will be
interesting to see what kind of coverage occurs after what I expect to
be a successful constitutional referendum in mid-October. If it comes
to believing what I read in the paper or see on television versus
listening to what someone on ground is actually seeing, I think it's
our young men and women there in Iraq who have it right.
Take for example, these protesters here in Washington this past
weekend who want to pull our troops out of Iraq. Many were probably
there because they don't think we are being successful in Iraq due to
what they are reading and seeing in the media. These protesters have a
very simplified view of the result of pulling our troops out of Iraq.
Either that or they are willing to toss away the opportunity to make a
lasting and needed change in that region of the world.
What will pulling out our troops mean? It means the country would
dissolve into civil war because it does not yet have the necessary
level of stability of the country to fend off these insurgents alone.
It means these insurgents would then begin to export the very terror we
have been fighting in Iraq. That's what these protesters would end up
getting if we were to pull out our troops.
What is your perception of the media coverage, how does that affect
your mission, and what can we do to get a more balanced story?
General Abizaid. The media trends towards reporting on the negative
and/or sensational issues; that is the nature of the news business. To
some extent, the events in Iraq and Afghanistan are viewed through a
soda straw. The 24-hour news cycle compresses the allotted time for
coverage of the issues which results in not every story being reported.
As a result, the most unreported story in Iraq and Afghanistan is
the true nature of the enemy. This is a despicable enemy that we need
to understand. They are killing civilians, they are killing Muslims,
and they are destroying Iraq's national infrastructure. We need to know
what their motivations are, what their vision of the future is and what
they are willing to do to accomplish their goals.
General Casey. Media reports are, for the most part, accurate and
unbiased, but they are also incomplete with respect to the
accomplishments of the Iraqi and coalition forces. The Multi-National
Force is rebuilding a nation with its Iraqi partners. Our day-to-day
work and accomplishments contribute to that end. Coalition and Iraqi
forces perform superbly under challenging conditions. I have no doubt
that the trend of their performance will continue.
I can tell you that American servicemembers deserve the full
support of the American people and that the American public deserves to
know the full story of their military's success in Iraq. I would
appreciate anything that you, Senator, and your colleagues, can do to
assist in that area.
9. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid, in an article earlier this year
you stated, ``Politics will assure the defeat of the insurgency,
provided the politics are open, transparent, and legitimate. It is
clear we are moving in that direction.'' It seems to me that this same
strategy has started to work in Lebanon, Libya, Afghanistan, and maybe
someday in Egypt and Saudi Arabia to name just a few countries in the
region. What do you see as the major obstacle to achieving an open,
transparent, legitimate political environment in Iraq, what is your
assessment of the changes we see taking place in the region, and are
they sustainable?
General Abizaid. The main obstacle to achieving an open,
transparent, legitimate political environment in Iraq is providing
inclusiveness in the political process for the diversity of religious,
ethnic, and tribal influences throughout the country. Eventual success
in Iraq will not be won by military operations on the ground, but by
the formation of a central government that is representative of the
people, and therefore fully supported by the people. This inclusiveness
must be protected by a constitutional structure that guarantees the
minority rights. If the Iraqi people truly believe that their voice is
fairly represented in governmental decisions and that the government
represents stability and a better future for them and their children,
the insurgency will no longer have a place to hide. The need for
inclusiveness during the political process is well-recognized at all
levels of the political spectrum and continues to be a priority of all
concerned.
The recent political events observed throughout the region in
Lebanon, Libya, and Afghanistan are indeed encouraging. These events
also lend credibility to the concept that an open, transparent, and
legitimate political process can significantly alter the direction in
which a country is moving. The sustainability of these events
throughout the region is difficult to predict, but our eventual success
in Iraq and Afghanistan will certainly play a role in the continuation
of future change throughout the region.
10. Senator Inhofe. General Abizaid, in the same article you
stated, ``The Afghans and Iraqis on this trip kept saying to me over
and over again, `Are you going to stick with us?' I kept telling them
over and over again, `Yes we will.' I ask the American people not to
make a liar of me.'' What will happen in the region if we don't stick
with them?
General Abizaid. While it is hard to predict the unknown, it is
possible to foresee certain possible outcomes. Leaving Iraq before the
security forces and government are ready to take on the challenges of
an evolving democratic state could have far reaching consequences for
Iraq and the region as a whole. The greatest concern would be that the
fledgling government would collapse and Iraq would devolve into civil
war, with the country eventually splitting into autonomous regions. If
this were to happen, Iraq could become a major terrorist sanctuary and
a destabilizing influence for Iraq's surrounding neighbors, resulting
in a regression from the gains in regional democratization that has
been recently witnessed.
With regard to Afghanistan, the effect of abandonment would be
slower to evolve than in Iraq due to the more advanced progress of the
political process and the greater degree of governmental control there.
Yet, while greater maturity exists, the political, economic, and
security infrastructure simply is not in place to guarantee the
continued success of democracy in Afghanistan. The country could begin
a gradual degeneration into a narco-terrorist state dominated by
warlords and terrorist activities due to the presence of a substantial
narcotics influence.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
NATIONAL GUARD
11. Senator Collins. Secretary Rumsfeld, just over 2 months ago, my
State's Adjutant General stated that Maine had only approximately 30
percent of the State's National Guard soldiers available for
mobilization for Federal missions. He said that Maine's National Guard
is ``building very quickly toward a crisis if, in the next two or three
rotations, we still have 135,000 troops on the ground in Iraq.''
Eventually, we will run out of Guard members with time left on their
mobilization clocks, particularly those serving in high-demand
specialties such as intelligence, civil affairs, and military police.
What are your plans to deal with this imminent problem?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First, I must applaud the important
contribution our Reserve components have made and continue to make in
support of our global war on terrorism. We could not have provided all
of the required capabilities to our commanders without their continued
and steadfast support. To ensure we manage this support properly, we
have maintained a judicious and prudent approach all along to ensure
their utilization remained fair and appropriate.
We have restricted the total aggregate time a reservist may be
placed on active duty involuntarily to 24 months. We have insisted that
our commanders request capabilities instead of units when requesting
resources for Iraq and Afghanistan to ensure all Services have the most
opportunities to support our efforts there, not just the traditional
ground force providers. We have expanded the use of volunteerism. We
constantly seek alternate manpower options, opening up additional
opportunities for DOD civilian personnel, coalition forces, civilian
contractors, and technological solutions. Though we are strained in
some specific capabilities, these and other mitigation strategies have
enabled us to preserve a significant portion of the Reserve component
force.
With respect to the Maine National Guard, over the course of four
rotations, there are over 1,500 Maine guardsmen--or 49 percent of the
currently assigned Maine Guard--who still have 24 months remaining on
their mobilization clock (see table below).
Further, the Department is now in its fourth year of rebalancing to
relieve the specific stresses on the force that you mentioned in your
question. From fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2005, the Services have
rebalanced about 70,000 spaces of low demand structure into capability
areas that are in high demand such as Intelligence, Civil Affairs, and
Military Police. Rebalancing is also a continuous and iterative
process. The Services have already planned about 55,000 spaces of
additional rebalancing from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2011.
For example, the Army has plans to add about 25,000 Military Police
spaces, about 3,000 Intelligence spaces, and about 1,000 Civil Affairs
spaces.
In addition to rebalancing, the Army's transition to modular
brigades is increasing the number of Active brigades available, thus
reducing the requirement to use Army National Guard brigades.
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National Guard (All) National Guard (Maine)
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Army Air Total Army Air Total
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Total Currently Assigned:............... 333,177 106,246 439,423 1,937 1,262 3,199
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Total Assigned, Previously Activated ISO 99,794 47,283 147,077 970 660 1,630
ONE/OIF/OEF:........................... 30 percent 45 percent 50 percent 52 percent 51 percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
24 Months Remaining on clock (not yet 160,075 58,963 219,038 967 602 1,569
activated):............................ 48 percent 55 percent 50 percent 50 percent 48 percent 49 percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12 Months Remaining on Clock (activated 36,022 33,020 69,042 86 381 467
previously):........................... 11 percent 31 percent 4 percent 30 percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently Mobilized (SELRES):........... 76,102 7,970 84,072 202 262 464
23 percent 8 percent 19 percent 10 percent 21 percent 15 percent
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Total Available for at least a 12 month 196,097 91,983 288,080 1,053 983 2,036
rotation:.............................. 59 percent 87 percent 66 percent 54 percent 78 percent 64 percent
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Table is as of September 30,2005.
12. Senator Collins. Secretary Rumsfeld, are there any plans, draft
or otherwise, to alter the 24-month maximum call-up policy?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No. We understand the intent of the law and are
complying with it. Furthermore, changes to our policy would tend to
generate long-term problems for our Reserve Forces.
13. Senator Collins. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, is the
Department of Defense studying the possibility of creating new
battalions within the National Guard that would focus only on homeland
defense missions, where units would solely train with State and local
authorities?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No. There has been no national strategy change
to justify the need to establish a separate role for the National
Guard, under which it only performs homeland security related missions.
There are already sufficient legal mechanisms in place that enable
State and territorial governors to employ their National Guard forces
in support of local authorities to meet a wide range of existing
homeland security missions.
General Myers. Although the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2005 is
examining a variety of possible alternatives in meeting homeland
defense requirements, to include potentially dedicating some National
Guard structure to that mission, there are no plans at this time to
create additional units solely for homeland defense. The Army and
National Guard Bureau position is to maintain units which have full-
spectrum utility across the range of military operations, including
major combat operations, stability and support operations, as well as
homeland defense, with the exception of selected niche capabilities for
homeland defense, such as the National Guard's Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Civil Support Teams and Northern Command's Joint Task Force
Civil Support. In essence, in order to provide the optimum level of
capability to the Nation in meeting needs identified in the National
Defense and Military Strategies, units are best structured to provide
full-spectrum capabilities across a range of missions, versus single
utility units with limited applicability.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
PROPOSED IRAQ CONSTRUCTION
14. Senator Thune. Secretary Rumsfeld, there is evidence that
Sunnis are mobilizing to vote down the proposed Iraqi constitution
during the December referendum. If they are successful, what effect
will that have on the duration that American troops will remain in
Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The December elections will be democracy in
action as the Iraqi people express their will at the ballot box. The
December 15 election will determine the composition of the Iraqi
National Assembly and set the stage for negotiations over remaining
constitutional issues. That the Sunnis are preparing to participate in
the elections should be taken as a positive sign of Iraq's continuing
political development.
American troops remain in Iraq in support of our goal of achieving
a peaceful, free, and democratic Iraq and at the request of the Iraqi
government. Decisions about the presence of American troops in Iraq
after the December election will be made according to the conditions
faced at that time, particularly the growth in the capabilities of the
Iraqi security forces.
15. Senator Thune. Secretary Rumsfeld, are you committed to staying
in Iraq until a constitution is accepted?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Iraqis turned out in large numbers to pass the
constitution in a referendum on October 15. The adoption of a
constitution is an important step in Iraq's political development. The
constitution, however, does not signal the end of the process. Iraqis
continue to negotiate several major political and legal questions, and
Iraq's National Assembly must pass a number of laws in support of the
constitution. We remain committed to providing support for Iraq's
political transition in support of our goal to achieve a peaceful,
free, and democratic Iraq.
16. Senator Thune. Secretary Rumsfeld, several news outlets are
reporting that the December referendum could likely push Iraq into
civil war between rival Shia factions and the Sunnis. I do not vouch
for the veracity of those reports nor do I endorse the conclusion.
However, suppose for a moment that this worst case scenario comes true,
what role will our armed services play?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our armed services work to support two
overarching strategic goals: the creation of strong Iraqi security
forces and the simultaneous development of a free and open Iraqi
political process. Achieving these goals provides a powerful incentive
for Iraqis to reject violence and settle their differences at the
ballot box and remain the best hope of achieving a peaceful, free, and
democratic Iraq.
Coalition forces have altered deployments and tactics on a daily
basis as the Iraqi security forces assume new responsibilities as well
as in response to changes in the threats posed by the insurgents. We
will continue to work with the Iraqi security forces in support of the
political process, adapting tactics to the conditions we face.
17. Senator Thune. Secretary Rumsfeld, would the Department's
experience in Somalia provide any lessons learned?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department is relying on a variety of
sources to inform its strategy, operations, and tactics in Iraq. While
I will leave specific details about lessons of urban fighting and
counterinsurgency to our military planners, I can say with certainty
that we consider historical lessons when we discuss operations in Iraq.
SERVICE LIMITATIONS
18. Senator Thune. Secretary Rumsfeld, many National Guard and
Reserve soldiers are getting close to fulfilling their 24-month service
limitation. What is the Department's plan for conducting operations in
Iraq if the pool of Reserve and National Guard soldiers begins to
dwindle because they have met their deployment requirements?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are 829,000 members of the Selective
Reserve assigned, of which, approximately 455,000 have never been
mobilized. After future reductions in Army National Guard combat
formations, the Reserve components will provide approximately 30,000 to
35,000 personnel per rotation. The pool of Reserve component forces
appears to be sufficient at this time. The Services are continuing
efforts to rebalance forces, including those in the Reserve components,
to ensure the correct mix of forces.
MOBILIZATION SITE DEFICIENCIES
19. Senator Thune. General Myers, soldiers deploying from South
Dakota to the Iraq theater are using Fort Dix, New Jersey, as a
mobilization site. My office has been contacted by some South Dakota
guardsmen with reports of unsatisfactory conditions at Fort Dix such as
overflowing dumpsters, unsanitary conditions in portable toilets, and
backed up plumbing which required some soldiers to bath from a drinking
water trailer or a ``water buffalo.'' Would the Department review these
complaints and keep my office apprised of findings and any actions
taken to correct these alleged deficiencies?
General Myers. In this specific case, the Army's Installation
Management Agency, U.S. Army Forces Command, and its subordinate
continental First U.S. Army are jointly responsible for operations and
facilities at Fort Dix, New Jersey. In order to best answer your
question, the Joint Staff is formally asking the Department of the Army
to respond directly to your office in this matter. Quality of life
standards for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and their
families are of the utmost concern across the Department.
SECURITY ROLE DURING REFERENDUM
20. Senator Thune. General Casey, it is possible that tensions may
arise in Iraq as the December referendum moves closer. What role are
American troops going to play in providing security for Iraqis during
the referendum?
General Casey. As a point of clarification, Iraq's constitutional
referendum took place on 15 October 2005. The political process that
will take place in December will be an election of a new national
government.
American troops, as part of the coalition force, will have three
broad roles during the election. They will advise Iraqi security force
leadership, provide rapid response in support of the Iraqi election
security plan, and perform counterinsurgency operations throughout the
area of operations.
21. Senator Thune. General Casey, will this role be defined by the
Iraqi government or American policy makers?
General Casey. The role of American troops, as part of the Multi-
National Force, is jointly agreed upon between the United Nations, the
Independent Election Council Iraq, and the coalition forces.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
IRAQI INSURGENCY
22. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, is the insurgency in Iraq
weaker now than it was a year ago?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The insurgency is failing at the strategic
level. While insurgents still possess the resources to conduct
operations, they have failed to prevent or derail the democratic
political process in Iraq, which is the strategic process. Lacking any
positive vision of the future, they have failed to win the hearts and
minds of the overwhelming majority of Iraqis. Nevertheless, the
insurgency continues to pose a potent tactical threat to coalition
forces as well as the Iraqi people. Our strategy of fighting the
insurgents while building the Iraqi security forces will be crucial to
ending the insurgents' tactical capabilities.
23. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, is the Zarqawi network in
Iraq weaker now than it was prior to the fall of Baghdad to coalition
forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Zarqawi can no longer rely on Iraqi territory
as a safe haven from which he can plot regional terrorist operations.
Coalition forces and in particular, the Iraqi security forces bring the
battle to the insurgents, taking the Zarqawi network further and
further from any hope of strategic success. The network does remain
capable of potent tactical strikes increasingly directed against Iraqi
civilians. These strikes, while very lethal, have isolated his network
from the developing political process, limiting the network's
viability.
24. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, at the hearing you said
``Zarqawi was already in Iraq before the war ever started. Zarqawi was
running terrorists out of Iraq in several countries before the war ever
started.'' It sounded like you were suggesting that Zarqawi was running
terrorist operations from Iraq with the knowledge and consent of the
Government of Iraq. What was the view of the Intelligence Community at
the time on whether Zarqawi was running terrorist operations in other
nations from Iraq before the war, and whether the Government of Iraq
knew of and permitted Zarqawi to run terrorist operations from Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not wish to speak authoritatively on
behalf of the Intelligence Community. However, I believe that the
statement you cited above is consistent with my understanding of the
Intelligence Community's position prior to the war. To the best of my
knowledge, in the spring of 2003, the Intelligence Community believed
Saddam Hussein regime elements were providing sanctuary to Zarqawi,
Ansar al-Islam, and other terrorists.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
CONFLICT IN IRAQ--POLICY AND STRATEGY
25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General
Abizaid, and General Casey, the International Crisis Group (ICG) just
released a report titled: ``Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process
Gone Awry'' in which they conclude that ``the situation appears to be
heading toward de facto partition and full-scale civil war.'' Assuming
for a moment that the ICG prediction is correct, do you believe that
the United States would have to alter its current military deployments
and tactics? If you do not concur with the ICG prediction, wouldn't it
be a prudent policy to prepare for that possible contingency and if so,
what is being done?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Coalition forces frequently alter their
deployments as the Iraqi security forces (ISF) assume new
responsibilities, as well as in response to changes in insurgent
tactics. The insurgents, for example, appear to be directing new
attacks against the Iraqi people, and the ISF are developing the
ability to protect their own citizens.
Our strategic goals continue to be the creation of strong ISF and
the simultaneous development of a free and open political process.
Achieving these goals provides a powerful incentive for Iraqis to
reject violence and settle their differences at the ballot box as they
have already done twice. The ISF also remain the best hope of a
peaceful, free, and democratic Iraq. We will continue to work with the
ISF to achieve these goals, adapting our tactics to the conditions we
face.
General Myers. While there has been much speculation over the
future of Iraq, I believe it is much more useful to deal with the facts
when addressing Iraq's future. After 2\1/2\ years of insurgent warfare,
Iraq is still a unified state. Terrorists like Zarqawi have tried to
incite sectarian violence, but the Iraqi people have not divided. I
believe the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people and Iraqi leaders
do not want a partitioned country. We do not need to alter our current
military deployments and tactics. The Iraqis are developing a
representative constitutional democracy with our assistance. They are
doing this and are making tremendous progress despite the factional
political environment. We are helping them mend their fissures. Our
current military efforts at establishing a secure and stable
environment do not need to be changed.
General Abizaid. If that prediction is correct, and I do not
believe it is, it would require a reevaluation of our national goals
and objectives for Iraq at the very highest levels. Our involvement in
a full-scale civil war would require a different mix of capabilities
and personnel than we currently have on the ground because the mission,
once defined, would be completely different. Our planners continually
assess, with our coalition partners, emerging situations and ``what-
ifs'' to develop plans for those possibilities. A civil war would take
our involvement to a different national policy level that would need to
be clarified before the military planners make any specific plans for
involvement.
General Casey. Civil war is not a foregone conclusion in Iraq, but
I would agree that it is prudent to plan for possible contingencies. We
are constantly assessing our deployment plans and tactics as situations
change.
The Multi-National Force strategy works to prevent civil war by
closing deep, pre-existing ethno-centric divisions and building
capacity for the Sunni, Shia, and Kurds to participate in the political
process and collectively govern a united country. Iraq's constitution,
though not a perfect document, provides a basis for political
resolution to the nation's most contentious issues and the conditions
most likely to foment civil war.
It is certainly prudent to prepare for contingencies. As part of
the military planning process, we prepare for contingencies we identify
as risks. We have identified actions to mitigate sectarian tension and
we have prepared a contingency plan.
26. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General
Abizaid, and General Casey, Major General Richard Zahner recently
stated that ``if you don't take off the terrorist element, the
political process can't mature.'' I certainly agree with that
assessment. However, a report by Anthony Cordesman of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies concludes that Iraq has become one
of the global centers for recruiting and training terrorists--the war
seems to be creating more terrorists, not fewer. If there is an almost
inexhaustible supply of terrorists being created in the Middle East and
being attracted to Iraq, how do we ``take off the terrorist element?''
The situation is similar to water flowing over a broken dam or dike: it
stops flowing once the water level on both sides even out--in the case
of Iraq, that would leave our troops surrounded by terrorists.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The terrorists understand that a free and open
Iraq represents a strategic defeat for their cause and join the
insurgency for this reason. Likewise, a free and open Iraq is a
strategic victory for the United States and our partner nations in the
global war on terrorism.
This strategic victory can be achieved by denying the terrorists
what they need to operate and survive, particularly support from inside
Iraq. We are working to draw support away from the insurgency and
toward the new Iraq. While the terrorists promise only hatred and
violence, we support the vision of a free and democratic Iraq. Broad-
based participation in the political process, evidenced most recently
by the constitutional referendum, shows the Iraqi people choosing the
democratic process and rejecting terrorist extremism. Support from the
Iraqi people means better intelligence for coalition forces, fewer
recruits for the terrorists, and fewer places for the terrorists to
hide. Iraq's political progress therefore remains a key part of our
strategy to defeat the terrorists in Iraq.
General Myers. I disagree with your assertion that there is ``an
almost inexhaustible supply of terrorists being created in the Middle
East.'' Hard core terrorists are not being created in Iraq, they are
massing there for what they believe is a decisive battle. Some
terrorists are exploiting the unstable areas in Iraq. However, unlike
other global terrorist sanctuaries, we are actively pursuing them with
Iraqi and coalition security forces and denying them safe areas from
which to operate. The key to reducing the supply of terrorists is to
create conditions, which are inhospitable to terrorism, much as a
healthy body rejects the onslaught of disease. We must harness all the
elements of national power to create good governance, economic
opportunity, and the rule of law.
General Abizaid. Although it is likely our presence there has drawn
foreign terrorists to the country, it is also probable that it has
significantly decreased the opportunity for terrorists to openly and
freely recruit and train. USCENTCOM has had some successes in stemming
the flow of foreign fighters coming into the country, especially in the
Syrian border region and we are working with the Iraqi government on
how they can provide long-term security in this region. We have also
had many successes in eliminating numerous terrorist leaders. There is
also evidence that the actions by foreign terrorists are not resonating
with the average Iraqi and in some cases are being resented. This
increases the chances that average Iraqis will report on these elements
and in turn, increase the coalition's capability to neutralize them.
Coalition forces will continue to train Iraqi security forces and
along with the Iraqi government, will continue aggressive pursuit of
terrorists. This multi-faceted approach to decrease the terrorist
threat will provide an environment where the political process can
mature allowing the U.S. to reduce the size of its footprint which
should help reduce the attraction of foreign fighters to Iraq.
General Casey. We employ two broad methods to ``take off the
terrorist element'' in Iraq. First, the Multi-National Force, in
partnership with the Iraqi security forces, conducts operations, such
as the recent missions in Tal Afar and the Western Euphrates Valley, to
defeat terrorists, foreign fighters, and those Iraqis who support them.
Second, we are reestablishing Iraqi control of its national borders to
stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. Those two objectives will
reduce the operational capability of the terrorists in the country and
prevent others from entering.
Simultaneously, we work in partnership with the Iraqi Transitional
Government to enable the democratic political process. A strong,
democratic government is the long-term solution to the insurgency in
Iraq.
27. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General
Abizaid, and General Casey, a few hearings or briefings ago, we were
told that the situation in southern Iraq around the city of Basra was
peaceful. That seems to have changed. British troops stormed a police
station looking for two captured British soldiers. An American
journalist was murdered. Other Iraqis have been murdered on an almost
daily basis. There are news reports that Islamic fundamentalists
representing several different factions have taken control of the city,
including police forces. Basra sits astride one of our critical lines
of communication to the ports and to Kuwait. Now it appears that this
strategically vital rear area may be in jeopardy. If this is the case,
what went wrong with our strategy?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The recent incidents in Basra are troubling,
and they deserve our careful attention. However, it is important to
keep these incidents in their proper perspective. The Department's
recent report to Congress on measuring security and stability in Iraq
noted that 50 percent of Iraq's people experience only 6 percent of
insurgent attacks. Basra is located in an area that has been peaceful
relative to the rest of Iraq but by no means completely free of
violence.
It is possible that additional incidents in Basra and in the
southern part of Iraq will occur in the future, and given the relative
quiet of that region, these incidents will tend to stand out from
incidents occurring in locations experiencing more consistent violence.
But these kinds of incidents do not represent a strategic threat. Our
supply lines and lines of communication remain safe and open, our
strategy in the south of Iraq remains an appropriate one. We will
continue to monitor the situation closely and safeguard our
communication and supply lines as necessary.
General Myers. Because it is a city with many different political,
religious, and tribal groups, Basra experiences periods of instability
and crisis. The incidents you describe are examples of group loyalties
or personal loyalties conflicting with the newly established democratic
authorities. As the relationship between central, provincial, and
municipal governments matures, these periodic incidents of instability
will diminish.
General Abizaid. The events to which you refer, while not
insignificant, are isolated and not indicative of the overall situation
in Basra and the surrounding Al Basra Province. Over the past 9 months
violence in Basra has accounted for only 1.2 percent of all violence in
Iraq, while Basra accounts for over 7 percent of the Iraqi population
making Basra significantly more stable than a majority of the country.
While attacks in the past 3 months leading to the successful
constitutional referendum have increased slightly in Basra, they are
not out of line with the expected increase in attacks across Iraq.
General Casey. Basra remains one of our most peaceful and stable
provinces averaging one attack per day. We will continue to maintain a
coalition presence in this key province. Vetting of Iraqi security
force recruits and continued professional development within their
police forces will add to the region's stability and ensure long-term
stability.
[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]