[Senate Hearing 109-534]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-534
SAGO MINE DISASTER AND AN OVERVIEW OF MINE SAFETY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
JANUARY 23, 2006--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
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__________
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri TOM HARKIN, Iowa
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CONRAD BURNS, Montana HARRY REID, Nevada
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire PATTY MURRAY, Washington
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
J. Keith Kennedy, Staff Director
Terrence E. Sauvain, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, and Related Agencies
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi TOM HARKIN, Iowa
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho HARRY REID, Nevada
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
TED STEVENS, Alaska PATTY MURRAY, Washington
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia (Ex
officio)
Professional Staff
Bettilou Taylor
Jim Sourwine
Mark Laisch
Sudip Shrikant Parikh
Candice Ngo
Lisa Bernhardt
Rachel Jones
Ellen Murray (Minority)
Erik Fatemi (Minority)
Adrienne Hallett (Minority)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement of Senator Arlen Specter....................... 1
Statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd.............................. 2
Statement of Senator Tom Harkin.................................. 5
Statement of Senator Mike DeWine................................. 7
Statement of Hon. David G. Dye, Acting Assistant Secretary, Mine
Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor.......... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Statement of Ray McKinney, Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and
Health, Mine Safety and Health Administation, Department of
Labor.......................................................... 11
Statement of Cecil E. Roberts, International President, United
Mine Workers of America, Fairfax, Virginia..................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Statement of Bennett K. Hatfield, President and CEO,
International Coal Group, Ashland, Kentucky.................... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Statement of Chris R. Hamilton, Senior Vice President, West
Virginia Coal Association, Charleston, West Virginia........... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Statement of Davitt McAteer, Vice President of Sponsored
Programs, Wheeling Jesuit University, Shepherdstown, West
Virginia....................................................... 38
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Statement of Bruce Watzman, Vice President, Safety and Health,
National Mining Association, Washington, DC.................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Prepared statement from the National Stone Sand & Gravel
Association.................................................... 63
Responses of David G. Dye to committee questions................. 65
Responses of Bennett K. Hatfield to committee questions.......... 78
Responses of Cecil E. Roberts to committee questions............. 80
SAGO MINE DISASTER AND AN OVERVIEW OF MINE SAFETY
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MONDAY, JANUARY 23, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education, and Related Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 11 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart
Senate Office Building, Senator Arlen Specter (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Specter, DeWine, Harkin, and Byrd.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER
Senator Specter. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The
Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services
and Education will now proceed with this hearing, which will
inquire into mine safety on coal mines.
This hearing is prompted by the disaster at the Sago Mine
on January 2. There have since been two more fatal accidents in
West Virginia. I thank the distinguished ranking member of the
full committee former president pro tempore Senator Byrd for
his requesting the hearing. This subcommittee has been active
on the investigation of mine disasters in the past, notably the
Quecreek, which occurred in Pennsylvania in the year 2002, and
there are very, very important questions on the issue on what
has happened at these mine incidents, focusing on Sago.
The Pittsburgh Post Gazette set the stage for our
consideration here in a very poignant statement as follows:
``The rest of the world will move on--in their reference to the
Sago Mine Accident. In the weeks and months to come, there will
be other disasters, other wars, other political scandals. But
for the families of the 12 men who died in the mine at
Tallmansville, West Virginia, for the one who survived and
their relatives and friends, for the investigator searching for
the cause of the mine explosion, for the people of these coal-
rich hills 100 miles south of Pittsburgh, Sago will be a daily
litany. Some questions about the January 2 accident may never
be answered, but there is understanding to be gained by
reconstructing what happened''.
We all know that mining is a very dangerous business. As I
noted a moment ago, two underground coal mine incidents this
January after the Sago disaster. On January 10, there was a
miner killed in Kentucky after a roof cave-in. On January 19,
two miners became trapped in the Aracoma Mine in Melville, West
Virginia. Both of them were fatalities. Last year, the safest
year on record, there were 22 fatalities in underground coal
mines in 20 separate accidents. Four deaths in my home State,
Pennsylvania, three in West Virginia, eight in Kentucky and
seven in other States.
The Sago Mine had some 208 citations, orders and safeguards
issued against it last year, 2005, with nearly half of these
violations categorized as ``significant and substantial''. The
budget for mine and health safety has increased by some 42
percent over the past 10 years, but these increases have barely
kept up with inflationary costs. This has forced the agency to
reduce staffing, we're told, by some 183 positions over that
period of time. Coal mine staffing has declined by 217
enforcement personel in the last 5 years. One of the grave
difficulties we have had in maintaining funding for mine safety
is the fact that the Department of Labor, which this committee
has jurisdiction over for appropriations purposes, is grouped
with the Department of Education and the Department of Health
and Human Services, and there are many demands on this
subcommittee. Senator Harkin, the distinguished ranking member,
Senator Byrd, and I, as well as others on this subcommittee
have advocated a more realistic budget through this
subcommittee, which has jurisdiction over worker safety,
jurisdiction over education and jurisdiction over healthcare.
We were underfunded in the last budget resolution, and then we
sustained a 1 percent across-the-board cut, and I've already
put the leadership on notice in the Senate that I'm not going
to support a budget resolution that does not adequately fund
this department next year or not adequately fund this
subcommittee next year. Of course, I hadn't anticipated the
Sago Mine Disaster, but we saw from Quecreek, and we've seen
from other disasters the importance of having adequate funding.
Now, let me yield at this time, it's always a difficult matter
whether to recognize the ranking member or the senior member,
but I've already had a note here from the generous ranking
member, Senator Harkin, asking or instructing that I recognize
Senator Byrd first. Senator Byrd, will you accept that
recognition?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I do. First, let me compliment
you, and Senator Harkin. Let me thank you and Senator Harkin
for the great work you do on this committee, and the great work
that you have done in the interest of safety and education and
other matters that come under the jurisdiction of this
committee. You have been very, very great and fine, generous,
considerate in this particular situation. Each of us has coal
mines in his or her State, and it is very important that the
people out there understand that this subcommittee is going to
do everything it can by way of funding and oversight to see
that the safety and health of coal miners are not underfunded
as they have been in the past. I'll get more into that. Shall I
do that right now?
Senator Specter. Please do, Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Fourteen men have
died in the coal fields of West Virginia, 14 men in the span of
3 weeks. These deaths, I believe, were entirely preventable,
and we owe the families of these deceased and noble, and great,
and brave men a hard look at what happened and why. I'm
striving to be measured in my statements. I have deep feelings
in this matter, but I'm going to try to be measured and careful
in my questions, but why was it that the Federal agency charged
with safety--the Federal agency charged with safety of this
country's miners, failed to protect them. Why was it? Well, let
me be clear.
I have no complaint with the brave rescuers who risked
their lives to try to save trapped miners, or with the rank and
file former miners who work for MSHA in the field. I wish every
American could know the total, the absolute total commitment of
these folks of these people and understand the dangers faced by
rescue teams, whether from secondary explosions like this one
at the Sago Mine in Upshur County, West Virginia or the extreme
heat of the raging underground fire at the Alma Mine in Logan
County, West Virginia. I'm talking today. Let me be clear. I'm
talking today about the leadership in MSHA's Washington office
have decisions to cut the mining health and safety enforcement
budget and staff, and abandon the critical mining regulations
endangered of the safety of these miners of Buckhannon and
Melville and Lord knows how many other communities in West
Virginia and across the country.
Federal and State investigators must explain what happened
at the Sago Mine and at the Alma Mine and whether those
tragedies could have been prevented. The Congress, however, has
a broader responsibility. We must try to determine what is
wrong at MSHA and contemplate how to make sure that the
leadership of that Agency does its job. Why did it take 2 hours
before MSHA was notified of the Sago Explosion and another 2
hours before MSHA personnel arrived at the scene? Why another
1.5 hours before rescue teams arrived and another 5 hours
before the first team entered the Sago Mine? The Mine Act
requires that rescue teams be readily available in the event of
an emergency, and yet, it took 11 hours, 11 hours before the
first team could even begin the rescue effort at Sago, 11 hours
in the darkness. Where was the help? Is help coming? Our lights
have gone out. It's dark. I can't see.
It took 11 hours before the first team could even begin the
rescue effort. Meanwhile, 12 coal miners, 12 at Sago, waited in
the dark. The horrors, can one imagine? Twelve miners at Sago
waited and waited and waited and waited in the dark 260 feet
below the surface armed only with a 1-hour breathing device, 1
hour of precious air, grossly inadequate for miners whom we
know may have to barricade themselves and possibly wait many
hours, even a day, even 2 days, even more for rescue. The
miners could not communicate with the teams involved in the
rescue effort underway, and the rescuers could not identify the
location of the miners. How sad.
Can you imagine the families of those miners waiting,
waiting, waiting? Why, in an age of technological marvels, was
the only apparent protection for these 12 souls trapped
underground a brattice cloth intended to divert toxic gases
from their barricade? Now, a short 2 weeks later, the Nation
watched as similar horrors emerged from a second tragedy at the
Alma Mine. Delayed notification to MSHA of 2.5 hours, no
ability to locate the lost miners and no means for any
survivors underground to communicate with rescue teams. Put
yourself in that situation, how horrible that is, unbelievable
in this age.
The administration's budgets have translated into 4-year
cuts in mine health and safety enforcement resources and
personnel. Let me say that again. It's worth saying. The
administration's budgets have translated into 4-year cuts in
mine health and safety enforcement resources and personnel.
This past week, or this past weekend, President Bush called my
house to talk with me on another matter and in passing noted of
the Alma Mine fire and asked if he could do anything. Here was
the President, President Bush, asking me if he, the President,
could do anything. I said, Yes. Stop cutting the coal health
and safety enforcement budget. We need more enforcement, not
less. We should be demanding a rapid response system in case of
a mine emergency. We should be demanding new communications
technology and emergency breathing equipment. We must look at
the safety and health regulations that MSHA has on the books as
well as those that have been discontinued. Those rules govern
everything from mine rescue teams to the use of belt entries
for ventilation. Let me say that again. Everything from mine
rescue teams those rules govern to the use of belt entries for
ventilation to inspection procedures, to emergency breathing
equipment, to escape routes and rescues and refuges, anyone of
which could figure into the disaster at the Sago and the Alma
mines. How about that?
What should be done about the pattern of violations that
existed at the Sago Mine, and how has MSHA employed its
statutory authority to pursue habitual violators? Fines may
have been levied, but the sheer number of violations suggests
that those penalties are failing to induce mine operators to
faithfully comply with the law. Mine safety demands aggressive
leadership.
The coal miners in my State, Senator Rockefeller and I
speak for them. The coal miners of my State have been doing
this kind of work for a long, long time. I should say here
again that Senator Rockefeller would have been here today at
this hearing, but he could not be because of personal matters,
important matters. Senator Rockefeller's heart is right at the
center, and he works and hopes and feels like a Senator should
whose coal miners are losing their lives. He has worked hard.
Mine safety, as I say, demands aggressive leadership. The
miners in my State are incredibly brave. Coal miners are a
different breed. I know. They will go into mines after a
disaster like this and risk their own lives to try to help
their buddies, try to find their comrades, their companions.
They are brave--brave, and so are their families. They know
there's danger there. All the time, they know it. Mine safety
demands, as I say, aggressive leadership, and these people are
very resourceful when confronted with an emergency. MSHA and
the Labor Department are filled with career professionals with
hundreds of years of accumulated experience in coal safety.
Given the resources of this Government and the statutory
authority of The Mine Act, most mining fatalities should be
preventable. We've come a long way, but we have more to do. The
Congress must not tolerate complacency about the health and
safety of the brave men and women who risk their lives to
provide energy, power to run these lights, which make it
possible for us here, the energy and power in time of peace and
in time of war. Profits should never come before protection for
the coal miners.
Did you hear me out there? Profits should never come before
the safety and welfare and wellbeing of the brave men and women
who go into the bowels of the earth and scratch the coal out,
sometimes with their hands, with water seeping from overhead
and with danger all around. Politics must never play a role in
the enforcement of safety and health regulations. We must not
allow the call for action in the wake of this tragedy to recede
without stiffening mine enforcement and emergency preparedness.
Senator Specter and Senator Harkin, I thank you again for
scheduling this hearing. I hope that this is the beginning of
an effort that will yield a worthy legacy for the Sago and Alma
miners and for other miners throughout West Virginia and
throughout the country. Thank you very much.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd. As
Senator Byrd has noted, Senator Rockefeller could not be here
today, he is out of town. Similarly, Senator Santorum could not
be here today because he is out of town, and I know both of
those Senators and doubtless others would have wanted to have
been here.
I might say, by one word of explanation, that the Senate is
not in session today although this room has been fully occupied
by the Alito hearing for many, many days, so the Judiciary
Committee members are here in any event as is Senator DeWine. I
want to yield now to my distinguished ranking member. We have a
custom of 5-minute opening statements, but the clock got stuck
when Senator Byrd was speaking. We'll give him a little more
latitude.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Specter. Senator Byrd has been in the Congress of
the United States since Harry Truman was President, elected to
the House in 1952 and the Senate in 1958, and it is quite a
record, so we have a little more latitude.
Senator Byrd. You have been very kind, Mr. Chairman, very
courteous as is characteristic of you. Thank you.
Senator Specter. You deserve it, Senator Byrd. Senator
Harkin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM HARKIN
Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
hosting this hearing. I especially want to thank Senator Byrd
for requesting this hearing. Over the years, I've listened to
Senator Byrd speak eloquently about the mining communities of
West Virginia. We heard it again here this morning. I know that
there is no greater advocate for the families of miners, no
more dedicated public servant for the people of West Virginia
than Senator Robert C. Byrd, so I thank him for requesting this
hearing, but also for the dedication that he has exhibited over
all his lifetime in fighting for miners not only in West
Virginia, but all over the country.
I know that he will continue to hold the folks of Congress
on this important matter, and for that we should all be
grateful. Although I'm far from the first, I offer my sincere
condolences to all the families of the fallen miners, the 12,
the 4 and the 2 on Saturday in the Logan County Fire. As the
son of a coal miner myself, your families remain in my thoughts
and prayers.
My father was born in 1886, started mining coal somewhere
around 1910, in Iowa. A lot of people don't know that there
were coal mines in Iowa. There used to be a coal mine capital.
There's still a lot of coal there, but that's soft coal. They
don't mine it any longer. A great coal mine leader, John L.
Lewis, many people think he came from Pennsylvania or West
Virginia. He actually came from Iowa.
That is where he was born and raised, and that's where he
mined coal, and that's where his brother mined coal all his
life in Iowa. So we had a lot of coal mines in those days. My
father mined coal for 23 years in a coal mine in Iowa. And a
lot of coal mines in Iowa. It wasn't till the depression hit
that he finally left the mines, but the mines never left him
because later in life, he had what we all called miner's lung.
We never called it black lung, never heard of that word before.
Black miner's lung, every miner had it.
Of course, it didn't help that he smoked all the time too,
but he had miner's lung, and that is what finally got him. I
can remember as a kid, listening to my father tell me stories
of working in the coal mines. Now, you're talking about the
teens, World War I and the 20s and going down in these shaft
mines a couple of hundred feet and going out in the laterals
and telling me about how dark it was and the cave-ins and the
miners that would get killed. Trying to get air down, they
would pump air down in these mines. He would describe it to me.
They would take these rickety old elevators down first thing in
the morning before the sun would come up. Sometimes he would
come back out of the mines after the sun went down. He never
saw the sun during the day. Twelve hours a day they worked down
in those mines and never see the sun.
Well, he was one of the lucky ones, but he told me, and I
used to see his friends as I was a kid growing up, some of the
old miners would come around, people from the old country, the
Italians, the Slovenes, the Welsh, the Irish, would all come
around, all the old miners, and they would tell their stories.
As a kid, I used to listen to these. They were frightening
stories. They all would tell the stories of their friends who
had died in the mines, and to me, it just painted a very
awesome portrait of what it meant to be a miner and how brave
these people were in what they did. Of course, that was before
any safety regulations or anything.
So, I come at this with that kind of a background, and I
wonder why it is--why it is--why it is over--after over a
hundred and some years of mining coal in this country, why do
we still have mining tragedies like this? Now, I know it's a
dangerous occupation. People make mistakes. It's a very
dangerous occupation, but still, accidents like these are
avoidable. Why--why don't we have, after all this time, better
coordinated risk procedures?
Now we have regulations for rescue procedures, but it seems
like they more often fall into the breach rather than the
letter. Why, after 208 violations in 2005, 95 of them, 40
percent were for serious and substantial violations at Sago,
why wasn't something done? Technology. Why? In 1969, the Bureau
of Mines, it's not called that anymore, promoted a handheld
system so miners could find their exact location, and they
could be found. That was used in Utah a couple of years ago in
a disaster.
I have a nephew of mine, my sister's boy, he's a miner,
goes down everyday in the mines, not coal mines, Trona Mine.
Soda Ash, Wyoming, deep mines, they go down a long way. He's
been mining there for over 20 some years in that Trona Mine.
He's on a rescue team. They have competitions to see how they
would set up. They don't have those kind of accidents. Why, in
a Soda Ash Mine in Wyoming, don't they have the kind of
accidents that we're talking about here? Why is it just coal
miners? Why is it just coal miners? Are they less valuable or
something? Is there something less valuable about coal?
As Senator Byrd eloquently said, that's what makes our
lights light. It makes my timer go down and says I'm overdue.
It seems to me that we do have other mines, and they operate
more safely, and they have better procedures. Why haven't we
done this? It seems to me, and I'll just end on this, Mr.
Chairman, it just seems to me that we have ignored this and
ignored it and ignored it and put it off and put it off. We've
cut the budgets. We don't have the safety procedures. We don't
have the handheld devices so that we can find a miner and his
exact location. That is possible. It can be done. It's not that
expensive. So why haven't we done it? These are the questions
that MSHA needs to answer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Harkin.
Senator DeWine.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE DE WINE
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
first, thank you very much for holding this hearing. Our
thoughts and prayers go out to the families of the miners who
have lost their lives, and we think about them this morning.
Miners are a courageous group of people. Mining is horribly
dangerous work. It takes a strong individual to endure the
physical as well as the mental toughness needed to work in this
industry. Everyday these miners put their lives on the line so
that we can have electricity, so we enter a room and flip on a
switch, the light does, in fact, come on. Coal plays such a
significant role as an energy supply for our Nation. Coal
generates more than half of the Nation's electricity. Eighty-
seven percent of my home State of Ohio is electric power, is
generated by coal. With a 250 to 300 year supply, coal is the
only fossil fuel this country has in great abundance. Coal is
part of this country's future.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, we simply have
to figure out how we can mine more safely than we do today.
Obviously, progress has been made, but we have to do better,
and these tragedies that this country has suffered, these
families have suffered, brings that home to us.
Mr. Chairman, I know our witnesses this morning who we're
going to hear in just a moment will help give us insight into
what we can do to see this vision move forward, and so I thank
you for holding this hearing. And also as a member of the full
Health Committee, I'll be working with Chairman Enzi when our
committee holds its future hearings as well. So again, Mr.
Chairman, I thank you for holding this very important hearing
today. I thank our witnesses. And again, my thoughts and
prayers remain with the families of the miners that have been
lost in the recent tragedies.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Senator DeWine. We
now move to our first panel. We have with us the Acting
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health, Mr.
David Dye, U.S. Department of Labor, bachelor's degree from
University of Texas at Austin and law degree from Franklin
Pierce Law Center in New Hampshire. Mr. Dye's accompanied by
Mr. Ray McKinney, Administrator of the Coal Mine Safety and
Health unit, Mr. Bob Friend, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Mine Safety and Health, no relation to the former Pittsburgh
pitcher, and Mr. Ed Clair, Associate Solicitor for Mine Safety
and Health.
We've allocated 8 minutes to Mr. Dye for a presentation,
which will be joined in by Mr. McKinney. Our standard practice
is to allocate 5 minutes for each witness. We have quite an
extensive hearing today with good representation on the panel,
especially for a day when the Senate is not in session. Thank
you for joining us, Mr. Dye, and we look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID G. DYE, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
ACCOMPANIED BY:
RAY McKINNEY, ADMINISTRATOR FOR COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
ROBERT M. FRIEND, ADMINISTRATOR FOR METAL AND NONMETAL MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
ED CLAIR, ASSOCIATE SOLICITOR, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Mr. Dye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, members of
the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before
you to discuss the work of the Mine Safety and Health
Administration and its performance related to the January 2
Sago Mine Explosion in Tallmansville, West Virginia.
My heart is especially heavy today as I appear before you
just days after the Aracoma Mine accident in Melville, West
Virginia, that claimed two lives. I would like to commend the
21 rescue teams involved in the Aracoma Mine rescue efforts
this weekend and the 13 mine rescue teams involved at Sago Mine
who put their own lives on the line in the quest to save their
fellow miners. Most of these brave rescuers are volunteers. All
of them willingly face danger and give generously of their time
and in constant training. We cannot thank them enough for their
help and their sacrifice; they are the embodiment of American
spirit, selflessness and courage.
PREPARED STATEMENT
All of us at MSHA deeply grieve the loss of these miners'
lives, and I want to assure the families and friends that we
are conducting uncompromising investigations of these
accidents. We will uncover the truth why both of those
tragedies happened and how we can better protect miners and
prevent tragedies such as these in the future. Mr. Chairman, my
colleague, Ray McKinney, will now give a short presentation on
the events following the explosion at Sago Mine.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David G. Dye
Mr. Chairman: Thank you for this opportunity to appear before the
Subcommittee to discuss the work of the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) and its performance at the January 2 Sago Mine
explosion in Tallmansville, Upsur County, West Virginia. We have only
preliminary information on the mine accident in Logan County, West
Virginia, but I will be happy to share what we know thus far with the
committee as well.
It is with the heaviest of hearts that every MSHA employee grieves
for the miners who died at the Sago mine and the loved ones who mourn
their passing.
MSHA's reason for being is to ensure that miners return home safe
and healthy to loved ones at the end of their shifts. That is our
mission and our focus, every day. That is our duty to America's miners
and the reason we are conducting the investigation with the greatest
care and diligence so we can uncover the full truth of why this tragedy
happened and how we can better protect miners in the future.
Although MSHA has significantly stepped-up enforcement in recent
years and dramatically reduced injury and fatality rates--mining
fatalities dropped 33 percent and total injuries dropped 25 percent
from Calendar Year (CY) 2000 to CY 2005--the Sago mine tragedy must
cause us to carefully assess MSHA's performance, as the Subcommittee is
doing today. From CY 2000 to CY 2005, the number of coal mine
fatalities dropped 42 percent and the number of coal mine injuries
dropped 22 percent, but that is cold comfort to the families of those
who are killed, or to miners who suffer injuries. So we can never let
up in improving mine safety, and we will not.
In addition to emphasizing increased enforcement of mine safety
laws, MSHA has promoted prevention and worked with the mining
community--operators, miners, state and local regulators, trade and
labor organizations, manufacturers, suppliers and others--to make
America's mines the safest in the world. Collaboration on safety
training, technical assistance, and education programs is essential and
has been productive in helping miners, supervisors and employers adopt
the safest and healthiest mining practices.
These efforts complement our strong enforcement regime and our
enforcement results from CY 2000 to CY 2005 are substantial:
--Total Citations and Orders issued by MSHA at all mines increased by
6 percent, from 120,050 to 127,682;
--Total Citations and Orders issued by MSHA at coal mines increased
by 18 percent, from 58,304 to 68,818; and
--Total ``Significant and Substantial'' Citations and Orders issued
at coal mines increased by 11 percent, from 23,994 to 26,779.
While enforcement went up, the number of coal mines fell. There
were 2,124 coal mines in 2000 and 1,982 in 2005 (through the third
quarter).
MSHA enforcement personnel have also significantly increased the
issuance of withdrawal orders that force coal mine operators who
exhibit an unwarrantable failure to comply with the regulations to shut
down areas or operations of the mine affected by the hazard.
Unwarrantable failure orders are one of the most severe enforcement
actions inspectors can take. And unwarrantable failure orders issued to
coal mine operators are up 35 percent over the last five years compared
to the previous five year period.
MSHA's increased enforcement has also resulted in increased
assessments--penalties imposed on mine operators for violating health
and safety standards or the Mine Act. From CY2001 to 2005, the number
of high-dollar final assessments imposed on all mine operators was 21
percent higher than during the period of 1996-2000. The total dollar
value was up by 16 percent during this same period of time. This
increase in high dollar assessments occurred while the total number of
mines decreased by 8 percent between 2000 and 2005. There is more
enforcement, more assessments and more scrutiny of mine operators than
ever before.
Under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, whether issued in a
citation or an order of withdrawal, each violation is assessed a
penalty (statutorily capped at $60,000) which must be assessed in
accordance with the law's six statutory criteria. The Administration
believes that the statutory cap is too low to deter repeat and
egregious violations of the Mine Safety and Health Act, and has urged
the Congress to increase the statutory cap from $60,000 to $220,000.
This would bring the Mine Act's civil monetary penalties in line with
those authorized by the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The
Administration again encourages Congress to act on this proposal to aid
MSHA in enforcing the Mine Act.
The statute itself provides for a graduated enforcement scheme that
provides for increasingly severe sanctions for increasingly serious
violations or an operator's unwarrantable failure to comply with a
mandatory standard. A chain of increasingly severe enforcement actions
causing all persons, except those necessary to eliminate the condition,
to be withdrawn from that area until the condition is abated, serves as
an incentive for operator compliance and is the statute's most powerful
instrument for enforcing mine safety.
In every link of the chain, a withdrawal order is limited by
statute to the area of the mine affected by the violation or unsafe
condition. In some instances, the area affected could be the entire
mine, or the area affected could be so critical or integral to the
operation of the mine that its closure effectively shuts down the mine
(for example, when the area affected includes the hoist used to move
personnel and material in and out of the mine, or a blocked escape
way). However, as soon as the operator corrects the cited condition and
an MSHA inspector terminates the order, the operator is free to re-
enter and resume mining work in that area. At the end of the graduated
chain of enforcement, even a relatively minor violation can trigger a
withdrawal order. A series of severe withdrawal orders affecting
critical areas of the mine can inflict a severe economic penalty on the
operator and could even lead to an operator ceasing operations.
However, the statute does not allow preemptive permanent closure of a
mine that has abated all violations.
MSHA enforcement personnel were vigilant in dealing with Anker
Mining, the operator of Sago mine until May of 2005 and International
Coal Group (ICG), the successor mine operator. As incidents increased
at the mine in 2005, so did the issuance of MSHA citations and
increasingly severe withdrawal orders, in accordance with the Mine Act.
The enforcement hours spent at the mine in 2005 demonstrate the
increased attention the mining operation received: MSHA spent 744 on-
site inspection hours in 2005 at the Sago mine, up by 84 percent over
the 405 hours spent during calendar year 2004. MSHA inspectors were at
the Sago Mine on 93 different days in 2005, and often more than one
inspector was at the mine. Inspectors issued 208 citations, orders, and
safeguards in 2005, including withdrawal orders that shut down areas of
the mine on 18 occasions. In addition, between April 27, 2005 and
December 15, 2005, MSHA managers and supervisors met with ICG officials
approximately 21 times.
MSHA was ramping up enforcement activity at this mine by issuing
these citations and insisting that the cited hazards be promptly
corrected. Each one of those citations represented a hazard that was
required to be eliminated within a fixed abatement time specified by
the inspector--and the inspector followed up to ensure the hazards were
indeed fixed. That meant extra inspector time in the mine, and
inspector time talking with mine operators, management and supervisors
to ensure that those hazards were indeed corrected. Sago Mine
management also received substantial engineering consulting services
from MSHA's Office of Technical Support on major issues at the mine
including water removal, roof control, dust control and other problems.
We were beginning to see positive results as the all-injury incidence
rate at this mine dropped from 55.8 in the 2nd Quarter to 8.3 in the
3rd Quarter.
While there were many problems at the Sago Mine, liberation of
large quantities of methane had not been among them. Methane is
explosive between 5-15 percent. At one percent, MSHA requires operators
to take action. At the Sago Mine, the highest readings never exceeded
two-tenths of one percent, which is one-twenty-fifth of the explosive
level. MSHA's routine monitoring of methane in the mine never warranted
a citation for excess accumulations of methane gas.
At this time, we have no information that would suggest that the
explosion was related to a recurrence of any of the conditions that
were required to be abated before the explosion. We will, of course,
aggressively pursue these and all other potential causes in our joint
accident investigation.
Until the joint investigation team can safely enter the mine to
thoroughly examine the site, we will not know the answers to these
questions.
It is a sense of duty, fellowship and a strong measure of heroism
that mine rescue teams took with them into the Sago Mine in the quest
to save their colleagues. Thirteen teams comprised of 109 dedicated
team members participated in the rescue and recovery operation, putting
their lives on the line for their fellow miners. Their bravery and
dedication are emblematic of the 314 mine rescue teams around the
country. It is noteworthy that the vast majority of rescue team members
are volunteers--good Samaritans in the highest American tradition. It
is extraordinarily courageous and generous to take on the
responsibility of such perilous rescue missions, knowing that heartache
may mark the end of the day. We cannot thank them enough for their help
and their sacrifice.
Some observers have raised concern that the Sago explosion occurred
at 6:30 a.m. and the first rescue team did not enter the mine until
5:25 p.m. The delay was out of concern for these rescuers' lives. MSHA
and the mining community have a history of hard-learned lessons on the
peril of rushing into mine accident scenes.
Those lessons were at the cost of the lives of rescuers who went
into mines too quickly and died in rescue attempts. As recently as
2001, 12 miners in Alabama attempted to rescue a miner gravely injured
after an explosion. Those miners were killed by a secondary explosion.
In 1976, 26 miners lost their lives in mine explosions in Overfork,
Kentucky. Fifteen miners were killed in the first explosion and 11
miners died in a second explosion, including 3 Federal coal mine
inspectors.
At 5:25 p.m. at the Sago Mine, the carbon monoxide and methane
readings finally started trending downward to a level where MSHA, West
Virginia's state mine regulators and the Robinson Run No. 95 rescue
team felt we could take a carefully managed and calculated risk
allowing rescue teams to enter the mine.
Mr. Chairman, we at MSHA are determined to find out how this
tragedy occurred. While I cannot comment on substantive aspects of the
accident investigation, I can promise you that it will be thorough and
meticulous. The investigation will examine the circumstances of the
accident, the circumstances of the rescue efforts, and every other
germane piece of information. All of the data and information collected
will be carefully scrutinized and analyzed, and a thorough report
prepared and made available to the public. We will finish this
investigation as soon as possible, consistent with the need for
accuracy, and we will promptly take any action indicated by the
investigation's results to improve safety and health in America's
mines.
As standard operating procedure, MSHA also conducts an internal
review after every major accident. We will carefully examine whether
MSHA followed its own policies and procedures with respect to the
accident, including the enforcement activities preceding the accident.
This report will be provided to the committee and made public on our
web site. We view this internal review process as an opportunity to
take a hard and honest look at how we do our job and use that
information to improve our performance on behalf of America's miners.
Miner health and safety is our bottom line and our only priority.
Thank you.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Dye. Mr. McKinney.
STATEMENT OF RAY MCKINNEY
Mr. McKinney. Thank you. This is a very brief presentation,
and if you would draw your attention to the power point
projector on the right. This is the service area of the Sago
Mine that depicts the drift portals and the surface structures.
To the right of those portals, you'll see an earthen embankment
and that's where the mine offices were located when we set up
the command centers. The Sago Mine was about 2.5 miles deep,
and the mining height was 5 to 6 feet.
This is an overview of the mine map. The mine has two
working sections where miners travel each day to produce coal.
Those working sections are the First Left and Second Left.
There are extensive shelter areas in the mine. Those are areas
that active workings are barricaded and built with proof seals
to isolate them from active workers where miners are. Those
sealed areas are identified in red in the lower part a little
bit farther up, and the most recently sealed area was 3 Left,
just in by 2 Left.
The red line indicates the route of travel for the miners
to the two active sections each day. On January 2, 2006, the
mine was examined by company mine examiners and deemed safe to
operate in the interim. Miners went--began to enter the mine at
approximately 6 a.m. At approximately 6:30 a.m., an explosion
occurred underground. All of the miners exited the mine except
for the 12 miners that had traveled toward the 2 Left section.
The mine examiner, who remained underground, was traveling from
1 Left to 2 Left. So, we had 13 miners unaccounted for.
An initial rescue attempt by mine management failed when
they encountered heavy smoke and excessive concentrations of
carbon monoxide in the 2 Left section. MSHA was notified at
8:30 a.m. in the morning by telephone, and we responded,
mobilized our force and were on the ground at 10:30 a.m. at the
mine. When we got there, the air exiting the mine portals
contained in excess of 500 parts per million of carbon monoxide
and indications of methane gas. Carbon monoxide is an indicator
of a fire or heat. Methane gas, of course, is inherent to
mining explosions, and is explosive when it constitutes between
5 to 15 percent of the air in a mine. The carbon monoxide was
trending upward, which meant we had indications of a potential
fire underground. By noon, the level had reached 2,600 parts
per million.
Also at noon, we had to remove people from the mine offices
due to the high and elevated levels of carbon monoxide (CO). It
was not safe to enter the mine until the CO, or the carbon
monoxide level, showed signs of trending downward and
stabilizing. We have a rich history of second explosions after
an initial explosion. In 2001, we had the Jim Walters event
where 12 miners were trying to rescue a fallen miner after a
first explosion. All were fatally injured during the second
explosion. In 1976, at the Scotia Mine, 15 miners were killed
in an initial explosion. During the second explosion, another
group was going in, and 11 miners lost their life.
It's a very serious situation when you send people
underground after an initial mine explosion. You have to know
you're doing the right thing. Air ventilation is generally
destroyed after the first explosion. Methane gas has an
opportunity to build quickly, and you have indications of fire.
The expansion of gases creates hot spots or fires in the coal
mine. At 5:25 p.m., the levels had dropped to the point that
the teams were sent underground. This was not an ideal
situation. This was a calculated risk when we sent those teams
underground, and we made contingency plans that if the CO
continued to rise again, we would evacuate the mine.
The teams explored the mine for the next 24 hours,
encountering water accumulations, destroyed ventilation
controls and electrical power sources and circuits. The teams
had to methodically explore the mine keeping attention on the
air entry return side to make sure what the CO concentrations
were leveling out to, and also looking for potential fires. It
was important also to look on the intake air entry side in case
there was a fallen miner who had tried to exit the mine.
At 4:21 p.m. on January 3, the teams had advanced to the
58th crosscut. That is the area just out by the intersection of
2 Left, the number 4 belt entry. At that point in time, we had
not explored the 2 Left section. We'd found the seals blown out
in the 3 Left section, which was the one that was most recently
sealed. We had not explored that area but we decided, given the
time frame, that we needed to extend ourselves on into 2 Left.
The teams began to travel toward the 2 Left faces and found
the section mantrap at number 10 block. We also found evidence
that indicated the miners had donned their self rescue devices.
We asked the teams to advance on into the faces of 2 Left,
which is a distance of approximately 2,000 feet, looking for
the miners. We rarely ever go more than 1,000 feet with the
mine rescue team, we move our fresh air up to those people and
allow them to move on. If we have a problem beyond that, it's
very difficult to get the team back to the fresh air base, but
the teams worked with us in order to advance themselves 2,000
feet.
The miners were located in number 3 entry face area, and
the first report came at 11:46 p.m. that all 12 miners were
alive. At 12:30 a.m., about 45 minutes later, a second report
came out. It was changed that there was 1 miner alive and 11
miners who were deceased. We continued to work underground, and
we brought the surviving miner out at 1 a.m. and rendered
medical attention to him, and he was transported to the
hospital.
We asked the teams to work under oxygen and continue to
pick up the other miners and bring them to the surface. It was
a long, arduous task through the night. At 9:55 a.m. the next
morning, all the miners were extracted from the mine, and that
ended the recovery operation.
There's been some question about the communication issues
underground. As the honorable Senator said, mine rescue team
members are to be honored and their work and their bravery.
These teams stretched themselves and pushed the envelope by
going in excess of the normal distance in order to try to save
life. If you look at this particular slide, you'll see that our
communication systems, and these were handheld radios. Normally
your sound-powered systems from the mine rescue only go 1,000
feet, so we had to use handheld radios. They work well in the
line of sight. They don't work well around 90-degree turns, so
we had one set up near the face, one at number 9 crosscut, one
at number 58 crosscut and then one at--I'm sorry, one at number
59 crosscut and one at number 58 crosscut. This information has
been transferred at least five times, and at least in the first
four, it has been done through a mine rescue apparatus face
piece with a speaking diaphragm. So I think that it's
understandable that those people were doing everything they
can, and you create situations for communication when you
stretch out that far. Thank you.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. McKinney. We'll now start
5-minute rounds for each of the senators on the panel, and I
would like everybody to stay within the time limits. We can go
to a second round if necessary, and I will stay within the
limit myself.
Mr. McKinney starting with you, there was a report that 11
of the miners had been reported alive, 12 miners reported
alive, and it was especially cruel and to then find out that it
was wrong, that they had died. Was there any way that report,
false report, could have been avoided to save so much pain and
suffering?
Mr. McKinney. I think it is sad, and I think it saddened
all of us. There was a lot of people who felt very good for a
short period of time and then were deeply saddened by that
loss.
Senator Specter. Could it have been prevented?
Mr. McKinney. As I said earlier, those communications were
coming from the underground. They were relayed several times
before they reached the surface. We always ask repeat that, and
you get a response back what you have, but by the time it
reaches the surface, you have to go back through six people
again, and I think that's exactly what happened.
Senator Specter. Let me move on to another question because
of limited time. The Sago Mine had 208 citations in the year
2005. Was any of those citations a causative factor in this
disaster? Any of the facts uncovered in the citations a
causative factor for this disaster?
Mr. McKinney. I think we're still investigating the
disaster itself, and that will be determined by the
investigation team if there's anything there we saw through the
course of those inspections.
Senator Specter. Is it a possibility that one or more of
these violations might have been the cause of the disaster?
Mr. McKinney. All of those 208 violations had been abated
and corrected. The only outstanding violations that we had, had
to do with roof conditions and tunnel liners being cushioned,
and things of that nature. The other conditions had been
corrected.
Senator Specter. I noted that these 208 citations resulted
in fines of slightly in excess of $27,000. Was that
sufficiently tough punishment for so many citations, Mr. Dye?
Mr. Dye. Nine of the most serious violations have been
appealed. Those that haven't been assessed yet could double or
triple the amount already assessed.
Senator Specter. Was the $27,000 in fines sufficient for
those which hadn't been subject to appeal?
Mr. Dye. Those assessments are determined through a formula
under our guidelines.
Senator Specter. We're going to take a close look at that,
and I would like to have your one-by-one itemization of all of
these violations specifying exactly what was involved and what
penalty was imposed so this subcommittee can make an
evaluation.
Mr. Dye. We will supply that for the record.
[Furnished as questions for the record.]
Senator Specter. Pardon me for moving on, but there's very
little time, and we want to pinpoint the questions and the
answers. Your unit had its funding reduced by $2,800,000 by
virtue of a 1 percent across-the-board cut. Had the allocation
remained without the 1 percent cut that this subcommittee had
put into effect, we would have met the budget request for the
administration. But with the 1 percent cut, there was that
reduction of $2,800,000, and I note that you've lost 183
positions as a result of budget insufficiency. Was that cut
causative of the reductions in personnel, and were the
reductions in personnel a causative factor in the Sago Mine
tragedy?
Mr. Dye. Please allow me to answer the last question first.
No, I don't think so. We have dealt with rescissions for
several years in a row. Our strategy has been, where we have
had to reduce personnel, to try to reduce them in
administrative and support positions, to try to reorganize in a
way that maximizes our ability to keep our enforcement
personnel out there. In fact, the Congress directed us to do
that, and we have tried to manage them that way.
Senator Specter. We would like a specification of what you
would have done with the additional $2,800,000 had you been
allocated that, and we would also like a written followup as to
what were these 183 positions which you had to cut and what the
impact has been on those cuts in terms of what your ability is
to improvise mine safety.
In the 16 seconds left, I have a final question for you. I
note that you have stated your intention to hold a hearing. Why
the delay? These hearings are very important. That is why we
responded to Senator Byrd, January 2 incident. We're still in
January, and this requirement that the witnesses be interviewed
in the presence of company coal officials, if true, why? Isn't
there a likelihood that they would be able to be in a position
to give more candid testimony if they weren't interviewed in
the presence of the company officials?
Mr. Dye. My understanding is under the Mine Act, the
company can be present; miner representatives can be present
also. It is important to get interviews if you can before you
have a public hearing. You do get more candid interviews that
way.
Senator Specter. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Harkin. Why did it take 2 hours for MSHA to be notified
by the Sago explosion?
Mr. Dye. We don't have that answer yet. That's one of the
things--you mean by the company, sir? That is one of the things
we're going to be investigating.
Senator Byrd. How long do you think it's going to take to
find out the answer to that question?
Mr. Dye. The investigation team is in the process of
interviewing witnesses. That is a rather thorough process. That
should be accomplished in a matter of a few weeks, and then
there will be a hearing. As soon as our investigation teams can
enter the mine, they'll need to go into the mine and do all
their forensic work. Then after that, they'll have to write a
report. It's a very careful, thorough process, and we will get
that report out and make it public to this committee, to the
public generally just as soon as possible, Senator. I promise
you that.
Senator Byrd. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think you should know
the answer now. That would be the first question, why did it
take 2 hours for MSHA to be notified, 2 hours. Then why did it
take 6 hours for rescue teams to arrive? Why is a rapid
notification and response system not available? Should that
mine have been closed with all of those citations? All of the
breaking and wearing down, and tearing down and easing the
regulations, why?
Mr. Dye. Please allow me to answer the last question first,
Senator. The Mine Act has substantial penalties and more
importantly, and people don't always recognize this, it has the
authority to close areas of the mine that are affected by
violations. We did that 18 times until each of those violations
were abated. As Ray mentioned, there were a couple of
violations that were outstanding at the time, that were in the
process of being abated, but The Mine Act does not contain a
provision that allows preemptive closure of a mine for
accumulated bad acts or a permanent closure.
Senator Byrd. Let me cut right to the chase. Do you think
that there's too much cronyism in situations of this kind? Do
you think that the regulations and penalties are too soft?
Should there be--I wonder if the enforcement procedures are
enforced without fear and without favor. Is there a cronyism?
Is there a possibility that cronyism develops between the
industry and the Federal agencies that has jurisdiction over
the safety of these people?
Mr. Dye. Well, there certainly isn't any cronyism between
me and anyone. I'm not aware----
Senator Byrd. Will you say that again?
Mr. Dye. There's no cronyism between me and anyone in the
industry. With respect to the agency itself, particularly our
coal mine division, I would note that our inspectorate have to
have 5 years' experience in the industry. They're all miners,
sir. They come from mining families. They come from mining
communities. They have a fire in their belly to protect miners,
and they go out and do that. I encourage them to do that fully.
Senator Byrd. I have no quarrel with that.
Mr. Dye. Yes sir.
Senator Byrd. We know those people are brave and
courageous.
Mr. Dye. Yes, they are.
Senator Byrd. But what I'm asking is, is there too much
opportunity here for cronyism? I wonder if the regulations are
being enforced without fear or favor, and the fines aren't
being levied. Are they heavy enough? They don't seem to be. Too
often, industry just seems to pay the fines and go right ahead
and keep doing the wrongs. What do we have to do to fix that?
That seems, in part, to have been the case here.
Mr. Dye. The administration has sent to the Senate and will
to the House, when it reconvenes, a proposel to raise the
penalties for flagrant violations to $220,000.
Senator Byrd. Is that just a tap on the wrist?
Mr. Dye. No, I think that's substantial. The other thing I
would like to mention is with respect to withdrawal orders and
closing down sections of the mine. That can be a very, very
powerful tool. In my opinion, even more powerful than citations
because if you close down a production area until the hazard is
abated, that can cost a company anywhere from $50,000 to
$150,000 in lost revenues for a single shift. So we did that 18
times, and that is a way that you can get the attention of an
operator very quickly.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, my time is about up, maybe
overdone. Thank you.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd. Senator
Harkin.
Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dye, in
December 2002, you were the deputy at that time, I believe.
Mr. Dye. No, I wasn't.
Senator Harkin. You weren't then?
Mr. Dye. No, I was a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the
Employment and Training Administration at that time.
Senator Harkin. When did you come to MSHA then?
Mr. Dye. In May 2004.
Senator Harkin. In December 2002, MSHA withdrew a proposed
regulation meant to encourage mine companies to host mine
safety teams on site. It was a proposed regulation, not 2 hours
away, but on site. It was withdrawn, I think, by Mr. Lauriski,
David Lauriski, with the statement that MSHA ``plans to
evaluate non-regulatory alternatives''. That was 3 years ago.
What did you come up with?
Mr. Dye. I would defer to Mr. Clair if you don't mind
because he was there at that time. My understanding of that
proposal centered around the idea that you would rebate some
fines and give that money to the companies to encourage them to
have mine rescue teams. I think that after some thought, pretty
much everybody thought that that wasn't a good idea because
that would undercut the value of the fines for enforcement
purposes.
Mr. Clair. Senator, I would only add to what Mr. Dye has
said that that proposal was something that the agency had under
consideration. I do not believe it had been formally proposed.
It was a work in progress, and the theory behind it had
substantial problems to it. It looked to economic incentives to
mine operators that essentially were funded out of civil
penalties, and that is a serious legal problem. There were also
difficulties when you streamline an existing standard like mine
rescue standard that is quite complex and comprehensive. If you
streamline that, there's a potential for reducing protections
that already exist.
Senator Harkin. There was also an advance notice of
proposed rule making in 1997 that was issued to improve the
oxygen devices worn by miners like the ones at Sago. The self-
contained rescue devices, as we know, provide an hour of
oxygen, they were required in 1981, 12 years after they were
invented, that every miner must be equipped with one. This
regulation was dropped from the agenda in December 2001. The
regulation would have addressed the manufactured quality of the
devices, the training of miners on its use. There's one other
part of that regulation, that my staff showed me that was very
interesting.
The regulation, the proposed regulation, would have
addressed the need for updated technology including personal
emergency devices, underground text messages devices. Why was
that dropped in 2001?
Mr. Dye. Well, getting back to 1997 is really getting
backed----
Senator Harkin. It was dropped in 2001.
Mr. Dye. Yes.
Senator Harkin. December 2001.
Mr. Dye. Yes.
Senator Harkin. Why was it dropped? Do you even know? If
you don't know----
Mr. Dye. Well, with respect to the self-contained rescuers,
there was a question about the service life of those devices,
and I'm told that it simply was not evidence that the
manufacturer service life should be reduced.
Senator Harkin. Say that again.
Mr. Dye. It concerned the recommended service life of those
devices. In other words, how long you should keep them or could
keep them for--before you use them.
Senator Harkin. The reason I brought up--brought it up, the
other part of it, in 1998, there was a mine fire at the Willow
Creek Mine in Helper, Utah. Personal emergency devices--which
is in that proposed regulations, instantly and wirelessly
received emergency message broadcast to each miner on the
screen. Forty-five miners used that to escape the fire. Seven
years later, only 17 mines in the United States utilized this
technology. Why?
Mr. Dye. Well, I talked to my tech support folks about
that, and there are, as you said, some mines that use it. Some
of them, candidly, are enthusiastic about it. Some of them have
had a number of problems, including reliability issues. That
is, I believe, a one-way communication device. We're looking to
see if that can be made into a two-way communications device,
which would be much more useful.
Senator Harkin. Well I just wanted to read here, here's 12/
01. MSHA's withdrawing this entry from the agenda in light of
resource constraints, and changing safety and health regulatory
priorities. Resource constraints, you know what that means, we
know what that means.
Senator Byrd. That's money.
Senator Harkin. I don't know what changing health and
safety regulatory priorities mean, priorities. Well it seems to
me again I harp on this, because there is technology out there
that can be used. My time has run out too, but I want to get
back to that Mr. McKinney, you talked about not getting around
the corner. There's easy simple technology to take care of
that, very simple easy technology. I realize what they had
couldn't get around the corners, it's line of sight. But, that
can be changed in a matter of minutes with technology.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Specter. Senator Harkin, did you say you wanted to
get back to that, if you want a few more minutes?
Senator Harkin. No, that's okay.
Senator Specter. Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Dye, let me kind of follow-up on what
Senator Harkin was asking you, and what some of the other of my
colleagues have been asking you, I'm not sure I quite
understand your procedure that you're going to follow in order
to conduct the investigation, and then come forward with
recommendations. Where are you going to go from here? What is
the time line, how long is the investigation do you think it's
going to take? So, you can tell us what happened, and then when
are you going to come forward with recommendations, and what's
the process that you're going through in regard to how you're
going to come forward with those recommendations, because
that's frankly what we're interested in.
What we're interested in, is where do we go from here? That
is what Senator Harkin was getting at. He's talking about the
technology that could be utilized. We've all read different
experts talking about the technology that could be used. We're
kind of interested in what you have to say about it.
Mr. Dye. Well with respect to the investigation, first of
all----
Senator DeWine. Well yes, and then where are you going to
go from there? Because that is the bottom line, is making it
safer for coal miners. Obviously, that's what we're all
interested in. That's what you're interested in.
Mr. Dye. Absolutely sir.
Senator DeWine. That's what everybody's interested in.
Mr. Dye. Yes sir. We appoint an investigative team in these
kinds of matters that is independent. The Lead Investigator
designs the investigation; they have to be custom designed
because there's a lot of issues. One of the first is, they have
to get in and look at the accident scene. They couldn't do that
for a long period of time, because they had to clear out a lot
of water and gas out of the mine. We still have mine rescue
teams.
Senator DeWine. I only have a couple of minutes. What's the
timing on that?
Mr. Dye. At the same time, the investigative team has to
interview witnesses. However many they have to do, and they can
do about three a day, because they're fairly extensive, and
when they've interviewed all of those, and they have that
information, they will hold a public hearing, in which they're
in the process of planning now. Then they will write a report,
and that will all be done as rapidly as possible. But because
we don't know the conditions in the mine, and how much time
they're going to have to spend in there, it's hard for me to
give you hard time line, Senator.
Senator DeWine. Then what's the process for your
recommendations, the administrations recommendations about how
we move forward?
Mr. Dye. This is an accident investigation, so the
recommendations will be specific to that situation. By the way,
we also do an internal investigation to see if we followed our
own procedures. Then from that separate inquiry, if we didn't
follow our own procedures, or there's ways to optimize them,
the internal review team will also write a report. We will
adopt those recommendations fairly quickly.
In the case of the Jim Walters accident in 2001, the Agency
adopted an emergency regulation very quickly. I want to add
with respect generally to mine rescue, we are in the process of
publishing, and have put up on our website today, a request for
information in the Federal Register.
What we're seeking is information from individuals all over
the country, or all over the world for that matter, on mine
rescue technologies. These are emerging technologies, new
things that are popping up all the time. So, we would like to
take a snapshot of what's available now, look at it, evaluate
it, and see what is out there.
Senator DeWine. What is you time line on that? That's good.
Mr. Dye. I believe that is a 60 day comment period going to
March, and then our technical folks will have to evaluate all
of the comments, and that depends on the volume, and other
things.
One thing about these technologies, you can't use off the
shelf technologies. Any electrically powered device, including
a battery device, has the potential to cause an explosion in a
gassy mine. So they'll have to be virtually redesigned, so they
won't do that. It is an expensive process, and manufactures
have to be willing to do that. I couldn't take my cell phone,
or a camera, or an MP3 player, or anything like that into a
gassy mine. That would not be permissible, because those things
have not been designed so that they would not create a spark.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Dye, my time is about up. I appreciate
your comments. I think what you're hearing from this panel, at
least you're hearing from this Senator, is that my constituents
expect out of this tragedy something positive to come. And what
the positive is, is something specific, and specifics, and the
specifics lead to better mine safety, and that's what we look
to you to come forward with.
To get back to what Senator Specter was talking about, if
we're talking about additional money, we expect you to come
forward and tell us that. We want to know how that lines up
with the dollars and cents.
Mr. Dye. Yes, I can tell you that there will be additional
funding for safety technology--mine safety technology in the
President's 2007 budget.
Senator DeWine. I thank you, my time is up. Thank you.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Senator DeWine. Thank you Mr.
Dye, Mr. McKinney, Mr. Friend, and Mr. Clair. Mr. Dye and Mr.
McKinney, I'm advised that you would like to leave. Your
presence will be required here for at least 1 more hour while
we move ahead with the next panel. Questions may arise, and we
want you here to answer the questions; we've assembled four
Senators who may need your responses.
Mr. Dye. Senator, we've still got a mine fire going. We
have a rescue team that's in the Sago Mine. We have another
mine fire, in which no one was hurt, burning in Colorado. We
have really urgent matters that we need to go back to and
attend. We have been diverted by dealing with these matters. We
were happy to prepare for the hearing, but we really need to
get back, and attend to all of this. There are 15,000 mines in
the United States, and we've got some really pressing matters.
Senator Specter. Well Mr. Dye, I can understand the press
of your other business. It may well be that some of the
Senators here have other pressing matters too, it may well be.
We're looking at the Alito hearings tomorrow in the Judiciary
Committee, a matter of enormous importance. Senator DeWine and
I have to be there. We're looking at the proceedings under the
PATRIOT Act, which expire on February 3, which we have to come
to a conclusion on. We're preparing for hearings on the
National Security Administration, NSA, about potential excesses
in power on the part of the President. We're in the final
stages of preparing immigration legislation, which is an 11
million person problem for this country. We're about to go to
the floor for the Asbestos Reform Act, and I think Senator
Byrd, and Senator Harkin, and Senator DeWine have other
matters. So, we don't think we're imposing too much to keep you
here for another hour.
If you told me your hearings were going to start tomorrow,
or there was some pressing business, we'd say you don't have to
be here, but that's the committee's request. You're not under
subpoena.
We'll now move on to the next panel. Mr. Cecil Roberts, Mr.
Ben Hatfield, Mr. Chris Hamilton, Mr. Davitt McAteer, and Mr.
Bruce Watzman. Our first witness on this panel is Mr. Cecil
Roberts, the International President of the United Mine Workers
of America. Mr. Roberts is a sixth generation coal miner. Both
of his grandfathers were killed in mines before he was born.
He's a graduate of West Virginia Technical College, where he
also received an Honorary Doctorate in Humanities.
Mr. Roberts, you come to this hearing as a distinguished
President of the United Mine Workers of America, and going back
six generations is very impressive.
Mr. Roberts. Thank you sir.
Senator Specter. I have a little trouble going back two
generations. I only knew one of my four grandparents. So, you
have quite a lot of longevity. As announced earlier, the
allocation of time is 5 minutes per witness, and we'll begin
with you Mr. Roberts.
STATEMENT OF CECIL E. ROBERTS, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT,
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, FAIRFAX,
VIRGINIA
Mr. Roberts. Well first of all Senator, thank you for
agreeing to have this hearing, and your long years of service,
and dedication to coal miners in this country, and there are
two other very distinguished Senators I've had the opportunity
to work with, and of course the person who lead the fight for
coal mine health and safety legislation in 1969. My senior
Senator from West Virginia, I've worked with Senator Harkin,
and I've had the pleasure of working with Senator DeWine, too.
First, I think it would be appropriate, and I will say it
for all of us, that our hearts go out to the families, not only
of Sago Mine, but most recently the terrible tragedy that
occurred, and ended over the weekend in Logan County, West
Virginia.
In my prepared remarks, we never mentioned the situation in
Logan, because we did not know at the time that you had
requested us to get this information to you, the unfortunate
outcome of that tragedy. Let me say that I'm probably going to
take a different approach to this as I think that you might
expect to represent the coal miners in this country as to what
I think needs to be done, and what should've been done, and
what is the possibilities for the Congress to do here.
First of all, everyone is now for oxygen being available
throughout the coal mine. Well, we've known for many, many
years that this was a necessity. I'm not talking about the
United Mine Workers when I say we. I would suggest to you that
any expert in this industry, if you had asked them yesterday, 1
year ago, 2 years ago, 6 years ago, they would've said to you,
if you want to give coal miners the best opportunity for
survival, then you provide oxygen in the working places of that
coal mine, and you provide it throughout the coal mine.
Now the question is not only should we do this, and require
it, and should Congress act, and give a mandate of some type
that that be done. I think it is appropriate for the question
to be asked, why is it as we come here today, that that has
never been done? The question was asked previously here, could
these tragedies be prevented? That's one question. There is
another question that should be asked and posed here, what is
the best opportunity for a coal miner to survive, if and when
tragically this occurs again? It's a relatively simple question
when it comes to oxygen. If I told everyone we're going to cut
off the oxygen to this room right here, and it's going to
disappear, there will be no more oxygen, but we're going to
take a vote here today, if we want 1 hour of oxygen available
to us, or 2 hours, I know what the vote would be.
Second of all, when I started working in the coal mines in
1971, we had a telephone line running to the outside. This was
30 some years ago, to the face. Today if you go in a coal mine,
that is what you find in most instances, one telephone line
from the surface to the working sections of the mine, now there
is some things that could be done, and we've been contacted by
the way, by the Pentagon, they don't know if they have the
expertise, or the technology to solve this problem for us. But,
they took the initiative to phone United Mine Workers, and
suggest that we should be talking to them, and we would urge
the Senate, this committee, to do that.
There's other things we could do. We could put that
portable hand held device that we were talking about the Mine
Rescue Team's using. It is only good for 1,000 feet, but for a
very minimal cost, I should report to this Committee we could
do that. If we could communicate with miners on the wrong side
of these disasters, they would know what their best opportunity
for survival might happen to be. There's two things we do know,
and I don't believe there will be any disagreement amongst
anyone on this panel. Had the miners at Sago had more oxygen,
and had they had the ability to communicate with the outside,
their lives could have possibly been saved. But we do know one
thing, it would certainly have given them the best opportunity.
This issue of mine rescue teams, I must admit to this panel
today, and I don't want to appear to be too frustrated, and too
angry here, but I am. We have known for years that we need
additional mine rescue teams in this country, and the problem
isn't getting better, it's getting worse. Because, as people my
age retire from this industry, who have life long experience as
mine rescue team members, then I submit to you, we're losing
those experienced mine rescue team members. We've known this
for many years, but we have not corrected this problem.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Let me submit one final comment, and I realize that this
may be getting into an area that may offend some people, but in
1969 Mr. Chairman, Congress decided this industry was incapable
of policing itself, and established MSHA as an independent body
to protect the coal miners of the United States of America. In
2001, we put the coal industry in charge of this Agency, and we
have submitted 17 rules that were withdrawn, in 2001 or later,
that would have protected coal miners in the United States of
America, and there are other issues that we could raise with
you today, but I realize my time is up, but I did not want to
leave here with that on my heart, and on my mind. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cecil E. Roberts
I thank you for this opportunity to appear before Congress. I only
regret that I have come to speak on the heels of the terrible tragedy
that befell the Sago miners. Our hearts and our prayers go out to the
miners' families, their loved ones and their communities. We also wish
to extend our deep appreciation for the mine rescue teams that
participated in the Sago Mine rescue efforts, and to the Federal and
State inspectors and UMWA safety committee members who travel and
inspect the mines regularly, working tirelessly to protect the nation's
miners.
Today I will be reviewing how current mine safety laws came into
being; problems with the enforcement of the current laws and
regulations and how those deficiencies have contributed to make coal
mining one of the most dangerous industries in the nation; how we have
the knowledge and ability to substantially improve miners' health and
safety; and what Congress can do to help improve miners' health and
safety.
For 116 years, the UMWA has been unwavering in its efforts to
enhance miners' health and safety.
However, too often remedial activity follows only after another
tragedy has focused our nation's attention: in 1968, 78 deaths at
Farmington, West Virginia lead directly and quickly to passage of the
Coal Act in 1969; it was then expanded to other mining industries and
re-named the Mine Act in 1977. Since the Coal Act was passed,
fatalities in coal mining have decreased dramatically: while over 300
miners died in 1968, the year before the Coal Act was enacted, fewer
than 100 miners have perished in any single year over the last 20
years, since 1985. While increased mechanization has meant fewer miners
are engaged in coal mining, the fatality rate has also dropped
significantly. This is commendable; but we can and must do much better.
Mining remains the second-most dangerous industry in this country.
This nation possesses the knowledge and ability to substantially
improve miners' health and safety, and to reduce the fatality rate. We
can direct some of the national attention generated by the Sago tragedy
to enhance health and safety conditions for all coal miners today, and
the generations to follow.
Unfortunately, what happened at Sago did not really surprise me.
Indeed, the underground coal industry has experienced tragedies, as
well as near tragedies, on a recurring basis. In just the last few
years the underground coal industry experienced these large-scale,
well-publicized, events:
Jim Walters Resources #5 mine explosions; 13 fatalities.--There was
a terrible series of events on the evening of September 23, 2001, two
short weeks after 9/11. What happened there eerily echoed the Twin
Towers' experience inasmuch as numerous rescuers also perished at this
Alabama mine. In fact, 12 miners lost their lives in a second explosion
while trying to rescue a miner who had been immobilized by an explosion
that had happened nearly an hour earlier. Communication problems
contributed to the deaths of the 12 rescuers; we believe the rescuers
were given insufficient and faulty information about the underground
conditions, and attempted the rescue without knowing the hazards they
faced.
Quecreek.--In July 2002, 9 miners were trapped by a water
inundation in a Pennsylvania mine, after 9 others were able to escape.
The trapped miners were rescued 4 days later; again, communication
inadequacies frustrated an easier and quicker rescue.
Sago Mine; 12 fatalities.--On January 2, 2006, this tragedy claimed
the lives of 12 miners, while the full extent of injuries to the 13th
miner, Randal McCloy, Jr., remain uncertain. Hopefully, with time we
will learn all of the conditions that caused and contributed to these
lost lives.
These dramatic events represent only the headline-grabbing
incidents. Thousands of miners are still disabled and dying from black
lung disease, while other miners also die in mining accidents each
year. Typically they die one or two at a time, from roof falls,
equipment failures, and other accidents.
There are also countless near-misses that occur on a regular basis.
In fact, just since August 2000, the Mine Safety and Health
Administration, known as MSHA, has records of well over 400 mine fires,
ignitions, explosions and inundations that far too-easily could have
developed into significant disasters and fatalities; many other
incidents likely went unreported.
With better regulations, more regular enforcement, and with support
from the highest echelons of the Agency, many of these accidents could
have been prevented. Senseless deaths and injuries must stop. Mining
will probably always be a dangerous job. But we can do a lot more than
we are doing today to make it safer. Miners should not have to get
sick, or to risk their lives just by going to work.
The most basic point I wish to make today is that as a nation, and
as an industry, we already possess the knowledge and the ability to
prevent most of the deaths that are still occurring in the coal mining
industry. What is needed is a real commitment by our government--in
this case, MSHA--to do better.
For example, if MSHA would require additional oxygen units (``self-
contained self-rescuers'') to be stored on the section where miners
work, and throughout the underground mine in addition to the self-
rescuers that each miner is required to have, then miners trapped in an
emergency would have a better chance of surviving. Self-contained self-
rescuers are what miners don to escape, when noxious air fills an
underground mine after a fire or explosion. They typically last for
about one hour. We understand that miners trapped at Sago wore self-
rescuers. However, there is now no MSHA requirement that coal operators
store any additional oxygen units in their underground mines. We can
only speculate about whether more miners would have survived at Sago if
additional self-rescuers had been stored underground. What we do know,
is that they would have had a better chance of surviving until help
arrived if they had more fresh air to breathe. MSHA should implement a
rule requiring additional units to be maintained in strategic locations
around the mine in order to provide miners with oxygen from the deepest
penetration of the mine out to the surface. No new technology is
required to implement this improvement. Self-rescuers can save lives.
Are they worth some modest additional costs? We submit the clear answer
is ``Yes.''
There is also technology available today that would enable trapped
miners to maintain better communications in an emergency situation. If
MSHA would require secondary telephone lines to be placed in a separate
entry, that would increase the likelihood that communications could be
maintained between miners and those on the surface, even after an
explosion or other emergency event. Also, if MSHA would require
operators to place walkie-talkies in underground locations, this would
facilitate communications during an emergency. Rescue teams rely on
walkie-talkies while they travel underground. The equipment is
effective for a distance of about 1,000 feet. If trapped miners could
communicate with their would-be rescuers, the trapped miners could both
provide and receive critical information that could assist in their
survival. By not having this ability to communicate, their own rescue
is hampered and rescue teams may confront additional hazards that could
be avoided if trapped miners would report on what they know. These
proposed communications' improvements could be implemented easily; the
UMWA urges MSHA to quickly implement these changes. If we can talk to
people on the moon, we should be able to talk to those trapped
underground.
After the Jim Walters tragedy, and again after the Quecreek near-
disaster, the need for better underground communications was crystal
clear. Yet, MSHA made no changes to implement any such improvements.
If we could locate trapped underground miners, we could also do a
much better job rescuing them. MSHA should draw on all the nation's
resources to address this compelling need. We are encouraged by
communications we have had with people at the Pentagon about equipment
originally developed for aviation security, which might also be
applicable to the mining industry. We do know that since the 1970's,
there has been electromagnetic technology available that would enable
us to locate trapped underground miners. The then-Bureau of Mines
reported about this equipment in the 1970's; the equipment was tested
and deemed reliable some 30 years ago. Why then aren't we using it
today? MSHA should take a look at this electromagnetic technology and
all other available technology to see which should be required
throughout this industry.
Another way to enhance the chances of survival for trapped miners
is to strengthen and expand mine rescue teams. The Mine Act required
MSHA to implement regulations ensuring that ``mine rescue teams shall
be available for rescue and recovery work to each underground coal or
other mine in the event of an emergency.'' 30 U.S.C. 825(s). MSHA's
regulation now provides that every operator must establish at least two
mine rescue teams, consisting of five members and one alternate, and
that these teams be available at all times miners are underground. The
regulations also permit an operator ``to enter into an arrangement for
mine rescue teams'' whereby at least two mine rescue teams are
available whenever miners are underground. Further, to be deemed
``available'' the mine rescue teams must be capable of presenting
themselves ``at the mine site(s) within a reasonable time after
notification of an occurrence which might require their services.'' 30
C.F.R. Part 49. Pursuant to MSHA policy, if a team can arrive in two
hours, it is deemed ``available.'' MSHA includes exceptions for small
and remote mines, but those exceptions would not have applied to the
Sago Mine.
At the Sago Mine on January 2, it was between three and five hours
before the first mine rescue teams arrived. Once mine rescue teams
arrived on property, including six teams comprised of UMWA members, the
sole activity they engaged in revolved around safely extracting the
trapped miners. It is extremely important for you to understand that
procedures followed during mine rescues are designed to save the lives
of trapped miners while also protecting the team members. Rushing into
the mine without a complete understanding of its conditions, would be
inviting additional problems. You need only review mining history
briefly to see examples of rescuers rushing in only to become
additional victims. We cannot permit that to occur. Even if underground
conditions may not have allowed the rescuers to immediately travel
underground at Sago, the five hours' lapse before the first teams
arrived constituted valuable time that was simply forfeited. We do not
know what arrangements the Sago Mine had to address its mine rescue
team obligations, but we do know that a five hour lag before mine
rescue teams arrive is unacceptable.
The UMWA submits that every underground coal mine should have mine
rescue capabilities on site. These team members should be employees at
the facility who would be acutely familiar with the mine. These
individuals would not only be best able to carry out many of the duties
required in these situations, but would also be uniquely qualified to
brief additional offsite teams that may be necessary to complete the
rescue. For even small and remote mines, MSHA should require mine
rescue teams to be ready when disasters strike. No trapped miners
should ever again have to wait three to five hours for rescue efforts
to begin.
While we all share the hope that all mining accidents will cease,
all of our hopes probably won't prevent more accidents from happening.
What we can do, and what we should do, is to give miners their best
chance at surviving a mine emergency. I have just described a number of
improvements that would be easy to implement; they would also go a long
way to furthering miners' ability to survive disasters. However, unless
MSHA requires that these improvements be implemented throughout the
industry, miners will continue to face emergencies from a position of
compromise.
If the Sago miners had been able to communicate with persons on the
surface and the mine rescue teams underground, those miners might have
been successfully lead to fresh air. If the location of those trapped
miners could have been more-quickly determined, we could have enhanced
the possibility of their rescue. These ``only-ifs'' are too late to
change what happened at Sago, but it would be inexcusable if our
inaction now would contribute to any more deaths.
There was a national outcry when 78 miners died in West Virginia in
1968. Unfortunately, after the Jim Walters' disaster and the
recommendations made from the lessons learned there, no lasting
improvements to miners' health and safety came after those 13 miners
perished. We cannot allow that to happen again. We need to make real
changes so that another tragedy like what happened at Jim Walters and
what happened at Sago will not happen again.
MSHA knows how to do better. The Agency itself has performed
countless internal reviews and self-analyses; the Federal Government's
watchdog agency, the GAO, has given it direction, and the UMWA has
communicated both formally and informally about how MSHA can and must
do better.
GAO recently focused on shortcomings in MSHA's performance with
regard to the underground coal industry. The underground coal industry
is the same part of MSHA's jurisdiction that was at issue in all three
incidents I highlight in this testimony: Jim Walters, Quecreek, and
Sago.
GAO issued its report in September 2003, two years after the Jim
Walters tragedy. In its report, which I attach to my testimony, GAO
noted that MSHA headquarters was not performing adequately in several
key areas. Specifically, the GAO found MSHA failed to ensure violations
cited to mine operators were corrected in a timely fashion. In fact,
GAO found that of all the citations issued by the Agency, including
those written as ``significant and substantial,'' despite inspector-
imposed deadlines by which problems were to be abated, 48 percent of
the time the Agency failed to follow-up in a timely fashion to see if
the operator fixed the hazards.
GAO also found that MSHA collected information about accidents and
investigations, but then failed to use the information effectively to
prevent future accidents. GAO noted that MSHA does not even collect
information about how many hours contractors work at mine sites, making
it impossible to compute the fatality and injury rates for particular
mines. It further found that MSHA failed to ensure that the ventilation
and roof control plans are reviewed every six months, even though the
Mine Act and applicable regulations, as well as MSHA's long- standing
policies, require that these reviews occur on a semi-annual basis.
After MSHA completed its investigation into the Jim Walters
disaster, the Agency also performed an Internal Review of MSHA's
actions before the explosions to ``improve our inspection process to
better protect our nation's miners.'' The review compared what MSHA
actually did with what the Mine Act requires it to do. A number of
problems were identified as deficiencies ``at both the district and
headquarters level'', deficiencies ``relevant to inspection procedures,
level of enforcement, plan reviews, the [Alternative Case Resolution
Initiative] and accountability programs, supervision and management,
and headquarters oversight.''
Unfortunately the Agency's top managers have done little to move
any of the necessary improvements from recommendation to reality. We
hope that by having Congress add its voice now, along with the public's
demand for its better performance on the heels of Sago, MSHA will
finally re-focus its attention.
MSHA should promulgate regulations that meaningfully improve
miners' health and safety, and MSHA must consistently enforce the
regulations it has. The circumstances that played out on January 2,
2006 have become all too familiar. The events that unfold at these mine
disasters change very little, they focus attention for a brief moment
but, as the spotlight fades, MSHA is content to ignore demands for
change. We cannot and will not permit that to happen here.
The Mine Act is an important piece of legislation. I am not here to
advocate an opening of any part of that historic and effective law. The
UMWA is here to simply demand that it be enforced by MSHA as Congress
intended. The real problems that exists with the current application of
the Act lie in an administrative malaise. Instead of enforcing it
aggressively, the Department of Labor has been whittling away at the
Mine Act. Too often MSHA relies on ``policies,'' which are developed
internally and without public comment, to circumvent the Mine Act. This
reduction in MSHA's effectiveness didn't happen overnight; it has been
a problem for much too long. We have been critical of MSHA under both
Democratic and Republican administrations. But now we call upon
Congress to put a stop to MSHA's inadequacies, to turn the Agency
around so it can enforce the Act the way Congress intended in 1969, and
again in 1977.
To make the needed changes will require MSHA to take a new
direction, beginning at the top. MSHA needs to have a larger budget for
coal enforcement. The Agency spends too much effort at ``compliance
assistance,'' and too little on enforcement. It needs to bolster its
expertise. MSHA has some excellent mine health and safety experts
working in field offices throughout the Country. Yet, they have not
been receiving support from those above them. Too often, an inspector
will write citations and orders upon finding violations of regulations,
only to have them compromised away through conferences and settlements.
While MSHA employs many experienced and dedicated inspectors, there is
a failure on the part of individuals sitting at the higher levels of
power to support the efforts of the MSHA field staff to enforce the
Mine Act.
MSHA's failure to aggressively enforce the Mine Act is the result
of many factors. MSHA is full of former mine management executives who
spend too much time trying to appease their friends, and too little
time looking out for miners' interests. How can we expect a regulatory
Agency to effectively and fairly carry out its duties and
responsibilities when it is run by some of the very coal operators it
was designed to regulate? Many of MSHA's top-level administrators spent
years opposing any regulatory efforts attempted by the Agency. They
continue to be influenced by other coal operators, effectively muting
the voices of miners who need a healthy and vibrant enforcement Agency.
For years, the fox has been inside the henhouse at MSHA. During his
tenure as Assistant Secretary for MSHA, David Lauriski, scrapped 18
proposed rules on topics MSHA had already identified as needing
attention. I attach to this testimony a list of those proposed rules
that former-Administrator Lauriski withdrew, and will discuss the
importance of a few of them. However, withdrawing proposed rules was
not the extent of his actions at the Agency. He also pushed to
completion several regulations that weakened health and safety, because
they benefitted mine operators. For instance, under his watch MSHA
implemented a regulation that allows mine operators to ventilate areas
of the mine where miners work with air that has already passed through
the conveyor belt entry, a practice Congress specifically prohibited in
the Mine Act (30 U.S.C. Sec. 863 (y)); and under his leadership MSHA
implemented a regulation that permits the use of diesel-powered
generators in confined areas of underground mines. While these
practices may increase production for mine operators, they also pose
new and significant risks to miners.
Unless something changes soon, history will repeat itself at the
Agency. Later this month, on January 31, 2006, a hearing is scheduled
to consider the Administration's nominee for Assistant Secretary of
Labor for MSHA. This second nominee by this Administration has been a
coal mine supervisor for most of his life. His lone excursion into
health and safety was marked by repeated attempts to limit regulations
and reduce the health and safety protections of miners in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. MSHA--and our nations' miners--cannot
afford having another coal operator sitting as the Assistant Secretary.
Miners deserve an advocate and an ally, not another coal boss. There
should be no doubt that when top-level appointees are too cozy with the
industry, miners ultimately pay the price.
Among the regulations MSHA stopped developing, and withdrew from
its agenda were those addressing coal dust exposure; self-rescuers;
mine rescue teams; accident investigations; and training/re-training.
The proposed rule on Occupational Exposure to Coal Mine Dust was
withdrawn on September 4, 2002. That proposed rule was drafted to
comply with the Secretary of Labor's Advisory Committee on the
Elimination of Pneumoconiosis Among Coal Mine Workers, and was intended
to decrease the level of respirable coal dust miners could be exposed
to during a working shift. By cutting the permissible exposure level in
half, miners would be less likely to contract debilitating black lung
disease. Application of such a standard would also have significantly
reduced the amounts of highly-explosive float coal dust released into
the mine atmosphere. Such a regulation would have significant health
and safety benefits for underground miners. Unfortunately, the only
efforts regarding coal dust that MSHA made under former Assistant-
Secretary Lauriski was a proposal that would have allowed respirable
dust levels to increase by four fold. To put it mildly, his proposal
was not well-received and he ultimately withdrew it.
MSHA's proposed rule on Underground Coal Mining; Self-Contained
Self-Rescuer was withdrawn on September 24, 2001. Self-contained self-
rescuers have not been updated to keep up with technology. They were
first required in 1981 and little has changed since then. Some of these
devices were found to be inoperable for a variety of reasons including
deteriorating hoses, contaminated chemical beds, and unrealistically
long shelf lives being approved by MSHA. The industry has also been
plagued with the fact that miners sometimes cannot properly don the
units in emergency situations. Moreover, with MSHA's continued
acceptance of the status quo, technological advances of these breathing
devices is being stymied. In the legislative history of the Mine Act,
Congress indicated that mining regulations should be technology-
driving, to maximize miners' protections. We had hoped that with the
promulgation of a new rule addressing self-rescuers, the existing
problems would be addressed, and technological advances encouraged. The
UMWA is convinced that such a rule would have been the catalyst for a
new generation of self-rescuer devices. While operators are willing to
invest in new technology when it increases production, it appears that
they are not so willing to invest when in miners' health and safety.
The proposed rule on Mine Rescue Teams was withdrawn on September
4, 2002. The basis for moving this rule forward is quite simple: the
UMWA and many industry officials recognize that, with mining operations
contracting in the late 1980's through the 1990's, the number of mine
rescue teams was disproportionally reduced. This left large coverage
gaps. The industry is also facing an overall aging of the workforce,
and this also adversely impacts participation in those rescue teams
that remain active. In May of 2000, when it published this pre-rule,
MSHA stated: ``We are assessing the current regulations to identify
problem areas where we might increase flexibility and increase safety
for miners.'' However, instead of promulgating a rule that would
improve rescue teams' availability and capabilities, MSHA eliminated
further work on rescue teams regulations. Meanwhile, it permits
operators to expand on the ill-advised practice of contracting out such
work. Withdrawing the proposed rule effectively eliminated any
meaningful improvement in comprehensive mine rescue activity, but it
also afforded some mine operators the opportunity to disband teams so
they could increase their profits.
On August 16, 2001, the Agency withdrew its proposed rule on
Accident Investigation Hearing Procedures. MSHA has no formal rules for
conducting investigations. While it has established policies, the
investigation process is subject to change on the whim of the
individuals running the Agency. This is exactly what developed in the
early stages of the investigation of the Sago Mine disaster. Not only
do questions arise about who should participate in various parts of the
investigation, but for the Jim Walters' investigation, for example,
MSHA did not conduct a single public hearing to ensure that all
relevant information was presented.
On September 24, 2001, MSHA withdrew its proposed rule on Training
and Retaining of Miners. This critical proposal would have increased
the number of hours operators are required to set aside annually for
health and safety training of miners. This training includes first aid,
donning and using self-contained self-rescue devices, fire drills, and
exiting the mine in the event of an emergency. Miners' lives may turn
on the quality of their training. The training must be updated and
improved. There should be no doubt that the better trained miners are,
the better equipped they will be to escape a mine emergency.
These are only five examples of the18 regulations the Agency, under
this Administration, determined to be insignificant, too burdensome, or
too costly to promulgate. Several of them may have had significance in
what developed at the Sago Mine. We may never learn that for a
certainty, but now is the time to require better rules, offering better
protections so that miners have a better chance of surviving mine
emergencies.
Congress can, and should demand that MSHA do in 2006 all that
Congress demanded in 1969 and again in 1977. Regulations that were in
the pipeline in 2001 and 2002 should be reactivated and finalized in a
timely fashion; regulations that are already in place must be enforced
regularly and aggressively. Now that the spotlight is on the issue of
miners' health and safety, we have a unique opportunity to make
improvements.
The status quo is inadequate. The government failed the Sago
miners, and when it failed them it failed all miners. In enacting the
Mine Act, Congress plainly stated: ``Congress declares that (a) the
first priority of all in the coal or other mining industry must be the
health and safety of its most precious resource the miner.'' (30 U.S.C.
Sec. 801.) We take that admonition seriously; everyone else associated
with the mining industry must re-establish miners' health and safety as
their top priority, too.
I thank you for your interest in miners' safety and would be happy
to answer your questions.
Senator Specter. Thank you, very much Mr. Roberts. I might
say at this point, if there are other key factors you want to
call to the attention of the subcommittee which will not be
covered in the questions session, we would welcome your
supplemental responses if they're not covered in any written
testimony which has been submitted. Attachments to your
testimony will be in the committee files.
We now turn to Mr. Ben Hatfield, President and CEO of
International Coal Group. Prior to joining the company, Mr.
Hatfield held leadership positions with the Eastern Operations
of Arch Coal, El Paso's Energies Coastal Coal Company, and
Massey Energy Company, Bachelor of Science, and Mining
Engineering from Virginia Tech. Thank you for coming in today
Mr. Hatfield, and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF BENNETT K. HATFIELD, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
INTERNATIONAL COAL GROUP, ASHLAND, KENTUCKY
Mr. Hatfield. Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity, and invitation to
testify here today. First, I want to extend my deepest
sympathies to the families whose loved ones were lost at the
Sago Mine. Our communities continue to mourn the deaths of our
friends and coworkers. We also pray for the full and speedy
recovery of Randy McCloy, our lone survivor.
Second, I commend the heroic efforts made by many mine
rescue teams from other companies, and volunteers who came
forward during our community's time of need. The outpouring of
support from the Buckhannon area communities has overwhelmingly
demonstrated how West Virginians come together in times of
crisis. We also appreciate the support provided by the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Administration, and the State of West
Virginia.
Our company is working closely with MSHA and the State in
the formal investigation to determine the cause of this tragic
accident. I personally promise to use all available resources
to get the answers that the friends, families, and coworkers
need and deserve.
My written statement details the events of January 2
through 4, beginning with an explosion at about 6:30 a.m. in
the midst of a violent lightening storm. This explosion in an
instant separated brother from brother, uncle from nephew, and
friends from friends. The supervisors onsite immediately
reacted with a rescue effort in an attempt to reach their
fellow miners. Sadly, their efforts were to no avail. It would
be many more hours before conditions improved to allow
additional rescue teams to enter the mine, and throughout we
waited, waited, and then waited more.
During those dark hours we prayed for 13 miracles, and in
the end, were blessed to receive one. We deeply regret the pain
caused by that early and erroneous communication to the
families. There was never any intent to misinform, mislead, or
raise false hopes. We, like you, and like the families of the
miners, and like Americans throughout our country road that
emotional roller coaster that has sadly lead us to where we are
today.
Within the next few days, investigators should be able to
safely enter the mine to begin determining the cause of the
accident. After a devastating accident of this nature, it is
understandable that questions are asked about the Sago Mine's
safety record. My written statement details some of the safety
improvements made by our company beginning on June 1, 2005,
when we assumed management oversight. What is important to
emphasize is that since June 1, our company has worked closely
with Federal and State Regulators to make this mine as safe as
possible. For example, we were the first coal company to
voluntarily invite MSHA's technical support group on incident
reduction, to help implement a new program to continually
improve mine safety. Most importantly, that effort helped us to
dramatically reduce the injury rate at the Sago Mine by nearly
60 percent from the first half of 2005 to the second.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I believe that if there is any good that can come of this
horrible event, it will be in inspiring greater innovations in
mine safety. Although it's too early to determine the cause of
the tragedy, we intend to be a leader in efforts to prevent
future tragedies. As an example, our company is already moving
forward with evaluation of improved wireless communication
technology, and supplemental oxygen supplies on demand. We will
work on our own, and with others in the mining community to
improve technology, and we will continue to base our business
decisions on worker safety as the first, and most critical
consideration.
We must learn lessons from this explosion that will better
protect coal miners. That is our company's commitment to the
families of the 12 miners who perished. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bennett K. Hatfield
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am Ben Hatfield,
President and Chief Executive Officer of International Coal Group, Inc.
(ICG). By way of brief background, International Coal Group, Inc. is a
leading producer of coal with operations in West Virginia, Kentucky,
Maryland, and Illinois. We employ approximately 2,100 people throughout
our operating area. During 2005, we sold about 19 million tons of coal
to utility, industrial, and metallurgical customers located throughout
the Eastern U.S. I appreciate the invitation to testify today.
First, I want to extend my deepest sympathies to the families whose
loved ones were lost at the Sago Mine. Our community will continue to
mourn the deaths of our friends and coworkers. We also pray for the
full and speedy recovery of Randal McCloy, Jr.
Second, I commend the heroic efforts made by many mine rescue teams
from other companies and volunteers who came forward during our
communities' time of need. The outpouring of support from the
Buckhannon area communities, churches, local businesses, civic
organizations, and emergency personnel has overwhelmingly demonstrated
how West Virginians come together in times of crisis. We also
appreciate the support provided by the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) and the State of West Virginia.
Our Company is working closely with MSHA and the State of West
Virginia in the formal investigation to determine the cause of this
tragic accident. We vow to use all available resources to get the
answers that the families, friends, and coworkers need and deserve.
BRIEF SUMMARY OF EVENTS
I would like to briefly summarize what we know about the events of
January 2, 3 and 4, 2006. At approximately 6:00 A.M. on Monday morning,
January 2, after their travel route and worksites had been reported
safe by certified safety examiners, two production crews and mine
support staff totaling 27 miners entered the Mine. Each production crew
needed to travel about two miles to reach the two working sections
(First Left and Second Left) of the Mine where they were scheduled to
work. The Second Left crew entered the Mine on a rail manbus that
departed roughly 10 minutes ahead of a similar manbus carrying the
First Left crew. One of the certified safety examiners had remained
underground and traveled to his normal workstation. Therefore, a total
of 28 miners were underground.
At 6:31 A.M., Sago mine management heard the audible alarm of the
mine monitoring system indicating the presence of carbon monoxide
underground. At about the same time, the electrical power supply to the
Sago Mine was disrupted. All of this occurred in the midst of a violent
storm with unusually strong lightning strikes. Shortly thereafter, the
supervisor of the First Left production crew telephoned the dispatcher
on the surface to report that his crew had just experienced a very
strong rush of air with substantial smoke and dust emanating from
deeper in the Mine. Mine management directed the First Left supervisor
to bring his crew out of the Mine through one of the two primary
escapeways. No communication was received from the Second Left crew of
miners. Repeated efforts by mine management and the First Left crew to
contact the Second Left crew, via mine phone and underground walkie-
talkie, were unsuccessful. So, mine management immediately became
concerned that they were in danger.
At 6:41 A.M., Mine Superintendent Jeff Toler, whose uncle was one
of the missing miners, and three other mine supervisors headed
underground to investigate. After traveling about one and a half miles
by rail manbus, they encountered the First Left crew coming out of the
Mine on foot. The rail manbus was given to the First Left crew to
expedite their safe exit from the Mine. The supervisor for the First
Left crew, whose brother was one of the missing miners, joined the mine
management team in an attempt to reach the Second Left crew located
roughly 2,000 feet deeper in the Mine. They quickly gathered tools and
ventilating materials and then proceeded toward the Second Left
section. This initial rescue effort by the five-man management team
continued for over two hours as the group encountered thick, black
smoke and attempted to redirect ventilating air to open a route of
access to the missing crew. Repeated calls to the Second Left crew via
mine phone received no response. The rescuers became increasingly
concerned that a possible explosion could be ignited as they directed
fresh air toward the Second Left section. Consequently, the mine
management group exited the Mine at 9:45 A.M.
Meanwhile on the mine surface, at about 7:00 A.M., company safety
managers not already on site were called and briefed on events at the
mine. Following various communications between those safety managers
and mine management on site regarding immediate emergency procedures
required, we began calling MSHA and State safety officials to report
the accident at about 7:40 A.M. Both MSHA and State safety officials
were reached between 7:56 and 8:28 A.M., and began arriving on site
soon thereafter. At 8:32 A.M., MSHA inspector Jim Satterfield orally
implemented an emergency mine closure order (a ``103k order'')
prohibiting further entry to the Mine. At about the same time, State
mine inspectors began monitoring the air quality at the Mine portal.
High concentrations of carbon monoxide were found, indicating
significant risk of an active underground mine fire that could ignite
an explosion, so state and Federal mine regulators on site determined
it was not safe for mine rescue teams to enter. This agonizing process
of monitoring the carbon monoxide and methane levels in the Mine air
and having to wait and wait for confirmation that it was safe to enter
would continue throughout the day.
In anticipation that mine rescue teams were going to be allowed to
enter the Mine soon, the first call to the Barbour County Mine Rescue
Team was made at 8:04 A.M. That Team arrived on site at approximately
10:40 A.M., and waited for State and Federal authorities to approve
their entry into the Mine. Other mine rescue teams were also contacted,
and continued to arrive at the Mine through the course of the day, with
eventual deployment of 13 to 15 mine rescue teams by late afternoon on
January 2.
After experts from MSHA, the State of West Virginia, and the
Company agreed that an underground mine fire was no longer likely based
on the air monitoring results, the first mine rescue team entered the
Mine (carrying special breathing apparatus) at 5:51 P.M. The search and
rescue efforts continued throughout January 2 and January 3. Progress
had to be careful and deliberate to protect the safety of rescuers,
given that many rescuers had fallen victim to secondary explosions in
coal mine disasters of years past. During the evening of January 3, a
rescue team found one miner's body. Just before midnight, our remaining
12 missing miners were found. As a result of the extreme difficulties
in communication hundreds of feet below the surface while wearing
special breathing apparatus, the now well-known miscommunication about
the number of survivors occurred. We, too, rode that same emotional
rollercoaster and suffered the inevitable pain when the truth was
learned.
We expect that investigators will be able to safely get back into
the Mine soon to determine the cause of the accident.
SAFETY AT THE SAGO MINE
Even before we completed the acquisition of the Sago Mine, on
November 18, 2005, we assumed management oversight through a consulting
agreement that allowed us to begin making safety improvements as of
June 1, 2005. Since that time, our Company has worked closely with
Federal and State regulators in an effort to make this Mine as safe as
possible. Specifically ICG has voluntarily:
--Rehabilitated two miles of primary intake escapeway and more than
doubled the amount of fresh air reaching the working sections.
This is the escapeway used by the surviving crew.
--Upgraded the rail system used to move miners and supplies into and
out of the Mine.
--Invited MSHA's Technical Support Group on Incident Reduction to
help implement a new program to continually improve mine
safety. We were told that ICG was the first coal company to
voluntarily work with MSHA under the Agency's Incident
Reduction Program.
--Required Sago Mine hourly employees to receive eight hours of
supplemental safety training during September 2005, in addition
to the extensive training already required under the Mine Act.
Then, during October-December, we required our Northern West
Virginia Region supervisors to receive two days of supplemental
training at the MSHA Training Academy at Beckley, West
Virginia.
--Established a Performance Group Initiative that gives every
employee a forum for addressing any safety or production
concerns or suggestions, anonymously, if they so chose, and
addressed any points raised in monthly meetings.
These voluntary initiatives helped us to dramatically reduce the
lost time injury rate at the Sago Mine by nearly 60 percent from the
first half of 2005 to the second.
Sago's employees are well-trained, skilled coal miners who
understand safety. Each employee is aware that if an unsafe condition
is identified, they are authorized to withdraw immediately from the
hazardous area and notify their supervisor of the danger.
MSHA data shows that:
--Mining operations at the Sago Mine more than doubled between 2004
and 2005, prompting MSHA to dramatically increase--by 84
percent--its on-site inspection and enforcement presence.
--Of the 208 citations, orders, and safeguards issued in 2005, none
involved an immediate risk of injury and all but three had been
fully corrected by January 2. The three remaining issues, which
relate to roof control, are being addressed by Sago in
compliance with the Mine Act.
--Only when MSHA completes its investigation will we know the cause
of the accident, but we do know that none of the health and
safety violations cited by MSHA at Sago Mine last year involved
immediate risk of injury and that the Mine has worked to
correct all health and safety problems in accordance with the
requirements of the Mine Act.
The Mine Act also authorized MSHA to shut down an operation that is
unsafe, and MSHA's trained mine safety professionals, who were at the
Mine nearly every working day in the several months before the
accident, would certainly not have allowed the continued operation of
the Sago Mine if they believed it to be unsafe. In addition, as
required by law, our certified mine examiners inspect the Mine before
and during every shift. They, too, are fully authorized to shut down
any part of the Mine they consider unsafe. While the tragic events of
January 2 confirm that we must be ever vigilant on mine safety, the
safety record at the Sago Mine demonstrates that our management team
aggressively focused on mine safety and protecting our people.
THE FUTURE OF MINE SAFETY
Although it's far too early to determine the cause of the tragedy
and the extent to which it may have been preventable, we intend to be a
leader in the effort to identify and develop safety technologies that
will help to prevent future tragedies. We will work on our own, and
with others in the mining community, to improve technology, and we will
continue to base our business decisions on worker safety as the first
and most crucial consideration.
We expect that this terrible series of events will further motivate
the entire mining community to identify and implement significant
improvements in mine safety through cooperation, information sharing,
and improved technologies. For example, working with MSHA, we should
vigorously seek to advance the development of permissible wireless
communications and breathing apparatus technologies that could further
improve the coal industry's underground mine rescue capabilities. Also,
this experience highlighted critical weaknesses in the design of MSHA's
V-2 robot that could likely be remedied with the technology now used by
NASA in space exploration. Once the actual cause of the Sago explosion
is known, there may be more specific measures that could help prevent a
recurrence.
We must learn lessons from this explosion that will better protect
coal miners. That is our Company's commitment to the families of the 12
miners who perished.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much Mr. Hatfield. Our next
witness is Mr. Chris Hamilton, Senior Vice President to the
West Virginia Coal Association, an organization which he has
been affiliated with for more than 20 years, has a Mine Foreman
Certifications from West Virginia to Ohio, Undergraduate and
Graduate Degrees from West Virginia University. I thank you for
joining us Mr. Hamilton, and we look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS R. HAMILTON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
WEST VIRGINIA COAL ASSOCIATION, CHARLESTON,
WEST VIRGINIA
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, other
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
invitation to address this committee, and for placing this
important topic on your agenda for review and discussion. In
West Virginia, we have approximately 40,000 individuals, men
and women who work directly in, or around a coal mining
facility, and without exception all miners, managers,
engineers, support staff, along with our entire State, have
been deeply saddened by the Sago and Alma tragedies, and the
mourning will continue for years to follow.
Our hearts and prayers are with the families and loved ones
of the miners who perished at Sago and Alma, and we continue to
pray for Randal McCloy's full and speedy recovery. We now
extend those prayers to the families of Don Bragg and Ellery
Hatfield of the Alma Mine tragedy as well.
West Virginians share a special bond with their families,
church, and communities. They have an unparalleled inner
strength, inner faith, and nowhere is that bond more prominent
than in West Virginia's coal industry. For the record, the West
Virginia Coal Association wholeheartedly embraces Governor
Manchin in his plain spoken sentiments, that no miner should
ever be fatally injured in a West Virginia coal mine. We also
fully support the Governor's commitment to operate the safest
mines in the world. We will commit the necessary resources over
the months to come, and we'll do everything humanly possible to
achieve that shared goal.
First and foremost, that is our commitment which we believe
is realistic and achievable. We also maintain that the primary
responsibility for achieving that goal rests firmly with those
who own, operate, and manage coal mining operations. A
responsibility we not only acknowledge, but aim to fulfill.
These tragic events have caught the eye of practically all of
America in the past three weeks, and the media has done a good
job, an accurate portrayal of the courage and overall character
of the men and women who have selected mining as a profession.
They have a passion for their work, and they do it with great
pride, in an exceptional level of professionalism.
Unfortunately, the events of January 2 and those of last
week, have not accurately portrayed how technologically
advanced mining has become, and all the progress, and safety
achievement that's been made over the past several decades.
But, one mining death is too many, and despite all this
progress recorded in recent years, we now realize that much
work remains. Particular focus is required in the post accident
phase, so that the effect of accidents can be truly minimized
or mitigated.
By its nature, mining is unique unlike any other business
or industry, and that it is dependent on natural conditions,
and natural geology. Through their skills, training,
dedication, and hard work, miners attempt to control and manage
the challenges of their environment, and they're good at it. It
requires a supreme vigilance every minute of every shift. New
mining technologies such as long wall mining, remote controlled
equipment design, and mine wide atmospheric monitoring systems,
combined with the extraordinary skill and experience level of
today's workforce has truly lead to safer conditions, and fewer
accidents.
As a relevant part of my testimony on record today, I
incorporate a copy of the most recent directory of mines, which
is published annually by the West Virginia Office of Miners
Health Safety and Training. It contains useful statistical
information, and also charged the Mine Safety Performance of
the industry over the years. This directory reflects a dramatic
reduction in mine related deaths since the passage of the 1969
Act, from 162 fatal accidents reported, to just three for all
of 2005. Again despite all this progress, we realized that much
work remains, and that vigilance will be continued day in, and
day out.
This report also depicts a significant reduction of mine
accidents, and lost time injuries over the same period. The
State's annual report also reveals that the State of West
Virginia has one of the more comprehensive mine safety programs
found anywhere in the country, with a full compliment of mine
safety inspectors, safety officials, and extremely aggressive
legislative and regulatory program. I'm pleased to report that
the State of West Virginia is taking a lead in dealing with
this terrible tragedy that we've all experienced. I believe we
will learn later this afternoon that three important pieces of
legislation will be introduced into the West Virginia
legislature for immediate action today. I believe that
legislation will address the points raised by Senator Byrd in
his opening remarks. I think we'll see legislation calling for
a central rapid response program, and modeled after our State
Office of Emergency Services. I think we'll see requirements
calling for additional self contained breathing apparatuses
stored at strategic locations underground, and I think we'll
see legislation that preempts, and that drives technological
advances to have improved communication systems within the mine
itself, and from above the surface to the underground mine, and
connected with all miners. I'm convinced we'll see that. I'm
confident we'll see that legislation introduced today, and it's
my understanding that by mid afternoon, that legislative action
ought to be well on its way.
We have joined with the Governor, we want to be part of the
solution, we recognize despite all of the improvement, all the
technological advancements, that much work remains. We are
truly here, part of this proceeding to offer our help and our
assistance to my colleagues sitting at this table, to the State
of West Virginia, and to this particular Subcommittee. We have
a wealth of technical capability.
Senator Specter. Mr. Hamilton, you're substantially over.
Could you summarize at this point?
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Hamilton. Yes. Again, I can't express enough the sorrow
that is shared by all West Virginians. We compliment you Mr.
Chairman, other senators for placing this on your agenda, and
we look forward to working with you in the months to come, to
address these concerns. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris R. Hamilton
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Thank you for the
invitation to address this Committee and for placing this important
topic ``Coal Mine Health & Safety'' on your agenda for review and
discussion.
INTRODUCTION
My role and contribution to today's hearing will be defined by the
following four (4) key points: First, to express our heartfelt prayers
for the families who suffered great personal loss at the Sago Mine. Our
prayers continue for Randal McCloy's full recovery and for his wife and
family. We now extend those prayers and our state's unique circle of
support to the families of Don Bragg and Ellery Hatfield of the Aracoma
Mine tragedy. The deceased miners will forever be with us as we
implement the necessary steps to improve coal mine safety and prevent
recurrences. We also thank the mine rescue team members, the State,
Federal, and company officials who directed and guided their heroic and
brave efforts at Sago, and whose performance in those dark and anxious
hours will be analyzed for years to come. It is our hope that their
performance will be constructively reviewed with an eye towards
improving future rescue efforts; Thirdly, we are here as one of the
nation's largest trade associations to offer our pledge to work with
you in whatever capacity you deem appropriate in the discharge of your
important work and to direct our Association's collective attention
towards the identification and implementation of appropriate remedial
measures; and Fourth, and subordinate to the preceding points, is the
perceived need to preserve the integrity and future of the coal
industry--to implement the necessary changes from the lessons learned
from the horrific accident that brings us here today and to elevate the
understanding and appreciation of our industry which means so much to
West Virginia and to our nation!
My personal background: I have nearly thirty-five years of
experience in the coal mining industry beginning in 1971 during the
immediate implementation of the 1969 Federal Mine Health and Safety Act
and over thirty years of experience in mine health and safety.
I worked as an underground miner and for underground and surface
mining companies. I have also worked for the Federal and State mine
safety agencies as a mine safety professional and safety instructor--
certified to train and certify miners in all aspects of mining and mine
safety including mine emergency preparedness and mine rescue
operations.
As Training Director for the West Virginia Department of Mines (for
then Governor Jay Rockefeller), I was responsible for approving mine
training facilities, mine training plans and individual mine training
instructors.
I possess underground Mine Foreman--Fire Boss certifications from
WV and the state of Ohio where I worked for several years in the
industry. I received my undergraduate and graduate degree from West
Virginia University and have also completed many college level courses
in mine safety, mining technology and mine industrial engineering.
I presently serve under gubernatorial appointment on the West
Virginia Coal Mine Health and Safety Board; the West Virginia Mine
Safety and Technical Review Committee; The West Virginia Board of Miner
Training Education & Certification; and, the West Virginia Diesel
Equipment Commission.
During my tenure on as a mine safety official, I have been involved
in the review/investigation of serious mining accidents and practically
every single mining death in West Virginia for the past twenty-five
years.
As a member of the West Virginia Board of Coal Mine Health & Safety
(the only independent entity in West Virginia with a statutory charge
to investigate and respond to mine accidents), I will be part of the
state's investigation and regulatory response to the Sago and Aracoma
accidents!
West Virginia's coal industry is comprised of approximately 40,000
individuals who work directly in, or around a coal mining facility and
without exception, miners, managers, engineers and support staff along
with our entire state have been deeply saddened by the ``Sago and
Aracoma tragedies'' and will continue to mourn for years to follow.
Our hearts and prayers are with the families and loved ones of the
miners who perished in the Sago incident and we continue to pray for
Randal McCloy's full recovery. We now extend those prayers and our
state's unique circle of support to the families of Don Bragg and
Ellery Hatfield of the Aracoma mine tragedy. I would observe that next
to the immediate families of the deceased miners, nobody is saddened
more than mine management officials over this tremendous loss. West
Virginians share a special bond with their families, church and
communities.
They have an unparalleled inner strength and inner faith and no
where is that bond more prominent than in the coal industry.
For the record, The West Virginia Coal Association wholeheartedly
embraces Governor Manchin's sentiments ``that no miner should ever be
fatally injured in a West Virginia coal mine''. We also fully support
the Governor's commitment to operate the safest mines in the world! We
will commit the necessary resources over the months to come and will do
everything humanly possible to achieve that shared goal!
First and foremost, that is our commitment which we believe is
realistic and achievable!
We also maintain that the primary responsibility for achieving that
goal rests firmly with those who own, operate and manage coal mining
operations. A responsibility we not only acknowledge but aim to
fulfill!
These tragic events have caught the eye of practically all of
America in the past three weeks and the media has presented an accurate
portrayal of the courage and overall character of the men and woman who
have selected mining as a profession. They have a passion for their
work and they do it with great pride and an exceptional level of
professionalism!
Unfortunately, the events of January 2nd and those of last week
have not accurately portrayed how technologically advanced mining has
become and all of the progress and safety achievement that's been made
over the past several decades. But one mining death is one too many and
despite all the progress recorded in recent years, we now realize that
much work remains! Particular focus is required in the post accident
phase so that the effect of an accident can be minimized or mitigated!
By its very nature, mining is unique (unlike any other business or
industry) in that it is dependent on natural conditions and geology.
Through their skills, training and hard work, miners attempt to control
and manage the challenges of their environment--and they are good at
it! It requires a supreme vigilance every minute of every shift.
Undoubtedly coal mining is a dangerous occupation with unique
hazards inherent to the workplace but I would maintain that mining is
much safer today than what was realistically believed possible a few
short years ago.
New mining technologies such as longwall mining systems, remote-
controlled equipment design and mine wide atmospheric monitoring
systems combined with the extraordinary skill & experience level of
today's workforce has led to safer conditions and fewer accidents.
As a relevant part of my testimony and record today, I incorporate
a copy of the most recent ``Directory of Mines'' which is published
annually by the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety &
Training. It contains useful statistical information and charts the
mine safety performance of the industry over the years.
The ``Directory'' reflects a dramatic reduction in mining related
deaths since passage of the 1969 Mine Safety Act when 162 fatal
accidents were recorded to 3 for all of 2005. It also depicts a
significant reduction in mine accidents and lost time injuries over
this same period.
The state's annual report also reveals that the state of West
Virginia has one of the more comprehensive mine safety programs found
anywhere in the country with a full complement of mine safety
inspectors, safety officials and an extremely aggressive legislative
and regulatory program. It is also noteworthy to point out that no
provision exists under Federal law for States to acquire ``primacy''
over the administration of mine safety laws.
Consequently, all West Virginia mines are examined by State and
Federal inspectors throughout each and every quarter.
The significance of the industry and the important role coal plays
in our everyday lives, which ranges from our basic quality of life to
national defense and national security and should also serve as a
tribute to the men and families of Sago!
Over the past several weeks we have heard local, regional, national
and international media sources all ask a similar question: Why do we
continue to mine coal?
Coal, and in particular, West Virginia coal, is crucial to our
advanced society and extraordinarily quality of life. Coal continues to
account for over fifty percent of the America's electricity. In West
Virginia that figure is closer to 99 percent.
Over the past several decades our state's coal industry has a
remarkably record of safety achievement, reclamation accomplishments
and environmental stewardship. We are coordinating proposed mine sites
with local and state planning agencies to ensure meaningful and more
productive development occurs.
West Virginia is a shining example of where you can have a robust
coal industry along with a thriving tourism industry--you can truly
have both and I submit to you that nobody is doing it better!
Today's industry represents a technologically advanced enterprise
with a highly skilled and efficient workforce and has established a
healthy presence in an international marketplace.
West Virginia produces approximately 160 millions tons of coal
annually. Of that total, over 105 million tons or 65 percent percent
comes from underground mines and approximately 55 million tons of coal
is produced from surface mines.
West Virginia continues to lead the nation in underground coal
production and is second only to the state of Wyoming in overall coal
production. West Virginia is the world's leader in Longwall mining and
is the leading coal export state.
All told, West Virginia coal is shipped to 23 foreign countries and
accounts for approximately one half of the United States total export
product leaving domestic boundaries contributing immensely to the
United States balance of trade.
We also have more processing plants than any other state, more
transportation outlets and one of the more elaborate transportation
systems and infrastructures you find anywhere in the world. It is
comprised of rails, trucks and barges and we have the best quality and
variety of coals found anywhere in the world.
Due to its clean and high quality, West Virginia coal is shipped
throughout the eastern half of the United States to thirty-three states
to generate electricity for industrial and household energy and for
coking and steel production. West Virginia has the highest quality of
coal found anywhere in the world and we have plenty of it (Reports of
our diminishing reserve base has been wrongly placed)! We have over 52
billion tons of demonstrated mineable reserves or 350 years of
production remaining at today's production levels.
The coal industry remains vitally important to our state and its
economy. Together, with the states electric power industry, it accounts
for nearly 60 percent of the total state business tax collections.
These tax dollars translate directly into important education,
government and community services and provide a reliable revenue stream
for many other county, local and municipal programs.
No other state business or industry affects so many people in so
many different ways! It's overall impact is staggering in terms of
employment, wages, taxes and overall economic activity.
The state's industry is postured with an abundance of opportunity
as the worlds thirst for low-cost, reliable energy grows on an
incremental basis of nearly 2 percent annually. Thus, coal generally
and West Virginia's coal particularly will continue to be a major
player in the world wide energy mix on a going forward basis.
A strong energy market and high demand has created an uplifting and
positive energy around the state that most of us in the business have
not witnessed since the 70s--and with that optimism comes the
realization that we can do so much more if we are able to capitalize on
todays opportunities. West Virginia Coal will be relied upon more than
ever for industrial and household energy; domestic energy independence;
national strategic defense; homeland security, and today's ever popular
``coal-to-liquids'' and ``coal conversion technologies.''
And lastly, just as all miners and mine managers have come together
to grieve over the tragic events of the last three weeks, they all need
to be part of the solution so we may effectively prevent a similar
event in the future. They all have unique experiences and
qualifications to contribute!
Today, more than ever before miners, mine managers, engineers,
research institutions and government officials need to become engaged
to develop safer mining plans, better designed equipment and more
effective ways to control our environment. Matters of safety, security
and stability are shared responsibilities.
And as the industry prepares to retrain its existing workforce
along with the next generation of skilled miners, the ``Sago'' miners
will be forever remembered and serve as a daily reminder of the supreme
vigilance required in the workplace!
Our membership has an abundance of safety, technical and
operational expertise which has been called upon to respond to the
challenges before us. We hereby extend those resources for your use and
dedicate the same towards making the West Virginia Coal industry the
safest in the world!
I'll close by reciting the inscription on the ``the West Virginia
Coal Miner'' statue located on the grounds of our state capital which
captures the essence and summarizes best the importance of the coal
miner and coal mining to West Virginia and to the Nation . . .
``In honor and in recognition of the men and woman who have devoted
a career, some a lifetime, towards providing the state, nation and
world with low-cost, reliable household and industrial energy . . . Let
it be said that `Coal' is the fuel that helped build the greatest
country on earth, has protected and preserved our freedom and has
enhanced our quality of life. God bless the West Virginia Coal Miner.''
Thank You.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Hamilton. Our
next witness is Mr. Davitt McAteer, Vice President of Sponsored
Programs of Wheeling Jesuit University, former Assistant
Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety and Health, worked as a
consultant to the former West Virginia Governor, Bob Wise, a
Bachelor's Degree from Wheeling Jesuit University, and a Law
Degree from West Virginia University. Thank you for coming in
today, Mr. McAteer, and we look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVITT McATEER, VICE PRESIDENT OF
SPONSORED PROGRAMS, WHEELING JESUIT
UNIVERSITY, SHEPHERDSTOWN, WEST VIRGINIA
Mr. McAteer. Thank you, Chairman Specter, Senator Harkin,
Senator Byrd, Senator DeWine. Thank you for inviting me to
participate in this hearing on the Sago Mine disaster and on
mine safety generally. It is tragic that we now must expand the
scope of this inquiry to include the fatal mine fire at Massey
Energies Alma Mine in Logan County, West Virginia. As you
mentioned, I am presently Vice President of Wheeling Jesuit
University, but previously served as the Assistant Secretary of
Labor from 1993 to 2000. I have been involved in mine safety in
a number of capacities since 1968.
On Friday, shortly after the Sago disaster, Governor Joe
Manchin called, and asked me to conduct an independent
investigation to determine the cause of that disaster, to
assess the rescue and recovery operation, and to make
recommendations to improve mine safety in West Virginia. In
accepting that assignment, I pledged that we would take every
step to identify the problems that caused the disaster that
contributed to the difficulties of the mine rescue operation,
as well as to the missed communication to the Command Center,
and the families, and that we would fix these problems.
Today, I want to make that same pledge to the families of
Don Bragg and Elvis Hatfield, the miners who lost their lives
at Alma. We will hold public hearings, we will hold them on or
about the 1st of March. We will have a report to the Governor
on or about July 1. I understand, as Mr. Hamilton does as well,
that Governor Manchin is this very morning, introducing three
pieces of legislation in an effort to try and remedy problems
that we have discovered and know exist as Cecil Roberts pointed
out, know exist in the mine rescue area. Those are the rapid
response system, more SCSR's, so you can get more time to get
out, and new technologies to try and deal with them. Let me say
here and now, that technologies do exist, and that is present,
and available, that is off the shelf, and has been approved by
MSHA.
This is the tracking system that the PED, the Personal
Emergency Device that Senator Harkin mentioned, this is
currently available. It is in roughly a dozen mines in this
country. It can be put into all the mines in this country, and
one of the proposals Governor Manchin is making is to do just
that, to put this device in the mines. Had we had this device,
a signal could've been sent from the surface to the miners
immediately upon the learning of the danger, and to tell them
to evacuate.
Second, this is the tracker system. This is a tracker that
can be carried by an individual miner, and he can be located.
These devices have been approved by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration. I must disagree with Acting Assistant Secretary
Dye. These devices have proved to be reliable. They have proved
to be effective, both in this country and abroad. These devices
are in mines in China. These devices are in mines in Australia.
They were developed after disasters in Australia by government
funded research that suggested that we need to be able to
locate them. They are available to the industry, and it is my
hope that the Senate and that the Administration would work to
see that these devices get put into the mines immediately.
Senator Harkin. How much do one of those cost?
Mr. McAteer. This is the system that you put a loop--an
antenna loop, a high end cost would be $100,000 for a mine the
size of Sago. These devices are much less expensive, quite
inexpensive; $15 to $20 is my understanding. I have literature,
which I will submit for the record from the mine company.
Obviously, we're not here to endorse this one company--the
technology from this one company. We are hear to say, products
exists that are out there, and are not being put into the
mines. Unfortunately, this mining industry, and I must say as
Assistant Secretary, we did make progress. We have brought the
number of deaths down, but we have not brought the number of
deaths down to where they need to be. But, the industry has
focused its attention on productivity, and that is their want,
and that is how they make a profit, and we don't take that away
from them.
But we do have to say, that the failure to focus attention
on safety devices, and improvements, and put them in the mines
is most unfortunate for those miners that we are all here and
concerned about, and that needs to be changed. We need a safety
system that will tell us at all times where miners are, and how
we can get them out.
Now, let me turn to the mine rescue system. In 1995, we
held a conference, a summit of all parties in the industry,
labor, management, State agencies, Federal agencies, and I
chaired that summit, and asked the question, are we prepared
now to deal with mine emergencies? The answer is we are not
adequately prepared. This is in part due to the fact, that we
are a victim of our success. We do not have the horrible number
of disasters that we had when Senator Harkin's father was in
the mines, but we have them often enough that we need to be
prepared. We identified declining numbers of people
volunteering. We identified declining equipment, we identified
declining interests on the part of the companies in this area.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Senator Specter. Mr. McAteer, your substantially over time.
Could you summarize at this point, please?
Mr. McAteer. I will sir, and I apologize.
Senator Specter. It's good testimony.
Mr. McAteer. We have the bravest mine rescue teams in the
world. We have not provided them with good equipment, and a
good system, and that needs to be fixed.
Thank you, Senators.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Davitt McAteer
Chairman Specter, Senator Harkin, and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for inviting me to participate in this hearing on the Sago
Mine Disaster and Mine Safety.
I am presently the Vice President for Sponsored Programs of
Wheeling Jesuit University. Previously I served as Assistant Secretary
of Labor for Mine Safety and Health from 1993 to 2000, and I have been
involved in the mine safety field in various capacities since 1968. I
live in Shepherdstown, West Virginia.
As you know, the Sago Mine Disaster was really two disasters--first
the crisis of the trapped miners, and then the appalling
miscommunication to the waiting families, leading them to believe for
nearly three hours that all but one of the miners had been saved when
in fact all but one had perished. Both parts of this dual disaster must
be investigated and their causes identified. And we owe it to the lost
miners, and to their families, to take all necessary steps to ensure
that there will never again be such a dreadful double tragedy.
Governor Joe Manchin of West Virginia called me soon after the
disaster and asked if I would serve as his personal advisor and conduct
an independent investigation of the cause or causes of the disaster,
assess the rescue and recovery operation, and make recommendations to
improve mine safety in West Virginia and across the nation.
In accepting that assignment, which Governor Manchin announced on
January 9, I pledged that we would pursue every lead, follow every
avenue of inquiry, and take every step necessary to identify the
problems that caused the disaster and contributed to the difficulties
of the rescue operation and the miscommunication to the command center
and the families, and that we would fix those problems.
That is the charge of the Special Commission on the Sago Mine
Disaster, and we are in the process of carrying it out. I am grateful
to Governor Manchin for entrusting me with this responsibility, and I
have promised to deliver a report to him by July 1.
Subsequently the leaders of the West Virginia Legislature, House
Speaker Bob Kiss and Senate President Earl Ray Tomblin, appointed six
legislators to work with me to help determine what went wrong at the
Sago Mine and, in the Speaker's words, to decide ``what we as a
lawmaking body should do to minimize the chances of such a tragedy
happening again.'' I appreciate the opportunity to work with these
bipartisan colleagues, many of whom have been closely involved with
coal mining.
Before going further, I want to stress that our investigation is
not intended to duplicate or in any way impede the investigations under
way by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the
West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training, and the
West Virginia Board of Coal Mine Safety and Health, or by any other
regulatory agency or lawmaking body with statutory responsibilities in
this area. But I must also stress that our investigation, unlike the
others, has a very specific constituency to whom we are accountable.
We are, of course, accountable to Governor Manchin, and through him
to the people of West Virginia and the nation. But ultimately we must
answer to twelve good men--Tom Anderson, Alva Bennett, Jim Bennett,
Jerry Groves, George Hamner, Jr., Terry Helms, Jesse Jones, David
Lewis, Martin Toler, Jr., Fred Ware, Jack Weaver, and Marshall Winans--
and to the families to whom they will return now only in memory. And we
are accountable as well to the sole survivor of the disaster--Randal
McCloy, Jr.--and to his wife and children and all those who continue to
pray for his recovery. We must answer to them.
Our responsibility, therefore, is to ask and explore all of the
questions to which the miners' families must have answers, including
these:
--Was the Sago Mine being operated unsafely?
--Were the responsible Federal and State agencies doing an adequate
job of enforcing safety and health laws and regulations at the
mine?
--What triggered the explosion on the morning of January 2?
--Could the explosion have been contained?
--Why did it take so long to get the rescue operation launched?
--Were the mine rescue teams adequately equipped and supported?
--Was the command center properly organized and directed?
--Were all communications between the command center and the rescue
teams properly verified and logged?
--What caused the breakdown in communications at the mine?
--What caused the miscommunication to the miners' families?
--What were the reasons for the long delay in getting the facts to
them?
--What steps must be taken to ensure that such a dual catastrophe
will never occur again?
--Is the mine rescue system as effective as it should be?
--As we absorb the lessons of the Sago Mine Disaster, what additional
steps must be taken to better protect miners nationwide?
To help us address these questions, I am gratified that we are
receiving support from miners, mine rescue teams, miners' families,
mining companies, the United Mine Workers of America, Federal and State
agencies concerned with occupational safety and health, and the entire
West Virginia Congressional delegation.
And, because this disaster has touched everyone in West Virginia--
and indeed has affected so many people in Pennsylvania as well, and
throughout the coalfields of the United States--it is also gratifying
that we are being assisted by student volunteers at Wheeling Jesuit
University and West Virginia Wesleyan College and by engineering and
law students at West Virginia University. They are the future of our
state, and it is heartening that they have volunteered to help us build
a safer future for those who dig the coal that creates the energy to
drive our nation's economy.
Most of our investigative work is ahead of us, and I do not want to
pre-judge any part of that work or speculate about our findings and
recommendations. But at the outset I do want to emphasize four points.
First, we have nothing but praise for the mine rescue teams. I have
been in charge of such operations, and I know the demands that a mine
rescue makes on those who willingly risk their own lives to try to save
the lives of others. I'm not sure that anyone but a miner can truly
understand what it's like to go underground in the full awareness of
hazards seen and unseen that can instantly end your own life, and to go
anyway because there are miners trapped in there who are counting on
you to come after them. That is a good working definition of heroism,
and we will not second-guess anyone who went to the aid of the Sago
miners.
Second, we are going to get to the bottom of the Sago Mine
Disaster, but we are not going to scapegoat anyone who was on the
scene, including those who responded on behalf of MSHA and the West
Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training. It has been my
privilege to know and work with many of those involved, and I want to
say here that my strong belief, going in, is that the failures that
occurred at the Sago Mine were primarily failures of the mine safety
system, probably compounded by human fatigue and communications
confusion, rather than failures that are somehow attributable to the
personalities of those involved. These are good and competent people. I
will be enormously surprised, and deeply disappointed, if our inquiry
leads us to conclude otherwise about any of them. And we should all
respect the fact that they are grieving the loss of their brother
miners just as the miners' families are.
Third, every aspect of our investigation will be open to the
miners' families and the public. We will hold a public hearing in
Buckhannon, West Virginia, on or around March 1, and we may schedule
additional public hearings if needed. I can see no valid reason for
conducting any part of our investigation behind closed doors. We need
abundant sunshine to help determine what went wrong at the Sago Mine
and how to strengthen mine safety protection and enforcement.
Fourth, it is very clear that the nation has not invested as much
money and energy in the cause of coal mine safety as in the pursuit of
coal production and profits. That imbalance must be corrected, I
believe, if we are to recover from the Sago Mine Disaster by making the
mines of the United States as safe as they possibly can be made.
I do not subscribe to the fatalistic view that coal mining is so
inevitably dangerous that we must be willing to accept the loss of life
as part of the price of coal. Let me point out that there are
productive coal mines in West Virginia and elsewhere that have operated
for twenty, thirty, forty years without a disaster. Tough Federal
legislation, enacted in 1969 after the Farmington No. 9 Mine Disaster
and subsequently strengthened, has helped to drive down the frequency
of disasters and fatal injuries in the mines. And the best mine
managers today know full well that safety and productivity go hand in
hand.
But legislation must be diligently and aggressively enforced to
have meaning, and adequate funds must be committed to the protection of
miners--both in day-to-day enforcement and in the development and
implementation of technologies as advanced as those that we rely on in
other fields, such as reducing the hazards of air travel, pinpointing
the location of vehicles, or facilitating instantaneous, error-free
communication around the globe and in outer space.
In some industries, investing in state-of-the-art technologies is
considered to be just part of the cost of doing business, and it must
at long last be seen that way in mining as well. The energy industry
can well afford to partner with the government in ensuring that new
health and safety technologies are rapidly developed and put to work in
the nation's mines.
In 1995, we convened a conference on mine emergency preparedness at
MSHA's National Mine Health and Safety Academy in Beckley, West
Virginia. Out of that conference came many useful recommendations to
improve mine rescue technology and communications, and a number of
initiatives, including proposed regulatory changes, were subsequently
advanced. But I share Senator Byrd's concern, which he expressed last
week, that MSHA today may be ``under-staffed, under-funded, and under-
equipped.'' If that is true, it will be incumbent upon Congress to help
fix the problem, so that MSHA can guide the mining industry in creating
a truly modern model of mine safety.
I want to mention one initiative that deserves our immediate
attention and support regardless of the findings and recommendations
that may emerge from the various investigations.
It appears that precious time was lost on the morning of January 2
while company officials attempted to contact MSHA, and perhaps while
MSHA organized its response. That remains to be determined, but it is
clear that MSHA's emergency response system is outmoded. Mine emergency
communications need to be brought into this century, in part by
establishing, perhaps at MSHA's National Mine Health and Safety Academy
facilities, the equivalent of the nationwide 9-1-1 emergency system
that is used to rapidly dispatch emergency personnel and other first
responders. We should begin immediately to develop plans for such a
nationwide system and to set target dates for implementing it.
Governor Manchin is today introducing legislation to develop such a
system for West Virginia. I want to commend him for his leadership in
launching this initiative, and I hope that we will soon be able to
expand the 9-1-1 system to protect miners nationwide.
Again, I do not want to anticipate our investigation's findings and
recommendations, but I think it is already clear that certain other
safety improvements deserve priority consideration. These include:
--Technological advances in mine communications.--If the technology
can be developed to facilitate space exploration and to equip
consumers with the ability to instantaneously transmit and
receive information worldwide from their laptops, cellphones,
and BlackBerries, there is no question that mine communications
technologies can be brought out of the dark ages. The only
question is whether we have the will to make the necessary
commitment to research and development. It is imperative that
we make that commitment and find the funds to fulfill it.
--Improved mine safety equipment.--The Self-Contained Self-Rescuer
(SCSR), which provides an oxygen supply for at least one hour,
is a technology developed more than 50 years ago. The fight to
make the government require SCSRs took more than twelve years,
ending with the adoption of SCSR regulations in 1981, and the
sad fact is that there has been little industry support since
then for efforts to improve the SCSR so that it can sustain
life for longer periods of time. What is true of the SCSR is
true of mine safety technology in general. In the wake of the
Sago Mine Disaster an industry spokesman was quoted as saying
that it was not the industry's responsibility to develop new
safety equipment. ``We're not in the self-rescuer manufacturing
business,'' he reportedly said. That attitude harks back to the
19th century and has no place in the 21st. The industry may not
manufacture safety equipment, but going forward it has an
obligation to support accelerated research and development so
that technologies available elsewhere can be transferred to the
protection of miners with all deliberate speed.
--Improved mine emergency training.--There are fewer mine disasters
today than in the past. That is the good news. The bad news is
that in such a situation it is difficult for all involved in
mine safety to maintain a constant state of high readiness.
Mine safety officials and mine rescue teams are generally well
trained, but there are few opportunities for them to test their
training and proficiency in real-world situations. Among other
things, we need to look into the feasibility of augmenting
today's training systems and improving response times by
conducting emergency rescue drills at operating mines on a
surprise, unannounced basis. Doing so would, of course, involve
considerable expense and inconvenience in temporarily halting
production, simulating emergency conditions, and deploying mine
rescue teams and support personnel. But we need to consider the
trade-offs in improving emergency readiness. The paradox is
that the safer we can make mining, the more we need to be fully
prepared for something to go terribly wrong anyway. If, for
example, the explosion at the Sago Mine turns out to have been
triggered by an abnormally severe lightning strike, it will
underscore the probability that we can anticipate but not
entirely eliminate all hazards and must be ready--totally
ready--when they suddenly put miners' lives in peril. Given the
importance of those lives and our reliance on the coal they
mine for our use, anything less than state-of-the-art training
should not be acceptable.
I would add that there is also a need to address the issue of
information control at the mine site. The Sago Mine Disaster was the
first such emergency to occur in the cellphone era. While cellphones
may or may not prove to be implicated in the miscommunication that
occurred between the command center and the families waiting at the
Sago Baptist Church, the presence of numerous cellphones at the site
and the difficulty of controlling their use underscores the need to
ensure that rescue and recovery information is strictly confined to the
command center until it has been verified. This is not to suggest that
there should be an information blackout during future rescue and
recovery operations, but that only authenticated information about the
progress of such operations should be released, by authority of the
responsible official in charge of the command center.
Governor Manchin has repeatedly pledged that the miners who died in
the Sago Mine will not have died in vain. We can fulfill that pledge
only by diligently working to identify what went wrong and then by
taking every necessary step to fix what went wrong by improving the
safety and health protection of miners. Your decision to convene this
hearing reflects your commitment to this goal and should be applauded.
I look forward to sharing our investigative findings and to working
together in the months ahead to make America's mines safe.
I would be glad to answer any questions and to provide any
additional information that may be helpful to you. Thank you.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. McAteer. Our
final witness on this panel is Mr. Bruce Watzman, Vice
President for Safety, Health, and Human Resources for the
National Mining Association, appointed recently to the Mine
Safety and Health Research Advisory Committee, has
Undergraduate Degrees in Economics and Psychology, and a
Postgraduate Degree in Environmental Health Management. Thank
you for joining us today Mr. Watzman, and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE WATZMAN, VICE PRESIDENT, SAFETY AND
HEALTH, NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Watzman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the
National Mining Association, its member companies in coal and
mineral production, I too, once again, extend our heartfelt
sympathies to the families in West Virginia. These tragedies
leave no one in the industry untouched. The events have shaken
the mining community, and all committed to mine safety. We join
with others here today, to ensure that out of these tragedies,
will emerge a stronger resolve, and greater cooperation in the
pursuit of mine safety. Our expectation is that from this, and
similar hearings, and from the exhaustive investigations now
underway, we can do better, what we've tried to hard to do
well. It's in this spirit that I appear before this
subcommittee today, to offer information on where we have been,
and recommendations for what we can do to advance mine safety.
As this committee considers the recommendations as a result
of this hearing, I urge that we not create an atmosphere in
which the parties feel the need to retreat to their respective
corners of the ring, and defend themselves. Rather, let us
create an atmosphere where we come to the center of the ring,
stand together, and fight against the common enemy, workplace
accidents.
The coal mining industry takes seriously its commitment to
protect its workforce. Since the first oil embargo in 1970, the
coal industry has been called upon to provide more coal to meet
our energy's needs. We've answered that call while providing a
safer working environment for our workforce. Since 1970, coal
production has increased 83 percent, and mine fatalities have
decreased 92 percent. As we look at the first 5 years of the
21st century, we see a continuation of that trend that began in
early 1970's, safer coal mining. This demonstrates that safety
and productivity are not competing goals, but rather
complimentary goals. Working in what are inherently hostile
environments, today's mining companies have proven that a well
trained, experienced workforce, using state of the art
equipment, can accomplish the dual goals of working safely and
being productive, and yet, these accomplishments are diminished
by what remains to be done, and what NMA, and its members are
committed to working towards.
Following a tragedy such as these, these statistics
understandably pale before the names of those lost. The events
of recent weeks have strengthened our resolve to work harder,
and work smarter on mine safety. This effort must begin with a
close and comprehensive examination of current safety
practices, and procedures. Our ability to further advance coal
mine safety and health, will require an examination of the
structural and technologic hurdles that must be overcome. It
will require a commitment to identify, and foster the
development of 21st century technology that will perform
effectively and reliably in the mining environment.
Advances in technology have been integral to the safety
improvements thus far, and will contribute to further advances.
In pursuit of this goal, and to ensure a focused, and
transparent effort, this week, the National Mining Association
is announcing the formation of a National Safety Technology and
Training Commission. The Commission will be drawn from safety
experts for the purpose of examining technologies, emergency
response, rescue procedures, and rescue conditions in our
Nation's mines.
The Commission will be chaired by a recognized expert in
mine safety, Dr. Larry Grayson, Chairman and Professor of
Mining and Nuclear Engineering at the University of Missouri-
Rolla. The Commission will report its preliminary findings by
July 1, with a final report by the end of the year. We
anticipate it will examine among other things, current and new
promising technologies for communication, tracking miner
location, rescue technology, and the methods to more reliably
detect potential hazards.
This subcommittee is very aware of the need to maintain a
vibrant mining research program within the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health. The tragic events we've
witnessed underscore this need. The Federal Government has an
important role to play in technology development, and we urge
your continued support to strengthen this vital government
function. It's especially important for us to continue to work
together as partners, because as Mr. Roberts said, coal is an
industry with a changing face. Many of the people who joined in
the 1970's, and who have built a career producing America's
energy, are now retiring. We all must work together to develop
programs to train and educate a new generation of employees, so
that they can have a safe and productive career in an industry
vital to this country's energy markets, and national interests.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Before closing Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not
recognize the efforts of those who participated in the rescue
activities. The efforts of these brave and often unheralded
rescue team members cannot be minimized. We as an industry are
fortunate to have these people as part of our mining family. We
thank them for their service. Mr. Chairman, we stand in the
ring with you and the members of this subcommittee ready to
lead in the effort to advance coal mine safety. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Watzman
Good morning. My name is Bruce Watzman. I'm the Vice President for
Safety and Health for the National Mining Association.
On behalf of NMA and its member companies in coal and minerals
production, I extend, once again, our heartfelt sympathies to the
families who lost loved ones at the Sago mine.
This tragedy leaves no one involved with the industry untouched.
Anyone who has worked in a mine . . . or knows someone who does . . .
feels deep sorrow.
In addition, it compels all of us in the mining community to work
harder towards the one goal we all share--zero fatalities.
We join with others here today to ensure that out of this tragedy
will emerge a stronger resolve and greater cooperation in pursuit of
safer mines. Our expectation is that from this and similar hearings . .
. and from the exhaustive official investigation now underway . . . we
can do better what we've tried hard to do well.
It is in this spirit that I appear before this subcommittee today--
to offer information on where we have been and recommendations for what
we can do to advance mine safety.
As this committee considers the recommendations as a result of this
hearing, I urge that we not create an unproductive atmosphere in which
parties feel the need to retreat to their respective corners of the
ring and defend themselves. Rather, let us create an atmosphere where
we come to the center of the ring stand together and fight against a
common enemy--workplace accidents.
INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
The coal mining industry takes seriously its commitment to protect
its workforce. Since the first oil embargo in the early 1970s, the coal
industry has been called upon to provide more coal to meet our Nation's
energy requirements. We have answered that call while providing a safer
working environment for our workforce. Since 1970, coal production has
increased by 83 percent and coal mine fatalities have decreased by 92
percent.
As we look at the first five years of the 21st century we see a
continuation of the trend that began in the early 1970's--safer coal
mining.
This demonstrates that safety and productivity are not competing
goals, but rather complimentary goals. Working in what are inherently
hostile environments, today's mining companies have proven that a well-
trained, experienced workforce, using state-of-the-art equipment, can
accomplish the dual goals of working safely and being productive. And
yet these accomplishments are diminished by what remains to be done and
what NMA and its members are committed to working towards. Following a
tragedy such as this, these statistics understandably pale before the
names of those lost.
MINE SAFETY AND TECHNOLOGY
The events at the Sago Mine have strengthened our resolve to work
harder and work smarter at mine safety. This effort must begin with a
close and comprehensive examination of current safety and rescue
procedures. Concurrent with a well-trained workforce and state-of-the-
art equipment, the coal industry has incorporated safety management
into its business and moral ethic. Safety management comprises four
functions: prevention, detection, first response and sustained
response. These are not new to the coal industry; we've incorporated
them for decades as sound safety practice dictates.
Our ability to further advance coal mine safety and health will
require an examination of the structural and technologic hurdles that
must be overcome. It will require a commitment to identify and foster
the development of 21st century technology that will perform
effectively and reliably in the mining environment. Technologies such
as the introduction of remote control miners, integrated methane
monitors on mining equipment, atmospheric monitoring systems, longwall
mining systems and canopies on equipment are a few of the advances that
have contributed to the industry's improved safety record. Advances in
technology have been integral to our safety improvements thus far and
will, we believe, contribute to further improve mine safety in the
future.
MINE SAFETY COMMISSION FORMED
In pursuit of this goal and to ensure a focused and transparent
effort, this week the National Mining Association is announcing the
formation of a Mine Safety Technology and Training Commission. The
commission will be drawn from safety experts in academia, labor,
industry, and public and state agencies for the purpose of examining
safety technologies, emergency response and rescues procedures and
training regimes that could significantly enhance safety and rescue
conditions in our nation's underground coal mines. The commission will
be chaired by a recognized expert in mine safety, Dr. R. Larry Grayson,
chairman and professor of mining and nuclear engineering at the
University of Missouri-Rolla. Dr. Grayson will report the commission's
preliminary findings to the public and mine safety authorities by July
1, with a final report by the end of this year. We anticipate the
commission will examine, among other items, the current and new
promising technologies for mine communication, tracking miners'
locations, rescue technology and methods to more readily and reliably
detect potential safety hazards.
This subcommittee is very aware of the need to maintain a vibrant
mining research program within the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH). The tragic events at the Sago Mine
underscore this need. The Federal Government has an important role in
technology development--in order to bring safer, new devices to a
relatively small market for safety equipment. We urge your support to
strengthen this vital government function.
In addition to government participation, our industry will continue
to examine how new technology and training can be adapted to further
improve mine safety performance. We must continue to use the labor-
business-government model that has served us well in the past on coal
mine safety.
It is especially important for us to continue to work together as
partners because coal is an industry with a changing face. Many of the
people who joined this industry in the 1970s, and who have built a
career producing America's energy, are now retiring. We--government,
industry and workers--all must work together to develop programs to
train and educate a new generation of employees so that they can have a
safe and productive career in an industry vital to this country's
energy markets and national interests.
In conclusion, if we work together, as partners, and if we focus on
improvement we will continue to advance both the cause of mine safety
and the cause of energy security.
Before closing, Mr. Chairman, I would remiss if I did not recognize
the efforts of those who participated in the rescue activities at the
Sago Mine. The efforts of these brave and often unheralded rescue team
members cannot be minimized. We as an industry are fortunate to have
these brave individuals as a part of our mining family. We thank them
for their service.
We stand in the ring with you ready to lead in this effort to
advance coal mine safety.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Watzman. Before
proceeding to the 5 minute rounds for questions, I'd like to
place in the record the identities of the miners who've lost
their lives. Mr. Tom Anderson, Mr. Alva Bennett, Mr. James
Bennett, Mr. Jerry Groves, Mr. George Hamner, Jr., Mr. Terry
Helms, Mr. Jesse Jones, Mr. Dave Lewis, Mr. Marin Toler, Jr.,
Mr. Fred Ware, Mr. Jackie Weaver, Mr. Marshall Winans from the
Sago Mine, and also Mr. Randal McCloy, who is still
hospitalized in a light coma, and the fatalities from the Alma
Mine are Mr. Don Bragg and Mr. Ellery Hatfield. And on behalf
of this subcommittee, and the full committee, and the Senate,
and the whole Congress we express our sympathy to the families
of those individuals.
Let us proceed now, to the 5 minute rounds for members, and
let me begin with you Mr. Hatfield. What steps has the company
taken to compensate the families of the deceased miners?
Mr. Hatfield. That's an excellent question Senator. Let me
explain what we've taken to this point--the steps we have
taken, first, we immediately sent a letter to each of the
family members--surviving family members, confirming that the
funeral costs would be covered, and also confirming to the
families, the amount of the insurance coverage they would
receive, by virtue of our companies benefits program, and the
life insurance.
Senator Specter. How much is that insurance coverage?
Mr. Hatfield. It varies depending on the individual, from
$164,000 to nearly $300,000 per miner.
Senator Specter. What beyond that, will the company do for
the families?
Mr. Hatfield. Beyond that, recognizing that sometimes these
issues take awhile to work through the system, and the
insurance companies often need information that takes awhile to
provide, we immediately----
Senator Specter. I'm talking about the company's efforts
beyond the insurance companies.
Mr. Hatfield. We extended their salaries, they continued to
get paid today just as much as they earned when their husband
or brother was alive.
Senator Specter. How long will that last?
Mr. Hatfield. We have extended that for 6 months, to be
sure that it safely bridged the period of time when the life
insurance proceeds will be delivered, and when West Virginia
Worker's Compensation awards are available to the families.
Senator Specter. Anything beyond that?
Mr. Hatfield. We've also extended medical care, full
benefits, medical, vision, and dental through the entire COBRA
period of 18 months at no cost.
Senator Specter. Mr. Hatfield, let the subcommittee know
what, if any, additional benefits the company intends to
provide here.
Mr. Hatfield. We will certainly do so Senator.
Senator Specter. The issue Mr. Hamilton as you articulated,
is to commit whatever resources are needed, that's a pretty
broad statement, considering the necessary resources. We've
seen Mr. McAteer testify about certain devices which could be
very, very helpful. The thought crosses my mind, that the coal
companies have been very profitable lately. Energy is in big
demand. We know what has happened. Coal's an enormous resource.
What about a potential for a user fee? When we wrestle with the
budgetary problems, the allocations to the Department of Labor
are at risk with other very, very high priorities, Pell Grants,
Community Health Services, OSHA. What do you think Mr. Roberts,
about the possibility of imposing a user fee to deal with your
testimony about additional mine rescue teams, or what Mr.
McAteer testifies about additional equipment?
The real responsibility lies with the industry, as opposed
to the taxpayers generally, and if you have a user fee, it's
not subject to a one percent cut, it's not subject to
bargaining with Pell Grants, or scholarships, or health for
children. What do you think Mr. Roberts?
Mr. Roberts. Let me make a couple of comments if I might,
Senator, about that. One, is some of the suggestion is that
have been made here today, particularly with respect to oxygen
on the section. I believe that the cost of a canister is
somewhere around $3,500 to $5,000 it's in that range, depending
upon what type of oxygen you're talking about providing. The
cost of running an extra telephone line into the mines is
probably 10 cents, or 15 cents a foot, so those couple of
things are minimal cost.
I think the larger cost items going to get into--and let me
just make a comment if I might, about mine rescue teams, and
what the law says, and somehow we've strayed away from that,
and I do want to say, and he may be surprised by this, but Mr.
Hatfield commented in a press conference that he intended to
place onsite a mine rescue team, consisting of miners who
worked at that mine, and I think that is something that the law
says should be done. But over the years, we've gotten away from
that, and I think he's on the right track with respect to that.
The law says that there will be two teams at every mine, and
within 2 hours of the mine, but we don't require that to
happen.
Obviously since the--when the downturn in the economy hit
in the 1980's, we got away from some of this. But we, I think,
need to go back to a strict interpretation of the law. But to
answer your question, our union would support any actions to
fund protections for coal miners, because we should remember
one thing here today, I believe Senator, when the act was
passed in 1969, it said the coal miner was the most precious
resource in the mining industry. So, whatever steps we have to
take to protect the coal miners in this country, we should
take.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Roberts. The red light went
on in the middle of your testimony, so I would yield at this
time to Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Let me thank Governor Joe Manchin, his
efforts have been recognized here appropriately. He has left no
stone unturned in his desire to help the families of these
stricken miners, and to help the industry, and the other
elements that are working together to protect the coal miner.
He is doing everything he possibly can.
Let me also thank my colleagues, Senator Rockefeller, and
Congressman Ray Hall--Nick Ray Hall, they were at the scene,
they stayed at the scene. I also want to thank the other
members of the delegation for the support that they give to
coal mining, coal miners, and safety of coal miners, and I'm
talking about Mr. Mollohan, and I'm talking about Ms. Capito.
They are supporters of every feature of the law, and
appropriations that come before the Congress.
But let me say this too, I also want to thank the witnesses
here today who've come. You've given splendid testimony, and
you can give more in whatever you wish to put in writing for
the record of this committee. You can be sure that it will be
read, not just by the staff's of the Senator's, but by
Senator's themselves. I particularly call to the attention of
the committee that the members of the delegation would all like
to have been here, but for one reason or another, some of them
could not come.
My question would be to Mr. McAteer, what needs to be done
to get to the problem of habitual violators? Are the penalties
sufficient, or not? Do the fines need to be increased? What
suggestions do you have? What needs to be done to get to the
problem of habitual violators, they just pay the fine? That's
not enough; they go on with the violations. That happens, and
is happening. How do we get at this problem?
Mr. McAteer. Senator, thank you. Let me try to give two
parts of an answer. First, as has been mentioned here by
Senator Specter--Chairman Specter, that the price of coal has
increased dramatically, and the price of the penalties have not
increased dramatically, and as with all of us, unless it makes
a difference in our monetary budgets then penalties are below
what they need to be, don't have the impact that you want them
to have, and I'm afraid that situation is where we have it
today.
Second, with regard to the habitual violator, there is a
scheme, a pattern of violations scheme within the act, which
was enacted in 1969 and amended in 1977, which is an effort to
get at the--at that type of violator. That has had a limited
use in the past 5 years. The second part of it, it can be used
in several ways. It can be used one, as a notice to the
operator that that change needs to be made, and that by sending
the letter, and saying we're looking at you to put you on a
pattern, is one way to do it.
Another way to do it is to send an inspector with some
degree of regularity to the mine, and then the mine company
pays attention to the violations, because you have an inspector
there. The ultimate responsibility, as everyone has testified
here today though, rests with the mine operator. When you see
the violations increasing, when you see the citations
increasing, when you see the accidents rates increasing at the
mines, then you as the mine operator must take action, and we
the Federal Government and State government, have the
responsibility to urge, and encourage, and use penalties to
force that. But, it has to be on the part of the mine operator.
So, I would say yes to the increase in fines, and yes to
the increase in use of pattern of violations. That needs to be
done, and it needs to be done immediately.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Roberts, would you like to comment?
Mr. Roberts. I'd like to just add Senator, thank you for
the question, one thing to this issue of fines, its one thing
to issue fines and penalties, and quite frankly, we have a
number of Federal Inspectors out there who do a good job of
that. But if you do some investigating here, you're going to
find something. That on appeal, those fines are reduced to
almost nothing, and so there are two issues here.
One, what level should the fines be? But at the end of the
day, when coal companies do spend a lot of money on attorneys,
at the end of the day, if those fines get reduced to zero, the
issue that I would ask you to look at, as Jim Walters resources
in 2001 where 13 miners lost their lives, and the Government
assessed huge fines there, but they were dropped to nothing.
More or less, I think it was $3,000 dollars over a period of
time, through legal work, and appeals. There's something wrong
with the process when that can be allowed to happen.
Senator Byrd. A miner knows his work best. The Mine Act
guarantees every miner, union or non-union, the right to leave
a mine whenever he feels that his safety is threatened. How can
we ensure that miners feel that they're free to exercise that
right without fear of retribution? Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Senator Byrd. My response to that
question is you're absolutely correct; there are more than
adequate protections under the law. The law is crystal clear,
that every miner in every mine has the ability to personally
withdraw himself if he thinks that his personal safety is
jeopardized, or the safety of others is compromised.
I've been a coal miner, I've been around coal miners all my
life. They're a very strong, courageous people. I have seen
those rights exercised, and there are protections in the event
that someone wants to discriminate against a miner, or any
other person in our workforce for exercising those rights.
There are ample adequate protections there as well. Those
rights are exercised; those protections are clearly understood
by the men and women who mine coal. Again quite honestly,
there's an extraordinary skill, and qualification and maturity
level amongst the miners in West Virginia, and these miners
take great pride in their work, and if in fact there are unsafe
conditions, they report those unsafe conditions. If in fact
they cannot, or don't have the qualification to correct those
conditions initially on their own.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You've been very
liberal with your extension of time to me. I also again, want
to thank the witnesses. I think the testimony has been helpful,
and will be helpful. Thank you very much.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Senator Byrd. Senator Harkin.
Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Roberts, in
your testimony you said something--you didn't say it, but it's
in your testimony. I read it, it said just since August 2000,
MSHA has records of well over 400 mine fires, ignitions,
explosions, and inundations that far too easily could've
developed into significant disasters and fatalities. Many other
instances likely went unreported. Four hundred. Think about
that, 400. Then you went on to say miners should not have to
get sick, or to risk their lives just by going to work. Now,
that's kind of a straight forward statement. People shouldn't
have to risk their lives, or get sick just to go to work
everyday, and this is why I'm trying to get to Mr. McAteer.
The one basic point to make today for the reading, Mr.
Roberts, from your testimony, is that as a Nation, and as an
industry, we already posses the knowledge and the ability to
prevent most of the deaths that are still occurring in the coal
mining industry. What is needed is a real commitment by our
Government, in this case MSHA, to do better.
Senator Byrd. Amen.
Senator Harkin. You know, that really sums it up. Now, I go
to Mr. McAteer. Now you were there when I pointed out, that
this one regulation on the SCSR's--self contained devices--
rescue devices, you promulgated that, and I think what--1998
maybe, 1999--I'm sorry, I don't remember when. But, that was
the one I asked Mr. Dye about that was done away with in
December 2001, do you recall that?
Mr. McAteer. Yes, Senator.
Senator Harkin. Do you recall at that time, when it was
withdrawn? This proposed rule came under your jurisdiction, it
sat there, then it was withdrawn in December 2001. Do you
recollect at that time, what you might've been thinking, or did
you make any kind of statements at that time?
Mr. McAteer. Senator, we didn't withdraw. It was done after
I left.
Senator Harkin. That's what I mean, it was done in December
2001. You were gone at that time. I'm asking you, what did you
think about it at that time; you were gone at that time?
Mr. McAteer. If I could answer it in a little broader way,
I think it would be helpful to the senators. To place the self
contained, self rescuer devices in the mines in the 1980's,
took a lawsuit on behalf of the individual miners. The
companies who were making them said they had prototypes, but
not production models. The industry said we didn't have orders,
so we didn't order it, and the agency wouldn't promulgate the
rule.
We had the good fortune of going before Judge Higgenbotham,
who was up in Philadelphia in the Third Circuit, and Judge
Higgenbotham had been an engineer, and he said this is
nonsense, put the devices in the mines. But, it took a lawsuit
to get there. To try to enhance that--to try to enhance that
device and others, it takes a tremendous amount of work.
Unfortunately historically, our industry had not been the most
receptive to new devices, and now when it was withdrawn, I was
saddened. I was saddened because we don't have the process.
I must tell you, that NIOSH about 9 months ago, asked an
institution at the university that I work with, the National
Technology Transfer Center, that Senator Byrd has supported,
and asked them to help us look for improvements in the SCSR.
And in addition to that, NASA has agreed for us to look for new
technologies at that center.
Senator Harkin. Let me ask you about this tracking device,
where was it made--do you know where it's made? I think it's
made in Australia; I'll just answer my own darn question. You
say it's about $20?
Mr. McAteer. Something to that effect.
Senator Harkin. With this $20, you could locate any miner?
Mr. McAteer. There's a transponder that's stationed
throughout the mines, and then you can locate any individual,
at any time.
Senator Harkin. You know exactly where they are.
Mr. McAteer. That's correct.
Senator Harkin. $20. How many miners wear these, and take
these underground with them?
Mr. McAteer. Currently?
Senator Harkin. Yeah.
Mr. McAteer. I don't know. It's very, very small. Perhaps
none in this country.
Senator Harkin. Do you know Cecil?
Mr. Roberts. If I had to give you an answer, I'd say none.
Senator Harkin. $20, and in case a mine has two of the most
important things, communication, location, and where you are,
and how can we communicate? This tells you where you are. Now
you've got this device here. Now this was the text messaging,
is this the same device they used out in Utah, or do you know?
Mr. McAteer. That's correct sir.
Senator Harkin. This is what they used in Utah.
Mr. McAteer. Exactly that device. Yes sir.
Senator Harkin. It's got a battery, the message comes
through right there, so you can talk to one another, and
obviously I didn't know this, it also has a light too.
Obviously, you have to have a light to be able to----
Mr. McAteer. This is attached to the miners lamp, every
miner carries one of those.
Senator Harkin. The device is attached to the battery.
Mr. McAteer. The advance is that part on top, which gives
you ability to text message to the surface to the miner.
Senator Harkin. Right here?
Mr. McAteer. That's correct sir.
Senator Harkin. So you can tell them what to do. So now
you--with this, you know where they are. With this, you can
tell them what to do?
Mr. McAteer. That's right.
Senator Harkin. Those are available. Now how many miners
have this available to them?
Mr. McAteer. We believe--we've checked with the
manufacturer, and 14 mines in this country are using those.
Senator Harkin. 14 mines are using these.
Senator Byrd. Out of how many?
Senator Harkin. Out of how many mines?
Mr. McAteer. 15,000.
Senator Harkin. 14 out of 15,000?
Mr. McAteer. That's with metal and nonmetal, if you can't
metal, nonmetal at the locations, as well as coal locations.
Senator Harkin. You said it would cost about $100,000 a
mine to hook that up, that sounded high to me, because I know
about the antenna loops that go with it, and that seemed to be
kind of high, just putting in an antenna.
Mr. McAteer. That's the manufacturer--gave us that amount,
and said that is the high end.
Senator Harkin. That sounds like a high end to me.
Mr. McAteer. It's not that much, but I'm suggesting to you
that that would be the size of the Sago Mine, $100,000.
Senator Harkin. That would be the loop, and buying these
devices for every miner?
Mr. McAteer. Yes sir, I'm sorry. That's the entire
installment. That's what they told us.
Senator Harkin. It seems like a small price to pay per
mine.
Mr. McAteer. Yes it is.
Senator Harkin. How many miners at Sago? How many miners?
Mr. McAteer. 150.
Mr. Hatfield. Approximately 150.
Senator Harkin. So, 150. You're talking about less than a
$1,000, $750 per miner to be able to have communications, $20
to tell us where they are. It seems to me, this is the
investment we ought to be making. I can't believe in this day
and age with the technology that we have, even with the oxygen
breathing devices, we know we can develop oxygen breathing
devices that are longer than an hour. Much longer than an hour.
Why aren't we doing it?
Mr. Roberts said a miner shouldn't have to get sick, or
fear death just to go to work everyday. This is just--I don't
know Mr. Chairman, it just seems to me that you hate to
regulate everything, but doggone it, if they won't do it, we
got to tell them to do it. It seems to me, this is something
that every miner ought to have available, period. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Senator Harkin. Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McAteer, you
did describe in your written testimony how the technology for
this self contained, self rescuers, which provides oxygen
supply for an hour, was developed more than 50 years ago.
Mr. McAteer. That's correct.
Senator DeWine. Could you tell us a little bit, where is
that technology now, and where should it be going, and what's
the potential here, and maybe Mr. Roberts, you could comment as
well. You talked a little bit about where it ought to be, and
I'd like for you to comment--one of you, then the other, then I
have a couple of other questions if you can do it real quick.
Mr. McAteer. Yes sir. There are two types of technology,
bottle oxygen and potassium super oxide--a device that you
breathe into, and it gives you back oxygen. Those two
technologies are advanced. We have them, we are examining under
this NIOSH grant, the industry where those are, and what
advances have been made. We think there has not been a large
expenditure of funds on new technologies. We think that there
are some advances that we can bring in, and we can add numbers
of ours. I can't tell you what the outside limit of that would
be, but we believe that we could give you longer periods of
time, for less weight, which is one of the problems. The
advances that we are putting in place in West Virginia today
are to add devices, so that you can carry two or three, and get
from one location to another.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Roberts, do you want to comment about
that, and also while I've got you, let me just say you're
testimony was very concise, very good, very helpful. If you had
to prioritize, what would you prioritize? Give me one, two,
three, four.
Mr. Roberts. The most immediate thing we could do, I
believe, to give the miners the best opportunity to survive,
and I think that is where we have to start, is to immediately
put additional oxygen devices underground. That is point one.
Point number two, and I don't want to speculate on what
could've happened, but I think I heard Mr. Hatfield say
something similar to this, I think experts looking at this will
tell you if there had been an ability to talk to these miners,
I probably would've told them, you're best opportunity for
survival is to leave, and we could've even sent mine rescue
teams toward them, as they walked outside. Perhaps, we would've
had more miracles here today.
So, I would start with the oxygen, I would go to the
communications, and we have to Senator, begin right this minute
to deal with this mine rescue team, because Mr. McAteer talked
about 1995 when he brought all of the people together in this
industry, I would submit to him, and to you, and to everyone
else the problem is worse right now, than it was in 1995 when
he knew then that we had a problem. The problem is much, much
worse. We have difficulty finding enough mine rescue teams in
these disasters to deal with these problems.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Hatfield, let me ask you, did you have
any difficulty in contacting the Federal Government for rescue
assistance on the day of the accident, and how would you
preliminarily assess their involvement in the rescue and
recovery efforts?
Mr. Hatfield. Senator, we did have some initial difficulty,
because of the nature of the holiday season, in that our first
calls to the various offices were going into a voicemail and
the like, but there were messages on those voicemails that gave
us alternate numbers to call, and so the process took a little
longer than it might otherwise have. But, we were on the phone
with the State regulators by I think around 7:50, and we had
contacted MSHA by about 8:28.
Senator DeWine. You lost a little time.
Mr. Hatfield. We lost a little time, but they were
responsive through cell phones and home numbers, because these
are mining professionals, they want to be available. They
always give contact numbers; it just took us a little while
longer to get there.
Senator DeWine. I wanted to make sure we understood what
the situation was there. Mr. McAteer, where's the
responsibility now? Where do we go in regard to the different
technology that you've talked about? How does this get done?
We've talked about several different technologies, how do we
move forward now?
Mr. McAteer. Senator DeWine, that's the problem. You put
your finger on a problem. We have not spent the money, neither
the industry, nor the Federal Government has spent the dollars
necessary to advance the technology, and we need to do that. I
think both the industry and the government, at a Federal and
State level need to be doing that to see that that happens.
This Australian device I mentioned grew out of research
that was done after mine disasters in Australia, and that was
paid for by the Australian Government. But I think we have this
problem here, where we have a gap, and we don't have the kind
of enhancements in technology that we should be doing, and it's
not on a continuing basis. We might do it for one thing like
the SCSR, but then there's never--we don't advance it, and we
don't bring in technologies from NASA, the Department of
Defense into the mining community.
Robots for example, that can go on the moon, we've tried to
introduce into mine rescue systems, because it's better to send
a robot down, then your not so much concerned about the fires
and the explosions. But we have only used that on one or two
occasions, and we haven't made the enhancements, and it's
expensive, but we haven't made the advancements that we need to
be making in that area.
Senator DeWine. I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Specter. Well, thank you very much gentlemen.
Mr. Hatfield. Mr. Chairman, Ben Hatfield. Could I ask the
indulgence of the committee to make a brief comment on the
technology, because we certainly share that interest with you.
Senator Specter. Go ahead Mr. Hatfield.
Mr. Hatfield. The PED system Mr. McAteer has referred to,
has certainly holds much promise. Indeed, we have that system
installed at our Illinois Mine, the Viper Mine, and have seen
some success with it. The couple of limitations that certainly
we want to focus on in moving forward with this effort is that
it's a one way communication. There are reliability issues. But
first and foremost, with respect to the Sago incident, we have
not found the technology yet, that will allow us to communicate
through 300 feet of rock. When you don't have a line on sight,
unless there's a cable or an antenna that goes underground, and
there's the challenge. Because in an explosion--the nature of
the Sago explosion, it obliterates everything in its path.
Antennas and cables were immediately gone in an instant, and
that is the challenge for the technology advancement efforts
here to find ways, do not rely on things that are going to be
damaged in an explosion, and that's something we certainly want
you to understand. But our Viper Mine in Illinois is making use
of this system, and I think it does hold significant promise.
I would also like to clarify, and apologize for my earlier
answer to you, not being as thorough as it should have been.
One other step that International Coal Group has taken with
respect to helping the Sago families is the establishment of
the Sago Mine Fund. We made our own initial contribution of $2
million, and that fund, through the generosity of many others
across the country, has already $20 million, and that is
exclusively dedicated for the benefit of the Sago victims, and
we expect that fund to continue growing. Thank you.
A letter from Senator Durbin asking about the safety of the
Viper Coal mine, with my response follows:
United States Senate,
Washington, DC, January 8, 2006.
Bennett K. Hatfield, President and CEO, International Coal Group, 2000
Ashland Drive Ashland, KY.
Dear Mr. Hatfield: I am writing to you to determine the safety
condition of the Viper Coal Mine in Williamsville, Illinois that is
owned by your International Coal Group (ICG). It has come to my
attention that the Viper Mine is one of 12 coal mines that the ICG owns
and operates, including the Sago Coal Mine in West Virginia where a
mine accident recently killed 12 employees.
I am deeply saddened by the tragic loss of life in West Virginia.
Like many others, I also am disturbed by the egregious number of
citations issued to the Sago Coal Mine in the year prior to the mine
accident for ``serious and significant'' violations of Federal safety
laws. Coal miners accept that their occupation is risky. But they have
a right to expect that their employer will put safety ahead of other
considerations, and the ICG has a moral obligation to ensure that
unsafe practices are scrupulously identified, promptly corrected, and
proactively avoided. The ICUs safety record at the Sago Mine raises
questions about the company's commitment to safety. Moreover, Federal
regulators appear to be unable to prevent companies from amassing large
quantities of safety violations.
According to Mine Safety and Health Administration records, the
Viper Mine in IIlinois was cited for 42 ``serious and significant''
violations out of 124 total citations in 2005, which was the f rst full
calendar year in which the ICG owned the mine. It is my hope that the
Sago disaster was an isolated incident and does not reflect a pattern
of mismanagement by the ICG and unsafe conditions at the Viper Mine.
At a time like this, the burden is on the ICG and our nation's
regulatory authorities to ensure that the ICG is properly and safely
managing its mine in Illinois, Please provide to me and the people
whose lives are affected by operations at the Viper Mine a safety
status report on the Viper Mine. In addition, please include the safety
record of the mine since the ICG purchased the operation and the extent
of any steps the ICG has taken to address past safety violations and
what the ICG plans to do to prevent them in the future.
Thank you for your time and attention to this matter. I look
forward to hearing from you within the next month.
Sincerely,
Richard J. Durbin,
U.S. Senator.
International Coal Group, Inc.,
Ashland, KY, January 16, 2006.
Hon. Senator Richard J. Durbin,
U.S. Senate, 332 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.
20510-1304.
Re: Your letter of January 8, 2006 regarding ICG Illinois, LLC's Viper
Mine
Dear Senator Durbin: Thank you for your concern for the safety of
the employees at the ICG Illinois, LLC (``ICG Illinois'') Viper Mine.
Although your interest in mine safety at Viper seems to have been
prompted by the Sago mine disaster at an affiliated subsidiary of ICG
Illinois' parent company, International Coal Group Inc. (ICG), I am
pleased to have an opportunity to introduce you to ICG's and ICG
Illinois' commitment to workplace safety.
Misapprehension of the facts about ICG subsidiary safety records is
understandable given the recent media-induced rush to judgment about
the safety record at the Sago Mine, with no meaningful review of that
record, or discussion of safety at ICG subsidiaries as a whole. The ICG
family continues to grieve concerning the devastating Sago tragedy. Our
thoughts and prayers remain with the families of the miners who lost
their lives and to the single survivor, Randal McCloy, Jr., and his
family.
To give you a more balanced appreciation of ICG's overall safety
record and commitment, I am attaching a one page summary of the
numerous safety nominations and awards ICG subsidiaries received in
2004 and 2005. (See Attachment A). I would especially like to bring
your attention to the Sentinels of Safety Award won by ICG Knott
County, LLC (ICG Knott County) in 2004. This is the premier mine safety
award in the nation. The Sentinels of Safety Award is an incredibly
prestigious safety award with an 85 year lineage, originating under the
presidency of Herbert Hoover. Simply put, ICG Knott County's Clean
Energy Underground Mine was the safest underground mine in the large
mine category in the entire U.S. during 2004. The Clean Energy Mine had
128,525 manhours of operation without a single loss time accident in
2004. Needless to say, ICG is extremely proud of Clean Energy's safety
accomplishments, and its safety performance is a model ICG strives to
emulate at all of its subsidiary operations.
ICG Illinois purchased the Viper Mine from the bankrupt and now
defunct Horizon Natural Resources Company on September 30, 2004. Over
the past fifteen months ICG Illinois has invested over eleven million
dollars ($11,000,000) of capital in the Viper Mine, including upgrades
to the mine's carbon monoxide (CO) monitoring system, the underground
communications system, a new rock-dust system, addition of a second
mine master supply system for both production and fire fighting, and
upgrades to other underground equipment.
The Viper Mine is well known for its immediate response to both
State and Federal regulatory directives during inspections. In 2005
MSHA conducted 257 inspection shifts at the Viper Mine and the State of
Illinois over 40 inspection shifts. The MSHA district inspectors and
State inspectors are highly regarded for their expertise in the mining
industry. The Viper mine enjoys a positive, constructive relationship
with both agencies.
Viper's employees are well trained, well educated coal miners who
understand safety. Each employee is aware that, if necessary, they are
authorized to shut down all or any part of the mine if an unsafe
condition is identified. Employees may also address concerns
anonymously. An employee can also contact the Illinois Department of
Natural Resources (IDNR) directly or call MSHA's hotline. International
Coal Group also has provided every employee a card with a hotline to
call to report safety concerns, environmental issues, harassment,
discrimination or other concerns.
In fact, Viper is proud to host a fully certified ``Mine Rescue
Team''. As you may know, the Viper Mine Rescue Team was one of the
teams that was dispatched to the Sago site and, while putting their own
lives at risk, proudly took part in the attempt to rescue the trapped
miners.
Regarding your concerns about safety citations, please refer to the
tabulated data below. This list consists of safety data for nine of the
older, larger Illinois underground coal mines for 2005. As you can
clearly see, the Viper mine ranks at the top of its peer group.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
citations
Mine Employees Total significant
citations and
substantial
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Viper............................ 243 124 42
Mine A........................... 341 138 52
Mine B........................... 229 167 81
Mine C........................... 151 184 50
Mine D........................... 277 173 42
Mine E........................... 221 227 105
Mine F........................... 383 397 112
Mine G........................... 253 777 277
Mine H........................... 867 1,456 389
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A serious infraction that would jeopardize miner's lives or could
cause a disaster results in a closure order by State or Federal
authorities which remains in place until the infraction is corrected.
The larger a mine becomes, the more area there is to inspect for safe
working conditions, with size accordingly increasing the number of
inspection shifts per year. For example the Viper Mine has four
operating sections and over ten miles of conveyor belts transporting
the coal out of the mine, thus resulting in a rather high number of
inspection shifts.
In December of last year, I presented my vision of ICG to our
operating subsidiary management. A critical component to this vision
includes being the employer of choice by providing employees a safe,
secure, competitive paying job where they are treated with respect.
I extend an open invitation to you to visit the ICG Illinois Viper
Mine to see first hand ICG's and ICG Illinois' commitment to the safety
of its employees. I am confident that your doing so will convince you,
even more than what I have shared with you in this letter, that the
attacks upon ICG's safety commitment are unwarranted.
ICG Illinois, like all other ICG subsidiaries, will continue to
operate the Viper Mine with a meaningful ``Safety First'' philosophy
and practice. It is our principal priority for protecting our most
valuable resource--our employees.
Thank you for the opportunity to share with you ICG's safety
accomplishments and its safety commitment. Should you have any further
questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Very truly yours,
Bennett K. Hatfield,
President and CEO.
SAFETY AWARDS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Subsidiary Unit Award Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004................................. ICG Addcar Systems, LLC. Bridger Highwall Miner Operation--Perfect
Safety Record for 59,759 Man-hours with no
LTA's in 2004, presented by the State of
Wyoming.
2004................................. ICG Addcar Systems, LLC. Bridger Highwall Miner Operation--Nominated for
a Sentinels of Safety Award for having no
LTA's in 2004.
2004................................. ICG Eastern, LLC........ Birch River Preparation Plant--Safety
Achievement for 2,257 Days Without an LTA,
presented by the State of West Virginia.
2004................................. ICG Hazard, LLC......... County Line Mine--Nominated for a Sentinels of
Safety Award for having no LTA's in 2004.
2004................................. ICG Hazard, LLC......... Rowdy Gap Mine--Nominated for a Sentinels of
Safety Award for having no LTA's in 2004.
2004................................. ICG Hazard, LLC......... Thunder Ridge Surface Mine--Surface Safety
Award, presented by the Kentucky Coal
Association.
2004................................. ICG Hazard, LLC......... Tip Top Mine--Nominated for a Sentinels of
Safety Award for having no LTA's in 2004.
2004................................. ICG Knott County, LLC... Clean Energy Mine received the Kentucky Coal
Association's Surface Safety Award for the
best underground mine in Hazard District.
2004................................. ICG Knott County, LLC... Clean Energy Underground Mine--The 2004
Sentinels of Safety Award for the Safest
Underground Mine in the United States,
presented by the National Mining Association
and MSHA.
2004................................. ICG Knott County, LLC... Classic Underground Mine--Best Safety Record in
Martin County, presented by the Kentucky
Office of Mine Safety.
2004................................. Sentinel................ Sentinel Preparation Plant--Best Safety Record
in 2004, presented by West Virginia Holmes
Safety Association.
2005................................. Vindex Energy........... Vindex Douglas Surface Operations--Safest Mine
in the State of Maryland for 2005, presented
by the Maryland Coal Association.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Specter. Well thank you, Mr. Hatfield. I'm a little
disappointed and a little surprised to note that Mr. Dye and
Mr. McKinney have departed the premises, so we're going to ask
Mr. Friend and Mr. Clair to supplement for the record on a
number of questions. We note, that consistent with what Mr.
Roberts testified to, when there was a fine imposed on the
Alabama incident where 13 miners were killed in December of
2001, a fine was imposed of $435,000, and that an
administrative law judge reduced it to $3,000, and a number of
us wrote a letter to the Secretary of Labor, dated November 22,
2005, protesting that, and asking that an appeal be taken, and
without objection, that will be made a part of the record.
[The letter follows:]
United States Senate,
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
Washington, DC, November 22, 2005.
Hon. Elaine Chao, Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Chao: We are writing to express our deep concern
about the recent decision of the Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission to drastically reduce the fines sought by the department
against Jim Walter Resources, Inc., in the case involving the deaths of
thirteen miners at Blue Creek No. 5 Mine in Brookwood, Alabama.
We urge you to appeal that decision. The men and women working in
America's mines do so in an extremely hazardous environment and they
are entitled to vigorous enforcement of the Federal workplace safety
laws. In the tragic explosion at Blue Creek, our Nation's deadliest
mine disaster in over 20 years, the Mine Safety and Health
Administration sought fines of $435,000. Fines of this level were
clearly justified due to Walter Resources' long history of safety
violations which led to perilous, and ultimately fatal, workplace
conditions.
Incredibly, however, on November 1, an Administrative Law Judge
reduced these fines from $435,000 to a mere $3,000--a decision that
harms workers and erodes MSHA's authority to protect the health and
safety of America's miners.
President Bush has clearly recognized the importance of fines in
deterring safety violations and enforcing worker safety laws with his
budget request for fiscal year 2005 to increase the monetary penalties
imposed by MSHA. We urge you to appeal the unfortunate decision in the
Blue Creek Mine case, and we look forward to hearing from you about
your action.
Sincerely,
Arlen Specter,
John D. Rockefeller IV,
Edward M. Kennedy, and
Robert C. Byrd.
Senator Specter. The subcommittee would like to know what
has happened on that. Other questions, which we had intended to
press on Mr. Dye, where reportedly 16 failures over the last 2
years at Sago, were seriousness enough to be designated as
``unwarrantable failures'' which has been defined as
``aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary
negligence'', and we would like to have a specification for
what they were, and whether there was any cause of the effect.
We've also noted the reduction in the number of criminal
prosecutions recommended from 38 in the year 2000, to 12 in the
year 2004. We would like to have some specification as to what
the recommendations there were on criminal prosecutions.
One other question that we have for Mr. Dye, we note that
he's the Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor, and of course the
Assistant Secretary is a confirmable position, confirmable by
the Senate, and I'd be interested to know if Mr. Dye has any
aspirations to move from Acting Secretary to Secretary of the
Department. We will be pursuing these issues further. There
have been a number of suggestions made as to possible
legislative action. The act, we're informed, requires the
company to be present at the time that witnesses are
interviewed. My own instinct is that they ought to be
interviewed privately, to have the maximum freedom in answering
questions.
May the record show a couple of nods from the panel, Mr.
McAteer and Mr. Roberts. We're going to explore the issue of
increased penalties.
Senator Byrd. Were the nods, Mr. Chairman, affirmative
nods, or negative?
Senator Specter. Affirmative nods. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Do you think I would've commented if they'd been negative nods?
You didn't nod Mr. Hatfield, what do you think about having
a requirement that the company representative be present at the
time witnesses are questioned? Isn't that a little
intimidating?
Mr. Hatfield. Well I don't think so, because again, we've
been very open with our people about what we know about the
investigation, and have encouraged them to speak out.
Senator Specter. There's nothing to stop the company from
interviewing them. There's nothing to stop anybody from
interviewing anybody. Nobody has to answer a question, unless
they're under a subpoena. You don't even have to answer a
question if the subcommittee asks you to stay, you could just
walk right out.
Anybody can ask anybody about everything, but nobody has to
answer, unless there is a subpoena, because with subpoena you
don't have to answer either if you take the privilege against
self incrimination, plus your granted immunity. But why should
an employee have to have a company official present? The
possibility of retaliation, I know your company wouldn't, but
some company might. What do you think?
Mr. Hatfield. I can't speak with any knowledge as to what
brought the rules to the position they're in, but I can speak
on behalf of my company, that we certainly have no fear of
leaving the interviews directly between the government
representatives, and our people. We've encouraged them to be
very open and honest with everything we know, and we certainly
willing to absent ourselves from all the interviews, so long as
the people interviewing our people, are truly the Mine Safety
and Health Administration group, and the West Virginia
Department of Miner Health and Safety.
Senator Specter. A second item, we're going to look at
increased penalties. I'll give you a chance to reply to that
Mr. Hatfield if you want to. Do you think it would be time to
increase the penalties, perhaps commensurate with the increase
coal prices?
Mr. Hatfield. I think it's certainly a reasonable area of
review. We have no objection whatsoever to review of the
penalties, because I suspect they've not been visited in some
time. But I would echo a comment that made by Mr. Dye earlier,
that real penalty is the threat of shutting down a production
section because that gets far beyond the fine level.
Senator Specter. I was just about to come to that. Do you
endorse that?
Mr. Hatfield. I believe that is an appropriate tool for
enforcers and regulators to use, and we certainly saw it used
at the Sago Mine, and other mines. Yes sir.
Senator Specter. How about the idea of user fees on the
mines to pay for all of these investigations, and rescue teams,
and all of the other safety procedures which may be an order?
They really go to the benefit of the mine companies that earn
the profit. What do you think about a user fee?
Mr. Hatfield. I think it's certainly an area that is worth
looking into. I don't know many of the facts, or the premises,
but certainly it's an area that's fair for discussion, and
advancement.
Senator Specter. How about Senator Harkin's photo op with
this orange mechanism, do you think they ought to be required?
Mr. Hatfield. I think that's remarkable opportunity.
Senator Specter. I take that to be a yes. But one other
thing we're going to do, is ask the GAO to undertake a follow-
up study. At the request of the subcommittee, and others, we
made that request of GAO in November 2002, and they filed a
report in September 2003, and we're going to request a follow-
up study of the September 2003 mine safety report focusing on
underground coal mines. Anybody on the panel, do the Senators
have any further questions they'd like to ask at this time?
Senator Byrd. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if you will. Mine safety
is a moral imperative. These miners are not to be considered
expendable. What do we need to do right now to ensure a tough
enforcement? Now there's been some talk about penalties, what
do you think of assessing penalties as a percentage of the
profits? What do you think of companies paying fines up front,
so that penalties cannot be reduced by negotiation? Does
anybody want to volunteer to respond? Mr. Roberts.
Mr. Roberts. I think we have a long history of support for
the toughest enforcement possible. It's our view that complying
with the law does not interfere with profits whatsoever. If
you're running a safe mine, you have nothing to fear. From
increased fines, we also would encourage that these fines could
not be dramatically reduced on appeal, as has happened time,
and time, and time again. I think that point that was made by
Senator Specter, with respect to shutting down mines, I think
that's the ultimate weapon in the hands of MSHA Inspectors, and
I think that Congress should mandate that the law that was
passed 1969, and was amended in 1977, be complied with.
Senator Byrd. Anybody else want to comment?
Mr. McAteer. If I might Senator. We have a good law on the
books. It is a law that has an enforcement aspect of it that is
quite strong. In recent times, that enforcement aspect has not
been emphasized as much as has cooperation. Now there's nothing
wrong with cooperation, and I'm in favor of it, and I think it
should be, but to do that and to diminish enforcement while
cooperation takes precedence, I think is an unfortunate turn of
events, and is not what this Congress, when it passed the law
in 1969, and amended in 1977, had in mind.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to say again, I
think this has been helpful. Where is the point that we should
attack? Should it be the Federal agency that oversees safety?
Is that where the problem is? I think there ought to be
stricter enforcement. There ought to be assurance that the
agency will do its best to do its duty.
It seems to me that there is a kind of a mental attitude
here, and mind set that yes, it is dangerous, mining is
dangerous, but these violations will pay the fines, but maybe
they can be negotiated downward, we'll just keep on doing it. I
think there ought to be tough enforcement with this idea in the
background that we're going to close you down. Why shouldn't
this mine have been closed down? Does anyone want to respond?
Mr. Roberts. It is the question, should the Sago Mine--I
think in trying to be as fair as I can be, and as objective as
I can be, I think it would be until a complete investigation is
completed, perhaps we don't know the answer to that, but I do
support Senator, as I have just previously said, that if there
is a pattern here, which is part of the law that was alluded to
previously, I think that is the ultimate penalty, and it should
be carried forward.
Senator Byrd. Mr. McAteer, did you want to respond to Mr.
Hatfield's remarks regarding the reliability of safety devices?
Mr. McAteer. Yes, I do Senator, and I have to take
exception to his remarks. These devices have proved to be
reliable. They are not perfect. It would be, in a perfect
world, better to have a device that could communicate both
ways. This device communicates one way, it is a step. The way
we improve technology in this country, is not--the perfect is
the enemy of the good. We have to put in what we have, and get
them there, and then make that very next step, and
unfortunately Mr. Hatfield's comments are suggestive of what
we've worked with in the past. Some in the industry have had an
attitude of suggesting that they won't take that step. They'll
wait until the perfect is in place, and that day never comes.
That's the unfortunate part of our situation at the present
time.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Hatfield, did you want to take 30 seconds
for any response to what has been said?
Mr. Hatfield. I certainly agree with Mr. McAteer's point
that we can't wait until the solution is perfect to implement
it. I don't think any of us around this table believe we can
wait for perfection. We've got to make our coal miners safer
today, and that's got to be the utmost priority. But, I believe
we continue to have to deal with the challenge of how do you
keep an explosion from blasting away the antennas, and the
cables, and everything else that we use to support these
systems, and still maintain that line of communication through
300 feet of rock. I'm only pointing out there are technical
issues that we need to move forward with, and that's the first
one to tackle, and we certainly want to tackle it.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Mr. McAteer. If I could on that question, there is no
question that part of the mine is destroyed in an explosion,
and at the time of an explosion, part of the mine is not
destroyed at the time of the explosion. The concept behind the
internet is that we have multiple nodes, so if part of it goes
down, all of it doesn't go down. That's the concept that we
need to adopt in the mines, multiple redundant systems that can
be overlaid. In the case of the transponder, and this device
here, the mine company--the Australian mine company that puts
this together has suggested, that if you lose communication
they can take a loop antenna, and put it on the surface, and
then you can reignite the ability to communicate underground
from the surface, and they've done that in other countries.
Redundancy.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd. Senator
Harkin, did you have anything else?
Senator Harkin. No. Just when you were speaking Mr.
Hatfield, I thought about redundancy. That is what you do, you
build in redundancy, and there may be some technologies I'm not
aware of. I'm not aware of this surface device you're talking
about, but I'm sure there are new technologies out there of
which I'm totally unaware of that help.
Mr. Hatfield. I thoroughly agree. Redundancy can be part of
the solution.
Senator Specter. Redundancy is something Senator's know a
lot about.
Well, thank you very much. Mr. Hatfield, Mr. McAteer, Mr.
Hamilton, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Watzman, thank you very much for
coming in today, and we will be pursuing the matter, I know all
of you will be too.
ADDITIONAL PREPARED STATEMENT
The subcommittee has have received a prepared statement
from the National Stone Sand & Gravel Association that will be
included in the record at this point.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Hawkins, III, CAE Executive Vice
President and COO, National Stone Sand & Gravel Association
Mr. Chairman, the National Stone Sand & Gravel Association (NSSGA)
appreciates the opportunity to submit a statement for the record of
this oversight hearing on the Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) and its regulatory and enforcement programs.
Based near the nation's capital, NSSGA is the world's largest
mining association by product volume. Its member companies represent
more than 90 percent of the crushed stone and 70 percent of the sand
and gravel produced annually in the United States and approximately
115,000 working men and women in the aggregates industry. Sale of
natural aggregates (crushed stone, sand and gravel) generates nearly
$38 billion annually for the U.S. economy. The estimated output of
aggregates produced in the first half of 2005 was 1.3 billion metric
tons, a four percent increase over the same period in 2004 (2.85 b MT).
According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the significant increases in
aggregates production were due to the increase in construction
activity, which has risen every year for the past decade. Construction
spending amounted to $617.9 billion during the first half of 2005, a
nine percent increase over the same period in 2004.
Aggregates are used in nearly all residential, commercial and
industrial building construction and in most public works projects,
such as roads, highways, bridges, railroad beds, dams, airports, water
and sewage treatment plants and tunnels. While the American public pays
little attention to these raw natural materials, they go into the
manufacture of asphalt, concrete, glass, paper, paint, pharmaceuticals,
cosmetics, chewing gum, household cleansers, and many other consumer
goods.
The events in the Sago Mine and Aracoma Coal Alma No. 1 Mine
disasters are tragic and the loss of even one life, let alone 14 lives,
is devastating. Nevertheless, the safety record of the mining industry,
and the aggregates industry in particular, has improved due to a
heightened level of effort invested by the industry to sustain an
improved performance. The improvement in the aggregates industry safety
record is attributable to a combination of more effective safety and
health programs developed and implemented by the industry over the past
decade in response to increased Mine Safety and Health Administration
regulation of the mining industry and heightened enforcement.
The first priority for the aggregates industry is and will continue
to be the safety and health of its miners. The industry recognizes that
its employees are its most valuable asset, an asset that must be
protected for the well being of the industry now and in the future. As
the workforce ages, it has become increasingly difficult to recruit new
miners to the industry. Maintaining an excellent safety record through
the implementation of effective safety and health programs is
considered a critical element for attracting and keeping a highly
skilled workforce. Members of the National Stone, Sand & Gravel
Association have developed and agreed to a set of guiding principles to
assist member companies in their efforts to understand the importance
of safety to their individual organizations as well as to the industry
as a whole. In addition, a safety pledge was developed in 2002
incorporating the safety guiding principles. More than 90 percent of
the operations of NSSGA member companies are now covered by this
pledge, signifying the importance of safety and a commitment toward
ensuring the safety and health of all their employees.
Recent news articles have ascribed some of the responsibility for
the Sago incident to the cooperative alliances MSHA has signed with the
industries it regulates, implying an inappropriately close
relationship. We would argue the opposite. The NSSGA and MSHA
formalized the first such alliance in 2002, setting forth a cooperative
agreement to develop programs and tools for the improvement of safety
and health in the aggregates industry. The resulting reduced incidence
rates speak for themselves.
It should also be noted that MSHA has similar alliances with labor
organizations, including the International Association of Bridge,
Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers and the
International Union of Operating Engineers. Important alliances also
exist with the National Safety Council and the American Society of
Safety Engineers. Through these alliances, MSHA has been able to
enhance its mission of protecting worker safety and health.
Another collaborative effort resulted in the MSHA Part 46
``Training and Retraining of Miners'' regulation in 2000. This
excellent regulation ensures every miner knows and understands how to
perform their job safely by covering the important safety and health
information prior to starting work and annually thereafter. This
regulation was developed collaboratively, with input from both labor
and industry groups, guaranteeing support of the rule by all involved
stakeholders and assuring their commitment to the ultimate goal of
injury reduction. The Coalition for Effective Miner Training included
many industry groups working in a joint industry/labor arrangement in
conjunction with MSHA to develop an effective standard for the
aggregates industry. The Part 46 regulation resulted from this effort.
In another example, the NSSGA and MSHA developed a cooperative
workplace-based sampling training program of noise and dust monitoring
workshops. A partnership agreement was signed and the training workshop
program launched on December 1, 1997. These workshops have been given
to industry representatives using training specialists from the Mine
Safety Academy every year since 1997. These workshops have won two
awards from Innovations in American Government for this joint venture
aimed ay reducing hearing loss and silicosis through a program of
recognition, evaluation and control of workplace hazards.
The NSSGA/MSHA alliance was further enhanced by an ad hoc coalition
consisting of the U.S. aggregates industry (NSSGA and MSHA) and the
quarrying industry (Health & Safety Executive and the Quarry Products
Association) in the United Kingdom (England). This informal alliance
was developed to share best practices between the countries in a
similar industry.
Based on the sharing of information about successful programs in
the UK, the NSSGA/MSHA Alliance has moved forward with joint efforts to
implement programs that will further improve the safety and health of
U.S. aggregates miners. The alliance first assembled a Data Mining Task
Force to review the incident data (not fatalities) with the hope of
elucidating specific areas where efforts could be targeted to reduce
injuries. It is this focus on incidents, rather than the focus on
fatalities, that offers the best chance of improving the safety
performance and at the same time reducing fatalities.
Simultaneously, the alliance began working on a model safety and
health program to take the best of industry and develop a model that
could be used by both small and large aggregate producers to develop a
safety management system. This resulted in the publication in December
2005 of the ``Core Principles of a Safety Program'' by the Alliance. It
is available free on the MSHA and NSSGA websites.
At present, the Alliance is working on promoting safety and health
through the publication of ``rip & share'' safety tools in the
bimonthly association magazine and articles on timely safety topics for
the industry to use in improving their safety programs. MSHA and NSSGA
member company representatives jointly develop these tools. The
cooperative relationship has made great strides toward improving the
safety of the aggregates industry.
You can see this clearly using the data required to be submitted by
mine operators on injuries/illnesses and manhours. The attached chart
``Comparison of Aggregate Industry Workhours vs. Incident Rates'' shows
that even with an increasing number of hours worked at aggregates
producers' sites there has been a significant reduction in the total
incidence rate in the industry. The second chart ``Aggregate Industry
Incident Rates 1989-2004'' shows this data broken down by aggregates
industry sector. More progress has been made since 2002 through the
cooperative efforts of the NSSGA/MSHA Alliance.
In no way does the NSSGA/MSHA Alliance interfere with the
compliance program of the agency. MSHA has an important role in
ensuring that safety at aggregates mines and quarries maintain
standards that protect employees. The MSHA enforcement program operates
independently of any of the cooperative industry alliances. The Mine
Safety Act, unlike any other safety agency, requires complete
inspections of every mine property 2 or 4 times per year depending on
whether it is surface or underground, respectively.
The mining industry is more heavily regulated and inspected than
general industry covered under the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration regulations. It is important that caution be exercised
before rushing to impose more regulations on the mining sector. Careful
study of the programs in place must be made and effective enforcement
ensured.
NSSGA believes that the cooperative relationship the aggregates
industry has developed with MSHA has led to increased safety for
aggregate industry employees. We believe that these relationships
rather than being discouraged should be encouraged. They are especially
helpful to the small- and medium-sized companies that are unable to
afford a staff safety professional by providing the mechanisms
necessary for continuous improvement to the safety and health of
aggregate workers.
NSSGA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments to this very
important hearing.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Specter. There will be some additional questions
which will be submitted for your response in the record.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the witnesses for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to David G. Dye
Questions Submitted by Senator Arlen Specter
Question. Has the Department made a decision whether to appeal
citations invalidated and penalties reduced in the Jim Walters
Resources Case?
Answer. On January 17, 2006, Solicitor of Labor Howard Radzely
responded to your letter of November 22, 2005, suggesting that the
Department should appeal a decision of a Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission (FMSHRC) Administrative Law Judge dismissing some of
the citations against Jim Walters Resources in connection with the
September 2001 explosion at the JWR#5 Mine. The Solicitor's letter
explains that on December 1, 2005, MSHA appealed the decision. A copy
of that letter, which explains the specific issues appealed, is
attached.
Question. Please provide me documentation of the 16 unwarrantable
failure orders the agency issued to Sago Mine in 2005, including
specification of what conditions caused MSHA inspectors to issue these
orders, and whether any of these conditions that led to the issuance of
these orders led to the accident on January 2, 2006.
Answer. The table below offers a description of each of the 16
unwarrantable failure orders issued to Sago Mine in 2005. It is
important to remember that the investigation of the Sago Mine accident
is ongoing, and the cause of the accident is at this time unknown. In
addition, all of these conditions were fully corrected before normal
mining activity was allowed to resume in the affected area.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulation and type
Violation number and Date action Condition
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7097825--5/20/05.................... 75.400--104 D-1 Loose coal permitted to accumulate at the No. 3
Citation. Belt Drive and Take-up. Condition was obvious and
extensive.
7097827--5/20/05.................... 75.360(a)(1)--104 D-1 Inadequate examination of the area cited in the D-
Order. 1 citation. The mine examiner failed to identify
and record this hazard.
7097835--6/02/05.................... 75.340a (1)(i)--104 D- Battery charging station was located in the
1 Order. primary escapeway. The air current ventilating
the charger was coursed directly to the two
working sections instead of to the return entry.
Repetitive citation and the conditions were
obvious.
7097941--7/12/05.................... 75.203(b)--104 D-2 The mining methods used exposed the miners to
Order. hazards related to reduced pillar size. The No. 5
entry was driven off sites to the point that in
60 feet of face advancement the pillar width was
reduced to 10 feet. No. 9 entry off sites and cut
into the No. 8 entry in only 56 feet of
development. Management failed to provide a sight
line and exposed the worker to the hazard of
overriding forces.
7098153--8/16/05.................... 75.202(a)--104 D-2 Mine roof and ribs were not controlled in the
Order. sections where the miners work or travel. There
were two prior serious accidents. The conditions
were obvious and extensive.
7098154--8/16/05.................... 75.380(d)(1)--104 D-2 Primary intake escapeway from the pitmouth to the
Order. No. 3 Belt Head had loose hazardous roof for 50
feet and loose hanging roof through out the area.
Also, the travelways were obstructed. This was
obvious and extensive and prevented safe passage.
7098158--8/16/05.................... 75.364(b)(1)--104 D-2 Inadequate examination of the primary escapeway
Order. for the above order. Management failed to
identify and record obvious and extensive
hazardous conditions in the weekly examination
book.
7098159--8/16/05.................... 75.340(a)(1)(i)--104 D- Battery charging station was located in the
2 Order. primary escapeway. The air current ventilating
the charger was coursed directly to the two
working sections instead of to the return entry.
Repetitive citation and the conditions were
obvious in an area that required a pre-shift
examination to be conducted.
4890534--9/12/05.................... 75.400--104 D-2 Order. Accumulations of loose dry coal were permitted to
accumulate around and under the No.6 Belt Drive
and Take-up. Extensive and obvious.
4890535--9/12/05.................... 75.400--104 D-2 Order. Accumulations of loose dry coal were permitted to
accumulate around and under the No. 5 Belt Drive
and Take-up. Extensive obvious, and repetitive.
4890536--9/12/05.................... 74.400--104 D-2 Order. Accumulations of loose dry coal were permitted to
accumulate around and under the No. 4 Belt Drive
and Take-up. Extensive, obvious, and repetitive.
4890537--9/12/05.................... 75.1403--104 D-2 Order Walkway along the Nos. 6, 5, and 4 Belt Conveyors
Belt Drives and Takes-ups were obstructed with
deep mud and water. This hazard was obvious,
extensive, and repetitive.
4890539--9/12/05.................... 75.360--104 D-2 Order. An inadequate pre-shift examination was conducted
as identified in the previous 4 orders. Examiner
failed to identify the obvious and extensive
hazards and record them in the examination book.
7098364--9/18/05.................... 75.330(b)(1)--104 D-2 Line curtains used to ventilate the Number 7 and 8
Order. entries were rolled, thereby interrupting the
face ventilation. No movement of air could be
detected with a smoke tube and 0.5 percent
methane had accumulated. This condition was
obvious. Management was present and allowed this
condition to exist.
7149865--11/8/05.................... 75.360(f)--104 D-2 The MSHA inspector issued 6 S&S citations and none
Order. of the hazards were identified and recorded in
the pre-shift examination book. All of these
citations were in the area that was examined by
mine management.
7098644--12/14/05................... 75.400--104 D-2 Order. Obvious and extensive accumulations of loose coal,
coal fines, and float dust were permitted to
accumulate in the 006 MMU. This was a repetitive
condition that was obvious and extensive.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. I note that recommendations by MSHA for criminal
prosecutions had declined from 38 in 2000 to 12 in 2004; we would like
some specification as to what recommendations there [are] on criminal
prosecutions.
Answer. MSHA is unaware of the source of information indicating
that the agency made 38 criminal referrals to the Department of Justice
in 2000, or that the agency made 12 such referrals in 2004. According
to the agency's information, the following criminal referrals have been
made since 1998, along with the most recent information regarding the
disposition of those referrals by the Department of Justice. Please
note that the Office of the United States Attorney to whom MSHA makes
these referrals may take several years to decide how to proceed on a
particular referral.
Please also note that the number of referrals in any given year
will vary due to factors beyond the agency's control.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent
Year Referrals Declined Criminal Open Percent criminal Percent
dispositions \1\ cases declined dispositions \1\ open
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998.................................................... 8 4 4 .......... 50.0 50.0 ..........
1999.................................................... 18 13 5 .......... 72.2 27.8 ..........
2000.................................................... 18 8 10 .......... 44.4 55.6 ..........
Avg 1998-2000........................................... 14.7 8.3 6.3 .......... 55.6 44.4 ..........
2001.................................................... 9 4 5 .......... 44.4 55.6 ..........
2002.................................................... 8 2 4 2 25.0 50.0 25.0
2003.................................................... 3 1 1 1 33.3 33.3 33.3
2004.................................................... 3 1 1 1 33.3 33.3 33.3
2005.................................................... 4 .......... 1 3 .......... 25.0 75.0
Avg 2001-2005........................................... 5.4 1.6 2.4 1.8 27.2 39.4 33.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes pleas, convictions, acquittals, and pre-trial diversions (diverted out of the criminal system).
Question. Is the Acting Assistant Secretary, David Dye, seeking
appointment as permanent administrator of MSHA?
Answer. On September 15, 2005, the President nominated Richard E.
Stickler of West Virginia to be Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine
Safety and Health.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
Question. As we all know the work of a coal miner is desperately
important to the life of our economy. But the job of the coal miner is
also extremely dangerous and requires that measures are taken and
standards are in place and that those safety standards are enforced. In
light of the Sago mine disaster, is MSHA properly staffed and funded to
carry out its mission to protect the safety of America's miners?
Answer. Yes. Congress has appropriated sufficient funding for MSHA
to carry out its mission. The number of Federal mine inspectors has
remained relatively constant over the last ten years, from a low of 902
in 1998 to a high of 986 in 2003.
MSHA ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Metal and
Year Coal nonmetal Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996............................. 690 289 979
1997............................. 634 272 906
1998............................. 615 287 902
1999............................. 631 318 949
2000............................. 660 305 965
2001............................. 653 326 979
2002............................. 605 339 944
2003............................. 621 365 986
2004............................. 579 371 950
2005............................. 584 357 941
------------------------------------------------------------------------
More importantly, the inspection workload has remained steady at 15
mines per inspector in each of the last ten years. The number of coal
mines decreased 26 percent over the last ten years but the number of
coal mine inspectors declined only 15 percent during that time.
Consequently, the coal mine inspector's workload has declined. In the
late nineties there were 3.8 coal mines for each inspector. Since 2000,
that workload has been reduced to 3.3 coal mines for each inspector.
Although the workload has remained relatively constant, inspection
activity, as measured by the average number of hours Federal inspectors
spend at each mine, has increased 14 percent in the coal sector to 219
hours per mine over the last five years (2001-2005) compared to 192
hours per mine over the previous five years (1996-2000). MSHA has been
able to retain its enforcement capacity through management efficiencies
such as optimizing office locations and reducing the paperwork burden
on inspectors.
In 2005, MSHA issued the highest number of citations and orders
since 1994. In recent years, MSHA increased its use of ``withdrawal
orders'' to gain compliance with the standards. The use of this
powerful enforcement tool--withdrawal orders require miners to be
removed from the area affected by the order, often disrupting
production--increased 17 percent over the last five years when compared
to the previous five years. MSHA issued more ``withdrawal orders'' in
both 2004 and 2005 than in any year since 1994.
These increased levels of enforcement have helped reduce mining
injury and fatality rates to historic lows. In 1978, the first year the
MSHA operated under the new Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 242
miners died in mining accidents. Last year, there were 57 mining
fatalities, 22 at coal mines and 35 at metal and nonmetal mines. From
2000 to 2005, the mining industry experienced a 33 percent decrease in
fatal accidents nationwide--with coal mines seeing a 42 percent
decline. The coal mine lost-time injury rate declined one-third over
the last five years.
Question. There has been a lot of talk about the communications
devices and safety equipment available to mine workers and mine
operators. What are the practical applications of these devices and
more to the point, do they work? Where are they being used, with
success, in deep coal mines?
Answer. Currently, the only MSHA-approved communication systems
that are available to mine operators, for use in gassy mines, are mine
page phones, leaky feeder communication systems (which use hand-held
radios) and the Australian-manufactured PED and Tracker IV TAG Systems.
Mine page phones and leaky feeder systems require underground power and
interconnecting wires. Communications provided by these systems could
be compromised in the event of an emergency, fire or explosion.
MSHA has reviewed several installations of the Mine Site
Technologies PED Cap Lamp/Paging system to determine if it is a viable
solution to the mining industries' communications concern. There are a
limited number of PED installations currently in the United States, and
there have been installation and reliability problems with the system
reported in the past by mine operators. MSHA investigators have
recently visited PED installations at Peabody's Air Quality and
Twentymile Mines and Consol Energy's Blacksville and Robinson Run
Mines. MSHA has plans to evaluate the PED installation at BHP's San
Juan Mine, the only U.S. mine with a surface-installed antenna loop.
MSHA specialists are evaluating the Australian-made Mine Site
Technologies Tracker IV TAG system, which is used to identify the
general location (within zones) of miners underground. This system is
not currently in use in the United States, but is installed in one
underground coal mine in Australia. Due to the need for underground
power for these two systems, MSHA will evaluate their ability to remain
functional after power is interrupted as is often the case after an
explosion or mine fire.
One of the significant obstacles that we encounter in dealing with
the currently available technology is that most systems are not
designed for hazardous location use. Systems intended for use in
underground gassy mines, if not properly designed, could themselves
present an explosion hazard. The current availability of communications
equipment that is designed for hazardous location use is very limited.
In response to MSHA's recent Request for Information (RFI), we have
received over 50 proposals from manufacturers for evaluation of
emergency communication and tracking systems. Additional proposals are
still being received on a daily basis. MSHA is currently reviewing
these proposals, arranging meetings with the manufacturers and field
testing of the systems. MSHA has posted an internet request for
manufacturers of advanced communication and tracking systems to contact
MSHA to partner in the development of mine-worthy systems. We have
already met with manufacturers of several very promising systems. We
are focusing our review of emergency systems on those systems that do
not rely on a wire back-bone and that would remain functional in a fire
or explosion. Once systems have proven to be mine-worthy and can
provide the desired emergency operations, MSHA will assist the
manufacturers in obtaining MSHA approval.
Our most current findings on these and other communications and
tracking technologies, including the PED and Tracker IV Tag systems,
can be found at: http://www.msha.gov/Techsupp/PEDLocatingDevices.asp
MSHA is also working with NIOSH and equipment manufacturers to test
and develop thru-the-earth, electromagnetic, locator beacons that may
be able to locate miners who have become trapped in the mine. This
system may also be able to work with existing proximity systems that
MSHA helped develop for underground mines, to prevent miners from being
injured by mining equipment. This technology is promising, but needs
further development.
MSHA strongly believes that this approach will lead to much
improved technology being made available to mine operators to respond
to any future emergencies.
Question. What are the protocols or requirements for life support
and rescue equipment in a mine?
Answer. At the time of the Sago accident, MSHA regulations required
the operator to provide one approved self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR)
for each miner who goes underground as well as for each visitor who go
underground. An SCSR must have the capacity to protect the individual
one hour or longer. On March 9, 2006, MSHA published an emergency
temporary standard (ETS) requiring operators to immediately provide an
additional SCSR for each miner and to provide caches of SCSRs for each
miner at strategic locations in the mine if it takes longer than one
hour to exit the mine. Training in evacuation procedures and use of
multiple SCSRs is also required. In addition, the ETS requires
operators to install lifelines to the surface from working face areas
through both escapeways. Finally, the ETS requires mine operators to
notify MSHA of mine accidents within 15 minutes.
Question. Are the current laws and regulations sufficient to
address the issues, or do we need to take new action?
Anwer. The Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 is a strong and
effective worker protection statute that has contributed to the
remarkable reduction in accidents, injuries and illnesses in our
nation's mines. The Department has proposed to amend the Act to
increase the maximum civil penalty for flagrant violations from the
current $60,000 to $220,000 to address egregious violations.
MSHA's comprehensive safety and health standards are constantly
being reviewed and adjustments made to improve them or address newly
recognized hazards. MSHA issued an Emergency Temporary Standard on
March 9, 2006, to address underground supplies of oxygen generating
breathing devices, training, lifelines and immediacy of accident
notification.
Question. Often we hear of mines being fined and then having those
fines reduced. Is this common practice? Does this affect the amount of
negligence at the mine?
Answer. If a penalty is contested by the mine operator, it is tried
before an administrative law judge of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission, an independent adjudicatory body.
Approximately 6 percent of MSHA's proposed civil penalty assessments
are contested each year and 2.5 percent of proposed civil penalties are
reduced as a result of this litigation. For the period 1996-2005, the
$225 million in proposed civil penalties were reduced by $24 million
through litigation. I do not believe the reduction in civil penalties
that occurs through litigation materially affects the amount of
negligence at mines.
Question. How often does MSHA have enforcement personnel at a
facility?
Answer. The Mine Act requires that MSHA make inspections of each
underground mine in its entirety at least four times a year and of each
surface mine in its entirety at least twice a year. The Mine Act also
requires additional spot inspections and investigations to monitor and
address conditions such as the liberation of certain quantities of
methane, investigations of accidents, and responding to hazardous
condition complaints. Therefore, MSHA enforcement personnel are
frequently at mines carrying out the inspections and investigations
required under the Mine Act.
In 2005, enforcement personnel spent over 685,000 hours at mining
operations--about 434,000 hours at coal mines and 251,000 hours at
metal and nonmetal mines. There were MSHA enforcement personnel at mine
sites every day last year.
The amount of time enforcement personnel spend at any particular
mining operation is contingent on a host of factors, including the size
and type of the operation, the condition of the mine, and the number of
days the mine is open or in production. Because underground coal mines
are generally more hazardous work environments than other types of
mines, MSHA enforcement personnel spend more time at underground coal
mines than at other types of operations.
In 2005, MSHA spent, on average, over 60 days at each underground
mine that produced coal during at least part of the year. On many of
these days there were multiple inspectors at these mines. There were
over 100 underground coal mines at which MSHA enforcement personnel
spent over 100 days on site, with 16 of these mines having MSHA
personnel on site more than 200 days during the year.
Question. Explain the process for enforcing regulations and any
subsequent appeals process for fines levied.
Answer. MSHA conducts frequent inspections of the Nation's mines to
ensure compliance with MSHA's safety and health standards. If an
inspector finds a violation of a standard, he must issue a citation or,
in certain specified circumstances, a withdrawal order. In addition,
MSHA, applying statutory criteria, proposes a civil penalty for every
violation. If a citation, order, or penalty is contested by the mine
operator, it is tried before an administrative law judge of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, an independent adjudicatory
body. The judge's decision may be appealed to the 5-member Commission,
and the Commission's decision may be appealed to a U.S. Court of
Appeals. Although the judge and the Commission are required to apply
the same penalty criteria as MSHA, they are not bound by MSHA's penalty
proposal. In contested cases they frequently reduce MSHA's penalty
proposal, often significantly.
Question. What is MSHA doing to ensure that we continue to reduce
the risk of mining to miners?
Answer. MSHA is relying on all its statutory tools to ensure that
we continue to make mining a safer occupation. MSHA is committed to
strong, fair and consistent enforcement. For example, last year MSHA
completed 99.6 percent of its statutory coal mine inspections and
continued to respond to every hazard complaint received. MSHA also has
an active training and education program including an office devoted to
assisting small mines with their compliance responsibilities. In
addition, compliance assistance is available to all mine operators who
face challenges in understanding mining's risks and dealing with
compliance issues across the board. MSHA is also supporting research
efforts by NIOSH into new technologies for improved mine safety and
health. In addition, MSHA is using its own resources to test and
develop new technologies for mine emergencies including use of robots
and sensing devices that will de-energize equipment before it can
injure or kill a miner working in close proximity.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
Question. Why did it take two hours for MSHA to be notified of the
Sago explosion?
Answer. The mine operator is responsible for immediately notifying
the appropriate MSHA district office once an accident occurs, as
required by MSHA regulations at 30 CFR 50.10. It should be noted that
MSHA provides a 24/7 emergency answering service number for the
operator to use if the operator is unable to reach appropriate district
personnel. The emergency number is listed in 30 CFR 50.10 and on MSHA's
website and is regularly made known to mine operators through various
methods. When the mine operator calls the emergency toll-free number,
the answering service immediately contacts the appropriate MSHA
headquarters official who then immediately notifies the district
office. This service has been provided to the mining industry for many
years.
The management at the Sago mine had the telephone numbers of
persons in the district that had jurisdiction over the mine. According
to MSHA's telephone logs, the mine operator began to call MSHA
personnel at approximately 8:15 a.m. on January 2, 2006. At
approximately 8:30 a.m. the mine operator was able to speak with an
MSHA field office supervisor. Sago management also did not contact
MSHA's emergency answering service number. The issue of immediate
notification is currently being examined by MSHA's accident
investigation team and enforcement action will be taken if appropriate.
On March 9, 2006, MSHA published an emergency temporary standard that,
among other things, defined the requirement to immediately notify MSHA
of accidents by clearly stating that such notification must be without
delay and within 15 minutes.
Question. Given the 2.5 hours it took MSHA to be notified of the
underground Alma fire, what is wrong with MSHA's notification system?
Answer. Under MSHA regulations, the mine operator is required to
immediately notify the Agency when an accident occurs. If the operator
fails to immediately contact MSHA, the Agency's response and rescue
efforts suffer accordingly. The management at the Alma mine had the
telephone numbers of persons in the district that had jurisdiction over
the mine. As noted above, Alma mine management also had access to the
Agency's 24/7 emergency answering service number. MSHA's accident
investigation team has begun a careful and thorough process to examine
this issue and will issue a report of its findings and enforcement
action will be taken if appropriate. On March 9, 2006, MSHA published
an emergency temporary standard that defined the term ``immediate'' to
mean ``at once without delay and within 15 minutes.'' In the event that
communications are lost due to an emergency or other unexpected event,
the term ``immediate'' means ``at once without delay and within 15
minutes of having access to a telephone or other means of
communication.''
Question. Why did it take six hours for rescue teams to arrive at
Sago?
Answer. It was the responsibility of Sago mine management to
provide the services of mine rescue teams for the rescue and recovery
effort. MSHA regulations at 30 CFR 49.2(f) state that the mine rescue
station(s) with which the two teams required to be available at each
mine are associated must be located within two hours ground travel time
from the mine. In addition, 30 CFR 49.2(g) requires that the teams
present themselves at the mine within a reasonable time once
notification is given. The explosion occurred at approximately 6:30
a.m.; MSHA was notified at approximately 8:30 a.m.; and the first two
mine rescue teams arrived at approximately 11:00 a.m., or 4.5 hours
after the explosion. The teams were prepared to go underground at noon.
However, even with mine rescue teams on the premises, the conditions
within the mine had to be determined safe enough for their entrance
(e.g., because of possible elevated carbon monoxide levels and the risk
of secondary explosions due to high methane levels). At approximately
5:20 p.m., teams were sent into the mine to begin rescue work after
MSHA and State officials determined that this work could safely
commence. The time that the two mine rescue teams were notified will be
determined during the accident investigation. Each distinct response
issue is currently being investigated by MSHA's accident investigation
team, which will produce an independent report of its findings, and
enforcement action will be taken if appropriate.
Question. Why is a rapid notification and response system not
available?
Answer. Under MSHA regulations, the mine operator is required to
immediately notify the Agency when an accident occurs. If the operator
fails to immediately contact MSHA, the Agency's response and rescue
efforts suffer accordingly. The management at the Sago mine had the
telephone numbers of persons in the district that had jurisdiction over
the mine. As noted above, Sago mine management also had access to the
agency's 24/7 emergency answering service number. This emergency number
has been published in 30 CFR Part 50 for many years.
A mine rescue team's availability in relation to mine emergency
response is governed by MSHA's regulatory requirements. Coupling a
reasonable period of time to get to the mine rescue station with a 2-
hour ground travel distance from the mine rescue station, one could
realistically expect a 2- to 3-hour response time by mine rescue teams.
Underground fires and explosions result in conditions that must
stabilize over a period of time before rescuers can safely enter the
mine. Under MSHA's mine emergency response requirements, mine rescue
teams almost always arrive at emergency sites before the conditions are
safe enough for them to enter the mines. MSHA's recent Request for
Information (RFI) asks for comments from the public on mine rescue
procedures and mine technologies.
Question. Why does MSHA not require more than two rescue teams at
every mine in case of emergency?
Answer. The legislative history for section 115(e) of the Mine Act
indicates that Congress considered the ready availability of mine
rescue capability in the event of an accident to be a vital protection
for miners. In responding to the direction of Congress in section
115(e) of the Act, the rulemaking process addressed, and the final Part
49 rule required the ready availability of two mine rescue teams for
each underground mine. In the discussion and summary of the final rule
for Part 49, MSHA addressed hundreds of comments and statements.
Since its inception, compliance with Part 49 has been accomplished
by company teams, contract teams and state-maintained teams.
Historically, the industry's response to accidents has included sending
additional mine rescue teams, equipment, and personnel to emergency
sites. This additional response is voluntary and not mandated. Notably,
there was no shortage of well-trained mine rescue teams at the Sago and
Alma mines. Following the Sago and Alma tragedies, MSHA is evaluating
the current needs and response capabilities for effective mine rescue.
It is important to remember that mine rescue teams using breathing
apparatus perform a very specialized function and are only used in
conditions where there is irrespirable air as the result of a fire or
explosion. The vast majority of mining accidents are handled without
the need for mine rescue teams.
Question. Given how many rescue teams were borrowed at Sago, how
prepared is a coal operator who meets MSHA's minimum requirement of two
rescue teams per mine?
Answer. Two mine rescue teams are able to conduct the initial
phases of a rescue and recovery operation. One team conducts mine
exploration while the other team backs them up at the fresh air base.
If the emergency event extends beyond a period of 8 hours additional
teams are essential. Historically, most mine emergency events last well
beyond 8 hours. The industry presently relies on the rest of the mining
community to provide additional teams necessary to respond to emergency
events. This has proven to be a reliable process in the past.
Question. What would have happened if other operators were not able
to loan rescue teams?
Answer. Historically, the mining industry has demonstrated their
willingness to assist other companies in an emergency situation.
Inability or refusal to lend rescue teams to other mines has simply
never occurred. If other operators had not responded to the Sago
disaster, the company would have had to rely on State teams in West
Virginia and other state maintained teams. In addition, MSHA's Mine
Emergency Unit (MEU) would assist these teams in the rescue operations.
Question. Given the number of rescue teams used at the Sago and
Alma Mines, how stressed is the system right now? What happens if
another mine rescue should be necessary in the coming days?
Answer. An adequate number of teams responded to the Sago and Alma
accidents. If another accident were to occur that required mine rescue
teams to intervene, history has shown the teams that responded to Sago,
Alma, and/or other teams would be able and willing to respond. There
are almost 190 mine rescue teams throughout the United States,
available to respond to mine emergencies when needed.
Question. In 2002, why did MSHA acknowledge the need to increase
the number of mine rescue teams, but then withdraw its assessment of
current regulations?
Answer. The number of mine rescue teams has declined over the
years, as has the number of mines. MSHA looked at regulations that
would increase the number of these teams and held a public meeting in
March 2002 in Barbourville, Kentucky to gather current ideas and
suggestions concerning mine rescue capabilities and preparedness. Both
labor and industry stated that cost is the major factor considered in
establishing a mine rescue team. Recommendations to MSHA focused on
incentives, particularly reducing penalties for violations if a mine
had a mine rescue team. Legally, MSHA could not adopt that approach.
Therefore, MSHA withdrew the mine rescue agenda item and issued two
Program Information Bulletins that addressed mine rescue cost concerns
related to training and technical assistance.
Question. Without regulations, how can MSHA address recalcitrant
coal operators who comply only with the minimum requirements for mine
rescue?
Answer. Mine operators who comply with the legal requirements of
the Mine Act and MSHA regulations are meeting the requirements of the
law and are providing the degree of protection required by the Mine
Act. MSHA is actively developing regulations to ensure that miners are
protected during a mine emergency. For example, on March 9, 2006, MSHA
published an emergency temporary standard requiring operators to
immediately provide an additional SCSR for each miner and to provide
caches of SCSRs for each miner at strategic locations in the mine if it
takes longer than one hour to exit the mine. Training in evacuation
procedures and use of multiple SCSRs is also required. In addition, the
ETS requires operators to install lifelines to the surface from working
face areas through both escapeways. Finally, the ETS requires mine
operators to notify MSHA of mine accidents within 15 minutes.
In addition, on January 25, 2006, MSHA published a Request for
Information (RFI) on issues related to mine rescue teams and mine
rescue equipment and technology. MSHA is in the process of evaluating
the comments in response to the RFI and has in-mine testing underway
for several promising communication systems to aid in mine rescue.
Question. Why did MSHA allow the Sago Mine to continue to operate
with a total of 276 safety violations?
Answer. MSHA does not have the authority to force a mine to
permanently cease operations. Under certain circumstances, MSHA has the
authority to suspend mining activity in the area affected by a
violation by issuing a ``withdrawal order.'' MSHA aggressively
exercised its withdrawal authority against Sago Mine in 2005, issuing
18 separate ``withdrawal orders'' that shut down mining activity in
specific areas of the mine until health and safety problems were
corrected by the operator. Under the Mine Act, the operator of the Sago
Mine has the right to reopen an affected area once all of the safety
issues that caused the withdrawal order have been corrected. Absent a
mine-wide hazard, MSHA does not have the statutory authority to shut
down a mine simply because it has a large number of other violations.
MSHA records indicate a total of 208 enforcement actions at the Sago
Mine in calendar year 2005.
Question. How did MSHA utilize Section 104 of the Mine Act in
regard to Sago, which authorizes MSHA to close an area of the mine,
after 90 days notice to a coal operator, if MSHA finds an unwarrantable
failure to curb habitual violations?
Answer. MSHA utilized section 104(a) citations, section 104(b)
withdrawal orders, section 104(d) citations, section 104(d)
unwarrantable failure withdrawal orders, and section 103(k) withdrawal
orders at the Sago Mine. MSHA did not use its ``pattern of violations''
withdrawal order authority at the Sago Mine because the mine did not
meet the criteria for a ``pattern of violations'' under the Agency's
pattern regulation at 30 CFR Part 104. This regulation requires a
review of the mine's compliance records at least once a year for: (1) a
history of significant and substantial (S&S) violations; (2) use of
increasingly stringent enforcement tools; and (3) evidence of the
operator's lack of good faith in correcting the problem that results in
repeated S&S violations. In the preamble to the pattern regulation,
MSHA suggested that a prior two-year history be used in conducting the
pattern review. The Sago mine did not operate continuously during 2004,
making a review for the period of 2004 to 2005 problematic. In
addition, the Sago mine changed ownership during 2005, with changes in
company personnel. The accident incidence rate at the mine declined
late in 2005, under the new owner. The fact that Sago received 208
enforcement actions during 2005 would not, alone, trigger the pattern
sanction. The compliance record had to be reviewed within the context
of other pattern criteria. MSHA had appropriately increased enforcement
at the Sago mine using the tools available under sections 103, 104, and
l07 of the Mine Act.
Question. How many pattern letters or notices did MSHA send in
regard to the Sago Mine?
Answer. None. The mine did not meet the criteria for a ``pattern of
violations'' specified in 30 CFR 104.
Question. How many pattern letters have been issued since you
became Acting Assistant Secretary in 2004?
Answer. Since I became Acting Assistant Secretary, MSHA has issued
one pattern letter. Subsequently, the mine operator submitted an action
plan to improve safety at their mine. Evidence showed that improvements
did occur and that the operator was committed to improving safety and
health conditions.
Question. How did MSHA utilize Section 108 of the Mine Act in
regard to Sago, which authorizes MSHA to institute a temporary
injunction, whenever MSHA finds a mine operator engaged in a pattern of
violations?
Answer. No such injunction has ever been sought or issued in the
history of the Mine Act. In any case, the mine did not meet the
criteria for a ``pattern of violations'' specified in 30 CFR 104.
Question. How many times has this authority been invoked since you
became Acting Assistant Secretary in 2004?
Answer. No such injunction has ever been sought or issued in the
history of the Mine Act.
Question. What influence does the Arlington office have on the size
of penalties assessment by inspectors? Since 2001, have policies been
enacted that allow the Arlington office to veto or reduce the size of
penalties? Has the Arlington office ever vetoed or reduced the size of
a penalty assessed by an inspector?
Answer. MSHA's inspectors do not determine the amount of civil
penalties for the citations and orders they issue. Almost 98 percent of
all civil penalties issued are assessed by MSHA's Office of Assessments
using its computerized assessment system based on criteria in 30 CFR
Part 100. The inspectors establish the specific values for each of the
five Part 100 criteria when they issue citations and orders.
Thereafter, the citation and order data is entered into MSHA's
electronic data system and subsequently transferred to Assessments for
civil penalty determinations. The remaining 2 percent to 3 percent of
civil penalties are for the more egregious violations that receive
special assessments. These assessments are higher fines determined by
special assessors in the Office of Assessments using procedures to
evaluate the same five criteria given in 30 CFR Part 100.
MSHA has not adopted any policies since 2001 that allow the
Arlington office to veto or reduce the size of penalties. All penalties
are determined by the Office of Assessments. The Office of Assessments
does not seek a consensus among senior agency officials when
determining penalties. I have never reduced an assessment proposed by
the Office of Assessments.
When a civil penalty is issued, the mine operator has 30 days to
pay or contest the assessment. Once a proposed penalty is contested,
the Mine Act mandates that the proposed assessment shall not be
compromised, mitigated, or settled except with the approval of the Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission). In addition, no
penalty assessment, which has become a final order of the Commission
shall be compromised, mitigated, or settled except with the approval of
the Court. Therefore, reductions of civil penalties are made by or
approved by the Commission and its administrative law judges.
Question. MSHA announced on Saturday that it would reassess
regulations related to mine rescue teams and technology. Does this
announcement mean that MSHA made a mistake in abandoning its assessment
of these rules in 2002?
Answer. MSHA recently published a Request for Information on Mine
Rescue Equipment and Technology. We did so because significant
questions remain about the availability and reliability of current
technology. Promising technologies are known to us, but practical
experience with their use remains very limited. Our decision to explore
these technologies and their potential application in the nation's
mines is not inconsistent with the decision to remove the previous
rulemaking agenda item, which was never published as a proposed rule.
Recommendations to MSHA focused on incentives, particularly reducing
penalties for violations if a mine had a mine rescue team. Legally,
MSHA could not adopt that approach.
Since 2001 we have had a continuing interest in improving mine
rescue capability. We have supported NIOSH research into two-way
wireless communications and have worked hard at developing robotic
technology for use during underground emergencies. In addition, in
March 2002, MSHA held a public meeting at the Mine Health and Safety
Academy to gather ideas and suggestions from the mining community on
the availability, quality and preparedness of mine rescue teams.
Question. Technology has improved significantly since the days when
miners used to carry canaries underground, but mine rescue efforts
still are hindered by the inability to communicate directly with
miners, to pinpoint their location underground in case of emergency,
and to provide them with sufficient oxygen in case they are forced to
barricade themselves and wait for rescue.
How can we better coordinate the mine safety technology being
developed in other Federal agencies, like the Defense and Energy
Departments, and in the commercial world, to equip miners with longer
lasting breathing devices and more advanced communications technology?
Answer. In 2005, through two workshops, MSHA and NIOSH reviewed new
technology that is currently under development in industry and
government, which may have an impact on new Self-Contained Self-Rescuer
(SCSR) technology. There are several promising technologies on the
horizon including new oxygen sources and filter technology; however,
new hybrid SCSR technology may have the most immediate impact on the
development of smaller, lighter, longer lasting SCSRs. A hybrid SCSR
would combine oxygen generation technology with new filter technology.
At least one manufacturer is interested in building such an SCSR. In
addition, MSHA and NIOSH would have to update respirator approval and
certification standards in order to approve such a novel device. MSHA
and NIOSH have found the workshop forum to be useful, and will continue
to sponsor such workshops in the future, to further seek out new
technology, which is being developed in both government and industry.
MSHA is also working with NIOSH and equipment manufacturers to test
and develop through-the-earth, electromagnetic, locator beacons that
may be able to locate miners who are involved in emergencies, and who
become trapped in the mine. This system may also be able to integrate
with existing proximity systems that MSHA helped develop for
underground mines to prevent miners from being injured by heavy mining
equipment. This technology is promising.
The Mine Act does not provide the Department of Energy (DOE) with
statutory authority for research into new technologies for mine safety.
However, DOE has partnered with the mining industry to foster the
development and use of advanced technologies and processes to save
money, cut emissions, and reduce waste. Research and development
projects are conducted through this partnership in areas of extraction,
beneficiation and processing, materials handling, and cross-cutting
applications. MSHA is aware of active and completed projects that have
an effect on the mining industry. One project being conducted by DOE,
NIOSH, academia and the mining industry is the development of an
emergency communication system. This project is one of six selected
that MSHA will evaluate from a total of 70 proposals received in
response to a request for information recently published. The six
selected projects do not rely on a wire back-bone and have the greatest
potential to remain functional in the event of a roof-fall, inundation,
fire, or explosion.
Security concerns can impair the ability of the departments and
agencies within the Department of Defense to share technologies with
civilian agencies, particularly in the area of communications.
Question. Why not create an Office of Technology in MSHA to assess
new technologies in other Federal agencies and the commercial world,
and to see if they would be applicable to mine safety?
Answer. MSHA already performs this function through our Office of
Technical Support at MSHA's Approval and Certification Center in
Triadelphia, West Virginia. I invite you to visit this facility and see
for yourself the high quality of work performed there by MSHA's highly
qualified and experienced engineers. Additional work investigating
state-of-the-art equipment and technologies related to mine rescue or
mine fires and explosions is performed by other MSHA engineers and
scientists at the Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center in
Bruceton, Pennsylvania. The various technical Divisions within the
Centers are constantly looking at new technologies and working with
manufacturers, other Federal agencies, academia, and industry to
identify, develop, test and promote equipment, systems and other types
of products that have the potential to improve miners' safety and
health.
Examples of these efforts include a recent partnership with two
equipment manufacturers, a mining machine manufacturer, NIOSH, and two
mining companies to develop and test a proximity protection system that
can be placed on a remote control continuous mining machine to prevent
operators from placing themselves in the hazardous area of the machine
as it is performing tramming operations. This project was precipitated
by the high incidence of pinning and crushing fatal injuries (29) that
the Agency has investigated over the last 17 years. The result of this
effort will be two commercially available systems that have been
approved by MSHA and can be installed on continuous mining machines to
prevent these types of accidents from occurring.
Other examples of the new technologies investigated by Technical
Support include motion detectors that can be installed in surface
mining pits to prevent haul trucks from traveling over berms when
dumping, and development of a high impact resistant glass for
installation on bulldozers working on surge piles at coal mine
preparation plants As coal is removed by draw-off feeders from
underneath large coal surgepiles, the coal does not draw to the
surface, but rather, bridges over such that the surface appears to be
solid. As machinery such as a bulldozer travels over the surface, the
bridged-over coal can collapse, and the bulldozer will fall into the
void. Fatalities have occurred as coal crushes through the bulldozer
cab windows and suffocates the operator. Impact resistant glass will
prevent this outcome.
One of the significant obstacles that we often encounter in dealing
with the currently available technology is that most systems are not
designed for hazardous location use. Systems intended for use in
underground gassy mines, if not properly designed, could themselves
present an explosion hazard. The current availability of communications
equipment that is designed for hazardous location use, for example, is
very limited.
In response to MSHA's recent Request for Information on mine rescue
technologies, Technical Support has received over 50 proposals from
manufacturers for evaluation of emergency communication and tracking
systems. Additional proposals are still being received on a daily
basis. MSHA is currently reviewing these proposals and arranging
meetings with the manufacturers and field testing of the systems. MSHA
has posted an internet request for manufacturers of advanced
communication and tracking systems to contact MSHA to partner in the
development of mine-worthy systems. We have already met with
manufacturers of several very promising systems. We are focusing our
review of emergency systems on those systems that do not rely on a wire
back-bone and that could be destroyed in a fire or explosion. Once
systems have proven to be mine-worthy and can provide the desired
emergency operations, MSHA will assist the manufacturers in obtaining
MSHA approval.
Our most current findings on these and other communications and
tracking technologies, including the PED and Tracker IV Tag systems,
can be found at: http://www.msha.gov/Techsupp/PEDLocatingDevices.asp
MSHA is also working with NIOSH and equipment manufacturers to test
and develop thru-the-earth, electromagnetic, locator beacons that may
be able to locate miners who are involved in emergencies, and who
become trapped in the mine. This system may also be able to work with
existing proximity systems that MSHA helped develop for underground
mines to prevent miners from being injured by mining equipment. This
technology is promising, but needs further development.
Technical Support scientists and engineers are in constant
communication with equipment and product manufacturers and participate
in industry consensus standard setting committees to keep abreast of
the latest state-of-the-art technologies that may offer improvements in
miner's safety and health. We strongly believe that this approach leads
to much improved technology being made available to mine operators to
improve mine safety and health.
Question. The 1977 Mine Act Committee report reads: ``To be
successful in the objective of including effective and meaningful
compliance, a penalty should be of an amount which is sufficient to
make it more economical for an operator to comply with the Act's
requirement than it is to pay the penalties assessed and continue to
operate while not in compliance.'' How did the severity of the
penalties change as the number of citations issued against the Sago
Mine began to increase?
Answer. From the beginning of calendar year 2004 through the end of
calendar year 2005, the number of citations and orders issued to the
Sago mine increased. More importantly, the severity of the enforcement
actions issued to the mine increased significantly later in calendar
year 2005. During the last half of 2005 thirteen section 104(d)(2)
withdrawal orders were issued to the Sago Mine. Only three section
104(d) citations and orders had been issued to the mine during the
previous 18 months. As a result, the amount of civil penalties also
increased for the mine from $9,515 during CY 2004 to over $20,300
during the first three quarters of CY 2005 and the majority of the
unwarrantable failure withdrawal orders have not yet been assessed a
civil penalty.
Question. Given the increase in coal prices and profits, is it more
economical for coal operators to comply with the Mine Act or to pay a
penalty?
Answer. The Administration believes that the statutory cap on civil
penalties is too low to deter repeat and flagrant violations of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, and has urged the Congress to
increase the statutory cap from $60,000 to $220,000 for flagrant
violations. MSHA has also announced its intention to revise the
decades-old civil penalty system.
Question. If penalties are large enough, why did the number of
citations at Sago Mine continue to increase?
Answer. MSHA inspectors are instructed to cite all violations of
the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act, and, in the last half of 2005,
13 unwarrantable failure withdrawal orders were issued. Compliance at
the Sago Mine was improving in the last quarter of 2005, but we were
still not satisfied with their safety performance and were devoting
considerable MSHA management time to addressing the problem with
company officials.
Question. The Mine Act provides mine operators with the right to
contest a fine, and penalties often are negotiated. How often are
penalties negotiated?
Answer. Civil penalties are proposed by MSHA and are not
negotiable. The citations and orders can be contested to, and the
penalties reduced by, the independent Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission. For the period 1996-2005, roughly 6 percent of all
proposed assessments issued by MSHA were contested, and the Commission
reduced 2.5 percent of all proposed assessments.
Question. What is the difference between the fines assessed and the
amounts collected?
Answer. For the period 1996-2005, approximately $225 million in
proposed civil penalties were assessed to mine operators and
contractors nationwide, that number was reduced by $24 million through
litigation at the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, and
MSHA has received payments totaling over $158 million, which is an 80
percent collection rate. When a civil penalty is contested and
subsequently reduced through litigation, the collection rate is over 98
percent.
Question. To what extent are the negotiations a matter of public
record and to what extent do off-the-record negotiations take place?
Answer. All settlements in contested civil penalties must be
approved by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and
are therefore a matter of public record. All records related to the
rare cases when the Agency reduced an assessed civil penalty due to
adverse effect on an operator's ability to stay in business are
available to the public in MSHA's case files.
Question. What was the chain of command at the Sago and Alma Mines?
Answer. The chain of command at any disaster, including Sago and
Alma, changes as senior officials arrive on property. Subsequent to the
initial arrival of MSHA first response personnel, the District Managers
arrived on the properties and assumed their roles as senior MSHA
officials for the emergency operations. The District Managers remained
in charge of MSHA's efforts until recovery operations were completed.
The Administrator for Coal was at the Sago and Alma mine sites
during the emergency operations. He provided guidance and assistance to
the District Managers during the mine emergency operations.
The Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary arrived at the Sago property
on the second day and was the senior MSHA official on property. He
attended briefings for families, met privately with families, and
provided briefings for the media and headquarters personnel.
During both incidents, I was located at MSHA's headquarters command
center where I received hourly updates from on site personnel and
participated in decisions as needed and provided coordination with
senior DOL officials.
Question. How were decisions made?
Answer. A three-party group was established at each of the
operations. The group consisted of designated personnel from the
Company, State, and MSHA. As issues arose, the group discussed options
and came to consensus on decisions. A senior mine official, MSHA's
District Manager, and the head of West Virginia's mine safety
department had oversight responsibilities for this group to ensure that
appropriate, timely, and safe decisions were made. As appropriate,
MSHA's District Manager consulted with other senior officials prior to
presenting an option to the three-party group.
Question. Who had the final authority to make decisions?
Answer. The Mine Operator was responsible for making decisions
concerning the mine and the emergency operations. MSHA issued a section
103(k) order for the mine and the State of West Virginia issued a
similar order, requiring the operator to submit a plan to MSHA and the
State for recovery. The plan had to be approved by MSHA and the State
before implementation. By its very nature, this process created a
problem-solving environment. Decisions at the two mine emergency
operations were made through discussion and consensus among the
participating parties, with each bringing their experience, knowledge
and skills to the process.
Question. What do we know about the MSHA rule issued in 2004
regarding belt entries and the fire at the Alma mine?
Answer. We know that the last approved map for the Alma mine
indicated that belt air was being used to ventilate the longwall
section, but not the section where the two deceased miners worked. In
May 2000, the mine operator submitted a petition for modification
seeking permission to use belt air to ventilate workings. The petition
was granted in June 2000, with stipulations. Most of these stipulations
were included in the 2004 belt air rule, which then rendered the
petitions granted prior to the effective date of the rule unnecessary.
While it is generally known that smoke from the fire contaminated
the escapeway being used by the crew from number 2 Section at Alma
Mine, MSHA is not able at this time to confirm the reasons for this
contamination because the matter remains under investigation, and all
facts are not yet known. There is no evidence that the proper use of
belt air, as defined in the Alma mine's approved ventilation plan, in
any way hindered the escape of the miners.
Question. How many mines use belt entries to ventilate workplaces?
Answer. Currently, there are 41 coal mines in the United States
that use air from a belt air course to ventilate a working section.
MSHA began granting petitions for modification to permit the use of
belt air for this purpose in 1980. Sixty-seven petitions were approved
between 1993 and 2001, each with a specific finding that the practice
was safe. An additional 27 were approved between 2001 and the
publication of the Belt Air rule in 2004, which included the major
stipulations of previously granted petitions and rendered those
petitions invalid with the application of a nationwide rule.
MSHA's 2004 belt air rule not only codified what had become a
routine and safe practice with the safeguards of technologically
advanced atmospheric monitoring systems (AMS) and multiple fire
suppression systems, but increased miner protection by adding various
requirements that were not included in all the petitions. For example,
all sensors used must be listed by a Nationally Recognized Testing
Laboratory; the trunk lines for the communication system and the AMS
must be installed in separate entries; carbon monoxide sensors must be
installed in the intake escapeways; sensor spacing must be reduced to
1,000 feet (as opposed to 2,000 feet for mines using older petition
requirements); and lifelines are required when returns are used as
alternate escapeways. MSHA records indicate that there has never been a
fatality caused by belt air carrying fire or contaminants to the
working section under the current rule or any of the preceding
petitions for modification.
______
Questions Submitted to Bennett K. Hatfield
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
Question. Why did it take two hours to notify MSHA of the explosion
at Sago? Is MSHA's notification system adequate?
Answer. My written statement presented to the Subcommittee on
January 20 provides significant detail on this point. However, to
address the question more concisely, the time lapse of approximately
117 minutes consists of a 69 minute period (6:31 to 7:40 A.M.) when the
notification process wasn't triggered because mine management was fully
engaged in the initial assessment and emergency response, and a 48
minute period (7:40 to 8:28 A.M.) during which notification was being
actively attempted but many telephone calls were not being answered.
The initial 69 minute period reflects the time during which Sago
mine management was: (i) attempting to determine what had happened,
(ii) safely evacuating the 15 miners from underground that were not
trapped, and (iii) launching a spontaneous rescue effort to reach the
remaining 13 miners. The 5-man team of mine supervisors and safety
managers reached over two miles into the mine, reestablishing temporary
ventilation as they advanced to replace the explosion-damaged
infrastructure, before being turned back by a wall of thick black smoke
and heightened explosion risk when they were only 1,000 to 1,900 feet
from the trapped crew.
The subsequent 48 minute period reflects the time required to
successfully make direct contact with a Federal (MSHA) inspector--
although it should be noted that a state inspector was contacted within
16 minutes. Multiple calls were placed during this period but state and
Federal offices were closed and many people were traveling due to the
holiday.
--The first notification call went to the state office in Fairmont at
approximately 7:40 A.M. Subsequent calls to home telephones and
cell phones of state mine inspectors were finally successful
with a returned call from state inspector John Collins at 7:56
A.M.
--The notification calls to MSHA contact numbers began at
approximately 7:50 A.M. with a call to the home of MSHA Field
Office Supervisor Kenny Tenney. This call went to an answering
machine. Subsequent calls to MSHA's District 3 office, other
inspector home telephones, and inspector cell telephones were
also unanswered. At approximately 8:28 A.M., MSHA inspector Jim
Satterfield was contacted via his home telephone and was
notified of the accident.
Hence, the notification process for state mine regulators required
approximately 16 minutes, for a total elapsed time from accident
occurrence of 85 minutes. The notification process for MSHA required
approximately 48 minutes, for a total elapsed time from accident
occurrence of 117 minutes.
With respect to the question as to whether MSHA's notification
system was adequate, we note that January 2 was a State and Federal
holiday so it was admittedly more difficult to reach officials than on
a normal workday. A central emergency call center would have made it
easier for the company to ``notify'' MSHA and the state. However, a
central call center would probably have had the same difficulty we
experienced in reaching individual officials outside of normal working
hours. Thus, even with a fully staffed central call center, we cannot
say that mobilization of state and Federal officials would have
resulted in a quicker response. Likewise, earlier contact with those
officials would almost certainly not have hastened entry of the rescue
teams into the mine due to the trend of carbon monoxide readings
confirming high risk of a second explosion.
Put simply, based on air quality monitoring by state inspectors
beginning at around 8:30 A.M., Federal and State officials were in
agreement that it was unsafe to enter the mine. In its deliberation,
the Subcommittee should not cast aside the lessons learned by painful
experience: rescuers are often at risk from secondary explosions and
additional lives should not be put at significant risk in a rescue
effort.
Question. Why did the Sago Mine have only two rescue teams
available in case of emergency? What would have happened if other coal
operators were unable to loan rescue teams?
Answer. To begin with, it is important to recognize that the
availability of mine rescue teams had no bearing on the tragedy that
occurred at the Sago Mine. The mine rescue teams responding on January
2 had to spend hours and hours waiting as State and Federal mine
authorities monitored carbon monoxide levels to determine whether safe
entry was possible.
That said, each mine is required by applicable law to have
emergency coverage by two mine rescue teams within two hours of the
mine. The Sago Mine contracted with the Barbour County Mine Rescue Team
to provide this service. These teams included several miners from Sago
and its affiliated operations.
To answer the hypothetical question about what would have happened
if other coal operators had been unable to loan rescue teams, there are
many mine rescue teams that are not associated with any particular coal
company--including the Barbour County Mine Rescue and Tri-state Mine
Rescue groups--both of which assisted in the Sago Mine accident. More
importantly, we are aware of no instance where there has been any
widespread refusal or inability of other coal operators to offer the
services of their mine rescue teams. Indeed, the events of the past
month have proven that, even in an environment of stiff competition in
the coal industry, competitors quickly rush forward with their mine
rescue teams to assist in the time of a mine emergency. For example, in
the Sago Mine accident, a total of 15 mine rescue teams were assembled
on site. Additional to the Barbour County and Tri-state teams
referenced earlier, this group included several mine rescue teams from
Cansol Energy, one of our primary competitors in the region, as well as
ICG's own Viper Mine Rescue Team that flew in from Illinois. Indeed, we
received more offers of mine rescue assistance than we were able to
utilize--including those from two other ICG competitors--Massey Energy
and Arch Coal.
These demonstrations of volunteerism, along with other recent
examples across the coal industry, clearly confirm that overwhelming
response by the industry in the time of need is the norm and not the
exception.
Question. How large are the fines assessed by MSHA in comparison
with your companies [sic] profits? What is more economical--to comply
with the Mine Act, or to pay the fine and operate in violation?
Answer. During the first nine months of 2005, ICG (including the
earnings of subsidiaries it acquired from Anker Coal Group in November
2005) had operating profit (EBITDA) of approximately $81 million.
During that same period, the fines assessed by MSHA against the
associated mining operations were approximately $116,000. However, it
is important to note that the Saga Mine lost approximately $6.2 million
during that same nine month period. Despite the poor financial
performance, upon ICG's gaining management oversight, our company
initiated approximately $5.0 million in capital expenditures to improve
the Sago Mine. Many of those capital expenditures had a direct impact
on safety. Those safety efforts were detailed in my written and oral
testimony to the Subcommittee.
With respect to the nexus your question places between profits and
the size of fines, I wish to point out that profitable mines would more
logically have the means to maintain the capital expenditures that
would allow more safety enhancements. However, some unprofitable
mines--like Sago--are subsidized by their owners to make such
improvements. The Sago Mine currently operates solely to meet the
contractual requirements of its customers. We certainly hope that the
Sago Mine becomes profitable, but the facts clearly reflect that while
it has operated (even at a loss), ICG has provided an influx of
capital. Comparing fines with profits seems to draw the incorrect
correlation--fines should be based upon the severity of the violation
rather than the financial health of the company cited.
The second question also reflects an incorrect premise. For ICG and
its subsidiaries, the question is not whether mining can be conducted
more economically by operating in violation of the law. ICG and its
subsidiaries are committed to operating in compliance with the Mine
Act. Unlike a factory floor, an underground mine is a dynamic
environment, subject to ever-changing geologic conditions, in which a
combustible fuel--coal--is mined. We proactively correct conditions
without governmental oversight, as is shown by the steps we have taken
as discussed in my testimony, but we also correct cited conditions
immediately upon receiving a citation.
Despite the apparently incorrect premise of the second question,
safety and productivity go hand in hand. If one ignores the moral,
social, and legal obligations that are the principal controlling
factors for our company, the true economic disincentives to operating a
non-compliant coal mine include: (i) Disruptions to production caused
by governmental orders to cease production, even if limited in
duration, and the loss of revenues due to that disruption; (ii) Expense
related to lawsuits; (iii) Increased workers compensation and insurance
premiums; (iv) Damage to reputation among customers and competitors;
and (v) Inability to attract and retain skilled workers that clearly
have other employment alternatives in the current labor market -all in
addition to fines and penalties. Of course, the ultimate disincentive
is the risk of injury or death to our employees.
The true economic decision is not whether to operate a mine
unsafely; rather it is whether a mining project is economically
feasible. No mine operator will choose to operate at a loss
indefinitely--nor will it choose to invest in new mines that are not
economically justifiable. However, speaking for ICG, compliance with
all applicable safety standards is the fundamental principle of our
business; investments have been and will be analyzed only in a manner
that presupposes such compliance.
______
Question Submitted to Cecil E. Roberts
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
Question. At MSHA's Emergency Preparedness Conference in 1995,
industry and labor representatives voiced concerns about the dwindling
number of rescue teams allotted per mine.
How many mine rescue teams should be maintained at each mine?
Answer. The Union believes that every operator of a coal mine
should be required to maintain two qualified mine rescue teams, which
would be immediately available whenever miners are in the underground
workings of the mine. (In practice, this would probably require the
creation of at least three rescue teams so that whenever the members of
one rescue team are working their normal assigned job underground, two
other teams would be available on the surface, in event of an
emergency.) All teams should be comprised of miners who are employed at
that mine, as they are acutely aware of the mine's layout and
conditions, to enable faster response and to afford their expertise to
any additional mine rescue teams that may arrive to assist in an
emergency. There should be no exceptions, even for small mines; this
requirement must be recognized as a necessary business expense.
In addition, specific training requirements such as drills one
weekend each month at the mine site and mandatory participation in mine
rescue contests each year should be required.
Question. How do we increase the number of mine rescue teams?
Answer. Allow a transition period of nine months from the date of
the legislation, during which time each operator can identify and train
sufficient numbers of miners to fill the needed mine rescue teams.
Selected miners can be trained through dedicated classes at MSHA's Mine
Academy in Beaver, WV and the Lake Lynn Lab in Fairchance, PA. The
Rockefeller legislation would provide tax incentives (for a 3-year
period) to promote the development of more mine rescue teams.
Question. The 1995 MSHA report on its Mine Emergency Preparedness
Conference reads: ``the industry's ability to learn from lessons of
past accidents is limited by inadequate information sharing as well as
by accident reports that do not always reflect what happened.''
What else can be done to ensure a complete accident investigation?
Answer. For all multiple-fatalities and life-threatening injuries,
and other major disasters like Quecreek, in addition to MSHA's
investigation of the accident GAO should review MSHA's conduct.
After MSHA completes every accident investigation (and the GAO
completes its report for multiple fatal accidents and other major
disasters) the reports should be provided to employees at the District
as well as National levels of MSHA, so that employees throughout the
Agency can learn from the particular investigation; also copies should
be made available to other organizations involved with miners' health
and safety, as well as the affected operator and any miners'
representatives at the affected operation. These should be generally
available to the public, including posting on the MSHA web page.
Also, to ensure all relevant information is relayed to MSHA's
accident investigation team, the legally authorized representative(s)
of the miners, in accordance with 30 CFR Part 40, should be included in
all aspects of the investigation, including all interviews and the
physical investigation. As MSHA itself and a Federal judge reviewing
the role of miners' representatives at the Sago mine recognized,
miners' representatives have the trust of affected miners and act as a
valuable conduit of information to those conducting an investigation.
The operator should be required to provide information, but not be
present when witnesses provide information during MSHA's interviews;
excluding the operator will enhance the likelihood that miners will
provide complete and accurate information.
Question. How long should it take for MSHA to be notified of an
emergency, and how long should it take to organize and deploy mine
rescue teams?
Answer. MSHA should be notified ``immediately'' after a mine
operator becomes aware that an emergency condition exists. Immediate
should mean no more than fifteen minutes, absent an extraordinary
explanation. If in doubt, the operator should provide notice to MSHA
even before the scope of the emergency may be fully known. Emergencies
for which notice must be provided includes: explosion, fire,
innundation, massive roof fall, and a serious injury or fatal accident.
The determination to send MSHA field personnel to the site after
notification can and must be a determination of the Agency. The mine
operator must be responsible for putting its own mine rescue teams into
immediate service upon any emergency; it also may seek to call upon
additional mine rescue teams from nearby locations even before MSHA
arrives on site. However, MSHA must have authority to direct and
coordinate the rescue.
The representative of miners' should be notified as soon as notice
is provided to MSHA.
By requiring each mine to have two mine rescue teams immediately
available, only minimal time would be required to deploy those
individuals. Typically a team could be assembled as quickly as 30
minutes, though it could take longer to assemble a team if its members
were not all nearby and accessible by phone. Most miners live in the
nearby communities and can respond quickly. If all operations
maintained at least two teams at all times, then supplemental teams
from the nearest mining operations would also be available to assist.
Additional rescue teams can arrive at later times to bolster rescue and
recovery efforts, and to trade out with the first responders. To give
an operator quick access to such additional rescue teams, information
about all rescue teams should be easily accessible through MSHA's web
page--information about all rescue teams should be regularly updated
and MSHA should ensure it is easy to find.
Question. How do we create a rapid response mine rescue system?
Answer. If every operation must maintain at least two mine rescue
teams, as we suggest and as is required by the Mine Act, then a ``rapid
response mine rescue system'' is well along to being in place. In
addition, MSHA must make its personnel quickly available: phone
numbers, including off-hours emergency contact numbers, must be
provided to all operators for use in an emergency. All such contact
information must be kept up to date. Also, a mobile triage/surgical
unit located within a reasonable distance from mining operations could
provide valuable resources when rescuers bring survivors to the
surface. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania currently has two such
medical/surgical units readily available and can deploy them quickly in
the event of a mine emergency. MSHA or the CDC could coordinate central
placements of such units.
Question. How do we insure that the size of penalties is large
enough to encourage compliance?
Answer. Penalties must be high enough to convince operators that
full compliance is the best choice. The current base fine of $60 is far
too low. For example, compare MSHA fines with those under OSHA: while
OSHA deals with many far less-dangerous industries, fines for knowingly
endangering workers begin at $5,000, while a coal operator
demonstrating ``high negligence'' could be fined just a few hundred
dollars. The base penalty under MSHA should begin at $1,000,
irrespective of the size of the mine, the number of miners exposed or
any other factor. For more serious violations, penalties should be much
higher. After it assesses a penalty, MSHA should not negotiate or
compromise that amount. The Agency must then collect the fines it
assesses, on a regular and prompt basis.
There needs to be an expectation throughout the industry that
violations of the Mine Act will be cited with regularity, costly for
the operator, and that abatement must be accomplished in a timely
fashion. Pursuant to the existing penalty structure, the number of
miners affected is one of the factors that is considered in assessing
penalties. However, even the way MSHA applies this factor is
unrealistically low: often MSHA counts how many miners are in the most
immediate area without considering that a problem in one area can
easily spread harm to all underground miners. Also, MSHA now considers
the effect of a fine on an operator's ability to stay in business. We
submit that factor is inappropriate. If an operator cannot satisfy its
obligations under MSHA, then it should not be in the business. No miner
should be subjected to unsafe mining conditions because his employer is
on shaky financial footing. Penalties should be the same size for the
same violation at all mines.
Fines for a failure to abate should be immediately doubled, then
tripled. Repeat violations should generally be assessed much higher
amounts. MSHA should also have the authority to shut an operation for
noncompliance and for a failure to pay outstanding fines. If an
operator continues to ignore the law, it should lose the right to
operate.
Question. What do you think of assessing penalties as a percentage
of profits rather than a flat rate?
Anwer. This would not be good idea for a number of reasons: many of
the smaller and more marginal operations pose some of the greatest
risks to miners' health and safety; many coal companies are not
publically traded so obtaining information about their profitability
may not be available or verifiable; some companies may have
artificially low profits because they pay extraordinary compensation to
their top executives, or might be motivated to alter their financial
records to avoid showing high profits if higher penalties could result;
coal companies are notorious for having complicated and quickly-
changing corporate structures--figuring out which entity had what
profit margin would be difficult to determine and could quickly change.
Question. A miner knows his work area best. The Mine Act guarantees
every miner union or nonunion the right to leave the mine whenever he
feels his safety is threatened.
How can we ensure that miners feel free to exercise that right
without fear of retribution?
Answer. This is a significant issue. In the same way that the NLRA
does not prevent employers from firing employees when they try to form
unions even though that is illegal, so too, do miners reasonably fear
getting fired for exercising their rights under the Mine Act, including
the right to withdraw. The right to withdraw is protected through the
anti-discrimination provision of the Mine Act, at Section 105(c).
However, enforcement of this protection takes too long and is not often
pursued.
While MSHA has the authority to seek temporary reinstatement for
any miner who is fired unlawfully, this relief is rarely pursued. MSHA
should regularly seek temporary reinstatements as soon as it finds
prima facie merit to a discrimination claim. Also, it needs to act in a
speedy fashion in these cases. MSHA habitually misses its own deadlines
in investigating and prosecuting these discrimination cases. It needs
adequate funding to accomplish this, and it must make this a high
priority. MSHA needs to be more aggressive in protecting all of the
miners' rights under the Mine Act.
Note that the right to withdraw has been interpreted to be quite
limited: only if a miner believes that his immediate safety is in
jeopardy does he have the right to withdraw, and the withdrawal is from
the particular area, not the mine itself. To exercise this right, a
miner must bring the perceived danger to the attention of his
supervisor stating expressly that the miner has immediate fears for his
health or safety. The miner can only speak out for his own protection,
and cannot seek to have any other miners withdrawn. This right is
rarely invoked; to make it more meaningful the legal standard for
withdrawal should be liberalized. Finally, a miner who pursues his Mine
Act rights is often blackballed, whether or not the case is ultimately
successful.
Question. Why are you opposed to the MSHA rule that allows belt
entries to be used for ventilation?
Answer. The Union has always been opposed to using belt air to
ventilate the working areas. We vigorously opposed implementation of
this rule, and sued the Agency in Federal court when it was finalized
in 2004; deferring largely to the government (under the applicable
``arbitrary and capricious'' standard), the court overruled the union's
challenges based on the present law.
The belt entry is the only location in the mine where equipment
remains in constant motion. This not only includes the conveyor belt,
but also head rollers, tail rollers, belt take-ups and structural
rollers used to support the conveyor belt. Stuck rollers, coal
spillage, worn bearings, unaligned belt conveyor and other problems
create extra friction, which can cause fires to ignite on the belts;
with coal ever-present, this fuels such a fire. Further, when the belts
themselves burn, toxic fumes are also generated.
Conveyor belts extend for miles in underground coal mines, and
these areas are not regularly monitored by personnel. The potential for
fire in the mine is greatest in the belt entry; MSHA's data
demonstrates that mine fires originate in belt entries most often. In
addition, the propagation of fire throughout the entry by a burning,
moving conveyor belt can quickly make a fire uncontrollable. Air
coursing through the belt entry at high velocities further compounds
the dangers posed by a belt fire. This is very similar to fighting a
forest fire during a period of extremely high winds. The flames are
fanned and even a small fire can become uncontrollable quickly.
The end result is obvious. The smoke, fire, and toxic gases are
directed by mine design toward the working areas of the mine and
directly over miners working at the face. These events can happen
quickly, rendering the belt and return entries not viable escapeways.
Generally, there will be a third entry that also supplies air to the
working section. However, because air pressures in the belt entry are
permitted (by MSHA regulation) to be greater than in other entries, the
fire and/or fire gases may bleed into other entries adjacent to the
belt. Mines with this design allow the other entries to also become
compromised when there is a fire on the belt. Miners have difficulty
escaping in these cases. Indeed, we understand that t was along a belt
entry that was used for ventilation, where the Aracoma Alma No.1 fire
began, resulting in the deaths of miners Don Bragg and Ellery Hatfield
in January, 2006.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Specter. Thank you all very much for being here.
That concludes our hearing.
[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., Monday, January 23, the hearing
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]