[Senate Hearing 109-384]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-384
U.S.-INDIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION: SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION
IMPLICATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 2, 2005
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware..... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas, Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., codirector, Preventive Defense Project,
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA...................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Joseph, Hon. Robert G., Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, Department of State, Washington, DC.... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Krepon, Michael, cofounder and president emeritus, Henry L.
Stimson Center, Washington, DC................................. 65
Prepared statement........................................... 66
Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., II, director, Center for Global Security
Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana................ 1
Sokolski, Henry D., executive director, Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center, Washington, DC............................... 51
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Viewgraphs................................................... 58
India's ICBM--On a ``Glide Path'' to Trouble................. 85
Feeding the Nuclear Fire..................................... 93
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Einhorn, Hon. Robert J., senior adviser, International Security
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC:
Letter to Senator Lugar...................................... 79
Recommended Modifications of U.S. Law and NSG Guidelines..... 80
Prepared statement........................................... 81
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 77
Rademaker, Stephen G., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
International Security and Nonproliferation, State Department,
Washington, DC, statement before the NSG Consultative Group,
October 18-19, 2005............................................ 77
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Lugar:
Responses of Under Secretaries Burns and Joseph.............. 97
Responses of Under Secretary Burns........................... 103
Responses of Secretary Joseph................................ 104
(iii)
U.S.-INDIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION: SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION
IMPLICATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, and Biden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is
called to order.
The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider the
Joint Statement issued by President Bush and Prime Minister of
India on July 18, 2005. This document stands as a milestone in
the United States-Indian relationship. It covers the full range
of economic, political, and security issues, as well as matters
related to nuclear energy cooperation, and has the potential to
bring our two countries closer together than ever before.
India is a very important emerging power on the world
stage. It enjoys a vibrant democracy, a rapidly growing
economy, and increasing influence in world affairs. Indians
have come to the United States to study in our universities, to
work in our industries, and to live here as citizens. It is
clearly in the interest of the United States to develop a
strong strategic relationship with India.
At this point, let me pause for a moment to express the
committee's condolences and our sympathy for the people of
India, who suffered a terrible terrorist attack over the
weekend in New Delhi. We fully support India in its battle
against terrorism.
Although the Joint Statement covers many areas of policy,
commentary has focused narrowly on the nuclear energy section,
which states that India will be treated as, ``a responsible
state with advanced nuclear technology.'' Critics and advocates
acknowledge that this represents a departure from previous U.S.
policies and international practices. India has never signed
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the foundation of
international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
India has developed a nuclear weapons arsenal, in conflict with
the goals of the treaty. New Delhi, in 1974, violated bilateral
pledges it made to Washington not to use U.S.-supplied nuclear
materials for weapons purposes. And, more recently, Indian
scientists have faced United States sanctions for providing
nuclear information to Iran.
India's nuclear record with the international community
also has been unsatisfying. It has not acknowledged, or placed
under effective international safeguards, all of its facilities
involved in nuclear work. Its nuclear tests in 1998 triggered
widespread condemnation and international sanctions.
Prior to the July 18 Joint Statement, India had repeatedly
sought, unsuccessfully, to be recognized as an official nuclear
weapons state, a status the NPT reserves only for the United
States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom.
Opponents argue that granting India such status will undermine
the essential bargain that is at the core of the NPT; namely,
that only by foregoing nuclear weapons can a country gain
civilian nuclear assistance. They observe that permitting India
to retain nuclear weapons while it receives the same civilian
nuclear benefits as nations that have foresworn weapons
programs would set a harmful precedent that would encourage
other nations to take India's path. New Delhi has long claimed
that the NPT is discriminatory, and that the international
community has instituted what it calls a, ``nuclear apartheid''
against it.
Implementation of the July 18 Joint Statement requires
congressional consent, as well as modifications to
nonproliferation laws and an American commitment to work with
allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil
nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. This
committee, and ultimately the entire Congress, must determine
what effect the Joint Statement will have on United States
efforts to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. To date, no associated legislative proposals have
been offered by the administration. Likewise, there does not
appear to be a specific Indian timetable to fulfill its
obligations under the Joint Statement.
India has agreed, according to the statement, to, ``assume
the same responsibilities and practices, and acquire the same
benefits and advantages, as other leading countries with
advanced nuclear technology.''
These responsibilities include seven specific action steps:
One, identifying and separating civilian and military
nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner, and
declaring them to the IAEA;
Two, voluntarily placing the civilian nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards;
Three, signing, and adhering to, an Additional Protocol;
Four, continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear
testing;
Fifth, working with the United States to conclude a
multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty;
Sixth, refraining from the transfer of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them, and
supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and,
finally,
Seven, complying with the Missile Technology Control
Regime, the MTCR, and Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG, guidelines.
There are four key questions that today's hearing seeks to
answer.
The first question is, How does civil nuclear cooperation
strengthen the United States-Indian strategic relationship? And
why is it so important?
Second, How does the Joint Statement address United States
concerns about India's nuclear programs and policies?
Third, What effects will the Joint Statement have on other
proliferation challenges, such as Iran and North Korea and the
export policies of Russia and China?
And, fourth, What impact will the Joint Statement have on
the efficacy and future of the NPT and the international
nonproliferation regime?
Today's hearing will consist of two panels. On the first
panel, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas
Burns, and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, Robert Joseph, will lay out the
administration's case for the July Joint Statement. They are
both good friends of our committee, and I want to express my
personal appreciation for their efforts to meet with Senators
on this and other important issues.
On the second panel, we will hear from several outside
experts. Ronald Lehman, former director of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, and currently director of the
Center for Global Security Research at Livermore National
Laboratory; and Ashton Carter, codirector of the Preventive
Defense Project will present their views to the committee. Dr.
Lehman and Dr. Carter are cochairmen of the Non-Proliferation
Policy Advisory Group, an informal panel of experts that I have
convened to examine nonproliferation issues. They are joined by
Mr. Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center, and Mr. Michael Krepon, cofounder and
president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center.
We deeply appreciate the appearance of all of our
witnesses, and we look forward to their testimony.
I would say at the outset, gentlemen, that each of your
full statements will be made a part of our record. As you are
asked to proceed, please summarize or give as much as you wish.
We want to hear from you. These are very serious issues.
I now want to recognize the distinguished ranking member of
our committee, Senator Biden.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing and for assembling such a distinguished and deep panel
here. And I mean that sincerely.
And, as we say in this business, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to
associate myself with your remarks, and, as a consequence,
eliminate the first half of what I was going to say, because
it's repetitious, and ask that my entire statement be placed in
the record----
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in the full.
Senator Biden [continuing]. So that I can just speak to the
second half of what I was going to say.
As our colleagues in the administration know, this is not a
``slam dunk'' here. There are a lot of questions. I had lunch
today, as you and Mr. Hyde did last week, I believe, with the
Secretary of State and some of her personnel, and this was a
topic of some discussion. And my House colleague, Congressman
Lantos, was pointing out what difficulty this may face in the
House.
Obviously, it's in our interest to have very close
relationships with India. At least, I believe that. I think we
all do. And as we understand it, India, in return for the
proposed opening of nuclear commerce, would separate civil
nuclear facilities from its military ones, put its civil
facilities under IAEA safeguards, and sign and implement an
Additional Protocol with IAEA, and it would work with the
United States on, as was mentioned, a multilateral Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty, continue its moratorium on nucler
testing, and improve its export control regime, all of which
are very much in our mutual interest.
As I said, I strongly support close relations with India.
India is not only the world's most populous democracy, it's
also a major power in the region and a longstanding contributor
to world progress in technology, philosophy, and the arts.
India and the United States are, in my view, natural partners,
but, at the same time, both countries have to ensure that close
relations don't lead to further nuclear proliferation. If this
nuclear deal, in fact, does have, as critics say, the effect of
significantly undermining nonproliferation, even by accident,
the cost to the world, in an increased risk of nuclear war or
terrorism, would be a terrible legacy to leave.
And I wonder how good the July 18 deal really is. Critics
have charged that India's promises are quite unclear regarding
separation of civil from military facilities, and that it
contains nothing new on testing, on the Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty, or on export controls.
So, it seems to me, as you gentlemen know, it's up to the
administration to demonstrate that, in dealing with the dilemma
of countries that have not signed the NPT, it will strengthen
nonproliferation rather than turning its back on over 50 years
of U.S. policy.
The July 18 Joint Statement raises several questions, some
of which have been raised by my colleague, that I hope the
witnesses are ready to address today. Let me summarize a few of
them.
First, Will this open the door to nuclear cooperation with
Pakistan, even if that is not our intent?
Second, What implications would an Indian exemption have
for potential nuclear weapons states that have abided by the
bargain implicit in the NPT? What concerns did other countries
raise at the recent Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in this
regard?
Third, Will an Indian exception decrease our ability to
forge a common front against the nuclear ambitions of Iran and
North Korea, or is it totally unrelated?
Could Russia use the Indian precedent to justify technology
transfers to Tehran? Could China use it to justify sales to
Iran, or even to North Korea?
Will India allow significant international safeguards on
its civilian nuclear entities?
Will it open as many facilities as possible to
international safeguards, as the United States does? Or will it
take Russia or China as its model?
Will it agree to permanent safeguards on civil nuclear
facilities that it declares?
And how confident are we that India shares our
nonproliferation concerns? Why were two of its senior
scientists sanctioned by the United States, just months ago?
How binding are the commitments that each side has made in
the July 18 statement? If India were to conduct a nuclear test
or did not put many facilities under safeguards, or if the
United States Congress or the NSG were to attach conditions to
the India exception, would the other country be released from
its promises?
How can we assure that what we do regarding India will
further nonproliferation? Is there a useful way to address the
broader dilemma of nonsigners of NPT, rather than just India?
And, last, how can we assure that what we do to preserve
nonproliferation equities will not undermine the important
United States-Indian relationship that we all want to improve?
These are very tough questions. I don't have the answers to
all of them. But that is in the nature of a serious hearing.
So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses--all of them,
but beginning with the administration.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the Secretaries for
being here.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
Mr. Chairman, as you and I both know, there may be no more urgent
issue for our country than nuclear nonproliferation. Today's hearing
addresses some of the most difficult aspects of this issue, and I am
grateful to you for assembling such excellent witnesses to help us.
I hope that this is only the first of several hearings on nuclear
trade between the United States and India. The matter is complex and
Congress will be asked to legislate on it, so we need careful
consultation with the executive branch. And I am sure you agree that
any needed legislation on this matter should go through the Foreign
Relations Committee.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty includes this basic bargain:
Countries that renounce nuclear weapons gain the right to civil nuclear
cooperation with the world's nuclear powers. The NPT and this bargain
at its core have deterred many countries from pursuing nuclear weapons.
Several countries did not sign the NPT--including India and
Pakistan, which openly tested nuclear weapons, and Israel, which is
presumed to have them.
Past practice has been to ignore or reject the status of new
entrants to the nuclear ``club,'' and to forswear nuclear commerce with
them. This has not stopped those countries from developing nuclear
weapons, but it may have slowed or limited their progress.
We are left with the problem of how to assure that these countries
do not become proliferators themselves or lead other countries to
develop nuclear weapons, as well as the concern that a forthright
nonproliferation policy might sour our relations with important and
otherwise friendly countries.
President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh propose to change
the rules for India. The United States would seek changes in U.S. law
and in NSG Guidelines to permit ``full civil nuclear energy cooperation
and trade with India.''
India, in return, would separate its civil nuclear facilities from
its military ones, put its civil facilities under IAEA safeguards, and
sign and implement an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. It would work
with the United States on a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty, continue its moratorium on nuclear testing, and improve its
export control regime.
I strongly support closer relations between the United States and
India. India is not only the world's most populous democracy, but also
a major power in the region and a long-standing contributor to world
progress in technology, philosophy and the arts. India and the United
States are natural partners.
At the same time, both countries must ensure that closer relations
do not lead to further nuclear proliferation. If we were to undermine
nuclear nonproliferation, even by accident, the cost to the world--in
an increased risk of nuclear war or terrorism--would be a terrible
legacy to leave.
And I wonder how good the July 18 deal really is. Critics have
charged that India's promises are unclear (regarding separation of
civil from military facilities) or nothing new (on testing, a Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty, and export controls).
So, it is up to the administration to demonstrate that in dealing
with the dilemma of countries that have not signed the NPT, it will
strengthen nonproliferation, rather than turning its back on over 50
years of U.S. policy. The July 18 Joint Statement raises several
questions that I hope our witnesses will address today, among them:
(1) Will this open the door to nuclear cooperation with
Pakistan, even if that is not our intent?
(2) What implications would an India exemption have for
potential nuclear weapon states that have abided by the bargain
implicit in NPT? What concerns did other countries raise at the
recent Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting?
(3) Will an ``India exemption'' decrease our ability to forge
a common front against the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North
Korea? Could Russia use the India precedent to justify
technology transfers to Tehran? Could China use it to justify
sales to Tehran or even Pyongyang?
(4) Will India allow significant international safeguards on
its civilian nuclear entities? Will it open as many facilities
as possible to international safeguards, as the United States
does, or will it take Russia or China as its model? Will it
agree to permanent safeguards on the civil nuclear facilities
it declares?
(5) How confident are we that India shares our
nonproliferation concerns? Why were two of its senior
scientists sanctioned a few months ago?
(6) How binding are the commitments that each side made in
the July 18 Joint Statement? If India were to conduct a nuclear
test or did not put many facilities under safeguards, or if the
U.S. Congress or the NSG were to attach conditions to their
``India exemptions,'' would the other country be released from
its promises?
(7) How can we assure that what we do regarding India will
further nonproliferation? Is there a useful way to address the
broader dilemma of nonsigners of the NPT, rather than just
India? And,
(8) How can we assure that what we do to preserve
nonproliferation equities will not undermine the important
U.S.-India relationship that we all want to improve?
These are tough questions, but that is in the nature of serious
hearings. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel, do you have an opening comment?
Senator Hagel. No; thanks.
The Chairman. Very well.
We'll proceed to our witnesses. And I'll ask you to testify
in this order: First of all, Secretary Burns, and then
Secretary Joseph.
Secretary Burns, we are delighted that you're here, and
would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Burns. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Senator
Biden, Senator Hagel, thank you for the invitation, to Bob
Joseph and myself, to be with you.
We have testimony we've submitted for the record. We will--
I will not read my testimony to you. But I would like to
address two questions, and I think that, in doing so, perhaps
we can begin to answer some of the questions that you and
Senator Biden have put on the table for us.
The first is to describe to you the nature and the schedule
of our negotiations with the Indians that do continue toward
the fulfillment of this civil nuclear energy agreement and to
talk about, obviously, the role of Congress and the need for
Congress to be fully briefed and to take a final decision on
this issue.
The second would be to provide a little bit of rationale
for why we undertook this deal, and also to discuss the
strategic benefits of the fuller relationship that we have
foreseen.
So, I'll proceed on that basis.
President Bush said, a couple of months ago, that this
century will see democratic India's arrival as a force in the
world. And he believes--Secretary Rice believes--that it is in
our national interest to develop a strong and forward-looking
strategic engagement with India as the global system shifts
inevitably eastward toward Asia. And we know that many in
Congress embrace that view. You've both said this in your
opening statements. And we believe the time is right to seek
such a relationship with India.
During the cold war, India was the ultimate nonaligned
country; we were the ultimate aligned country. And the cold war
is now long past. So, it's our view that it's time to build
this relationship. And that was the intent that the President
had when he met with Prime Minister Singh here in Washington on
July 18.
We look at India as a rising strategic power. Within the
first quarter of this century, it is likely to be included
among the world's five largest economies. It will soon be the
most populous nation in the world. It has a demographic
distribution that bequeaths it a very large and youthful and
skilled workforce. Its military forces are increasingly
training with ours, working with ours. They are large, they are
capable, they're sophisticated, and they also are under
civilian control, as, of course, ours are.
Above all else, as we look at India, we think we know what
kind of country India will be a generation from now. It's going
to be a country like the United States--multiethnic and
multireligious and multilingual--and it will be a democracy. It
will be a--it will be a country that is built on the rule of
law and individual freedom. And that is a great assurance to
provide the bedrock or the foundation of any strategic
relationship.
We're here as part of the beginning of a consultative
process with the Congress, and we are determined to work very
closely with the Congress as we proceed through these rather
complex and difficult negotiations. When the President and
Prime Minister agreed, on July 18, on the many, many joint
ventures, including this nuclear deal between the two
countries, we determined that we obviously would need to
negotiate the implementation of these agreements, especially
the nuclear agreement, with the Indian Government.
And Bob and I testified before the House International
Relations Committee in September. Since then, as you said, Mr.
Chairman, I know that Secretary Rice has had a chance to brief
the leaders of both the Senate and the House, in general, on
this arrangement. She's eager to engage with you in more
detailed discussions, herself, on our South Asia policy, more
broadly, and on this particular initiative, more specifically.
We've had extensive briefings with the House and Senate
staff. We even invited members of the House staff to attend
with us the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in Vienna 2 weeks
ago.
So, in short, we believe we've shared with the Congress the
basics of our rationale for the July 18 agreement, and we
intend to proceed in that fashion in the months ahead.
We cannot go forward on this initiative without the express
authorization of the Congress. The advent of full United States
civil nuclear cooperation with India would require a change in
United States law, and that is the responsibility, not of the
executive branch, but of the legislative branch.
Based on my visit to New Delhi 2 weeks ago, it's clear to
us that it's going to take some time for the Indian Government
to fulfill all the commitments it made to us in the July 18
agreement. The actions India agreed to take are difficult, and
they're complex, and they're time consuming. And our
administration, thus, believes that it would--it's better to
wait before we ask Congress to consider any required
adjustments in law until India is further along in taking these
necessary steps to fulfill our agreement. And it may be,
although it's very hard to predict this, that the Indians won't
be ready to have--they won't have taken all these steps until
the first part of 2006. It could be February or March or April.
Our judgment is: It wouldn't be wise or fair to ask
Congress to make such a consequential decision without evidence
that the Indian Government was acting on what is arguably the
most important of its obligations, and that's the separation of
its civilian and military nuclear facilities.
I told the Indian leadership in Delhi, 2 weeks ago, that
they must craft a credible and transparent plan, and have begun
to implement it--this is the separation plan--before the
administration would request congressional action. And my
counterpart, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, assured me that the
Indian Government will produce such a plan.
As India begins to meet its obligations under the--our
agreement, we would propose appropriate language that, in our
view, might best be India-specific and would demonstrate our
dedication to fulfilling the July 18 agreement. I have invited
Foreign Secretary Saran to come to Washington to continue these
implementation negotiations in December, and I'll be returning
to Delhi in January. We will, of course, keep the Congress
fully apprised of all of these discussions, and we're ready to
come and brief and talk, on an informal basis or a formal way,
whichever is better for you.
Mr. Chairman, you posed four questions to us. Senator Biden
posed more questions to us, and let us see if we can answer
some of them. And I know we won't fulfill that in our opening
statements, but we're happy to take your questions.
When Secretary Rice set out on her first trip to India last
spring, she had in mind the development of a broad strategic
relationship, a partnership with India. And she knew, and we
knew, that we would have to deal with the one issue that had
bedeviled United States-India relations for the last 30 years,
and that's the nuclear issue. We determined from the start that
we could not recognize India as a nuclear weapons state. Such a
step would weaken, fundamentally, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. It would be logically inconsistent with the policy of
the last seven American Presidents.
It was equally clear that India would not become a party to
the NPT as a nonnuclear weapons state. We also knew that we
would have to confront the more difficult and complex issue of
whether to work with India on full civil nuclear cooperation.
India had made this a central issue in the new partnership
developing between our two countries. And, as you know, past
administrations had decided to forego such cooperation with
India due to India's nuclear weapons program and its status
outside the nonproliferation regime. We had to decide whether
this policy remained consistent with American interests in
building a strong nonproliferation regime, and with our obvious
interest in building a new across-the-board strategic
relationship.
Because India had developed nuclear weapons outside the
regime, we had no existing cooperation between our civil
nuclear energy industries, and, as such, no real influence on
India's adherence to the critical international safety and
proliferation standards that are the bedrock of the
international regime.
And while not formally part of the NPT regime, India has
demonstrated a strong commitment to protect fissile materials
and nuclear technology. Indeed, India has upheld an important
obligation undertaken by all NPT members in resisting proposals
for nuclear cooperation with nuclear aspirants that could have
had averse implications for international security.
We weighed the pros and cons, frankly, of whether or not to
seek changes to U.S. policy and to ask Congress for
authorization to begin full cooperation in this field. And we
decided that it was in the American interest to bring India
into compliance with the standards and practices of the
international nonproliferation regime. And we decided that the
only way to reach that goal was to end India's isolation and
begin to engage it. India will soon have the largest population
in the world, and we thought to consign it to a place outside
that system did not appear to be strategically wise. And that
isolation had not been effective. Without such an agreement,
India, with its large and sophisticated nuclear capabilities,
would continue to remain unregulated by international rules
governing commerce in sensitive nuclear and nuclear-related
technologies. With the agreement, and especially given India's
track record in stemming the proliferation of its nuclear
technology, the United States and the international community
will benefit by asking India to open up its system to submit to
international inspections and to safeguards in its civil
facilities, and to take the steps necessary to separate
civilian and military nuclear facilities. In other words, we
would be asking India to come into effective compliance with
international standards.
This agreement, then, is about the formation of a much more
effective partnership between India and the United States on
nonproliferation for the first time in 30 years. India is going
to assume, if this agreement is implemented, the same
responsibilities as other nations with civil nuclear energy,
and will protect against diversion of items to India's nuclear
weapons program or to other countries.
United States-Indian cooperation on nuclear energy will,
therefore, help strengthen the international order in a way
that advances widespread international equities in nuclear
nonproliferation. It will also allow India to develop, much
more quickly, its own civilian nuclear power industry, thus
reducing demand in the world energy market, and by the use of
clean fuel, clean nuclear energy.
Mr. Chairman, I should tell you this was not an easy
choice. The construct that I just reviewed with you was
essentially a sense of the pros and cons as Secretary Rice and
her senior officials weighed them. We concluded we had a better
chance to have India meet international standards if we engaged
it, rather than isolated it. And we believe that the July 18
agreement advances our strategic partnership and is a net gain
for nonproliferation. And we do not plan to offer such
cooperation to any other country. I think that answers one of
Senator Biden's questions.
India is, in effect, for us, a unique case. Unlike North
Korea, unlike Iran, it remained--it never adhered to the NPT;
it pursued nuclear weapons outside the NPT. But it's now
prepared to comply with the restrictions and safeguards on its
civil nuclear program. That, to us, is a distinct advantage.
There are other benefits here. There are security benefits.
India's September vote in the IAEA that joined with the United
States and other countries in finding Iran not in compliance
with its international obligations reflects that India is
beginning to think of its global role differently, and that
India--the United States-Indian conversation on this issue is
at an impact. And I should give some credit here to the
Congress. When Bob and I testified in September before the
HIRC, Congressman Lantos and Chairman Hyde and others made it
abundantly clear that if India acted to somehow protect Iran in
this issue of whether or not Iran should have a nuclear weapons
capability, then those Members of Congress said they could not
support this civil nuclear agreement. India has acted. And we
have every reason to believe that India's vote in September is
a permanent change in Indian policy.
There are environmental benefits to this that I have spoken
about. There are certainly commercial benefits. As we seek to
normalize commercial civil nuclear cooperation there are
advantages to American companies, and there are opportunities
for American jobs.
And there are energy benefits, because we have pledged to
bring India into the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor Program, which will help make the next generation of
reactors safer and more efficient, and also to have it become a
member of the Generation IV Forum.
Mr. Chairman, let me just conclude, because I don't want to
read the rest of my testimony, that in addition to this civil
nuclear energy deal, President Bush was able to negotiate a
wide range of initiatives--joint-venture initiatives--that
we've never undertaken before with the Indian Government. And
we believe these are consequential for American interest: A new
defense relationship, broader work on trade and investment--in
fact, our trade relationship has expanded several times over in
the last 4 or 5 years; science and technology research
cooperation, space launch and space research cooperation; a
return to agricultural cooperation of the type that we had, as
many will remember, in the 1950s and 1960s, at the beginning of
this relationship, after Indian independence; and,
interestingly, a commitment by the Indians to work with us to
promote democracy worldwide. That kind of thing didn't happen
when the nonaligned movement and the aligned West were often at
ideological odds during the cold war. But India's agreement and
its sponsorship of a U.N. democracy fund with President Bush is
an indication that the Indians are thinking differently about
their global role, as is their joint sponsorship with us of
HIV/AIDS programs in Africa and other parts of the world.
So, we see a distinct advantage, not just from the nuclear
agreement, but from this broader based strategic engagement
that we've outlined, and we're happy to talk about any of those
programs.
And I would just make one final point, Mr. Chairman. This
is not a perfect relationship, by any means. We're still very
different countries with different histories, and sometimes
with different interests. But we seem to have a coincidence now
of interests and views on the issues that are truly important:
On nonproliferation, on the question of Iran's nuclear weapons
program, on the promotion of democracy, on the need for
stability and peace in Asia as we look toward strategic
challenges there in the 21st century.
There are some remaining challenges and differences that we
need to work out with the Indians. We hope that the Indians
will join the Proliferation Security Initiative. They're
really, I think, the only great partner of the United States,
large partner, that has not elected to do that.
We hope very much that the Indians and our Government will
cooperate better at the United Nations. We have tended, over
the years, not to vote with each other on important issues at
the Security Council. But as we increasingly find a coincidence
of views together, we hope there will be a change in New York,
and that we'll both support reform of the United Nations.
And, finally, India is a country that is critical to
resolving some of the--some of the difficult and complex
problems in South Asia: The question of the autocratic regime
in Burma and its denial of human rights to its own people; the
question of the problems in Nepal with the renunciation of the
political party system by the King of Nepal in the--over the
last half year; the problem of stability in Bangladesh. India
can be helpful to the United States, and I think we can be
helpful to India, on all of those questions. And we now are
building this kind of cooperation across the board in South
Asia, as well as globally, and that is a distinct departure
from where we were even 5 or 10 years ago in this relationship.
So, I would just submit the rest of my testimony for the
record, Mr. Chairman, but I wanted to give you a sense of the
strategic prism through which we view this relationship.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting
Under Secretary Joseph and me to discuss the current state of our
relations with India and, specifically the development of full civil
nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States. The
July 18 visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington
marked a watershed in our ties with the world's most populous
democracy.
President Bush's desire to transform relations with India is based
on his conviction that, as he has said, ``This century will see
democratic India's arrival as a force in the world.'' We believe it is
in our national interest to develop a strong, forward-looking
relationship with India as the political and economic focus of the
global system shifts toward Asia. We know that many in Congress embrace
this view. And the time is right. The cold war, when India was the
ultimate nonaligned nation and the United States the ultimate aligned
nation, is long past. It is time to shift our United States-India
relationship to a new, strategic partnership for the decades ahead.
India is a rising global power with a rapidly growing economy.
Within the first quarter of this century, it is likely to be included
among the world's five largest economies. It will soon be the world's
most populous nation, and it has a demographic distribution that
bequeaths it a huge, skilled, and youthful workforce. India's military
forces will continue to be large, capable, and increasingly
sophisticated. Just like our own, the Indian military remains strongly
committed to the principle of civilian control. Above all else, we know
what kind of country India will be decades from now. Like the United
States, India will thrive as a multiethnic, multireligious and
multilingual democracy, characterized by individual freedom, rule of
law and a constitutional government that owes its power to free and
fair elections.
Under Secretary Joseph and I are here as part of a consultation
process with both Houses of Congress to seek eventually the adjustment
of United States laws to accommodate civil nuclear trade with India. We
are at the very beginning of that process. We will work closely with
Congress to determine the best way ahead.
Since President Bush agreed with Prime Minister Singh on this
nuclear initiative on July 18, we have discussed with many of you
individually where best to begin the decisionmaking process with
Congress. Both of us testified before the House International Relations
Committee in September. Secretary Rice has briefed the Senate and House
leadership on this initiative. She is eager to engage with you in more
detailed discussions in the coming months. We have already had
extensive briefings of House and Senate staff, and we even invited
House staff to attend with us the meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group in Vienna 2 weeks ago dealing with the Indian civil nuclear
issue. In short, we have shared with the Congress our rationale for the
July 18 agreement and have consulted consistently and in detail on our
discussions with the Indian Government since that time.
Secretary Rice, Under Secretary Joseph, and I look forward to
continuing this dialog. We recognize that the pace and scope of the
initiative requires close consultation with Congress and we welcome
your suggestions and advice as we move forward.
Indeed, we cannot go forward on this initiative without the express
consent of Congress. The advent of full United States civil nuclear
cooperation with India requires adjustments in United States law. I had
the privilege of negotiating the July 18 agreement for the United
States and remain the principal negotiator with the Indian Government.
Based on my visit to New Delhi 2 weeks ago, it is clear that it will
take some time for the Indian Government to fulfill all of the
commitments it made in the July 18 agreement. The actions India
committed to undertake are difficult, complex and time consuming. The
administration thus believes it is better to wait before we ask
Congress to consider any required legislative action until India is
further along in taking the necessary steps to fulfill our agreement. I
believe that will likely be in early 2006.
Our judgment is that it would not be wise or fair to ask Congress
to make such a consequential decision without evidence that the Indian
Government was acting on what is arguably the most important of its
commitments--the separation of its civilian and military nuclear
facilities. I told the Indian leadership in Delhi 2 weeks ago that it
must craft a credible and transparent plan and have begun to implement
it before the administration would request congressional action.
My counterpart, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, assured me that the
Indian Government will produce such a plan. He stressed last week to a
domestic audience at the New Delhi-based Institute of Defense Studies
and Analyses, ``It makes no sense for India to deliberately keep some
of its civilian facilities out of its declaration for safeguards
purposes, if it is really interested in obtaining international
cooperation on as wide a scale as possible. As India begins to meet its
commitments under our agreement, we will propose appropriate language
that would be India-specific and would demonstrate our dedication to a
robust and permanent partnership.''
I have invited Foreign Secretary Saran to Washington in December to
continue our talks, and I intend to return to India in January to
further our understanding of India's plans to separate its civil and
military nuclear facilities. We will, of course, keep the Congress
fully apprised of all these discussions. We hope very much that India
can make the necessary progress to allow us to refer legislation to
Congress by early 2006.
THE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION INITIATIVE
Mr. Chairman, you requested that we answer three questions in this
hearing: First, why is it necessary to draw closer to India; second,
how would United States concerns about India's nonproliferation
policies be addressed by this agreement; and, third, will our proposed
policy change apply to countries other than India? Under Secretary
Joseph and I will respond to each of your questions.
When Secretary Rice set out last spring to develop the structure of
such a partnership, we knew we would have to deal with the one issue
that has bedeviled United States-India relations for the last 30
years--the nuclear issue.
We determined from the start that we could not recognize India as a
nuclear weapons state. Such a step would weaken fundamentally the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and would be logically
inconsistent with U.S. policy under the last seven American Presidents.
It was equally clear that India would not become a party to the NPT as
a nonnuclear weapons state.
We also knew that we would have to confront the more difficult and
complex issue of whether to work with India on full civil nuclear
cooperation. India had made this the central issue in the new
partnership developing between our countries. As you know, past
administrations had decided to forgo such civil cooperation with India
due to India's nuclear weapons program and its status outside the
nonproliferation regime. We had to decide whether this policy remained
consistent with U.S. interests in building a strong nonproliferation
regime and with our obvious priority of improving relations with the
world's largest democracy.
Because India developed nuclear weapons outside the regime, we had
no existing cooperation between our civil nuclear energy industries
and, as such, no real influence on India's adherence to the critical
international nonproliferation standards that are the bedrock of our
efforts to limit the spread of nuclear technology. While not formally
part of the NPT regime, India has demonstrated a strong commitment to
protect fissile materials and nuclear technology. Indeed, as other
responsible countries with advanced nuclear technology, India has
resisted proposals for nuclear cooperation with nuclear aspirants that
could have had adverse implications for international security.
We weighed the pros and cons of whether or not to seek changes to
U.S. policy and ask Congress for authorization to begin full civil
nuclear energy cooperation.
We decided that it was in the American interest to bring India into
compliance with the standards and practices of the international
nonproliferation regime. And, we decided that the only way to reach
that goal was to end India's isolation and begin to engage it. India
will soon have the largest population in the world, and to consign it
to a place outside that system did not appear to be strategically wise
and has not proven effective.
Without such an agreement, India, with its large and sophisticated
nuclear capabilities, would continue to remain outside the
international export control regimes governing commerce in sensitive
nuclear and nuclear-related technologies. With this agreement, given
India's solid record in stemming and preventing the proliferation of
its nuclear technology over the past 30 years, the United States and
the international community will benefit by asking India to open up its
system, to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities, and to
submit to international inspections and safeguards on its civil
facilities, thus allowing it to bring its civil nuclear program into
effective conformity with international standards.
India will assume the same nonproliferation responsibilities as
other responsible nations with civil nuclear energy and will protect
against diversion of items either to India's weapons program or to
other countries. United States-Indian cooperation on nuclear energy
will therefore help strengthen the international order in a way that
advances widespread international equities in nuclear nonproliferation.
It also will allow India to develop much more quickly its own civilian
nuclear power industry, thus reducing demands on the world energy
market and in a way that provides clean energy for the future.
This was not an easy choice. We do not live in an ideal world. We
concluded we had a better chance to have India meet international
nonproliferation standards if we engaged rather than isolated it. We
believe the resulting agreement advances our strategic partnership and
is a net gain for nonproliferation. We do not plan to offer such
cooperation to any other country.
In addition to aligning ourselves with a country that shares our
democratic values and commitment to a multiethnic, multireligious
society, developing civil nuclear cooperation with India will bring
concrete benefits to the United States and to the international
community more broadly. Under Secretary Joseph will address this
initiative in detail, but let me outline here some of the key reasons
why we believe this initiative makes excellent sense:
Security Benefits: All the steps that India pledged on July
18 strengthen the international nonproliferation regime, and
all align with our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of
mass destruction. India's September vote in the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that found Iran in noncompliance
with its nuclear obligations reflects India's coming of age as
a responsible state in the global nonproliferation mainstream.
Environmental Benefits: Nuclear energy is one of the few
proven sources of energy that does not emit greenhouse gases,
and thus can help India modernize in an environmentally
friendly manner that does not damage our common atmosphere and
contribute to global warming.
Commercial Benefits: As a result of our involvement in
India's civil nuclear industry, United States companies will be
able to enter India's lucrative and growing energy market,
potentially providing jobs for thousands of Americans.
Energy Benefits: India's expertise in basic science and
applied engineering will add significant resources and
substantial talent in the development of fusion as a cheap
energy source if India can participate in the International
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) program and help make
the next generation of reactors safer, more efficient and more
proliferation-resistant as a member of the Generation IV Forum
(GIF).
THE BROADER RELATIONSHIP
Although our civil nuclear initiative has garnered the most
attention, it is only part of a much broader and deeper strategic
partnership with India, something that has not really been possible
until now.
In late June, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld signed a New Defense Framework that will guide
our defense relations for the next decade. We're planning to enlarge
defense trade, improve cooperation between our Armed Forces, and
coproduce military hardware. The brilliant cooperation of our two
militaries during the response to the tsunami disaster last December
was a remarkable testament to how far we have come, and the great
potential we have for the future.
A strong, democratic India is an important partner for the United
States. We anticipate that India will play an increasingly important
leadership role in 21st century Asia, working with us to promote
democracy, respect for human rights, economic growth, stability and
peace in that vital region. By cooperating with India now, we
accelerate the arrival of the benefits that India's rise brings to the
region and the world. By fostering ever-closer bilateral ties, we also
eliminate the possibility that our two nations might overlook their
natural affinities and enter into another period of unproductive
estrangement as was so often the case during the cold war period. By
challenging India today, with a full measure of respect for its ancient
civilization, traditions, and accomplishments, we can help it realize
its full potential as a natural partner in the struggle against the
security challenges of the coming generation, and the global threats
that are flowing over, under, and through our respective national
borders.
I visited New Delhi 2 weeks ago and held an extensive series of
discussions with senior Indian officials on the range of our foreign
policy interests. While there, I had broad-ranging discussions on many
issues, everything from HIV/AIDS to the situation in Nepal to our
concerns about Iran. The July 18 Joint Statement calls for government-
to-government joint cooperation in many areas, including civil nuclear
cooperation; a United States-India Global Democracy Initiative; an
expanded United States-India Economic Dialogue focusing on trade,
finance, the environment, and commerce; continued cooperation in
science and technology; an Energy Dialogue to strengthen energy
security and promote stable energy markets, an Agricultural Knowledge
Initiative, an Information and Communications Technology Working Group;
Space Cooperation; a United States-India Disaster Response Initiative;
and the United States-India HIV/AIDS Partnership. Foreign Secretary
Saran and I have already begun working on the joint ventures that the
President and Prime Minister Singh had asked us to undertake and plan
to further our cooperation in the fields of education, in agriculture,
in science and technology, and in space. We very much would like to
welcome an Indian astronaut to fly on the space shuttle. I think it is
clear that our interests converge on all these issues. With this
ambitious agenda, our two countries are becoming, in effect, global
partners.
Cooperation in several of these areas has already begun and is
yielding results. Just last month, the United States-India Treaty on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into force,
providing for enhanced, streamlined and more effective law enforcement
cooperation between our two countries. On October 17, Secretary Rice
and Indian Science and Technology Minister Sibal signed an umbrella
Science and Technology Agreement that will strengthen United States and
Indian capabilities and expand relations between the extensive
scientific and technological communities of both countries. This
agreement includes a substantive Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
provision--another indication of India's increasing recognition of the
need to respect intellectual property.
THE CHALLENGES WE FACE
We have accomplished much, but we have just scratched the surface
of our partnership with India. Ambassador Mulford and his outstanding
team in New Delhi, aided by frequent high-level visitors to the
subcontinent over the next several months, will continue to pursue this
expanding agenda.
We want the United States and India to work together more
effectively than we have in the past to become more effective global
partners. Let me provide a few examples. On the political side of the
ledger, we will be seeking early tangible progress with India toward:
Creating a closer United States-India partnership to help
build democratic institutions in the region and worldwide.
During the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, our two
leaders agreed for the first time to work together to promote
democracy worldwide. Both countries have contributed to the
U.N.'s Democracy Fund. We will seek ways to work together in
strengthening democratic institutions and practices in specific
countries. India's experiment in democracy has been a success
for over half a century, and its 2004 national polls were the
largest exercise in electoral democracy the world has ever
seen. We share a belief that democracy and development are
linked, that effective democratic governance is a precondition
to healthy economic development. In this regard, we hope India
will share its democratic experience with central Asian
nations, which are having a difficult time making the
transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and assist them
in building institutions necessary to the success of democracy
and the advancement of human rights.
Advancing our shared interest in reform at the United
Nations. Members of this committee know well the President's
deep desire to promote reform at the United Nations. This is a
top priority for this administration, and India as well. We
want a far more vigorous Indian engagement with us in the
ongoing process of reforming the United Nations into an
organization that serves the interests of its members. I think
both our countries would agree that this process should neither
be politicized nor subjected to the sort of country bloc
calculations that prevailed during the cold war. India has much
to offer in moving reform efforts ahead.
Indian participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative. India boasts one of the world's largest commercial
maritime fleets and a navy that demonstrated its rapidly
growing expeditionary capacity in responding to the December
tsunami. Indian support for the multinational Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) would be a boon to the participating
nations' goal of tracking and interdicting dangerous terrorist
and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) cargoes worldwide. We
hope India will choose to join PSI.
United States-India cooperation for regional peace and
stability. India is one of the largest international donors to
Afghanistan's reconstruction and works closely with us in the
areas of road construction, public health, education,
telecommunications, and human resource development. India and
the United States share the goal of a return to democracy in
Nepal and a defeat of the Maoist insurgency. In Sri Lanka, we
both support the government's efforts to recover from the
tsunami and return to the peace process. We should do more to
promote human rights and democracy in autocratic Burma. Our two
countries should work more closely to promote peace and
stability in Asia.
Convincing Iran to return to negotiations. India and the
United States have found an increasingly positive dialog on
Iran. We are both dedicated to the goal of an Iran that lives
in harmony in its region, ends support of terrorist groups and
does not seek nuclear weapons. We welcomed India's vote with us
at the IAEA in September to find Iran in noncompliance with its
international obligations. We appreciate India's belief that
Iran should not acquire a nuclear weapons capability, and
India's continuing cooperation with the United States and
Europe is essential to convince Iran to return to negotiations.
We and India also need to focus on a number of important economic
challenges, both bilateral and global. Since the early 1990s, India has
progressed far in liberalizing its tariff regime and investment
environment, and these major changes have fueled the growth and
increased prosperity of recent years. Any quick survey of India's
economic landscape provides thousands of examples of innovation and
excellence. India is increasingly a global competitor in knowledge-
based industries such as information and communications technology and
biotechnology research and development.
Despite its impressive record of economic growth during the last
decade, India still struggles with many of the persistent challenges
faced by developing countries: Insufficient and underdeveloped
infrastructure, inefficient markets for goods and services, and minimal
access of credit and capital among the urban and rural poor. In
addition, India also suffers from a shortage of foreign capital and
investment, which can bring in key, new technologies, create jobs, and
modernize industries.
In this new partnership, the United States and India have a great
opportunity to work together to overcome these challenges, toward the
continued prosperity of our peoples, and to play a positive role in
shaping the world's economic future. The ongoing negotiations in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in the Doha Development Round offer the
perfect opportunity to work on our shared goals of trade, development,
and prosperity.
Both India and the United States stand to gain from the increasing
liberalization of trade in goods and services, and in convincing our
trading partners to do the same. There is no reason why India and the
United States should not be partners in this forum, whose success is so
crucial to our common future. We plan to work closely with India on
proposals that can translate the promise of the WTO's mission--and the
new era of United States-India relations--into reality. This effort
will take hard work on both sides, and we look forward to this
opportunity to engage India seriously, to the economic betterment of
both our people.
As we build closer economic relations, we look forward to India's
agreement to purchase American civil and military aircraft and to open
its doors further to trade with our country.
BUILDING PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE AND PRIVATE SECTOR COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA
AND THE UNITED STATES
The new United States-India partnership is not and cannot be just
between governments. We have seen an equally powerful expansion of our
people-to-people ties and business growth. The immense power of the
India-United States people-to-people network goes deeper than anyone
could have ever imagined. We find thousands of Americans in Delhi, in
Mumbai and Bangalore, and even more Indians in New York, Washington,
and Los Angeles. Over 85,000 Americans are living in India, lured by
its growing economy and the richness of its culture. There are 2
million persons of Indian origin in the United States, citizens and
legal permanent residents. They are operating businesses in our
country, running for political office, and building bridges back to
India. There are more Indian students in the United States today than
from any other country in the world--80,000.
We have, in essence, the development of a true, comprehensive,
across-the-board engagement between India and the United States, our
governments, our societies, and our peoples. This engagement by
individuals and businesses will propel and sustain the formal ties
between our governments.
CONCLUSION
I am pleased to have had the opportunity to share with you the many
elements of this strategic transformation that we are witnessing in the
United States-India relationship. Both President Bush and Prime
Minister Singh have shown the confidence and vision to pursue a common
vision for the world together. We hope the Congress will help us make
that vision a reality.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Burns,
for your very comprehensive testimony. We appreciate that.
Secretary Joseph, would you proceed?
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT G. JOSEPH, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Joseph. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator Hagel, it
is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the
President's policy on India and to address the very legitimate
and very important questions that have been raised.
I, also, will not read my prepared remarks, but will submit
them for the record. But I would like to make three
introductory points.
First, working toward full civil nuclear cooperation with
India is not a case of strategic interests or power politics
trumping nonproliferation principles. The agreement, reached by
President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in July, seeks to
develop full civil nuclear cooperation as a component of our
broader relationship with India, while, at the same time,
strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In other
words, this is not a zero-sum tradeoff whereby gains in the
strategic partnership with India result in nonproliferation
losses. Countering proliferation is a core national security
objective of this administration. We believe that it's in our
interest to establish a broad strategic partnership with India,
and nonproliferation is a key objective we intend to advance in
the context of that enhanced relationship. So, our two goals
are not in conflict, but, rather, are reenforcing.
With the Joint Statement, India has agreed to take on key
commitments that align it more firmly with the nuclear
nonproliferation mainstream than at any previous time. The
commitments that India takes on in the Joint Statement, as you
have outlined, Mr. Chairman, are meaningful. And India's
implementation of these commitments will, on balance, enhance
our global nonproliferation efforts and strengthen the nuclear
nonproliferation regime.
Since his first days in office, the President has made non-
and counter-proliferation top national security priorities.
This has not, and this will not, change. One characteristic of
this administration's approach to preventing and protecting
against WMD proliferation is the willingness and the
determination to pursue new and pragmatic approaches that
address real-world problems. There is no viable cookie-cutter
approach to nonproliferation. We need to be both creative and
determined. We need to adjust our approaches to take into
account the conditions that exist, so that we can effectively
combat weapons of mass destruction. It is this determination,
it is this willingness, to undertake the task of non- and
counter-proliferation differently that has produced such
results as the G-8 Global Partnership, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1540, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.
In the case of India, we must pursue approaches that
recognize India as a growing 21st century power, one that
shares our democratic values, has substantial and growing
energy needs, and has long possessed nuclear weapons outside of
the NPT. Status-quo approaches neither acknowledge these
pragmatic considerations, nor have they achieved the positive
outcome of integrating India into the international nuclear
nonproliferation mainstream.
As the Joint Statement is implemented, I believe it will
prove to be a win for our bilateral strategic relationship, a
win for our energy security, and a win for our nonproliferation
objectives.
Based on our consultations to date with the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, which met in mid-October, this prospect is
generally understood. Some states, such as Sweden and
Switzerland, have expressed severe reservations, for fear of
undermining the NPT. Others, such as the United Kingdom and
France, have expressed strong support, arguing that this is the
right move at the right time. Most have adopted a wait-and-see
approach, recognizing the need to come to terms with India and
not allowing it to remain outside the international
nonproliferation system. They welcome the steps that India has
agreed to take in the context of the Joint Statement. At the
same time, they have made very clear that their support will
depend on the scope, and on the pace, of India's actions.
Second, the key to success is India's timely and effective
implementation of its agreed commitments. I would underscore
that implementing the Joint Statement will, in some cases,
prove very challenging and will take time to realize fully. For
example, developing an appropriate civil-military separation
will be complex and time consuming. India has not yet presented
a plan, and we have underscored that the nature and
completeness of this plan will be critical in building support
within the Nuclear Suppliers Group and here in Washington. The
separation of civil and military facilities must be both
credible and transparent.
We have encouraged India to make a comprehensive
declaration of its civil infrastructure, and have discussed
some straightforward principles. For example, a credible plan
must ensure that we, and other potential suppliers, can meet
our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so
safeguards must be applied in perpetuity. Moreover, any
separation plan must ensure, and the safeguards must confirm,
that cooperation does not in any way assist in the development
or production of nuclear weapons. Nuclear materials in the
civil sector simply must remain in the civil sector.
Many of our international partners have expressed strong
views that India's separation plan be meaningful and have noted
the importance of IAEA safeguards being applied to India's
civil facilities. Several states have argued that it is
integral to maintaining the integrity of the global regime that
India not be granted de jure or de facto status as a nuclear
weapon state. For this reason, many have indicated that a so-
called ``voluntary offer arrangement,'' of the type that is in
place with the five nuclear weapon states, would not be
acceptable for India. Neither would we view such an arrangement
as defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint.
Third, Mr. Chairman, we would urge both Congress and our
international partners to avoid the temptation to renegotiate
the deal. Some observers, both in the United States and abroad,
have argued that the United States-India agreement does not
represent the maximum gain we might have achieved. According to
this view, we, presumably the United States Congress, should
condition approval of the agreement on additional Indian steps,
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state. Based on our
interactions with the Indian Government, we believe that such
additional conditions would likely prove to be deal-breakers.
This is a case where the perfect is the enemy of the good,
and we must resist the temptation to pile on conditions that
will prejudice our ability to realize the important
nonproliferation objectives that are already embedded in the
Joint Statement.
In our view, it would be better to lock in this agreement
and then seek to achieve further results in our continuing
nonproliferation dialog with India. We are much better off with
India undertaking the commitments it has now agreed to, rather
than allowing status-quo stalemates to prevail.
We believe that this is a sound arrangement, and one that
should be supported, because the commitments India has made
will, when they are implemented, bring it into greater
alignment with international nuclear nonproliferation standards
and practices, and, as such, will strengthen the global
nonproliferation regime.
The NPT is not a perfect instrument, as we have seen with
North Korea and with Iran. As an administration, we are
endeavoring to strengthen the regime, including principal
components such as the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
through the types of proposals that the President made in
February 2004, including advancement of the Additional
Protocol, the creation of a special IAEA Committee on
Verification, and the end to the transfer of sensitive
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not
have a fully functioning capability.
Bringing India closer to the regime, in terms of its
actions, will contribute to this goal. This was demonstrated, I
believe, at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in September,
when Delhi took the important step of voting with the majority
to find Iran in formal noncompliance.
In conclusion, we look forward to working with you over the
months ahead to bring this important objective to a timely and
successful outcome. As Under Secretary Burns noted, we do not
intend to ask Congress to take legislative action until the
Indian Government takes certain implementation steps. We
welcome your partnership as we embark on this effort, and we
look forward to working with your committee, together with your
House counterparts, as we jointly consider the best way forward
in this legislative area.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joseph follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms
Control and International Security, State Department, Washington, DC
Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the
committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the
President's policy toward India with respect to civil nuclear
cooperation. I look forward to working with you over the months ahead
to bring this important objective to a timely and successful outcome.
toward united states-india civil nuclear cooperation
We believe it is in our national security interest to establish a
broad strategic partnership with India that encourages India's
emergence as a positive force on the world scene. Our desire to
transform relations with India is founded upon a contemporary and
forward-looking strategic vision. India is a rising global power and an
important democratic partner for the United States. Today, for the
first time, the United States and India are bound together by a strong
congruence of interests and values. We seek to work with India to win
the global War on Terrorism, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and the missiles that could deliver them, to enhance peace
and stability in Asia, and to advance the spread of democracy. India
and the United States are on the same side of these critical strategic
objectives. Our challenge is to translate our converging interests into
shared goals and compatible strategies designed to achieve these aims.
In the context of this growing partnership, the United States and
India reached a landmark agreement in July to work toward full civil
nuclear cooperation while at the same time strengthening the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. The Joint Statement agreed to by President
Bush and Prime Minister Singh is not--as some have argued--a triumph of
power politics over nonproliferation principles. This is not a zero-sum
trade-off, whereby improvement in our bilateral strategic relationship
results in nonproliferation losses. Rather, as the broadly constituted
Joint Statement is implemented, it will prove a win for our strategic
relations, a win for energy security, and a win for nonproliferation.
India believes, and our administration agrees, that it needs
nuclear power to sustain dynamic economic growth and to address its
growing energy requirements in an affordable and environmentally
responsible manner. Our goal--in the context of the Joint Statement--is
to provide India access to the technology it needs to build a safe,
modern and efficient infrastructure that will provide clean, peaceful
nuclear energy.
At the same time, India has clearly demonstrated over the past
several years its desire to work with the United States and the
international community to fight the spread of sensitive nuclear
technologies. As part of an effort launched with India during the
administration's first term--the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership--
India took a number of significant steps to strengthen export controls
and to ensure that Indian companies would not be a source of future
proliferation. Not only did India pledge to bring its export control
laws, regulations, and enforcement practices in line with modern export
control standards, but also passed an extensive export control law and
issued an upgraded national control list that will help it achieve this
goal. In addition, India has become a party to the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and has taken significant steps
toward meeting its obligations under UNSCR 1540.
The additional nonproliferation commitments India made as part of
the Joint Statement go even further and, once implemented, will bring
it into closer conformity with international nuclear nonproliferation
standards and practices. This is a very important move for India and
for the nonproliferation community. While we will continue to work with
India and to encourage it to do more over time, India's implementation
of its commitments will, on balance, enhance our global
nonproliferation efforts. We expect the international nuclear
nonproliferation regime will emerge stronger as a result.
As evidence of this expectation, we note with satisfaction India's
positive IAEA Board of Governors vote in September on Iranian
noncompliance, and look forward to further cooperative action on this
critical international security issue.
NONPROLIFERATION GAINS
Through the Joint Statement, India has publicly committed to a
number of important nonproliferation steps. It will now:
Identify and separate civilian and military nuclear
facilities and programs and file a declaration with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its
civilian facilities;
Place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards;
Sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to
civilian nuclear facilities;
Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
Work with the United States for the conclusion of a
multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) to halt
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
Refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies to states that do not have them and support
efforts to limit their spread; and
Secure nuclear and missile materials and technologies
through comprehensive export control legislation and adherence
to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG).
India's commitment to separate its civil and military facilities
and place its civil facilities and activities under IAEA safeguards
demonstrates its willingness to assume full responsibility for
preventing proliferation from its civil nuclear program. It will also
help protect against diversion of nuclear material and technologies to
India's weapons program.
By adopting an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, India will commit
to reporting to the IAEA on exports of all NSG Trigger List items. This
will help the IAEA track potential proliferation elsewhere, and bolster
our efforts to encourage all states to adopt an Additional Protocol as
a condition of supply.
By committing to adopt strong and effective export controls,
including adherence to NSG and MTCR Guidelines, India will help ensure
that its companies do not transfer sensitive weapons of mass
destruction and missile-related technologies to countries of concern.
In July, India took an important step by harmonizing its national
control list with the NSG Guidelines and by adding many items that
appear on the MTCR Annex.
India has also committed to work with the United States toward the
conclusion of a multilateral FMCT, which, if successfully negotiated
and ratified, will ban the production of fissile material for use in
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
India's pledge to maintain its nuclear testing moratorium
contributes to nonproliferation efforts by making its ending of nuclear
explosive tests one of the conditions of full civil nuclear
cooperation. Since to date Pakistan has test-exploded nuclear weapons
only in response to Indian nuclear tests, this commitment will help
diminish the prospects for future nuclear testing in South Asia.
By committing not to export enrichment and reprocessing technology
to states that do not already have such fully functioning capabilities,
India will help us achieve the goals laid out by President Bush in
February 2004, designed to prevent the further spread of such
proliferation sensitive equipment and technology. This will help close
what is widely recognized as the most significant loophole in the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime--a loophole that has clearly
been exploited by countries such as North Korea and Iran and could be
manipulated by others in the future.
Each of these activities is significant. Together, they constitute
a substantial shift in moving India into closer conformity with
international nonproliferation standards and practices. Their
successful implementation will help to strengthen the global
nonproliferation regime.
As befits a major, responsible nation, and in keeping with its
commitment to play a leading role in international efforts to prevent
WMD proliferation, we hope that India will also take additional
nonproliferation-related actions beyond those specifically outlined in
the Joint Statement. We view this as a key component of the developing
United States-India strategic partnership and look forward to working
with the Indian Government, as well as the international community more
broadly, to further strengthen nonproliferation efforts globally.
Through our ongoing bilateral dialog we have already discussed with
India such steps as endorsing the Proliferation Security Initiative
Statement of Principles, bringing an early end to the production of
fissile material for weapons, and harmonizing its control lists with
those of the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
U.S. COMMITMENTS UNDER THE JOINT STATEMENT
On a reciprocal basis with India's commitments, the United States
has committed to work to achieve full civil nuclear cooperation with
India. In this context, President Bush told Prime Minister Singh that
he would:
Seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and
policies;
Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes
to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with
India; and
Consult with partners on India's participation in the fusion
energy International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)
consortium and the Generation IV International Forum, the work
of which relates to advanced nuclear energy systems.
To implement effectively the steps under the Joint Statement, we
will need the active support of Congress and that of our international
partners. We expect--and have told the Indian Government--that India's
follow-through on its commitments is essential to success. We believe
that the Government of India understands this completely and we expect
them to begin taking concrete steps in the weeks ahead.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO DATE
Mr. Chairman, since the July statement, we have actively engaged
with our international partners--both bilaterally and in such
multilateral fora as the G-8 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. I have
met directly with my counterparts from many different countries.
Secretary Rice and other senior U.S. officials discussed the initiative
with states at the recent U.N. General Assembly and at IAEA General
Conference meetings. Assistant Secretaries Stephen Rademaker and
Christina Rocca both traveled to Vienna to make presentations to the
NSG Consultative Group. And, of course, many of our Embassies have been
actively engaged on this front.
While some countries, such as Sweden, have expressed substantial
doubts about the initiative for fear of inadvertent damage to the
nuclear nonproliferation regime, others have expressed strong support.
For example, the United Kingdom has ``warmly welcome(d)'' this
initiative and indicated that on the basis of the Joint Statement it
was ``ready to discuss with our international partners the basis for
cooperation in civil nuclear matters with India.'' Similarly, France
has underscored the ``need for full international civilian nuclear
cooperation with India.'' The Director General of the IAEA has also
welcomed India's decision to place its civil nuclear facilities under
safeguards and to sign and implement the Additional Protocol as
``concrete and practical steps toward the universal application of IAEA
safeguards.''
To date, many other countries have adopted a ``wait-and-see''
approach. Most recognize the need to come to terms with India and not
to allow it to remain completely outside the international
nonproliferation system. They welcome the nonproliferation steps India
has committed to take in the context of the Joint Statement. At the
same time, they have made clear that their ultimate support will depend
on the scope and pace of India's actions.
Some have understandably questioned how this complex initiative
comports with the NPT and our efforts to combat WMD proliferation.
Others have asked whether the provision of civil nuclear technology to
India would be consistent with their obligations under the NPT not to
contribute to India's nuclear weapons program. Still others have asked
why a cap on India's production of fissile material for weapons was not
part of the deal.
We have sought to clarify that the United States does not and will
not support India's nuclear weapons program. As it is for other states,
this is a ``red line'' for us. We are obligated under the NPT not to
assist India's nuclear weapons program. Our initiative with India does
not recognize India as a nuclear weapon state, and we will not seek to
renegotiate the NPT, whether to change the treaty definition of a
nuclear weapon state or in any other way. We remain cognizant of, and
will fully uphold, all of our obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and we remain committed in principle to universal
NPT adherence.
But we also recognize that India is in a unique situation and has
shown to be responsible in not proliferating its nuclear technologies
and materials. With its decision to take the steps announced in the
Joint Statement, India will now take on new nonproliferation
responsibilities that will strengthen global nonproliferation efforts
that serve the fundamental purpose of the NPT.
India has informed us that it has no intention of relinquishing its
nuclear weapons or of becoming a party to the NPT as a nonnuclear
weapon state, the only way it could adhere under the current terms of
the treaty. Despite this, it is important to seize this opportunity to
assist India in becoming a more constructive partner in our global
nonproliferation efforts. Indian commitments to be undertaken in the
context of the Joint Statement will align Delhi more closely with the
nuclear nonproliferation regime than at any time previously. India has
said it wants to be a partner and is willing to take important steps to
this end. We should encourage such steps.
In this context, it is important to note that the NPT does not ban
civil nuclear cooperation with safeguarded facilities in India, nor
does it require full scope safeguards as a condition of supply. In
fact, under the ``grandfather'' provision of the NSG Guidelines, Russia
today is building two nuclear reactors in India.
The NPT does preclude any cooperation that would ``in any way
assist'' India's nuclear weapons program. For that reason, we have made
clear that, under our proposal, supplier states will only be able to
engage in cooperation with safeguarded facilities. Moreover, the more
civil facilities India places under safeguards, the more confident we
can be that any cooperative arrangements will not further any military
purposes. We expect--and have indicated to the Government of India--
that India's separation of its civil and military nuclear
infrastructure must be conducted in a credible and transparent manner,
and be defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint. In other words,
the separation and the resultant safeguards must contribute to our
nonproliferation goals. Many of our international partners have
similarly indicated that they view this as a necessary precondition,
and will not be able to support civil nuclear cooperation with India
otherwise. We believe that the Indian Government understands this.
With respect to the cessation of fissile material production, we
continue to encourage India, as well as Pakistan, to move in this
direction as part of our strategic dialogs with both governments. But
we think it would be unwise to hold up the nonproliferation gains that
can be obtained from the civil nuclear cooperation initiative for an
Indian fissile material cap. Moreover, in the context of the Joint
Statement, we jointly committed to work toward the completion of an
effective Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. As we have indicated
previously, the United States also stands willing to explore other
intermediate options that also might serve this objective.
As India completes the significant actions that it has committed to
undertake in the Joint Statement, we are convinced that the
nonproliferation regime will emerge stronger. Separately, we will
continue to encourage additional steps, such as India's acceptance of a
fissile material production moratorium or cap, but we will not insist
on it for the purposes of the civil nuclear cooperation initiative
announced by the President and Prime Minister. Even absent such a cap,
the initiative represents a net gain for nonproliferation.
KEY CHALLENGES
Five key challenges face the successful achievement of Joint
Statement implementation. These include: Developing a meaningful civil/
military separation; negotiating the appropriate safeguards
arrangement; building support within the NSG; avoiding the temptation
to renegotiate the deal; and securing domestic legal reform.
Developing a meaningful civil/military separation: We have
indicated that the separation of civil and military facilities must be
both credible and transparent, as well as defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint. We have engaged in initial discussions
with the Government of India, and look forward to further discussion of
a mutually acceptable approach. While India has not yet presented a
formal separation plan, we are encouraged by Foreign Secretary Saran's
public acknowledgements both that ``it is legitimate for our partners
to expect that such cooperation will not provide any advantage to our
strategic programme,'' and that ``it makes no sense for India to
deliberately keep some of its civilian facilities out of its
declaration for safeguards purposes, if it really is interested in
obtaining international cooperation on as wide a scale as possible.''
In our discussions to date, and in particular during Under
Secretary Burns' recent talks in Delhi, we have discussed some
straightforward principles. I will not enumerate them fully here since
the negotiations remain ongoing, but would like to underscore just a
couple of these. For example, to ensure that the United States and
other potential suppliers can confidently supply to India and meet our
obligations under the NPT, safeguards must be applied in perpetuity.
Further, the separation plan must ensure--and the safeguards must
confirm--that cooperation does not ``in any way assist'' in the
development or production of nuclear weapons. In this context, nuclear
materials in the civil sector should not be transferred out of the
civil sector.
Negotiating the appropriate safeguards arrangement: India's
voluntary commitment to allow IAEA safeguards on its civil facilities
is both a substantial nonproliferation gain and a key enabler for
nuclear energy cooperation. A critical bellwether of Indian intentions
will be how it handles the separation and safeguarding of its civil
nuclear infrastructure. In our discussions with key international
partners, both in the NSG context and otherwise, many have expressed
strong views that India's separation plan be transparent and have noted
the importance of IAEA safeguards being applied to its civil
facilities.
In this context, several countries have argued that it is integral
to maintaining the integrity of the global regime that India not be
granted de jure or de facto status as a nuclear weapon state under the
NPT. For this reason, many have indicated that a ``voluntary offer''
arrangement of the type in place in the five internationally recognized
nuclear weapon states would not be acceptable for India. We indicated
at the recent G-8 and NSG meetings that we would not view a voluntary
offer arrangement as defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint or
consistent with the Joint Statement, and therefore do not believe that
it would constitute an acceptable safeguards arrangement. Such a course
of action would in all likelihood preclude NSG support. Conversely,
should India put forward a credible and defensible plan, we anticipate
that many states will become more steadfast in their support.
Building support within the NSG: At the recent NSG Consultative
Group meeting in Vienna, the United States discussed the initiative
with regime members. We stressed our desire that the NSG maintain its
effectiveness, and emphasized that we do not intend to undercut this
important nonproliferation policy tool. For this reason, the U.S.
proposal neither seeks to alter the decisionmaking procedures of the
NSG nor amend the current full-scope safeguards requirement in the NSG
Guidelines. Rather, the United States proposes that the NSG take a
policy decision to treat India as an exceptional case, given its energy
needs, its nuclear nonproliferation record, and the nonproliferation
commitments it has now undertaken. We do not advocate similar treatment
for others outside the NPT regime.
In our view, once India makes demonstrable progress in implementing
key Joint Statement commitments--with a credible, transparent, and
defensible separation plan foremost on the list--we will be ready to
engage with our NSG partners in developing a formal proposal to allow
the shipment of Trigger List items and related technology to India.
Obviously, the number of facilities and activities that India places
under IAEA safeguards, and the method and speed with which it does so,
will directly affect the degree to which we will be able to build
support for full civil nuclear cooperation. We look forward to
discussing this more fully with NSG members at the Consultative Group
meeting in early 2006 and at the plenary session that follows.
Avoiding the temptation to renegotiate the deal: Some observers--
both in the United States and abroad--have argued that the United
States-India arrangement as negotiated by the President and the Prime
Minister does not constitute a net gain for nonproliferation, or at
least does not reflect the maximum gain we might in theory have
achieved. According to this view, the United States, presumably the
United States Congress, should condition United States nuclear
cooperation under the Joint Statement on additional Indian steps, such
as implementing a moratorium on fissile material production, ratifying
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or joining the NPT as a
nonnuclear weapon state. Based on our interactions with the Indian
Government, we believe that such additional conditions would likely be
deal-breakers.
This is a case where the ``perfect'' is the enemy of the ``good,''
and we must resist the temptation to pile on conditions that will
prejudice our ability to realize the important and long-standing
nonproliferation objectives embodied in the Joint Statement. We are
better off with India undertaking the commitments it has now agreed to
rather than allowing the status quo to prevail.
The Joint Statement reached by President Bush and Prime Minister
Singh is good both for India and for the United States, and offers a
net gain for global nonproliferation efforts. Rather than layer on
additional conditions or seek to renegotiate the Joint Statement, it
would be better to lock in this deal and then seek to achieve further
results in subsequent nonproliferation discussions. We believe that
this is a sound arrangement that should be supported because the
commitments India has made will, when implemented, bring it into closer
alignment with international nuclear nonproliferation standards and
practices and, as such, strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.
Securing domestic legal reform: The President promised in the Joint
Statement that the administration would seek agreement from Congress to
adjust U.S. laws and policies. We recognize that the pace and scope of
civil nuclear cooperation requires close consultations between the
executive and legislative branches. In our own ongoing review, we have
identified a number of options for modifying and/or waiving provisions
of the Atomic Energy Act that currently prohibit the United States from
engaging in such cooperation with India.
As Under Secretary Burns noted, we do not intend to ask Congress to
take legislative action until the Indian Government takes certain
important steps. We welcome your partnership as we embark on this
effort, and look forward to working with your committee, together with
your House counterparts, as we jointly consider the best way forward in
the legislative area.
BOTTOM LINE: ADVANCING NONPROLIFERATION
We must recognize that there is today no viable cookie-cutter
approach to nonproliferation; we need tailored approaches that solve
real-world problems. We need to be creative and adjust our approaches
to take into account the conditions that exist, so that we can achieve
our nonproliferation objectives. This has been a premise of
administration policy since the outset of President Bush's first term,
in which he established non- and counterproliferation as top national
security priorities. He put in place the first comprehensive strategy
at the national level for combating this preeminent threat to our
security, and he embarked on changing how we as a nation, and how the
international community more broadly, design and expand our collective
efforts to defeat this complex and dangerous challenge.
Indeed, recognizing that traditional nonproliferation measures were
essential but no longer sufficient, the President has established new
concepts and new capabilities for countering WMD proliferation by
hostile states and terrorists.
He sought increased national resources to prevent
proliferation through Nunn-Lugar type nonproliferation
assistance programs and, through the G-8 Global Partnership,
successfully enlarged the contributions from other countries to
this essential task.
He launched the Proliferation Security Initiative to disrupt
the trade in proliferation-related materials. This initiative
has achieved the support of more than 70 other countries who
are working together to share information and develop
operational capabilities to interdict shipments at sea, in the
air, and on land.
He initiated the effort resulting in the unanimous adoption
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all
states to enact both legislation criminalizing proliferation
activities under their jurisdiction and effective export
controls to help protect the sensitive materials and
technologies on their territories.
These efforts in effective multilateralism, coupled with the
strengthening of our own counterproliferation capabilities, have
produced concrete successes such as the unraveling of the A.Q. Khan
network and the decision by Libya to abandon its nuclear, chemical, and
long-range missile programs.
Similarly, we must pursue approaches with respect to India that
recognize the reality that it is a growing 21st century power, shares
our democratic values, has substantial and growing energy needs, and
has long possessed nuclear weapons outside the NPT. Status quo
approaches have not acknowledged these pragmatic considerations, nor
have they achieved the positive outcome of progressively integrating
India into the international nuclear nonproliferation mainstream.
We have begun consultations with our international partners; have
conducted a number of introductory discussions with you, your
colleagues, and your staff; and look forward to working further with
you on the steps necessary to realize the benefits of the July Joint
Statement.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Joseph.
Let me just suggest, for our first round of questioning,
maybe 8 minutes. We have four distinguished witnesses on the
second panel, and we'll want to question them. If there are
compelling questions, we'll go beyond that time, as always.
Let me start the questioning by noting, Secretary Joseph,
that you've pointed out that we should not make the perfect the
enemy of the good by piling on additional amendments and
qualifications. And that may be sound advice. Yet, as I
listened to your testimony, as well as what has been occurring
in the world even since the meeting at the summit, I have noted
that significant sanctioning of two Indian scientists occurred
on September 23, 2004. Let me just ask, for a second: Is that
correct?
Mr. Joseph. I believe it was the previous year, sir.
The Chairman. What was the reaction of the Government of
India to those sanctions at that time? In other words, as these
activities occur, whether they are Indian scientists or whether
they are votes in the IAEA or the United Nations, these are
events that occur in the world, outside of our relationship,
which is tested. I'm eager for your feeling of this.
I add, just anecdotally, reports that there are pressures
on the Prime Minister from opposition party members in India,
who feel that he has been too concessionary and that India's
negotiations with the United States are going too far. It's not
really clear how things are shaping up in their Parliament as
this proceeds. You have suggested that until significant
progress is made in meeting the requirements of the summit, you
would not submit legislation to us. Yet, at the same time, we
all acknowledge that amendments to our laws have to occur in
order for this to be perfected.
Now, there are so many moving parts of this, I'm finding it
awfully hard to respond to questioners who have the sort of
broad question, ``What do you think of all of this?'' You know,
I think our overall thought is that it's a great idea, that
India and the United States should be much closer. Furthermore,
this is only a part, as you pointed out, of a large agreement
that concerns defense and trade and various other items that
are helpful. But, at the same time, the nonproliferation part
is extremely important, for obvious reasons, including our
negotiations in Iran now, the Six-Party Talks in North Korea,
and general activity in the nonproliferation area.
So, what are your guidelines for this? Is the idea,
perhaps, that we just, sort of, stay in touch? In other words,
you have certainly offered a lot of consultation, but I'm not
certain that I perceive the action steps that you're looking
for.
Mr. Joseph. Well, Senator, you're quite right about the
political dynamics in Delhi. I know they're both complex and
crosscutting. And Under Secretary Burns can probably do a
better job addressing that than I can.
There are many moving parts--in Delhi, here in Washington,
in our bilateral context, but also in the context of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group and in other international fora that
deal with nonproliferation. And we are trying to bring these
activities together in such a way that we will move forward
with the commitments that the President has made in the July
statement, following the delivery of certain actions by India,
including the presentation of a plan for the separation of
military and civilian facilities that is both credible and
defensible, from a nonproliferation perspective. And they're--
--
The Chairman. And that's a very----
Mr. Joseph [continuing]. Beginning----
The Chairman [continuing]. Critical thing right there,
isn't it? And how are they coming along on that?
Mr. Joseph. Well, again, Nick was just in New Delhi and
addressed that issue in the context of the bilateral Working
Group, so I will let him address that. In terms of North Korea
and Iran, if you would like, I can take that on now, or we----
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Joseph [continuing]. Can return to that.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Joseph. It is my sense that the interactions that we've
had with India since July have had a very positive effect on
our efforts with regard to Iran, and both Nick and I have
pointed out the positive move that India took at the IAEA board
meeting in September to support the resolution of
noncompliance. I think that's very significant, and I think it
is attributable to the fact that the July statement, and the
agreement that is embodied in that statement, is a very
positive step for India. I think that they will benefit
significantly from this arrangement. And they know it. But they
also know that they have to become much better partners in
nonproliferation. And, again, I think their action on Iran is
indicative of the fact that they're moving in that direction,
even though that wasn't formally part of the July agreement.
In terms of North Korea, I don't think that the July
arrangement, or the changes that are envisioned in that
arrangement, will have any impact on North Korea. North Korea,
of course, is different from India, in the sense that North
Korea has violated the NPT. North Korea doesn't have a peaceful
nuclear energy program. In fact, my understanding is that all
aspects of its nuclear program are weapons related. We have, in
the context of the Six-Party Talks that followed the July
announcement, the round in September, achieved the commitment
from North Korea to undertake complete denuclearization, to
abandon all of its nuclear programs. And I think that is
significant. It's still a long way before we achieve that
commitment, but I think it's important that we've made that
first step.
The Chairman. Secretary, just following up, a moment, on
the vote of the Security Council, I think we all agree that was
very significant. But, as I understand, the Indians stated they
voted that way because the resolution did not report Iran to
the Security Council. Now, it's been, generally, the policy of
our administration to report Iran to the Security Council. What
happens when the day comes and that vote comes up? This is
coupled with rumors that India is forging strategic
relationships with Iran because of oil needs, energy needs.
It's no secret that Indians, people from China, and people from
the United States are all over the Middle East, all over
Africa, pinning down the last acre now. What sort of feel do
you have for continuing fealty to the prospect of the two of us
staying together?
Mr. Joseph. Senator, I think that goes to your observation
about the complexity of the political dynamics in India. And
there are many crosscutting pressures, as there are elsewhere.
In terms of the vote that was taken in Vienna in September
at the Board of Governors meeting, it is our view that that
vote requires a report to the Security Council. The issue is:
When will that report be made, and what will be the nature of
that report? And I think those questions will only be answered
in the context of Iran's activities.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator----
Mr. Burns. Mr. Chairman, if I----
The Chairman. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Burns [continuing]. If I could, with your permission, I
just wanted to add to what Under Secretary Joseph said. The
Indian Government has made it clear to us they do not wish Iran
to become a nuclear weapons power. They do not wish Iran to
have the capability to enrich or reprocess. And the Indian
Government joined us--after a lot of discussion and thought in
Delhi--they joined us in this vote on September 23. And so, we
think that they've given a fairly clear answer as to----
The Chairman. That's a very----
Mr. Burns [continuing]. As to where they stand.
The Chairman [continuing]. Declaration.
Mr. Burns. If I could also say--you asked a question about
sequencing--and, very briefly, after July 18 the big dilemma we
had with the Indians was: How do we implement this agreement,
because there are corresponding actions on both sides? And we
said that we would introduce the idea into the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, that we would help to make India a part of
both ITER and Generation IV, but that they had an obligation,
too, a series of them, and the most critical was the separation
of the civil and military nuclear programs. They are simply not
in a position yet to give us a plan. And until they do, we
think it's best to hold off asking Congress to act. I've told
the Indians that once they have a plan that's credible and
that's transparent, we would want to share that plan with the
Congress, with Members and staffs, so that you could look at it
before we ask you to take action. They understand that, and
they know that's going to be part of this arrangement.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Fellows, this is a gamble, under any circumstance. To try
to square the circle to say that the action being proposed with
regard to India is somehow not fundamentally inconsistent with
the NPT is, I think, impossible to do. But there is the art of
the practical, and the strategic benefits that could flow from
this relationship might trump the problem of having to argue
that somehow this fits our nonproliferation policy.
One of the great benefits of having men of your caliber
here, and the witness list that's to follow, is that, although
this forum doesn't lend itself to it, what I would like to do
is sit you all in the room at one time and have an open
discussion among all of you, because I have such regard for
each of you, in terms of your background, intellect, and
experience.
This is a way of apologizing ahead of time to Ash Carter. I
want to ask you a question from the end of his testimony,
because you're not going to be here, in all probability, to
hear his testimony, although I'm sure you will read his
statement. And I think he puts it, as he always does, extremely
well. He goes through, in the first five pages of his
testimony, laying out and acknowledging all the potential
benefits that could flow from this new and emerging
relationship, and he says, ``The list above is a very
substantial, even breathtaking, set of potential benefits to
the United States of a strategic partnership with India.'' Then
he asks what I think is a $64 question, ``How realistic is
it?''
So, it's one thing to take an action which I think is
totally inconsistent with what we've had in place as a
rationale to keep other countries from going nuclear, the NPT,
but it may be worth the risk if the benefits are realistic.
And, again, asking for anticipatory absolution here, going on
to read, in one of the concluding paragraphs, Ash says, ``Most
of the items on the list are also hypothetical and lie in the
future that neither side can predict. This is certainly the
case with regard to China counterweight and Pakistan
contingency items. Other items on the list, like Iran's nuclear
program, will unfold sooner.''
Then, going to the end, he says, ``India, as befits a great
nation on its way to global leadership, will have its own
opinions about this list. Some American proponents of the India
deal--have compared it to Nixon's opening to China, a bold move
based on a firm foundation of mutual interest, but more a leap
of trust than a shrewd bargain. Mao and Nixon, however, had a
clear and present common enemy, the Soviet Union, not a
hypothetical set of possible future opponents. But the real
difference between the Nixon-Kissinger deal and the Indian deal
is that India, unlike Mao's China, is a democracy. No
government in Delhi can turn decades of Indian policy on a
dime, or commit to a broad set of actions in support of United
States interests. Only a profound and probably slow change in
the views of India's elites can do this. India's bureaucracies
and diplomats are fabled for their stubborn adherence to the
independent position regarding the world order, economic
development, and nuclear security.''
I have a lot of questions my staff prepared, but nothing,
it seems to me, says it as succinctly and lays out the choice
as starkly as what I've just read.
So, how confident are you regarding the benefits of this
bargain between two unorderly democracies like ours and theirs?
Some have suggested, as did the author of the paper I just read
from, that the India deal just may be premature. What you guys
are saying is, you're not coming to us yet, until you see what
happens in the first step. Are they going to make these kinds
of front-end changes? And that's going to be an indication of
what's likely to come.
This is not, as I said, a slam-dunk. This is a difficult
decision. You've bet on the future here. What are some of the
broader indicators that make you think that that bet is a sound
bet? That's my question.
Mr. Burns. Senator, thank you. I had a similar experience.
I was riding over here. I took a sneak preview at Ash's
testimony--my friend Ash's testimony--and I, too, noticed the
back part of it and was intrigued by how he formulated the--one
of the strategic benefits.
I'll take a stab at answering your question in the
following manner. We're very different countries. And there's
no question, if you look back all the way to 1947, when
President Truman and Prime Minister Nehru began to think about
our United States-India relationship. It's never--this
relationship has never achieved its promise. I think we have to
give credit to President Clinton for having made the first
strategic step a decade ago to try to reach out to India and to
define a strategic relationship. President Bush, I would say,
has doubled that effort.
And here is how we view the relationship. It is going to
take some time before we develop the kind of strategic
partnership with India that we have, say, with Australia or the
United Kingdom or France or Germany or different countries. But
India increasingly sees its role in the world as a global
country. And we find that on the issues that are important to
us, the transnational problems--whether it's global climate
change or trafficking in women and children, or terrorism, or
WMD, international crime, democracy promotion--we tend to think
alike with the Indians, and we tend to adopt the same
strategies and positions on those transnational problems. On
the--that's the first.
Second, both of us are Asia-Pacific powers. Both of us have
a stake in the stability of Asia in the next 25 or 50 years.
Both of us are democratic. Both want to see democratic
countries protected. And we want to see a regional architecture
in APEC, in the ASEAN Regional Forum, develop that would
solidify security and peace in Asia. India is part of the
strategic balance in Asia.
Third, I think one of the great changes I've seen since
I've come back to Washington is the new emphasis on South
Asia--the American national interest in stability in
Afghanistan; a stable, productive relationship with Pakistan;
to see Pakistan and India reduce their problems; and to see, in
Nepal, Burma, and Bangladesh, hopefully, the growth of
democracy. India is fundamental to all of those issues that are
central to the United States. And I've spoken of democracy
promotion, and both of us have spoken about India's principal
position on Iran. And India is in a position to have some
influence on Iran, to dissuade it from seeking a nuclear path.
So, for all those reasons, we think there are the
beginnings of a strategic partnership. I don't want to oversell
this and equate it to what we've got with our NATO allies. But
I would say this, as a career diplomat, there is the
possibility that, in 5 to 10 or 15 years, we might count India
among the four or five most important countries to the United
States in the world, if we can develop this partnership. The
civil nuclear initiative is a big part of this, both
psychologically, in separating ourselves from the past 50
years, and also in terms of responding to both of our interests
in nonproliferation.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Gentlemen, welcome.
Secretary Burns, you've just mentioned Pakistan, and I'd be
interested in you developing that a little more as to what
consequences there might be regarding the Pakistani nuclear
weapons program if this deal is consummated, as well as how
might this affect the Pakistani-Indian relationship?
Mr. Burns. Thank you, Senator.
Well, Senator, as you know, we have a critically important
relationship with Pakistan on counterterrorism, and we find
Pakistan to be a good partner to the United States. But we are
not contemplating offering the same type of civil nuclear
energy cooperation to Pakistan as we are now hoping to offer to
India, with congressional consent, for a variety of reasons.
And I'd be happy to go into those.
Second, it's our view that, as Secretary Rice has pointed
out, we need to dehyphenate--it's not a very elegant phrase--
dehyphenate our policy in South Asia. For a long, long time,
successive American administrations have looked at South Asia
as a zero-sum region, where we try to balance everything we do
with Pakistan and what we do with India. And we, frankly, think
it's time to separate the two and to develop a full-bore
successful relationship with Pakistan, based, of course, on the
critical imperative of effective counterterrorism, but also to
develop with India this wide strategic framework of joint
initiatives that we have described this afternoon. And we think
that we can have a good relationship with both countries. And
this civil nuclear energy deal should not have a negative
impact on our relations with Pakistan.
Finally, I would say, in answer to your question, the
United States does not see itself as a mediator between
Pakistan and India. Kashmir is a fairly complex problem. There
has been an attempt by Prime Minister Singh and President
Musharraf over the last year or so to meet more often. You can
see, in the wake of the earthquake, they decided to open the
line of control in many different places on November 7. The
Indians have extended earthquake assistance to Pakistan. This
is very slow, a very slow rapprochement, and there are a
considerable number of problems ahead, but they're off to a
good start. And if we can help that process, we will. And we're
trying to do that, behind the scenes. But the civil nuclear
energy deal should not upset that process, of India-Pakistan
relations, and certainly should not have a negative effect on
the United States-Pakistan relationship, in our judgment.
Senator Hagel. Have we consulted with the Pakistani
Government on this?
Mr. Burns. We have--yes, we have described--after July 18,
we sat with the Pakistani Government, described the outlines of
what we're trying to do with the Indians in all the fields that
I enumerated, not just the civil nuclear field. And I know that
Secretary Rice had a chance to talk to President Musharraf
about it in September when they were together at the United
Nations. And I wouldn't be a good diplomat if I described the
Pakistani reaction, but, except to say, very businesslike.
They're focused on the United States-Pakistan relationship.
They're not trying to judge us, at least in our conversations,
with what we're doing with the Indians.
Senator Hagel. So, they do not object to this.
Mr. Burns. Well, I don't want to speak for them. I can't
say--I can't say that there haven't been Pakistani officials
who have--not President Musharraf, but others--who have, maybe,
been unhappy about this. I know that Pakistani officials have
said, from time to time since July 18, ``We'd like to have the
same kind of nuclear arrangement with the United States that
India has.'' And I think you've heard today, and in previous
statements, we've said that this is a unique arrangement;
unique to India.
Senator Hagel. What about the 44 members of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group? We've consulted with them. What reactions have
we received?
Mr. Joseph. We did begin the consultations with the members
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group last month.
Senator Biden. You must have said something wrong.
[Laughter.]
Thank you all very much.
Senator Hagel. Well, this is a----
[Laughter.]
Senator Hagel [continuing]. This will give you more of an
opportunity----
Mr. Joseph. Yeah.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. To think clearly. [Laughter.]
Please continue, Secretary Joseph.
Mr. Joseph. The reactions were mixed, as I mentioned in my
introductory comments. Some states did express significant
reservations about moving forward, in the sense that they
believe that there will be severe risks to the NPT regime. I
mentioned two: Sweden and Switzerland. Other states were very
supportive. The United Kingdom was supportive, France was
supportive. Both of those governments have made very positive
comments about the need to move forward with India in this
context.
I think the majority of those who spoke raised questions,
but did not express support or opposition; rather, they made
very clear that they were taking a wait-and-see approach to
this. And one of the main factors that will affect their
judgment, their assessment, is the question of the separation
of civilian and military facilities and the application of IAEA
safeguards on the civilian side, as well as how India deals
with the commitment that it has made with regard to adherence
to an Additional Protocol.
So, like us, those countries are in a waiting posture to
see what the Indian plan is, and, perhaps like us, they will
wait until they begin to see the implementation of that plan.
Senator Hagel. What was the reaction of other countries
with major civil nuclear programs--Brazil, Japan, Germany?
Mr. Joseph. Again, of the countries that you mentioned, it
has been mixed. Japan, in the context of my discussion in the
G-8, raised a number of significant questions and concerns
about moving forward, but, at the same time, did not express
support or opposition. I think they, like most of the others,
are waiting to see what develops out from this.
Other countries with large civilian nuclear
infrastructures, of course, I've mentioned France and Russia
has been very positive with regard to moving forward with India
in the context of the July agreed framework. Also, Russia has
been very clear to emphasize that they believe that, in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group context, as well as in others, we
should treat India as a unique case that provides the best
protection for moving forward without damage to the NPT regime.
Senator Hagel. May I follow up on a question that Senator
Biden had asked at the beginning in his opening comments? That
is regarding the precedent that we would set with other
countries that could be picked up, countries like Russia or
China, in relationship to Iran, that they would use such a
precedent to make their own side deals with Iran, something
obviously we've thought through. And how do we respond to that?
Mr. Burns. I would just--maybe both of us could take a stab
at this, Senator.
Senator Hagel. Sure.
Mr. Burns. I know, from--we can't speak for the Russian
Government, obviously--but I know from our discussions with the
Russian Government pertaining to Iran, the Russians don't want
to see Iran enrich and reprocess, and have stated publicly they
do not wish Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. So, I wouldn't
think that Russia would be in a position to make the argument
that somehow what the United States is doing with India on the
civil nuclear side would give Russia a license to somehow be
softer on the big issue that we face with Iran--that is,
denying it a nuclear weapons capability.
Senator Hagel. North Korea, I would include in that, by the
way, as well. So--go ahead, I'm sorry.
Secretary Joseph.
Mr. Joseph. With regard to Russian provision of technology
to Iran, of course they're already building the Bushehr power
reactor in Iran and they're very interested in building
additional power reactors in Iran. We believe that we have,
working with the Russians and with others, made the case that
the sensitive technologies, particularly enrichment and
reprocessing, should not be provided to Iran. Iran should
resuspend its conversion activities and not move forward with
enrichment.
But going to your fundamental question, Senator, I think
that there is a risk. There is a risk that, as we move forward
with this type of arrangement with India, other countries
could, very cynically, use it as an excuse to provide
technologies that would present a proliferation risk. We need
to deal with those on a case-by-case basis. We need, I think,
to prevail in our argument that India is a unique case. We are
there with Russia, but we need to make that argument with
others, and I think we can sustain that argument, because India
does have unique energy requirements. India has a nuclear
nonproliferation record that is quite solid. And the other
countries that I think would be on the list that you or I or
others would develop as particularly risky do not have that
same nonproliferation record.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
gentlemen.
How much domestic energy does India have now, either
through coal, gas, oil, hydro?
Mr. Burns. Senator, India is a country with enormous energy
needs. It cannot produce all the energy it needs. And, as you
know, it's got a rapidly expanding population. Before you came
in, I think, I mentioned, at the start of my testimony, it will
soon overtake China as the world's most populous nation. And
one of the major----
Senator Chafee. They don't have any domestic energy sources
to speak of, anything significant?
Mr. Burns. No, and that's one of the major issues in Indian
foreign policy. They do have some domestic sources of energy,
of course, but they need to look outside their country for a
lot of their future energy needs. And that's--they're focused
on developing their civil nuclear sector--in part, for that
reason.
Mr. Joseph. Senator, I think they do have a significant
amount of hydro energy. They also have, of course, a lot of
coal. But the coal is not environmentally friendly, in the
sense that it's the dirtier type of coal. That is one reason,
quite frankly, that we believe nuclear energy is an attractive
option for India.
Senator Chafee. And, presently, they have 14 reactors that
generate 2,500 megawatts of power, and, if this agreement goes
through, anticipate increasing that tenfold, to 20,000
megawatts over 10 to 15 years. So, for the sake of argument, if
the agreement does not occur, where would that gap be made up,
your best guess, I guess would be my question?
Mr. Burns. Our best guess is that India would have to go in
search of foreign oil and gas contracts. That would be one of
their first initiatives. As you know, they've--there have been
some discussions between Iran and India about a future gas and
oil contract. They have not yet made an agreement. Our--it is
our hope that they will not make an agreement with Iran. Of
course, it's up to India to decide this, but that would be our
hope. And part of the rationale here, for this particular
initiative by the United States, is to help India cope with its
future energy needs.
Senator Chafee. And, again, for the sake of argument, if
they were to contract with Iran, how would they get that
supply? Pipelines or shipping?
Mr. Burns. I'm not an expert on the Iran--a prospective--or
a hypothetical, I should say, Iran-India oil and gas deal, but
I believe that they've talked about the development of a
pipeline system. A lot of people think that would be
prohibitively expensive.
Senator Chafee. It would have to cross Afghanistan and
Pakistan, obviously, or--now, Secretary Burns, you said you
were in New Delhi 2 weeks ago, and the--from my information
here, the Prime Minister received some domestic criticism from
political parties on the left and right for voting with the
United States on the Iran nuclear issue, the IAEA, on September
24, and both the right-wing BJP and the leftist party, from the
ruling Congress, rely on to maintain power accused the Prime
Minister of buckling under to United States pressure. What's
the--having just come back from there, what is the sentiment
toward the United States there--on the street, if you will?
Mr. Burns. Thank you very much. Well, the Prime Minister
heads a very large coalition of--that contains a variety of
different political parties inside the coalition. And some of
those coalition partners have been critical of the Government
for the July 18 agreement, as well as for the civil nuclear
energy deal, which is one of its principal components. The
Government, in Delhi, has defended the agreement, saying that
it's in India's best national interest.
In general, the United States is well thought of in India.
If you look at the public opinion polls in India, itself, the
United States consistently has high ratings, in terms of being
perceived as a friend to India. This is a great change from
general Indian--and, indeed, American attitudes toward India--
of the past, of the cold-war period. It's positive, it's very
hopeful, but it's not universally shared. There is a Communist
Party of India that doesn't think much of the United States. We
traditionally have had very good relations with the dominant
parties, both the Congress Party, which is the major party in
the current coalition, as well as BJP, the leading opposition
party, formerly the government party--the governing party. And
we've made a great effort to try to expand our relationship
with India to build on the broad measure of public support that
the Indian Government--the Indian population gives to relations
with us.
Senator Chafee. How do you analyze, then, the Prime
Minister's own political party criticizing him for this deal?
What was their--what was their point? What--why criticize it?
Mr. Burns. Senator, I'm not an expert in every facet of
what's been said and what kind of barbs have been exchanged in
Indian politics over the deal, but I do know that the Congress
Party supports the deal, the Prime--the majority party, but
that there are some other members of the coalition that do not.
I thought that, based on my conversations in New Delhi 2 weeks
ago, that this agreement, on balance, has strong support in
India. The civil nuclear agreement, as well as the opening to
the United States, that it's being hotly debated, because, for
decades, India was the personification of a nonaligned country.
We were perceived differently by the Indian public, and by
politicians. And that is what's changing. And we see a
confluence of interests between our two countries, and we see
now the opportunity to have the kind of strategic political
relationship that was just not possible 20 or 30 or 40 years
ago between our countries. So, it will be controversial in some
parts of India. It's controversial in some parts of the United
States. But we think it's--on balance, this is a good deal for
the United States to pursue this civil nuclear energy
agreement.
Senator Chafee. Would there be politicians in New Delhi
that would argue they draw--they get the energy from Iran?
Mr. Burns. I met with two groups of Parliamentarians when I
was in Delhi. Large groups. And I--Secretary Rice and I met
with another group of Parliamentarians last week, a visiting
group from India. And they represented, in all three of these
engagements, all the different political parties--I think, with
the exception of the Communist Party--in the Indian spectrum.
And, for the most part, what I heard--and, I know, as Secretary
Rice heard last week--was strong support from these Indian--
various Indian political parties for a strategic engagement
with the United States, for a closer relationship, and for
civil nuclear energy cooperation. So, it's not universal, but
it's fairly broad--broad-based.
Senator Chafee. It seems to me that if you are going to
criticize the deal, the only option is, as you said earlier,
that's where the energy would have to come from.
Mr. Burns. Yeah.
Senator Chafee. Following up on Senator Hagel's questioning
about: You're not going to--and you said this in your prepared
statement--``we do not plan to offer such cooperation to any
other country,'' who might feel aggrieved in this around the
world? Why--what other country might take exception to this
favoritism?
Mr. Joseph. The most likely candidate on that list, of
course, would be Pakistan. It's only India, Pakistan, and
Israel that have not signed the NPT. Israel has not expressed
any desire to have this same sort of cooperation. And that is,
I think, directly attributable to the fact that Israel doesn't
have the same sort of energy requirements that India does.
Senator Chafee. Great. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Let me ask just one final question on my part. How will
this civil nuclear agreement impact India-Pakistan nuclear
confidence-building? For example, how might increased
transparency on the Indian civilian nuclear facilities impact
on Pakistani policies regarding its nuclear arsenal?
Mr. Burns. Senator, we believe that the increased
transparency, the opening up of India's civil nuclear program
for the first time in 30 years, to international inspection and
supervision and oversight is going to give confidence to the
Pakistani Government. And should. And so, while it's not the
major factor in the relationship between Pakistan and India, it
is a--it is an important one. And we hope that it will
contribute to what we would like to see, and that is a gradual
improvement of relations between the two countries, both of
them friends of the United States.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagel, Senator Chafee, do you have additional
questions?
We thank both of you for very comprehensive testimony, and
very thoughtful arguments. We look forward to many more visits
with you, and we appreciate your coming today.
Mr. Joseph. Thank you.
Mr. Burns. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I would like to call now on our second panel
of witnesses. As I mentioned earlier, they are the Honorable
Ronald Lehman, the Honorable Ashton Carter, Mr. Henry Sokolski,
and Mr. Michael Krepon.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Gentlemen, we welcome all of you. As was
indicated earlier, your statements will all be made a part of
the record, so you need not ask for that to happen. And we will
ask you to proceed in summaries, if you can, so that we will
have ample time to hear the four statements, and proceed to our
questioning.
I will ask you to testify in the order that I introduced
you, which, first of all, would be Ronald Lehman, Ashton
Carter, Henry Sokolski, and then Michael Krepon.
Very good to have you, again, Ron, before the committee. We
would like for you to proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN II, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
GLOBAL SECURITY RESEARCH, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL
LABORATORY, LIVERMORE, CA
Ambassador Lehman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Since I wear a number of hats, including my association
with you, let me remind everyone I'm speaking only for myself,
for whatever that's worth. And a lot of what I would have said
has already been said. And a lot of what I want to say is about
to be said. And it's late. So, let me try to go right to
something of a net assessment that gives the thrust of my
views.
The Joint Statement is an historic milestone for
nonproliferation that creates both great opportunities and
great risk. It creates an opportunity to strengthen a nuclear
nonproliferation regime that is suffering from its own internal
weaknesses. These weaknesses include inadequate enforcement,
the threat of breakout, and an inability to engage effectively
nonparties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is a
subset of the more general problem of reconciling the
application of universal rules to what are often very different
particular circumstances. Because the terms of the Joint
Statement, however, also spotlight those weaknesses,
mishandling of its implementation could have adverse
consequences for the nonproliferation regime.
Whether one could have negotiated a somewhat better deal
is, I think, moot. The Joint Statement is in play, and we all
have an obligation to ensure that our national security is
enhanced as a result of the dynamic process now underway.
Bringing India into a more comprehensive regime of
nonproliferation and restraint could enhance our ability to
reduce the dangers associated with weapons of mass destruction.
India could do much to help within its borders, in South Asia,
in other troubled regions, and globally. Congress can help
ensure that this is a sufficiently ambitious agenda.
If the basic approach contained in the Joint Statement
collapses, however, we will not return to the status quo ante,
United States-Indian cooperation will be set back, and the
weaknesses in the existing regime would be exposed to even
greater pressure. I would urge the Congress to focus on the
dynamics of the process and the goals to be achieved as a
result of the United States-India Joint Statement.
Much that one might have detailed in the original package
may be more successfully achieved by driving subsequent
interactions in the right direction. This can only be done, I
believe, if nonproliferation is a centerpiece of strategic
engagement, rather than a tradeoff. It is best achieved by
retaining a viable nuclear nonproliferation treaty at the core
of a broader nonproliferation regime that uses more targeted
embedded engagement to address the fundamental causes and
conditions of proliferation. In short, widely shared goals
should guide our actions, but implementation will fail if a
one-size-fits-all mentality is applied rigidly to different
circumstances.
Relations between the United States and India have long
been far worse than the objective conditions warrant. The
reasons are too numerous to list. Much has changed, however.
Strong bipartisan support exists for engaging the emerging
India. I believe it is the right approach. But we should not
let our euphoria about the potential relationship cause us to
undermine our most effective nonproliferation tools. We should
not assume that great economic and strategic gains would result
simply from civilian nuclear cooperation. Rather, we should
fold our flexibility on civil nuclear cooperation into our
efforts to work with India to strengthen the overall regime to
counter weapons of mass destruction.
Many United States and Indian concerns are addressed in the
Joint Statement, but it's premature to suggest that they will
be addressed successfully. What is underway is a phased
process. Neither side will be certain of how much will be
achieved for some time.
Over the years, for example, various Indian interlocutors
have floated the idea of separating civilian from nuclear
facilities and applying safeguards to them. We have never known
the scale of the separation or the quality of the safeguards,
or I might add, the seriousness of the Indian commitment to
this. If India is serious about nuclear power, then its
infrastructure should be declared predominantly civilian, with
permanent IAEA safeguards. A token step would be
counterproductive.
India has long had a formal position in favor of a fissile
material cutoff. The Joint Statement reiterates that support,
and goes further in trying to align India's responsibilities
and benefits with those of other responsible states with
advanced nuclear technology. The definition of ``responsible
states with advanced nuclear technology'' is not clear, but
examples might be those that are associated with the ITER
fusion program and the Gen-IV advanced nuclear reactor
programs. Nearly all already have de factor or de jure fissile
material cutoffs, and the rest are committed to such cutoff.
Because the prospects for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
seem so poor in the Conference on Disarmament, perhaps an
interim multilateral approach could be put forth with such
states with advanced nuclear technology, and other relevant
states--in part, to enhance nuclear security; in part, as a
fly-before-buy experiment that might lead ultimately to
progress on an FMCT in the CD. If India were to join the rest
of the advanced nuclear community in this regard, it would be a
major contribution.
Perhaps the greatest contribution that India could make
nonproliferation outside its borders would be to end its
guerrilla war against the Non-Proliferation Treaty and support
the international community in its efforts to encourage and, as
necessary, enforce compliance with obligations. The problem is
that India has strategic and economic objectives in addition to
whatever nonproliferation goals it may share with the United
States. Whether it is nonaligned politics or it's strategic
engagement of Iran, these can create serious problems.
India cannot be expected to alter its most fundamental
interests, but, in these areas, we may find a measure of New
Delhi's actual commitment to real nonproliferation and global
partnership.
Within its own borders, the growing concern over nonstate
and quasi-state actors places a premium on modern physical
security, export controls, counterterrorism, implementation of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, and support for measures
such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. These are areas
in which the United States and India can work together and
gauge each other's commitment by our synergy and transparency.
Mr. Chairman, in summary, the Joint Statement creates
opportunities to strengthen nonproliferation by engaging India
and reducing some of the stresses on the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. A failure by India to step up to its side
of the bargain fully, and to continue to move in the direction
of cooperation and restraint, however, could create dangers for
an NPT-centric regime that is having difficulty because of
noncompliance, weak enforcement, the spread of WMD capability
into troubled regions, and the rise of dangerous nonstate or
quasi-state actors.
Ultimately, states will remain committed to
nonproliferation, and members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
will remain within the regime, only if it serves their
interest. Many support the NPT because they get civilian
nuclear cooperation, but most support the NPT because it
enhances their security. So long as the NPT serves their
interests, the emergence of asymmetrical arrangements to deal
with different circumstances is not only manageable, it is
absolutely necessary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lehman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, Center for
Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore, CA
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to accept your
invitation to join with this distinguished committee--and with my good
friends on this panel--to discuss the nonproliferation implications of
the United States-India civilian nuclear cooperation called for in the
July 18, 2005, Joint Statement of President George W. Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh. Over the years, I have appeared before this
committee in various capacities, and, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to
cochair with Ash Carter your Policy Advisory Group on the future of the
nonproliferation regime. Nevertheless, I would like to make clear that
today I am speaking only for myself and the views I express here do not
necessarily represent those of any administration, organization, or
group with which I am or have been associated.
The committee is well aware of the content of the United States-
India Joint Statement: In the context of the broader global partnership
on the economy, energy and the environment, democracy and development,
and high-technology and space reflected in the Joint Statement, India
will receive the benefits of civil nuclear cooperation in exchange for
enhanced nonproliferation commitments. More specifically, India has
agreed to separate civilian and military nuclear facilities, place
those civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, and implement an IAEA
Additional Protocol. India will continue its moratorium on nuclear
weapons testing and work toward a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty. India will help prevent the spread of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and adhere to
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) while legislating strong export controls.
For its part, the United States Government will propose that
Congress adjust United States law and that relevant international
bodies adjust their regimes to permit full civilian nuclear energy
cooperation with India. The United States will also consult with its
partners on the inclusion of India in certain advanced nuclear energy
research associated with both fission and fusion energy.
Before I address the three specific questions the committee has
asked about the Joint Statement, let me offer a short net assessment.
The Joint Statement is an historic milestone for nonproliferation that
creates both great opportunity and great risk. It creates an
opportunity to strengthen a nuclear nonproliferation regime that is
suffering from its own internal weaknesses such as inadequate
enforcement, the threat of breakout once an advanced nuclear capability
has been achieved, and an inability to engage effectively the
nonparties to the NPT, Because the terms of the Joint Statement,
however, also spotlight those weaknesses, mishandling of the
implementation of its terms can have adverse consequences even when the
best of intentions are involved. The elements of the package are not
new, but the suddenness with which the particular mix of elements was
put together has caught many key players at home and abroad by
surprise. They need to take the time to think through their positions
carefully as the governments of India and the United States flesh out
their phased approach. The executive branch needs also to consult
closely with the Congress, and within the executive branch, regional
and functional experts need close, regular, and detailed coordination.
All of this will serve to improve our ability to work with India and
other governments to enhance our efforts against all weapons of mass
destruction.
Whether one could have negotiated a somewhat better deal is moot.
The Joint Statement is in play, and we all have an obligation to ensure
that our national security is enhanced as a result of the dynamic
process now underway, especially our ability to prevent and counter the
spread of weapons of mass destruction. If the basic approach contained
in the Joint Statement collapses, we will not return to the status quo
ante. United States-Indian cooperation will be set back, but also the
weaknesses in the existing regime will be exposed to even greater
pressure. Bringing India into a more comprehensive regime of
nonproliferation and restraint, however, could significantly enhance
our ability to reduce the dangers associated with weapons of mass
destruction. Congress can help insure that this is a sufficiently
ambitious agenda. India could do much to help within its borders, in
South Asia, in other troubled regions, and globally.
Yet India remains a symbol of a glaring challenge to the
nonproliferation regime; namely reconciling universal principles with
very different circumstances. Is the same verification system
appropriate for both Sweden and Iran? Is a democratic India outside the
NPT really to be considered more of a nuclear pariah than a despotic
North Korea inside the Treaty? Measures to deal with specific concerns
are often inappropriate to apply universally. Yet rules that can be
applied universally are often too general to address specific concerns,
sometimes creating an inability to enforce compliance or even encourage
restraint. In many ways, progress in the NPT centered nonproliferation
regime has been measured by the success or failure in tailoring
measures to different circumstances. One sees this in the dealings
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Israel, and others over the last
decade or more. It will remain true with India.
If the process set in place by the Joint Statement were to continue
in a positive direction, it could create a more sound, broad-based
nonproliferation community with the tools necessary to deal with the
different circumstances of the real world. It could further integrate
our nonproliferation goals into our national strategy and those of
others, permitting us to more effectively deal with the increasing
availability of destructive technology in the global economy and the
persistence of dangerous actors, both state and nonstate.
I would urge the Congress to focus on the dynamics of the process
and the goals to be achieved as a result of the United States-India
Joint Statement rather than attempting to rearrange the pieces of the
initial package. Much that one might have detailed in the original
package may be more successfully achieved by driving subsequent
interactions in the right direction. This can only be done, I believe,
if nonproliferation is a centerpiece of strategic engagement rather
than a tradeoff. It is best achieved by retaining a viable Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty at the core of a broader nonproliferation regime
that uses more targeted, embedded engagement to address the fundamental
causes and conditions of proliferation. In short, widely shared goals
should guide our actions, but implementation will fail if a ``one-size-
fits-all'' mentality is applied rigidly to different circumstances. Let
me clarify what I mean by addressing the three questions you have
asked.
(1) If there is need to draw closer to India for strategic reasons,
what are those reasons, and why does civil nuclear cooperation weigh so
heavily among them?
The NPT was designed to enhance the benefits for membership, but
for India, a nonsignatory, restrictions on civilian nuclear cooperation
are deeply resented in India because they are seen as punitive,
discriminatory, and demeaning. The emotional quotient is high. Yes,
India's nuclear power infrastructure has suffered from lack of access
to outside technology and uranium shortages could become a major factor
in India's nuclear power future, but that future still remains very
uncertain. India's nuclear elite is divided on what it wants and why.
One can imagine a major scale-up of India's nuclear power, but it is
not clear private investment will be there. Even smaller public
investment may be unwise if it continues the weaknesses of the current
programs. Neuralgia over the nuclear issue is intense primarily because
it triggers deeper seated resentments.
Relations between the United States and India have long been far
worse than the objective conditions warrant. The reasons are too
numerous to list. Again, they are not primarily about nuclear
cooperation. South Asia was a backwater of United States diplomacy
during the cold war, and cooperation was made difficult by India's
socialist orientation, nonaligned tactics that often tilted toward the
Soviet Union, and a related testiness toward the West as a result of
its colonial experience. In the United States, there were many ``Years
of India,'' none of which seemed to last even that long. Indian
nonproliferation policy was draped in grandiose disarmament rhetoric
that provided moral top cover for the nuclear weapons program that gave
its population much satisfaction. Thus, India has often been unwilling
to take ``Yes'' for an answer. Long a leading advocate of a
Comprehensive Test Ban, it backed away when rapid negotiations
threatened options to demonstrate its nuclear prowess. One of the
godfathers of the Fissile Material Cut-Off, India has been satisfied to
see it buried in a moribund Conference on Disarmament. In short, India
has serious security concerns, but its behavior is often driven by
concerns about status.
What has changed? Much. The end of the ``Permit Raj'' and the
opening up of the Indian economy has emboldened a huge, highly educated
middle class. The new demographics are also compelling. It is not just
that India will have the world's largest population in 2030. It will be
experiencing the so-called ``demographic dividend,'' as the falling
fertility rates and improved health increase the ratio of workers to
dependents in ways that have historically driven economic growth. A
global, high technology Indian diaspora is now networked and returning
skills and investments to India. India is proud of its information
technology and seeks to do the same in biotechnology. And if messy
domestic politics is a signature of democracy, then India is clearly a
democracy. This too can provide a basis for a new relationship with an
India that may be more able to look more self-confidently to its real
interests and leave the politics of resentment behind.
As an economic, cultural, and strategic partner, India could offer
much in the years ahead, especially if adverse geostrategic
developments in the Islamic world or Eurasia create economic or
security dangers, but a grand strategic partnership is not inevitable.
It needs to be groomed. Indian domestic and regional politics are
volatile because of economic, class, and ethnic divisions. For all of
its tradition of business and trade, South Asia remains a region in
which the win-win often seems alien. Spoilers abound domestically and
around the region. As Indian power and influence grows, both its
ability to help and its ability to do harm will grow. Positive steps
will be accompanied by negative steps and vice versa. Most Indians are
proud of having tested nuclear weapons, but having made this
demonstration, many Indians are now more willing to reach out and to
show restraint. We will not always have overlapping interests, but we
can achieve a relationship that is at least as good as the common
interests we develop, something we have often failed to achieve in the
past.
Strong bipartisan support exists for engaging the emerging India,
much of it overly optimistic about near-term possibilities and long-
term probabilities. Still, I believe it is the right approach, but we
should not let our euphoria cause us to undermine our most effective
nonproliferation tools. We should not assume that great economic and
strategic gains that would not otherwise be possible would result
simply from civilian nuclear cooperation. Rather we should fold our
flexibility on civil nuclear cooperation into our efforts to work with
India to strengthen the overall nonproliferation regime including
improvements in strategic relationships and the international security
architecture.
(2) The July 18 Joint Statement addresses many long-standing Indian
concerns about the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and United
States law, but what United States concerns about India's past and
current nonproliferation policies and laws are addressed by the Joint
Statement? Please enumerate these concerns and indicate specifcally how
they are addressed in the Joint Statement.
Many United States and Indian concerns are addressed in the Joint
Statement, but it is premature to suggest that they will be addressed
successfully. What is underway is a phased process. Neither side will
be certain of how much will be achieved for some time. Over the years,
various Indian interlocutors have floated the idea of separating
civilian from nuclear facilities and applying safeguards to them. We
have never known the scale of the separation or the quality of the
safeguards. If India is serious about nuclear power, then its
infrastructure should be declared predominantly civilian with permanent
IAEA safeguards. To clarify the separation may take some time, and full
implementation of IAEA safeguards could take years. A major shift to
safeguard civilian activity would be a positive step worthy of
considerable movement on the part of the United States and the
international community. A token step would be counterproductive.
India has long had a formal position in favor of a Fissile Material
Cut-Off. The Joint Statement reiterates that support and goes further
in trying to align India's responsibilities and benefits with those of
other ``responsible state[s] with advanced nuclear technology.'' The
definition of responsible states with advanced nuclear technology is
not clear, but examples might be those that are associated with the
ITER fusion program and the GEN IV advanced nuclear reactor programs,
countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, South
Korea, South Africa, Japan, France, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, China,
and Russia. Nearly all already have de facto or de jure fissile
material cutoffs, and the rest are committed to such a cutoff. Because
the prospects for a FMCT seem so poor in the Conference on Disarmament,
perhaps an interim multilateral approach could be put forth with such
states with advanced nuclear technology and other relevant states, in
part to enhance nuclear security and in part as a ``fly before buy''
experiment that might lead ultimately to progress on an FMCT in the CD.
If India were to join the rest of the advanced nuclear community in
this regard, it would be a major contribution.
Perhaps the greatest contribution that India could make to
nonproliferation outside its own borders would be to end its guerrilla
war against the NPT and support the international community in its
efforts to encourage and, as necessary, enforce compliance with
obligations. India's stated long-term goals are compatible with those
of the NPT, but India's insistence that the NPT is a discriminatory
treaty that singles them out has resulted in a regular campaign to
undermine support for the NPT. Certainly, it is not too much to expect
of India that, in the context of renewed civil nuclear cooperation, the
rhetoric against the treaty could be dispensed with. A polite agreement
that we have some disagreements should be sufficient. For its part, the
United States need not walk away from its view that ultimately we would
like to see universal adherence to the NPT, but we have long ago
stopped pressing India to join as if the conditions might be near at
hand. Getting India to support adherence to treaties, including
treaties they do not belong to, should also not be an issue of
membership. The greater problem is that India has strategic and
economic objectives in addition to whatever nonproliferation goals they
may share with the United States. Whether it is NAM politics or its
strategic engagement of Iran, these can create serious problems. India
cannot be expected to alter its most fundamental interests, but in
these areas, we may find a measure of New Delhi's actual commitment to
nonproliferation and global partnership.
Within its own borders, the growing concern over nonstate and
quasi-state actors places a premium on modem physical security, export
controls, counterterrorism, implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540, and
support for measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). These are areas in which the United States and India can work
together and gauge each other's commitment by our synergy. In recent
years, official Indian policy has been increasingly positive in these
areas, but the longer history has clouds. Confidence in effective
implementation would be enhanced by more direct, bilateral engagement.
(3) The policy adopted in the Joint Statement, if fully
implemented, will require changes to international nonproliferation
rules, rules that apply to nations other than India--in particular it
is not clear how those changes would affect United States policy with
respect to Iran and North Korea, as well as the nuclear export policies
of Russia and China. How can the administration and Congress work to
ensure that if rules are changed for India, those changes will not
result in other proliferation challenges--and if such consequences are
not avoidable, should these rules be changed?
The nonproliferation rules have constantly been changing, becoming
both more restrictive and less restrictive based upon changed
circumstances. Perhaps I can illustrate this. In January 1992, at an
historic summit of the United Nations Security Council, further
proliferation was declared to be a threat to international security,
strong words implying strong actions. These world leaders were
encouraged in their strong statement by many historic developments. The
cold war was over and United States-Russian cooperation was
accelerating. Longstanding holdouts who had disparaged the NPT, such as
France, China, Brazil, Argentina, and others, were now members.
Historic arms control agreements were in place. The first gulf war had
imposed on Saddam Hussein's regime an unprecedented, tailored UNSCOM
inspection regime that ultimately revealed how badly we had
underestimated the WMD capability in Iraq, both nuclear and biological.
Just in time, we had learned how difficult it is to assess what really
goes on in the global world of dual use technology. Enhanced
nonproliferation initiatives were being expanded. On the Korean
Peninsula, a North-South denuclearization agreement had been completed,
and North Korea had finally concluded an IAEA safeguards agreement. The
two Koreas were also negotiating a North-South bilateral inspection
regime that would create a stronger NPT plus regime in that troubled
region. Going beyond the Joint Verification Experiments and the
laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges, the Nunn-Lugar programs were
expanding the frontiers of engagement and transparency. Both the
international norms and the means to engage concretely and in detail on
their behalf were being enhanced with more hands-on flexibility.
No sooner had the Security Council Summit spoken, than the
remaining challenges became clear. Talks between the two Koreas on
bilateral inspections stalled. Then implementation of the North-South
denuclearization agreement under which both Koreas agreed to give up
both reprocessing and enrichment finally collapsed when North Korea was
revealed to have a covert reprocessing plant. When Pyongyang refused to
permit an IAEA special inspection and announced it would withdraw from
the NPT, the international community could not agree that this was a
matter for the Security Council. Instead, the world turned to the
United States to solve the problem, with great pressure applied on the
United States to use carrots rather than sticks. However vital,
nonproliferation began to loose its urgency. To buy time, an Agreed
Framework was negotiated with North Korea under which new nuclear
reactors would be provided Pyongyang as part of a process for resolving
outstanding issues. Russians complained that the Agreed Framework
subsidized a noncompliant North Korea even though the United States had
opposed Russian sales of similar reactors when Pyongyang was thought to
be compliant. Russia cited the Agreed Framework in rejecting United
States opposition to reactor sales to Iran, which was then accepting
IAEA inspections. And of course many Indians noted that reactors that
were denied India, a democracy that was not party to the NPT, were
being supplied to a North Korea in open violation of the NPT and still
threatening to complete its withdrawal from the treaty. Whatever the
merit of such protestations, they remind us that the difficult cases
and changed circumstances have resulted in modifications to our basic
approaches in the past, not always with good results. Sometimes, we
bowed to the inevitable. We once had very tight limits on computer
exports, but long ago we decontrolled far more capable machines because
of foreign availability. Sometimes, we have been able to expand
restraint. Because of the close association of enrichment and
reprocessing with nuclear weapons potential, the United States and
others have pressed for a further narrowing of the access of additional
states to those technologies. Under the terms of the Joint Statement,
India has agreed to join in this selective approach as it undertakes
not to transfer enrichment and reprocessing technologies to those who
don't have them and to support international efforts to limit their
spread.
Once again, we are faced with the challenges of achieving our basic
goals under different circumstances. Common rules and criteria can be
useful, but they can also be self limiting and counterproductive if
they prevent us from developing different rules for different
circumstances to promote the same goal. Of course, we need to keep in
mind the real measures of merit. Too often we measure nonproliferation
only by the number of benign and compliant states that have adhered to
the treaty rather than by assessing the real state of proliferation
capability and intent in a world in which much more potential is now
latent.
Mr. Chairman. In summary, the Joint Statement creates opportunities
to strengthen nonproliferation by engaging India and reducing some of
the stresses on the NPT that result from India's pariah status on
civilian nuclear cooperation. A failure by India to step up to its side
of the bargain fully and to continue to move in the direction of
cooperation and restraint, however, could create dangers for an NPT-
centric regime that is having difficulty because of noncompliance, weak
enforcement, the spread of WMD capability into troubled regions, and
the rise of dangerous nonstate or quasi-state actors. Ultimately,
states will remain committed to nonproliferation, and members of the
NPT will remain within the regime, only if it serves their interest.
Many support the NPT because they get civilian nuclear cooperation, but
most support the NPT because it enhances their security. So long as the
NPT serves their interests, the emergence of asymmetric arrangements to
deal with different circumstances is manageable and necessary.
Unfortunately, such arrangements can serve as a pretext for withdrawal
or nonsupport when the treaty itself no longer serves the interests of
specific parties. To strengthen the NPT, we need to enforce compliance
and concentrate on enhancing its value to its members rather than
focusing on punishment of those who have not yet adhered, all of which
are nations with which we have friendly, if sometimes difficult,
relations.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Lehman. We really
appreciate, once again, your contribution today.
You mentioned your association with me. Let me explain that
you and our next testifier, Ash Carter, have been a part of
this Policy Advisory Group since the time of the Indian Summit,
and really before. These issues of the Non-Proliferation
Conference that occurred this year, quite outside the Indian
agreement, were extremely important in this area. And Senator
Biden has mentioned his desire for all of us to sit around the
table for a while. I would simply indicate, we've been sitting
around the table, and we will be sitting around some more,
because all of us need the education that comes from the
expertise of people who have been there for a long time in
public policy, and you have been.
With that, I would like to recognize Ash Carter for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, CODIRECTOR, PREVENTIVE
DEFENSE PROJECT, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is a privilege
for me to be here and also to serve you on the Policy Advisory
Group.
And I'll just say the same thing Ron Lehman, my friend and
cochair of that group, said already, which is that though the
PAG is working on this problem, I am speaking now on my own
behalf, my own analysis, and not for your advisory group, as a
whole. And, moreover, that advisory group has been focusing on
the nuclear aspects of the deal, and I'd like to paint on a
wider canvas, if I may, and emphasize the need to look at the
India deal through a wide lens, because most of the discussion
and controversy associated with the India deal has focused on
its nuclear aspects. And since preventing nuclear war and
nuclear terrorism is, I believe--and I know you believe, Mr.
Chairman, from all you've done for that cause--is the single
highest priority for American national security policy, now and
as far into the future as I can see. I have some sympathy with
this emphasis, but I don't believe this deal can be assessed
properly within this narrow frame. In fact, when viewed as a
nuclear-only deal, it's a bad deal for the United States.
Washington recognized Delhi's nuclear status in return for,
I would say, little in the way of additional restraints on
India's nuclear arsenal, or additional help with combating
nuclear proliferation and terrorism, or at least not additional
help that India wasn't already committed, or inclined, to give,
and at appreciable--not grave--but appreciable likely cost to
our nuclear nonproliferation objectives in other critical
regions. But it seems clear to me that President Bush did not
view the India deal through a nuclear-only lens, and neither
should we.
The United States, in this view, gave the Indians what
they've craved for 30 years, which is nuclear recognition in
return for a strategic partnership between Washington and
Delhi. Washington gave, on the nuclear front, to get something
on the nonnuclear front.
I agree strongly with the administration that a strategic
partnership with India is in the deep and long-term United
States security interest. A nuclear-recognition quid for a
strategic-partnership quo is, therefore, a reasonable framework
for an India deal. However, as a diplomatic transaction, the
India deal is quite uneven. First of all, a United States-
Indian strategic partnership would seem to be in India's
interest, as well as ours. So, why do we have to give them
something for it? Second, the deal is uneven in its specifics.
What the United States gives is spelled out quite clearly, but
what India gives in return is vaguer. And, third, the deal is
uneven in timing. We gave something big up front, and what we
stand to get lies further out in the future.
Should Congress reject the India deal as too uneven? I
would recommend, instead, trying to improve the diplomacy to
rebalance the deal. There are two ways this can be done. The
United States can give less, or it can expect more. My
statement takes the second approach: Aiming to define a set of
expectations for specific benefits to the United States from a
strategic partnership with India.
It's premature, I would say, to judge whether the
expectations that I will describe below, and which were
apparently foreseen by the United States side, are shared by
India and will, in fact, materialize. And the deal, itself,
therefore, was premature. And the risk with the poorly prepared
diplomatic initiative is that disenchantment will set in on
both sides. That's the risk. But the deal is now an
accomplished fact, and I think that we and the Indians must do
our best to build upon it.
Let me say what India got and then, very briefly, what we
might hope to get in return.
India obtained de facto recognition of its nuclear weapons
status. The United States will behave, and urge others to
behave, as if India were a nuclear weapons state under the NPT.
We won't deny it most nuclear technology or commerce, we won't
require it to put all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards, only those that it declares to be civil.
Beyond these technicalities, nuclear recognition confers an
enormous political benefit on India. In effect, it allows India
to transcend the nuclear box that has for so long defined its
place in the international order, jettison at last its outdated
nonaligned movement stances and rhetoric, and occupy a more
normal and modern place in the diplomatic world. Proponents and
critics of the deal, alike, agree that this is huge.
Some other supposed benefits of the deal don't survive
close scrutiny, and one is energy security, Senator Chafee, an
issue you raised, which is terribly important to both India and
the United States. And we want India's huge population, as
Under Secretary Burns emphasized, to satisfy its energy needs
without contributing further to the problems of dependence on
Middle East oil, environmental issues, global warming, and so
forth. But the arithmetic does not support the case that
nuclear power will spell the difference for India, though it
can, and should, play a role.
For the foreseeable future, electricity generation in India
will be dominated by coal-burning. That's just a fact. Burning
coal more cheaply and more cleanly would do more than any
conceivable expansion of nuclear power to aid India's economy
and the environment. And nuclear power does nothing to address
the principal Indian oil-consuming sector, which is cars and
trucks, since these don't run off the electrical grid, and
won't for a long time. Moreover, the type of nuclear assistance
the United States is best positioned to provide, which is
light-water reactors, is at odds with India's vision of a civil
nuclear power program based on breeders.
It's also said that the deal will require India to improve
its laws and procedures for controlling exports or diversions
of sensitive nuclear technology, preventing an Indian A.Q.
Khan, but, to my knowledge, India has a good record of
controlling nuclear exports, though not always ballistic
missile exports. India is already bound by the United States-
sponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires
such good conduct. So, on paper at least, Delhi has sold the
same horse a second time in this deal.
In any event, the United States intends to justify the
deal's nuclear recognition to other nations around the world on
the grounds that India's nuclear proliferation behavior is
already exemplary. So, it will be difficult to argue this point
both ways at the same time.
Let me now say what Washington should expect to get from
this deal, and I'll simply list these items. My testimony
spells them out more--at greater length.
First, immediate diplomatic support to curb Iran's nuclear
program. That's been discussed by others.
Second, potential counterweight to China. Let me pause on
this one just a moment. No one wants to see China and the
United States fall into strategic competition, but neither can
anyone rule this out. The evolution of United States-China
relations will depend on the attitudes of China's younger
generation and new leaders, on Chinese and United States
policies, and on unpredictable events, like a crisis over
Taiwan. It is reasonable for the United States to hedge against
a downturn in relations with China by improving its relations
with India; and for India to do the same. But, for now, India
is intent on improving its relations in trade with China, not
antagonizing China. Neither government will wish to talk
publicly, let alone take actions now, pursuant to this shared,
but hypothetical and future, common interest. But it's there.
It's on the list.
The third is assistance in a Pakistan contingency. Again, I
won't elaborate. Governments won't be talking about that, I
would imagine, but it is an important item.
Fourth, joint action of the Indian military with the United
States military in operations outside of the United Nations
context.
Fifth, military access and basing. Not now. Sometime in the
future.
Sixth, preferential treatment for United States industry in
India's civil nuclear expansion.
Seventh, preferential access for United States defense
industry to the Indian defense market.
And, eighth, additional contributions to nuclear
nonproliferation from India's nuclear program, of a kind that
I'm sure some of my colleagues will spell out here and Robert
Einhorn has spelled out.
Let me close by asking: Will we actually get these benefits
of the India deal? The list above is very substantial, even
breathtaking. And the question is: How realistic is it?
Some of the items on this list reflect joint common
interests of India and the United States. The United States
might, therefore, have had many of these benefits without
having to pay the nonproliferation costs associated with
nuclear recognition for India. Most of the items on the list
are also hypothetical and lie in a future that neither side can
predict. This is certainly the case with respect to the China
counterweight and Pakistan contingency items. Other items on
the list, like Iran's nuclear program, will unfold sooner.
The United States can certainly hope that India will behave
as a true strategic partner in the future across all the items
on this list, but I believe that we may also find, when we ask
India to do something they are reluctant to do, that we come to
regret having played our big diplomatic card, nuclear
recognition, so early in the process.
Finally, and I am repeating something that Senator Biden
was kind enough to quote, but I--it's important enough--to me,
at least--that I'd like to say it. India, itself, as befits a
great nation on its way to global leadership, will have its own
opinions about this list that I just made. Some American
proponents of the Indian deal have compared it to Nixon's
opening to China, a bold move based on a firm foundation of
mutual interests, but more a leap of trust than a shrewd
bargain.
Mao and Nixon, however, had a clear and present common
enemy--the Soviet Union--not a hypothetical set of possible
future opponents. But the real difference between the Nixon-
Kissinger deal and the India deal is that India, unlike Mao's
China, is a democracy. No government in Delhi can turn decades
of Indian policy on a dime or commit it to a broad set of
actions in support of United States interests. Only a profound,
and probably slow, change in the views of India's elites can do
this. India's bureaucracies and diplomats are fabled for their
stubborn adherence to independent Indian positions regarding
the world order, economic development, and nuclear security.
Proponents of the India deal suggest that these positions
will yield to the grand gesture of nuclear recognition by the
United States. I believe this expectation is naive.
Americans view the change of longstanding and principled
nonproliferation policy to accommodate India as a concession.
India views it as an acknowledgment of something to which they
have long been entitled. This is not a durable basis for a
diplomatic transaction.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it's, therefore,
premature to tell whether the United States will achieve
security benefits from the India deal that outweigh the costs.
That means the deal itself was premature. At this point, the
United States, including the Congress, can only do its best to
ensure that its benefits are fully realized by both parties.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ashton B. Carter, Codirector, Preventive
Defense Project, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
thank you for inviting me to testify before you about the benefits and
costs of the deal between India and the United States reflected in the
July 18 Joint Statement between President Bush and Prime Minister
Singh, which for brevity I will refer to simply as the India Deal.
Chairman Lugar has charged his Policy Advisory Group (PAG), which I
cochair, with assessing the India Deal and advising him on its pros and
cons, and with recommending steps the Congress should take to ensure
that the final version of the Deal best serves U.S. interests. The PAG,
like the committee itself, has not yet had the opportunity to hear all
sides of the issue and make its recommendations. My statement today
therefore reflects my own analysis and does not represent the views of
the PAG.
THE NEED TO LOOK AT THE INDIA DEAL THROUGH A WIDE LENS
Much of the discussion--and controversy--around the India Deal
focuses on its nuclear aspects. Since preventing nuclear war and
nuclear terrorism is the single highest priority for American national
security--now and as far into the future as I can see--I have some
sympathy with this emphasis. But I believe the Deal cannot be assessed
within this narrow frame. In fact, when viewed as a nuclear-only deal,
it is a bad deal for the United States. Washington recognized Delhi's
nuclear status in return for little in the way of additional restraints
on India's nuclear arsenal or help with combating nuclear proliferation
and terrorism (that India was not already inclined or committed to
give), and at appreciable likely cost to its nuclear nonproliferation
objectives in other critical regions.
But it seems clear that President Bush did not view the India Deal
through a nuclear-only lens, and neither should we. The United States,
in this view, gave the Indians what they have craved for 30 years--
nuclear recognition--in return for a ``strategic partnership'' between
Washington and Delhi. Washington gave on the nuclear front to get
something on the nonnuclear front. I agree strongly with the
administration that a strategic partnership with India is in the deep
and long-term United States security interest. A nuclear-recognition
quid for a strategic-partnership quo is therefore a reasonable
framework for an India Deal.
However, as a diplomatic transaction the India Deal is quite
uneven. First of all, a United States-Indian strategic partnership
would seem to be in India's interest as well as ours. So why give them
something for it? Second, the Deal is uneven in its specifics--what the
United States gives is spelled out quite clearly, but what India gives
in return is vaguer. Third, the Deal is uneven in timing--we gave
something big up front, but what we stand to get lies further out in
the future.
Should Congress reject the India Deal as too uneven? I would
recommend instead trying to improve the diplomacy to rebalance the
Deal. There are two ways this can be done: The United States can give
less, or it can expect more. My statement takes the second approach--
aiming to define a set of expectations for specific benefits to the
United States from a ``strategic partnership'' with India.
My statement is divided into three parts: First, I describe what
India got. Second, I describe what the United States should aim to get.
Third, I assess the chances that U.S. expectations will actually be
met.
It is premature to judge whether the expectations of this
partnership as apparently foreseen on the United States side are shared
by India and will, in fact, materialize. The Deal itself was premature.
The problem with a poorly prepared diplomatic initiative is that
disenchantment will set in on both sides. But with the Deal now an
accomplished fact, we and the Indians must do our best to build upon
it.
WHAT DELHI GOT
India obtained de-facto recognition of its nuclear weapons status:
The United States will behave, and urge others to behave, as if India
were a nuclear weapons state under the NPT. We will not deny it most
civil nuclear technology or commerce. We will not require it to put all
of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards--only those it declares
to be civil. It is worth noting that even if the administration wished
to make India a formal Nuclear Weapons State under the NPT (which it in
fact refused to do), it probably could not persuade all the other
signatories of the NPT to agree to the formal change.
Beyond these technicalities, nuclear recognition confers an
enormous political benefit on India. In effect, it allows India to
transcend the nuclear box that has for so long defined its place in the
international order, jettison at last its outdated Non-Aligned Movement
stances and rhetoric, and occupy a more normal and modem place in the
diplomatic world. Proponents and critics of the Deal alike agree that
this is huge.
The Deal has accordingly been popular in India. Criticism from the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been narrow and technical and probably
reflects regrets that a Prime Minister from the Congress Party and not
the BJP secured the Deal. The other source of criticism has been
leftists in the Congress Party. They are wedded to the old politics of
the Non-Aligned Movement which was overtaken by the end of the cold
war, but they are unlikely to be able to block the Deal.
The Joint Statement contains a list of other items--civilian space
cooperation, agricultural exchanges, HIV/AIDS cooperation,
``promot[ing] modernization of India's infrastructure,'' and so on--
that comprise Delhi's long-standing list of desires. There is little in
here for the United States.
Other supposed benefits of the Deal do not survive close scrutiny.
Energy security, for example, is terribly important to both India and
the United States. We want India's huge population to satisfy its
energy needs without contributing further to the problems of dependence
on Middle East oil, pollution, and global warming. But the arithmetic
does not support the case that nuclear power will spell the difference
for India, though it can and should play a role. For the foreseeable
future, electricity generation in India will be dominated by coal
burning. Burning coal more cheaply and more cleanly will do more than
any conceivable expansion of nuclear power to aid India's economy and
the environment. And nuclear power does nothing to address the
principal Indian oil consuming sector--cars and trucks--since these
don't run off the electrical grid and won't for a long time. Moreover,
the type of nuclear assistance the United States is best positioned to
provide (light water reactors operating on low-enriched uranium fuel)
is at odds with India's vision of a civil nuclear power program built
primarily around breeder reactors.
It is also said that the Deal will require India to improve its
laws and procedures for controlling exports or diversions of sensitive
nuclear technology--preventing an Indian A.Q. Khan. But to my knowledge
India has a good record of controlling nuclear exports (though not
always ballistic missile exports). India is already bound by the U.S.-
sponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 which requires such
good conduct, so on paper at least Dehli has sold the same horse a
second time in the Deal. In any event, the United States intends to
justify the Deal's nuclear recognition to other nations around the
world on the grounds that India's nuclear proliferation behavior is
already exemplary. It will be difficult to argue this point both ways
at the same time.
Missile defense cooperation is also cited in the Joint Statement.
The United States has had the world's largest and most technically
proficient missile defense R&D program for many years; it is doubtful
the United States can learn much from India in this field of military
science, though India will benefit from United States knowledge. Basing
United States missile defense radars or interceptors on Indian soil
would not be of much benefit to the United States (in the way that such
facilities in Japan, Great Britain, or Poland are useful), since with a
few exotic exceptions the trajectories of ballistic missiles heading to
targets of United States interest do not pass close to Indian airspace.
Finally, it is possible that the administration expects India to
purchase United States missile defense systems like THAAD to protect
India from Pakistani and Chinese missile attack. Buying such defense
systems would benefit United States industry and, through economies of
scale, subsidize DOD's own purchases of missile defenses . . . but it
is unlikely that India will make purchases of integrated BMD systems on
that scale.
WHAT WASHINGTON SHOULD GET
What is it then that the United States might expect from the
``strategic partnership'' in return for nuclear recognition and other
items of interest to Delhi in the Joint Statement?
I would suggest that over the long run the United States would be
expecting the following strategic benefits from the India Deal:
Immediate diplomatic support to curb Iran's nuclear program. India
will need to abandon its long-standing policy of rhetorical support for
the spread of nuclear fuel-cycle activities and compromise, to some
extent, its friendly relations with Iran. India's September 24 vote
with the United States and its European partners in the IAEA Board of
Governors, finding Iran in noncompliance with its NPT obligations (and
containing an implicit threat to refer the matter to the United
National Security Council) was a welcome suggestion that India's
support in the international struggle to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions
will be firm. But India's continued firmness in this and other urgent
counterproliferation efforts will be an early test of the value of
strategic partnership and its new status.
Potential counterweight to China. Though no one wants to see China
and the United States fall into strategic competition, neither can
anyone rule this out. The evolution of United States-China relations
will depend on the attitudes of China's younger generation and new
leaders, on Chinese and United States policies, and on unpredictable
events like a crisis over Taiwan. It is reasonable for the United
States to hedge against a downturn in relations with China by improving
its relations with India, and for India to do the same. But for now
India is intent on improving its relations and trade with China, not
antagonizing China. Neither government will wish to talk publicly, let
alone take actions now, pursuant to this shared--but hypothetical and
future--common interest.
Assistance in a Pakistan contingency. Avoiding and responding to
dangers from Pakistan is another common interest that is awkward for
either India or the United States to acknowledge. Pakistan, alongside
Russia, belongs at the center of our urgent concern about nuclear
terrorism--a concern Chairman Lugar has done so much to address.
Terrorists cannot make nuclear bombs unless they obtain enriched
uranium or plutonium from governments who have made these materials.
The exposure of the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan makes clear that
Pakistan has to be regarded as a potential source of vital materials
for nuclear terrorists--whether by theft, sale, diversion by internal
radical elements with access to bombs or materials, change of
government from Musharraf to a radical regime, or some sort of internal
chaos. Which version of the A.Q. Khan story is more alarming--that the
government and military of Pakistan was unaware of what he was doing,
or that they were aware and permitted it? Either way it illustrates a
serious danger. Were there to be a threat or incident of nuclear
terrorism originating in Pakistan, the United States would want to act
in concert with as many regional players as possible, including India.
The Pakistan contingency is even more difficult for the newly
minted ``strategic partners'' to acknowledge publicly, let alone to act
upon. India seems intent on improving its relations with Pakistan--
despite the recent bombings in Delhi and their impact on public
opinion--and a rapprochement between these long-time antagonists is in
the U.S. interest. The United States, for its part, has important
interests at stake with the Musharraf government--among them supporting
the search for Osama bin Laden and other terrorists on Pakistani
territory, arresting the growth of radicalism in Pakistan's population,
and stabilizing Afghanistan--and can ill afford the perception of a
``tilt toward India.'' For now, therefore, the Pakistan contingency,
like the China counterweight, remains a hypothetical and future benefit
of the India Deal.
Joint action with the U.S. military in operations outside of a U.N.
context. India has historically refused to join the U.S. military in
operations outside of the context of a U.N. mandate and command. In the
future, when the United States needs partners in disaster relief,
humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping missions, or stability
operations, the United States can reasonably expect India to cooperate.
Judging from the evolution of United States security partnerships in
Asia and Europe (especially NATO's Partnership for Peace), anticipation
of joint action can lead first to joint military planning, then
progressively to joint exercises, intelligence sharing and forging of a
common threat assessment, and finally to joint capabilities. This is
the path foreseen for a deepening United States-India strategic
partnership in the defense field.
Military access and basing. There could be occasions when access
for and, if needed, basing of United States military forces on Indian
territory would be desirable. At first this might be limited to port
access for United States naval vessels transiting the Indian Ocean and
overflight rights for United States military aircraft, but in time it
could lead to such steps as use of Indian training facilities for
United States forces deploying to locations with similar climate (the
way German training areas were used for forces deploying to the
Balkans).
Preferential treatment for United States industry in India's civil
nuclear expansion. The authors of the India Deal might have anticipated
preferential treatment for United States industry in construction of
Indian nuclear reactors and other civil power infrastructure made
possible by the Deal. But there are two barriers to realization of this
U.S. benefit. First, the United States must secure preferential access
for its nuclear industry at the expense of Russian and European
suppliers who are also seeking access to the Indian market. Second, the
United States will also need to persuade India to focus its nuclear
power expansion on light water reactors, not the exotic and
uneconomical technologies (e.g., fast breeders), that the Indian
nuclear scientific community favors. This benefit should therefore not
be exaggerated.
Preferential access for United States defense industry to the
Indian market. India is expected to increase the scale and
sophistication of its military, in part by purchasing weapons systems
abroad. In view of its concessions in the India Deal, the United States
can reasonably expect preferential treatment for United States vendors
relative to Russian or European vendors. Early discussions have
included the F-16 and F-18 tactical aircraft and the P-3C Orion
maritime surveillance aircraft.
Additional contributions to nuclear nonproliferation from India's
nuclear program. Finally, many commentators and nonproliferation
experts have recommended that Congress urge the administration to
pursue Indian agreement to certain additional steps, not spelled out in
the Bush-Singh Joint Statement, to ``even up'' the nuclear portion of
the Deal. These proposed additional steps by India include: Agreeing to
cease production of new fissile material for weapons (as the Nuclear
Weapons States have done); agreeing to forego indigenous enrichment and
reprocessing for its civil nuclear power program in favor of the
international fuel cycle initiative proposed by President Bush in
February 2004; separating its civil and military nuclear facilities
permanently and in such a manner that all reactors producing
electricity are declared ``civil,'' and so forth.
WILL THE UNITED STATES GET THE BENEFITS OF THE INDIA DEAL?
The list above is a very substantial--even breathtaking--set of
potential benefits to the United States of a strategic partnership with
India. How realistic is it?
Some of the items on this list reflect joint, common interests of
India as well as the United States. The United States might therefore
have had many of these benefits without having to pay the
nonproliferation costs associated with nuclear recognition for India.
Most of the items on the list are also hypothetical and lie in a
future that neither side can predict--this is certainly the case with
regard to the China counterweight and Pakistan contingency items. Other
items on the list, like Iran's nuclear program, will unfold sooner. The
United States can certainly hope that India will behave as a true
``strategic partner'' in the future across all the items on this list.
But I believe we may also find, when we ask India to do something they
are reluctant to do, that we come to regret having played our big
diplomatic card--nuclear recognition--so early in the process.
India, as befits a great nation on its way to global leadership,
will have its own opinions about this list. Some American proponents of
the India Deal have compared it to Nixon's opening to China--a bold
move based on a firm foundation of mutual interest, but more a leap of
trust than a shrewd bargain. Mao and Nixon, however, had a clear and
present common enemy--the Soviet Union--not a hypothetical set of
possible future opponents. But the real difference between the Nixon-
Kissinger deal and the India Deal is that India, unlike Mao's China, is
a democracy. No government in Delhi can turn decades of Indian policy
on a dime or commit it to a broad set of actions in support of United
States interests--only a profound and probably slow change in the views
of India's elites can do this. India's bureaucracies and diplomats are
fabled for their stubborn adherence to independent positions regarding
the world order, economic development, and nuclear security. Proponents
of the India Deal suggest that these positions will yield to the grand
gesture of nuclear recognition by the United States. I believe this
expectation is naive. Americans view the change of long-standing and
principled nonproliferation policy to accommodate India as a
concession. India views it as acknowledgement of something to which
they have long been entitled. This is not a durable basis for a
diplomatic transaction.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is therefore
premature to tell whether the United States will achieve security
benefits from the India Deal that outweigh the costs. That means the
Deal itself was premature. At this point, the United States, including
the Congress, can only do its best to ensure that its benefits are
fully realized--by both parties.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Ash Carter. We
really appreciate that analysis.
We turn now to Mr. Henry Sokolski and ask for your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Sokolski. Mr. Chairman, I didn't have a chance to read
that testimony, but, having heard it, I think it's pretty good.
[Laughter.]
And I think it's worth rereading. And I think everyone
should then, as a very subordinate exercise, take a look at
what I have to say, because I think, actually, there is pretty
substantial agreement on that analysis, at least in my
testimony.
Having worked on the Hill, I was always reminded: Keep it
simple. So, I have, in the back of my testimony, pictures. I'm
told they're worth more than the testimony. And I honestly
believe that if anyone takes 5 minutes--that's all I need, is 5
minutes for you to look at those viewgraphs and read the
words--several lights will go on that nothing I can say here
will help.
Mr. Chafee, you're on a correct beam when you wonder
whether nuclear energy is the most leveraged, quickest way to
take care of energy requirements in India. I think, as Mr.
Carter pointed out, the answer to that is ``No.'' Now, that
doesn't mean eventually it may not be important. But no one on
this committee, on one in this Congress, should be in any rush,
out of fear, that if we don't get nuclear cooperation going
immediately with India, somehow you will be choking off the
economy of India.
Let me also ask now, before I go through my remarks, that
two pieces of research, one commissioned by the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, that I direct, on
India's ICBM program, and one written by an Indian and
Pakistani expert--they actually coauthored it--on the nuclear
energy program in India, be entered in the record. I recommend
that they be read, certainly the second one--it's interesting,
you don't see too many joint articles on this topic by Indian
and Pakistani experts, and what they have to say is quite
telling.
The Chairman. They will be placed in the record.
Mr. Sokolski. Thank you. Now to the testimony, itself.
My recommendation, based not in--a little bit on the kinds
of thinking you've just heard from Mr. Carter, is that Congress
needs to recognize that this deal is done, but that the terms
need to be clarified. I mean, after all, the Executive is
negotiating to clarify them. They have asked you to legislate.
Your powers in the Senate and in the House are being asked for
to be exercised. You have an active role. You do not have to
wait upon the Executive when it comes to making laws. That is
entirely your purview. They get to negotiate, but you get to
legislate.
In that regard, I would approach what's been dealt in the
following fashion. And I would clarify things in the following
way.
I would not go with country-specific legislation. Too much
is at stake. My general recommendation is that Congress should
authorize implementing nuclear cooperation with India only
after New Delhi commits to the restrictions that it claims it
wants to adhere to, and that is, they only want to do what
other responsible advanced nuclear states are doing now. Well,
they have a way to go. And this is also what we claim the deal
is about. And, therefore, out team needs to go a little
further.
Nothing I'm going to recommend, that follows here, is out
of bounds from the agreed statement. I want that to be
understood. This is not additional conditions; it's
clarification of the conditions already reached, but which are
vague.
Congress should accomplish this in a country-neutral
fashion by amending the Atomic Energy Act to allow U.S. nuclear
cooperation with non-NPT states. That would include Pakistan
and Israel, if needs be. In other words, if those countries can
do the following five minimal conditions, then maybe we should
consider giving nuclear cooperation with them, as well.
First, non-NPT states who seek U.S. and international
civilian nuclear cooperation have to foreswear producing
fissile materials for military purposes. Every other nuclear
weapons state that's an NPT state does this. The full meaning
of ``full safeguards'' or ``safeguarding as much as possible''
would be, essentially, to have a cap on their program. So, if
you push that condition in the agreement to its logical
conclusion, it comes to this. Now, the administration doesn't
want to ask for that outright, because the Indians don't want
to give it outright, at least not immediately. And yet, there
it is. I mean, that is the whole point of the safeguarding.
And, indeed, if you don't go all the way with the safeguarding,
you're not getting very much at all--and I'll explain that in a
moment--because they can continue to make weapons.
If they have a nuclear arsenal, foreswearing an increase in
the net number of nuclear weapons in their arsenal--this is,
again, what everyone but China has agreed to--such states would
also have to pledge eventually to dismantle their nuclear
arsenals, as have all other nuclear NPT weapons states.
Second, they must identify all reactors supplying
electricity, all research reactors claimed to be for peaceful
purposes, all spent fuel these reactors have produced, and all
fuel-making plants supplying these reactors as being civilian
and, therefore, subject to routine compulsory international
inspections.
They must publicly adopt the principles of the
Proliferation Security Initiative. And it was quite interesting
to hear the administration witnesses' discomfort on that point.
They're obviously pushing on that one. So, Congress can help.
Fifth, they must be free of any U.S. nuclear or nuclear-
capable missile sanctions for at least 2 years. This is your
own rule. A briefing, for sure, needs to be had, privately, on
what sanctionable activities has India engaged in since it was
last sanctioned. You need to get that briefing from the
intelligence community. You want it to be ``nothing.'' If
there's anything there, you want to pay attention.
In addition, Congress should seek a briefing on what it
would cost the IAEA, beyond its current budget, to safeguard
all of India's stockpiled spent fuel and weaponized--
nonweaponized direct-use materials, reactors and fuelmaking
plants. It's my understanding that this is an issue right now,
because the IAEA may not be able to even safeguard additional
heavy water reactors. You may, as Congress, want to put money
in a bill aside for this purpose in support of implementing
this deal. In other words, no one should use the excuse that
the IAEA can't do the inspections as a reason for not listing
as many facilities as possible to get inspected.
Finally, and something which I don't think anyone has
spoken to, is: How does the administration intend to keep its
space launch vehicle assistance from helping India's ICBM
program? That is what this paper is about.
Four weeks after our announcement that we would do space
launch assistance, the Indians announced they were going ahead
with an ICBM program. The ICBM program is based on their space
launch vehicle program. The last time anything was written on
this program, Indian officials claimed it was targeted against
Europe and the United States. We want to get fully briefed on
what this is about and where it stands and how, in fact, space
launch vehicle assistance is going to be kept from helping this
program. This will only complicate our relations; it will not
make it easier. Of course, those in a hurry to seal the nuclear
and space deals may chafe at these kinds of conditions. But I
think insisting on them is critical. I think they're, in fact,
minimal to make sure that we do not, in fact, indirectly assist
their nuclear weapons program.
Both the paper that I asked be entered in the record and
this first viewgraph make very clear, if you send lightly
enriched uranium from any country, including the United States,
just to run the two light-water reactors that we have operating
there--they're called the Tarapur, Units 1 and 2--it's
equivalent to freeing up enough enrichment capacity for India
to make 12 more additional bombs a year and/or 75 plutonium
bombs if they were to run what's called mixed-oxide fuel as a
substitute for the normal kind of fuel that would go in these
plants. That is fairly direct assistance to their weapons
program. If you don't get them to foreswear making weapons, or
making more material for weapons, that is what the U.S.
Congress will be endorsing.
Similarly, with the ICBM program, if we go ahead with space
launch assistance that isn't properly curtailed--that is, I see
nothing wrong in helping the Indians launch satellites on other
countries' launchers. I see nothing wrong with giving them data
to help us on cosmological questions. They have some of the
world's leading cosmotol--cosmo--excuse me--experts on the
universe. I'll escape from that one. But once you assist a
program with satellite-dispensing technology and satellite
integration, you end up doing what we did with China. And we
were all embarrassed by that. And China is not an enemy, but we
still didn't want to do it. The similar point goes here. Those
are fairly direct ways in which if we're not careful, this
space and nuclear set of deals could literally and politically
explode in ways we don't want it to.
Given the time, I think I'd better wrap up. I do want to
make one comment, though, about China.
I think the last thing anyone would want to do, and is the
last thing that's in anybody's interest, is to help India
compete against China with nuclear arms. I mean, I--this is
really the last thing that anyone should be doing. China has 5
to 10 times the number of deployed nuclear weapons as India,
and hundreds more advanced long-range rockets. Although China
no longer makes fissile materials for weapons, it has
stockpiled thousands of additional weapons' worth of highly
enriched uranium and separated plutonium. It has shied from
converting all of these into bombs, for fear of sparking a
rivalry with Japan, who could go nuclear by bolting the NPT
itself. It's something which people on the edge of my community
worry about. I mean, it's not the first thing, but Japan has
thousands of weapons' worth of separated plutonium, both in
Europe and in Japan, sitting. And nobody understands what it's
for.
To be sure, the current government may not be interested in
ramping up their nuclear ICBM production, but the BJP and its
opponents clearly are. If they were to return to power, and we
were not to cap, in any way, India's nuclear weapons effort,
more Indian weapons would likely be built, which, in turn,
would provoke China into a self-defeating nuclear arms rivalry,
and this rivalry would not only--also would spark a rivalry
with India and Pakistan; and, finally, between China, Japan,
and the United States. This is just not a good idea.
Therefore, in conclusion, I hope that Congress actually
starts saying, now, through letters, maybe draft experimental
senses of the Senate, perhaps bills of any sort, what it thinks
the minimal requirements of cooperation should be. I'll tell
you why. You will shape those negotiations if you do. If you
don't, you will be faced with a fait accompli, and it will be
very discomforting to deal with. I think you, by exercising
your constitutional authority, can actually help make sure that
this deal gets properly implemented.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement and viewgraphs of Mr. Sokolski
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director,
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to thank you for
asking me to testify on the nonproliferation impact of the U.S.-India
nuclear and space cooperation deals announced July 18, 2005. Unlike the
many other mutually favorable deals announced July 18, 2005, these two,
if not properly clarified by Congress, are fraught with danger.
Improperly implementing them in their current form could not only
encourage India to make intercontinental-range ballistic missiles and
more nuclear weapons, it could devastate any firm reading of the
current nuclear rules, whether they be the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or America's own
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
My general recommendation to you today is that Congress should
authorize implementing these agreements only after India commits to the
limits other responsible, advanced nuclear states have. This should be
done in a country-neutral fashion by amending the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 to allow U.S. nuclear cooperation with advanced, responsible
nuclear states that are not members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) if, and only if, they meet five minimal conditions.
First, they must forswear producing fissile materials for military
purposes and, if they have a nuclear arsenal, forswear increasing the
net number of nuclear weapons in their arsenal. Such states would also
have to pledge eventually to dismantle their nuclear arsenals as have
all other NPT weapons states.
Second, they must identify all reactors supplying electricity, all
research reactors claimed to be for peaceful purposes, all spent fuel
these reactors have produced, and all fuel making plants supplying
these reactors as being civilian and, therefore, subject to routine,
compulsory international inspections.
Third, they must uphold all previous bilateral nuclear
nonproliferation obligations they might have had with the United States
and other countries.
Fourth, they must publicly adopt the principles of the
Proliferation Security Initiative.
Fifth, they must be free of any U.S. nuclear or nuclear-capable
missile sanctions for at least 2 years and have cleared up any
outstanding sanctionable actions before U.S. cooperation is formalized.
To be sure, insisting on these requirements will displease those in
a hurry to seal the nuclear and space deals with India. Yet, insisting
on such conditions in no way moves the goal posts or raises the bar on
the U.S.-India Joint Statement announced July 18, 2005. At the time,
both the United States insisted that it does not regard India as a
nuclear weapons state under the NPT. As such, it should have been
understood that IAEA inspections of India's civilian nuclear facilities
might well be tighter than the unique, voluntary spot inspections, that
NPT weapons states' facilities are given.
Also, at the time, both United States and Indian officials agreed
that India would assume all those restraints that ``advanced,
responsible nuclear states'' had assumed. Among the most important of
these is forswearing the expansion of one's nuclear arsenal by
renouncing the further production of fissile material for military
purposes and capping the net number of nuclear weapons one has. Under
these conditions, one could possess nuclear weapons, modernize them, or
(as the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, and France, have done)
dismantle them, but that would be it.
It should be noted that demanding that these conditions is more
than merely desirable. They must be met if, as the deal's backers have
claimed repeatedly, the nuclear and space deals are to enhance the
cause of global nonproliferation and U.S. security. Certainly, the
credibility and success of United States and allied efforts to curb
proliferation in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea has depended heavily on a
firm reading of the nuclear rules. The NPT bargain of giving up nuclear
weapons to secure international civilian nuclear cooperation also was
critical to securing Libya's agreement to give up its nuclear
activities, and to South Africa's and the Ukraine's surrender of their
nuclear arms. Finally, the United States has an interest in making
India behave as the United Kingdom and Japan do, not merely as China or
Iran. Indeed, only by insisting on better behavior here will the United
States, India, and other responsible nuclear nations have the moral
authority required to pressure Iran to limit its unnecessary and
dangerous nuclear fuel making and China to stop its expansion of its
nuclear weapons arsenal.
Unfortunately, India has yet to express interest in meeting these
conditions. Nor has the Bush administration pushed very hard to secure
them. This all might be acceptable to Congress. If so, Congress need
only endorse the loose nuclear inspections arrangements India and the
executive branch are currently negotiating and approve legislation to
relax U.S. Atomic Energy Act and missile technology controls in the
sole case of India. But Congress should understand that if it does
this, it will put the United States in the dubious position of:
1. Helping India expand its nuclear weapons arsenal by freeing up a
nuclear fuel making capacity that otherwise would be needed to supply
civilian reactors, such as those at Tarapur, with lightly enriched
uranium (see viewgraph I).
2. Lending technical support to India's intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) project, the Surya, an incredibly massive, inherently
vulnerable, first-strike missile derived directly from its civilian
satellite launch system (the Polar Space Launch Vehicle). India already
has a medium-range missile, the Agni, which it is upgrading to reach
all of China and can be made road and rail-mobile. Indian officials,
meanwhile, claim India's ICBM is intended to deter Europe and the
United States (see attached viewgraphs and 3 and NPEC's newly released
study, ``India's ICBM: On a Glide Path to Trouble?'' by Dr. Richard
Speier).
3. Undermining United States and international efforts to restrict
nuclear and missile technology exports to states such as North Korea
and Iran by giving such help to a state that has not yet signed the
NPT, capped its nuclear weapons program, rectified proliferation
transactions that are sanctionable under United States law, endorsed
the Proliferation Security Initiative's principles, or placed all of
its nuclear activities under compulsory IAEA nuclear inspections as all
responsible, advanced nuclear states have.
For most people, avoiding these pitfalls would be worth
considerable effort. Yet, more than a few of the deals' backers
cynically believe that encouraging these developments is necessary to
enhance United States security against a hostile China or Iran. This,
however, reflects an unwarranted, defeatism that is unworthy of the
United States. More important, it is strategically misguided on at
least three critical counts:
1. India's Foreign Secretary and Prime Ministers insist India's
July 18 understandings with the United States are not ``directed
against any third country.'' In fact, India struck a strategic
agreement with Iran in January 2003 known as the New Delhi Declaration,
not only to help develop Iranian oil and gas fields, but to assure
continued cooperation with Iran against the Taliban in Afghanistan,
many of whom threaten the peace in Kashmir. Indian officials also are
insistent that India's vote on Iranian IAEA noncompliance was cast
primarily to help prevent referral to the United Nations and did not
mean that India thought Iran was actually in noncompliance. As for
China, the current Indian Government sees economic cooperation with
Beijing as a key to India's future development.
2. The last thing in anyone's security interest is to help India
compete against China with nuclear arms. China has 5 to 10 times the
number of deployed nuclear weapons as India and hundreds more advanced
long-range ballistic missiles. Although it no longer makes fissile
materials for weapons, it has stockpiled thousands of additional
weapons' worth of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium. It
has shied from converting all of this material into bombs for fear of
sparking an arms rivalry with Japan, who could go nuclear by bolting
the NPT and militarizing its own massive, growing stockpile of
separated civilian plutonium. To be sure, the current Indian Government
is not interested in dramatically ramping up Indian nuclear weapons
production. Its main opponents, the BJP, however, clearly are. If they
were to return to power and no cap had been placed on India's nuclear
weapons efforts, more Indian weapons would likely be built, which, in
turn, could provoke China--prompting a nuclear arms rivalry, not only
between it and India (and, consequently, revving up even more nuclear
competition between India and Pakistan), but with Japan and the United
States.
3. Every rupee India invests in developing nuclear weapons, ICBMs,
and missile defense is one less that will otherwise be available to
enhance security cooperation with the United States in the imperative
areas of antiterrorism, intelligence sharing, and maritime cooperation
in and near the Indian Ocean. India's entire annual military budget of
about $20 billion (which supports a military of over 1.3 million active
duty soldiers) is roughly what the United States spends on its nuclear
arsenal and missile defenses alone. Encouraging India to spend in these
areas could easily hollow out its conventional military and undermine
the very areas most promising for United States-Indian cooperation.
This then brings us to the weakest and least credible arguments for
pushing nuclear and space cooperation on an urgent basis; that is that
India must have substantial United States cooperation in these fields
immediately to sustain its economic growth. In fact, for the near term
just the reverse is the case: Investing in the expansion of nuclear
power in India for the next decade is the very least leveraged way to
address India's growing need for more and cleaner energy. Instead, one
should focus first on increasing efficiencies in India's consumption,
distribution, and generation of energy (including but not limited to
its electrical sector). This would entail transitioning to cleaner uses
of coal and restructuring India's coal industry to meet demand;
introducing market mechanisms and curbing massive energy theft and
subsidies; and expanding the use of renewable energy, e.g., biomass,
small hydro, wind, etc. (both connected and unconnected to the grid).
So long as the Indian nuclear sector continues to be preoccupied with
extremely complicated thorium-fuel cycle systems and breeder reactors
and relies on dysfunctional state secrecy and monopoly-style
management, investing in this energy sector will be self-defeating.
Instead, the United States and others should encourage India's nuclear
sector to acquire a more reasonable set of goals and open itself up to
foreign ownership and management. This will take time (for more
details, see attached viewgraphs, 4 through 7).
As for space cooperation in the space launch area, by far the
safest, most cost-effective form of cooperation would be to make
affordable United States launch capabilities more accessible to India.
Certainly, the recent announcement that the United States intends to
include Indian astronauts in upcoming United States space shuttle
missions is the proper path to take. Transferring satellite integration
and space launch technology to India, on the other hand, is a sure-fire
way to repeat the frightening development that Loral and Hughes
produced in the 1990s with China when their satellite launch
integration assistance literally boosted China's ICBM modernization
efforts.
For this and all the other reasons noted above, Congress should
exercise due diligence in sorting out the specifics of United States-
Indian nuclear and space cooperation. Your committee is to be commended
for taking the initiative in requesting that any enabling legislation
to implement United States-India space and nuclear cooperation be
referred to the appropriate committees rather than on any legislative
spending vehicle. Congress and the appropriate committees also should
make their own views known on what legislative conditions they believe
the proper implementation of nuclear and space cooperation with India
and similar non-NPT states require. Under no circumstances, should
Congress allow itself to be rushed.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for those
thoughtful suggestions, as well as the pictures and the
additions that you have asked to be part of the record. We
appreciate that.
Mr. Krepon, would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KREPON, COFOUNDER AND PRESIDENT EMERITUS,
HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Krepon. I'll condense my testimony quite a bit.
How do we deconflict, as much as we can, two objectives
that we all care so much about: Improving ties with India and
strengthening our nonproliferation policy? We can't deconflict
them entirely. And I regret to say, Ash, I'm doubtful that the
strategic benefits that you've laid out are likely to be
realized, at least in major part.
To help the process of deconfliction, I would urge you to
work with the administration to affirm a set of first
principles that would guide the administration in its
negotiations, and that would guide the Congress in considering
the end result.
What first principles do I have in mind? I think the first
``first principle'' is that nonproliferation norms are
absolutely essential against dangerous weapons in the most
dangerous hands, and that country-specific exceptions to these
norms are absolutely corrosive. They're the worst kind of
exceptions. Later on I'm going to urge you to consider
conditional exceptions rather than country-specific exceptions.
Why are country-specific exceptions so corrosive? It's
true, as the administration says, that there are good countries
and then there are really problematic countries out there. But
if we try to change public law on the basis of good countries
versus bad countries, we're in trouble, and we're especially in
trouble internationally, because one country's friend may be
another country's foe. And if we seek an exception for country
A, somebody else is going to seek an exception for country B.
Thus, friends and adversaries or problem states, are not clear-
cut categories. We have a friend that's also a problem state in
this area, next door to India. And sometimes friends become
problem states, and sometimes vice versa. I really think this
good-guy/bad-guy approach that the administration is drawn to
is very corrosive to the norms that have to be the bedrock of
our policy.
So, my first principle, my first ``first principle,'' is
that norms have to be strengthened a whole lot more than
loopholes have to be opened.
Public law for nonproliferation isn't sacrosanct. Our
Constitution has been amended. The Congress has been known to
amend laws. I don't have a doctrinaire position on our
nonproliferation laws. I'm prepared to amend law. But my second
``first principle'' is that the net effect of any changes in
public law should be to strengthen nonproliferation. If we're
going to relax laws, then we need to find compensatory steps
that strengthen nonproliferation.
My third ``first principle'' is that no changes in public
law should assist the recipient to either enlarge or enhance
its nuclear arsenal. That's pretty straightforward. And hearing
Bob Joseph today, it seems to me that you're not going to get
an argument on this matter if, indeed, you do decide to enter
into discussions with the executive branch, or if you decide to
do this on your own and attach guiding principles to some
legislative vehicle.
My fourth ``first principle'' is the principle of
proportionality, which is to say that some changes in public
law could have modest effects, but other changes in public law,
like that proposed by the executive branch, are quite
substantial. Since not all changes in public law are equal, I
would propose that you consider laying out a set of conditions
attached to different types of changes in public law. The more
substantial the change in public law, the greater the remedy we
would need to shore up our nonproliferation policies.
I'm talking about conditional exemptions, not country
exemptions. I would rather that the U.S. Government talk to the
Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA on a set of conditions
that we would expect others to sign up to in order to engage in
nuclear commerce with us. That's a much better approach, in my
view, than for us to declare, ``I want an exception for this
country,'' and then China says, ``I want an exception for
Pakistan,'' and then Russia says, ``Well, I want an exception
for Iran.''
We could engage in a long meeting about what the different
conditions might be. Many conditions have already been
presented to you and to your counterpart committee on the House
side. But I think I've left enough--we've all left enough on
the table.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Krepon, Cofounder and President Emeritus,
Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC
The debate now unfolding on the Bush administration's nuclear
cooperation initiative is not about isolating and penalizing India.
India is already the beneficiary of significant changes in U.S.
Government policy. The real issue at hand is how to greatly improve
bilateral ties without greatly weakening rules against proliferation.
Many ardent admirers of India and staunch defenders of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty are conscientiously struggling with this dilemma.
The NPT faces a number of problems more severe than India's nuclear
program. But these problems can be compounded by how we handle India.
The rules we change on India's behalf can also weaken the rules we want
other nations to abide by.
We can't sidestep this dilemma by distinguishing, as advocates
within the administration do, between friendly states and problem
states. Such distinctions are rarely permanent or clear cut. We all
know that friendly states can also be problem states, that yesterday's
friend can become tomorrow's adversary, and vice versa.
Another significant problem with making U.S. nonproliferation
policy dependent on country-specific distinctions between good and bad
states is that this approach will seriously damage domestic laws and
international treaties that set norms against proliferation. Domestic
traffic laws don't allow some people to speed, but not others. Nor do
international treaties distinguish between friends and foes, since one
nation's friend can be another's foe. Instead, the rule of law applies
to all. It allows us to distinguish between those who abide by the law
and those who break it. Laws still get broken, but that doesn't
diminish the importance of rules. Having rules, laws, and international
norms provides the basis for prosecution, coalition building, and
enforcement.
I will describe below four fundamental principles that I hope will
serve as guideposts for your deliberations:
Strengthen nonproliferation norms more than you widen
loopholes. Country-specific exemptions are bad for norms;
The net effect of any changes in public law should make
proliferation harder, not easier;
Follow the guideline of proportionally: Link conditions to
changes in public law. The greater the exemption sought, the
greater the need for compensatory steps against proliferation;
No exemption should assist the recipient to enhance or
enlarge its nuclear arsenal
My first principle is that country-specific exemptions are
corrosive to nonproliferation norms. If the United States were to
champion a country-specific exemption, there is a strong likelihood
that other nuclear suppliers would seek other exemptions, and that the
United States would lose leverage to prevent such transactions.
Thus, if after thoughtful deliberation, you conclude that some
relaxation of our laws is advisable, I strongly urge you not to do this
on a country-specific basis. Instead, I urge you to establish
conditions under which the relaxation of public law would apply to any
state seeking an exemption that meets congressional conditions. In this
way, exemptions would be granted on the basis of performance, not on
the basis of a particular country.
A second general principle that I would propose for your
consideration is that the net effect of changing public law should be
to make proliferation harder, not easier. Put another way, the
strengthening effects of the conditions established by the Congress
should outweigh the weakening effects of the exemptions granted.
Not all proposed relaxations of public law are equal. Since some
kinds of U.S. nuclear assistance would have minimal negative impact on
global nonproliferation norms, the conditions set by the Congress to
allow for such transactions might also be modest. Conversely, other
types of U.S. nuclear assistance could potentially have larger adverse
impacts on nonproliferation norms and treaties. In such instances, the
Congress might set very stringent conditions--or prohibit such
transactions altogether.
To address the fact that there are widely disparate gradations of
nuclear commerce, I would propose that the Congress consider a third
principle when considering changes to public law--the principle of
proportionality. If the Congress deems it advisable to establish
conditions associated with U.S. nuclear assistance, different types of
assistance might be conditioned on different strengthening measures
against proliferation. Minor adjustments in existing law would
therefore be possible when modest conditions are met; major adjustments
would be possible when significant conditions are met.
The first two principles would mesh with the third: When applying
the principle of proportionality, a relaxation of public law should be
accompanied by conditions that, in all cases, result in a net
strengthening of the global norm of nonproliferation. Moreover, these
conditions should not be country specific. Instead, these
considerations should apply to every applicant meeting congressional
standards.
The fourth fundamental principle that I would urge for your
consideration is that the relaxation of U.S. nuclear assistance must
not assist the recipient to enhance or enlarge its arsenal of nuclear
weapons. If U.S. nuclear commerce were to result in more and more
capable nuclear weapons on the part of any recipient, global
nonproliferation norms would be dealt a severe blow. The reassertion by
Congress of this fundamental objective and purpose of public law is
essential because the July 18 Joint Statement by President Bush and
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh could lead to this negative result,
depending on how it is implemented.
How might these four general principles be applied in the proposed
U.S.-India agreement? Let's take a look at both ends of the spectrum
reflected in this initiative, and at two cases in between.
The most troubling kinds of nuclear commerce--aside from the
outright sale of bombmaking material and bombs--have to do with
enrichment and reprocessing. This kind of nuclear commerce offers
nations very costly ways to produce electricity, but essential means to
produce nuclear weapons, regardless of cost. Given the negative
proliferation consequences of commercial trafficking in enrichment and
reprocessing technologies, President Bush spelled out his
administration's opposition to this practice in a speech delivered at
the National Defense University on February 11, 2004:
The world must create a safe, orderly system to field
civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons
proliferation. The world's leading nuclear exporters should
ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to
fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce
enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are
not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes.
In the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, President Bush endorsed a
very different formulation. He promised to ``work to achieve full civil
nuclear energy cooperation with India'' and to ``seek agreement from
Congress [and to] work with friends and allies to adjust international
regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with
India.''
President Bush's February 2004 statement is consistent with a
principled position to strengthen nonproliferation norms, much like the
one I am asking you to consider. His July 2005 promise appears to carve
out an exception to this principled position. A rules- and norms-based
system would seek to set the highest barriers against transfers that
could do the most proliferation damage--without exception.
On the other end of the spectrum, the July 18 Joint Statement
discusses bringing India into international research efforts related to
advanced development concepts for civil nuclear power generation. While
the particulars of such engagement matter--since some research and
development initiatives could have more utility for nuclear weapon
programs than others--in general this type of engagement would be
consistent with the general principles advocated here.
Two cases in between these poles are not so easy. One is providing
fuel for safeguarded facilities at Tarapur. The other is selling new
nuclear power plants to India. Providing commercial assistance to
Tarapur, which the Government of India seeks in the near term, would be
of far narrower scope than signing contracts for new nuclear power
plants, but both steps would be contrary to the ``full-scope
safeguards'' standard that the United States has long insisted that
other nuclear suppliers live up to.
In these intermediate cases, the fundamental principles enumerated
above ought to apply: Norms should be strengthened, rather than
exceptions; the net effect of any changes in public law linked to
conditions should strengthen, not weaken, these norms; the principle of
proportionality should apply; and no assistance should be given with
respect to the military nuclear capabilities of the recipient state.
The last of these fundamental principles would mandate that any
relaxation of nuclear commerce for particular facilities be linked to
the requirement that such facilities be safeguarded in perpetuity. But
this still begs the question of what to do about the full scope
safeguards requirement that U.S. administrations have finally succeeded
in establishing as an international norm.
A key formulation embedded in the July 2004 Joint Statement
suggests one way to proceed. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has stated
that his government is ``ready to assume the same responsibilities and
practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading
countries with advanced nuclear technologies.'' This passage suggests
that India would be treated in the same way--and would behave in the
same way--as the nuclear weapon states recognized under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
The ``equal benefits for equal responsibilities'' formulation has
some merit. But what would it mean in actual practice? In actual
practice, the five nuclear weapon states recognized under the NPT have
stopped producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. India has not.
In actual practice, the five nuclear weapon states recognized under the
NPT have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Three of the five
have ratified the treaty. The Senate of the United States has not
consented to ratification. But under international law, all five are
equally obligated not to undermine the objectives and purposes of this
treaty, pending its entry into force. India has not signed the CTBT.
Government officials have affirmed, using the present tense, the
absence of current plans to test. These statements do not carry equal
weight, nor do they impose equal responsibility, to the obligations
accepted by the 176 states that have signed the CTBT.
If India were serious about the ``equal benefits for equal
responsibilities'' formulation, then New Delhi would be well advised to
favorably consider a moratorium on the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons, and to sign the CTBT. Such steps would clarify
that India seeks commercial nuclear transfers to fuel its economic
growth and not to increase or enhance its nuclear arsenal. These steps
would also clarify that the net effect of the changes Congress is being
asked to consider would strengthen, not weaken, global nonproliferation
norms. Under the principle of proportionality proposed above, such
steps by the Government of India would open up a much wider range of
cooperative nuclear endeavors.
While I endorse this structure for handling the dilemmas posed by
the Bush administration's nuclear cooperation initiative with India, I
most emphatically do not recommend that the Congress direct the
Government of India to take such steps. Any such directive would be
counterproductive and deeply offensive to most Indian citizens. India
is a proud, sovereign state facing vexing security problems. It will
not take dictation from a nation with many thousands of nuclear weapons
and large stocks of fissile material that has tested nuclear weapons
over 1,000 times.
Decisions regarding a moratorium on fissile material production and
nuclear testing are India's to make. India will make these decisions in
light of its perceived security requirements, and not as a result of
foreign pressure. We must respect New Delhi's decisions, which could
facilitate or impede nuclear cooperation. Either way, these are New
Delhi's decisions to make. My preferred approach respects New Delhi's
powers of decision, while reinforcing a principled stance by the United
States against proliferation.
By laying out a set of fundamental principles associated with
changes in public law, and by establishing conditions for different
levels of relaxation, the Congress could provide consistency and
clarity that are lacking in the July 2005 Joint Statement, while
strengthening global norms against proliferation. Improved bilateral
ties with India will continue to proceed on many fronts, including
trade, investment, nonnuclear energy, agriculture, defense cooperation,
and public health issues. There is no compelling reason why improved
relations should come at a great cost to the nonproliferation norms
that have buttressed national and international security. Working out
the particulars associated with a statement of principles and
conditions will not be easy. But, in my judgment, this approach could
substantially strengthen bilateral relations and nonproliferation
norms, rather than pitting one against the other.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for those additions to
our understanding, and for your suggestions for our activity.
Let's have another 8-minute round of questioning to this
panel.
And let me begin by indicating that the administration has
come forward with what they have described as a strategic plan
for an enhanced relationship. They've discussed the history of
our relationship with India, and unsatisfactory elements, and
how it's improved, but this is designed to be, as I understand,
a giant leap forward. It's very country-specific.
Now, I appreciate the legislative suggestions that at least
two of you have made that this should not be country-specific,
and that, in fact, whatever the administration has done with
the summit conference, with the Indian officials here, with
visits by our Secretaries to India and so forth, that we ought
to stand back and try to perfect the rules of the game with
regard to nonproliferation, to try to strengthen that regime.
This really is a benefit to India, and to us, and to others. At
the same time, Secretary Carter has suggested that, in fact,
this is not necessarily a done deal. Still, we're far down the
trail. Therefore, leaving aside nonproliferation, there are
some broad foreign-policy objectives with regard to our
alliance with India, our performance with regard to other
countries, or problems that we have in the world that ought to
be a part of that. It's a rather daunting list, as he admitted.
The Indians might not cede readily, or might not like the list
at all. But, nevertheless, there would be benefit to our
country.
As I was discussing with the administration witnesses,
there are a lot of moving parts. The administration said they
would not really approach this with legislative language until
this separation of the civilian and the military aspects
progressed. This has not occurred as yet, and it's not really
clear exactly when that might occur, nor how far it might
occur, nor how satisfactorily we all feel that that happened.
So, there is always a work-in-process aspect about what has
been perceived and celebrated as a historic new arrangement. I
think we ought to be, on this committee, loathe to simply pour
rain on the parade, and indicate that this is not all that
important. It may have seemed that way for people who were
negotiating it. But, all things considered, here are all these
things lying out there. I don't really want to take that
attitude, personally. I think there are possibilities for our
country, for India, for the world, for this thing to progress.
On the other hand, it's not clear to me how it's going to.
Mr. Sokolski suggested, before we wait for the
administration--that probably won't be interminable, but it's
been suggested that it might be into next year----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman [continuing]. February, March, even some think
April--before this progress in India is really identifiable,
and all sorts of other things may be happening in the world in
the meantime. That's a long time, given the other issues that
are in play. So, he has suggested, helpfully, that we propose
legislation on our own, to begin with that we don't wait around
for this draft; or, absent that, that we offer resolutions,
that we make statements on the floor, maybe that we do various
things that try to help frame the issues and inform the
administration of what seems to have some support here; and
maybe that we inform the Indians, in the process, of how
sentiment is going at this stage. And that may be possible.
This is a daunting process, all by itself. It may be a good
idea. Maybe, independently, the distinguished ranking member
and I ought to say something, or others should be invited from
time to time. But the dangers of this are obvious, too. You
have a good number of voices, all spouting off, so to speak,
and this may be confusing to Indians and the Indian press, the
free press. There has been a lot of democratic discussion over
there, as it tries to interpret what in the world is going on
here, quite apart from what our counterparts in the House of
Representatives may have already said, or may say.
Let me just ask this general question of you. How do we
proceed in a responsible way? You've all been involved, in one
way or another, in the legislative or administrative procedures
of our Government. Thinking of this constructively, as opposed
to ``gaming'' the thing between the committee and the
administration or the House or so forth, just outline--if you
were in my position, or that of the distinguished ranking
member, what would you advise this committee to do? Mr.
Sokolski already had a go at that. I don't want to exempt you
from answering the question, even after hearing all of this
again, but give us some advice regarding the grounding that
I've just explained. Would you start, Ron, with your thoughts
about this?
Ambassador Lehman. Well, that is the big question. In my
prepared statement, while I alluded to a lot of things you may
want to consider, I actually think the most important point I
made was: Be careful. Because although none of these issues are
new and almost all the players have been working these issues
for some period of time, I think there's actually a lot of
confusion out there. And I thought your recommendation that we
lock ourselves in a room and get our acts together is really a
good idea.
And let me use some specific examples from our testimony
today, where, you know, we have tremendous amount of agreement,
and our body language is often the same, and yet we're already
getting into some trouble. And let me explain what I mean.
I don't want to assert what my colleagues at this panel, or
the previous panel, have said, but let me, sort of, use some
strawmen, and those who feel offended can speak up for
themselves.
Have we recognized India as a nuclear weapons state? Well,
in one sense, of course, they're a nuclear weapons state. They
have nuclear weapons. But the only way you could really have
the relationship with them that you have with a nuclear weapons
state would be either to leave the NPT or amend the NPT. And I
think the Indians know that whatever the details are of all of
the relationship on the civilian cooperation, the
administration, and no administration, is prepared to do with
India what it would do with an official nuclear weapons state.
OK, we can argue over, ``Well, how much do we want to talk
about one aspect--they've got 'em--and the other, which is
their legal status and what it means in terms of what we can
do?'' But I think we--those are important distinctions. They
matter.
The second is a tactical point I want to make, which is the
heart of my prepared statement, which is, there are a lot of
people running around, euphoric, about this new strategic
relationship, and they want to justify what they've done on
civilian nuclear cooperation----
Is that me? Should I shut up?
The Chairman. No. [Laughter.]
With the forebearance of my colleague, why, you--please go
ahead.
Ambassador Lehman [continuing]. That there's this great
strategic relationship which fully justifies any concessions we
make on civil nuclear cooperation. I actually think that most
of the positive, and some of the negative, things in the
strategic relationship are going to continue, no matter what
you do on civil nuclear cooperation. That's why my point is
that, to the degree that you play out civil nuclear
cooperation, you really ought to keep it focused primarily--not
totally, but primarily--on the nonproliferation area. That's
where you need to play it.
The next point is over whether or not disagreement is
premature. I would argue it's overdue. You know, I've been
through so many years of India. And, of course, as everyone has
pointed out, they almost never last that long. India has long
been the country that can't take yes for an answer. We know how
difficult it is to deal with their domestic politics and with
their regional problems. Having said that, I would argue that
this deal, in some form, is long overdue.
Now, let me join with almost all of the colleagues in this
panel, and none of the colleagues in the previous panel, and
say: Would I have wanted to do it exactly this way? Probably
not. Could I have done better? How do I know? But, clearly, I
think the more important point is, it's underway, and it is a
process.
Now, you can argue over who pays what when, but, in fact,
the bad news, or good news, depending on your perspective, is,
that's not resolved. And so, the Congress still has a chance to
shape what's going to happen.
But I thought a very important point was made today, which
is that, right now, having gone to the--come to the Congress
and said, ``We're not ready--going to be ready yet, til the
Indians act,'' and having gone to the NSG and said, ``We're--
you know, we've still got to--work from the Indians,'' the ball
is in the Indian court. They are going to have to pony up on
the whole question of civil-military separation. And let me
tell you something, that's going to tell a lot about whether
this is going anywhere. And so, I think India needs to
understand that. This will be a big symbol as to whether or not
there's a ``there'' there.
Finally, on this question of country-specific versus
criteria, or norms versus bad-guy lists, it's an old issue, and
some of my friends are for the criteria and some norms, and
some of my friends are for the lists, and I, of course, am for
my friends. The--but I think it's something you can't really
understand until you try to work it specifically. But I will
argue that the--one of the fundamental weaknesses in the
nonproliferation regime today is that we try to apply general
universal principles to very different particular cases, and we
get into all kinds of trouble. And we've got to find a way to
have what is a norm, the norm; what are guidelines, guidelines.
And when you have to go down and engage on specific problems,
how do you tailor them to the problem? And so, in this case, I
think that we're not talking about a lot of cases. We're
talking India, Pakistan, and Israel. And I think we can start--
ask, ``Well, are there criteria that apply to all, or are there
enough differences, or are there ways to capture what it is
that's different?''
So, I've gone on at length, but what I wanted to do was,
kind of, energize the discussion and say, we've got a lot of
agreement here, but I think we also have a lot of smoke.
The Chairman. Well, that's a terrific response. You have
energized all of us.
Now, let me ask Senator Biden for his questions.
Senator Biden. No, if anyone else wishes to----
The Chairman. Would anyone like to enter into this?
Yes, Mr. Sokolski.
Mr. Sokolski. Just briefly. By the way, if you spout off,
it's a good thing, even if it--any time. I mean, the idea that
you're going to be reckless, I just think is very harsh and
unfair to yourself. [Laughter.]
So, first thing----
Senator Biden. But it would be nice to see. [Laughter.]
Mr. Sokolski. You might----
Senator Biden. I haven't seen it yet.
Mr. Sokolski [continuing]. You might surprise us all.
[Laughter.]
So, don't worry about that. I think you overcompensated.
[Laughter.]
Second of all, if you are worried about that, or you think
some of your colleagues will spout off and you're worried about
that, how about just asking questions? You have an oversight
role, and this hearing--I can tell you, a lot of people got
spun up trying to get their charts ready and trying to figure
out how to shape what the message is. The more, the better.
This is your legitimate constitutional role. So, when I said
``get briefings,'' if you don't like those questions, come up
with others, but that is your role, and there are plenty of
questions here.
Finally, last point, I cannot imagine the relations between
our country and India being anything but better and better and
better--dare I say it?--almost irrespective of what our two
governments do. And if you have any doubt about that, fill out
your tax forms with TurboTax. [Laughter.]
Because if you've got a question, you know who's going to
answer it?
The Chairman. Bangalore. [Laughter.]
Mr. Sokolski. You've got that one right. And if you have
any American students that are studying, and they have
questions on their Web site education, when it has to do with
natural science or math, it's Bangalore again. And it seems to
me that if you go to our universities, you'll see a lot of
Indian students. That isn't going to change. That's going to
just become more and more the case. And the two more neuralgic
topics, according to my former boss, Harry Rowen--if you want
to get into a really difficult conversation with an Indian--is
to talk about nuclear weapons and ICBMs and space launch
vehicles and civil nuclear power. The rest of the deals--and
there are a lot of them in that July 18 gathering--were pretty
darn sound. And I would focus on them. And you will not do
anything but improve our relations if you do.
The Chairman. Thank you. I would just say, anecdotally, I
had spent the noon hour listening to Tom Friedman and his
discussion of ``The World is Flat'' again. He pointed out that
there are, of course, not only Indian students here, but a lot
of Americans interning at Indian firms, a horde of them, on the
anticipation that they will be involved in the management of
businesses there, quite irrespective of what we're talking
about today. The rush is on. But that's a different field
altogether.
Mr. Sokolski. If you go to Silicon Valley, every one of the
units working on anything that's making money is one-third
Asian, one-third Caucasian, one-third Indian.
The Chairman. Yeah. Yeah.
Ash.
Mr. Carter. Yeah, I'll be very brief. But, just to respond
directly to your question, I think that your question is
exactly the one that I have posed to myself, and that is: ``How
do we be constructive at this point?'' I made it clear I
wouldn't necessarily have chosen this moment to make this deal.
Our President has. We are where we are, and we ought to try to
make the best of it. And it seems to me, that has two
dimensions to it. One is to make it as clear as we can to India
what our expectations are for the upside, why we're willing to
take this leap and this risk. And that's what my list
represents, the things that we would hope, over time, develop
in the way of benefits to us. And the second is that we've paid
a price; there is some damage--I wouldn't call it ``grievous'';
I called it ``appreciable'' in my statement--to the
nonproliferation system, and we ought to try to be softening
that downside, minimizing that damage.
So, maximizing the upside benefits, making clear what we
hope to get out of it, and trying to get as much momentum going
as possible so we realize those benefits, though I understand
Michael's skepticism that we will fully realize them; and then,
second, recognizing that we're making an exception here that
necessarily entails some damage, and being up front about
limiting that damage. And if we can spell both of those steps
out, the actions pursuant to both of those steps, that's how I
think we capitalize on the promise here and soften the
downside.
The Chairman. Michael.
Mr. Krepon. Mr. Chairman, you're already making headway.
The State Department's testimony today is far more specific
than it has been. It's more forthcoming. It lays down markers.
So, you're making progress. And I--the more you and Senator
Biden and others work on this, I think, the more progress
you're going to make.
Ash, your list of expectations is going to be explosive in
India. It's going to be viewed as yet more evidence that the
United States intends to have India on a leash on issues that
matter more to the United States than India. And that's
poisonous for this deal. So, just a warning flag on that.
The Chairman. Well, the whole hearing may be seen as
provocative. [Laughter.]
Now, isn't it time for Senator Biden to speak and temper
this whole thing? [Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Oh, there's nothing--everything's perfectly
clear. [Laughter.]
Your advice is consistent and totally contradictory.
[Laughter.]
The goals are clear. I'm just not sure how to get from here
to there. As I think you said, Mr. Lehman, the bottom line of
all this is, unless there is an amendment or a change of some
kind in the NPT, we're never going to be at the point where we
say that India is treated the same as other states, no matter
how we dance around it.
You know, I think the most frustrating part of sitting on
this committee during the tenure of seven different Presidents
has been the reality that many times we're left with only
Hobson's choices. We don't get to make foreign policy. We
impact on it. We slow it up. We help it detour. Let's assume
the House or the Senate derails this agreement. I think there
would be consequences. The President has already put this in
motion; notwithstanding the fact that India is a democracy and
understands how we work and that you need the Congress for this
kind of thing, I don't know. The agreement's a pretty powerful
tool in India. And I know you've all spoken to that, to some
degree. You know, you have to take into account some of that.
And you have to factor it in how we proceed from here.
And I agree with you, Michael, that laying out, explicitly,
and codifying in this agreement our expectations--I know you're
suggesting we codify them, but codifying the expectations, that
is pretty explosive stuff in India. But the flip side of that
is, trying to figure out a noncountry-specific approach--
effectively amending the NPT--that, also, is pretty difficult,
and probably not doable in the near term.
So, having said all that, I'm not confused, in that I fully
understand what each of you said, but perplexed as to which
avenue to choose. Your point about our responsibility to
exercise this oversight, set conditions, if we think they're
appropriate, that's a lot easier to say than to do.
I've just arrived at two general conclusions, Mr. Chairman.
One, this is a train that's left the station, and stopping it
will have consequences. How serious the consequences are is
debatable. Trying to catch up and add more cars to the train,
I'm not so sure what that does. And--to keep this ridiculous
metaphor going--instructing the engineer which track to turn
onto, because you expect that of them, that's also pretty hard.
So, I guess what we'll do is, we'll, kind of, muddle through
here. What I'm going to do is try to digest and try to combine
the advice we've gotten here, just to figure out what we do
from here.
And, by the way, I apologize for not being here for your
testimony. One of the few benefits of not being the chairman is
that I was able to leave and go to a memorial service for
Gaylord Nelson. I know you wanted to be there, Mr. Chairman.
You couldn't do that. But I had the luxury of being able to
meet that obligation and not be here. So, I apologize for not
being here for your statements.
One additional complicating feature is the implications of
India's emphasis upon breeder reactors for civil nuclear power
production. Does that--because it gives a potential breakout
capacity--does that complicate matters?
Mr. Sokolski. Two comments. First, you get to legislate.
You don't have to change the NPT. It's the Atomic Energy Act,
which is your baby. You get direct referral. That's the reason
why all----
Senator Biden. Well, no, I'm not suggesting we don't have
the authority to do this.
Mr. Sokolski. Oh, no, no, no.
Senator Biden. I'm not talking about that.
Mr. Sokolski. No, no. You--if you do not do anything, and
you let the administration--which, by the way, came here for a
reason; they want you to change the law, or to do a Brownback
amendment, maybe, where you, kind of, do a sleight of hand,
which deflects the Atomic Energy Act in this one case. They
need something from you. They will either get it, or they'll
get something different. That is for sure. Those are your
options. So, you're going to be forced to act, one way or the
other, but there are consequences.
My hunch is this. The pace and importance of the nuclear
and space portions of what is a much larger set of deals is
something you can dictate; and you need to, with regard to the
other cases that you're afraid be affected if you don't do the
right thing. And the Atomic Energy Act is something the Nuclear
Suppliers Group is watching--they're looking to see what this
committee and the House committee and the Energy committees do.
When they see you move forward, they'll move forward. And, by
the way, I'd bet you'll move forward when you see them move
forward. You're going to be watching one another.
So, you're very important. You're very important. And this
deal, and its majority characteristics, will go forward, with
or without the space and nuclear portion, immediately. I don't
think you have to worry about that. They would like to get the
space and nuclear deals done, but maybe they come later. You
remember the Chinese experience. Thirteen years it took before
they got their U.S. nuclear cooperative deal. Things didn't
fall apart over that. And it was a good period of time to wait
to get the Chinese to behave a little bit better.
Now, with regard to breeders, it is very important that you
understand that their nuclear program--and that matter about
breeder reactors is discussed in length in this paper--is one
of the reasons why the nuclear energy program in India is so
impractical even to help. They have to drop the breeder reactor
thorium fuel-cycle approach that they've got if we're to even
begin to help them dig their way out with any kind of expansion
of nuclear power. And it will take a long time. That's the
reason why this is the least leveraged of the things you can do
to help their energy needs or to clean up their energy
consumption. It's a very long and distant pole in the tent. And
one of the reasons is the breeder reactor program.
Mr. Carter. Senator, may I address your concerns?
I accept that the statement of the list of expectations
that I named as a statement of American expectations, ``By God,
we expect it next year,'' would be inflammatory in Delhi.
Still, in all, that really is what we're expecting of a
strategic partnership from India. And I think it's fair, and in
the spirit of the strategic partnership, for us to be clear
about that. That's not the same as putting a ring in the nose
of another nation or establishing benchmarks. But that is the
American expectation, and, I think, phrased in that way, can
and will be shared, over time--or at least that's the promise
of this agreement. And I don't think you ought to be shy--or we
ought to be shy, collectively--about saying that.
Second, there's another kind of death for this agreement
that's not the death of the Congress deciding that this was a
mistake and it's not going to play ball--which I do not
recommend, and I know you were not stating that as your view,
either--and that's the death of a thousand cuts. For us to get
into a protracted negotiation with the Indians about the
nuclear details of this is to recapitulate the whole problem of
the relationship that this deal is supposed to transcend.
And so, I would say that the witnesses here--they've not
confused me. These panelists, and those that have--I've read
elsewhere, have been broadly consistent. There are a few things
that the administration seems willing to add to its negotiation
with the Indians, which will go a long way toward softening the
downside of making this deal. They're very clear. And I think
that, provided the Indians don't haggle over them, and we don't
unnecessarily haggle over them, we can get through this. But
for us to, again, look at this as a nuclear deal, and we put
our nuclear doctors and they--but I say this with great respect
as a physicist, myself--but put the two parties that have had
the greatest difficulty surmounting the nuclear issue for 30
years in a room and ask them to work out the details, that's a
formula for a death of a thousand cuts. And I think that we
need to be cleaner than that.
You have before you some recommendations--there are several
different flavors here, but they're all the same product--for
clarifying and softening the downside of the nuclear exception,
which is unquestionably being offered to India here. Let's pick
one and move on.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, we thank you very, very much for
not only your testimony, but, likewise, for your good counsel,
which we have been seeking, obviously, in these questions,
because it is important that we act responsibly and in a timely
manner. This is the purpose of the hearing, to gain insights
from the administration as they're proceeding, but, likewise,
to have the benefit of the views of each of you, as experienced
veterans of the trail.
We thank you for your testimony and your responses to our
questions. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:34 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold, U.S. Senator From
Wisconsin
Mr. Chairman, today's hearing on potential United States-Indian
nuclear energy cooperation and its security and nonproliferation
implications is extremely important and I am pleased that this
committee will be taking a close look at this complex issue today. I
was troubled by the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement made by President
Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh that included a promise of
increased nuclear cooperation. The President's promise will require
Congress to take legislative action, changing laws and policies that
are decades old and that are key to our national security. Did the
President bother to consult with Congress before negotiating changes in
U.S. legislation with a foreign country? The answer, unfortunately, is
``No.'' In what has become a well-established pattern, this
administration has acted unilaterally to reverse well-established
policies, completely ignoring the elected representatives of the
American people in the legislative branch.
In ignoring Congress and making a promise of increased nuclear
cooperation, a promise he was not in a position to make, the President
has put this committee and the Congress in a difficult position. He has
raised great expectations within India, a nation of growing importance
to the United States. If Congress is perceived as not living up to the
President's promise, an effort to bolster United States-India relations
could backfire badly. However, with an issue as important as nuclear
cooperation, it would be irresponsible for Congress to endorse the
President's proposal without taking a close look at it. The difficult
position in which we find ourselves could have been entirely avoided,
of course, if the President had simply respected the constitutional
role of this body.
Mr. Chairman, it is our duty to thoroughly explore the broad
implications of nuclear cooperation with India and carefully weigh our
options before we change well-established national security policy.
This hearing is a key first step. I look forward to today's testimony
and to this committee's continued work on this important foreign policy
matter.
______
Statement of Stephen G. Rademaker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for International Security and Nonproliferation, State Department,
Washington, DC, Before the NSG Consultative Group, October 18-19, 2005
Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased to be here to outline the United States
proposal for civil nuclear cooperation with India and address any
questions you may have. You have just heard Assistant Secretary Rocca
place the initiative in the broader context of United States-India
relations, including our dialog and cooperation on future energy
resources. I would now like to take a few minutes to address more
specifically the nonproliferation aspects of the initiative. For more
detailed information on the initiative and on our proposed approach to
the NSG you can reference the paper just distributed,
As Assistant Secretary Rocca has stated, the United States has
worked to establish a strategic partnership with India that encourages
India's continued emergence as a positive force on the world scene. An
important component of this partnership is a landmark agreement with
India to work toward full cooperation in the civil application of
nuclear energy--while strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. This includes our commitment to work with our other friends and
allies to enable such cooperation.
Let me first say a word or two about what this initiative is not.
It is not about nuclear weapons, and the United States has no intention
to support India's weapons program. Neither do we intend to recognize
India as a nuclear weapon state under the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, or renegotiate the treaty itself. Nor do we have any intention
of undercutting the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an important
nonproliferation policy tool. We view India as a special case, and have
no plans to extend similar cooperation to other states.
Rather, the initiative calls for concrete steps by India that
clearly further international nonproliferation goals--key
nonproliferation commitments that will bring India for the first time
into the mainstream of the international nuclear nonproliferation
community. These include commitments to:
Identify and separate civilian and military nuclear
facilities and programs and file a declaration with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its
civilian facilities;
Place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards;
Sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to
civilian nuclear facilities;
Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
Work with the United States for the conclusion of a
multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) to halt
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
Refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies to states that do not have them and support
efforts to limit their spread; and
Secure nuclear and missile materials and technologies
through comprehensive export control legislation and adherence
to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG).
India's commitment to separate its civil and military facilities
and place its civil facilities and activities under IAEA safeguards
will help protect against diversion of nuclear material and
technologies either to India's weapons program or to the weapons
programs of other countries.
By adopting an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, India will commit
to reporting to the IAEA on exports of all Trigger List items. This
will help the IAEA track potential proliferation elsewhere.
By committing to adopt strong and effective export controls,
including adherence to NSG and MTCR Guidelines, India will help ensure
that its companies do not transfer sensitive weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and missile-related technologies to countries of
concern.
By themselves, India's commitments are significant. Collectively,
and when implemented, they will constitute a net gain for
nonproliferation. Of course the initiative is not without challenges.
India's separation of its civil and military facilities must be
credible and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint. It must
strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and provide strong
assurances to supplier states and the IAEA that materials and equipment
provided as part of civil nuclear cooperation will not be diverted for
military purposes. And, of course, we intend to work with NSG partners
to devise a strategy to permit such cooperation in ways that will not
undermine the effectiveness of the NSG regime itself.
This is a challenging undertaking, but one that will, in the end,
produce rewarding nonproliferation dividends. So, over the months ahead
the United States looks forward to working with our partners in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group to accomplish our objective. In our initial
discussions, several states have indicated their agreement on the need
to come to terms with India--a state which developed nuclear weapons
outside the nonproliferation regime and which faces extraordinary
energy needs ahead. We have already received several expressions of
support for this effort to date, including by the Director General of
the IAEA and states such as the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and
Russia.
We believe that India's implementation of its commitments under
this initiative will, on balance, enhance global nonproliferation
efforts. The international nuclear nonproliferation regime will emerge
stronger as a result. Obviously much depends on the progress that India
makes. We continue to work with them to move the process forward.
Thank you.
______
Letter to Senator Richard G. Lugar From Robert J. Einhorn
October 28, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lugar: I'm sorry that, because of a long-standing
commitment to be in Moscow next week, I will not be able to attend the
Nonproliferation PAG meeting or appear as a witness at the SFRC's
hearing. I would nonetheless like to convey to you and members of the
PAG my thoughts on the issues you will be discussing.
Please find below answers to the questions posed to us by Tom
Moore. I am also attaching a one-page summary of my recommendations for
modifying U.S. law and the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines as well
as my prepared statement for a hearing held by the House International
Relations Committee this past Wednesday, October 26. I would appreciate
it if these papers could be circulated to PAG members.
1. Why does civil nuclear cooperation weigh so heavily in U.S.-Indian
relations?
A key reason is the huge expansion of Indian energy needs in coming
decades. Although the role that nuclear power can realistically play in
meeting those needs is exaggerated by India's influential nuclear
lobby, it is clear that nuclear will be an increasing share of India's
future energy mix. Moreover, given India's limited domestic supplies of
natural uranium, its ability to import yellowcake--which it cannot do
under current Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions--has become a
critical requirement if India's nuclear energy program is to expand.
But there is also a political reason why the nuclear issue weighs
so heavily. Civilian nuclear cooperation with the United States and
other NSG members has been the forbidden fruit that Indian political
elites crave. More than anything else, U.S. willingness to set aside
NPT-related rules to engage in nuclear cooperation with India has been
sought by Indians as both a validation of their status as a nuclear
weapon state and as a litmus test of the U.S. desire to transform the
bilateral relationship.
2. How does the Joint Statement address U.S. nonproliferation concerns?
The United States has long urged India to align its policies and
practices more closely with the international nonproliferation regime
and, in general, to make its own contribution toward strengthening that
regime. The Joint Statement brings India a few steps closer to the
nonproliferation mainstream, but the benefits are limited.
Most of India's pledges in the Joint Statement are either
reaffirmations of existing positions (to continue its unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing, strengthen its export control system,
and work toward a fissile material cutoff treaty), codifications of
current Indian practices (no transfers of enrichment or reprocessing
technology to states without fuel-cycle facilities), or announcements
of steps India had already agreed to take in the context of an earlier
bilateral dialog on technology transfer and export control (adherence
to the NSG and MTCR guidelines).
The genuinely new Indian commitment is the pledge to separate
civilian and military nuclear facilities and to place civilian
facilities under IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol. This has
the symbolic value of helping reduce the perceived discrimination
between countries that are obliged to accept safeguards on all their
facilities and those that are not. But at this stage we don't know how
complete will be the list of facilities India designates as civilian.
And regardless of how inclusive or selective the list turns out to be,
the pledge will not affect India's ability to continue producing
fissile material for nuclear weapons at facilities not designated as
eligible for safeguards. Without a halt to such production, the U.S.-
India deal could facilitate an increase in India's stock of bomb-usable
nuclear material (see my HIRC testimony).
In a serious omission, the July 18 agreement doesn't call on India
to play a more active role in helping address today's most acute
proliferation challenges, especially Iran. India's ``yes'' vote on the
recent IAEA Board resolution that found Iran in noncompliance with its
nonproliferation obligations was a welcome step. But since then, the
Indians have tried to mollify the Iranians, saying that they actually
oppose the finding of noncompliance and that they had voted for the
resolution only because that was necessary to get the Europeans to back
down from pursuing referral to the U.N. Security Council. The key test
will be whether India makes a sustained and determined effort in the
months ahead to persuade Iran to forgo its own enrichment capability
and whether, if it becomes necessary, India votes yes to refer the
question to the Security Council.
3. What are the risks of the deal and how can they be minimized?
Following are among the risks if the deal goes forward as it
currently stands:
By seeking an exception to the rules for India, the deal
will make others less inhibited about engaging in risky nuclear
cooperation with friends of their own--Iran in the case of
Russia, Pakistan in the case of China.
Bush administration initiatives in the NSG to tighten export
controls will be harder to achieve if at the same time we're
asking the Group to relax the rules for India.
By sending the signal that the United States will eventually
accommodate a decision to acquire nuclear weapons, the deal
will reduce the perceived costs to states that might in the
future consider going nuclear.
It will make it more difficult to address proliferation
challenges such as Iran. The Iranians have won some support
internationally by asking publicly why they, as an NPT party,
should give up their right to an enrichment capability while
India, which rejected the NPT and acquired nuclear weapons, is
being offered nuclear cooperation.
In general, the deal conveys the message that the United
States now gives nonproliferation a back seat to other foreign
policy goals--which will give others a green light to assign a
higher priority to commercial and political interests relative
to nonproliferation.
Among the ways of minimizing these risks are the following
recommendations:
Require that India stop producing fissile materials for
nuclear weapons, perhaps as part of a multilateral moratorium.
This would bring India in line with the practices of the five
original nuclear powers, all of whom have already stopped. A
multilateral moratorium would help fight nuclear terrorism by
capping stocks of bomb-grade material worldwide and thereby
making those stocks easier to secure.
Urge India to use its standing with Iran and the NAM to
press Iran to give up its enrichment and other fuel-cycle
capabilities.
Preserve a semblance of the long-standing ``NPT preference
policy'' by maintaining a distinction between India and NPT
parties in terms of the nuclear exports they would be eligible
to receive. Accordingly, U.S. law and NSG guidelines should be
modified to permit nuclear exports to India except equipment,
materials, or technology related to enrichment, reprocessing,
and heavy water production. This would permit India to acquire
uranium, enriched fuel, and nuclear reactors, but not items
most closely related to a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, in
keeping with U.S. NPT obligations and existing U.S. law, we
should allow nuclear exports to India only to facilities that
are under IAEA safeguards in perpetuity--not to facilities
under voluntary safeguards arrangements that allow countries to
withdraw materials or facilities from safeguards for national
security reasons.
Pursue changes to U.S. law and NSG guidelines in a country-
neutral manner--not as a special exception to the rules for
India alone. An India-specific approach heightens concerns that
the United States is acting selectively and self-servingly on
the basis of its own foreign policy interests rather than on
the basis of nonproliferation performance. Modified U.S. law
and NSG guidelines should therefore permit nuclear cooperation
with any state not party to the NPT that meets certain criteria
of responsible nuclear behavior. Such criteria can avoid the
pitfalls of making a country-specific exception without opening
the door to nuclear cooperation in cases where it is clearly
not yet merited. (Suggested criteria are contained in the
attached one-page paper.)
I hope these responses to Tom Moore's questions and the attached
papers can be of some assistance to you next week in your meetings on
the U.S.-India nuclear deal.
Yours truly,
Robert Einhorn.
______
Recommended Modifications of U.S. Law and NSG Guidelines
Nuclear cooperation--except in the areas of enrichment,
reprocessing, or heavy water production or with facilities not under
IAEA safeguards in perpetuity--would be permitted with any state not
party to the NPT as of January 2002 * that has demonstrated a strong
commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and has a sustained, consistent
record as a responsible nuclear power. Such a state will be considered
a responsible nuclear power if it:
Has provided public assurances that it will not test nuclear
weapons;
Is not producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons;
Has placed under IAEA safeguards its civil nuclear
facilities, including all nuclear power reactors and R&D
facilities related to electricity generation;
Is playing an active and constructive role in helping
address acute nuclear proliferation challenges posed by states
of proliferation concern;
Has established, and is rigorously implementing, a national
export control system that meets the highest international
standards, including stringent rules and procedures banning
unauthorized contacts and cooperation by personnel with nuclear
expertise;
Has provided public assurances that it will not export
enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technologies;
Is working actively on its own and in cooperation with other
countries in stopping illicit nuclear transactions and
eliminating illicit nuclear commercial networks, including by
fully sharing the results of any investigations of illicit
nuclear activities; and
Is applying physical protection, control, and accountancy
measures meeting the highest international standards to any
nuclear weapons and to all sensitive nuclear materials and
installations, both military and civilian, on its territory.
Under modified U.S. law, in order to make a nonparty to the NPT
eligible to receive U.S. nuclear exports, the President would be
required to certify that the prospective recipient had met these
criteria. The criteria could also be adopted by the NSG as criteria for
deciding, by consensus, whether a particular nonparty to the NPT should
be eligible for nuclear transfers from NSG member states.
* To avoid creating an incentive for countries to withdraw from the
NPT, the modified rules should apply only to countries that were
outside the NPT as of a specified date, which would be chosen to
exclude North Korea and include only India, Pakistan, and Israel.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser,
International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
committee on the nonproliferation implications of the recent agreement
between the United States and India on civil nuclear cooperation.
The United States has an important national interest in
strengthening relations with India and making it a strategic partner in
the 21st century. But efforts to strengthen the United States-Indian
relationship should not be pursued in a way that undermines a United
States national interest of equal and arguably greater importance--
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is precisely what
the Bush administration has done in the nuclear deal reached this past
summer during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington.
In the Joint Statement released on July 18, India agreed to take
several steps to demonstrate its commitment to being a responsible
nuclear power and a supporter of nonproliferation goals. In exchange,
the United States administration agreed to seek changes in United
States law and multilateral commitments to permit exports of nuclear
equipment and technology to India--a radical departure from
longstanding legal obligations and policies that precluded nuclear
cooperation with states not party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
Administration officials have claimed that the deal, by aligning
India more closely with the policies and practices of the international
nonproliferation regime, is a net gain for nonproliferation. In his
testimony before this committee on September 8, Under Secretary of
State Robert Joseph maintained that ``India's implementation of its
agreed commitments will, on balance, enhance our global
nonproliferation efforts, and we believe the international nuclear
nonproliferation regime will emerge stronger as a result.'' Upon close
scrutiny, however, it appears that the nonproliferation benefits of the
July 18 Joint Statement are rather limited.
NONPROLIFERATION GAINS ARE MODEST
Several of the steps pledged by India are simply reaffirmations of
existing positions, including India's commitments to continue its
unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, strengthen its
national system of export controls, and work toward the conclusion of a
multilateral fissile material cutoff treaty. In view of unsuccessful
efforts for over a decade to get negotiations underway on a fissile
material cut-off treaty and no near-term prospect of removing obstacles
to beginning negotiations, this last pledge is unlikely in the
foreseeable future to have any effect on India's ongoing program to
produce more fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
Other Indian commitments in the Joint Statement break new ground,
but their actual nonproliferation gain is modest. For example, the
pledge to refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing
technologies to countries that do not already possess them is welcome.
But since India--to its credit--has never transferred those
technologies and has no plans to do so, it will have little practical
consequence. Moreover, adherence to the guidelines of the Missile
Technical Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is also
positive; but it is a step New Delhi was already planning to take
before the July 18 Joint Statement as part of a United States-Indian
dialog on technology transfer and export control called ``Next Steps in
the Strategic Partnership.''
The commitment that has drawn the most criticism within India is
the pledge to separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and
place civilian facilities voluntarily under IAEA safeguards and the
Additional Protocol. Indian critics claim that, because of the
colocation of civilian and military activities at a number of Indian
nuclear facilities, implementation of the commitment could be expensive
and time consuming and could impose unwarranted constraints on military
programs. In response to these concerns, Indian officials have stressed
that India alone will decide which facilities are subject to safeguards
and have suggested that only a relatively small number will be put on
the civilian list. While recognizing that the designation of civilian
facilities (i.e., those eligible for safeguards) is an Indian
prerogative, United States officials have made clear that, to be
credible, any list should be complete.
However, regardless of how inclusive or selective the list turns
out to be, the nonproliferation value of India's commitment to place
certain nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards will be rather
limited. The purpose of IAEA safeguards for non-nuclear weapon states
party to the NPT is to verify that no nuclear materials are diverted to
a nuclear weapons progam. But as long as India continues to produce
fissile materials for nuclear weapons (at facilities not included on
the safeguards list), its willingness to apply safeguards to facilities
designated as civilian serves primarily a symbolic function--to reduce
the perceived discrimination between countries that are obliged to
accept safeguards on all their facilities and those that are not.Beyond
this symbolic value, willingness to put civilian facilities under
safeguards also serves a more practical function. If members of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group change their rules and permit nuclear
cooperation with India, they will presumably confine such cooperation
to safeguarded facilities in India. (NPT Article III(2) obliges them to
engage in nuclear cooperation only with safeguarded facilities in
nonweapon states. Since the Bush administration is not seeking to give
India nuclear weapon state status under the NPT, III(2) will continue
to apply to India.) The list of safeguarded Indian facilities will
therefore serve to define the scope of permissible nuclear cooperation.
For India, the trade-off will be between broadening the list (to expand
opportunities for cooperation) and narrowing the list (to shield
facilities from international scrutiny). However it chooses, the
fundamental shortcoming of India's July 18 safeguards commitment
remains--it has no effect on India's ability to continue producing
fissile material for nuclear weapons at facilities not designated as
eligible for safeguards.
DOWNSIDES OF THE DEAL
Administration officials are right that the various pledges
contained in the Joint Statement move India closer, both in rhetorical
and practical terms, to the international nonproliferation mainstream
it has shunned for over 30 years. Still, the nonproliferation gains of
the United States-India nuclear deal are meager compared to the major
damage to nonproliferation goals that would result if the deal goes
forward as it currently stands.
The United States-India deal would make it harder to achieve key
Bush administration nonproliferation initiatives. The United States is
now asking the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group to permit nuclear
cooperation only with countries that adhere to the IAEA's Additional
Protocol and to ban transfers of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies to states that do not already possess fuel-cycle
facilities. But getting NSG partners to tighten the rules in ways
favored by the United States will be an uphill battle if they are also
being asked to bend one of their cardinal rules (i.e., no nuclear trade
with nonparties to the NPT) because it no longer suits the United
States.
By seeking an exception to the rules to accommodate America's new
special friendship with India, the deal would reinforce the impression
internationally that the U.S. approach to nonproliferation has become
selective and self serving, not consistent and principled. Rules the
United States initiated and championed would be perceived as less
binding, more optional. Russia and China would feel less inhibited
about engaging in nuclear cooperation that the United States might find
risky and objectionable with special friends of their own--Iran and
Pakistan, respectively.
The nuclear deal in its present form has produced resentment on the
part of close United States friends like Japan, Germany, and Brazil who
were forced to choose between nuclear weapons and civil nuclear
cooperation. They chose the latter, giving up the weapons option and
joining the NPT to realize the benefits of nuclear cooperation. Now
that India has been offered the opportunity to have its cake and eat it
too, many non-nuclear NPT parties feel let down. Not wishing to harm
relations with either India or the United States, they are unlikely to
make a public fuss over the sudden reversal of U.S. policy (on which
they were not consulted). But they will be less inclined in the future
to make additional sacrifices in the name of nonproliferation.
The United States-India deal could also reduce the perceived costs
to states that might consider ``going nuclear'' in the future. In
calculating whether to pursue nuclear weapons, a major factor for most
countries will be how the United States is likely to react.
Implementation of the deal would inevitably send the signal, especially
to countries with good relations with Washington, that the United
States will tolerate and eventually accommodate to a decision to
acquire nuclear weapons.
In the near term, United States plans to engage in nuclear
cooperation with India will make it more difficult to address
proliferation challenges such as Iran. Of course, Iran's interest in
nuclear weapons long predated the India deal. But the deal has
strengthened the case Iran can make--and is already making--
internationally. Why, Iranian officials ask publicly, should Iran give
up its right as an NPT party to an enrichment capability when India, a
nonparty to the NPT, can keep even its nuclear weapons and still
benefit from nuclear cooperation? It is an argument that resonates well
with many countries and weakens the pressures that can be brought to
bear on Tehran.
In general, the Bush administration's policy shift conveys the
message that the United States--the country the world has always looked
to as the leader in the global fight against proliferation--is now de-
emphasizing nonproliferation and giving it a back seat to other foreign
policy goals. Other countries can be expected to follow suit in
assigning nonproliferation a lower priority relative to political and
commercial considerations in their international dealings, and this
would have negative, long-term consequences for the global
nonproliferation regime.
MAKING THE DEAL A NONPROLIFERATION GAIN
The damage can be minimized--and the deal transformed from a net
nonproliferation loss to a net nonproliferation gain--if several
improvements are made in the course of implementing the July 18 Joint
Statement, either by the Governments of India and the United States
themselves, by the U.S. Congress in adopting new legislation, by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group in modifying its guidelines, or by a
combination of these.
The most important improvement would be an Indian decision to stop
producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons. India need not stop
such production unilaterally, but as part of a multilateral moratorium
pending completion of an international fissile material cutoff treaty.
A multilateral production halt would make a major contribution to
fighting nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism by capping stocks
of bomb-making materials worldwide and thereby making those stocks
easier to secure against theft or seizure--in India, Pakistan, or
elsewhere.
Without a moratorium on fissile material production, the United
States-India deal could actually facilitate the growth of India's
nuclear weapons capability. India's indigenous uranium supplies are
quite limited. Under current nonproliferation rules--with India unable
to buy natural uranium on the world market--India must use those
limited supplies for both civil power generation and nuclear weapons,
and the trade-off will become increasingly painful. Under new rules,
India could satisfy the needs of the civil program through imports,
freeing up domestic uranium supplies for the weapons program and
permitting, if the Indian Government so decided, a continuing and even
major increase in bomb-making material. A production moratorium would
preclude such an increase.
Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said in July that India ``is
willing to assume the same responsibilities and practices--no more and
no less--as other nuclear states.'' It so happens that the five
original nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia, France, United
Kingdom, China) have all stopped producing fissile materials for
nuclear weapons. Applying the ``no more, no less'' standard, it would
be reasonable to ask India to join the others. India claims that it
does not have a strategic requirement for parity with the other nuclear
powers (including China) and that it seeks only a ``credible minimum
deterrent capability.'' If that is the case, then perhaps it can soon
decide that it has sufficient plutonium for its deterrence needs and
can afford to forgo further production.
Another way to strengthen the July 18 agreement would be for India
to assume a more active and constructive role in helping the United
States address today's most acute proliferation challenges, especially
the challenge posed by Iran. Given its desire to make Iran a long-term
source of energy supplies, India has been reluctant to press Iran on
its nuclear program. During a September visit to Tehran, Indian Foreign
Minister Natwar Singh made public remarks supportive of Iran's position
on the nuclear issue and critical of the approach taken by the United
States. The remarks produced a sharp backlash by Members of Congress
across the political spectrum, including several strong supporters of
India, who made clear that India's failure to side with the United
States on the Iran nuclear issue would jeopardize congressional support
for the legislative changes needed to implement the United States-India
nuclear deal.
In response to these congressional warnings and tough messages
conveyed in person by President Bush and Secretary Rice to their Indian
counterparts, the Indians on September 24 joined the United States and
Europeans in voting yes on an International Atomic Energy Agency Board
resolution finding Iran in noncompliance with its nonproliferation
obligations but deferring the matter of when and how the Iran question
would be referred to the United Nations Security Council. This was a
positive step but not yet an indication that India is prepared to use
its influence in a sustained and determined way to get Iran to abandon
its plans for an enrichment facility capable of producing both fuel for
civil nuclear reactors and fissile material for nuclear bombs. Indeed,
since the IAEA vote, the Indians have sought to mollify the Iranians,
stating that they had acted in Iran's interest by persuading the
Europeans to back down from seeking an immediate referral to the UNSC.
The key test in the months ahead will be whether India makes a real
effort to persuade Iran to forgo an enrichment capability and whether
it eventually supports referral to the Council, which is required by
the IAEA Statute after a Board finding of noncompliance.
The risks of the nuclear deal could also be reduced by preserving
some distinction between NPT parties and nonparties in terms of the
nuclear exports they would be permitted to receive. A long-standing
element of the nonproliferation regime has been the ``NPT preference
policy''--giving NPT parties benefits in the civil nuclear energy area
not available to those outside the NPT. The Joint Statement undermines
that policy by calling for ``full'' nuclear cooperation with India. A
way of maintaining some preferential treatment for NPT parties would be
to modify U.S. law and the NSG guidelines to permit nuclear-related
exports to nonparties except equipment, materials, or technologies
related to sensitive fuel-cycle facilities, including enrichment,
reprocessing, and heavy water production. Such a distinction would
permit India to acquire natural uranium, enriched fuel, nuclear
reactors, and a wide range of other nuclear items, but would retain the
ban on transfers of those items that are most closely related to a
nuclear weapons program.
In addition to precluding any cooperation with India in the area of
sensitive fuel-cycle capabilities (even under IAEA safeguards), the
United States should permit cooperation in less sensitive nuclear areas
only under safeguards. As noted earlier, India will remain a non-
nuclear weapons state (NNWS) as defined by the NPT, and Article III(2)
allows nuclear exports to NNWSs only under IAEA safeguards. Moreover,
consistent with existing U.S. law, such exports should only be
permitted to facilities that are under safeguards in perpetuity (under
facility-specific, or INFCIRC/Rev.2, safeguards agreements with the
IAEA)--not to facilities under voluntary safeguards arrangements that
allow countries to withdraw materials or facilities from safeguards for
national security reasons. The choice would be up to India. If it
wished to benefit from nuclear cooperation at a particular facility, it
would have to put in place a facility specific safeguards agreement at
that facility.
Nonproliferation risks could also be reduced by implementing the
nuclear deal in a country-neutral manner--not as a special exception to
the rules for India alone. Although the administration has been slow to
indicate how specifically it would seek to adjust United States law and
NSG guidelines, it has suggested that one option would be to leave the
general rules in place but waive their application in the special case
of India because of its qualifications as ``a responsible state with
advanced nuclear technology.'' A problem with that option is that it
would accentuate concerns that the United States is acting selectively
on the basis of foreign policy considerations rather than on the basis
of objective factors related to nonproliferation performance. Moreover,
in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where changing the guidelines requires
a consensus, some countries--notably China--might well resist a
country-specific approach and press for permitting nuclear cooperation
with other nonparties to the NPT with whom they are friendly (e.g.,
Pakistan).
To avoid the pitfalls of making a country-specific exception
without opening the door to nuclear cooperation in cases where it is
clearly not yet merited, the administration should propose
modifications of U.S. law and the NSG guidelines that would permit
nuclear cooperation (except in sensitive parts of the fuel cycle or in
unsafeguarded facilities) with any state not party to the NPT that
meets certain criteria of responsible nuclear behavior. To avoid
creating an incentive for countries to withdraw from the NPT, the
modified rules should apply only to countries that were outside the NPT
as of a specified date, which should be chosen to exclude North Korea
and include only India, Pakistan, and Israel. For such non-NPT states
to be eligible to receive U.S. nuclear exports under a revised U.S.
law, the President should be required to certify that the state:
Has provided public assurances that it will not test nuclear
weapons;
Has provided public assurances that it will not produce
fissile materials for nuclear weapons and is fulfilling that
assurance;
Has placed under IAEA safeguards its civil nuclear
facilities, including all nuclear power reactors and R&D
facilities related to electricity generation;
Is playing an active and constructive role in helping
address acute nuclear proliferation challenges posed by states
of proliferation concern;
Has established, and is rigorously implementing, a national
export control system that meets the highest international
standards, including stringent rules and procedures banning
unauthorized contacts and cooperation by personnel with nuclear
expertise;
Has provided public assurances that it will not export
enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technologies and is
fulfilling that assurance;
Is working actively on its own and in cooperation with other
countries in stopping illicit nuclear transactions and
eliminating illicit nuclear commercial networks, including by
fully sharing the results of any investigations of illicit
nuclear activities; and
Is applying physical protection, control, and accountancy
measures meeting the highest international standards to any
nuclear weapons and to all sensitive nuclear materials and
installations, both military and civilian, on its territory.
These criteria could be written into U.S. law. They could also be
adopted by the NSG as criteria for deciding, by consensus, whether a
particular nonparty to the NPT should be eligible for nuclear transfers
from NSG member states. While such an approach would be country-
neutral, it would enable both the U.S. Government and NSG members to
distinguish among the nonparties to the NPT in terms of whether--and
how soon--they would be eligible for nuclear cooperation.
Staunch supporters of the NPT can be expected to argue that these
criteria do not go far enough--and that only NPT adherence should make
a country eligible for nuclear cooperation. But it is unrealistic to
expect India or the other nonparties ever to join the NPT, and
continuing to insist on adherence as a condition for nuclear
cooperation could forfeit the contribution to nonproliferation that
steps short of NPT adherence could make.
Those who strongly favor the July 18 Joint Statement can be
expected to argue that the criteria are too demanding and could result
in India's walking away from the nuclear deal. But even the most
demanding criterion--ending fissile material production--is a step
India, in principle, supports and says it is willing to take when its
minimum deterrence needs are satisfied. If India is prepared now to
stop production, it could readily meet the remaining criteria. If not,
the door would be open for India to walk through at a time of its own
choosing.
The approach suggested here would clearly be less attractive to the
Indians than the less demanding one that Bush administration was
prepared to settle for on July 18. But it would be a major change from
the status quo that has prevailed for decades, in which the door to
nuclear cooperation for India and the other nonparties has been locked
as a matter of law and policy.
In its ardent desire to transform United States-Indian relations,
the Bush administration has given too little weight to the damaging
implications of its actions for the nonproliferation regime. The remedy
should not be to reject the deal struck in July but to require that it
be pursued in a way that enables the United States to advance its
strategic goals with India as well as its nonproliferation interests--
not serve one at the expense of the other.
______
India's ICBM--On A ``Glide Path'' to Trouble?
(A Policy Research Paper by Dr. Richard Speier, October 26, 2005)
INTRODUCTION
A glide path is the gentle course that an airplane follows as it
descends to a safe landing. If the plane encounters an unexpected
development, it can divert, regain altitude, and change its course.
Because India has been developing nuclear weapons and missiles to
deliver them, United States-Indian technology relations have for many
years remained up in the air, not heading for a safe landing. After 4
years of Bush administration negotiations the United States now
describes its technology relations with India as being on a ``glide
path.''
This paper addresses the question whether, in view of India's
abundantly reported intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
development, we should divert from our present ``glide path'' approach
to space cooperation.
On October 3, 2003, the Washington Post questioned Secretary of
State Powell about the latest diplomatic developments with India.
QUESTION: . . . last week, President Bush presented [Prime
Minister Atal Bihari] Vajpayee with what was called, like, a
``glide path'' toward better relations. . . .
SECRETARY POWELL: . . . there was a basket of issues that
they were always asking us about called, well, we called it--we
nicknamed it, ``The Trinity.'' How could you help us? How can
we expand our trade in high tech areas, in areas having to do
with space launch activities, and with our nuclear industry? .
. . we also have to protect certain red lines that we have with
respect to proliferation, because it's sometimes hard to
separate within space launch activities and industries and
nuclear programs, that which could go to weapons, and that
which could be solely for peaceful purposes. . . . And the
``glide path'' was a way of bringing closure to this debate.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41977-
2003Oct3.html. Italics added for emphasis.
Nearly 2 years later, President Bush and the Indian Prime Minister
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
confirmed this cooperation in a joint statement.
. . . the two leaders resolve . . . Build closer ties in
space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the
commercial space arena. . . .\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 18, 2005,
``Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh,'' available at http://usinfo.state.gov. Italics added
for emphasis.
As this cooperation was being negotiated and agreed, reports
persisted that India was preparing to produce an ICBM. These reports
had been accumulating for over two decades.\3\ The latest public report
appeared less than 6 weeks after the Presidents' joint statement.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For early reports see Islamic Defence Review Vol. 6/No. 4,
1981; Maurice Eisenstein, ``Third World Missiles and Nuclear
Proliferation,'' The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1982; ``Liquid Fuel
Engine Tested for PSLV,'' Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 13,
1985, p.1; ``Growing Local Opposition to India's Proposed National Test
Range at Baliapal, Orissa,'' English Language Press, October 1986; and
``India Faces Rising Pressure for Arms Race With Pakistan,'' Christian
Science Monitor, March 9, 1987, p.1.
\4\ Madhuprasad, ``Boost to Indian Armed Forces' Deterrence
Arsenal; India to Develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,''
Bangalore Deccan Herald in English, August 25, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the last decade the reports have been consistent in avering
that the ICBM will be called ``Surya'' and that hardware and technology
for the ICBM will come from India's gigantic Polar Space Launch Vehicle
(PSLV).
What are the capabilities of the ICBM, and why does India want it?
How did India acquire the space launch vehicle technology for the
weapon? And how did the United States come to ride a ``glide path'' to
space launch cooperation with India? These topics will be covered in
turn.
India's ICBM--what and why
In 1980s India adapted a space launch vehicle, the SLV-3, to become
the Agni medium-range ballistic missile. In keeping with India's
practice of describing nuclear and missile programs as civilian until
their military character could not be denied, India originally claimed
that the Agni was a ``technology demonstrator.'' The Agni program now
consists of three missiles with ranges, respectively, of upwards of
700, 2,000, and 3,000 kilometers.
India may have officially begun the Surya project (also sometimes
known as Agni IV) in 1994.\5\ Reports cite various dates perhaps
because the project has several decision points. Reports generally
agree that the Surya program, like the Agni program, will result in
missiles with various ranges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Vivek Raghuvanshi, ``Indian Scientists Poised To Test-Launch
Country's First ICBM,'' Defense News, April 30, 2001, p. 26.
Surya-1 will have a range of about 5,000 kilometers.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ International missile nomenclature defines an ICBM as a
ballistic missile with a range of 5,500 or greater. However, Indian
commentators have tended to exaggerate their missiles' capabilities by
bumping missiles into the next higher range classes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Surya-2 from 8,000 to 12,000 kilometers.
Surya-3 up to 20,000 kilometers.
Table 1 compares the Agni and Surya families of missiles.
TABLE 1.--THE AGNI AND SURYA MISSILE FAMILIES \7\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missile Size Range Mobile? Probable Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lxd............................. (km) (m)
Agni-1.......................... 15xl............... 700-1000+.......... yes............... Pakistan
Agni-2.......................... 20x1............... 2000-3000+......... yes............... China
Agni-3.......................... 20x1 or 13x1.8..... 3000-5000+......... yes............... China
Surya-1......................... 35x2.8............. -5000.............. no................ China
Surya-2......................... 40x2.8............. 8000-12000......... no................ United States
Surya-3......................... 40+x2.8............ 20000.............. no................ Global
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reports agree that the Surya will have the option of a nuclear
payload--and sometimes the claim is made that the payload will consist
of multiple nuclear warheads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The low-end figures for the Agni family are commonly reported.
The high-end figures are more uncertain. In the case of Agni-3, the
high-end figures may relate to later Agni models or even to the Surya.
Surya lengths are approximations based on the lengths of the PSLV and
GSLV missile stages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reports generally agree that the Surya will be a three-stage
missile with the first two Surya stages derived from PSLV's solid-fuel
rockets. India obtained the solid-fuel technology for the SLV-3 and the
PSLV from the United States in the 1960s.\8\ The third Surya stage is
to use liquid fuel and will be derived either from the Viking rocket
technology supplied by France in the 1980s (called Vikas when India
manufactured PSLV stages with the technology) or from a more powerful
Russian-supplied cryogenic upper stage for the Geosynchronous Space
Launch Vehicle (GSLV), which is an adaptation of the PSLV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Gary Milhollin, ``India's Missiles--With a Little Help from Our
Friends,'' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1989, available
at http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/misshelp.html and
Sundara Vadlamudi, ``Indo-U.S. Space Cooperation: Poised for Take-
Off?'', The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2005, p.
203.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If--as reported--the Surya uses PSLV rocket motors, it will be an
enormous rocket with solid-fuel stages 2.8 meters (about 9 feet) in
diameter and a total weight of up to 275 metric tons. This will make it
by far the largest ICBM in the world--with a launch weight about three
times that of the largest U.S. or Russian ICBMs.
There appears to be no literature on Indian plans to harden or
conceal the Surya launch site or to make the missile mobile, any of
which would be difficult to do because of the missile's size and
weight. If a cryogenic third stage is used, the launch process will be
lengthy. This means that the Surya is likely to be vulnerable to attack
before launch, making it a ``first-strike'' weapon that could not
survive in a conflict. Indeed, the Surya's threatening nature and its
prelaunch vulnerability would make it a classic candidate for
preemptive attack in a crisis. In strategic theory this leads to
``crisis instability,'' the increased incentive for a crisis to lead to
strategic attacks because of each side's premium on striking first.
Why would India want such a weapon? The reported ranges of the
Surya variants suggest the answer.
5,000-kilometer Surya-1 might overlap the range of a
reported 5,000-kilometer upgrade of the Agni missile.\9\ Surya-
1 would have only one advantage over such an upgraded Agni.
That advantage would be a far larger payload--to carry a large
(perhaps thermonuclear) warhead or multiple nuclear warheads.
India has no reason to need a missile of ``ICBM'' range for use
against Pakistan. 5,000 kilometers is arguably an appropriate
missile range for military operations against distant targets
in China. As illustrations of the relevant distances, the range
from New Delhi to Beijing is 3,900 kilometers, from New Delhi
to Shanghai 4,400 kilometers, and from Mumbai to Shanghai 5,100
kilometers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey internet news service in
English, 1252 GMT November 1, 2004; and a publication of more uncertain
quality, Arun Vishwakarma, ``Agni--Strategic Ballistic Missile,'' April
15, 2005, available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/
Agni.html. It is possible that either or both of these references have
conflated the Surya-1 the Agri program.
An 8,000-to-12,000-kilometer Surya-2 would be excessive for
use against China. However, the distance from New Delhi to
London is 6,800 kilometers, to Madrid 7,400 kilometers, to
Seattle 11,500 kilometers, and to Washington, D.C., 12,000
kilometers. An Indian Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) official wrote in 1997, ``Surya's targets
will be Europe and the United States.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Wilson John, ``India's Missile Might,'' The Pioneer in
English, New Delhi, July 13, 1997, p. l, available as FBIS-TAC-97-195
BK1407155097, July 14, 1997
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 20,000-kilometer range Surya-3 could strike any point on
the surface of the Earth.
Indian commentators generally site two reasons for acquiring an
ICBM: To establish India as a global power and to enable India to deal
with ``high-tech aggression'' of the type demonstrated in the wars with
Iraq.\11\ Because there is no obvious reason for India to want a
military capability against Europe, there is only one target that
stands out as the bullseye for an Indian ICBM--the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ For example, Brahma Chellaney, ``Value of Power,'' The
Hindustan Times in English, May 19, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How India got here
The established path to a space launch capability for the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China was to
adapt a ballistic missile as a space launch vehicle. India turned the
process around, adapting a space launch vehicle as a ballistic missile.
If Brazil, Japan, or South Korea were to develop long-range ballistic
missiles, they would probably follow India's example.
President Kennedy was once asked the difference between the Atlas
space launch vehicle that put John Glenn into orbit and an Atlas
missile aimed at the Soviet Union. He answered with a one-word pun,
``Attitude.'' Paul Wolfowitz is said to have compared space launch
vehicles to ``peaceful nuclear explosives'' (PNEs); both have civilian
uses but embody hardware and technology that are interchangeable with
military applications. India has demonstrated this interchangeability
with both space launch vehicles and PNEs.
The path to India's ICBM capability took more than four decades.
Early 1960s: NASA trains Indian scientists at Wallops
Island, Virginia, in sounding rockets and provided Nike-Apache
sounding rockets to India.\12\ France, the UK, and the Soviet
Union also supply sounding rockets.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Vadlamudi, op cit.
\13\ Milhollin, op cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1963-64: A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, an Indian engineer, works at
Wallops Island where the Scout space launch vehicle (an
adaptation of Minuteman ICBM solid-fuel rocket technology) is
flown.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1965: Upon Kalam's return to India the Indian Atomic Energy
Commission requests U.S. assistance with the Scout, and NASA
provides unclassified reports.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1969-70: U.S. firms supply equipment for the Solid
Propellant Space Booster Plant at Sriharokota.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Vadlamudi, op cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1973: India tests a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.''
1970s: A.P.J. Abdul Kalam becomes head of the Indian Space
Research Organisation (ISRO), in charge of developing space
launch vehicles.
1980: India launches its first satellite with the SLV-3
rocket, a close copy of the NASA scout.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Alexander Pikayev, Leonard Spector, et al., Russia, the U.S.
and the Missile Technology Control Regime, Adelphi Paper 317,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 1982: Kalam becomes head of DRDO, in charge of
adapting space launch vehicle technology to ballistic missiles.
1989: India launches its first Agni ``technology
demonstrator'' surface-to-surface missile. The Agni's first
stage is essentially the first stage of the SLV-3. Later, the
Agni becomes a family of three short-to-intermediate-range
ballistic missiles.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, ``India's Nuclear Forces,
2005,'' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 61, No. 05, September/
October 2005, available at http://www.thebulletin.org/
article_nn.php?art_ofn=so05norris.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990: Russia agrees to supply India with cryogenic upper
stage rockets and technology. The United States imposes
sanctions on Russia until, in 1993, Russia agrees to limit the
transfer to hardware and not technology. However, India claims
it has acquired the technology to produce the rockets on its
own.
1994: India launches the PSLV. Stages 1 and 3 are 2.8 meter-
diameter solid-fuel rockets. Stages 2 and 4 are liquid-fuel
Vikas engines derived from French technology transfers in the
1980s.
1994: This is the earliest date for which the Surya ICBM
program, using PSLV technology, is reported to have been
officially authorized. However, India's space and missile
engineers--if not the ``official'' Indian Government--had
opened the option much earlier.
1998: India tests nuclear weapons after decades of
protesting that its nuclear program was exclusively peaceful.
1999: India flies the Agni II, an extended range missile
that tests reentry vehicle ``technology [that] can be
integrated with the PSLV programme to creat an ICBM'' according
to a defence ministry official.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ V.G. Jaideep, ``India Building ICBM with 8,000-Plus Km
Range,'' The Asian Age in English, February 8, 1999, pp. 1-2 and
Barbara Opall-Rome, ``Agni Test Undercuts U.S., Angers China,'' Defense
News, April 26, 1999, p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999: Defense News cites Indian Defence Research and
Development Organisation (DRDO) officials as stating that the
Surya is under development.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Vivek Raghuvanshi, ``India To Develop Extensive Nuclear
Missile Arsenal,'' Defense News, May 24, 1999, p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
November 6, 1999: India's Minister of State for Defence (and
former head of DRDO) Bachi Singh Rawat says India is developing
an ICBM known as Surya that would ``have a range of up to 5,000
km.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, ``Ballistic Missile
Proliferation,'' Report # 2000/09, March 23, 2001, available at http://
www.cisiscrs.gc.ca/eng/misdocs/200009_e.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
November 23, 1999: Rawat is reported to have been stripped
of his portfolio after his ICBM disclosure.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Iftikhar Gilani, ``Premature Disclosure of ICBM Project, Rawat
Stripped of Defence Portfolio,'' New Delhi, November 23, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001: Khrunichev State Space Science and Production Center
announces that it will supply five more cryogenic upper stages
to India within the next 3 years.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Moscow (Interfax), ``Khrunichev Space Center To Supply Rocket
Boosters To India,'' April 16, 2001, available at http:/spacer.com/
news/india-01d.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001: The cryogenic engine is reported to be ``the Surya's
test-bed.'' \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Cf. footnote 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001: A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate states, ``India
could convert its polar space launch vehicle into an ICBM
within a year or two of a decision to do so.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ National Intelligence Estimate, ``Foreign Missile Developments
and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,'' December 2001,
available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_missilethreat2001.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004: A Russian Academy of Sciences Deputy Director states
that India is planning to increase the range of the Agni
missile to 5,000 kilometers and to design the Surya ICBM with a
range of 8,000 to 12,000 kilometers.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Cf. footnote 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005: According to Indian Ministry of Defence sources, there
are plans to use the non-cryogenic Vikas stage for the Surya
and to have the missile deliver a 2\1/2\ to 3\1/2\ metric ton
payload with two or three warheads with explosive yields of 15
to 20 kilotons.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Madhuprasad, op cit.
The common threads in all these reports are that space launch
vehicle technology is the basis for the Indian ICBM, and that India
obtained the technology with foreign help.
How the United States got here
The United States has a policy against missile proliferation, but
the policy has not been in place as long as the Indian missile program.
Nor has the policy been consistently applied. Some markers:
1970s: The United States begins to consider a broad policy
against missile proliferation.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Richard Speier, ``The Missile Technology Control Regime: Case
Study of a Multilateral Negotiation,'' manuscript funded by the United
States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., November 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1980s: The United States and its six economic summit
partners secretly negotiate the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). After 1\1/2\ years of difficult negotiations on
the question of space launch vehicles, all partners agree that
they must be treated as restrictively as ballistic missiles
because their hardware, technology, and production facilities
are interchangeable. The MTCR is informally implemented in 1985
and is publicly announced in 1987.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Speier, ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990: Two weeks after the United States enacts a sanctions
law against missile proliferation, the Soviet Union announces
its cryogenic rocket deal with India. The two parties are the
first to have sanctions imposed on them under the new law.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Pikayev, et al, op cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993: The United States and Russia agree that Russia may
transfer a limited number of cryogenic rocket engines to India,
but not their production technology. \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998: India tests nuclear weapons. United States imposes
broad sanctions on nuclear and missile/space-related transfers.
1999: Kalam says he wants to ``neutralise'' the
``stranglehold'' some nations had over the MTCR that had tried,
but failed, to ``throttle'' India's missile program. ``I would
like to devalue missiles by selling the technology to many
nations and break their stranglehold.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ ``Agni IRBM Built to Carry Nuclear Warhead,'' Jane's Defence
Weekly, April 28, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
September 22, 2001: United States lifts many of the
technology sanctions imposed in 1998. Subsequently, India's
Prime Minister visits the United States amid agreement to
broaden the technology dialogue.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Vadlamudi, op cit., is an excellent source for recent
developments in the U.S.-Indian space dialogue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002: Kalam becomes President of India.
2002: The United States tells India it will not object to
India launching foreign satellites, as long as they do not
contain U.S.-origin components.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ C. Raja Mohan, ``U.S. Gives Space to ISRO,'' The Hindu in
English, September 30, 2002, p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2003: The last mention of India is made in the
Director of Central Intelligence's unclassified semi-annual
report to Congress on the acquisition weapons of mass
destruction. Future reports deletes descriptions of India's
activities.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Director of Central Intelligence, ``Unclassified Report to
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30
June 2002,'' posted April 2003, available at http://www.cia.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
October 2003: Secretary of State Powell speaks to the
Washington Post about the ``Trinity'' and the ``glide path.''
\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Cf. footnote 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2004: President Bush agrees to expand cooperation
with India in ``civilian space programs'' but not explicitly to
cooperate with space launches. This measure is part of a
bilateral initiative dubbed ``Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by
the President on India, ``Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with
India,'' January 12, 2004, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/01/20040112-1.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 2005: President Bush agrees to cooperate with India on
``satellite navigation and launch.'' The Prime Minister of
India agrees to ``adherence to Missile Technology Control
Regime . . . guidelines.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Cf. footnote 3.
The common thread in these developments is that the U.S. clarity
about the relationship between space launch vehicles and missile
proliferation appears close to being obscured in the case of India.
India's agreement to adhere to the MTCR's export control guidelines is
a welcome development but does not entitle India to missile (or space
launch vehicle) technology. Without India's adherence, if India were to
export missile technology restricted by the MTCR, it would be a
candidate for the imposition of sanctions under U.S. law.
Analysis
The story of India's ICBM illustrates short-sightedness on the
parts of both India and the United States. If India completes the
development of an ICBM, the following consequences can be expected:
An incentive to preempt against India in times of crisis,
A diversion of India's military funds away from applications
that would more readily complement ``strategic partnership''
with the United States,
Increased tensions and dangers with China,
Confusion and anger on the part of India's friends in Europe
and the United States,
A backlash against India that will hinder further
cooperation in a number of areas, and
A goad to other potential missile proliferators and their
potential suppliers to becoming more unrestrained.
The governments of India and the United States have nothing to be
proud of in this business. In seeking to become a global power by
acquiring a first-strike weapon of mass destruction the Indian
Government is succumbing to its most immature and irresponsible
instincts. The U.S. Government, by offering India the ``Trinity'' of
cooperation, is flirting with counterproductive activities that could
lead to more proliferation.
There are, of course, arguments in favor of such cooperation:
Strategic cooperation with India is of greater value than
theological concerns about proliferation.
India has already developed nuclear weapons and long-range
missiles, so resistance to such proliferation is futile.
And India is our friend, so we need not worry about its
strategic programs.
It is true that there is considerable value to strategic
cooperation with India. But nuclear and space launch cooperation are
not the only kinds of assistance that India can use. It has a greater
use for conventional military assistance, development aid, and access
to economic markets. Moreover, nonproliferation has a strategic value
at least as great as that of an Indian partnership. A little
proliferation goes a long way. It encourages other nations (such as
Pakistan, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) to consider similar
programs. And the example of U.S. cooperation encourages other
suppliers to relax their restraint.
It is true that India has already developed nuclear weapons and
long-range missiles. But India has a long way to go to improve their
performance, and it has a history of using nuclear and space launch
assistance to do just that. Some areas in which India can still improve
its missiles are:
Accuracy. For a ballistic missile, accuracy deteriorates
with range. India's ICBM could make use of better guidance
technology, and it might obtain such technology with ``high-
tech'' cooperation with the United States.
Weight. Unnecessary weight in a missile reduces payload and
range. Or it forces the development of gigantic missiles such
as India's PSLV-derived ICBM. India is striving to obtain
better materials and master their use to reduce unnecessary
missile weight.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Mir Ayoob Ali Khan, ``Agni-Ill to get light motor for bigger
bombs,'' The Asian Age in English, New Delhi, October 14, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reliability. India's space launch vehicles and medium range
missiles have suffered their share of flight failures.
Engineering assistance in space launches could improve India's
missile reliability--as was demonstrated with unapproved
technology transfers incident to launches of U.S. satellites by
China.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ The ``Cox Commission'' Report, House of Representatives Report
105-851, ``Report of the Select Committee on US National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China,''
June 14, 1999, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/
hr105851/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple warheads. India's reported interest in missile
payloads with multiple nuclear warheads means that certain
elements of satellite technology may get diverted to military
use. Deliberate or inadvertent transfers of technology
associated with dispensing and orienting satellites could, as
in the Chinese case, make it easier to develop multiple re-
entry vehicles.
Countermeasures against missile defenses. Assistance to
India in certain types of satellite technology, such as the
automated deployment of structures in space, could aid the
development of penetration aids for India's long-range
missiles. Given that the United States is the obvious target
for an Indian ICBM, such countermeasures could stress U.S.
missile defenses.
Supplier restraint can slow down India's missile progress and make
such missiles more expensive and unreliable--perhaps delaying programs
until a new regime takes a fresh look at them and considers
deemphasizing them. Apart from the technical assistance that the United
States is considering supplying, the relaxation of U.S. objections to
foreign use of India launch services will augment the ISRO budget for
rocket development. Even if India were not materially aided by U.S.
space launch cooperation, the example is certain to kindle hopes in
such nations as Brazil that they can get away with the same tactics.
And France and Russia, India's traditional and less-restrained rocket
technology suppliers, are certain to want a piece of the action.
It is true that India is our friend and ``strategic partner,'' at
least at the present time. History raises questions whether such
friendship would continue through a conflict with Pakistan. And India's
interest in an ICBM, which only makes sense as a weapon against the
United States, raises questions whether the friendship is mutual.
Moreover, nonproliferation policy is often directed against programs in
friendly nations. Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Ukraine are all friendly nations for which the
United States has attempted to hinder WMD and missile programs without
undermining broader relations. An exception for India is certain to be
followed by more strident demands for exceptions elsewhere. Is the
space-launch component of ``friendship'' worth a world filled with
nations with nuclear-armed missiles?
India's missile program has evolved over more than four decades.
The history of proliferation demonstrates the difficulty of holding to
a strong nonproliferation policy over years, let alone decades.\41\
There will always be temptations to trade nonproliferation for some
bilateral or strategic advantage of the moment. In the current
situation, India may have out-negotiated the United States. After
India's 1998 nuclear weapon tests, the United States imposed sanctions
and then gradually lifted them. In nuclear and rocket matters, this was
not enough for India. And once the United States began easing up on
India, the United States kept easing up.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Richard Speier, ``United States Strategies Against the
Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons,'' doctoral dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1968.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States professes to be holding to its ``red lines''--in
Secretary of State Powell's words--in whatever kind of cooperation it
is considering. But the world needs to know where these lines are when
it comes to ``space launch'' cooperation. It is one thing for the
United States to provide launch services for Indian satellites. It is
another thing for the United States to use or help improve India's
ICBM-capable rockets. Are the ``red lines'' firm or flexible? Is the
``glide path'' a slippery slope? This brings us to this paper's
recommendations.
Recommendations
Under the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States and
India committed themselves to ``build closer ties in space exploration,
satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena.''
This does not require nor should it encourage U.S. cooperation on
India's ICBM program directly or indirectly. In fact, the United States
has already taken a step in the right direction by offering to launch
Indian astronauts in upcoming space shuttle missions and to involve
them to the fullest extent in the International Space Station
The United States should do more to encourage India to launch its
satellites and science packages on U.S. and foreign launchers by making
these launches more affordable. The United States also should be
forthcoming in offering India access, as appropriate, to the benefits
of U.S. satellite programs--including communications, earth resource
observation, and exploration of the cosmos. India, in fact, has some of
the world's best astrophysicists and cosmologists. It is in our
interest, as well as the world's, that we make all of the data from our
space observation programs involving the Hubble telescope and similar
systems available to Indian scientists to analyze.
(1) Do not be naive about the nature of India s program
After more than two decades of reports about India's interest in an
ICBM--including reports from Russia, statements on India's ICBM
capability by the U.S. intelligence community, and the firing of an
Indian official after he publicly described the Surya program--there
should be no illusions. All of the reports state that India's ICBM will
be derived from its space launch vehicle. The United States should not
believe that it is possible to separate India's ``civilian'' space
launch program--the incubator of its long-range missiles--from India's
military program. There should be no illusions about the target of the
ICBM. It is the United States--to protect India from the theoretical
possibility of ``high-tech aggression.'' The U.S. intelligence
community's semi-annual unclassified reporting to Congress on India's
nuclear and missile programs was discontinued after April 2003. This
reporting should be resumed.
(2) Do not assist India's space launch programs
The United States should not cooperate either with India's space
launches or with satellites that India will launch. India hopes that
satellite launches will earn revenues that will accelerate its space
program--including rocket development. U.S. payloads for Indian
launches--such as the envisioned cooperative lunar project--risk
technology transfer (see recommendation No. 3) and invite other nations
to be less restrained in their use of Indian launches. Because there is
no meaningful distinction between India's civilian and military rocket
programs, the United States should explicitly or de facto place ISRO
back on the ``entities'' list of destinations that require export
licenses.\42\ Certainly, Congress should insist that the United States
explain it's ``red lines'' regarding space cooperation with India. If
these lines are not drawn tightly enough, Congress should intervene.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ U.S. Department of Commerce, ``Control Policy: End-User and
End-Use Based,'' Export Administration Regulations, Part 744, available
at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744.pdf. ISRO was removed from
the ``entities'' list under a U.S-Indian agreement signed on September
17, 2004. See Vadlamudi, op cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Review carefully any cooperation with India's satellite
programs
India is reportedly developing multiple nuclear warheads for its
long-range missiles. If India develops an ICBM, the next step will be
to develop countermeasures to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Certain
satellite technologies can help India with both of these developments.
The United States should review its satellite cooperation to ensure
that it does not aid India inappropriately in the technologies of
dispensing or orienting spacecraft, of automated deployment of
structures in space, or of other operations that would materially
contribute to multiple warheads or countermeasures against missile
defenses.
CONCLUSION
The target of an Indian ICBM would be the United States. The
technology of an Indian ICBM would be that of a space launch vehicle.
The United States should not facilitate the acquisition or improvement
of that technology directly or indirectly In this matter, U.S. clarity
and restraint are what the world--and India--need.
______
Feeding the Nuclear Fire
(From Foreign Policy in Focus, by Zia Mian and M.V. Ramona, Sept. 20,
2005)
The July 18 Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh has attracted a great deal of comment. The
focus has been on the possible consequences of United States promises
to support India's nuclear energy program in exchange for India clearly
separating its military and civilian nuclear facilities and programs
and opening the latter to international inspection.
Much of the debate on the deal has arisen between what can be
broadly called nuclear hawks and nuclear nationalists. The hawks
believe that New Delhi's nuclear program is a great success and that
India is more than able to take care of itself. They see the deal as
imposing unnecessary constraints on India's nuclear program and
impeding the creation of a large nuclear arsenal--including
thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs)--which they believe to be
essential for India to achieve ``great power'' status.
The clearest expression of this perspective comes from former Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), who
seek the largest possible nuclear weapons capability. Vajpayee argues
that: ``Separating the civilian from the military would be very
difficult, if not impossible . . . It will also deny us any flexibility
in determining the size of our nuclear deterrent.'' When he refers to
``flexibility'' in determining the size of the Indian nuclear arsenal,
he does not include reducing or eliminating it. Rather, his term
expresses the fear that separating civil and military facilities may
curb the arsenal's size.
Nuclear nationalists have a less ambitious, more traditional
perspective that considers Indias nuclear program a great national
technological achievement and necessary for India's economic and social
development. They see the deal as offering a way to sustain and expand
the nuclear energy program without unduly restricting a ``minimum''
nuclear weapons arsenal.
The current government has embraced this nationalist view, as have
many defenders of the deal. The Prime Minister laid it out most clearly
to Parliament on July 29, saying: ``Our nuclear program . . . is
unique. It encompasses the complete range of activities that
characterize an advanced nuclear power . . . our scientists have done
excellent work, and we are progressing well on this program as per the
original vision outlined by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Homi
Bhabha.'' Singh went on to argue that ``nuclear power has to play an
increasing role in our electricity generation plans,'' and he noted
that the deal is flexible because ``our indigenous nuclear power
program based on domestic resources and national technological
capabilities would continue to grow.'' The expected international
support, both in nuclear fuel and nuclear reactors, will help ``enhance
nuclear power production rapidly,'' he added. At the same time, he made
it clear that ``there is nothing in the Joint Statement that amounts to
limiting or inhibiting our strategic nuclear weapons program.''
These two positions have by and large dominated the debate so far.
There are many problems with both views. The first is their shared
belief in the success of India's nuclear energy program and the need to
continue with and expand this effort. They fail to recognize that the
deal is actually a testament to the long-standing, expensive, and
large-scale failure of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to
safeguard health, safety, the environment, and local democracy.
Both camps also contend that nuclear weapons are a source of
security, though this conviction has been extensively debunked. Those
who persist in this belief also ignore the essential moral, legal, and
criminal questions of what it means to have--and be prepared to use--
nuclear weapons. The only differences between the two camps are in the
character and size of the genocidal weapons they desire and in the
number of people they are prepared to threaten to kill.
A HISTORY OF FAILURE
The establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1948 was
framed by the rhetoric of indigenous national development. Led by Homi
Bhabha, the AEC portrayed India as forging its own path in the new
nuclear age. That was not to be. There was no progress until the United
Kingdom offered the design details and enriched uranium fuel for the
first Indian nuclear reactor, Apsara. In what was to become a pattern,
the official announcement when the Apsara reactor went critical
declared the landmark a ``purely indigenous affair.''
Similarly, the CIRUS reactor, which provided the plutonium used in
the 1974 nuclear test (and quite likely some used in the 1998 tests as
well), was supplied by Canada, and the heavy water used in it came from
the United States. An American firm, Vitro International, was awarded
the contract to prepare blueprints for the first reprocessing plant at
Trombay. The first power reactors at Tarapur and Rawatbhata were
supplied by the United States and Canada respectively. And foreign
collaboration did not just extend to reactors. Many of India's nuclear
scientists were schooled in America and elsewhere. Between 1955 and
1974, over 1,100 Indian scientists were sent to train at various United
States facilities.
Extensive foreign support of the nuclear program ended only after
the 1974 nuclear test. The international community led by Canada and
the United States--both of whom were incensed by India's use of
plutonium from the CIRUS reactor, which had been given purely for
peaceful purposes--cut off most material transfers relating to New
Delhi's nuclear program. However, India's nuclear facilities
surreptitiously procured components from abroad, and foreign
consultants continued to be hired for projects. Moreover, DAE personnel
still had access to nuclear literature and participated in
international conferences where technical details were freely
discussed.
Even with all this help, DAE's failures were many and stark. In
1962, Homi Bhabha predicted that by 1987 nuclear energy would
constitute 20,000 to 25,000 megawatts (MW) of installed electricity
generation capacity. His successor as head of the DAE, Vikram Sarabhai,
predicted that by 2000 there would be 43,500 MW of nuclear power. In
1984, the ``Nuclear Power Profile'' drawn up by the DAE suggested the
more modest goal of 10,000 MW by 2000, India never came close to
meeting any of these goals.
After over 50 years of generous government funding, nuclear power
amounts to only 3,400 MW, barely 3 percent of India's installed
electricity capacity. This capacity is expected to rise by nearly 50
percent over the next few years but not because of the DAE. The largest
component of the expansion will be two 1,000 MW reactors purchased from
and being built by Russia.
This history of failure explains the escalating demands from the
DAE and other nuclear advocates to gain access to international nuclear
markets. Only with international help can the DAE ever hope to achieve
its latest promised goal of 20,000 MW by the year 2020.
Another pressure driving the deal with Washington has been the
DAE's failure to manage its existing nuclear program. In its
determination to build more and more reactors--something to show for
all the money that it gets--the DAE has failed to provide reactor fuel.
Soon after the United States-India deal was announced, this oversight
became apparent in a statement from an unnamed official to the British
Broadcasting Corporation who admitted: ``The truth is we were
desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till [sic] the end of
2006. If this agreement had not come through we might have as well
closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension our nuclear
program.'' The former head of the atomic energy regulatory board has
reported that this is not a new problem, he notes that ``uranium
shortage'' has been ``a major problem for the officials of NPCIL and
the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) for some time.''
The issue is simple. Apart from Tarapur I and II, all DAE reactors
are fueled using uranium from the Jaduguda region of Jharkand. The
total electric capacity of the heavy water-based power reactors is
2,450 MW. At 75 percent operating capacity, they require nearly 330
tons of uranium every year. The reactors that are supposedly dedicated
to making plutonium for nuclear weapons, CIRUS and Dhruva, consume
perhaps another 30-35 tons. When mining started in Jaduguda, the
average ore grade was about 0.O67 percent. Now it is reportedly less
than half that. The current mining capacity is around 2,800 tons of
uranium ore per day. This means the DAE may only be producing about 300
tons of uranium a year, which falls well short of the fueling
requirements. The DAE has been able to continue to operate its reactors
only by using stockpiled uranium from earlier days when nuclear
capacity was much smaller. This stockpile should be exhausted by 2007.
The DAE has been desperately trying to open new uranium mines in
India, but it has been met with stiff public resistance everywhere.
This local resistance stems from the widely documented negative impacts
of uranium mining and milling on public and occupational health.
The limits on domestic uranium reserves have been known since the
nuclear program was started. This concern was the justification for the
three-phase nuclear power program that Bhabha originally proposed and
that continues to be pursued. This program involves separating
plutonium from the spent fuel produced in natural uranium reactors and
setting up breeder reactors, which in turn could theoretically be used
to utilize India's thorium resources for energy production. But the
three phases are far from being realized. The DAE has failed to build
and sustain enough natural uranium-fueled reactors for the first phase.
The second phase is still experimental, and the first plutonium-fueled
power reactor has yet to be completed. Even if it becomes fully
functional, breeder reactors are unlikely to be a significant source of
electricity for several decades. The thorium fuel cycle, the third
phase, is still far in the future.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY IN INDIA
If the deal with Washington goes through, the DAE will be free to
purchase uranium from the international market for its safeguarded
reactors. This has some important consequences. For starters, it will
reduce pressure on domestic uranium reserves. Since imported uranium
will be much cheaper than Indian uranium, it may also marginally reduce
the operating costs of Indian nuclear plants. Although the DAE hides
its actual costs, there is little doubt that nuclear electricity is
more expensive than other major sources of power in India.
At the same time, access to cheap, imported uranium will remove
what has been the DAE's primary justification for much of its long-term
nuclear plan. For decades, the DAE has cited a shortage of domestic
uranium as justification for India's breeder program, even though poor
economics and countless engineering problems have effectively killed
similar breeder reactor programs in the United States, France, and
Germany. The high cost of breeder reactors stems from their need for
plutonium fuel produced at reprocessing plants by chemically treating
spent (i.e., used) nuclear fuel from ordinary reactors. The separated
plutonium is then fashioned into breeder fuel at special and costly
fabrication plants. There are enormous economic costs, environmental
repercussions, and public health risks associated with this whole
scheme.
If cheap uranium becomes available to India, there will be no need
for any of this. Even so, the DAE may balk at giving up its breeder
reactor program. It may instead choose to emulate Japan, which imports
uranium to power its nuclear reactors and, ignoring the costs and
risks, continues to pursue its breeder reactor program. If so, the
DAE's institutional interests will have once again triumphed over
economic good sense and concerns about health and the environment.
India's existing nuclear capacity--and any increases in it,
domestic or foreign, that the United States deal facilitates--should
not to be considered a benefit. Nuclear electricity is expensive, and
it would be far better to invest in other, cheaper sources of power as
well as energy conservation measures. There are also important safety
concerns associated with nuclear power. At least one of the DAE's
nuclear reactors has come close to a major accident. One can barely
imagine the consequences of a Chernobyl-like meltdown involving the
release of large quantities of radioactive materials at a reactor in a
densely populated country like India. Other facilities associated with
the nuclear fuel cycle have also experienced accidents, though these
have primarily affected workers within the plant.
Apart from extreme accidents, there are many environmental and
public health consequences associated with the many facilities that
make up India's nuclear complex. A scientific study of the health
consequences on the local population around the Rajasthan Atomic Power
Station (RAPS) located at Rawatbhata near Kota observed statistically
significant increases in the rates of congenital deformities,
spontaneous abortions, stillbirths and 1-day deaths of newborn babies,
and solid tumors.
And, to cap it all, there is the unsolved problem of managing large
amounts of radioactive waste for many tens of thousands of years. The
question that really needs to be discussed (but has hardly figured in
the debate) is whether India needs any nuclear power plants at all.
There are many who believe India would be better off giving up this
costly and dangerous technology and finding ways to meet the needs of
its people without threatening their future or their environment.
HOW MANY BOMBS ARE ENOUGH?
Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons have been linked from the
beginning, and this will continue under the deal with Washington.
Access to the international uranium market for fueling reactors will
free up domestic uranium for India's weapons program and will likely
boost New Delhi's nuclear clout.
There are several ways in which India could use its freed-up
domestic uranium. It could choose to build a third reactor dedicated to
making plutonium for nuclear weapons. There have been proposals for a
larger reactor to add to CIRUS and Dhruva at the Bhabha Atomic Research
center in Mumbai. India could also start to make highly enriched
uranium for nuclear weapons. Pakistan has used such highly enriched
uranium, produced at Kahuta, for its weapons. Both paths, which need
not be exclusive, would allow India to increase its fissile materials
stockpile at a much faster rate. A third use for domestic uranium would
be in supplying the fuel for a nuclear submarine that has been under
development since the 1970s. Modest uranium availability and the more-
pressing need to keep the power reactors running have restricted all
such plans in the past.
If the proposed agreement is solidified, India could use both its
current stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium and all future production
to make nuclear weapons. The current stockpile is estimated to be
perhaps 400-500 kg, sufficient for about 100 simple fission weapons.
(It is usually assumed that 5 kg is needed for a simple weapon. More
sophisticated designs typically require less plutonium.) CIRUS and
Dhruva produce about 25-35 kg of plutonium a year. This means that by
2010 India's potential arsenal size could be about 130 warheads using
only existing facilities.
But there are other sources of weapons-grade fissile material.
Power reactors can be used to make weapons-grade plutonium by limiting
the time the fuel is irradiated. Run this way, a typical 220 MW power
reactor could produce between 150-200 kg/year of weapons-grade
plutonium when operated at 60-80 percent capacity.
Another source of fissile material is the stockpile of plutonium in
the spent fuel of power reactors. Though it has a slightly different
mix of isotopes from weapons-grade plutonium, it can be used to make a
nuclear explosive. The United States conducted a nuclear test in 1962
using plutonium that was not weapons-grade. One of India's May 1998
nuclear tests is also reported to have involved such material.
Over the years, some 8,000 kg of reactor-grade plutonium may have
been produced in the power reactors not under safeguards. Only about 8
kg of such plutonium are needed to make a simple nuclear weapon. Unless
this spent fuel is not put under safeguards-i.e., declared to be off-
limits for military purposes, as part of the deal--India would have
enough plutonium from this source alone for an arsenal of about 1,000
weapons, larger than that of all the nuclear weapons states except the
United States and Russia.
Lastly, there is the plutonium produced in Kalpakkam in India's
small, fast-breeder test reactor (FBTR). Even more plutonium will be
produced by the 500 MW prototype FBTR now under construction. It is
curious that ever since the 1960s, the DAE has resisted placing India's
breeder program under international safeguards, even though both
Germany and Japan, neither of them nuclear weapon states, subjected
their breeder reactor programs to such safeguards. In theory,
international scrutiny prevents plutonium or uranium from civil nuclear
facilities from being used to make nuclear weapons. The DAE's
resistance to safeguards begs the question as to whether the breeder
program is, or ever was, only for civilian purposes.
A.N. Prasad, former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre
(BARC), has argued that these large stocks of weapons-usable material
are beside the point. Prasad asserts that the deal with Washington
should be rejected because ``our military activities are not aimed at
stockpiling nuclear weapons,'' since the weapons become old, their
materials degrade, [and] they have to be dismantled and replaced.
But Prasad is disingenuous. It is estimated that the plutonium used
in U.S. nuclear weapons may not need to be replaced for 45-60 years.
The material can then be recycled into new nuclear weapons. Moreover,
many of the aging effects that plutonium experiences can be avoided
with proper storage, allowing existing stocks of plutonium to last
indefinitely. All other nuclear weapons states have stopped producing
new material for their nuclear weapons programs-only India, Pakistan,
and Israel appear to be producing new weapons ingredients.
Another nuclear weapons resource is tritium, a gas used to boost
the yield of fission weapons. The DAE claims to have tested a tritium-
boosted weapon in 1998. However, tritium decays relatively quickly (its
half-life is just over 12 years). Thus, to maintain a stockpile of
tritium for a long time requires either a very large initial amount or
production at a rate that balances decay. Tritium is a byproduct in
nuclear reactors dedicated to producing plutonium for weapons. These
reactors can also be used specifically to generate more tritium.
In short, the deal with Washington promises not only to leave New
Delhi's weapons capability intact but to allow for a rapid and large
expansion of India's nuclear arsenal. And both parties to the pact
accept this as a good thing.
The effects of the use of both the smaller yield fission weapons
and the more destructive thermonuclear weapons in India's arsenal are
well-known. Put simply, the smaller weapons will kill almost everyone
within 1.5 km of the explosion, and the larger weapons will kill most
people out to distances of 3.5 km. The effects of radioactive fallout
would spread tens of kilometers further. Either kind of bomb would be
enough to destroy a modern city. The question that needs to be asked
is, ``How many cities do India's leaders wish to be able to destroy?''
There are many who believe that no country should have nuclear
weapons, since such weapons engender fear through the threat of
genocide. In the 60 years since Hiroshima, we all should have learned
that there is no security to be found in the threat to kill millions.
CONCLUSION
The nuclear agreement between the United States and India has many
problems and raises two fundamental questions. The first is whether
India needs nuclear energy for its development and the well-being of
its people. A good case can be made that it does not.
The second question is whether India needs nuclear weapons if it
truly wants to live in peace with its neighbors and with the world.
Many believe, with good reason, that it does not.
The outcome of the proposed nuclear agreement, therefore, is a
future in which a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed India swaggers
along in Washington's shadow. Such a choice could not be more stark.
______
Responses of Secretaries Nicholas Burns and Robert Joseph to Questions
Submitted by Senator Lugar
The Administration's Legislative Proposal and the July 18 Joint
Statement
Question. When will the administration present this committee with
legislation regarding nuclear energy cooperation with India?
Answer. We do not intend to ask Congress to take legislative action
to facilitate this agreement until the Indian Government takes certain
important steps. We have made it clear to the Indians that they need to
begin to follow through on their commitments, including to present--and
begin to implement--a credible and transparent plan for separation of
their civilian and military nuclear facilities that is defensible from
a nonproliferation standpoint before we would further seek to adjust
our legal frameworks.
We have agreed to work closely with the Indians over the next
several weeks to months on this plan and on other Indian steps which
will allow us to seek changes to our laws. We hope to be in a position
to seek formal legislative relief in the first quarter of 2006.
Question. When do you anticipate that India will have completed all
of the steps it has committed to undertaking in the July 18, 2005,
Joint Statement?
Answer. Some of the actions to which India has committed are
ongoing, such as its pledge to continue its moratorium on nuclear
testing and its commitment to refrain from the transfer of enrichment
and reprocessing technologies to states that do not already have them.
Others can be completed with additional effort, such as India's
adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology
Control Regime. Some of the actions that India must take are complex,
and will take time to complete. There is not yet an established
timetable for the separation of India's civil and military nuclear
infrastructure, for instance. Implementation of the plan will, as the
Joint Statement suggests, take place in a phased manner. We intend to
move expeditiously and will assess progress on all aspects of the Joint
Statement prior to President Bush's expected trip to India in early
2006. We hope that India will have developed and begun to implement a
plan for civil-military separation and also be engaged in substantive
discussions with the IAEA by that time.
Question. In your view, when should Congress act to change U.S.
law? Before or after completion by India of all its undertakings in the
July 18 Joint Statement or after the completion of certain parts of the
Joint Statement?
Answer. Because the Joint Statement will take considerable time to
implement fully, we do not intend to wait until all Indian commitments
are fully realized to submit proposed legislation to the Congress.
Rather, once India develops a transparent and credible civil-military
separation plan for its nuclear facilities and programs and begins to
implement it, we will then seek appropriate legislative solutions.
Ideally, U.S. law would be properly adjusted before the Nuclear
Supplies Group Guidelines are adjusted.
Question. What are the interim forms of legislation being
considered by the Department in this area? Will there be a new nuclear
cooperative agreement with India, one for which statutory amendments
would be required, or does the administration prefer to create a broad,
new authority outside of the current Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2011, et seq.) for India?
Answer. In consultation with Congress, our objective is to conclude
a new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with India that
satisfies all requirements of section 123(a) of the Atomic Energy Act,
except for the requirement that full-scope IAEA safeguards be applied
in India. India has agreed to separate its military and civilian
nuclear facilities and programs, and to place its civilian components
under IAEA safeguards. The result will not be ``full-scope'' IAEA
safeguards, so the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation will not
provide for that; but the agreement will allow for appropriate controls
to help ensure that material or goods provided for civilian purposes
remain within the civilian sector. The administration prefers stand-
alone, India-specific legislation, but could envision alternatives as
well. We look forward to continuing consultations with both the Senate
and the House in the coming weeks.
Question. Could you please provide me with your understanding of
current U.S. law, i.e., which U.S. laws or regulations prohibit exports
to India of nuclear and dual-use nuclear items and which U.S. laws or
regulations provide a presumption (of approval or denial) of such
exports to India, and which such laws and regulations would need to be
modified to implement the Joint Statement?
Answer. Under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954,
as amended, an agreement for cooperation between the United States and
India will be required in order for the United States to engage in
major nuclear cooperation (e.g., nuclear material, nuclear facilities,
and major nuclear components) with India as contemplated by the Joint
Statement. One of the requirements is that an agreement for cooperation
(outside of the NPT-recognized five nuclear weapon states) must include
full-scope safeguards unless exempted by the President as provided in
section 123. An agreement that has been exempted by the President from
one or more requirements in section 123(a) cannot become effective
until Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating
that Congress favors the agreement. We believe stand-alone legislation
offers a preferable long-term solution.
Section 128 of the AEA requires, as one of the export license
criteria for significant nuclear exports, that a recipient nonnuclear
weapon state have full-scope safeguards. The AEA's full-scope
safeguards requirement is incorporated in the regulations of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 10 CFR Sec. 110.42(a)(6), as one of
the export licensing criteria for exports of nuclear facilities and
material. Section 129 of the AEA prohibits significant nuclear
cooperation with a nonnuclear weapon state that is found by the
President to have undertaken certain activities, including detonating a
nuclear explosive device, or to have engaged ``in activities involving
source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for
the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has
failed to take steps which, in the President's judgment, represent
sufficient progress toward terminating such activities.'' The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's regulations at 10 CFR Sec. 110.46 incorporate
section 129 of the AEA. Both section 128 and section 129 provide
Presidential waiver authority.
With respect to dual use nuclear items under the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), there would be no need to make a
regulatory change. Dual-use items are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
As a matter of policy, Commerce does not approve exports to
unsafeguarded facilities. Moreover, the United States remains committed
to not ``in any way'' assist weapons programs in nonnuclear weapon
states as defined by the NPT.
Question. The Joint Statement commits the United States to ``full
civil nuclear energy cooperation with India.'' As the United States has
different forms of nuclear energy cooperation with many nations,
differing even among NPT Parties, what is the meaning of this phrase in
relation to U.S. law and regulation regarding nuclear commerce with
India?
Answer. For the United States, ``full civil nuclear cooperation''
with India means trade in most civil nuclear technologies, including
fuel and reactors. But we do not intend to provide enrichment or
reprocessing technology to India. As the President said in February
2004, ``enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations
seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'' We do not
currently provide enrichment or reprocessing equipment to any country.
We will also need to ensure that any cooperation is fully
consistent with U.S. obligations under the NPT not to ``in any way''
assist India's nuclear weapons program, and with provisions of U.S.
law.
Question. What regulatory changes (beyond those already made under
the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership or NSSP) would need to be made
to implement full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India?
Answer. Many of the specifics of required regulatory changes to
implement full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India have yet to
be determined by the administration. U.S. regulations that incorporate
or reflect statutory language will need to be modified or waived in
order to permit civil nuclear cooperation consistent with the Joint
Statement, and will need to be addressed along with modification or
waiver of the related statute. No Department of Commerce regulatory
changes will be required in order to implement full civil nuclear
cooperation, except as facilities are put under IAEA safeguards, they
could in principle be removed from the Entity List.
Question. Presuming Congressional approval of statutory amendments
and Nuclear Suppliers Group approval of an exception to its Guidelines
for India, when would the United States Government begin to approve the
export of nuclear items or technical data to India, and what are those
items or technical data likely to be?
Answer. Should the NSG and the Congress approve, in principle,
supply would be feasible when the United States and other potential
suppliers assess they can confidently supply to Indian facilities and
remain in compliance with our obligations under the NPT and NSG. This
will occur once IAEA safeguards are put in place and applied in
perpetuity. Further, the separation plan must ensure--and the
safeguards must confirm--that cooperation does not ``in any way
assist'' in the development or production of nuclear weapons. In this
context, nuclear materials in the civil sector must remain within the
civil sector. A clear and transparent separation between India's civil
and military facilities is essential. We will be unable to supply
facilities that are not under appropriate safeguards.
We cannot say precisely which nuclear technologies the United
States (or other suppliers) would export to India, except that we would
exclude reprocessing and enrichment technologies from our list. In our
view, once India makes demonstrable progress in implementing key Joint
Statement commitments--with the presentation of a credible,
transparent, and defensible separation plan foremost on the list--we
will be ready to engage with our NSG partners in developing a formal
proposal to allow the shipment of Trigger List items and related
technology to properly safeguarded facilities in India.
Nuclear Suppliers Group Issues
Question. What are the positions of each of the 44 members of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group on the comments and proposals made by A/S Rocca
and A/S Rademaker during their consultations with NSG members in
Vienna, Austria, last October?
Answer. Not every member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group expressed
an opinion on the comments made by A/S Rocca and A/S Rademaker during
their consultations with NSG Participants at the Consultative Group
meeting in October. The meeting provided many NSG partners the first
opportunity to consider our proposed approach to realizing full civil
nuclear cooperation without amending the NSG Guidelines, per se.
Of those delegations expressing an opinion, some governments,
including the Czech Republic, France, Russia, and the U.K., expressed
support for the proposal; several governments, including Argentina,
China, Greece, Japan, and South Korea, said that their governments
would require further information on implementation, including details
of India's plans for the separation of civilian and military nuclear
facilities, before they could make a decision on the proposals; and
some governments, such as Sweden and Switzerland, expressed initial
reservations and indicated a need for further study.
Question. Could you please furnish the remarks made by Assistant
Secretary Rocca and Assistant Secretary Rademaker in Vienna to the NSG
members to the committee?
Answer. Yes. To satisfy standard NSG confidentiality practices,
Assistant Secretary Rocca's and Assistant Secretary Rademaker's
statements are reproduced below. These are not intended for open
publication.
Question. Did the remarks made by the U.S. delegation present
specific proposals regarding changes to specific parts of the NSG
Guidelines for Nuclear Exports for India?
Answer. We have not yet tabled any formal proposals. We expressed a
preference at the October meeting of the NSG Consultative Group to
treat India as an exceptional case in light of its substantial and
growing energy needs, its nuclear nonproliferation record, and the
enhanced nonproliferation commitments it has now undertaken. We also
expressed our firm intention that the NSG maintain its effectiveness,
and emphasized that we will not undercut this important
nonproliferation policy tool. The U.S. proposal neither seeks to alter
the decisionmaking procedures of the NSG nor amend the current full-
scope safeguards requirement in the NSG Guidelines.
Question. Has the United States shown proposed changes to NSG
Guidelines to Indian Government officials?
Answer. No. Our discussions with India to date have centered on
implementation of Indian and U.S. commitments rather than on what the
NSG should do.
Question. Will India join the NSG?
Answer. In the 18 July Joint Statement, PM Singh committed India
not to join but to adhere to Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines. The practice of unilateral
adherence to the MTCR or NSG is not unique to India. Unilateral
adherents voluntarily abide by the Guidelines of the regime--as do
regime members--but are not formal members, per se. We expect to hold
unilateral adherents, such as India, to the same standards specified in
the Guidelines.
Question. Do you anticipate that the NSG will be able to make a
consensus decision on the U.S. proposal(s) regarding India at its next
plenary meeting?
Answer. While we will certainly consider advancing a formal
proposal for NSG consideration at the next plenary, the pace and scope
of India's implementation will help determine the specific timing.
Should its actions, and our ongoing consultations with NSG partners
support it, we may be in a position to seek agreement on a formal
proposal at the 2006 plenary session, expected in the May/June
timeframe.
INPA Sanctions
Question. On September 23, 2004, the administration sanctioned two
Indian scientists for their activities in Iran under the authority of
the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178, or INPA).
Has the administration considered other sanctions against
Indian entities or persons under INPA or any other relevant
U.S. law or executive order since last September?
Answer. While we believe India has a solid record overall of
ensuring that its nuclear-related expertise and technologies do not
pose a proliferation risk, we continue to review information and take
action to implement U.S. law as appropriate. In an unclassified
response, it would not be appropriate to comment on the consideration
of any other sanctions cases due to intelligence sensitivities that
would surround any such case. However, if additional details are
required, we could provide a classified response separately.
What was the reaction of the Indian Government to the INPA
sanctions last year?
Answer. In the context of our ongoing dialog with India, we
informed the Indian Government when sanctions were imposed. At that
time, they expressed serious concerns, and we discussed the sanctions
cases as part of the dialog. The Indian Government has made clear to us
its commitment to close any loopholes and ensure that its entities are
not a proliferation source of sensitive technologies in the future.
Among recent steps, India has improved its export control legislation
and has harmonized its national control list with the Nuclear Suppliers
Group Guidelines.
What steps has India taken to prevent Indian interactions
with Iranian entities or persons closely involved with Iran's
atomic energy activities?
Answer. We cannot comment in unclassified channels on specific
Indian actions, but would be able to discuss this further in a
classified setting.
We believe India has a solid record overall of ensuring that its
nuclear-related expertise and technologies do not pose a proliferation
risk, and we have an ongoing dialog with India on proliferation issues.
India has clearly demonstrated over the past several years its desire
to work with the United States and the international community to fight
the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies.
As part of an effort launched with India during the
administration's first term--the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership--
India took a number of significant steps to strengthen export controls
and to ensure that Indian companies would not be a source of future
proliferation. Not only did India pledge to bring its export control
laws, regulations, and enforcement practices in line with modern export
control standards, but also passed an extensive export control law and
issued an upgraded national control list that will help it achieve this
goal.
Other measures were also instituted as a part of the NSSP process,
which included India permitting U.S. Government end-use verifications
and agreement to increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation on
nonproliferation.
In addition, India has become a party to the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and has taken significant steps
toward meeting its obligations under UNSCR 1540.
The additional nonproliferation commitments India made as part of
the Joint Statement go even further and, once implemented, will bring
it into closer conformity with international nuclear nonproliferation
standards and practices.
In our view, it is clear that India agrees that Iran's pursuit of a
full nuclear fuel cycle makes no sense from an economic or energy-
security standpoint. India has called on Iran to return to negotiations
with the EU-3 aimed at ending Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability in exchange for expanded cooperation from Europe and others
in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, as well as economic,
commercial, political, and security incentives. India has also called
on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's ongoing investigations, and
to resume a suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities as a way of building confidence. We welcomed India's
decision to join 21 other IAEA Board members in voting to adopt the
September 24 resolution that found Iran in noncompliance with its
safeguards obligations. That outcome demonstrated to Iran that it is
not just the United States and other Western countries that have
concerns about Iran's nuclear activities, but the entire international
community. India has offered full support to the EU-3's efforts to seek
an end to Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions.
India and Iran
Question. India's vote in favor of IAEA Board of Governors (BOG)
Resolution GOV/2005/77 was seen by some as a departure from its
traditional siding with developing countries in multilateral fora.
Prior to the vote, it had been my understanding that the goal of
the United States and the EU-3 at that BOG meeting was to report Iran's
noncompliance to the U.N. Security Council.
Indian officials have taken credit for preventing such a report by
supporting language that found Iran's noncompliance ``within the
competence of the Security Council.'' An earlier Indian Ministry of
External Affairs press release regarding a telephone conversation
between Indian Prime Minister Singh and Iranian President Ahmadinejad
stated that ``India supports the resolution of all issues through
discussion and consensus in the IAEA.''
What were the reasons India did not support reporting
Iranian noncompliance to the Security Council at the last
meeting of the BOG?
Answer. India voted for a resolution that requires a report to the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and finds Iran in noncompliance
with its NPT safeguards obligations under Article XII.C of the IAEA
Statute. However, the timing and content of this report to the UNSC are
still to be determined.
Under what circumstances would India support reporting
Iranian noncompliance to the Security Council?
Answer. In its support for IAEA BOG Resolution GOV/2005/77, India
endorsed sending a report to the Security Council. The contents of the
report and the timing of transmitting the report are unclear at this
point. In our view, it would not be useful to speculate further on this
hypothetical question.
Is it the Administration's position that Iran's
noncompliance should be reported to the Security Council?
Answer. The United States has long expressed the view that Iran
should be reported to the United Nations Security Council. At the
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting
on September 24, India voted--along with the United States and our EU-3
partners--in favor of a resolution that requires a report to the United
Nations Security Council and finds Iran in noncompliance with its NPT
safeguards obligations under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. In
addition, for the first time, the IAEA Board concluded with this
resolution that Iran's pattern of deception and denial, continued lack
of cooperation with the IAEA, and continued pursuit of nuclear fuel
cycle capabilities in defiance of the international community, is a
matter that falls within the competence of the United Nations Security
Council, under Article III.B.4 of the IAEA Statute.
Does the administration consider Iran's July-August 2005
resumption of uranium conversion activities at UCF-Isfahan to
be a breach of its suspension of fuel-cycle activities agreed
to with the EU-3?
Answer. Yes. Under the November 2004 Paris Agreement, Iran agreed
``on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to
include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and
specifically: The manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their
components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas
centrifuges; work to undertake any plutonium separation, or to
construct or operate any plutonium separation installation; and all
tests or production at any uranium conversion installation.'' Iran's
uranium conversion activities represent a breach of its commitments
under the Paris Agreement with the EU-3 and defy the September 24 IAEA
Board resolution, which called on Iran to suspend all enrichment-
related activity including uranium conversion.
Does the Indian Government consider Iran's July-August 2005
resumption of uranium conversion activities at UCF-Isfahan to
be a breach of its suspension of fuel-cycle activities agreed
to with the EU-3?
Answer. We do not know whether India considers Iran in breach of
the Paris agreement, an agreement between Iran and the EU-3. Certainly,
the EU-3 considers Iran in breach.
Question.I understand that India has a formal defense cooperation
agreement with Iran. Has the Department been provided with a copy of
that Agreement, and if so, could you please furnish it to this
committee?
Answer. We do not know of a formal defense cooperation agreement
between Iran and India. A Memorandum of Understanding between the
Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran on Road Map to Strategic Cooperation, was signed on
January 23, 2003, in New Delhi by the previous administrations in both
countries. According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, this
MOU set out, among other things, ``to agree to explore opportunities
for cooperation in defense in agreed areas, including training and
exchange of visits.''
Question. Public reports in late 2004 suggested that India was
considering the sale to Iran of an advanced radar system known as
``Super Fledermaus,'' a system capable of detecting low-flying objects
such as the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) the United States
frequently uses to conduct surveillance operations. The radar system is
produced by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) under license from
Ericsson Radar Electronics, a U.S. firm.
(a) Has India decided not to proceed with this sale?
(b) Do you know of other significant defense equipment sales to
Iran being considered by India?
Answer.
(a) We understand that the sale of the Super Fledermaus system has
not occurred.
(b) We do not know of other significant defense equipment sales to
Iran being considered by India.
Interaction with Other Nonproliferation Policies and Countries
Question. Could you please explain how the policy the
administration adopted in the Joint Statement is consistent with other
administration policies and statements regarding the ongoing crises of
noncompliance in North Korea and Iran?
Answer. The Joint Statement represents a carefully tailored
approach that helps solve a real-world nonproliferation issue: How to
integrate the world's largest democracy and rising 21st power into the
nonproliferation mainstream.
We need to adjust our approaches to take into account the
conditions that exist, so that we can achieve our nonproliferation
objectives. This has been a premise of administration policy since the
outset of President Bush's first term, in which he established non- and
counterproliferation as top national security priorities. Recognizing
that traditional nonproliferation measures were essential but no longer
sufficient, the President has established new concepts and new
capabilities for countering WMD proliferation by hostile states and
terrorists.
There is no comparison between India's nonproliferation history and
energy needs, and the compliance violations incurred by Iran and North
Korea.
Our position on Iran's nuclear program is well known and is
unrelated to our increasing cooperation with India. We do not want to
see any additional states developing nuclear weapons, whether Iran,
North Korea, or others. Iran's compliance violations are a national
security concern to the United States and many of its international
partners--not just the EU-3. Indeed, India's September vote in the IAEA
Board of Governors which found Iran in noncompliance with its nuclear
nonproliferation obligations, demonstrated India's coming of age as a
partner in global nonproliferation efforts.
Further, our understanding with India should not affect the Six-
Party Talks in any way. India has taken a number of steps to deepen its
commitment to nonproliferation and did not violate the NPT in order to
pursue its nuclear weapons ambitions since it was not a party to the
treaty. There can be no comparison of North Korea's record with that of
India. North Korea has violated its NPT and IAEA safeguards
commitments; it must abandon its nuclear weapons program.
______
Responses of Under Secretary Nicholas Burns to Questions Submitted by
Senator Lugar
The Administration's Legislative Proposal and the July 18 Joint
Statement
Question. During your testimony before the committee, you seemed to
indicate that the administration would prefer India-specific
legislative language rather than country-neutral criteria. What are the
strengths, in your view, of an India-specific exception to current U.S.
law as opposed to a country-neutral exception?
Answer. An India-specific exception would build on the precedent
set by the Brownback II amendment, which created a South Asia-specific
waiver authority for four different statutory sanctions without
amending those statutes. An India-specific exception is appropriate to
this country-specific initiative and well reflects the need for
tailored, actor-specific strategies to combat WMD. It would confirm
that the confluence of India's solid nuclear nonproliferation record,
enhanced nonproliferation commitments, growing energy needs and
strategic position in the world requires an unique approach. Finally,
singling out India through legislation would also provide assurances to
the Indian Government that the United States intends to develop key
aspects of this partnership for the long-term.
Question. Is it your view that if Congress did not approve
provisions for India related to nuclear energy that the U.S.-India
relationship would be harmed?
Answer. The initiative to reach civil nuclear cooperation with
India recasts one of the most divisive issues in our relationship, and
is viewed by many in India as a litmus test for our strategic
partnership. If Congress does not approve provisions for India related
to nuclear energy, it is likely that the nuclear issue will continue to
constrain our diplomatic relationship, as well as our strategic,
commercial, defense, and scientific ties, thereby having a negative
impact on many of the bilateral activities mentioned in the July 18
Joint Statement.
Question. Have Indian officials stated to you that if Congress does
not approve a legislative exception for India from current law for
nuclear commerce that India would either look differently on its new
relationship with the United States or respond negatively to the lack
of congressional action?
Answer. Indian officials have not stated that they will treat the
United States differently if Congress does not take action. They have,
however, expressed concern about achieving extensive advances in the
future of U.S.-India relations if either side does not complete its
Joint Statement commitments.
Question. What does India's current plan for its nuclear power
sector call for in terms of the types of reactors (heavy- or light-
water reactors) it will seek from foreign providers?
Answer. Because of the current international restrictions on
nuclear commerce with India, India's plan for its nuclear power sector
seeks to provide for a 20-fold increase in nuclear-generated
electricity by 2020 without reactors from foreign suppliers. In support
of this objective, India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has
committed extensive resources to develop a three-stage nuclear fuel
cycle, based on its plentiful domestic thorium reserves, that involves
fast-breeder reactors, which could pose proliferation risks. Moreover,
some specialists assess that such an approach would not prove cost-
effective, and there are clear technical challenges to overcome.
Opening the Indian market to foreign suppliers provides India with
a vast array of new civil nuclear energy options. Access to new
technologies, such as pebble-bed reactors and low-enriched uranium
reactors, and participation in the Generation IV Forum (GIF) on
advanced nuclear energy systems would encourage more viable and
proliferation-resistant alternatives.
Place in the New Relationship
Question. In testimony before the committee, several experts
suggested that creating an exception from long-standing U.S. law and
policy, and asking the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to do the same
with respect to NSG Guidelines, damages U.S. nonproliferation
leadership, and that the strategic rationale for the Joint Statement
does not provide a basis for such changes.
Why does nuclear energy figure so prominently among the many ways
the United States can forge a new, strategic partnership with India?
Answer. The initiative to reach civil nuclear cooperation with
India recasts a divisive issue that has for decades constrained our
diplomatic relationship, as well as our strategic, commercial, defense,
and scientific ties. In addition to firmly aligning the United States
with a country that shares our democratic values and commitment to
freedom, it holds substantial, concrete benefits for the United States,
India, and the global community.
When implemented, all the steps that India pledged on July 18 will
strengthen the international nonproliferation regime, and bolster our
efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
Commercially, the opening of India's lucrative and growing civil
nuclear energy market to U.S. firms could provide jobs for thousands of
Americans, and provide India with a vast array of clean and viable
options to meet its skyrocketing energy needs. India's participation in
the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) program
will add significant resources and critical talent to global efforts to
develop fusion as a cheap energy source program. If India joins the
Generation IV International Forum (GIF), it could contribute to GIF's
mission to make the next generation of reactors safer, more efficient
and more proliferation resistant. Finally, these efforts will also help
India pursue its ambitious plans for power development and
electrification in a more environmentally friendly manner.
______
Responses of Under Secretary Robert Joseph to Questions Submitted by
Senator Lugar
The Administration's Legislative Proposal and the July 18 Joint
Statement
Question. In your statement you note that Congress should not
``make the perfect the enemy of the good'' and that adding any
conditions to the eventual changes to law that Congress might make for
India would be a ``deal breaker.''
Do you mean that the entire set of things contained in the
Joint Statement, beyond civil nuclear cooperation, would also
be sacrificed if Congress conditioned nuclear commerce with
India on things not detailed in the Joint Statement?
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with the Indian
Government, we believe that additional conditions such as implementing
a moratorium on fissile material production, ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or joining the NPT as a nonnuclear
weapon state ``would likely be deal breakers.''
The initiative to reach civil nuclear cooperation with India will
remove one of the most divisive issues in our bilateral relationship.
If the civil nuclear aspects of the Joint Statement are not realized,
we believe that our diplomatic relationship and our strategic,
commercial, and scientific ties will remain constrained; many of the
bilateral activities delineated in the statement will be adversely
affected.
The critical point is that we must resist the temptation to pile on
conditions that will prejudice our ability to realize the important and
long-standing nonproliferation objectives embodied in the Joint
Statement. We assess that additional conditions such as those specified
above remain deal breakers for India. We are better off with India
undertaking the nonproliferation commitments to which it has now agreed
than in allowing status quo stalemates to prevail.
Question. Does the administration oppose any additional
nonproliferation measures for India beyond those stipulated in the
Joint Statement?
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with the Indian
Government, we believe that additional conditions such as implementing
a moratorium on fissile material production, ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or joining the NPT as a nonnuclear
weapon state ``would likely be deal breakers.''
In our ongoing dialogs, we strongly encourage India to take
additional steps to strengthen nonproliferation, such as joining PSI
and harmonizing its national control lists with those of the Australia
Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. We have indicated that we also plan to
continue to discuss such issues as a fissile material cutoff. But we
strongly recommend against adding additional conditions to Joint
Statement implementation. The Joint Statement reached by President Bush
and Prime Minister Singh is good both for India and for the United
States, and when implemented, offers a net gain for global
nonproliferation efforts. Rather than add additional conditions or seek
to renegotiate the Joint Statement, we believe it would be better to
lock in this deal and then seek to achieve further results as our
strategic partnership advances. We believe that this is a sound
arrangement that should be supported because the commitments India has
made, will, when implemented, bring it into closer alignment with
international nuclear nonproliferation standards and practices and, as
such, strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.
Question. Could you please provide me with your views with regard
to each of the following items, items which have been proposed as those
I might consider including in legislation:
A requirement that India stop producing fissile materials
for nuclear weapons.
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with the Indian
Government, we believe that additional conditions such as implementing
a moratorium on fissile material production, ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or joining the NPT as a nonnuclear
weapon state ``would likely be deal breakers.''
We have sought India's curtailment of fissile material production
but have not reached agreement on this issue. In our assessment,
insisting on such a cutoff as a precondition for implementing the Joint
Statement would likely be a deal breaker for the Indian Government. We
believe that we achieved an important objective, however, by obtaining
India's commitment to designate, separate, and safeguard its civilian
nuclear program. Moreover, the commitment to work toward the completion
of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is a significant step.
We continue to encourage India, as well as Pakistan, to move in the
direction of a fissile material cap or moratorium as part of our
discussions with both governments. We also are willing to explore other
intermediate options that might serve such an objective.
The Joint Statement does not alter our policy on FMCT. We continue
to support immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on
Disarmament of a treaty banning production of fissile material for use
in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We welcome
India's support for the FMCT, which should help to build a consensus to
begin those negotiations.
A requirement that India declare it will not conduct any
more tests of its nuclear weapons.
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with the Indian
Government, we believe that additional conditions such as implementing
a moratorium on fissile material production, ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or joining the NPT as a nonnuclear
weapon state ``would likely be deal breakers.''
In principle, making new U.S. law or waivers contingent on India
fulfilling its commitments in the Joint Statement is a sound idea. As
reflected in its pledge in the Joint Statement, India has already
declared that it will maintain its nuclear testing moratorium. Since to
date Pakistan has test-exploded nuclear weapons only in response to
Indian nuclear tests, this commitment should help diminish the
prospects for future nuclear testing in South Asia.
A distinction between India and NPT parties that would
provide different treatment in terms of the nuclear exports for
non-NPT parties, i.e., India would be eligible for most U.S.
exports except equipment, materials, or technology related to
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production.
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with the Indian
Government, we believe that additional conditions such as implementing
a moratorium on fissile material production, ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or joining the NPT as a nonnuclear
weapon state ``would likely be deal breakers.''
We do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to any
state. Therefore, ``full civil nuclear cooperation'' with India will
not include enrichment or reprocessing technology. We have not yet
determined whether such a prohibition would extend to heavy water
production.
Permitting U.S. nuclear exports only to those Indian
facilities, sites, and locations that are under IAEA safeguards
in perpetuity--not to facilities, sites, or locations under
voluntary safeguards arrangements.
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with the Indian
government, we believe that additional conditions such as implementing
a moratorium on fissile material production, ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or joining the NPT as a nonnuclear
weapon state ``would likely be deal breakers.''
To ensure that the United States and other potential suppliers can
confidently supply to India and meet our obligations under the NPT,
IAEA safeguards on civil facilities must be applied in perpetuity. We,
and other potential suppliers, will be unable to supply facilities that
are not under permanent safeguards.
India's Violations of U.S. Law
Question. In testimony before the House on October 26, 2005,
Leonard S. Spector, Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, stated that
India's misuse of plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied
CIRUS research reactor is not a matter of ancient history; it
is an ongoing offense. The original transgression took place in
the 1970s, when India misused the reactor, along with U.S.-
supplied heavy water that was essential for the reactor's
operation, in order to produce the plutonium for India's 1974
nuclear detonation.
What is the status of India's violation of its peaceful use
undertakings in the 1956 U.S. heavy-water contract, are they
``ongoing'' or are they, as a result of the termination of
U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation, no longer operative?
Answer. India used heavy water that the United States provided
under a 1956 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) contract--along with
Indian and third-country heavy water--as a moderator for the Canadian-
provided CIRUS research reactor, the reactor India reportedly used to
generate plutonium for its weapons program.
After India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, the U.S. Government
examined whether India's actions were inconsistent with a clause under
the 1956 contract stating that the heavy water would be used for
``research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.''
The outcome was that a conclusive answer was not possible due to both
the factual uncertainty as to whether U.S.-supplied heavy water
contributed to the production of the plutonium used for the device and
the lack of a mutual understanding of scope of the 1956 contract
language.
Has any of the plutonium from CIRUS that was produced using
U.S.-origin heavy water been incorporated into Indian nuclear
explosive devices or used in any Indian tests of nuclear
explosive devices?
Answer. As noted above, a conclusive answer has not been possible
as to whether U.S.-supplied heavy water contributed to the production
of the plutonium used for Indian nuclear explosive devices.
Will the administration, as a part of the process under the
Joint Statement, obtain from India a full, accurate, and
complete account of the disposition of any U.S.-origin heavy
water in India?
Answer. The administration believes the most productive approach is
to focus on India's new commitments under the Joint Statement. These
commitments include, among other things, acceptance of IAEA safeguards
(including monitoring and inspections of its civil nuclear facilities
and programs), and agreement to sign and implement the Additional
Protocol, which provides for broadened access to locations and
information regarding nuclear and nuclear-related activities.
Does the Government of India acknowledge that its
unauthorized end use of U.S.-origin heavy water supplied for
the CIRUS reactor was a violation of U.S. law?
Answer. Following India's 1974 detonation of a nuclear device, the
Government of India plainly stated its disagreement with the United
States over the meaning and scope of the clause in the 1956 contract
that stipulated that the heavy water would be used for ``research into
and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.''
At the time, the debate on whether India had violated the contract
was inconclusive owing to the uncertainty as to whether U.S.-supplied
heavy water contributed to the production of the plutonium used for the
1974 device and the lack of a mutual understanding of scope of the 1956
contract language on ``peaceful purposes.''
We have since made it clear that we exclude so-called ``peaceful
nuclear explosions''--and any nuclear explosive activity--from the
scope of peaceful nuclear cooperation.
India has not acknowledged to the United States that it considered
that its use of U.S.-supplied heavy water was a violation of the 1956
contract.
Does the Government of India acknowledge that its 1974
nuclear weapon test was not a ``peaceful nuclear explosion''?
Answer. It is our understanding that it remains the view of the
Indian Government that its test of a nuclear explosive device in 1974
was a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.''
If India declares that CIRUS is a peaceful reactor, would
any plutonium produced there need to be removed from those
plutonium stocks that India has set aside for weapons and
placed under permanent IAEA safeguards?
Answer. We do not yet have from the Government of India a plan
outlining which of its nuclear facilities will be declared civilian;
our discussions continue.
The details of the safeguards agreement which India has undertaken
to negotiate with the IAEA will presumably follow. However, as most
such agreements are not retroactive, we would not expect the agreement
to specify that previously produced material must be returned to the
plant in order to be placed under safeguards. Were the plant to be
placed under safeguards, those safeguards would be applicable in
perpetuity to any material produced by, used by, or stored in the plant
after the effective date of the agreement.
Safeguards Verification and Compliance
Question. Has the Government of India entered into discussions with
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials regarding a new
declaration of civil nuclear sites, facilities, or locations?
Answer. To our knowledge, the Government of India has not yet
entered into discussions with the IAEA. Such a step might be viewed as
premature, considering that India has not yet developed a separation
plan upon which such a declaration would be based. We have indicated
that such a plan must be credible, transparent, and defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint.
Question. When will India submit a new declaration to the IAEA of
its civil sites, facilities, or locations that would be subject to
safeguards?
Answer. There is no set date. The first step is for India to
develop a credible and transparent plan for separating its civil and
military facilities and programs. We hope that such a separation plan
and subsequent declaration to the IAEA of what is to be civilian--as
well as initial implementation toward safeguarding its facilities--can
be accomplished by early 2006.
Question. What kinds of safeguards will be applied to India's
declared civil sites, facilities, or locations (please specify IAEA
Information Circular (INFCIRC) number)?
Answer. Safeguards agreements are modeled after INFCIRC/153 (the
NPT safeguards agreement) or INFCIRC/66 (the Agency's safeguards system
predating the NPT). India will not likely sign a safeguards agreement
based strictly on INFCIRC/153, as this would require safeguards on
India's nuclear weapons program. NPT-acknowledged nuclear weapon states
have so-called ``voluntary'' safeguards agreements that draw on
INFCIRC/153 language, but do not obligate the IAEA to actually apply
safeguards and do allow for the removal of facilities or material from
safeguards. We heard from other states at the recent NSG meeting that
they would not support a ``voluntary offer'' arrangement as, in their
view, it would be tantamount to granting de facto nuclear weapon state
status to India. We have similarly indicated to India that we would not
view such an arrangement as defensible from a nonproliferation
standpoint. We, therefore, believe that the logical approach to
formulating a safeguards agreement for India is to use INFCIRC/66,
which is currently used at India's four safeguarded reactors. For the
most part, INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/153 agreements result in very similar
technical measures actually applied at nuclear facilities.
Question. Will India allow the safeguards applied to its declared
civil sites, facilities, or locations to be permanent, i.e., that no
declared site, facility, or location may be removed from India's
declaration to the IAEA and that the safeguards in place on those
declared sites, facilities, or locations are to be in place in
perpetuity?
Answer. We do not view a safeguards agreement that would allow
India to withdraw facilities or material from safeguards as acceptable,
and we have informed India of this view. Among other considerations, we
must be assured that safeguards will be applied in perpetuity, that
``civil'' material remains in the civil sector, and that any assistance
provided in no way contributes to India's nuclear weapons program. The
safeguards must effectively cover India's civil nuclear fuel cycle and
provide strong assurances to supplier states and the IAEA that material
and technology provided or created through civil cooperation will not
be diverted to the military sphere.
Question. Has the administration briefed the IAEA on its
discussions of a civil-military split in Indian sites, facilities, or
locations, and if so, when?
Answer. No, we have not briefed the IAEA Secretariat on our
discussions of a civil-military split in Indian sites, facilities, or
locations. The IAEA Secretariat will play an essential role in this
process, but that role is still in the future, once India has taken
certain key steps and there is a clearer understanding and acceptance
of India's separation plan.
Question. What are the general ``phases'' (not dates) that will
unfold under the Joint Statement's terms with respect to India's
separation of its civil and military nuclear facilities, sites, or
locations?
Answer. The first step in the process will be for India to produce
a general plan for the separation of its civil and military facilities
and programs. We expect that India will propose a civil-military
separation plan that is credible, transparent, and defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint. Such a plan would form the basis for a
declaration by India to the IAEA of its civil facilities. It would also
form the basis for the negotiation of a safeguards agreement between
the IAEA and India. Negotiation of an Additional Protocol would
probably proceed in parallel with the negotiation of the basic
safeguards agreement, but this remains to be determined. Upon
completion and entry into force of the safeguards agreement, the IAEA
would begin inspections of Indian nuclear facilities. Based on the
language of the Joint Statement, we expect that it will take some time
to complete full implementation of safeguards at India's civil
facilities, and thus implementation would occur in a ``phased'' manner,
based on a sequence identified in the separation plan and as agreed to
with the IAEA and as specified in the safeguards agreement.
Question. The IAEA, because of budgetary pressures, discontinued
inspections in the United States in 1993, largely because the value of
such inspections is of limited utility in states with declared and
lawful nuclear weapons programs. At the request of the U.S. Government,
the IAEA resumed inspections in 1994 by applying safeguards to several
tons of weapons-usable nuclear material, which had been declared excess
to U.S. national security stockpiles. The IAEA undertook this effort on
the condition that the United States reimburse the IAEA.
The Joint Statement notes that India will ``assume the same
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology,
such as the United States.''
Will India declare a portion of its weapons-useable
materials excess to its defense needs and place them under
permanent IAEA safeguards?
Answer. India has not informed us of whether it views any existing
weapons-usable material as ``excess.''
Will India reimburse the IAEA for any inspections conducted
in India on safeguarded facilities, sites, locations, and
materials?
Answer. To our knowledge, the IAEA and India have not yet discussed
whether India will reimburse the IAEA for any inspections conducted in
India on safeguarded facilities, sites, locations, and materials.
Question. Do you assess that the IAEA currently has the staff,
funding, and necessary information to support safeguards monitoring for
India without taking away from inspection and verification efforts in
other countries?
Answer. We recognize that implementing safeguards in India will
entail significant costs that are not currently included in the IAEA's
budget. We look forward to working with the IAEA and the Government of
India to estimate those costs and to identify how best to meet them
without undercutting inspections/verification efforts in other
countries.
Question. Would India permit the IAEA, as a confidence-building
measure, to conduct inspections of its declared facilities, sites, or
locations, and if so, how many such inspections and how many
facilities, locations, or sites would be inspected?
Answer. The safeguards agreement that India negotiates with the
IAEA after developing a separation plan will require sustained IAEA
inspections on all Indian civil facilities containing nuclear material,
with frequency to be determined by the IAEA. The Additional Protocol
will allow inspections of additional nuclear-related locations.
Question. Will the Additional Protocol (AP) that India signs be
identical to the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540)?
Answer. No. The Model Additional Protocol is structured to
accompany a country's full-scope safeguards agreement. Because India's
safeguards agreement will differ from a full-scope safeguards
agreement, India's Additional Protocol will differ from the Model as
well.
Question. In the Joint Statement the Indian Prime Minister states
that India commits to ``signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol
with respect to civilian nuclear facilities.'' Does this mean that
India would not ratify and implement its Additional Protocol?
Answer. No. We expect that India will ratify and implement both its
safeguards agreement and its Additional Protocol.
Question. Is it permissible for any Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS)
under the NPT to sign and adhere to, but not to ratify and implement,
the Additional Protocol?
Answer. While India is not a party to the NPT, nonnuclear weapon
states party to the NPT are obliged under the NPT to bring into force a
full-scope safeguards agreement, effectively covering all nuclear
material in the state. The NPT does not, however, require such a party
to either sign or bring into force an Additional Protocol, whose
provisions strengthen the safeguards agreement beyond what is required
by the NPT. The Additional Protocol's provisions include, for example,
requirements to declare information regarding, and to allow access to,
locations that do not involve nuclear material. The NPT also does not,
unlike the NSG, condition full scope safeguards as a condition of
nuclear supply. Rather the NPT requires that cooperation does not ``in
any way assist'' any weapon program in nonnuclear weapon states.
Question. Is it permissible for any Nuclear Weapon State (NWS)
under the NPT to sign and adhere to, but not to ratify and implement,
the Additional Protocol?
Answer. Nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT are not required
by the NPT to sign any type of safeguards or inspection agreement,
including an Additional Protocol. All such undertakings by the nuclear
weapon states are voluntary.
Question. Will the Additional Protocol that India signs permit it
to exclude the application of safeguards to any facilities, sites, or
locations in India?
Answer. India has not yet negotiated an Additional Protocol with
the IAEA. The Joint Statement indicates that India's Additional
Protocol will apply to Indian civil nuclear facilities, and we expect
that there will be some language in the Indian Additional Protocol
making its scope consistent with that concept. We believe it is
unlikely that India will permit access to its nuclear military
facilities under its Additional Protocol.
Question. When will India sign an AP?
Answer. There is not yet an established timetable for this step.
The actions India committed to, in the Joint Statement, involve complex
issues, and they will take time to implement fully. We hope to move
expeditiously on all aspects of the civil nuclear initiative and will
assess progress prior to President Bush's expected trip to India in
early 2006.
Question. What would be the relationship between India's list of
declared civil sites subject to safeguards and its AP? Are the
provisions of its AP binding on its declared civil sites?
Answer. Two types of inspections would presumably occur at civil
facilities in India: Safeguards inspections that would take place at
nuclear facilities containing nuclear material of a defined purity, and
complementary access inspections that would take place at other
facilities, which, with minor exceptions, do not contain such material.
The first type of facilities is declared and inspected as specified by
the safeguards agreement, and the second type is declared and inspected
as described by the Additional Protocol. The two types of facilities
are distinct, but we anticipate that both would be part of an Indian
declaration. The requirements on the state to provide information and
access are equally binding in the two cases.
Question. With regard to the plan that GOI will bring here this
month, and in connection with the principle of ``Transparency'': If we
are talking about an INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 [safeguards agreement] (SGA), it
would clearly spell out which facilities were covered by the terms of
that SGA. But if India does a voluntary safeguards agreement, or has
some sites covered under a voluntary SGA, or sites, facilities, and
locations colocated with sites that are not covered by the terms of an
INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 SGA, then some of the list of eligible, declared
civilian facilities would be considered ``safeguards-confidential'' not
under an INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 SGA nor made all that transparent. In other
words, there would be an INFCIRC agreement, but no one would have
access to the actual list of sites, facilities, and locations (like our
Voluntary Offer SGA).
Are we prepared to accept a mixed situation in India? Some
sites under VOA-type SGAs and some under INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 SGAs?
Does the IAEA hold such a situation with any other countries?
Answer. Because the IAEA publishes a list of all facilities to
which safeguards are applied, all exporters will be aware of which
facilities in India they can export to. So-called ``voluntary offer''
agreements are used only by the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon
states. In general, voluntary arrangements allow the covered state to
withdraw facilities and material from safeguards at will. In our view,
a voluntary offer arrangement for India would be inconsistent with the
Joint Statement and would not be defensible from a nonproliferation
standpoint.
Is the administration looking to accept a cooperation
agreement that would already be covered by an existing 66
agreements (i.e., Tarapur), and then let India put additional
civilian facilities on an eligible list?
Answer. Both an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation between
the United States and India and a new safeguards agreement between
India, the IAEA, and possibly other parties, would have to be
negotiated.
There is no ``eligible list'' associated with current Indian
safeguards arrangements, which conform to INFCIRC/66. We expect India
``to place all its civil nuclear facilities under full IAEA safeguards
and that includes monitoring and inspections,'' as Under Secretary
Burns said July 20, 2005. Since a voluntary offer arrangement would not
require the IAEA to apply safeguards to facilities on a list of those
eligible for safeguards, it would not meet that standard. Furthermore,
in order to provide reasonable assurances to potential suppliers that
they are not assisting the Indian nuclear weapons program, among other
things safeguards must be applied in perpetuity and ``civil'' nuclear
material must remain civil.
India's Export Control Laws, Regulations, and Policies
Question. Has the administration undertaken an expert-level legal
analysis of India's export control laws and regulations?
Answer. Department of State and Commerce lawyers and export control
experts have reviewed India's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their
Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, adopted in
2005, consistent with India's NSSP and Joint Statement commitments. We
continue to discuss export control related issues with the Government
of India.
Question. If so, could you please furnish that analysis to this
committee?
Answer. There is today no consolidated analytical document
representing an interagency assessment of India's export control law
and regulations. As always, we stand ready to brief the committee on
the results of our review.
Question. I understand that the State Department sent a number of
questions concerning India's export control law(s) (what is termed its
``WMD law'') to New Delhi some time ago. Has the Government of India
answered all of those questions, and could you please furnish (a) those
questions and (b) answers to this committee?
Answer. Given the sensitivities of the diplomatic communications
involved, we cannot provide the information for the record. However, we
would be happy to provide the committee with a briefing on our
exchanges with India on this issue. We intend to have follow-on
discussions regarding the implementation of the WMD law within the High
Technology Cooperation Group meetings in early December 2005.
Question. Does Indian law specify anything with regard to the
reexport or resale of foreign-origin dual-use equipment?
Answer. As we understand the Indian legislation, export from India
of foreign-origin dual-use equipment exported to India, if of types
covered by India's own control list and catch-all controls, would be
subject to the same requirements that apply to export of Indian-origin
goods.
Question. What does Indian law specify about the access of either
foreign nationals or dual-nationals to sensitive items exported from
other nations to India?
Answer. India's new WMD law deals specifically with the possession,
export, reexport, transfer, and other conveyance or trafficking of WMD
and their delivery systems, their components, and related technology by
Indian and foreign nationals. The law, however, does not address access
by foreign nationals or dual nationals to such items or technology in
the course of those individuals' legitimate employment in India.
Clause 13(4) of the WMD law seems to address in-country transfers
of items to foreigners, but the operation of this provision is not
entirely clear.
Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work at or
have access to sites currently subject to IAEA safeguards in India
(Rajasthan 1 & 2 and Tarapur 1 & 2)?
Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which specific
foreign nationals may work or have access to these facilities. In
general, however, IAEA inspectors, who are foreign nationals, have
access to Rajasthan 1 & 2 and Tarapur 1 & 2, since these sites are
subject to IAEA safeguards. The Indians have also granted Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) delegations limited access to those
facilities, most recently in February 2005. Additionally, the World
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) is able to conduct peer reviews
at these sites.
Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work at or
have access to the Indian nuclear facilities Kundankulam 1 and 2?
Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which specific
foreign nationals may work or have access to these facilities. In
general, however, Kundankulam 1 & 2 are being constructed under a
contract between India and the Russian Federation, so we presume that
Russian nationals have access to these sites. IAEA inspectors, who are
foreign nationals, will eventually have access to Kundankulam 1 & 2,
once they are placed under IAEA safeguards.
Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work at or
have access to the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)
Headquarters in Bangalore, India; ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command
Network (ISTRAC); ISRO Inertial Systems Unit (IISU),
Thiruvananthapuram; Liquid Propulsion Systems Center; Solid Propellant
Space Booster Plant (SPROB); Space Applications Center (SAC),
Ahmadabad; Sriharikota Space Center (SHAR); Vikram Sarabhai Space
Center (VSSC), Thiruvananthapuram?
Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which, if any,
foreign nationals may work or have access to these facilities. We stand
ready to discuss this and other considerations relating to these
organizations further with the committee in a separate classified
forum.
Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work at or
have access to the following Indian Department of Atomic Energy
entities: Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC); Indira Gandhi Atomic
Research Center (IGCAR); Indian Rare Earths; Nuclear reactors
(including power plants) not under International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards, fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities, heavy
water production facilities and their collocated ammonia plants?
Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which, if any,
foreign nationals may work or have access to these facilities. We stand
ready to discuss this and other considerations relating to these
organizations further with the committee in a separate classified
forum.
Question. Does Indian law contain ``catch-all'' controls on items
not otherwise stipulated in national controls?
Answer. Clause 11 of the 2005 WMD law prohibits export of any
material, equipment, or technology if the exporter knows that the
exported items are intended for use in the design or manufacture of a
biological weapon, chemical weapon, nuclear weapon, or other nuclear
explosive device, or in their missile delivery systems, but does not
specifically refer to transfers, retransfers, items brought in transit
or transshipment. We read Clause 11 of the 2005 WMD law as a catch-all
provision similar to the ``knows'' portion of the U.S. catch-all
control provisions. Clause 5 of the 2005 WMD law may provide the
equivalent of the ``is informed'' portion of the U.S. catch-all
controls over exports, reexports, transshipments, and transits.
Question. Have there been successful prosecutions of entities or
persons brought by the Government of India for violations of its export
control laws?
Answer. The Government of India has been actively prosecuting the
Indian entity NEC Engineers Private Ltd.'s cooperation with Iraq.
According to Indian press reports, NEC sent 10 shipments containing
titanium vessels, filters, titanium centrifugal pumps, atomized and
spherical aluminum powder, and titanium anodes to Iraq. The NEC
prosecution is ongoing.
We do not have information on other examples of Indian prosecutions
regarding violations of its export control laws. One reason for this is
that, before India passed its WMD law this year, its governmental
authority over such export activities was relatively limited. India's
new WMD law has greatly increased its ability to hold its entities and
individuals accountable for activities that impinge on nonproliferation
practices.
Question. Did India pursue any action (civil or criminal) against
Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad and Dr. C. Surendar after the United States
sanctioned them under the authority of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of
2000 (P.L. 106-178)?
Answer. We understand that India investigated the activities of the
retired scientists Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad and Dr. C. Surendar after the
United States imposed sanctions on them in September 2004. As far as we
are aware, India did not pursue any civil or criminal action against
Drs. Prasad or Surendar.
Question. Does the United States have any information that Indian
entities or persons in the United States have engaged in attempts to
falsify necessary bona fides in transactions with U.S. entities or
persons?
Answer. Any such activities would be regarded as a law enforcement
matter in this country. Any such matters would need to be addressed to
the Department of Justice, Department of Commerce, and/or the
Department of Homeland Security.
Question. In oral remarks made at the Department of Commerce's
annual Bureau of Industry Security (BIS) ``Update'' Conference recently
held in Washington, DC, Steven Goldman, director of the BIS Office of
Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, stated that ``India has
modified its approach, has made major commitments, in many respects
commitments that exceed those of our closest allies.'' \1\
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\1\ As found at http://www.exportcontrolblog.com/blog/2005/10/
update_day_one_4.html.
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Do you concur with this assessment, and if so, how does India
exceed the nonproliferation commitments made by our closest allies, in
particular, those who are nuclear weapon states (such as the United
Kingdom) under Article I of the NPT?
Answer. The Department of State agrees that India has made major
commitments which, when implemented, will bring it closer into
conformity with nonproliferation standards and practices. India has
committed to a number of important nonproliferation steps. Some of
these steps exceed NPT requirements, such as India's export-restraint
of enrichment and reprocessing technologies and its willingness to sign
and adhere to an Additional Protocol.
RMP Facility
Question. Do you concur with the assessment of alleged Indian
attempts to illicitly acquire certain dual-use nuclear technology
provided by David Albright during testimony before the House on October
26, 2005? Which states in relevant part:
Indian nuclear organizations use a system that hires domestic
or foreign nonnuclear companies to acquire items for these
nuclear organizations. Such procurement appears to continue for
its secret gas centrifuge enrichment plant near Mysore. In an
attempt to hide its true purpose from suppliers and others when
it started this project in the 1980s, India called the facility
the Rare Materials Plant (RMP) and placed it under Indian Rare
Earths (IRE) Ltd, an Indian Department of Atomic Energy company
focused on mining and refining of minerals. Since the mid-
1980s, IRE has served as a management company for RMP and
appears to be the declared end-user of its procurements of
centrifuge-related equipment and materials.\2\
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\2\ Available at http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/
alb102605.pdf.
Answer. We cannot comment in any detail in unclassified channels on
assessments of activities of Indian entities or facilities. We could
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discuss further in classified session.
Question. What is the purpose of the RMP facility?
Answer. We cannot comment in any detail in unclassified channels on
assessments of activities of Indian entities or facilities. We could
discuss further in classified session.
Question. The Commerce Department issued revised U.S. regulations
for balance of plant exports to certain Indian entities last
September.\3\ The Indian Department of Atomic Energy entity called
``Indian Rare Earths'' is named in those FR notices, but could you
please explain for the record the current regulatory treatment provided
to the entity Indian Rare Earths under current law and regulation?
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\3\ 69 FR 56,693 (2004), revised in 69 FR 58,049 (2004).
Answer. The September 22, 2004, regulatory change did not change
the regulatory treatment for Indian Rare Earths. India Rare Earths is
still a listed entity under Commerce regulations, as it has been since
the sanctions were imposed in 1998. Therefore, under the Export
Administration Regulations, exporters need to apply for licenses to
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export even uncontrolled commodities to this end-user.
Proliferation Security Initiative
Question. Why has India not joined the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI)?
Answer. The United States has encouraged India to join PSI, given
its geographic location along several key routes for proliferation
trafficking and its significant operational capabilities in the region.
Officials of the Government of India have told us that they are
continuing their internal review of PSI, including an examination of
the international and national legal underpinnings for their possible
participation in PSI. We are hopeful that India will soon endorse PSI,
and join the more than 70 countries around the world--and United
Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan--that have expressed their support
for PSI.
Question. What are the views of the Government of India on the
Statement of Interdiction Principles?
Answer. Officials of the Government of India have told us that they
are continuing their internal review of PSI, including an examination
of the international and national legal underpinnings for their
possible participation in PSI. We are hopeful that India will soon
endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, and join the more
than 70 countries around the world--and United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan--that have expressed their support for PSI.