[Senate Hearing 109-368]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-368
FIREFIGHTING AIRCRAFT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND FORESTS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TO
REVIEW PROGRESS MADE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERIM AND LONG TERM PLANS
FOR USE OF FIRE RETARDANT AIRCRAFT IN FEDERAL WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION
OPERATIONS
__________
FEBRUARY 15, 2006
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
_____
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 2006
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska RON WYDEN, Oregon
RICHARD M. BURR, North Carolina, TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CONRAD BURNS, Montana MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia KEN SALAZAR, Colorado
GORDON SMITH, Oregon ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Alex Flint, Staff Director
Judith K. Pensabene, Chief Counsel
Robert M. Simon, Democratic Staff Director
Sam E. Fowler, Democratic Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho, Chairman
CONRAD R. BURNS, Montana, Vice Chairman
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming RON WYDEN, Oregon
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
GORDON SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
Pete V. Domenici and Jeff Bingaman are Ex Officio Members of the
Subcommittee
Frank Gladics, Professional Staff Member
Scott Miller, Democratic Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS
Page
Burns, Hon. Conrad R., U.S. Senator from Montana................. 2
Craig, Hon. Larry E., U.S. Senator from Idaho.................... 1
Hall, James, Hall & Associates, LLC.............................. 20
Hatfield, Nina Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Policy,
Management and Budget, Department of the Interior.............. 7
Hull, James B., President, National Association of State
Foresters...................................................... 27
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska................... 2
Rey, Mark, Under Secretary for Natural Resources and the
Environment, Department of Agriculture......................... 5
Salazar, Hon. Ken, U.S. Senator from Colorado.................... 4
APPENDIX
Responses to additional questions................................ 33
FIREFIGHTING AIRCRAFT
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Public Land and Forests,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:30 p.m. in room SD-366, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Larry E. Craig presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY E. CRAIG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Craig. Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to
today's Public Lands and Forests Subcommittee hearing. Today we
will take testimony from the Department of Agriculture's Under
Secretary of Natural Resources and the Environment, Mark Rey,
and the Department of the Interior's Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Policy Management and Budget, Nina Rose Hatfield. Tom
Harbour, I understand, is a backup resource for the U.S. Forest
Service.
I also want to welcome back to our hearing room Mr. Jim
Hall of Hall & Associates and Mr. Jim Hull, the Texas State
Forester. They provided excellent testimony on the Blue Ribbon
Panel on Federal Aerial Firefighting Assisting Safety and
Effectiveness Report in our 2003 meeting and I expect that same
type of testimony today. Mr. Hull, if you also want to give us
a quick update on your experiences in the recent fires in both
Texas and Oklahoma this winter, I think the committee and the
record would appreciate that.
I've called this hearing for four reasons. First, the Blue
Ribbon Panel called for the agencies to develop a plan to
replace retardant aircraft with non-military aircraft.
In 2004, Congress directed the agency to develop a long-
term strategy and report back to Congress by March 2005. What
do the agencies plan on doing to resolve this issue? What will
the cost be to move away from the old paradigm by using old
military aircraft to do whatever it is the agencies plan and
are recommending?
Next, the Forest Service has acquired three Navy P-3 Orions
that it plans to convert into retardant aircraft and contract
with a company or companies to operate and maintain these
aircraft. It would seem to me that this acquisition might tell
us what the long-term strategy is, but we need to discuss the
costs and the implication of this strategy.
Third, the blue ribbon report included a number of other
important recommendations and I will explore some of them in my
questions with our witnesses this afternoon.
Last, I see that the BLM is moving toward a higher number
of exclusive use contracts for its single-engine retardant
aircraft. Given the uproar that engulfed the Forest Service
last year regarding helicopter contracts, I want to know that
the BLM has learned from the Forest Service's tantrum of last
year. Additionally, you need to help me understand the shift to
larger single-engine retardant aircraft and what that means.
Mr. Hall will have to leave us earlier to make his flight.
Thus I may move him forward in the hearing in relation to
questions. We will see how we're progressing and I'll let, of
course, him know, but I don't think that we're going to extend
beyond his time limit.
Finally, I know that many of the members may want to take
this opportunity to ask Under Secretary Rey about the
administration's proposal to sell Forest Service lands in order
to finance payments to counties. So far, those Senators have
not showed up. We'll see how that progresses. Mark, I would
suggest one might need to be prepared to respond to those kinds
of questions.
Mr. Rey and the Chief of the Forest Service are scheduled
for a hearing on February 28 at 10 a.m. here on budget issues.
That would be the more appropriate time for us to discuss that.
I will maintain a 5-minute clock for testimony and questions of
the committee. We'll make both your written and oral
testimonies a part of our record, so I urge you to resist
referring to your full testimony, giving us the opportunity to
move to the necessary and appropriate questions.
Again, welcome before the committee. And before I turn to
Nina and Mark, let me turn to Senator Lisa Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski.
[The prepared statement of Senator Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Conrad R. Burns, U.S. Senator From Montana
Chairman Craig, thank you for calling this hearing to discuss
wildland aviation fire safety and thanks to our witnesses for traveling
to be here today.
Firefighting aircraft play an integral role in wildland fire
management. In Montana, we understand the dangers associated with
catastrophic wildfires and firefighting. The crews of these planes take
exceptional risk and perform a great service to our state. Since the
Blue Ribbon report was published in 2002, this subcommittee has met
several times to track the Forest Service's progress in implementing
the findings of the report.
I am also concerned with the rising cost of aerial operations. In
recent years the Forest Service has expended as little as $155 million
dollars in FY 2004 and as much as $255 million in FY 2002 for all
aviation activities. It is estimated the cost could be in excess of
$280 million in a bad fire season. With rising costs, it is important
the Forest Service has a strategy plan in place for procuring and
managing its aviation assets in the future. Congress has asked for this
plan and is still waiting.
I am also interested to hear more about the Forest Service's plan
for the recently acquired Lockheed P-3 Orion Aircraft. I am primarily
concerned about whether or not the government will face liability in
the event of an accident.
Thank you again for joining us here today. I look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR
FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to speak this afternoon. Welcome. It's always
nice to see and talk about issues that are important to us up
north, and as you know, things have been warm up there the past
couple of summers. But, Senator Craig, I want to thank you, as
the chairman of the subcommittee, for holding the hearing so
early this year. What has been happening up north is that it
appears that our fire season seems to be coming just a little
bit earlier year after year. So it is appropriate for the
subcommittee to conduct the oversight hearings while we can
still influence the Federal fire managers for the upcoming
season.
Now, we always seem to refer to the 2004 fire season in
Alaska as the toughest fire season on record. We lost about
seven million acres burned up there, mostly in the interior,
but really last year wasn't much better. We lost 4.1 million
acres. It was the third busiest fire season on record and it
was also very significant in that fire managers were battling
two very significant fires in May. We never used to think about
May as being fire season in Alaska, but we saw them in Kenai
and the Northway fires.
While the number of acres burned in 2005 was less than in
2004, what we saw from the smoke and Alaskans suffering from
the smoke, I felt it was increased. I spent a little bit of
time in the interior in both July and in August doing my other
duties--that of being a soccer mom--and had the misfortune of
being in conditions where the soccer tournaments were canceled,
where I had people coming up to me and saying, yes, we
appreciate that the job is all about protecting property,
protecting life, but the quality of life is such that we can't
go outside. We're canceling the sporting events, they're
advising seniors and young children to stay indoors if you've
got any kind of respiratory issues. It was an issue where I had
people coming to me saying, I live here in the interior, suffer
through the long, cold winters because we know during the
summertime we can go out and enjoy the sunshine, enjoy the heat
of the interior, and people couldn't go outside because of the
air quality issues.
So, really, we still see the lack of availability of the
heavy airtankers during the fire season and that's irritating
people as much as the smoke. They're saying, where are the
tankers, what's going on? Now, we have contracted with the
heavy airtankers from Canada for the past several seasons, but
there remains this arguing, quibbling with the Federal
Government about where the tankers can be used.
And we've had great discussion in this committee about the
interagency operations. As we know, the firefighting in Alaska
is uniformly interagency. The State has the lead in south-
central, the Federal Government has the lead in the interior,
but the resources are used Statewide. We believe, the State
firmly believes, that the tankers are safe to fly on fires
anywhere in the State and that the rigor of the Canadian
regulation assures that they're safe.
We've brought this issue up now for several years, 3 years
running. We still don't have an entirely straight answer. Last
year, Mr. Rey, you testified the problem was resolved, but then
we got a letter from Lynn Scarlett saying that, in fact, it
wasn't fixed. So I do look forward to the agency's plans for
the 2006 fire season. We certainly hope that a long-term
solution to the tanker availability problem is going to be
resolved and we see that problem disappear. So I appreciate
your testimony here this afternoon. And I appreciate the
opportunity, Mr. Chair, to make a few comments.
Senator Craig. Senator, thank you very much. Now let us
turn to our colleague, Ken Salazar, Senator Salazar of
Colorado.
STATEMENT OF HON. KEN SALAZAR, U.S. SENATOR
FROM COLORADO
Senator Salazar. Thank you very much, Chairman Craig, and
thank you for your leadership, not only on this subcommittee,
but also on this issue. It's good to know that you're out front
before the heat of the fire season starts making sure that
we're ready to do what we need to do.
Senator Craig. Well, looking at that map, you're kind of in
it feet first, I guess. Is that how we say it?
Senator Salazar. I was trying to calculate the percentage.
It looks like about 66 percent, about two-thirds of us, are
right there in that danger zone.
Senator Craig. Okay.
Senator Salazar. So I am concerned. And I very much
appreciate you holding the hearing. I was noticing--let me see,
how much of Idaho is in there? Well, not very much. Thank you,
sir, for holding this hearing. I know Alaska's right in there,
too, so I think there are a number of our States that are in
there. I think it's an important hearing because, even though
we now have 10 feet of snow in many of our mountain ranges, we
know that that will all disappear and we'll be in the fire
season again sooner than we expect.
For me, from a perspective of Colorado, I witnessed in 1994
a Storm King tragedy which resulted in 14 men and women dying
on Storm King Mountain near Glenwood Springs. I also, during
the time I was attorney general, participated in some of the
efforts concerning two huge fires in Colorado. One, which was
the Hayman fire, was started by one of the Federal employees
and burned 138,000 acres. Also in that tragedy, there were four
young men and women who died on their way to fighting that
fire. And, finally, in 2002, we lost two crew members when a
helicopter and a tanker crashed in the Big Elk fire near Estes
Park.
And so it's an issue of great concern to me and I look
forward to hearing from the agency what plans we have with
respect to these slurry bombers in the year ahead.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I have some
questions that I would ask, if I could submit them for the
record, and then if the agency could respond to those
questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Craig. Certainly questions will become a part of
the record for their response. We appreciate that.
Senator Salazar. Thank you.
Senator Craig. Now let us proceed with our witnesses.
Aerial fire assault has become a very major part of your fire
budgets and the quality of the aircraft is in question and, of
course, we've been through several iterations of this now, so
let us proceed. Let me turn first to Mark Rey, Under Secretary
for Natural Resources and the Environment, Department of
Agriculture. Again, Mark, welcome before the committee. Please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF MARK REY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Mr. Rey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to talk about our Department's aviation programs
today. We'll be submitting a single statement and we'll both
summarize elements of it. In the statements, we'll discuss our
aviation resources, responses to reports and recommendations to
improve the fire aviation program, progress on our long-term
aviation plans, and the outlook for the upcoming fire season.
The fire aviation program has undergone significant changes
since the spring of 2004, when contracts for large airtankers
were terminated in the wake of the NTSB report addressing
airworthiness issues. In 2004 and 2005, we made greater use of
small single-engine airtankers and both large and medium
helicopters. This strategy, combined with the certification and
return to service of 16 large tankers, has served us well. The
mix of aircraft, including large airtankers, SEATs,
helicopters, and other aircraft, provided aerial support to our
firefighters in achieving an initial attack success rate of
98.2 percent in 2003, 99.1 percent in 2004, and 98.5 percent in
2005. So our 2 years of experience in 2004 and 2005 with our
modified aviation fleet has proven successful results. We
continue to have the firefighter's equipment and aircraft
necessary to achieve a high rate of success in suppressing
fires on initial attack, and we expect that will continue
during the 2006 fire season.
As I indicated, in May 2004, we terminated the contracts
for 33 large airtankers, based on the recommendation of the
NTSB regarding the airworthiness of these aircraft. The NTSB's
recommendation were the result of investigations of three large
airtanker crashes. The report noted the need to have
maintenance and investigation--maintenance and inspection
programs for all firefighting aircraft based on their
operational service life in the firefighting environment. It
was the opinion of NTSB that the FAA, the Forest Service and
DOI all have a role in ensuring airworthiness for aircraft use
in firefighting operations, but that the primary role for
assuring the airworthiness of large airtankers rests with the
Forest Service.
At the time of the NTSB report, mechanisms to assure
airworthiness of firefighting aircraft were not fully
developed. Consequently, the contracts for 33 large airtankers
were terminated. Two subsequent actions were immediately taken.
First, we developed a strategy of utilizing SEATs and
helicopters to provide additional aerial support, and second,
we began a lengthy process to address the airworthiness of the
large airtankers. Following that work, a determination on the
airworthiness of two models of large tankers was made and these
aircraft were turned into service.
We have been unsuccessful in assessing the operational
service life for 14 Douglas DC-4, 6, and 7 aircraft. Without
confidence in a method of determining the structural strength
and fatigue life of the Douglas aircraft, neither the Forest
Service, nor any other firefighting organization, can be
reasonably assured of their safety. Therefore, consistent with
the manufacturer's advice--that would be the Boeing
Corporation--the DC-7 that was flown experimentally in 2004 and
2005 will not be federally contracted for 2006.
In January 2006, three additional Lockheed P-3B aircraft
were made available from the U.S. Navy. Ownership of these
aircraft has been transferred to the Forest Service. The Forest
Service, on behalf of the firefighting agencies, will pursue
competitive bids to install tanks and operate the aircraft.
Conversion inspections of these aircraft could take several
months. They are expected to be available for the 2007 fire
season. In response to your question, this is not part of our
long-term strategy, but it's an effort in the interim to add
some additional flexibility to our airtanker fleet.
During the 2006 fire season, we expect to have available 16
large airtankers, subject to testing and inspection, and four
military C-130 aircraft equipped with modular airborne
firefighting systems. An additional four of these C-130
aircraft will be available when maintenance and inspections are
completed in the early summer and they will thereafter be added
to the firefighting fleet.
Along with the heavy tankers and the SEATs, additional
large, type I helicopters and medium helicopters have allowed
us to fight wildland fires even with the reduction in the
number of large airtankers. While the large, fixed-wing
airtankers have the ability to fly faster and go longer
distances to deliver retardant, a type I helicopter with a
retardant supply can exceed fixed-wing airtankers in capacity
and effectiveness.
For the 2006 fire season, the Forest Service and DOI plan
to have available 15 exclusive-use and 94 call-when-needed
large helitankers and helicopters, as well as 39 exclusive-use
and 110 call-when-needed medium helicopters. Seventy-three
smaller, type III, exclusive-use helicopters are stationed
around the country for local use in areas of high fire
potential. There are also a large number of call-when-needed,
type III helicopters available.
I'll take just a second to respond to the clarification
that Senator Murkowski requested about the availability of
tankers in Alaska. First and foremost, all of our large
airtankers and all of--virtually all of our aviation assets are
national assets and if they are needed in Alaska, they will be
directed there, as they're requested by incident commanders in
the State.
Additionally, the State of Alaska also flies aircraft. At
one time last year, we thought they were going to be flying the
CL-215's, which are certificated for air safety and would not
have been restricted in any fashion. Later, the State changed
its mind and contracted with some DC-6's. As I said earlier, we
have not been able to assure the operational service life of
the DC-6's, so those won't be flown in Federal incidences. As
long as they're flown under State control, however, they would
not be restricted for use in Alaska.
With that, I turn the microphone over to Ms. Hatfield for
the balance of our statement.
Ms. Hatfield. Thank you, Mark.
Senator Craig. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF NINA ROSE HATFIELD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
POLICY MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Ms. Hatfield. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
thank you for this opportunity to meet with you today to
discuss the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and the
Department of the Interior's Fire Aviation Program. As Mr. Rey
stated, the fire aviation program is an important and multi-
faceted component of our overall firefighting strategy and is
used in tandem and in support of our other firefighting
operations.
Today, I'd like to address our refinement in the use of
single-engine airtankers, or SEATs, in our firefighting
efforts, our response to the report of the blue ribbon panel,
and the 2006 outlook for the fire season. In 2006, the BLM will
implement a refined aviation program that will achieve greater
operational efficiencies by focusing on faster, higher-capacity
aircraft and enhancing collaboration and cooperation to
position these aircraft where the need is the greatest.
The overall number of aircraft will essentially remain
unchanged from last year, but they'll be managed in a more
efficient manner. By using faster, higher-capacity aircraft and
extending the lengths of the exclusive use contracts, the BLM
will achieve the same or greater capacity than in 2005. For
example, two 800-gallon SEATs would replace three 500-gallon
SEATs in this new strategy.
As a result, all the geographic areas will continue to have
access, as they have in previous years, to more aircraft when
the need arises. BLM is also initiating a program to collect
flight data encountered in firefighting operations with the
long-term goal to gather and analyze data regarding the
structural conditions and continuing airworthiness in the fire
environment for each aircraft's particular mission, whether
it's a smokejumper aircraft, helicopters, aerial supervision,
or other types of aircraft and missions.
We referred earlier today to the NTSB study, which the
Forest Service and DOI co-sponsored, and to a blue ribbon panel
to review all aspects of the aviation program. Both Departments
appreciate the efforts of Mr. Hall and Mr. Hull, who are co-
chairs of the blue ribbon panel.
As a result of the NTSB and blue ribbon panel reports, the
Departments have a number of efforts underway to anticipate and
address the long-term aviation needs of the fire community and
for the continued protection of lives, property, and resources.
The feasibility of aircraft, such as the S-3 Viking and other
aircraft, for the use of airtankers is being studied. In
addition, both the Forest Service and DOI are collecting and
analyzing flight data that will help us in improving aviation's
safety for the future. This data will also provide a foundation
for the discussion of purpose-built airtankers, or airtankers
specifically designed and built for missions and operations in
the fire environment.
In response to the blue ribbon panel findings, both DOI and
the Forest Service have modified its contracting procedures for
aircraft to focus on obtaining the best value without
compromising safety considerations.
In addition, both DOI and the Forest Service have
progressed in the implementation of training, including online
training for our SEAT contract pilots. Prior to the 2006
season, the Forest Service will train nearly 300 agency and
contract pilots through its sponsored crew resource management
courses and the National Aerial Firefighter Academy.
An interagency work group comprised of the agency fire
directors and the National Association of State Foresters is
identifying unified and consistent mission standards, as well
as assessing the long-term needs of the aviation program.
Recognizing the evolution and changing needs of the aviation
program, this group will address the next 10 to 15 years of
interagency fire aviation needs.
The first phase of this group's work, which provides a
broad overview of the entire aviation program, including large
airtankers, is currently underway. Phase two will address
congressional direction for a strategic plan and will contain
more specific elements, such as the issues surrounding purpose-
built airtankers. Phase three of this effort will be the
creation of an implementation plan that will be developed
shortly after the completion and approval of phase two. We
anticipate initial implementation to occur in fiscal year 2007,
with full implementation phased in over a number of years.
Now, as we turn our attention to the outlook for the 2006
fire season, as you have already noted, this map demonstrates
that our 2006 fire season is shaping up to be another
challenging year. The areas in maroon represent those areas in
which we believe there's an above normal potential for fire
activity. And then in the Northeast area, you will see that the
predictive services indicate that we think we'll have less than
a normal fire year. So this certainly does reflect the drought
conditions that continue across much of the Southwest and the
fire activity that is expected to begin early and remain above
normal through June and into July.
However, Alaska, as you can see, especially in the Kenai
Peninsula, continues to have areas of concern where we expect
to have higher than normal fire potential. We do expect to have
firefighting resources, firefighters, equipment, and aircraft
that are comparable to those that were available in 2005. If
local areas experience severe fire risks, we will continue to
increase firefighting ability by staging or deploying our
firefighters and equipment as it is needed. Each aerial
resource, whether fixed-wing or helicopter, fields a key role
in that multifaceted interagency fire suppression strategy.
We have shown that we have the capability for adjusting for
the short-term as we complete our long-range plan using the
kind of information that is behind the construction of this
map. We certainly are keenly aware of the challenges that we
face regarding fire aviation and aerial support of our
firefighters on the ground in protecting lives, property, and
resources, and we are facing these challenges head-on.
We appreciate your continued support and look forward to
working with you as we move forward through this process toward
an ever more modern and efficient fire and aviation program for
the future. We'd like to thank you again for the opportunity to
discuss these aviation issues with you today and we'd be happy
to answer your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared joint statement of Mr. Rey and Ms. Hatfield
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nina Rose Hatfield, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Policy, Management and Budget, Department of the Interior, and Mark
Rey, Under Secretary, Natural Resources and Environment, Department of
Agriculture
introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the Department of
Agriculture Forest Service and the Department of the Interior (DOI)
fire aviation program. Since the two Departments work closely together
in fire management, we are providing a joint statement. The fire
aviation program is an important and multifaceted component of our
overall firefighting strategy, and is used in tandem and in support of
other firefighting operations. In our testimony today, we will discuss
our aviation resources, responses to reports and recommendations to
improve the fire aviation program, progress on our long-term aviation
plans, and the outlook for the upcoming fire season.
background
The fire aviation program has undergone significant changes since
the spring of 2004 when contracts for large airtankers were terminated
in the wake of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report
addressing airworthiness issues. In 2004 and 2005, we made greater use
of smaller Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATs) and both large and medium
helicopters. This strategy, combined with the certification and return
to service of 16 large air tankers has served us well. The mix of
aircraft, including large air tankers, SEATs, helicopters, and other
aircraft provided aerial support to our firefighters in achieving an
initial attack success rate of 98.2 percent in 2003, 99.1 percent in
2004, and 98.5 percent in 2005.
The increasing accuracy of interagency predictive services
capabilities assists in the refinement of fire aviation management.
Advances in technology, data-gathering, and data analysis, combined
with increased collaboration between interagency meteorologists and
fire behavior and fuels specialists, provide greater accuracy in
predicting the potential for, and severity of, fire activity. In turn,
this allows managers to move and place aircraft where the needs are
greatest and aviation resources can be most effective.
The Forest Service and DOI continue to have the firefighters,
equipment, and aircraft necessary to achieve a high rate of success in
suppressing fires on initial attack. We have increased our fleet of
firefighting aircraft to assist ground firefighters, particularly
during extended attack. As you know, during any year, the vast majority
of wildland fires--numbering in the thousands--are suppressed without
the benefit of air support. If a fire continues to grow and locally
available resources are inadequate, fire managers request additional
resources, including aviation support. Aviation assets are managed
through the National Multiagency Coordination Group and prioritized for
prepositioning, initial attack, and extended attack.
In calendar year 2005, more than 66,000 fires burned 8.7 million
acres of Federal, State and private lands. In calendar year 2005,
Federal suppression costs totaled $966 million. Wildland fire use--by
which fire was used to achieve resource management objectives in
predefined geographic areas--accounted for an additional 489,000 acres.
aviation resources
Large Airtankers--Large airtankers are only one of the many tools
we use to suppress wildland fires. The primary role of large airtankers
is to rapidly deliver a large amount of retardant in the initial attack
of a wildfire. In May 2004, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) terminated the contracts for 33 large airtankers based
on the recommendations of the NTSB regarding the airworthiness of these
firefighting aircraft; the NTSB recommendations were the result of
investigations of three large airtanker crashes. The report noted the
need to have maintenance and inspection programs for all firefighting
aircraft based on their operational service life in the firefighting
environment. It was the opinion of NTSB that the Federal Aviation
Administration, the Forest Service, and DOI all have a role in ensuring
airworthiness for aircraft used in firefighting operations, but that
the primary role for assuring the airworthiness of large air tankers
rests with the Forest Service.
At the time of the NTSB report, the mechanisms to ensure
airworthiness of firefighting aircraft were not fully developed.
Consequently, the contracts for 33 large airtankers were terminated.
Two subsequent actions were immediately taken: first, the Departments
developed a strategy of utilizing SEATs and additional large and medium
helicopters to provide aerial support; this reconfigured fleet
performed successfully albeit at a higher per hour cost during the 2004
fire season. Second, a process to address airworthiness was developed
by the Forest Service through contracting with aviation technical
experts.
Following the work of the aviation technical contractors, a
determination on the airworthiness of two models of large airtankers
was made and these aircraft returned to service. The Forest Service
spent considerable time and effort with the owners and operators of all
large airtankers to respond to the NTSB findings. We have been
unsuccessful in assessing the operational service life for fourteen
Douglas DC-4, 6, and 7 aircraft. Without confidence in a method of
determining the structural strength and fatigue life of the Douglas
aircraft, neither the Forest Service nor other Federal firefighting
organizations can be reasonably assured of their safety. Therefore,
consistent with the manufacturer's (Boeing Corporation) advice, the DC-
7 that was flown experimentally in 2004 and 2005 will not be Federally-
contracted during 2006.
In January 2006, three Lockheed P3B large aircraft became available
from the U.S. Navy. Ownership of these aircraft has been transferred to
the Forest Service. The Forest Service, on behalf of the firefighting
agencies, will pursue competitive bids to install tanks and operate the
aircraft. Conversion and inspections of these aircraft could take a
year. They are expected to be available for the 2007 fire season.
Airworthiness efforts related to airtankers and other aircraft are
continuing. The Forest Service plans to have all airtankers and agency
owned aircraft instrumented with Operational Loads Monitoring Systems
by the end of 2006. The Forest Service's Operational Loads Monitoring
Program collected, converted, and disseminated over 800 hours of flight
loads data and expects that figure will quadruple for 2006. These data
will be analyzed by aviation technical experts to identify aerial
firefighting environment. The long-term goal is to gather and analyze
data regarding operational loads and continue to use that data to
enhance the continuing airworthiness of aircraft used in aerial
firefighting. The data collected and its analysis were instrumental in
the reintroduction of the Lockheed P2V aircraft and have helped
validate its use for the next 5-10 years. All of the airtankers have
been configured with traffic collision avoidance systems.
During the 2006 fire season, we expect to have available 16 large
airtankers, subject to testing and inspection, and 4 military C-130
aircraft equipped with modular airborne firefighting systems (MAFFS).
An additional 4 MAFFS will be available when maintenance and
inspections are complete in the early summer.
Helicopters--Along with SEATs, additional large (Type I)
helicopters and medium helicopters have allowed us to fight wildland
fires even with the reduction in the number of large airtankers. While
the large fixed-wing airtankers have the ability to fly faster and go
longer distances to deliver retardant, a Type I helicopter, with a
close suppressant/retardant supply, can exceed a fixed wing airtanker
in capacity and effectiveness. This provides improved operational
effectiveness through quick turnarounds, precision drops, and increased
gallons delivered.
For the 2006 fire season, the Forest Service and DOI plan to have
available 15 exclusive use and 94 call-when-needed large helitankers
and helicopters, as well as 39 exclusive use and 110 call-when-needed
medium helicopters. Seventy three smaller (Type III) exclusive use
helicopters are stationed around the country for local use in areas of
high fire potential. There are also a large number of call-when-needed
Type III helicopters available.
Single Engine Airtankers--For the 2006 fire season, the BLM, which
manages the vast majority of the DOI fire aviation program, will
implement a refined aviation program that will achieve greater
operational efficiencies by focusing on faster, higher-capacity
aircraft, and by enhancing collaboration and cooperation to position
these aircraft where the need is greatest. The overall number of
aircraft will essentially remain unchanged from last year, but they
will be managed in a more efficient manner.
Vendors are gradually transitioning from piston aircraft to the
faster turbine aircraft which have a higher capacity, are more
reliable, and perform better at higher altitudes. By using faster,
higher-capacity aircraft and extending the lengths of the exclusive-use
contracts, the BLM will achieve the same or greater capacity than in
2005. For example, two 800-gallon SEATs would replace three 500-gallon
SEATs. Additionally, these aircraft will be contracted at the national
level, allowing for improved cooperation at all organizational levels
and for greater flexibility in positioning and utilizing the aircraft
where they are most needed. The net result is that all geographic areas
will have greater access than in previous years to more aircraft when
the need arises.
Additionally, in a separate effort the BLM has initiated a program
to collect flight data encountered in firefighting operations. This
program, which stems from the findings of the Blue Ribbon Commission
(discussed below in more detail), is in the process of evaluating each
type of aircraft and its use in the Department's fleet. BLM
instrumented two aircraft in 2005 to monitor structural conditions and
gather data regarding operations in the fire environment. A third
aircraft will be equipped in 2006. The long-term goal is to gather and
analyze data regarding structural conditions and continuing
airworthiness in the fire environment for each aircraft's particular
mission, whether it is smokejumper aircraft, helicopters, aerial
supervision, or other types of aircraft and missions.
working toward the future
In 2002, prior to the NTSB study, the Forest Service and DOI co-
sponsored a Blue Ribbon Panel to review all aspects of the aviation
program. Both Departments appreciate the efforts of Mr. Hall and Mr.
Hull who were Co-Chairs of the Blue Ribbon Panel. As a result of the
NTSB and Blue Ribbon Panel reports, the Departments have a number of
efforts underway to anticipate and address the long-term aviation needs
of the fire community, and for the continued protection of lives,
property, and resources. The feasibility of aircraft such as the S3
Viking and other aircraft for use as airtankers is being studied.
Large airtankers, helicopters, and SEATS have specific missions in
responding to wildland fires, ranging from the delivery of crews and
supplies, providing a management platform, to dropping water and
retardants. The collection and analysis of flight data will aid us in
improving aviation safety for the future. It will also provide a
foundation for discussions about ``purpose-built'' air tankers, or air
tankers specifically designed and built for missions and operations in
the fire environment. The data we are gathering will be analyzed by
independent aviation experts, either original manufacturers or other
experts. We will limit our aircraft to those having the structural
strength to operate safely in the fire environment.
In response to the Blue Ribbon Panel findings, both DOI and the
Forest Service modified its aircraft contracting process to focus on
obtaining the best value without compromising safety considerations. In
addition, DOI and the Forest Service have progressed in the
implementation of training, including on-line training for SEAT
contract pilots. Additional training modules for helicopter pilots, air
tactical supervision pilots, and others are scheduled to be completed
and available in the future. Prior to the 2006 fire season the Forest
Service will train nearly 300 agency and contract pilots through its
sponsored crew resource management courses and the National Aerial
Firefighter Academy.
An interagency work group chartered by the National Fire and
Aviation Executive Board, comprised of the Agency Fire Directors and
the National Association of State Foresters, is identifying unified and
consistent mission standards, as well as assessing the long-term needs
of the aviation program. Recognizing the evolution and changing needs
of the aviation program, the National Fire and Aviation Executive Board
chartered a group to address the next 10 to 15 years of interagency
fire aviation needs. The first phase of this group's work, which
provides a broad overview of the entire aviation program, including
large air tankers, is currently underway.
Phase 2 of the group's work will address the Congress's direction
for a strategic plan and will contain more specific elements such as
the issues surrounding ``purpose-built'' air tankers; the anticipated
numbers and types of airtankers that will be needed; the infrastructure
that will be required to support a future air tanker fleet;
acquisition, infrastructure, maintenances, and other associated costs;
and acquisition and management models.
Phase 3 of this effort will be the creation of an implementation
plan that will be developed shortly after completion and approval of
Phase 2. We anticipate initial implementation to occur in fiscal year
2007, with full implementation phased in over a number of years.
outlook for the 2006 fire season
The 2006 fire season is shaping up to be another challenging year.
Drought conditions continue across much of the southwest and fire
activity is expected to begin early and remain above normal through
June into July. Below normal fire potential exists in the northeast
based on a wet winter. In Alaska, the Kenai Peninsula continues to be
an area of concern with higher than normal fire potential. We expect to
have firefighting resources--firefighters, equipment, and aircraft--
comparable to those available in 2005. If local areas experience severe
fire risk, we will increase firefighting ability by staging or
deploying our firefighters and equipment as needed.
summary
In conclusion, we would again like to thank you for the opportunity
to discuss these aviation issues with you today. Each aerial resource,
whether fixed wing or helicopter, fills a key role in the multifaceted
interagency fire suppression strategy. We have shown that we have the
capability of adjusting for the short-term as we complete our long-
range plans. We are keenly aware of the challenges we face regarding
fire aviation and aerial support of our firefighters on the ground in
protecting lives, property, and resources. We are facing these
challenges head-on and with determination, and we are pursuing every
possible avenue to maintain and improve the safety, efficiency, and
effectiveness we've all come to expect from the fire aviation
community. We appreciate your continued support and look forward to
working with you as we move through this process toward an ever more
modern and efficient fire and aviation program for the future. I would
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Craig. Secretary Hatfield, thank you very much.
Both Secretary Rey and Secretary Hatfield, thank you. We've
been joined by two more of our colleagues, Senator Conrad Burns
of Montana and Senator John Kyl of Arizona. If you two are not
on a hard timeline, we'll move right into questions and allow
you to make any opening statements along with your questions;
okay? If not, we'll give you the floor. All right, thank you
all very much.
Mark, the blue ribbon report suggested that the Forest
Service and BLM develop a strategy to replace the aging ex-
military retardant aircraft with a plane developed specifically
for the purpose of dropping retardant on fires on Federal land.
The blue ribbon panel report was critical of the repeated
reliance on ex-military aircraft for conversion into
airtankers.
In view of this--and you partly explained this, but I wish
you'd broaden your explanation--why is the Forest Service
contemplating issuing a contract for the conversion of P-3
aircraft to airtankers and investigating the feasibility of
converting S-3 Viking antisubmarine tracking aircraft into
airtankers?
Mr. Rey. The blue ribbon panel made several very useful
recommendations, many of which we're following and we'll
probably talk about today. But with all due respect to the
panel, we believe that both the P-3 and the S-3 are built
stronger than commercial aircraft and are better able to
withstand the stress loads--stress and loads encountered in the
firefighting environment.
We also believe that an aircraft's hours flown, or the
operational service life, rather than the year it was
manufactured is the more appropriate measure for deciding when
it's time to retire an aircraft. And the three P-3's that we've
got access to have very low flight hours on them, so they give
us a very cost-effective way of adding some flexibility to our
existing fleet.
One area where we, and I guess the Blue Ribbon Commission,
don't completely agree is on the utility of former military
aircraft. We think that they have demonstrated capabilities,
they're built stronger than most commercial aircraft, and as
they have been used within their operational service life, they
have generally performed well. That having been said, there are
in the market a number of contractors and entrepreneurs who are
trying to develop a fire service-based aircraft and we're in
relatively constant communications with them. And to the extent
that--and at the point that--they are able to achieve
certification from the FAA and from the tanker board, we'll
consider adding those aircraft to our fleet as well. The idea
is to have as much variety and as much flexibility in the fleet
as we can get. And I can provide to the committee a list of all
of the known contractors and entrepreneurs who are currently
working on different aircraft models, some former military, and
other aircraft that are specifically built for this purpose in
other countries.
Senator Craig. Well, we would appreciate the list, but
don't give out our phone number.
[Laughter.]
Senator Craig. Both Mr. Hall and Mr. Hull will testify
there is still a strong need to designate one agency in charge
of aviation. Both also continue to insist that the FAA must
play a greater role in firefighting aviation safety
certification. Do you agree with their testimony, and if so,
which agency should be put in charge and how do we get the FAA
to do more?
Mr. Rey. I don't think we completely agree with their
testimony, in the sense that I don't think there's a great deal
of utility to be--or benefit to be garnered from either of
those recommendations, and here's why.
First off, in terms of coordination of aviation assets,
there are only two agencies involved, the Forest Service and
the Bureau of Land Management. We operate through a unified
command system, so I don't think you're going to see much
change if you decide that one or the other of us is going to
have to manage all of the aviation assets and all of the
aviation contracts. In a sense, right now, our operations are
seamless.
Moreover, there are a number of States that also manage
aviation assets and this recommendation wouldn't change that.
Indeed, to some degree, the fact that we have had to develop a
unified command system to coordinate our two agencies' efforts
has helped ensure and encourage the States to participate
accordingly. So you've already, I think, gotten as much
unification or coordination as you're going to get, and adding
one more step isn't probably going to materially improve how
well we use these assets.
With regard to the role of the FAA, they're already
involved. Much of the work that we've done to certificate the
safety of the large airtankers and now the other aviation
assets has been closely advised by the FAA. And indeed, to the
extent that we've retained outside experts, they've been
experts that have been recommended and approved by the FAA. But
to the extent that you want the FAA more directly involved,
that's really an issue for Congress to decide, because under
the relevant legislation that governs the FAA's activities,
they're now only responsible for the civil fleet and not for
public use aircraft. But, again, I think the bottom line is
we've achieved most of the goals of those recommendations, even
if we haven't achieved exactly those recommendations as they
were offered.
Senator Craig. Thank you. I'll have more questions in the
next round. Let me turn to Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, I'm
sitting here looking at your map with great concern, because
last year, if you'll recall, at this hearing, you had
highlighted the Kenai Peninsula as being the one area in the
State that was vulnerable, and you were right on the money. And
so I'm looking at this, and perhaps the map isn't as accurate
as last year, but if you are even close to being right, I am
greatly concerned and I think my constituents back home are
going to be even more concerned, because we want to believe
that there is going to be a relief in sight and we're going to
be able to enjoy the summer, but that's a large swath and that
runs through the population centers in the interior down in
south central, in Anchorage, certainly on the Kenai Peninsula,
so that's a great concern. So my question is, in terms of
stationing aviation assets, what can you tell me that we can
expect in the 2006 fire season in terms of those assets that
would be on the ground in Alaska?
Ms. Hatfield. I'd like to start by mentioning again that
the aviation assets vitally important in Alaska certainly are
only one piece of the infrastructure that we have in place to
fight fires in Alaska. We also are going to have three hotshot
crews, a number of firefighting crews and other emergency crews
that are available. And so now we're looking at working with
the State to evaluate what additional resources we might need
to bring in, in light of this map, which was done as of
February 8. We can give you a list of particular aircraft that
are there now and will be available, but, again, as we are
structuring our strategy, we would be able to move aircraft to
Alaska as we needed it and as the season erupted. So our whole
strategy is really built on being able to pre-position and then
making other resources available as it becomes necessary.
Senator Murkowski. Well, we were in a position last year of
not having any Federal retardant tankers in the State, and I
think that was an issue of basically having to requisition the
assets. I think it would be helpful and certainly I appreciate
the opportunity to do the sit-down before the fire season
begins so that we do have an understanding as to what assets
will be positioned up north, recognizing again we've got
earlier fire seasons coming, we have a huge area that we have
to cover, and we're still a long way from the lower 48 even
when you're flying there. So it is something that we want to be
able to resolve before we have a crisis.
Ms. Hatfield. We would be glad to sit down with you. I
might mention, in terms of airtankers, we do have two
airtankers already pre-positioned or planned to be pre-
positioned in Alaska.
Senator Murkowski. Okay. That is helpful to know. As far as
the comment you had made, Mr. Rey, about the DC-6's that the
State had contracted with last year, I understand those are
still on contract with the State. Under what conditions will
the State be able to utilize the contracted tankers on
federally managed lands, on those fires that are on those
lands?
Mr. Rey. The issue is not the land, it's who has
operational control of the fire. If this is an incident where
the State is running the incident, in the unified command
structure this is a State-controlled fire. It's their incident
command team that's running it. If they want to contract for
use of those tankers, then that's not a Federal issue.
Where we have the operational responsibility for the fire,
following the recommendations of the NTSB, we do not believe
that we can guarantee the operational safety of a DC-6 and so
we won't have it flown on a Federal fire, because we don't want
to accept the risk or the liability associated with that. We do
not know today the operational life of any of the DC aircraft
that may be flown by any other firefighting agency. As
contrast, we know with the P-3's, the P-2V's and the military's
C-130H's when it is no longer safe to fly that aircraft because
of the flight hours that that specific aircraft has acquired.
Senator Murkowski. Well, the difficulty, as you know, is
the Alaskan on the ground doesn't care who's managing the fire,
just take care of the fire, protect the property, protect the
life, and the issue of the air quality that I spoke to at the
beginning is really a major irritant. And it's not just that
it's smoky out there, it is literally unsafe to be outside. And
I think this is what perhaps is not getting through, this
recognition that the fires that we are seeing and the smoke
levels that we are seeing are not just an inconvenience, but
that they are stopping us from being able to really move around
and do what you would consider to be normal business.
And so there is this--there's this wall, this problem that
we have in working through this Federal interagency. I do hope
that we can have some good, long sit-downs, again, before the
fire season, to work out these things because we talk about
them ahead of time and then the fires come and nothing seems to
be any different than it was the previous fire season. So,
again, we need to do something that's going to be different
this year.
Mr. Rey. I think that we should sit down, because the issue
that you're describing goes beyond the use of large airtankers
to the overall decisions about when and how to attack fires.
And, you know, in reality, I don't think the issue is the
availability of large airtankers, it's the need to walk through
what our current suppression and attack strategies are and see
if you agree with them and then see what we can do about it if
you don't.
Senator Murkowski. Okay. I will look forward to some of
those meetings.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Craig. Thank you.
Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. Secretary Rey, I've just got a couple of
questions and I guess they have to do with the blue ribbon
report. It was supposed to be up here the first of March. When
can we expect that report?
Mr. Rey. Not the blue ribbon report, which is a report we
contracted, but the report on the----
Senator Burns. Yes, I'm sorry. I got the wrong one.
Mr. Rey. When did you say that would be available?
Ms. Hatfield. I think it's by the end of the year.
Mr. Rey. We'll have it probably sometime in the fall.
Senator Burns. Okay.
Mr. Rey. This report isn't going to affect this year's
firefighting.
Senator Burns. Okay. Now, on the Lockheed P-3's, you bought
those from the Navy. Have we worked out the liability issue on
that--on those airplanes?
Mr. Rey. Yes. We hold the liability for their use.
Senator Burns. Okay.
Mr. Rey. And the responsibility to assure their safety. The
Navy gave them to us, we didn't--no money changed hands.
Senator Burns. No money changed hands.
Mr. Rey. No money changed hands.
Senator Burns. I'll send you out on a--I've got to buy
another car. I'll send you.
[Laughter.]
Senator Burns. But I was just wondering if that report and
the firefighting and the assessment of--how big does this
aviation fleet--what do you see? How far do we go on that and
are we better off owning our own or contracting?
Mr. Rey. We think we're better off contracting. We think
the Government gets better service at a more reasonable price.
Senator Burns. Now, these P-3's. If you've decided that and
if you have them equipped so they can haul retardant, do you
have the authorization to sell those P-3's to a private
contractor?
Mr. Rey. We don't. You would have to give us that
authorization through additional legislation, but we do have
the authority to contract to have a private operator fly it. So
absent legislation to allow us to convey these three P-3's into
private ownership----
Senator Burns. You do have that authority though? You can
contract those airplanes out.
Mr. Rey. We can contract with private contractors to fly
them for us.
Senator Burns. Okay. That's about the only thing that I was
concerned about, just how far we're going to go with this with
the size of our air force for the Forest Service.
Mr. Rey. We can give you the aviation plan for this year,
which includes the number of large tankers, helicopters, and
single-engine tankers.
Senator Burns. Okay. Helicopters, I realize, are a lot more
efficient whenever you start--they put the retardant closer to
the fire and they can spot it a lot quicker and are a lot more
accurate with it, although they do have a range problem. I'm
aware of that.
Mr. Rey. Right. Each aircraft has its advantages and
disadvantages, that's why we try to have some variety in the
fleet for different tactical purposes.
Senator Burns. Well, it's important and I think you know
that we're coming up on a fire season, and it looks like you've
got a big season down south. For the first time in many years
we have read about the range fires in Texas and Oklahoma and so
their conditions have not really improved a lot down there as
we move into the summer months. But I would hope that we can be
ahead of this thing a little bit this year in pre-positioning
where we think the problems are going to be and to get on those
fires a lot quicker. I know the worst fire we had in Montana,
in 1988, could have been stopped. It burned from an old snag
for 4 or 5 days before it decided to really blow up and go. So
we need to react a lot faster. Thank you.
Senator Craig. Senator Burns, thank you. Senator Kyl,
you're burning. I have a feeling that's probably why you're
here. Welcome to the committee.
Senator Kyl. Well, it's one of the reasons. Mr. Chairman,
thank you. As a former member of this committee, I appreciate
your courtesy in letting me sit in.
Senator Craig. Certainly.
Senator Kyl. It's always good to visit with Mark Rey. Thank
you for being here and for all of the cooperation that you've
given to my office and to our State over the years. We
appreciate it very much.
It is, in fact, true that we are just mopping up the first
fire that actually began on February 7. It's the earliest on
record. It's called the February fire. It burned about 4,200
acres, $3.3 million in cost, had 539 personnel, 11 type II
crews, a couple of airtankers, and six helicopters, plus a lot
of other equipment that helped to fight it.
Fortunately, it was a combination of mixed--well, it was
primarily ponderosa pine and some pine pinyon in both the
Coconino and Tonto Forests. The point is, that area has not had
moisture in about 4 months, any significant amount. And the
point is that what it presages is a very long and very
dangerous season. As you noted, the type of aircraft that can
be utilized, each have their purposes, but there's no question
in your mind that the large airtanker is a significant
contributor in fighting the fires; that's correct, isn't it?
Mr. Rey. It's the most cost-effective asset for initial
attack, but we do get good results from other aircraft as well.
Senator Kyl. Sure. It's just that you'd like to have a good
combination of all of the different types of aircrafts you have
and, I guess let me put it this way, if you had the ability to
get more of the large tankers, given the fact that we're
already in the fire season and it's only the middle of
February, in a world in which you could have what you wanted,
you would have more large tankers, would you not?
Mr. Rey. Well, we're actually evaluating that in the
context of putting together our long-term plan. It's not as
simple as it seems because we're balancing the capabilities of
each of the three categories of aircraft and also looking at
what new technologies are being brought online to increase the
efficiency of the single-engine airtankers and helicopters.
What I tell you is this, we seem to be sort of heading toward a
future where we think the optimal number of large airtankers
would be somewhere between 22 and 24. This year we'll have
probably close to that many available if we add the military
aircraft. We have 17 of our own and then eight available from
the military.
Senator Kyl. Well, we certainly hope that that's enough. I
hope that next September, Mr. Chairman, we can come back
together and say, wow, that was just great, we only had a few
fires and we were able to get to them quickly and didn't have
any problems. But judging on the basis of what we've seen so
far, I'd be very happy if that prediction or anything close to
it came true.
Just one other thought. I've written a letter to the
President and sent you a copy that raises two concerns, but let
me give you one bit of good news first. In fighting this
particular fire, once again we find that earlier treatments
were of significant help. In fact, in the report from the Tonto
Forest--I'll just read these two sentences--there were over
5,000 acres of previously treated land right in the vicinity of
this fire and the writer says, ``the thinned areas and
previously burned areas were instrumental in stopping advance
of the February fire in several locations. The areas also
provided secure anchor points for fire line construction.'' A
point that you've made many times, and that is that the more we
can treat the forests, the better we are to prevent the fires
in the first instance.
Now, in the President's budget, there's a reduction both in
the amount of money for treatment and in the amount of money
for fighting fires, and that's the point of my letter to the
President. We just can't continue in these kinds of
circumstances to reduce the amount of money available.
The second problem is that in the wet Northwest, which is
not colored on your map, there is an oversupply of money
compared to the very dry and the dangerous Southwest, which has
already been noted is a significant part of the map there and
which includes my State, which has already had fires. What this
suggests to me is that during the course of this year and early
on, if possible, there could be a readjustment of money made
available. We have thousands of acres of NEPA-ready land for
treatment in the Tonto Forest alone, where this fire burned. I
met with the local forester ranger there the Saturday before
this fire was reported a day or two later and he noted that it
was strictly a matter of money, that they were ready to go and
we were ready to do some more treatments, but the money is not
available.
And so what I would ask you to do is to work with us to
transfer money from the Northwest to the extent that that's
possible to do, and to support the plus subs which we will be
seeking, both for restoration as well as for firefighting in
this particular year, because clearly in the Southwest we're
going to need those resources. I suspect you haven't seen my
letter yet.
Mr. Rey. No, I've seen it.
Senator Kyl. Oh, you have? Good. Okay. Great. That's good
news in and of itself, the speed with which you got the
communique, and I appreciate that. Any comment on that right
now?
Mr. Rey. Let me comment on both the preparedness issue as
well as the fuels treatment issue. For preparedness, since the
fire season typically begins in the Southwest, we are already
starting to move assets and send severity funding to Arizona
and New Mexico.
Last week we sent an additional $1.25 million to Arizona
for severity funding. Presently deployed in the State is
somewhere in the neighborhood of 560 engines, 21 single-engine
airtankers, seven large helicopters, and six large airtankers.
Additionally, by the end of the month, that is to say before
March 1, we will be pre-positioning 10 type I crews. Those are
the most experienced and sophisticated crews in our
firefighting force. So we think with the pre-positioning of
assets, we will be in good shape. Unfortunately, your hope that
there will be few fires is one I don't think will be realized,
but I feel reasonably confident that we will be able to realize
your second hope and that is that we maintain a level of
success at initial attack at around the 99 percent level.
With regard to fuels funding, actually our overall budget,
the two Departments combined, shows a slight increase in fuels
funding from fiscal year 2006. The totality of what we devoted
to implementing the President's Healthy Forest Initiative in
2005 was $835 million. The totality in 2006 was $907 million.
The totality of what we've proposed for 2007 is $902 million.
Now, in our fiscal year 2007 request, we did request a
boost for the Pacific Northwest, but not in fuels treatment,
per se, but rather in the forest management program to increase
commercial timber sales to meet the President's commitment to
fully implement the Northwest Forest Plan. So much of that work
would not be fuels-related, although some of it will have an
ancillary fuels treatment benefit. All of our regions showed
slight increases in fuels treatment, and obviously as the
appropriations process continues, we'll be happy to work with
you to look at adjustments for how that money is distributed
throughout the country.
Senator Kyl. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Craig. Thank you for being with us. We know you're
in a critical situation in your State and in the Southwest and
we'll monitor it very closely. Thank you. A couple more
questions for this panel and then I need to get to our next
panel because of their time constraints.
Secretary Hatfield, what steps has the BLM and the National
Interagency Fire Center taken to ensure that companies that
might be affected are notified well in advance of any of the
changes that you're making as it relates to the contracting
that you're looking at, and by that I'm referencing plans to
move away from the call-as-needed contract to the exclusive-use
contracts and to a shift to larger, single-engine retardant
aircraft?
Ms. Hatfield. Well, the first thing is our strategy, as
refined, would actually decrease the number of exclusive-use
contracts and supplement those exclusive-use contracts with
more call-when-needed contracts.
Senator Craig. Okay.
Ms. Hatfield. The exclusive-use contracts would be for the
larger planes that carry more retardant. In the process of
doing that refinement of our strategy, we have talked with all
of the vendors and all the States and explained what we were
doing and what that would mean in terms of the contracting
process for them. We're currently in that contracting process,
so I think in terms of vendor impact, it's difficult for us to
tell, at this point, that it's going to have very much of an
impact on them. To the extent that a vendor does not have an
exclusive-use contract, the vendor will still be in the pool
that would be available for the call-when-needed contracts. So
it's really a matter of a difference in terms of the vehicle
we'll use and in terms of having the resources there we need
when we need them.
Senator Craig. Well, I thank you for that. We'll monitor
that closely with you. Last year, when the Forest Service
announced a similar shift in its contracting for helicopters, I
think we received a significant amount of complaints from
helicopter operators in Oregon and in Idaho and we hope that
you are advancing this in a way that will give effective pre-
notice and all of that.
Ms. Hatfield. Right. Well, we have talked to them and they
are aware of the shift and how we're going to approach this
fire year.
Senator Craig. Secretary Rey, one last question of you. Has
the U.S. Forest Service sought the ongoing participation and
involvement of existing and potential airtanker operators in
your strategic planning process?
Mr. Rey. Yes. That's something we do on an ongoing basis.
We meet with a variety of current operators, that is, people
who are flying aircraft under contract for us now as well as
people who would like to be future operators, that is, people
who have an aircraft that they're testing and trying to bring
online for firefighting purposes. One of the things that we're
going to announce in short order is an aviation day that's
similar to what the Air Force does when they invite all of the
various potential and current vendors for military aircraft to
come and give them some ideas about where they think the future
of the industry is headed and what sorts of new models they
have that they want to bring online and what the capabilities
are. So you'll hear more about that later as we have the first
Federal Firefighting Aircraft Aviation Day, modeled after the
Air Force approach.
Senator Craig. Well, thank you. Thank you both very much
for being with us this afternoon. We'll obviously stay tuned
and monitor this very closely as we proceed--I won't say into
the fire season, it's obvious we're already into it--but as the
fire season spreads North and West. Thank you both.
Mr. Rey. Thank you.
Ms. Hatfield. Thank you.
Senator Craig. Now let me call James Hall of Hall &
Associates, Washington, DC, co-chair of the Blue Ribbon Report
on Aerial Firefighting Safety, along with James Hull, a Texas
State forester, College Station, Texas, co-chair, again, along
with Mr. Hall of the Blue Ribbon Report for Aerial Firefighting
Safety.
Mr. Hall, we understand you're the one time-sensitive.
We're going to allow you to proceed first and I'll ask some
questions of you, then you'll be free to leave and we'll turn
to Mr. Hull.
STATEMENT OF JAMES HALL, HALL & ASSOCIATES, LLC
Mr. Hall. Thank you very much, Senator, and I greatly
appreciate that courtesy and my wife appreciates it more. As
chairman of the 2002 blue ribbon panel that reviewed the safety
of Federal aerial firefighting, I'm pleased to appear before
you for the second time with my co-chair, Jim Hull. We have
submitted a document that reflects the views of all the panel
members and contains more detail on each of the items that I
will discuss today. I would appreciate it if our long testimony
and an article submitted by one of our members could be placed
in the record.
Senator Craig. All of your material testimonies will become
a part of the permanent record.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, simply put, there has been some
progress in dealing with the safety and effectiveness of aerial
firefighting, but much less than we had hoped for. We have
little direct information comparing the cost and effectiveness
of the more recent operations that have been characterized by
fewer large airtankers, the introduction of single-engine
tankers, and increased numbers of large helicopter tankers, as
opposed to earlier operations using mostly large airtankers and
some large helicopters. We are concerned, Mr. Chairman, about
the acquisition of additional P-3 aircraft for conversion to
airtankers, given that the most recent fatal large airtanker
accident involving a P-3 occurred April 20, 2005, killing three
crew members, and we consider this particularly troubling
considering that the NTSB has not yet released its report on
the accident.
The panel's first finding was that the safety record of
airtankers was unacceptable. Some aircraft types are no longer
given contracts and others have had more intense inspections,
but the safety of the aircraft used in aerial firefighting has
not been assured. The loss of the P-3 as well as a number of
helicopters since the report was submitted demonstrates that
the record remains unacceptable.
Our second finding noted that the wildland environment has
changed so that controlling wildland fires could not be
considered an auxiliary mission to land management. The Forest
Service has produced a strategic plan, but it has not led to
the resources necessary for the overhaul of the aerial
firefighting activity.
The panel's third finding was that under the present
arrangement for certification, contracting, and operation, key
elements of the fleet are unsustainable. There has been some
work, but no real progress.
Our fourth finding noted that a variety of philosophies,
missions, and standards created a mission muddle that seriously
undermined the effectiveness of wild land firefighting. While
work on this complex problem is underway, not much headway
appears to have been made.
The panel's fifth finding concluded that the culture,
organizational structure, and management of the agencies
conducting the aerial firefighting was inappropriate to the
task. Little seems to have changed and the accidents continue.
Our sixth finding noted that the FAA had a minimal role in
certifying the public aircraft use in firefighting. This leaves
the Forest Service in the untenable position of being both
operator and regulator of firefighting aircraft. It has neither
the resources nor the skills to provide the safety oversight of
this fleet.
The seventh finding of the panel noted that the contracting
procedures did not recognize the business and operational
realities of aerial firefighting and did not produce incentives
to conduct safe operations. From what we have been able to
determine, there have been minor improvements in contracting,
but the fundamental problems remain.
Our final finding was that training was underfunded and
inadequately specified. Again, while there have been some
improvements, we are not aware of any comprehensive plan based
on validated training needs.
In conclusion, the Forest Service is composed of many
dedicated individuals who are experts in land management, but
have limited aviation expertise. I want to thank the work of
the individuals in the Forest Service Office of Fire and
Aviation Management who have spent countless hours working in
an attempt to address the issues raised in our 2002 report.
However, one cannot expect such an organization to possess the
resources nor the expertise of the Federal Aviation
Administration in aircraft certification and the oversight of
airworthiness.
I appreciate the opportunity to present again before the
committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Hall, Hall & Associates, LLC
review of the progress made on the development of interim and long-term
plans for the use of fire retardant aircraft for firefighting on
federal land
The Blue Ribbon Panel has not been directly involved with the work
of the USDA-FS since it submitted its report in December of 2002, nor
has the Panel remained formally constituted since the publication of
its report. However, members of the Panel did assemble in Washington on
December 17, 2003 for a progress briefing that was given by the USDA-
FS.
Information in our presentation is based on published information
and on a listening watch of progress toward a safe, affordable, and
effective fleet of retardant/water dropping firefighting and related
support aircraft. We have also considered a document provided to us by
the USDA-FS titled `Actions Taken in Response to the Findings of the
Blue Ribbon Panel,' dated October 2005.
There has been some progress in both the safety and effectiveness
of aerial firefighting. The USDA-FS has increased its emphasis on
initial attack and made changes to the mix of aircraft types. The
change in the mix of aircraft types is partly because some of the large
tankers have been disqualified from eligibility for contracts. We have
been told that the present mix of large tankers, single-engine tankers
and helicopter tankers seems to be improving the effectiveness of
firefighting operations. While progress has been made toward
determining what is necessary to keep aging aircraft airworthy and
training has been improved, accidents continue to take place. The
involvement of the FAA in assuring the airworthiness of the air tankers
remains minimal.
You have indicated that you want to review the costs and
effectiveness of utilizing single-engine fire retardant aircraft and
heavy-lift helicopters as opposed to the Forest Service's reliance on
multi-engine retardant aircraft in earlier seasons. Most recently, the
approach has been to use fewer large multi-engine tankers, supplemented
by single-engine tankers, and an increased number of heavy-lift
helicopters. In the earlier fire seasons the mix included a larger
number of large multi-engine aircraft and fewer heavy-lift helicopters.
Thus, there is not a clear distinction between the traditional and the
most recent practices. We have been informed that the single-engine
tankers were effective for initial attack--in some regions. We have
also been advised that teaming a few single-engine tankers with a large
airtanker made a positive difference in controlling a number of fires.
However, we do not have access to the financial information or the
measured effectiveness of the different operations to assist you with
the comparisons that you wish to make. We are advised that the USDA-FS
Pacific South-West region is making progress in analyzing aging
aircraft problems and introducing new technology into both training and
firefighting operations.
We have not been provided with the USDA-FS long-term strategy for
replacing aging multi-engine aircraft. We understand that the USDA-FS
is prepared to conduct a three-year study of its aviation assets.
Unfortunately, we cannot be of great assistance in assessing the
three recently acquired P-3 aircraft. The earlier model P-3s that have
been in service were seen as effective and were the newest aircraft
type in the heavy airtanker fleet. However, there was a fatal P-3
airtanker accident in April 2005 and the NTSB has not released its
analysis of that accident. We have no way of ascertaining whether
aircraft design, performance, or airworthiness were among the factors
involved in the P-3 accident. It does seem risky to acquire more of the
same aircraft type involved in this most recent accident before
learning what factors contributed to that accident. In the following
parts of this submission, we comment on the low probability that the
USDA-FS is capable of conducting and controlling a safe aviation
operation. As the operator of the public aircraft employed in aerial
fire suppression, the Forest Service appears particularly unprepared to
assure their airworthiness.
As our major product was our December 2002 Report, we will
structure our comments in the context of the Panel's findings and the
progress, or lack thereof, in addressing the Panel's findings through
its consultations.
The Panel's first finding was: The safety record of fixed-wing
aircraft and helicopters used in wildland fire management is
unacceptable.
In our March 26, 2003 report to this subcommittee, we noted that
contractor personnel flying the large airtankers were subject to lower
safety standards than were government personnel flying the lead planes
and smoke jumper aircraft. We also noted that both contractor and
government aerial firefighting was being conducted at lower safety
standards than we feel could be justified.
Sadly, since our last appearance, a four-engine P-3 airtanker
crashed, killing its crew, in addition to a number of helicopter
accidents. Each aircraft was attempting to support the wildland fire
management program. The safety record, after more than three years
since the release of our report, remains unacceptable.
Efforts were made by the USDA-FS to assess the structural integrity
of the aircraft, and some types are no longer eligible for firefighting
contracts. Some structural assessments have been carried out under
contract, and some in-flight data has been gathered from a sampling of
aircraft that were fitted with stress recording devices. We understand
that the information from the instrumentation was fairly limited, and
while it may provide useful data, it will be, on its own, far from
sufficient to call for detailed measures that will assure the
airworthiness of the airtankers. We are unaware whether the data from
the instrumented aircraft has been analyzed. In any event, we have no
indications that the data has been put too much use.
Some aircraft operated by the Forest Service have been fitted with
airborne collision avoidance devices.
The USDA-FS notes in its progress report that ``safety as a core
value'' was a goal and that they will develop a systems-safety
approach. We are dismayed to see ``safety as a core value'' still
listed as a goal when it should have immediately been adopted as a core
value--even as the paramount core value. In our view, three years after
our report and with continuing accidents and fatalities in the fleet it
operates, this is a feeble and telling response to the Forest Service's
unacceptable safety record.
The USDA-FS has discontinued the use of the two aircraft types that
experienced structural failure accidents in 2002. The rationale for
that decision does not seem to be related to the suitability of those
aircraft, if appropriately maintained, but due solely to the fact that
they had accidents. The use of fewer large airtankers has been offset
by the greater use of SEATS (Single Engine Airtankers) and helicopters,
without any apparent assessing of the structural effects of more
intense use of these aircraft. There appears to have been no
consideration of the mid-sized twin-engine tankers like the S-2s used
by California and other states.
Flight load monitoring devices (which gather data on in-flight
stresses and are quite different from flight data recorders that
capture altitude, speed, and control positions, etc. for accident
investigation purposes) have been installed on a small sample of the
large multi-engine tankers. Flight load data has been gathered, but to
our knowledge it has not been validated and analyzed. As far as we
know, none of the USDA-FS aircraft have been fitted with flight data
recorders to assist in accident investigations. From what we have seen,
the concern of the Forest Service is with aircraft exceeding certain
maximum `g' acceleration criteria and not the cumulative effect of low-
level turbulence. Literature suggests the low-level turbulence is as
great a concern in generating structural fatigue as the exceeding of
the maximum allowed for `g' levels.
There appears to be an increasing amount of public opposition to
the dropping of water mixed with retardants. The mixture is much more
effective in fire suppression than water alone. However, concerns are
being expressed about the contamination of lakes and rivers as well as
risks to both communities and firefighters. It may be that tankers
will, in the future, be restricted to dropping water. If so, there will
likely be more emphasis on helicopters and `scooper' aircraft that are
typically able to scoop up water from lakes and rivers without stopping
to be loaded.
We have received information that various elements of the Forest
Service and some regional offices have been working on some of these
problems, but in an uncoordinated manner and without central direction.
The Panel's second finding was: Because the wildland environment
has changed significantly, controlling wildland fires cannot be
considered an auxiliary mission to land management. Wildland
firefighting has grown to a level of importance that warrants the
attention of national leaders.
From what we have been able to gather, the Forest Service has
obtained some climate forecasts that predict a continuation, for at
least several years, of the dry conditions recently experienced in much
of the United States. How that information has been employed to justify
the resources necessary to maintain a safe, efficient fleet of fire
suppression aircraft is not known. A viewpoint that allows the natural
regeneration of forests through periodic fires and more attention to
the presence of fuels in unwanted areas appears to be gaining
prominence--but we have seen little indication of progress. Our 2002
comment that ``fire policy to address all of this is not evolving at a
rate that is essential to address the situation,'' remains valid.
The USDA-FS has developed a strategic plan to address the
appropriate mix of aircraft (the composition of which has not been made
available to us) to meet new environmental requirements, but has
reported no change other than increasing emphasis on initial attack.
This seems to us to be a very slow response to the fatal aircraft
accidents, the loss of homes at the wildland urban interface, and the
loss of many millions of dollars worth of commercially valuable forest.
The Panel's third finding was: Under the current system of aircraft
certification, contracting and operation, key elements of the aerial
wildland firefighting fleet are unsustainable.
Considerable sums have been spent on attempting to assure the
structural integrity of the air tanker fleet. Some aircraft types that
were part of the fleet in 2002 are no longer used. The original fleet
of lead planes has been disposed of. To our knowledge, no method has
been validated that will determine the remaining operational service
life of the large airtankers and many of the other aircraft used in
aerial firefighting. There have been some attempts to work more
effectively with the FAA on the initial certification of the air
tankers, but we have seen nothing to suggest that there is an effective
way to ensure the continuing structural integrity of the aircraft. The
FAA, we understand, has been making efforts to cooperate with the
Forest Service, but its involvement in assuring the airworthiness of
the firefighting aircraft has changed little since the time of the Blue
Ribbon Panel. There is no formal understanding between the FAA and the
Forest Service. The additional role of the FAA, we are informed, is
limited to such matters as providing lists of individuals and firms
that the Forest Service may choose to engage to assist them.
The Panel's fourth finding was: The variety of missions,
philosophies, and unclear standards of federal land management agencies
creates a ``mission muddle'' that seriously compromises the safety and
effectiveness of wildland fire management.
We noted in our last appearance that no single body was in charge
of fire suppression aviation activities, with the result being that
risks associated with unclear command and control were higher than
necessary. That situation remains. Some progress has been made toward
creating improved interagency coordinating bodies, but there is still
no one agency in charge.
A recent Quadrennial Fire and Fuel Review Report that was developed
with the assistance of the Brookings Institution is the first
substantive attempt to deal with the very difficult question of what
our Panel characterized as ``mission muddle.'' While the Report created
a blueprint for change, the mandate for the quadrennial review depends,
as it must, on interagency cooperation. As the interests of the various
agencies become affected, the principles outlined in the blueprint will
become irrelevant unless there is a decision to allow one agency to
have the final word in setting priorities and allocating resources to
fire management. Discussing who is to do what while fires rage cannot
be allowed.
The Panel's fifth finding noted: The culture, organizational
structure and management of federal wildland fire management agencies
are ill-suited to conduct safe and effective aviation operations in the
current environment.
At our last appearance we noted that a clearly articulated and
widely understood safety culture seemed to be either absent or, as in
the case of the mission, muddled. We noted that the lack of knowledge
of aircraft condition, together with insufficient training, inspection,
and maintenance, has resulted in the deplorable safety record for
airtankers and a less than acceptable record for other aircraft.
We have seen no evidence of substantive improvement.
The Panel's sixth finding related to the very limited role of the
FAA in certifying `public aircraft.'
We noted that there had been a misunderstanding of the role of the
FAA. The operators believed that the FAA had a much more significant
role than it does for the certification and continuing airworthiness of
public aircraft. The absence of real airworthiness oversight by the FAA
puts the Forest Service in the untenable position of being both the
operator and the regulator of its fleet of firefighting aircraft.
There have been several initiatives by the Forest Service in the
area of continuing airworthiness, and it has hired some additional
staff. However, the Forest Service does not have the expertise or
experience of the FAA, and it is, in our view, most unlikely that it
ever will be an effective airworthiness authority for a fleet of large,
old aircraft that are being employed in a role that is much harsher
than they were designed for. The USDA-FS reports increased cooperation
with the FAA, but as far as we can tell, the continuing airworthiness
responsibility remains with the USDA-FS, an organization that is suited
to--and respected for--plant life management rather than the
airworthiness of aircraft. In this country we have the world's most
outstanding airworthiness authority in the FAA. It seems completely
unreasonable not to provide the resources to the FAA and give it the
mandate to employ its expertise in ensuring the necessary standards and
oversight of airtanker airworthiness.
The Forest Service reports that it is also examining strategies for
obtaining needed funding to maintain and/or replace old airtankers.
That a plan for this has not been formulated three years after the
release of Blue Ribbon Panel Report is so slow as to be baffling.
The Panel's seventh finding was: Government contracts for airtanker
and helicopter fire management services do not adequately recognize
business and operational realities or aircraft limitations. As a
result, contract provisions contain disincentives to flight safety.
At our previous appearance we noted the importance of the
contracting process as the only effective means of enforcing the
airworthiness and safety requirements of the Forest Service. We also
noted that the process as it was did not provide incentives for safe
operation. Even by using its contracts to assure airworthiness, it is
in our view, very unlikely that the Forest Service will possess the
aviation knowledge necessary to include the appropriate language in its
airtanker contracts. Even if it does develop suitable contract
language, the Forest Service does not have, and cannot be expected to
develop, an FAA-like capability of providing the necessary
airworthiness safety oversight. There are still no multi-year contracts
that will allow contractors to obtain adequate financing.
We are aware of some minor changes in the contracting process but
have seen nothing to give us confidence that it has been changed
sufficiently to take on the functions, which at the time of our Panel
were presumed by the USDA-FS to have been vested in the FAA.
The Panel's final finding was: Training is underfunded and
inadequately specified for helicopters, large airtankers, and other
fixed-wing operations.
When we were here in 2003, we noted that the training deficiencies
remained. We are aware of some minor changes but the situation remains
much as it was.
Summary/Proposal: The Forest Service and the other agencies
involved with wildland fire protection appear to have made little
progress in three years. Progress toward resolving airtanker safety and
effectiveness has been unacceptably slow. We say this with full
knowledge that the Forest Service and other agencies are staffed with
dedicated individuals who are knowledgeable in their primary fields of
endeavor. The problem at the time we did our work, and which remains
today, is largely institutional and is associated more with mandates
and appropriate expertise than with a lack of will.
It is time to cut the Gordian knot rather than continue to try to
unravel it. One approach would be for authority to be put into the
USDA-FS and other agencies to deal with command and control problems
that are necessary to ensure that one agency is clearly in charge.
However, this would still leave the fundamental question of who should
provide the airworthiness standards and aviation safety oversight.
Alternately, and probably preferably, the government land management
agencies could get out of the aircraft operating business and simply
state their operational requirements. Those requirements, which could
be handled entirely by competent aviation operators, would leave the
land management people to their established expertise. This latter
approach would be contingent on some assurance that the industry would
be capable of providing the needed service on a safe, effective and
reliable basis. Whatever approach is taken, our view is that
significant additional resources will be required; but before
additional funding is provided, the institutional arrangements need to
be changed so that aviation operations can be effectively and
efficiently carried out.
Finally, we believe there is need for an independent external body
that can speak freely and advocate necessary change. It could advise
and work with the Forest Service and the related agencies to speed up
the resolution of the problems that were identified in our 2002 Report.
We believe that institutional problems like these (e.g., multiple
agencies and limited aviation expertise) cannot be solved from within.
Senator Craig. Mr. Hall, again, thank you very much for
your commitment to this and obviously your continued critical
and constructive observation. You suggest that the Government
land agencies get out of the aircraft operating business. That
would suggest that either--that some Federal agency, like the
FAA, take over the job of providing the firefighting aircraft
or, as you suggest, have the aircraft provided by a competent
aviation operator. I presume that the FAA would still be
required to certify the airworthiness of aircraft operated by
the competent aviation operator, is that not correct?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, let me point out that if the FAA--
and maybe clarify--were to operate the aircraft, they would be
both the operator and the regulator of this aircraft, which
would produce a conflict of responsibilities, and operation by
the FAA would not be a good idea. If a competent operator were
to operate the aircraft, it would depend on whether the
aircraft was classified as a public aircraft. If they continue
to be considered public aircraft, little would change unless
the FAA received additional funding for the airworthiness
oversight function.
I might add, Mr. Chairman, since 1993, in my presence on
the board, I've been talking on this because we have the black
hole of safety, which is public-use aircraft, that exists, not
just with the Forest Service and BLM, but with other Federal
agencies.
Senator Craig. Well, you're absolutely right. And I guess,
given the FAA's reluctance to take over responsibility for
checking airworthiness of government-operated aircraft, other
than outright legislation that would require this to happen, do
you have any other suggestions?
Mr. Hall. Well, obviously, congressional action with
appropriate funding for the FAA to do the job. My understanding
from conversations with two administrators, and I'm certainly--
this is my understanding, my conversations with them is they
would be very reluctant to take on the airworthiness oversight
of the aircraft unless they were provided additional funding to
perform the function, and the overnment money would have to be
spent also to provide airworthiness oversight. And I believe if
that's done, the FAA is an agency already sitting there with
that expertise. Personally, I believe from a public policy
perspective, it would make good sense to provide the FAA money
to do the airworthiness oversight job that they already do in
commercial aviation.
Senator Craig. You've also recommended an independent
external body to help address the other institutional concerns
that surfaced in the blue ribbon report which, as you correctly
point out, have not been resolved. Do you have an organization
in mind?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, let me point out that I had the
honor for 8 years to serve an independent body that was set up
by Congress that I personally believe functioned very well and
we all worked very hard at our responsibilities. I think when
Congress goes to agencies--operating agencies and asks for
oversight and recommendations that that is ineffective. I think
you need an independent look and an independent look that
reports directly to the oversight committees.
How that would be structured with the funding of a report
through OMB, I'm not sure, but I don't believe that you will
get any independence--the structure of that, obviously, the BRP
could be reconstituted or a new panel could be created to look
at some of these things that are put on the table before you
all, like the effectiveness of initial attack.
As you know, those numbers--the 99 percent numbers are
based on fires all over the United States, many of those very
small fires in the South or in Tennessee, where I'm from, and
it skews the numbers and presentations for the committee for
representatives from States where forest fires can actually be
major, major killers.
Senator Craig. Well, again, Mr. Hall, thank you very much
for staying involved in this. We'll continue to work with you
and your expertise.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, anything we can do. And let me
apologize to my co-chairman and beg his indulgence for not
being here to listen to his excellent testimony, which I've
already read. Thank you.
Senator Craig. Fair enough. Thank you very much. Now, let's
turn to Jim Hull, Texas State forester, College Station, Texas,
co-chair of the Blue Ribbon Aerial Firefighting Safety Panel.
Again, welcome before the committee, Mr. Hull.
STATEMENT OF JAMES B. HULL, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
STATE FORESTERS
Mr. Hull. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to be back. I would
present testimony somewhat on behalf of the blue ribbon panel,
but also State foresters. As you know, over two-thirds of the
forests in the United States are in State and private
ownership. State foresters have the primary responsibility for
protecting these acres from wildfire, along with most other
private lands in America, and a lot of Federal land, for that
matter. It's essential that we have access to aerial
firefighting resources if we're going to do our job
successfully.
In Texas, we saw significant wildfires in 2005, however, on
New Year's Day of this year, 2006, 1 day, we saw more wildfire
destruction, acres burned, than we did in all of 2005 put
together. I was very appalled that during the week of
Christmas, between the week of Christmas and New Year's, that
we saw 345 homes destroyed by wildfire. We saw three
fatalities. We saw two and a half entire communities destroyed
by wildfire, hundreds of cars, tractors, barns, livestock. This
was more wildfire destruction in Texas than I've seen in my
entire 40-year career combined, and that happened in 1 week. It
happened largely because of 40, 50 mile-an-hour winds
restricted our use of aerial firefighting resources. As
drought, fuels, and population increase across our Nation, it
becomes more and more critical that we have reliable, high
quality, sustainable aerial firefighting resources. It's in
this context that I would offer three specific points.
First, we must all work together, both Federal and State,
in developing an interagency long-term strategy for our
Nation's aerial firefighting resources. We need a strategy that
will provide a diverse fleet of helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft, and we need to do so in a manner that provides
adequate numbers to allow and, in fact, encourage scheduled
maintenance and time off for pilots to relieve stress and
fatigue. Neither of those is the case right now. This strategy
must be designed to meet the needs of our wildfire suppression
mission and do so in a safe, airworthy, and sustainable manner
over the long-term. To this end, you've heard about the fire
directors and State foresters working together to initiate such
a strategy to develop its interagency fire program, and I am
hopeful that by the end of this fiscal year that we will have
that report available.
My second point addresses the issue of certifying
airworthiness. Like all the other findings of the 2003 blue
ribbon panel report, the National Association of State
Foresters strongly supports the position that the current
program of relying on aging former military and surplus
commercial aircraft is not sustainable.
Ideally, I think this would mean funding and support for
aircraft that are designed, engineered, and purpose built
specifically for delivering fire retardant products. As a State
forester, I am very much aware of fiscal constraints, but we
must not arbitrarily rule out the fact that purpose-built
planes are too expensive. I firmly believe that the free
enterprise system in this country is capable and poised to
provide such aircraft if appropriate contractual assurances are
provided.
And the third point that I would make is that State
foresters, along with the blue ribbon panel, believe that the
missing link in this entire issue is the role of the Federal
Aviation Administration. As the premier aviation agency,
whether limited by law or merely a perceived lack of
responsibility or funding, we feel like that the FAA must
provide the leadership essential to assuring complete
airworthiness of these public-use aircraft. The Federal land
management agencies cannot and should not attempt to duplicate
the expertise of the FAA when it comes to assuring sustained
airworthiness of firefighting aircraft. Therefore, I'm urging
Congress to specifically charge the FAA with the responsibility
for certifying the airworthiness of public-use aircraft,
especially airtankers.
In closing, the National Association of State Foresters
pledges to work with our Federal partners in any way that we
possibly can in this entire effort. However, ultimately, it
seems to me that the ultimate success will depend on Congress
providing the necessary support and funding to implement
whatever strategy is developed.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to work with this
committee, Congress, and the administration in this entire
effort and look forward to addressing questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hull follows:]
Prepared Statement of James B. Hull, President, National Association of
State Foresters
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: On behalf of the
National Association of State Foresters (NASF), I am pleased to offer
the following statement for the hearing record. NASF is a non-profit
organization that represents the directors of the fifty state forestry
agencies, eight U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia. State
Foresters manage and protect state and private forests across the U.S.
Aerial firefighting resources are essential to the fire protection
programs of most states and territories represented by NASF. Over two-
thirds of the forests in the United States are in state and private
ownerships. State Foresters are not only responsible for protecting
these vast forests, but in most states we are also responsible for
wildfire protection on all rural lands and, in some states,
considerable federal land as well.
Fire protection in America is neither uniquely a western states'
event nor is it confined predominately to federal lands. More than
80,000 wildfires occur annually across our nation. Well over 60% of
those occur in non-western states and over 75% occur on non-federal
lands. The key point, however, is that no single entity, including
federal, state, or local government, has the capacity to handle all
responses to wildfires within their jurisdictional area of
responsibility. All fire protection programs are thus, by necessity,
strategically integrated to most effectively and economically serve all
rural lands of the nation. Aerial firefighting resources are utilized
in exactly the same way; in other words, we are all in this together.
Therefore, at this time it is critical that we all work together,
federal and state, in developing an interagency, long-term strategy for
our nation's aerial firefighting resources. We need a strategy that
will provide a diverse fleet of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft
that will meet the needs of our wildfire suppression mission, and do so
in a safe and airworthy and sustainable manner over the long-term.
In this context, you asked me to address three specific topics this
afternoon. First, you asked me to address the effectiveness of using
additional single-engine air tankers (SEATs) and heavy lift (Type 1)
helicopters to compensate for the loss of approximately 50% of the
nation's large, multi-engine air tanker fleet. In 2004 and 2005 the
combination of additional SEATs and Type 1 helicopters along with the
remaining 17 heavy air tankers allowed federal and state wildland fire
agencies to achieve an initial attack success rate similar to that of
previous years. However, I must caution that statement by reminding you
that in both 2004 and 2005 we experienced relatively moderate fire
seasons when viewed at a national level. We have yet to test this new
mix of aviation resources in a long, severe fire season. In other
words, we don't really know if we can continue to be effective with
only 16-17 large, multi-engine air tankers, regardless of how many
SEATs and Type 1 helicopters we have available. The capabilities of
each of these aircraft types are not entirely interchangeable. Each has
specific strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, it is essential that we
develop a long-term strategy that includes a sufficient number and
variety of safe and effective firefighting aircraft in order to protect
this nation's forests and communities.
This leads me to your second question regarding progress on a long-
term strategy. The Fire Directors of the Forest Service, the Bureau of
Land Management, the US Fish & Wildlife Service, the National Park
Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the National Association of
State Foresters, acting together as the National Fire & Aviation
Executive Board, have recently chartered a group of agency aviation
experts to develop this desperately needed, long-term aviation strategy
for the interagency fire program. This strategy, tentatively scheduled
for completion by the end of this fiscal year, will continue work the
Forest Service has already initiated by evaluating all realistic
alternatives and making recommendations on: (1) the mix or diversity of
aircraft that are needed; (2) the specific make and model of aircraft
that meet the identified specifications; (3) the quantity of each
needed; and (4) the appropriate business model for acquisition and
management.
Although this strategy will address all types of aircraft and all
aviation missions in support of fire suppression, it will focus heavily
on the large air tanker program. As the Subcommittee is well aware, in
response to three tragic air tanker crashes (one in 1994 and two in
2002), the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
chartered a Blue Ribbon Panel to evaluate aviation safety issues. In
its 2002 report the Panel, which I co-chaired, called into question the
airworthiness of the fixed-wing heavy air tanker fleet. Subsequently on
April 23, 2004, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
released the report of its investigation and sent its findings and
recommendations in a letter to the Secretaries of Agriculture and the
Interior. Because the two Departments did not have the personnel,
expertise, or funding to comply with the NTSB recommendations, they
terminated the contracts for the entire fleet of 33 large air tankers
in May of 2004. Since then, through a program of independent analysis
and increased inspections, the Forest Service has been able to
gradually return some of the less ancient former military aircraft to
service. At the current time, 16 large air tankers are approved and
available for contract--all of which are aging, former military
aircraft.
Lastly, you asked me to comment on the Forest Service's recent
acquisition of three former U.S. Navy P-3 Orion aircraft for conversion
as air tankers and my thoughts regarding certification of air
worthiness. In regard to the P-3 acquisition, even though the long-term
strategy has not yet been completed, we need to make operational
decisions in the short-term in order to continue to provide the best
aerial response to wildfire that we can. In this context, the P-3--
may--serve us well as a bridge aircraft to the next generation of
large, multi-engine air tankers. However, until the strategy has been
completed, we won't know whether or not the P-3 aircraft will have a
role over the long term. This is yet another reason why it is critical
that we complete the long-term strategy as quickly as possible.
In regard to certifying airworthiness, it is time, in fact far past
time, for a better answer. NASF strongly believes that our nation needs
a safe, modem, and effective aerial firefighting program. As was
clearly stated in the 2002 Blue Ribbon Panel report on ``Federal Aerial
Firefighting'', the current program of relying on aging, former
military and surplus commercial aircraft is not sustainable. Continued
reliance on older aircraft adapted for firefighting use will merely
perpetuate the problem over the long term. Ideally, this would mean
funding and support for aircraft that are designed and engineered
specifically for delivering fire retardant products. However, we do
understand that we are currently in a time where fiscal constraint is
necessary, and it is therefore only prudent to thoroughly examine all
available sources of aircraft to ensure a cost-effective strategy. But,
we must not arbitrarily rule out purpose-built aircraft as too
expensive. We believe that the free enterprise system in this country
is capable and poised to provide such aircraft if appropriate
contractual assurances are provided.
Further, we believe that the missing link in this entire issue is
the role of the Federal Aviation Administration. Whether limited by law
or merely a perceived lack of responsibility or funding, the FAA, as
the world's premier aviation agency, must. provide the leadership
essential to assuring complete airworthiness of public use aircraft,
including air tankers, to the same standards that have brought such
resounding success to the overall airline industry around the world.
The federal land management agencies cannot, and should not, attempt to
duplicate the expertise of the FAA when it comes to assuring sustained
airworthiness of firefighting aircraft that are such a vital part of
protecting our nation. Therefore, we further encourage Congress to
specifically charge the FAA with the responsibility for certifying the
airworthiness of public use aircraft, including air tankers.
In closing, I want to reiterate that it is absolutely essential
that we use an interagency process to develop this national aviation
strategy; one that includes the Forest Service, the Department of the
Interior Bureaus, and the National Association of State Foresters. To
accomplish this, NASF pledges our support to work together with the
federal agencies in developing an interagency long-term strategy for
our nation's aerial firefighting resources; a strategy that will cost-
effectively provide a diverse fleet of helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft that will meet the needs of our wildfire suppression mission
in a safe and airworthy and sustainable manner over the long term.
Therefore, we urge the Subcommittee to support sufficient funding for
the federal wildland fire programs to ensure our collective ability,
state and federal, to quickly and safely respond to wildfires across
our country, and to provide for the safety of our communities, our
firefighters, and the pilots and crew of our aircraft.
We appreciate the opportunity to offer our testimony and look
forward to the opportunity to work with Congress and the Administration
to address this critical issue.
Senator Craig. Well, Jim, thank you very much for your
testimony. First of all, I neglected to congratulate you on
becoming president of the Association of State Foresters.
Mr. Hull. Thank you.
Senator Craig. I won't suggest your year will be
interesting. It sounds like it's already been interesting and
tremendously challenging.
Mr. Hull. It has been that.
Senator Craig. The fires you've had down in your region.
Like Mr. Hall, you make a strong point for having the FAA take
responsibility for certification of these aircraft and their
continued airworthiness. I'm sure you're aware that the FAA has
resisted taking that duty on with government operated aircraft
because of the cost and number of aircraft involved. I'm told
the Forest Service has over 250 aircraft alone that are mostly
assigned to States and counties.
I'm wondering if you think it might be reasonable to have
the FAA only deal with those aircraft involved in the delivery
of retardant as a way to reduce the burden that might come if
we were to charge the FAA with that responsibility?
Mr. Hull. Yes, I think that'd be a great start. The real
problem that we have right now is with airtankers, and I would
like to see very much that change specifically in that area.
Senator Craig. Okay. What about the other recommendations
in the blue ribbon report? Are you comfortable that sufficient
progress is being made in addressing these recommendations?
Mr. Hull. I think, like co-chairman Jim Hall mentioned, the
bottom line is no. I think that the entire response to me seems
to be in slow motion to the point that at times I wonder if
we're going anywhere, to tell you the truth.
I must say that we have a great group of folks that are
working on this that are dedicated, committed to what they're
doing. These are without a doubt the finest folks in the world
at managing any kind of disaster, and they've proved that over
and over, whether it's wildfire, hurricanes, tornadoes, it
makes no difference. They do a great job there. Unfortunately,
I don't think they have the expertise to deal with aviation as
it must be dealt with. It's a highly specialized area and so I
really get the feeling that basically we're in this proverbial
time warp. It just seems to me like the recommendations that I
continue to see are the same types of recommendations that
we've seen virtually ever since the aviation program started
back in the 1950's. And to me, I can really see great efforts,
but it all seems to point toward the same cycles of disaster
that we've experienced time and time again.
Senator Craig. Okay. In your testimony, you mentioned that
we cannot arbitrarily rule out propose-built aircraft as
prohibitively expensive. How do you suggest this option be
pursued in a cost-effective manner?
Mr. Hull. I think first you have to define what cost
effectiveness really is. Fire protection of any kind is not
cheap, unless you're talking about fire prevention, and fire
prevention is one of the greatest tools that we have,
regardless of what form that takes. But fire protection itself
is very expensive until you factor in the enormous values being
protected, and those values are increasing every single day. To
be cost-effective, particularly in the area of firefighting
assets, I think four or five things have to be there.
No. 1, it has to be safe, it has to be reliable, it has to
be sustainable, and it has to be affordable. And I would have
to think that under the current system, the program is
affordable, but that's the only ingredient that's there. Safety
is not there, reliability is not there, and sustainability is
certainly not there. So I would say the current system is not
reliable. I guess my suggestion to encourage this to happen
lies in the free enterprise system to solve the problem. And in
that I would see these factors taking place.
No. 2, tell the private sector what needs to be
accomplished, provide them long-term contracts and incentives
to allow them to make the investments that are essential to
develop these kind of aircrafts to solve the problem, insist
that the FAA provide the certification to make sure the
airworthiness is there, and then get out of the way and let the
private sector develop it.
I've heard one possible scenario that might save some money
in this process and that would be to take some of the current
airframes as they are being developed at the factory and at
that point add tanks to them. I have no idea if that's a
possibility. It's way beyond my understanding, but the main
thing in this is I know that the aircraft industry is poised
and ready to develop aircraft that are purpose built for this
purpose. We just need to give them the incentives and the
contractual arrangements that allow them to do it.
Senator Craig. Well, once again, thank you very much for
coming up to testify. We appreciate it. Your expertise, your
experience in these areas, we'll continue to tap it as we
nudge, push, and pull this program along. It's obviously a very
critical component in firefighting and you've listed the
criteria from which we need to review it. And reliability and
safety are critical, and having obviously the resources
available at the time necessary becomes awfully important, too.
Again, thank you very much. We'll keep the committee open for
how long for questions?
Mr. Gladics. Ten days.
Senator Craig. Ten days and the record will remain open for
the purposes of questions to be addressed to any of the
witnesses of the panels.
Thank you all very much. The subcommittee will stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
Responses to Additional Questions
----------
Response of Mike Johanns, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, to
Question From Senator Wyden
Question 1. In the FY 2005 Interior Appropriation Act (S. 2804) the
Senate report (S. Rpt. 108-341) directed the Forest Service to develop
a strategic plan for procuring and managing large air tankers, as
follows: ``The Committee believes action taken by the Forest Service to
ground large airtankers at the beginning of the 2004 fire season has
hampered the ability of land management agencies to mobilize
efficiently the equipment necessary to protect natural resources and
communities. The Committee expects the Forest Service to move
aggressively to address its future needs for aviation assets, and work
with the Committee to ensure that all necessary components of the
aviation fleet, including both large airtankers and rotor aircraft, are
available to maximize firefighting capability. The Committee directs
the Forest Service to provide it with a strategic plan by March 1, 2005
for procuring and managing these critical assets, and further directs
that this plan be developed with alternatives that include input
provided by private industry.''
Why hasn't this Plan been completed? How can you propose, for the
2006 fire season, a combination of large airtankers, helitankers, and
single engine air tankers to make up for the capability lost by the
reduction in the number of large airtankers contracted, but you have no
long term plan on which to base this proposal?
Answer. A comprehensive, long-term plan is under development by the
National Interagency Aviation Council (NIAC) with strategic options
that consider all aspects of the wildland fire mission. The analysis
considers all aircraft types in current use and assesses options for
providing effective and cost-efficient aircraft that will meet
interagency suppression and fuels management goals in the future. The
planned completion date is December, 2006.
Each year we adjust the kinds, types and numbers of resources to
best meet the anticipated needs of the current fire season. In 2006, we
plan to have sufficient resources to maintain an equivalent level of
effectiveness as we have achieved on initial attack in previous years.
Responses of Mike Johanns, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, to
Questions From Senator Salazar
Question 1a. How has the retirement of certain makes and models of
aircraft, such as the Beechcraft Baron, affected the availability of
aircraft to suppress wildfires?
Answer. We have effectively substituted other aircraft as
replacements. Consequently, there has been minimal impact on wildfire
operations.
Question 1b. Are there less aircraft available? More? The same?
Answer. Yes, however, there have been no shortages or unfilled
orders for aviation assets. Overall, our initial attack rate has
remained stable since 2003.
Question 2. The USFS acquired 3 Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft from
the Navy to use as large retardant aircraft. Will those aircraft be
converted and available this fire season? Where will those aircraft be
based?
Answer. The three Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft will require
extensive modifications and are likely not to be available for this
year's wildfire season. We will conduct a thorough analysis and
assessment of these resources and, should that confirm the modification
and maintenance of these aircraft be shown to be cost-effective and
cost-efficient, would perform the modifications with an anticipated
aircraft availability 2007.
Responses of Mike Johanns, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, to
Questions From Senator Burns
Question 1. In the Fiscal Year 2005 Interior Appropriations bill,
the Forest Service was directed to develop a report on the future
composition of the aviation fleet. This report was due on March 1,
2005. Can you give me any insight to what is holding this report up and
what the contents of the report are?
Answer. A comprehensive, long-term plan is under development by the
National Interagency Aviation Council (NIAC) with strategic options
that consider all aspects of the wildland fire mission. The analysis
considers all aircraft types in current use and assesses options to
providing effective and cost-efficient aircraft that will meet
interagency suppression and fuels management goals in the future.
Identifying and coordinating the needs of the various Federal wildfire
agencies as well as coordination with the States have proven to be the
greatest challenge in completing this task. The planned completion date
is December, 2006.
Question 2. I am also concerned about the future use of military
surplus aircraft. When do you expect to let these contracts and how
much it will cost to retrofit the planes?
Answer. The cost of retrofitting these aircraft is currently being
evaluated. An accurate estimate of the cost will be available as soon
as the aircraft can be thoroughly inspected later this month. We
anticipate awarding a contract by early summer 2006 for the conversion
of the aircraft. The actual conversion effort will take approximately
12 months. We anticipate the aircraft being available for the 2007 fire
season.
Question 3. Will the government still hold title to these aircraft?
Answer. Yes, the Forest Service plans to maintain ownership of
these aircraft and offer operation and maintenance contract to
commercial operators. Once these contracts are awarded, the aircraft
will be provided to successful bidders as government furnished
equipment.
Question 3a. If so, will the government be liable if there are
accidents with these aircraft rather than if they were solely owned by
the operator?
Answer. If the government retains title to the aircraft, it might
be sued for negligent maintenance or negligently entrusting it to
incompetent personnel. If the government does not retain title, such
allegations cannot be made. As a practical matter, this does not appear
to be a significant risk. Aircraft accidents involving such aircraft
generally are caused by either pilot error or mechanical failure,
including metal fatigue. Regardless of who owns the aircraft, they will
be piloted by contractor employee; thus, the Government will not be
liable for pilot error. Similarly, the Government will not be
conducting maintenance of the aircraft, so the Government should not be
liable for any mechanical failure. The two most recent accidents were
caused by breakup of the aircraft in flight caused by metal fatigue
cracks. Again, even where the Government holds title, the contractors
will be responsible for inspections to detect such cracks. Accordingly,
the Government should not be liable for such failures.
Question 3b. Does it make sense to give the agency the authority to
sell these aircraft to operators in order to avoid additional
government liability?
Answer. Transferring the aircraft to private contractors would not
avoid Government liability. Any decision whether to retain ownership or
sell the aircraft to private contractors should be based on other
factors.
Question 3c. Would that require a change in law?
Answer. Yes, the Forest Service, like other agencies, lacks
authority to sell property directly to private contractors except under
very limited circumstances. Congress would need to amend the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act.
Question 3d. If we did allow sale would we need to give the Forest
Service the authority to enter into longer term contracts so that
operators would know if they bought the aircraft they would get a
return on their investment since they would be guaranteed that they
would fly the planes for long enough time to capitalize their
investment?
Answer. Currently, Forest Service has authority to enter into
three-year contracts for air tanker services. For many years, private
contractors have acquired aircraft and competed for such contracts
every three years. However, acquisition costs have generally been very
low. Whether the contractors will need longer term contracts to spread
the acquisition and conversion costs over a longer term and thus lower
the price for their contracts will depend on the acquisition costs and
other financial factors. In the past, the Forest Service has used
nearly all aircraft available for air tanker services. Thus, the
contractors might compete every three years for a specific contract,
but could count on receiving a contract for their aircraft in at least
some locations. Generally, the contractors could then spread their
fixed costs over many years. If contractors could not rely on having
contracts for at least some aircraft for a longer time period, one
alternative would be to enter into longer term contracts. Congress
would need to give authority to the Forest Service to enter into such
longer term contracts.
______
Response of James Hall and James B. Hull to Question From Senator
Salazar
Question 1. Not long ago, the 9/11 Commission graded the federal
government on the implementation of its recommendations. If you were to
do the same type of thing for the Blue Ribbon Commission's Report, what
grade would you hand out to the agencies and why?
Answer. We are very pleased that the question asked us to grade the
federal government and while Mr. Salazar mentioned the agencies, we
think it is essential to expand the grading to include the full scope
of those we addressed in our report, that is, the USDA Forest Service,
the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management, the Federal
Aviation Administration, Congress and the Administration. Therefore, on
behalf of the Panel I will provide you with a grade for each, from our
perspective:
1) USDA Forest Service and DOI Bureau of Land Management--At
best we would give these agencies a grade of ``C-''. They
clearly realize the seriousness of the situation and the vital
role that aerial fire fighting resources play in the nation's
wildfire suppression responsibilities. At least they are
attempting to do something, even if it is to sustain a very old
and archaic aviation program, but that seems to be their only
choice given financial constraints and administrative and
political realities.
These federal agencies appear to either be in slow motion in
fully addressing the Blue Ribbon Panel's report, or in the
proverbial ``time warp"--trying to re-invent the same old
aviation system that has for 50 plus years now proven over and
over to be unsustainable.
As we testified, some minor progress has been made in the
area of safety, but accidents continue to happen and the safety
record remains unacceptable. For further information on this,
please refer to the written testimony that I submitted on
behalf of the panel prior to the hearing of 2/15/06.
We also reported that under the current system of aircraft
certification, contracting, and operation, key elements of the
aerial fire fighting fleet are unsustainable. Contracting still
leaves much to be desired as it sets up a ``value based''
assessment that seems unduly influenced by price. Moreover, it
provides little encouragement for scheduled maintenance and
time off for pilots to relieve stress and fatigue. In the long
term, it provides no incentive for the free enterprise system
to work to develop a purpose built plane(s) to replace the
failed approach that repeatedly sees the agencies having to
rely on old surplus military or commercial aircraft for
conversion to air tankers.
Mission muddle amongst the agencies, which is caused by
differences in culture, organizational structure and
philosophical matters, and land management objectives,
continues today and is not conducive to solving the problem.
However, the most dominant problem is that these outstanding
land management professionals do not have the technical
expertise necessary to oversee and conduct a highly complex and
much needed quality aviation program from the ground up. This
is not to be confused with their phenomenal expertise in the
tactical use of aircraft, as the premier emergency response
management organizations in the world.
Bottom line, the current aerial fire fighting system is not
sustainable, and it is not possible for these federal land
management agencies to improve their grade of ``C-'' by
themselves.
2) Federal Aviation Administration--We would also have to
give the FAA a maximum grade of ``C-'' in response to the Blue
Ribbon Panel's report. We spent extensive time describing the
FAA's lack of attention to certification of air tankers and
argued that a vital safety link is missing when the FAA does
not certify airtankers. Whether limited by law or merely a
perceived lack of responsibility or funding--we feel that the
FAA should have aggressively sought to rectify this deplorable
situation instead of rationalizing its way around taking no
responsibility for it. We give the FAA a grade of ``C-'' for
taking some actions to help the USDA Forest Service get
connected with some aviation specialists and because apparently
it does not in fact have the statutory authority to deal with
public use aircraft.
3) Congress and The Administration--The Blue Ribbon Panel
went into considerable detail with our Finding #2 dealing with
the fact that wild land firefighting has grown to a level of
importance and magnitude that warrants the attention of
national leaders. It is impossible for any of the federal
agencies to adequately address this massive situation by
themselves, or even collectively, without strong support,
commitment and funding from the Administration and Congress.
After three years there is no tangible evidence that our
national leadership has any inclination to help provide a
sustainable aerial fire-fighting program for the nation.
A safe and efficient aviation program requires at least three
basic characteristics: 1) It must be reliable; 2) It must be
sustainable; and 3) It must be affordable. The current system
that Congress and the Administration seem to favor meets only
one of these criteria--it is affordable. In fact, we would
express it as a very ``cheap'' way of trying to do business.
This is not good enough.
The puzzling part of this scenario is that we have a private
free enterprise aviation system in this country that seems to
be poised and ready to develop the type of purpose built
aviation aircraft and program that would sustain us for decades
to come, but they cannot make the required private investments
without some sort of commitment from the federal government
that the products will be utilized in such a manner as to make
it feasible for the long term.
We need to get the federal land management agencies out of
the aviation business so that they can concentrate on their
areas of expertise. This would provide our citizens with the
most effective and efficient aerial fire protection available.
We would suggest that the Congress and Administration jointly
form another Blue Ribbon Panel to study and outline how a
privately oriented aerial fire fighting (large air tanker)
program might be developed, funded and operated to serve the
federal land management agencies, not be controlled by them.
This matter is urgent, and continuing down the current path is
a waste of time and places the American public at greater risk
every day, to say nothing of the pilots and others that are
charged with flying old converted military and commercial air
tankers.
By the way, we will resist the urge to give Congress and the
Administration a grade for their lack of taking action to set
in place a workable solution to resolving the aerial fire-
fighting dilemma.