[Senate Hearing 109-807]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-807
HURRICANE KATRINA: MANAGING
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
IN A CATASTROPHE
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 6, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
David T. Flanagan, General Counsel
Chad T. Sarchio, DOJ Detailee
Larry F. Vigil, Professional Staff Member
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Robert F. Muse, Minority General Counsel
Stacey M. Bosshardt, Minority Counsel
Michael L. Alexander, Minority Professional Staff Member
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Collins.............................................. 1
Senator Lieberman............................................ 3
Senator Levin................................................ 23
Senator Warner............................................... 27
WITNESSES
Monday, February 6, 2006
Michael J. Vanacore, Assistant Director, Office of
Investigations, Office of International Affairs, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 7
Kenneth W. Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Office,
Federal Bureau of Investigation................................ 9
Warren J. Riley, Superintendent of Police, New Orleans Police
Department..................................................... 11
Peter M. Fonash, Ph.D., Deputy Manager, National Communications
System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security................... 36
Colonel FG Dowden, Regional Liaison, New Orleans Department of
Homeland Security and Public Safety............................ 39
William L. Smith, Chief Technology Officer, BellSouth Corporation 42
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Dowden, Colonel FG:
Testimony.................................................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 86
Fonash, Peter M., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 77
Kaiser, Kenneth W.:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Riley, Warren J.:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 69
Smith, William L.:
Testimony.................................................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 92
Vanacore, Michael J.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 55
APPENDIX
Exhibit 6........................................................ 106
Exhibit 7........................................................ 109
Exhibit 20....................................................... 111
Exhibit P........................................................ 122
HURRICANE KATRINA: MANAGING LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
IN A CATASTROPHE
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MONDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M.
Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Collins, Warner, Lieberman, and Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS
Chairman Collins. The Committee will come to order.
Today the Committee will examine two essential elements of
disaster response: Strong, coordinated law enforcement to
protect the public and first responders, and effective
communications to expedite rescue and relief efforts. Both of
those elements were tragically absent in the immediate
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In this, the Committee's 16th
hearing on Katrina, we will focus on the deficiencies in
planning and management that added to the misery and fear of
the victims and that made the arduous work of first responders
even more difficult and needlessly dangerous.
In the first days after Katrina struck, reports of murder,
rape, and looting were rampant. Fortunately, some of these war
stories turned out to be false. Still, while the overwhelming
majority of the people in the Gulf region pulled together to
help one another through the crisis, there were criminal
opportunists who sought to intimidate or vandalize or steal.
These criminals added yet another dimension to the suffering of
our fellow Americans caught in the hurricane's wake.
In addition to the harm caused by actual criminal activity,
Katrina's victims were harmed by the wildfire of rumors that
swept through their communities. Indeed, the horror stories
coming out of the Superdome in New Orleans were so numerous, so
frightening, and so often repeated, not just by the news media
but by city officials as well, that FEMA medical teams withdrew
from the very place they were needed the most.
The basic question we will explore with our first panel of
witnesses is to what extent the law enforcement community at
the local, State, and Federal levels anticipated that a major
natural disaster would bring about lawlessness. We also want to
know how law enforcement agencies planned to cope with the
disintegration of their normal operations, with individual
officers cut off from their units, units cut off from their
departments, and departments cut off from one another. Who
takes control when resources are scattered and the chain of
command is stressed to the breaking point?
The specific issues we will explore cut to the very heart
of effective disaster response: Planning for the predictable
consequences of a disaster and having a structure in place that
can overcome the unexpected. For example, the defections from
the New Orleans Police Department contributed both to the
actual lawlessness and the perception that crime in the city
was beyond control. Some defections may have been the result of
dereliction of duty. Others, however, were the result of
officers being caught in their own personal crises and, thus,
being unable to respond. That is a predictable consequence of
any major disaster, yet there seems to have been no plan in
place to reorganize and reconstitute the department following
its initial disruption.
And how prepared were government agencies at the State
level to respond to the law enforcement collapse in the city?
We must also learn where Federal law enforcement fits into this
picture, in particular, what effect the split command between
the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security had upon the
speed and effectiveness of the Federal response. The lack of
coordination among law enforcement agencies at all levels of
government appears to be glaring and unacceptable.
Similarly, shouldn't it have been apparent that if New
Orleans flooded, then the city's correction facilities would
also flood? There is no question that the Orleans Parish
Central Jail would have to be evacuated. We must learn why pre-
disaster planning failed to anticipate this and what effect the
lack of back-up facilities had on the ability to control crime.
Among all the examples of insufficient pre-disaster
planning, this is one of the most troubling and one that had a
considerable effect on public safety and the security of first
responders.
Communications failures plagued nearly every aspect of
Katrina response and relief, including law enforcement. Our
second panel of witnesses represents a wide range of expertise
in emergency communications both from government and the
private sector. When the telephone lines and the cell towers
went down and the power went out, the ability of agencies to
mount an effective and coordinated response was lost, and the
public was plunged into even greater uncertainty and fear. The
thousands of unanswered 911 calls are evidence of that.
This collapse of the public telecommunications system was
accompanied by that long-standing Achilles heel of emergency
response: The lack of interoperable communications equipment
among emergency response agencies. Communications among first
responders and with their headquarters were, at best, sporadic,
inconsistent, and at times overwhelmed by competing traffic.
More often it was non-existent as the captain from the New
Orleans Police Department testified last week. Also last week
we heard Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi say that the
lack of survivable interoperable communications was the single
biggest problem he confronted.
The collapse of communications systems was so widespread
and so complete, Governor Barbour told us, that the head of his
State's National Guard might as well have been a Civil War
general, having to communicate with field commanders by
messenger instead of with technology. For communications
technology to serve as the powerful tool it can be in a
disaster response, it must be able to withstand the disaster
itself, or back-up equipment must be readily available.
This Committee has invested a great amount of effort over
the past several years to strengthen the emergency response
partnership and to improve our Nation's emergency
communications capabilities, and we have made some progress.
The issue we will highlight today, however, demonstrates the
grim consequences that result when that partnership breaks down
and communications fail.
This hearing will show how very much more needs to be done,
starting with the enactment of the Lieberman-Collins
interoperability communications bill.
I yield to my colleague.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is a
measure of the quality of our relationship that I always call
it the Collins-Lieberman bill. I thank you for mentioning it,
and I agree with you.
In today's hearing, Managing Law Enforcement and
Communications in a Catastrophe, we are going to examine two
capacities that are crucial to any effective response to a
disaster. Emergency response will never be successful in our
country if our Federal Government, working with State and local
governments, is unable to help restore order and maintain
communications at the scene of a disaster, whether it is
natural or a terrorist attack.
The National Response Plan (NRP), which was issued in
January 2005, clearly puts the Department of Homeland Security
in charge of making sure communications and law enforcement
work in an emergency. Unfortunately, as today's hearing will
show, and as I have come to learn as our investigation has gone
on, the Department of Homeland Security was largely unprepared
to provide the emergency communications and law enforcement
support the Gulf Coast needed after Hurricane Katrina struck.
And that is a serious failure. That failure was part of a
larger failure, which in some sense began on January 6, 2005
when the NRP was issued and continued right until August 29,
when Hurricane Katrina struck. It was a failure by the
Department of Homeland Security to take steps to activate its
role under the NRP and get ready to carry out its
responsibilities under that plan in time of disaster anywhere
in America.
Its unpreparedness left State and local police,
firefighters, search and rescue teams, Red Cross, and FEMA
volunteers adrift in this enormous disaster without
communications or the public safety support they needed from
the Federal Government. The portion of the NRP that addresses
public safety and security creates a framework for Federal law
enforcement to assist other Federal, State, and local
authorities during what is labeled by the NRP ``an incident of
national significance.'' But under this portion of the plan,
which is designated ESF-13, for Emergency Support Function 13
two agencies instead of one are designated as the coordinators:
The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Justice.
Evidence gathered by our staff makes clear that in the
critical days before, during, and after Katrina, there was
little coordination between these two Federal agencies and, in
fact, little coordination within the agencies as well.
The Homeland Security Department's senior leadership failed
to understand it had a leadership role for public safety, and
so far as I have reviewed, our investigation to date has
produced no evidence that anyone in the Department of Homeland
Security was given clear, explicit responsibility to take the
lead on public safety for the Department in the days before
landfall or in the days immediately after the hurricane struck.
The responses to these two emergency functions that we are
focused on in this hearing today--ESF-2, which is
communications, and ESF-13, which, as I have said, is public
safety and security--raise troubling questions about who was in
charge of the NRP, generally, who was making sure that the NRP
was being properly activated, ready to be implemented. Later
this week, we will hear from people from FEMA and the
Department of Homeland Security, and then next week we will
hear from Secretary Chertoff of DHS. And I intend to ask those
witnesses those very important questions.
While they saw the storm coming, as the rest of America
did, on television, and even after the President in response to
requests from the governors in the region declared a state of
emergency on Saturday, August 27, the Department of Justice
waited to be asked for law enforcement help to take any action.
On August 30, Tuesday, the day after landfall, DOJ did receive
a request from the State of Louisiana, but documents show the
response by the Department of Justice was delayed while it
struggled to answer fundamental questions about its authority
under the NRP, which, of course, should have been answered long
before the hurricane struck.
This confusion was compounded by a lack of cooperation
between the Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security. According to e-mails our staff has obtained
from DHS, there appears to have been a conflict between the two
Departments over who should be in charge of law enforcement
assistance to the city of New Orleans.
Our exhibits today in the book that the witnesses have
specifically include an e-mail dated September 4, 2005, that
refers to a dispute as to who would take the lead--the FBI,
which is under the Department of Justice, or the Immigration
and Customs Enforcement agency, under DHS.\1\ This lack of
coordination clearly slowed Federal assistance to New Orleans,
which could have helped avoid the breakdown of law and order
that had serious consequences on the ground in the desperate
and confusing aftermath of Katrina.
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\1\ Exhibit 6 appears in the Appendix on page 106.
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For example, as we have heard, FEMA Disaster Medical
Assistance Teams deployed to the Superdome to assist evacuees
with special needs decided to abandon their posts and, in fact,
their patients and leave their supplies and equipment behind
because the teams grew concerned about security, including
rumors that segments of the crowd at the Superdome were
plotting to stage a riot on the third day after landfall. On
the same day, which was Thursday, September 1, search and
rescue and communications teams in New Orleans were also forced
to curtail critical operations in large parts of the stricken
city for similar safety reasons.
So public safety fears, in some cases some people say they
were exaggerated, but whether they were exaggerated or not,
those fears limited the rescue and recovery efforts, and that
must not be allowed to happen again.
Our second panel today deals, as Senator Collins has said,
with communications and the twin problems of the inability of
first responders to talk to each other, which can be described
as interoperability, and in this disaster the inability to talk
at all, which might be called operability. The heroes of the
search and rescue efforts in New Orleans who testified before
this Committee last week about their inability to communicate
with each other, with the victims, and with coordinators at the
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge really left an
impression on me.
Katrina's high winds and subsequent flooding caused what
the Federal Communications Commission called ``extraordinary''
destruction of communications facilities. And it was
extraordinary. It reminds us all how much we depend on those
systems in our daily lives, let alone in a disaster. Almost 3
million telephone lines were knocked down by Katrina. Thirty-
eight 911 call centers were put out of action, and more than
1,000 cell towers were left useless. Most over-the-air and
cable television service was wiped out by Hurricane Katrina.
Now, those enormous outages not only made it extremely
difficult for hundreds of thousands of victims to get emergency
information or communicate with family and friends, they also
crippled the ability of government officials and first
responders to coordinate their activities and respond.
Despite the clear responsibility given to the Department of
Homeland Security under the NRP to assure communications
support to Federal and State and local response efforts in a
disaster, the fact is that the Department, as far as we can
determine, had no plan when Katrina struck to provide such
emergency support. While the National Communications System,
which we will hear about in the second panel, which is within
the Department of Homeland Security, did engage in daily
contact with the telecommunications industry, which was helpful
in facilitating restoration of landline and cellular systems,
as far as we can determine, it had no similar contact with
State or local governments who were desperately in need of
their help to restore communications.
DHS was simply unprepared to move in with mobile systems,
for instance, to provide emergency communications solutions to
the police, fire department, search and rescue teams, and other
first responders who were struggling to save lives in the days
after landfall.
As Chairman Collins indicated, last week Mississippi
Governor Haley Barbour and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco all testified that
communications failures greatly hampered emergency response
efforts and, along with interoperability, Governor Barbour
specifically said, is the number one problem that they feel
needs to be addressed before disaster strikes again.
This inability to communicate after Katrina serves as a
grim reminder that 4 years after September 11, our Nation was
still nowhere near as prepared as it should have been for a
major disaster. So restoring law and order and maintaining
communications, both for first responders as well as the
stricken population, have got to be crucial missions for the
Federal Government in the immediate aftermath of an American
catastrophe, and in the case of Hurricane Katrina, which was an
American catastrophe, neither happened. We need to find out why
in this investigation if we are to make sure that never happens
again.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses for
being here. I look forward to their testimony.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
I am very pleased to welcome our panel of witnesses today.
Each of them has a deep commitment to law enforcement and has
devoted many years to public service.
Michael Vanacore is Director of the Office of International
Affairs for Immigration and Customs Enforcement and was a key
member of the transition team when the Department of Homeland
Security was created 3 years ago. After Katrina hit, he was
assigned to New Orleans to serve as a liaison between the DHS
headquarters and its personnel on the scene.
Ken Kaiser is the Special Agent in Charge of the Federal
Bureau of Investigations Field Office in Boston. I would note
that he has worked very hard with my office to create the Joint
Terrorism Task Force in the State of Maine, and I am grateful
to him for those efforts. Among many supervisory assignments
during his 23 years with the FBI, he served as Special Agent in
Charge of the New Orleans FBI office from 2001 to 2004, and
that experience caused him to volunteer to deploy to New
Orleans. In the aftermath of Katrina, he was tasked with
commanding the FBI's tactical assets.
Warren Riley is the Superintendent of Police for the City
of New Orleans and a 24-year veteran of the New Orleans Police
Department. During Hurricane Katrina, he was the department's
chief of operations. As such, he commanded all the field units,
precincts, and SWAT teams during the response effort.
I would ask that you each rise so that I can swear you in.
Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give the
Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Vanacore. I do.
Mr. Kaiser. I do.
Mr. Riley. I do.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Vanacore, we will begin
with you.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. VANACORE,\1\ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE
OF INVESTIGATIONS, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Vanacore. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Lieberman. It is an honor for me to appear before you today to
discuss U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and how
our Federal law enforcement and support personnel responded to
Hurricane Katrina.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Vanacore appears in the Appendix
on page 55.
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Before I begin to share with the Committee the details of
our support to the people of New Orleans and Louisiana during
and after Hurricane Katrina, I want to talk for a moment about
the agency I am proud to represent.
ICE's principal mission is to protect the American people
by combating criminal and terrorist activities that cross our
borders and threaten us here at home. The men and women of ICE
accomplish this by investigating and enforcing the Nation's
immigration and customs laws while also protecting vital
Federal facilities throughout the Nation. Working overseas,
along our borders, and throughout the Nation's interior, ICE
agents and officers prove every day that the newly merged
customs and immigration authorities create a powerful
enforcement mechanism. These unique enforcement tools allow ICE
to quickly detain, arrest, and remove from this country those
who violate our borders and also develop stronger cases that
are more likely to be accepted for prosecution with more
significant penalties.
By leveraging the full enforcement potential provided by
the new and unique blend of customs and immigration authorities
wielded by ICE, we are making it more difficult for potential
terrorists and organized criminal groups to move themselves,
their supporters, or their weapons across our borders through
traditional human, drug, contraband, or financial smuggling
networks, routes, and methods.
By virtue of their dedication, excellence, and commitment,
the men and women of ICE have made great strides since 2003 in
building upon their traditional strengths and capabilities
while simultaneously creating a new agency.
Nowhere was this more evident than in our unprecedented
response to Hurricane Katrina.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina making landfall, 30 ICE Federal
Protective Service (FPS) personnel were on the ground, in the
area, in preparation for the storm supporting the Federal
Emergency Management Agency relief operations--medical
assistance teams, Red Cross, and evacuation shelters--as per
agreement with FEMA and protecting the Federal facilities in
the affected area. Additionally, a FPS Emergency Response Team
was deployed immediately from Washington, DC, and further
personnel were pre-staged along with resources in Houston and
Fort Worth, Texas; Jackson, Mississippi; Atlanta, Georgia; and
Tallahassee, Florida. As a component of ICE, FPS was on the
ground before the storm came ashore.
In response to the magnitude of the storm and the
subsequent flooding, ICE deployed large numbers of law
enforcement and support staff to the affected area. Countless
times, in response to the exigent circumstances in the area,
ICE agents and officers participated directly in response,
rescue, and recovery efforts while also simultaneously
establishing and visibly demonstrating a robust law enforcement
presence. We accomplished this in the midst of countless life-
or-death situations with an almost complete absence of local
law enforcement capability and infrastructure. Over the course
of ICE's commitment to the entire Katrina operation, we
deployed nearly 2,000 law enforcement officers.
With respect to my personal involvement in Hurricane
Katrina, I was notified on Friday, September 2, 2005, that I
had been selected to deploy to Louisiana and attended a meeting
at DHS headquarters that same day. I departed Washington, DC,
by commercial air for Louisiana on Sunday, September 4, 2005. I
was charged with serving as ICE's lead representative on the
ground to help coordinate the ongoing Federal, State, and local
law enforcement activities while ensuring connectivity between
the field and ICE headquarters. Over the course of ICE's
support to Louisiana, our agents and officers completed
thousands of law enforcement and security assignments and
rescued hundreds of citizens from their residences.
Any response to a natural disaster of this magnitude on
U.S. soil cannot and should not escape close scrutiny in an
effort to improve our ability to assist those affected. Many
questions have been asked, such as what lessons have we learned
on pre-hurricane deployments and how we can enhance emergency
preparedness, strengthen command and control, and increase
coordination between Federal, State, and local law enforcement,
first responders, and the National Guard.
The Department has publicly acknowledged that Katrina
revealed problems in national response capabilities, stretching
back more than a decade, and demonstrated the need for more
comprehensive Federal, State, and local planning for
catastrophic events. DHS has publicly announced that it will
issue a comprehensive strategy to improve the Nation's
capability to manage catastrophic incidents in the very near
future.
In closing, I would urge the Members of this Committee that
in the course of your important oversight responsibilities to
consider that the numbers of DHS and ICE personnel deployed do
not begin to tell the whole story. Every one of our deployed
agents, officers, and support staff left friends and family to
help others in the face of great hardship and uncertainty. Upon
arrival, our people worked round the clock in a very austere
environment. Their tireless work and dedication to their
mission reflected the very highest performance standards of the
Department of Homeland Security.
At the outset, our goal was to provide critically needed
assistance to the people of Louisiana during a very difficult
time. We fulfilled our mission by assisting the people and
police departments throughout the State, and most importantly,
we saved lives.
Thank you for your continuing support of the men and women
of ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you might have.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Kaiser.
TESTIMONY OF KENNETH W. KAISER,\1\ SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,
BOSTON FIELD OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Kaiser. Good afternoon, Chairman Collins, Ranking
Member Lieberman. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's response to Hurricane
Katrina. I am currently the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) at
the FBI's Boston Division where I am responsible for 268 FBI
special agents and 205 FBI support personnel in an area which
covers four New England States. Prior to my current assignment
from August 2001 through March 2003, I was the SAC of the FBI's
New Orleans Division. During my tenure in New Orleans and
continuing through today, the FBI has enjoyed strong
relationships with our State and local law enforcement partners
in Louisiana.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Kaiser appears in the Appendix on
page 63.
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We are all aware of the catastrophic damage caused by the
storm. Although the FBI has a broad mission, Hurricane Katrina
posed unique and unprecedented challenges. Historically, the
FBI has had a very limited role in response to natural
disasters, but the large-scale destruction of the Gulf Coast
region from Hurricane Katrina and the substantial failure of
the infrastructure led to post-storm events not previously
experienced. With our assets, resources, and crisis management
experience, the FBI was able to address some of the unique law
enforcement needs of the region following the storm.
Prior to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, the Special
Agent in Charge (SAC) of the FBI's New Orleans Division, Jim
Bernazzani, had made preparations for continuity of his
division's operations. These included establishing a protocol
for communications with his employees and arranging for the
deployment of personnel, equipment, and supplies from the FBI
Division in Quantico, Virginia, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
where SAC Bernazzani intended to temporarily relocate his field
office operations should that become necessary. As Hurricane
Katrina made landfall, SAC Bernazzani and a small staff
remained in the FBI office in New Orleans to ensure the
security of the FBI's records, equipment, and evidence. Once
the storm had passed and FBI SWAT agents relieved SAC
Bernazzani, he immediately relocated to a mobile FBI command
post in Baton Rouge, which provided him with the communications
equipment he needed to begin accounting for his personnel and
re-establishing FBI field operations. As it became evident that
the vast majority of the FBI New Orleans Division personnel had
been displaced, additional FBI personnel from around the
country were deployed to New Orleans to ensure FBI operations
continued.
On September 1, the Office of the Attorney General directed
the DOJ components to identify personnel, assets, and other
resources for immediate deployment to areas impacted by
Hurricane Katrina. On September 2, having received the
inventory of assets and personnel available for deployment, the
Attorney General issued a memorandum directing its components
as follows:
The FBI to continue to deploy Special Agents, including
SWAT agents, and tactical assets, including helicopters, boats,
and technical and communications assets, to the affected area;
The DEA to prepare to deploy Mobile Enforcement Teams,
special agents, and tactical assets, including helicopters and
other aircraft, to the affected area;
The ATF to establish a Violent Crime Impact Team in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, with related personnel and assets, to address
any rise in criminal activity in the city;
The U.S. Marshals Service to continue to deploy Deputy U.S.
Marshals and court security officers to conduct prisoner
transport operations and provide additional court security and
to prepare to utilize the Justice Prisoner and Alien
Transportation Act to deploy law enforcement personnel to
airports around the country as needed.
I was deployed to Louisiana and designated the FBI Tactical
and Emergency Operations Commander. As such, I was responsible
for the command and control of all FBI tactical assets deployed
to the area. My role was to coordinate and manage requests for
standard SWAT operations such as high-risk arrests or search
warrants, officer rescue operations, and other operations
supporting Federal investigations. I also directed the
coordination, management, and execution of critical
infrastructure and site security operations requested by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency or other components of the
Department of Homeland Security under the National Response
Plan Emergency Support Function 13, ESF-13.
Upon my arrival in New Orleans on September 1, 2005, it was
immediately apparent to me that the effects of the storm and
subsequent damage to the levees had severely affected the
ability of the New Orleans Police Department to perform
effectively. New Orleans Police Department officers were
dealing with personal losses from Hurricane Katrina, were
without a supporting infrastructure, and were depleted of such
resources as communications, ammunition, transportation, and
food. Effective law enforcement activities could not be
conducted under these circumstances. Also, many law enforcement
agencies from around the country were sending resources into
New Orleans.
The NRP contemplates that a senior law enforcement official
will be appointed during an Incident of National Significance
to oversee the combined Federal, State, and local law
enforcement response to the incident. The FBI identified New
Haven Division Special Agent in Charge Michael J. Wolf as
having the experience and expertise to support this mission.
SAC Wolf was deployed to Louisiana on September 4, 2005, and
arrived late that evening to begin the process of establishing
an effective method of command, control, and coordination of
law enforcement assets in New Orleans.
SAC Wolf and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Assistant Director Michael Vanacore assumed the duties of
SFLEOs after being identified by their respective agencies. In
order to address the identified gaps in the law enforcement
response, SAC Wolf established the Law Enforcement Coordination
Center. The purpose of the LECC was to coordinate, deconflict,
and track requests for and response to law enforcement support;
to organize and coordinate interaction among law enforcement;
to ensure coordination between law enforcement efforts and
National Guard and Department of Defense operations; and to
provide limited investigative and criminal law enforcement
resources, until such time as the NOPD was able to maintain
service without additional resources from other law enforcement
agencies.
I was specifically asked to talk about the FBI's effort to
train its agents in accordance with the NRP. One of the
missions of the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group is to
provide training to select FBI personnel in the effective
response to critical incidents. The FBI defines a critical
incident as any situation, event, or set of circumstances that
poses a serious threat, diverts significant resources, and/or
demands command level coordination. Our training includes
instruction on the NRP, as well as other national plans and
policies, and the roles and responsibilities of the FBI in
accordance with them. CIRG conducts this training on a regular
basis for members of the Senior Executive Service, including
FBI SACs, FBI middle management at the FBI's Executive
Development Institute, and field division crisis management
coordinators, who are the individuals within each field
division tasked with ensuring the division's crisis response
operational readiness. Additional training is afforded to all
levels of FBI personnel through their participation in various
interagency counterterrorism exercises, including the senior
official and TOPOFF series of exercises.
The FBI's after-action review process of our involvement
and performance in response to Hurricane Katrina is ongoing.
FBI executives are also engaged in the Administration's review
of the Federal Government's response to Katrina and continue
discussions with other departments and agencies about ways to
improve our response to such catastrophic events.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I would
be happy to answer your questions.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Superintendent Riley.
TESTIMONY OF WARREN J. RILEY,\1\ SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, NEW
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Riley. To Senator Collins as Chairman, Senator
Lieberman as Ranking Member, and to all Members of the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security, thank you for the opportunity
to be here today to speak to you directly on behalf of the men
and women of the New Orleans Police Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Riley appears in the Appendix on
page 69.
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I am Warren Riley, Superintendent of the New Orleans Police
Department. I was sworn in as Superintendent on November 28,
2005. When Hurricane Katrina struck, I was the second ranking
officer under then-Superintendent Edwin Compass.
To begin, on Saturday, August 27, 2005, at about 7:30 a.m.,
I received a call from the Director of Homeland Security and
Public Safety for the City of New Orleans, Colonel Terry
Ebbert, and was instructed to meet him at City Hall as soon as
possible. When I arrived at City Hall, I was met by Colonel
Ebbert; Deputy Superintendent Steven Nicholas, the Assistant
Chief for the Technical and Support Bureau; and Superintendent
Edwin Compass. At that meeting, we were advised by Colonel
Ebbert that Hurricane Katrina would, in fact, impact New
Orleans in a drastic way. After a brief conversation with
Colonel Ebbert, then-Superintendent Compass called for an
immediate command staff meeting. We met with every commander
and most of the assistant commanders of each district and major
unit within the New Orleans Police Department. That meeting
began at 10 a.m. that same Saturday morning.
We advised the command staff that Hurricane Katrina was
expected to be a very severe storm--a Category 3 or 4--and we
would possibly be in the direct path of the storm. We informed
the command staff that Hurricane Katrina might, in fact, cause
substantial wind damage and possible street flooding.
All commanders were instructed to, first and foremost,
ensure their officers to provide for the safety of their
families. As per instructions from then-Superintendent Compass,
commanders were advised to be prepared for storm duty by 4 p.m.
on Sunday, August 28. Vehicles were to be fueled and a limited
number of vehicles were to remain in service. The remainder of
the fleet was to be stored in prearranged, designated locations
above ground where commanders believed they were safe and
easily accessible. Those commanders who believed that they did
not have within their geographic districts suitable parking
facilities were instructed to place the vehicles in one of two
designated parking garages in the Louisiana Superdome. Our own
limited number of full-size SUVs remained in service.
On Sunday, August 28, we continued communications with all
of the various commanders, assuring that all necessary actions
were being taken in preparation for the storm. Later that day,
Mayor Nagin announced a mandatory evacuation of all citizens in
the City of New Orleans.
The responsibility of the New Orleans Police Department was
to traverse all areas of the city with marked units, lights and
sirens on, announcing through their public address systems that
there was a mandatory evacuation, that all citizens must leave,
must evacuate the City of New Orleans. Officers were staged at
numerous locations around the city, where bus transportation
was provided to transport citizens to the Louisiana Superdome.
This effort continued until storm winds reached 50 to 55 miles
per hour, at which time all officers were directed to relocate
to their pre-staged locations to weather the storm.
On Sunday night, August 28, I, along with members of my
staff and Assistant Superintendent Steven Nicholas, reported to
police headquarters. We prepared to weather the storm with our
staffs, all essential communications personnel, recruits, and
other units, as well as civilian employees and some family
members.
Strong storm winds began to roll in about 5:30 Monday
morning. I was in my office on the fifth floor of police
headquarters, and as I looked out of my window, I could see the
wind. If you can imagine seeing the wind, that is how strong it
was. I could hear the wind blowing, and I could hear the
tornadoes coming--once, sometimes twice in an hour. I knew they
were tornadoes because they sounded like a freight train
passing. Sometimes that sound was too close for comfort.
As I was looking out of my window, the window started to
leak. The ceiling tiles began to fall and the entire frame for
the window blinds came out of the ceiling. At that point we all
moved from offices into the hallways.
At about 7 a.m., I went down to the Communications Section
on the second floor to contact my commanders and get a status
report. When I walked into Communications, almost every
dispatcher and 911 operator was crying. I asked one of the
supervisors what was going on. She stated, ``Chief, you have to
listen in on the calls.'' I was given a headset.
I did not know that only moments earlier, the Industrial
Street Canal levee breached and had an almost 200-yard opening
and water was now pouring into the Lower 9th Ward. As I
listened, I heard panicking mothers, fathers, husbands, wives,
and children desperately pleading and begging for help. They
were asking if there were boats or helicopters available. They
had water rising in their homes. Some of them were stating the
following:
``I can't swim.''
``My babies can't swim.''
``My husband has drowned, please help me.''
``The water's to my neck. I can't swim.''
``Oh, my God, the wind just blew my husband off the roof.''
``God, please help me.''
When the water hit the Lower 9th Ward, it went from nothing
to as high as 14 feet within 23 minutes.
We had over 600 911 calls within the first 23 minutes. The
calls came in as the streets flooded from west to east. Water
flowed down the streets, from Jordan Road, Tennessee Street,
Flood Street, and into St. Bernard Parish.
Understand, our 911 dispatchers and operators heard the
desperate pleas for help, but they were powerless to assist.
They could not dispatch officers because the weather conditions
were too dangerous. We still had sustained winds in excess of
100 miles per hour. Pursuant to the Emergency Preparedness
Plan, we cannot respond to emergency calls once sustained winds
are greater than 55 miles per hour.
Around 9:30 a.m. that day, the levees in Lakeview breached,
and more desperate calls came from citizens trapped in their
homes. Later that morning, the water overtopped the levees in
eastern New Orleans and then the London Avenue Canal breached.
As the day wore on, we learned that close to 300 police
officers assigned to the Fifth, Third, and Seventh Districts
were now stranded by flood water. Their vehicles were under
anywhere from 8 to 13 feet of water and the officers had to be
rescued. It took 24 to 48 hours to rescue all three districts.
We had over 80 off-duty officers stranded on rooftops and
in attics for many days.
The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Districts were all located in
three different medical facilities--two hospitals and a dental
school--that were from six to eight stories tall. When the
generator failed at one of the hospitals, the Fifth District
personnel assisted medical staff in efforts to provide life
support. The Fifth and Seventh Districts ensured that patients
were evacuated from those medical facilities prior to leaving.
The Third and the Seventh Districts had to be rescued due to
high water. The Fifth District walked out in chest-deep water.
All three of those units lost vehicles that were staged for
their later use due to high water.
The First, Second, and Sixth Districts immediately began to
respond to 911 calls and assist in rescue operations. These
officers also secured heavy equipment from work sites
throughout the area and began removing obstructions from major
streets so that officers could respond. The Fourth and Eighth
Districts, which did not sustain flooding immediately, deployed
anti-looting units to shopping areas and businesses.
Using the three boats that we had, Special Operations
Division began water rescue operations and responded to 911
calls. At this time, many officers, using their own personal
boats, joined in to assist with rescue operations. The bottom
line is we shifted from traditional policing to responding as
search and rescue units. Our priority was to save as many lives
as possible.
We had numerous calls for assistance from off-duty officers
who were not expected to report to work until 4 p.m.
Let me give you one real example of what our officers went
through. Very early in the morning, while the winds were still
very strong, we received via police radio a call for assistance
from Officer Chris Abbott, who lives in eastern New Orleans.
Officer Abbott advised that he was in his attic, water was up
to his chest, and the water was rising very fast.
He stated, ``I'm getting tired. I don't know if I'm going
to make it this time.'' Understand that Officer Abbott had been
shot twice in the line of duty before.
Captain Jimmy Scott, Commander of the First District and
former SWAT commander and now a Deputy Chief, began to
communicate with Officer Abbott by radio. He told Officer
Abbott that he could make it, to hang on. He asked Officer
Abbott to find the attic vent. Officer Abbott stated that he
was near the attic vent. Captain Scott instructed him to
attempt to push or punch out the attic vent. Officer Abbott
after several attempts stated he tried but he couldn't. He said
again, ``I don't think I'm going to make it. I'm very tired.''
He then began to thank everyone in the department for all that
they had done for him.
At that time, Captain Scott asked if he had his weapon and
if he had all of his rounds. Officer Abbott stated he had his
weapon and all 45 rounds. Captain Scott instructed him to
carefully fire each round into the base of the attic vent.
Captain Scott advised him to use all of the rounds. There was
then no response from Officer Abbott for about 5 minutes. Many
officers who listened in continued to ask, ``Chris, are you
there? Are you OK?'' But only silence. After about 5 minutes,
Officer Abbott advised, ``I'm halfway out, and I'm going to
make it.''
Imagine the joyful relief of the many officers listening
in, including those who were stranded and in desperate
situations themselves.
And this is only one of the many adversities and challenges
that the men and women of the New Orleans Police Department
overcame.
In closing, there are many other heroic stories that were
never told and may never have an opportunity to be expressed.
Much has been said about officers abandoning their
positions during the storm, and it is true that about 147
officers abandoned their positions. However, they are no longer
members of the New Orleans Police Department.
Our dedicated officers are still working hard every day.
Eighty percent of our officers lost homes; families were
displaced; some are living on a ship or in trailers or
elsewhere, separated from spouses and children, and seeing
their families only once every 3 or 4 weeks.
Admittedly, we did not handle everything perfectly. We hold
ourselves accountable. We are working to ensure that lessons
learned are implemented in our future Emergency Preparedness
Plan.
But Madam Chairman and Senator Lieberman and all of the
Members of this Homeland Security Committee, one thing you
should know is that 91 percent of the members of the New
Orleans Police Department protected, sacrificed, served,
prayed, and stayed all the way through Hurricane Katrina and
its seemingly endless devastation.
I am now prepared to answer any questions.
Chairman Collins. Thank you very much. Your testimony was
both chilling and eloquent, and it prompts me to tell each of
you how grateful this Committee is for the work of the men and
women whom you represent and also how much we appreciate your
personal commitment.
Our purpose here today is to learn the lessons of Hurricane
Katrina. That is why we are here because we don't want what you
just so eloquently described to happen again if we can possibly
avoid it through better planning, through better coordination,
through better communications. And the experiences of the first
responders that you have just described are part of the reason
that we are here. It is not just the victims in the traditional
sense. It is the first responders who put their lives on the
line time and again to rescue others, who suffered great injury
and loss themselves. And it would be a disservice to them if we
did not probe what happened and find out how we can improve.
Superintendent Riley, I am, therefore, going to start with
you with my questions. Your description of the 911 calls that
you listened in on really is so compelling and so chilling.
People were going through so much. The crisis was so urgent. It
prompts me to ask you whether you believe that the city should
have issued a mandatory evacuation order earlier in the
process.
Mr. Riley. Well, in hindsight, yes. Prior to the storm--and
we have gone through many over the years. A mandatory
evacuation had never been ordered to the best of my knowledge.
Why? I really don't know. Had this happened a little earlier,
would it have made it easier and better? Yes. But, again, this
is after the fact.
Chairman Collins. Last week, we heard truly compelling
testimony that was deeply troubling about the number of nursing
home residents who lost their lives, literally dozens who lost
their lives because the nursing homes did not evacuate prior to
the storm. And, indeed, the majority of nursing homes did not
evacuate.
Were your officers given any direction by city officials to
go check on the various nursing homes within your jurisdiction?
Mr. Riley. No, we were not given any direct orders to do
that, but we were advised to traverse the entire city, for our
officers to advise through a public address system that
everyone--it was a mandatory evacuation, that everyone needed
to evacuate the city. We did provide transportation to those
who wanted to go to the Louisiana Superdome. But were we told
to go to nursing homes? No.
Chairman Collins. Were you aware of any special planning by
the city to make sure that nursing home residents were
evacuated?
Mr. Riley. No. My understanding is that nursing homes have
their own evacuation plan, and we will assist them with that
plan. But was it in the plans? Not that I know of.
Chairman Collins. It is my understanding that you were the
chief of operations for the police department during Hurricane
Ivan. Is that correct?
Mr. Riley. Yes.
Chairman Collins. At that time, prior to Hurricane Ivan,
you requested and received from the National Guard high-water
vehicles to be pre-staged at police districts around the city.
Is that accurate?
Mr. Riley. Yes.
Chairman Collins. Did you make a similar request of the
National Guard prior to Katrina to have five high-water
vehicles and five boats stationed at each of the police
stations around the city?
Mr. Riley. That is correct. There was a conversation--I
don't remember the ranking officer from the National Guard. I
initially requested it through a lieutenant who was assigned to
City Hall from the National Guard and asked them to place the
vehicles--I don't remember if it was five or three--high-water
vehicles at each district station and five boats at each
district station. The lieutenant agreed. He put in the request.
I then received a phone call maybe a few hours later from a
higher-ranking officer of the National Guard who basically
objected to those boats being located at those areas.
I explained to him during the conversation, I said, ``It's
obvious we're going to get some water. We don't know how much.
However, if we place them at all district stations, we can
immediately deploy in those areas that are dry.'' And I also
asked him, because as he stated, he wanted to keep all assets
at Jackson Barracks, which is the National Guard compound. And
I asked him how was he going to get to Algiers, how was he
going to get to other areas of the city, and he basically
stated, ``I would prefer to keep all our assets here.''
Chairman Collins. And, in fact, what happened is the
barracks flooded, and access to many of those high-water
vehicles was lost completely, was it not?
Mr. Riley. I believe most of the high-water vehicles, if
not all, were damaged or destroyed during the flood, and all
the boats were lost, from what I understand.
Chairman Collins. If your request had been granted, do you
think that would have improved your ability to do search and
rescue as well as to evacuate your own force?
Mr. Riley. Well, it definitely would have improved our
ability to get to areas of the city that took us probably 24 to
48 hours to get to. We would have had five boats in the
Carrolton area, which is uptown, which has not flooded before
as it relates to a storm. We would have been able to address
that and other areas more quickly, yes.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Vanacore, what was your understanding of the role and
responsibilities of DHS under the Emergency Support Function,
ESF-13, which is the public safety and security support
function, prior to your being deployed to Louisiana?
Mr. Vanacore. Madam Chairman, prior to that, I had no real
connection with that. I was deployed basically as a
representative of ICE, not of DHS. My initial response was not
for the Department but for my Bureau.
Chairman Collins. Although that support function was
activated by FEMA pre-landfall, the decision to designate a
senior Federal law enforcement officer was not made until
September 4, which was almost a full week after landfall. Do
you know why there was such a delay between when that support
function was invoked and when a senior law enforcement officer
was designated?
Mr. Vanacore. I don't know the exact reason why that would
be. I know our response was predicated--we had people on the
ground, and the Federal Protective Service was part of the ESF-
13 process. But the designation didn't take place even--until I
arrived on September 4. That was my first day in Louisiana.
Chairman Collins. Do you think that the delay between
recognition that the support function was going to be invoked
and the designation of an official was harmful in any way?
Mr. Vanacore. Madam Chairman, I don't believe so. I think
that everybody on the ground was doing their job. We were law
enforcement professionals. People were arriving and doing what
needed to be done long before the designation was even
discussed. I think DHS had significant numbers of people on the
ground, as did DOJ, to try to help our colleagues in the NOPD.
So I don't really believe harm was done.
Chairman Collins. There were actually two senior law
enforcement officials who were ultimately designated. Is that
correct?
Mr. Vanacore. That's correct. They were designated, but not
officially designated. There was an indication that there would
be a designation, but that never actually happened. We served
in that function without official designation.
Chairman Collins. And who was the other individual who was
the senior law enforcement officer?
Mr. Vanacore. SAC Michael Wolf from the FBI was my
counterpart.
Chairman Collins. So we had a senior law enforcement
officer designated by DHS and one for the FBI. Do you think
that it would have been preferable to have one law enforcement
officer designated as the senior official for purposes of
control and command?
Mr. Vanacore. Madam Chairman, my opinion is that it is
always better to have one person in the lead. I think in this
particular case it worked with the co-leads because SAC Wolf
and I worked very well together, had little or no conflict, and
moved forward as we needed to. But if you are asking an
opinion, I would say it is always good to have one field
general.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Kaiser, what is your judgment on that
issue?
Mr. Kaiser. Well, I would echo what Mr. Vanacore said. I
would tell you that Mr. Wolf and Mr. Vanacore worked
seamlessly. As you are aware, I was the tactical and crisis
management coordinator for the FBI, and I, sitting from the
outside, saw no conflict or struggle between the two. So I
think they worked very well together.
It should be noted that I was contacted on Friday,
September 2, by DHS and asked to be the law enforcement liaison
to the consequence management side. At that time I could not
fulfill that position because I was operating as the tactical
and crisis management coordinator for the FBI, but I told them
I would serve in that capacity until Mr. Vanacore and Mr. Wolf
got there, which I did, in fact, do.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Vanacore, although I have no doubt
that you worked very well on a personal level with your FBI
counterpart, if you look through the documents, through the e-
mails, there is considerable evidence that suggests there was a
lot of tension between DHS and the Department of Justice on who
was going to be the lead, who was going to be in charge. And I
would like you to refer to Exhibit 6 \1\ in the exhibit book.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Exhibit 6 appears in the Appendix on page 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This document is a chain of e-mails among DHS personnel
concerning whether or not the FBI is going to take over the
Federal law enforcement response in New Orleans, and on the
second page of the e-mail chain is an e-mail from John Clark,
the Acting ICE Director, which reads in part, ``Below are
communications between ICE and DHS PAOs discussing the rumors
that the FBI has now been designated to lead the law
enforcement effort in New Orleans. I think DHS has one
opportunity to turn this fiasco around. Having failed in many
aspects on preparation, emergency assistance, and recovery, if
we now turn our homeland security responsibility over to the
FBI/DOJ, we might as well all await 3SR''--which I assume is a
reference to the Second Stage Review.
There are many other e-mails in that chain. My time has
expired, but I want to get your response to that. It looks like
there was a debate between DHS, particularly ICE, and the FBI
on who was going to be in charge, and there is in Exhibit 7,\2\
an e-mail chain between you and Marcy Forman in which you
write, ``If we don't act, this is where we are going. DOJ is
looking to run this whole effort. If we don't get a push from
above, we are not going to be at the table.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Exhibit 7 appears in the Appendix on page 109.
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Could you give us a better understanding of this tension
between DHS and the Department of Justice?
Mr. Vanacore. Yes, Madam Chairman, I could try. Basically,
if you look at those e-mail strings, they're both very early in
the process. I think mine is on the first day I arrived, and
Mr. Clark's is soon thereafter.
We were, I think, suffering some confusion as to what our
role would be, whether DHS would be part of the senior Federal
law enforcement official function or not. We had a significant
number of assets down there, I think by then over 1,000 people
on the ground. And I know that in my response, I knew that we
needed a place at the table because of the significant amount
of assets there.
I think in the field what was actually happening--didn't
have a problem, there were no problems at all in the field, and
the higher-level one, Mr. Clark's memo, did not even include
field people. So whatever tensions were being felt at the DHS
supervisory level weren't being felt between SAC Wolf and
myself.
I think as was said, we worked well together. Once
everybody got on the ground and started working together, it
was apparent that it really didn't matter who was in charge,
and we had many conversations, SAC Wolf and myself, in which it
was, I think, apparent to all of us that had he been designated
and I was co or deputy, it would have still worked.
So the tension might have been above. We thought we needed
a place at the table. I don't think we wanted to have an all-
DOJ response because of the significant assets we had there. It
was just a matter of making sure we controlled our own destiny.
Chairman Collins. Was there a feeling that if it is a
terrorist attack, the FBI should be in the lead, but if it is a
natural disaster, the Department of Homeland Security should be
in the lead?
Mr. Vanacore. I think it was clear on a terrorist attack it
would be the FBI in the lead and there would have been no
dissension at all. On a natural disaster, I think it was less
clear as to who should be in the lead, so the co-designation, I
think, was the compromise for that.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Vanacore, let me say to you first that both in my
opening statement, which was critical of the Department of
Homeland Security, and in any questions that I ask now, my own
conclusion based on what our staff has said is that you really
performed extremely well in response to Hurricane Katrina, but
my conclusion is that you and a lot of others were put in an
untenable position in this sense: The very fact that when you
are sent down there, as Chairman Collins' line of questioning
just elicited, it is not clear whether you or the FBI agent in
charge at the scene is in charge--the FBI agent on the scene
for DOJ is in charge. I mean, it is really, to me, frustrating,
outrageous that the two departments didn't work that out long
in advance of a disaster striking so that when you went, you
would know exactly what your authority was, and so would the
lead person for the Department of Justice.
The other thing I want to do is to thank you for your
candor, both in the interview that you had with our staff prior
to testifying today, because unless we have that kind of
candor, we are not, as a Committee, going to be able to
understand exactly what happened, and neither we nor you all in
the Department of Homeland Security are going to be able to
make it better.
You in the interview with our staff, I think, made some
very important points, some of which you have spoken to
already, today. You told our investigators that ICE had not
prepared for Katrina because it had not been designated in
advance as a response agency under the NRP. I am going to quote
from page 108 of the transcript of your interview with our
staff: ``While the NRP may call on DHS, it didn't call on ICE.
And I think ICE stepped up and took on a role that nobody
defined for us up until that point''--which was Katrina.
``Nobody told ICE, `This is your role.' '' I mean, that is
really incredible and unacceptable.
I want to read from some of your comments in that interview
with regard to the NRP, on page 8. ``I had a fleeting
familiarity with it. To be honest, it wasn't something that was
high on my radar screen with my particular responsibilities.''
Obviously, you were doing other things.
On page 35, during your first 3 days in Baton Rouge, ``A
lot of it seemed to be in a foreign language because the whole
National Response Plan had a language all its own, which I had
never heard up until that point.'' That is correctly a quote
from you, am I right?
Mr. Vanacore. That is correct.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. When you were put on stand-by on
September 2, which was Friday after the hurricane hit, ``I was
told that I would probably be going down in some capacity for
ICE, but nobody was sure what that capacity would be.''
As of September 3, which is Saturday, ``I still didn't know
what my role would be, but I did know that I was to coordinate
the ICE efforts, to work with the Federal Protective Service
and the ICE agents who were on the ground to make sure that we
had a flow of information back and forth.''
And then at page 33 and 34, with respect to the question of
who was the lead agency for the Federal Government in charge:
``No one had stepped up to take the lead. There was nobody
who's stepping up to say, `I'm in charge,' and I don't think
that any of us had the authority to step up and say, `I'm in
charge.' Hence, I think the need for some sort of
designation.'' Correct?
Mr. Vanacore. Correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Page 50, processes were not in place for
coordinating the chains of command among State, local,
military, National Guard personnel; page 89, that as of
September 6, 2 days after your arrival, you did not know
whether you were there ``to coordinate ICE or to coordinate all
of DHS.'' Right?
Mr. Vanacore. Correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. And of ICE, you said, ``I
think we're primarily a law enforcement investigative agency.''
And that is certainly what we think of you on this Committee.
``That is where our focus is. We do investigations. We really
did not, up until that point, have a focused role in a natural
disaster response.'' That is at page 8. I am going to ask you
to speak a little more about that, if you would.
Mr. Vanacore. Sure, Senator. Basically, as you know,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, we have 6,000 Federal
investigators, 1811 series, that investigate crimes. We have
the Federal Protective Service, which does have a role, and a
big role, in the ESF-13 and in disaster response. But my
particular background was as an investigator.
As an investigator, our training doesn't focus on local
policing, which is what the response ended up being. So we were
doing something that we really hadn't been prepared for prior
to that. I think with all that we stepped up and still did what
needed to be done, but I don't think it was something that any
of us thought would be a defined role for us under Homeland
Security.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, and were you actually performing
law-and-order functions there?
Mr. Vanacore. We were patrolling with the New Orleans
Police Department, we were patrolling the streets, and we were
doing search and rescue--both.
Senator Lieberman. Right. And then, finally, at page 108,
you indicated that you--and correct me if I am not quoting you.
You do not think ICE investigators should fulfill this function
because, ``I think we''--meaning DHS--``have uniformed people
who would be much better equipped to respond to that sort of
thing than taking ICE investigators.'' Correct?
Mr. Vanacore. Well, it was my opinion that we were better
served with the FPS people who were in uniform and perhaps the
Border Patrol people, who are also uniformed and were trained
in patrol functions, as opposed to investigators.
Senator Lieberman. That is a very important point because
the ICE personnel that were there are not uniformed personnel.
Mr. Vanacore. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. So that when you were helping the New
Orleans Police patrol, they were not in uniform.
Mr. Vanacore. Other than the Federal Protective Service,
who are uniformed.
Senator Lieberman. Correct.
Mr. Vanacore. The investigators are not. Plainclothes
force.
Senator Lieberman. Correct. I thank you for that.
Do you know at this point whether there has been any post-
Katrina clarification within DHS of either ICE's role in
disaster-related law enforcement function, public safety
function, or the designation of anybody else in DHS to play
that role next time around?
Mr. Vanacore. I know they are doing some type of lessons
learned. I have been called in to the ICE people who I think
were submitting things up to the Department on lessons learned.
So I assume there will be a report coming out in the future on
what our role will be.
Senator Lieberman. OK. I thank you again for what you did
in a very tough situation, and it is really disappointing not
only that it was not done before Katrina hit landfall, but,
frankly, that it seems like not that much has been done since.
Again, we will want to ask the folks in the Department when
they come in later.
Mr. Kaiser, thanks for being here. Am I correct that you
ended up involved in New Orleans, basically, as a result of
your volunteering, your calling?
Mr. Kaiser. Yes, sir. I'd been assigned not only as the SAC
in New Orleans from 2001 to 2003, but I also served as a first
office FBI agent in 1982 through 1984. So I had a lot of
friends in numerous departments and Federal agencies down there
and also the FBI office there.
Senator Lieberman. So that when you saw, obviously, the
disaster that had occurred, if I understand correctly, you got
on the phone or maybe you e-mailed Director Mueller and said
you were prepared to go down if necessary?
Mr. Kaiser. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Lieberman. And then am I right that he got back to
you almost immediately and asked you to get there as soon as
you could?
Mr. Kaiser. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. And then you got in your own vehicle and
drove down there.
Mr. Kaiser. Yes, sir. The reason why I drove down there, we
tried to get flights down to that region, and there were no
flights available. We went through the travel service, what we
usually do. The Bureau aircraft was tied up until 6 p.m. at
night, and there were no landing lights in the city of Baton
Rouge. So they couldn't fly me until the next morning, so the
quickest way to get down there was to drive all night, which I
did with three other agents that drove with me.
Senator Lieberman. From Boston?
Mr. Kaiser. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. And that was Monday night?
Mr. Kaiser. No, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Or was it Tuesday?
Mr. Kaiser. I left Wednesday about 3 o'clock and got there
Thursday in the morning.
Senator Lieberman. Right. And was Special Agent--first off,
I admire you greatly and appreciate that you took that
initiative yourself. And that was, am I right, from our staff
record, a 26-hour drive?
Mr. Kaiser. Yes, sir, it was.
Senator Lieberman. When you got there--I just want to make
it clear--was Special Agent Wolf there already?
Mr. Kaiser. No, he was not. Special Agent in Charge Wolf
did not arrive until Sunday evening, September 5.
Senator Lieberman. Right. So at that point you were
effectively the lead agent for the Department of Justice?
Mr. Kaiser. I was the tactical and crisis management
coordinator for the FBI.
Senator Lieberman. Right. I accept that.
As far as you know, was anyone else on scene playing the
lead officer role for the Department of Justice at that point
when you arrived?
Mr. Kaiser. Yes, sir, there was. There was a Special Agent
in Charge of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. His name was Jerry
Tate. He was there. And there was also two Special Agents in
Charge from DEA. There was Jim Craig from the Houston Division
and Billy Renton, who was the DEA SAC in New Orleans that was
there.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you this in terms of the NRP,
and I suppose it would be unusual if you had had any
involvement in the discussions in the Department of Justice or
FBI about how to handle responsibilities under the NRP because
you were up in Boston. But I just wanted to ask you, did you
prior to the Hurricane Katrina landfall?
Mr. Kaiser. Am I familiar with the NRP?
Senator Lieberman. Yes, and--well, I guess I will ask you
that first. Were you familiar with it at that point?
Mr. Kaiser. Yes, sir. I was trained by DHS as a Principal
Federal Official, and in that training, I received training in
the NRP.
Senator Lieberman. And that was earlier in 2005?
Mr. Kaiser. I believe it was 2004. In the fall of 2004, I
received that training.
Senator Lieberman. OK. So it probably was under the
predecessor to the NRP.
Mr. Kaiser. Right.
Senator Lieberman. But you had a similar role. But you had
not been involved during 2005 in any discussions at national
FBI or Department of Justice about how the Department would
handle their responsibilities under the NRP?
Mr. Kaiser. We received training on the NRP, but
personally, I didn't deal on a day-to-day basis with the NRP.
Senator Lieberman. Right, or this question I am trying to
get at as to whether anybody in DOJ was getting ready for a
disaster if it occurred. I appreciate that you got the
training, but, again, it is not clear to me, from what we see,
lines of authority were clear.
I want to just quickly refer you to Exhibit P in the
book,\1\ and on the third page of that exhibit. This is a memo
dated September 1, 2005, which was the Thursday of the week of
the hurricane hitting on Monday, to Ted Ullyot, Office of
Attorney General, and Bill Mercer, Office of Deputy Attorney
General, which comes to us from Mr. Mercer's files. And it
appears to be a memo written on that day which is a kind of
briefing on DOJ's responsibilities under the NRP. And on it,
somebody has written in the margins, ``Who activates?'' On the
last page next to the caption ``Responsibilities: ESF
Coordinators, Primary Agencies,'' someone has written in the
margin, ``How are these designated and by whom?'' We would
assume that is the handwriting of the Principal Associate
Deputy AG Mercer, but we have not been able to get a response
to our questions as to whether that was his handwriting. But
let me just say we have the same question, which was who was in
charge and who determined which agency between DOJ and DHS had
the lead for carrying out the law enforcement responsibilities.
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\1\ Exhibit P appears in the Appendix on page 122.
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I don't expect you to be able to know, unless you happen to
know Mr. Mercer's handwriting, whether that is his writing. But
the point I want to make, even though you have been through the
training, is I presume you were not in a position to answer
that question about who activates the FBI and DOJ's role under
the NRP or who decides who has what responsibilities.
Mr. Kaiser. No, sir, I was not.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Special Agent Kaiser. My time is
up, and I look forward to more questions on a second round.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Riley, let me ask you questions about the
communications capabilities, the interoperability, the lack of
interoperability, a number of questions relating to loss of
communications.
In what specific ways did the loss of communications
capabilities negatively impact the ability of first responders,
Federal authorities, and the National Guard to respond?
Mr. Riley. Well, it was a tremendous hindrance, and the
fact that myself or any of the other chiefs, we could not
command or give directions or instructions to our commanders
that were out in the field. We could not communicate with
Federal authorities or any adjacent law enforcement agencies.
So it was, in fact, the primary cause of all of the
dysfunctions throughout this entire event.
Senator Levin. How would the response been different, if it
would have been, if Federal, State, local authorities, and the
National Guard had interoperable communications? In other
words, was this mainly a problem of lack of interoperability,
or was it mainly a problem that the batteries went dead and the
electricity went out?
Mr. Riley. No, the problem with our communications systems
was that one of our towers, due to damage from the wind, one of
the microwave--it damaged the microwave dish as well as the
generator. This tower was in the Central Business District. It
is on a building that is 44 stories high. That generator was,
in fact, repaired by an engineering company, and two of our
people who had to walk 44 flights of stairs, bringing fuel to
the generator, as well as working on it and maintaining that
every day once we were there. But when that tower went down, it
forced us to go to a mutual aid channel. This mutual aid
channel was a talk-around channel that after a couple of days
allowed us to actually transmit. But it was radio to radio, and
it could only transmit to a distance of 1 to 3 miles, depending
on what type of obstacles were in the way. So it was only
direct communication.
The problem with that was not only were our police officers
on that channel, so was Jefferson Parish, an adjacent parish.
So the ability to talk was hindered because there was so much
traffic once it went down.
Senator Levin. So that if that tower had stayed up, there
would not have been a problem that would have been caused by
lack of interoperable equipment?
Mr. Riley. Well, it still only allowed--it is still a lack
of interoperable equipment, yes.
Senator Levin. So now if that tower had stayed up, how
would the lack of interoperable equipment have been a problem?
Mr. Riley. Well, it would not have assisted us as it
relates to interoperability with the Federal agency. That would
not have assisted us. It would have only assisted us with the
ability to communicate to our own people and to our adjacent
parish, Jefferson Parish. We still would not have had the
ability to communicate with the Federal authorities.
Senator Levin. Published reports indicate that
communications capability suffered because some first
responders in New Orleans were using radios that would only
accept rechargeable batteries. When these batteries lost power,
there was no way to recharge them because of the electricity
shortfall. Was the possibility that New Orleans would totally
lose power as a result of a catastrophic event like Katrina
ever considered so that there would have been back-up batteries
rather than relying on rechargeable batteries?
Mr. Riley. Those batteries did not have a major impact. It
did impact us to some degree, but that was rectified shortly
after because we had generators, we had terminals that would
house or charge anywhere from 15 to 20 batteries. So our radio
shop came out. We were able to get that up and running within a
day or so. But that wasn't the real issue. The tower was the
real issue.
Senator Levin. Were you present at the Superdome either on
Monday or Tuesday when the mayor discussed the city's needs for
assistance with FEMA officials?
Mr. Riley. No, I was not.
Senator Levin. Were you aware of any requests from the city
of New Orleans for assistance in providing food and water to
the Convention Center?
Mr. Riley. No, I was not. The Convention Center was never a
part of the original plan. That evolved. On day two, our
headquarters, for instance, on that Tuesday, our basement had
16 feet of water. Our first floor had 3 feet of water. We had
to evacuate our headquarters, which was almost 400 police,
civilians, and family members. We had to evacuate by boat. We
had to shut down headquarters. And one of our officers
recommended that we go to the Convention Center to house those
people, those officers as well as those civilians from
headquarters.
That officer went over and attempted to get that for
housing, which the officials from the Convention Center did
eventually agree to do later that evening. Now, this is on
Tuesday. We were actually getting that for police officers. I
believe that OEP or the mayor also had requested the Convention
Center, that it be used.
The problem was that we could no longer bring people to the
Louisiana Superdome because the water was 4 to 4\1/2\ feet
around the Superdome. So we needed another location. Initially
it was for police officers, but hotels began to basically eject
citizens from the hotel because they were short on staff and
other reasons. So we had citizens from all around this country
who were now stranded on the street, and we began to then
direct them to the Convention Center.
So it evolved. Initially it was only for 300 or 400 people,
but over about a 30-hour period, they had 12,000 or 14,000
people there.
Senator Levin. I take it you were not present at the State
Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge on Wednesday when
General Honore met with Governor Blanco. Is that correct?
Mr. Riley. Correct.
Senator Levin. You were not there. Do you have any
understanding as to whether and when the State requested
Federal active-duty troops?
Mr. Riley. No, I do not know when that happened, but if I
remember, sometime on Wednesday it was my understanding that we
would have troops that were coming in very soon. I don't know
how the request came about.
Senator Levin. All right. Or whether there was any
misunderstanding or problem relative to that?
Mr. Riley. I am not aware of that.
Senator Levin. There were media reports on Wednesday of a
large number of people at the Convention Center without food or
medicine. The Convention Center was not secured until late
Friday morning, and food and water were not provided until
Friday afternoon.
From your perspective, what took so long since everybody
knew the Convention Center had a major problem Wednesday night?
What was the reason from your perspective for that delay?
Mr. Riley. I have no idea. I can tell you our toughest
times among the men and women of the New Orleans Police
Department was that we expected assistance quickly.
Senator Levin. From?
Mr. Riley. From the National Guard, from Federal
authorities. Now, the FBI and Homeland Security did come in.
Their officers did assist. But as it relates to food and water,
those requests were made because, when I checked with OEP
concerning food and water for the Convention Center, they
stated that a request was made. We expected that food, I
believe on Wednesday evening or Thursday. It was not until the
military came in on Friday. We assisted them with setting up a
perimeter. And even with setting up that perimeter, it still
took several hours for the food to arrive, and that was a very
difficult time to watch our citizens with no food, no water,
and a very bad situation.
Senator Levin. You say you expected the Guard and the
active-duty military to come in before Friday. What was that
based on? Did someone tell you they were coming in on Wednesday
or on Thursday?
Mr. Riley. No, we knew that the President had signed that
disaster declaration, I think 24 or 48 hours before. Based on
information from OEP, being in meetings in City Hall where our
original OEP was, and talking to some National Guard people, we
expected a large number of National Guard soldiers to come in.
Now, on that Tuesday night, I believe Louisiana National
Guard from northern Louisiana came in--I don't know how many it
was--and some National Guardsmen came in the next day from
Oklahoma. So they did come in.
I do have to state one thing, and hopefully I am not
getting off track. The National Guard from, I believe, northern
Louisiana came in, and it is not in any of my statements, but
we had about 600 or 800 people on the interstate that had been
pulled from water over a 2-day period. It was 2 o'clock in the
morning, and we requested--it was requested by one of our
lieutenants that we get transportation to get them off. And
there was a Guard unit by the Convention Center with at least
30 or 40 trucks that we requested to assist us in getting
citizens off that bridge. And the general who commanded that
unit as well as a colonel denied that request.
Senator Levin. Was that the Louisiana National Guard?
Mr. Riley. I believe they were from--they said they had
just driven--drove in from northern Louisiana, so 5 hours from,
I believe, Natchitoches, Monroe, somewhere in northern
Louisiana. But I have to say that was a disappointment because
they were there and we did not get that assistance.
There was a liaison in City Hall, in OEP, from the National
Guard, who I believe--that advised us that we would have
assistance from the National Guard. We did not know the 82nd
Airborne were actually coming in until a few hours before they
landed. And when they came, they were outstanding when they
arrived.
Senator Levin. The failure of the Guard to respond to that
request, I take it when you say it was a disappointment, that
is probably an understatement in those circumstances?
Mr. Riley. I can tell you when I met with probably 100 to
200 officers, it was probably the first time that I probably
broke down a little bit because I advised them it looks like
we're on our own, that we have to do this on our own.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Let me pick up on that because we have had, under the
leadership of our distinguished Chairman and the Ranking
Member, a remarkable series of hearings here, and we are still
trying to get all the facts that are helpful to guide us for
the future. But generally speaking, I have felt that the
testimony, which reflected on the participation by the
uniformed individuals, both the Guard and the active forces,
that they tried to fulfill their missions as best they could,
and on the whole they did a reasonably good job, if not a
splendid job professionally. You pointed out one disappointing
chapter, but can you speak in generalities as to your
impression of the contribution made by the Guard, whether they
are Louisiana Guard or Guard from many other States, that came
and responded together with the active forces?
Mr. Riley. I would have to say overall that the National
Guard from Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, Louisiana, that they did in
fact do an outstanding job. The young Guardsmen were
enthusiastic, energetic, and were more than willing to help.
Some of the delays were with the command staff not being able
to make an instant decision, and some of those decisions
unfortunately took several hours. But other than that, when the
National Guard performed, they were in fact very good.
Senator Warner. I cannot speak to knowledge about the
indecision, but I do understand the military quite well. They
were probably waiting for clarification from a higher level
authority to execute their orders. I know General Honore, who
we will be privileged to have as a witness here--I believe it
is on Thursday--in my one visit down there I had the
opportunity to speak with him, and I watched him, as did all
America. I think he discharged his duties, and I think at times
he did not try to get too much guidance from up above, he made
his decisions there on the ground like a fine military
commander that he is, and we are very proud of him.
Back to the question raised by my distinguished colleague,
Senator Levin. Senator Levin and I had the opportunity, as you
did, to meet with the Commander of NORTHCOM when he visited
here a few days ago. I spoke with him about--he is the
Commander, as you know, of all the military forces in the
United States that lend assistance under these situations, that
is, the active forces. We talked specifically about
communications, and he left with me a request for some funds
which I will, in consultation with my colleague from Michigan,
the Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services, we are
going to address the authorization and, hopefully, the eventual
appropriations of a package of communications equipment, such
that if this Nation is faced with a similar problem, the
military will at least have pieces of equipment that can come
in, and do not rely in any way on local power sources or local
antennas. It can be put up and provide communication to all
those who have access to that system.
But when the military came in, they, obviously, brought
such equipment as they had for communication. Were you able to
access that?
Mr. Riley. I can tell you that we had some mobil
communications systems that were set up in various parts of the
city that did improve our ability to communicate, but, honestly
I don't know where they came from. They could have been
military.
Senator Warner. To a different question. One of the issues
that the Congress is looking at, as well as the Executive
Branch, is the age-old doctrine of posse comitatus. I address
this question to both Mr. Kaiser and Mr. Riley. And as you may
know, that is embedded in the laws of the United States from
about the middle 1800s to this point in time. It simply states
that the men and women of the armed forces, the active armed
forces, as distinguished from the National Guard, the active
armed forces are, for historic reasons and valid reasons, not
authorized to participate in local law enforcement.
In this situation we learned an awful lot, and we had times
when the uniformed National Guard were working with units of
the uniformed regular forces. And to some extent, there were
occasions that they were involved in trying to assist local law
enforcement officers in carrying out their missions as law
enforcement officers. The Guardsmen were able to render such
assistance as the local law enforcement either asked for or
they performed on their own initiative, but the active forces
had to literally stay at a distance and not involve themselves
pursuant to longstanding law and regulation.
Did you know of any instances where that posed a problem
when the active forces were not able to actively work with law
enforcement in carrying out their duties?
Mr. Riley. I can tell you there were several situations
where the 82nd Airborne, they would see things and hear things
in certain locations that they were guarding or protecting, and
they would have to call us. And then when NOPD would arrive 5
or 10 minutes later, that situation had dissolved or that
person had disappeared. There were times when those soldiers
wanted to respond to things, but could not respond.
Senator Warner. When you say ``things,'' we are preparing a
record and people are following this. ``Things'' meaning what
appears to be violations of local law.
Mr. Riley. Well, people were looting or breaking into a
place, where they would call and advise us because they could
not----
Senator Warner. You mean the uniformed 82nd would call and
advise you that we are witnessing infractions of local law.
Mr. Riley. People breaking into a building or something
like that.
Senator Warner. Right.
Mr. Riley. I think in a situation such as this, one of this
magnitude, it certainly would help if they could in fact take
action.
Senator Warner. So there were times when they were in a
position, the regular forces, to observe breaches of law, and
had they had the authority to respond, they might have been
able to step in and alleviate that situation or contain it
until the arrival of either the Guard or local police?
Mr. Riley. Yes.
Senator Warner. And it is your professional judgment, if
they had the ability to get a waiver, given the extenuating
circumstances of this, it would have been helpful?
Mr. Riley. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. That is very interesting.
Mr. Kaiser, can you amplify on this at all in your
experience?
Mr. Kaiser. Well, sir, I would say that's a subject that's
been debated quite a bit. But I would tell you that we did have
those discussions with the U.S. Attorney there in the Eastern
District of Louisiana and the Middle District of Louisiana, and
there were some concerns about U.S. soldiers who were not
trained in law enforcement functions performing law enforcement
functions.
Senator Warner. You are talking about the regular Army and
not the National Guard?
Mr. Kaiser. Right. Now, the National Guard does have, in
fact, some detachments, such as military police, that their
full-time job is a police officer for a town or a State. There
was less concern about that, but full-time military. There was
concern that they weren't trained in law enforcement and it
might create some problems.
Senator Warner. Back again to your original observations.
You all discussed the posse comitatus doctrine with the U.S.
Attorney, which is quite appropriate.
Mr. Kaiser. Right.
Senator Warner. And you were advised that the regular
forces could not participate in law enforcement. I guess my
question is, do you have an opinion similar to that of Mr.
Riley, where regular Army were at a place to observe crimes
taking place, but there were no associated units of either
Guard or local police, and had they had the authority to step
in, they might have been able to curtail some of the looting
and other things?
Mr. Kaiser. My opinion, and certainly not the FBI's, but my
opinion that if a crime was committed in their presence that
they observed, yes, it would have been beneficial if they could
have made the arrest, instead of having to call the NOPD or
other agencies.
But beyond crimes committed in their presence, I personally
would have some concerns over that.
Senator Warner. I think that answer is very helpful. I
thank the Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Will you yield for one minute? I just want
to applaud Senator Warner on the initiative that he made
reference to in the Armed Services Committee, and I will join
him in his leadership on that. I would point out, as I think we
all know on this Committee, that both Chairman Collins and our
Ranking Member have worked hard and indeed succeeded in getting
a significant authorization for interoperable equipment for
first responders. So between that success that they have had
and the leadership that they have shown for the first
responders and the program which you have just outlined, I
think, hopefully, that there will be some real significant
improvement on the interoperability, but I just wanted to both
thank our Chairman and Ranking Member for the leadership that
they have shown here, as well as you.
Senator Warner. I thank my colleague. It will be a joint
decision that you and I have to make because it is not in the
President's budget, and we have to get it in.
Senator Levin. That is not what we will call ``pork.''
Senator Warner. No. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Riley, I just want to follow up on a
few issues that have been raised. We had testimony last week
from Mayor Nagin about his decision to open the Convention
Center on Tuesday, August 30, and Senator Levin referred to the
fact that neither food nor water were pre-staged at that
location.
What I want to ask you about is security. When the Mayor
made the decision that because of conditions at the Superdome
he was going to open the Convention Center, did he talk to you
first about how security could be provided?
Mr. Riley. No, the Mayor did not talk to me directly. I
believe he talked to Colonel Ebbert, if I remember correctly,
and Colonel Ebbert inquired on how would we secure the
facility. So I believe, if I remember correctly, it came from
Colonel Ebbert.
And what we initially had done was to send 35 officers from
our 8th District, which is not far away from the Convention
Center, and a couple of days later we added 40 officers from
the 3rd District.
Chairman Collins. Initially at least, those officers were
staged outside the Convention Center.
Mr. Riley. Yes.
Chairman Collins. Could you explain that to us? It seems
that you would want to have them inside where the evacuees
were.
Mr. Riley. Well, we didn't. What we did was we had a SWAT
team that made routine patrols through the Convention Center,
periodic patrols through, and also when there was a complaint.
Sometimes people would call in once cell phone service was back
up, call in and state that there were certain types of
incidents that went on.
We did not stage our officers there because we did not have
a significant enough--our Convention Center, I believe, is the
second or third largest Convention Center in the world. It
would be impossible for us. We would have needed probably 400-
500 officers to cover that entire situation, and in fact,
because there were so many people in there and it was spread
out so far, it wouldn't have been a wise decision for us to put
officers inside, but we did in fact have them outside just
across the street, and that was a decision I made.
Chairman Collins. As we discussed earlier, there were
reports of crimes that turned out not to be true.
Mr. Riley. Yes.
Chairman Collins. I am not asking you to comment on media
comments made by your predecessor, but suffice it to say that
those, in some cases, exacerbated the rumors that were flying
around by giving them credence. The rumor to control or the
failure to control these rumors had true consequences. They
led, for example, to FEMA's decision to withdraw its medical
teams from the Superdome. In another situation, they led to
FEMA's decision to temporarily suspend its search and rescue
mission at a critical time. Now, one can criticize FEMA for
making those decisions, and indeed, I have, but the fact is
that if there had been a better situational awareness of what
the crime situation was, neither of those actions would have
been taken.
In the future, what do you think should be done to control
the rumors of lawlessness that occurred in the situation in New
Orleans?
Mr. Riley. Well, what we actually did, once we learned that
the rumors were rampant--because we didn't have radio,
television--my first time, actually, hearing about some of
those rumors was actually my daughter calling me from Houston,
saying that, ``Daddy, leave. You're going to get killed,'' and
other rumors, that our police were being shot at.
What we will do in the future, and what we should have in
fact done this time, but it was very chaotic, is we should have
a press conference two to three times a day to put our own
message out, to ensure that the public, the citizens, the
world, whoever is watching, that they know exactly what's going
on and not be confined to listening to rumors.
Chairman Collins. I absolutely agree, and I think that
would have really helped in the situation. One final question
for you. You were facing a situation where although many of the
reports of violent crimes fortunately proved to not be true,
there was considerable looting. You did not have a jail to put
the looters in once they were caught and arrested. What did you
do when looters were arrested?
Mr. Riley. Well, in the early stages, the looters were
basically--the property was taken and warehoused. The looters'
names were in fact taken in most of those cases, and we will,
in fact, turn that over to the District Attorney's office. We
will put some of those subjects out wanted based on the
information that we have on them.
But about 4 or 5 days, or maybe 3 or 4 days later, I
actually assigned Captain Bryson to begin looking for a
facility where we would begin to house people. One of the
majors of the department, Major Burkhardt, contacted the
Department of Corrections, the State Department of Corrections,
and they actually came in and took over an Amtrak bus station,
fenced it, and we then began to house arrestees. But this,
unfortunately, probably was--I'm guessing, I don't remember--
probably 6 or 7 days later.
Chairman Collins. Initially, if the individual was not
caught committing a violent act, but was just looting--I mean
looting is terrible--did you have any choice but to let them
go?
Mr. Riley. At that point we did not, and if a person
committed a violent act, then we contacted adjacent parishes to
see if they could in fact hold the arrestee.
Chairman Collins. I think that's another lesson learned
from this catastrophe, is that we need to anticipate the need
for a back-up facility out of the flooded area. You would agree
with that?
Mr. Riley. Yes. I agree. I think that we have to--it
depends on where the storm comes from. That could be 5 miles
away or it could be 150 miles away. It really depends on the
devastation.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Kaiser, just one final comment and
question for you. Senator Lieberman and I, being from New
England, have been struck by how many of the emergency response
team members from various agencies were sent from New England
to Louisiana. We had Phil Parr from FEMA Region I in New
England. We had Marty Bahamonde, who was the first person on
site in New Orleans, who was sent from Boston. We have your
situation where you had some previous experience, unlike many
of the other players. While we are convinced that people from
New England have special qualities that enable them to adapt to
any situation, it does raise an important point.
You told our investigators that, ``You have to bring people
down that are familiar not only with the area, but the culture,
too. You have to know people, and they have to trust you if you
want to get anything done down there.'' I think that is true of
most regions in the country.
So my question is, as part of our recommendations, should
we have teams that know the area, have either lived there, live
there now or served there, ready to go when a catastrophe
strikes, so that you are not cobbling together individuals,
regardless of their expertise, but cobbling together teams from
all over the country, who may not know the geography, the
decisionmakers, the local customs. Would it be better to have
these teams that were either sited in the region or at least
had experience with the region?
Mr. Kaiser. Well, my opinion, yes, it would be. When I
arrived down in New Orleans and in Baton Rouge, I was familiar
with Warren Riley, the former chief also of NOPD, Eddie
Compass. I knew the colonel in the State Police. I knew the
head of Homeland Security there for the city, Terry Ebberts. So
I knew most of the Federal agency heads there, so I was very
familiar with those individuals. And they knew me because I had
served down there on several occasions, so it made an easier
transition for me to come in there and help them out.
So, yes, to answer your question, I absolutely think it
would be beneficial to have someone from the area that knows
the area and the people down there that he's going to be
dealing with.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Vanacore, my final comment to you is I want to
acknowledge the fact that you delayed or gave up a trip to
China in order to be here today, and ironically, the last time
you were supposed to go to China, Katrina hit.
Mr. Vanacore. Correct.
Chairman Collins. And you were unable to go then as well.
We hope you do not consider testifying before us to be the kind
of catastrophe that Katrina was, but we look forward with
interest to know when your next trip to China is scheduled.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Vanacore. I'm not sure I should comment on that.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Collins. I think you are right. Thank you for your
testimony.
Mr. Vanacore. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks again, Madam Chairman.
Superintendent Riley, thanks very much for your testimony
today. Thanks for your service during the storm and since to
New Orleans. Your opening statement was very powerful, and it
really brought me--and I know Chairman Collins, based on what
she said--back to why we are here. Memories are short, but you
reminded us of those officers stranded on rooftops, that
Officer Abbott, really close to death, miraculously making his
way through it, and a terrible lack of communications in the
midst of all that, as you discussed with Senator Levin, with
people calling those 911 calls, fear of drowning and death, and
a limited ability to get done what you needed to get done. I
just have great admiration for what you did in spite of and in
the midst of all that.
I have been asking everybody who has come from New Orleans,
I want to just ask you for the record--you referred to it in
your opening statement--exactly when did you know that the
levees had broken in New Orleans on that morning of August 29,
to the best of your recollection?
Mr. Riley. Somewhere between 7:15 and 8 o'clock, something
like that.
Senator Lieberman. Do you remember how you heard?
Mr. Riley. I was in communications, and actually, the
citizens were calling in, but it was a police officer who
stated that the levees had breached, the Industrial Canal levee
had breached.
Senator Lieberman. It was pretty early and that confirms
the other evidence, information we have heard, although a lot
of others, unfortunately, did not hear until later as the day
went on. I wanted to ask you also, just so I understand
clearly, at what point, if you were in a position to do this--
because you were not a superintendent at the time--did you
express to anyone the fact that there was a desperate need for
other law enforcement assistance, including from the Federal
Government?
Mr. Riley. We really didn't request other law enforcement
agencies. We were counting on the National Guard and the
military. But other law enforcement agents began to contact us
and to contact the State Emergency Preparedness Center,
requesting to come in, and then some, just came in.
Senator Lieberman. Right. I am sorry, do you want to
finish?
Mr. Riley. No, I'm fine.
Senator Lieberman. You did not yourself, you were not part
of any specific request for Federal assistance that you recall?
Mr. Riley. No. That would have come from Colonel Ebbert.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Our Committee has found a letter
dated August 30, which was the day after landfall, from Henry
L. Whitehorn, Colonel Whitehorn, Superintendent of the Office
of State Police. It is actually a letter to Robert Mueller,
Director of FBI. It is very brief. I will read it. ``Dear
Director Mueller, As you are aware, the city of New Orleans,
Louisiana, suffered massive damage caused by Hurricane Katrina.
We are currently utilizing all State assets to stabilize the
situation. However, looting continues to be a significant
problem. As the head of the Louisiana State Police, I am
requesting any assistance you can provide to this agency to
assist with this issue, to include deployment of available
tactical teams.''
Were you aware of that letter?
Mr. Riley. No.
Senator Lieberman. Agent Kaiser, did you know about that
letter at all to Director Mueller on August 30 from
Superintendent Whitehorn?
Mr. Kaiser. I never saw the letter, but I was advised when
I arrived in Louisiana, in Baton Rouge, and I made contact with
the Colonel of the State Police, Colonel Whitehorn, that he had
sent the letter.
Senator Lieberman. That he had sent it. And again, that was
on Wednesday that you arrived, or was it Thursday?
Mr. Kaiser. Thursday.
Senator Lieberman. Thursday you got there, Wednesday you
left.
Mr. Kaiser. Right.
Senator Lieberman. On August 31, which would have been
Wednesday, the Department of Justice reported to us in our
conversations that the Special Agent in Charge of the New
Orleans FBI Office, who you have mentioned, Jim Bernazzani,
told the U.S. Attorney in Baton Rouge, David Dugas, that
``3,000 armed troops'' were necessary to restore order. Were
you aware of that communication at all?
Mr. Kaiser. No, sir, I was not.
Senator Lieberman. Were you, Superintendent Riley?
Mr. Riley. No, sir.
Senator Lieberman. We will come back to that. It does raise
an interesting question in terms of the Federal response or the
State response because Special Agent Bernazzani specifically
says 3,000 armed troops, and that does not sound like--that
sounds like the National Guard or the Federal active military,
not ICE or ATF or anybody else from the Department of Homeland
Security.
I want to say for the record also that according to the
Department of Homeland Security documents we have seen, no one
who was fulfilling the ESF-13 function appeared in the State
Emergency Operating Center in Baton Rouge before September 1,
which was Thursday. Interesting scenario, by the end of the day
Thursday, September 1, Agent Kaiser, there are now 45 total DOJ
law enforcement personnel in New Orleans including 11 FBI
agents. I do not expect you to remember exact numbers, but does
that sound about right, to the best of your recollection?
Mr. Kaiser. You know, I don't know. I could tell you on
August 20, there were 64 TDY FBI SWAT personnel in New Orleans,
FBI. And there were another 20 from the local field office. But
I don't know the numbers that DEA or ATF or ICE had at that
time, so that number doesn't sound correct.
Senator Lieberman. Doesn't.
Mr. Kaiser. No.
Senator Lieberman. Interestingly, by September 7, our
investigation shows there were 883. That is the following
Wednesday, week and a half after landfall, 883 Department of
Justice personnel in New Orleans providing operational support,
but it did not get started until later. I mean, just to put in
context my own frustration and disappointment about what the
record shows, you, Superintendent Riley, mentioned before the
presidential declaration of emergency, and I want to put this
in context.
We have the NRP issued in January 2005. It is a very
comprehensive plan. It gives a whole host of Federal agencies
various responsibilities in time of disaster, natural and
terrorist. Unfortunately, as I have said earlier, the record
that we have compiled shows that neither DHS, Homeland
Security, or DOJ, Justice, did very much to get ready to assume
its responsibilities.
The President, on Saturday morning, August 27, 2 days
before landfall, based on very serious warnings from the
Weather Service and requests from the governors, declares a
state of emergency. Under the NRP, that immediately becomes a
so-called incident of national significance. So you would hope
that at that moment DHS, DOJ, and the whole Federal apparatus
would have swung into action and essentially would have done
what the Coast Guard did, which prepositioned assets, waiting
for landfall, ready to respond. The record sadly shows that did
not happen, and I believe the testimony today confirms that. So
that you, Superintendent Riley, and--notwithstanding the few
who abdicated responsibility--the many on your force really
behaved heroically, but you are left alone in an hour of
crisis. That is a sad conclusion from the record.
But I thank the three of you for heroic action. We are
going to add you to our list of Katrina heroes, and thank you
for it.
Mr. Kaiser. Thank you.
Mr. Riley. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Vanacore. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I would now like to call forward the second panel of
witnesses. This panel consists of individuals with key roles in
establishing and repairing the communications network in the
greater New Orleans area.
The first witness, Peter Fonash, is the Chief Technology
and Programs Officer of the National Communications System of
the Department of Homeland Security. In that role, he oversees
the acquisition of priority communications service in the
public switch network through the Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service and the Wireless Priority Service
programs.
Colonel FG Dowden has served in the New Orleans Department
of Homeland Security and Public Safety as the Regional Liaison
for Communications Interoperability since 1994. He is
responsible for developing and managing interoperability
projects for the City of New Orleans, and he works in
conjunction with three different parishes.
William Smith is the Chief Technology Officer for BellSouth
Corporation. In this role he is responsible for setting the
technology direction of BellSouth's core infrastructure.
I would ask that you three rise so that I can administer
the oath.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give the
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Fonash. Yes.
Colonel Dowden. I do.
Mr. Smith. I do.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Fonash, we will start with
you.
TESTIMONY OF PETER M. FONASH, Ph.D.,\1\ DEPUTY MANAGER,
NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Fonash. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Senator
Lieberman. I am Peter M. Fonash, and I am honored to testify
before you today. I am the Deputy Manager of the National
Communications Systems (NCS). In my testimony today, I will
explain the role that the NCS played in preparing for and
responding to Hurricane Katrina and what we are doing to
improve the response and recovery of the communications
infrastructure today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Fonash appears in the Appendix on
page 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NCS started under President Kennedy in the 1960s. The
NCS is a consortium of Federal departments and agencies that
have assets, resources, requirements and/or regulatory
authority regarding national security and emergency
preparedness, NS/EP, communications. The NCS assists the
Executive Office of the President in ensuring NS/EP
communications for the Federal Government under all
circumstances.
A key tenet of ensuring communications is reliance on
resiliency and rapid restoration capabilities of the commercial
communications infrastructure, necessitating strong
relationships with industry.
The NCS's National Coordinating Center for
Telecommunications (NCC) is a joint industry/government body
within the NCS. The operational mission of the NCC is the
coordination of communications restoration efforts in an
emergency. The NCS has a major communications role in the
current NRP. The NCS is the lead agency for Emergency Support
Function 2, ESF-2, which is the communications component of the
NRP. The purpose of the ESF-2 is to ensure the provision of
Federal communications support to Federal, State, local,
tribal, and private sector response efforts during an incident
of national significance.
To facilitate coordination of industry/government
operations during an emergency, the NCS has established and
continuously operates several priority service programs, which
help to ensure critical calls are completed in the event of
congestion or damage to the national commercial communications
infrastructure. The Nation heavily used each of these programs
during Hurricane Katrina. These programs include the Government
Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), the Wireless
Priority Service (WPS) program, and the Telecommunications
Service Priority (TSP) program.
The NCS also manages another program, the Shared Resources
High-Frequency Radio Program (SHARES), which provides voice and
low-speed data communications independent of the commercial
communications infrastructure.
In anticipation of Hurricane Katrina, the NCS conducted
various preparations including heightening the alert status of
the NCC's 24-hour watch; placing key programs such as GETS,
WPS, TSP, and SHARES on alert; providing personnel to staff
ESF-2 regional offices and at FEMA headquarters; and conducting
analysis of critical communications assets in the projected
impact area.
Industry worked equally hard to prepare. Companies moved
emergency response teams and equipment to the region,
established communication bridges among carriers, activated
damage assessment teams, routed communications traffic around
the expected impact area, and kept in constant communication
with the NCC. BellSouth opened its operations center to all
carriers for coordination purposes.
As of August 28, 2005, the NCS was ready. All systems and
personnel were in place for the ESF-2 elements to receive
communications support requests from the States impacted by
Katrina.
Now our response. Katrina and the flooding of New Orleans
caused unprecedented damage to the communications
infrastructure. In the telecommunications sector, more than 3
million phone customers were out of service. For the first time
in history, switching centers were out of operation due to
water damage. Numerous 911 call centers were down, and up to
2,000 cellular towers were out of service. In addition,
significant damage had been inflicted on first responder land
mobile radio (LMR) communications. Significant network
congestion and call blockage was being experienced in the
disaster area. Millions of calls were being blocked daily.
Fortunately, many emergency responders had GETS cards and
WPS phones. During the early stages of recovery, over 32,000
GETS calls were attempted, and 95 percent of the calls were
completed where the commercial network remained in operation.
At the NCC in Washington, industry identified three
priorities to the NCS, security, fuel, and access. The NCC
assisted industry by attempting the coordination of security
requirements between industry and government to protect repair
teams, communications sites, and staging areas. In addition, in
a limited number of circumstances, the NCC arranged to provide
communications carriers and broadcast companies with generators
where the power was out, fuel for generators, and power outage
maps. The NCS coordinated closely with FEMA and local
authorities in an attempt to provide the carriers access to
locations in need of repair.
In the impacted areas, ESF-2 worked with State and local
governments to help identify and provide solutions to their
communications needs. ESF-2 arranged for mobile satellite and
cellular vans and for hundreds of satellite phones. For
example, we arranged for mobile communication vans to be sent
on August 30, 2005, to the National Guard in Bogalusa,
Louisiana, and Louisiana State Police in Kenner, Louisiana.
Communications restoration was definitely slowed,
particularly in New Orleans, by security issues. The NCC,
working on behalf of the communications industry, attempted to
solve three separate security related issues during the
Hurricane Katrina response: Fixed-asset security, repair crew
security, and fuel and logistics convoy security.
While State and local authorities were able to meet some
convoy security needs and Federal Marshals secured one
important site, the NCC and ESF-2 were generally unable to
arrange security for asset and repair crew security. ESF-13 and
the National Guard were unable to assist in this regard.
Industry's subsequent efforts to obtain private security were
also hindered when State officials refused to allow out-of-
state security guards to operate without proper Louisiana
licensing.
As a result of the lack of security for repair crews,
telecommunications companies were delayed by as much as a week
and a half in commencing work on some areas in and around New
Orleans.
The storm's damage also left the industry with limited
energy options. Although most companies had extensive plans in
case of power outages, the lack of civil order, coupled with
the extent of destruction, severely impaired companies from
carrying out these plans. Fuel was imperative to keeping back-
up power generators for telecommunication sites and other
critical nodes up and running. Power outages of critical
communication facilities were prevented through cooperative
sharing of fuel supplies among commercial communication
companies.
The lack of a commonly recognized credential for industry
and the need for recognition and acceptance of the credentials
by local jurisdictions also significantly slowed communication
restoration efforts. The day after Hurricane Katrina hit,
industry repair crews, ready to begin restoring services, could
not obtain permission from officials to enter disaster areas,
preventing vital services from being restored as quickly as
they could have been. An apparent disconnect between Federal
and State access authorization policies delayed crews and
burdened incident management teams.
Obtaining access to restricted areas for the communications
repair crews remained problematic in Louisiana for nearly a
month. Subsequent to the landfall of Hurricane Rita, ESF-2 was
able to work out a blanket access letter in the State of Texas
and, using that as a precedent, got Louisiana to allow a
similar letter, thus finally achieving a state-wide solution in
Louisiana.
In conclusion, the extent of the destruction and damage to
communications infrastructure and services caused by Hurricane
Katrina greatly exceeded any other disaster previously
encountered by the NCS. A hurricane of the historic magnitude
of Hurricane Katrina stressed the processes and procedures of
the NCS and required ESF-2 to perform new functions, such as
performing interim land mobile radio repairs in eight parishes.
Now that the NCS has completed its role in assisting with
the restoration efforts, and with hurricane season only 5
months away, and the ever-present need for preparedness, the
NCS believes that prudence dictates that the NCS continue
efforts to improve its ability to respond. We are identifying
issues and lessons learned and developing recommendations. Our
after-action sessions with other ESF-2 agencies and industry
demonstrate our full commitment to incorporating lessons
learned into future plans, procedures, and capabilities.
Our goal is to look at both short-term and long-term
improvements, focusing on what we can accomplish in advance of
the 2006 hurricane season. In particular, the NCS is developing
ESF-2 operational plan modifications with the ESF-2 support
agencies. We are establishing standard operating procedures for
both the primary and support agencies. Once these standard
operating procedures are developed, we will conduct an exercise
of ESF-2 functions in the mid-May timeframe to ensure the plans
are thoroughly understood by those who will be part of any
Federal response team. Where appropriate, it is hoped that
participants will be from all levels of government and
industry.
We are working with other agencies, State Governments, and
industry on security and access issues. We are working with
ESF-13 and others to improve physical security mechanisms and
to develop pre-approved emergency credentials for key
infrastructure providers to facilitate industry restoration
efforts. NCS is developing a pilot program with industry
partners and the State of Florida to test screening and
credentialing for the communications infrastructure.
Other areas to be considered for improvement are: Improving
required knowledge and skill sets of the response teams;
increased level of exercises of all parties involved; and
improved planning to expedite the acquisition of emergency
communications capabilities.
The NCS will continue to work with industry and government
counterparts to improve the restoration of the Nation's
communications network.
This concludes my oral remarks. I have submitted a written
statement for the record.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished
Committee. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may
have.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, and your full statement will
be included in the record. Colonel Dowden.
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL FG DOWDEN,\1\ REGIONAL LIAISON, NEW
ORLEANS DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY
Colonel Dowden. Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, by way
of introduction, I am FG Dowden, and I currently serve as the
Regional Liaison for the New Orleans Department of Homeland
Security and Public Safety. In this position I represent the
City of New Orleans, and I have worked for the last 2 years to
develop and execute communications interoperability projects
and issues with St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson
Parishes, which along with New Orleans make up Louisiana Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI) Region I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Colonel Dowden appears in the
Appendix on page 86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to thank you for the invitation to testify before
the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and
the opportunity to assist your Committee and the Nation in
improving our capability of communications interoperability and
response to catastrophic events.
Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster that destroyed or
damaged our communications infrastructure and made it extremely
difficult, and in some cases impossible, to react and to
coordinate the massive response and recovery effort brought on
by the storm. Thousands of lives and property were put at risk
because of the extensive damage and losses to the
communications systems that were in use by various agencies
within the respective parishes.
The ability to communicate with State and Federal agencies
in most cases was limited to a few land lines, satellite
phones, and data links.
Today I would like to provide you with information relative
to the challenges to communications and communications
interoperability prior to and during the storm and a status on
where we are as we move forward.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, we had over 75 first responder
agencies operating over myriad disparate voice radio
communications systems within the region. The two-way radio
spectrum ranged from your very basic simplex radios to more
advanced VHF and 400 megahertz radios, to the even more modern
and more sophisticated 800 megahertz trunked radio systems.
Two parishes were operating systems that had far exceeded
their normal service life and which challenged the best radio
technicians to keep them operational on a daily basis. Day-to-
day operability was challenging, to say the least.
Additionally, within those two parishes they were operating on
several different types of proprietary systems, which in many
cases could not communicate with each other. The other two
parishes were operating more modern and technically
sophisticated 800 megahertz trunked digital or analog systems.
In the case of New Orleans, the city's 800 megahertz network
supported police, fire, emergency medical services, and the
Office of Emergency Preparedness over a common shared system.
Jefferson Parish was supported by two 800 megahertz trunked
radio systems, one of which supported the parish government and
the other the sheriff's department. State agencies were
operating on a different 800 megahertz trunked analog system,
and Federal agencies were operating on VHF spectrum and other
radio systems, depending on that particular agency.
As you can see, in addition to the day-to-day operational
issues, communications interoperability was extremely
problematic. Recognizing these problems, New Orleans and
Jefferson Parish law enforment had put in place console patches
connecting their 800 megahertz controllers, and this provided
some level of interoperability. Local agencies in coordination
with Federal agencies and with support from a public service
wireless network project had used bridging technology in the
form of ACU 1000s to connect disparate radios from the 17
local, State, and Federal agencies and to provide a level of
interoperability.
Recognizing the interoperability problems, the City of New
Orleans had applied for and received a Community Oriented
Policing Services (COPS) grant, which with the local cash match
totaled $7.3 million. The grant would provide the basis for
improving day-to-day operability within each parish and improve
interoperability within the region. We were 16 months away from
the completion of the project when we were struck by Hurricane
Katrina.
Additionally, working in coordination with the
Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program,
provided by the Department of Homeland Security, we had begun
the effort of aligning our regional operating procedures and
protocols through the completion of a regional tactical
interoperable communications plan and in late June had
conducted a tabletop exercise as part of the validation process
for that plan. A follow-on exercise was scheduled for late
September; however, that exercise was preempted by Hurricane
Katrina.
Before moving on to address the impact of Hurricane Katrina
on voice communications, I would like to briefly address
funding issues related to public safety or first responder
communications systems. In conjunction with the development of
the application for the COPS grant, the region analyzed options
for creating a region-wide shared 800 megahertz trunked digital
system in support of where we thought the region should go in
order to achieve the highest order of interoperability and
operability. The cost estimates ranged as high as $45 million,
and it was viewed as cost prohibitive. Therefore, a plan was
developed that would move us to a region-wide shared system in
a phased approach over time. The plan moved St. Bernard and
Plaquemines Parishes onto the Jefferson Parish law enforcement
system, which would be upgraded to a dual-mode P25 compliant
700/800 megahertz system and then link the Jefferson Parish and
New Orleans systems together through an interoperability
switch. The expectation was that, as additional funds became
available through additional COPS or UASI grants, New Orleans
would migrate to a dual-mode P25 compliant system and then
further link the region to the State.
The point here is that, even in ordinary times, most
agencies who operate on the margin from a fiscal standpoint
cannot afford to invest in a modern technically advanced voice
radio communications system without significant Federal grant
support. After a catastrophic event such as Hurricane Katrina,
local governments are faced with even greater financial
challenges and must rely even more on outside funding and no-
cost outside assistance.
Hurricane Katrina had a devastating impact on the
communications infrastructure in the four parishes making up
Region I. In St. Bernard Parish, the extreme winds took away
communications towers and antennas, and floodwaters inundated
the 911 center and forced the evacuation of buildings housing
communications for the fire and sheriff's departments. All
voice radio communications were lost except for very limited
radio-to-radio communications.
In Plaquemines Parish, the parish government communications
tower and communications center, along with their microwave
antennas, were lost. The Plaquemines sheriff lost the 911
communications and dispatch center and all towers. In short,
all agencies in Plaquemines Parish lost all communications, and
it was almost 3 weeks before they had any means of voice
communications.
The Jefferson Parish sheriff's office lost the main tower
supporting their communications system and suffered damage to
other sites throughout their system. Today, antennas supporting
their communications center are still temporarily located on
the 400-foot boom of a crane.
During and in the aftermath of the storm, the region's only
means of voice communications was the use of five or fewer
mutual aid channels. In New Orleans, one tower was inundated by
the storm surge and remains inoperable. Two towers had
equipment damaged or lost power because of floodwaters, and the
911 centers and police, fire, and EMS dispatch centers were all
impacted and rendered unusable by floodwaters. The city was
also forced to rely on a limited number of mutual aid channels.
The ACU 1000 interoperability switch, which was located with
the fire department, had to be abandoned because of the
floodwaters. Therefore, the interoperability between the four
parishes and State and Federal agencies was lost.
It needs to be stated and clearly understood that the
communications failures were a result of catastrophic physical
damage or loss as a result of extremely high winds, storm
surge, and flooding, and not the result of actual system
failures, even in the older systems.
As you have heard, the impact of Hurricane Katrina was
severe, and it has left the region scrambling to restore
communications before the next hurricane season. That is only 5
months away. The repair or replacement of infrastructure such
as communications towers that were damaged by the storm and
rightfully eligible for replacement and reimbursement by FEMA
has languished. Some efforts at the State or Federal levels
have complicated the effort to restore capability and
interoperability.
We, as a region, totally understand the implications of
entering this next storm season without our communications
systems fully operational, and we are currently working on two
parallel efforts to restore our communications. The first is to
patch together what we have left, what has been provided by
FEMA, and what equipment we can purchase immediately and still
be able to reuse in the future. This temporary solution will
support all of the agencies in the region and will provide
interoperability and redundancy to the fullest extent possible.
This will not be optimum, but we can at least communicate
before the next storm season.
The second is to pursue our regional plan and install a
dual-mode 700/800 megahertz fully P25 compliant system
comprised of all first responders in our four-parish region on
one shared radio system connected to the State's 700 megahertz
radio system by the end of the year. To augment the COPS grant,
we have committed all available UASI funds and, as much as
possible, we are taking advantage of FEMA funding; however, we
are still approximately $22 million away, and we require that
for the purchase of subscriber radios for New Orleans and
Jefferson Parish. Without the additional funding, we will not
be able to complete the project and will continue to have
interoperability problems.
Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, thank you for your time.
I am open for questions.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Smith.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. SMITH,\1\ CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER,
BELLSOUTH CORPORATION
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Lieberman. My name is Bill Smith. I am the Chief Technology
Officer with BellSouth. It is a pleasure to be here with you
today. I am here today to address the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on BellSouth's network, the status of that network
based on restoration completed to date, where we expect to go
from here as we continue to restore communications to the hard-
hit Gulf area, and what the Federal Government can do to assist
in those efforts.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Smith appears in the Appendix on
page 92.
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Given the area that we serve, BellSouth has dealt with
hurricanes for a number of years, and we're proud of the
resiliency that our network has consistently demonstrated.
Based in large part on these past experiences and as part of
our overall network plan, we have actually prepared to put
equipment in higher floors in many of the low-lying areas of
the New Orleans bowl, and in fact, most all of that critical
equipment was located on second floors or higher. That helped
to avoid damage to much of that critical equipment and actually
turned restoration periods that would have been months into
periods of weeks.
In the coastal areas of Louisiana and Mississippi, we had
built certain flood-prone structures on pilings in order to
elevate those buildings approximately 10 feet above ground
level. But even those precautions were not enough to withstand
Katrina's sustained winds in excess of 145 miles an hour and
storm surge that was measured in places to be nearly 40 feet
tall.
Prior to making landfall in Florida, BellSouth was
monitoring Katrina and actually instituted our standard
hurricane procedures. Those included positioning over 1,000
portable generators, making sure that they are in working
order, that they're fueled properly, making sure that fuel
tanks are filled in all of our central office locations and
administrative buildings as well as our vehicles. We also take
provisions into the area to build temporary structures, tents
that can house our personnel, and provide food and shelter in
nearby locations.
BellSouth has 1,591 central office buildings across our
region; 578 of those are in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. Throughout the storm, 545 of the 578 offices never
lost service. As the loss of commercial power was widespread,
many of these offices were running on batteries supported by
generators. Generators require fuel. In the past, our
technicians have had access to those central offices where the
generators are housed in order to provide proper fueling and
refueling, as well as maintenance. This was not the case in
Hurricane Katrina. When the levees failed in New Orleans, the
water did not recede. Because of the continued flooding and
unprecedented security issues, generator power was lost at
several central offices due to our inability to refuel the
generators.
Once we were able to gain access and begin restoration, we
concentrated on restoration of the highest priority circuits,
specifically those which support public safety, including
hospitals, E-911 centers, and law enforcement. We then focused
on supporting other carriers, including the wireless industry.
I have listed these sequentially, but they often work
simultaneously.
BellSouth has been extremely focused on the wireless
industry in restoration efforts. We conducted two daily calls,
one with wireless carriers and the other with wireline
carriers. These collaborative efforts were very important in
the restoration effort. In this new dynamic age of
communications, alternative technology, such as wireless and
Voice over IP, utilize and interconnect to the traditional
wireline network. Thus, as BellSouth restores its network, we
also enable other carriers to restore theirs.
We made significant progress in restoration due to the
tireless and often heroic efforts of our employees, who have
worked around the clock with the single-minded mission of
restoring communications to these hard-hit areas.
I would like to discuss what our cooperation has been and
needs for further assistance. Overall, the cooperation and
assistance from local, State, and Federal agencies has been
good. The FCC, along with staff members, was extraordinarily
helpful. The FCC reached out to offer assistance in many areas,
waiving rules that helped customers who were without service
and taking actions that allowed for the quick restoration of
network facilities. Because of this, BellSouth was able to make
its own corporate network available to other companies to help
them restore their networks. BellSouth was also in constant
communication with other Federal agencies and received strong
support from the White House Executive Office of the President.
Now let me address what additional assistance is necessary.
My testimony, as follows, outlines a number of areas, and I
won't go into all of those, but I think what is most important
is that we do need to be designated as emergency responder in a
hurricane or natural disaster of this nature. We believe that
may involve modifications to the Stafford Act, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, and the NRP to explicitly indicate that
we get access, security, fuel, and power.
Other issues we believe involve the cost to restore our
network. Our investments thus far have been over $500 million
to restore service in our network, and we think that the total
amount will be close to $900 million. Now, as we make those
investments in these uncertain situations in the Gulf area,
we're not only enabling our own network, but we're enabling
other carriers who use our network, and we would like to see
that taken into consideration.
That concludes my comments. Thank you for your attention.
Chairman Collins. Thank you very much for your testimony,
Mr. Smith.
The Committee during the course of its investigation has
come across many documents, e-mails in particular, talking
about the difficulties that communications workers, the repair
crews, had in gaining access due to State, local, and Federal
roadblocks. In the exhibit book on Exhibit 20,\1\ which you can
turn to, but I will just paraphrase some of it. We have, for
example, an e-mail that talks about MCI being told by the State
Police that they needed a letter from the governor in order to
get access to the New Orleans area, and MCI saying that the
inability to get access is giving the whole Gulf-South network
problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Exhibit 20 appears in the Appendix on page 111.
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Similarly, there is an e-mail from Cox Communications
describing the experience of their employees, and it says,
``Our efforts to get our telecommunications network back up and
running is being severely hampered by FEMA. They are denying
our field personnel fuel and taking any surplus that we have.''
So here we have heard from MCI and from Cox. You have
mentioned the lack of security was the problem for your
workers. Did you have difficulty in even getting access to the
sites where you needed to do repairs?
Mr. Smith. Yes, we did. We had similar situations in all
those cases, whether it was fuel--at one point in time we had a
priority letter that I think came from DHS that said we should
get priority access to fuel so that when we went to fuel
suppliers we could get that. It was subsequently rescinded, and
I think, again, as I understand it, it was because there was
some question about whether the Stafford Act actually allows
them to give a private organization priority access. Fuel and
security were our biggest issues, as well as access. We had a
significant amount of problems in trying to get secure forces
for our areas. In fact, in my filed testimony, there is a more
detailed explanation about what happened at the New Orleans
main central office, which is kind of the nerve center of the
telecommunications network in New Orleans.
Chairman Collins. Go ahead and describe that for us.
Mr. Smith. Well, we had our major center located there to
coordinate all of our emergency efforts. On Tuesday morning, it
became pretty evident that the situation was deteriorating in
New Orleans, and part of this, as you mentioned earlier, was
based on information that we were getting regarding people
being attacked, buildings being overrun, so forth and so on. So
we began trying to get security for that facility because we
had 82 people in that facility. It was a critical facility for
us. We did not want to abandon it. We wanted to maintain it.
But we wanted our people to be safe.
We spent most of that day trying to get security for that
facility. Finally, at about 3 p.m. local time, Central Time, we
got the State police to escort our people out of the building
because they could not stay and secure it. After we evacuated
the building, we were able to arrange for an FBI team to go in
later that evening, re-secure the building, and we were able to
go back in the next morning with an armed convoy, with fuel and
supplies.
Fortunately, that building did not fall to looters or
anyone that would have done harm because it would have been a
much more serious situation. But that is an example of the kind
of thing that we faced.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Fonash, you said in your statement
that security, fuel, and access were the key priorities. We
have just heard through documents and through testimony
problems with security, fuel, and access that prevented
telecommunications workers from getting to the sites where they
needed to make desperately needed repairs. What is your
response to that?
Mr. Fonash. Well, Madam Chairman, my response to that is
those are issues that were identified in after-action reports,
and the department and other parts of the government are
examining ways of making sure that those things do not happen
in the future. So we are addressing those issues. We recognize
the problem, and the Department is trying to address those
issues. But those were clearly problems that we saw throughout
Katrina. I think we identified that problem on September 2,
security being a problem. And it lasted probably for about a
month. There were also concerns with regard to physical
security of the crews working inside the central offices. There
were security concerns with regard to the trucks going out in
the field and trying to make repairs. And there were issues
about security in terms of the fuel resupplies.
For example, we had to arrange for fuel resupply convoys,
and industry actually arranged for fuel resupply convoys where
they would hire private guards. For example, BellSouth many
times arranged a convoy where Poydras Street is, that street in
New Orleans where there are many communications facilities, and
it was actually arranged for many convoys, fuel convoys, by
industry to come in so that they could refuel those locations,
and security was a concern, as well as the fact that fuel many
times was a scarce resource, and the companies had to share
among each other to ensure for the most part that those
communications facilities stayed up.
In addition, there were some problems in the broadcast
area. The major Spanish language station was having some major
problems in terms of fuel. Their generators--they had to go on
half-power for quite a while, and it was actually BellSouth
again that also arranged for fuel resupply on that.
So fuel was a problem for quite a while--not as long as
security--I think for about 2 or 3 weeks. Security was a major
concern. And then also there was a problem of access, and
access, first of all, you break it into two pieces:
Credentialing--and credentialing is that the person has
authenticated, valid identification that says this person works
for BellSouth, AT&T, or MCI and needs to get into a key
facility, maybe a facility that is not open to the general
public. Because one of the things that the communications
industry as well as the power industry has to do is they have
to come into those areas. Before the general public can come
in, you must restore power and you must restore communications.
Chairman Collins. But that is utterly foreseeable. It is
obvious that you are going to have to have the power company
and the telecommunications companies with access to the area
before the general public. I mean, that is something that
should have been anticipated.
Mr. Fonash. That is currently not--in the NRP, no
infrastructure is provided any priority over any other
infrastructure.
Chairman Collins. Well, isn't that a huge deficiency of the
NRP then?
Mr. Fonash. Well, we, as the telecommunications
infrastructure, have identified that as something that we would
like to address in the NRP. We have identified that.
The other part of access, which is a really tough nut to
resolve, is the fact that it is a State and local issue and not
just a Federal issue in the sense of not only do you have to
have the credentials, but you have to have the State and local
authorities recognize the credentials and allow people to enter
into those locations. So we need to address the credentialing
problem. We need to address the fact that the local and State
authorities will recognize those credentials. And then we need
to also address the issue of which infrastructures have to get
in there first to restore services so that the general public
can come in.
Chairman Collins. I am not saying that this is just a
Federal problem. I read an e-mail where MCI was told in order
to get access to an area they needed a letter from the
governor. So, clearly, the credentialing issue spans State,
local, and Federal Government. But it is extraordinary to me
that the need to have this access and this credentialing was
not recognized prior to Hurricane Katrina or any other natural
disaster.
Mr. Fonash. In general, Madam Chairman, what happens is
that the State--what will happen is during a disaster--for
example, in Florida and in Texas, the State worked out a
credentialing system and accepted the entry, allowed the entry
of the communications carriers into facilities that were areas
that were closed off. So a lot of it depends on the State
Government being able to function in terms of saying that these
are credentials, we will allow in the communications carriers,
we will allow in the power companies, and to work with the
State and local authorities to accept that. So that is
something that is generally worked out at the State level, and
the State and local governments work that out. In this case, it
didn't work.
Chairman Collins. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much again, Madam Chairman.
Incidentally, Mr. Smith, thank you for your testimony, and
here again BellSouth looks to me, sounds to me like it took
some very effective pre-storm steps to prepare for what
happened and under the circumstances of an enormous storm
really did very well, and I congratulate you for that. We have
seen some cases where the Federal, State, and local government
did the same, and we have seen some other cases where it didn't
do the same. And that is what we are trying to work toward, so
I appreciate your testimony--it was very helpful--and your
suggestion about the changes in the Stafford Act.
Mr. Fonash, thanks for your testimony. I think you followed
the line of questions that I asked the previous panel, and I
want to do the same in your case. The National Communications
System has a very impressive and long record of working
particularly with the private telecommunications industry to be
ready in crises. And you were given responsibility under the
ESF-2 part of the NRP for communications.
I was really interested in reading the transcript of
interviews that both you and Jeff Glick, who is operationally
in charge of Emergency Support Function ESF-2--am I right about
that?
Mr. Fonash. Correct.
Senator Lieberman [continuing]. And reports to you, about
your answers to some of the questions. Mr. Glick, for instance,
told Committee investigators that it is possible to interpret
the NRP as not including first responder systems since the plan
does not specifically refer to so-called LMR networks, land
mobile radio. And I wanted to ask--and, in fact, I will go on
one more. You and Mr. Glick in your interviews said that in
past hurricanes, the issue of so-called LMR, land mobile radio
networks, used by first responders had never come up, that in
that sense even since the NRP that ESF-2 had never had to deal
with those radio systems.
So I want to ask you what your understanding was after the
NRP following its predecessor was issued in January of 2005,
with regard to your responsibility for communications in a
disaster circumstance, natural or otherwise, and specifically
whether it included more than working with the private
telecommunications industry.
Mr. Fonash. OK. Sir, there was something--predecessor to
the NRP----
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Fonash [continuing]. Was something called the Federal
Response Plan.
Senator Lieberman. Exactly.
Mr. Fonash. And in the Federal Response Plan, there was an
ESF-2 also, but it was for telecommunications.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fonash. Not communications.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fonash. And we actually explicitly decided to change
that from telecommunications to communications to make it
broader.
Senator Lieberman. You mean in the NRP?
Mr. Fonash. The NRP changed it.
Senator Lieberman. Did you have a hand in that?
Mr. Fonash. Yes, I did, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Interesting. So what were you thinking
about?
Mr. Fonash. It was expanded in terms of two planes: First
of all, in terms of communications, pure communications, we
view it as including cable, broadcast, and radio.
Senator Lieberman. Got you.
Mr. Fonash. But we also broadened it to include cyber or
IT. So it is not only the transfer of information, which is the
standard definition of communications, but also the information
processing, what you would look at as cyber or Internet.
Now, also, the comment I would like to make, sir, is that
the telecommunications companies that you are talking to are
also the Internet providers.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fonash. I think what Jeff and I were referring to was
not whether or not it was within scope, but that we had--first,
the way we work is that ESF-2 is set up--that the Federal
Government is set up to respond to State and local requests.
Actually, we are set up to respond to State requests. In
general, what normally happens is that the local government has
requirements. If they cannot meet those requirements, they go
to the State Government. If the State Government cannot handle
those requirements, they come to us for communications
requirements. And then we will try to address them.
In our experience of handling hurricanes and over our years
of experience of handling hurricanes, we had never seen the
need to provide--or were never asked by the State or local
government to help them put together--or to repair a land
mobile radio system. We had never had that request before.
Senator Lieberman. Right. So can I fairly conclude, then,
that in your work in the predecessor plan--was it called the
Federal Response Plan?
Mr. Fonash. Federal Response Plan.
Senator Lieberman. And then in the NRP, you were not
prepared to come in and provide emergency communications
systems for State or local governments in time of crisis?
Mr. Fonash. No, that is not true.
Senator Lieberman. So explain that to me.
Mr. Fonash. So what I mean by that is that we in general
rely on a commercial infrastructure. First of all, we have our
priority service programs that allow you to utilize what
remaining public infrastructure is there. In addition to that,
what we will do is, using the ESF process, Emergency Support
Function process, which basically says if the State Government
has a requirement--there are technical areas. There are 15 ESF
organizations.
Senator Lieberman. Excuse me for doing this, but the time
is running.
Mr. Fonash. Sure.
Senator Lieberman. I just want to make it clear. I gather
from what you have said that you never had been asked by the
State and local governments to play this kind of role.
Mr. Fonash. Correct.
Senator Lieberman. But were you ready to help them if they
asked?
Mr. Fonash. It is very difficult to be ready to support a
request for land mobile radio because, first of all, one of the
big differences is analog versus digital.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fonash. Second is frequency. Third is that the
algorithms that each of those--they are proprietary algorithms.
A Harris system will not work with a Motorola system, even if
it is digital, even if it is on the same frequency.
Senator Lieberman. Understood. This is an interesting
problem because I suppose in one sense to be direct and
comprehensive and fair about it, to the extent that you help
private telecommunications to get their system up, you are
assisting public authorities because they can then use that
system to communicate.
Mr. Fonash. Correct.
Senator Lieberman. But I do think that there is a
requirement now to think about--because I do think that some of
the local officials really overwhelmed as they were and seeing
this--this goes back to my earlier line of questions. The
President declares an emergency Saturday morning. I wish
looking back that--in all the exercises we have gone over here,
the Hurricane Pam exercise, the State and locals in the case of
a hurricane like Katrina with flooding and over-running the
levees, that would have been overwhelmed and would have a need
for emergency communications help, but nobody was there to--I
mean, let me ask you this question: In the weekend before
Katrina made landfall, did anyone in the Homeland Security
Department, the Secretary or anyone else, ever bring together
you and the other heads of the relevant DHS agencies who had
responsibility under the NRP to coordinate the response to the
hurricane that was now thought to be so serious that the
President had declared an emergency?
Mr. Fonash. Well, first of all, the NRCC was activated,
National Response Coordination Center.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fonash. So under the NRP, they are the ones to
coordinate across the ESF structure, and they were activated,
and we sent a representative over there.
Senator Lieberman. And what did that mean? Were you asked
what you were prepared to do at that time?
Mr. Fonash. Right. In other words, we basically established
a desk, a watch over there. We provide them with situation
awareness in terms of what is going on with the communications
infrastructure at that point in time. And we let them know if
there are any particular requirements that we are trying to
address, and if we need help, we would go to them because all
the ESFs are there at the national level. They're all there at
the national level, and so if there's a national issue, they
would address it there at the national level.
There is also a corresponding infrastructure, an ESF
structure at the local level. And if there are problems at the
local infrastructure that those local ESFs can handle, then
initially they are handled at the Regional Response Control
Center, and then at the Joint Field Office. They handle those
problems. The way we do it is there are problems that can be
handled at the local level, for example, if there are problems
at Baton Rouge, there are not enough phone lines, the ESF-2
there would get that requirement to add additional phones. That
would generally not be a problem that we would see.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fonash. We would see problems that would be policy.
Also the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) was
activated, and my boss, Bob Stephan, the Assistant Secretary,
heads that up.
Senator Lieberman. Let me interrupt you because time is
running out. I want to get some questions to Colonel Dowden. So
I appreciate the answer, and you are in a unique situation
because of the circumstances you described about communications
and the difficulty of stepping in.
Colonel Dowden, as a lay person in this, as I watched what
was happening--and we have spent a lot of time now on this
investigation going over it--obviously as I see how your
communications system was knocked out, I look back and I say,
Why wasn't the Federal Government in some form ready to come in
to provide an alternative system?
On the ground in the middle of it all, did you have a
similar hope yourself?
Colonel Dowden. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Was there any discussion at all prior to
Katrina with the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, or
anyone else about what, if any, kind of emergency
communications support they might provide if the so-called big
one, the big hurricane, hit New Orleans?
Colonel Dowden. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Lieberman. I do want to ask you a couple of
questions briefly. You told our staffs that you had developed a
tactical interoperable plan for the region, but interestingly,
it was geared more toward an explosives situation, a terrorist
attack, never designed to work given the destruction or
magnitude of the problems you encountered with Hurricane
Katrina. If that is right, I wonder if you could elaborate on
it and tell us a little more about it.
Colonel Dowden. Sir, the scenario that was specifically
required for the development of the tactical interoperable
communications plan was spelled out in the 2005 UASI grant
guidance.
Senator Lieberman. I got you. So this is what you did in
response to the UASI?
Colonel Dowden. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Urban Area Security----
Colonel Dowden. It is one of the 17 scenarios that they lay
out in the National Plan.
Senator Lieberman. That is a very important point. So that
the Urban Area Security--the ``I'' is ``Initiative,'' am I
right?
Colonel Dowden. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. That was focused on preparation for a
terrorist attack.
Colonel Dowden. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. So that is why you did that as opposed
to beginning to think about what you would do in the case of a
disaster, a natural disaster.
Colonel Dowden. Yes, sir, and that particular scenario is
geared toward an explosion of an IED-type device in a major
sporting event with numerous casualties, but nothing on the
magnitude or the scale of what happens with a hurricane, even a
small hurricane.
Senator Lieberman. Understood. This is actually one
specific area in which we can see the impact that some have
charged that the Department was focused on terrorist response
and preparation and may have, therefore, not given adequate
attention to natural disaster preparation and response.
Colonel Dowden. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Madam Chairman, do you intend to have
another round?
Chairman Collins. I was going to do a very brief final
round.
Senator Lieberman. Good. Then I will save my last question
until you do yours. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. My last question is for you, Colonel,
also. You discussed in your testimony the need for a new
interoperable communications system that would connect all
first responders in a four-parish region to each other and
would further connect them to the State of Louisiana's radio
system. And, of course, the problem, as you point out, is the
cost.
You note that beyond what New Orleans can devote to the
project through various Federal grants, you need an additional
$22 million to purchase the subscriber radios. My staff has
analyzed the numbers, and I want to share with you what we
found.
First, the figures from the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security indicate that the State of Louisiana has approximately
$58 million in unspent first responder grant money, and that is
not counting what it will receive in this fiscal year. And some
of these funds date back to the fiscal year 2003 grant
allocation.
Second, the figures provided by the State of Louisiana
indicate that roughly 16 percent of the Federal first responder
grant dollars that it receives are spent on interoperable
communications equipment. And you may be interested to know
that is only approximately half the national average. In other
words, most other States spend far more of their first
responder grant money for interoperability communications
projects because that is a need everywhere. Nationally,
approximately one in three Federal homeland security grant
dollars are spent on interoperable communications equipment.
Now, it is very clear from all the testimony that we have
had and from the experience with Katrina that you have an
urgent need for better, more sustainable, and interoperable
communications equipment. It also seems to me that the State
should have an interest in seeing to it that you get that
equipment.
I wonder if you have approached the State of Louisiana to
see whether it would reallocate some of the $58 million in
unspent funds to allow you to complete the system that you
envision.
Colonel Dowden. Madam Chairman, we each year lose about 20
percent of our UASI grant monies, for example, because the
State withholds that amount of money as their prerogative, and
the stipulation is that money is supposed to come back to the
region in some form to support the region. This last year, we
did go to the State and ask for the 20 percent that they had
withheld from our UASI grant. After Katrina, they agreed, and
it is my understanding that their intent is to release that 20
percent they have withheld from the UASI grant for support of
Region I or for the four-parish area.
Chairman Collins. Let me clarify that I am not talking
about the UASI money.
Colonel Dowden. I understand.
Chairman Collins. I am talking about the first responder,
the standard homeland security grant money.
Colonel Dowden. That money, we have asked, but
unfortunately I have no control over how they allocate those
funds. So we do not see those funds at the local level,
typically, specifically earmarked for communications. Now, they
may come in other forms, but to my knowledge, what we have seen
in communications equipment in the last 3 years has probably
been in the neighborhood of about $3 million.
Keep in mind that the way the State accounts for the money
is any equipment that they buy, whether it is computers or fax
machines or whatever, may get charged against communications or
communications interoperability, not necessarily to land mobile
radios or voice radios.
So I don't know specifically, when you say they have spent
$16 million and that they have got $56 million remaining, I am
not quite sure how they account for that money, very honestly.
Chairman Collins. Neither am I. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
Colonel Dowden, I know that you, in addition to your
current responsibilities, have had extensive service to our
country in the Marines, and as part of that, have a lot of
logistics and communication background. Maybe I have more than
one question, but it is under that general category about how
this all worked.
Some of the problems were clearly because of outdated
equipment, but it seems to me that some of the problems that
you had may also have been related to more than that. And let
me just lead you into an anecdote, which is that--I gather you
were assigned to the State Emergency Operations Center in Baton
Rouge as the city's liaison.
Colonel Dowden. That's correct.
Senator Lieberman. And I take it, notwithstanding all the
problems with communications, you managed to stay in
communication with Colonel Ebbert and his staff and conveyed
the needs of first responders in New Orleans, therefore, to the
State EOC and to FEMA. I want you to talk a little bit about
how that process worked inside the State Emergency Operations
Center.
Colonel Dowden. Sir, in the early days, and I would say
within the first 3 or 4 days after the storm made landfall,
most of the communications and most of the requests for support
came via telephone, and there was at that point only one
telephone line that we were able to communicate with Colonel
Ebbert in New Orleans.
At some point, what they called their E-team system came
up, and that's a computer system that's designed to allow you
to request support, track support, and then give you the status
later of what type of support you----
Senator Lieberman. Is that a State system or a Federal
system?
Colonel Dowden. It is a State system.
Senator Lieberman. OK.
Colonel Dowden. That particular system was installed by the
State. It has serious shortfalls, the actual program itself
does. For instance, it does not allow you to go back and check
the status of a particular request. You have to go in based on
when you think the date was, or if you knew what date it was
submitted, you can go into the system and find that particular
request. But there is no way of tracking the status, getting an
update on what is outstanding, what has been taken care of,
what has not been taken care of.
That E-team request reaches the State EOC, and they make a
determination as to whether or not that particular support can
be provided by the State within its existing resources or it
must be passed to FEMA.
Senator Lieberman. This is a system that is used
particularly in an emergency?
Colonel Dowden. It's designed for an emergency, yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Colonel Dowden. The State makes a determination that it can
be handled within State resources, and they task to the
National Guard or the State Department of Transportation or
whatever.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Colonel Dowden. If they make a determination that it cannot
be handled within State assets, then they pass that through
what they call an administrative request form, or AR, as I came
to understand it, to FEMA. At that point, basically, as a local
person trying to track support requests, I lose visibility on
what's happened with my particular request. Part of my job in
Baton Rouge was to go to FEMA and request status on particular
requests, particularly for fuel, water, food, and those kinds
of things.
Senator Lieberman. Do I understand correctly that the State
system, the E-team system, is a computerized system; whereas,
the FEMA system is still a paper system?
Colonel Dowden. At that point, it is manual. That's
correct.
Senator Lieberman. So that you had to transfer in the
middle of the emergency to be able to----
Colonel Dowden. They have a form, Senator, many government
forms, that you transfer the request in writing, you handwrite
it, basically fill it out, and you hand it to the FEMA ops
desk.
Senator Lieberman. Do I correctly assume that caused delays
or that there were bottlenecks in the process as a result?
Colonel Dowden. Oh, absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. I have heard that the problems in the
system that you have just described led one of your deputies, a
Captain Joseph, to bypass the system and contract directly with
vendors, such as Fisher Scientific, for commodities or
equipment that were needed, and that the companies like Fisher
provided--were able to deliver the supplies to first responders
in New Orleans during the very first days when apparently FEMA
could not. Am I right?
Colonel Dowden. That's correct.
Senator Lieberman. Can you tell us just a bit about that?
Colonel Dowden. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, we had an
established relationship with Fisher because they provided
other equipment that we often need and homeland security hazmat
equipment, bomb suits, hazmat suits, those kinds of things. So
when the hurricane hit and we began to encounter problems with
being able to get what we needed to keep the police and the
fire folks properly equipped or clothed, Mike Joseph basically
reverted to what we knew would work, and with that established
relationship, we began to post requisitions or requests with
Fisher, and they honored those requisitions, and they filled
those requisitions and got the equipment and supplies to our
folks in New Orleans.
Senator Lieberman. How did you make the request, by phone
or computer?
Colonel Dowden. Telephone.
Senator Lieberman. Telephone. And did they actually get it
in in the first days after the storm?
Colonel Dowden. Yes, they did.
Senator Lieberman. How did they do it?
Colonel Dowden. Various means, everything from UPS to FedEx
to line-haul freight carriers.
Senator Lieberman. But it wasn't going directly to New
Orleans, was it?
Colonel Dowden. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Even during those first few days?
Colonel Dowden. Yes, sir. We knew the routes that you could
take into New Orleans, and so when we were in contact with
Fisher, and in some cases they guided the drivers into New
Orleans, and it was delivered. In the early days, that was the
only way we were able to get some clothing--dry clothing and
equipment and things of that nature to our police and firemen.
Senator Lieberman. That is quite a story.
Thank you all for your testimony. Thank you for your
service. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Thank you very much for your testimony today. The hearing
record will remain open for 15 days, so we may have additional
questions for you for the record. But we very much appreciate
your cooperation and your being here this afternoon.
Thank you. This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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