    [Senate Hearing 109-757]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 109-757

          HURRICANE KATRINA: URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE IN A CATASTROPHE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                   HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                JANUARY 30, 2006

                                   __________

                           Printed for the use of the
            Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

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            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                       SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
    TED STEVENS, Alaska                  JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio            CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota              DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    TOM COBURN, Oklahoma                 THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
    LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island      MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah              FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
    PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
    JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia

               Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                       David T. Flanagan, General Counsel
                            Asha A. Mathew, Counsel
          Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
                    Robert F. Muse, Minority General Counsel
                        Joshua A. Levy, Minority Counsel
                      Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Collins..............................................     1
        Senator Lieberman............................................     2

                                   WITNESSES
                            Monday, January 30, 2006

    William M. Lokey, Operations Branch Chief, Response Division,
      Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of
      Homeland Security..............................................     6
    Brigadier General Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General for
      Air, Louisiana National Guard..................................     9
    Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze, Assistant Chief, Law Enforcement
      Division, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.......    12
    Captain Timothy P. Bayard, Commander of the Vice Crimes/Narcotics
      Section, New Orleans Police Department.........................    14

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Bayard, Captain Timothy P.:
        Testimony....................................................    14
        Prepared statement...........................................    63
    LaCaze, Lieutenant Colonel Keith:
        Testimony....................................................    12
        Prepared statement...........................................    55
    Lokey, William M.:
        Testimony....................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................    41
    Veillon, Brigadier General Brod:
        Testimony....................................................     9
        Prepared statement...........................................    51

                                    Appendix

    Questions and responses for the Record from Mr. Lokey............    68
    Exhibit 1........................................................    73
    Exhibit 6........................................................    79
    Exhibit 12.......................................................    80

          HURRICANE KATRINA: URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE IN A CATASTROPHE

                                  ----------

                            MONDAY, JANUARY 30, 2006

                                           U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M.
    Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Collins, Warner, Lieberman, and Pryor.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS

        Chairman Collins. Good afternoon. The Committee will come
    to order.
        In the first hours and days after Hurricane Katrina struck,
    heroes emerged. Across all levels of government, search-and-
    rescue personnel took swift action, saving thousands of the
    storm's victims. These men and women saved the lives of others
    amid great peril to themselves. They demonstrated outstanding
    courage, devotion to duty, and inspiring ingenuity.
        A great many of these rescuers carried on despite the fact
    that their own homes and communities had been destroyed. They
    also faced obstacles exacerbated by an absence of planning, a
    lack of direction and leadership, and a misallocation of
    resources.
        The purpose of today's hearing, the 12th by the Committee
    on Hurricane Katrina, is to examine the search-and-rescue
    operations in New Orleans and its vicinity. Our witnesses today
    represent local, State, and Federal agencies that were involved
    in these operations. I look forward to their testimony as they
    recount their agencies' efforts to locate trapped hurricane
    victims and to move them to safety.
        It is also the purpose of this hearing to dig deeper, to go
    behind the scenes. We will explore the planning that went into
    preparing for a disaster that had been predicted for years and
    was imminent for days. We will discuss how well those plans
    were carried out when disaster finally struck. We will learn of
    the impediments these agencies faced to full coordination and
    effective communication and the difficulties they encountered
    from the lack of necessary equipment to the management of
    volunteers and other offers of assistance.
        More specifically, this hearing is intended to shed light
    on the following issues:
        Were Federal, State, and local efforts to preposition
    search-and-rescue assets successful? While some efforts to
    position critical assets in safe areas near the strike zone
    worked well, it is clear that many did not. As a result,
    valuable transportation assets that could have been used to
    expedite the rescue of victims were lost. In other cases,
    extraordinary measures had to be taken to save those resources
    before they could be used to save people.
        How effective was FEMA in supporting the search-and-rescue
    efforts mounted by the State of Louisiana? The record appears
    to be very mixed.
        Should FEMA play a greater role in supporting search-and-
    rescue operations in flood situations? This hearing will
    demonstrate that FEMA has seen its search-and-rescue role as
    largely confined to situations involving building collapses
    such as occur in earthquakes. Yet testimony at the hearing we
    held last week on Hurricane Pam exercise indicates that
    drowning is the principle cause of death in natural disasters.
        How well were search-and-rescue efforts coordinated? The
    individual heroism and the extraordinary efforts that occurred
    cannot mask the fact that coordination at all levels of
    government was poor, resulting in the inefficient use of
    resources, needless danger to first responders, and prolonged
    suffering for the victims.
        One key search-and-rescue agency that is not testifying
    today is the U.S. Coast Guard. That is because we examined the
    Coast Guard's outstanding performance in great detail at our
    hearing on November 9. We learned that their success was
    largely due to three principles: Extensive planning and
    training that was actually put into practice when needed; the
    careful prepositioning of assets out of harm's way but close
    enough to the front lines to be immediately available; and a
    command and control structure that empowered front-line leaders
    to make decisions. I will be very interested in hearing the
    views of our witnesses on how these principles can be adopted
    across the entire emergency preparation and response community.
        No one has ever doubted the courage and commitment of
    America's emergency responders. Time and time again throughout
    our history they have performed magnificently whenever disaster
    strikes. Hurricane Katrina added a new chapter to this
    outstanding record, but it also revealed significant and
    troubling flaws in planning, preparation, and coordination that
    made their jobs more difficult, put them in needless danger,
    and delayed the rescue of victims. We owe it to them, as well
    as to future victims, to do better.
        Senator Lieberman.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

        Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. Thanks
    to our witnesses for being here.
        As you indicated, Madam Chairman, today we begin our 12th
    hearing in this investigation, but it also begins a week of
    hearings that will examine how well the Federal, State, and
    local governments heeded the warnings over the years,
    particularly the warnings and lessons of the fictional
    Hurricane Pam exercise that was the subject of last week's
    hearing.
        FEMA paid more than $1.5 million for the Hurricane Pam
    exercise and follow-up workshops which began in July 2004 and
    continued through August 2005, just days before Katrina made
    landfall. One hundred and forty-seven representatives of 15
    Federal agencies, 20 State agencies, 13 parishes, 5 volunteer
    agencies, the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and
    Emergency Preparedness, FEMA Region VI, FEMA National
    Headquarters, and IEM, Inc.--the contractor that produced the
    exercise--all took part in the fictional Hurricane Pam
    exercise.
        The first draft of the dangers this exercise revealed was
    released in August 2004, more than a year before Hurricane
    Katrina hit landfall, and it was followed by several redrafts
    until the final draft was written and distributed in January
    2005, about 8 months before Katrina.
        The Pam exercise predicted the flooding, the people left
    stranded, the need for fleets of buses to get them out. It also
    predicted that local first responders would be overwhelmed, not
    just figuratively, but literally by the flooding that occurred,
    and that FEMA would therefore need to be ready to step in
    quickly.
        The Pam exercise was, as we know, only the most recent and
    detailed set of warnings given to all levels of government over
    the years about what would happen when the so-called big one
    hit New Orleans as everyone expected it inevitably would one
    day. There was a 1993 report by the former Government
    Accounting Agency, which warned of these dangers in the Gulf
    Coast. Flooding in Biloxi in 1998 after Hurricane Georges, in
    fact, was what convinced Gulf State officials that they were
    unprepared for the big one and led to the appeals for the
    Hurricane Pam exercise. But as we pointed out last week in
    testimony, it took 6 years for it to get going.
        Today we are going to deal with the search-and-rescue part
    of the government's response to Hurricane Katrina. Tomorrow,
    the topic is pre-disaster evacuations, and following that there
    will be panels on post-disaster evacuations, law and order, and
    communications in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
        Unfortunately, these hearings will show that all of these
    warnings from Hurricane Pam and all that proceeded over the
    years were largely ignored, so that one of America's great
    cities and its people were unprepared and all too unprotected
    when Hurricane Katrina finally struck.
        Today's hearing, Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe,
    not only illustrates the lack of preparedness, but I must say
    also honors the heroes of Hurricane Katrina. Interesting that
    Senator Collins and I chose the same words without previous
    consultation.
        These heroes stepped in, in some ways unprepared and
    unassisted, you might say with nothing but their courage and
    their wits about them, to save tens of thousands of lives. And
    we honor them today. More than 60,000 people rescued by a
    relative handful of these heroes. Today before the members of
    the panel speak and we ask questions, I want to say thank you
    to our witnesses and all of the heroes that you represent who
    are not with us today.
        Although Pam was a clear warning that the search-and-rescue
    efforts in New Orleans would require boats, helicopters, and
    buses, the record shows that these alerts did not draw an
    effective or adequate response. As we will hear from our
    witnesses today, the heroes of Hurricane Katrina did not just
    fight against the predictable aftermath of an enormous,
    catastrophic storm, they also had, too often, to battle with
    bureaucracy, inadequate equipment, and poor planning, all of
    which, in hindsight, seem inexplicable and unacceptable given
    the years of warnings.
        For instance, in that first dark night after the storm
    passed, rescuers went out in a small number of available boats,
    searching for the stranded, their spotlights providing the
    crippled city's only light. But while they had some eyes, as we
    know, they had no ears because their communication equipment
    either did not work or was not compatible with other rescue
    workers. New Orleans police and fire rescuers often had to wait
    20 minutes to get their turn on the overloaded mutual aid
    frequency, and sometimes they had to resort to a variation of
    the childhood game ``operator'' to relay messages to different
    parts of the city step by step because of the limited range of
    the equipment that was still usable.
        The New Orleans Fire Department, which was the city's
    designated lead agency for urban search-and-rescue, owned no
    boats, none, despite repeated requests to the city over the
    years to buy some. The Police Department had just seven. Police
    and fire rescue workers were forced to commandeer, even hot
    wire, boats to begin their life-saving critical rescue work.
        The Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries rescue workers put on
    what I would consider to be an extraordinary display of both
    organization and courage. On Monday morning, as Katrina was
    still raging, they transported 60 boats to New Orleans from
    their prestaged areas around the State, and by 4 p.m. the same
    day they began to rescue people stranded in the storm. They
    succeeded in rescuing more than 1,500 by the next afternoon,
    and more than 21,000 before it was over. But many of these
    boats were too small for the job, and Wildlife and Fisheries
    requests to FEMA for larger boats went unanswered.
        Unfortunately, it gets worse. There was no plan for the
    evacuation or care of those rescued once they arrived at the
    search-and-rescue collection points. This awful gap in planning
    was not resolved until 2 days after Katrina passed and created
    the grueling and inhumane conditions at the Superdome and on
    the Interstate 10 overpasses.
        Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze of Louisiana Wildlife and
    Fisheries, who is here today to testify, has told us that his
    agency called for medical support at collection points after
    landfall, but to no avail. Ground transportation to evacuate
    was also lacking and fought over by competing agencies with
    competing evacuation missions. Obviously, when it comes to
    search and rescue in a case like this, time is of the essence.
    Hours or minutes wasted, certainly days wasted, can mean saving
    a life or not.
        FEMA search-and-rescue teams did not arrive in New Orleans
    until late Monday afternoon and did not begin their missions
    until Tuesday morning, well after the other Federal, State, and
    local rescuers--and here when I say Federal I mean particularly
    the Coast Guard--had begun their work. It appears--and we will
    ask Mr. Lokey about that--that the FEMA search-and-rescue teams
    were not specifically trained for water rescue. When they got
    there, the members, I believe, also did some heroic work.
        Why the delay and lack of training? Why did FEMA apparently
    have no plan for this particular kind of search-and-rescue
    mission? That is a question I think we are going to want to
    answer.
        After finally beginning operations with those three rescue
    teams on Tuesday, FEMA suddenly stopped those rescue missions
    on Thursday, September 1, apparently because of security
    concerns, but the record seems to show that other Federal,
    State, and local rescue missions continued without
    interruption.
        Today, and in other hearings to follow with other DHS and
    FEMA representatives, we are going to ask why FEMA decided to
    leave the scene of the tragedy.
        Madam Chairman, as you and I have both said, many heroes
    were born in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and thousands
    and thousands of people are alive today thanks to them. What
    those brave men and women did recalls--I cannot phrase it
    better than Churchill did--how so many owe so much to so few.
        But all we can do, and the greatest honor we can pay those
    who risked their lives in the aftermath of Katrina, is to make
    sure that the heroes of the next catastrophe, which will surely
    come, whether from a natural disaster, or God forbid, a
    terrorist attack, are given the proper equipment, a clear and
    comprehensive plan, and all the support they need to carry out
    their life-saving work. Thank you.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you.
        I am very pleased to welcome our four witnesses today.
    William Lokey is the Operations Branch Chief in the Response
    Division of FEMA. He served as the Federal Coordinating Officer
    for Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina, and he has more than 25
    years of emergency management experience.
        Brigadier General Brod Veillon is the Assistant Adjutant
    General of the Louisiana National Guard, the Commander of the
    State Air National Guard, and its Search and Rescue
    Coordinator. The General is an experienced fighter pilot and
    served for 13 years on active duty with the U.S. Air Force.
        Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze is the Assistant Law
    Enforcement Division Administrator for the Louisiana Department
    of Wildlife and Fisheries, which is the lead agency for search
    and rescue under the State Emergency Operations Plan.
    Lieutenant Colonel LaCaze has served with the Department for 28
    years.
        Captain Timothy Bayard is the Commander of the Vice and
    Narcotics Squad of the New Orleans Police Department and has
    been with the Department since 1975. In the immediate aftermath
    of Hurricane Katrina, he and three fellow officers established
    a command post at a New Orleans casino.
        I welcome you all to the Committee. I would ask that you
    all rise so I can administer the oath.
        Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to
    the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
    but the truth, so help you, God?
        Mr. Lokey. I do.
        General Veillon. I do.
        Colonel LaCaze. I do.
        Captain Bayard. I do.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Lokey, we will begin with
    you.

      TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM M. LOKEY,\1\ OPERATIONS BRANCH CHIEF,
     RESPONSE DIVISION, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S.
                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Lokey. Good afternoon, Chairman Collins and Senator
    Lieberman. I am William Lokey, the Operations Branch Chief of
    the Response Division of FEMA. It's an honor to appear before
    you today to discuss the activities of the National Urban
    Search and Rescue System in response to Hurricane Katrina.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Lokey appears in the Appendix on
    page 41.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        FEMA appreciates your interest in this particular part of
    our response to this unprecedented disaster. I think we all
    recognize that the hurricanes of 2005, in particular Hurricane
    Katrina, thoroughly stressed the capabilities of FEMA, as well
    as the Nation.
        Under very difficult circumstances, members of FEMA's Urban
    Search and Rescue Program (US&R) rose to the occasion, working
    outside the scope of their regular mission, although well
    within the authority of the Stafford Act, and Urban Search and
    Rescue provided guidance and leadership to State and local
    personnel and volunteers who were organizing their response in
    this effort. These efforts resulted in saved lives, plus
    provided necessary assistance and comfort to numerous citizens
    in the affected disaster.
        Allow me to provide a brief overview to the National
    Disaster System.
        Experiences gained and awareness from the responses to the
    major earthquakes in Mexico City and Armenia in 1980
    dramatically demonstrated the need for specialized urban
    search-and-rescue capability in the United States.
        In March 1989, hearings were held in the reauthorization of
    the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act by the
    Subcommittee on Science of the House Committee on Science,
    Space, and Technology. Following the Loma Prieta earthquake,
    which occurred in the San Francisco area in October of that
    year, $800,000 was provided to FEMA for one-time grants to
    accredited State and local search-and-rescue organizations for
    the training and the acquisition of special equipment and to
    develop specialized teams. Thus, the National Urban Search and
    Rescue System was born.
        After 17 years and numerous activations to hurricanes and
    earthquakes, as well as to the Oklahoma City bombing, the World
    Trade Center, the Pentagon, and other emergencies, there are
    now 28 sponsored National Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces
    located throughout the United States that are trained and
    equipped to handle structural collapse rescue.
        The 28 teams are comprised of State, local, nonprofit
    organizations, and volunteers. These teams are based in their
    home communities and States. Except when deployed for Federal
    activation, the team members and the teams themselves operate
    in their home States. One of the basic foundations of the
    system, in return for making these State and local resources
    available to the Federal Government, the Federal Government
    provides resources and training that allow the teams to better
    serve their communities.
        Any of these national task forces can be activated and
    deployed by FEMA to a disaster area to provide assistance in
    structural collapse rescue or may be prepositioned when a major
    disaster threatens a community. When activated, the task force
    can be dispatched and en route to its destination in a matter
    of hours.
        Each task force is comprised of 70 specialists and is
    divided into six major functional elements of search, rescue,
    medical, hazardous materials, logistics, and planning. They may
    be divided into two 35-person teams, which allows for rotation
    and relief of personnel for round-the-clock operations. A full
    team of this size is referred to as a Type I task force.
        The task forces also have the flexibility to reconfigure
    and deploy as one 28-person team, which we call a Type III
    team, in response to small, primarily weather-driven incidents,
    where the requirements would be physical, technical, and canine
    search, and light search and rescue in wood frame construction.
    Such events typically include hurricanes, tornadoes, ice
    storms, and typhoons.
        When the system responds, a management group called the
    Incident Support Team also responds to support the teams. The
    IST, as it's called, provides command and control for
    supporting local and State rescue operations.
        Some of the capabilities of a US&R Task Force are: The
    physical search-and-rescue operations in damaged or collapsed
    structures; operation in known or suspected weapons of mass
    destruction environments; emergency medical care for entrapped
    victims, task force personnel and search canines;
    reconnaissance to assess damage and needs and provide feedback
    to other officials; assessment and shut-off of utilities to
    houses and buildings; hazardous material survey and
    evaluations; structural and hazard evaluations of buildings;
    stabilizing damaged structures, including shoring and cribbing;
    and they carry approximately 62,000 pounds of equipment with
    them, configured to quickly deploy with the team.
        Let me now provide a brief overview of US&R operations for
    Hurricane Katrina. I was deployed and arrived in Baton Rouge on
    Saturday evening, August 27. Also with me was Richard Deir, my
    Emergency Response Team--the National ERT-N, as it's called--
    Emergency Services Branch Chief. He was an experienced person
    with ESF-9, which is the Emergency Support Function for Urban
    Search and Rescue. He began working with personnel for
    Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries, the National Guard, the Coast
    Guard, and others who were at the State EOC, planning for
    potential search-and-rescue operations. We had also embedded
    staff from IEM, the contractor who helped with the Hurricane
    Pam workshops, to be there also to provide technical
    assistance.
        Before landfall, three task forces, one Type I and two Type
    III, and the Blue IST were stationed at Barksdale Air Force
    Base in Shreveport, Louisiana. Two task forces, one Type I and
    one Type III, and the Red IST were staged in Meridian,
    Mississippi, at the Meridian Naval Air Station. Five additional
    task forces, two Type I and three Type III, were put on alert,
    and then on Sunday, five additional task forces were added to
    that.
        By the morning of August 30, eight additional task forces,
    three Type I and five Type III, and eight of the California
    Swift Water Rescue Teams were activated and en route to
    operations in Mississippi and Louisiana. On August 31, 10
    additional task forces, all Type I, were activated and staged
    to assist.
        In Mississippi, the task forces responded the morning after
    Katrina. They were used in four counties. The theater of
    operations spread 85 miles along the Mississippi coastline.
    They worked in close cooperation with the Coast Guard in
    carrying out the searches and developing appropriate
    documentation. They located 60 deceased victims. They also
    located three live victims and gave medical care to 35 people.
    A total of 15 task forces worked in Mississippi and demobilized
    on September 10.
        In Louisiana, the task forces departed from Barksdale Air
    Force Base when weather permitted on Monday afternoon, August
    29. The leadership and some of the task force members came to
    Baton Rouge, where they were briefed, where they programmed
    their radios to work on local frequencies, and they departed
    for the New Orleans area. They were destined to go to what we
    called in Metairie the Sam's Club parking lot. Teams started
    arriving there Monday evening. The teams met up with U.S. Coast
    Guard representatives and those from Louisiana Wildlife and
    Fisheries, who were leading the search operations.
        They were later asked by the State to move their base of
    operations to Zephyr Field, which is about five miles from New
    Orleans. During this time the Louisiana State Wildlife and
    Fisheries Department was organizing boats for Urban Search and
    Rescue personnel use. When the boats were secured early Tuesday
    morning, the rescue operations were launched.
        The water rescue operations carried out in the New Orleans
    area may be one of the largest life-saving efforts in history.
    It was a local, State, and Federal team effort. Tens of
    thousands of people were saved or assisted in the flooded area,
    and the FEMA US&R personnel accounted for 6,582 people saved or
    assisted. Over 22,300 structures were searched. They also
    helped to identify locations and helped recover more than 300
    human remains, over 25 percent of the victims. They were also
    asked by the State to take a follow-up lead on 22,000 911
    calls. They delivered food and water and assisted unaccounted
    numbers of people in distress.
        Due to our training, we were able to work together with 40
    different teams from 19 States to work as interchangeable parts
    in this rescue effort, and there were no serious member
    injuries in spite of the continuous operations in the highly
    hazardous environment.
        Both Incident Support Teams were instrumental in working
    with State and local folks to set up a unified command that
    helped out a lot in organizing the diverse number of people
    that were there along with teams that arrived through the
    Emergency Management Assistance Compact, or EMAC, that arrived
    over the first several days.
        With the assistance from FEMA logistics, within 5 to 6
    days, base camps were built from literally nothing to provide
    support to over 3,000 people and support helicopter rescue
    operations. Our teams also assisted in capping approximately 40
    broken gas mains.
        It is especially important to note that water rescue is not
    part of the US&R mission, although they were somewhat equipped
    to do their collapse structure rescue mission in the water
    environment with personal protective equipment.
        We learned a tremendous amount from this event. We have had
    one meeting already with our task forces to identify lessons
    learned, and a second meeting is taking place as we speak in
    Miami, which I will be departing for tonight to take part in
    the planning effort.
        One of the most significant efforts we have going from our
    lessons learned and for the program is the development of a 5-
    year strategic plan. Through this process, in the partnership
    with members of the system, the sponsoring chiefs, and the
    various organizations, our goal is to actually define what the
    system is and what we should be providing. It was designed for
    rescue in collapsed structures. The ability to work in a
    weapons of mass destruction environment was added as a result
    of the events of September 11. We recently added the capability
    to accomplish our structural collapse mission in a water
    environment such as providing personal flotation devices for
    the rescuers.
        Our goal is to work with the task forces and the States to
    come up with a recommendation on what the system needs to be.
    An example of working in a water environment in a collapsed
    structure, down in the depths of the World Trade Center they
    were using boats several floors down due to the broken water
    mains, so it is necessary as part of that mission.
        The men and women of the urban rescue program represent the
    finest tradition of search and rescue in America. For the job
    they did, and the risks they took, and the lives they saved,
    they deserve high praise.
        Thank you very much for allowing me to be here. I stand
    ready to answer your questions.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you, Mr. Lokey. General Veillon.

       TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL BROD VEILLON,\1\ ASSISTANT
           ADJUTANT GENERAL FOR AIR, LOUISIANA NATIONAL GUARD

        General Veillon. Thank you, Chairman Collins and Senator
    Lieberman. I am Brigadier General Brod Veillon. I am the
    Assistant Adjutant General for Air of the Louisiana National
    Guard.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of General Veillon appears in the
    Appendix on page 51.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On Sunday, August 28, at about 10 a.m., the Adjutant
    General called and asked me to coordinate the Louisiana
    National Guard's support of the Louisiana Wildlife and
    Fisheries search-and-rescue efforts in response to Hurricane
    Katrina. I called a meeting at 2:30 p.m. of the agencies that
    would participate in the search-and-rescue operations. The
    meeting occurred at the Louisiana Office of Emergency
    Preparedness. Representatives from the following agencies
    participated: The U.S. Coast Guard, Louisiana Wildlife and
    Fisheries, Louisiana State Police, FEMA and FEMA DMORT
    personnel, as well as the Civil Air Patrol. We discussed
    capabilities of each of our organizations and areas of
    responsibilities.
        I arrived at the Louisiana National Guard Headquarters,
    Jackson Barracks, New Orleans, on Sunday, August 28, at 5 p.m.
        The National Guard, as well as the Louisiana Wildlife and
    Fisheries, had positioned small boats and rescue equipment at
    Jackson Barracks to be used for the search-and-rescue effort.
    Sunday night, I was in the National Guard Joint Operations
    Center monitoring the storm's progress.
        Monday morning, August 29, as the eye of the storm
    approached New Orleans, flood water began to quickly rise. It
    went from about one foot deep, mainly associated with the heavy
    rain, to 10 feet deep in 30 minutes. This was a dramatic surge
    of water. Jackson Barracks was quickly covered. In some places
    it was over 20 feet deep. A local AM radio station was
    reporting that the Industrial Canal Levee had broken and that
    the 9th Ward was flooding.
        We had prepositioned 18 boats at Jackson Barracks. The
    rapidly rising water prompted concern that we may lose the
    equipment and motors, so I directed the National Guardsmen to
    move all equipment and motors to the second floor. Wildlife and
    Fisheries had also parked their boats on trailers adjacent to
    our Operations Center and I noticed that they were all floating
    with their trailers attached.
        By mid afternoon of Monday, August 29, the wind and the
    rain had subsided enough where we could use our boats to begin
    the rescue effort. Because of the depth of the water, we used
    one of our small boats to motor over to the larger boats. I put
    a guardsman into the water with bolt cutters to cut the boats
    loose from their trailers. We bailed them of their rain water
    and put two National Guardsmen in each. At that time I was
    thinking we would probably find a few people who would need
    help. We moved out into the immediate neighborhood, and as I
    looked around, there were people on rooftops in every direction
    calling for help.
        There were many natural gas pipeline breaks, which formed
    small geysers, and several houses were on fire. I was expecting
    to find a few, but what I found were hundreds. My team and I
    began taking people into our boats. The water was deep enough
    to allow us to dock on the rooftops. The wind and the rain made
    it very difficult to maneuver in and around these homes.
    Telephone and electrical lines had to be lifted by hand to
    allow us to pass beneath them.
        At the third house I approached, the people there advised
    me that their neighbor was trapped in her attic. We docked on
    her roof and removed the roof vent. Looking down, we could see
    her crying for help. My crew and I used an axe to cut a hole in
    her roof, and several of us reached down and lifted her to
    safety. The rapidly rising water had forced her up into her
    attic, where she became trapped, unable to go higher, and she
    could no longer go down.
        This sequence of events was repeated over and over and over
    again, National Guardsmen cutting holes in rooftops to lift
    people out. Our boats would quickly fill, and we would motor
    toward the Mississippi River levee, which took them out of the
    immediate danger and placed them on good high ground. This
    action made them visible to follow-on forces who were tasked,
    during earlier coordination meetings, to evacuate them by air,
    land, or boats on the river.
        We continued this effort until nightfall. At that time the
    Joint Operations Center moved from Jackson Barracks to the
    Louisiana Superdome. Search and rescue operations continued
    through the night. I boarded one of the helicopters to the
    Superdome and continued my coordination from there.
        During the night, National Guard, as well as U.S. Coast
    Guard helicopters, began flying over the city and assessing the
    situation. It was clear that Hurricane Katrina had dealt a
    catastrophic blow to the city of New Orleans and the State of
    Louisiana. When the sun rose on Tuesday morning, the Superdome
    was an island, surrounded by 6 feet of water in every
    direction. I could see columns of smoke rising from several
    buildings in the city.
        The Superdome had become the center of gravity of our
    search-and-rescue efforts. We used the top floor of a parking
    lot as an additional helicopter landing zone. Helicopters began
    lifting people from rooftops throughout the city, bringing them
    to the Superdome. National Guard medics would assess the
    rescued for medical care. We would give them food and water,
    and direct them away from our helicopter landing area.
    Sometimes we were lifting people to safety via hoist, and other
    times these helicopters would lightly land on the rooftops
    where people would climb in.
        I direct your attention to my left and some of the
    photographs that we brought to accompany my testimony.
        We used the EMAC process to request and receive additional
    helicopters from other States to assist us with the search-and-
    rescue effort. In every direction I could see helicopters all
    over the city, hovering and lifting people to safety. This
    helicopter operation went on 24 hours a day. At night our crews
    used airborne spotlights, night vision goggles, as well as on-
    board infrared capabilities. The city was completely dark at
    night, and many who were waiting rescue would flash flashlights
    at us.
        The Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries used their boats to
    comb through the neighborhoods, house to house, searching and
    rescuing people from their flooded homes. All high ground,
    bridges and elevated highways, became drop-off points for the
    boats. Helicopters were used to pick up the people at these
    sites and transport them to the Superdome.
        In the days following the storm, the number of helicopters,
    as well as boat assets, grew rapidly, as more and more States,
    as well as the Federal Government, sent personnel and equipment
    in to assist us. With each passing day more and more people
    were lifted to safety. By Thursday, September 1, most of the
    people in need had been rescued.
        In many areas of the city the water was too deep for our
    high-water vehicles to enter. So we relied to a great extent on
    small boats and helicopters. Except for the Chinook helicopter,
    we were only able to take small groups at a time, but over time
    all were brought out to safety.
        I am very proud of all who were involved, State, Federal,
    military, and local volunteers.
        In the face of Hurricane Katrina, the greatest natural
    disaster to hit the United States, a disaster of biblical
    proportions, over 72,000 people were safely lifted to high
    ground and evacuated out of the city. I am proud of the
    National Guard and proud that I had a part in the Hurricane
    Katrina effort. I look forward to answering your questions.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you. Lieutenant Colonel LaCaze.

      TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KEITH LACAZE,\1\ ASSISTANT
       CHIEF, LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
                         WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES

        Colonel LaCaze. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman
    Collins, Senator Lieberman, and Senator Pryor. Thank you for
    having us here. My name is Keith LaCaze. I am the Assistant
    Chief of Law Enforcement with the Louisiana Department of
    Wildlife and Fisheries.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Colonel LaCaze appears in the
    Appendix on page 55.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Department of Wildlife and Fisheries enforcement agents
    were among the first search-and-rescue teams to arrive in New
    Orleans. We had to wait for landfall and passage of Hurricane
    Katrina. We had experience with planning and response to storm
    impacts in Louisiana dating back as far as Hurricane Andrew in
    1992. Prior to Katrina's landfall, the Department of Wildlife
    and Fisheries had alerted its personnel and staged boats and
    vehicles at locations near Baton Rouge and the central part of
    the State in anticipation of response to the impacted areas.
        By 9 a.m. of the morning of Monday, August 29, Wildlife and
    Fisheries response teams were moving to unite in Baton Rouge.
    By 1 p.m., the response teams were en route to New Orleans. The
    initial group was made up of 120 agents, boats, and four-wheel
    drive vehicles.
        The teams arrived in New Orleans at about 4 p.m. We had
    boats in the water and started making rescues in the New
    Orleans East area at St. Claude Avenue Bridge, Esplanade,
    Elysian Fields, Franklin Avenue, and St. Bernard Avenue by
    dark. Prior to that, we had started evacuating a nursing home
    in the Power Boulevard area of Kenner. Rescues in the
    neighborhoods under the nighttime conditions and the flooded
    streets were further complicated by debris, downed power lines,
    obstructions, and water at depths of up to 15 feet in some
    areas.
        I have to tell you that it's just unimaginable to see the
    conditions, and after dark, with the obstructions and the
    downed trees and the obstructions in the neighborhoods, in the
    dark, no lighting, you could hear the cries for help, and our
    officers went out in the boats into areas that they weren't
    very familiar with, and some of the city streets, and would go
    into those areas and come out with boat loads of people. And it
    was a very gratifying thing to see, and very remarkable.
        Despite the challenges that we faced, the people were
    rescued from rooftops, attics, and makeshift boats floating in
    the neighborhoods. Anything that they could grab onto or they
    could place themselves on, we found them there. Many were sick
    and injured people. The population included elderly, people
    with chronic medical conditions such as diabetes and those
    requiring dialysis, and many who had suffered injuries due to
    falls or mishaps during and after the storm.
        Rescue operations continued throughout the night, and by
    break of day on Tuesday, August 30, we estimated nearly 2,000
    citizens had been moved to safety on the elevated portions of
    I-10 and I-610. By midmorning Tuesday, additional Wildlife
    enforcement agents and Department biologists, technicians, and
    specialists, strengthened our rescue effort. We brought out
    even more people.
        In the following days, we were joined by Conservation
    officers from responding States, including Texas, Missouri,
    Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Minnesota, Michigan, North Carolina,
    and South Carolina. We were joined by volunteers and fire
    rescue and police and sheriff's deputies from local agencies
    throughout the State. Everyone demonstrated levels of
    determination, dedication, and professionalism beyond my
    ability to adequately describe.
        In all, Wildlife and Fisheries rescued an estimated 21,000
    people. We were joined by the Louisiana National Guard, the
    Coast Guard, State Police, and local law enforcement. In all, I
    am told that 60,000 people were rescued in the New Orleans and
    St. Bernard Parish areas from houses, hospitals, nursing homes,
    schools, and churches, anywhere people had taken refuge to
    escape the flooding.
        LSU Hurricane Center scientist Ezra Boyd wrote in the Times
    Picayune, January 16, 2006, Your Opinions column that the
    Katrina death toll could have reached 10,000 and that search-
    and-rescue operations of this unprecedented magnitude resulted
    in a significantly lower death toll than could have occurred.
        Hurricane Pam exercise predicted that 60,000 would die in a
    catastrophic storm. We saved 60,000.
        I am proud to have been part of this life-saving effort. I
    am proud of my Department. Where we met obstacles and
    challenges, we improvised. Where we found problems, we came up
    with solutions. Communications failures severely affected our
    ability to coordinate search and rescue effectively. Katrina
    destroyed the communications infrastructure. Without towers and
    antennas, the radios just don't work, cell phones don't work.
    Then came the flood, and this took out the land telephone
    lines. Louisiana had redundant communications. We had
    interoperability. Katrina just smashed it all to pieces.
        In order to build more redundancy, we must get funding from
    Congress for expanded radio systems. The Nation's need for
    interoperable communications was identified after September 11.
    Homeland Security was created after September 11. We look to
    you, the oversight committee for Homeland Security, for this
    funding. We are already working on preplanning with other
    agencies, including Louisiana State Police, Louisiana Army
    National Guard, and U.S. Coast Guard, who are our partners in
    search-and-rescue operations. We want to use the lessons
    learned from Katrina to be ready for the next storm. Our
    biggest lesson, flexibility, was a key component to our
    success.
        I am very excited about our initiative to create a trained
    search-and-rescue volunteer force. We are partnering with the
    U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary to accomplish this. We have designed
    the specifications for a new mobile command unit, and it is on
    order. We have already purchased 32 small boats with outboard
    motors to improve our response to urban flooding. We have
    obtained input from field level personnel, the guys on the
    ground, on ways to improve for future missions. More and better
    equipment is needed, especially in the communications area. We
    must develop a list of preapproved contractors who are
    authorized to perform search-and-rescue missions on behalf of
    State or Federal agencies, with the expectation of payment for
    services provided.
        Written standard operating procedures describing
    preparedness levels and specific actions to be taken with
    approach and landfall of major storms or events have been
    developed. In the next 6 months, our agency will provide
    additional search-and-rescue training for in-service personnel
    and future academy classes. We will apply for grants for money
    to acquire additional emergency search-and-rescue equipment
    needed for similar operations in the future. We will enhance
    the training of mid-level supervisory personnel in search-and-
    rescue organization and coordination. We will meet and train
    with other agencies involved in response for better joint
    agency performance. We will explore equipment and training
    levels at local agencies to determine resources available and
    their location. We want to build a better team with our local
    and Federal search-and-rescue partners.
        In closing, I must emphasize the dedication of the
    Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries staff members
    who responded to this crisis, particularly those enforcement
    agents, biologists, and technicians who lost homes and personal
    property in the same flooded areas where they worked so
    diligently to help others. These men and women in many cases
    evacuated with nothing more than their families and the clothes
    they were wearing. They got their families to safety, then
    immediately returned to face this task. Without their knowledge
    of the local area and their ability to guide rescue forces
    through the confusion of flooded roads and streets, our mission
    would not have been nearly as effective and successful.
        I would like to thank the Chairman and all Committee
    Members for the opportunity to speak and to answer any
    questions.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you. Captain Bayard.

      TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN TIMOTHY P. BAYARD,\1\ COMMANDER OF THE
      VICE CRIMES/NARCOTICS SECTION, NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT

        Captain Bayard. Good afternoon. I appreciate the
    opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Tim Bayard.
    I'm a Captain with the New Orleans Police Department, Commander
    of the Vice Crimes and Narcotics Division. I have been a member
    of the Department for 30 years. I coordinated and directed the
    water rescue and recovery operations throughout the city of New
    Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. I am here today to relay
    my experiences, which began prior to Katrina's arrival and
    include the 14 days that followed.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Captain Bayard appears in the
    Appendix on page 63.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Let me briefly explain the events that led to my
    coordination of the massive water-based rescue and recovery
    operations.
        In 1965, I experienced Hurricane Betsy. My father was a New
    Orleans fireman. Based on my conversations with him, I had a
    good recollection of the areas of the city which flooded as a
    result. I knew which areas of the city were high and the
    available routes to access bridges and overpasses suitable for
    boat launch locations. Forty years later, many of the same
    areas flooded again. The high ground was essentially the same.
        On Friday, August 26, at approximately 11:30 p.m., I
    learned that New Orleans was in the cross-hairs of Katrina. I
    spoke with Deputy Superintendent Warren Riley, Commander of
    Field Operations, and suggested items that would be immediately
    needed following the storm's impact. This information was also
    forwarded to the Office of Emergency Preparedness.
        On Saturday, August 27, I instructed the supervisors under
    my command to contact each member of our division with
    instructions to evacuate their families and rally at our office
    at 12 noon on Sunday, August 28. Each member was instructed to
    bring at least 3 days supply of food and clothing.
        On Sunday, August 28, we removed our division's vehicles
    from the Equipment Maintenance Division, an area prone to
    flooding. All of our vehicles were fueled for deployment. With
    the exception of our high-water vehicles, all vehicles were
    secured in the Superdome parking lot and at the Convention
    Center.
        My unit patrolled the central business district, while I
    privately negotiated safe housing for my officers. The
    Narcotics Unit was housed at the Maison Dupuy Hotel, the Vice
    Crimes Section was housed at the Marriott. Once the sustained
    winds reached 55 miles an hour, my units were instructed to
    return to their respective hotels.
        I later met with Captain Jeff Winn, Commander of the Tac
    teams and Special Operations Command, and Captain Harry
    Mendoza, Commander of the Traffic Division. Together we
    established a rally point which was Harrah's Casino, which is
    at the foot of Canal Street, one of the highest points in the
    city. We agreed to meet there following the storm.
        We, however, were not equipped with any emergency rescue
    equipment, provisions, or fuel.
        Captain Robert Norton, Commander of the Bomb Squad and the
    Dive Team, was housed in the LSU Dental School, along with the
    Third District contingent. Captain Norton had previously
    deployed our Department's three boats. These boats were
    deployed in Mid-City, Algiers, and New Orleans East. Captain
    Norton, cut off a lot by rising water, was able to conduct a
    hasty rescue operation in the neighborhood adjacent to the
    dental school, utilizing a privately owned boat. Captain
    Norton's boat experienced motor failure, and he himself had to
    be rescued. The three departmental boats were also engaged in
    hasty rescue operations in the same areas. The issue here was
    that none of these efforts were coordinated by a central
    command. Additionally, due to the vehicles and the boat
    trailers being flooded, the mobility was limited.
        Based on contact with our Communications Division, I knew
    that the lower 9th Ward was flooding. Later in the day, we
    additionally learned that Lakeview was also taking on water.
        Immediately after the storm, Captains Winn, Mendoza, and I
    met at Harrah's. Absent instructions from superiors, we made
    decisions to save lives. Routes were identified to access
    bridges and overpasses we utilized as boat launches. The
    problem was that we only had five boats at our disposal, two of
    which were commandeered. The Harbor Police met us on the St.
    Claude Bridge and worked side by side with members of the
    Tactical Unit and the Narcotics Unit in our continued efforts
    to save lives. Other members of the Tactical and Narcotics
    Units teamed up with firemen in conducting rescue operations in
    Lakeview Gentilly. The Vice Unit transported evacuees to the
    Superdome and Convention Center utilizing two 15-passenger vans
    and a pickup truck.
        The first night, we lost communication with three
    detectives trapped by rising water. The batteries on our radios
    were depleted, and they were unable to call for help. After
    spending the night attempting to locate the missing detectives,
    they appeared at the hotel the following morning.
        The following night, three Tactical Unit officers were
    lost. Again, without communication, officers set out in search
    of their colleagues. At 11:30 p.m., the officers returned to
    Harrah's. All six officers had to walk through the water to get
    back to their respective units.
        By day three, Captain Winn was given the two-pronged task
    of rescuing trapped law enforcement officers and responding to
    violence. From that point forward, the Tactical Unit ceased
    civilian boat rescues and became the primary rapid response
    unit for the countless acts of violence.
        Given the change of Captain Winn's mission and the fact
    that Captain Norton was trapped by surrounding water, I became
    the sole commander of the water rescue operations.
        Our efforts were not coordinated with other agencies. Our
    communication system was inoperable. We had no aerial views to
    ascertain water levels necessary to prioritize our rescue
    operations. Through public service announcements, we welcomed
    citizens from various areas in the State of Louisiana and other
    States, equipped with privately owned boats, who met us at
    Harrah's, to assist us in rescue operations. In an effort to
    coordinate rescue efforts, several contacts were made with
    Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries.
        By happenstance, I met with members of the U.S. Army 20th
    Group Special Forces. This meeting propelled our rescue
    operation to another level. We immediately gained access to
    helicopters, Zodiac boats, and trucks. Captain Will Lynn became
    my counterpart. With the Special Forces Group, we set up a
    forward command post equipped with maps, asset boards, and
    deployment strategy. This was the first incident command center
    established following the event. From that moment forward, it
    became the command from which all water rescue operations were
    deployed.
        For 14 days, my division was involved in water rescue
    operations. At no point did we have a truly unified command.
        In week three, we finally coordinated with FEMA. That is
    when we began conducting secondary rescue operations. We worked
    along with Fire Department search-and-rescue units from other
    States through November 2005.
        Mistakes. The New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness
    failed. They did not prepare themselves, nor did they manage
    the city agencies responsible for conducting emergency response
    to the disaster. Their function was to coordinate with State,
    Federal, and other local agencies to enlist logistical
    assistance. We did not coordinate with any State, local, or
    Federal agencies. We were not prepared logistically. Most
    importantly, we relocated evacuees to two locations where there
    was no food, water, or portable restrooms. We did not implement
    the pre-existing plan. We did not utilize buses that would have
    allowed us to transport mass quantities of evacuees
    expeditiously. We did not have food, water, or fuel for the
    emergency workers. We did not have a back-up communication
    system. We had no portable radio towers or repeaters that would
    enable us to communicate. The other mistakes have been
    mentioned previously.
        The remedies. New Orleans Police Department now has a fully
    staffed Bomb Squad and Dive Team. It is equipped with four flat
    boats and one 16-foot V-hull. We have two 8-wheel all terrain
    vehicles for shallow water rescue. Captain Norton is currently
    negotiating with the State officials in an attempt to secure
    privately owned boats that were abandoned, as well as boats
    that are now owned by insurance companies, in order to increase
    our fleet.
        Captain Norton has met with members of the New Orleans Fire
    Department in an attempt to cross-train police officers and
    firemen in water and urban rescue procedures. This will allow
    the New Orleans Police Department to be the lead agency in
    water rescue, with fire personnel in support, and will allow
    the New Orleans Fire Department to take the lead in structural
    damage rescue, with police officers as support personnel.
        Captain Norton is also attempting to secure a facility to
    house large quantities of food and water for the 2006 hurricane
    season.
        Captain Jeff Strickland, Commander of Miami Dade's Urban
    Search and Rescue Unit, has been contacted by Captain Norton to
    attempt to secure training, as well as to obtain information on
    how and what is needed to outfit a US&R team.
        He is also engaged in conversations with members of the
    Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries in an attempt to secure boat
    safety training for each member of his unit and each member of
    the Vice, Narcotics, and Tactical Units. I would like to say
    that training will be conducted this Thursday with Louisiana
    State Wildlife and Fisheries.
        Requests. I lived this horror, and as a result, I have
    identified the following equipment needed to adequately prepare
    for the 2006 hurricane season.
        We must establish a regional communications system, as per
    the USAI agreement, that's the Urban Area Security Initiative,
    which allows us to coordinate rescue efforts with surrounding
    jurisdictions, St. Bernard Parish, Jefferson Parish, and
    Plaquemines Parish, all parishes that were affected by the
    storm.
        We need additional flat boats, inflatable boats, air boats.
    We need a fully-equipped US&R trailer. We need training for 100
    members of the New Orleans Police Department.
        The most important thing to me is reimbursement for the
    damages and repairs to police officers and firemen who used
    their personal boats to rescue people, to get their boats
    repaired. The question is, can this equipment and reimbursement
    be funded through a Community Block Development Grant? That I
    don't know.
        I would like to make two suggestions if I may. I suggest or
    request that someone draft legislation to mandate that all
    health care facilities, hospitals, raise their emergency
    generators and fuel reservoirs to a minimum of 32 feet. Also
    mandate that they have enough fuel to operate the generators
    for at least 3 days. How many individuals on life support
    perished due to generator failure? Many generators are located
    in basements. The basement of every hospital in New Orleans
    flooded.
        Additionally draft legislation to mandate mandatory
    evacuation of all one- and two-story elderly care centers in
    the event of a Category 3 or higher storm. The city and State
    will be responsible for supplying the vehicles needed to
    transport the elderly. These patients will be relocated to a
    facility that will accommodate their every need.
        Conclusion. My purpose before you today is to help you
    understand what the members of New Orleans Police Department's
    Vice Crime/Narcotics Section experienced. I know numerous
    mistakes as it relates to planning and decisionmaking occurred.
    Mistakes were made in every level of government. I am not here
    to point fingers. I am here to relate my story and my
    experiences in an attempt to ensure that other agencies do not
    make the same mistakes that we made prior to, during, and after
    Katrina.
        I would also like to say that I'm very proud of the members
    of the Vice Squad, Narcotics Section, and the other members who
    rallied with us to do rescues in the city of New Orleans.
        Thank you. I am now prepared to answer any questions.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you, Captain.
        Mr. Lokey, when you arrived in Baton Rouge on Saturday, you
    arrived amidst predictions for a catastrophic hurricane with
    enormous storm surges and the overtopping of the levees as a
    likely event. I recognize that FEMA is not the lead agency for
    search and rescue, but you do have Urban Search and Rescue
    Teams, and you do have an obligation to be the coordinator and
    to make sure that your State and local partners have what they
    need.
        In light of these predictions for a truly horrific
    hurricane to strike the city, I would think that FEMA would
    have tapped every possible resource, would have responded very
    quickly to requests from State and local agencies for
    assistance, and would have eagerly taken up other offers of
    qualified assistance. And yet that is not what seems to have
    happened, and that perplexes me.
        I want to ask you about two particular examples. If you
    would turn to Exhibit 6 \1\ in your book, this is a Louisiana
    form for State agencies to use to make requests for supplies,
    and I know that the staff has discussed this form with you. It
    shows that on Sunday, before landfall, the State asked for
    rubber rafts. It asked that these rubber rafts be delivered to
    New Orleans the next day, the day of landfall, to be used in
    rescue missions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Exhibit 6 appears in the Appendix on page 79.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Department of Wildlife and Fisheries has told our
    investigators that FEMA turned down that request, and indeed,
    you can see written on that document ``Request Denied.''
        It is puzzling to me, given the predictions for flooding,
    for the storm surge, for the overtopping of the levees, that
    FEMA wouldn't have said, ``Of course, we will get them to you
    instantly.''
        What happened in this case?
        Mr. Lokey. In this particular case, first of all, I first
    became aware of this when your staff showed me this. Literally
    hundreds of requests came through, many of which the level I
    was working, I did not know about. So on this particular one, I
    followed up with my staff.
        The request for 300 did come in to the State EOC. That
    request was turned into a request for 1,000 rubber boats. That
    was sent to our regional office in Denton, Texas, where most
    everything--the actual procurement and things like that were
    taking place.
        I am informed that a meeting took place there with the
    search-and-rescue people, the DOD, the Corps of Engineers, and
    the Coast Guard, where the decision was made that these rubber
    boats in the environment we were working in would not be useful
    with the debris and things like that. So the request was
    denied. More substantial boats were ordered, and although in
    lesser numbers, 20 Zodiacs and I believe 27 flat-bottomed boats
    were procured and sent in to use.
        Chairman Collins. Mr. LaCaze, let me ask you to respond to
    that because the request was initiated by your agency. Do you
    think it would have been helpful to have those rubber rafts?
        Colonel LaCaze. I think to us in the field, in the New
    Orleans area, the situation we were in, I believe that the
    rafts would have been beneficial, especially in the early
    stages, because in the situation we were in, we could have used
    the rubber rafts in tow with the small motorboats that we sent
    into the neighborhoods, and we could have loaded additional
    evacuees into the rafts and towed them.
        The other benefit of the rafts would have been that in some
    of the very shallow water areas, say 2-foot to 3-foot,
    officers, rescuers could have actually taken the rafts and
    walked alongside and pulled them into shallow water areas, up
    onto porches, for example, or very near or up into the doorways
    of homes where we could have loaded mobility-impaired people or
    sick people that could have been placed in those rafts. So they
    would have had some benefit to us, I think, especially in the
    early stages of the rescue.
        Chairman Collins. Mr. Lokey, I didn't know what Mr. LaCaze
    was going to say, but he just gave a very good reason why at
    least this initial version of the request should have been
    granted. But what troubles me is, Don't you all talk to one
    another? I mean, wouldn't this be a case if you thought that
    the State didn't really need this equipment, that you would
    have a conversation and try to figure out what assets are
    needed?
        Captain, from your testimony and other interviews, what
    strikes me is the utter lack of coordination on search-and-
    rescue operations. It sounds like the New Orleans Police
    Department, your staff and officers, were operating all on
    their own and doing a great job, the best job that they could
    with search and rescue. But did you see coordination with the
    city, the rest of the city agencies, the State, FEMA, and the
    National Guard?
        Captain Bayard. No, ma'am, we did not actually get with
    FEMA until week four. Week three, we moved into the OEP at the
    Hyatt Hotel, but I did not actually meet with any member of
    FEMA until week four, and then we started doing secondary
    rescue.
        Chairman Collins. Mr. Lokey, the other example that I want
    to talk to you about was an offer from the Department of the
    Interior. Now, this was after landfall. The levees had
    breached. The city was 80 percent underwater, and the
    Department of the Interior says to FEMA, Hey, we are experts at
    search and rescue. We have a lot of experience. What is more,
    we can help you out on law and order, which was one of the
    reasons that FEMA pulled back its Search and Rescue Teams
    temporarily.
        The Department of the Interior offered 300 boats, 400
    trained law enforcement officers, 11 aircraft, and, in fact, in
    its response to our inquiry, the Department wrote that these
    were clearly the assets and skills that were precisely relevant
    in the post-Katrina environment.
        I know that you told the Committee that you were not aware
    of that offer either. Doesn't that suggest a systemic problem
    when you as the Federal coordinating official do not get word
    that these assets are available?
        Mr. Lokey. Well, yes, it does. And to back up, my report
    about the change in the order to the Zodiacs and the flat-
    bottomed boats was just a report of what I was told what
    happened, not that I disagreed that they needed it.
        Communications and coordination was lacking. Preplanning
    was lacking. We were not prepared for this.
        Relative to the DOI request, I was not aware of that at the
    time. I have since talked with my staff, and no one was. Those
    resources certainly could have been. At minimum, that shows
    that we have a lot more work to do at the Federal level.
        I am sorry. I lost my train of thought. There was one other
    question you have about----
        Chairman Collins. I was just suggesting that when you get
    offers of trained personnel assets----
        Mr. Lokey. Oh, yes. If we had gotten it, we certainly would
    have used it. But, again, I mainly in my operations partnered
    up with Jeff Smith, the State coordinating officer. I made
    every effort, anything he asked for, to try to get. And I even
    talked with him when the first issue of boats came up after my
    first interview with your staff, and he was not aware of this.
    I can assure you, had he approached me, things might have been
    different.
        But, there was so much going on. We have a tremendous
    amount of work to do on this. There is no question.
        Chairman Collins. I appreciate your candid answer to that.
    My point is that we have a broken system. We have a system
    when, even when desperately needed, personnel and equipment are
    offered, we don't seem to be able to incorporate them into the
    response. And in the meantime, we have thousands of victims on
    the rooftops waiting to be rescued. We have first responders--
    State, local, and Federal--doing their best, but going through
    the city with no maps to guide them in some cases and without
    coordination, so that you have rescuers from all different
    agencies literally bumping into one another, not dividing up
    the city in a logical way, not coordinating their efforts. And
    I want to come back to this. Mr. Lokey.
        Mr. Lokey. If I could add one other thing, and I could ask
    Wildlife and Fisheries to respond, because where we set up camp
    was at Metairie at Zephyr Field, and that is where plans were
    made on where to search for the whole area. And, that is where
    we partnered with them on Tuesday. Daily plans were done.
    Incident action plans were done on who would search where. And
    I thought there was representation from the Police Department
    there. The New Orleans Police was doing their search and rescue
    there. But we were making every effort, with the number of
    people that came in at Zephyr Field, to do that coordination.
    It wasn't that it wasn't taking place or that people weren't
    trying. But there was a lot of great efforts going on by a lot
    of people. But as an overall single command post controlling
    everything going on in Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, no,
    ma'am, that did not exist.
        But we went to where the State asked us to go to work with
    them to do the unified command.
        Chairman Collins. But I think that shows some of the lack
    of coordination between the State and local agencies as well
    that the captain alluded to. I will come back to that issue.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        Mr. Lokey, let me continue that line of questioning. I
    think in some sense you may have, in your own quiet response to
    Senator Collins, given us the bottom line when you said we were
    not prepared for this. And I take that to mean that FEMA was
    not prepared for Hurricane Katrina. And our responsibility here
    is to figure out why and what we can do together to make sure
    that the next time disaster strikes, natural or otherwise, we
    are better prepared.
        I want to clarify that you are the Operations Branch Chief
    of the Response Division at national FEMA.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Which is to say that you are in charge
    of all operations, I suppose planning and implementation of the
    response to an emergency.
        Mr. Lokey. My specific responsibilities are the National
    Urban Search and Rescue Program, the National Disaster Medical
    System, the National Response Coordination Center. I do have a
    planning unit that was the--where Hurricane Pam was planned.
    But like in the Response Division, all the logistics and
    equipment and support and things come out of the logistics----
        Senator Lieberman. That is somewhere else.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, that is someplace else
        Senator Lieberman. OK.
        Mr. Lokey. I am not overall of all operations.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. But am I right that you were
    asked to go to Baton Rouge to be the No. 1 person for FEMA in
    regard to Hurricane Katrina?
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. You have heard us talk about the
    Hurricane Pam fictional exercise, which FEMA sponsored and paid
    for. Were you aware of the Hurricane Pam exercise prior to the
    weekend before Katrina?
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir, I was. I assumed my job at
    headquarters in late April.
        Senator Lieberman. April 2005?
        Mr. Lokey. Of 2005, yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. OK.
        Mr. Lokey. And as I was coming up to speed on the various
    initiatives, I was briefed by my staff on the Hurricane Pam
    initiatives. My only direct involvement was on the July
    workshop in New Orleans, I was able to be there for the last
    day for the briefing from various working groups on, I think,
    specifically at that time on transportation and search and
    rescue where they were in the process.
        Senator Lieberman. As we go along today, I think we are
    going to want to ask you why to our eyes and ears, as we go on
    with this investigation, it seems that there was so little
    specific and tangible response to the deficiencies, not just in
    FEMA but State and local as well, that the Hurricane Pam
    exercise showed. In other words, we weren't ready for this. We
    weren't ready for Katrina at all levels of government. But I
    want to focus on having--well, let me ask you just real
    briefly: Did you take any specific action in your work in
    response to what you saw of the Hurricane Pam report?
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir, I did, and in hindsight, it obviously
    was not the right thing. One of the things, for example, we
    were briefed on was the locals were only 10 percent done with
    their planning for the use of buses for evacuation, and they
    told me they would need a Presidential declaration of emergency
    72 hours in advance to be able to pay for it.
        I went back to headquarters and sent a memo over to the
    Recovery Division where that declaration unit was housed,
    expressing this to get the discussion started. And also instead
    of making plans to do the buses myself, I went and worked on
    getting them more money so they could continue their planning.
    And so I worked to--because they had asked that--they had done
    a lot of good things in the Hurrican Pam process, and my main
    focus was trying to get continued money to do that. And then
    Hurricanes Dennis through before Katrina kind of wound us up,
    and we didn't do anything more than that.
        Senator Lieberman. Let me take you to August 27, 2 days
    before landfall. FEMA officials, including yourself, were e-
    mailed certain sections of the southeast Louisiana catastrophic
    hurricane plan, the plan that came out of the Hurricane Pam
    exercise, by Sharon Blades. Could you identify Sharon Blades?
        Mr. Lokey. Sharon Blades works for me. She is part of our
    planning unit in the Response Division. She had been intimately
    involved, one of the lead staff working on the Hurricane Pam
    process.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. So did she circulate that at your
    request, or did she just find it and circulate it as a crisis
    reminder?
        Mr. Lokey. Well, it was kind of as a reminder because when
    I got tagged to be the--well, when Director Brown made the
    decision to send the ERT-N, the National Response Team, which
    the Blue Team was up and I was the FCO for that, on Saturday
    morning, and one of the things--and by that time, as the
    hurricane moved west, it became New Orleans and Louisiana were
    coming into the target area, I had asked that the contractors
    from IEM be embedded in Louisiana and in our NRCC to give
    technical advice to remind people what had been done through
    the planning.
        I carried with me several of the documents, and I don't
    want to take credit for good staff work. I wanted to get the
    word out, and Sharon did the appropriate thing to plan that.
    And on the airplane going down there, I thumbed through it and
    looked for things to--you tickle me on the things we need to be
    talking to the State about.
        Senator Lieberman. Don't you agree that by that time it was
    too late? In other words, the deficiencies that the Hurricane
    Pam exercise showed in FEMA would have required a response much
    earlier, training of your Search and Rescue Teams for water
    rescue, etc.?
        Mr. Lokey. Well, for overall system things to respond with,
    yes, sir, you are exactly right. As far as the prepositioning
    of assets and things like that, that was specifically
    challenging in Katrina because after it hit southern Florida
    and came out, the track had it going through Tallahassee. And
    then the track moved very rapidly west, and we were staging
    commodities and teams to respond to Alabama, Mississippi, and
    Louisiana. And that was why when I got there on Saturday night
    and got the briefing we activated the additional Urban Search
    and Rescue Teams. They would have been entirely--we never could
    have gotten them on time there. We put them on alert to move
    them in as quickly as possible after.
        Senator Lieberman. Let me read you from the Hurricane Pam
    plan's section on search and rescue, ``Parish resources in the
    most severely impacted areas will not be available for several
    weeks or even months, as they were not removed from the area
    prior to the storm.''
        My understanding from my staff in the pre-hearing interview
    that they had with you is that you indicated some awareness of
    that particular prediction in Pam, which is to say that the
    first responders locally would be overwhelmed by the flooding.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Why was that? It certainly appears in
    the explicit wording of the Pam plan that there is a prediction
    that this kind of hurricane would in some sense drown--not
    literally, thank God, but would overwhelm the local first
    responders.
        Looking at the plan, in hindsight, knowing that it came out
    in January 2005, you arrived at FEMA in April 2005, it cries
    out for action at the Federal, State, and local level, which,
    unfortunately, did not happen.
        In the case of FEMA, it seems to me to clearly say that if
    this big one hits, the locals are simply not going to be able
    to handle it and that FEMA has got to get ready to come in with
    everything and take over.
        Am I reading it right? And if so, why didn't something more
    happen at FEMA national headquarters to get ready for it?
        Mr. Lokey. Well, let me say what I will express will be my
    opinions.
        Senator Lieberman. Please.
        Mr. Lokey. Not necessarily that of the Department. But
    before I came to headquarters, I was a Federal Coordinating
    Officer. What is ingrained in us is that the State is
    sovereign. We work for them. We partner up with them. And FEMA
    does not even have the authority to go in and take over. And so
    I did as I was trained and what I was used to doing, partnered
    up with the State, and made sure I met their objectives.
        I was able to review the Hurricane Pam things, like, for
    example--I am not sure exactly where it is, but there is a
    suggested 24 hours out what to have available. And it was four
    NDMS teams and two DMORT teams, and it was a pretty short list.
    Boats were not on that list.
        In my discussions with the State, the Coast Guard and the
    Fisheries folks were moving their boats to safe areas. I don't
    have boats. But I didn't get a request for boats.
        In hindsight--I mean, next time, sir, I will be before this
    Committee wondering why I spent so much money on things that
    were not needed.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, there you go. I mean, looking at
    the Pam exercise, you are responsible for the Urban Search and
    Rescue Teams.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Don't you agree that the Pam exercise
    really was a plea that the Urban Search and Rescue Teams have
    some water rescue capacities?
        Mr. Lokey. No, sir. I think the Urban Rescue Teams weren't
    even part of the Pam process. There is extremely robust water
    rescue capability in this country.
        Senator Lieberman. Within FEMA?
        Mr. Lokey. No, sir. FEMA does not have organic water rescue
    capability. We have found from experience our urban search-and-
    rescue people occasionally, in doing their collapsed structure
    mission, do need to be prepared to work in a water environment.
    Subsequently, they have the safety gear. But to expand that
    program into a water rescue asset, we don't have enough funding
    to even do our structural collapse program as we would like.
        Senator Lieberman. So part of it was a lack of adequate
    funding.
        Mr. Lokey. Well, initially. That has always been considered
    that is a local and State responsibility. And with the time we
    could get there with teams to perform water rescue, all through
    the EMAC program.
        Senator Lieberman. The EMAC is the State mutual aid
    programs. So you called in a water rescue team, as I recall you
    mentioning in your opening statement, from California.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes.
        Senator Lieberman. But, obviously, it was not there early.
        Mr. Lokey. No, because what happened was when early in the
    game I was talking to Jeff Smith, especially when water became
    an issue, I was giving him advice from my experience in search
    and rescue of where through EMAC they could get robust water
    rescue capability. I suggested California. I found out a few
    hours later California had not signed the EMAC agreement.
    Fortunately, we have cooperative agreements with the eight main
    jurisdictions that are sponsors of Urban Search and Rescue
    Teams, which I worked for 2 years for California OES, Office of
    Emergency Services. Those are the jurisdictions that have eight
    California Swift Water teams. So we had a legal mechanism to
    bring those teams on board, pay them through FEMA, provide them
    the liability, and----
        Senator Lieberman. Right. When did they get there, do you
    know?
        Mr. Lokey. We have a detailed record of that. I believe
    they got there by Wednesday, but I am not sure. I provided your
    staff a timeline of when they were in.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes. Do you think FEMA should have its
    own in-house water rescue capacity?
        Mr. Lokey. I personally do not. I think that we ought to
    train our teams and better prepare them to work in a water
    environment so they can help as they did in this event. I do
    personally feel we should take the leadership, though, to help
    develop a national system of standards and training, and we can
    pay to move other teams around the country. That would be much
    more cost-effective than developing 28 Swift Water rescue teams
    within FEMA.
        Senator Lieberman. Madam Chairman, may I ask your
    indulgence to ask one related question to Captain Bayard? And
    it is also similar to what I just asked Mr. Lokey, and we will
    be asking other city officials this.
        Why after Pam's clear warnings, to the best of your
    knowledge, Captain, did the city barely have any watercraft to
    deploy for search-and-rescue missions? And why did neither the
    New Orleans Fire Department nor the Police Department, to the
    best of my knowledge--and you correct me if I am wrong--have
    any water rescue training before Katrina made landfall?
        Captain Bayard. Senator Lieberman, I cannot answer that one
    way or the other. I was not involved in the exercise with
    Hurricane Pam, and I know that there are requests that went up
    about boats.
        Senator Lieberman. Prior to Katrina?
        Captain Bayard. Prior to Katrina, yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. From the Fire Department, Police
    Department, or both?
        Captain Bayard. I think from both agencies, sir. I know for
    sure from the Police Department.
        Senator Lieberman. Up to the city government?
        Captain Bayard. It went up through the chain of command,
    yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. And, of course, it was not responded to
    affirmatively in a timely way.
        Captain Bayard. Correct.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
        Chairman Collins. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        We have much to learn about this tragedy. Is America, today
    at this moment this afternoon, better prepared should we have
    the misfortune of a similar incident? In other words, are we
    learning from the past? Have we implemented correct steps as
    best we can? More is to be done, but are we in a better state
    than we were when this happened? Just a simple few remarks from
    each of you. Mr. Lokey.
        Mr. Lokey. I think we are because we learned some hard
    lessons that have already been instituted. And as I mentioned
    earlier, our Urban Rescue Teams are as we speak in Miami
    working on making things better and doing the things to
    implement what we learned so we don't make the same mistakes
    twice.
        Senator Warner. Good.
        General Veillon. Senator Warner, thank you for that
    question. We are better. Throughout the Katrina rescue effort,
    there was unity of efforts by all organizations. We were all
    focused on the same thing: Rescuing people and taking them to
    safety. We did not have command and control, one command and
    control cell that controlled this whole effort. But there are a
    lot of positive lessons learned from the efforts of New
    Orleans, and I know they will all be instituted by the coming
    hurricane season.
        Senator Warner. Good. Thank you. Colonel LaCaze.
        Colonel LaCaze. Yes, sir, I think we are. I know certainly
    our agency learned a great deal from it. We have effected some
    changes and improvements already and have lots of plans to do
    additional planning. And for the rest of the country, I will
    say this: If we ever have to respond to another State in a
    similar situation the way those States responded to us, I think
    we would bring a very effective and experienced and useful
    force to their assistance. Within our State and with other
    groups, we are already getting requests to come speak at
    conferences and at meetings and things to share the knowledge
    that we have. So in that way, I think we are going to go out,
    go forward to a lot of the rest of the country and tell our
    story and share our experience so they can benefit and make
    plans to be better prepared for these things.
        Senator Warner. Thank you. Captain Bayard.
        Captain Bayard. Senator Warner, we definitely learned a
    lot. Right now we are going through a lot of training with the
    Wildlife and Fisheries as far as boat and rescue. We are trying
    to get a US&R team established on the Police Department because
    we already have on-the-job training, I guess you would say,
    through this one. Even though we had no experience, we did
    search and rescue. Then we did secondary search and rescue with
    breaching homes and all. So we got a lot of experience, and we
    are going to try to get better.
        The Department has implemented training as far as
    leadership training. We are getting incident command training.
    I spoke with the superintendent prior to coming up here, and
    this training is being slated right now. DEA and FBI are doing
    the leadership training on behalf of the New Orleans Police
    Department, and the incident command training, to my
    understanding, will be coming from the FBI as well.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        Madam Chairman, and I say to the Ranking Member, it is very
    important that we have had these series of hearings, and I
    thank the Chairman. And I think they have been very productive.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you.
        General, I want to explore with you an issue of
    prepositioning assets. I recognize that hindsight is always 20/
    20, but the fact is that FEMA wasn't the only agency that
    turned down what at least today appeared to be reasonable
    requests.
        Our Committee is informed that the Chief of Operations, now
    Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department, made a
    request of the National Guard Commander at Jackson Barracks for
    five high-water vehicles and five boats to be pre-staged at
    each of the eight police district stations around the city so
    that the New Orleans Police Department could deploy immediately
    after the storm.
        Are you aware that, in fact, Superintendent Riley was told
    that the National Guard felt that most of the assets should
    stay at Jackson Barracks, which subsequently flooded, and that,
    in fact, no boats were pre-staged at all and high-water
    vehicles, rather than being pre-staged at all eight stations,
    were placed at only three or four?
        General Veillon. Madam Chairman, I am not aware of that
    specific request. We placed high-water vehicles as well as
    boats at Jackson Barracks in order to be close to those people
    that may need us. We did lose some high-water vehicles due to
    the water, but those vehicles were quickly put back into
    commission and used after the floodwaters began to recede.
        But specifically, ma'am, I am not aware of the request from
    the New Orleans Police Department.
        Chairman Collins. Well, given that Jackson Barracks was in
    the flood zone, did anyone express concern that assets might be
    lost due to flooding? And I want to follow up on your previous
    answer by pointing out that the Committee is informed that 20
    high-water vehicles were out of commission due to flooding.
    Those are 20 vehicles that would have been very helpful in
    rescuing people and bringing them out of the city.
        General Veillon. Yes, ma'am. It was a decision made that we
    should have assets at Jackson Barracks, our headquarters, in
    preparation for this storm. The catastrophic nature of the
    floods did have an impact on our prepositioned equipment. We
    have always positioned boats and high-water vehicles at Jackson
    Barracks for all hurricanes and have always had better luck.
    When the levees broke and Jackson Barracks flooded, we lost a
    lot of that equipment initially.
        So, yes, ma'am, we were aware of the relative danger and
    possibility of loss, but we believed it was the right place for
    the equipment.
        Chairman Collins. Mr. LaCaze, we have heard that you
    experienced difficulty in getting the National Guard to allow
    you to use buses that would have assisted in the evacuation of
    patients from Tulane Medical Center. Could you tell us about
    that incident?
        Colonel LaCaze. Yes, ma'am. The Wednesday following the
    hurricane, we were asked that morning to go to the Tulane
    Medical Center to evacuate patients from that hospital and also
    if we would have the ability to evacuate some from Charity
    also. So we deployed into that area and began moving people
    from the hospital. We were met on scene by some people from the
    Shreveport Fire Department and some Shreveport medical first
    responder units that explained to us that they had a triage
    location set up in a small parking lot just across the street.
    This is at Loyola and Perdido. Just across the street from the
    Holiday Inn Hotel was the first dry ground that you could get
    to coming from Tulane Medical Center. And the plan was for us
    to take our boats, go to the hospital, move the people from the
    hospital to the parking lot where there would be ambulances
    that would be arriving to take the patients from there and to
    evacuate them out of the city.
        So we started the evacuation, and in just a little while we
    had to stop with only about 20 patients because the parking lot
    area, that was about all they could hold at one time, and we
    were not getting the ambulances in as scheduled. So we held up
    on further evacuation and turned our efforts to just working in
    the city area evacuating people and assisting people who were
    trying to get out while we waited for the ambulances so we
    could resume the hospital evacuation.
        It came to my attention sometime that afternoon that there
    were about--I think it was five buses that were parked on up
    near the interstate, just up the street, actually, from where
    we were. Our radio systems were very poor. You would get
    communication to the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge
    occasionally, about 50 percent or less of the time, and I
    relayed a request and advised that there were buses that were
    on location here, they were very near to where we were, in the
    absence of the ambulances would it be possible to get the
    buses, to place the patients on board, and to move them out
    that way.
        The initial response that we got back from Baton Rouge EOC
    was that that was approved to go send someone up there and get
    the buses. We sent one of the firemen, the Shreveport firemen.
    There was a 4-wheeler that they were using to run around in the
    area. It went up, contacted, and there were some National
    Guardsmen who had the buses, had a security watch on the buses.
    And I assume he made contact with them. He went up and talked
    to them and told them that we had a request and they had been
    authorized.
        He came back to me and said that they would need to know
    who had authorized that, who was requesting it, and could I put
    that in writing. So I made a note with the authorization from
    the EOC, I think it was Colonel Smalley or Colonel Smith. I
    can't recall who the person in the EOC that had advised, that
    had authorized it. I told them who I was and signed my name to
    it and sent it.
        He took the message and went up. He stayed a few minutes.
    He came back and said, ``They want you to come up there.'' So I
    got on the 4-wheeler with him, and we rode up to the Guardsmen
    who were watching the buses, and I said, ``We really need the
    buses.'' And the senior sergeant there advised that they did
    not have the authorization and they, therefore, couldn't
    release the buses. And I said, ``Well, let me try to talk to
    somebody. Do you have something that beats the radio that I
    have that is not working very well?'' They provided a cell
    phone, and I tried to make a phone call on the cell phone but
    couldn't get through on it either. It wasn't really working any
    better than the radio was. And just couldn't get through and
    couldn't talk--at that point communications were virtually lost
    again. And with that, he just said, ``I am sorry. I know you
    and I would love to be able to. I just can't do it without the
    authorization.'' And I had asked, ``Well, what is the purpose
    of the buses? What are they doing here?'' And he said, ``These
    are for special needs people.''
        Chairman Collins. What are patients?
        Colonel LaCaze. And what did I have down the street? But I
    said, ``Well, I understand the position you are in,'' and I
    knew that it wasn't any use to pursue it at that level with him
    because he had his orders and I had my responsibility and my
    request.
        So at that point we went back, and since we still were not
    getting ambulances and were not--and finally did, but not in
    any adequate numbers--I think there were five. That was when I
    made the decision to go ahead and load the patients in our
    pick-up trucks and load the equipment, the wheelchairs, and
    stretchers and things like that into the boats that we were
    trailering. After we got out of the water and got all the
    patients out of the hospital, we trailered our boats, loaded
    the people in the trucks, put the equipment on board the boats,
    and went to the causeway.
        Chairman Collins. That sounds like bureaucracy at its
    worst. Here you are trying to evacuate patients. There are five
    empty buses available. And instead, you are asked to fill out
    paperwork, you cannot get the authorization, so you end up
    loading patients into pick-up trucks and other vehicles, which
    is much slower and delays the evacuation. Is that a fair
    assessment?
        Colonel LaCaze. Yes, ma'am, that is a fair assessment. And
    I attribute it to the communication problem.
        Chairman Collins. Did you see any evidence, as you are
    attempting to evacuate hospitals, of any kind of coordination
    among Federal, State, and local agencies to deal with the
    problems of the need to evacuate hospitals?
        Colonel LaCaze. Helicopters were doing air evacuations very
    rapidly and very regularly from the hospitals, but at the
    ground level where we were, the situation that I have described
    to you there was the kind of things that we were encountering.
        Chairman Collins. So on the ground there was no
    coordination that you could see.
        Colonel LaCaze. Not at that point. The only coordination
    that I was able to see was at least the Shreveport Fire
    Department and medical service personnel who had been tasked to
    that assignment. They were on scene and in place, as were we.
    But as far as the coordination needed for the ground
    transportation, we ran into a problem there.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks again, Madam Chairman. Just let
    me continue on the question of red tape in the middle of the
    crisis.
        I know that our staffs have received testimony from
    witnesses that indicated--and here, again, Colonel LaCaze, I am
    going to ask you--that when the Louisiana Department of
    Wildlife and Fisheries went to make certain EMAC requests,
    which I take it to be requests from other States who could
    provide assistance, you also met with some red tape about
    whether FEMA had approved a particular State agency to deploy
    specifically to Louisiana. Is that correct? Did you have
    problems with red tape in that regard?
        Colonel LaCaze. To some degree, sir. I know that Texas
    Parks and Wildlife was on scene--by Wednesday morning they had
    arrived. The remaining States that I mentioned showed up in the
    following days. But it did seem in all honesty that it was a
    little bit slow. Help was slow in coming. I think that anyone
    that was involved there and into the area immediately after
    impact will tell you that our feeling was that help was slow in
    coming at those levels.
        Senator Lieberman. And was it your impression that was
    because of some red tape within the FEMA system or just that
    FEMA had not been adequately prepared as the hurricane was
    coming to get people in there quickly?
        Colonel LaCaze. The information that I was getting was
    coming from the Office of Emergency Preparedness in Baton
    Rouge, and what the Wildlife and Fisheries personnel were
    relaying to me there was that requests were bogged down in the
    process, in the pipe, so to speak.
        Senator Lieberman. Mr. Lokey, when you were there, were you
    aware that there was a logjam in terms of the EMAC request?
    Again, I'm talking about an EMAC request being a request from
    Louisiana for help from other States with the kinds of
    capacities that they needed.
        Mr. Lokey. Well, EMAC is strictly a state-to-state mutual
    aid operation. I do not believe FEMA has any dog in that fight,
    if you will.
        I do remember delays of people not wanting to respond
    because they didn't have the right signature to assure they
    were covered under the EMAC compact, but that is strictly
    state-to-state.
        Senator Lieberman. In any case, just to clarify, am I right
    that wouldn't come through your division? Or would it?
        Mr. Lokey. No, sir, that would be strictly state-to-state.
    Now, we do have an EMAC representative at the National Response
    Coordination Center that helps coordinate things like that. But
    I do not believe there is any part of the FEMA approval process
    in an EMAC request.
        Senator Lieberman. So, therefore, your answer is, contrary
    to what the Colonel said, who felt that FEMA was part of
    holding up those----
        Mr. Lokey. I do not believe FEMA was part of holding that
    up.
        Senator Lieberman. OK. Let me go back to a baseline
    question. General Veillon, as you testified earlier, you began
    doing your water rescue on Monday, August 29, the day of
    landfall. I want to ask you a couple of questions. At what
    point did you realize that day that a major water rescue effort
    would be required? And as part of that, when did you know that
    any one of the levees, the significant levees around New
    Orleans, had been broken?
        General Veillon. Yes, sir, thank you. On Monday morning,
    mid-morning, around 9:30, the water rapidly rose with a
    significant current at Jackson Barracks.
        Senator Lieberman. Which is where you were.
        General Veillon. Yes, sir, which is where I was. From past
    experience with hurricanes and floods, charts, I expected some
    water at Jackson Barracks. This was different in how fast it
    rose and what a current it had. So it was significantly deep in
    a very short time.
        I learned shortly thereafter, maybe 30 minutes, listening
    to the AM radio station in New Orleans, WWL, which was
    announcing that the Industrial levee had broke.
        Senator Lieberman. As far as you could tell, that
    announcement was made based on something the radio station had
    heard from a reporter or people in the area.
        General Veillon. Yes, sir. I am not sure how they came to
    that information.
        Senator Lieberman. But it turned out to be accurate.
        General Veillon. Yes, sir, it was accurate, and about an
    hour after that, the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge
    advised us at Jackson Barracks that, in fact, the Industrial
    Canal had a levee breach.
        Senator Lieberman. So that would be what time?
        General Veillon. That would have been in a sequence of
    maybe 9:30 the water rose; 10, 10:30, the radio announces it;
    11, 11:30, OEP advises.
        Senator Lieberman. OK. Colonel LaCaze, when did you first
    learn that the levees had been broken?
        Colonel LaCaze. We had heard apparently the same radio
    broadcast from the public radio stations that morning around 9
    o'clock, that they suspected that there were levee breaches. I
    did not get true confirmation of that until Tuesday morning,
    but we had made observation during the night Monday night and
    in the wee hours of Tuesday of fluctuation in the water levels
    that made us suspect that we had a levee breach.
        Senator Lieberman. Although, am I right, you were already
    out there on Monday afternoon?
        Colonel LaCaze. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Captain, when did you hear about any one
    of the levees breaking?
        Captain Bayard. It was Monday morning. We were able to
    speak with Communications Section, and the Lower 9th Ward was
    inundated with 911 calls, so we knew we had a problem. And the
    levee actually breached in two locations--one right at Jordan
    Avenue, and the second, the major break, was at Pria.
        Senator Lieberman. And which levee was this, just for the
    record?
        Captain Bayard. Industrial Canal levee, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        Mr. Lokey, at the State Emergency Operations Center, when
    did you first learn that the levees had broken?
        Mr. Lokey. Well, we were getting unsubstantiated reports
    starting Monday about the same time because I was right next to
    Colonel Smith in the Emergency Operations Center. I got
    confirmation with the eyes-on conference call I had with Marty
    Bahamonde, who had flown around in a Coast Guard helicopter.
        Senator Lieberman. We have heard from him. Right.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. And did you then communicate that
    information to FEMA in Washington?
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir. Well, the conference call with Marty
    included my chain of command, and so we all got it at the same
    time.
        Senator Lieberman. And that was, as I recall, later in the
    day.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. More specifically, but not to the
    minute, it was more like early evening, am I right? Or later
    afternoon?
        Mr. Lokey. It was later in the afternoon, and I was with
    Jeff Smith, and we were trying to get reports. The Corps of
    Engineers was going out to inspect, and we were getting all
    sorts of things and seeing things on CNN.
        Senator Lieberman. Mr. Lokey, while I am directing a
    question to you, I want to come back to something I said in my
    opening statement, which is based on Exhibit 12.\1\ It is a
    report from the Homeland Security Operations Center dated
    Thursday, September 1, 2005. And it states that FEMA Search and
    Rescue Teams stopped operations until the National Guard could
    provide adequate security for them. Explain first why that
    happened because my understanding is that the rest of the
    Search and Rescue Teams had continued in their work.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Exhibit 12 appears in the Appendix on page 80.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Lokey. I followed up on this, even the discussions
    today, with members of our Incident Support Team on the exact
    timing of this. Monday night was the time the rumors were
    abounding about the breakdown of law and order and things like
    that.
        Senator Lieberman. The very first night.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir. And some of our rescue teams had even
    heard gunshots, although no fire was directed at them.
        Search and rescue operations never totally stopped, and
    FEMA did not pull out. What occurred was, according to my folks
    who were on scene, that the unified command of the Coast Guard
    and the National Guard and the folks working out of Metairie
    pulled back in to make a decision on exactly what was happening
    and how to get protection for our forces in their boats.
        Senator Lieberman. Basically, they pulled back into
    temporary headquarters.
        Mr. Lokey. Well, into their command posts at Zephyr Field.
    Some of the assets that were in the field were diverted to
    neighborhoods they knew were safe. As soon as they identified
    where they could get law enforcement officers--and this was in
    coordination--I understand that Jefferson County Parish law
    enforcement was there. As soon as they got law enforcement
    officers to put in the boats to protect the people, they were
    back in the water again doing rescues.
        Senator Lieberman. So how long was that, would you say?
        Mr. Lokey. I believe that they pulled back in Monday
    midday, and they launched again early Tuesday morning when they
    got the law enforcement support.
        Senator Lieberman. OK. Now, there is a confusion here
    because in Exhibit 12 there is a reference to Thursday,
    September 1, later in the week, when the Search and Rescue
    Teams stopped operations.
        Mr. Lokey. Well, if I remember correctly, it was September
    1.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, that is the Thursday.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, that was--well, this is probably a later
    report. But by the time it got out from us--when I had heard
    that they had ceased operations--because the decision was made
    in the field. The decision to protect your forces I leave to my
    people managing in the field. When I got the word that they had
    pulled back because of this and finally made touch with them,
    they had already solved it and were working on their plans to
    get back with law enforcement people as soon as they could get
    that in the water.
        So I am pretty confident that the event that spawned this
    was the rumors from August 31 in the evening, and then the
    morning of September 1 was the day they----
        Senator Lieberman. That would have been Tuesday and--OK,
    Wednesday and Thursday.
        Mr. Lokey. Well, they stopped midday--I would have to check
    this. The night of August 31--September 1 was when they ceased
    until they got the law enforcement and launched again September
    2, I believe. But they did not pull out.
        Senator Lieberman. They just pulled back.
        Mr. Lokey. They redirected in other places, and they did
    not go into the hazardous area until they ascertained exactly
    what the threat was and were able to get law enforcement people
    to accompany them.
        Senator Lieberman. General, to what extent did disorder
    inhibit search and rescue?
        General Veillon. Senator, there was probably a rumor an
    hour about snipers and other things going on in the city. The
    National Guard, we did not stop our rescue efforts for any
    security issue. It is my experience of Katrina that the
    National Guard did not experience security concerns. There were
    a lot of rumors of issues, but we continued our operations and
    did not experience any problems.
        Senator Lieberman. OK. My time is up. Thank you.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you.
        Captain, it is my understanding that you have been with the
    New Orleans Police Department for some 30 years. Is that
    correct?
        Captain Bayard. Yes, ma'am, it is.
        Chairman Collins. So during that time, you have undoubtedly
    been involved in preparations for other hurricanes. Could you
    give the Committee some comparison on the preparation for
    Hurricane Katrina versus other hurricanes during that 30 years?
        Captain Bayard. Well, for previous hurricanes, again, we
    would call people in early, just like we did for this one. We
    would go over the plan, make sure everybody understood what the
    plan was. Then we would start having--we would disperse food,
    water, everybody would fill fuel tanks up in their cars, just
    like we pretty much did for this one.
        We would have some military vehicles staged at stations at
    the Mars Street compound where myself and the TAC teams were
    staged. Each district always had at least a Hummer or one truck
    at the station houses in the previous storms in my 30 years.
        Chairman Collins. But that did not happen in this case.
        Captain Bayard. We didn't have any at Mars Street, and we
    pulled out of Mars Street probably 7, 8 o'clock that night to
    go to the hotels and then go patrol until the winds got up. So
    we pretty much planned just like we do for any other storm.
        Chairman Collins. Were the plans more extensive for
    Hurricane Katrina?
        Captain Bayard. No, ma'am.
        Chairman Collins. Were they less or just similar?
        Captain Bayard. I would say pretty much the same.
        Chairman Collins. Pretty much the same. So even though this
    was a hurricane that was expected to be a far stronger
    hurricane, you did not see more robust preparations. Is that
    fair?
        Captain Bayard. Yes, ma'am. I did not experience that.
        Chairman Collins. It is my understanding that the city has
    a mobile command center. Was that brought to the casino where
    you set up operations?
        Captain Bayard. No, ma'am, it is not. It is a tractor-
    trailer, and it was stationed at Elysian Fields or North Miro
    in the fire station, and it was moved. And I found out later on
    that it was moved to a safe haven in Algiers and that it is
    currently being used as a fire station by Holy Cross High
    School on Renee Street below the Industrial Canal. And our two
    mobile command posts were--we did not know where they were
    either. They didn't come into play until after, I think, like
    the third week.
        Chairman Collins. Did that hinder your efforts?
        Captain Bayard. We were trying to coordinate everything off
    two picnic tables and chairs, and when I ran into the special
    forces group, we went and got plywood and two-by-fours, and
    then they built a little area, and that was the Incident
    Commander Center made out of plywood and two-by-fours, and that
    is where we worked.
        Chairman Collins. Some have said that if the physical
    communications network had not been devastated, the response to
    Hurricane Katrina would have been far better and a lot of the
    problems that we saw would not have occurred. And there is no
    doubt that if people's cell phones and radios are working,
    obviously communication is a lot easier.
        But in your report, you present a far broader indictment of
    what went wrong. I want to refer to Exhibit 1,\1\ which is a
    memo that you wrote to Deputy Chief Steven Nicholas. Could you
    read the first paragraph under ``Summary and Recommendations''
    for us?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Exhibit 1 appears in the Appendix on page 73.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Captain Bayard. It says, ``The Office of Emergency
    Preparedness needs to be revamped. If their role is to have us
    prepared to handle a disaster such as this, they failed. They
    lacked a plan, did not provide the necessary equipment,
    provided no direction or leadership, did not coordinate or
    attempt to have commanders of field operations coordinate with
    any State or Federal agency, etc. We really need to take a
    long, hard look at this section.''
        Chairman Collins. Can you tell us how this report came
    about? Was it an after-action review?
        Captain Bayard. Yes, ma'am. It was an after-action summary.
    It was submitted on October 16, 2005, which is a little over a
    month after the storm had impacted New Orleans.
        Chairman Collins. So does it remain your judgment that it
    was a lack of planning, direction, and leadership that were
    responsible for the poor response?
        Captain Bayard. Yes, ma'am. I read the mission statement. I
    gave it to the investigators, to you all, and I felt, based off
    of what that mission statement is, that they should have had us
    better prepared for this storm, and not only this, but any
    other storm that's coming. They were supposed to be
    coordinating with State, local, and Federal agencies. They were
    supposed to have equipment staged for us, things along those
    lines, and that didn't happen.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Mr. Lokey, I am
    going to come back to you. You happen to be the guy from FEMA
    here today, so you are naturally getting a lot of questions,
    and because we are focused on the Federal role, although we are
    interested, obviously, and concerned about State and local
    preparedness too. We had all of these warnings that built up
    over the years. We have the specific warnings contained in the
    Hurricane Pam report and plan, which showed in a test case of
    what turned out to be, thank God, worse than Katrina, that
    locals were overwhelmed, they could not handle it.
        We heard you say earlier that you wish you had done more
    before to respond to the PAM report. You came in April. You
    were not there for a long time, and I can only ask you this
    from your perspective; we are going to have other people
    testify from FEMA as this goes on--and a lot of this, we are
    finding memos, and we are asking you questions about memos. But
    let's be honest about this, we were all watching television,
    and Max Mayfield was on TV Thursday and Friday, telling us this
    is a Category 4 or 5 storm. So neon lights are flashing saying,
    this is the big one. And I do not see within FEMA, even at that
    point, acknowledging that there was not enough earlier reaction
    to Pam, that somebody there said, ``Hey, this is it. Pam warned
    us the State and local people are going to be overwhelmed. The
    levees are going to break. We have to mobilize everything we
    have to get in there as quickly as possible.''
        I do not see that it happened. I see that it happened as
    time went on, but I do not see that it happened, for instance,
    that weekend. Am I right or wrong?
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir. We certainly did not mobilize
    everything we had. We did mobilize more than we had ever
    mobilized before.
        Senator Lieberman. In advance or afterward?
        Mr. Lokey. In advance. We had a number of urban rescue
    teams, a number of National Disaster Medical Teams, the amount
    of commodities that were staged, and literally, they were
    spread from Florida through Texas to respond. But it certainly
    was not everything we had, but, again, our challenge was that
    this was a huge storm, and Mississippi took a terrible brunt of
    it also. Alabama took a brunt of it. And just with what we had
    available, in hindsight, yes, we should have put more teams in
    and brought them in.
        Senator Lieberman. How many search-and-rescue teams could
    you have brought into the Gulf Coast or New Orleans?
        Mr. Lokey. Well, theoretically, I could have brought 28 of
    them in, but we had a bunch of them on alert. We had two teams
    in Mississippi and three teams in Shreveport, and then when the
    storm--again, when I got there Saturday, the first thing I did
    was call my urban rescue people and put a bunch of more teams,
    I think five additional teams, on alert for quick response.
        Senator Lieberman. Looking back, you said you wish that
    over that weekend you had activated more of those teams to come
    in.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Because of the scope of it. How about
    Monday when you found out pretty clearly from people on the
    scene that the levees had broken? So now the nightmare, which
    had been predicted and could be reasonably foreseen over the
    weekend with all the weather forecasts and, incidentally, some
    e-mail traffic within FEMA and the Department of Homeland
    Security, becomes real. The General and others can verify this.
    What should have happened then? For instance, looking back, do
    you wish that you had immediately notified people in Washington
    that the levees had broken, or do you think that they knew
    about it?
        Mr. Lokey. Well, they had some of the same information I
    did. They might have even had more because communications were
    so bad that even my chain of command was constantly on me that
    they could not get me on the phone because phone lines were
    saturated.
        Senator Lieberman. From Washington?
        Mr. Lokey. From Washington, yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. So where do you think they might have
    gotten the information, from public sources?
        Mr. Lokey. Watching CNN because the media was out right
    away, showing those pictures of not only the problems that were
    developing at the Superdome and at the Convention Center, but
    the rescues, and I was scrambling from where I was to move
    everything under my control and to advise the State on where
    they could get additional water assets, and I had discussions
    with Under Secretary Brown that although it was not our policy,
    we were putting our people in the water, and we would make
    plans with the State, if they would provide the boats, we would
    put the people in them. And then we got the California teams
    in.
        Senator Lieberman. When did you have that conversation with
    Under Secretary Brown?
        Mr. Lokey. Monday and Tuesday.
        Senator Lieberman. Monday afternoon or evening?
        Mr. Lokey. Well, Monday afternoon. Mr. Brown did not get
    there until Monday afternoon.
        Senator Lieberman. Correct. This was face to face?
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir. We already decided that because the
    teams were appropriately equipped and appropriately prepared,
    and these firefighters, although water rescue was not their
    mission, these are some of the best rescue people in the world,
    and we certainly knew that----
        Senator Lieberman. I have to tell you, I applaud that
    decision. Even though they were not specifically trained, as I
    said before, they fall under the category of heroes because
    they just used their brains and their guts and saved an awful
    lot of lives.
        Mr. Lokey. Yes, sir. They improvised and made it work.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, absolutely.
        I wanted to ask just one general question, and again, this
    is about search and rescue. We are going to do a separate
    hearing on communications. But how much did the communications
    failure hurt the search-and-rescue efforts? Any of you want to
    reflect a little bit on what happened? Captain Bayard.
        Captain Bayard. Well, Senator, when we didn't have
    communication, it means we couldn't get real good intelligence
    back from the fields, and without communications, we couldn't
    coordinate with Wildlife and Fisheries, with the military, and
    things along those lines. So communication is vital in a time
    of crisis. If we cannot communicate, we can't coordinate, and
    that's exactly what happened here.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. Colonel LaCaze.
        Colonel LaCaze. Yes, sir, I would concur with that. You
    have to have communication, not only among the rescuers within
    the teams that are out there affecting the rescues so they can
    help each other, but all the way up the chain of command, to be
    able to provide information as to how many people we have, what
    kind of condition they are in, the medical assistance and
    transport we need, the food, water supplies that we need. All
    of that information has to be relayed. And when you have the
    breakdown of communications, the very lifeblood of the whole
    search-and-rescue operation is severely cut back.
        Senator Lieberman. General, let me ask the question a
    little bit differently, which is: How manageable is the task of
    providing a sustainable communications system in a Katrina-like
    disaster? In other words, obviously, the system that existed
    was out. Is it just a question of having the will and the money
    to buy the system, to get one that stays in, that continues to
    work?
        General Veillon. What we had primarily was 800 megahertz
    radio.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Veillon. Where we communicated from the Superdome
    to Baton Rouge via radio. That radio was saturated, the
    frequencies, with all agencies trying to operate. We also used
    satellite phones, and they became saturated. Blackberries
    served a good purpose, where we did have e-mail capability.
        Senator Lieberman. Interesting.
        General Veillon. The National Guard possesses some
    communications assets unique to the military, radio pallets
    loaded in the back of a Humvee. We have a forward air control
    unit that has that capability, where we forward deployed those
    units to give us feedback.
        What we need for the future is a communications package
    that has interoperability, that we can talk to everybody at
    this table, as well as a surge capability, that when everybody
    comes up on the frequency, the system can handle that.
        So we had communications, but it was saturated.
        Senator Lieberman. As far as you know, does that kind of
    system exist? In other words, if we decided we want to buy it
    and give you the resources to buy it, I presume you could find
    it, it does not have to be developed.
        General Veillon. Sir, in this country, I presume it does
    exist. I am not an expert in that, but that is what I would
    think where we need to go.
        Senator Lieberman. One of the questions we are going to
    look at in another hearing is the sequence of events and
    decisions that were made about when to deploy the military more
    broadly than the National Guard. One of the questions I know
    will be whether the military, existing as it does and preparing
    as it does for combat situations, would have brought with it,
    if it had been sent in early, the kind of separate
    communications system that would have withstood the pressures
    of the situation on the ground? Do you know?
        General Veillon. Well, sir, the Iwo Jima arrived with a
    vast amount of communications capability. It did not--by that
    time that the Iwo Jima was in place----
        Senator Lieberman. When did it get there? I have forgotten.
        General Veillon. Sir, as I recall, it would have been about
    Saturday after the storm.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Veillon. By that point, most of the rescue and
    evacuation of the Superdome and the Convention Center had taken
    place. We were more into a hasty search mode.
        Senator Lieberman. Right, and there was less demand on the
    system.
        General Veillon. Yes, sir. The peak had passed.
        Senator Lieberman. Right, thank you.
        Mr. Lokey. If I may, just to let you know what we are doing
    to inprove that, we got caught up in the communications
    problems. But we have been working with the Northern Command,
    which is the major military group we work with for military
    support to civilian authorities, in looking at what we're
    calling capability packages to predefine the capabilities they
    may have that are available to match up with what our potential
    needs are, so the time it takes for us to develop a scope of
    work and the exact needs can be shortened. We have been working
    with them on that, not only for communications packages, but
    also for medical capability, air capability, and ground
    transportation capability.
        Senator Lieberman. That is very reassuring because the
    poignant moment that you describe, where your superiors in
    Washington are having trouble contacting you as the chief FEMA
    person on the scene in Louisiana, is a moment that should never
    come again. I mean, you cannot imagine, if I may use the handy
    example, that General Abizaid at CENTCOM Headquarters in Qatar
    would have trouble getting General Casey in Baghdad. It would
    not happen, and it should not have happened in your case.
        Mr. Lokey. And one thing we have done also, that the
    availability to us of what we have now purchased as a result of
    Katrina, of additional satellite phones, and also for the ERT-
    Ns, the two National Response Teams, we are developing
    communications packages and caches for them. We are doing
    training that we were not able to do last year, and we are
    trying to make things better so something like this won't
    happen again, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Appreciate that. Thank you.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you.
        I want to thank each of you for testifying today and for
    your cooperation with the Committee. As I listened to each of
    you testify, I was reminded of a phrase from the 9/11
    Commission's report. When the Commission described ``good
    people straining against bad structures,'' and particularly
    with the Lieutenant Colonel and the Captain's recitation of how
    they had to get around bureaucracy, or a lack of leadership and
    direction, a lack of planning, and be very innovative. I thank
    all four of you and your teams for all that you did to help the
    victims of Katrina. But good people should not have to strain
    against bad systems or inadequate structures, and that is one
    of the things that we want to help recommend remedies for.
        I was also struck once again, as I have been throughout
    this series of hearings, by the absence of effective planning
    and determined leadership at all levels of government, and that
    is an issue that we will continue to pursue as well. I thank
    you for increasing our understanding.
        Senator Lieberman, do you have any final comment?
        Senator Lieberman. I think you said it just right, and I
    appreciate it. These are good people who are working hard under
    tough circumstances, some of whom performed heroic service, and
    a lot of people are alive today as a result of it. But the
    really infuriating reality is the extent to which the warnings
    were being given and people at all levels of government did not
    respond. There was a lot more damage done to life and property
    as a result of an admittedly catastrophic storm than should
    have been the case.
        I take some heart, Mr. Lokey, from hearing about some of
    the things you said that FEMA is beginning to do internally,
    and we hope that coming out of this, by telling the story, by
    putting it all together and enabling everybody, including the
    public, to look back and see how this happened, that we will
    generate both the pressure and, frankly, the kind of support
    that you all need to do the jobs you do, to put the structures
    in place, and then to fund them. I am sure there was a good
    reason why somebody in the New Orleans Government or in the
    Federal Government did not give you exactly what you needed.
    You requested the boats, and you did not get them. But it was
    not a good enough reason, as you look back at it, and it sure
    was penny-wise and pound-foolish when you think about the
    terrible damage that resulted from it.
        So you have helped us very much today in your testimony,
    and we are going to take it and try to make something
    constructive out of it. Thank you very much for your service.
        Chairman Collins. Thank you for your cooperation. The
    hearing record will remain open for 15 days. This hearing is
    now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

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