[Senate Hearing 109-616]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-616
HURRICANE KATRINA: WHO'S IN CHARGE OF THE NEW ORLEANS LEVEES?
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 15, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
_____
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
David T. Flanagan, General Counsel
David K. Porter, Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Robert F. Muse, Minority General Counsel
David M. Berick, Minority Professional Staff Member
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Collins.............................................. 1
Senator Carper............................................... 4
Senator Voinovich............................................ 22
Senator Coleman.............................................. 24
Senator Levin................................................ 37
WITNESSES
Thursday, December 15, 2005
Richard P. Wagenaar, Colonel, Commander and District Engineer,
New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; accompanied
by Alfred C. Naomi, Senior Project Manager, New Orleans
District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and Gerard A. Colletti,
Operations Manager for Completed Works, New Orleans District,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers................................... 7
James P. Huey, former President of the Board of Commissioners of
the Orleans Levee District..................................... 12
Max L. Hearn, Executive Director, Orleans Levee District......... 16
Edmond J. Preau, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Public Works and
Intermodal Transportation, Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development................................. 19
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Colletti, Gerard A.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Hearn, Max L.:
Testimony.................................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 79
Huey, James P.:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 69
Naomi, Alfred C.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Preau, Edmond J., Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 19
Wagenaar, Richard P.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Appendix
``Hurricane Katrina: Who's in Charge of the New Orleans
Levees?'', PowerPoint presentation submitted by Senator Collins 49
The American Society of Civil Engineers, prepared statement...... 83
Ann K. Mittal, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, prepared statement........... 89
Exhibit 18....................................................... 114
HURRICANE KATRINA: WHO'S IN CHARGE OF THE NEW ORLEANS LEVEES?
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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M.
Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Collins, Voinovich, Coleman, Levin, and
Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS
Chairman Collins. The Committee will come to order.
Today the Committee continues its investigation into the
preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. The focus of
our ninth Katrina hearing is on the key government agencies at
the local, State and Federal levels responsible for operating
and maintaining the levees that were supposed to protect New
Orleans.
While the levees were absolutely critical to the survival
of the city, our November 2 hearing demonstrated that this last
line of defense was fatally flawed in design, construction, or
maintenance. The witnesses testified that these flaws resulted
in the levees not merely being overtopped, but actually
crumbling before the onslaught of the storm.
The people of New Orleans and the surrounding parishes
depended on the levees to protect them. It now appears their
faith had little foundation. Even though the hurricane caused
extensive damage, it was the flooding from the levee breaches
that actually destroyed the city of New Orleans.
Our purpose today is to follow up on that hearing by
examining which agencies were responsible for operating,
maintaining, and inspecting the levees; for preparing for
emergencies; and for responding to problems ranging from
gradual erosion to sudden collapses.
The Army Corps of Engineers, the Orleans Levee District,
and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
are the key players. But they each played their parts in a
system fragmented by overlapping obligations and inexplicable
past practices. On the screen at the side of the room,\1\ the
principal legal obligations of each is set out.
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\1\ The PowerPoint presentation appears in the Appendix on pages
49-62.
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Once the levees have been constructed, the Army Corps of
Engineers is expected to: Turn over completed sections to the
Orleans Levee District; perform an annual inspection with the
district; and review the semi-annual reports filed by the
district.
The Orleans Levee District is charged by law with:
Operating and maintaining the levees; conducting a quarterly
inspection of the levees at least once every 90 days; and
filing a semi-annual report with the Army Corps.
The Louisiana Department of Transportation is obligated by
State law to: Approve the soundness of the engineering practice
and the feasibility of the plans and specifications submitted
by the Orleans Levee District; conduct training of the
district's commissioners; and review the district's emergency
plans.
All had responsibility for preparing for and responding to
emergencies. In addition to the Corps' responsibilities under
the Flood Control Act, the National Response Plan designates
the Corps as the primary agency responsible for public works.
Likewise, the Louisiana Department of Transportation is tasked
with the public works emergency functions under Louisiana's
Emergency Operations Plan.
In addition to owning the levees, the Orleans Levee
District is given a supporting role for public works by
Louisiana's Emergency Operations Plan.
Today the Committee will hear from witnesses from all three
agencies as we examine how those various responsibilities were
actually carried out. The laws called for one thing. Today we
will hear about the reality, about the confusion on issues as
fundamental as control, the misunderstandings, and what appear
to be abdications of responsibility.
To begin, there was confusion about the basic question of
who is in charge of the levees. Key officials at the Army Corps
and the Orleans Levee District have demonstrated this confusion
by telling the Committee staff one thing in transcribed
interviews, and then changing their positions later.
But that confusion is difficult to understand. There are at
least 18 letters from the Army Corps of Engineers turning over
various sections of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity
Hurricane Protection Project to the Orleans Levee District. In
one such letter, dated June 15, 2000, the Army Corps informed
the Orleans Levee District that the final inspection had been
completed on a section of the levees and the Orleans Levee
District was now responsible for the operation and maintenance
of the completed section. The letter goes on to explain that
maintenance means keeping all completed works in first-class
condition.
Responsibility for emergency management was also unclear.
For example, when asked about the Louisiana Department of
Transportation's levee and flood control repair
responsibilities articulated explicitly in the State's
Emergency Operations Plan, the Assistant Secretary for the
Department stated, ``I'm not sure what that means, because we
don't have any State flood control works. [The] State doesn't
own any flood control works.''
The uncertainty about control, combined with overlapping
responsibility for emergency management, affected the repair
efforts at one of the breach sites after Hurricane Katrina. In
a staff interview, the Commander of the New Orleans District of
the Army Corps of Engineers described the confusion: ``Who is
in charge? Where's the parish president? Where is the mayor?
And then the State? Who is in charge?''
In addition to this confusion about control and emergency
management, there are also cases in which the letter of the law
may have been observed, but its spirit was mocked. For example,
Louisiana State law requires educational training for levee
board commissioners.
However, the former President of the Board candidly
described the training sessions as follows, ``Once in four
years, you know what that is? That's going up to a workshop for
the weekend and having a crawfish boil up here and hear a
couple people talk about some things, and they get a little
piece of paper, and they honored the law.''
He also described the annual inspections of the levees
conducted by the Army Corps, the Louisiana Department of
Transportation, and the Orleans Levee District as largely
ceremonial events. . . . ``They . . . normally meet and get
some beignets and coffee in the morning and get to the buses,
and the colonel and the brass is all dressed up. You have
commissioners. They have some news cameras following you
around. . . . And you have your little beignets, and then . . .
you have a nice lunch somewhere or whatever. They have this
stop-off thing or whatever. And that's what the inspections are
about.''
Finally, although the title of the Orleans Levee District
implies that the district's primary function is to operate,
maintain, and inspect the levees, the Committee found that the
minutes of the meetings of the District's Board of
Commissioners showed that the majority of the Board's meetings
were actually devoted to other activities. For example, the
district owns commercial property that it leases to various
restaurants, karate clubs, and beautician schools. It also owns
two marinas, an airport, and it licenses a floating casino.
Collectively, based on our review of the minutes, these
enterprises consumed the majority of the Board's deliberating
time in recent years.
The tragedy that unfolded last August to one of America's
most vibrant cities was rooted in the failure of the levees.
That failure, in turn, did not happen by chance, but as a
result of fundamental flaws in design, construction, or
maintenance. Those flowed from basic problems with governance.
Superb engineers and competent contractors can solve some
of these issues, but until we face up honestly to the issue of
governance, we will have failed the citizens of New Orleans and
taxpayers across America. Confused, overlapping, and imprecise
roles, shortcomings in training and qualifications, the focus
on unrelated business activities, and complacency as to the
vulnerability of the system were the human flaws that Katrina
exposed.
The future of the city of New Orleans is inextricably
linked to its levee system. The Mayor, business leaders, and
the Federal Reconstruction Coordinator have all emphasized to
me that the private sector will not make significant
investments in the city without assurances that the levees will
be rebuilt stronger and better.
But that commitment to strengthening the levees must be
accompanied by significant reforms. The confusion and chaos
that characterized the current regulatory regime can no longer
be tolerated. Not only must we strengthen the levees
themselves, but also we must strengthen the oversight of the
entire levee system if we are truly to protect New Orleans from
another catastrophic failure.
I am very pleased today to recognize Senator Carper, who is
going to be acting as the Ranking Member today. Senator
Lieberman, who has been extremely involved in this
investigation and has a special interest in the integrity of
the levee system and its oversight, unfortunately is ill today
and is unable to join us. He has asked Senator Carper to very
ably step in to act as the Ranking Member, and I am pleased to
call upon him for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am honored to
sit at your right hand and to pinch hit for Senator Lieberman.
That was quite an opening statement, by the way. I do not
know that I can add a whole lot to it. I will try to
reemphasize a couple of points that you have made and maybe add
one or two others as well.
To our witnesses today, thank you for joining us, and we
look forward to hearing from you. You will get a chance to
speak, and thank you for your patience in the interim.
More than a million people in the New Orleans area--that is
more than the whole State of Delaware, by the way--counted on
the levees to protect their lives, to protect their homes, and
to protect their businesses. We must know why they failed, not
the people, not the businesses, not the homes--the levees. It
is the key, as the Chairman has said, to any rebuilding plan
for New Orleans.
Preliminary evidence from the teams examining the levees
suggest at least to us that design flaws contributed
significantly to the collapse of the levees. Media reports also
indicate that there may have been failures in the levee
maintenance and inspection regime. It also appears that there
was no plan in place to respond to a major breach of these
levees that are so critical to the life of this city and to the
lives of its citizens.
This morning our Committee will hear from representatives
of the key agencies at each level of government, Federal,
State, and local, who have the responsibilities over the levee
system. Each of you will explain how you viewed your
responsibilities for the design, for the construction, for the
maintenance of the levees, and who responds if they do fail.
In brief, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible
for the design and construction of the levees, as we have seen
and heard. The State Department of Transportation and
Development provides technical support to the levee district,
sometimes serving as a local sponsor itself. Local sponsors,
the levee districts, share the cost of constructing the levees
and are then responsible for operation and maintenance once the
levees are completed. Both the State and the Corps also have
ongoing oversight responsibilities of operation and maintenance
activities.
That all sounds simple enough, but a closer examination
reveals a more confused and disturbing picture. The Army Corps
says that they finished the levees and floodwalls and turned at
least most of them over to the Orleans Levee Board. At the same
time, the Corps admits that the levees continue to settle into
the earth and has continued to ask Congress and the
Administration for funding to build those levees back up and to
maintain them as a Federal responsibility. And also, although
Army Corps regulations require levee districts to immediately
repair damaged or below-grade sections, it often takes months
or even years before repairs are made.
To make matters worse, there is still confusion about what
level of protection the levees were capable of providing. The
Army Corps has stated for years that the system was capable of
withstanding a ``fast-moving Category 3'' storm, but this
system of rating the strength of hurricanes, known as the
Saffir-Simpson Scale, was not invented when these levees and
floodwalls were designed. And the hypothetical hurricane that
the Corps used as a basis for the design of the New Orleans
levees, known as the Standard Project Hurricane, does not
really fit the current definition of Category 3 hurricane.
In the case of wind speed, the Standard Project Hurricane
would be classified, I believe, as a Category 2 storm. In the
case of central pressure, it would be a Category 4. When
Committee staff asked for documentation to show how the Army
Corps of Engineers arrived at the conclusion that the levee
system would protect against a Category 3 hurricane, our staff
was told that there really was not any.
And finally, we know a lot more about hurricanes in the
Gulf of Mexico, and we are well aware of changes occurring in
the physical environment that impact the effectiveness of
levees in New Orleans, such as the settling and sinking of the
entire region, the loss of coastal wetlands, and the widening
of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet.
And despite this, there was no systematic effort at any
level of government to determine exactly what effect these
changes had on the level of protection provided by the levees.
As a result, there has been no chance in the design of the Lake
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project since the project was
authorized, I believe, in 1965. An effort begun in 1999 to
examine how to improve the levee protection to guard against a
Category 4 or Category 5 storm never got past the preliminary
study phase.
Finally, the response to the breaches is problematic.
Although the Army Corps of Engineers and the levee district
struggled under catastrophic conditions to close off the
floodwall breaches in the aftermath of Katrina, it is clear
that no one had a plan in place to deal with this kind of
disaster.
So, Madam Chairman, and to my colleagues, I conclude these
remarks really where I started. Over a million people depended
on these levees for their protection. Billions of dollars worth
of property and economic activity lay behind these barriers.
And yet, despite their enormous importance, the patchwork of
government agencies simply failed to ensure that the level of
protection the levees were intended to provide was in fact
being provided. Federal, State, and local leaders are now
trying to determine how to rebuild New Orleans and the
surrounding parishes flooded by Hurricane Katrina. A critical
element of those plans is going to be what level of hurricane
protection is needed?
As we will discuss this morning, it is not just a question
of building hurricane protection barriers that are high enough
to stand up to these storms, it is also imperative that we
reexamine the roles and responsibilities of the government
agencies at all levels that are responsible for the financing,
design, building, and maintenance of the levee system, as well
as for responding to emergencies. As we have seen in Katrina,
the levee system is only as strong as its weakest link, and
that a critical part of that system is the government agencies
that create and maintain it.
Thanks very much.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. I want to thank our two other
members for coming today.
I am now going to welcome our witnesses to the hearing. We
have representatives from the Federal, State, and local
government agencies that have a role in the design,
construction, operation, maintenance, and inspection of the
levees in New Orleans and in preparation for and in response to
emergencies involving those levees.
Colonel Richard Wagenaar is the District Engineer and
Commander for the New Orleans District of the Army Corps of
Engineers. The Colonel is a 26-year veteran of the U.S. Army
with significant command experience both in the United States
and abroad.
Alfred Naomi is the Senior Project Manager for the New
Orleans District of the Army Corps. Mr. Naomi has over 23 years
of experience as either a Project Manager or Senior Project
Manager with the Army Corps.
Gerard Colletti is the Operations Manager for Completed
Works for the Army Corps' New Orleans District. Mr. Colletti
started working for the Army Corps in 1977 as a student while
attending college. He began work for the Corps full time in
1982 and has rotated through several departments at the Corps,
including flood control, hurricane protection and emergency
management, and inspections of completed works.
Edmond Preau is the Assistant Secretary for Public Works
and Intermodal Transportation of the Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development. He is a registered professional
engineer and has worked for the Department or its predecessor
since 1968.
Also, Mr. Preau, I understand that you had to defer some
family obligations in order to be with us today. I want to
thank you very much for doing so. I understand that created
some hardship for you and your family, and I very much
appreciate your rearranging your schedule. I think your
testimony is very important to us, and our consideration would
have been incomplete without your participation, but I do very
much appreciate your being here.
James Huey served as the President of the Board of
Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District from June 1996 to
October of 2005. Prior to becoming the Board's President, Mr.
Huey served as a Commissioner and Chairman of the Board's
Engineering Committee. In total, Mr. Huey has served the Board
for approximately 13 years.
And finally, Max Hearn is the Executive Director for the
Orleans Levee District. After serving in the U.S. Air Force for
30 years, Mr. Hearn started working for the Orleans Levee
District in 1989 as the Director of Operations and Maintenance.
He became the Executive Director in 1997 and has served in that
capacity ever since.
I would ask that you all rise so that I can swear you in.
Do you swear that the testimony that you're about to give the
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you, God?
Colonel Wagenaar. I do.
Mr. Naomi. I do.
Mr. Colletti. I do.
Mr. Preau. I do.
Mr. Huey. I do.
Mr. Hearn. I do.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. It is my understanding that
Colonel Wagenaar, Mr. Huey, and Mr. Hearn have formal
statements and that the other witnesses today will be available
to respond to questions. So, Colonel, we will start with you.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD P. WAGENAAR,\1\ COLONEL, COMMANDER AND
DISTRICT ENGINEER, NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, ACCOMPANIED BY ALFRED C. NAOMI, SENIOR PROJECT
MANAGER, NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
AND GERARD A. COLLETTI, OPERATIONS MANAGERS FOR COMPLETED
WORKS, NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
Colonel Wagenaar. Madam Chairman and distinguished Members
of the Committee, I am Colonel Richard Wagenaar. I am the
Commander and District Engineer of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, New Orleans District, one of 45 operating around the
world. While the district is small in geographic area, it has
the most civil works staff of any district in the Corps today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Colonel Wagenaar appears in the
Appendix on page 63.
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The primary missions of the district include operating and
maintaining navigation on the Mississippi River and other
navigable waters in South Louisiana, constructing flood and
storm damage reduction projects, and working with other Federal
agencies and the State to restore the aquatic ecosystem of
Coastal Louisiana.
I am honored to be testifying before your Committee today
on the roles and responsibilities of the Corps of Engineers
related to storm damage reduction in the metropolitan New
Orleans area and our response prior to, during, and following
Hurricane Katrina.
My statement covers the following topics: The storm damage
reduction system for the metropolitan New Orleans area;
responsibility for operations, maintenance, and inspection of
the system; and the role of the Corps of Engineers New Orleans
District in responding to Hurricane Katrina.
In the metropolitan New Orleans area, the Corps has
constructed two large storm damage reduction projects, the West
Bank Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project and
the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Louisiana Hurricane
Protection Project.
The Corps designed the West Bank project to reduce the risk
of storm damage on the West Bank of the Mississippi River from
storm surges coming from Lakes Cataouatche and Salvador and
waterways leading to the Gulf of Mexico. It covers parts of
Orleans, Jefferson, and Plaquemines Parishes and includes the
Westwego to Harvey Canal, and the Lake Cataouatche and East of
Harvey Canal areas. The Corps designed the Lake Pontchartrain
and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project to reduce the risk of
storm damage between Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi
River Levee from storm surges coming from Lake Pontchartrain.
It covers parts of St. Bernard, Orleans, Jefferson, and St.
Charles Parishes.
In accordance with Title 33, Part 208.10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, operations and maintenance of these two
projects is a non-Federal responsibility. For the West Bank and
Vicinity Project, the Louisiana Department of Transportation
and Development is the non-Federal sponsor for construction,
and the West Jefferson Levee District is the non-Federal
sponsor for operations and maintenance.
For the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project, the Lake
Borgne Basin and Levee District, St. Bernard Parish, the
Orleans Levee District, the East Jefferson Levee District, and
the Pontchartrain Levee District are sponsors for the work in
St. Bernard, Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Charles Parishes
respectively.
The levees in the New Orleans area are inspected visually
on a regular basis by both the Corps and the local levee
district, together and independently. Specifically, the Corps
has an annual inspection program, with the New Orleans District
Engineer and with the appropriate design engineers. The local
levee districts patrol the system periodically between the
annual joint inspections. The Corps also completed a joint
inspection of the Orleans area with both the levee district and
the State in June 2005.
The Corps of Engineers responds in three ways to natural
disasters. In all cases, our priorities are to support efforts
to save lives and find people, to sustain lives through the
provision of water and shelter, and to set the conditions for
recovery, such as cleanup and restoring infrastructure and
navigation.
First we respond in support of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. We also provide engineering assistance, as
needed, in support of the Department of Defense military
forces, who are responding to the disaster. Finally, we act
under our own civil works mission responsibilities, which in
the area impacted by Katrina involved principally our storm and
flood damage reduction and commercial navigation missions.
For example, we conduct surveys of all of the structures in
the area, both navigation and flood and storm damage reduction,
and then begin to make repairs. We are also working under our
Public Law 84-99 authority with the local parishes to repair
the levee systems that were damaged during the event. Under
this authority, we repair structures built by the Corps, as
well as non-federally built structures that qualify for the
Corps Rehabilitation and Inspection Program.
I took command of the New Orleans District on July 12,
2005. Prior to my arrival, the district had participated in an
annual hurricane preparedness exercise conducted by our
regional headquarters, the Mississippi Valley Division. The
district also hosted a day long hurricane preparedness
conference on July 25, in which representatives of local,
State, and Federal emergency offices attended. Also, prior to
Hurricane Katrina, district emergency teams reviewed their
crisis information and made preliminary plans for activation,
including prepositioning equipment and supplies.
About a week prior to landfall in Louisiana, I began
monitoring the storm as it moved east of Florida. On August 24,
we monitored Hurricane Katrina's projections, and I directed
that a block of hotel rooms be secured in Vicksburg,
Mississippi. As provided in our crisis plan, I coordinated the
activation and deployment of the Crisis Management Team. On
August 26, I advised my commander, Mississippi Valley Division
Commander Brigadier General Robert Crear, that forecasts did
not bode well for New Orleans and key decisions would be made
from my Emergency Operations Center (EOC) the following day.
After an emergency meeting on August 27, I issued an
evacuation order for the New Orleans District staff under the
Department of Defense Alternate Safe Haven Plan, with teams
deployed to alternate operations sites. I also ordered the main
district building closed for Monday, August 29. The Crisis
Management Team established a temporary district headquarters
in Vicksburg, Mississippi. The District Reconstitution Team
deployed to Baton Rouge, and other emergency teams deployed to
various locations with orders to be operational no later than 4
p.m. on August 28.
Soon after my arrival into my district EOC on August 28,
the division conducted a conference call to discuss and assess
preparations. Immediately following the call, my Chief of
Emergency Management and I visited the Orleans and Jefferson
Parish EOCs and had short meetings with emergency officials. At
8 p.m., I ordered my team to the bunker. Eight district
employees and I remained at the district to coordinate
operations in a bunker designed to withstand a Category 5
hurricane. Our goal was to monitor how the levee system was
faring, talking by phone with local parish and city officials,
and to provide immediate post-storm assessment to the chain of
command.
The biggest challenge both during the storm and its
aftermath was communications. The Corps and all of its partners
have redundancies built in to provide backup. However, each
time one system failed, it seemed as though everyone moved to
the next redundancy and then overloaded it. Throughout the
night we received numerous reports of overtopped, failing, or
breached levees. After a few hours of sleep, I was woken up
early August 29, Monday, and was told that water was
overtopping a levee or that there was a levee failure. Many of
these reports came from a local radio station. Around that
time, we also received a call from a district employee who
reported overtopping of the walls along the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal. There was little that could be done to
investigate at that time since the worst of the storm was upon
us. By about 11 a.m., the winds had decreased some and the
weather was beginning to clear. By 2 p.m., we had moved from
the bunker and reestablished the Emergency Operations Center in
the main district office building. Around this time is when I
believe we first received a call regarding the breach at the
17th Street Canal.
We departed the main district building at about 3 p.m. It
was apparent as soon as we left the district that New Orleans
had suffered catastrophic damage. Due to debris, water, and
live electrical wires, it took us an hour-and-a-half to get to
the Causeway and I-10 intersection, about three miles from the
main district office building. Blocked here, we attempted to
travel east to get to the canal and were stopped at the I-10/
610 split where the water levels left only treetops exposed. I
didn't know the city all that well, but I knew rainwater didn't
cause flooding like this. Based on the water height at that
location, it was obvious that significant flooding was
occurring.
We also attempted to drive to the canal from another route,
but the high water, debris, and strong winds kept us from
getting through to inspect damage to the levee. We made our way
back to the main district office building in the early evening.
It was around this time that we heard media reports about how
the city had ``dodged a bullet,'' but it was clear to us that
conditions were very bad. Soon after this, I submitted a
situation report to my division commander.
Due to the extreme conditions outside, we put together a
security and escape plan. We continued our attempts to
communicate with district teams and local officials. We had
difficulty calling out, but people could call us
intermittently. Sometime that evening, Rudy St. Germaine,
engineer of the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board, joined
us. We managed to request a helicopter, and last we heard it
was supposed to arrive the next day at 7:30 a.m. We hunkered
down for the night.
Immediately the following morning, August 30, I dispatched
two people to the 17th Street Canal, who commandeered a boat to
inspect the canal. The helicopter arrived at 9:15 a.m., and Mr.
St. Germaine and I were able to view the city from above
shortly afterwards. I saw the breach at the 17th Street Canal,
and then we flew over toward the east side of the city. The
bridge spans on Interstate 10 were knocked off their
foundations or gone completely. Devastation was widespread, but
it was in the Six Flags area in New Orleans East that I first
saw hundreds, if not thousands, of people on their roofs
waiting to be rescued.
When we flew over the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal we
found three breaches. It was at this time that we determined
that water was actually draining out of the Lower 9th Ward area
and not into the neighborhood area.
After completing an overflight of the rest of the city, I
returned to my main district office building at approximately
2:30 p.m. and attempted to call the CMT in Vicksburg to
initiate coordination. At that time I also found two district
construction representatives in my EOC that reported in
voluntarily. We immediately put together a plan to initiate
operations on the 17th Street Canal in conjunction with the
West Jefferson Levee District.
Throughout the rest of the day and evening, with
intermittent communications, we worked a plan to repair the
breach on the canal. The Crisis Management Team in Vicksburg
immediately began orchestrating the necessary resources and
materials to stem the flow of water. With verbal authorization,
Corps contractors responded.
Normal transportation routes were impassable, complicating
even small tasks. The security, transportation, communications,
and living conditions at this point were marginal at best. We
were working 24 hours a day at this point.
By August 31, the Corps had begun marshaling resources.
Contractors, material, and equipment were arriving at the 17th
Street Canal site. By that afternoon, 10 large sandbags were
dropped into the breach in our first attempt to close the
breach. The activities at the site were chaotic, as three to
four different operations were being executed with multiple
agencies involved.
By September 1, contractors had begun delivering sand,
gravel, and large rock to areas on the 17th Street Canal, where
an access road was being built to reach the breach. Deliveries
were also being made to the sandbag staging area in the
vicinity of the Coast Guard station, where thousands of 2- to
5-ton sandbags were being prepared.
The next step at the 17th Street Canal and later the London
Avenue Canal was to cut off flow from Lake Pontchartrain.
Contractors drove 150 feet of steel piling across the canal to
seal it. Meanwhile, Army Chinook and Black Hawk helicopter
crews began placing 7,000-pound sandbags, an average of 600
bags each day, into the breaches. One breach took over 2,000
sandbags before engineers could see the bags under the water
surface.
Sandbagging operations ran 24 hours a day for 10 days, with
riggers averaging one to three hookups every 2 minutes during
daylight hours. We stockpiled 1,500 bags and even more rock to
address future repairs. Crane barges were also used to place
sandbags, stone, and gravel, especially along breaches on the
Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, where ground access was
nonexistent. Expedient repairs were made to two breaches there.
A week to the day after Katrina, the 17th Street Canal
breach was closed. For the next week, which included a rescue
of one of our employees, I was involved in the formation of
Task Force Unwatering under the command of Colonel Duane
Gapinski and accompanied the President during his visit.
By September 8, I had turned my attention to the
reconstitution of the New Orleans District. Many of our
employees in the New Orleans District lost their homes and
belongings, the same as their friends and neighbors, but
returned to the main district office building to work and to
help ensure that their fellow citizens were able to begin the
recovery and rebuilding process. I am immensely proud of them
for their sense of duty and their selfless service.
This concludes my statement. Again, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify today. I would be pleased to answer any
questions you may have.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Huey.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. HUEY,\1\ FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS OF THE ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT
Mr. Huey. My name is James P. Huey, and I am the former
President of the Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee
District, having served as the Board's President from June 1996
until October 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Huey appears in the Appendix on
page 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I appreciate the opportunity this Committee has afforded me
to testify here today. I want to take this opportunity to thank
your staff and the delegation investigating this very important
segment of the flood control system. They have conducted
themselves in a very professional and courteous manner and have
been sensitive and courteous in gathering the information and
facts that will be crucial to this Committee in identifying any
weakness and/or problem that may have contributed to the
disaster that Hurricane Katrina created for the city of New
Orleans and the surrounding parishes.
I completely understand the importance of providing the
information in a truthful and factual manner, so that this
Committee will have the best information possible. This is the
only way to assure that our community will be provided with the
appropriate flood control system to protect their property and
lives.
In order for our community to rebuild and recover from this
catastrophic event, our people must have the confidence that
the proper solutions will be formulated and that the errors
identified are corrected. This can only be accomplished if we
all tell the truth and provide the facts regardless of our
personal and/or self-interest. It is with this spirit and
understanding that I testify today.
I appear before this Committee with a sense of the deepest
sadness in the wake of the greatest natural catastrophe in
American history, Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina
virtually destroyed the great city of New Orleans, where I was
raised, grew up, and have made my home since boyhood. This
hurricane affected me personally. I have been displaced from my
home and witnessed catastrophic destruction to the city that is
my home. This hurricane also resulted in my resignation as
President of the Board in late October under criticism
primarily for actions taken by me immediately after the storm.
I am not here to defend those actions or take up this
Committee's valuable time debating those issues because they do
not concern the important issue and enormous challenge being
addressed by this Committee: Understanding how the recent
catastrophe caused by the flooding of the city of New Orleans
can be avoided in the future.
I also do not appear here as an advocate for any particular
cause or viewpoint; the issues are of such gravity and stretch
beyond the realm of personal or partisan interest. I hope,
therefore, that you will receive what I say solely as the
expression of a concerned citizen with one purpose in mind, to
assist you in your awesome responsibility of formulating
policies for the flood protection of one of the greatest cities
in our country. And it is at this level of the Congress of the
United States that these issues need to be debated and policy
decisions made because flood control protection for the city of
New Orleans and the Lake Pontchartrain vicinity has been the
product of national legislation since enactment of the Flood
Control Act of 1965.
In your letter to me, dated December 7, 2005, you stated
that the focus of this hearing would be on the roles and
responsibilities of the Federal, State, and local government
entities for the design, construction, operation and
maintenance, and inspection of the levees, and the preparation
for, and response to, levee emergencies in metropolitan New
Orleans. You also stated in this letter that I would be asked
to testify concerning my experiences as President of the
Orleans Levee Board, particularly with respect to the Orleans
Levee District's operation and maintenance procedures and
policies, inspection of the levees, and also the financial
resources available and used to meet the levee district's
primary mission of protecting the lives and property of the
citizens of Orleans Parish by constructing, operating, and
maintaining the levees within the district's jurisdiction. I
will do so to my very best to share with you my understanding
of these matters and my experience as a Commissioner and as
President of the Orleans Levee Board on how these matters were
addressed and dealt with by the Orleans Levee Board and
District.
The floodwalls and levees that failed during the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on the city of New Orleans were constructed
by the U.S. Corps of Engineers as part of the Lake
Pontchartrain and Vicinity High Level Plan. When I was
appointed to the levee board as a commissioner in 1992, the
Board was actively pursuing the commencement of the
construction of parallel protection for the London Avenue,
Orleans Avenue, and 17th Street Canals. The role and
responsibilities of the Orleans Levee District for this project
was to act as local sponsor and, as such, provide certain
assurances for this project to the Corps and its consideration
of the Corps constructing the project. These assurances by the
Board, as local sponsor, were set forth in a number of
agreements between the Board and the United States of America,
by and through the Corps of Engineers, dating back to July
1966. The responsibilities and obligations of the Board, as the
authorized local governmental body to enter into these
agreements under Louisiana law, were set forth in detail in
these agreements.
These obligations of the Board as local sponsor, referred
to as ``assurances'' in these agreements, consisted of the
following:
To provide all lands, easements, and right-of-ways,
including borrow and spoil disposal areas necessary for
construction, operation, and maintenance of the
project;
To accomplish all necessary alterations and
relocations to roads, railroads, pipelines, cables,
wharves, drainage structures, and other facilities
required for the construction of the project;
To hold and save the United States free from damages
due to the construction works;
To provide 30 percent of the cost for the project
through cash contributions in lump sum, or in
installments paid at least annually, in proportion to
the Federal appropriation for the project, in
accordance with the construction schedules as required
by the Chief Engineer of the United States Corps of
Engineers; or as substitute for any part of the cash
contribution, to accomplish, in accordance with
approved construction schedules, items of work of
equivalent value as determined by the Chief Engineer;
To provide all interior drainage and pumping plants
required for reclamation and development of the
protected areas;
To maintain and operate after completion of a project
all features of the project in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the Corps;
To acquire adequate easements or other interest in
land to prevent encroachment on existing ponding areas,
unless substitute storage capacity or equivalent
pumping capacity if provided promptly; and
To comply with all applicable provisions of the
Federal law relating to the project, including the
Flood Control Act, Uniform Relocation Assistance and
Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In connection with the local cost share for these projects,
including the floodwalls for parallel protection on the London
Avenue and 17th Street Canals, the levee district was
authorized to identify and select engineering consultant firms
to participate in the work on the parallel protection plan and
provide services in accordance with the requirements of the
Corps. The payments made by the levee district to these
consultants were an in-kind contribution and credited on the 30
percent local sponsor contribution. The levee district did
secure the services of engineering firms for the design phases
of these projects, and their work was subject to the review and
approval of the Corps. After the Corps approved the engineering
work for the project, the Corps then entered into contracts for
the construction of the project with local contractors.
These were the responsibilities and duties of the Orleans
Levee District in connection with the design and construction
of floodwalls on the outfall canals that failed as a result of
the impact of Hurricane Katrina. As set forth in the
assurances, after these projects were completed, the Orleans
Levee District's personnel maintained and inspected these
projects consisting of 27.8 miles of inner levees and
floodwalls in the city of New Orleans. In addition, the
district maintained and inspected some 73.4 miles of front-line
levees on Lake Pontchartrain and 27.5 miles of Mississippi
River levees and floodwalls protecting the citizens of the city
of New Orleans. In total, the district maintains and inspects a
total of some 128 miles of levees, including 203 floodgates and
102 valves. As required under the assurances, the operation and
maintenance of these levees is in accordance with the
regulations prescribed by the U.S. Corps of Engineers.
During my tenure as Commissioner on the Orleans Levee
Board, I can tell you that we worked closely with the Corps'
district office in New Orleans and had an open and solid
working relationship with the Corps. Prior to my election as
President of the Board, I served as Chairman of the Board's
Engineering Committee, and as such, I was personally familiar
with the parallel protection plan authorized and constructed by
the Corps. This committee met monthly, and a Corps
representative updated the district on the status of the work
at each monthly committee meeting. Also, after my election as
President, the Corps representatives each month attended
committee meetings of the Board and briefed the Committees on
the status of projects as well as future projects necessary to
complete the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane
Protection Plan.
I can also inform you that, to my knowledge, there were no
complaints by the Corps about the inspection and maintenance of
the flood protection system by the Orleans Levee District. In
addition, the recent reports that the system was only inspected
biannually and only in a cursory manner by levee district and
Corps representatives are inaccurate and unfounded. As will be
discussed by the Executive Director of the District, inspection
of the flood control system was a daily function of the
operations and maintenance departments of the levee district.
The Executive Director of the Levee District, Max Hearn, well
knows the procedures followed since he served as the Director
of Operations and Maintenance until his promotion to Executive
Director in 1997.
The maintenance and inspection of the levee system was also
conducted under the supervision of the Orleans Levee District
Engineering Department. The district has a Chief Engineer, an
Assistant Chief Engineer, and a staff that report to the Board
each month at Committee and Board meetings. Furthermore, while
I was President over the past 9 years, I was available on a
daily basis to discuss any needs or concerns of the levee
district staff, especially any related to flood control.
In sum, after serving 13 years on the Orleans Levee Board,
I can earnestly tell you that it was my understanding that the
primary responsibility for design and construction of the flood
protection system of the city of New Orleans rested with the
U.S. Corps of Engineers. The Orleans Levee District did not
unilaterally initiate flood control projects, which were
subject to the direction and control of the U.S. Corps of
Engineers. I do not say this in any way to cast blame for the
recent catastrophe on the Corps. I say this because this is how
things were, and are. This was the reality when I was appointed
and throughout my tenure on the Board. There are good reasons
why this was the case. The scope and cost of these projects are
far beyond the financial capability of local governmental
agencies. Simply put, flood protection is a national obligation
beyond the capacity of State and local governments.
The local government entities have obligations, as
reflected in the assurances, to be provided for the projects,
and the Orleans Levee District provided these assurances for
completion of these projects by the Corps. After completion of
these projects by the Corps, the Orleans Levee District
operated, maintained, and inspected these flood protection
projects in accordance with the regulations of the Corps.
During the time I served on the Board, the levee district
also had a legal department that attended to all of the legal
questions confronted by the district, including the Board's
obligations under Federal and State laws relating to flood
control. While a member of the Board, I cannot recall one
instance when we were advised either by our in-house counsel or
through outside complaints brought to our attention that the
Board was not fulfilling its legal obligation regarding any
aspect of the operation, maintenance, or inspection of the
flood control system that protected the lives and properties of
our citizens of the city of New Orleans.
I appreciate the opportunity to make this statement and
will do my best to answer your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, Mr. Huey. Mr. Hearn.
TESTIMONY OF MAX L. HEARN,\1\ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ORLEANS LEVEE
DISTRICT
Mr. Hearn. Senator Collins, Committee Members, thank you
for inviting me to participate in these hearings.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Hearn appears in the Appendix on
page 79.
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I'm Max Hearn, Executive Director of the Orleans Levee
District, and I'm a resident of Jefferson Parish, just outside
the city of New Orleans, and live there with my family. My home
is within the area protected by the flood control structures,
and we were impacted, along with our neighbors, by Hurricane
Katrina and the aftermath. Consequently, both in my capacity as
the Director of the levee district, as a husband and homeowner,
I welcome this Senate investigation.
We citizens of Louisiana and residents of New Orleans share
your concerns regarding the integrity of the flood control
structures that protect our city, our homes, and our families.
We also share your goal to determine what went wrong and to
take preventative measures to ensure that the loss of life and
devastation to property never occurs in New Orleans or any
other community protected by the Lake Pontchartrain and
Vicinity Hurricane Protection system.
As stated earlier, I served in the U.S. Air Force from 1959
until my retirement from active duty in 1989, after attaining
the rank of colonel. Beginning in 1989, I was employed as the
Director of Operations and Maintenance for the Orleans Levee
District. I became the Executive Director of the levee district
in 1997 and serve in that capacity today. In these capacities,
I am very familiar with the relationships among the various
governmental entities involved with the flood control systems
and the operation and maintenance of these systems.
As you know, a large portion of New Orleans lies below sea
level. The city is surrounded by water, wetlands, and marsh,
and is threatened by the Mississippi River, Lake Pontchartrain,
and the Gulf of Mexico. Consequently, flood protection is
essential to this city.
As I appreciate the Flood Control Act of 1928, the Federal
Government, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, assumed
primary responsibility for the national flood control system.
As such, the Corps determined where the levees and flood
control structures were needed, established the criteria for
the design and construction of the levees, then assigned the
operation and maintenance responsibilities for the levees over
to local governmental bodies, like the levee district.
The levee district was created by the Louisiana legislature
as the State governmental entity charged to coordinate and
cooperate with the Federal Government with respect to flood
control structures built under the National Flood Control Act.
The district's jurisdiction, as Mr. Huey said, includes 73
miles of front-line levees, 28 miles of inner levees and
floodwalls, 28 miles of Mississippi River levees, 203
floodgates, 102 valves, and two flood control structures.
Following Hurricane Betsy in 1965, which caused extensive
flooding in New Orleans, the Corps of Engineers worked with the
levee districts in the region to design and build upgrades to
the flood control system. The floodwalls for the New Orleans
outfall canals, which are the focus of this Committee's
attention, are part of the Corps of Engineers' Lake
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Plan. The
designs for these flood walls were approved by the Corps and
construction was commenced in the late 1980s. As sections of
the project were completed, the floodwalls and levees were
turned over to the levee district for operation and
maintenance.
The levee district's operation and maintenance procedures
are conducted in accordance with Federal regulations and under
the oversight of the Corps. In fact, the levee district was
required to enter into contracts with the Federal Government
assuring that the operation and maintenance of the levees
constructed under the Federal Flood Control Act would comply
with the Federal regulations and the Corps of Engineers
guidelines. These regulations and guidelines set forth specific
inspection and operation procedures.
The levee district maintenance supervisors conduct major
inspections prior to the beginning of the hurricane flood
season and during high-water events. Additionally, at regular
intervals of at least a monthly basis, district work crews and
supervisors, in conjunction with regularly scheduled
maintenance, observe the levee system and the flood control
structures within the district's jurisdiction.
During any inspection of the levees and floodwalls, the
district employees check for levee problems including unusual
subsidence, encroachment by trees, shrubs, or private
structures, animal burrows, seepage, sand boils, leaks, caving,
erosion, slides, sloughs, and for floodwall problems including
accumulation of trash or debris, things growing on the
floodwall, cracked, unstable, or misaligned floodwalls. Levee
district employees are trained to report any problems observed
during their routine maintenance activities to their supervisor
for corrective action.
The Corps conducts annual inspections of the flood control
structures within the Orleans Levee District's jurisdiction and
grades the levee district on compliance. During my tenure as
the Executive Director of the Orleans Levee District, the Corps
has always evaluated the district's compliance level as
``Outstanding.''
The district operates the gates, valves, and other flood
control structures as appropriate for various high water and
storm events.
In preparation for the approach of Hurricane Katrina, the
levee district instituted its emergency operations plan, which
included the activation of the Emergency Operations Center,
located at the Lakefront Airport Administration Building, and
the mustering of the Emergency Maintenance Crews. Additionally,
the district assured that sufficient food, water, fuel,
sandbags, trucks, and equipment were on hand for the emergency
response.
Prior to Katrina's impact, levee district employees closed
all of the hurricane flood protection gates and valves, along
with 13 floodgates on the Mississippi River. As the hurricane
approached and as water levels began to rise, district
employees monitored the water levels and patrolled the flood
control system. As weather conditions deteriorated and became
unsafe, the district's employees were pulled into sheltered
areas to ride out the storm.
During the storm, 60 levee district employees were staged
at the Franklin Avenue facility, 19 at the Emergency Operations
Center, and additionally, 43 district police officers were
stationed at various locations. At the height of the storm one
of the walls of the administration building blew out and the
lower floor eventually flooded to a depth of about 4 feet.
Additionally, one of the buildings used as a staging facility
for the Emergency Maintenance Crews was damaged during the
storm.
On the morning of August 30, conditions had abated such
that field inspections were possible. District employees
immediately inspected flood control structures that were
accessible and coordinated with the Corps of Engineers, the
Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, and the
East and West Jefferson Levee Districts, to respond to the 17th
Street Canal breach.
The 17th Street Canal breach was inaccessible to our land-
based equipment due to flooding. Beginning August 30, and using
sandbags and equipment staged by the Orleans Levee District,
U.S. Army personnel began airlifting sandbags to close the
breach. On August 31, the Department of Transportation and
Development began construction of a road to the breach so that
land-based repair could be conducted.
The levee district was requested by the Corps to close the
London Avenue Canal mouth, and this closure was completed on
September 2, 2005. The Corps suggested that we build a ramp
across the Norfolk Southern Railroad tracks to Jordan Road to
allow heavy equipment access to Lakeshore Drive. This ramp was
completed on September 5.
The National Guard commandeered the Franklin facility on
September 6 to provide additional security and assistance for
the area, and at that time we relocated to Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, in accordance with our Business Continuity Plan.
This concludes my formal statement, and I'll entertain any
questions you may have for me.
Chairman Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Hearn.
Colonel, when you assessed the scene at the 17th Street
Canal levee breach, who did you think was in charge of making
the repairs?
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, my original thought was that it
was the Orleans Levee District.
Chairman Collins. In your statement this morning you
describe the situation at that breach as being chaotic. In the
staff interview you referred to a turf war that you found.
Could you describe for the Committee the confrontation that you
encountered at the 17th Street Canal breach?
Colonel Wagenaar. Yes, Senator. The situation--I mean
understanding that there was no communications, the canal was
literally surrounded by water on all sides, our initial
coordination--because we had no communications with the Orleans
Levee District, my two construction reps typically work on the
West Bank of New Orleans. They were in contact with the West
Jefferson Levee District. That canal typically is the border
between Orleans Levee District and East Jefferson Levee
District. West Jefferson Levee District had the assets to
immediately move into the area sandbags and some equipment to
move to the site to do some work initially. So we had three
levee districts involved in a repair operation, and the Corps
really wasn't initially engaged because it was up to the levee
district to attempt a repair.
About 2 days into the repair, the Corps had started
bringing resources from around the Southeast of the United
States, contractors, many major contractors moving into the
area. But--and we wanted to engage all of those resources into
the repair, however, personalities, the situation, hours
without sleep, they would not let the Corps of Engineers
operate in that area to attempt multiple different courses of
action to try and stop the water from flowing into the city.
There were personalities out there that prevented the Corps
from establishing overall control of the site--and this was
about day two or three after the hurricane--until Secretary
Bradbury from the State DOTD and the Director of Civil Works
from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers arrived and directed all
State entities to work for the Corps of Engineers. There was no
direct oversight by the Corps until that time.
Chairman Collins. When the Corps tried to bring in special
equipment, did anyone try to block that?
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, there was a turf war on the site
because one project was being done by one entity and the Corps
tried to bring in all their contractors at one time. We didn't
care who was working on what. We just wanted the hole filled.
But there was an individual from the West Jefferson Levee
District that wanted exclusive use or construction of the road
behind the levee wall, and when the Corps tried to get involved
in supporting that effort, he literally blocked our equipment
from operating on the bridge.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Preau, who do you think was
responsible for that repair?
TESTIMONY OF EDMOND J. PREAU, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY, PUBLIC
WORKS AND INTERMODAL TRANSPORTATION, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Preau. Originally, the levee districts are supposed to
be first responders on situations like this. If it is beyond
their control, beyond their resources, then it would move up to
the State level to take over. I think it was beyond the State's
resources at that point. We looked towards the Federal
Government, who had a lot more resources than we did, and who
we've relied upon in the past to do major repairs.
If you read the project agreements, most major repairs are
to be undertaken by the Corps of Engineers on Federal projects.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Huey, what is your view on this? Who
do you see as being in charge?
Mr. Huey. Well, first of all, I'd like to clarify the fact
that this is the first I heard of that situation, and I think
it's an excellent situation. First of all, you have a levee
district who's from another parish, who's telling a colonel
from the Corps of Engineers--I've never heard of anything of
that nature.
But, first of all, it is unequivocally, I would say, the
Corps of Engineers. And again, history and time will prove, and
through every--I always look at it--and previous colonels that
I have met may look at it in fact that the levee district is a
client, a partner with the Corps of Engineers in flood
protection. That's often stated from time to time. We are a
resource for the Corps of Engineers. I look at it from the
standpoint, from my level, is that they're the head, they're
the brains. They have the engineering, the design, the overall
knowledge of how the flood protection system should be
constructed, and so forth.
The levee district provides substantial resources, and as I
mentioned in my statement, the various assurances and so forth.
We've provided resources, sandbags, whatever equipment we have
available to the Corps. In previous storms, George as being a
tropical storm, we identified the effects of the coastal
erosion from high levels, and we pump our water. We're one of
the few places in the entire world, next to the Netherlands,
that I understand, we have no gravitational drainage, we're in
a bowl. So those levees are the critical part.
And our pumping stations are designed to pump the water
into the river, the lake, or these canals. So the water levels
rose to the levels of the--where the pumping station basically
had no place to pump, and we provided and worked with the Corps
with providing sandbags and things of that nature or whatever.
But that is my understanding, the Corps of Engineers.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. I am going to pursue this
issue in the second round of questions. My time has expired.
But I think your answers, as well as what happened at that
site, demonstrates the need for far more clarity in
establishing who is in charge and when does maintenance,
routine maintenance become a major repair. Does that change who
becomes responsible?
Senator Carper. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
I have some specific questions, I just want to go back and
ask our three witnesses who have spoken, just to put in your
own words, in layman's terms, the respective responsibilities
of each of the three entities that we have heard from. I am
going to ask each of you to describe what you believe to be the
Army Corps' responsibilities, what you believe to be the New
Orleans District's responsibilities, and so forth.
And then I am going to ask each of you to say whether you
agree with the other assessments or not, and just words that
anybody could listen in and sort of understand this.
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator Carper, as the District Engineer
for the New Orleans District, I am responsible for hurricane
protection, flood control, navigation, ecosystem restoration,
and water resources development projects in southern Louisiana
and the metropolitan area of New Orleans. I am responsible for
that program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The Hurricane Protection Project, as a comprehensive
project, the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project, is a
Corps of Engineer project, comprehensive. It has multiple
different components. When viewed comprehensively, the Corps of
Engineers is responsible for the project as a whole. As
components are completed, such as the 17th Street Canal, the
operations and maintenance is turned over to the local
authorities, the local levee districts or levee boards; that is
why I believe when the canal--as a separate entity--that's why
I believed at the time that the levee board was responsible for
the immediate action on that canal, pending any request through
the process of State, Federal, back down to the Corps for
support.
Senator Carper. Talk to us about the responsibility of the
State. The Department of Transportation and Development, how do
they figure into this?
Colonel Wagenaar. I can't give you the specifics. Mr. Preau
may be able to do that.
Senator Carper. Just your understanding.
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, my view is, is that they
somewhat have an overarching command and control structure of
the levee districts in facilitating mutual support, and we look
to the State to provide guidance to the levee boards. But
that's about the extent of my knowledge in regards to their
ability to have oversight over those levee boards and
districts.
Senator Carper. Good, thanks.
Mr. Huey, the same question, if you will, just in your own
terms, to where you agree with the Colonel's interpretation,
and just add to or take away from that. Your understanding of
the relative responsibilities in a situation like this of both
the Army Corps, the State, and the levee district?
Mr. Huey. First of all, you said in my own words. I was
sitting here reading Orleans Levee District responsibilities
basically prepared for me, what-have-you, but from just the
day-to-day experience, from the outlook of a commissioner.
Understanding the fact that our staff works hand-in-glove with
the Corps day to day. That's one of the primary, our
engineering staff, our people on a daily basis, we have a
tremendous relationship.
On the other hand, they attend--Mr. Naomi, who is here,
attends virtually every meeting of the Orleans Levee District,
both committee meetings and board meetings, and that's who us,
as commissioners, and the people look to as our experts and
people who are constructing and building the flood protection
system, and we're working hand-in-glove as their support team
and assuring that it is maintained and serviced properly.
I think one of the biggest weaknesses here appears to be in
an emergency situation, who steps up to the plate. First of
all, I would like to clarify one of the things, that the
Orleans Levee District was--the only dry area in the city was
along Lakeshore Drive. Our folks, Mr. Hearn and about 60 of our
people, were trapped in this facility for 10 days. During that
period of time, they were the ones bringing the 5,000 pound
sandbags from our facility back and forth along this particular
area.
As the Colonel said, one of the most frustrating problems
was communications. We virtually had none. I could only get Max
on the phone or the radio for a matter of a minute or two, and
he was trying to tell me what was going on there, and vice
versa, and I had headed to Baton Rouge for the recovery effort.
So--but our people did join in. We support them. If in fact the
situation would have been they were out, which Max will tell
you, exploring these areas, and a lot of the information we
were getting was from scattered news media reports, rumors,
things of that nature also, but again, I disagree from the
standpoint of the fact that we look to the Corps.
Now, our people may be responsible for the first ones out
there, and if we spot a breach or a problem, contact the Corps,
get them in here because we're not prepared, we don't have the
helicopters or certain things, or the--really, I would have to
say the expertise of the type of engineers they have to say,
``You have this breach coming in here. What do we do?''
Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Hearn, your response to the
same question, if you would, please. What I am trying to get is
just a lay person's understanding of the relative
responsibilities of the three major entities here, Federal,
State, and local.
Mr. Hearn. I think the responsibility for a breach like
this is above the Orleans Levee District, but we would go to
DOTD and the Corps to get their support because they can do the
contracting or get whatever is necessary. I think the
confusion--if there is a way to explain that--is that it was on
the Orleans Levee District side. We couldn't get to it because
the depth of the water. East Jeff was trying to help out. West
Jeff had the riprap.
And that turf war that occurred, according to the Colonel,
over on the Hammond Highway Bridge, I think it was just assumed
that that's the Orleans Levee District's responsibility, and we
couldn't come anywhere close to it. So, to me, it's a matter of
if the Orleans Levee District could handle it, then we would.
We would go to DOTD and the Corps at the same time, and it's a
partnership between the three of us to handle whatever breach
we may have.
Senator Carper. My time has expired, and I look forward to
a second round. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Senator Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I thank you
for these hearings. I think you and Senator Lieberman are doing
an outstanding job. This is the ninth Katrina hearing, and I
think that once the investigation is complete you will come
back with a comprehensive report that delineates the problems
and proposes good solutions.
It is obvious to me from the testimony here and from
reading some of the interviews that there is a real lack of
understanding about who is responsible for what. It is clear
that opinions about who should have assumed responsibility vary
widely. Madam Chairman, as a former mayor and governor, I think
that if I were sitting at today's witness table, I would have
thought that the Chairman had taken me out to the shed for a
good tongue-lashing. And if you listened carefully to what was
said, Madam Chairman, today's witnesses did not do the job they
were supposed to be doing. I am concerned about that, and I am
sure that you are too. I think that some of you were not as
candid in your testimony here as you were when you were with
the staff. It appears that there are some differences in terms
of information from the testimony and information the staff
picked up from their interviews.
The point I am making is that we have not done the job,
Madam Chairman, that we should have been doing over the years
in terms of funding the Army Corps of Engineers and dealing
with some of the problems that we have in this country. We have
been penny wise and pound foolish in terms of our human capital
and our physical capital needs of this agency and, quite
frankly, a bunch of other agencies.
The thing that really frustrates me is, is that this Lake
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project was
first authorized in 1965. This is the 41st year. As of early
2005, the project was not expected to be completed until 2015,
nearly 50 years after it was authorized. Prior to Katrina, the
project was estimated to be from 60 to 90 percent complete in
different areas. It said Federal allocations reached $458
million, 87 percent of the Federal responsibility on the
project. It was supposed to be $738 million.
The Corps Project Fact Sheet stated that the project's
fiscal year 2005 appropriation and the President's budget
request for 2005 and 2006 were insufficient to fund new
construction contracts. The Corps had the capability to use $20
million. The Corps noted that several levees had settled and
needed to be raised to provide the designed level of
protection.
Madam Chairman, we can criticize these folks, but we do
bear some of the responsibility, and it is about time that we
faced up, this Administration, and I am talking about this one
and the ones before them, and this Congress and Congresses
before, that we face up to our responsibilities in terms of
dealing with the infrastructure problems that are confronting
this country.
I would like to know, Colonel, why have you not been more
candid with this Committee in terms of what you need? Have you
given this information to the person that runs the Army Corps
of Engineers, and have they made this information available to
the Office of Management and Budget? Have you come before this
Committee? I dealt with the Corps back when I was Chairman of
the Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee as a
freshman here. I had it for 2 years. I kept asking the
question, ``Do you need more money?'' It seemed like everybody
shut up. I am asking you, what have you done to try and make
sure that we or the Office of Management and Budget know the
fact that you did not have the money to get the job done?
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, I believe that the process we
use at my level--to notify my headquarters to request monies
for those projects and explain to them our capabilities on
construction for all of my projects, that information would
make it to this Committee or to the Congress of the United
States.
But there's also an understanding at my level that there
are national priorities and the Congress does its best to
distribute those appropriations as possible. I mean every
district in the Corps of Engineers, I believe, would like
increased funding for its projects, but we also have a common-
sense approach to understanding that the Congress is
distributing those appropriations based on its priorities, and
that's how we look at it and----
Senator Voinovich. Let me interrupt you because I am almost
running out of time. The fact of the matter is, we cannot do
that unless we have the information that is necessary to make
good decisions.
I want to ask you one other thing. Did you ever tell the
Department of Transportation and Development or the Orleans
Levee Commission that the maintenance on this was not what it
should be?
Colonel Wagenaar. Sir, I cannot answer that. One of my
experts may be able to answer that, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Colletti.
Mr. Colletti. Yes, sir. We've dealt with the levee district
for many years, and their operation and maintenance has been
outstanding. So, from the aspect of cutting the grass, making
sure that the levees are in the condition for what they were
designed from a visual standpoint, and all the inspections that
are done throughout the year, we have felt that they've done an
outstanding job.
Senator Voinovich. So you did not see any problems there?
Mr. Colletti. No, sir.
Senator Voinovich. OK. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Coleman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN
Senator Coleman. Thank you. I also want to thank you for
your leadership on this issue and at these hearings. It is
critically important, and you and the Ranking Member have done
an outstanding job.
I have three areas that I want to delve into. One is the
construction design, the other is maintenance, and third is
reaction. And I am like you, Madam Chairman. I also want to say
there is a need for clarity, whatever comes out of these
hearings, and I hope we get that. My mom did not raise dumb
kids, and I am a little confused as to who has ultimate
responsibility here--actually, not responsibility, but when
responsibility needs to be transferred. Mr. Huey would say that
the Corps has the responsibility. The Corps would say--and I
think the State would agree--that the folks at the local level
have the first response, and then it is shifted through. Who
makes that decision? When is it made? And is it clear who makes
it? Because in times of crisis, if that is not clear, you have
got big problems. And I think we had problems here.
I also want to say in regard to the money, I represent a
State that borders the Mississippi River. We do a lot of work
with the Corps. We have a lot of needs. And, Colonel, I
appreciate your candor in terms of priorities. I think that is
the reality that we deal with here. It is simply not a matter
of money. There are a lot of us who would say that a lot of
things need to be done. The question is how the money is used,
and then when it is used, is it used in a way in which it is
going to maximize what is needed?
Let me ask you a question about design because there have
been some questions about floodgates--floodgates at mouths of
canals. Jefferson Parish has floodgates, and those gates did
not fail. My folks have raised this question about floodgates,
and at least some of the feedback I got was that the Orleans
Sewerage and Water Board opposed floodgates here at the
entrance to the Orleans and London Avenue Canals. I am not sure
who is to respond. Would it be perhaps Mr. Huey? Can someone
provide some insight into the opposition to floodgates and
whether floodgates would have made a difference here?
Mr. Naomi. Yes, sir. The way the project was designed, or
at least after the reevaluation in 1984, the Corps started
addressing the outfall canals. The outfall canals are the
canals that lead far into the city, 2 or 3 miles into the city
where the pump stations are, and those canals connect directly
to Lake Pontchartrain. The Corps' preferred plan was to put
structures at the mouths of those canals where it entered Lake
Pontchartrain to keep the storm surge from entering those
canals.
The construction of those gated structures was opposed by
local officials, including the Sewerage and Water Board, the
city officials, and such, because they felt that if those gates
were constructed, they would not be able to operate the pumping
stations during a hurricane event. And so those concerns were
great in their minds, and so they succeeded in obtaining
legislation to require the Corps to put parallel protection or
put floodwalls along those canals in lieu of the floodgates.
Senator Coleman. And in retrospect, the decision to go
parallel protections versus floodgates, would you conclude that
floodgates would have been a better course of action?
Mr. Naomi. Well, I think that they both would have been
designed to the same level of protection, of course, for the
Standard Project Hurricane. But it is problematic as to what
would have happened had we had floodgates versus those
floodwalls. Certainly the floodgates could have had a problem,
too, so it is hard to say definitively what would have
happened. But it certainly would have--there wouldn't have been
any floodwalls along those canals to fail had we put the
floodgates in.
Senator Coleman. Let me ask you about the issue of
maintenance. At an earlier hearing, I believe we were told by a
number of experts that the issue with the failure of the levee
system was not necessarily the overflow, but it was an erosion
underneath. I am trying to understand maintenance. Somebody has
got to be looking at things and seeing erosion. My question is:
Are there no visible signs of that erosion before this
catastrophe? If there should have been some way to see that
beforehand, who had the responsibility to identify that and
deal with it?
Mr. Colletti. Well, from our standpoint, our inspections
are visual. They are not subsurface types of inspections.
Subsurface investigations are all done at the initial design
and construction phases. So, the levee district or the Corps is
not doing any type of subsurface investigations at any of the
levees or floodwalls at this point.
Senator Coleman. I want to make it clear. Am I hearing that
we do not have the capacity to determine whether the kind of
structural damage that was occurring over a period of time
could have been identified and then prevented? Colonel.
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, I believe that--I mean, from a
visual--we typically do visual inspections. I don't know of any
physical inspections that the levee district or the Corps does
post-construction. So they look for visible signs of potential
problems. At that point, based on the problem, is when actions
are taken on all of the different types of flood control
structures in the city.
Senator Coleman. But we heard a lot of testimony that,
again, erosion occurred. I want to make it clear. Do we not
have the capacity to figure out that there is a systemic
structural problem until a catastrophe occurs?
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, I do not believe at this point
that the failure or what caused the failure has been
determined. There is a significant amount of information being
gathered, to include removing the sheet pile, which we just did
in the last 2 days, and we determined that the sheet pile was
to the design specifications of the Corps of Engineers and it
was not shorter than some people had hypothesized.
But I believe that we are gathering all of that information
for each of those breaches because each one could have had a
different cause of failure. I will tell you there were over 50
breaches in the metropolitan area. Two-thirds of the flooded
area would still have occurred regardless of whether these
walls would have failed. The New Orleans East area and the St.
Bernard area, those levees were severely compromised by the
magnitude of Katrina. Their flooding had nothing to do with the
floodwalls on the 17th Street Canal.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, Senator.
I am going to follow up on the issue that Senator Coleman
just raised. Mr. Hearn, the Committee received a letter from a
retired professor of ocean engineering at MIT, Ernst Frankel.
It is at Tab 18 in the exhibit book.\1\ He has considerable
expertise in coastal structures, and he wrote to us that it is
insufficient to rely solely on visual inspections of levees
because voids or pockets of water or air may develop within the
body of the levee. He recommends that acoustic and mechanical
inspection techniques are normally employed in order to
determine whether there are any voids or other weaknesses
within the levee.
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\1\ Exhibit 18 appears in the Appendix on page 114.
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Did your personnel employ mechanical inspection techniques
that involved, for example, drilling holes to obtain soil
samples from within the levee?
Mr. Hearn. No, Senator, we did not. The task that we have,
as I gave in my opening statement, is basically looking for
sand boils, which would indicate some water getting underneath
the sheet piling or coming up on the other side.
The other thing we do is what we call a levee profile, with
our survey department of each of the levees to find out exactly
how much subsidence they have in a period of time. We did the
17th Street Canal--we do them all, and it takes us about 3
years to do all of the levees because of the length. We did the
17th Street Canal last year, and the profile was less than half
an inch deviation from what it was from the year before, which
did not indicate any subsidence at all or any problems at all
with that particular levee. But we do not have the seismic
gear. Maybe that is coming in the future of a way to test it,
but we have not done that in the past.
Chairman Collins. Professor Frankel also wrote that it is
critical to inspect the integrity of the surface layer on the
water side of the levees, particularly that part which is
underwater, which is the point that Senator Coleman just
raised. Did any of your personnel inspect areas of the levee
walls that are underwater, either visually or using acoustic
equipment?
Mr. Hearn. No, we did not.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Colletti, as the Army Corps'
operations manager, are you aware of any structural or
geotechnical review of the levees done during the years before
Hurricane Katrina and specifically of the levees along the 17th
Street and London Avenue Canals?
Mr. Colletti. As far as I know, the structural analysis
that was done along those particular canals was done during the
design and construction phases. You just asked about scour
surveys or investigations. We do those near the structures, but
not against floodwalls.
Chairman Collins. You stated to the Committee staff that a
structural re-evaluation is not part of the inspection program.
Is that correct?
Mr. Colletti. That is standard unless we know of a known
problem or it has been brought to our attention or there is a
suspicion of some type of problem. Then we will go and actually
do some type of additional evaluation.
I want to make it clear. The reason we do that is we are
responsible for over 1,300 miles of levees and floodwalls. So
to just go out and actually do random inspections, it may not
turn up anything. We may miss the spot where there actually was
a failure about to occur.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Huey, is it accurate that the first
time that you became aware of the Federal regulation requiring
inspections of the levees at least once every 90 days was when
our Committee staff read that regulation to you?
Mr. Huey. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Collins. Colonel Wagenaar, the Army Corps
regulation requires you as the district engineer to keep
informed of the levee district's compliance with the operation
and maintenance regulations through ``careful analysis of the
semiannual reports submitted by the levee district.'' Did the
Orleans District submit to the Corps or submit to you
semiannual reports?
Colonel Wagenaar. Ma'am, I cannot answer that. Mr. Colletti
may be able to answer that.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Colletti.
Mr. Colletti. We do receive operation and maintenance
reports, semiannual reports on the structures, and on certain
features of the projects. In the past we did not enforce the
semiannual requirement on certain types of projects,
particularly those that meet and have routine project
maintenance along them, on river levees and hurricane
protection Federal project levees. They are routinely
maintained, so the levee districts are out there overseeing
that work.
Also, we meet semiannually with the Levee Board Association
and its members, of which the Orleans Levee District and most
of the other levee districts, as well as DOTD, are all
involved. We meet with them in May of each year at a workshop,
and we meet again in December.
In addition to that, we have a very proactive flood control
permits program where we evaluate, not just with this levee
district but with other levee districts, anywhere from 300 to
500 permits throughout the year.
So there is involvement out there that is in addition to
just basic routine visual inspections, not only by the levee
district, DOTD, the Corps, landowners, facility owners,
stakeholders that have some business in those levees that are
next to them.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Hearn, in our review of the
district's financial statements, we found that the district's
Special Levee Improvement Fund had a balance of approximately
$13 million at the end of June 2005, the end of your fiscal
year, that was ``available for spending for major maintenance
and capital improvements of the levee system.''
Was any consideration given to spending that money on more
sophisticated levee inspection equipment so that you could do
more than just a visual inspection and instead have the
acoustical and mechanical equipment that is recommended by the
MIT professor?
Mr. Hearn. No, ma'am. Until this breach, there was no
indication, and I had complete faith in this levee system. You
can believe that or I would not be in the position I am in
today. Before this breach, I had heard no mention of seismic or
anything else. And as we are going to find out as this
investigation is completed, the seismic indication on the 17th
Street Canal said the piling was at a certain depth. We pulled
them, and they are actually at a different depth. So I don't
think we have refined it to the point and did not have the
knowledge of the fact that this system could fail and it needed
inspection from the water side or from seismic. I think that
will be considered in the future.
But, yes, we do have the $13 million to do projects with,
and, for example, on the Marabou Canal Bridge, we gave $1
million to the Corps because they did not have enough funding
to finish the bridge. So I am sure that as this develops,
whatever our requirements are for the inspections, then we can
use that money to buy the equipment that we need.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Huey, I was really surprised to learn
that the levee district has commercial enterprises. I would
have thought that the levee district would be concentrating
solely on the operation and maintenance of the levees pursuant
to its agreement with the Army Corps. And, in fact, when we
reviewed the minutes of the board's meetings, we found that a
majority of the meeting time was actually spent discussing
these commercial enterprises, whether it was the licensing of
the casino or the operations of the airport or the marinas or
the commercial leases with the karate business and the beauty
shop and the restaurants.
Do you think it is appropriate for the board to be involved
in these commercial activities? Do those business activities
detract time and attention from what is truly the mission of
the board, which is to ensure the safety, the maintenance, and
the operation of the levees?
Mr. Huey. Yes and no. First of all, the ``no'' part is the
fact that, no, I don't think it detracts the levee district,
and there are numerous instances in which it has been a
tremendous help.
The levee district, I was the first president in the
history of the levee district--and it was formed in 1890, so
over a hundred years. In 1996, when I became president, the
levee district had a $6 million deficit, the first time in
history. So taking the district over, looking at the city, very
poor city--we are struggling--our chances of getting any tax
increase or things of that nature was nil to none. As a matter
of fact, our legislature in their wisdom said, well, go out--
because they took half the millage away from the Orleans Levee
District and gave it to the Sewerage and Water Board and School
Board down the line, so the Orleans Levee District receives
half the millage of the other levee districts in the State
because we do have commercial properties.
I have spent a substantial amount of my time educating our
legislators in the State of Louisiana about the entity that
they created under the Constitution, the Orleans Levee
District. With that, the Orleans Levee District under the
Constitution was so substantially different than any other
levee district in the State of Louisiana, it is a very
confusing factor that has complicated a lot of issues in this
matter, and I was asked whether things should be changed or
this, that, and the other, or what have you, by the
investigating committee. And my answer to that is a yes and a
no--yes because it is confusing, we have got to clarify it to
the public because they have got the same questions you have
asked on their mind. How can we focus on flood protection when
we are running all of these other entities and so forth from
that aspect of it?
But Mr. Hearn and his staff, when I came on board, we
started running things in more of a businesslike manner,
reducing overhead costs. I think the flood-proof bridges that
were being built alleviated a big burden off of folks because
we used to have to sandbag these, and these were evacuation
routes and things of that nature.
But to get to the bottom line, we utilize a lot of the same
resources we have and the folks that operate the equipment and
tractors and so forth to close floodgates and things of that
nature or what have you. Our commercial properties were 50-
percent self-funded, and our bond rating from a $6 million
deficit to a $21 million surplus, which has been identified in
the financial statement, was developed with prudent management
and with the understanding in the board--that is why a lot of
our focus was maximizing our abilities for the assets under our
control to generate revenue because we knew it was essential to
continue to provide the level of services that our community
has come to expect and deserves from the Orleans Levee
District.
Does that need to be changed? I think they are taking a
look at it in the State at this particular point in time. My
only fear and concern here is that decisions will be made
without the appropriate facts and people jumping the gun.
The previous question, I would like to address that because
all of a sudden some professor who is supposed to really be
good at what he does says that the Corps of Engineers only had
the sheet piles driven down 9, 10 feet and that is what caused
this thing, and it caused commotion in the news media and
lawsuits popping out all over the darn place because people
think this. When they did their core sample--and they took it
the other day--it was built to specifications. I think these
folks need to have the opportunity and the time to find out
what really happened there.
The second point, could things have been identified without
this situation? It was brought to my attention by your
delegation of the Sewerage and Water Board being called by a
lady who was on Bel Air who found--and was told that it wasn't
their water, it was water from the lake. Well, doggone it, if
the Orleans Levee Board would have known that it was water from
the lake in this lady's backyard on the 17th Street Canal, we
would have certainly--we may not have known where it was at,
but we would have known there was a problem. Those are the type
of issues that we need to find out. How was that missed? You
know, who didn't call us or somebody, you know?
Those are things I would like to see focused on, but, yes,
we do have a lot of additional responsibilities, and the board
has focused on that, but I think these folks have been working
in conjunction with the Corps. Our flood protection system, as
Mr. Hearn said, we have complete confidence in unless we hear
otherwise from the experts that we look to in the Corps of
Engineers.
So I think there are going to be some changes made, but I
think that the type of research and investigation that is being
done by this Committee to get down to the true facts so that
your decisions can be based on reality and that the proper
things would be done is the best way to approach it, not
jumping the gun.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
A quick question of Mr. Huey, just a real brief answer, if
you would. How are the commissioners chosen?
How is the president chosen to serve on these levee
districts?
Mr. Huey. The commissioners are made up--there are eight
appointees to the board: Two are appointed by the city of New
Orleans. That is normally or has been the tradition, basically,
that the mayor appoints the chief administrative officer and
also a council person from that particular district that covers
the majority of the lakefront levee district or council person.
The governor selects six. Out of those eight members, they
elect a president and the officers of the board.
Senator Carper. And are there specific requirements that
are spelled out in legislation or statute that say what kind of
background the members need to have?
Mr. Huey. No, I do not believe there is.
Senator Carper. And folks serve a specific number of years?
Is there a term to their tenure and then they have to be
reappointed? Or are they term-limited?
Mr. Huey. No, no terms limits. We serve at the pleasure of
the governor.
Senator Carper. Fair enough. OK.
I want to go back to a point that Senator Voinovich made a
little bit earlier, and we were talking about--in fact, you
asked a question. I don't know that our witnesses had an
opportunity to answer it. I think what you were saying is if
they are sort of in our shoes, how would they ask questions
about whether the Administration and the Congress has met its
responsibilities.
In my State--and my guess is it is probably true in Ohio
and in Maine as well--we meet regularly with the Army Corps of
Engineers. Our delegation sort of meets collectively. It is
easy in a little State like Delaware where you only have three
people on your delegation. But we meet regularly with the Army
Corps. We talk about priorities, theirs and ours, and we
develop almost a game plan to come to the Administration and to
the Congress and lobbying the relevant committees,
Appropriations and otherwise, to make sure that the priorities
that we have identified--that we get them funded, and if we
don't get them funded the first year, we go back the second
year or the third year or the fourth year.
For anyone who ever visits our beaches in Delaware, you
find that we try to protect our beaches, our dunes, and the
areas behind them, and we work very closely with the Army Corps
in developing those priorities and those projects and trying to
get them funded.
So when we think of the responsibilities here, there is
obviously the responsibility that the Federal, State, and local
agencies have. We have responsibilities, too, but also I would
add that the delegation, the Federal delegations, House and
Senate within a respective State, have an opportunity and I
think a responsibility to identify what their needs are and
then just to lobby like heck to get them addressed over time.
It has been about--what did you say, 41 years? That is a long
lobbying effort, at least in my experience.
I want to go back to Mr. Naomi, and I don't want you to
leave here and feel like you haven't had a chance to answer a
bunch of questions, so I will ask you a couple, if I could. The
Army Corps of Engineers has publicly said that the hurricane
protection system was designed to protect against a fast-moving
or a moderate Category 3 hurricane. The Saffir-Simpson rating
scale, as far as I know, did not exist when these projects were
designed, and they were, in fact, designed to a completely
different standard. I think it is one called the Standard
Project Hurricane. And here is my question: Mr. Naomi, how did
the Corps establish that the projects were designed to protect
against a fast-moving Category 3 or a moderate Category 3? That
is the first question. And the second question is: What, in
fact, was the level of protection this system provided during
Hurricane Katrina?
Mr. Naomi. Well, you are correct, the authorization by
Congress provides for the Standard Project Hurricane, and that
authorization and that level of protection was established long
before Saffir-Simpson. The problem that we encountered is that
when folks, the general public, want to know what level of
protection we have, what kind of category we are protected
against, it is very difficult to say based on this hybrid type
storm. And when you try and explain this to the general public
or you have a wind speed of a high strength Category 2 and a
central pressure of a Category 4 and the surge characteristics
of a Category 3, it is very hard to explain why that is.
Well, there are some very good scientific reasons why that
is, and it certainly made sense to the meteorologists and to
the folks at the Weather Service who gave us that design. But
it does not really make much sense to the media or the general
public.
So when we set out the criteria of what the SPH, the
Standard Project Hurricane, were and applied them to the
Saffir-Simpson Scale, you try and draw some general conclusions
so that it will help people understand the type of protection
they have. And so when we look at the 11.5-foot storm surge in
Lake Pontchartrain which the Standard Project Hurricane was
designed to protect against, that came in in the area of a
Category 3 storm, a fast-moving, relatively low strength
Category 3 storm.
And so that is what we generally would say, just to help
the public understand the type of protection that they have. So
an 11.5-foot storm surge in the lake is what we have designed
to protect against. Generally, the lakefront levees are around
17 feet, which accounts for a certain amount of wave action and
wave run-up. And so when we explain to the public what level of
protection they have, we generally will say a fast-moving
Category 3 storm so that people can understand better what that
relationship is. They seem to understand the Saffir-Simpson
Scale. They have a harder time understanding the Standard
Project Hurricane.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks.
Mr. Preau, I would welcome your comments in response to
what Mr. Naomi has said on this point. Anything, Mr. Preau?
Mr. Preau. The Saffir-Simpson Scale is kind of misleading
when you are talking about hurricane protection projects. We
are building projects to protect against wave action, not wind.
Hurricane Katrina was listed as a Category 5 when it was out in
the Gulf. There have been people now saying it is a Category 4.
Wind speed dropped when it hit land, so now it is a Category 4.
That storm was the biggest storm ever to enter the Gulf of
Mexico. Hurricane Camille on the Mississippi coast pushed up
about 20 to 25 foot of surge. Hurricane Katrina put over 30
foot of surge up there. Camille was listed as a Category 5 and
went down in the history books as a Category 5. I think it
would be a real disservice to everybody if Katrina goes down in
the history books as a Category 4 because the wind speed
dropped at the last minute.
Winds can drop immediately. Water has, as it has been
explained by some, a memory to it. When you have a surge up, it
does not drop as quickly as the wind does. So you have that
storm surge stays up well after the wind dies. I think if we
are telling people what type of protection we are providing, it
ought to all be based on we are providing protection against a
storm surge of so many feet.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you, sir.
My next question would be for the Army Corps, and I don't
care if--maybe several of you may want to take a shot at this,
Colonel and Mr. Naomi and Mr. Colletti. There have been a
number of changes in our understanding of hurricanes in the
Gulf since the Lake Pontchartrain Project was authorized some
40 years ago, and there has been regional subsidence in the
entire southern Louisiana area, a significant loss of coastal
wetlands, and the Mississippi River Gulf outlet, which I
understand acted as sort of a channel for Katrina's surge, has
been widened. There has also been subsidence of individual
levee segments.
A couple of questions. First, how have these changes
affected the protection needed for New Orleans? And, second,
how has this been factored into the design of the levee system
since it was originally conceived some 40 years ago?
Mr. Naomi. Sir, the levee was designed back in 1965 when it
was authorized, and that is a long time ago. I was in high
school at the time.
Senator Carper. So was I. [Laughter.]
No, that is not true. I was in college at Ohio State.
Mr. Naomi. The system was re-evaluated in 1984, and the
high-level plan was instituted back in 1984. So the design back
in 1965 really was changed in 1984 to go to what is called the
high-level plan. So the plan that we are constructing right now
is really from 1984. And those levees are designed based on
certain criteria, and certainly the issues of subsidence and
coastal land loss are important and changes have occurred.
It was our intention and in what we had underway at the
time was, as we completed some rather sophisticated models that
have been developed in the last 3 to 5 years, we were going to
remodel the Standard Project Hurricane to see exactly what
level of protection was afforded by these existing levees.
Unfortunately, we got overtaken by events with Hurricane
Katrina, and we were not able to complete that program. That is
even underway now.
But that is an important factor that we do have to go back
and re-evaluate, and re-evaluation of projects this size takes
quite a while and takes quite a bit of money and resources to
undertake. We do not undertake those things lackadaisically. We
take those things very seriously. We have to involve our local
sponsors and the State as well as various other Federal
agencies in the environmental consequences of these projects.
So certainly re-evaluation is called for to look at all these
ecological and geographic changes that have occurred over the
last 40 years and the last 20 years or so since the project was
re-evaluated the last time.
Unfortunately, it takes so long to construct these
projects, they are so massive, that you could re-evaluate one
of these projects several times before it is totally completed.
Senator Carper. My time has expired. If I could, Madam
Chairman, let me just ask if either of the witnesses from the
Army Corps want to add to that or take away, just briefly.
Colonel Wagenaar. The only thing I would add, Senator, is
that regarding the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, it is a
federally authorized navigation canal, a channel. There is a
lot of passion and feelings behind what happened with the River
Gulf Outlet in regards to the hurricane. I believe, though,
that modeling and science has to show what actually happened
with Katrina and how the storm surge overtook the hurricane
protection levees along the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet.
I believe it is too simple to state that the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet was the cause of all of this destruction. I
believe the models and the science has to prove that out.
Senator Carper. All right. Gentlemen, thanks very much.
Madam Chairman, I am supposed to be in Senator Frist's
office right now for a meeting. I am going to slip out, so
thanks for letting me sit in here with you today, and see you
both later on the floor.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Again, to our witnesses, thank you very
much for joining us today.
Chairman Collins. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. According to the information that I
mentioned earlier, the Corps noted that several levees had
settled and needed to be raised to provide the design level of
protection. Mr. Colletti, are you familiar with the levees that
settled and needed to be raised to provide the design level of
protection?
Mr. Colletti. Well, the levee protection and construction
and reconstruction is generally handled through Mr. Naomi's
project management group. So throughout the years, there are
pieces of levees that do settle.
Senator Voinovich. The question I have for whoever wants to
answer it is: Given that several levees had settled and needed
to be raised to provide the design level of protection, had the
appropriate repairs been made, would that have made a
difference in terms of whether or not the city would have
flooded?
Mr. Naomi. Senator, I think it would be highly unlikely
that raising the levees to the degree that we were going to
raise them would have prevented the significant flooding that
was experienced due to Katrina. We had no plans to do anything
with the floodwalls on the outfall canals. There were some
levees in Eastern New Orleans and in St. Bernard Parish that
needed to be raised, but the surge that was encountered at
those locations----
Senator Voinovich. So what you are saying is it would not
have made a difference.
Mr. Naomi. No, sir, it would not have.
Senator Voinovich. Madam Chairman, one of the things that I
am still puzzled about is whether Katrina was a Category 5 or a
Category 3 storm. I understand that the National Science
Foundation and the American Society of Civil Engineers both
concluded that this was actually a Category 3 and that had the
levees been maintained properly this might not have happened.
Chairman Collins. That is correct.
Senator Voinovich. So I think that there is a significant
difference of opinion regarding the strength of the storm. You
all think this was a Category 4 or 5, and others think it is
was a Category 3. Is that right?
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, as an example, what we base it
on, there were many areas of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet
levee that were 17.5 feet, at the authorized elevation. That
levee system was completely destroyed by this storm. Completely
overtopped, completely removed. And it was at its authorized
height.
Senator Voinovich. OK. So you believe it was more than a
Category 3.
Colonel Wagenaar. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. OK. Madam Chairman, do we know yet what
the plan for rebuilding is? Has that decision been made as to
whether the levees will be built to withstand a Category 3 or a
Category 5 storm?
Chairman Collins. It is my understanding that the decision
has not been made. I would defer to the colonel.
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, we are using emergency monies
right now to re-establish the pre-Katrina levee system to its
authorized height, which is Category 3 in most areas, and no
decision has been made on future heights of that levee system.
Senator Voinovich. I will ask you the same question I have
asked other members of the Corps of Engineers. In preparation
for upcoming storms, would you do anything differently? With
the work that you are doing right now to fix what has
deteriorated or been destroyed, would you make changes to your
efforts based on whether you were preparing for a Category 3 or
a Category 5 storm?
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, I guess the easy answer would be
that if we want to offer a level of protection greater than
what was there before, then we need to look at this system
comprehensively. It is not as simple as building a levee 50 or
60 or 70 feet high. It also includes water evacuation from the
city. It includes coastal restoration. We have to look at the
system comprehensively. I am not sure that has been done in the
past. But to offer a level of protection greater than what was
there before really is going to take a comprehensive approach.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I think somebody ought to get on
with the question. The decision as to what you do there will
impact how the town is going to be developed. Major decisions
are going to have to be made on the basis of that.
Supplementing Mr. Huey's description of the annual levee
inspection, Mr. Hearn said that, ``The inspection starts at 9
a.m. and ends at 12:30 p.m. and covers close to 100 miles of
levees. Mr. Hearn also said that even though professional
engineers work for the OLD, they perform nothing more than a
visual inspection of the levees.'' Is that true? Is that a
visual inspection?
Mr. Hearn. That is correct.
Senator Voinovich. OK. I would like to hear from the
colonel or from the Army Corps of Engineers. Do you think that
the current way that these are being inspected is adequate? And
does the Orleans Levee District need to become a lot more
sophisticated in what they are doing?
Mr. Colletti. Well, all of our inspections have been
visual, with the exception of when we have a known problem.
When you have in that case over 100 miles of levees, we have a
program along the Mississippi River called levee monitoring,
and you occasionally go through reaches and you do some
subsurface testing along the bank lines and such. It is quite
expensive to do that.
After the fact here in this case, but we have considered
possibly instituting some type of hurricane protection
monitoring program which would maybe randomly take samples at
certain areas.
Senator Voinovich. OK, here is the deal: You had the
hurricane. We have operation and maintenance. And according to
what I read, Madam Chairman, once something is turned over to
the Orleans Levee District--I have got some previous testimony
that says that they were not sure whether or not it had been
turned over to them or not. But the fact is--let's get back to
the original question. Now that we have been through this,
would you suggest as a professional that in terms of the
maintenance and monitoring better equipment should be used in
order to get the job done at this stage of the game?
Mr. Colletti. There are better techniques that possibly
could be utilized, and I think it is going to be possibly a
combination of OLD as well as the Corps of Engineers. But
initially----
Senator Voinovich. Having survived this disaster, who do
you think should be responsible for making sure that the levees
are being sufficiently maintained?
Mr. Colletti. Operation and maintenance, as it has been, is
the responsibility of the Orleans Levee District. To go beyond
where we are at and do structural re-evaluation I believe is
going to take more than the capabilities of the Orleans Levee
District. I cannot say for sure what would that be, but it is
much more extensive when you do structural re-evaluations.
Senator Voinovich. You indicated to me that, as far as you
were concerned, they were doing a good job in terms of
operation and maintenance. Is that what you said?
Mr. Colletti. That is correct.
Senator Voinovich. According to, again, staff, ``Mr. Hearn
indicated that at least on one example they failed in its
operation and maintenance. Last year a train damaged a railroad
floodgate in the East Orleans area. Mr. Hearn agreed that the
OLD's duty to repair the floodgate''--and this may not have
anything to do with the problem, but were you aware of that?
Mr. Colletti. Yes. As I said, there are over 100 miles of
levees and floodwalls and such, and you are going to have
pieces of that----
Senator Voinovich. Would you say that they could have done
a better job? And did you let them know that?
Mr. Colletti. In their defense, in that particular
instance, they did provide sandbagging of that area. They did
take an action, and they did show that responsibility. It just
so happened that it was overtopped at that location.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Preau, what are your
responsibilities here? I understand that you were responsible
for looking at the emergency plans. According to Mr. Hearn's
testimony, ``DOTD has been slack in performing its duties.
Although DOTD is supposed to review the levee district's
emergency operation plan, Mr. Hearn has never received comments
or any indication of approval or disapproval.'' What do you say
to that?
Mr. Preau. We do review the emergency operations plans of
all of the levee districts. If there are no comments to send
back, we don't send any comments back.
Senator Voinovich. Do you ever tell them the plans are
approved? Or, if they don't hear from you, the plans are OK?
Mr. Preau. There is nothing in there that says we have to
approve it, to my knowledge. It says we review them. All of
these operations plans, emergency operations plans, were set up
on a template, set up by, I believe, Homeland Security for each
levee district. They are put on a template. In my time here,
they were put together originally back--what was it, Max? About
1985, I think?
Mr. Hearn. Yes.
Mr. Preau. Somewhere around 1985. I have not been involved
in reviewing them that long. So all I look at is the updates.
Every 2 years they are supposed to update them. We look to see
that they have the correct names and phone numbers in it. There
is nothing to change on the plan. If there was, it would have
been given to us by Homeland Security.
Senator Voinovich. I have run out of time, but, Madam
Chairman, if I could just ask one for the record.
Chairman Collins. Sure.
Senator Voinovich. This is to you, Colonel. Do you have a
record of the turnover of completed projects to the local
project sponsors and the New Orleans District? Is there
paperwork on that?
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, I would have to ask Mr. Colletti
to respond.
Mr. Colletti. We have provided various pieces of paperwork
on pieces of the system. I don't know how many. I think Senator
Collins had mentioned 22 or something to that effect. There
were various pieces that we have turned over to them.
Senator Voinovich. Do you have documentation to accompany
each of those turnovers? In other words, do they know that it
was turned over to them?
Mr. Colletti. The letters pretty much explain that.
Basically they state that the project is--the contracts are
completed and it is now their responsibility for operation and
maintenance.
Senator Voinovich. I would like to see the paperwork during
the last several years. Because according to what Mr. Hearn
said to the staff people, ``This is partly explained by Mr.
Hearn understanding that no part of the LP&V HPP has been
officially turned over to the levee district even though the
levee district assumes maintenance responsibilities once the
contractor finished the work on the section.'' I would like to
know whether or not they know it has been turned over to them
and they have responsibilities.
Mr. Colletti. Yes, when we send those letters--some of
those are actually sent by certified letter. So there is a
documentation there with those.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, Senator. Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Madam Chairman, thank you. And I apologize
for coming so late. I am going to try to ask questions which I
believe have not either been addressed or have not been
addressed clearly as far as we can tell.
The first is, who had the responsibility. Let's look
backwards first as to who had the responsibility for operation,
maintenance, repair, replacement, and rehab for the 17th Street
Canal floodwall. OK, we will start with you, Colonel. Who had
the responsibility for the operation, maintenance, repair,
replacement, and rehab of the 17th Street Canal floodwall?
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, in regards to the operations and
maintenance, it is my understanding that the Orleans Levee
District was responsible. In regards to repair, rehab, or
future construction, it would be a partnership between
ourselves, the State DOTD as the cost-share sponsor, and the
levee district as the local sponsor to do that work.
Senator Levin. And that would depend on the size or scope
of the repair necessary? What would it depend on?
Colonel Wagenaar. It would depend on the activity, Senator.
Senator Levin. And is that clearly divided as to who would
have what responsibility for repair, who would have what
responsibility for replacement, and who would have what
responsibility for rehab? Is that a clear division line between
State, Federal, and local?
Colonel Wagenaar. I believe it is pretty clear. Mr.
Colletti may be able to add light to it, but I believe it is
clear, Senator.
Senator Levin. And was it clear at the time?
Colonel Wagenaar. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. OK.
Mr. Colletti. On the Federal projects, if the project is
damaged by a flood or coastal storm or hurricane, it is
repaired under Public Law 99 through the Corps of Engineers. If
it is damaged by--such as the railroad gate, if it is damaged
by a train accident, then it is the responsibility of the levee
district.
Senator Levin. And where does the State come in? I think
the colonel said the State also has a role.
Colonel Wagenaar. They have oversight, yes, Senator.
Senator Levin. Oversight, but in terms of responsibility to
carry out and to fund the repair, replacement, and rehab, is
there any State funding in that?
Mr. Preau. No, sir, there is not. The State, unless it is
the non-Federal sponsor, would not have any authority in that.
Senator Levin. Now, in terms of operation and maintenance,
the colonel said that is up to the district?
Colonel Wagenaar. The levee district, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. The levee district. Do you all agree that
the levee district at the time of these events was responsible
for the operation and maintenance of the 17th Street Canal
floodwall? Do you all agree with that?
Mr. Naomi. Yes, I agree with that.
Mr. Preau. Yes.
Mr. Huey. Yes.
Senator Levin. OK. Now, in terms of the question of whether
or not a project is completed or not, was this project
considered at the time a completed project?
Mr. Naomi. The project itself, overall project, was not
completed. Individual parts of it were, but construction--it
was still in the construction general program of the Corps of
Engineers and, as such, was a project that was deemed under
construction.
Senator Levin. And did that have any impact as to who was
responsible for operation, maintenance, and repair, the fact
that it was not in the view of the Corps of Engineers a
completed project?
Mr. Naomi. Well, the pieces of the projects that were
turned over were in operation and maintenance, and the only
time we get involved actually from the construction standpoint
is when we have to go out and build something. Generally, when
the project pieces are finished, we turn them over to the
sponsor for maintenance.
Senator Levin. All right. But the fact that the overall
project was not completed did not then have any effect as to
who was responsible for the operation and maintenance of that
part of the project.
Mr. Naomi. I don't think so, sir.
Senator Levin. OK.
Mr. Huey. Could I step in because it also clarifies a
question asked by Senator Voinovich earlier with the turning
over of projects. Mr. Hearn and I, in discussions, in talking
with Chief Engineer Steve Spencer, I want to clarify the fact
that when Mr. Hearn made the statement that he has never seen
anything--or he hasn't seen anything to turn over a project,
that is one of the reasons. We have received, according to
Chief Engineer Steve Spencer, from the Corps of Engineers
letters turning over the various flood-proof bridges, for
example, as they are completed and so forth. The levee systems
and other things have been dealt with prior to his time, so
they had already been turned over. Projects such as the 17th
Street Canal, which is an ongoing project, which was a flood-
proof bridge in the process of being completed, and things of
that nature, they will say, hey, look, you need to cut the
grass, maintain it, take a look at it, because the project is
substantially completed, but they don't officially turn it over
because it doesn't fit into the project criteria.
Senator Levin. Well, was the 17th Street Canal part of this
overall project? Had it been turned over to the district?
Mr. Huey. Not officially, but it was clearly understood
that we maintain and cut the grass and look out for the--all of
our normal day-to-day activities and looking for things and so
forth. And unless I am wrong, Mr. Hearn, we had been taking
care of that particular section from the bridge on down that
was completed while the bridge was being completed.
Senator Levin. So that the operation and maintenance of
that section was your responsibility regardless of the fact
that it had not been officially turned over to you?
Mr. Huey. Correct. I mean, that is the kind of working
relationship we work with the Corps on a day-to-day basis. I
think our people communicate on a day-to-day basis on things of
this nature, and the reason I stepped in there, to make sure it
is clarified with the fact that Al Naomi attends virtually
every meeting. We talk about this. The commissioners are aware
of what is going on, and the staff works on a day-to-day basis.
And I know from pretty well the time I have been on the board
that the levee district had taken over maintaining it because
the Corps doesn't do some of the maintenance services we do.
They don't go out with tractors and cut grass.
Senator Levin. My major question, though, is the fact that
it had not been formally turned over did not affect the
question of whose responsibility it was for the operation and
maintenance of that portion.
Mr. Huey. Not in my mind.
Senator Levin. Not, apparently, in anybody's mind.
Mr. Huey. If the Corps asks us to do something, we do it.
That is the way I look at it.
Senator Levin. Do you all agree with that, that the fact
that this portion of the overall project had not been formally
turned over by the Corps did not affect the responsibility
question for operation and maintenance? Would you all agree
with that?
Colonel Wagenaar. Senator, I am not sure that we did not
formally turn it over. I would have to look at the
documentation.
Senator Levin. But if you had not formally turned it over,
officially turned it over, would that have had any effect on
who was responsible for operation and maintenance of that part
of the project?
Colonel Wagenaar. No, sir, and the actions of the levee
district clearly indicate that they had responsibility for
those canals.
Senator Levin. OK. And now the interim turnover question,
where does that fit?
Mr. Colletti. That essentially is basically a notification
that the contract is complete. When we go to do a construction
contract, we get a right of entry for certain limits of the
project, and the interim turnover per se is to notify them that
we are finished in that area and that they will go ahead and
maintain it. We do not ask them to maintain while we are doing
construction within the area.
Senator Levin. Does that have any effect as to whether or
not interim control status had been achieved or adopted or
stated? Does that have any effect on who is responsible to do
the operation and maintenance?
Mr. Colletti. No, sir, other than, like I said, in that
construction limits, when it is finished, we look at the levee
district to do that.
Senator Levin. And then once it is finished, in terms of
reconstruction, rehabilitation, repair, that depends on very
clear and set ground rules which you all agree are clear and
well defined? Is that fair? No, Mr. Preau? Am I pronouncing
your name correctly?
Mr. Preau. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. You are shaking your head no.
Mr. Preau. I am shaking my head no about the whole issue of
turning over piecemeal pieces of these projects. When a project
takes 40 years to develop and they start turning loose pieces a
little bit at a time, you do not have a completed project. It
is supposed to be useful elements. I do not think we even have
useful elements. It looks like it is just turned over as the
construction contract ends. It is handed to the levee district,
and they are told to go maintain it.
Senator Levin. What is the relevance?
Mr. Preau. The relevance comes down to who is responsible
for the repair.
Senator Levin. For the repair issue, OK. So there is a
question here because it was a piece turned over, and not a
finished piece turned over, as to who is responsible for the
repair and rehab of that--or of any project? Is that what you
are saying?
Mr. Preau. That is what I am saying, and it is not just for
that project. That is for all of these Corps projects. They are
long-term, multi-year projects, and they are done in pieces.
Senator Levin. And that the rule for who is responsible for
repair of those projects is not clear when these are turned
over, in effect, in pieces rather than as larger pieces. Is
that what you are saying?
Mr. Preau. That is what I am saying, and I think that needs
clarification. It needs it on all of the Corps agreements. It
says ``a useful element.''
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you, Senator Levin.
The issue you raised is one that we have spent a great deal
of time on today, and I really think it is the key issue. Who
is in charge? Who is responsible when there is a problem? Who
responds when there is a breach? And having listened to the
testimony today, having read the staff interviews, I believe it
is still unclear, and it is imperative that we clearly define
the lines of responsibility and authority.
I would like to pose two brief hypotheticals to try to get
at this issue a little further. The first is that water is
found to be seeping up from the ground near the Mississippi
River levee, so for that hypothetical, who is responsible for
responding? Colonel?
Colonel Wagenaar. Depending on who that initial seepage was
reported to, near the Mississippi River levee, it could
multiple different factors. But, for example, if the Sewer and
Water Board went to investigate it for a potential water main
leak or something to that effect, they would report that to the
levee district and to the Corps. That is the process that
should occur. If it is in the vicinity of the Federal levees on
the Mississippi River, ultimately that is a Corps
responsibility to analyze and look at that issue and
potentially effect repair.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Preau, what is your answer to that
question?
Mr. Preau. I think I would have to agree with that one.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Hearn.
Mr. Hearn. I agree with that. Normally it would be reported
to either the Sewer and Water Board or to us. When we go out,
we find out whether or not it is river water or whether or not
it is a leaking water pipe. We would call Sewer and Water Board
if it was a leaky water pipe. We would call the Corps of
Engineers and start working on the sand boil if it was
Mississippi River water.
Chairman Collins. There, again, it depends on who got the
report, how big is the problem, what is the cause of the
problem. The answer varies.
Second example: Let's say that an earthquake hits New
Orleans, and as a result, a portion of the levee system
experiences considerable subsidence. In that hypothetical, Mr.
Hearn, who is responsible for responding?
Mr. Hearn. I think if it is an earthquake that caused that
subsidence, we would have to come to the Corps of Engineers--it
would depend upon the amount of subsidence you are talking
about. If it was small subsidence, then we could take care of
it in-house coordinating with the Corps. Then we would fund it,
have it repaired. If it is larger than that, we would go to the
Corps and ask for assistance on the repair.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Preau.
Mr. Preau. I would say that if it was an act of God type of
occurrence, then it would be the Corps that would be
responsible under P.L. 84-99.
Chairman Collins. Colonel.
Colonel Wagenaar. I believe that if it is an immediate
action, then the levee district has to respond to it. And then
if it exceeds their capacity, they request through the State to
the Corps for assistance or directly. They can come directly to
us. But if it exceeds their capability, then the Corps comes
in.
Chairman Collins. Again, the answers are a little
different, and once again, really what you are telling me is it
depends, and I think that is a problem. I think we need to have
a clear delineation of who does what, and I don't know whether
that requires legislation or regulation or revisions of State
law or Federal law. But that seems to me to be a problem that
we saw in real life, not in a hypothetical, when Colonel
Wagenaar discussed the turf war that broke out on the 17th
Street Canal breach. And that is what we have to straighten
out.
Mr. Huey, first of all, I want to thank you for being very
candid in your staff interview. I really appreciated that
because it is important that we understand exactly what
happened. You made a comment about the qualifications of the
people who serve on the levee board, and you talked about
people coming from special interest groups. ``I have got
commissioners, like I said before, who are only concerned about
DBE''--is that disadvantaged business enterprises?
Mr. Huey. Correct.
Chairman Collins. ``. . . who get the contracts in
developing New Orleans East. I've got them who are only
concerned about particular issues, and the least on their mind
appears to be flood control because they think that is all done
by the Corps. As we have said here, they are there for whatever
political agendas or personal agendas that they have, number
one.''
So I want to ask you two questions. First, I want to go
back to the issue of whether the board should be involved in
business enterprises or whether it would be clearer to those
who are appointed to the Board what their duty is and what
their obligation is if the Board only dealt with the levees. So
let me ask you that question first.
Mr. Huey. Yes, I think it would be clearer, and if I could
just comment quickly on that, the previous board--which I will
just make a statement here and so forth. It was one of the
finest and most talented boards in my tenure that I could ever
know. It was made up with--it was the first time I have been on
a board ever that we had a retired Corps of Engineers
individual, Vic Landry, who was vice president, who was able to
assure and work with all the levee district systems and work
with the Corps, and that we were focused in the right direction
on flood protection. We had a Congressional Medal of Honor-
winning general, General Livingston, who lent a lot to the
board. We had some substantial folks who identified some of
these complexities, and that is why some of the maneuvers had
looked to say how can we divest ourselves from some of the
commercial activities, and we went into the privatization of
the lakefront airport, for example. We were looking into the
formulation of--the board functioned similar to what they do at
the rate commission in New Orleans where you have a private-
public type partnership, where you can work or have an entity
that focuses on your private-public--commercial development of
the area and generating of revenues, and the board primarily
focused on the flood protection and get the benefits of all.
Where we can continue to utilize the resources we have in
people who maintain and do the things with the--for the levee
system, our police department, for example, and things of that
nature where we could utilize them more efficiently. They are
like the Marine Corps, I used to say. You have them. You need
them if a storm comes. You want to make sure that your property
is secure and things of that nature. You hope you never need
them in the event of that, but they are there. And if they are
there, get some use out of them. Those type of things.
So I think the board was moving in a direction to try to
clarify that issue because it was somewhat complicated, and so
to answer your question, yes, I do think that some seriousness
needs to be looked into it, but it needs to be done in the
right way, understanding that I had mentioned to you before
that the levee district's funding, 50 percent is self-
generating. So I hope in the wisdom of what they do in our
local community is addressed with the fact that where will that
money go.
Chairman Collins. Should there be qualifications to serve
on the board? For example, should there be a requirement that
someone has engineering experience or business management
experience? As I understand it, the only qualification right
now is you have to be a resident of the State. Should there
be----
Mr. Huey. No. Of the district, from what I understand, the
governor just appointed an appointee and suspended the rules of
the State because you have to live in the--vote in the parish
you reside in for 1 year, and I do not believe that individual
qualifies at this particular point in time. But if not, that
ought to be the governor's choice. But to answer qualification,
the past board, when they moved on, just said that they hoped
in the governor's wisdom, a new governor moving in and so
forth, that she would select more of the type of business
people, the type of people in which you are going to look to--
because as we saw it and looked at the board, our staff and the
way they have worked and so forth for so many years understands
the flood protection system. They work so closely with the
Corps of Engineers, and we saw our responsibility to assure
that we are providing the funding necessary and the resources
necessary to our folks to continue to grow because as you
develop this flood protection system we are talking about, you
are developing a liability--more property to maintain, more
grass to cut, more responsibilities and floodgates to open and
close, and so forth. And we were concerned about our ability to
generate it through a tax base. So that is why the board
focused a lot on the business activities.
I am sure that some wiser than me can come up with a way
that maybe all of this could be brought together for an overall
good of the community.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Hearn, my final question is for you. We have been
carefully reviewing the minutes of the district board meetings
as well as the minutes of the various committee meetings of the
board, and what we have found is, in the months before
Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, a number of unfunded
projects were identified, and that included fixing the
subsidence of a major levee in New Orleans East, repairing two
pumping stations, floodproofing the Hammond Highway Bridge, and
repairing bulkheads at the airport and at one of the marinas.
Now, I understand that some of these projects are the
responsibility of the Corps, or you could argue that they are
the responsibility of the Corps. But some are not, and the fact
is that the levee board was aware of these needed repairs and
had some $21 million in the bank, $13 million of which was
specifically allocated to levee-related projects.
So my question is: Why didn't the board use some of its
millions of dollars that it had in the bank to make New Orleans
safer through these repairs which had been identified?
Mr. Hearn. The pumping station project, for example, there
are two of them, and they are over $10 to $12 million each, if
you had put that in frontal protection of the pumping station
on London Avenue Canal, I don't think that would have made any
difference in this particular case. But it is a lack of
funding. If you look at that, the $13 million, and you see the
debt service associated with the bonds that we had applied for
to get the money to build all these other projects, we did not
feel that there was enough money in that pot to construct these
other projects. The New Orleans East, all we did was go to all
of our Senators--or our delegation, the Louisiana delegation,
requesting assistance on the funding from the President's
budget. There just was not enough money there to do that.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Huey.
Mr. Huey. If I can answer that, and I thank you, Max, for
trying to not throw the finger anywhere. The board is
responsible for where the money is spent. What Max's
responsibility should have been is to come to the board and
say, Hey, board, we have these particular projects, and I would
like to utilize some funding for this.
The board makes those decisions, and in my entire tenure,
in order to expend money for flood protection projects, we have
always dealt with the fact that the Corps of Engineers in that
are going to put up a certain specific funding, and we have
always come up with our matching funds. OK? But I want to at
least say that these folks, the Corps of Engineers, and Al
Naomi in particular--and I heard it was mentioned here, and I
don't know what the higher-ups in the Corps of Engineers or who
presents things to the Senate and so forth, but this man should
have presented the case to us, and he should have said how bad
money was needed, and we let loose on that $1 million because
we had never heard of the Federal Government shutting a project
down during the construction and hurricane season coming up.
And if you check the minutes, you will see how we have done
that. I have packets of letters we wrote our Senators and so
forth. But from our budget from the levee district, you have a
very good question from that end of it.
Let's take, for example, we have been criticized for the
Mardi Gras Fountain, and here I have got before 1983, when he
talked about the high-level protection plan changing, is the
tax referendum where the people--we went to the people. We got
authorized for taxing, and what projects along Lakeshore Drive
and things like that that can be utilized as far as flood
protection? And we spent $2.5 million in redoing the Mardi Gras
Fountain, which is a historical entity within the city of New
Orleans. The maintenance was becoming phenomenal. It was very
old and what have you. But in this project, one thing it taught
us that I think is going to save us billions of dollars, the
seawall--and I think the Corps of Engineers and everybody here
will certainly attest to this. The seawall certainly showed us
where the breakwater--when the waves hit, they didn't even come
close to topping some of those waves on a consistent basis and
how important that seawall is. But we have had a serious
problem with erosion just on normal storm days that are coming
back and digging holes behind it, and the concern that it is
going to collapse into the lake.
So with it being so costly and our chances of knowing that
we may not get funded to replace it because it would be in the
billions, we have come up with some methods, and one of those
things in conjunction with the Mardi Gras Fountain was to
utilize that, build that fountain, sheet pile was driven
between the seawall and the earth, and we built a promenade. So
now you have something that--and it held up tremendously during
Katrina. The board had passed a resolution to continue if, in
fact, this proved to be an economical fix, to do so much of
that each year until we can cover the lakefront.
So those are the kind of things that I think the board
looked and how it can maximize utilization of its funds in both
recreational--because, again, we are mandated by the
legislature to maintain 35 percent green space. We have swing
sets up there we have been sued for, and we have had problems
over there, and we are not a recreational department, but they
asked us--we want to do something for the people. There are
levees on top. Even the Federal Government has authorized the
fact they want to see the levees for walking and bike paths.
And we work through those programs, too.
So, yes, we do have other responsibilities. I am sure the
intent is very good and want the people to enjoy, especially
when we are landlocked and have as much recreational area, and
they are trying to use the levee systems and the flood
protection system as part of that.
Chairman Collins. The point that I want to make is there is
no doubt that the Army Corps has been underfunded, and
underfunded for years, as Senator Voinovich pointed out. But
when the local levee board has more than $20 million on hand,
you would expect that some of that money is being spent to
improve the inspection process and to improve the maintenance.
So that is hard to understand. It is hard to understand that
kind of balance not being used for some of these safety-related
repairs or to improve your ability to detect problems.
Mr. Huey. Yes. Well, first of all, that is a wonderful
question. I am glad you gave me a follow-up on that because I
do want to make a point.
Recall the fact that I was the first president in the
history of the levee district to take over a $6 million
deficit. I have been the president for 9 years. We were digging
out of a hole, and a surplus had started to just develop, and
it is somewhat of the $21 million, it is lower than that due to
the fact that the way our taxes and our ad valorem taxes are--
it drops. So you have to have the cushion money. It will drop
during a collection period. You never really know how much you
are going to collect, for example. So at that particular point
in time, when the financials were done at $21 million, I am
certainly proud to say that, hey, I was able to make a $27
million difference in the financial condition of the levee
district.
Now, that is why I wanted to explain the Mardi Gras
Fountain, and there are numerous other cases in which that is
done and that the levee district has worked on that, but how do
you expend money on something that the Corps of Engineers, who
we look at as the experts in this area and that we work with
and we pride ourselves on working with them, they are expert--
you look, you see boils, you see breaches, you do this, the
various things. They go to workshops, they work together and
try and identify what is an inspection method. I think the
question that arises in my mind: Is there any other better way
to inspect them? Everybody I have talked to so far said no. You
mentioned an individual, and it sounds like, hey, maybe that is
something we need to look into. But I am a little discouraged
because the last specialist that told the city of New Orleans
that these folks did not build this thing to specification,
found out it is built to specifications, he was supposed to be
an expert, too.
So I think we need to investigate why his equipment said
that it was only 9 feet deep, and they had to go dig down there
and pull it up and find out it was built to--so we are hearing
all of these things, and it is important to us to get to what
are the real issues here. And if that is a real issue in flood
protection, I will assure you, the city of New Orleans, the
State of Louisiana, we understand flood problems, and we will
allocate, and they have never failed to come up with our
matching funds. If we could better utilize the budget--it is a
levee district. It was asked to me by your investigative staff
how can we use--they are some pretty good people. They know how
to get stuff out of you. If we can have a general fund, can we
use it for whatever? Yes, we can. The general fund is flexible.
And had we known these problems and that our funds could better
be utilized, I think the board would have moved to do that.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for testifying today.
You really have added to our understanding. I am convinced that
we need to sort out the lines of authority much more clearly as
we proceed to rebuild the levees stronger and better than ever.
Before I adjourn the hearing, I would like to take a moment to
read a few excerpts from an Army Corps of Engineers document.
``The hurricane inundated over 5,000 square miles in
Louisiana, including highly populated urban areas in Orleans
and St. Bernard Parishes. Fortunately, advance warning by the
U.S. Weather Bureau enabled hundreds of thousands of residents
to flee their homes before the storm struck. Many others,
however, were not so fortunate. Rapidly rising water trapped
them in their homes, on roofs, on tops of cars, in trees, and
anything else that stood above the water. Extensive flooding
was caused by overtopping and breaching of existing protection
levees. In her trip through Louisiana, the hurricane left 81
dead, over 17,600 injured, and caused the evacuation of 250,000
persons to storm shelters.''
Well, perhaps from the statistics on the number of people
who lost their lives, it became evident to you that I am not
reading from a document related to Hurricane Katrina. It is
instead taken from the Army Corps' after-action report for
Hurricane Betsy, and it was drafted in September of 1965.
This is troubling to me, and when you read this report and
you look at the pictures, one immediately notices that many of
the same neighborhoods that were devastated by Katrina were
also damaged and flooded by Hurricane Betsy. The similarities
are striking.
Furthermore, Hurricane Betsy led to the initiation of new
flood control projects, some of which failed the city of New
Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. And I mention this because,
as I said earlier, the future of New Orleans is tied to its
levee system. If people and businesses cannot be assured that
the levees are strong, that there is effective and efficient
oversight of the levees, then we cannot assure them that we are
protecting New Orleans from a future catastrophic failure. And
I feel we simply all have an obligation in this regard. The
stakes are just too high. And that is why it is important that
we do identify what went wrong and make it right.
We owe that to the people who have lost their lives, their
properties, their jobs. We owe it to the city of New Orleans.
We owe it to the State of Louisiana. And I appreciate your help
this morning in giving us a better understanding of what went
wrong and how we can do better in the future.
Thank you for your cooperation. This hearing record will
remain open for 15 days for additional questions and materials.
This hearing is now adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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